JUDICIAL NOTICE IN RELATION TO DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondents.
Facts:

 Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
 On 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a
Filipina – and respondent were married on 1994, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino.
 On 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
 Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy as respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time, he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
 Respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
 RTC declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven.
Ruling:
No. Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion. The burden of proof lies with "the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F.
SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
Facts:

 Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan
branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets.
 Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of
the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan,
for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.
 A writ of summons was issued by Tokyo District Court of Japan against
defendant at its office. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful
because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the
person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila and
would be back on April 24, 1980.
 Bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo
refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the
defendant. After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the
Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons
served at the head office of the defendant in Manila.
 Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons.
Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint rendered
judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen
and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum until payment is completed.
 Defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court
sought to be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction
having been rendered without due and proper notice to the defendant and/or with
collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact.
Issue:
Whether or not a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine Corporation
doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine
corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
failed.
Ruling:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings
and the giving of due notice therein. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty
to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity
of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
stand. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on
the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents
within the Philippines. Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Nowhere in its pleadings did
SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan.
 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
Facts:

 The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino

parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
 On 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
 The petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
 The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown in La Union in the 2007 elections.
She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the 2010 elections this
time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May
13, 2010.
 The private respondents all registered voters of La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective
post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
 The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen and that her act of running for public office is a
clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
 The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office.
Issue:
Whether or not the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No.
9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is
already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree. Foreign
laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. DCTSEA
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a
foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness
such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes
verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the
facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is “satisfied of the authenticity
of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent
proof of that law.
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above
methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof
of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government
showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated
hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence
the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular
Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the
law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do
so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were
to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225,
we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections cannot cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the
greatest number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies
to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act
that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her
political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
 MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE
AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
Facts:

 Petitioner Laureano then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air
Manila, applied for employment with defendant company as its Area Manager in
Manila.
 Defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-
707 captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979.
After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs’ appointment was
confirmed.
 On 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five
(5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms
and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted.
 During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for
which plaintiff apologized. Plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the
tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt.
Choy. He was reprimanded.
 Plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at defendant’s expense. Having successfully
completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981,
for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as
captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast
Asia.
 Prior to the expiration of the five-year employment contract however defendant,
hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate
captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s requirement.
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
 Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
terminate its excess personnel. It did not, however, immediately terminate its A-
300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747
fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified.
Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
 Plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant
moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages
due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo.
 Then he filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts
 have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint
is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the
course of plaintiff’s employment «thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code» and that, since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract
and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that
Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not Singaporean laws should apply in the instant case.
Ruling:
NO. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant’s failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has
the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be
applied.
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-
appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.
 ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
Facts:

 Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.
 Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one
year.
 Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.
 Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as
the local recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as
the foreign principal.
 The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of her contract.
 The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
 Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being
a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity
extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to
meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under
Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.
 The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the
money claims of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its
foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with the Rules of Court.
These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042:
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.