9

The Con-Cor War: India-China Rivalry

in the Asian Century

Sitakanta Mishra

The contemporary strategic discourse fervently pores and mulls over the unfolding
India-China rivalry and suggests: Is a new Cold War at play between the emerging
Asian neighbours in the 21st century? Surprisingly, the debate is speciously square
within the archaic Cold War narrative, as if the current strategic scholarship has run
out of the appropriate lexicon. It would be convenient to propound that the India-
China rivalry, termed as the “New Cold War”,1 will not be fought over ideology like
the old Cold War between the former Soviet Union and USA in the last century.
But the immediate theatre and theme of their rivalry is to jostle for more space in,
and dominance over, Asia and beyond. Whatever may be the equation, the strategic
debate in vogue is marked by competing narratives, first over the question: “If this
is the Asian century, who does it belong to”?—even though such a phenomenon, by
all reckoning, seems preordained; secondly, over the emerging strategic alignments
in Southern Asia that bring a sense of imminent rivalry between China and India,
whether India will be able to surpass China, and how soon, since the huge disparity
between them is all-pervasive.
This study, while refuting the extrapolation of Cold War narratives to the unfolding
India-China faceoff in Asia, propounds that the “rivalry is over Connectivity-Corridors
(Con-Cor)” across Afro-Eurasia, during which China will remain as a friend, enemy, rival,
and investor for India at the same time—what many refer to as ‘coopetition’—i.e., the
concomitance of all five equations of “conflict, competition, coexistence, cooperation and
collusion”!2 Largely, the unfolding India-China rivalry involving connectivity-corridors
to recreate Asia’s geography for securing access to strategic places, and consequent
contentions between them, will determine the order in the Asian Century. As rightly
observed by India’s former National Security Adviser S. Jaishankar, “Connectivity itself
has emerged as a theatre of present-day geopolitics.… The interactive dynamic between
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strategic interests and connectivity initiatives—a universal proposition—is on particular

display in our continent.”3
With the assumption that the India-China Con-Cor War (rivalry) is likely to intensify
in the decades ahead, this study delves into how their various commercial initiatives
would be the means to advance corresponding strategic ambitions in different theatres;
and the repercussions thereof for the region, as well as for the entire world. All these are
analysed within the narrative of the ‘Asian Century’ and who it belongs to.

Whose Century?
The idea of an ‘Asian Century’ can be traced back to the 1950s that were filled with ‘anti-
colonial’ vigour. The early intellectual exercise on this was The Asian Century: A History
of Modern Nationalism in Asia by Jan Romein in 1956. Subsequently, in the 1980s, the
‘Asian Miracle’ by Japan and the ‘Asian Tigers’ led commentators to propagate that
the Confucian model would lead to an ‘Asian Century’ even though China was not yet
the most prominent Asian member. But that model, or the Asian Century ‘Mark-1’, had
proven to be a “false start”.
“A Mark-2 ‘Asian Century’ is now being bandied about, but with a different focus”
than the talk of Asian Tigers during the 1980s and 1990s.4 Today, although a scenario is
set for an Asian Century to emerge with the prediction by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that Asia will account for over 40 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
by 2030, there exists no consensus on ‘who does it belong to’? Zachary Keck believes that
“this century is not so much Asia’s century as China’s … not because China will be the
only large economy, if the rosy projections of Asia’s rise come to pass, but rather because
whether these projections come to pass at all will largely depend on China.”5 He further
says, “The other way by which China will determine whether an Asian Century is realized
or not is through the success or failure of its economic rebalancing. If the rebalance is
unsuccessful and China experiences a hard landing or a lost decade or two, it will bring
down most of Asia with it. This is because China has become such an integral part of
other Asian countries’ economies as a result of trade”6 and this is likely to be hastened
through the connectivity-corridors it is carving all around. On the other hand, Martin Wolf
asserts that we should not conclude that “an autocratic China is sure to become the world’s
dominant power in the next few decades”; and “the future might not belong to China”.7
Samir Saran, on the other hand, finds that “the ‘Asian Century’ might actually belong to
India, not China” as India has set out with its ‘21st Century project’ “to break the Chinese
stranglehold in the Asian imagination of its future.”8 But the larger question is: in what
aspects will India surpass China?
 THE CON-COR WAR 205

Suffice to say that “competing and mutually incompatible narratives of India-China

relations are evolving simultaneously to shape the contours of the Asian Century”.9 As
far as the role of the external players is concerned, China perceives that “India’s growing
strategic proximity with the US is a willing endorsement of the US’ traditional balance
of power strategy to put Asians against Asians and, will not allow the Asian Century
to materialize.”10 Therefore, no credible Asian Century can be envisaged without a
cooperative and constructive engagement between an ‘emerging’ India and a ‘rising’
China. As China considers India as the “lynchpin in the US strategy” in Asia, and as a
“swing state” capable of changing power equations, Beijing has not taken easily to the
India-US warming up.
Consequently, every bid of India for the global high table has been a casualty of
China’s obstinacy. Does China checkmate India at every forum because it is threatened by
India’s rise? Many would differ. China acknowledges India as a formidable power in Asia
and expects New Delhi to be part of its effort to craft its scheme of a global governance
structure consisting of alternative institutions and alliance systems. China has already set
out for establishing multilateral institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa,
New Development Bank (SCO, AIIB, BRICS, NDB, etc.). by collaborating with like-
minded countries to provide alternative platforms for global governance, and redefine
the rules of the game. Understandably, if China, India, and Russia join together, the
fulcrum of the ‘American world order’ would falter. China certainly expects India to be
an integral partner in all its efforts. But India has shed its traditional non-aligned posture
and aligned with the USA, without compromising on its ‘strategic autonomy’; it seems
India is oblivious of China’s game of evolving an alternative world order. Beijing’s
reservation on India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership is symptomatic of
China’s anguish about India’s accommodation as a great power in the America-led world
order.11 Meanwhile, China has embarked on the ‘strategic access’ strategy by building
artificial islands, sea-ports, road connectivity-corridors, and alliances; the ‘string of
pearls’ strategy is part of this design.
Undoubtedly, China and India’s strategic peripheries overlap, which “foreshadows
a danger of increased interaction, competition, and friction in Southern Asia.”12 This
is likely to intensify in the years ahead. How this overlap will play out in the coming
decades, one can only speculate. But the “concurrent rise of China and India” is “a
geopolitical event of historical proportions” and they would progressively reshape the
international system to advance their own interests.13 The epicentre of their activities will
remain in Asia, thereby making it the fulcrum of the new global order in the offing. Wang
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Gungwu says it is the “age of new paradigms” in the international system which “reflects
geopolitical and geoeconomic changes, and with it, the talk of ‘power transitions’ in
the international system.”14 With the rise of China and India, we are likely to see more
paradigm shifts, or situational changes to come, in Asia in particular, and in the power
configuration of the world at large.
As noted earlier, the debate over the Asian Century and who it belongs to is
inconclusive. It is certain that the 21st century is turning out to be the “century of
China and India” with a thrust on cooperation between them. This has been emphasised
repeatedly by none other than various Chinese political leaders and scholars. For
instance, Deng Xiaoping was recorded saying to Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 that “unless both
India and China become well developed, there is no such thing as an Asian Century”.15
Wen Jiabao, while recalling his visit to India in April 2005, had reportedly stated that the
Sino-Indian strategic partnership had reached a “historic stage” and he fondly hoped that
their “fraternal friendship” could usher in a “true Asian Century”.16 President Hu Jintao,
during his visit to India in November 2006, termed the rise of India and China as “central
not only to rise of new Asian Century but to a new world order”.17 He desired win-
win cooperation between India and China for achieving mutual development through
trade and business which he linked to the realisation of the Asian Century.18 Furthermore,
Chinese President Xi Jinping in his article in The Hindu (September 2014) expressed
confidence over the realisation of the Asian Century at an early date if China and India
work together.19
The Indian political leaders equally have been vocal about the paradigm of an Asian
Century and the imperatives of India-China cooperation. India’s former Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in his inaugural address at the first India-Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Business Summit in October 2002, welcomed how “the 21st
century will be the Asian century. This is not mere rhetoric. The centre of gravity of the
world is shifting”, for “in one form or the other, Asia is set to dominate the politics and
economics of this century”.20 In 2005, Member of Parliament Jairam Ramesh authored a
book titled Making Sense of Chindia that referred to China and India together in general
as friends but not “natural enemies”, though “there will be competition and, sometimes,
some confrontation perhaps as well”.21 Similarly, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had
reiterated similar message at the 2005 East Asia Summit:

I am convinced that the 21st Century will be an Indian century. The world will once
again look at us with regard and respect, not just for the economic progress we make
but for the democratic values we cherish and uphold, and the principles of pluralism
 THE CON-COR WAR 207

and inclusiveness we have come to represent and which is India’s heritage. … I reiterate
India’s commitment to work with ASEAN and other East Asian countries to make the
21st century truly an Asian century. 22

On December 20, 2018, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said in the
inaugural session of a seminar in New Delhi, “With the regional and international roles of
India and China evolving, there are expectations from the two countries to lead Asia and usher
in an Asian Century”.23 From all these pronouncements, one can sense how the euphoria of
the Asian Century is pervasive in the strategic community of both countries. The strategic
community on both sides and elsewhere stress the India-China ‘setting’ continuously.
An elaborate survey of the literature on the Asian Century debate is furnished by David
Scott in his article “The 21st Century as Whose Century?” in the Journal of World-Systems
Research in 2008. He brings out the fact that the talk of an Asian Century is premised on the
rapid economic growth that China and India have registered during the last few decades.
In fact, China’s economy had quickly boomed in the 1990s and India’s economy started to
boom a decade later. As Jeffrey D. Sachs puts it, “Welcome to the Asian Century. By 2050,
China, and may be India, will overtake the US economy in size”.24 So the paradigm of the
Asian Century is essentially an economic-driven “tripolar century with China and India
rising up towards and eventually past the USA.”25 The return of Japan and its equation with
the two countries will largely determine the shape of Asian geopolitics even though the
USA will remain a major player. But the answer to the question of “whose Asian Century,
China’s or India’s?” would be based on assumptions only. Jim Hoagland and William Pesek
view that “the forces that will determine which nations will dominate the 21st century
may yet favor India’s emerging reach for global power status more than China’s.”26 This
assumption is backed by the argument that India’s bigger deregulated economy, brings with
it a bigger entrepreneurial grassroots potential, so that India will “outdo” China27, and that
consequently “India will lead in the Asian century”.28
Undeniably, all these points of view have some logic and truth in them. But both China
and India are beset with many divisive forces, demographic loopholes, and domestic
constraints which would hinder the intended progress. “Asia’s rise is not inevitable,
individual drivers could fall back; China’s regime could go into political meltdown ….”
India’s economy might seize up amidst internal divisive forces. Therefore, the euphoria
of the ‘Asian century’ may prove to be ‘hubris’,”29 with so many problems confronting
Asia, one has to be modest in self-estimation. Similarly, in which way the India-China
equations would evolve is anybody’s guess. When Western scholars presume China-USA
equations within a warring framework, calling it the ‘Thucydides Trap’, will not the same
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happen between India and China? Can China accommodate India as an equal partner in
Asia? “As an Asian power, China never proposed a multipolar Asia. Chinese diplomats
avoid discussing this concept. From all indications, it is clear China is pursuing the
structure of a unipolar Asia, China being that pole.”30 But the evolving quadrilateral
grouping among India, Japan, USA and Australia (or the ‘Quad’) might culminate in
another pole opposite to China.
Suffice to say, as per SD Muni’s views, both the competing and mutually incompatible
narratives of India-China relations are evolving simultaneously to shape the contours of
the Asian Century. Therefore, “an Asian Century will take a credible form only when
the cooperative narrative overtakes the conflictual one.”31 Muni further says that in the
Chinese perceptions and strategic calculations, India’s growing strategic proximity with
the US is a willing endorsement of the “US traditional balance of power strategy to
put Asians against Asians” to constrain and contain China’s rise. “The more India gets
closer to the USA, the more China pleads with it to keep the distance.… For India, its
trust deficit with China can only be bridged if and when China moves to resolve the
border dispute in an amicable manner. China also needs to desist from using Pakistan as a
counter balance and encroaching upon India’s strategic space” in its backyard. Therefore,
“the prospects of an Asian Century hang on the extent to which India and China would
measure up to each other’s expectations in reinforcing and consolidating the narrative of
cooperative and constructive engagement.”32 Without a cooperative framework between
India and China, an Asian Century will not materialise.

India-China Cold War?

The unfolding competition between India and China is often viewed in the Cold War
lexicon, and narrated as the ‘new Cold War’, ‘cold confrontation’ ‘return of the Cold War
in Asia’, etc. If there is likely to be a new Cold War at all, then in this Cold War, unlike the
old one, “the adversaries and competitors are interdependent, with other powers either
oscillating between the two camps or maintaining strategic ambivalence.… Therein an
oriental mind of 5,000 years of warfare of a very different kind of psychological intrigues,
ideological differences between the two remain, but not pronounced.”33
Undoubtedly, the China-India geostrategic and geoeconomic competition is visible
but can it be termed as a Cold War? Chinese leaders and commentators often point
fingers towards India for having a ‘Cold War mentality’. In 2017, in the aftermath of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Indian, Japanese, Australian and US officials, the
Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui pointed out India’s apprehension of China as
an obstacle to New Delhi’s prospects as a dominant power in South Asia. Terming this
 THE CON-COR WAR 209

as the “typical Cold War mentality” Zhaohui advised India to shed this for closer Indo-
Pacific ties.34 Essentially, China thinks the Quad is aimed at containing China’s ‘peaceful
rise’, even though the grouping is yet to devise its formal institutional mechanisms. On
the contrary, India perceives China’s active involvement in South Asia as encirclement
of India. China’s infrastructure projects in the neighbourhood, which it terms as
‘developmental engagement’ or development partnership and not strategic partnership,
are viewed by India as China’s direct interference in its backyard.35
China’s involvement in South Asia is largely part of its search for alternative trading
routes to ensure uninterrupted energy supply and its mercantile trade in the Indian Ocean.
Given India’s dominant presence in the Indian Ocean—what China regards as its ‘Malacca
Dilemma’—Beijing is desperate to exploit alternative routes to feed its periphery through
the construction of a chain of sea-ports or waterways in India’s neighbourhood – Gwadar,
Hambantota, Chittagong, Sittwe, etc.;—what many call its ‘string of pearls’ strategy. China
is planning to build a new canal between the Pacific and Indian Oceans—the Kra canal—a
135-km canal through the Thai isthmus between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman
Sea, that would reduce some 1,200 km (or two to three days) of the journey for ships
travelling from China to the Indian Ocean.36 In addition, the Indo-US strategic partnership,
linked up with the ‘US pivot’ strategy, compels China to get involved in South Asia. In
response, India has embarked on a strategic and economic counter-strategy of the ‘necklace
of diamonds’, consisting of access to bases like Changi in Singapore, Duqm in Oman,
Sabang in Indonesia, Chabahar in Iran, strategic partnership with Vietnam and Japan,
Farkhor air base in Tajikistan, etc. Whatever their strategy and counter-strategy may be, the
underlying objective of both countries is to secure, or access, energy sources and supply,
through investment partnerships in massive connectivity-corridor projects.
The India-China competition, in fact, is unfolding through aggressive connectivity-
corridor projects spanning Asia, Africa and Europe. Some of the projects are already
complete and many more have been planned. As these projects are time consuming,
India and China would find themselves in a long-drawn connectivity-corridor war
(competition) or the Con-Cor War in the decades ahead. Essentially, connectivity
should diffuse rivalries and regional tensions; but in the absence of any agreed security
architecture in Asia, this could give rise to unhealthy and unavoidable competitiveness.

India-China Con-Cor War!

Evidently, both India and China have resorted to massive ‘connectivity-corridor’ projects
as a tool for development of their own border regions, as well as for exerting foreign policy
influence beyond their borders. They are “poised to engage in competitive connectivity
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projects across the Indo-Pacific region of Afro-Eurasia, essentially expanding their

previous South Asian-focussed rivalry across a broad swath of the Eastern Hemisphere.”37
Andrew Korybko, in a detailed report (2017) titled, “The Chinese-Indian New Cold
War” divides the geographic scope of the India-China competition for connectivity-
corridors into three realms spanning five regions of the globe. The first realm of their
competition consists of Southeast and South Asia; the second involves the Middle East
and Central Asia; and the third realm, often overlooked, is East Africa where both are
likely to intensify their engagements—this is likely to be a region of possible ‘collision of
interests’. However, the Indian Ocean Region will remain the epicentre of this Con-Cor
War as it is the focal point of “Greater South Asia”.38
The underlying theme of the Con-Cor War is based on the idea of what feasible
alternative developmental opportunities these two big neighbours can provide to the
small neighbours through trade and investment, along with continental and maritime
connectivity. At the moment, rival infrastructure projects have been attempted by both,
and greater South Asia (Southeast and South Asia) is becoming the focal point. As noted
by India’s former Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, “The interactive dynamic between
strategic interests and connectivity initiatives—a universal proposition—is on particular
display in our continent.”39 For that matter, “connectivity offers a set of tools to influence
other countries’ foreign policy choices.”
It is, therefore, needless to emphasise the urgent requirement for the creation of
massive infrastructure in Asia. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated that
the developing countries in Asia will need to spend $1.7 trillion per year to build
the infrastructure required to maintain their growth momentum during 2016-30.
Traditionally, Japan and the USA, along with Germany and the UK, have been among
the primary donors in Asia since the 1950s. But China’s emergence as a regional strategic
and economic power has “reshaped the prospects for connectivity” and developmental
projects in Asia.40 Given China’s phenomenal economic and technological prowess, there
is a new-found political interest to undertake regional connectivity initiatives; and Beijing
is way ahead of New Delhi in its ability to act alone in the investment and connectivity
projects. China has invited like-minded partners with lucrative investment plans through
its much-hyped ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). This has given rise to some sort of
alignment formation in the region. On the other hand, India’s resource limitation has
compelled it to collaborate with other regional actors like Japan, South Africa, Australia,
USA, etc. in its connectivity-corridor initiatives. Meanwhile, India objects to the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for its territorial sovereignty concerns as the project
is planned to pass through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
 THE CON-COR WAR 211

A strong drive for ‘connectivity’ would remain the mainstay of the Asian strategic
theatre for the foreseeable future, and both China and India are set to push forward; but the
key issue is whether they will build their connectivity through consultative processes or
more unilateral decisions. Prior to the BRI itself, there were a few multilateral consultative
connectivity initiatives pursued by India and China involving their neighbours. For
example, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor launched
in the early 1990s; the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) in the Indian
Ocean Region that China planned as a multilateral project. However, the current wave of
the respective connectivity-corridor initiatives by them seems aimed to use them as “a set
of tools to influence other countries’ foreign policy choices” in the region.41 Especially,
until the BRI by China, India did not perceive any threat to its stature and control in the
neighbourhood. As India at the moment cannot match China’s investment capability,
New Delhi views Beijing’s influence in the region as being at the expense of its own
status as a regional leader. In the absence of any agreed security architecture in Asia,
competition involving connectivity-corridor projects by them would give rise to flash
points of conflict, rather than diffusing national rivalries.

China’s Con-Cor Initiatives

Around six land corridors are the “belt” part of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI)—a
$1 trillion chain of infrastructure development programmes stretching across 70
countries, and likely to grow as more countries join, built and financed by China.42 Most
of the connectivity-corridor projects by China are, in fact, pre-BRI bilateral initiatives.
Subsequently, the old projects, along with the new plans, have been clubbed under the
BRI and presented as multilateral projects, e.g. Gwadar port in Pakistan, China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, etc. In the realm of Southeast
and South Asia, China has undertaken three major projects as part of its New Silk
Road: first, the ASEAN Silk Road, a high-speed rail corridor, plans to connect Yunnan
(Kunming) with Singapore via Laos and Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia; second, the
East Coast Rail Line that will connect both coasts of Malaysia and which will help to
bypass the Strait of Malacca; third, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which could
not fructify but is likely to be revived. The Kyaukpyu-Kunming oil and gas pipeline that
has been operational since 2017 could be the basis for a revival of the China-Myanmar
Economic Corridor.
In South Asia, China aspires to lead the establishment of a quadrilateral trading
arrangement in the Bay of Bengal involving Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and
Malaysia. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor seems to
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be a non-starter “as it is seen as a China-led initiative and, hence, unlikely to be of much

benefit to the South Asian economy, given the asymmetry of economic strengths and
the strong Chinese role in Myanmar.”43 But there are three other mainland Silk Road
projects in South Asia that are being aggressively pursued by China. The Himalayan
Silk Road that China plans to construct, establishing a rail connection between Tibet and
Nepal (from Lhasa and Gyirong to Kathmandu), with an investment of $8 billion, is an
alternative to the India-Nepal Free Trade Agreement.
Besides, the ASEAN Silk Road plans to connect the Yunnan capital of Kunming
with Singapore via Laos and Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia through a high-speed rail
corridor.44 Part of the Pan-Asia Railway Network, it is a network of railways that would
connect China, Singapore and all the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. The idea was
formally revived in October 2006 when 18 Asian and Eurasian countries signed the Trans-
Asian Railway Network Agreement, which designates the Kunming–Singapore Railway
as one of several planned trans-Asian Railways. In addition, as part of the East Coast Rail
Line, China has decided to build an iron bridge across the Malay Peninsula connecting
both coasts of continental Malaysia in order to reduce dependence on the Malacca Strait.
In addition, the East-West and Southern Corridors include the Transport Corridors of
the Greater Mekong Region running from the Myanmarese coastal city of Mawlamyine
to the Vietnamese city of Da Nang. China aims to further integrate itself with mainland
Southeast Asia, or the Indochina peninsula through the transnational transport network of
the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in combination with the maritime Silk Road that
will link major sea-ports along the coasts of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar,
which will intensify China-ASEAN trade and industrial cooperation.45
The CPEC project is the centrepiece of the emerging BRI in South Asia which seeks
to link Kashgar in Xinjiang in northwestern China with a deep sea-port at Gwadar in
Balochistan in southwestern Pakistan via PoK, with some $62 billion investment.
Besides it passing through the disputed territory, some military projects like the Chinese
military jets being co-developed by China and Pakistan, weaponry and other hardware to
Pakistan, are designated as part of the BRI; thus, clearly belying the initial claim of the
Chinese that the BRI is “purely an economic project with peaceful intent.46
The second realm of China’s Con-Cor initiative is in West and Central Asia where it
has large-scale plans to link these regions for it to pass through Central Asia to reach West
Asia and Afghanistan. The CPEC has two spikes in this realm: the first being the potential
expansion of the CPEC from Gwadar (Pakistan) to Chabahar (Iran). Tehran has expressed
its willingness to join this, though it is not acceptable to India which is financing the
building of the Chabahar port. The second spike is the Islamabad-Peshawar-Jalalabad-
 THE CON-COR WAR 213

Kabul-Mazar-i-Sharif Corridor, or the Af-Pak Corridor which would eventually connect

the Uzbek city of Samarkand. This would be known as the China-Central Asia-Mideast
Economic Corridor, and the China-Iran Silk Road. Some experts describe it as the old
Silk Road or the China–Central Asia–Western Asia corridor passing through Central
Asia, Iran, and Turkey to Europe.47 In February 2016, the first Silk Road train, carrying
cargo from China to Iran, arrived in Tehran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan after
starting from Yiwu city in China’s Zhejiang province.48 Meanwhile, China is in talks
with Afghanistan for a military base in the remote mountainous Wakhan Corridor where
Chinese and Afghan troops are already conducting joint patrols.49
The third realm of China’s Con-Cor initiative is East Africa. Many connectivity
projects have already been completed, and a few more are planned. The Djibouti-
Addis Ababa Railway, the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Corridor (LAPSSET), the
Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) connecting Mombasa to Uganda, the Central Corridor
connecting Tanzania with Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway
(built in the 1970s) connecting to the South-Central African copper-rich regions, the
Nacala Development Corridor connecting Zambia and Malawi with Mozambique, and
the Ponta Techobanine Railway connecting Zimbabwe to the Mozambican capital of
Maputo are some connectivity projects already in operation, giving China easy access
in Africa. Besides, there are multiple stand-alone connectivity projects such as the
Saharan-Sahelian Road, Cameroonian-Kenyan Silk Road, Congolese-Kenyan Silk Road,
South-Central African Silk Road, Ethiopian-South African Silk Road, etc. which China
is enthusiastically pursuing. The Chinese-backed Renaissance Pipeline in Mozambique
will develop a parallel economic corridor alongside its route which will directly connect
Ethiopia and South Africa with China’s New Silk Road. “Southeast Africa (especially
Mozambique) is rapidly emerging as a key gateway for the landlocked countries of
South-Central Africa to obtain access to the Indian Ocean Region, from where they can
participate in China’s New Silk Road (and India’s Cotton Road counter proposal).”50
Though these Chinese-led cross-continental corridor initiatives sound impressive, the
agenda behind them is to reach and extract the continental hinterland’s natural resources
which is bound to instigate competition among other powers eying the same. Also, this
may get entangled with the dynamics of persisting local conflicts, giving rise to a “hybrid
war”51 involving regional and global players.

India’s Con-Cor Initiatives

India has perceived the imperatives of interconnectedness, and of late has embarked on
“efforts to enhance as a new theater for geopolitical competition with China in South
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Asia and the Indian Ocean”.52 Some of its connectivity projects, named as the “Cotton
Road”,53 are viewed to be counter proposals to the Chinese projects while some others
are based on its economic imperatives and big power ambition. In principle, India’s
official response to the Chinese connectivity corridor projects “has been cautious and
relatively muted” though India is deeply concerned about their strategic implications.54
At the outset, India has more immediate and specific concerns pertaining to the CPEC
that passes through PoK. India understands that extremism should be countered with
the assimilation of underdeveloped inaccessible regions into the national mainstream
through developmental projects but not at the cost of national sovereignty. Therefore,
India registered a muted protest and boycotted the CPEC meeting.
Meanwhile, India had to manage two specific challenges: first, how to provide
lucrative alternative connectivity projects to take along its small neighbours that are
otherwise eager to collaborate with the Chinese projects; second, how to muster the
required resources to lay down a viable trans-regional connectivity infrastructure to
establish itself as a formidable economic player. In either case, competition will ramp up
between the two Asian colossi as their natural spheres of influence intersect. So, as aptly
put by India’s former Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, “The key issue is whether we will
build our connectivity through constructive processes or more unilateral decisions.”55
China’s unilateral decision to build the CPEC through PoK conveys that it is impervious
to the reality and India’s concerns.
Given its limited resources and domestic economic compulsions, New Delhi plans
and executes its Con-Cor strategy modestly. It collaborates with like-minded partners to
make its plans multilateral and cooperative. India’s most important connectivity project is
the trade and transit corridor from Chabahar in Iran to Afghanistan. India has contributed
to this network with the Zaranj-Delaram highway which has the greatest strategic value
as it provides unimpeded access to Afghanistan, and enables India and Iran to contribute
together to the stability of Afghanistan.
Another important connectivity initiative that India has planned prior to the One Belt,
One Road (OBOR) (September 2000) is the International North-South Transport Corridor
(INSTC). It is a 7,200-km-long multi-modal connectivity project to establish transport
networks (ship, rail, and road route) among India, Russia, Iran, Europe and Central Asia
for moving freight. The main objective of the corridor is to increase trade connectivity
among major cities such as Mumbai, Moscow, Tehran, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Astrakhan,
Bandar Anzali and other cities. The route is “30% cheaper and 40% shorter than the current
traditional route”. For India, it provides access to the lucrative markets of Central Asia, by-
passing the transit through Pakistan. The potential benefits of this route would be manifold
 THE CON-COR WAR 215

if India can bring on board its Southeast Asian neighbours too. The Suez Canal route takes
45-60 days, whereas the INSTC would take 25-30 days.56 Turkey has offered to provide
the necessary information for linking the Black Sea Cooperation (BSEC) with INSTC for
mutual benefit.57
In the immediate neighbourhood, India plans to invest $5 billion in connectivity
projects. As mentioned by India’s former Economic Affairs Secretary Shaktikanta
Das in May 2016, India is “planning to establish Integrated Customs Ports (ICPs) and
improved Land Customs Stations (LCS) at key border points with Bangladesh, Nepal
and Bhutan to ease the movement of goods and people within the sub-region”. Other
connectivity projects include the development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
in the Bay of Bengal into a maritime hub, including a dry dock and a ship-building
facility. India and Sri Lanka have principally agreed to jointly operate the World
War II era oil storage facility in Trincomalee as a petroleum hub in the strategically
located port in Sri Lanka.58
India is also developing two priority road corridor projects along with the East Coast
Economic Corridor (ECEC) with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).59
The India-Mekong Economic Corridor (IMEC) and East-West and Southern Corridors
are collaborative initiatives between India and Japan. The IMEC aims to connect the
Kenya-Tanzania-Mozambique (KTM) growth zone through the Jawaharlal Nehru and
Kochi ports. The India-Japan initiative, called the Freedom Corridor, stretching from
the Asia-Pacific to Africa, aims at stabilising the region amid Chinese designs.60 As
an embodiment of India’s “Act East” policy, the trilateral highways project aims to
connect India’s northeast to Myanmar and Thailand. The East-West Corridor runs from
Myanmar’s coastal city of Mawlamyine to the Vietnamese one of Da Nang by means
of Thai and Laotian transit territory. This initiative is a bridge between South Asia
and ASEAN. To develop connectivity through water, ASEAN and India are working
on the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), initiated in 2008,
entirely funded by India. Alongside, India has contributed to the construction of a sea
link via Sittwe port in Myanmar in order to have an alternative transit route through
Bangladesh.61
Besides the trilateral highway, India and Japan are collaborating on developing the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands into a maritime hub, including a dry dock and a ship-
building facility. This would “allow the Indo-Japanese Axis to control access to and from
the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca as well as to protect the two coastal termini
points for the East-West and Southern Corridors in Myanmar.”62 The strategy around
this part of the world indicates that while “India is becoming more active on one side of
216 ASIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2019

Indochina in the South China Sea, Japan is doing the same in the Bay of Bengal.… This
incipient process will impact South Asia, potentially diminishing the Chinese merchant
and military navy’s strategic freedom in this part of Greater South Asia.”63
An OBOR-related project that involves India and China directly is the Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), endorsed in December 2013
with the plan for a combination of infrastructure set-up from Kolkata to Kunming in
Southeast China, at a cost of $22 billion.64 This project symbolises that China does not
have the monopoly for envisaging major connectivity projects in Asia, and India can be
a credible partner; unfortunately, every country has serious identity-centric vulnerability
that hinders the fructification of the project.
In East Africa, New Delhi and Tokyo jointly focus mostly on the Kenya-Tanzania-
Mozambique (KTM) growth zone which is “positioned right in the centre of the
Ethiopian/Egyptian-South African Silk Road. … India’s impressive trade with KTM was
already occurring even before most of China’s Silk Road projects were completed.”65
India has also got into the game of seeking overseas bases, though it failed to convince
Seychelles to build military infrastructure on Assumption Island recently. However,
Mauritius is stationing the National Command Control Communication Intelligence
network of the Indian Navy and India’s security grid, including the Coastal Surveillance
Radar (CSR).66 As far as the Chinese military base in Djibouti is concerned, it seems to
be much hyped for the fact that Djibouti is already hosting multiple military bases of
countries like Japan, America, France and a Saudi facility which is under construction.
There are multiple players in Africa and it is not entirely pro-Beijing only. Undoubtedly,
China is investing heavily in physical infrastructure and is also physically present across
Africa; something which India needs to contemplate.
Furthermore, at the 52nd Annual Meeting (May 24, 2017) of the African Development
Bank (AfDB) held in Gujarat (India), the idea of an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
(AAGC) was unveiled jointly by New Delhi and Tokyo.67 The AAGC is a consultative
initiative which is essentially a sea corridor to link Africa with India and other countries
of Southeast Asia and Oceania. “There is a plan to connect ports in Jamnagar with
Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden. Similarly, the ports of Mombasa and Zanzibar will be
connected to ports near Madurai; Kolkata will be linked to Sittwe port in Myanmar and
India is developing ports under the Sagarmala programme specifically for this purpose.”68
The ultimate objective of AAGC is to build robust institutional, industrial and transport
infrastructure in Asia and Africa. India is already the fifth biggest investor in Africa and
has offered a $10 billion line of credit which will help finance projects in the African
countries.69
 THE CON-COR WAR 217

One significant difference between India and China’s Con-Cor strategy is the number
of players involved on each side. While the Chinese projects are almost unilaterally
designed and executed with the involvement of small host countries in the region, India’s
are truly multilateral, involving external players and regional like-minded countries.
Besides Japan, India is cooperating with France to get access to bases in the Indian
and Southern Pacific Oceans.70 Second, China is pursuing connectivity projects more
aggressively, given its current economic prowess. India, on the other hand, is modest in
its pace, while taking along all the interested players in the region and beyond.

Conclusion
The list of Con-Cor projects by India and China is likely to expand in the years ahead;
consequently, their competition for access to strategic places in different parts of the
world will intensify. The already “complex relationship”71 between them is likely to get
further complicated due to the competing and overlapping spheres of influence in which
they operate. Moreover, as they grow, their spheres of influence would grow, thereby
the rivalry could encompass the entire globe in the years ahead. The thriving ‘security
dilemma’ could affect their military build-up strategies seriously. Their ambitious visions
of global power status and consequent endeavours may lead them towards collisions. The
crisis over Doklam in Bhutan is one such example where both powers came dangerously
close to a military showdown.
Evidently, China wishes to restore its rightful superpower status by 2049 by invoking
its “dream of great national rejuvenation.”72 With its immensely ambitious BRI, Beijing
clearly intends to go far beyond Deng’s goals and make China the economic engine
of the world.73 On the other hand, in its march towards global power status, India is
jostling for more space in the region and beyond. First, China’s engagement in India’s
backyard has prompted New Delhi to resort to a counter-engagement strategy, clubbing
with China’s traditional competitors. Second, in the pursuit of securing resource supply
to fuel and sustain its desired economic growth, India is bound to stretch its legs to
places where China is already present. Whether such competition would lead to military
conflict is difficult to predict at this juncture. At best, to speculate about a collision
in their immediate neighbourhood is not unrealistic. Doklam-type skirmishes could
emerge in the intersection areas of their influence. But, presently, both India and China
cannot afford a full-scale war for practical reasons. Most likely, both countries would
aggressively pursue their own Con-Cor projects, polarising their spheres of influence,
while desiring, and remotely playing, a role to entangle the projects of the other side in
controversies, mainly to obstruct and delay them.
218 ASIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2019

The unfolding Con-Cor War between India and China is yet to attain its complete
shape. In a decade from now, it is likely that both countries would have concretised their
respective plans and alignment frameworks, avoiding a direct tussle between them, and
dissuading their respective partners from any such postures along the divide as well.
While ‘hedging’ against each other, both countries would endeavour to remain as a
determinant in each other’s transformation process. Whether they would respect each
other’s core interests while hedging, is anybody’s guess.

Notes
1. Andrew Korybko, “The Chinese-Indian New Cold War”, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG, May
31, 2017, https://countercurrents.org/2017/05/31/the-chinese-indian-new-cold-war/, accessed
on January 16, 2019; Bhaskar Roy, “The New Cold War and India”, South Asia Analysis
Group, Paper no 5764, August 13, 2014.
2. Geoff Easton and Luis Araujo, “Non-Economic Exchange in Industrial Networks,” in Björn
Axelsson and Geoff Easton, eds, Industrial Networks: A New View of Reality (London:
Routledge, 1992).
3. S Jaishankar, “Speech by Foreign Secretary at Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi”, Ministry
of External Affairs, March 2, 2015, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/26433.
Accessed on January 12, 2019.
4. David Scott, “The 21st Century As Whose Century?”, Journal of World-Systems Research, vol.
XIII, no. 2, 2008, p. 106.
5. Zachary Keck, “China IS the Asian Century”, The Diplomat, July 4, 2013, https://thediplomat.
com/2013/07/china-is-the-asian-century/. Accessed on January 12, 2019.
6. Ibid.
7. Martin Wolf, “The Future Might not Belong to China”, Financial Times, January 2, 2019.
8. Samir Saran, “Why the ‘Asian Century’ Might Actually Belong to India, Not China”,
Huffingtonpost, December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samir-saran/asian-
century-india-china_b_7496170.html. Accessed on January 15, 2019.
9. S.D. Muni, “India, China and the Asian Century”, https://www.academia.edu/11335929/India-
China_and_Asian_Century. Accessed on December 10, 2018.
10. Ibid.
11. “Destination NSG: PM Modi Seeks China’s Support as Members Differ on India’s Entry”,
FirstPost, June 23, 2016, http://www.firstpost.com/world/destination-nsg-pm-modi-seeks-
chinas-support-as-members-differ-on-indias-entry-2852692.html. Accessed on December 10,
2018.
12. Yang Xiaoping, “When India’s Strategic Backyard Meets China’s Strategic Periphery: The View
from Beijing,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, April 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/
when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinas-strategic-periphery-the-view-from-beijing/.
Accessed on December 10, 2018.
13. Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski, “Introduction”, in Crux of Asia: China, India, and the
Emerging World Order (Carnegie, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/crux_of_asia.
pdf, p. 3.
14. Wang Gungwu, “The Age of New Paradigms”, Keynote speech at the 18th Conference of
International Association of Historians of Asia, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 2004, https://
www.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/capas/publication/newsletter/N26/2601.pdf. Accessed on December
1, 2018.
 THE CON-COR WAR 219

15. Quoted in Yagma Reddy, “Sino-Indian Competition and Cooperation Protract as Parallels”, in R
Sidda Goud and Manisha Mookherjee, eds, Sino-Indian Relations: Contemporary Perspective
(New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2016), p. 35.
16. “China, India will Usher in an ‘Asian Century’: Wen: Taiwan Warned over Independence
move”, Dawn, March 15, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/183096. Accessed on February
5, 2019.
17. Reddy, n. 15.
18. IANS, “Rising China, India Key to True Asian Century: Hu”, November 22, 2006, cited in
Goud and Mookherjee, n. 15, p. 46.
19. Reddy, n. 15.
20. MEA, “Inaugural Address by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the First India-
ASEAN Business Summit”, October 17, 2002, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.
htm?dtl/8843/Inaugural+address+by+Prime+Minister+Shri+Atal+Bihari+Vajpayee+at+the+F
irst+IndiaASEAN+Business+Summit. Accessed on December 12, 2019.
21. Jairam Ramesh, Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India (New Delhi: India
Research Press, 2005), p. x.
22. “Shared Integration: Promoting A Greater Asia”, Information and Resource Centre, Singapore,
2006, http://www.asiandialogue.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NER_Report.pdf, p. 3.
Accessed on January 15, 2019.
23. “Expectations from India, China to Lead Asia, Usher in Asian Century: Swaraj”, Business
Today, December 20, 2018, https://www.businesstoday.in/pti-feed/expectations-from-india-
china-to-lead-asia-usher-in-asian-century-swaraj/story/302781.html. Accessed on January 15,
2019.
24. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Welcome to the Asian Century: By 2050, China and Maybe India will
Overtake the US Economy in Size”, FORTUNE Magazine, January 12, 2004, http://archive.
fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/01/12/357912/index.htm. Accessed on
January 15, 2019.
25. Scott, n. 4.
26. Jim Hoagland, “Whose Asian Century?”, Washington Post, June 9, 2005; William Pesek,
“Welcome to the Chinese Century? No So Fast?”, International Herald Tribune, February 15,
2005.
27. Chietigi Bajpaee, “Will the Peacock Outdo the Panda?”, Asia Times, July 13, 2005.
28. Ramananda Sengupta, “India will lead in the Asian Century”, Rediff.com, March 20, 2006,
https://www.rediff.com/money/2006/mar/20asoc6.htm. Accessed on January 15, 2019.
29. Scott, n. 4, p. 108.
30. Bhaskar Roy, “The New Cold War and India”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no 5764,
August 13, 2014.
31. Muni, n. 9.
32. S.D. Muni, “India, China and the Asian Century”, The Diplomat, March 2015, http://www.
diplomatist.com/dipo201503/article009.html. Accessed on February 9, 2019.
33. Ibid.
34. Elizabeth Roche, “Need to Shed Cold War Mentality for Closer Indo-Pacific Ties: China”, livemint,
November 17, 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ZsRgDte38O5wnhONMEAK7I/Need-
to-shed-Cold-War-mentality-for-closer-IndoPacific-ties.html. Accessed on January 16, 2019.
35. “How India and China are Vying for influence in South Asia”, The Times of India, May 31,
2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/how-india-and-china-are-vying-for-influence-
in-south-asia/articleshow/63395543.cms. Accessed on January 16, 2018.
36. David Brewster, “The Kra Canal: Double Bypass”, The Lowy Institute, August 14, 2017,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kra-canal-double-bypass. Accessed on February
3, 2019.
220 ASIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2019

37. Korybko, n. 1.
38. Ibid.
39. MEA, Speech by Foreign Secretary at Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, March 2, 2015, http://
mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/26433. Accessed on January 16, 2019.
40. Darshana M. Baruah, “India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia”,
Carnegie India, August 21, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Darshana_Baruah_
Belt_Road_FINAL.pdf, p. 2. Accessed on January 10, 2019.
41. Ibid.
42. Maria Abi-Habib, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Plan in Pakistan Takes a Military Turn”, The New
York Times, December 19, 2018; Charles Kunaka, “Six Corridors of Integration: Connectivity
Along the Overland Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative”, The Trade Post, April 10,
2019, http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/six-corridors-integration-connectivity-along-overland-
corridors-belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed on February 2, 2019.
43. Rangan Dutta, “The Implications of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor”, impactnews,
December 19, 2017, https://www.impactnews.in/2017/12/19/the-implications-of-the-china-
myanmar-economic-corridor/. Accessed on February 2, 2019.
44. Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Completion of High-Speed Southeast Asian Rail Link is Still far
Down the Track”, The Nation, January 22, 2018, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/
asean-plus/30336801. Accessed on February 10, 2019.
45. “The ASEAN Link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, HKTDC Research, September 30,
2015, http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Research-Articles/
The-ASEAN-Link-in-China-s-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/rp/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3UUO.htm
Accessed on February 10, 2019.
46. Abi-Habib, n. 42.
47. Feride Inan and Diana Yayloyan, “New Economic Corridors in the South Caucasus and the
Chinese One Belt One Road”, The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV),
https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1523615843-0.New_Economic_Corridors_in_the_
South_Caucasus_and_the_Chinese_One_Belt_One_Road.pdf, p. 34. Accessed on February
10, 2019.
48. Ibid.
49. “China in Talks Over Military Base in Remote Afghanistan: Officials”, The Straits Times,
February 2, 2018.
50. Andrew Korybko, “Mozambique Is South-Central Africa’s Gateway to Multipolarity”, Voice
of Africa, May 5, 2017, http://www.voiceofafrica.tv/en/mozambique-is-south-central-africa-s-
gateway-to-multipolarity-d1723. Accessed on February 10, 2019.
51. ‘Hybrid War’ in Africa involves identity conflicts in geostrategic transit states located along
China’s New Silk Roads which are alleged to be America-backed to disrupt Beijing’s plans.
Korybko, n. 36.
52. Baruah, n. 40.
53. Andrew Korybko, “What Could India’s ‘Cotton Route’ Look Like?”, Sputnik International,
March 19, 2015, https://sputniknews.com/columnists/201503291020170021/. Accessed on
February 10, 2019.
54. Talmiz Ahmad, “Who is Afraid of One Belt One Road?”, The Wire, June 3, 2016.
55. Jaishankar, n. 3.
56. Arvind Gupta, “India and Central Asia: Need for a Pro-active Approach”, IDSA, October 14,
2013, https://idsa.in/policybrief/IndiaandCentralAsia_agupta_141013. Accessed on February
3, 2019.
57. Government of India, “International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Dry Run Report
2014”, http://commerce.nic.in/publications/INSTC_Dry_run_report_Final.pdf. Accessed on
February 3, 2019.
 THE CON-COR WAR 221

58. Meera Srinivasan, “Sri Lanka, India to Jointly Develop Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm”, The
Hindu, April 8, 2017.
59. “India to Develop Regional Connectivity Projects Worth $5 Billion in South Asia”, The Hindu
BusinessLine, January 20, 2018, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/
india-to-develop-regional-connectivity-projects-worth-5-billion-in-south-asia/article8581464.
ece. Accessed on February 3, 2019.
60. “India-Japan ‘Freedom Corridor’ set to Counter China’s OBOR”, May 16, 2017, https://
www.domain-b.com/economy/infrastructure/20170516_freedom_corridor.html. Accessed on
February 3, 2019.
61. Suyash Deesai, “ASEAN and India Converge on Connectivity”, The Diplomat, December 19,
2017.
62. Korybko, n. 1.
63. Ibid.
64. R.J. Ferguson, “Chapter 6: Linking the Silk Roads: The Belt and Road Initiative as the Driver
of Eurasian Integration” in China’s Eurasian Dilemmas: Roads and Risks for a Sustainable
Global Power, August 31, 2018, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781786433817/14_
chapter6.xhtml. Accessed on February 10, 2019.
65. Korybko, n. 1.
66. Amit Agrahari, “In a Clear Snub to China, Mauritius Seeks Deeper Ties with India”, January
27, 2019, https://rightlog.in/2019/01/mauritius-pm-india-investments-01/. Accessed on
February 3, 2019; Andrew Forbes, “Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region”,
Sea Power Centre, Australia, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No. 30, 2010, http://www.
navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA30.pdf
67. Neha Sinha, “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: Can It Be a Game Changer?”, Vivekananda
International Foundation, June 5, 2017.
68. Avinash Nair, “To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa Sea Corridor”, The
Indian Express, May 31, 2017.
69. Ibid.
70. Dhairya Maheshwari, “India Gets Access to French Bases in Indian and Southern Pacific
Oceans”, The National Herald, March 10, 2018.
71. Shivshankar Menon, “Asia’s Three Futures and the Place of India and China in It”, The
Wire, December 24, 2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/asia-world-china-changing-power-
equations. Accessed on February 3, 2019.
72. Iftikhar Ali, “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation”, Pakistan Observer, November
12, 2017, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gw1aoriNZkYJ:https://
pakobserver.net/chinese-dream-national-rejuvenation/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in.
Accessed on February 3, 2019.
73. Jiayang FanMarch, “Xi Jinping and the Perils of One-Person Rule in China”, The New Yorker,
March 1, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/xi-jinping-and-the-perils-
of-one-person-rule-in-china. Accessed on February 3, 2019.