3

Starting Point:
Requirement for
FGS Evaluation
The FGS design work flow starts with a need to conduct a perfor-
mance-based fire and gas system (FGS) design. There are many hazard
and risk studies that may be undertaken and that may result in a rec-
ommendation to implement an FGS or verify that an existing system is
adequate. These studies include process hazard analyses (PHA) (such
as a hazard and operability [HAZOP] study) a checklist, or a “what-if”
study. The hazard scenarios being considered during these studies
may lead to concerns by the study team that certain hazardous condi-
tions should be detected and effectively mitigated. This results in a
recommendation to implement, or at least study, an FGS. Also, other
more-detailed risk analysis techniques, such as Layer of Protection
Analysis (LOPA), often recommend that an FGS be evaluated or
implemented.

In certain locales, a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is required to

obtain a license to operate a process plant. Unfortunately, poor
assumptions in QRA studies may contribute to an inaccurate percep-
tion of the level of risk. A QRA study may actually assume that an FGS
is in place and in operation. Worse, the QRA probably assumes a level

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18 Performance-based Fire and Gas Systems Engineering Handbook

of performance for the system, such as being “95 percent effective” in

detecting a hazard. The basis of such assumptions is usually undocu-
mented, and the ability of the system to achieve that performance is
unknown. Recently, more operators are questioning whether the per-
formance of the existing system is in accordance with the QRA
assumptions. As a result of these non-conservative assumptions, the
efficacy of an FGS may be overestimated, resulting in an unrecognized
level of risk that exceeds an organization’s tolerable risk criteria.

In many cases, FGSs in process plants are required by government reg-

ulation. Many regulating bodies will prescribe that the operator of a
certain type of facility, such as a liquefied petroleum gas storage facil-
ity, is required to implement some degree of fire and gas detection.
There are also industry standards (e.g., API 14C or ISO 10418) and cor-
porate standards that require FGSs for certain types of facilities or cer-
tain types of process equipment.

In some cases as insurance carriers audit a facility, they scrutinize the

installed FGS, particularly the number and location of detectors. If the
auditor believes the system to be inadequate, he or she will make a rec-
ommendation for specific changes or wholesale upgrades. The penalty
for not implementing a recommended FGS can range from increased
insurance premiums to outright refusal to underwrite the policy.

Regardless of the mechanism that causes an FGS to be recommended,

ISA-TR84.00.07 provides an excellent framework for addressing the
recommendation. Whether the issue is a complete design of an FGS, an
evaluation of an existing design to determine the need for upgrades
and improvements, or simply an assessment to rule out the need for an
FGS, the ISA report contains the techniques and framework for FGS
decision making.