The Effects of Lobbying: A Comparative Assessment Harmon Zeigler The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1. (Mar., 1969), pp. 122-140, Stable URL hitp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=0043-4078% 28 196903%2922%3 1% 3C122%3ATEOLAC%3E2,0,CO%3B2-G ‘The Western Political Quarterly is currently published by University of Utah. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www jstor.org/joumnals/utah. hl. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Sat Sep 2:09:54:04 2006THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT Hanson Zetouer University of Oregon DHERENTS of the group theory of politics would consider it heretical to wonder what would happen to the legislative process if there were no interest groups and lobbyists. Yet, such a question is not unreasonable, especially when one considers the fact that most case studies of “interest groups in action” begin with the assumption that the group model is correct. However, recent studies of the lobbying process in Washington, notably those of Milbrath and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, suggest that the policy outcomes of Congress would not have been very different if lobbyists were eliminated from the decision-making process." The serious questions raised by these studies need further exploration on a comparative basis. If itis true that lobbyists are not very influential in Washington, why is this so? One would suspect that there are certain structural conditions in Washington, not the least of which is that the legislator has other sources of infor- ‘mation, that reduce the influence of lobbyists. The purpose of the research reported here is to offer an assessment of the strength of interest groups in four states: ‘Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, and Utah* ‘The theoretical focus of the study centers around the concept of interaction. We need to know: (1) how much interaction between legislators and lobbyists actually takes place; (2) what is the nature of this interaction; and (3) what is the effect of this interaction. Finally, having offered an assessment of the effects of interaction, it is necessary to speculate as to possible explanations for variations in effect. This is a dificult task, and any number of explanations might be as valid as the one suggested in the conclusion to this article. Nevertheless, a beginning of a revised theory of the role of groups in the political process should offer some speculation as to why groups are powerful in some systems and not in others. Of course, one can argue that the political systems themselves, rather than the inter- action of participants within these systems, is the crucial explanatory factor. Taking approach, one might link the strength of interest groups to the economic, social, and political characteristics of a state. Tt will be necessary to consider this argument after first presenting an alternative explanation. "Raymond A. Bauer et al, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Pres, 1963), p. 398. Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyiats (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), > Interviews were conducted during February and March, 1966, Bfforts were made to inter- ‘lew each leginlator and lobbyist. For the legislators, the percentage af completed inter- views is: Mattachuscts, 87%, North Carolina, 979%, Oregon, 94%, and Utah, 949%, Hor lbp the percestage interviewed ix move dificult fo ape "Tn Uta there no birt of registered lobbyists and in the other tates it was found that some lobbyists do not resister. In Mastachusetts and North Caralia, the number of completed interviews xceeds the number of registered lobbyists. Ta Oregon, 94% of the registered lobbyist ‘were interviewed. In Utah, since we frst had to construct a list based upon preliminary Inverviews with experienced legislator, newspaper reporters, and mare Visible 1obbyist, no percentage calculation can be given 122‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT — 123 Frequency or Inreracrion To be effective, lobbyists have to interact with legislators on a regularized and frequent basis. State legislators are busy, and the sources competing for their time are many. Therefore, the beginning of an assessment of interest group strength must be frequency of interaction. Legislators and lobbyists were asked how many contacts (of any kind) occurred per week during the legislative session? Table 1 indicates, first, that there are substantial interstate differences and, second, with regard to interstate differences, that the perceptions of lesislators and lobbyists differ. Tt seems quite clear that both legislators and lobbyists report more contact, TABLE 1 Mraw Invexactions Pex Weex as Revontzo ny Leotstatoss ano Lonavist’s Mauachusetts Legislators = = 78 me Lobbyists : 107 185, North Carolina Legislators... ——— 85 164 Lobbyists 239 132 Oregon ‘Legislators 340 24 Lobbyists slo 193, Utah ‘Legislators . 160 9 Lobbyits oo 185 14 Oregon. More interaction takes place in Oregon than in any other state, regard- less of who is making the judgment. It also is clear that legislators and lobbyists hhave the fewest number of interactions in Massachusetts. Utah falls between the two extremes, and again there is substantial consensus. ‘The real problem is North Carolina. In'each of the other states legislators and lobbyists are relatively close in their assessment of the extent of interactions, but in North Carolina legislators think litle interaction takes place, while lobbyists would “rank” their state second only to Oregon. Here we encounter a basic problem in Eulau’s suggestion that both actors in the interaction should be examined. Who is right? One possibility is, ‘of course, that lobbyists are exaggerating their importance, as McAdams has sug gested in another context, while legislators, conforming to their perception of the ‘good legislator, believe they are acting ‘“independently.”* ‘This explanation has the ‘obvious flaw of failing to account for the tendency of legislators in other states to approximate the estimates of lobbyists. In Oregon, legislators see more interaction than do lobbyists. It is obviously better to observe the number of interactions than to ask the participants to ‘ecall them, but to do ao would have been impossible both in terms of comparative ‘esearch and in terms of me involved. ‘The table should be interpreted as an estimate ‘Alan K. McAdams, Power and Politier in Labor Legislation (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1964), p 193.124 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY it be some truth in the explanation. North Carolina is less urban, less industrialized, and less wealthy than the other states. It also has the lowest rate of political participation. These conditions generally contribute to the strength of the interest group system, but at the same time might contribute to the reluctance of legislators to discuss interest groups, oF to the failure of legislators to be able to offer accurate assessments. North Carolina has, according to Elazar, a traditionalstc political culture. The essential attributes of such a culture are “a paternalistic and elitist concept of the commonsealth.” Consequently, such a culk ture confines “real political power to a relatively small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite” who have a “right” to govern If legislators reflect these kinds of attitudes, they would admit very litle “outside” influence, ‘whether from party, interest group, or constituents. Eulau’s evaluation of Tennes- see—a state with essentially the same political culture as North Carolina — is suggestive of this conclusion. ‘There are more “trustees” in Tennessee than in any of the other states examined.* Trustees define their leyslative role as that of free agent, relying on their own conscience and principles rather than the advice of any external forces. Therefore, they would be reluctant either to place much reliance on lobbyist or, perhaps, to admit that they doso The fact that interest groups seem to be such a minor part of the Massachu- setts legislative system might be a function of the strong party cohesion in that leg lature. Further, Massachusetts is a populous, ethnically diverse state which might, on the one hand, produce more demands for legislative action, but atthe same time increase the number of competitors for rewards (still, there are fewer registered lobbyists in Massachusetts than in Oregon) Tn addition to the strength of party, Massachusetts has nearly three times as many legislators as does either Oregon or Utah, making the task of interaction dificult purely on the basis ofthe ratio of leislators to lobbyists.” Boston isa large city in which one can easily submerge oneself in anonymity: Salem, Oregon, isa small town with the legislature as the main foeal point of activity. Sale Lake City, between Boston and Salem in population, yields an interaction rate also between these two extremes. OF course, one can hardly maintain thatthe size of the capital city, per se, is a basic contributor to the rate of interaction, but coupled with the limited visbility of interest groups in comparison to the strong political parties of Massachusetts, it might be a reinforcement. The weakness of groups in North Carolina and Massachusetts appears easier to explain than the strength of groups in Oregon and Utah. As the explanation develops, attempts will be made to correct this deficieney. ‘The fact that legislators and lobbyists have different perceptions of the extent of communication might be indicative of actual patterns of interaction. Both sets "Danie Elasar, American Federal: A View From the Stter (New York: Crowell, 196), P *Wahlke, etal, op cit, p. 281 "The idea of the dificulty of the Lobbyists’ job being related to the size of the audience can bbe explored by examining the interaction rates of the sate senates, which have fewer embers In Masachusetts and Utah there fs substantially more interaction in the ‘Senate than in the House: However, in North Carina, there is subvtantaly less contact in the Senate, while in Oregon the interaction rates are virtually the same.‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT — 125 of judges might be correct. Assuming this is true, we might conclude that in the states in which legislators perceive more communication than do lobbyists, the bulk of the contact comes from a few lobbyists trying to communicate with a lange body of legislators. ‘The target of communications might be large. The best exam~ ples of this possibility are Oregon and Utah. ‘The larger targets of lobbyists might reflect the relatively open decision-making structure of these legislatures. Neither strong parties nor traditionalistic cultures would restrict the number of legislators who might be viewed as useful targets for communication. The strategy would thus be to contact as many legislators as possible, whether or not they hold impor- tant party or legislative positions. Yet, since a relatively small proportion of lobby- ists are full time “professionals” who make lobbying a business, this relatively large body of legislators would interact with a smaller proportion of lobbyists. In Ore- gon, in contrast to Utah, more lobbyists are “professionals” and put in longer hours ‘on the job, In this state, therefore, there is both the necessity of contacting a langer body of legislators and a larger number of lobbyists trying to interact. ‘Two contrasting patterns are presented by North Carolina and Massachusetts, neither of which has broad target areas. In Massachusetts, few legislators interact swith few lobbyists. In North Carolina, many lobbyists interact with few legislators. ‘Thus, the rigidity of party control in Massachusetts might eliminate the rank-and- file from the communication process, while the traditionalism and value placed ‘upon experience might do so in North Carolina. In North Carolina, however, the case for a restricted target zone appears strengthened because of the greater activity of lobbyists. North Carolina brings to mind the research of Garceau and Silver man, which suggested that many Vermont legislators are unaware of intense lobby- ing activity, and of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, who find Tennessee legislators uninformed, but draw a different sort of conclusion: that there not much lobbying takes place. It is clear, in North Carolina, that most legislators are not involved in the lobbying process, but this does not necessarily mean that little lobbying takes place. ‘The problem would not have existed had only legislators been interviewed, but the description emerging from a single set of interviews would have been less valid. One approach to the problem is to find out what kinds of lobbyists and legislators are most likely to interact. For instance, it may be that interaction increases with the experience of both or either of the sides. In the case of lobbyists, it may take time to locate key decision-makers, become familiar with the rules of the game, lear the technicalities of legislation, establish a reputation, and get on friendly terms with legislators. Legislators might have increased contact with lobbyists if they have had considerable legislative experience and if their position in the legislature is sufficiently important to attract the attention of lobbyists. Since turnover in the ranks of both groups is fairly high, perhaps a minority really get involved. To some extent these speculations are supported by the data, but not in a clear fashion. In all states except Utah, the experienced lobbyists do interact ‘more with legislators than do the novices. However, the Oregon novice lobbyists interact with legislators as much as do the experienced lobbyists in North Carolina. ‘Thus, intense interaction is limited in North Carolina but is more “open” in126 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY Oregon. In Utah, the novice lobbyists actually have more contacts with legislators than do the experienced ones. Assuming that the experienced lobbyists know more about their jobs, this suggests that a better strategy isto limit contact. Both North, Carolina (52 percent) and Utah (44 percent) have a higher proportion of experi- ‘enced lobbyists than Oregon (30 percent) ancl Massachusetts (29 percent). How- ever, in spite of the relative experience of their lobbyists, the two states differ markedly with respect to intensity of interaction. ‘A similar pater emerges for legislators; those with the most experience have the greatest contact with lobbyists, except for North Carolina, which is a puzzling development. We have described North Carolina as a relatively “closed” state which only the more experienced lobbyists actually get into the act of contacting a few legislators. But the experienced legislators do not absorb the bulk of the ‘efforts of lobbyists, as they do in other states. Nor do committee chairmen or party leaders receive more communications from lobbyists than non-leaders, as is gen- crally true." The structure of power in North Carolina's legislature — insofar as it can be ascertained from the efforts of lobbyists — is totally unrelated to the formal structure of the institution ‘On the basis of interaction — without concern for the effects of interaction, Oregon and Massachusetts stand at opposite ends of a continuum with North Caro- Tina (depending upon the judges) and Utah falling in between. Of course, inter- action need not be an indicator of effect. Perhaps one contact by a good lobbyist is worth 100 contacts by an amateur. Also, perhaps the greater the contact — indicating a more intense set of demands— the less effective any one contact is likely to be. Further, intensity of interaction might simply be a function of how ‘busy legislators are. ‘The more bills there are to consider, the more frequent will, be the interaction (assuming that interest groups are the basic communicators of demands). Such an assumption clearly does not work because Massachusetts, with its low rate of interaction, considers almost twice as many bills per day (19) as does Oregon (10) Although the explanation of the reasons for varied rates of interaction is parted at this point, let us proceed to the next step in the argument. The question is: to what extent does frequency of interaction provide clues both about the nature and effects of the interaction? Waar is rie Nature oF rie Interaction? Although a communications model may be too weak, communicating with legislators is what lobbyists are supposed to do. Tes certainly true that the purpose of any communication is to change behavior, yet the communications and mecha istic models offer markedly different interpretations of the nature of communica tions. The supporters of the communications model believe that lobbyists transmit information to legislators. The consequences of this assumption are: (1) most interaction occurs between to partisans “Is [the interest group] role became that of an ausiliary service bureau for a senator with whom it was in complete agree The cnt-point for experience is eleven years (the mean). * From data to be reported in the Future‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 127 ment”; and (2) successful lobbyists are those upon whom legislators know they ‘can rely for accurate information, preferably information which is available most conveniently (or exclusively) from lobbyists. One lobbyist phrased the job of the informant in these words: “I try to establish a reputation for having certain technical information which is otherwise unavailable to them [legslators).”| ‘The assumptions of the mechanistic model are funeamentally different. Lobby- ists have as their fundamental goal the persuasion of legislators. Subscribers to the mechanistic theory believe: (1) lobbyists communicate with opponents or unde- cided legislators, and (2) successful lobbyists are those able to convert opponents into supporters and firm up waveress. According to one such lobbyist: “Well, I may as well be honest about it. We are trying to influence votes on certain mea- sures. We spend most of our time trying to influence votes on legislative measures. Just as Eulau argues that neither the mechanistic nor the communications models are entirely correct, it is reasonable to assume that there is a bit of truth in the behavioral consequences which flow from either model. Gertainly the data suggest that this isthe case (Table 2) TABLE 2 Pencenmace oF Lesistarons ano Lonavisrs Ciassiryina Titein Rous A: Permeder Moscachucetts Legislators 30% 2 28 oe Lobbyists 54% 18 28 185 North Carotina Legislators 20% 33 27 164 Lobbyists 45% 29 27 132 Oregon Legislators 26% 55 19 a Lobbyists 48% 34 19 193 Utah Legislators 299% 37 4 90 Lobbyists 389% 36 % 134 Legislators and lobbyists are categorized according to whether they spend ‘more of their time sending or receiving messages with a content either primarily informational or persuasive.” Obviously, such a categorization of the nature of com- ‘munication is ideal. Information is certainly an instrument of persuasion, and most ‘messages are probably a “mix.” Nevertheless, respondents were able to decide what the perceived essential purpose of a message was. Table 2 is illustrative of some fundamental concepts in the examination of the interaction process. ‘The evalua- * Bauer, eta op. cit, p. 357, The categorization is derived from the “purposive” and “nonpurposive™ distinction found fe Mterature of communications. See Bruce H. Westley and Malcolm 'S. Maclean, Fe," Ggrespial Mel for Communications Research a Jamey H, Cauntell and ial W, Helper (eds), Dimensions in Communication. (Belmiont, California“ Wade- ‘worth Publishing Go,, 1965), pp. 61-62,128 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY tion of an encounter will be based upon self-perceptions and! pereeptions of the other person. The nature of the interaction is seen quite differently by the two participants. The pattern is quite consistent from state to state. In every case, a higher proportion of lobbyists are classified as persuaders and a higher proportion, of legislators define their role as receivers of information. ‘These contrasting per- ceptions of the encounter can be expected to have an impact upon the behavior of the actors. As we have argued, the nature of the encounter is defined by the perceptions of the participants. Tt stands to reason that the more congruent the perceptions of the participants, the less ambiguous will be the encounter. In this, case, the effectiveness of the lobbyist should be related to the extent of harmony between his perceptions and that of the legislator. In other words, the clearer the ‘mutual expectations, the more effective will be the lobbyist. Table 2 provides categories based solely upon whether or not one type of com- munication outweighs another. To get an idea of the extent of congruence, let us ‘examine the rate of interaction spent in either informational or persuasive com- munication (Table 3). We can now see that the greatest congruence conceming TABLE 3 Iwrenaction Rates or Leotstarons ano Lonaviers Devore 70 Pensuasion on Ixronsarton Peri Tlermaton Mastachusetts Legislators nnn 2 33 Lobbyists 46 22 North Carolina Lesislators 09 7 Lobbyists 33 2 Oregon Legislators : a 30 Lobbyists 37 5 Utah Legislators .. 23 38 Lobbyists 33 32 perception of persuasion occurs in Oregon, followed by Utah, North Carolina, and Massachusetts. ‘Thus, the two states with the highest interaction have the greatest congruence. It will be argued shortly that Oregon and Utah are the states with the strongest groups, thus supporting the ideas of the relationship between con- gruence and effectiveness. Further, the fact that there is greater congruence in states with high interaction indicates that stereotypic perceptions probably dictate the terms of an initial encounter, but that more accurate images develop as the interactions become more frequent. Hence, Massachusetts and North Carolina, with the lowest rates of interaction, also have the least congruence and the least effective lobbyists. Notice also that there is uniformly greater congruence concern- ing informational communication. ‘This may indicate a greater acceptance of the‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 129 legitimacy of this type of communication and, incidentally, suggest an introductory chapter to a textbook for beginning lobbyists, ‘Tue Evrncrs or Lonsvina Measuring the effects of lobbying is especially difficult in view of contrasting perceptions, and because of the existence of at least two functions of lobbying. If lobbying is persuasion, we need to know how often this goal is achieved. If lobby- ing is information, we need to know how much confidence is placed in this infor- ion. The point to be made is that a single measure of influence is not able to account for the ends attached to various lobbying means. Mention was made earlier of the report by Zeller? Political scientists were asked to describe the influence of interest groups in their states as “strong,” “moderate,” or “weak.” The defects of this method are apparent. The panel of judges is, at best, questionable. Asking people to evaluate the effects of interest groups in terms of such an ambigu- fous concept as “power” compounds the felony. A better method was devised by Wablke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson. Their measure was based on questions dealing with both the legislators’ awareness of interest groups and their acceptance of the legitimacy of lobbying. By combining legislators’ attitudes (as measured by a series of scales) and awareness (as measured by ability to identify certain organi- zations), legislators were classified into three role-orientations: facilitators, neutrals, and resistors. Thus, in no case is anybody simply asked about the power of interest groups. However, as we noted earlier, there are some problems with this scheme. ‘The classifications are only minimally behavioral. They do not deal with the effects of actual interaction but only with attitudes. Wablke reatons that legislators can be expected to behave according to their role definitions and that the behavioral consequences follow naturally from role definitions. Whereas this assumption may be correct, no actual behavior is described.!* Our data do indicate, in support of Wablke, that the extent of contact, effect of contact, and attitudes toward lobbyists are clearly interrelated. However, one of the conclusions of The Legislative System, that percentage of resistors declines as legislative experience increases, is challenged. Tt was found that, whereas the attitudes of legislators toward lobbyists become more favorable as experience increases, legislators do not become more persuadable. The lack of connection between behavior and attitude is illustrated by Wablke's discusion of the potent for interest-group politics in the various states, avoiding a diseustion of what hap- pens in favor of an estimate of what might happen. Finally, the potential and the actuality are gradually merged until the distinction is lost, ‘There is no clear way out of these dilemmas. ‘The approach offered here is to consider lobbying as both a persuasive and informational process and to assess the ‘effects of both attempts, relying upon reports of behavior more than upon assess- ‘ment of attitudes "Belle Zeller (ed.), American State Legislatures (New York: Crowell, 1954), pp. 190-91 Since this analysis is based upon reports of behavior rather than independent observations ‘of behavion the point of the objection js questionable, ‘Nevertheles, in using reports Sha surrogate for behavior, the effort to describe behavior is made clea,130 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY Initially, we might observe some apparent differences between lobbying in the states and lobbying in Washington, D.C. In Washington, where informational lobbying seems typical, lobbyists talk to sympathetic legislators. In the states, where there is more persuasion, opponents seem to have considerable contact with each other. It is true that more contact takes place among like-minded lobbyists and legislators than among those who do not see things in the same way, but in all states at least a third of the legislators and lobbyists indicate substantial contact with ‘opponents. In Oregon, to use a slighly atypical case, about the same number of contacts take place among those with conflicting points of view as between those in agreement. In fact, lobbyists tend to lean toward contacts with legislators whose Position is unclear. In short, lobbyists appear to “lobby” in the traditional stereo- type more in the states than in Washington. Concerning stereotypes, the younger lobbyists are more likely to talk to opponents and to define their role as persuader than are the older lobbyists; hence, they fit the stereotype more easily. sort of professionalization process which reduces the stereotypic behavior of lobby- ists as they begin to learn the rules of the game. Such a process of professionaliza- tion is certainly related to the number of interactions. ‘The greater the number of interactions, the more realistic become the actors’ images of each other. Hence, younger lobbyists who do not get “into the game” very much have not had the ‘opportunity to correct their stereotypes. ‘Another aspect of stereotypic behavior which is probably related to extent of interaction concerns the notion of “pressure.” According to popular and some scholarly characterizations, pressure groups do just what the name implies. No one is really sure what pressure tactics are available to lobbyists, and the research in the Washington setting of Milbrath and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter suggests that “infor~ ‘ation groups” is a more appropriate appellation. Nevertheless, the image persists. ‘To legislators and lobbyists, pressure is an undesirable connotation. When a legis- lator says that he is being pressured, he means that he perceives the lobbyist to be trying vigorously to overcome his resistance by any available means, ‘The perceived incidence of pressure varies from state to state and between legislators and lobbyists. Massachusetts lobbyists, who report very little contact With legislators, believe that they engage in pressure tactics far more so than do the lobbyists of the other states. In Massachusetts, as is true for the other states, legislators tend to see less pressure than lobbyists, but the discrepancy between the perceptions of the two judges is substantially greater. * By contrast, Oregon, which appears to have the greatest interaction, also appears to have the lowest perception of pressure tactics on the part of both legis- lators and lobbyists. ‘The general rule seems to be that interaction and perceptions of pressure exist in a funtional relationship. The greater the interaction between legislators and lobbyists, the more favorable become the evaluations of the encounter. ‘The exception is Utah, which is a high interaction state with high per- ceptions of pressure. Indeed, Utah legislators believe themselves to be more pres- sured than the legislators of any other state, As will become evident shortly, although Utah and Oregon seem to be the two states in which interest groups are "See p. 127.‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 131 most active, the attitudes of legislative participants in these states is quite different. ‘There is a general reluctance on the part of legislators in Utah to accept interest groups as legitimate, even though they come into frequent contact with them. It ‘can be demonstrated that, whereas the interaction frequency in Utah is slightly less than that in Oregon, the effects of interaction are somewhat less in Utah. Effectiveness of lobbying is measured by three questions based upon the assumptions of Guttman sealing. Legislators were asked, first, whether they could recall being influenced by a lobbyist to the point of questioning their position about any given issue. Next, they were asked if they could recall being influenced by a lobbyist to the extent of changing their opinion on an issue so that the positions of legislator and lobbyist were not as far apart as they were initially. Finally, legisla~ tors were asked if they could recall being influenced to the extent of reaching total agreement with the position of the lobbyist. ‘The fist question represents minimum effect and the last question represents maximum effect. Lobbyists were also asked these questions with appropriate modification in wording so that the legislators ‘became the object rather than the subject of persuasion. The assumptions require that the frequency of success would decrease with the difficulty of the task. ‘The assumptions held true for lobbyists. In terms of what they think they are doing, the more difficult the task, the fewer the favorable responses. According to lobby- ists, they are able to produce “questioning” and “leaning” responses more often than they are able to produce a “conversion” (‘Table 4) TABLE 4 Pencentaos® of Leotstators axo Lonavisrs Brisevino Tuar Tutey Have (Have Been) Inevvencen v0 nue Exrenr oF* Changing fom Massachusetts Legislators 3 31 20 14 Lobbyists EN 39 6 185, North Carolina Legislators 2 20 18 164 Lobbyists 76 70 39 132 Oregon Legislators .. 6 2 at a Lobbyists 2 2 a 193, With legislators, the assumptions are not so neatly fulfilled. In both Oregon and Utah, more legislators indicate that they have changed postions more often than they have undergone more moderate forms of persuasion. The table confirms pretty well what we have learned so far about the four states under examination132 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY Massachusetts lobbyists are far more skeptical about their ability to achieve success- ful results than are the lobbyists in any other states. This pessimism is shared to some extent by legislators, although the gap between perceptions is far less severe than it is in North Carolina. North Carolina lobbyists soe their influence as far greater than do legislators. Indeed, the difference between the North Carolina lobbyists (whose legislators consider them impotent) and the Oregon lobbyists (whose legislators consider them powerful), is minimal and in one case the North Carolina lobbyists appear to be more optimistic. The table also firms up the argu- ment that Oregon and Utah appear to be strong lobbying states, whereas Massa- chusetts and North Carolina appear to be weak lobbyist states, especially if we consider the attitudes of legislators ‘Naturally, lobbyists exaggerate the impact of their efforts. However, there is ‘one exception to the rule of lobbyists’ overestimation which deserve mention. In Oregon, more legislators than lobbyists believe that conversion has occurred. The difference in Oregon is especially striking. In this particular case, lobbyists are underestimating substantially the impact of their communications. ‘The difference in the perceptions between legislators and lobbyists is least in Oregon and in Massa- chusetts, with both judges in Oregon agreeing that lobbyists are powerful and both in Massachusetts agreeing that lobbyists are ineffective (Table 5). ‘These ‘TABLE 5 Dirremencrs 16 site Brrscts oF Comneuniearion ‘As Revonrep av Laotstarons av Lonsvises Qwetionng — Sea” Changing rom ie Sameer Aaerage Massachusets a7 -8 = North Carolina “34 30 -2t Oregon “34 “10 +10 Uak 4 28 “lleencs between the prcentgercopgred fn Table 4 Nem orem of by sopra’ o8 cect Poste iene the reve sorts of realistic appraisals are, of course, not found in North Carolina or in Utah. ‘The optimism of the Oregon lobbyists is earned, as is the pessimism of the Massa- chusetts lobbyists. To a lesser extent, the optimism of the Utah lobbyists is realistic, but the optimism of the North Carolina lobbyists is apparently without foundation. Finally, conversion does occur more frequently than the research on national legislation has suggested. We would expect legislators to underestimate the extent of conversion; but even taking this into account, a slight majority of Oregon law- makers and a large minority of Utah legislators indicated that they have been switched from one position to another by lobbyists. Even in Massachusetts, 34 percent of the legislators have been influenced by lobbyists, albeit to the limited extent of questioning a previously held opinion. These data assume, of course, that the job of the lobbyists is that of changing minds. In fact, we have seen that there are two role definitions of the job of the lobbyist: that of persuader and that of informant, Needless to say, these role definitions are not mutually exclusive,‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 133 ‘making it possible for lobbyists to perform different roles at separate points in time or even simultaneously. Further, the data should not be interpreted to mean that more subtle, les explicit modes of communication cannot have a quite persuasive consequence. ‘This chapter is not concemed with lobbying strategies, but rather with an assessment of lobbying strengths. Nevertheless, one source of strength, and indeed pethaps a crucial source, is the extent to which legislators accept the lobbyist as a legitimate source of information. Our data indicate that, whereas there is no rela- tionship between the extent of communication initiated by legislators and this degree of persuasability (Table 6), legislators who seek out lobbyists are more Pencestsor" oF uvence Retaten 70 7H Extent of Inranacrion Isrmiaren nv Tate LectstaTon TOUTE” camtag yom Macha Tome 2% % * 196 Median’ a a i a High* a7 53 60 15 North Carat » 8 1s 130 2 2 3 2 x 8 5 3 Fa 3 “2 “ 8 53 a 0 % 5 8 ” “ 2 “4 50 3 46 39 6 oo 0 0 0 {Bese hata nt hd cere “testy” o rein 5 Sete ene conics per week, SMe econ ck likely to be persuaded by them in comparison to legislators who do not initiate as much interaction, Consequently, one source of the strength of interest groups Oregon and Utah might be found in the fact that two-thirds of the lexislators in these states indicate that they solicit the opinions of lobbyists when an isue arises about which they have legitimate concem, Tn contrast, only slightly more than one-third ofthe legislators in Massachusetts and North Carolina dos. We would assume that the seeking out of lobbyists indicates an acceptance on the part of the legislators of the legitimacy of interest groups inthe legislative process. However, by a variety of measures it appears thatthe attitude of Utah legislators toward lobbyists is Far more hostile than their behavior would indicate134 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY Consider, for example, a question approaching legitimacy from a slightly different angle. Legislators were asked if they believed it was proper to be seen socially ‘ith a lobbyist. Whereas 83 percent of the Oregon legislators indicated that it was proper to be seen with a lobbyist, 68 percent of those in Utah indicated that it ‘was proper. Fewer Utah legislators are comfortable in the presence of lobbyists than Massachusetts legislators (75 percent) and are exceeded only by North Caro- Jina legislators (58 percent). Thus, legislators in one of the “strong lobby states” are more circumspect in the presence of lobbyists than legislators in a “weak lobby state.” ‘This pattern can be amplified further by the return to the problem of the relationship between attitudes and behavior. We noted that there was a relation- ship between the two, but the caveat should be added that this relationship does not emerge very clearly in Utah. For instance, there is no relationship in Utah between the attitudes of legislators toward interest groups and the extent of inter- action. Those who have an unfavorable attitude are just about as likely to interact, as those who do not. Also, more legislators in Massachusetts than in Utah believe ‘that lobbyists are “absolutely necessary” in the legislative process. A good illustra- tion of the suspicion ofthe lobbying process in Utah can be seen in Table 7, which presents the attitudes which legislators have toward the information they receive from lobbyists TABLE 7 rons Towaan Inromaeamios Recriven Pence Inocarivo THEY? Maat alan Momehi Rel yy Masachusets 50 55 4 ot North Carolina 4a 56 8 164 Oregon 3 88 6 at Utah 0 70 43 90 Recent eect thn dees Percentage isting ‘ Foventage identi Sah ed dea” of ome ofthe ie. dessin information eit Tt can be seen that legislators in Utah depend upon lobbyists for information ‘almost as much as their counterparts do in Oregon, but that the confidence that, they have in this information is subtsantially les. Also, only a minority of Utah legislators in contrast to Oregon ones find this information especially helpful. Indeed, they appear almost as unimpressed with such information as the Massa- chusetts legislators. It is clear that the dependence of Utah legislators upon the services of lobbyists is not based solely upon a facilitating attitude. Tt appears that the interaction of Utah lobbyists and legislators is not entered into in a purely Voluntary way. The interaction seemed forced upon each actor, somewhat in the‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT — 135 nature of the exception Homans cites to his principle that interaction and attraction are related.” In political systems there are compelling reasons for the continual functioning fof a system in spite of private attitude systems; the interaction system is more compelling than the attitude system. Certain things have to be done; laws have to be passed, information must be gathered. There are very few staff services in Utah, and the legislators are very inexperienced in comparison to those in the other states. Thus, attitudes alone do not explain the nature of the Utah legislative system. The Utah legislators’ attitudes are perhaps traceable to the fact that two thirds of them are Mormons (in contrast to less than half the population of the state). Utah isthe only state in which a religio-economic group controls a majority of the seats. Since the Mormon church has such total access itis naturally not seen as an interest group. The dominance of the Mormon church probably dim ishes the favorable attitude of legislators toward other “outside” groups. Tn ad tion, there isa stern moralism associated with the Utah legislature. Perhaps one source of these hostile attitudes is an orientation booklet which tells the beginning legislator: Perhaps the most overwhelming experience for any new legislator it hie frst contact with the lobbyist — the person representing a special interest Since each lobbyist is committed to advancing the cause of his own group, the legislator can expect to encounter considerable pressure to vote a narrowly seen “right way.” There is nothing wrong with listening to the fave presented by a lobbyist. He may provide valuable information. But the legislator shoul always remember that the lobbyist will volunteer oply information which is helpful to his cause; that which is contrary must be leamed elsewhere.” In spite of these pressures against lobbyists, Utah still has a strong interest- sroup system, Services Provioeo nv Losavists Since we know that a favorable persuasive situation is created when the leis- Tator asks the lobbyist to perform a service for him, we now need to know the nature of the services peeformed by lobbyists. We have previously discussed the nature ofthe interaction between lobbyists and legislators in terms of either persua~ sion or information. slight modification needs to be made with respect to the Kinds of services performed. Here we are dichotomiing services into those involv- ing a display of power or influence and those involving the provision of informa- tion. Three kinds of services are selected as being typical of the use of lobbyists as sources of influence by legislator. They ate, fst, ealling upon lobbyists to have them influence other legislators; second, calling upon lobbyists to have them help amass public opinion in favor ofa legislators position; and third, including lobby- ists in planning strategy in an effort to negotiate a bill through the legislature. ‘The extent to which lobbyists are called upon perform these services are given in Table 8 Considering only the relative importance of lobbying in the various state, nothing new is learned from this table. Oregon still appears as the most lobbying oriented state; Utah runt a close second, with North Carolina and Massachusetts See George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950), pp. 116-17. "The Utak Legislator’ Orientation Manual (1966), p. 6136 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY TABLE 6 Pencentaoe* or Leoistarors ax Lopavists INTERACTING fon "Ixrnaence” Seavices fuie — Mabine Petite talline ” Masachusetts Legislators un 7 7 2a Lobbyists 2 38 36 105, North Carolina Legislators 8 2 39 164 Lobbyists 5 65 8 132 Oregon Legislators 33 32 65 of Lobbyists 35 6 64 193 viak Legislators 46 4 2 70 Lobbyists 6s 6 B 134 "Percentage indate the who “Iequeny” and “acainally” requ (or are requted f0) perform bringing up the rear. However, there are some variations both in the kinds of services likely to be performed within a given state and in the extent to which the perceptions of legislators and lobbyists differ. For instance, participation in the planning strategy preceding the introduction of a bill seems relatively more impor- tant in Oregon and North Carolina than it does in Utah and Massachusetts. At the same time, helping to amass public opinion does not seem as prominent in Oregon as it should be in comparison to the relative utilization of other services. Tt appears that a greater amount of the services performed by Oregon lobbyists are kept within the internal politics ofthe legislature. This type of service is not found to the same extent in any other state. Indeed, the amassing of public opinion is the single item on which both sets of judges in Utah “rank” their state higher than Oregon, ‘The other type of service which lobbyists can perform consists of the provision of information. We consider here two types of such services: the communication to the legislator of the opinions of other legislators or lobbyists, and. the actual conducting of research for the legislators for use in the presentation of arguments for or against legislation. ‘The frst kind of service is, essentially, the utilization of lobbyists for the “'nose-counting” which usually precedes any decision by the leis- lator concerning strategy. The second kind of service, the actual production of information based upon technical research, is usually performed in Washington by staffs, Since state legislators typically do not have staff assistants, legislators come to rely upon lobbyists more than any other service, as Table 9 indicates The tables, considered together, suggest that even though informational ser- vices are more frequently provided than are influence-type services, lobbyists appar- ently do not consider them as glamorous. With the exception of those in North‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 137, TABLE 9 37 Lgorsuatons axp Lonsvisrs Ivreeacing: von *INronMationat” SERvIGES Prncexrace® iain ciher = Reverehing te ‘a y Masrachusetts Legislators 2s 46 24 Lobbyists 2 8 185 North Carolina Legislators - 19 ” 164 Lobbyists : 3 n 132 Oregon Legislators - 40 89 4 Lobbyists 53 B 193 Deak Legislators o 9 78 0 Lobbyists 6 6 134 sc aeagBeretaes inate Gove whe “eget” or “oreo” request of ar requested 8) peo Carolina, the general tendency is for legislators to agree with lobbyist that informa- tional services are typical of the lesislator-lobbyist relationship. An examination of the differences between the percentages indicates that there is a mean difference of about 21 percent between the perceptions of legislators and lobbyists with regard to influence services as compared to a difference of 7 percent with respect to infor- rational services (Table 10). ‘TABLE 10 Durvenexens 1y Leoistarons’ axp Losayists' Peacerrioy oF THE Sexvicrs Puaroreo by Lonsvisrs® Tnlormaton + 3% 28% + 2% + 1% sn. SEI a, teats tosis eon adi pif Tt # and Indeed, only in North Carolina do the differences between the perceptions of legislators and lobbyists with respect to informational services approach the magni tude of the difference on influence services. When evaluating influence services, lobbyists exaggerate (or legislators minimize). When evaluating informational services, both legislators and lobbyists see lobbyists’ performance in a similar manner. In Oregon and Utah, for example, legislators indicate they call upon lobbyists for research quite a bit more than the lobbyists so indicate. It should also be noted, however, that the differences in perception in Oregon are relatively138 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY small no matter whether influence or informational services are being evaluated, indicating a high congruence in perception in comparison to the other states Nevertheless, it does appear that these answers are somewhat indicative of idealized roles. Tt appears that legislators look upon lobbyists as providers of information, but lobbyists lke to think of themselves as agents of influence These findings support the earlier conclusions with respect to how lobbyists spend their time. At any rate, pedestrian though it may be, iti clear that even in weak lobbying states, such as Massachusetts, lobbyists are frequently called upon to provide legislators with facts. In strong lobbying states there is a considerable amount of influence-trading, but even here research i the basic task To lobbyists, the prominence of research means that persuasion has to be accomplished by indirect means. We noted earlier that experienced lobbyists are inclined to define their role as that of informant. Concurrently, lexislator indicate 4 substantial preference for the services of experienced lobbyists, especially if they have had previous governmental experience. Tn all states, these kinds of lobbyists are sought out for services far more than are the inexperienced lobbyists. The experienced lobbyists frequently engage in an explicit attempt to define their role to the legislators. Consider, for example, the following statement: Last season there were eleven people on the House Financial Affaire Committee. Five of them were freshmen. My first job was to introduce myself to them and let them know that T would be around, be at the Committee meetings, and that T am the fount of all information with respect to the insurance industry and if they have questions they should call-on me, Gertainly I try to persuade them, but I try to persuade them Wwith information In this case the lobbyist is seeking to establish a relationship based solely upon his role as informant. The purpose is to produce perceptions on the part of legislators congruent with the lobbyists’ self-perceptions. If successful, this lobbyist would hhave built a substantial influence base, resting upon the willingness of legislators to seek him out. Suamiary AND Concrustons This comparative analysis has probably raised more questions than it has provided answers to existing questions. In the first place, it is obvious that neither the mechanistic nor the communications model are universally applicable, suggest- ing that less inclusive theories are more useful. ‘There seems to be little question that interest groups are very powerful in Oregon and very weak in Massachusetts. To phrase the conclusions in terms of Eulau’s rhetorical question, very little would happen in Massachusetts if there were no lobbies, but the legislature would function in an entirely different fashion in Oregon were this situation to come to pass. On the other hand, in the case of North Carolina and Utah it would be very difficult to say what the consequences would be because the perceptions, especially in North Carolina, are so incongruent. Also, in Utah the high activity and moderate impact ‘of lobbyists is not matched by a favorable set of attitudes on the part of Utah legislators. Attitucinally, Utah is as similar to Massachusetts as itis to Oregon. To return to the question about the effect of environmental variables, it appears that they are randomly dlstributed. ‘The “weak lobby states” — Masea- chusetts and North Carolina —have litte in common, Massachusets is urban,‘THE EFFECTS OF LOBBYING: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT — 139 heterogeneous, industrialized, with a relatively wealthy, welledueated population. North Carolina isthe reverse. Massachusetts is competitive, North Carolina is not. Indeed, Massachusetts is more similar to the “strong lobby states” — Utah and Oregon — in its degree of party competition, than it is to North Carolina ‘On the other hand, Utah and Oregon scem somewhat more similar. Yet, on a variety of measures they are approximations of Massachusetts. The population of ‘Utah and Oregon is quite a bit more mobile than that of the weak lobby states. Indeed, this isthe only characteristic which is consistent. The socio-economic environment does not appear to effect interaction of legislators or lobbyists and consequences of the lobbying effect, with the exception ‘of mobility. Mobility, however, is in reality an artifact of a more fundamental distinction between weak and strong lobby states which is more developmental than environmental. To illustrate this point, let us add to our sample of four states two states examined by Wahlke, Eulau, Ferguson, and Buchanan: California, which is clearly a strong lobby state, and Tennessee, which is clearly a weak lobby state.” ‘We can now see that a basic distinction is between the newer, late developing: states, and the older, now established political systems, California, Oregon, and Utah did not develop viable stakes for the political game until the twentieth cen- tury. By the time that Massachusetts, Tennessee, and North Carolina had devel- ‘oped enough complexity to support an interest group system, the rules of the game of polities had been established and, in a sense, closed to interest groups. In the South, legislators are likely to view all “outsiders” (interest groups, parties, con- stituents) as having doubtful legitimacy. In Massachusetts, interest groups have a difficult time competing with established parties. In both areas, therefore, there is an oligarchical type of politics which do not include interest groups. In contrast to the old New England or southern states stands the new west. Political systems and interest eroups developed simultaneously in a much more open fashion. Interest groups did not have to fight existing politcal institutions; they shared in the developing of the political system; als, political development coin- cided with economic development. Lobbyists and politicians “grew up" together. Finally, the western political tradition —non-partisanship, open primaries, a high rate of participation — invite interest groups, along with everybody else, to compete for the stakes of politics. ‘A further possibility is raised by this notion of the stakes of politics. We have explained high interaction and the effects so far without reference to the obvious possibility that interest groups will be attracted to the arenas where important decisions are being made — where the stakes are the biggest. Do the stakes vary from state to state? Do some states do a “bigger business” than others? If so, how does this relate to patterns of group politics? To answer this question, consider Table 11, which compares the per capita revenues and expenditures of the strong. and weak lobby states. Clearly the strong lobby states have a greater output than the weak lobby states. In the research of Dye, Hofferbert, and others mentioned earlier, the environment influences the output. In this case, a sort of reverse of this "Ohio and New Jersey ate exchuded because their classification is less certain140 ‘THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY suggestion is developed. The magnitude of the outputs influences the patter of activity accompanying the output. TABLE 1 Exresoervae ap Revenve oF Staoxo axp Weax Lo Oregon Calorie Uk Mauchuets Te Revenue per capita $257 $251 $251 gies S171 $183 Expenditure: er capita $260 $254 $259 si90 sist st7t