ALAUDDIN KHALJI—MARKET REFORMS

The reign of Alauddin Khalji was marked by a period of expansion, conquests

and annexation as well as the brave counter to the Mongols. In addition to the
military achievements of Alauddin, his reign was also well known for the
agrarian and market reforms which were introduced by the Sultan. They
highlighted the need of the state for additional revenue which could have been
possible only through state intervention.

Contrary to the opinions of some scholars like Moreland, information about

Alauddin’s reforms would have been available had Barani’s work not been
present. A number of contemporary historians have propounded their view
points about this particular issue. Amir Khusrau had written his Khaza’inu-l
Futuh in 1311 or soon after; Ibn Battuta’s Rihla was written during the period
he was in Delhi (1335-1342); Isami devoted a section of his book-Futuh-us
Salatin- to this particular topic in 1350 and even the Chisti mystic Nasiruddin
Mahmud had spoken on this topic twice at some length in his conversations
recorded in 1354-55. However, most of these accounts only provided a factual
information about these reforms without giving an indepth analysis of the
same; most of the time even the information was neglected or incomplete. It
was Barani’s ‘Tarikh-I Firuz-Shahi written in 1357, which provides a full
account of the market reforms which took place during the reign of Alauddin
Khalji along with his own opinions on the same.

These reforms had come up as a possible solution to a critical financial problem.

This was caused by the constant stream of invasions of the Mongol army for
which Alauddin Khalji had to undertake a vast amount of expenditure. Fortified
walls had to be thrown around Delhi, the damaged forts had to be rebuilt and
strengthened and a number of new walls were also created. All these fortified
settlements had to be stocked with grains and a large standing army had to be
maintained at all times, with well-trained, equipped soldiers and good horses.
These troopers had to be paid a regular annual salary as well. Khalji believed
that if such an army was paid in cash on a regular basis than the royal treasury
would be empty within a few years.
He worked out a system by which a fully equipped soldier maintaining one
horse would be paid 234 tankas and a soldier maintaining two horses was to
be paid 78 tankas extra. But such low payments could be put into effect only if
the troops were still able to get all the articles and animals they were required
to maintain and also such goods and services as were necessary for the
maintenance or subsistence of their families, slaves and servants. Thus,
Alauddin attempted the mechanism of pushing down prices of these goods
without hurting his military ambitions.

However, some scholars have objected to this on the grounds that Alauddin had
regulated and reduced the prices of all commodities, even those which had no
importance for the military. However, other scholars have countered this by
stating that the chief objective was not to merely cheapen the military stores
and horses, but also reduce the salaries of the cavalrymen and other troopers.
However, to ensure that these people were able to enjoy other goods as well for
the basic subsistence pattern it was necessary to reduce the prices of all goods,
whether directly required by the troopers or not.

Some scholars on the basis of Nasiruddin Mahmud’s writings believe that

Alauddin’s market reforms were aimed at the general welfare of the people.
Alauddin, apparently, wanted to do something beneficial for the people. He
considered giving up his wealth but realized that it would not reach out to
everyone. As a result, he decided to reduce the prices of the grains as the
benefits of that would accrue to everyone living in his empire. This view was
also supported by the writings of Amir Khusrau.

The essence of Khalji’s reforms was to bring the villages in closer association
with the government in area extending from Dipalpur and Lahore to Kara near
modern Allahabad. In this region, the villages were to be brought under Khalisa;
lands assigned in charitable grants were also confiscated and brought under
the khalisa. The Sultan decreed that three taxes were to be levied on the
peasantry viz. the Kharaj or the land-tax; a grazing tax (charai) on cattle and
ghari on houses or huts. As far as Khiraj was concerned, the land under
cultivation was measured; the yield was estimated per unit area; and then by
multiplying the area by the yield the total produce was to be worked out. Half
of the produce thus determined was to be exacted uniformly from every
peasant without exception.

A significant feature of rural agriculture in India was the existence of a large

number of intermediaries. At the village level there was the village head, called
the chaudhari or muqaddam. Alauddin’s agrarian reforms implied putting
greater pressure for the displacement of the rais or ranas, who were chiefs
controlling a trace of land which was parceled out to his clan and other
supporters for collecting land-revenue. In the areas brought under the khalisa,
Alauddin tried to curb the privileges of the zamindars, muqaddams and
chaudharis. These sections formed the rural aristocracy and according to
Barani, they were rich enough to ride Arabi and Iraqi horses, wear weapons and
fine clothes and indulge in wine drinking. Their wealth was based on holding
the best land in the villages. Moreover, in a system where the village was
assessed as a whole, they often passed on the burden of their share of the land
revenue on to the shoulders of the weak.

Alauddin took stringent measures against this section of society forcing them
to pay the grazing and housing taxes like the others and as a result of the system
of measurement of area under cultivation to determine the land revenue he
prevented them from passing on the burden to someone else. Although, he was
unable to offset the trend of land redistribution in the rural areas he was able
to infuse a fear of punishment among the rural elite, which made them more
obedient and ensured regular payment of land revenue. A contemporary source
states “their obedience reached such a pitch that a footman from the town
revenue office would tie the necks of twenty zamindars, muqaddams and
chaudharis together and kick and thrash them for the realization of tribute”.

While reforming the agrarian system, Alauddin tried to ensure the efficient and
honest working of the machinery of revenue administration. This was done by
appointing a large number of accountants, collectors and agents in a very short
span of time. The accountants of all these officials were audited strictly by the
wazir and even if one jital was out of place they were to be punished severely.

Alauddin was more or less the first ruler who looked at the problem of price
control in a systematic manner and was able to maintain stable prices over a
considerable period of time. Alauddin had set up three markets at Delhi, the
first for food grains, the second for cloth of all kinds, and for expensive items
such as sugar, ghee, oil, dry fruits etc and the third for horses, slaves and cattle.
Detailed regulations were framed for the control and administration of all these
markets.

In order to control the food prices, Alauddin attempted to control the supply of
food grains from the villages, its transportation to the city by the grain
merchants and its proper distribution to the citizens. Alauddin’s first effort was
to see that there were sufficient stocks of food grains with the government so
that the traders did not try to raise the prices by creating an artificial scarcity
or indulging in profiteering. For this purpose royal stores were setup at Delhi.
However, Barani had raised the question “how were the Sultan’s grain store-
houses so full that they had enough within them to replace normal supplies
whenever these failed in the bad season?”

The answer to this question was rooted in Alauddin’s land-tax policy. As stated
above, this was half of the produce and in addition taxes were also imposed on
the milch cattle and houses. As a result of these high tax demands, and the strict
measures adopted to collect these taxes, Alauddin was able to obtain half the
agricultural produce for the state. Moreover, Alauddin had made it very clear
that grains alone should be collected from all areas in the khalisa in lieu of land-
tax, while in all areas lying in the eastern part of Rajasthan only half the revenue
was to be collected in grain, the remainder in cash. Thus, in this way the royal
stores always had enough of a stock to face any food crisis. According to Barani
“There was no mohalla in Delhi in which two or three houses were not fully
stocked with the Sultan’s grain”.

The task of transporting these grains was undertaken by banjaras, some

of whom had 10,000 or 20,000 bullocks. These banjaras were ordered to form
themselves into one corporate body, giving sureties for each other. They were
to settle on the banks of Jamuna with their wives, children, goods and cattle. An
official was appointed to oversee them. In fact, in normal times these banjaras
were able to bring in so much food grains into the city that it was not necessary
to touch the royal stores.
To ensure the regular supply of grains to the banjaras, a number of regulations
were made. In the areas, which had been brought under the khalisa, the local
officials were charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the grains would
be delivered by the cultivator to the grain merchant at a cash price from their
fields. Alauddin ordered the Royal Finance Ministry should take letters from
the officials and collectors to say that they would demand the land-tax from the
peasants with such harshness that the latter would not be able to bring the
grain from the fields into their houses and engross it, and would be forced to
sell the grains at low rates by the side of the field to the grain carrier. As a result
of this regulation, the grain-carriers found no obstacle in conveying grain to the
market and grain supplies constantly reached the market. For their own profit,
villagers also brought whatever they could from the fields to the market and
sold it at prices fixed by the Sultan. These regulations were imposed mostly in
the assigned territories, where the grain was not taken in revenue, but the tax
in money was to be so rigorously demanded so as to force the peasant to sell
part of his grain to pay the tax.

If the cultivator wished to sell more they could do so but the local officials
were asked to sign a bond that said they would not permit anyone to regrate
or sell at a price higher than the official price. Anyone who violated this rule
were severely punished and the regrated grains were confiscated. All the food
grains were to be brought to the market for food-grains set up by Alauddin and
sold only at official prices.

Thus, grain supplies at low prices depended upon the extraction of the agrarian
surplus through the land-tax, brought directly into the Sultan’s granaries or into
the grain-carriers’ hands by the rigour of the tax demand. The Sultan then fixed
low prices arbitrarily, which were then enforced in the urban market, by
assuring continuous supply of grains. As a result of all these measures there
was an adequate supply of food grains in the towns because of which the prices
fell. Wheat was sold for 7.5 jital per man, barley for 4 jital, superior quality rice
for 5 jital etc. an officer, with an adequate force was also appointed in charge of
the market with strict instructions to anyone who tried to raise the price. “So
long as Alauddin lived, monsson or no monsoon, there was not the slightest rise
in these prices. The permanence of prices in the grain market was a wonder of
the age”.

Alauddin received daily reports about the activities of the market from three
different sources- controller of the market, intelligence officers and lastly from
secret spies who had been appointed for this very purpose. Thus, people tended
to behave properly as they were aware of the fact that Alauddin’s spies were
informing him about everything.

Alauddin had also instituted a system of rationing during the times of scarcity.
Each grocer was issued an amount of grains from the government stores
bearing in mind the population of the ward. No individual was allowed to buy
more than half a man at one time. However, the amount was more for nobles
who did not have villages of lands of their own. As a result of these measures,
even during the time of famine there was no shortage of food-grains at Delhi
and even the price of food-grains did not increase.

The second market was called sarai-i-adl. It was an exclusive and to a large
extent a subsidized market for manufactured commodities and merchandise
brought from a long distance, from territories outside the Sultan’s dominion
and even from foreign countries. The first regulation with regard to this market
was the setting up of a separate market by itself for these commodities.
Alauddin had ordered that cloth brought from different parts of the country
including foreign lands, was to be stored and sold only in this market at
government rates. To ensure an adequate supply of all the commodities, all
merchants whether Hindu or Muslim, were registered with the ministry of
commerce and their business was to be regulated. A deed was taken from these
merchants, who had been importing commodities into the city, that they would
bring the same quantities of commodities to this market every year, and sell
them at government rates. The “regulated” merchants brought so much
merchandise from the provinces and adjoining territories that it accumulated
in the market and was left unsold for many years.

However, as most of these goods were imported from outside the price-control
zone, Alauddin’s price regulation measures did not apply to these goods. As a
result, there was a stark difference between the cost in the place of origin and
the retail price at Delhi. The prime costs could not be reduced but other
measures were taken to bridge this gap. The rich Multani merchants i.e. those
who brought commodities from long-distances including foreign countries,
were given an advance of 20 lakh tankas from the treasury, on condition that
they did not sell them to any intermediaries but at the market at official rates.
The power and responsibilities for obeying these orders were given to a body
of merchants themselves. Finally, a permit officer was appointed. Alauddin
believed that many of the items available in this market were of extremely high
quality and were not required by the general public. Thus, these products were
not to be sold to anyone, until and unless, the permit officer wrote out a permit.
This was done to ensure that costly cloth was not purchased by people and
given to others who would take it out of Delhi, and sold in the neighbouring
towns at four or five times the price, an officer was appointed to issue permits
to amirs, maliks etc for the purchase of these costly commodities in accordance
with their income.

The prices of the commodities even in this market were quite cheap. Thus, for
one tanka a person could buy 40 yards of coarse, or 20 yards of fine-woven
cotton cloth, one ser of coarse sugar for 1 ½ jital, ½ ser of ghee for 1 jital, 3 ser
of oil for 1 jital etc.

The third market dealt with horses, cattle and slaves. The horse trade was
more or less a monopolistic trade, with the overland trade being monopolized
by Multanis and Afghans. But they were sold in the market by middlemen or
dallals.

The horse merchants had become a severe headache for the Sultan. According
to the procedure of that day, a man who wanted service with the cavalry had to
provide himself with one or two horses and the necessary equipment and then
appear at the review, where he was inspected by the officer-in-charge. If he was
found fit, the price of the horse would be paid to him. But since most horsemen
could not afford to pay the price of their horses before the review, persons with
money found the purchase and stabling of horses a good investment. They
entered into an alliance with the leading brokers, who not only helped them to
raise the price but also took a commission from both the horsemen and the
horse-merchants.

Alauddin took harsh measures against such merchants. They were banished
from the town, and some of them were imprisoned in forts. A stern order was
issue that no horse-merchant or capitalist was to purchase a horse directly or
through an agent or come anywhere near the horse-market. Then, with the hep
of other dallals, the quality and price of the horses were fixed. Horses of high
quality were priced between 100 and 120 tankas, those of the second category
80 to 90 tankas and those of the third 65 to 70 tankas. The price of ordinary
horses, which were not used in the army was 10 to 25 tankas.

The prices of the slave boys and girls and of cattle were also fixed. The reasons
for doing this are slightly unclear but its believed that these measures were
taken to make the life of the nobles or richer sections of society easier, who had
become accustomed to buying slaves for domestic and personal service.
Likewise, animals were needed for meat, transport and for milk and milk
products.

The general markets, scattered throughout the city, were put under the control
of the Department of Commerce. Alauddin did not interfere in this arrangement
but he made sure that every commodity’s price was fixed irrespective of how
insignificant it may have been-hats, comb, betel leaf, needles, sugarcane etc.
Alauddin had selected a ruthless and shrewd minister of commerce who was
able to keep the shopkeepers under control. The minister would regularly
check the prices of goods in the market and thrash the shopkeepers ruthlessly
for charging above the price list. These severities compelled the shopkeepers
to reduce their prices, but they did not give up all tricks, such as using false
weights, keeping aside their best commodities and telling lies to young and
ignorant purchasers. As a last measure Alauddin would send children to the
markets to purchase goods. The minister would then make inquiries into these
purchases and if the shopkeeper had charged over the price list then double his
body weight would be carved out of the flesh of the shopkeeper.

It is not possible to define the territory in which Alauddin Khalji’s price

measures were effective. Barani speaks as if the prices were set for Delhi; but it
is reasonable to infer that the same prices also prevailed in the surrounding
areas, which could offer an alternative market to these products. This probably
included the entire Khalisa region where the land revenue system was
instituted by Alauddin. It is unlikely that price control measures extended to
areas outside of this region. A letter in Mahru suggests that prices were kept
low under Alauddin in Multan and Ucch as well; but a closer scrutiny of these
texts suggests that he comparing the state of affairs in Delhi at the time of that
sultan with contemporary conditions in Ucch.

Many of Barani’s contemporaries praised Alauddin immensely for instituting

these measures. Amir khusrau looked upon these measures as an act of
generosity on part of the Sultan, undertaken for the sake of “general comfort,
the welfare of the elect and the public at large’ and ‘of the general benefit of the
city-man and the villager”. Ibn Battuta noted how “the people of the hind greatly
praised Alauddin on this account.” Isami lauded the measures for the relief that
it brought to the people and Nasiruddin Mahmud recounted how the Sultan was
anxious to do something from which ‘gain would accrue to all the people’.
Similarly, even Barani in his first account had praised the Sultan for
implementing these measures.

However, in his later accounts he was far more discriminating in assessments

of the benefits flowing from price-control. The entire fabric rested on a very
heavy agrarian taxation. The peasants had to part with half their produce and
this was collected in such a harsh manner that they were forced to sell all the
grain and could not hold back any surplus for stocking or for engrossing. The
market reforms had left the peasantry with so little as to be “barely enough for
carrying on cultivation and his food requirements. The peasantry was
completely impoverished during the reign of Alauddin and could not even raise
a voice against the harsh treatment meted out to them by the officials.

Large segments of the upper rural population were also greatly impoverished
as they themselves became subject to tax-demand and were forbidden to levy
their cesses. No longer could “the chaudhris, zamindars and muqaddams ride
horses, wield arms, wear good clothes or chew betel leaf”; even the women of
the lords had to take service in Muslims’ houses. Part of the grain and other
rural products, which these classes consumed, must have now gone to Delhi
and the other towns in tax-payment, thereby augmenting supplies over there.

The gains from the low prices within the city were also not universal. While,
some citizens were benefitted by the rationing system as it ensured a regular
food supply during famines. A major section of the population who seems to
have had its real income reduced was that of the artisans and the unskilled
labourers and servants. This arose because of the fall in the prices of the goods,
which they used to sell in order to obtain their income. According to Nasiruddin
Mahmud, during the reign of Alauddin a tailor could make a robe for 4 or 6 jitals,
whereas in his time-1354-no less than 48 jital would be charged for. Similarly,
Barani also stated that wages of labourers in Alauddin’s time were a fourth of
what they were under his successors. Thus, under Alauddin there was a general
lack of money in the hands of the people.

Though the ‘market men’ suffered the proper merchants had a fairly
respectable position in Alauddin’s reign; the Multanis indeed received large
treasury loans to encourage them to bring supplies of luxury goods from distant
places.

The principal gainers of all these moves seem to have been the nobles.
According to Barani, under Alauddin “things came to such a pass that except for
the houses of the nobles and commanders, officials and Multanis little money
was to be found anywhere else”. Their revenues were significantly contracted
but their purchasing power was unaffected; they also had a saved up treasury
which would have firther enhanced this purchasing power. Moreover, the
revenue collected outside the limits of the zone where commutation prices had
been reduced would be on the old scale, and yet be worth far more in Delhi in
terms of goods. The special provision for supply of high quality cloth, restricted
to the nobility or the cheap supply of slaves and good horses clearly shows the
concern for the welfare of the nobility.

Alauddin Khalji had seen the need to regulate markets and prices in order to be
able to afford a large standing army which could counter the perpetual Mongol
threat. He was successful as far as the reduction in prices was concerned. The
market prices of all goods from horses to grains to cloth to insignificant items
remained low and at the fixed price as set by the Sultan. This had enabled him
to organize a large army and also increase the wealth of the treasury
marginally. However, the extremely harsh measures used to ensure this had
caused a great deal of pain and suffering to the common people. Some of the
people in fact were fed up of their lives and wished for death as they could no
longer take such a strict control.

Thus, shortly after the death of Alauddin his price control system collapsed;
under his successor Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji prices rose rapidly and the
wages went up ‘four times’. He also released the prisoners who had been
imprisoned for selling commodities at prices above the fixed rate. Moreover, he
withdrew the laws which, to some extent, denied people the freedom to eat,
wear, speak or buy or sell what they wanted. The regulations of Alauddin had
also resulted in a lot of bureaucratic controls and thus corruption. His policy
would have been more successful had he controlled the prices of only a few
essential commodities or those meant for direct use by the military. However,
he controlled the prices of everything; such centralized control were bound to
lead to violations, inviting punishments and thus resentment. Hence, by their
very nature, Alauddin’s market reforms were temporary and largely meant to
tide over an emergency, or a particular situation.