11. People vs.

Marcial, Sept 2006

FACTS:

The respondents, all members of the Philippine National Police, were charged with homicide and
frustrated homicide in connection with a shooting incident which killed Junnyver Dagle and seriously
injured Wendell Sales.

On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them. Pre-trial was
thereafter held and terminated. During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an oral
motion to reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted committing the acts
for which they were charged in the two informations but interposed lawful justifying circumstances. The
motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Its motion for reconsideration having been similarly
denied. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner's request for a reverse order of trial.

RULING:

No.

Rule 119, Section 3(e) states that “When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.”

In this case, the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order of
trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The RTC
correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a reverse order of trial. In any event,
a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable.
As it turned out, petitioner's appeal has in fact caused more, a lot more, delay than would have been
caused by proceeding with the trial forthwith as directed by the trial court. No further delay should be
countenanced in these cases.

12.

Vino vs. people, GR 84163

FACTS:

The petitioner, Lito Vino, together with Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder for the death of
Roberto Tejada. It was alleged that after two gunshots, the victim’s father, Ernesto heard Roberto crying
out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot, asking and calling for help. With this, he and Julius, the
victim’s brother, went down to meet Roberto. After meeting Roberto, the two, saw Vino and Salazar
riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying
an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his
armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Salazar’s case was endorsed to the Judge Advocate General's Office as he was a member of the military,
while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately,
the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of
murder in the Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting
evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which
the prosecutor filed an answer. The RTC found Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder. He
filed for a motion for reconsideration before the CA but said court only affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Hence, Vino petitioned for review.

During the pendency of the appeal in the CA, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the
civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same
RTC. In a supplemental pleading, the Court was informed that the RTC acquitted Salazar.

The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The Court then resolved to deny the
petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible
error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged
principal in a separate proceeding.

RULING:

Yes.

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity
(Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact
established. Further, in United States vs. Mendoza, where the Court held in an arson case that the
acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that
no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis
for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same
offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However,
Salazar was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an
accessory. The acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce
the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the
person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino. Although in this case involving
Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle
aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was
acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the
gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even
adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable
doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the
assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the
assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

13.

People vs. Webb, GR 132577

FACTS:

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in a criminal case for Rape with Homicide.
During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, respondent filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral
Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of five (5) citizens and residents of the
United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California.
This is in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of
the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no
jurisdiction over them. He claims that the oral depositions of the individuals whose testimonies are
allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime charged.

The RTC denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule
24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent elevated his cause to the
Court of Appeals which later granted his petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral
depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.

RULING:

No.

Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court states that “The court may stop the introduction of
further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this
power should be exercised with caution.”

It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of
Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by
the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10,
1998. In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through
the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. The RTC cannot be faulted with
lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case,
respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can
not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his side. Whether or not the
respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a
further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Under the circumstances, the Court sustains the proposition that the trial
judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be
proved in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence
involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American public officers and the bicycle store owner
can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and private
documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a
person whom they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United
States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.

14.

Joseph vs. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324

FACTS:

The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio
Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime of multiple rape. The
petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with another offense of
multiple rape by the same complainant. Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of
not guilty in both cases.

After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the petitioners Claparols,
Jr., Romulo, Santamaria, Joseph and Moran filed a motions to dismiss while Lopez filed a motion to
acquit. The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, heard the oral arguments who then later denied the
motions. He also denied the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion asking
for separate trial for each accused which was denied by the respondent judge as well as their verbal
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and/or petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners Motion for separate trial be granted.

RULING:

Yes.
Section 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court provides that, “When two or more defendants are jointly
charged with any offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon motion of the
fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the court y order that one or
more defendants be each separately tried, or may order that several defendants be jointly tried in
another trials, or may order that each defendant be separately tried.”

The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be made. As a matter
of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly barged with an offense is
discretionary with the trial court. Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State
would not be jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as the petitioners
are said with capital offenses, great care should be taken the evidence of one should not prejudice the
others. It appears they have different defenses which may be antagonist to each other. in the interest of
justice, this Court a separate trial may be granted even after f the prosecution as finished presenting its
evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain in
the record as evidence against al the petitioners. It is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce all
over again its evidence in chief in each separate trial of the accused. In the separate trial of the accused,
only the accused presenting evidence has to be present