StereoHCJDA 38

Judgment Sheet
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

I.C.A. No.22963 of 2019.

Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority through its

Chief Executive Officer

Versus

Muhammad Arshad & another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 03.10.2022.

Appellant by: Barrister Pirzada Aurang Zaib, Advocate.

Respondent Nemo
No.1 by:
Respondent Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate-
No.2 by: General, Punjab.

Shujaat Ali Khan, J: - Shorn of unnecessary details, the

facts forming factual canvass of this appeal are that while

serving as Junior Clerk in the office of District Manager,

Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority

(“TEVTA”), Okara, respondent No.1 was proceeded against on

the charge of absence from duty. On conclusion of the

departmental proceedings, the Competent Authority imposed

major penalty of removal from service vide order, dated

I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --2--

03.01.2018 against which he filed an appeal but without any

success as the same was dismissed by the Appellate Authority

vide order, dated 21.03.2018. Against the orders, passed by the

Competent Authority as well as Appellate Authority,

respondent No.1 tried his luck by filing revision petition but

without any fruitful result as it was dismissed by the

Secretary/Chairman TEVTA, vide order, dated 12.04.2018.

Feeling aggrieved of the order passed by the Departmental

Authorities, respondent No.1 filed writ petition (bearing

No.206734 of 2018) before this Court which was accepted by

the learned Judge-in-Chamber through order, dated 06.03.2019,

against which the appellant-TEVTA has filed this Intra Court

Appeal.

2. When confronted with the query as to how this appeal is

maintainable as the orders impugned in the writ petition were

passed by the Appellate as well as Revisional Authority, this

Intra Court Appeal is barred in terms of proviso to Section 3(2)

of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, learned counsel for the

appellant states that since the appellant could not challenge the

order passed by it or any its functionaries, the embargo

contained in the aforesaid provision is not applicable. To fortify

his contentions, learned counsel has referred to the judgment of

I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --3--

a Division Bench of this Court reported as National Electric

Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply

Company Limited (PLD 2015 Lahore 661).

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and

have also gone through the case-law cited at the bar.

4. A remedy of Intra Court Appeal has been provided to a

person aggrieved of a decision of a learned Single Judge

rendered in exercise of civil original jurisdiction. The said

provision, for convenience of reference, is reproduced here-in-

below:-

“3. Appeal to High Court in certain cases. —(1) An

appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a
High Court from a decree passed or final order made by
a single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original
civil jurisdiction.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more
Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single
Judge of that Court under [clause (1) of Article 199 of
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan] not
being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of
paragraph (b) of that clause:
Provided that the appeal referred to in this sub-
section shall not be available or competent if the
application brought before the High Court under Article
199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law
applicable provided for at least one appeal [or one
revision or one review] to any court, tribunal or
authority against the original order.
(3) No appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) from an interlocutory order or an order which
does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --4--

(4) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be

construed as affecting:-
(a) any appeal under the provisions of the Letters
Patent applicable to a High Court or under section
102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of
1908), which was pending immediately before the
commencement of this Ordinance; or

(b) any appeal or petition for leave to appeal from

a decree, judgment or order of a single Judge of a
High Court made to the Supreme Court before the
commencement of the Law Reforms (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1972.”

According to proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms

Ordinance, 1972, the remedy of Intra Court Appeal is not

available if the constitutional petition filed before this Court in

terms of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic

of Pakistan, 1973, arose out of any proceedings in which the

law applicable, provided for at least one appeal or one revision

or one review to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the

original order. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned,

admittedly respondent No.1 assailed the orders passed by the

Competent Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional

Authority in the constitutional petition, hence the bar contained

under proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance,

1972, comes into play and impede the way of the appellant-

TEVTA to maintain this appeal.

I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --5--

5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the

appellant put much emphasis on the fact that since the

Authority could not challenge any order passed by it or any of

its functionaries, the embargo contained under proviso to

Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is not

attracted. In this regard, we are of the view that the plain

reading of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972,

quoted supra, does not draw any line of distinction on the point

as to whether any authority can file an appeal against the

proceedings subject matter of writ petition before the learned

Single Bench or not rather the import of law is that whenever a

remedy of appeal, review or revision has been provided against

an order challenged in constitutional jurisdiction of this Court

the remedy of Intra Court Appeal is not available in such

matters.

6. It is well entrenched by now that while interpreting a

provision of law its plain meanings are to be taken. The

language in which proviso to sub-section 2 to Section 3 of the

Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 has been couched clearly

demonstrates that remedy of Intra Court Appeal has been barred

in the cases where the order impugned in the writ petition is

appealable, revisable or reviewable without putting any

I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --6--

condition. In this scenario assertion of the learned counsel for

the appellant that since appellant-TEVTA could not file appeal

against the order passed by itself or by any of its functionaries

this appeal is maintainable, carries no weight.

7. Now coming to the case-law referred by learned counsel

for the appellant, we are of the view that the same is

inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of present case

inasmuch as the question regarding maintainability in the said

appeal revolved around the fact as to whether the act of

National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA)

deciding the motion for leave to review vide order, dated

16.06.2014, could hinder the way of NEPRA to file the Intra

Court Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single

Judge. To fortify this fact, reference can be made to the

following portion from the referred judgment:-

“7. The appellant decided the motion for leave to

review vide order dated 16.6.2014which was impugned
before the learned judge in chambers, who set aside the
said order, holding that Rule 16 (6) of the Tariff Rules
required full strength of the Authority to hear the motion
for leave to review. The Authority has impugned the
judgment of the learned single judge before us and is not
aggrieved of the order issued in the motion for leave to
review as the said order was actually the order passed by
the Authority itself. The Act read with Tariff Rules
cannot possibly contemplate a remedial forum for the
Authority where it would challenge its own orders as the
Authority itself is the appellate and reviewing authority
I.C.A.No.22963 of 2019. --7--

under the Act and the Tariff Rules. Therefore, section

12A has no applicability to the case of the appellant. The
provision of one appeal, review or revision against the
original order, under section 3 of the Ordinance must be
available to the parties to the dispute in order to question
the maintainability of the ICA. No such remedy is
available to the appellant under the Act and therefore the
appellant cannot be deprived of its right of appeal (ICA)
before us. Any such interpretation would also be against
the right to access to justice. Hence, the preliminary
objection, being without any substance is overruled.”

A cursory glance over the afore-quoted para of the referred

judgment renders it crystal clear that the facts of the referred

case were at poles apart from the present case, hence the said

case does not come to the rescue to the appellant.

8. The Apex Court of the country, in the cases reported as

JS Bank Limited, Karachi and others v. Province of Punjab

through Secretary Food, Lahore and others (2021 SCMR

1617), SME Bank Limited through President Islamabad and

others v. Izhar ul Haq (2019 SCMR 939), Messrs Punjab

Sugar Mills v. Government of Punjab and others (2011

SCMR 1950) and ECHO West International (Pvt.) Ltd.

Lahore v. Government of Punjab through Secretary and 4

others (PLD 2009 S.C. 406), has held that in the matters

wherein remedy of appeal, review and revision has been

provided against the order impugned in a petition filed under

Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

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Pakistan, 1973, the Intra Court Appeal against the order passed

by a learned Single Judge is not maintainable. In this backdrop,

no contrary opinion can be formed.

9. For what has been discussed above, we have no

hesitation to hold that the present Intra Court Appeal is not

maintainable. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed with

no order as to costs.

(Rasaal Hasan Syed) (Shujaat Ali Khan)

Judge Judge

Approved for Reporting.

Judge

Jamil*