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Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China

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Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China
Author(s): Xueguang Zhou
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 54-73
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096218
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 UNORGANIZED INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

XUEGUANG ZHOU
Cornell University

I explore how the institutional structure of state socialism systematically transforms indi-
vidual behavior into collective action in China. State monopoly of the public spherefosters
and reproduces large numbers of individual behaviors with similar claims, patterns, and
targets. The state bureaucratic apparatus at the workplace also generates similar discon-
tents and links them with national politics. The "large numbers"phenomenonprovides the
basis for theformation of collective action. The institutionalarrangements also inducefre-
quent state policy shifts and alternative modes of mobilization,providing the opportunityfor
collective action. Finally, individual behaviors based on unorganized interests tend to con-
verge in the same direction and assume a "collective" character - that is, they are often
causally defined as "collective action" in this particular institutional structure. The phe-
nomenon of "collective inaction" is discussed in the same vein.

T he popularuprisingsin Chinaand Eastern Chinese statethateventuallywent beyond state

Europein 1989 arerecentexamplesof the
"powerof the powerless"in state socialist soci-
eties. However, the currentliteratureon collec-
tive action,whichemphasizesorganizingcapac-
ity, resourcemobilization,and interestarticula-
tion, is ill-preparedto account for such events
understate socialism. In typical socialist states,
societyconsistsof unorganizedintereststhatcon-
trastwiththeorganizational apparatus of thestate.
China,for example,evidencedminimalautono-
mous organizingeffortspriorto the outbreakof
the 1989 pro-democracymovement.The lack of
strategicmaneuveringandtheprevalenceof con-
flicts among studentleadersillustratethe unor-
ganized natureof the movement. Nonetheless,
withina shorttime, millionsof people acrossthe
nationpouredinto the streets.The participants
cut across the boundariesof work units, locali-
ties, andsocialgroups.Andthe 1989pro-democ-
racy movement,althoughthe most spectacular,
was by no means an isolated event. Instances
abound of mass mobilizationsinitiatedby the
* ants of the nineteenthcenturysharedthe same
Direct all correspondenceto Xueguang Zhou,
Departmentof Sociology, Uris Hall, CornellUniver-
sity, Ithaca,NY 14853. Earlierversions of this paper
were presentedat the RegionalConferenceof the As-
sociationof Asian Studies,StanfordUniversity,1990
and the Regional Conferenceof China Studies, UC
Berkeley,1991.I am gratefulto ValerieBunce,James
March,JohnMeyer,VictorNee, David Stark,Sidney
Tarrow,AndrewWalder,Robin Williams,the editor
andreviewersof ASRfor theirhelpfulcomments.
controlandbecamea challengeto the state.
How can we explain collective action based
on the unorganizedinterestsin the statesocialist
context?I examinethe link betweenthe institu-
tional structureof state socialismand collective
action in China. My central theme is that the
formationand outbreakof collective action are
rootedin the particularinstitutionalstructureof
the state-societyrelationship.I arguethatcollec-
tive actionin Chinais less a processof purposive
and rationalorganizingthan an aggregationof
largenumbersof spontaneousindividualbehav-
iorsproducedby theparticularstate-societyrela-
tionship.Althoughindividualsare unorganized,
theiractionsin pursuitof theirown self-interests
tendto convey similarclaims, sharesimilarpat-
terns,andpointto the state,i.e., they "converge"
into collective action.
THE CHINESEPOLITYAND THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVEACTION
Marx([1852] 1963)arguedthatthe Frenchpeas-
economic situationand had the same political
demands. But the lack of communicationand
organiclinks amongthe peasantsled to isolated
and unorganizedinterests;peasantsformed "a
class of itself' but not "a class for itself."More
thana centurylater,Chinesecitizensarefarmore
organicallyintegratedintothenationalsystemand
more interrelatedwith each otherthanwere the
Frenchpeasants.In terms of self-organization,

54 AmericanSociological Review, 1993, Vol. 58 (February:54-73)

UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
however,theChineseareno betterthantheFrench
peasants.Studiesof theChinesepolityhavefound
theuniquedualinstitutionalstructureof the state-
society relationship:strongorganizationalcon-
trol over society by the stateand the systematic
positiveincentivesfor complianceofferedby the
socialisteconomicinstitutions. Fromthemetropo-
lis to ruralareas, social life in China has been
organizedby the statebureaucraticsystem (Par-
ish and Whyte 1978; Whyte and Parish 1984).
Accompanyingthe state organizationalappara-
tus are politicalsanctionslike politicallabeling,
monitoring,and campaignsthat systematically
repressand deteroppositionto the state (White
1989).Thus,the Communiststatehaseffectively
monopolizedthe resourcesfor social mobiliza-
tion and deniedthe legitimacyof any organized
interestsoutsideits control.
At the same time, "thepositive incentivesof-
feredfor compliance"(Walder1986, p. 6) in the
so-called "unit-ownership system" (danwei
suoyouzhi)tiesworkersto theirworkplaces,peas-
antstotheirvillages,andindividualsto their"work
units." Workunitsfunctionnot only as the state
apparatusof politicalcontrol,but as redistribut-
ing agenciesin whichrewardsandopportunities
are linked to individuals'political attitudesand
loyalty. One consequence of this institutional
structureis the prevalenceof the clientelistsys-
tem "in which individualmembersof subordi-
nate social groupspursuetheir interestsnot by
bandingtogetherfor coordinatedgroup action,
but by cultivatingties basedon the exchangeof
loyalty andadvantagewith individualsof higher
statusandpower"(Walder1987, p. 47). In con-
trast to "civil society," in which autonomous
groupsareformedandinterestsarticulated through
the politicalprocess,its counterpartin Chinacan
best be labeled"subordinatesociety."The popu-
lace constitutessociety,butdoes notconstitutean
organizedpoliticalforcecountervailingthestate.I
1
The recentfinding of a pluralisticdecision-mak-
ing process - negotiation,bargaining,and compro-
mise amongformalgroups- is less relevantto soci-
ety proper.Becausetheseformalgroupsarebasedon,
or arepartof, the statebureaucraticorganization,they
are closer to the state system thanto society. Recent
studies of groups in Chinese politics concurredthat
social groups in China are not autonomous"interest
groups" (Goodman 1984; Falkenheim 1987). Shue
(1988) notedthe cellularfeaturesof Chinesesociety,
which helpedlocals resistcentralauthority.However,
she focused on the withdrawalof isolated and local
interestsfrom the macropoliticalprocess ratherthan
on collective actionacrosslocal boundaries.
55
Of course, state penetrationof society is not
complete or always successful.Indeed,in most
Communist societies, there are some private
realms, such as "the second economy"in Hun-
garyandthefree marketin China.Duringtheera
of economicreformin China,statepoliticalcon-
troloversocietyhasweakenedconsiderably.The
emergenceof the privatesectorhas providedso-
cial space outside the realm of immediatestate
administrativecontrol. This intermediatecivil
structurehasfacilitatedlateralinteractionamong
individualsand social groups,but by and large,
theseprivaterealmsareeitherclosely monitored
by the stateor too narrowto escape statedomi-
nance.The emergingelementsof a civil society
are far from the organizedinterestscommonly
perceivedin the collective actionliterature.
To studentsof collective action, particularly
those who take a "resourcemobilization"ap-
proach,the Chinesepolityappearsto presentfor-
midableobstaclesto collective action opposing
the state. If the success of collective action de-
pendson the strategyadopted,theextentto which
interestsare organized(Gamson 1968) or on a
socialmovement"industry" (ZaldandMcCarthy
1987), Chinais a puzzle. The absence of orga-
nized interestsmakes it impossible to identify
stableinterestgroupsor to find some systematic
distributionof rewardsor sanctionsthat would
motivateindividualsto join in collective action.
The dualinstitutionalstructure- organizational
control and positive incentives for compliance
- has severelylimited,if not eliminated,collec-
tive actionbased on organizedinterests.Collec-
tive action outside state control has invariably
met with a state crackdown,and the state has
kept the cost of organizedresistancehigh. Fur-
thermore,positiveincentivesbasedon workunits
have erodedthe basis for social mobilizationby
encouragingindividualsto pursuepersonalin-
tereststhroughprivilegedaccess and particular-
ism ratherthan through collective action. As
Walder(1986, p. 19) argued,the Chinese state
hasan"extraordinary abilityto preventorganized
political activitieseven from reachingthe stage
of collective action."
However,to understandmass mobilizationin
China, the logic of collective action cannot be
uncriticallyaccepted from a literaturethat has
been largely built on non-Communist(mainly
Western)experience.Two assumptionsembed-
ded in varioustheoriesof collective actionseem
particularlyproblematicin this regard:(1) that
thereis a separationbetweenpublic realmsand
privaterealms;and (2) that individualactivities
56
in the privaterealm involve market-liketrans-
actions.
Olson (1965) suggestedthatwhen individuals
calculatethe costs and benefits of participating
in collective action,they comparethe option of
participationwith the opportunitycost incurred
by deferringthe pursuitof individualinterests
without collective action. This assumption is
spelledout by Hirschman(1982), who held that
the separationof the privateand public realms
leads to cycles of involvementin collective ac-
tion. When individualsfind thattheirself-inter-
ests can be satisfiedby engagingin activitiesin
the privatearena,they areunlikelyto participate
in collective action. On the otherhand, frustra-
tions and dissatisfactionsover issues in the pub-
lic realm often lead to changes in individuals'
preferencesthatpush them to collective action.
The privatespherethusoffers an exit frompub-
lic life andhence fromcollective action.
Thepresenceof a marketeconomyalsoreduces
theprobabilityof collectiveaction.Thebasicfea-
tureof markettransactionsis an equilibriumbe-
tween supply and demand among individuals
engagedinmarketactivities.Individualsenterthe
privatearenawithdivergentdemandsandprefer-
ences. Given individuals'rationalcalculations,
transactionstend to producea market-likesolu-
tion to their self-interests.In terms of political
analysis,thisis a processthroughwhichindividu-
als' pursuitof theirself-interestswill compensate
each otherso thatcollective actionis impossible
or unnecessary.Thus,individualbehaviorin pri-
vate realmsis commonly seen as being outside
the scope of collective actionresearch.
Both above assumptionsfail miserablyin the
Chinese context.The boundarybetween public
and privatearenas,if it exists, does not prevent
stateinterventioninto the individual'severyday
life. "Thepenetrationof the stateinto all realms
of life did not extenda public sphereso muchas
negate it, for withoutattachmentto the partyor
one of its subsidiaryorganizationsno particular
individualcould make claims with any general
validity"(StarkandNee 1989,p. 22). Moreover,
studentsof comparativepolitics have noted"the
importanceof the nonmarketeconomy in shap-
ing a patternof social andpoliticalrelationships
unlike those thathave been elucidatedfor capi-
taliststates"(Perry1989, p. 581), andthe role of
the Communiststatein forgingparticularforms
of mass mobilization(White 1989). These con-
siderationspoint to a link between the institu-
tional structureof state socialism and collective
actionbasedon unorganizedinterests.
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
AN INSTITUTIONALAPPROACHTO
COLLECTIVEACTION
Organizedor unorganized,people everywhere
pursuetheir interestsand resist what they per-
ceive as injustices. To explore the causal link
between individualbehaviorand the collective
outcome,researchersclassify these behaviorsas
purposiveaction versus spontaneousresponse,
organizedinterestsversusunorganizedinterests,
and everyday forms of resistanceversus open
protests.Collective outcomes are explained in
termsof theirpurposiveness,leadership,organi-
zational resources, and the circumstancessur-
roundingthem.
At a deeperlevel, however,institutionalstruc-
turespecifiesthe stablepatternsof the state-soci-
ety relationship,the interconnectednessamong
social groups,andthe channelsanddirectionsof
politicalinput.In this respect,recentresearchon
the formationof nation-statesand collective ac-
tion provides importantinsights. An emerging
themefromthese studiesis the close association
betweenthe expansionof the nation-stateon the
one handand the increasingscale of interestar-
ticulation,organizingcapacity,and social mobi-
lizationon the other.Tilly (1986) arguedthatthe
rise of a capitalisteconomyandthe modernstate
in the nineteenthcenturyproducedthe "prole-
tarianization" of society,engenderedwidespread
discontent,and transformedlocal conflicts and
revoltsto the nationallevel. Skocpol (1979) em-
phasizedthe link betweencrises andthe dynam-
ics of social mobilization.She arguedthatsocial
mobilizationoften occurswhen the stateexperi-
ences crisesandcannoteffectivelycontrolpoliti-
cal resources.This createsnew opportunitiesfor
bottom-upmobilization. Birnbaum(1988) di-
rectlylinkedthe typesof regimeswithvariations
in collectiveactionandempiricallyexaminedthis
causal model in differentpolities. Though his
studies were confined to Western Europe and
NorthAmerica,his findings stronglysuggested
thatcollective actioncannotbe fully understood
withoutincorporatingthe stateinto the theoreti-
cal models (Tarrow1986). The statesocialistre-
distributivesystemproducesa sharpdivision of
interests between the state bureaucracies as
"redistributors" and other social groups as the
"immediateproducers"(Szelenyi 1978). Thus,
the institutionalstructureof statesocialismpro-
vides the startingpoint to approachcollective
actionphenomenain China.
Institutionalstructurecircumscribesboth the
solution space and channels of political input.
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
Apparentlysimilarpoliticaland social phenom-
ena may have quitedifferentimplicationsin dif-
ferent institutional contexts. For example,
Birnbaum(1988) found thattradeunions in the
UnitedKingdomand the United Statespreferto
reach agreementdirectly with employers in a
contractualsettingbecausetheinstitutionalstruc-
ture does not provide for state intervention.In
France,on the otherhand,collective agreements
do not exist, and recourseto the state and the
courts is often necessary (p. 78). In the same
vein, it is importantto understandthe political
significanceof local grievancesin the workplace
andconflictsamongsocial groupsby examining
how they are interconnectedand wherethey are
channeledin the Chineseinstitutionalsetting.
The natureof collective action is defined by
theparticularinstitutionalstructure,whichspeci-
fies the legitimacyof formsof politicalparticipa-
tion. The Communiststateclaimsa monopolyof
the public goods and denies the legitimacy of
interests at the individuallevel. An important
consequence is that any behavioroutside state
control is seen as a challenge to the state. As
Havel (1985) observed:"Anythingwhich leads
people to oversteptheir predeterminedrules is
regardedby the system as an attackupon itself.
And in thisrespectit is correct:every instanceof
such transgressionis a genuinedenialof the sys-
tem" (p. 30). When these behaviorsappearin
large numbers,they constitutecollective defi-
ance againstthe state.
Tilly (1986) emphasizedthe importanceof the
existing repertoiresthat constrainthe types of
collective actionandthe availabilityof opportu-
nities. Changes in the repertoiresof collective
action are often the resultof the evolving state-
society relationship.As Dyson (1980) pointed
out, the state "representsnot only a particular
mannerof arrangingpoliticalandadministrative
affairsand regulatingrelationshipsof authority
butalso a culturalphenomenonthatbindspeople
togetherin terms of a common mode of inter-
pretingthe world"(p. 19). An examinationof the
particularstate-societyrelationshipcan help us
understandhow the repertoiresof collective ac-
tion aremaintainedand sharedamongindividu-
als acrosslocal andorganizationalboundaries.
I use the dichotomy between the market
economy and state socialism as ideal types and
choose this comparativeframeworkfor the pur-
pose of theoreticalexposition. From an institu-
tionalperspective,thecapitalistmarketeconomy
and the state socialistredistributivesystem rep-
resent two distinctmodes of state-societyrela-
57
tionship. One fundamentaldifference between
the two is that,in the capitalistmarketeconomy,
organizedinterestsoutsidethe stateexist andare
legitimate.In the Chinese context, on the other
hand,if interestsareorganized,theyarebasedon
the stateorganizationalapparatusand hence are
not autonomous;if interestsare independentof
the state,they are often unorganized.State mo-
nopoly of the public spherereducesthe private
space in which individualscan pursuetheirself-
interestthroughmarket-liketransactions.Conse-
quently,individualbehaviors,even in pursuitof
self-interest,areunlikelyto lead to a market-like
solution.That is, althoughunorganized,the de-
mandsandbehaviorsof individualsarenonethe-
less structuredby theinstitutionalconstraintsthat
connectindividuals,social groups,andthe state.
INSTITUTIONALSTRUCTUREAND
COLLECTIVEACTIONIN CHINA
In studyingthe popularuprisingsin Franceand
England during the transition to a capitalist
economy between the eighteenthand the nine-
teenthcentury,Rude (1981) observed:
Thiswas still a periodwhenpopularattachmentand
antipathytended to focus not so much on causes
andinstitutionsas on individualheroesandvillains.
As the crowd had its heroes, like Wilkes, Lord
George Gordon,Marat,or the semi-mythicalRe-
becca, so it hadits clearlyidentifiablevillainsin the
shape of the individualemployer,merchant,fore-
staller, baker,landlord,or official; and such men
became the naturaltargetsof its vengeance when
wages werecut,priceswerehigh,theharvestfailed,
or traditionalrightswere threatened.(pp. 240-41)
Piven and Cloward's (1977) account of the
"poorpeople's movement"in the United States
afterWorldWarII revealeda similarpicture:
Peopleexperiencedeprivationandoppressionwithin
a concretesetting, not as the end productof large
and abstractprocesses,and it is the concreteexpe-
riencethatmoldstheirdiscontentintospecificgriev-
ances againstspecific targets.Workersexperience
that factory,the speeding rhythmof the assembly
line,theforeman,thespiesandtheguards,theowner
andthepaycheck.Theydo notexperiencemonopoly
capitalism.(p. 20)
Obviously,a marketeconomy presentsparticu-
lar obstaclesto collective actionbecause it pro-
ducesa complexstratification systemanda struc-
ture of fragmentedgrievancesand discontents.
Thepresenceof privatespheresandmarkettrans-
actionsalso providesa wide rangeof alternatives
58
forpursuingself-interestwithoutresortingto col-
lective action. Within this marketcontext, the
collective action literaturehas emphasizedthe
ways in whichincentives,resources,andorgani-
zations affect individuals'choices between pri-
vate spheres and public spheres and between
marketsolutionsandpoliticalsolutions.Inrecent
years,studentsof collective actionhave pointed
to theimportanceof "thecriticalmass"- a group
of individualsthattakes the initiativein pursuit
of public goods (Oliver 1980; Oliver, Marwell
and Teixeira 1985). The roles of leadership,cu-
mulativeinvolvement,andtheprospectsfor suc-
cess then alterthe incentivesof the latentgroup
andattractmorepeopleto participate (Granovetter
1978; Chong 1991).
In contrast,I contendthatthevery institutional
structureof state socialism that preventsorga-
nized interestsfacilitatescollective actionbased
on unorganizedinterests.Centralto my argu-
mentis thepropositionthattheinstitutionalstruc-
tureof statesocialismreducesthe barriersto col-
lective actionby producing"largenumbers"of
individualswith similarbehavioralpatternsand
demandsthatcut acrossthe boundariesof organ-
izations and social groups.The creationand re-
productionof these"largenumbers"of individu-
als providethe basis for social mobilizationon a
broadscale.
My secondpropositionis thatthe institutional
structureof statesocialismalso providesa direct
link between the workplaceand the state and
influences the directionof the local demands:
Once the opportunityis given, largenumbersof
discontentedindividualsin workplacestend to
converge in the same direction- toward the
state. Even conflicts between social groupsand
workplacestendto be directedtowardthe center
for solutions.These instancesof discontentmay
not be based on common interests,nor are they
necessarilyconsistentwith each other;but they
often take a "collective"form because of their
similarpatternsandtargets.
Finally,the opportunityfor collectiveactionis
embeddedin the state-societyrelationship.The
use of political campaignsand mass mobiliza-
tions by the Communiststate to deal with its
bureaucraticandeconomicproblemsenablesin-
dividualsto articulatetheirintereststhroughtheir
responsesto statepolicies.Statepolicy shiftshave
thus induced spontaneousindividualbehaviors
acrossworkplacesandlocalitiesatthe sametime,
leadingto collective action.In brief, the institu-
tionallinksimposestructureandorganizationon
these otherwiseunorganizedinterests,allowing
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
them to "act toghether"and converge into col-
lective actionchallengingthe state.
The "LargeNumbers"Phenomenon
By incorporatingall citizens into its webs of or-
ganizationalcontrol, the Communiststate can
effectively extract resources to fulfill the
leadership'sambitionsof economicdevelopment
and political control. Two important conse-
quencesfor the state-societyrelationshipfollow.
First,the Communiststate eliminatesthe tradi-
tional intermediatestratabetween the state and
society - it directlylinks each citizen with the
stateandthusreducesall social groupsto a simi-
larstructuralpositionsubordinateto the stateand
its bureaucraticorganizations.In state-owned
enterprises,workers' wage grades, promotion
opportunities, financingforhousingconstruction,
healthinsurance,etc., are decidedby the minis-
tries in Beijing. Althoughlocal collective enter-
prises,or privateenterprisesin recentyears,are
not underthe administrativecontrolof the state,
they nonethelessare subjectto directstateinter-
vention. For instance,in 1988, the centralgov-
ernmentlimited the organizationalpurchasing
power2of stateenterprisesandgovernmentagen-
cies as well as collectivesandruralorganizations
with over 200 employees.Fororganizationsthat
employedfewer than 200 workers,an "indirect
controlmeasure"requiredtheirsupervisingagen-
cies to setupquotas(RenminRibao 16Oct. 1988).
In the countryside,as Oi (1989) noted, "after
eliminatinglandlordsandcollectivizingagricul-
ture,the state for the first time steppeddirectly
intothe strugglewithpeasantsovertheirharvest"
(p. 227). Even in the reformera,when statecon-
trol reachedits lowest point in the last 40 years,
the peasants'well-being is still keenly affected
by statepolicies on price control,materialsup-
plies, and above all, the stabilityof reformpoli-
cies.
Second, state policies tend to penetratethe
boundariesof social groups and organizations
and affect all individualssimultaneously.Mass
mobilizationand resourcetransfersacross sec-
tors subjectdifferentsocial groupsto the same
statepolicy vibration,i.e., individualsandgroups
tendto be mobilizedsimultaneouslythroughtheir
vertical links with the state. For example, the
2"Organizational purchasingpower"(shehuijituan
goumaili) is a Chinese term that refers to non-
production-relatedexpenditures(welfare, subsidies)
in the workunits.
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
Great-Leap-Forward Campaignin 1958 was ini-
tiatedby the Communiststate to increasesteel
production.To achieve its goals, the statemobi-
lized not only workersin the steel industry,but
also intellectuals,workersin otherindustries,and
even peasantsin the campaign.As a result,the
ensuingdisasterspreadover the countrysideand
othersectorsas well (Chang1976).3In a central-
ized polity, state policies designatedfor a spe-
cific areatendto affect individualsin otherareas
as well. The 1987 antibourgeoiscampaignwas
launchedby the state to deal with liberalismin
"ideologicalandpoliticalareas."However,peas-
ants and workerswere also put underpolitical
pressure and responded by withholding their
marketactivities(RenminRibao 10 Oct. 1987).
As a result,even withouta consciousarticulation
of interests,individualsandsocial groupstendto
exhibita spontaneousarticulationof behaviorin
responseto statepolicies.
In the Chinese context, the similarityof the
linksbetweensocialgroupsandthe stateexertsa
muchstrongereffecton individualbehaviorsthan
do localwithin-group conditions.Theinstitutional
structureconstrainsindividuals'choice-setsand
opportunitiesandthusnarrowsthedirectionsand
types of claims generatedin society. Moreover,
this similarityin structuraldependencyand vul-
nerabilityto the rhythmsof statepolicies implies
that social groups in China not only live in a
similarpolitical and economic environmentbut
also tend to share similarlife experiences.It is
notsurprising,then,thatthesemacropolitical con-
ditions have producedsimilarbehaviorpatterns
amongindividualsacrosstheboundariesof work-
places and localities. Chinese scholars use the
"swarmsof bees"metaphorto describethis phe-
nomenon(Dong andZhang1987).Likebees that
always swarm, similar individualbehaviorsin
Chinaarealso presentin largenumbers.
This is in sharpcontrastto the formationof
interest groups in other institutionalcontexts.
Studiesof theriseof professionalismin theUnited
States and WesternEurope,for instance, have
demonstrated thattheformationof interestgroups
is often drivenby competitionin the labormar-
I The Great-Leap-Forwardcampaign, aimed at
"rushedgrowth"of steel production,was the immedi-
ate cause of the disasterof the 1959 to 1962 periodin
ruralChina.Duringthis period,the rurallaborforce
was sent to participatein steel production,leavingthe
autumnharvestuntended.The advocacyof a "Great-
Leap-Forward"also led to a rushedadoptionof the
People's Commune during the same period, which
acceleratedthe disaster.
59
ket. Interestgroupsstriveto establishtheirown
identitiesandboundariesanddifferentiatethem-
selves from each other (Larson 1977; Freidson
1986). Consequently,the boundariesof social
groups, occupations,and organizationslead to
differentpaces of change and differentrhythms
in absorbingexternalshocks.
The"largenumbers"phenomenonis reinforced
by the stateorganizationalapparatusin the work-
place (danwei).4The recent literatureon China
emphasizesthat the local bureaucracynot only
exerts political control againstinterestarticula-
tions outside the state, but also generatesfrag-
mentedandorganization-based interests(Walder
1986; Oi 1989; Shue 1988). Indeed,the bureau-
craticapparatuseffectively preventsthe forma-
tion of autonomousorganizedinterestsand per-
haps also diffuses manypotentialprotestsat the
locallevel. However,theworkplacedoes notpre-
vent the penetrationof the state into its bound-
aries,nor does it lessen the tensionbetweenthe
stateand social groups.On the contrary,the bu-
reaucraticapparatusin the workplacefacilitates
the "largenumbers"phenomenonby (1) directly
linkinglocal grievancesto nationalpolitics, and
(2) creatingsimilar bureaucraticproblems and
breedingsimilardissatisfactionsacross organi-
zations.Thisleadsme to theinstitutionalarrange-
ments in the workplace,especially the role of
local bureaucratsin linking local conflicts and
the centralstate.
In the Chinesesetting,bureaucratsat the local
level acquiretheirauthorityandlegitimationfrom
the stateandthey act as stateagents,interpreting
and implementingstate policies. In additionto
its supervisingagencies, the governmentoften
sends workteamsdirectlyto local enterprisesor
villages to inspect and implementstate policies
(Burns1988). In this context,the abilityof local
bureaucrats to solve localproblemsis constrained
by the state. Duringa wave of reformin 1984,
managers in 55 factories in Fujian Province
cosignedan appealto the provincialgovernment
for authorityto appointtheirown managerialas-
sistantsand to decide on bonuses in the work-
place (RenminRibao 30 Mar. 1984). This well-
4I use the concept of "workplace"in the sense of
the Chineseconceptdanwei,which includesnot only
factoriesfor the workers,but also universitiesfor stu-
dents and faculty,hospitalsfor doctorsand staff, and
villages for peasants,etc. Althoughthese danwei dif-
fer in their social functions, they are the basic or-
ganizationsthatindividualsbelong to and dependon
for resourcesand where the state exerts controlover
individualson a daily basis.
60
publicized story shows the depth of the state's
penetration into the workplace at the time:
Throughits bureaucraticapparatus,the central
governmentcontrollednot only workers'wage
levels, but also the internalmanagerialand in-
centivestructures. Perhapsmoreimportantis that
the centralgovernmenthad the ultimateauthor-
ity in meeting these demands- a few weeks
later,the centralgovernmentinstructedits local
agencies to allow managerialautonomyalong
thesedimensions.Thisis notanisolatedexample.
As lateas 1988,thecentralgovernmentinstructed
its local agenciesto intervenein agriculturalpro-
ductionin ruralareas (NongminRibao 28 July
1988). Laba's (1986) observationof the Polish
workplacefits the Chinesecontextas well: "The
politicalcontrolsof the Leniniststate are so di-
rect, so unmasked,that they generatea critique
of statepower withinthe workplace"(p. 66).
Bureaucratsare not merely state agents, they
also have their own interests (Djilas 1966;
Hirszowicz 1981). Bureaucratsas a "newclass"
tendto exhibitsimilarbehavioralpatternsacross
differentworkplacesand localities, a tendency
thatis reinforcedby an institutionalarrangement
thatgrantsbureaucrats monopolisticpowerat the
locallevel (Zhou1989).Thus,bureaucratic prob-
lems, whicharepervasive,also exhibitthe "large
numbers"phenomenonandcut acrossorganiza-
tion boundaries(Harding1981;Lampton1987).
Thedoubleidentityof localbureaucrats as state
agentsandas a class suggestsa link betweenthe
workplaceandthestate.Althoughgrievancesand
discontenttendto beengenderedintheworkplace,
they are often attributedto constraintsimposed
by thecentralgovernment.Conflictswithbureau-
cratsin the workplaceareunlikelyto be solved at
the local level, becauselocal bureaucratshave a
monopoly on power and, normatively,they are
stateagents.Consequently,once the opportunity
is presented,theseinstancesof discontenttendto
go beyondtheboundariesof theworkplaceandto
be directedtowardthe state. This argumentis
consistentwith the 40 yearsof Chinesepolitical
historyin which antibureaucratism has been an
effective weapon used by the state to mobilize
peopleacrossorganizationsandlocalities(Whyte
1980). The collective defiance duringthe Hun-
dredFlowersperiodandthe 1986studentdemon-
strationswere triggeredby widespreadbureau-
craticproblemsat local levels.
Different, even conflicting, interests among
localitiesor social groupsin Chinaareembodied
less in lateralcompetitionthan in their similar
verticaldemandsmadeon the state(Chen 1990,
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
p. 51). Perry(1985) documentednumerousin-
stancesof collective violence and feuds in rural
villages that clearly show that the state and its
local governmentstreatedtheselocal conflictsas
a threatto the governabilityof the state(p. 190).
In one case of clan fighting in Hainanin 1981,
the local Party Committee"dispatcheda work
teamof morethan600 statecadres,public secu-
ritypolice,militiamen,andPLAsoldiers"to solve
conflicts among villages (Perry 1985, p. 180).
The absenceof institutionalarrangements allow-
ing different social groups to settle their own
disputesmeansthatthesecompetinginterestscan-
not be dealt with in a market-liketransaction.
Rather,the statemustinterveneto providepoliti-
cal solutions.Thus,divergentlocal interestsand
conflicts,at a higherlevel of analysis,sharesimi-
lar behavioralpatternsthateitherdirectlymake
politicaldemandsor indirectlygeneratepolitical
pressureon the state.
Groupconflictduringthe CulturalRevolution
providesan illuminatingexample.Althoughthis
episode is complicated,it is clear that the con-
flictsamongsocialgroupsduringthisperiodwere
constructedby the Communistleaders (White
1989). As a result,the disputeswere ultimately
referredto the centerfor solutionsand thus cre-
ated politicalpressureson the top leaders.Dur-
ing this period,all these groupsdemandedthat
the Maoist leaders recognize their "seizure of
power" (Tsou 1986). Because the top leaders
failedto reconciletheconflictingdemands,these
demandsrepresenteda challenge to the leader-
ship's authority.This was evidencedby the re-
peatedbut unsuccessfulappealsfor allianceby
the Maoist leaders. The political pressuresre-
sultingfrom groupconflictschangedthe course
of the CulturalRevolution (Wang 1988). Mao
Zedong originally estimated that the Cultural
Revolution would last for three months. How-
ever, the accelerationof factionalandlocal con-
flictscouldnotbe containedevenby MaoZedong
himself and he was forced repeatedlyto post-
pone the deadline.
for CollectiveAction
Opportunity
Collectiveactiondependson opportunities.Inthe
contextof unorganizedinterestsand statepoliti-
cal controlin China,why do "largenumbers"of
discontentedindividualsemergeacrosslocalities
andorganizationalboundaries?
The asymmetrybetween a strongstate and a
weak society understatesocialismsuggeststhat
opportunitiesfor collectiveactionaremoreoften
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION 61

providedby the stateand statepolicy shiftsthan spond to crises in otherareas (Zhou and Wang
are createdby conscious organizingefforts on 1991). Mass mobilizationhas been adoptedto
the part of society. Ironically,institutionalar- deal with economic shortages,to enhanceeco-
rangementsin Chinahaveintermittently provided nomic development, and to support factional
such opportunities.Collective action has often struggleswithinthe leadership.In the economic
grown out of political campaignsinitiatedand arena, for example, the Great-Leap-Forward
organizedby thestateorhasstemmedfromcleav- Campaignof 1958 mobilized humanresources
ages createdby the relaxationof state political from other sectors to increasesteel production.
control. In the politicalarena,the most dramaticexample
The Chinesepoliticalprocessis characterized is the CulturalRevolutionin whichMao Zedong
by frequentpolicy shifts that alternatebetween mobilizedmillionsof students,workers,andpeas-
bureaucraticimplementationand politicalcam- antsto attackhis opponentsandthe bureaucratic
paigns.Focusingon the earlierperiodof the So- organizations.Inpart,thisaccountsforthe state's
viet Union, Arendt(1958) first arguedthat the occasionalrelaxationof politicalcontrol,andtol-
constantshiftsof powercentersandoffices were eranceandeven supportfor individualinitiative.
intrinsicto a totalitarianregimebasedon the ab- The responseof individualsand social groups
solute power of the leadership and the to state policy shifts providesclues to the out-
structurelessnessof the state. More recently, break of collective action in China. As Tilly
Chinascholarsattributethis phenomenonto the (1978) argued,"the generaleffect of sustained
organizationalfailuresof state socialism. State repressionis not to buildup tensionsto the point
dominanceover society dependson a huge bu- of a great explosion, but to reduce the overall
reaucraticapparatus.The state's monopoly of level of collective action"(p. 228). In fact, the
power is duplicatedat the lower levels of the "positiveincentivefor compliance"in Chinaen-
bureaucraticsystem. Statepolicies are transmit- couragesandeven forcesindividualsto takepart
ted throughdocumentsand only local bureau- in state-initiatedcampaignsandrespondto shifts
crats have access to these documents and the in statepolicy (Bums 1988). The politics of life
authorityto interpretthem (Oksenberg 1974). chancesare highly significantin state socialism
Thus,localbureaucrats canmanipulatestatepoli- (Whyte1985;Walder1986).Shiftsin statepolicy
cies to serve their own interests.The emphasis either affect individuals'lives directly,or indi-
on politicalloyaltyratherthancompetenceleads rectly signal the impendingdangersor opportu-
to, as Harding(1981) observed,"a stifling con- nities, with severe consequencesfor those who
formityamongofficials, a reluctanceto take in- fail to adaptto these dramaticchanges.As a re-
dependentinitiatives, a low level of technical sult, individualsmust be keenly awareof these
and managerialskills, and disillusionmentand signalsandrespondaccordingly.However,indi-
cynicismat the frequentshiftsin officialline"(p. viduals'responsesto shiftsin statepolicy do not
375). Consequently,two types of organizational suggestadherenceto the politicalline set by the
failuresemerge:(1) systematicbureaucraticde- state.Participating politicalcam-
in state-initiated
viations in implementing state policies; and paigns provides an opportunityfor individuals
(2) an accumulationof incompetentbureaucrats, and groupsto pursuetheirown agendasandex-
whichreducesthe statecapacity(Lampton1987; ploit new opportunities(Harding 1981; Shirk
Whyte 1980). Moreover,the bureaucraticsys- 1982).State-initiated politicalcampaignsprovide
tem cannot adequatelydeal with these organ- opportunitiesfor unorganizedgroups and indi-
izationalfailuresbecausethe structureof upward vidualsto act together.
accountabilitycreates close ties and personal So far, my discussion has been confined to
loyaltiesbetweenlocal bureaucratsandtheirim- what I call institutionalized collective action -
mediatesupervisors.As a result,the stateoften the collective action was initiatedby the state
adopts alternativemodes of mobilization,usu- and participantsfollowed the rules of the game
ally politicalcampaigns,to remedybureaucratic and employed legitimateinstitutionalchannels.
problems. Moreover,individualstook part in these cam-
As Arendt(1958) argued,mass mobilizations paigns more as spontaneousand adaptive re-
area core characteristicof the totalitarianmove- sponses to statepolicies ratherthanas self-con-
ment. In China, political campaigns serve the sciousorganizingefforts.The sourcesof shiftsin
purposes of the leadership by mobilizing re- statepolicy mayvary- factionalconflictsin the
sourcesto achievethe state'sambitiouspolitical CulturalRevolution,bureaucratic problemsin the
and economic goals (Townsend 1967) or to re- HundredFlowersperiod,ormobilizationforeco-
62
nomic developmentin the 1980s - but as long
as these opportunitiesare offered, individuals'
behavior tends to go beyond state prescribed
boundariesandtaketheformof collectiveaction.
Another type of collective action, un-
institutionalizedcollectiveaction, refersto pro-
tests and displays of open defiance that are not
initiatedby the state - they bypass legitimate
institutionalchannels to directly challenge the
state. This type of collective action was espe-
cially salientduringthe economicreformsof the
last decade, e.g., the studentdemonstrationsin
1986 andthe pro-democracymovementin 1989.
Unlike collective action in the pre-reformera,
social protestsin the 1980s were not initiatedby
the state.Forinstance,studentdemonstrationsin
1986 andthe pro-democracymovementof 1989
both defied warningsand threatsof repressive
measures by the top leaders. The participants
made explicit demandson the state and in both
cases, therewere open confrontationswith gov-
ernmentofficials, police, or the army.In many
respects, the social protests of the 1980s re-
sembled collective action in other social con-
texts.
The emergenceof open protestis rootedin the
new opportunitystructurecreatedby recenteco-
nomic reformsin China.In the economicreform
after1978,the staterelaxedits policy of political
control and introducedmarketmechanismsin
the allocationof resources(Nee 1989). The re-
formfacilitatedlateralcommunicationacrosslo-
calities and group boundaries,and some free-
dom of expressionwas tolerated.These reform
measurescreatedtwo conditionsthatfacilitated
collective action:(1) The relaxationof political
controlloweredthe fearof repressionandhence
reducedthe expectedcost of participatingin col-
lective action; and (2) political and economic
resourcesweredecentralized and,indirectly,were
madeavailablefor the mobilizationof collective
action.
However,the discontinuitybetween the Mao
era and the reformera shouldnot be overdrawn.
The institutionalarrangementsthat createdthe
"largenumbers"phenomenonhave not funda-
mentallychanged.The stateremainsat the cen-
ter,initiatingreformthrougha top-downprocess
(Davis andVogel 1990).Thebasiccharacteristic
of the decentralizationprocess was that power
was "granted"to local authoritiesby the state,
andthuscan be, at least normatively,withdrawn
by the state (Yan 1991). Hua, Zhang, and Luo
(1988) documentedthe majorreformdecisions
madeby the centralgovernmentduringthe 1978
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
through1988 period.They showed that,despite
the decentralizationefforts, the state played a
decisive role in promotingits policies. The dif-
ference, as one delegate to the People's Con-
gress put it, is thatbeforethe reform,local gov-
ernmentsand representativesdemandedmoney
and resources from the central government,
whereasnow theydemanded(specialprivileged)
policies from the central government(Renmin
Ribao, overseas ed., 4 Apr. 1992). Not surpris-
ingly, althoughthe state monopoly has eroded
considerably,the "largenumbers"phenomenon
still prevailsand,moreimportant,politicalpres-
sures generatedby the reformprocess are still
directedtowardthestate.Thus,uninstitutionalized
collective actionresemblesinstitutionalizedcol-
lective actionin many ways.
TWO CASE STUDIES
To illustratemy arguments,I examinetwo cases
of collective actionin some detail.
InstitutionalizedCollectiveAction. The
HundredFlowers Period
In 1957, aftera periodof economic reconstruc-
tion, nationalization,and collectivizationcam-
paignsthatbeganin 1949, the ChineseCommu-
nist statehad consolidatedits territorialcontrol
and had completedthe nation-buildingprocess.
At the same time, the bureaucraticsystem had
overexpanded and administrative problems
loomedlarge(Harding1981,pp. 87-115). In ad-
dition, popularrevolts in Hungaryand Poland
duringthis period challengedthe legitimacyof
all Communiststates. Incidentsof conflict be-
tween the populaceand bureaucratsat the local
level were also reported(Mao [1957] 1977a).
In this context,the CommunistPartyadopted
a "rectificationcampaign"to correctits bureau-
craticproblems.Mao Zedong identifiedsubjec-
tivism,bureaucratism, andsectarianismas major
problemswithinthe Party.In February,Mao sig-
naledthe beginningof the HundredFlowerspe-
riodin a speech in which he declared"leta hun-
dred flowers bloom and a hundredschools of
thoughtcontend"and that "long-termco-exist-
ence andmutualinspection"were the long-term
state policy for handlingcontradictionsamong
the people (Mao [1957] 1977a). He also advo-
catedopencriticismof theproblemsin the Com-
munistParty.
Intellectualsat first were reluctantto respond
for fear of repression.On April 30, Mao invited
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
leadersof the democraticparties5and intellectu-
als not affiliatedwith any politicalpartiesto dis-
cusstheCommunistParty'srectificationandwel-
comed their criticisms.From May 6 to June 3,
the CommunistParty'sMinistryof UnitedFront
organized a series of meetings to gather criti-
cismsfromnon-Communist Partymembers,most
of whom were intellectuals.Encouragedby the
leadership'sattitude,many individualsopenly
criticizedproblemswithinthe CommunistParty.
In a few weeks, criticismsfromdifferentsectors,
workplaces,and localitiespouredout.6
Severalcharacteristicsof thisepisodeareworth
noting.First,thecriticismswereclearlyindividu-
als' spontaneousresponses to state advocacy.
Except for some gatheringsof senior members
of the democraticparties in Beijing that were
encouragedby the CommunistParty,thereis no
evidence thatthe criticismswere coordinatedor
organizedby autonomousinterestgroups. Nu-
merousaccountsof thisperiodindicatethatmost
participantsacted on the basis of appealsfrom
top leaders. For instance, some universitystu-
dentswerelaterpurgedsimplybecausetheycriti-
cizedheadsof CommunistPartybranchesin their
departmentsor in the university.In an interview,
a professorwho was purgedduringthis period
recalledthat,at the invitationof the Partysecre-
tary in his department,he wrote an articlesup-
portingthe CommunistParty's"HundredFlow-
ers" policy and warning that subjectivism,
bureaucratism, andsectarianism,if notcorrected,
would lead to national disaster. As he put it:
"Thosewerethe samewordsthetop leadersused
whentheyadvocatedtherectificationcampaign."
Second,notonly intellectualsbutsocialgroups
such as managers,doctors, civil servants,and
I In Chinese practice,all political parties
outside
the CommunistPartyare labeleddemocraticDarties.
6My discussionreliesmainlyonXinhuaBanyuekan
(Apr.- Aug. 1957), an official news-collectionseries
that assembledinformationon the background,par-
ticipation,andstateresponsesduringthis period.The
best source available in English is MacFarquhar
(1960), who collected a sample of criticismsduring
this period.In this collection and other official Chi-
nese publications,criticismsby prominentintellectu-
als are disproportionatelyrepresentedwhile circum-
stances at the local level are not adequatelyrepre-
sented.In 1979, when the CommunistPartyrehabili-
tatedthose purgedduringthis period,many individu-
als recountedtheirexperiencesin workplaces.Some
of thecases citedbelow aredrawnfromwhatI learned
when I was at a university in Shanghaiduring the
rehabilitationperiod.
63
religiousgroups,respondedwithcomplaintsand
demands(MacFarquhar 1960).Officialpublished
materialsreveal non-Partymemberscriticizing
the CommunistParty'smonopolyof power,doc-
tors complaining of bureaucraticcoverups of
medical malpractice(GuangmingRibao 3 May
1957), studentsquestioningthe proceduresfor
electing student representatives (Guangming
Ribao26 May 1957),andwritersdemandingcre-
ative freedom(WenxueYanjiu(5) 1957). Open
criticismsfrom peasantsand workerswere less
frequentandtheirexpressionsof discontenttook
otherforms. For instance,accordingto a report
by the official media, 13 workers' strikes or
"troublemaking" incidentsoccurredin one year
in GuangdongProvince alone. In the country-
side, over 10,000householdswithdrewfromthe
cooperativesin GuangdongProvinceduringthe
same period(New ChinaNews Agency 14 May
1957 as quotedin MacFarquhar1960, p. 234).
The common characteristicof these incidents
is thatcriticsacrossdifferentworkplacesandlo-
calitiesraisedsimilarcriticisms.The centralized
politicalsystemproducedlargenumbersof simi-
lar bureaucraticproblemsacross localities and
largenumbersof individualswithsimilarexperi-
encesanddissatisfactions. Thesecriticisms,while
differingin specifics,all demandedthattheCom-
munistPartycorrectlocal bureaucratic problems
and relax its political controlover society. The
linkbetweenlocalbureaucratic problemsandthe
centralstate was clearly perceived.As two stu-
dents in a teachers'college in Shenyangput it:
"Themain sourceof bureaucraticproblemslies
in the centralgovernment.If we don't eliminate
these problemsat their roots, they will emerge
again"(ShenyangRibao 10 June 1957).
Thecollectivenatureof these spontaneousand
large-scalecriticismsexceededthe state'sexpec-
tations.On May 15, 1957,less thanthreemonths
after he declaredthe HundredFlowers policy,
MaoZedongchargedthatthesecriticismswerea
concerted effort by counter-revolutionariesto
overthrowthe CommunistParty (Mao [1957]
1977b). On June 8, the Partylaunchedits Anti-
Rightist Campaign. Those who criticized the
CommunistParty were labeled "rightists"and
"conflicts"between rightistsand the state were
declared"contradictions betweenthe people and
the enemies"ratherthan"contradictionsamong
thepeople."Ina few months,over400,000"right-
ists"were purgednationwide.
This episodeis anexampleof institutionalized
collectiveaction,i.e., the Communiststatemobi-
lized the masses to deal with the state'sbureau-
64
craticproblems.However,even thoughthe par-
ticipantsclearlywere unorganizedandfollowed
the stated rules of the game, their remarkably
similarcriticismsand demandsand the political
pressuresputon the statefollowed the patternof
collective action.Consequently,they were seen
as a challengeto the stateand were severelyre-
pressed.
Uninstitutionalized
CollectiveAction:Student
Demonstrationsin 1986
Near the end of 1986, Chinawas full of frustra-
tions, expectations,andexcitement.The frustra-
tion stemmed from difficulties in carryingout
economic reforms. In 1986, China entered its
eighthyearof economicreform.Intheinitialthree
years,Chinaexperiencedthe most rapidagricul-
turalgrowth in its history.Encouragedby this
economic miracle,the state extendedreformto
theindustrialsectorin urbanareasin 1984.It soon
became clear that the political system was the
biggest obstacle to urbanreform.Bureaucratic
interferenceandcorruptionled to economicstag-
nationandengenderedmass grievances.
On the otherhand,expectationswere high. In
an effortto overcomethesedifficulties,the Com-
munist leadership,especially Deng Xiaoping,
advocatedpoliticalreform.On June28 andSep-
tember 13, 1986, Deng Xiaoping instructedthe
Politburoto considerpoliticalreformin orderto
enlist mass supportfor economic reformand to
overcome bureaucratism(Document Office of
the PartyCentralCommittee1986). Inspiredby
these signals,in the summerof 1986,heateddis-
cussions occurred among intellectuals on the
problemsof thecurrentpoliticalsystemandpros-
pects for politicalreform.Articles,debates,and
proposalsappearedin newspapers,professional
journals,andpublicforums.7
While talk of political reformwas in the air,
university studentscould wait no longer. The
apparentwillingnessof the stateto considerpo-
litical reformreleasedlong-suppressedtensions
in society. On December 5, 1986, studentsat
China Science and Technology University in
AnhuiProvincetook to the streetsto protestin-
valid election proceduresin a local election and
to demandpoliticalreformand democraticpro-
cedures.The governmentrealizedthepotentially
I
Many publicationson politicalreformsappeared
during this period. Interestedreaders can refer to
RenminRibao,GuangmingRibao,JiefangRibao,and
XinhuaYuebaofor mid-1986 for details.
REVIEW
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
explosive natureof this event and on December
8, 1986, an editorialin RenminRibao warned
thatpolitical reformmust proceedaccordingto
the CommunistParty'sblueprint.But it was too
late. That same month, studentdemonstrations
tookplacein Shanghai,Beijing,Nanjing,Wuhan,
Hongzhou,Shenzhen,and other large cities. In
many places, studentsconfrontedpolice and lo-
cal officialsin defianceof thegovernment'schilly
warning.
Eyewitnessaccountsand mediareportsnoted
the spontaneityof participationand the partici-
pants' lack of organizationand clear goals. For
example,studentsatFudanUniversitymobilized
aftera groupof studentsfrom a nearbyuniver-
sity marchedto FudanandaskedFudanstudents
to join them.One studentorganizerat Fudanre-
called: "We [classmates]were all excited about
what was happening.Someone posted an an-
nouncementthattherewouldbe a demonstration
the next day. We discussedit duringlunch and
decided we would preparebannersandjoin the
demonstration." In a few days, studentsfromall
majoruniversitiesin Shanghaiwere participat-
ing in the demonstrations.The unorganizedna-
ture of the protests was also reflected in their
lackof sustainedmobilizationandlackof coher-
ent demands(Wasserstrom1991).On December
18, just a few days afterthe first outbreak,stu-
dentsreturnedto theirclassroomsin spiteof some
studentorganizers'calls for a boycottof classes
(Schell 1988, p. 230).
Althoughdemonstrations indifferentareaswere
triggeredby differentlocalincidents,theyallcon-
verged on the same issues. In Anhui Province,
studentdemonstrationsbroke out to protestthe
violationof electionprocedureswhena localParty
office triedto impose its candidateson the stu-
dents.InShanghai,demonstrations weretriggered
by theabuseof studentsby policein a publicplace
(NinetithFeb. 1987, pp. 74-76). In Shenzhen,
demonstrationsprotested high tuition (Schell
1988).Evenin Shanghai,differentdemandswere
madeduringthedemonstrations. Forinstance,the
initialdemandsatFudanUniversityincludedcom-
plaintsaboutdormitoryconditionsandfood qual-
ity, among others (Schell 1988; Wasserstrom
1991).Diverseas thesecomplaintswere,student
demonstrationsquicklyconvergedon a demand
8 My discussion here is based primarilyon pub-
lished eyewitness accounts,news reportsin Chinese
journalsin Hong Kong, andinterviewsin the summer
of 1987 with studentparticipantsfromFudanUniver-
sity.
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION 65

for the centralgovernmentto speed up political that studentshad lost their enthusiasmand be-
reformsandcorrectbureaucraticproblems. come apathetic(ZhongguoQingnianbao4 Apr.
Thegeneralatmosphereof politicalreformcre- 1988).Althoughtherewerea few informaldissi-
atedby top leadershadprovidedthe basis for the dentgroupsamongthe studentsat Beijingon the
mobilizationof studentsat differentcampuses eve of the 1989 events andthe membersof these
andlocalities.Thesedemonstrations actuallysup- groupswere actively involved in the social pro-
ported the top leaders' reform efforts. As one tests,thereis no evidencethatthese groupsiniti-
studentexplained:"We were respondingto the ated,or werecapableof mobilizingandorganiz-
call last July by Deng Xiaopingfor politicalre- ing suchlarge-scaleopenconfrontations.In fact,
form. We are impatientthat in spite of all the the originalstudentrepresentativesof the Inde-
newspaperarticlesadvocatingmassparticipation, pendent StudentAlliance of Beijing Universi-
nothingconcretehas yet been done to allow us a ties, establishedduringthe protest,includedno
say in governmentaffairs"(Schell 1988,p. 213). membersof these dissidentgroups(Shen 1990).
Nonetheless,thePartyleadershipsaw thedem- Nonetheless,the institutionalstructurecreated
onstrationsas a challengeto Partyruleandinter- interconnectionsamong individualsand social
pretedthem as "riots"(naoshi)inspiredby "bad groups. Individualsfrom various social groups
elements." In response, the government took andorganizations- victimsof thereforms,such
strongpoliticalmeasuresto suppressthe student as workersandcadresin state-ownedenterprises,
demonstrations.GeneralSecretaryHu Yaobang as well as beneficiariesof the reforms,such as
was forced to resign;threefamous intellectuals privateentrepreneurs joined the demonstra-
who advocatedpoliticalreformwerepurged;the tions.Althoughparticipantsmaynothave shared
presidentand a vice presidentof ChinaScience a common interest,they shareda common en-
and Technology University, where the student emy. The central state and its policies engen-
demonstrationsbegan, were replaced and the dered widespread discontent among students,
university administrationreorganized. In the workers,cadres,andothersocialgroups.Though
meantime,a nationwideAnti-BourgeoisCam- demands varied across social groups (Strand
paignwas launched.The CommunistPartyorga- 1990), it was the centralposition of the state as
nized mass criticisms of Western liberalism. thecauseof, andthe solutionto, socialproblems,
Withinone month,majorPartynewspaperspub- that was the basis for the articulationof behav-
lished numerouseditorialsand commentariesto iors amongthese participants.
motivate this campaign (Xinhua Yuebao Jan. Inmost instancesof collectiveactionin China,
1987). studentsand intellectualswere the main partici-
Althoughthey occurred30 years apart,these pants.In part,thiscan be attributedto therelative
twoinstancesof collectiveactionsharesomesimi- homogeneityof the intelligentsia,but it also re-
larities. In both cases, participantswere moti- flects the sensitivityof intellectualsand students
vatedby shiftsin statepolicy ratherthanby their to shiftsin statepolicy. The distancebetweenthe
own organizingefforts. Political control at the intelligentsiaand othersocial groupswas not as
workplaceandfragmentedinterestsbasedon for- greatas it appeared.For instance,althoughonly
mal organizationsdid not preventcollective ac- studentsparticipatedin the 1986demonstrations,
tion across these boundaries.On the contrary, citizens reportedlycheered the studentdemon-
bureaucraticproblemsat the local level were the stratorsand providedthem with food and cloth-
immediatecause of collective action. But these ing (NinetithJan. 1987, pp. 17-20). These ac-
criticismsandprotestsquicklymovedfromlocal tions resembledcitizen supportfor studentsat
issues to the centerand threatenedthe Commu- the beginningof the 1989 demonstrations,just
nist state. before they joined studentsin demonstrations.
Thepuzzlesof the 1989pro-democracymove- This suggests that the promptstate crackdown
mentcanbe understoodin a similarmanner.Wide interruptedthe emerging mobilizationof these
participationin the movement cannot be ac- nonstudentgroupsin the 1986 episode.
countedfor by eithercommoninterestsor orga- In examiningthe patternsof collective action
nizationalefforts. On the eve of the 1989 pro- in China,I have focused on its causal link with
tests, Chinese society was highly differentiated; theinstitutionalstructureof statesocialism.How-
inequalitygeneratedtensionsamongsocialgroups ever, microconditionsare also important re-
(Davis and Vogel 1990). Even universitystu- sources,organizingcapacity,leadership,incen-
dentswere divided(Chen 1991). Justa yearear- tives, personalnetworks,andexistingrepertoires
lier,thePresidentof BeijingUniversitylamented of collective action also play importantroles.
66
Thereis evidenceof mobilizationacrossuniver-
sities duringthe 1986 and 1989 studentdemon-
strations.Informalchannels of communication
were availablethroughpersonalnetworks,trav-
elers,hearsayand,in recentyears,foreignbroad-
casts. The mobilizationof studentprotest was
also based on existing repertoiresof collective
actionsuch as patrioticsymbols,the big charac-
terposters(dazibao),andworkunits.Thesesym-
bols and forms can be tracedto the May Fourth
movementof 1911 and the CulturalRevolution.
Furthermore, the 1989pro-democracy movement
clearlyreflectedtheprofoundsocialchangesthat
had occurredduringthe ten-yeareconomic re-
form thatunderminedthe capacityof the Com-
munist state. Whetherthe reform process can
continueandwhetherit will lead to fundamental
changes in the patternsof collective action re-
mainto be seen.
COLLECTIVEINACTIONAS A FORMOF
COLLECTIVEACTION
Thus far, I have consideredcollective action in
theformof opendefiantbehavior.However,col-
lective actionunderstatesocialismalso includes
noncompliance,apathy,and pessimism among
thepopulace(TownsendandWomack1986;Ma-
son,Nelson,andSzklarski1991).Certainly,these
formsof resistancearenot uniqueto Communist
society - they have been documentedin many
othersocialcontexts(Scott 1985;Colburn1989).
I would argue,however,thatin the institutional
structureof state socialism,noncomplianceand
apathyassumea collective characterand have a
specialpoliticalsignificance.I labelthisphenom-
enon collectiveinaction.
Collectiveinactionmay takedifferentforms:a
lackof enthusiasmfor participatingin state-initi-
ated politicalcampaigns,absenteeismor ineffi-
ciency in the workplace,evasion of public du-
ties, and the emergenceof subculturesopposing
the official ideology. Some of these behaviors
are more visible than others and may well be
seen as "action"ratherthan "inaction,"such as
looting of crops and animalslaughter.But their
commoncharacteristic is thattheyareindividual-
based and take the form of escape from state
controlratherthanopenconfrontations. Thistype
of behaviorhas minimalsymbolicvisibility:
Whentheyarepracticed widelyby membersof an
entireclassagainstelitesorthestate,theymayhave
aggregated consequences out of all proportion
to
theirbanalitywhenconsidered singly.(Scott1989,
p.5)
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
In a marketeconomy,problemsresultingfrom
noncomplianceandinefficiencyattheworkplace
do not assumea collective characterbeyondthe
local boundaryand a set of complicatedeco-
nomiclayersabsorbstheirimpacts.Forinstance,
inefficiency in the Americanautomobileindus-
try has been suggestedas a majorsource of its
competitivedisadvantage.However,the cost of
inefficiencyin the workplaceis sharedby com-
panyowners,consumers,and,indirectly,thestate,
throughdeclines in tax revenues.Furthermore,
the adverseimpactof inefficiencyat the national
level maybe partlyalleviatedby the successesof
otherindustries.Even whendiscontentspansso-
cial groups, it tends to be directedto multiple
targetswith multipledemands.
State socialism is a directlyoppositecase. In
the institutionalstructureof state socialism,the
state's monopoly over the public spheremeans
thatnoncompliancedirectlychallengesstateau-
thority,affectsthe state'sextractionof resources,
andthreatensits governancecapacity.Collective
inactionemergeswhenstatepoliciesshifttoward
political repressionand tightercontrol. During
periodsof repression,open protestsare severely
punishedand individualsprotectthemselvesby
resortingto invisible forms of resistancerather
thanopen defiance.Collectively,these formsof
resistanceputenormouspoliticalpressureon the
state,challengingits legitimacyandconstraining
its capacityto implementpolicies. In this light,
the "largenumbers"of noncompliantbehaviors
resemblecollective action.
Althoughit is difficultto documentinstances
of collective inaction,severalstudies shed light
onthisphenomenon.SkinnerandWinkler(1969),
in a studyof stateagriculturalpolicies duringthe
1950s and 1960s, found that peasants'indiffer-
ence toward state policies and their collective
resistanceinhibitedthe state'scapacityto imple-
ment its policies andforcedthe stateto abandon
old policies andtakea differentdirection.Zweig
(1989) examined the peasants' resistanceover
collectivelandin the 1960sand1970sandreached
similar conclusions. Townsend and Womack
(1986, pp. 265-69) also recognizedthis type of
behaviorasadistinctive typeof interestarticulation.
Perhapsthe most spectacularexample is the
changein agriculturalproductivitythatoccurred
duringthe reform.The collectivizationof agri-
culturebefore 1979 deprivedpeasantsof their
lands and the policy met with tacit resistantbe-
haviors like free-riding,low productivity,eva-
sion of farm duties. The pervasivenessof the
resistanceconstitutedcollective inactionand its
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
cost was clearlyreflectedin a stagnationof agri-
culturalproduction.During the 1971 through
1978 period,when the peasantswere underthe
communesystem,theannualgrowthratein gross
value of agriculturaloutput was 4.3 percent
(Perkins1988).Duringthereformera,whencol-
lectivizationwas abandonedand privatehouse-
holds leased the land,the growthratejumpedto
7.5 percentduringthe 1980through1982period,
and 13.0 percentfrom 1982 to 1986. As Perkins
(1988) noted,"thegrowthof such key inputsas
mechanicalandelectricpowerandchemicalfer-
tilizerall increasedat ratesno higherandin most
cases lower in the 1979-85 periodas contrasted
to the 1965-78 period"(p. 612). Clearly,these
high growthrates in agricultureare attributable
mainly to human factors, "particularlythe re-
lease of energiesconnectedwith privatehouse-
hold output"(p. 612). It is evidentthatcollective
inactionin agriculturebeforethe reformera had
a devastatingeffect on the capacityof the stateto
extractresources.
Even in the reformera,collective inactionfre-
quentlyoccurred.For instance,in the springof
1989, 150,000 workersin the coal industryin
ShanxiProvincerefusedto returnto work after
the ChineseSpringFestivalto protestthe short-
age of grainsuppliedby the state.This actionre-
duced coal productionby around400,000 tons
per day anddisruptedproductionin otherindus-
tries(Chen1990,pp. 130-31).OnJanuary4,1988,
a reportappearedon the front page of Renmin
Ribao entitled "Workers' Enthusiasm in the
WorkplaceReachedItsBottomLow."Thereport
presentedtheresultsof a socialsurveyconducted
by theNationalWorkersUnionin whichonly 12
percentof the 210,000 workerssurveyedagreed
thattheirworkenergieswere fully utilized.
In some instances,collective inactiondirectly
affectedstatepolicy.Forexample,in 1987,when
theCommunistPartylaunchedtheanti-bourgeois
campaignto repressstudentdemonstrations,in-
dividualssensed the impendingpoliticalrepres-
sion andpolicy shifts.Peasantscut the treesthey
were growing and slaughteredpigs they were
raisingin fearthatthey would be confiscatedby
the state. Enterpriseswithheld productionand
investmentbecauseof thepossibilitythatthe au-
tonomygrantedto themby thegovernmentmight
be revoked(ChengmingMar. 1987, pp. 19-21).
Althoughsimilarresponsesmay occurin a mar-
ket economy, the differenceis thatthe Chinese
were respondingto political uncertaintyrather
thanmarketuncertaintyandtheirbehaviorswere
directlytranslated intopoliticalpressure.A speech
67
by then Acting GeneralSecretaryZhao Ziyang
representsan effort to change the course of the
politicalcampaign:
If the current[refonn] policy is interpretedas the
result of bourgeois liberalism,it will create great
uncertaintyamong the people. If productionis un-
attended,commercialactivitiesdisrupted,forestde-
stroyedandpigs killed, who can shoulderall these
responsibilities?(RenminRibao 10 Oct. 1987)
Clearly,collective action in the Chinesecon-
text manifestsitself not only throughopen resis-
tanceanddemonstrations, butalso in moresubtle
formsof noncompliantbehaviorthatfall outside
the conventionalscope of collective action.Un-
likeothersocialcontexts,however,in Chinathese
forms of resistanceshare the characteristicsof
collective action. In a sense, collective inaction
is an invisible "sit-in"in the Chinese political
context.Itsmessageis loudandclear,even with-
out symbolicactions.
In a capitalistmarketcontext, as Hirschman
(1982) noted,the dichotomybetweenthe public
andprivatearenasallows individualsto shiftbe-
tween public and private realms and between
collective actionand the pursuitof self-interest.
In state socialism, on the other hand, shifts of
individualinvolvementaremorelikely to be be-
tween collective action and collective inaction.
Whetherindividualsstrivefor the publicgood or
pursuetheirself-interests,theirbehaviorsassume
a collective characterand challenge the state
monopoly.
DISCUSSION
I have examinedcollective action in China by
contrastingstate-societyrelationshipsin thecapi-
talist marketeconomy and the state socialistre-
distributivesystem. These ideal types highlight
how the uniquefeaturesof statesocialismleadto
collective actionbasedon unorganizedinterests.
The Chinese experienceis not an isolated case
- collectiveactionsbasedon unorganized inter-
ests have also occurredin the marketeconomy.
The studentprotestsin Francein the 1960s and
1986emergedspontaneouslyratherthanthrough
carefulorganization(McMillan 1992; Wilsford
1988). Protestsby blacks in the early periodof
the U. S. civil rightsmovementalso were not a
resultof consciousorganizingefforts.Whatcon-
ditionsfosterthese similartypesof collectiveac-
tion in differentsocial contexts?
Accordingto Hirschman(1982), one cause of
this phenomenonis marketfailures that shrink
68
the privaterealm where individualscan pursue
their self-interestsand alter their preferences,
therebypushingindividualsintothepublicarena.
In a studyof the poorpeople's movementduring
the GreatDepression,PivenandCloward(1977)
madesimilararguments.The politicalandsocial
bases of racialprejudiceand discriminationren-
dered any market-likesolution impossible,set-
tingthe stagefor theriseof the civil rightsmove-
ment. Underthese circumstances,collective ac-
tion may occur with or withoutconscious orga-
nizing efforts. The maintenanceand expansion
of collective actions, however, depend heavily
on leadership,organizations,and the evolving
politicalprocess(McAdam1982).
Anothercontributingfactor is the increasing
concentrationof powerthataccompaniedtherise
of the nation-stateand redefinedthe boundaries
of the publicand privaterealms."As capitalism
advanced,as nationalstatesbecame more pow-
erful and centralized,local affairs and nearby
patrons matteredless to the fates of ordinary
people"(Tilly 1986, pp. 395-96). These evolv-
ing state-societyrelationshipsled to fundamen-
tal changesin theformsandchannelsof political
input from society. Wilsford (1988) attributed
studentprotestsin Franceto the dominanceof
the state apparatusthere:"Forthe Frenchstate,
by dealinghighhandedlywith its opponents,cut
themoff fromnormalavenuesof politicalnego-
tiation.In doing so, it forces its opponentsto exit
normalpolitics" (p. 152). The studentdemon-
strationsof the 1960s in the United Stateswere
interconnectedin a similarmanner- they were
a collectiveresponseto thefederalgovernment's
foreignpolicy andits interventionin higheredu-
cation.
The emergenceof new social movements in
WesternEuropealso illustratesthispoint.Incon-
trastto the traditionalorganizationalbase of so-
cialmovements,scholarshaveobservedtheemer-
gence of social movementssince the 1970s that
arisefroma diffuseandfluid socialbase andcut
acrossgroupboundariesandtraditionalpolitical
arenas(DaltonandKuechler1990).This pattern
of social mobilizationis mainlythe resultof the
rise of welfare state in industrializedsocieties
which has blurredand widened the boundaries
of the political (Maier 1987). The state's pen-
etrationinto social life has linkeddiverse social
issuesandpoliticalarenasandprepareda broader
base for interestarticulation.Clearly,changesin
the repertoiresof collective actionand forms of
social mobilizationreflect an evolving state-so-
ciety relationship.
REVIEW
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
The absenceof a marketandthe prevalenceof
the state in social life do not necessarilyentail
collective actionin the Chinesecontext.The re-
distributiveeconomicsystemin Chinaplaces in-
dividualsunderthe organizationalcontrolof the
state. The lack of organizedinterestslimits the
effectiveness of leadership,personalnetworks,
communication,andmobilization.Furthermore,
the track record of the state's repressivemea-
suresagainstcollective actionmakesthe cost of
participationhigh. Why does collective action
occurunderthese adverseconditions?
An institutionalperspectivesheds lighton this
puzzle. Althoughunorganized,collective action
in Chinais systematicallystructuredby the par-
ticular type of state-society relationship.The
Communiststate and its institutionshave fos-
teredinterconnectionsamongotherwiseunorga-
nized interestsby generating"largenumbers"of
discontentedpeople, by linkinglocal discontent
withnationalpolitics,andby a mobilizationpolicy
thatperiodicallyincorporatessocialgroupsin the
political process. Thus, collective action is un-
wittingly"organized"by the Communiststate.
Considerthe role of formal organizations.It
has been arguedthat factories,communes,and
universitiesare part of the state organizational
apparatuswhereby the Communiststate exer-
cises controlthroughpoliticalpressuresandeco-
nomic incentives.In the studentdemonstrations
in 1980s, universityauthoritiesdiscouragedstu-
dents from participating.The governmentalso
threatenedworkersthroughPartybranchesat the
workplace(Stavis1988,p. 105).However,work-
placesanduniversitiesareplaceswherepersonal
ties and social networks are formed (Calhoun
1989). When opportunitiesopen up, they pro-
vide a channel for social mobilization,as evi-
denced in the 1989 pro-democracymovement.
In this light, the workplace is a social space
where individuals share similar interests and
similarexperiencesand interact.It is also a po-
litical space where discontentagainst the state
and local bureaucratsis bred and accumulated.
In time, it becomes an organizationalbasis for
mobilizationof its membersin pursuitof their
interests.
Moreover,in the instancesof collective action
I consider,participationwas eithermobilizedby
the statedirectlyor inducedby statepolicy. Dur-
ing the HundredFlowersperiod,for instance,the
state took greatpains to motivateindividualsto
participatein the anti-bureaucratism campaign.
Studentdemonstrationsand studentattackson
bureaucraticorganizationsin 1986 were also
UNORGANIZEDINTERESTSAND COLLECTIVEACTION
promptedby the call for politicalreformby the
top leaders.In such an institutionalsetting,indi-
viduals may start with diverse targets and de-
mands,but they tend to converge in a common
directionowing to the centralizedpolity andop-
portunitystructure.Regardlessof participants'
motivations,the large numberof criticismsdi-
rectedtowardthe stateandopenprotestsarecaus-
ally defined as collective action. Even tree-cut-
ting andpig-killingin ruralareasthatare within
theprivaterealmtakea "collective"formto chal-
lenge the stateand statepolicies.
Communistpracticesin China also generate
andmaintainthe repertoiresof collective action.
Severalscholarshave notedsimilaritiesbetween
the studentprotestsof the 1980s andothersocial
movements in Chinese history (Strand 1990;
Wasserstrom1991). The studentprotestsof the
1980srepeatedlyinvokedtheimageryof the May
Fourthmovementof 1911, whose patrioticsym-
bols legitimizedparticipation.Studentsalso drew
on memoriesof the CulturalRevolution,which
providedformsof organizationandmobilization.
Forinstance,big characterpostersweredisplayed
on campuses;studentorganizersin Beijing sent
representativesto othercities to mobilize fellow
students;workersjoined by holding bannersof
their work units - all these actions were re-
markablysimilarto actions adoptedduringthe
CulturalRevolution.Interestingly,both sources
of the actions were createdand maintainedby
the Communiststate:The Communiststatecel-
ebratesthe May Fourthmovementannuallyas a
symbol of patriotism,and the CulturalRevolu-
tion and othermass mobilizationswere also ini-
tiatedandorganizedby the state.The centralized
politicalsystemcreatesa culturalcontextin which
therepertoiresof collectiveactionaremaintained
and sharedby individualsacross organizations
and social groups.
Outbreaksof collectiveactionaretriggeredby
shifts in several importantparameters:Political
controlsare relaxed,individualsare encouraged
to participatein thepoliticalprocess,lateralcom-
municationnetworks are activated,and cleav-
ages open owing to factionalconflictsat the top.
During such episodes, individualsare encour-
agedby the stateto "speakout."Thus,the popu-
lace becomes awareof widespreaddiscontents,
which in turnpromotesfurtherparticipationin
thisprocess.Moreimportant,sucha politicalpro-
cess mustpersistlong enoughto affect individu-
als' incentivesand perceptionsof risk. Because
the simultaneousemergenceof these conditions
is rare,collective actionin Chinais infrequent.
69
Obviously,thecollectiveactionsdiscussedhere
differin manyaspectsfromcollective actionsin
othersocial contexts.Becausethey areless "pur-
posive," they could be termed"aggregates"of
individualbehavioror "crowdbehavior."How-
ever, the transformationof individualbehavior
into collective action discussed here is too sys-
tematic, structurallyembedded,and politically
significantto be treatedmerelyas a circumstan-
tial outcome.The largenumberof individualre-
sponsesis rootedin thenatureof the state-society
relationshipand reproducedin everydayactivi-
ties. Theseresponsesarepartof the politicalpro-
cess, bothasproductandas input.Theyshouldbe
treatedas "collective"becausetheyareperceived
andrespondedto as suchby thestate,andbecause
they affect the politicalprocessas collective ac-
tions ratherthanas unorganizedinterests.
RETHINKINGTHE STATE-SOCIETY
RELATIONSHIPUNDER STATE
SOCIALISM
In concluding,I assess therelevanceof my argu-
ments to collective actionin otherstatesocialist
societiesandreconsiderthe state-societyrelation-
ship in statesocialismin light of my arguments.
AlthoughI have focused on China,the issues
and mechanismsinvolved are more generaland
are rooted in the patternsof state-societyrela-
tionshipstypical of state socialism. In develop-
ing these ideas, I have benefited greatly from
studies of the Soviet Union and EasternEuro-
pean politics where the "large numbers"phe-
nomenonhasalsobeenobserved.Griffiths(1971)
found a "parallelarticulationof behavior"cut-
ting across formal groups in the Soviet Union.
Morerecently,Bunce(forthcoming)usedthecon-
cept of "homogenization" to characterizethe ba-
sis for spontaneousinterestarticulationin East-
ern Europeancountries.The directlink between
the state and the workplacehas been most evi-
dent in the Soviet Union and in EasternEuro-
pean contexts (Laba 1986). Politicalcampaigns
andmassmobilizationshaveoccurredfrequently
in the Soviet Union (Viola 1987) and Eastern
Europe (Hankiss 1989). Studies of mass resis-
tance - instances of "collective inaction"
andits politicaleffectson statepolicieshavealso
emergedin recentyears(Scott 1989).
Hankiss(1989)examinedthemobilizationpro-
cess in Hungaryand found that shifts in state
policy towardopennesscreatedthe opportunity
for society to mobilize and challenge the state.
Even in Polandbefore the birthof Solidarityin
70
the 1980s, workers'uprisingsexemplifiedcol-
lectiveactionbasedon unorganizedinterests.For
instance, workers' strikes in 1976 occurredin
morethan100factoriesthroughoutthe nationon
thedaythePolishgovernmentannounceditsprice
reformprogram.Bernhard(1987) showed that
these strikeswere immediateresponsesto state
policy ratherthan carefully organized efforts.
Therewere noticeabledifferencesin the partici-
pants' demandsacross sectorsand regions.The
unorganizednatureof the strikes is also indi-
cated by their short duration:They lasted one
day and ended when the governmentwithdrew
its pricereformpolicy. The basic featuresof the
institutionalarrangementsandstate-societyrela-
tionshipsdiscussedherehavedirectimplications
for understandingcollective actionin otherstate
socialistsocieties.
Of course,the argumentsdevelopedherecan-
not be applied in a wholesale mannerin other
contexts.The state'scapacityto monopolizethe
publicarena,therhythmsof shiftsin statepolicy,
and the resources available to society vary in
differentcontexts, which may introducediffer-
ent dynamics and forms of resistance.For in-
stance,thecivil structuresoutsidestatesocialism
variedacrossEasternEuropeansocieties, which
then led to differentpaths of transition(Stark
1992). These conditionshave substantialeffects
on the state-societyrelationship.The patternsof
strategicmaneuveringin the Solidarity era in
Polandclearlyshow an alternativecollective ac-
tion based on organized interests (Staniszkis
1984).
Earlystudiesof contemporary Communistpoli-
tics have focused on the state and its organiza-
tionalapparatus. Thesestudiesattributed changes
in state policy to factionalconflicts among the
top leaders.This focus on organizationsand in-
terestarticulationsmeantthatworkers,peasants,
and intellectuals were treated as categorical
groupsandignored(Skilling1971).Furthermore,
these studies often attributedcollective action
based on unorganizedintereststo policy mis-
takesby the leadershipor as circumstantialout-
comes (MacFarquhar1960; White 1989). With
the exceptionof studiesof the Solidaritymove-
mentin Poland,the role of unorganizedinterests
has been neglected in the analysis of political
processesin statesocialistsocieties.
Understatesocialism,society is organization-
ally weakcomparedto the stateapparatus.Politi-
cal demandsin such a contextare not generated
by the formationand shiftingof interestgroups
typicalof a liberalrepresentativepolity. Nor are
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
these demandsembodiedin differentorganiza-
tions strivingto obtainstate licensing for privi-
leged access to resourcestypicalof a corporatist
system. However,collective action in a society
of unorganizedinterestsplays a criticalrole in
the political process. The impact of collective
actionis revealedin its timing.Collectiveaction
based on unorganizedinterestsis largely a re-
sponseto the stateandto statepolicies.Ittendsto
occur when the state shifts policy. This is when
the state is "weak" - owing to leadership
changes, fragile coalitions, or a lack of confi-
dence in its new orientation.This type of collec-
tive action resembles social mobilizations
promptedby thebreakdownof the state(Skocpol
1979).
Collectiveactionbased on unorganizedinter-
ests has been crucialin the erosionof the Com-
munist state; it also underliesthe dynamics of
reformcycles in Communistregimes.Collective
actionhas disruptedstatepolicies, weakenedthe
stateorganizationalapparatus,limitedthe state's
capacityto implementpolicies, andundermined
its ability to govern. Ultimately,the collective
resistanceof thepopulaceforcedthe Communist
statesof Chinaand EasternEuropeto undertake
the reformsof the 1980s thatled to popularup-
risingsin 1989.
ZHOUis AssistantProfessor of Sociology
XUEGUANG
at Cornell University.His research centers on the
state-society relationshipunder state socialism. His
currentproject is a study of the distributionof life
chances in China (with Phyllis Moen and Nancy
Tuma).He also conductsresearch on the role of the
modernstate in occupationalstructureand practice
in the UnitedStates.
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