Overcoming the Desire to Kill Whilst Overcome with Emotion:

An Analysis of the Justification of Loss of Self Control Killings

Sorial (2019) puts forth the idea that loss of self control is a misleading term to describe

the psychological mechanisms at play that give rise to emotionally motivated killing. Rather,

Sorial (2019) argues that “an assessment of the defendant’s reasons for acting… can be grounded

in a normative moral rights-based theory. In assessing a defendant’s reasons for acting, we would

need to scrutinize the initial wrongdoing or provoking conduct, and whether it constituted a

violation of a person’s rights, in order to determine whether the response was justified” (p. 266).

This moral framework is an “ontological account of normative ethics that grounds moral

judgment in a theory of rights”, which would count abusing women as moral wrongs that

undermine their rights or autonomy (Sorial, 2019, p. 266). In order to evaluate Sorial’s argument,

I will break it down to define self-control, then discuss what constitutes justifiably being

wronged.

In defining self-control, we need to discuss the subjective test and desires, which would

have implications for intentionality. For example, irascible and drunk people would fail the

subjective test. If one’s mental faculties are impaired, we should not consider their lack of self

control as a result of a certain provocation; rather, it is that they have lost it long before the

provocation or they never had self-control. According to philosophers Holton and Shute (2007),

self-control can be defined as a) consisting in the ability to bring one’s actions into line with

one’s second-order desires, and b) to bring one’s actions into line with one’s judgments about

what is best to do. A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order

desire is a desire for a desire. Loss of self control is succumbing still to one’s first-order desires,
and thus is intentional; we can control which desires or emotions drive our actions. Sorial (2019)

illustrates her idea that “while it is the case that persons may have little control over feeling

certain emotions, they do have significant control over how those emotions are expressed” with

an example of becoming angry with one’s spouse: “I can respond by shouting at him…or I might

negotiate some time off when he returns” (p. 258). Anger does not make us kill; it is the intention

to kill that we choose to indulge in that results in the action. If one’s argument to loss of self

control is that they did not intend to kill someone, just to hurt them slightly, then the argument

still wouldn’t hinge on emotional self-control, but rather control of one’s strength. It follows that

we need to make a distinction between emotionally motivated killing and accidental excessive

force, which would truly be accidental.

We must also discuss the slippery slope of the term “wronged” and what constitutes a

justifiable sense of being “wronged”. Sorial (2019) claims that focusing on the provocation’s

impact on the offender can be “potentially leading to subjectivist interpretations” (p. 266). In

cases of hate crimes, what if one feels as though someone’s existence wrongs them? What

reaches the threshold of being wronged differs from person to person and such a varying

interpretation would be unjust to those who do manage to control themselves upon being

wronged. We should have clear lines about what would constitute a valid set of reasoning to

justify killing: I argue prioritization of one’s own safety when there is an obvious threat would

count. Hence, I agree with Sorial (2019) that we should focus on whether the provoking conduct

violates someone’s rights or autonomy, which would constitute a “justifiable sense of being

seriously wronged” (p. 266).

Employing the process model of emotion regulation, there are various ways we can

regulate our emotional expression at different stages. Take the example of arguing with your
sibling, leading to you killing them out of anger. This is a result of failure to regulate emotions at

each stage. You couldn’t have predicted that this argument would have happened (situation

selection) but you could have chosen to leave (situation modification). As for cognitive change,

you could reappraise their insults as the result of a frustrating day or displaced aggression.

Finally, you failed to regulate your emotion at response modulation by choosing to respond by

fatal physical attacks. Once again, these regulation methods are only calling for regulating one’s

expression of an emotion and not succumbing to first-order desires to fatally hurt someone.

To explore how first-order and second-order desires are at play when impacting

emotional expression, I propose analyzing it through the lens of multiple valuation systems.

Gross (2015) suggests that a multiple valuation system is when an agent is being pulled in

different directions by conflicting valuation systems, such as killing someone who has wronged

you, which would be good for you (a first-order desire) versus not killing because of punishment,

which would also be good for you (a second-order desire). Someone who supposedly “lost

control”, I would argue, actually just chose one valuation system over the other. However, I

believe some valuation systems are more valid: for women killing their abusive partners, their

valuation system has to do with their safety, so they are more justified to think that killing would

truly be good for them. Though, any intentional act that could have reasonably been avoided if

they were to choose another valuation system is still their responsibility.

The purpose of this discussion primarily is to determine legal penalties for “loss of

self-control” killings, which should be approached with nuance. Referring back to the subjective

test, I believe individuals with severe mental impairment should not be held to the same standard

as the general population, and thus be given appropriate treatment in the form of psychiatric

help. According to the distinction made between intentional emotionally-motivated killing and
accidental excessive self-defense, the latter should count as manslaughter; if the valuation is

valid, which is when autonomy or rights are legitimately violated, even though the act of killing

is intentional, I would argue for a reduced sentence as well.

Word Count: 1000

References

Gross, J.J. (2015). Emotion regulation: Current status and future prospects. Psychological

Inquiry, 26, 1-26.

Holton, R., & Stephen Shute. (2007). Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence. Oxford

Journal of Legal Studies, 27(1), 49–73. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4494573

Sorial, S. (2019). Anger, Provocation and Loss of Self-Control: What Does “Losing It” Really

Mean?. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 13, 247-69.