Republic of the Philippines| SUPREME COURT| Manila EN BANC

The lawyerÕs oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. (Sebastian v. Calis, Adm. Case No.
5118, Sept. 9, 1999) 

A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999 | (A.C. CBD No. 97-485)

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, | vs.| ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

(by the court." An opinion from an appellate court that does not identify any specific judge who may have written the
opinion.
In law, a per curiam decision (or opinion) is a ruling issued by an appellate court of multiple judges in which the
decision rendered is made by the court (or at least, a majority of the court) acting collectively (and typically, though not
necessarily, unanimously).

For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty.
Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.

The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), 1 in its Report, are as follows:

Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the
respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainant's trip to the USA for
a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a
receipt was issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent
regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an
additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign
from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights.

On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters
Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor
of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant
copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would
be asked during interviews.

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming
the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc.
The complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity. 1âwphi1.nêt

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her
money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something
goes wrong.

Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by
complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.

When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to
her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her
passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and
a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.

Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel
were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant
 contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From
September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.

On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her
from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Respondent took complainant's passport with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for
complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her
money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and
P5,000.00.

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund
of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by
the respondent.

Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that
the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent
had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.

Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications
for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of
fees paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent. 2

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no
response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was
made by the respondent. 3 As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply
with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.

On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for
a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad,
hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.

The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an
assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the
respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the
complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his
attempt to escape responsibility.

In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED

as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with
the order of the Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6, of the Rules of
Court. 4

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of
Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution 5 dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with
amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that
 Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross
Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.

After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the Resolution passed by the
Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal
recruitment was not established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact
she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of the
respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United States.

We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give
her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he
guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case
something went wrong. All for material gain.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 6 The nature of
the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. 7 This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. 8 We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 9

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her
travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been
imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the
personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondent's acts
illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real
threat to the Bar and the administration of justice.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 10 We must stress
that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. 11

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total
disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we
find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous
and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in
order. 12 Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainant's money upon demand, but he stubbornly
persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on
the personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from
her.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. |||||||||||\Davide, Jr., C.J. and Panganiban, J., on official leave.
Sebastian vs. Calis, A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999

In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.  They reveal moral flaws
in a lawyer.  They are unacceptable practices.  A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized
by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor.  This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath.  The
lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character.This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.We have sternly warned that any gross
misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.We must
stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.  A lawyer has the privilege to
practice law only during good behavior.  He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his
total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional
conduct.  Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for
his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

EN BANC|A.C. No. 11023, May 04, 2021

GRACITA P. DOMINGO-AGATON, Complainant, v. ATTY. NINI D. CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

This is a Disbarment Complaint 1 filed by Gracita P. Domingo-Agaton (complainant) before the

Office of the Bar Confidant against Atty. Nini D. Cruz (respondent), for Grave Misconduct,
constitutive of qualified theft, estafa, and betrayal of trust, defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code.

On February 3, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution 2 requiring respondent to file comment on the
complaint. Respondent, however, repeatedly failed to comply with the Court's directive and
subsequent resolutions. In the Resolutions3 dated January 9, 2017 and September 11, 2017, the
Court "deemed as served" on respondent the February 3, 2016 Resolution and the January 9,
2017 Resolution, respectively.

On August 19, 2019, the Court issued another Resolution 4 requiring respondent to "show cause"
why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for failure to comply with the February 3, 2016
Resolution.

On February 24, 2020, the Court issued a Resolution5 dispensing with respondent's comment, and
considered the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed and attached
documents.

Complainant's Allegations

Sometime in 2013, complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer for the reacquisition
of an ancestral home located in West Bajac-bajac, Olongapo City (the property), which was
foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Complainant informed respondent that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 of Olongapo City rendered a decision pertaining to the
property, which was then pending appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Complainant
personally negotiated with PNB for the repurchase of the property. Upon being informed by
complainant that the property was already sold to a third person, respondent proposed that
complainant could still buy-back the property from PNB. Respondent then drafted and signed a
Letter of Intent6 for the repurchase of the property from PNB for P2.5 Million. 7

After a few weeks, respondent informed complainant that PNB refused their offer. Nevertheless,
respondent told complainant that the property was not yet sold, but was merely endorsed to a
third party who acted as PNB's broker. Respondent then assured complainant that upon advice of
the Head of the Asset Acquired Department of the PNB, complainant had a good chance of buying
back the property by filing a petition for consignation with the RTC. 8

Accordingly, respondent instructed complainant to prepare the amount of P2.5 Million to be posted
as bond in favor of PNB. The bond was purportedly to remain effective until PNB's acceptance of
her offer. Convinced, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00, as filing fee for the petition, and
P50,000.00, as her professional fee. 9

On July 19, 2013, respondent filed a Complaint 10 for judicial consignation (consignation complaint)
with the RTC, Branch 74 of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 86-0-2013.

On September 7, 2014, respondent informed complainant that the RTC approved her bond in the
amount of P2 Million.11 Pursuant to respondent's instruction, complainant purchased a manager's
check, Union Bank Manager's Check No. 000030071412 dated September 8, 2014, designating the
RTC as payee for the amount of P2 Million.

On September 9, 2014, complainant went to the RTC to deposit the check. Thereat, respondent
told her that the personnel authorized to receive the check was not around. Respondent then
volunteered to personally deliver the check to the RTC personnel, under the following assurance:
"Alam mo naman Manager's Check yan, wala naman akong magagawa diyan, hindi ko naman
kayang i-cash yan, ang payee ay Regional Trial Court. Ako na ang magbigay sa court para
makabalik ka na sa work mo."13 Persuaded, complainant gave the manager's check to respondent,
who, in turn, signed a photocopy14 thereof indicating her receipt.15

Several months passed, complainant did not hear any feedback from respondent. Every time
complainant would request for a copy of the RTC's acknowledgment receipt of the P2 Million
representing the value of her manager's check, as well as proof of PNB's acceptance of their offer,
respondent would always come up with excuses.16

Beginning to suspect that something was amiss, complainant verified with the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the RTC (COC-RTC), where she learned that in an Order 17 dated July 31, 2014, the
RTC dismissed her consignation complaint for violation of the rule against forum shopping, long
before she delivered her manager's check to respondent on September 9, 2014.

On August 13, 2015, the parties met, but respondent still failed to show the RTC's
acknowledgment receipt of the manager's check. In their subsequent meeting on August 17,
2015, respondent promised to return her money by the end of August 2015. Thereafter,
complainant never heard a word from respondent. 18

Upon verification with her bank, complainant learned that her manager's check was cleared and
deposited to the RTC's account on September 12, 2014. This was confirmed from the RTC's
passbook indicating that complainant's manager's check was encashed on September 12, 2014. 19

On October 6, 2015, complainant went to the COC-RTC, where Atty. John Aquino (Atty. Aquino),
Clerk of Court VI, told her that her manager's check was actually withdrawn by a certain
Josephine Chua (Chua) of Grand Pillar Development International, Inc. (Grand Pillar), a party to
Civil Case No. 119-0-2008. Plaintiff therein, Josephine Lim (Lim), was represented by respondent
lawyer. Atty. Aquino's formal Letter-Reply20 to complainant's inquiry pertinently reads:

A verification was made on our Books of Accounts to trace the whereabouts of your Manager's
Check. We found out that the Manager's Check you issued and intended for Civil Case No. 86-0-
2013 was deposited on 12 September 2014 to Land Bank Account No. 038-0117-96, representing
the Court's Fiduciary Trust Fund. The Manager's Check was delivered to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City by Christopher T. Perez, Sheriff IV of Regional Trial
Court-Branch 74, Olongapo City not by your counsel Atty. Nini Cruz.

We have verified from Sheriff Christopher T. Perez that he received Manager's Check No.
0000300714 from your counsel Atty. Nini Cruz as payment in satisfaction of the Compromise
Agreement dated 19 February 2013, where incidentally Atty. Nini Cruz is the counsel of the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 119-0-2008. Sheriff Christopher T. Perez and this office were not aware
that Manager's Check No. 0000300714 was issued for Civil Case No. 86-0-2013 and not tor Civil
Case No. 119-0-2008.

Our office had deposited Manager's Check No. [0]000300714 to the Court's Fiduciary Trust Fund
when it was delivered to this office by Sheriff Perez for safekeeping. The afore-mentioned check or
its equivalent face value was later withdrawn from the Court's Fiduciary Trust Fund pursuant to
the Order of the Court (RTC-Branch 74, Olongapo City) dated 15 September 2014 in Civil Case
No. 119-0-2008.21 (Underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, complainant sent demand letters to respondent, Lim, and Chua, respectively, for the
return of the amount of her manager's check.22

In a Letter23 dated October 9, 2015, Chua of Grand Pillar, through Atty. Ericson Chang Aguila
(Atty. Aguila), replied claiming good faith in receiving the check as settlement for the obligation of
Lim, who was represented by respondent lawyer in Civil Case No. 119-0-2008. The letter reads:

Had it not been for the action, representation, and assurance of Atty. Nini D. Cruz that said
manager's check was plaintiff Josephine Lim's means of paying or settling the remaining balance
of P1,994,769.50, x x x to my client, defendant Grand Pillar International Development, Inc., my
client would not have filed an Urgent Motion for Release of Payment involving the same check. x x
x [M]y client acted in utmost good faith and without any malice or deceit whatsoever.

If there is anyone who should be held responsible, accountable, and liable criminally, civilly, and
administratively x x x it should only be Atty. Nini D. Cruz, and all persons behind her, in
knowingly, willfully, and deliberately issuing and tendering said manager's check as plaintiff
Josephine Lim's full payment and settlement of the remaining balance of P1,995,769.50 x x x due
to my client, Grand Pillar International Development, Inc.

Rest assured that my client is also very seriously contemplating on instituting the necessary
criminal, civil, and administrative actions against Atty. Nini D. Cruz x x x. 24 (Underscoring
supplied)

On November 5, 2015, complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City a
criminal Complaint25 for qualified theft against respondent, Lim, and Chua. In the
Information26 dated July 14, 2016, respondent and Lim were charged with qualified theft in
Criminal Case No. 2016-1398.

Imputing moral obliquity to respondent's character, complainant refers to the Informations both
dated August 17, 1999 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25660 and 25661, 27 wherein the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) charged respondent with two counts of falsification of public document
before the Sandiganbayan. Complainant claims that the criminal cases are now pending with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 847-04 and 848-04. Complainant
also avers that on May 24, 2005, the OMB, through a Joint Decision 28 in administrative cases
docketed as OMB-L-A-04-0651-J and OMB-L-A-04-0652-J, recommended for the dismissal of
respondent, as then Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, from the government service on the ground
of dishonesty.

Complainant, therefore, prays that respondent lawyer be disbarred.

The Court's Ruling

Respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

In disbarment cases, complainant bears the burden of proof to satisfactorily prove the allegations
in his/her complaint through substantial evidence;29 that is, such "relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 30

In this case, complainant submitted the following documents to prove her allegations: (1) Letter
of Intent31 dated July 5, 2013 drafted and signed by respondent, offering PNB the amount of P2.5
Million for the repurchase of complainant's ancestral home; (2) Complaint32 dated July 18, 2013
for judicial consignation of the subject property filed by respondent with the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 86-0-2013; (3) Photocopy of Manager's Check No. 000030071433 dated September
8, 2014 designating the RTC as payee, in the amount of P2 Million as bond in the consignation
complaint; (4) Photocopy34 of Manager's Check No. 0000300714 signed by respondent indicating
her receipt of the check on September 14, 2014;  (5) Copy of the RTC Order35 dated July 31, 2014
dismissing complainant's consignation complaint on the ground of forum shopping; (6) Atty.
Aquino's Letter-Reply36 dated October 7, 2015, clarifying that complainant's Manager's Check was
withdrawn by Chua of Grand Pillar for the settlement of the obligation of Lim, who was
represented by respondent in Civil Case No. 119-0-2008;  (7) Complainant's Demand
Letters37 sent to respondent, Chua, and Lim for the return of the amount of her Manager's Check;
(8) Atty. Aguila's Letter38 dated October 9, 2015 claiming that Chua received complainant's
Manager's Check in good faith from respondent as settlement of Lim's obligation in Civil Case No.
119-0-2008; and (9) Information39 dated July 14, 2016, charging respondent and Lim with
qualified theft before the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2016-1398.

The Court finds that the totality of evidence submitted by complainant has clearly, satisfactorily,
and convincingly shown that respondent has authored deplorable acts.
Respondent was dishonest when she concealed from complainant that Civil Case No. 86-0-2013
had already been dismissed by the RTC on July 31, 2014. She even went to the extent of
instructing complainant to purchase the subject manager's check purportedly as bond for the
consignation of the subject property. Indeed, respondent deceived complainant when she
impressed upon the latter the need for such bond, despite the prior dismissal of Civil Case No. 86-
0-2013. Consistent with her dishonest acts, respondent got hold of complainant's manager's
check through deceitful assurances. Respondent, then, defrauded complainant by
misappropriating the latter's manager's check as settlement for the obligation of another client in
another case. In doing so, she likewise deceived the RTC into believing that complainant's
manager's check was issued for Civil Case No. 119-0-2008, to which complainant was not a party.

Interestingly, for reasons only known to her, respondent has opted to remain silent despite such
serious charges. After the disbarment case was filed, respondent repeatedly failed to file her
comment despite due notice. From the issuance of the Court's first Resolution on February 3,
2016 requiring her to file comment, to the issuance of Resolution dated February 24, 2020
submitting the case for resolution, an overwhelming period of about four years had already
passed. During said period, respondent was reasonably accorded a chance to file her comment,
and was even issued a "show cause" Order on August 19, 2019 for her repeated failure to do so.
Failing to refute the allegations levelled against her despite several opportunities to do so,
respondent is either not at all interested in clearing her name or simply has nothing to say in her
defense.

Relevant to respondent's reticence is Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson,40 wherein the Court said:

The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend
himself. It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face
of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission
of the truth thereof.

In this case, respondent has left the Court with no choice, but to deduce her implicit admission of
the charges against her. Qui tacet consentire videtur. Silence gives consent.41

In In Re: Sotto,42 the Court emphasized "possession of good moral character" as a core
qualification for members of the bar, thus:

One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good
moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a
series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an
upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards
the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty
of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the
ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his
professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude,
including any act contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals. 43 "It is an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 44 The Code exacts from lawyers
"not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship."45

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court imposes the penalty of disbarment or suspension for
deceitful and dishonest acts, as follows:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
[willful] disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, in any of the following circumstances, to wit:  (1) deceit; (2)  malpractice; (3) gross

misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; or (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; the Court is vested
with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension.

In CF Sharp Crew Management. Inc. v. Torres,46 the Court disbarred respondent therein for failing
to account for and for misappropriating the various amounts he received from his client. Similarly,
in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,47 the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating the
client's money intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf.

As discussed earlier, respondent's established deplorable conduct exhibited her unfitness and
sheer inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. Her
dishonest, deceitful and fraudulent conduct of misappropriating complainant's manager's check,
as well as her act of misleading the RTC in Civil Case No. 119-0-2008, evinces a serious flaw in
her moral fiber justifying the extreme penalty of disbarment.

Lastly, respondent is liable to refund complainant the amount of P2 Million representing Manager's
Check No. 0000300714, plus 6% interest per annum from the date of demand, or on October 12,
2015, 48 until full payment.49

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nini D. Cruz, having clearly violated her Lawyer's Oath and the
Canons of Professional Responsibility through her dishonest, deceitful and fraudulent conduct,
is DISBARRED and her name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Atty. Nini D. Cruz is ORDERED to refund the amount of P2 Million representing complainant's
manager's check, plus 6% interest per annum from October 12, 2015, until full payment.

Let copies of this Decision be served to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Nini D. Cruz's
record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Delos
Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on May 4, 2021 a Decision copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-
entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 27, 2021 at 10:40 a.m.

A.C. No. 12197 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3355) - CORAZON E. RECIO, Complainant, v. ATTYS.
ULPIANO S. MADAMBA AND MANOLITO M. APOSTOL, JR., Respondents.
A.C. No. 12197 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3355), June 16, 2021
DECISION
INTING, J.:
The Court resolves the Complaint1 filed by Corazon E. Recio (Recio) against Atty. Ulpiano S. Madamba (Atty.
Madamba) and Atty. Manolito M. Apostol, Jr. (collectively, respondents) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for alleged abuse of court processes in violation of the Lawyer 's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Antecedents
2
On July 26, 2004, Recio filed a Complaint  for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against
Amalgamated Motors Philippines, Inc. (AMPI) who was a client of respondents at that time.
On February 23, 2006, the LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. 3 The LA ruled that there was no
constructive dismissal in Recio's case because her transfer of office from Quezon City to San Fernando,
Pampanga was done by AMPI in good faith in order to serve its corporate needs. 4
Aggrieved, Recio appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In its Decision5 dated March 25, 2009, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's ruling. It found AMPI liable for
constructive dismissal in view of: (1) Recio's demotion from transport secretary to clerical staff with no valid
reason, and (2) her sudden reassignment to San Fernando, Pampanga despite having served the company in its
Manila office for 19 years.6 The NLRC further explained that under the circumstances, Recio's continued
employment in AMPI had become impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely because of the company's vindictive
actions against her for joining a labor union. Thus, the NLRC awarded Recio P767,542.82 representing her
backwages and separation pay.7
Thereafter, respondents, as counsel for AMPI, filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the
motion in its Resolution8 dated July 31, 2009. As a consequence, respondents filed a Petition
for Certiorari9 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the NLRC Decision
and Resolution. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110950. 10
While the case was pending resolution with the CA, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment 11 dated November
25, 2009 stating that its Decision dated March 25, 2009 and Resolution de.ted July 31, 2009 had become final
and executory on October 17, 2009. Thus, on January 4, 2010, Recio filed a Motion for Execution of the NLRC
Decision and Resolution.12 Despite respondents' opposition thereto, the LA granted the motion in an
Order13 dated February 1, 2010 and issued the corresponding Writ of Execution in favor of Recio.
Undeterred, respondents elevated the matter before the NLRC, arguing that the NLRC Decision and Resolution
cannot be the subject of an order of execution while AMPI's certiorari  petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 110950 was
still pending with the CA.14 Moreover, respondents also filed a complaint for damages and injunction against
Recio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging that she had committed wrongful acts when she insisted to
implement the NLRC Decision and Resolution.15
In its Resolution16 dated August 31, 2010, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It pointed out that
the Decision dated March 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated July 31, 2009 had already attained finality per the
Entry of Judgment dated November 25, 2009. Moreover, the NLRC noted that the CA had not issued any order
staying the execution of the judgment against AMPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 110950. Thus, it concluded that the LA
did not commit an error in issuing the Writ of Execution in Recio's favor. 17
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC dismissed the motion in its Resolution 18 dated January
31, 2011 and thereafter issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment on March 7, 2011. 19
Proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 110950
Meanwhile, the CA, in its Decision20 dated July 9, 2010, affirmed the NLRC Decision dated March 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated July 31, 2009 in toto. It agreed with the NLRC that Recio had been forced to quit or abandon
her job by reason of AMPI's disfavor over her membership in a labor union that resulted not only in her
demotion to a clerical position, but also her sudden reassignment in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated October 1, 2010.
Consequently, on October 27, 2010, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Court assailing the CA Decision and Resolution. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
194035.21
In its Resolution22 dated November 24, 2010, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. It upheld the
finding of the lower tribunals that Recio had been constructively dismissed by AMPI due to her membership in a
labor union. It likewise denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents in its Resolution
dated March 7, 2011.23 Notably, the Resolution dated November 24, 2010 had already become final and
executory per the Entry of Judgment24 dated March 15, 2011.
Proceedings after the finality of the Court's
Resolution in G.R. No. 194035
On September 30, 2010, Recio moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the LA, citing the
NLRC Resolution dated August 31, 2010.
In the Order25 dated May 5, 2011, the LA granted Recio's motion and issued an Alias Writ of Execution in her
favor. The LA pointed out that the NLRC ruling, which denied respondents' appeal regarding the issuance of the
Writ of Execution, had already attained finality. 26 Thus, there was no longer any question as to whether the
execution of the NLRC Decision dated March 25, 2009 and Resolution dated July 31, 2009 should proceed.
Still unperturbed, respondents once again appealed before the NLRC on May 17, 2011. The NLRC, however,
denied the appeal in its Decision27 dated November 16, 2011 as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondents in its Resolution28 dated December 28, 2011.
On January 11, 2012, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari29 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA
challenging the NLRC Decision dated November 16, 2011 and Resolution dated December 28, 2011. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122848.
This prompted Recio to file the present disbarment complaint against respondents before the IBP. In her
complaint, Recio alleged that respondents had utilized their legal knowledge in order to unjustifiably delay the
execution of the NLRC Decision dated March 25, 2009 awarding her backwages and separation pay of
P767,542.82 which had long attained finality. 30
For their part, respondents denied that they deliberately delayed the disposition of the subject case against
AMPI and justified their actions by stating that they were duty-bound to support the cause of their client within
the legal means provided under pertinent rules and in line with recent jurisprudence. 31
The IBP Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation32 dated June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner found that
respondents had glaringly abused and misused the legal processes in order to unduly delay the execution of the
judgment in favor of Recio,33  viz.:
The complainant Corazon E. Recio's repeated attempt[s] to execute the money judgment involving her
backwages and separation pay, despite its finality, have been thwarted by the legal maneuverings and
stratagem perpetrated by the respondents Attorneys Madamba and Apostol. The frivolous appeals to the NLRC
of the orders of execution and the alias writ thereof, as well as the filing of multiple Petitions for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals which were consistently dismissed, should not be countenanced. 34
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondents be suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the
CPR.35
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-65036 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner's findings and recommendation to suspend respondents from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
Respondents separately moved for reconsideration.37 They likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss38 together with
Recio, citing a Compromise Agreement [With Waiver, Release, and Quitclaim] 39 between the parties wherein
they agreed to move for the dismissal of all pending cases between them.
However, in its Resolution No. XXIII-2017-03740 dated August 31, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether respondents should be held administratively liable for their
actions.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors, but modifies its recommendation as to the
proper penalty, taking into serious consideration the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter as well as the
gravity of respondents' transgressions.
While it is true that lawyers are, by all means, given the autonomy to defend the cause of their clients with
utmost zeal, this is not without reasonable limitations. After all, as members of the Bar, their first and primary
duty, is not to secure the success of their clients, but to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.41
In the case, it is clear that respondents' filing of multiple motions and cases before the LA, the NLRC, the RTC,
the CA, and even the Court had been intended to delay the execution of the NLRC Decision dated March 25,
2009, which found respondents' client liable for constructive dismissal and awarded Recio backwages and
separation pay of P767,542.82.
As a matter of fact, the records show that respondents continued to block the execution of the NLRC Decision
through various legal maneuverings despite the absence of any order from the CA staying the execution of the
NLRC's final judgment; notwithstanding the two Entries of Judgment issued by the NLRC – the   first pertaining to
the finality of its Decision on the main case, and the second on the validity of the Writ of Execution issued by
the LA.
To make matters worse, respondents proceeded with their strategy to delay the execution of the NLRC Decision
even after the Court itself had ruled on the matter with finality in G.R. No. 194035 wherein it upheld the NLRC's
award of backwages and separation pay in Recio's favor. To this end, respondents again questioned the LA's
issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution before the NLRC and then with the CA via another certiorari petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122848. This time, respondents argued that the NLRC Decision could not be executed despite its
finality on account of a ''supervening event" in the form of a supposed Notice to Work requiring Recio to report
back to work.42
Notably, the CA, in its Decision dated October 30, 2012, dismissed the  certiorari petition in view of the Court's
final ruling in G.R. No. 194035,  viz.:
No less than the Supreme Court has already put an end to this controversy that petitioners are still tenaciously
resurrecting. Furthermore, the notice to report could hardly be considered newly[-]discovered evidence. In the
first place, it was petitioner, through its responsible officer, which issued the same. It should have known its
existence at the very dale it was issued. To even argue that it merely discovered the issuance of a notice it itself
sent on a later date is beyond belief. In addition, there was no proof that the same letter was received by
private respondent. Even if submitted on time, the notice to report carries with it no weight for being self-
serving.43
What is more disturbing though is the CA's conclusion that Atty. Madamba, whose signature appeared in the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, had filed the certiorari petition without the required
authority from their client. For clarity and precision, the pertinent portion of the CA Decision is quoted below:
At the outset, we must agree with private respondent's observation that the person authorized by the Board of
Directors of petitioner company to prepare, sign and file the instant petition for certiorari and other pleadings,
papers and documents relative hereto, on its behalf, is a certain Genesis M. delos Reyes. However, in the
petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, it was Atty. Ulpiano S. Madamba who signed it.
xxxx
In this case, Atty. Madamba was not specifically authorized by the board of directors to file the
petition and to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of petitioners. Neither AMPI nor
Atty. Madamba himself explained the relationship of Mr. delos Reyes, the authorized person, with Atty.
Madamba. There is no other conclusion but that Atty. Madamba was not authorized by AMPI to file the instant
petition.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on these considerations, there is no question that respondents have made a mockery of the judicial
system by abusing and misusing court processes in order to unduly delay the execution of a final judgment , in
clear violation of the Lawyer's Oath which proscribes lawyers from delaying any man tor money or malice, as
well as Rule 1.03, Canon 1, Rule 10.03, Canon 10, and Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR which
provide:
Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.02 — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
In so doing, respondents also breached their duties under Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
xxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law;
xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any
corrupt motive or interest.
xxx
In their defense, respondents claim that the legal actions they have undertaken thus far in their client's behalf
are in line with pertinent procedural rules as well as the latest pronouncements of the Court. 45 In particular,
respondents insist that the NLRC Decision in this case was not immediately executory in view of the pendency of
their  certiorari petition with the CA.46
Respondents, however, could not be more wrong. After all, it is well settled that the NLRC has a  ministerial
duty to issue an entry of judgment  unless a restraining order is issued by the CA.47 In other words, the filing of
a certiorari petition, by itself, will not stay the execution of an otherwise final judgment by the NLRC. 48 Here,
there was no valid reason to delay the execution of the NLRC Decision because the CA never issued any
restraining order to that effect in favor of respondents' client.
Besides, respondents' assertions do not justify why they continued to delay the execution of the NLRC Decision
despite the finality of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 194035. To recall, the LA issued its second order of
execution of the NLRC Decision on May 5, 2011, or after the Court's Resolution dated November 24, 2010 in
G.R. No. 194035 became final and executory. Still, respondents again challenged the execution of the judgment
before the NLRC and the CA in a clear disregard of the Court's pronouncements in G.R. No. 194035.
By their own actions, respondents have demonstrated a lack of respect for the Court and its legal processes,
which, in itself, is tantamount to willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the Supreme Court in violation of
Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
Given the unjustified delay in the execution of the NLRC Decision, it should come as no surprise that Recio
eventually gave her consent to settle the labor dispute out of court as evidenced by the Compromise Agreement
[With Waiver, Release and Quitclaim] dated October 3, 2013, wherein she agreed to receive the amount of
P450,000.00 instead of the original monetary award totaling to P767,542.82 per the Entry of Judgment issued
by the Court dated November 24, 2010. This clearly shows that the dilatory tactics that respondents employed
for several years in order to frustrate the execution of the NLRC Decision had actually worked to the detriment
not just of Recio, but the legal profession and the judicial system as a whole.
In similar cases involving the abuse and misuse of court processes, 49 the Court has imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law against erring lawyers for a period ranging from six (6) months to two (2)
years. In this case, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year against respondents, in view of the multiplicity of motions and cases that they filed in order to
unduly delay the execution of the NLRC judgment, their apparent lack of remorse for their actions, and the
damage and prejudice they have caused the complainant.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Attys. Ulpiano S. Madamba and Manolito M. Apostol, Jr. GUILTY of
violating the Lawyer's Oath as well as Rule 1.03, Canon 1, Rule 10.03, Canon 10, and Rules 12.02 and 2.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. They are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon their receipt of the Decision.
Attys. Ulpiano S. Madamba and Manolito M. Apostol, Jr. are DIRECTED to immediately file their manifestations
to the Court stating that their suspension has started, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
when they have entered their appearances as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the personal records
of Attys. Ulpiano S. Madamba and Manolito M. Apostol, Jr., and the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson), Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur. Hernando, J., on official leave.
In re Luis Tagorda, GR No 32329, March 23, 1929.

FACTS:
 The respondent, Luis B Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of

Isabela admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and

Ilocano. Stating, therein, that he is a notary public and a candidate for third member of the board. Further,

respondent also admits that he is the author of a letter address to a lieutenant of barrio in his home

municipality written in Ilocano, with the following statements: “I will attend the sessions of the Board in

Iligan, but will come back home on the following day to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary

public”, “I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public”, and “if the people in your locality

have not as yet contacted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land

titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would change only three pesos for every

registration.”

ISSUE:

Won respondent violated Canon 27 and Canon 28 of the Code of Ethics

HELD:

Yes, respondent violated Canon 27 and Canon 28 of the Code of Ethics because the practice of

soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,

constitutes malpractice. It is the duty of the court to condemn in no certain terms the ugly practice of

solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards

of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of

the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

PENALTY: Due to mitigating circumstances, respondent is suspended from practice of law for one

(1) month.
In re Luis B. TAGORDA

March 23, 1929

FACTS

In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. He admits that during his campaign, he made use
of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which, in translation means that he is a lawyer and a notary public; and that
as a notary public he can do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, can renew lost documents, and etc.;
that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; and that he is willing to serve the
poor. The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality advising the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice
law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding
preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of
three pesos.

ISSUE Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.

HELD

Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.

Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he was unaware
of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.

DECISION

Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, March 23, 1929
FACTS:

Atty. Tagorda, in his card written in Spanish and Ilocano, noted his capability as a lawyer such as executing 
a deed of sale, collection of loans, etc. Also, in his letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home muni
cipality, he also advertised his profession as a lawyer and even asked a favor to disseminate this information 
to the barrio people in any of their meetings or social gatherings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda through the card and letter is wrong and be punished.

RULING: Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect advertising and stirring up litigation were vio
lative of the Code of Ethics. Still, the most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young la
wyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professio
nal capacity and fidelity to trust.

It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases b
y lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It wo
rks against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless 
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as 
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaw
are of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to 
commit a similar mistake in the future. Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.

SECOND DIVISION| [G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.]

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA
Duran & Lim for Respondent.
 Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND CANONS 27 AND 28 OF THE CODE OF ETHICS
ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION
CONSTRUED AND APPLIED; SOLICITATION OF CASES BY AN ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION. — Application is given to section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2828, providing: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent
lawyer.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The law is a profession and not a business.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and the commission of offenses of this character
amply justices permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. As a result, the
respondent attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"LUIS B. TAGORDA
"Attorney
"Notary Public
"CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
"Province of Isabela
"(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
willing to help and serve the poor.)"

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

"MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction
into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my hose at any time here in
Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

"I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the sessions of the Board in Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite
my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and
notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can
always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will received any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.
"I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified
to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make
it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague.

"I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.

"Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) "LUIS TAGORDA

"Attorney

"Notary Public." cralaw virtua1aw library

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section
21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the
bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended
by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."cralaw virtua1aw library

The statue as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of
a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but
must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience,
is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling,
and are intolerable.

"28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a

lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it
is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action
and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out
those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attachés or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the
sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public
and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices
upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may
be disbarred." cralaw virtua1aw library

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a
number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State v. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17
Ann. Cas., 625; People v. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That

should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly,
the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon he action which should here be taken. The
provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the
oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that
our action should go further than this if only to reflect out attitude toward cases of this character
of which unfortunately the respondent’s is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working
in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety
of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience mistake in the future. A modest period of
suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly
understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to be relatively lenient in this particular instance, and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis
B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of
one month from April 1, 1929.

Street, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.|||Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions OSTRAND, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand
would have been sufficient punishment.

Republic of the Philippines| SUPREME COURT | Manila| FIRST DIVISION | A.C. No. 6672  |September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and expeditious collection on
their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services
instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card: 6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other
canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting
cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition
would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended
penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice
in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent
or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business
as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon
3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avvphi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client
list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his
office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic
notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment
may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as
his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in
its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of
his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the exercise of the
Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility
of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. 27 For
this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon
3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of
this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO

Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance
and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should
be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant
presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the
Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to
uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business
LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO| A.C. No. 6672| September 4, 2009
FACTS:

• There was a complaint for disbarment filed by LINSANGAN against Atty. TOLENTINO for solicitation of clients
and encroachment of professional services.

– LINSANGAN alleged that TOLENTINO, with the help of a paralegal, LABIANO, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. TOLENTINO promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

• LINSANGAN presented an affidavit attesting that LABIANO tried to prevail upon a client to sever his lawyer-
client relations with LINSANGAN and utilize TOLENTINO's services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. 

• LINSANGAN also attached TOLENTINO's calling card.

• TOLENTINO denied knowing LABIANO and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.

• The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.

• The CBD recommended that TOLENTINO be reprimanded as it found that he:

– had encroached on the professional practice of LINSANGAN, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility

– contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court

ISSUE/S:• W.O.N. Tolentino's actions warrant disbarment

RULING:

• SC adopts the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of TOLENTINO but modifies the recommended
penalty.
• The means employed by TOLENTINO in furtherance of the said misconduct constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
• • Canon 3, CPR provides:
– A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.
– The practice of law is a profession and not a business. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
• • Rule 2.03, CPR provides:
– A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
– Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
• • Rule 1.03, CPR which provides:
– A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
– This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.
• TOLENTINO clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• TOLENTINO also committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice, in violation of
• • Rule 8.02, CPR
– A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
• Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, TOLENTINO violated:
• • Rule 16.04, CPR
– A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
• • The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as
well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. 
• Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. 
• Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
• • Atty. TOLENTINO for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of 1 year .
• Lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: lawyers name; name of the
law firm with which he is connected; address; telephone number and special branch of law practiced.

FACTS
Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent,
with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to said respondent
with the promise of financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of
James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and use
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tolentino’s actions violate Rule 2.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: YES. The court adopted the findings of the IBP on unethical conduct of the respondent whereby it found the
respondent to have encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 2.03 of the CPR which
provides:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection
with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
Rule 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. Based on such, Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is found to have violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, of the CPR and
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 SC | EN BANC|

A.M. No. P-03-1690            April 4, 2003

(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363 ||April 4, 2003 ||
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC             April 4, 2003
IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF HIS
PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively
charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in
performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service
Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.

In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party
litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus
amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that
he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked
from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for
amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed
to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and
divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a monetary
consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).1

Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit, 2 and members of the court
staff,3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court
premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's affidavit
also corroborated Judge Paas' allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and
thereafter stay out of the office.

Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000, 4 attested that the alleged
printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails posted in
the Pasay City Post Office on said date.

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City Jail,
by their respective affidavits,5 attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention
prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release Orders.

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,6 denied Judge Paas' charges, and alleged that the real reason
why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty.
Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she
resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the
following invectives before the other employees of the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita,
pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted that he
sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of oppression and abuse
of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated him as follows:
"Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong
resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification;" the next day, the Judge, on seeing him,
told him "Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her
chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver
kita."
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC
Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court;
and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-complaint 7 against Judge Paas and went to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told
him that they should forget all about it.

On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of court
orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because Judge
Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for
helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the court's mail matters were always sealed
whenever he received them for mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed
matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail,
because the money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office,
he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their
personal driver and messenger.

As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to
undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000, 8 even if he had no history of drug abuse on a
periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his examination. 9

The Court treated respondent's Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1363.

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to
Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas' husband,
private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife's office as his office address in his law practice, in support of
which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch
109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-
37) which indicated Atty. Paas' address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City, 10 the office assigned to
Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.

Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate
proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-
SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12 of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted
their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit13 wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter was using
Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds
office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit
his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when he
lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her
birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for
any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas' law
partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15 attesting that he is holding office at the
above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court
personnel16 attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never
used the court in the practice of his profession.

On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit 17 wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did
use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198, "People vs.
Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-
37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but
after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.

By Resolution of February 12, 2002, 18 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap
submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002. 19
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002. 20

I. OCA Findings and Recommendations

A. On the charges against Almarvez:

The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of exacting money
from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and
insubordination. Given Almarvez' unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to
June 2000,21 July to December 2000,22 and January to April 2001,23 however, the OCA recommended that he be
duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month suspension without
pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed
to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the
later portion of this decision.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting evidence,
recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however,
that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of supervision and control over court personnel for her
personal pride, prejudice and pettiness"24 when she issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering
Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded
that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for
evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against him.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in office, and be
penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

II. This Court's Findings:

A. On the charges against Almarvez:

Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of confidentiality of
official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas' complaint-affidavit which
reads:

That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is confidential in
nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the release of Court Order and
Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party
detrimental to the due administration of justice.25

in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet the same.

As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of
court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to what is reflected in his
performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.

On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any evidence to
support the charge, the affiants jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive money from
detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their
claim remains hearsay, Almarvez' categorical denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their
affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.

As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the office, again
Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in
evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum 26 requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the
office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on
those dates indicating that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and
13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 2000 27 memorandum,
which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II
of the Dangerous Drug Board.28 As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez' explanation that he was
actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court 29 was not controverted.

On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he should be faulted
therefor:

The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January to June
2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his
official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is
tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No.
292, quoted as follows:

"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal
through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the
prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right."

The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from the
Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth
in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder
quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to
improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating
for the period April to June 2001 with a "very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer
be appropriate30 (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings of the OCA
reads:

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.

(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped
from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in
writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding
unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not
later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall
enable the employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is thus in order.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate
the same.

Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to
employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but
is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering
that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion
that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for
which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.

C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:

By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit, 31 she was aware that her
husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court.
As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending
a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment
by other judges or court personnel." 32

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting
Respect for their Officials and Employers" reads:

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and enhanced.
In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must:

1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary action under,
as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully
comply with the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);

2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;

xxx           xxx           xxx

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial
functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)

SC Circular No. 3-92,33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR

COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be
devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for
carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case
involving unauthorized and improper use of the court's premises for dwelling purposes by respondent
and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty
of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best
interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that
such use of the court's premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to
exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage. (emphasis supplied.)

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed
"allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct"34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less
serious charge under the Rules of Court35 and is punishable under the same Rule. 36

A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not only in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is premised on
the truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and
that upon a Judge's attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary. 37

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no purpose
other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a
member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
 Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM
ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking on his relationship with a member of the
bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is
unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of court
orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office of
Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no
showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary
arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyer's
oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to
breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds:

(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby
SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;

(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;

(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,

(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92
and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of
TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely; and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
appended to respondents' personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
 JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales

FACTS:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Estrellita Paas administratively charged Almarvez, a Court
Aide/Utility Worker, with discourtesy to his fellow employees, neglect in performing duties (by not maintaining the
cleanliness around the court premises and often being absent from work), and solicitation of money (from prisoners
before serving them their Release Orders, and from litigants by offering to divulge confidential information in
advance of its unauthorized release).

 The Court found that the aforementioned charges were not supported by evidence since those who filed
affidavits as evidence against Almarvez were not present at the hearings. The only offense which Almarvez was
found to commit was inefficiency in the discharge of his duties. Thus he was suspended for 3 months.

Almarvez filed a counterclaim alleging that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a drug test after the latter
had already filed an administrative complaint against him. Regarding this, the court held that this elicits the suspicion
that the Judge is just fishing for more evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against
Almarvez. This was held to constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which  Judge Paas should
be duly reprimanded.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was found that Judge Paas’ husband, Atty.
Paas, who is a private practitioner, was using his wife’s office address in his law practice; particularly in a criminal
case he was handling which was docketed at an RTC also in Pasay. In support of this charge, documents were
submitted such as 1) a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, and 2) notices from Pasay City RTC, and from the
Supreme Court.

This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she claims that this was done only to ensure and facilitate the delivery
of those notices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Estrellita Paas and Atty. Renerio Paas should be penalized for allowing the latter to use
the office of the former as his return address in his private practice.

HELD:
Yes. Using the Judge office address is improper. In Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 01-99, it was
stated that court officials and employees must “never use their offices…for any other purpose that for court or
judicial functions.”

Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities and shall not allow
the use of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others. Supreme Court Circular No. 3-92 prohibits the
use of halls of justice for residential or commercial purposes. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to misuse a public
office to enhance a lawyer’s prestige. It violates canons 3, 10, 13, and 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Paas is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law, while Judge Paas shall pay a fine of
Php12,000.
 SC| EN BANC | A.C. No. 5580| June 15, 2005

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V.

LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a Petition1 for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for using the title "Judge" despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct
in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.2

The facts are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human
Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case3 against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of
the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224
was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961
but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for
SJHAI’s conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner’s Board of Directors terminated
respondent’s services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No.
18014 entitled "San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing
conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.

In her Report4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:

… Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the
Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active
board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and
its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano
and Co. Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and
yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.
…
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn’t controverted by the Complainant
which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject
to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him. 5

The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that
respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity
and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the
Court of Appeals6 and this Court7 and even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution
in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found
guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was
erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation,8 respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the
second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first
disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge", respondent stated that since
the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name.

On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. 9

Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate the admonition
because it referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never
questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal
until the case was terminated.

The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he used the title
"Judge", thus creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:

In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the following penalty
range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand
to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is further recommended that in addition to the
penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to Respondent in that should he violate his
undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the Complainant would be the adverse
party and/or should he again use the title of "Judge" which would create an impression that he is still
connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more
severe penalty shall be imposed against him.

Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent
Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued
representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as
the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his
oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure.
Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent’s continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from
using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice
he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead
the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably
stripped of the privilege.

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the
pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.

In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party
litigant. We ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his
resignation during the pendency of this case. … Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing
respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]),
wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds application in this
case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an
administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule. …
…
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave
and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned
during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela ( supra.),
hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which herein
respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.

SO ORDERED.10

The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits
and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations. Certainly, the use of the title ‘Judge’ is one of such privileges.

We have previously declared that the use of titles such as "Justice" is reserved
to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and
may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of "Justice". 11 By
analogy, the title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not to those who
were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the
bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as
respondent.

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. 12 It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. 13 Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. 14

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are]
most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who
violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession. 15

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons, 16 and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a
member of the bar.17

This is not respondent’s first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He
was stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.18 In A.C. No.
4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should
have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary,
he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus
unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an
officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.  – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent’s record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur
San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos (2018)

Petitioners: SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS REPRESENTED BY REBECCA

V. LABRADOR
Respondents: ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS
Ponente: Per Curiam (En Banc)
Topic: Legal Ethics

SUMMARY: The SC denied Labrador’s petition to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

DOCTRINE: In the case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

FACTS: The SC had found Romanillos guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule
1.01, 3.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment
from the practice of law.
Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, Romanillos filed the
instant Letter once more praying for the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUES:

 WoN Romanillos may be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys

o NO. Here, while more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on
June 15, 2005, Romanillos's present appeal has failed to show substantial proof of his
reformation as required in the first guideline above.
o The Court is not persuaded by Romanillos's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While
he expressly asks for forgiveness for his transgressions in his letters to the Court,
Romanillos continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict of interest
notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary.
o Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by Romanillos all claim that Romanillos
is a person of good moral character without explaining why or submitting proof
in support thereof. The only ostensible proof of reformation that Romanillos has
presented are the following:
 1. The Letter dated March 7, 2017 signed by Domingo L. Mapa, President of
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., averring that Romanillos is "one with
[them] in pursuing [their] advocacies in [their] scholarship x x x;"
  2. The Letter dated March 13, 2017 signed by Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez, claiming that
Romanillos has been active in community affairs while staying in Cebu;
 3. The undated Letter signed by Sol Owen G. Figues, humbly asking that
Romanillos be reinstated again in order for him to "continue his [G]ood Samaritan
work to the common people that seeks justice and guidance in times of trouble and
grief;"
 4. The undated Letter of Arnaldo C. Cuasay, the brother-in-law of Romanillos,
stating that after his disbarment, Romanillos provided community services in
Muntinlupa and in his hometown in Cebu;
 5. The Letter dated March 14, 2017 signed by Rolando L. Sianghio, President of
Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation, stating that Romanillos rendered voluntary service
as Adviser- Consultant of the Directors of the Habitat for Humanity in their
programs for housing for the poor;
 6. The Letter dated March 17, 2017 signed by Antonio E. De Borja, a friend of
Romanillos, where Borja claimed that Romanillos provides free legal assistance to
the poor, who were victims of injustice, through his son who is also a lawyer;
 7. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Leonardo U. Lindo, a friend of
Romanillos, which stated that Romanillos is "[a strong supporter of their] social
[and] civic activities to provide free medical services to the less fortunate members
of the society;"
 8. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay,
Chairman and President of Asian+ Council of Leaders, Administrators, Deans and
Educators in Business, stating that he personally knows Romanillos having served
together in their church and community service with the Knights of Columbus in the
mid-2000s until the present; and
 9. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Carolina L. Nielsen, a neighbor of
Romanillos, where she claimed that Romanillos "[graciously rendered free legal
advice to her and her family.]"
o Still, aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual
engagements or activities by which Romanillos had served the members of his community
or church, provided free legal assistance to the poor and supported social and civic
activities to provide free medical services to the. less fortunate, hence, insufficient to
demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.
o The other testimonials which Romanillos submitted, particularly that of Ernesto M.
Caringal, President of Abcar International Construction Corporation, who stated that "[he
hired Romanillos as Vice President for Administration of his company even after] he was
disbarred in 2005," and that of Police Senior Superintendent Marino Ravelo (Ret.), who
stated that "[he is the business partner of Romanillos] in the sourcing and supply of nickel
and chromite raw ores from Zambales to [their] local customers," all relate to Romanillos's
means of livelihood after he was disbarred; hence, these are incompetent evidence to
prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement subsequent to his
disbarment. If at all, these testimonials contradict Romanillos's claim that he and his family
were having financial difficulties due to his disbarment.
o To add, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his potential for
public service, or that he - now being 71 years of age - still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third
and fourth guidelines were neither complied with.

Notes: Appeal Denied.

 A.C. No. 5580
June 15, 2005
San Jose Homeowners Association Inc., vs. Romanillos

Facts:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for
violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot
No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands
in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for
SJHAI’s conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano. When the
request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner’s Board of Directors terminated respondent’s services as
counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association. Respondent also acted as counsel for
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in a Civil Case. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case
against respondent for representing conflicting interests.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent is liable for grave and serious misconduct.

Ruling:

Yes, respondent is liable.

The court held that, it is undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI,
DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he
continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI. It is inconsequential that petitioner never
questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of
opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Wherefore, the court hereby disbars Atty. Romanillos.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL
E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO
TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized
in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using
the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985]

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel.
He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership
organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents,
aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

ISSUE: Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the Philippines.

HELD: NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

RATIO:

Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

[R]espondents’ use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation that being associated with the
firm they could “render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment”. This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to
practice law here.

Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985]
FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under
the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres
used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie
Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the
letterhead of another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie. 
 Republic of the Philippines||SUPREME COURT||Manila||EN BANC

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC               August 28, 2009

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID1 TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM
PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008.2 The resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid 3 (NCLA)
to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the
various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 provided:

RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008

RESOLUTION OF THE IBP–MISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE
TO REQUEST THE COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION
CENTER AND PROSECUTOR’S OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING,
DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid
Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as ["]Guideline[s] on Legal
Aid["]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may
often lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should
therefore unde[r]ly all legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum possible
assistance to indigent and deserving members of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which
legal aid may be necessary to forestall injustice.
WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should
be as close as possible to those who are in need thereof – the masses. Hence, every chapter of the IBP must
establish and operate an adequate legal aid office.
WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBP–Misamis Oriental Chapter has long been operational, providing free
legal services to numerous indigent clients, through the chapter’s members who render volunteer services in the
spirit of public service;
WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation centers and prosecutor’s offices are
collecting fees, be they filing, docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original proceedings or
on appeal;
WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used by the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are
disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting
defenses, and other similar causes;
WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment of docket and other fees for cases, be they
original proceedings or on appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16–D of R.A. 9406 (PAO Law), without
the need for the filing of any petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants;
WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the
same benefits or privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of docket and other fees before
the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutor’s offices;
WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional strain to
their next to non-existent finances;
WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter
is insufficient to even cover the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less answer for the
payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutor’s offices and
mediation fees collected by the Philippine Mediation Center;
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBP–Misamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it
is hereby resolved, to move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary requests or
representations with the Supreme Court, the Philippine Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and the
National Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients, towards the
end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically exempted from the filing of the abovementioned fees;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable
Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors, Secretary of
Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial bodies and their local offices;
RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and National Officers to make the necessary
representations with the National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the House of
Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of docket, filing
and or other fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutor’s offices and the mediation
centers.
Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City.
Unanimously approved upon motion severally seconded. 4
The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the IBP, through the NCLA, to comment
thereon.5
In a comment dated December 18, 2008,6 the IBP, through the NCLA, made the following comments:
(a) Under Section 16-D of RA7 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys’ Office (PAO) are exempt from the
payment of docket and other fees incidental to the institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial
bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the same
exemption. IBP’s indigent clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court;
(b) They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove compliance with the requirements
under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development. However, not only does the process involve some expense which indigent
clients could ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious process of obtaining these
documents;
(c) Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives from the government is
barely enough to cover various operating expenses; 8
(d) While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid subsidy), 9 said allocation
covers neither the incidental expenses defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the
payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutor’s office,
as well as mediation fees and
(e) Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued by the Supreme Court granting IBP’s
indigent clients an exemption from the payment of docket and other fees similar to that given to PAO clients
under Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the Supreme Court previously issued a circular
exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes. 10
At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the administration of
justice, particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of
the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court
last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed
its duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and
in the administration of justice."11
We now move on to determine the merits of the request.
Access to Justice:
Making an Ideal a Reality
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a
democracy and in the rule of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.12 (emphasis supplied)
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most important pillar of legal empowerment of the
marginalized sectors of our society.13 Among others, it has exercised its power to "promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights" 14 to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and
to allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are permitted
under Section 21, Rule 315 and Section 19, Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.
The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to "improve the administration of justice and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively," 17 assists the Court in providing the poor access to justice. In
particular, it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the NCLA.
A New Rule, a New Tool
for Access to Justice
Under the IBP’s Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of
the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined "means and merit tests" shall be used to determine the
eligibility of an applicant for legal aid:
ARTICLE VIII
TESTS
SEC. 19. Combined tests. – The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for
legal aid by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the consideration of other factors adverted to in the
following sections.
SEC. 20. Means test. – The means test aims at determining whether the applicant has no visible means of support or his income is
otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to engage competent private counsel owing to the demands for
subsistence of his family, considering the number of his dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality.
The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas
Filipino Workers, fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged groups.
SEC. 21. Merit test. – The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the applicant’s cause of action or his defense is valid and
chances of establishing the same appear reasonable.
SEC. 22. Other factors. – The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be
considered.
SEC. 23. Private practice. – Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or
taken advantage of by anyone for personal ends.
SEC. 24. Denial. – Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the
Integrated Bar.
The "means and merit tests" appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the
IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to
clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor.
This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be observed by
the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients:
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National
Committee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and
of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

A Final Word

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a
remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is
inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The
legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to
adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free
access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or
action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and
access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.

WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for
helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption
from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters
is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee
on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
(which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is
hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a
newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this resolution. ||||||||||||
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the
Philippines of the import of this resolution. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS
FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES

NOVEMBER 6, 2017

FACTS: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices
in the various IBP chapters.

ISSUE: Should indigent litigants be exempted from paying docket fees?

RULING: YES. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses
only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with
the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 1922             June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL

PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing
interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as
may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation." Caprio-
Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)
 Republic of the Philippines| SUPREME COURT| Manila |SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment 1 affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust
Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9,
1994,2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation
that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was unable to
do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, 4 among other things, granted the substitution but denied the motion
for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court
thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from
notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994. 7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General himself
recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain
Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately
exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit" 9 reads:
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies, organized a number
of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading Corporation, whose
purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods
and using Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the instructions directly from
me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and are covered by
the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the
delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as
agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to
issue the said trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued
by CDCP to China Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and
CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which included the trust
receipts subject of this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust receipts
because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under
my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered by
the trust receipts subject of this case.
 9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca
was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation
to pay.
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust receipts subject
of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has asked this
Honorable Court to review.
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Affiant
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by
the Court.
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his
brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the
People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce
Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.) 10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is
not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has
no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for
only questions of fact are involved therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General,
granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of
persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the
judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should
be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the
"People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially
commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest
hour, indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 109870, December 01, 1995

FACTS: After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for violation
of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
February 9, 1994, petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL"[3] setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
"6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation
(the Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra;
and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was
unable to do so earlier."

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other things, granted the substitution but denied the
motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9,
1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO
ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said
motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION: In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the
Court,[8] the Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding
from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an
admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability.

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

"Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
"However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto
Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.
"The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother's
affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

ISSUE: WON NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED

HELD: "The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign `whose obligation to govern
impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
y Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Italics supplied.)"
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled
that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly
newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only
questions of fact are involved therein",

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People" and "People v. Amparado".

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor
General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor
General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of
impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.\

DOCTRINE: "Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the
accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

`Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.

`Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.'
 EN BANC

A.M. No. 2001-9-SC            October 11, 2001

DOROTEO IGOY, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO, Court Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility "to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers."1 Arrogating unto oneself, as in this case, the mantle of a Justice of the
Highest Court of the land for the purpose of extorting money from a party-litigant is an ultimate betrayal of this duty
which can not and should never be countenanced, because "[i]t is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the
part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and
surely corrodes the respect for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart
the very bonds of our polity."2

Complainant Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 141843, entitled "Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. v.
Mactan Shangrila Hotel".3 In a letter-complaint dated October 8, 2000,4 written in the Cebuano dialect and addressed
to the Chief Justice, complainant alleged that while the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of Appeals,
he tried to look for a person in the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. Sometime in July 1, 1999,
a friend introduced complainant to a certain "Justice" of the Supreme Court. He narrated to the said Justice the history
of their case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum of P20,000.00. However, the said
Justice reminded complainant that he could offer no help while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.

In February 2000, they received an unfavorable decision from the Court of Appeals. Thus, complainant immediately
visited the said Justice at his office in the Supreme Court to inform him of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Justice offered to prepare the petition for review to be filed with the Supreme Court. Complainant subsequently met
the said Justice at the Max's Restaurant, where the latter turned over the prepared petition for review. In consideration
therefor, the Justice asked for an additional P20,000.00. Since complainant did not have that amount of money with
him at that time, he undertook to send the same by courier as soon as he arrives in Cebu. Complainant asked for the
said Justice's complete name and address, which he readily gave as: Atty. Gilbert Soriano, 22 Melon Street,
Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Piñas City.

As promised, complainant sent the amount of P20,000.00 through the Aboitiz Express on May 2, 2000. The parcel
was received by a certain Alvin Soriano, who turned out to be respondent's son, on May 5, 2000.

Complainant was surprised to learn that on May 31, 2000, this Court denied the Petition for Review. Accordingly, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court denied with finality on July 31, 2000.

Together with his letter, complainant submitted the following documents:

l. Photocopy of the Petition for Review allegedly prepared by the "Justice;" 5

2. Shipper's Copy of Prepaid Consignment Note No. EO993783C dated May 2, 2000, addressed to one Atty.
Gilbert Soriano of 22 Melon St., Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Piñas City, with telephone numbers 826-
1018, containing cash in the amount of P20,000.00, 6 and sent by one Doroteo Igoy of Mactan, Lapu-lapu City, with
telephone numbers 495-8-49;7

3. Letter dated May 5, 2000 of one Atty. Gilbert F. Soriano, addressed to Aboitiz Express, authorizing his daughter,
Christine Soriano, or his son, Alvin A. Soriano, to receive Parcel No. EO993783C on his behalf; 8

4. Note dated May 5, 2000, evidencing receipt by one Alvin Soriano of the package on that date at 11:30 o'clock in
the morning.9

In his comment dated November 6, 2000,10 Atty. Gilbert Soriano denied that he was the "Justice" alluded to. He
alleged that his friend, Nic Taneo, introduced complainant to him because the latter was seeking help regarding a
pending case involving his poor relatives; that complainant requested him to go over their petition to be filed with the
Supreme Court, to ensure that the same would not be denied on technical grounds; he acceded to the request, after
which complainant told him that he will be sending him a token of gratitude, but he did not know that it was money.

Respondent further narrated that on May 4, 2000, he received a telephone call from Aboitiz Express, informing him
that complainant had sent him a parcel but the messenger was unable to locate his given address, and asking him to
execute a letter authorizing anyone in his house to receive the parcel. He recalled complainant's promise of a token of
gratitude, so respondent authorized his children to accept the parcel. He was surprised to find inside the parcel cash
in the amount of P20,000.00. After several days of mulling over what to do with the money, respondent asked his
friend to contact Atty. Rodulfo Taneo. the counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 141843. Atty. Taneo told him to hold the
money and wait until he arrives in Manila.

Respondent denied giving complainant any assistance other than checking the formal requirements of the petition for
review. He also denied that he entertained complainant in his office in the First Division of this Court which, according
to him, barely accommodates the staff therein with very little elbow room. Assuming that complainant was thus
accommodated in respondent's office in the First Division, respondent could not have uttered the irresponsible and
degrading statements imputed on him by complainant. Further, respondent denied having received the amount of
P20,000.00 from complainant, arguing that, as a practicing catholic and active church leader, he can not in conscience
deceive anyone and ask for money.

Respondent likewise denied having demanded for an additional P20,000.00, countering that complainant merely
promised him a token gift for the little help that he extended, without mention of any amount. In fact, he almost forgot
about that promise, and he remembered it only when he was notified by the courier service that he had a parcel from
complainant. That was almost two (2) months after the case petition for review was filed with this Court.

In closing, respondent insinuated that if this Court should find that he committed a misconduct despite his explanation,
he shall offer to retire from the service.

On November 16, 2000, complainant wrote another letter to the Chief Justice, again written in the Cebuano
dialect.11 Complainant averred that respondent was introduced to him by Engr. William Redoblado as one of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. He only learned that respondent was not a Justice when they met at the Cebu Mactan
International Airport on October 31, 2000. Respondent offered to return the P40,000.00, but he refused to receive the
same. Instead, he told respondent to just wait for the outcome of the complaint he filed against him with the Office of
the Chief Justice.

In the same letter, complainant provided the following questions and answers, to wit:

1.         What is the name of the Justice of the Supreme Court whom you contacted? Answer: Atty. Gilbert Soriano.

2.         Where did you meet/see him? Answer: Inside the premises of the Supreme Court.

3.         Who was the person who introduced him as Justice?

 Answer: Eng. William Redoblado was the one who introduced to me that Gilbert Soriano is a Justice. I never knew
that Gilbert Soriano is not a Justice.

4.         Where did you specifically give to the Justice the first P20,000.00?

 Answer: At the ground floor of the Supreme Court beside the canteen where the parking area is located.

5.         Who were with you at the Max's Restaurant when the petition was given to you?

&           Answer: Engr. William Redoblado, Leonardo Paquibot, Atty. Rodolfo Taneo, Atty. Gilbert Soriano and
myself (complainant Igoy). Atty. Taneo returned the petition because it was lacking.

Respondent submitted his comment12 to the second letter, wherein he contended that when complainant allegedly
gave him the sum of P20,000.00 on July 16, 1999, his case was still pending before the Court of Appeals; hence,
there was then no reason for complainant to approach respondent and give him money. Moreover, it is unnatural for a
person to give money to someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time. Respondent
brands as unbelievable the version that complainant handed the money to him at the parking area beside the
Supreme Court canteen, where many of the Court's employees and visitors frequently pass. He claimed that it was not
Engr. William Redoblado, but Mr. Taneo who introduced him to complainant.
Respondent alleged that on October 30, 2000, he informed Atty. Taneo that he was returning the money he received
through Aboitiz Express. He was told ,by Atty. Taneo to meet him in Cebu. On October 31, 2000, respondent arrived
in Cebu and met Atty. Taneo and complainant at an eatery near the airport. Respondent offered to return the
P20,000.00 to complainant, but the latter refused to accept it. Complainant stated that he will withdraw his complaint
only after the Supreme Court decides their case in their favor. Respondent, however, informed complainant that as a
mere employee of the court, he could not dictate the outcome of the case.

On January 8, 2001, Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under R.A. 1616, without specifying its
effectivity date.13

The Office of Administrative Services, to which this case was referred for evaluation, issued a Memorandum on May
30, 2001, recommending respondent's dismissal from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits to which he may be entitled.

Respondent's offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be imposed on him. However,
the mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate him from the consequences of his acts. As this
Court pointed out in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:14

. . . Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizen's may have in the proper administration of justice.

Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court may proceed with its investigation and mete the
appropriate penalty against erring officers of the court. 15 Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an
easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative sanction. 16

In recommending the dismissal of respondent from service, the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) reasoned that:

From the established facts, it is clear that complainant came to see respondent to plead for help in preparing a
Petition for Review. The respondent, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to make the complainant
believe that he has the "influence and connections" in the court and would be easy for him (respondent) to
help the complainant.

True, as respondent claimed, he was not urged by ulterior motives in preparing the Petition for Review or at
least reviewing the same, but not being his official duty to do so, his actuation led complainant to believe that it
should be for a fee. It would have been very easy for him to decline the offer of P20,000.00 even if it was
gratuitously given if his real intention was merely to help. He knew for a fact that the petitioners have a
counsel who, presumably, knows the appropriate pleadings to be filed with this Court.

Sec. 7 (D) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Ethical Conduct and Standard for Public Officials and Employees)
specifically provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions

xxx           xxx           xxx

d. Solicitations or acceptance of gifts — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept,
directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from
any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by,
or any transactions which may be affected by the functions of their office.

Respondent, who is himself a lawyer, should have avoided all the circumstances in which he might be
accused of using his office in the guise of "helping others", for this taints the integrity of the Court.

The denial of the respondent of the receipt of initial payment of P20,000.00 cannot simply overcome the
positive assertions of the complainant. If no such initial payment took place, Atty. Soriano would not have
claimed the subsequent payment through the Aboitiz Express.
 The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. To
tolerate such acts would open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption to be committed by officials and
employees of the Court.

Likewise, the fact that respondent tried to return the amount to Mr. Igoy after the Chief Justice required him to
comment on the complaint only strengthened the case against him. Even if the offer to return the money was
accepted by the complainant, it will never exculpate him of his administrative liabilities. Respondent by his
brazen conduct consummated an act that by itself is a disservice to the administration of justice and an affront
of the image of the court before the public.

It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should not be used as an easy way to
escape administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction. Respondent therefore
cannot go scot-free and be simply forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution he was bound by his
oath and The Canons of Legal Ethics to serve with utmost integrity.

Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished his record irreparably and
under the circumstances, this office believes that dismissal as a penalty is warranted.

The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendation of the OAS. Time and again, this Tribunal has
emphasized that "[t]he conduct or behavior of all officials and employees of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.17 Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum in
order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18 Indeed, Canon 6, Rule 6.02, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states in no uncertain terms that —

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing facts of this case considering that
respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government lawyers who are public servants owe
utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.19

The Court could not help but express its great disappointment over the conduct of respondent who, as a lawyer with
twenty-eight (28) years of government service behind him, should have been among the first to set an example to his
co-employees and fellow civil servants. Instead, he badly tainted the image of this Tribunal as well as the judiciary.
Only recently in In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with
Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,20 this Court said that:

Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion.
Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with
utmost prudence and discretion. For theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality
and integrity of the Judiciary.

Respondent should be reminded in this regard that the nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the
Constitution, and oft- repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic
sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. 21 Those involved
in the administration of justice must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service, 22

In sanctioning errant officers and employees involved in the administration of justice, the Court has held:

Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest
standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressing once again that public service requires
utmost integrity and the strictest discipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public trust that
enjoins all public officers and employees, particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest
degree of dedication often even beyond personal interest.23

All too often, this Court has declared that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office,
especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. 24 To
reiterate, public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 25
This Court has also ruled that:

Time and again, we have emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are saddled
with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They must be constantly reminded that
any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided.
As we have held in the case of Mendoza v. Mabutas (223 SCRA 411 [1993], citing Sy v. Academia, 198
SCRA 70s [1991]), this Court condemns and would never countenance such conduct, act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 26

Respondent's acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public in the entire judicial system. What
makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the
Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and
in so doing he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply
disciplinary sanction on an errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes
on respondent the only penalty that he deserves — that of dismissal from the service.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This dismissal shall be immediately executory.

Further, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why
he should not be DISBARRED. In the meantime, respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Gilbert Soriano and furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C. J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan and Panganiban, (on official leave)

IGOY vs. ATTY SORIANO

Facts:

Igoy was a petitioner in a certain case pending in the CA. He later sought help from a
friend to win his case in the event it would lose in CA. The said friend introduced IGOY from
one of the alleged “JUSTICE” of the SC which later turned out to be Atty Soriano. The “Justice”
offered IGOY to help him when his case reaches SC for a consideration of 20k. When then they
 loss the case in CA, the “Justice” prepared a petition for review for a consideration of another
20k. When IGOY found out that the “Justice” is not really a Justice, and when the petition for
review was denied, IGOY now filed this administrative case against ATTY SORIANO.

Held:

ATTY SORIANO is disbarred.

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing facts of this case
considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government
lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is
a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional
obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.

EN BANC | A.C. No. 6707  |   March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will
be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year
which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant
deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant
demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned.
When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a
member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March
1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his
promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent
complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of
deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the
same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his
letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made
several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who
sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that
having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or
pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent
visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was
introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the
Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were still minors
then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years
as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related
polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which
they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent visa
under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided
them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a
$40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age,
has to have the same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa,
while her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them
to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application,
which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant
and her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was
finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son
Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as dependents of
the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I
became the intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter
would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the
 complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me
which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself
began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding the
matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really her money but
money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her son
Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration
Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was
made to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly
they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died
sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of
money is now being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed
the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the
present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same would only
be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March but was
aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now
become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings
(11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his
client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and
again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report 5 recommending
the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000
from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant)
showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate
the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by
respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1
March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he
stated thus:

"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended
that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of
then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate
release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were
recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some important papers were already finished
as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and
there is no day since January that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time
before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being
looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack.
Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just
a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued
by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that
the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from
Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified
that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board
of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with
modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7

It is undisputed that respondent admitted 8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his
signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said
amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and
children in their application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate
of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even
though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for
reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a
weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such
denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such
admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09
March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal
money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on that day and the
amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal money.

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are still
being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and
who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are
already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.

xxxx

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other
one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates
the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would
be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount
but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early return
of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I
stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it
is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue
should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from
worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of which
are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently
funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these
checks, is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to put an end to
this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped
all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I
issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I requested
for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to me
and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the
Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place
considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and I was
assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if
said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas
is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest.
Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring
the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. 19 Respondent’s conduct in office
betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the
effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests
of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus,
paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals."21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he
had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.
Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions
which includes suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of
their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a
former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who
are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by
this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.27

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer
of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act
of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.

Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of
the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This
case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

6707

March 24, 2006

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

Facts:

In 1995, complainant alleged that while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied
for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that
in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit
a certain sum of money worth. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant
deposited with respondent the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant
demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be
returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited the complainant filed for disbarment
in the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
merits the penalty of disbarment.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The court held that, It is undisputed that respondent admitted having received the
US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers and
receipts1 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainant’s
application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and
interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant
and children in their application for visa in the BID. Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he
failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did
not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting
the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate is not only impudent but downright
ignominious. Wherefore, the court hereby disbars Atty. Gutierrez.

Republic of the Philippines| SUPREME COURT| EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD
P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO
HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
1 

loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
2 

GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
3 

financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
4 

group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with
5 

the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as
mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July
17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan,
Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank),
Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued
6 

several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court
7 

referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions
8  9 

alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in
10 

the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring
about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to

disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
11 

inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance
12 

as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one
year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of
13 

the ruling.
14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth
Division. In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s
15 

motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and
16 

observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
18 

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive
the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No.
0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply. 19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again,
the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness
in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate,
including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees
and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those
in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern
attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation
fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential
New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of
eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time,
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out
the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus
brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes,
other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood"
oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor,
had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were
isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. 21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
— the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the
academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of
law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the
late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left
off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's
(ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service." These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
25 

conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the

former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other
26 

hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to

former government lawyers. For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
27 

canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen
new canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified
28 

them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." The rationale for
29 

disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who
might later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides, viz.:
30 

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively. 31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. 32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the
"adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial
revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and
were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation
in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
33 
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. In the case of Canon
34 

9, DR 9-101(b) became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the
35 

Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model
Code. 36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth
by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where
the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The
Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing
comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules
made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. In particular, the ABA
37 

did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views
of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this
Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
39 

deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz: 40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank
and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the
court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon
finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and
shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver
to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover
accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the
action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining
order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the
petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal
or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining
order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which
is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No.
0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that
they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue
of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to
the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK
is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)
41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under
43 

the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03
44 

of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969
Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while
in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of
the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be
signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville
for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this
type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role
of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still
fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account
of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its
end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to
match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have
them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in
private practice. Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great
45 

for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which
they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. Indeed, "to
46 

make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted
"the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel
of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." Even the United States Supreme
48 

Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." In 49 

the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
50 

the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not
only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a
51 

disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of this
52 

prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." He adds: "Any system that
53 

affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence." The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
54 

respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a
great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of
the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their
office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of
law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the
55 

legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to
56 

untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
57 

attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
58 

the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification
59 

based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how
to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. The example given
61 
by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently
charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. In the cautionary words of the Association of
62 

the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies." Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." He opines "x x x it is hard to
63  64 

imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones
who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." But again, this particular concern is
65 

a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on
how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues
defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout." Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale
66 

for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of
his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." More, he contends that the
67 

concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials
make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than
about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem
justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid
even the appearance of favoritism." 68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by
this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by
any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.

Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS : In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation
of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.

Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In
the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that
it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do
not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that
the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting
the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private
interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies
to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713]

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES,
TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES
AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees." Section 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge
their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead
modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.

35. Gisela Huyssen vs. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006
FACTS: Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section
13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which
could be withdrawn after one year. Believing respondent, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her
demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that
said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus
(of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money.
In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999.
Failing to comply, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. Respondent sent complainant a letter
dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed
two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent
had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999,
explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates
but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered
stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises, complainant referred the matter to a
lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded. Thus, a complaint for
disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).

Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from
receipt thereof.

Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never physically received the money
mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used
as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. He alleged that through a
close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was introduced to him at
his office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines. Their problem
was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary
visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related policies of the government. He
advised them that they better secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law
otherwise known as Quota. Complainant further requested him to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their
application, which he did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family. The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until
the same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. He
became the intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would
request for whatever purpose was coursed through him which request were then transmitted to the complainant
and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru him which is the very
reason why his signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit. On several occasions, the
complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at
the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of
respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to
appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING

COMMISSIONER: Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report5 recommending the
disbarment of respondent. There is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from
complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing
his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for
himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by complainant. respondent makes it appear that the
US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how
come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and
official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING OF THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: Approved the Investigating Commissioner’s report
with modification. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.

RULING: It is undisputed that respondent admitted having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by
his signatures in the petty cash vouchers and receipts he prepared, on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount
and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children
in their application for visa in the BID. Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the
matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by
fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence
against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times
whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice. The defense of denial proffered by
respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. When respondent issued
the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. In a desperate attempt to put up a
smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby
compounding his case. In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent
with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.