The Struggle for a National Women’s Lobby: Organizing a Diffuse Interest Anne N. Cos in The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Dec., 1980), pp. 476-491. Stable URL htp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=0043-4078% 28198012%2933%3A4%3C476%3ATSFANW%3E2.0,CO%3B2-F ‘The Western Political Quarterly is currently published by University of Utah. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www jstor.org/joumnals/utah. hl. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Sat Sep 2 05:34:18 2006THE STRUGGLE FOR A NATIONAL WOMEN’S LOBBY: ORGANIZING A DIFFUSE INTEREST, ANNE N, Costatn. University of Colorado diffuse interests are rarely well represented in the political process." Interests such as consumers, senior citizens, good government ad- vocates, and women are spread widely throughout society and encompass diverse type of individuals with differing legislative priorities. Therefore, it is an extreme organizational and political challenge to mobilize any of these groups to compete effectively with narrow specialized interests in achieving Tegislative objectives. Added to these organizational difficulties is the logic of non-participation by most members of these groups, persuasively argued by Mancur Olson in his classic work, The Logic of Collective Action. As Olson indicates, it is rarely to the advantage of an individual to spend time and effort working for a diffuse interest in whose benefits he or she is likely to share regardless of input. The “free rider” problem associated with the non-divisible goods, like lower prices, less discrimination, or removal of mandatory retirement age, most often sought by diffuse interests, limits their ability to attract followers. Yet, despite the weight of evidence arguing against the effective mobili- zation of such interests, a significant volume of national legislation has in fact been passed in the last twenty years responding to the needs of diffuse interests and leading to at least a partial reassessment of their potential for political influence.* In addition, there has been enough work published about national lobbying by such interests to allow a preliminary assessment of factors which appear to permit this lobbying to organize and compete successfully in the national policy process. ‘The particular focus of this study ison the development of a national lobby by one diffuse interest, women. Women have always provided a particularly difficult problem for organizers, encompassing as they do one of the largest and most varied primary groups in society. By comparing interview data from individuals active in creating a national women’s lobby in the 1970s* with A, COMMON wistiom among those studying politcal influence is that [NovE: This research is prt of a larger study of lobbying for women's rights carried out under a {grant awarded through the Horence Eagleton Grants Program of the Center forthe merican Woman and Police of the Eagleton Institute of Polis, Rutgers Uiverssy. 1 ‘would like to thank W. Douglas Contain and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for {heir important contrBstons to the ial version ofthis manuscript See for example: Mancur Olson, The Logic of Callcve Action (New York: Schocken Books 1968), pp. 5-65: Anthony Downs, dn Economie Thay of Demoerac (New York Harper an Row, 1887), pp. 25438. and EE. Schattchnetder, The Semsovergn Pepe (Hisadale, lino: Dryden Pres, 1960 00m, The Lag of Calective Action “Andrew S. McFarland," ‘Third Forces in American Politics: The Case of Common Cause,” in ‘Pardes and Elecon ina Ant Party Age ef Jeff Pshel Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 318-93; Andrew 8. Sicariand, Pubic Ire Lair: Desin-Matng ot Engy (Washington: American Enterprise Inwutate, 1976, Jelrey M. Berry, Laying for the Fre (Piston: Princeton Uniteray, Pes i877), Mark. Nadel, The Pees of ConsimerProcon (Indianapolis: Bobby Merril, 1971, “This examination ofthe development of a cooperative lobby for women is based on structured interviews with representatives of fourteen organizations meeting the following itera (2) each hab an going interes in women's tights which central othe organization's purpose: 2) each makes 4 systematic effort to influence congressional ply relaing £0 teomen: andl (3) each has am office in Washington, D.C Imtal interviews, lasting from fonyctive minutes to tworand-shalf hours were conducted between Sepimber 194 andThe Struggle for a National Women's Lobby 477 findings from studies of consumers, public interest groups, and senior citizens, a body of material exists with which to test the ways in which diffuse interests generally have organized to exercise legislative influence.* WoMEN: AN UNREPRESENTED INTEREST Until the mid-1970s, there was little effort to organize on-going national representation of women's interests in Washington. Congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the spring of 1972 was not so much the product of an organized, mass-based political campaign, as the intense work of a relatively small group of activists and idealists under the leader- ship of Congresswoman Martha Griffiths (D-Mich,). It succeeded in large part because of the parliamentary skill, electoral good fortune, and perser- verance of individuals within this group, who eventually prodded an in- different Congress to act." Since this effort was based on the organizing capability of one member of Gongress, who had neither the time nor the inclination to devote her litical life to organizing an on-going lobby for women, the entire venture Iemed ikl to ce with ths singe legate victory in Congres A minor. ity of supporters of the ERA thought that this was as it must be. Recognizing the difficulty of mobilizing such a diffuse interest as women to sustain pres- sure on Congress, they felt that at least the ERA, with its promise of legal equality for women, would address women’s most central shared concern. Other supporters of the ERA were less pessimistic. They believed that women had many common political concerns in addition to the ERA and that these concerns could form the basis for organized national lobbying on behalf of women’s rights. Recognizing as they did that without an organized politically active group representing women, there was little possibility of January 1975. In mos cases the director of the group's legislative office was interviewed Ina {ew of the organizations either a lobbyist or the president of the group was inter: Viewed instead, Les structured follow-up interviews were held through March 1976 with ‘elected organizations to check on current legisative activities. The groupe whose repres- hetatives were interviewed are: American Assocation of University Women, November 19, 1974, and August 11, 1975; Bal Brith Women, November 19, 1074; Federally Employed Women, December 3,107, and May 7, 1975: Federation of Organizations or fessional Women, January 8, 1975, and July 30, 1975; General Federation of Wome! Ghuin Ouober 17 i874; League of Wonen Voters, Ovcber 81971 and August Tt ‘Women, November 1, 1974; National Federation of (Clubs (BPW), September 20, 1973, and October 1, 1974! National Organization for Women, October 31, 1974, and August 5, 197 Noman's Party, January 28, 1975: National Women's Political’ Caucus, October 22, 1974; United Methodist Women, November 4, 1974, Women's Equity Action League, November 2, 1974; Women's Lobby, December 3, 1974. Two additional organizations seeming to meet these criteria declined to have tl [Negro Women and; the National Gouncl of Catholic Women. Twelve other groupe, n ‘meeting all ofthe eiteria specified, atthe time these intl interviews were conducted, ut {Active in join lobbying on some women's isues also had representatives interviewed. Infor ‘mation from these interviews is not included in aggregate ‘data describing the cooperative women's lobby. However, these interviews have been used to provide Supplementary and background material onthe development of a women's lobby. * Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); McFarland, Public Inieres Lobes: Bert, Lobbying forthe People: Nadel, The Pols of Consumer Protection: Joyce Gelb and Marian Lie Paley, Women and Interest Group Polis,” American Polis Quar ‘erly 5 (uly 1977): 331-58: Jo Freeman, The Polis of Women’s Liberation (New York Longman, 1975); Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, "Women and Interest Group Polis: A Comparative Analysis of Federal Decision-Making,” Joural af Pais 41 (May’ 1979) ‘2-02 ‘Gary Orfeld, Congressional Power: Congres and Social Change (New York: Harcourt, Brace, ‘Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 900-302; Freeman, The Palitis of Women's Liberation, pp. 213-17,478 Western Political Quarterly further legislative gains from Congress, they urged individuals and groups active in the Women's Liberation Movement to seize the initiative and begin lobbying Congress. Response was rapid. In 1972, Women’s Lobby was or- ganized under the leadership of Carol Burris for the purpose of represent- ing women before Congress.” In the same year, Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) moved its headquarters from Ohio to Washington to facili- tate its legislative activities" In 1973, National Organization for Women (NOW) and National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC) both opened Washington legislative offices." Despite this new commitment to national lobbying by active women's groups, two difficulties arose almost immediately in attempting to create an effective national lobby for women. First was the question of who or what group should organize such an effort, and second, how sufficient resources Could be brought together to lobby successfully. ISSUE COALITIONS AS A METHOD OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE After a brief period of intense competition among women’s movement ‘groups, each anxious to direct a national women's lobby, legislative opportu- nity provided the stimulus to submerge rivalries and build a common, if loosely structured, lobbying effort in support of women's rights."” After passage of the ERA by Congress, three issues quickly surfaced which gene ated widespread interest among groups supporting women's rights: women’s educational equity;"" equal access to credit! and a minimum wage for domestic workers.'® Each of these issues attracted the support of diverse collections of traditional voluntary groups like the League of Women Voters, the National Council of Jewish Women and the American Association of University Women (AAUW), as well as more militant women's movement groups like NOW and NWPC. Coordinated by sympathetic congressional offices," these issues provided a further training ground, after the ERA, for women's groups to work together in ad hoc coalitions for a common legisla- ive goal ‘This pattern of lobbying through ad hoc issue coalitions was one which soon won favor with most active supporters of women’s rights. They found "Flora Crater, “Women Lobbyist Incorporate for Full Scale Action for Women,” The Women ‘Auvst 2 (November 1972) 1, describes the founding of Women's Lobby: “Women lob- byists by forming # non-partisan nonprofit corporation have formalized their activities to develop a stronger and broader participation of more women on more issues to effect the ppatage of bills in Congress for the benefit of women.” "Interview with a representative of the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL). Conducted on, ‘November 25, 1974 in Washington, D.C "Interviews with representatives of the Women's National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women’s Political Caueus (NWPC). Conducted in Washington. D.C. on Oc- tober 31, 1974, and October 22, 1974, respectively “NOW, NWPC, and Women's Lobby all briefly attempted to lead national lobbying on behalf ‘of women. NOW and NWPC were hampered in their bid for leadership by membership ‘opposition to these organizations taking too active a legislative role. Women's Labby was {oo small to lead such an effor, possessing no national membership. "Women’s Educational Equity Act. Public Law 98-380, Tile IV, section 408, August 21, 1974 "Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Public Law 93-195, Title VII, October 28, 1974 "*Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. Public Law 98-259, Section 7, April 8, 1974 “Lobbying in support of the Women's Educational Equity Act was directed by Representative Patsy Mink (D-Haw.). Representatives Leanor Sullivan (D-Mo,), Margaret Heckler (R: ‘Mass) and Edward Koch (D-N.¥,) a5 well as Senator William Brock (R-Tenn}) were all acive in coordinating support for the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Representative Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.) was the prime mover and lobbying director ofthe campaign to extend the minimum wage to domestic workers.The Struggle for a National Women’s Lobby 479 that this method of lobbying allowed individual groups to retain their au- tonomy, an important consideration given the diversity of active groups, while it brought together organizations with sufficient resources t0 lobby effectively. Specific comments by group representatives convey the perceived advantages of lobbying through ad hoc coalitions: 11 a coalition) spreads out available resources The real advantage of coalitions is that one organization can have elout in a specific area Increases expertise on legislative issues through exchanging information, Of the fourteen group representatives questioned for this study, thi teen felt that joint lobbying was either “important” or “very important” in their legislative work.'® This is a pattern of approval quite similar to that discovered by Jeff Berry and reported in his comprehensive examination of public interest groups, Lobbying for the People. Berry found that 76 percent of the eighty-three public interest lobbyists he surveyed rated joint lobbying as “important” or “very important.""* Andrew McFarland in describing how public interest groups push for reform legislation, sketches a picture of inter-group cooperation which is very close to that adopted by women's lobbyists: Reform laws, and agencies to implement them, are backed by ad hoe coal tions, limited as to subject matter and in time, Typically one of the larger public interest groups will take the lead in lobbying for a bill. Nader, for ‘example, will ake the lead in calling for creation of a consumer protection agency, Common Cause will take the lead in support of legislation to regu: late campaign financing and so forth.” So, those anxious to organize a national lobby representing women’s imerests adopted a method of coordinating active groups which is widely used by public interest lobbyists. Compared to other types of diffuse interest, however, the women’s lobby was somewhat unusual in that it developed no lasting superstructure linking the separate groups in their common work for women's rights. This contrasts, for example, with the experiences of con- sumers and senior citizens, who, like women, after a period of legislative inactivity and then rivalry among competing organizations, developed um- brella groups, the Consumer Federation'® and the Conference of Interested. Agencies in Aging (CIAA), to coordinate long-term lobbying efforts." Among diffuse interests, it appears that women and public interest lobbies, at least, encompass such a wide range of organizations that only the most flexible and impermanent structures can maximize support on specific issues while allowing separate organizations to pursue their own legislative priorities Divisive ASPECTS OF LOBBYING WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND TRADITIONAL GROUPS. For women, failure to sustain a lasting umbrella group like the Con- sumer Federation or the CIAA is due in part to the problem of preserving an on-going cooperative alliance combining traditional voluntary groups See footnote 4 forthe lst of organizational representatives interviewed. "Berry, Lobbying forthe People, p. 254 "'MeFarland, Publ Interest Labbe, opt, p18 Nadel, The Pots of Consumer Protection, p.158. "Prat, The Gray Lob, p. 152480 Western Political Quarterly with social movement groups. Interviews with group representatives demon- strate the extent to which individual organizations, sharing many of the same legislative objectives, feared being linked too closely to other groups with which they worked in issue coalitions. For example, a representative of the National Woman's Party, once a radical feminist group, but now almost conservative on the feminist spectrum, was careful to explain that her group, was a women’s rights group concerned with legal equality, not a liberation, group.” Members of NOW, by contrast, were equally adamant that although, they might work comfortably with “traditional liberal” groups, they were dedicated to political action and liberation, not reform. ‘The self-images and indeed the organizational needs of traditional vol- untary groups and social movement groups are sufficiently different to make it hard to lock such groups together on even a semi-permanent basis.?* Cooperation is much easier when it is structured on an issue-by-issue basis, permitting a great deal of group autonomy.## One representative of a trad tional voluntary group endorsed the need for flexibility in coalitions: Organizations have egos and it is necessary for coalitions to allow a lot of ‘organizational autonomy. Problems really begin when coalitions sct up rigid Sires nih offices and bylaye: They Shout be tote coledions of groups with a common purpose. Some people become very involved with the coalition itself. Tt begins to assume a separate identity. When this hap- pens individual members begin to feel iti the coalition’ job to do every- thing. This just will not work: The strength of the coalition isin the separate organizations and their resources and their members. The coalition should analyze problems and help groups plan strategies, but the groups themselves, must act Not only does the structure of coalitions containing social movement and traditional groups need to be loose, but the legitimacy of non- participation on certain issues must also be respected. In the case of women’s lobbying, it was recognized that not all supportive women’s rights groups feel comfortable lobbying on behalf of abortion. Many of the groups believe that itis an issue which is too divisive for their organizations to take a stand **Imerviw with a representative of the National Woman's Party. Conducted on January 28, 1075 in Washington, D.C. *"Inuerview with & representative of NOW. Conducted on October 31, 1974 in Washington, De "To compare the organizational needs of traditional voluntary groups and socal movement froupe, sce: James Q. Witon, Pola! Organsatons (New Vork: Basic Books, 1978), and Mayer N: Zsld and Roberta Ash, "Socal Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change” Sail Forces 44 (March 1968): S27-40. For avdirectcomparuon of womens ‘voluntary groups and socal movement groups se Anne N. Contain, “A Social Movement Lobbies Women's Liberation and Pressure Poitcs” paper delivered at she annual meet: ing ofthe Southern Political Science Assocation, Nashville, Tennessee, November 1975, ‘Representatives of groups active in developing » national women's lobby (footnote 4) were erie in ieriges fo name other groups th which they lobbied aol brucs ohh they were working or had worked. As Table 3 tndkates, rather surprisingly, there was line mutsal group naming amnong the representatives quesoned. Infact calculating a ch scare state to termine i the fact that one groups represen {roup indicates thatthe second group's representative wil in arn name the Fst group, Show that such information provides no significant improvement over random auesing Knowing that one group nashes another ass lobbying parner doesnot help in knowing Irhether or not the second group wil iso name ie What docs help in thi elatonship i= Towing how many common aus group representatives mentioned (Table 4) It grou ‘mention many ofthe sume ies, uring schiguare measure agai, there goa probability (the O1 level) tha be ideted a5 lobbying parmmers. This Indias that adhoc issue coaltions do, i fac, appear to be the focus Of cooperative avy among acve groups rather than intergroup alliances which span several aus,The Struggle for a National Women’s Lobby 481 ‘on. Yet, non-participation by groups on the abortion issue does not prevent these groups from being included in other women's issue coalitions. 's among women's movement groups have also made flexibility in itions essential. As one movement group representative noted: “The main problem is that unlike unions, many of the women's [movement] groups are battling one another for funds and membership.” This competi- tion has given rise to disagreement among movement groups over which should take the lead in fashioning lobbying strategy. At the same time, severe criticism of the actions of other movement groups has not been un" common. Women's Lobby and NOW spend too mich time pushing Congresswomen and not enough dine helping them Often NOW in its positon asthe largest women’s rights group gets dra down to the lowest common denominator posions. == [NOW lobby] ieintellcually sloppy. — [another NOW lobbyist] i cute. She it of the fanny-pinching, ase patting school of lobbying. The Washington legislative office of NOW is just nota big success ‘The most appropriate comparison for the difficulties experienced by traditional and social movement groups in the women's lobby is the expel ence of the black civil rights lobby." For, like the women’s lobby, the civil rights lobby has had to weather conflict’ among sympathetic groups over leadership, appropriate legislative strategy, and issue priorities** Indeed, the rather stormy history of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights was specifically mentioned by several of the women’s lobbyists interviewed as the strongest argument against attempting to create any lasting umbrella organi- zation in support of women's rights. Such lasting structures would, it was feared, make rivalry more intense and, worse yet, bring it into public view. For women, then, the different styles of traditional voluntary and social movement, groups and the rivalry among socal movement organizations hhave kept formal leadership and enduring coalitions to a minimum, even as compared with other diffuse interests in society. COMPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF LOBBYING WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL GROUPS Although differences between social movement and traditional groups often work against close cooperation and coordination among groups repre- senting women, some differences actually make such cooperation easier. Looking.at Tabies 1 and 2 suggests the complementary pattern of lobbying Comparisons with lobbying for black civil rights have been minimized upto this point since ‘owt cil rights groupe have experience few of the same problems which characterize Altus interests In general inthe 940s, 1950s and 1960s, black cil rights organizations tree tying to represent 4 reaively homogeneous eienele of disadvantaged, bers), Democratic individuals, mox of whom, whether living in the Southern or the Northern United States, had experienced simlar problems of tical diciminaion, The organiza: ‘ional difficbies encountered by Black groups were more often reflections ofthe povert Sa fear of reason which troubled ore cy represented than the aandard prbles ‘of organizing a diffuse interest. See for example, Lester Salamon and Stephen Van Evers, “Fear Apathy and Distimination: A Tex of Three Explanations of Poliial Partisa: Sion" Amencan Pail Seenee Reviews 0712881806, and Hulbert M. Blalock, J. Towa Theory of Minority Group Relations (New York: Capricorn Books, 1967) ‘For an excellent dscusion ofthese problems, see, Gary Oriel, "Congres, the Presi ‘AnweBusing Legislation, 1966-1878." Jal of Low and Eduction 4 (january 1995): 1“nate ON = VIN euoney ‘uouogy ysnaf Jo [pUNOD feuoneN "s Pig Jo Honesapay "Uawoy Yi g Ye UO, eomog ssuawoy4 feuoneN “uoUI094 10} woneztueIO euONEN ‘uouIOg, pasoydurg Ayeropag case potouins sdnoiH Y9WaNOU §,H9UOM ML t 1 ° ° ° § z § + z ° & 1 z t * * ° ° 1 + U + z ° t ' ° 3 + & © 1 t s 6 ° ° ° ‘ o ° t * + ° 6 1 + ° ° 6 ° ° t + ° s * ° ° ° 5 6 s + ° ° 1 + oN ong FN aN ag jen T=") _ homer, akan — ROHS TO RIAL ob om po sy osm an prs San my sed om wor ma oy smn ag oo ya "OREN 482. Western Political Quarterly NAINOM WOd ONIAWGOT TWNOLLVNY NI BALDY S4NOUD AW HSH) SOUDVL ONIAGHOT | TMVThe Struggle for a National Women's Lobby 483 activities engaged in by women’s movement and traditional voluntary ‘groups. ‘Traditional groups seem to concentrate primarily on lobbying activities which involve their members (Table 1). Having members write or visit their representatives are popular ways for these groups to lobby. Legislative fact, sheets and newsletters can “lobby” the membership, while at the same time involving it in the group's purpose. For many traditional voluntary organi- zations, lobbying is used as a method of providing group members with a sense of participation. Many of the representatives of traditional groups speak of lobbying as a public service. Joyce Hamlin of the United Methodist ‘Women observed: We feel that we have the ability to educate our members and get needed information out to them. Through publishing voting records and making information known, we have the capacity to bring about social change. Our religious experience is connected with social change. ‘This type of lobbying through the membership, in addition to imbuing members with a sense of the purpose of the group, can directly involve ‘members in organizational activities as well. This is done through a variety of techniques including: membership polls to select issues for the group to Serr iametonho ellen le phone trees which spread information about pending legislation; and even lewer-vwriting corps composed of group members who write letters to public officials. A member of the AAUW legislative staff described her office's work on national lobbying as follows: We want to use their [members] resources and we need their help in lobby: ing. Thave no influence as a lobbyist separate from what our members are ‘TABLE 2. Most EFFECTIVE Lonnyino TEcHNIQUES FoR EACH ORGANIZATION® (Membership figures in parentheses) Direct Lobbying ~ Personal presentation, testifying before Congress, contrib League of Women Voters (157,000) National Woman's Party (N.A.}t National Women's Political Caucus (30,000) Women's Lobby Constituency Lobbying - Leter writing, contact by constituents “American Association of University Women (182,000) Federally Employed Women (3,000) of Jewish Women (100,000) ion of Busines and Profesional Women’s Clubs (167,000) National Organization for Women (35,000) ‘Women's Equity Action League (3,000) Inivect Lobbying ~ Publishing voting records, releasing research, public relations, political demonstrations Broai Brith Women (150,000) Federation of Organizations for Professional Woment General Federation of Women’s Clubs (621,000) United Methodist Women (1,500,000) 4, See footnote 4 for compete list. NA. No Answer Nota membership org "Interview with Joyce Hamlin, Secretary for Legislative Affairs, (Conducted on November 4, 1974, in Washington, D.C.484 Western Political Quarterly doing back in the states, separate from what they want. We use code-a- phone. They [members] dial a number on which I have recorded a forty-five Second message, I tell them what resources we need and what legislation we need help on. If we need letters to senators, or work within specific districts, Feonvey these needs to the state legislative directors.” Since the continuing challenge for voluntary groups is to maintain an acceptable level of membership, this type of lobbying is functional for achieving this goal. Lobbying helps to give members a sense of accomplish- ing something through group participation. It aso gives members an activity in which to participate. Through lobbying, the group also may get publicity in the wider community which may help attract new members to the group. ‘This is not to indicate that this type of lobbying is as effective as direct, lobbying in influencing Congress. It clearly is not. There are several prob- lems with relying on constituent lobbying. First, an organization's members normally cannot be given sufficient expertise to provide useful new infor- mation to members of Congress. Second, despite telephone trees and other communication improvements, itis difficult to coordinate the arrival of mail for maximum political impact. Often by the time letters arrive, the major issue is no longer the focus of attention. Amendments or exemptions to pending legislation may be more important. Finally, most of the representa- tives of organizations interviewed indicated that there were limits to the number of times members would respond to appeals for letters, telegrams and visits: Many of the most active organizations find that once a month is about as often as they can expect their members to answer lobbying calls ‘Women’s movement groups, as voluntary organizations, also use lobby- ing to attract and keep members. But, for these groups, direct forms of lobbying are also quite important (Tables | and 2). The chief difference between movement organizations and the traditional voluntary groups which does allow less emphasis on membership lobbying and greater emphasis on direct lobbying is the commitment of these groups to change. Although congressional lobbying by national staff is not particularly helpful in main- taining membership (as indicated by the experiences of NOW and NWPO):* it isa faster, more direct way to stimulate legislative action. Unlike traditional voluntary organizations, most movement groups are adamant that they are not service or study groups but that they are engaged in a struggle for change. Although there is some disagreement as to whether this change is appropriately arrived at through a legislative route, once a commitment to lobbying has been made, there is litle patience with passive or indirect strategies of influence. A. representative of NOW explained the group's orientation toward political involvement. NOW is action-oriented. The AAUW shares many of NOW's goals, but they are primarily a research organization. The League (of Women Voters) is also oriented toward research. .... Most NOW chapters start out as more oF less consciousness raising groups. Once they decide to do something about an issue, they get in touch with our task force coordinators. This links them to the action being taken on an issue. You notice that we do not have committees, but task forces pursuing established goals through legislation. * Interview witha representative of the American Assocation of University Women. Conducted ‘on November 19, 1974 in Washington, D.C *See footnote 10 and Susan Caroll, "Women’s Rights and Political Parties: Issue Development, the 1972 Conventions and the NWPC" (M.A: thesis, Indiana Universiy, 1973). jterview with a representative of NOW. Conducted on October 81, 1974, in WasThe Struggle for a National Women’s Lobby 485 Changing the policies of government is central then to the purpose of NOW as well as other movement groups. This distinguishes them sharply from organizations like AAUW and BPW whose purposes are oriented more toward allowing individual women to develop their full potential in society ‘This emphasis on members and prospective members by traditional groups rather than on social change, accords with the constituent lobbying used by these groups. By contrast, the emphasis of movement groups on change creates great pressure on’ them to use direct lobbying techniques. A involvement by a lobbyist trained to help draft legislation, to provide a rapid assessment of pending amendments during committee markup sessions and to aid supportive congressional offices in gathering votes for a bill, is central to achieving significant legislative action, Despite the ambivalence of many movement groups toward delegating the power necessary to have an effec tive national legislative staff, this type of involvement in direct lobbying has increased unavoidably in response to desires for political change. Most movement groups, despite instances of membership opposition, have moved steadily to increase direct lobbying. A NOW spokesperson noted: We recently hired our first lobbyist to provide a continuous presence on the Hill for NOW... Hiring (her) reflects the demands of maturity of the organization. We need more information about how Congressmen are vot ing within committees as well as on the floor [of Congress). We also need better tracking of bills so we know when key votes are expected. On the spot lobbyists are necessary to provide this kind of information.** The somewhat different needs of voluntary and movement organiza- ns make them complementary rather than competitive in lobbying. Trad- itional voluntary organizations, by concentrating their legislative activities in the areas of constituent contact and influencing public opinion, can use their memberships and developed communication systems to create a political climate in congressional districts which cannot be replicated by movement groups. Comparing size alone, the contrast is clear. Traditional women’s groups like the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, with a membership of 621,000, and the United Methodist Women, with 1,500,000 members, are more likely to affect public opinion by educating their membership on an. issue than are WEAL, with 3,000 members, NOW, with 35,000 members, or NWPG, with 30,000’ members. Conversely, movement groups with their exclusive concentration on women's issues are better able to follow and re- port on issues affecting women than are their less specialized allies. Organi- zational needs and comparative advantage both operate to make lobbying coalitions between movement and traditional groups easy to maintain, The regulations of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also work to encourage this complementary alliance. THE IRS AND Lonayinc The tax classifications of organizations have an important effect on the types of lobbying in which these groups engage.” Most of the women's movement groups active in Washington have divisions with 501 (c)(4) tax status, allowing them to lobby freely, subject only to congressional regulation of lobbying activity. The majority of traditional voluntary organizations, however, have 501 (08) tax status. This status exempts these groups from income tax liability and allows donations to the group to be used as tax bid 21For a more complete discussion ofthis linkage, sce Berry, Lobbying forthe People,486 Western Political Quarterly deductions by individual donors. Having 501 (c)(3) status also imposes severe limits on the amount of congressional lobbying in which the groups can engage. Several organizations, including the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters, have had their 501 (6) status revoked by the IRS for “substantial” political involvement. Although the IRS has refused to publish specific guidelines defining what constitutes “substantial” involvement, most of the individuals interviewed for this study in 1974 and 1975 interpreted substantial as anything over 10 percent of their total budgets. In addition to regulating amounts of money which groups may spend in lobbying, specific lobbying activities are also limited under 501 (6)(8) tax status. Although groups may freely communicate with their members, pro- viding them with research material and information about legislation, they are more restricted in urging members to contact their representatives about legislation. Similarly, the group may “educate” Congress on specific legisla- tive proposals, if invited to do so, but is more constrained in initiating con- tact with members of Congress. There is also a difference in regulations depending on the target of lobbying. Organizations with 501 (¢)(8) status are less regulated in using the courts for policy change or in approaching ad- ministrative agencies than they are in lobbying Congress. In examining the lobbying techniques identified as most effective by representatives of the groups interviewed (Table 2), the influence of tax status and membership needs seem to combine to determine types of lobby- ing activism. Groups like Women's Lobby, which has a 501 (c)(4) tax status, and is not run as a membership organization, can focus a great deal of effort ‘on lobbying Congress directly. As Carol Burris, founder of the group com- mented, “Women’s Lobby does nothing else but lobby." Larger constituency-oriented groups with 501 (c)(3) tax status like the AAUW and the Business and Professional Women (BPW) have greater incentive to in- volve their membership and to limit their activity on Capitol Hil LoppyiNG BY WOMEN’s GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH LOBBYING BY OTHER DIFFUSE INTERESTS ‘The strength of women's lobbying, like the strength of lobbying by other diffuse interests, comes chiefly from the diversity of groups it can bring together in support of a single issue. Ad hoc issue coalitions allow women’s rights groups to work with labor unions, business lobbies, public interest groups and even rivals such as Right to Life on issues of common, concern. The lobby itself, by encompassing organizations as different as the League of Women Voters, the National Women’s Party, the NWPC and. Women’s Lobby, has the potential to use a range of separate constituencies and political styies in approaching Congress. This is important in bringing together sufficient resources to lobby effectively, but it is also useful in «creating tactical flexibility ‘A member of Congress who may not pay attention to a letter from a women's liberation group, may take notice when contacted by a member of "Imterview with Carol Burts, President of Women's Lobby. Conducted on December 8, 1974, in Washington, D.C A partial list of active groups supporting legislation to end discrimination on the bass of pregnancy indicates how diverse such tue coalitions can be: Physical RecreationThe Struggle for a National Women's Lobby 487 sdnou8 ounce ye yu mor reuonen up o2snFIIDEDEd>H 3H aque yeranus = x spqoue Sunmeu uoneaueiuo 240 {omoystnu suoneaue 10 yo 8 a. #30) 01004 295) $1 = Ne pasos, dos soy pres x x am , van ’ x sees AND x x x DAMN 1 - or 1 aMN x x x x MON. x moa Sem Nga — : MON x ox , x AMT , , 1 MID , , , ’ MdOd ’ ee Aa : wi 1 , x 1 of x an TTI WN _DdNN dN MON Ma _NDN AW? _OMGO md’ md Naw ang rT Bay er ‘SAND ONIAGNOT SY G31 SIMORD {:NIHOM 404 ONIANEOT TVNOLLVN NI 3ALIDY SNOLLVZINVOUD ONONY NOUYOTLINGO] IWALAW 40 1NAIXG "§ TTEV488 Western Political Quarterly “TABLE 4, Issues Men TioND BY ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN NATIONAL LoMBYING FoR WoMEN Groups Mentoning ae ‘mes Mentone Move Than One Grosp Abortion ‘AAUW, NOW, BBW, WL WEALUMW, 7 NCW Social Security Reform BPW, FEW, NWPC, BBW, AAUW, WL, 7 ‘WEAL Equal Credit AAUW, BPW, NOW, NWPC, WEAL, 6 NEW ‘Women’s Educational Equity Act(WEEA) AAUW, BPW, NWPC, WL, WEAL. 5 Family Planning AAUW, UMW 2 Child Care BPW, FEW, NOW, NWPC, BBW, NCW 6 Discrimination inthe Military BPW, WEAL. 2 ‘Minimum Wage for domestics, ip credit FEW, NOW, BPW, WL. 4 Rape FEW, NOW, BW 3 Title 1X (discrimination in education) NOW, NWPC, FOPW, WEAL, WL. 6 ‘AAUW Flexible Hours ¥, AAUW 3 Free Trade NC]W, LWV 2 Equal Rights Amendment AAUW, BPW, GEWC, FEW, BBW, n FOPW, NOW, NWP, WL, UMW, LW Environment LWV, AAUW, UMW. 3 (Campaign Finance AAUW, NWPC, UMW, LWV N= 14. See Footnote 4 for a complete li of organizations (erviewed the League of Women Voters. Similarly, a letter-writing campaign by groups as diverse as NOW, the National Council of Jewish Women and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs can cover a broad spectrum of American society. By bringing together a wide range of constituencies in support of a single policy, congressional response to that issue becomes increasingly likely. Ultimately, the chief strength of the women’s lobby rests on the diver- sity of interests and organizations which it can mobilize for congressional lobbying, not on the political clout of any single group. American Jewish Congress ‘Americans for Democratic Action ‘Assocation for Advancement of Paychology Coalition of Labor Union Women Dela Sigma Theta Sorority Federally Employed Women Federation of Organizations for Professional Women Leadership Conference on Civil Rights League of Women Voters of the US. Mexican-American Women's National Association National Abortion Rights Action League National Astociation for the Advancement of Colored People National Education Assocation National Federation of Business & Professional Women's Clubs, Inc ns Political Caucus New Jersey Insurance Department Planned Parenthood United Auto Workers United States National Student Assocation ‘Women's Equity Action League Women's Legal Defense Fund ‘Women’s Lobby, IneThe Struggle for a National Women's Lobby 489 The style of lobbying favored by the women’s lobby is similar to the participatory coalitions of public interest groups identified by Berry, in which, (N)o one group is dominant although a single member group may have a major leadership or coordinating role. At least two organizations are highly active and supportive of a participatory coalition. Although it is possible for the coalition to include some nominal members, it is more likely that all members will be committing significant resources.) Although Berry does not formally evaluate the effectiveness of participatory coalitions, he clearly established that the public interest group representa- res he surveyed found them to be among the most effective types of coali- ns in which they worked.* In assessing the likelihood of legislative success or failure for diffuse interests lobbying through ad hoc or participatory coalitions, two variables seem particularly noteworthy. The first is the presence of a consensu There is strong evidence that when pursuing consensus issues with broad d. The problem faced by lobbyists working on such issues is to ie enough to the public and politicians to get them added to the legislative agenda. Ad hoc coalitions seem an effective way to achieve this end.** Often a “break-through” issue will open an entire’area of consensus for legislative action. Consumer groups in the 1960s achieved this break- through with auto safety. This issue aroused public interest in the whole field of consumer protection, putting it securely on Congress’ discretionary agenda.*? For women's groups the break-through issue was the Equal Rights, Amendment which, initially at least, aroused little opposition and stimulated both public and congressional support for women’s rights issues. The notion of consensus issues as Gelb and Palley have cogently pointed out in the case of women's issues, helps to distinguish between successful areas of lobbying on behalf of women, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Act and the Women’s Educational Equity Act, and relatively unsuccessful efforts like protecting the right of poor women to have abortions and federally funded day care.** When there is strong opposition to an issue backed by a diffuse interest, itis very difficult for that interest to prevail The exception to this generalization occurs when support for such an issue is particularly widespread, the second variable determining the success or failure of lobbying by diffuse interests. When a variety of groups are incorporated in an ad hoc coalition supporting the position of a diffuse interest, it becomes increasingly likely that such a coalition will succeed even in the face of organized opposition. For example, the women’s lobby was able to win passage of a bill extending the time allowed for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment despite intense opposition. The women’s lobby did this by mobilizing several hundred sympathetic groups supporting its Berry, Lobbying forthe People, p. 257. 1b, pp. 257-61 Fora discussion of legislative agendas, see: Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Pariipation ‘in American Polis: The Dynamics of Agenda Building (Balsmore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Nadel, The Politics of Consumer Protection, pp. 40-41 Gelb and Palley, “Women and Interest Group Politic: A Comparative Analysis”490 Western Political Quarterly position. Similarly, a strong and exceptionally diverse coalition of suppor- tive groups succeeded in passing the Pregnancy Disability Act, assuring disa- bility benefits for pregnant workers, in the face of organized opposition.” Yet, the converse also holds. When such widespread support is not forth- coming, as in the case of a pro-choice position on abortion, and opposi present, prospects for legislative success are slight, ConcLusions Ad hoc issue coalitions appear to be both the most realistic and the most, common way to organize diffuse interests. There are several reasons why this type of structure appears to work well. First, cooperative lobbying allows a great deal of diversity of opinion among cooperating groups while still combining lobbying capabilities. This is very important for an interest as varied as that of American women. Groups only need to agree on a single issue to join an ad hoc issue coalition. In this way even politically undesirable ‘groups can be useful in lobbying efforts. Although few far left groups in the women's movement chose to engage in lobbying, their continued use of disorderly politics often made it easier for more moderate groups to gain The fllowing i «paral it of groups affiliated wit dhe Equal Rights Amendment Ratfica ion Council, a Washington-based umbrella group with works on strategies to pass the ERA American Assocation of University Women ‘American Civil Lierties Union ‘American Home Economics Association ‘American Nurses Asocation Common Cause ‘Communications Workers Democratic National Com ERAmerca Federaly Employed Women Federation of Organizations for Profess General Federation of Women's Chub Inercllegate Associaton of Women Studie Interstate Awocation of Commissions on the Status of Women League of Women Voters of the US. {tonal Counal of Jewish Women National Organization for Women National Treasury Employees Union National Women's Polical Caucus Network Suaff ‘The Newspaper Guild Republican National Commitee United Methodim Board of Church and Society United States Commision on Ci Rights Washington Forum YW.CA: National Board Zonta Imernational America al Women, support was also reflected in lobbying. March Tomorrow.” Washington Post, July 8, 1978, p. AB: “Religious groups, labor unions, vl rights organizations, educational groups —they are all coming to Congress o demon: Strate the vitality of ERA... More than 825 groups are sponsoring the demonstration, according to NOW President Eleanor Smeal." See also: James Lardner and Nell Henry, ver 40,000 ERA Backers March on Hill" Washington Pos, July 10, 1978, pp. 1, 10, 1 "ERA Backers Lobby on Hil,” Washington Pox, July 11, 1978, p.2: and Robert G. Kaiser, “ERA Proponent Win Key Vciory wi Senate Vote” Watingn Post, October 8,197, pp. *oyrraien to ening dcininln base on pregnancy nchided: the Nao Aacinion ‘of Manufacturers; American Councl of Life Insurance Association of America: and the ‘Chamber of Commerce of the United States.The Struggle for a National Women’s Lobby 491 access to political leaders. Just as the NAACP and the Urban League became more acceptable as representatives of the civil rights movement after political leaders were confronted with the possibility of dealing instead with the Black Panthers or SNC, so also did NOW become more acceptable in contrast to ‘Women’s Strike for Peace or Redstockings. The thrust of cooperative lob- bying is to maintain a left, right, and center of the movement to broaden possible avenues of access to the policy system. ‘Also, since each issue generates anew coalition and a new opportunity for leadership of the coalition, conflicts and rivalries among groups are ‘made less intense. There is the opportunity for every group to take a leader- ship role on some issue if it wants to do so. This pattern of cooperative lobbying through ad hoc issue coalitions seems to be one way in which a diffuse interest with few resources can rapidly bring together and hold together sympathetic groups to achieve collective impact on the legislative process. When combining social move- ment and traditional voluntary organizations in this cooperative effort, as the women's lobby does, a natural division of preferred lobbying activity is likely to occur, based on the disparate organizational needs of the two types of groups. The experiences of the women’s lobby suggest that these differ- ences may result in complementary lobbying preferences which make cooperative lobbying relatively easy to coordinate among these types of seth addition, the overlapping of lobbying preferences among participat- ing groups also provides strength to a cooperative effort. The diversity of styles and constituencies which make a diffuse interest difficult to represent through a single organizational framework, provides great benefits in cooperative lobbying. When a wide range of groups are successfully com- bined on behalf of a specific legislative issue, a number of constituencies and. points of legislative access are opened up to the coalition. Problems of scar- City of resources and differences among separate groups often disappear in this pursuit of legislative success. Although the use of ad hoc issue coalitions to structure a new national lobby may not be as efficient as pooling the resources of separate groups for a unified effort, it is far more feasible for a diffuse interest. The rivalries and differences in priorities among women’s groups, like many other diffuse interests, make it almost inconceivable that a unified women’s lobby would have succeeded. Yet, with this diversity, a loosely tied cooperative structure not only sustained interest in a national women’s lobby, but succeeded bringing together sufficient resources for the lobby to have an impact in ‘work with Congress In considering how much of an impact such a lobby will have, it seems clear that diffuse interests can lobby effectively enough through ad_ hoc coalitions to stimulate congressional action on consensus issues. When faced with organized opposition, however, they are less likely to succeed. Their sole advantage in head-to-head contests with narrow interests rests on their ability to build highly diverse and broad-based support for their position. Failing this, they are likely to fulfill the common wisdom, cited in the intro- duction, and represent their interest less well than narrower more clearly defined groups.