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What caused the Wars of the Three Kingdoms?

An obsession with the causes of the English Civil War has always been clear among historians.

From 1637 to 1642, each of Charles’ kingdoms plunged into civil war, beginning in Scotland from 1637,

engulfing Ireland from 1641, and finally England the following year. Studying what caused these events

has become the “traditional blood-sport of English historians”,2 so colourfully put by Conrad Russell,

whose works spearhead the revisionist movement of reanalysing the origins of the civil wars.3 Key to

Russell’s analysis is the notion of three different kingdoms under one ruler, creating what he perceived

as “the British problem”. This outlines a structural source of instability which underscored the events

of 1637 onwards, along with an economic dimension that asserts the executive was in the grips of a

financial crisis come the succession of Charles.4 John Morrill too is part of this movement, with his

canonical work stressing the mainstream reluctance for war, and holding up the influence of religious

extremists as key to understanding the slide.5 In this context, the civil wars were the “last of the Wars

of Religion”.6 These works, amongst countless others, were reactions to the flawed writings of

Christopher Hill and Lawrence Stone, proponents of social determinism. For them, the civil war was

tied towards the falling fortunes of the aristocracy, the rising affluence of the middle-classes, and

represented “the first European revolution”.7 As with any discussion of the civil wars, one cannot avoid

Gardiner in their assessment nor research. A colossus in the scholarship, his assertion lies in the

1
The term to describe the events of 1637 onwards has taken on many different forms. I have decided upon
“The Wars of the Three Kingdoms” for a couple of reason: Firstly, the term encompasses the events of each
England, Scotland and Ireland succinctly, which is vital for understanding each one; Secondly, the term does
not lend itself to any inherent biases (such as seen in the ‘Puritan Revolution’ by Gardiner or the ‘English
Revolution’ by Hill).
2
Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.4.
3
Or as John Morrill maintains, the revisionist ‘mood’. It is important to maintain that key revisionists such as
Kevin Sharpe, Mark Kishlansky, Anthony Fletcher, Conrad Russell, and of course John Morrill among many
others hardly interacted as ‘movement’. John Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces: The People of England and
the Tragedies of War, 1630-1648 (London: Longman, 1999), p.3.
4
Conrad Russell, “The British Problem and the English Civil War”, History, 72, 236 (October 1987), pp.395-415.;
The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).
5
Morrill, Provinces.
6
John Morrill, “The Religious Context of the English Civil War”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 34
(1984), pp.155-178.
7
Christopher Hill, The English Revolution, 1640 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1940); Lawrence Stone, Social
Change and Revolution in England: 1540-1640 (London: Longman, 1965); The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-
1641 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1972)

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traditional Whig notion of ‘progress’, that the inevitable development of parliament as ‘the noblest

monument ever reared by mortal man’ was obstructed by Charles.8 Building on the arguments of Russell

and Morrill, long-term factors were very influential, but even more so than either may admit. While not

straying too far as to call these factors overly deterministic, this essay will discuss these influences and

how they discontented the kingdoms, before detailing each kingdom’s slide into war in the context of

these analyses. The long-term factors this essay will discuss are: the British problem; the financial crisis

facing the monarchy; and the religious diversity of the kingdoms. It is important to mention that these

factors impacted the reigns of Elizabeth and James, but they were able to handle them without

provoking war.9 This reserves a key part for someone to be especially neglectful and aggravating. As

for who the part is reserved for, one must only look at the one man who ties the kingdoms of England,

Scotland, and Ireland all together. Charles.

Charles’ rule of the three kingdoms was steeped in his conviction of the ‘divine right of kings’. 10

Early in his reign he made it clear in a speech in 1628 to the English Parliament that “I owe the account

of my actions to God alone”,11 and this was upheld throughout his life. Even at his trial, where in his

stout and defiant defence, declared to the Lord Commissioner John Bradshaw “A king cannot be tried

by any superior jurisdiction on earth”.12 His father, James, would have had a profound impact on this

development, as he was sure to make sure his son was educated by his writings.13 In 1598, James

published his Trew Law of Free Monarchies, and in 1616 published The Workes of the Most High and

Might Prince, James, both declarations of his theory of rule, and blueprints that Charles would have

looked to follow.14 In the former tract, Charles would have paid particular attention to the lines “I grant

indeed that a wicked king is sent by God for a curse to his people, and a plague for their sins. But that

8
It was this historiography that Stone and Hill rebelled against. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of England:
Volume V; VI; VII; VIII; IX; X (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1886). Quote can be found in Volume I, p.2.
9
John Morrill, Brian Manning and David Underdown, “What was the English Revolution?”, in Peter Gaunt, The
English Civil War: The Essential Readings (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), pp.14-16.
10
Geoffrey Davies, The Early Stuarts: 1603-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp.33-34.; Charles Carlton,
Charles I: The Personal Monarch (London: Routledge, 1995), p.61, 83, 108.; Richard Cust, Charles I (Harlow:
Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), pp.472-473.
11
Thomas Bayly Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other
Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other Illustrations,
Volume 3 (London: T.C. Hansard, 1816), p.231.
12
J.G. Muddiman, Trial of King Charles the First (Edinburgh: William Lodge & Company, Limited, 1928), p.90.
13
Carlton, Charles, p.20.; Mark Kishlansky, Charles I: An Abbreviated Life (London: Allen Lane, 2014), pp.5-6.
14
Davies, Early, pp.31-34.

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it is lawful to them to shake off that curse at their own hand, which God has laid on them, that I

deny…It is certain then that patience, earnest prayers to God, and amendment of their lives, are they

only lawful means to move God to relieve them of that heavy curse”. 15 Fundamentally, Charles believed

that what he wanted could and would be done, and he simply could not understand those who opposed

him. In all three kingdoms, this characterised Charles’ rule, and is what bred an undercurrent of

resentment that would explode from 1637.

Charles’ role is key to understanding the causes of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, but it must

next be understood the kingdoms that he inherited. Since 1603, England, Scotland, and Ireland were

under one ruler, but there was no further integration, and the character of each nation remained

continuous. James did however desire an integration of England and Scotland, but plans for a unification

were incredibly alarming, and James had to yield.16 By the beginning of Charles’ reign, this lack of close

integration of his three kingdoms was represented by the relative autonomy each kingdom possessed,

and the lack of an encompassing council of state. This was a notably absent feature in Britain that

existed across Europe in other composite monarchies, and instead each nation had their own Privy

Council.17 This major weakness meant that the King had no compulsion to take any advice on British

issues at all. Both James and Charles resided in England for practically all their reign, and musings with

the English Privy Council had little business with the governing of Scotland and Ireland.18 In making

policy for the other two kingdoms, the King would take advice from their respect Privy Councils, but

this advice came from whoever and whenever it was desired. The one body able to properly assist in

the ruling of Ireland and Scotland were therefore located hundreds of miles away in Dublin and

Edinburgh, and Charles was in no rush to ask their opinion. 19 Ireland too contributed to this problem.

Treated effectively as a colony, it represented a third nation of a distinct ethnic group that the monarch

had to effectively manage. Governed by a Lord Deputy and a subordinate Privy Council, the King had

15
David Wootton, Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p.102.
16
Russell, Causes, pp.213-214.; Brian P. Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the
Union, 1603-1707 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp.4-9.
17
A single council for all of Britain was not an unlikely proposition. Sir Francis Bacon, David Hume, and
numerous union writers had recommended it to James at the beginning of this reign. Levack, Formation, p.61.
18
J.H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, Past & Present, 137 (November 1992), pp.55-56.; Russell,
Fall, p.30.; Levack, Formation, p.61.
19
Russell, Fall, p.30.

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a great deal of autonomy across the Irish Sea too. With a majority Catholic nation of ethnic Irish,

Ireland was in stark contrast to her neighbours. This was James’ legacy, and Charles’ inheritance as

the King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and it is this context to Charles reign that needs to be made

apparent.

To expand on this notion of the British problem as a cause of the English Civil War, the style

of government under Charles’ rule must be analysed, especially within the Scottish and Irish kingdoms

as the first to fall into war. In analysing the style of rule in the Scottish and Irish kingdoms, sources of

instability can be identified, even before the matter of royal policy is considered for all three. First, to

Scotland. Here, Charles was an absentee monarch. This on its own was not necessarily a problem that

could lead to civil war, as his father James had managed relatively well in his governing from London.20

James’ himself gleefully remarked “Here I sit and govern it with my pen”, displaying both the style of

absentee rule, and the sheer power the monarch can still possess from afar. 21 Charles however, with

no memory of his birthplace or knowledge of their customs nor traditions of rule, proceeded to alter

these structures without regard for the Scots. It is in this way that Charles’ style of ruling Scotland as

a northern kingdom fostered resentment. To govern Scotland, Charles had a Secretary for Scotland

residing in England, and a Scottish Privy Council in Edinburgh. While under James the desires for

patronage were carefully allocated, under Charles these were closed off to the traditional Scottish

nobility.22 Upset with the opposition he saw amongst the Scottish nobility, Charles aimed at “drawing

back into our crowne all the heritable offices”, 23 and saw to it that nobles such as Rothes, Loudoun,

Lorne, Huntly, and Hamilton had to resign.24 Their replacements, bishops of favourable doctrine, 25 were

branded by travel writer William Lithgow as “effeminat”. They “weare womens loks” and “that many

20
He may have broken his promise to visit his nation of birth every three years, and upset many of the ruling
families that desired close cooperation with the King, but his rule of Scotland from the English capital was
tolerable, carefully using patronage and keeping contact with the Scottish Privy Council to placate the Scottish
nobility and preserve order. Pauline Croft, King James (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp.49, 136-143.
21
C.V. Wedgwood, “Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1603-40”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 32 (1950),
p.31.
22
The Earl of Melrose took exception to such action, arguing that the King had no right to remove members
without proper cause. Falling back on his convictions of divine right, Charles succeeded, and Melrose resigned.
Cust, Charles, pp.210-226.
23
William Alexander, Earl of Stirling, The Earl of Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters: Volume One (Edinburgh:
Burness & Company, 1885), pp.269-270.
24
Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), p.299.
25
David George Mullan, Episcopacy in Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1986), p.173.

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doubt, if they bee mayds or men, till that their beards sprout forth”. This defamatory portrait would

have characterised the general perception amongst the Scots. 26 Charles twice restructured the Scottish

Privy Council and central government, making sure they were all packed for his own bidding. The new

President of the Privy Council was William Graham, the Earl of Menteith, a “near-sighted and selfish”

individual, who was more than happy to follow Charles’ lead. 27 Charles also set about barring any

individual from holding simultaneous offices. Separating the Court of Session and Privy Council signalled

Charles reluctance to rely on the traditional cooperation of nobility in governing Scotland.28 His letter

to the Court of Session is rather frank in this. “We have determined that no Nobleman…salbe admitted

for a judge thairin…In regaird to your officeis, which…may be moir serviceabill unto us” wrote Charles,

preferring less collusion among the Scots, and more ability to be able to influence either body.29

Furthermore, access to the King was heavily restricted.30 Appointed by Charles in 1626, William

Alexander was the Secretary for Scotland, and made the focal point for all correspondence relating to

Scotland.31 Under Caroline rule, Scottish resentment rose as they quickly grasped with the reality that

their King was prepared to discard the traditional repositories of power if they conflicted with his views.

Moreover, Ireland must next be discussed regarding British problem. Effectively run as a colony,

the Irish kingdom found itself occupying a peculiar spot alongside England and Scotland. Where the

other two kingdoms enjoyed equal status, Ireland was subservient to England. It had its own

Parliament, a Lord Deputy, and Privy Council, but they were directly responsible to England. Therefore,

Charles’ appointment of the Lord Deputy allowed him incredible sway in what manner Ireland was to

be ruled, and he was certain to pick someone who was likeminded to his ideals.32 Thomas Wentworth,

26
Edward J. Cowan, Montrose: For Covenant and King (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p.38.
27
Maurice Lee Jr., The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles I, 1625-37 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1985), pp.46-47.
28
Allan I. Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement: 1625-1641 (Edinburgh: John
Donald Publishers Ltd., 1991), p.50.
29
26 January 1626. David Masson, The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland: 2nd Series, Volume 1 - 1625-
1627 (Edinburgh: H.M. General Register House, 1899), pp.220-221.
30
David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution: 1637-1644 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1973), pp.29-31.
31
“All the packettis, etc., that salbe send from the Privie Council of this kingdome concerning the affaires
thairof salbe directed unto Sir Williame Alexander, knight, his Majesties Secretarie”, outlined Charles. Masson,
Privy, pp.232-233.; Macinnes, Covenanting, p.50.
32
Traditionally, the Parliament was a political battle between the Old and New English, with the Privy Council
predominantly being made up of the latter, and the Lord Deputy keeping tensions from rising too high
between them while keeping royal authority in place.

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the Earl of Strafford, was a prime candidate for such a job, establishing himself as a powerful member

of the Court and a man of “vigour and force” in Charles’ own words. 33 He was made Lord Deputy of

Ireland from 1632 and quickly established a regime that can easily be characterised as authoritarian.34

Upon first meeting his Privy Council in Dublin, Strafford remarked “I find them in this place a company

of men the most intent upon their own hands that ever I met with”,35 leading him to purge many inside

his government, and cut deep into the vestiges of power the Old English nobles traditionally held.

Despite owning the most valuable land, the Old English found a growing discrepancy between their

economic strength and their political power. 36 Amongst this purge, Strafford’s extension of the

plantations towards the west of Ireland completely disillusioned the Irish from royal authority.37 When

viewing the depositions of English refugees from Ireland following the 1641 uprising, there is a

commonality among many witnesses that the Irish were rising in response to Strafford’s expansion of

plantations. John Wood witnessed the rebels proclaim that “haueinge there Landes vniustly taken away

by the plantation could not haue any sattisfaccon but by the Sword”,38 and in County Fermanagh William

Baxter detailed how Irish rebels killed the English settlers “on their owne lands, wheroff they or their

predecessors had beene by plantation dispossessed.”39 Clearly Strafford’s policies had bred such hatred

in the Irish that an uprising to take back land could not have been surprising. Through the proxy of

Strafford, Ireland represents the King’s desire for a strong hand in each of his kingdoms. With the

British problem laid bare, it is vital to now move towards analysing Charles’ ecclesiastical and financial

policies. It is here that it can be highlighted the disastrous failings of Charles not just as a ruler of

multiple kingdoms, but as a man of diplomacy, tact, and flexibility.

33
Cust, Charles, p.202.
34
Ibid., pp.201-202.
35
Richard Bagwell, Ireland Under the Stuarts and During the Interregnum (London: The Holland Press, 1963),
p.201.
36
Such as Meath, Dublin, Tipperary, Limerick, Kilkenny, and Waterford. Hugh F. Kearney, Strafford in Ireland:
1633-1641 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.17.
37
Even the Old English were disillusioned. Early signs existed since 1624 that the Old English were in danger of
pulling their support, with an article on the ‘Grievances of the Landholders of the Pale’ stating that “the late
plantations…and the dispossessing thereby of many who…did quietly enjoy their lands, does much affright the
individuals of the English Pale”. This led the Old English and the Irish to even find affinity in the tyranny of the
Strafford’s changes to land ownership. Ibid., pp.87, 102.
38
“Deposition of John Wood”, 17 February 1642, Trinity College Dublin, MS 811, fols 116r-117v.
39
“Deposition of Wiliam Baxter”, 22 September 1642, Trinity College Dublin, MS 835, fols 192r-193v.

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Opposition towards Arminian leaders was at the heart of the political debate before the Wars.

Upon Charles’ ascension it was clear that he was to follow an Arminian policy towards his kingdoms,

and this would play a huge role of building resentment towards the Caroline administration. Charles

would follow a policy establishing ecclesiastical conformity between England, Scotland, and Ireland,

but, to his detriment, carried it further than James ever thought sensible to do.40 The first Parliament

under Charles saw early alarm to the growing Arminian movement among the educated clergy, and

Charles’ defence of the anti-Puritan writings of Dr Montagu was taken as an early warning sign.41

Arminian thought had permeated the upper echelons of power since James, but never to the extent

that it was overwhelming. Russell called this “a church designed by a committee”, as no doctrine was

universal in its application.42 Charles desired an Arminian-led church however, and the man he tasked

with doing so was William Laud. One of the leading Arminians, James admired Laud for his skill in

debate and theology but feared the strength of his convictions. 43 Under Charles, Laud was quickly

promoted, sitting on the Privy Council in 1627; appointed the Bishop of London in 1628; and elevating

to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633.44 Charles and Laud had an affinity toward one another. In

Charles, the kingdoms had a man bent on restoring episcopacy and who would give anti-Calvinist

policies their cutting edge, and in Laud was a man adept at orchestrating policy, navigating ecclesiastical

administration, and turning words into action.45 Charles’ and Laud’s task of unifying the kingdoms along

religious lines was a difficult one, as they were governing an English nation with a substantial number

of Puritans, a Scottish nation with a predominant Presbyterian population, and an Irish nation of Catholic

lower classes, Catholic Old English, and Protestant New English. But the difficulty of the task was not

going to restrain Charles from exercising his prerogative, and this was to antagonise three kingdoms

into civil war.

40
Levack, Formation, p.127.
41
J.R. Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century, 1603-1689 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1928), pp.51-53.
42
Russell, Causes, pp.83-108.
43
“He hath a restless spirit, and cannot see when matters are well” observed James, who would never appoint
Laud higher than the Bishop of St. David’s. Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain: 1485-1714 (London:
Pearson Longman, 2005), p.241.
44
Ibid., p.241.
45
Cust, Charles, pp.134-135.; Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake, “The Ecclesiastical Policies of James I and
Charles I”, in Kenneth Fincham, The Early Stuart Church: 1603-1642 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp.45-46.

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Anti-Puritan appointments became the norm after Charles’ ascendancy, with four of the five

main sees now controlled by Arminians. 46 One of the key ‘innovations’ of Laud was moving every

communion table in England to the east end and to rail them in, preventing the layman from

approaching.47 Branded Popish, the Puritan population was incensed by such an action, and efforts to

move back the tables were seen into the 1640s.48 Areas where Laudian policy was most implemented

saw the most examples of iconoclasm, which had become a common occurrence in the later years of

the personal rule.49 In the northbound belt between Middlesex and the Wash, iconoclasm was rife, and

consistently took the form of the destruction of altar railings.50 In July 1640, the altar rails of Kelvedon

Easterford church were destroyed and removed by the local populace, and other local churches suffered

the same fate in the following months.51 Hardly isolated incidents, these were representative of a wider

dissatisfaction with Arminian doctrines and the direction of the Church of England. A famously prolonged

case of refusal to conform involved the church of Beckington in the diocese of Bath and Wells, and

other churches in the area were influenced by the refusal. One Joan Goodman called the altar rails “idle

fools bables”, before being presented before court for “verbal disrespect”. 52 A few weeks after Laud’s

appointment the Jacobean Book of Sports was reissued,53 and a proclamation in June the following

year “for the establishment of the peace and quiet of the Church of England” solidified Charles’

intolerance of Puritanism. It forbade “new inventions or opinion concerning Religion”,54 and reactions

to both were predictably hostile. Richard Baxter observed the tensions that these proclamations brought

to his village in his youth: “we could not read the Scripture in our Family without the great disturbance

of the Taber and Pipe and Noise in the Street!” he complains of the impact of the Book of Sports. Baxter

would further witness examples of how Charles’ policies deepened tensions: “when I heard them call

46
These four were Canterbury (Laud), York (Neile), London (Juxon), and Winchester (Curle). The exception was
Durham (Morton). Fincham & Lake, “Policies”, p.37.
47
John Campbell, “The Quarrel over the Communion Table”, Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal
Church, 40, 2 (June 1971), p.175.
48
Julie Spraggon, Puritan Iconoclasm in England 1640-1660, Thesis (University of London, 2000) pp.25-26.
49
Kenneth Fincham, “The Restoration of the Altars in the 1630s”, Historical Journal, 44 (2001), pp.919-940.
50
John Walter, “Popular Iconoclasm and the Politics of the Parish in Eastern England, 1640-1642”, Historical
Journal, 47, 2 (June 2004), pp.261-266.
51
Radwinter, Great Holland, and St. Oysth all saw their altar rails destroyed. Ibid., pp.261-290.
52
Ibid., p.26.
53
Fincham & Lake, “Policies”, p.41.
54
James F. Larkin, Stuart Royal Proclamations - Volume Two: Royal Proclamations of King Charles I, 1625-1646
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) pp.90-91.

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my Father Puritain, it did much to cure me and alienate me from them”. 55 Even the Latin-English

Dictionary became a battleground for Laudianism, whereby its first definition for Praedestinatiani is an

attack on Puritan theology: “a kind of heretic that held fatal predestination of every particular matter

person or action, and that all things come to passe, and fell out necessarily; especially touching the

salvation and damnation of particular men”. 56

An indication towards the double act of Charles and Laud was exhibited through the annual

reports on the state of the dioceses sent in by the bishops. Laud was tasked with summarising these

for Charles who would then annotate them with ideas and commands for Laud to report back. Here,

Laud was selective in what to show Charles. In a 1633 report he would use terms such as “seditious

lectures” and would arouse concern by reporting that said lectures were “ordained to illuminate the

dark corners of that diocese”. Charles predictably would reply “If there be Darke Corners in this Diocese;

it were fitt a trew light should Illuminat it”.57 The best example of this double act can be found in 1638

report, where Laud complained of no “assistance from the judges” in suppressing the “separatists about

Ashford”. Charles responded forcefully, writing in the margin “Demande there help and if they refuse,

I shall make them assist you”.58 It is important to note two aspects in these letters: Charles trusted his

Archbishop to see things as he did, allowing Laud a considerable amount of freedom, and with the

backup of Charles to ‘encourage’ the hesitant; and that Laud and Charles were not afraid of interfering,

a source of great resentment among the churchgoers of all three kingdoms, who were continually under

the watchful eye of Laud and Charles.

In Scotland and Ireland especially, Laud was kept abreast of the implementation of his Arminian

doctrines and was never slow to react when he heard of discontent with his policies. This interventionist

attitude was a continual thorn in the side for the Scots, who were never given license to stray too far

55
Richard Baxter, Reliquiæ Baxterianæ (London: T. Parkhurst, J. Robinson, J. Lawrence, and J. Dunton, 1696),
pp.1-2.
56
Nicholas Tyacke, Aspects of English Protestantism, c.1530-1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2001), pp.148-149.
57
1633. William Laud, The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, D.D., sometime Lord
Archbishop of Canterbury: Vol. 6 Part 2 - Letters & Notes on Bellarmine (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1857),
p.320.; Another example can be seen the following year, where Laud’s use of “great nurseries of
incomformity” to describe areas in Canterbury and Sandwich was easily picked up by Charles who asked for it
to be brought up in the Privy Council. 1634. Ibid., p.323.
58
1638. Ibid., p.355.

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towards their preferred Presbyterianism. In a letter to the Bishop of Ross, Laud lambasts him for failing

to reorganise the church in the Arminian manner, writing “if you do not see the chapel well furnished,

the blame [will] for ever be yours”.59 The Archbishop of St. Andrews was similarly attacked. “Whereas

you write, that the fault is most in your ministers, I easily believe that to be true. But then they should

have been dealt with beforehand, and made pliable”.60 Laud also kept up his use of Charles’ prerogative

to force the hand of difficult Scottish bishops. The Bishop of Dunblane received such treatment, with

Laud writing “his majesty hath heard that there have lately been some differences in Edinburgh about

the sufferings of Christ, and that your lordship was some cause for them”. 61 As did the Earl of Tranquair,

who received a letter warning that “His Majesty takes it very ill, that the business concerning the

stablishment of the service book hath been so weakly carried”.62 Within these letters is evidence of

continual interference within the Kirk. Reactions to such overbearing rulers can be seen in the actions

of the Scottish nobility, who through the 1630s tried to present Charles with supplications opposing the

Arminianism and arguing for a more independent church. When Charles was presented with one such

declaration by Rothes, he handed it back unopened and warned him “My Lord, ye know what it is fit

for me to hear and consider, and therefore do or do not upon your peril”.63 Clearly Charles was not to

be in a conciliatory mood.

Ireland too did not escape the religious tensions of Stuart rule, as advancement of Arminian

doctrine exacerbated tensions between the Irish and English. Strafford implemented Episcopalian

doctrines with extreme rigor, appointing many Arminians from across the Irish Seas to bishoprics all

over the land.64 On his arrival, Strafford was shocked by the state of the churches, which by this point

had fallen into disrepair and were being used by the Irish for a variety of secular means.65 Strafford

59
19 September 1635. Ibid., pp.434-436.
60
4 September 1632. Ibid., pp.503-504.
61
6 May 1636. Ibid., pp.320-321.
62
7 August 1637. Ibid., pp.493-496.
63
Hilary L. Rubinstein, Captain Luckless: James, First Duke of Hamilton (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press,
1975), pp.49-50.
64
George Webb (English) appointed to Bishop of Limerick in 1634; Henry Leslie (Scottish) to Bishop of Down
and Connor and John Atherton (English) to Bishop of Waterford and Lismore in 1635; Robert Sibthorp (English)
to Bishop of Kilfenora in 1638; Henry Tilson (English) to Bishop of Elphin in 1639. Kearney, Strafford, p.114.
65
In Dublin, one had become a stable, others were made into residences, and another even being used as a
tennis court. Thomas L. Coonan, The Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan Revolution (Dublin: Clonmore
& Reynolds, Ltd., 1954), p.46.

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took back these church lands to the fury of the Irish re-settlers of the land.66 By 1640, the Church of

Ireland had almost completely changed character. 67 Laud, again, was intervening from afar. When the

Earl of Cork erected a monument in St. Patricks Church, he wrote “it seems some mouths, which durst

not open there, did fully open here”. 68 Laud was again the instigator of Charles’ wishes for a uniform

religion across his lands, but Strafford was not powerless in this area. In correspondence between the

two, Strafford detailed a confrontation with an Irish bishop. Upon hearing of Puritan worship, Strafford

“sent to the Bishop, told him roundly, he had betrayed the Bishoprick; that he deserved to have his

rochet, pulled over his ears”.69 A greater instigator of religious, and even ethnic tension was Strafford’s

reorganising of the Irish army. Consisting of mainly Catholic Irish, the Lord Deputy implemented a

rigorous discipline and increased the ranks.70 The idea of a Catholic army serving an English Protestant

monarch was incredibly disconcerting in every kingdom. The Scots and the English feared a Popish

army ready to cross the Irish Sea and crush royal dissent, and the Irish were angered by the prospect

of fighting for a Protestant cause. The result was a few thousand well-armed and well-trained men

ready to boil over in the event of war. Ireland was not to escape the authoritarian nature of monarchical

rule, and as such deepened religious and ethnic divisions further than they ever had been under James

or Elizabeth before him.

Another important factor on any monarch’s reign is the state of the royal finances, and for

Charles this was a point of great worry. Debt by 1625 was growing quickly and the executive was slowly

heading towards a financial crisis.71 The pursued option was to increase income, and Charles never

shied away from an unpopular tax if it was profitable. Traditionally, revenue was derived from the

crown lands. However, by 1625, Charles found that these lands had been sold off at an alarming rate.72

66
Levack, Formation, p.95.
67
Kearney, Strafford., pp.113-114.
68
21 March 1633. Laud, Works, pp.364-365.
69
9 January 1634. William Knowler, The Earl of Strafforde’s Letters and Dispatches (Dublin: R. Reilly, 1740), I,
p.171.; Even Strafford himself noted the similarities in convictions between him and Laud when he writes “I
have wondered many times to observe how universally you and I agree in our judgement”. 31 December 1636.
Ibid., II, p.42.
70
Bagwell, Ireland, p.201.
71
Conrad Russell, “Parliament and the King’s Finances”, in Russell, The Origins of the English Civil War
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), pp.91-116.; Causes, pp.161-185.
72
Henry VIII and Edward VI had sold nearly all the monastic lands acquired during the dissolution of the
monasteries; Elizabeth I sold nearly £1,000,000 worth of property; and James had sold off £650,000. Maurice

11
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Collecting rents had also become inefficient, but a restructuring of how they were managed would have

helped alleviate financial worries to a considerable degree.73 Charles’ policy instead however was to

continue selling to pay off his short-term debts.74 What remained were so inefficiently run that they

yielded less than £10,000 per annum by the start of the personal rule in 1629, a figure that could never

be stretched to fulfil the regal spending of any monarch.75 The main source of extra parliamentary

revenue was distilled within Parliament, and Charles was able to secure a number of subsidies totalling

some £275,000.76 However, this was merely a placating measure to Charles before the more pressing

matter of grievances related to Charles’ early rule took precedence. Moreover, tonnage and poundage

was granted on an annual basis, not for the lifetime of the monarch, an unacceptable proposition for

Charles. He simply kept collecting the duty, coming up against a growing contingent of merchants who

refused to pay, and a parliament who were proceeding against the customs officers.77 This was despite

Charles making it perfectly clear that they had been acting on his behalf. 78 In proceeding against the

customs officers, Parliament was, in effect, showing that Charles’ will was not superseding, and that

those following it against the wishes of parliament was punishable. 79 Popofsky’s analysis of the crisis

arising from tonnage and poundage displays that it was an indication to the growing resentment

towards the authoritative nature of the levy, and the autocratic behaviour of Charles. 80 Refusing to bow

down to what he saw as the “provocations of evil men”, Charles dissolved Parliament and set off solving

this monetary crisis on his own.81

Ashley, The English Civil War (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974), pp.13-14.; G.E. Aylmer, The Struggle for the
Constitution (London: Blandford Press, 1968), pp.52-53.
73
Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p.105.
74
Frederick C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1485-1641 (New York, NY: Century Co., 1932), II, pp.243-244.
75
Ashley, English, pp.13-14.
76
Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp.40-42.
77
J.P. Somerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640 (London: Longman, 1986), pp.156-157.
78
Samuel Rawson Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution: 1625-1660 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1906), pp.49-51.
79
Johann Sommerville, “Ideology, Property, and the Constitution” in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, Conflict in
Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642 (London: Longman, 1989), p61.
80
Linda S. Popofsky, “The Crisis over Tonnage and Poundage in Parliament in 1629”, Past & Present, 126
(February 1990), pp.44-75. For revisionist works, see Russell, Parliaments; Sharpe, Charles; J.P. Kenyon, The
Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
81
Kenyon, Constitution, pp.83-99.

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The personal rule of Charles had to begin with new financial policies. Over the next few years,

a revival of feudal devices belonging to the crown contributed considerably to the feelings of distrust.82

The first device was Distraint of Knighthood.83 Under this right, all gentlemen who were worth at least

£40 per annum in freehold land were required to put themselves forward to be knighted at the King’s

coronation.84 A mere formality under recent monarch, Charles appointed commissioners to collect fines

from the more than nine-thousand gentlemen who did not offer themselves at his coronation, and

raised a substantial £175,000 in the process. 85 Despite its success this cannot be misconstrued as

acceptance. Research by Leonard into the commissioners shows that in Berkshire, 78 men had paid

their dues, but a further 133 had refused, offered less, or simply did not appear before them. It was a

similar story elsewhere.86 Clarendon would later observe “the Law of Knighthood; which, though it had

a foundation in Right, yet,…was very grievous…And no less unjust”.87 Charles would also make use of

the old Forest Laws.88 On the basis of old documents, the forest boundaries would be enlarged to their

maximum extent, and even covered whole counties.89 Charles then declared the thousands of people

who lived there to pay fines levied for their supposed encroachment onto royal territory.90 The residents

of a Northamptonshire eyre were fined £51,000, and riots erupted across the south-west.91 Moreover,

it was not just the common people who were pained by such proceedings.92 Sir Basil Brooke would be

fined £20,230 after a protracted fight with Crown lawyers,93 and Clarendon also observed this measure,

noting that “the old Laws of the Forest were revived…which Burden lighted most upon Persons of

82
Russell, Causes, pp.161-184.
83
The revival of which was the work of the confusingly named lawyer Sir Julius Caesar. Lockyer, Britain, p.317.;
Alain Wijffels, “Caesar [formerly Adelmare], Sir Julius”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), accessed 20 April 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/4328.
84
Aylmer, Struggle, p.80.
85
Lockyer, Britain, p.317.
86
In Shropshire, this number was 88 men, in Somerset 171, and in Buckinghamshire a staggering 322 refused
to pay. H.H. Leonard, “Distraint of Knighthood: The Last Phase, 1625-1641”, History, 63, 207 (February 1978),
pp.28-29.
87
Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (Basil: J.J. Tourneisen,
1798), Vol. I, p.115.
88
Unearthed by the less confusingly named William Noy, Charles’ Attorney-General. Lockyer, Britain, p.317.;
Hart Jr., James S. “Noy [Noye], William”. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009. Accessed 20 April 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/20384.
89
Such as Essex and Northamptonshire.
90
Aylmer, Struggle, pp.80-81.; Lockyer, Britain, pp.317-318.
91
Wiltshire, Dorest, and Gloucestershire saw most reactions. George Hammersley, “The Revival of the Forest
Laws under Charles I”, History, 45, 154 (1960), pp.98-101.
92
Ibid., pp.85-102.
93
Ibid., pp.98.

13
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Quality and Honor, who thought themselves above ordinary oppressions, and were therefore like to

remember it with more sharpness”.94 Charles would also continue the practise of granting patents.95 By

granting to companies and not individuals, Charles was able to circumnavigate the law, raising money

in the process.96 These restrictions were felt particularly in London, with William Prynne writing in a

1636 tract that patents, “ali[e]nate subjects affections from their Kings, by putting them upon unjust

Taxes,…Monopolies, oppressions”.97 Charles also increased the fines payable to the Court of Wards,

vastly increased duties on trade with his New Impositions, and issued a new Book of Orders.98 The

revenues that resulted were staggering. Charles was on course for making £1m per annum without

parliament in 1640, but what the crown gained in money, it lost vastly in goodwill. Charles had reduced

the political nation to passively acquiescing to his financial exploits, and it was already boiling over in

pockets across the nation. However, conclusions cannot be fully draw before delving into the most

nefarious of Charles’ financial tools: ship money.

Traditionally, ship money was levied in times of emergency on the ports and coastal regions.

The tax was to go towards the Royal Navy and provide for the defence of the kingdoms. Charles had

already abandoned plans to issue writs in 1628 after consultation with Parliament, but when the royal

coffers were feeling light he reconsidered.99 With no Parliament to convince him otherwise, Charles

sent out writs demanding the ship money payments in late-1634, and then made the unprecedented

step of expanding this from just the coastal regions, to the whole of his kingdom. On the grounds “that

charge of defence which concerneth all men ought to be supported by all”, Charles would aggravate

the nation with his most egregious financial device.100 Early reactions were ones of bewilderment.

Richard Rose, a Justice for the Peace, wrote “what foolery is this that the country in general shall be

thus much taxed with great sums to maintain the King’s titles and honours?”, and his views were

indicative of the wider attitudes towards the tax.101 Langelüddecke especially highlighted the resistance

94
Clarendon, History, I, pp.115-116.
95
Or monopolies as critics would call them.
96
Normally this would be obtained by a cut of the profits from each sale under the patent, or a flat fee to
continue holding it. Aylmer, Struggle, p.81.
97
William Prynne, A Looking-Glasse for all Lordly Prelates (unknown: unknown, 1636), p.25.
98
Ashley, English, p.15.
99
Cust, Charles, p.70.
100
Howell, Complete, pp.830-832.
101
Thomas Wemyss Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1911), p.324.

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early on. In July 1636 the sheriff of Sussex and Surrey commented on widespread opposition that “I

finde all men and my officers all soe unwilling”, and notes that taxpayers were quite reactive to demands

to pay.102 Until Hampden’s case however, serious challenges did not appear.103 What was common

amongst reactions was the failure for this measure to be granted the consent of Parliament. Charles’

mooted this levy was in response to an emergency, but few could fathom what emergency this was in

relation to. John Hampden especially noted the lack of parliamentary consent, and his failure to pay

ship money made widespread news as he was taken to court on the issue.104 Interest was incredibly

high. Sir Thomas Knyvett wrote to his wife during the case that “although I was up by the peepe of th

day to that purpose, I was so far from getting into the roome that I could not het neer the doore…, the

crowd was so great”.105 Clearly the case was tackling a matter so many had a vested interest in. With

legality hanging in the balance, many withheld their payments until the case was settled. In Cheshire,

an impressive example of the case’s influence was exhibited whereby many of the constables tasked

with collecting the levy were threatened with lawsuits of their own. 106 When the final judgment was

announced, a slim 7-5 victory for the King, refusing to pay ship money became extremely prevalent. In

Middlesex, when inhabitants see ship money commissioners coming to collect, ”they forth with shut the

doors against them and they…cry thieves”.107 An even more extreme reaction was seen in Melbourne,

Cambridgeshire, where Sheriff Prychard saw over 100 people “greevously wound, and beate five or

sixe” commissioners, a further indication to the widespread undercurrent of tension Charles bred with

his financial policy. Nor can these examples be taken as synonymous with tax collection. No other early-

modern tax exhibited such levels of refusal.108 While this impacted the royal finances in later years,109

102
Furthermore, “scandalous language” was noted by Sheriff Rolle in Devon regarding the abuse received, and
Edward Boys of Kent was denounced for proclaiming “yf wee have such taxes layd upon us we must rebel”.
Henrik Langelüddecke, ““I finde all men & my officers all soe unwilling”: The Collection of Ship Money, 1635-
1640”, Journal of British Studies, 46, 3 (July 2007), pp.512-517.
103
Allison A.M. Gill, Ship Money during the Personal Rule of Charles I: Politics, Ideology, and the Law: 1634-
1640, Thesis (University of Sheffield, 1990), p.344.
104
D.E. Kennedy, The English Revolution: 1642-1649 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p.2.
105
Bertram Schofield, The Knyvett Papers: 1620-1644 (Norwich: Norfolk Record Society, 1949), pp.90-92.
106
Peter Lake, “The Collection of Ship Money in Cheshire during the Sixteen-Thirties: A Case Study of Relations
between Central and Local Government”, Northern History, 17, 1 (1981), p.62.
107
Keith Lindley, The English Civil War and Revolution: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.35-37.
108
Except possibly the Amicable Grant of 1524-25. Michael Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-
Century England: Local Administration and Response (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1994), pp.39-54,
117-125.
109
Laud in a letter to Strafford asserted “the King’s monies come in a great deal more slowly than they did in
former years”. 14 May 1638. Knowler, Strafforde’s, II, p.171.

15
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ship money did still create huge revenues for Charles, but historians must be wary to assume this can

be taken as widespread acceptance of the tax. Gill’s conclusions are most accurate in this case. While

it is difficult to truly understand how widespread opposition was, she concedes that it was much more

consistent than historians such as Russell were willing to admit.110 Financial constraints upon the

monarchy did not cause the civil war itself, but placed upon a man such as Charles, who was too proud

to call Parliament, the only option he left himself was a dangerous one. By subjecting his people to

medieval feudal laws and a vastly overreaching ship money policy, all without the consent of Parliament,

it is not difficult to draw a parallel between religious discontent, and the fall into war.

By now significant sources of instability have been identified, and their significance clearly

exhibited. While Charles played no part in creating these long-term problems his reign exasperated

them far more than necessary. It is these factors coupled with an incompetent King that explain the

fall into war beginning in 1637. Between 1637 and 1642, three crises occurred, and all three kingdoms

were lost. This next section examines why these instances, exasperated by the long-term factors, were

able to plunge all three kingdoms into war.111

The first of these flashpoints occurred in 1637, sparked by a riot in St Giles Cathedral,

Edinburgh. Regarding Scotland the issue of religion and the impact of the British problem are paramount

in understanding the call to arms under the Covenanting Movement. Charles and Laud by 1637 had

pushed their luck too far with Laud’s constant interference and Charles’ insistence on a revival of

episcopacy north of the border. Laud was unaware of the hostility he faced from the whole body of

Scottish councillors and being Charles’ sole advisor on religious matters in Scotland compounded this

problem.112 After making progress in his ecclesiastical policies Charles instructed Laud “to make the

alterations expressed in this book, and it fit a liturgy for the Church of Scotland”, a move that would

break the Scottish in following royal authority.113 The new prayer book resembled the English Arminian

liturgy to a huge extent and Charles was thrilled with the result. 114 News of the impending prayer book

110
In her concluding remarks she highlights Charles’ influence on these proceedings, as the instigator of the tax
and as the name that it was collected in. Gill, Ship, pp.496-585.
111
Jason Peacey, “The Outbreak of the Civil Wars in the Three Kingdoms”, in Barry Coward, A Companion to
Stuart Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p.291.
112
David Mathew, Scotland under Charles I (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955), p.243.
113
Ibid., p.249.
114
Lee, Road, p.202.

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created an early storm. Robert Baillie,115 anxious to view a copy, feared its supposed Popish nature,

writing he heard it contained “a very ambiguous prayer”,116 and Samuel Rutherford would proclaim that

within this book “reconciliation with Popery is intended”. 117 Even Sir Thomas Hope as Lord Advocate, a

man widely perceived as at the forefront of the King’s interests was deeply unhappy with the direction

Charles was taking the Kirk. Hints of this can be found after he took communion in the parish of

Pencaitland in April 1637, where he was able to avoid submitting to innovations such as kneeling to

receive the elements.118 The riot was the beginning of the massive Scottish uprising against Charles.

Archibald Johnston, who assisted in the writing of the National Covenant, would refer to the prayer

book as “this vomit of Romisch superstition”,119 and the resulting National Covenant has many

references to the discontent created under Charles rule. “We all…do protest, that after long and due

examination…we are now thoroughly resolved of the truth;…and therefore we abhor and detest all

contrary religion and doctrine” begins the Covenant, which is a clear reference to Arminian doctrine.120

The prayer book too is explicitly referenced, whereby the Covenanters “do condemn all erroneous

books…containing erroneous doctrine”.121 Charles’ attitude to the refusal of the Prayer Book was one

of anger, and was resolved to use aggression.122 “I expect not anything can reduce that people to

obedience, but only force” he wrote to the Marquis of Hamilton, as he asked him to play for time to

raise an army. By going to war with the Scots, Charles was dragging Ireland and England into civil

war.123

Ireland was the next kingdom to fall. Here, Strafford’s rule had reduced the Catholic majority

to a sect filled with fear for their land and livelihood. Plantation was one of Strafford’s main aim as Lord

Deputy of Ireland. It would not only satisfy the financial desires of Charles, but it would fully establish

115
Scottish Kirk minister and author. David Stevenson, “Baillie, Robert”, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), accessed 23 April 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/1067.
116
Ibid., p.204.
117
To John Stuart, Provost of Ayr, 1637. Rev. Andrew A. Bonar, Letters of Samuel Rutherford (London: The
Religious Tract Society, 1891), p.300.
118
Of course, Laud would send correspondence demanding an explanation for such action. David Stevenson,
King of Covenant: Voices from Civil War (Phantassie: Tuckwell Press, 1996), p.54.
119
Mullan, Episcopacy, p.176.
120
Gardiner, Documents, pp.124-125.
121
Ibid., p.128.
122
Mathew, Scotland, p.250.
123
Christopher Durston, Charles I (London: Routledge, 2015), p.198.

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the King’s claim to the land.124 First advancing into Connacht, Strafford rapidly reorganised the land

and caused upset for thousands of Irish living there. Suddenly they found their land deeds void, and

ready to be sold off to Scottish and English nobles. The Irish also had cause for concern across the

Irish Sea, from the Puritan Parliament in England, and the newfound Covenant Scottish power. An Irish

Catholic army, raised in the name of a Protestant England, was a terrifying prospect for many ethnic

Irish. With Scotland threatening an invasion through Ulster, the army was moved north, and a

prospective English path into Ireland was open at Dublin. 125 This struck terror into the hearts of the

Irish.126 A plot was formulated between Irish landowners for two simultaneous uprisings in Dublin and

Ulster. Encouraged by the success of the Scots, pained by the acceleration of plantations under

Strafford, and incredibly wary of the Puritan character of the English Parliament, the attack was

launched on 23 October 1641.127 The Scottish influence on the Irish cannot go unmentioned. O’Moore

stated in his objectives for the rebellion that Ireland were next to following in what “the Scots had

succeeded in obtaining”.128 It would be correct to see this as an expression of the Irish freeing

themselves of the tyrannical rule of Strafford, the free hand of which was granted by Charles. While

the attempt on Dublin Castle failed, the rising in Ulster was a rousing success and led to a massacre,

displacing thousands of English settlers as the Irish took back their land.

In England, Charles had created a nation and Parliament utterly unwilling to grant him his

required finances. The war with the Scots had depleted the royal coffers and he was required to call

two Parliaments in 1640.129 However, money was not forthcoming. The Long Parliament were

unanimous in their critiquing of the King. 130 Laud and Strafford were both impeached, and the latter

executed in May the following year. Considerable concessions were made in the form of the Triennial

Act, Ship Money Act, and Habeas Corpus Act, but news of the Irish Rebellion in October put Parliament

124
C.V. Wedgwood, Strafford: 1593-1641 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), p.162.
125
Jane H. Ohlmeyer, “The Wars of Religion, 1603-1660”, in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey, A Military
History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.160-187.
126
Kearney, Strafford, p.102.
127
Hugh MacMahon and Conor Maguire were to take Dublin Castle while Phelim O’Neill and Rory O’Moore led
an uprising in the heavily planted Ulster. J.C. Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923 (London:
Faber and Faber, 1966), p.80.
128
Coonan, Irish, p.87.
129
Sharpe, Personal, pp.871-873.
130
This is where Russell’s argument that England was not divided utterly breaks down. His arguments for
reconciling this against the attitudes of the Short and Long Parliament are unconvincing.

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and Charles at a crossroads. Needing to raise an army in Ireland to put down the rebellion, control over

Catholic Irish contingents were of the utmost important for either side. 131 Distrust and discontent had

grown to such an extent that Parliament demanded control of the Irish army, out of fear that Charles

would use it in England to enforce the litany of authoritarian measures seen in the previous decade,

and reverse the progress made so far. A Grand Remonstrance presented to Charles in the beginning of

December details many of the consequences of Charles’ exacerbation of the long-term causes.

“Ecclesiastical tyranny” was purported to reign over England, and grievances over the collection of

tonnage and poundage,132 book of rates,133 ship money,134 monopolies,135 selling of patronage,136 and

Irish Catholic army137 were all included. The attitude towards Charles’ religious policy in particularly is

encapsulated in a speech by Harbottle Grimston MP, during a debate on Laud. “He is the Sty of all

Pestilential filth, that hath infested the State” Grimston begins, hardly holding back in his hatred for the

“Ruines, Misseries, and Calamaties” he attributes to the “wicked and bloody designs” of Arminianism. 138

On 4 January 1642, Charles physically entered the House of Commons and demanded the surrender of

five members he had impeached the previous day.139 This act finally killed any hope of a conciliatory

relationship between King and Parliament and was the last moment before war in England was to

become practically inevitable.140 In an act of ultimate defiance, the House Speaker William Lenthall

replied, “I have neither Eye to see, nor Tongue to speak here, but as the House is pleased to direct

me”.141 Charles stormed out and departed London. He had become the ultimate autocrat, dispelling

with Parliamentary privilege to take revenge on a Parliament he felt had undermined his authority, but

any authority was gone by the time he entered the Chamber doors. Over the coming months, either

side began building up their ranks, and on 22 August 1642 Charles raised the royal banner outside

131
Ibid., p.
132
Grievance no. 18. Gardiner, Documents, pp.210-211.
133
Grievance no. 19. Ibid., p.211.
134
Grievance no. 20. Ibid., p.211.
135
Grievance no. 27. Ibid., p.212.
136
Grievance no.48. Ibid., p.214.
137
Grievance no.75. Ibid., p.217.
138
John Rushworth, Historical Collections of Private Passages of State: Volume 4, 1640-1642 (London: D.
Browne, 1721), p.122-123.
139
These members were John Hampden, Arthur Haselrig, Denzil Holles, John Pym, William Strode, and Edward
Montagu, the Earl of Manchester.
140
C.V. Wedgwood, “Revolutionary Tactics - and Charles I’s Decisive Blunder”, in Philip A.M. Taylor, The Origins
of the English Civil War (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1960), pp.91-98.
141
Rushworth, Collections, 4, p.238.

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Nottingham castle, signalling the official beginning of war with Parliament.142 The final kingdom had

fallen.

Charles was an incompetent monarch. Sympathy must be preserved for the structural problems

he faced, but it is undeniable that he went about alleviating these tensions in a manner

incomprehensibly poor. His attempts to rule from afar were poorly implemented, so assured in himself

that as king, he should not be questioned, and continual resistance to his rule meant nothing. His

religious policy was overtly antagonistic, with the application of a uniform church a futile prospect. In

Scotland, Charles’ obsession with unity and the divine right of kings blinded him from the lessons he

should have learnt from his father. By shutting out the traditional nobility completely, forced his views

on an unwilling population, and must be at fault for the Bishops’ Wars. His rule over Ireland was less

direct, but the impact still the same. By installing Strafford, Charles was choosing a man who

characterised the authoritarian nature he was so fond of. By stretching plantations further west, stealing

thousands of land deeds from the Irish and Old English, and antagonising all with a predominantly

Catholic army, Charles can have no complaints as to the reaction in October 1641. Finally, in England,

Charles was again blinded by his convictions, and buried by his stubbornness. By drudging up feudal

rights, refusing to capitulate his pride by calling Parliament, and then refusing to give to the pressure

when he did in 1640, Charles displayed his incompetence and rashness. While tension in all three

kingdoms was a derived from long-term factors, it was Charles who gave birth to conflict.

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