Mind Association

Liberal Nationalism. by Yael Tamir

Review by: Menachem Lorberbaum
Mind, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 410 (Apr., 1994), pp. 236-239
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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236 BookReviews

allow an agent pursuingpersonalachievementsto harmothers in ways that we

intuitivelythinkimmoral?
Having just raised the worry that Slote's virtue ethics has counter-intuitive
implications,I want to close by asking whetherhis theory leaves us with enough
direction.Slote admitsthathis theorysays "nothingexplicitly aboutwhatconsid-
erationsmake for admirabilityand how they combine into overalljudgementsof
admirability"(p. 230). We are thus thrown back on our intuitions about what
makes traitsor actions virtuousand aboutwhetherone traitor action is more vir-
tuous or admirablethan another.I agree with Slote that "no moral theorycan do
without(appealsto) intuitionaltogether"(p. 252). But acknowledgingsome role
for intuitionin theory constructionis compatiblewith wanting an ethical theory
to do more than catalogue our intuitions about virtuous actions and character
traits.Ideally, an ethical theory should offer a justificationor foundationfor our
centralethical convictions. It should also help resolve ethical disagreementsand
uncertainties.Slote's virtuetheory does not even try to do these things. We may
thus be reluctantto accept his theory until we are convinced no internallycoher-
ent rival theorydoes do them.

Departmentof Philosophy BRAD HOOKER

Universityof Reading
Whiteknights
Reading
RG6 2AA
UK

Liberal Nationalism, YaelTamir.Princeton,New Jersey:PrincetonUniversity

Press, 1993. Pp. xi + 194. ?17.50.
The political historyof the twentiethcenturyhas earnednationalisman evil rep-
utation. Nationalism is hastily identified with related though distinct political
movements such as fascism and nazism. Often, it is too easily dismissed as an
irrationalpassion stemmingfrom tribalinstinctsand the need for groupidentity.
Yet the fact remainsthatnationsform the sociological basis of our political lives.
The prevalentparadigmof political life on the globe today is that of the nation-
state. A political theory which adopts a dismissive strategytowardsnationalism
does so at the risk of missing a fundamentalfeatureof our political lives.
Among sociologists and historiansin the past decade recognitionof this fact
has created a series of innovative works from Benedict Anderson's Imagined
CommunitiesthroughAnthony Smith's The Ethnic Origins of Nations to Liah
Greenfeld's recent Nationalism. Yael Tamir's Liberal Nationalism is doubly
refreshing: the book points to a renewed interest among political theorists
engaged in first order arguments about political morality in the challenge of
nationalism.And it shows that arguingfor liberalismdoes not entail an en bloc
dismissal of nationalism as a political phenomenon. Tamirhas written a very

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 Book Reviews 237

importantand well argued book. She displays a rare capacity of being finely
attunedto both contemporarypolitical theory and political life.
Tamirforcefully arguesthatmost liberalsarede-facto liberalnationalists.Cru-
cial elements of political associa'tionsuch as focusing distributivejustice within
states ratherthanglobally, accordingprioritiesto birthright,and restrictingpolit-
ical obligation to particular states are commionly assumed but not seriously
arguedfor by liberaltheory.Liberaltheoristsimplicitly addressthemselves to the
realitiesof the nation-stateinsofaras nationalmembershipprovidestheirbound-
ary criteria.They are at their best when defining the terms of the social contract
but are silent on the basic questionsprecedingit. Liberalnationalism,by contrast,
attemptsto incorporatethe insights of theoriesof nationalisminto its conception
of liberalism.It is based on the premise that "no individualcan be context-free,
but that all can be free within a context"(p. 14).
National self-determinationis the single most importantsource of political
legitimacy in contemporarypolitical life. Hence the importanceof Tamir'seffort
to provide a model of liberalismwhich grows out of a conception of the nation.
By addressingherself to the nation,Tamirgoes beyond prevalentcommunitarian
correctives of liberal theory. "Community"is a foggy notion. Schools, neigh-
bourhoods,synagogues and churches,universities,unions, and polities all count
as communities.It is not clear which commonfeaturethey sharethatwould make
a difference to our self-perception as political agents. "Nation," by contrast,
refers to a much narrowerrange of phenomena.Whateverdisagreements'exist
regardingthe definition of nations, their centrality is due to the particularrole
nationalidentificationplays in political consciousness.
Liberal nationalism is a prescriptive theory. It stipulates the conception of
nationalismone ought to adopt ratherthan describing the range of phenomena
normally associated with nationalism. Following Benedict Anderson's work,
Tamirsuggests a nominalistdefinitionof nation accordingto which "the nation
is seen as an 'imaginarycommunity'... [R]atherthan implying false beliefs or
misrepresentationsof reality, 'imaginary' implies that, unlike the family, the
tribe, or the people, the nation exists only when its members consciously con-
ceive themselves as distinct from membersof other groups"(p. 8). Contraryto
organic interpretationsof nationalismthat "assumethat the identity of the indi-
vidual is totally constitutedby theirnationalmembership"(p. 79), this definition
has strongindividualisticIeanings,and two importantpoints follow. First, a pre-
mium is placed on the role of individual choice of communal identity. Tamir
seeks to encourage"agentswho acknowledgethattheirends aremeaningfulonly
within a social context, but who do not necessarily accept socially dictatedends
unreflectively"(p. 18). Second, the right to national self-determinationis con-
ceived of as a rightbelonging to individualsnot to a collective: "thefact that we
acquirean interestdue to our membershipin a particulargroupdoes not alter its
essential natureas an individualinterest"(p. 43).
The model of liberalnationalismTamirdevelops rests on two main arguments,
one moral, the other political. The first deals with what she calls the moralityof

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 238 Book Reviews

community:when confrontedwith moralchoices "we have a reason... to favour

those who sharetheirlives with us, and aboutwhom we care deeply"(p. 96). The
thrustof this formulationvis-'a-visliberalsis to recognize the weight of personal
and communalties in determninlng precedence.The moralityof communitycele-
bratescare ratherthandisinterestednessas its point of departure,arguingthatour
sense of justice grows out of care. Notice, however, that this formulationargues
for a reason that is to be reckonedalongside others;it is not necessarily a trump
card nor a licence to disregardthe needy stranger.
Tamirreworksthe Rawlsianoriginalposition to fit the moralityof community
in such a way that"individualscan agree on principlesof justice withouthaving
to transcendtheirparticularity".The partiesare assumedto be risk-averse,hence
concernedenough abouttheirfutureto protectthemselves even againstpositions
they areunlikelyto occupy in society. But they are also mutuallyinterested,"that
is, they take into accountthe needs of some particularothersas well as theirown
needs and interests"(pp. 106-7). Tamirbelieves thatthe partieswill choose prin-
ciples of justice similarto Rawls' for the basic institutionsof their society. How-
ever, "knowingthattheir firstduty is to theirmembers,these institutionswill act
to promote the latter's well-being and give preference to the interests of their
members".The generalattitudebeing that"whereaspartialitytowardmembersis
justified, one ought to be impartialamong members"(p. 111).
The second main argumentdistinguishesbetween the rightfor self-determina-
tion, which is a culturalright, and the claim for political sovereignty.The former
asserts a right for "the presence of a public sphere where the nationalcultureis
expressed"andis rootedin a theoryof nationalism.It relatesto the ways in which
individuals define their personal and collective identity. The latter asserts the
right"to take partin the political institutionsthatgovernone's life" (pp. 8-9), and
is derivedfromdemocratictheory.It relatesto individuals'rightsto governthem-
selves. Disentangling these closely related aspects of nationalist discourse is
Tamir'simportantcontributionto the theoryof nationalism.It is truethatpolitical
sovereignty could be viewed as the apex of the cultural self-expression of a
nation, but it does not follow that sovereignty is a necessary condition of self-
determination.If one accepts the premisethat self-determinationis an individual
not a collective right,the following argumentcan be made:the rightto participate
in governmentis satisfiedby participationin a democraticprocedure,whatever
its outcome, providingit is a just procedure.By contrast,the right to self-deter-
minationis not measuredby the procedurebut by its results. Self-determination
is attainedonly when certainfeatures,unique to the nation, are expressed in the
public sphere. Culturalautonomy and political sovereignty are two related but
not necessarily linked expressions of nationalism.
The success of this model dependsupon a numberof factors:
(1) The right to make culturalchoices requiresthe availability of an ade-
quate range of options. A pluralityof cultureshave to be protectedfor
choice to be meaningfullyexercised.

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 BookReviews 239

(2) Counteringxenophobictendenciesof ethnocentricnationalismandgen-

eratinga pluralityof culturesrequiresan awarenessof the universaliza-
bility of the argument for the importance of particular identity.
Polycentricnationalism"presupposesthat there is, one civilization but
many nations and views particularisticnational struggles as variations
on a theme"(p. 90).
(3) The criteriaof individuationof nations has to be flexible. Assuming an
individualisticbasis of the nation,it follows thatthereis no satisfactory
"objective"way of deciding when differencesbetween groupsmeritthe
recognition of a new nation. "Hence, when members of a particular
group sharing some identifying natlonal characteristicsdefine them-
selves as a nation,they oughtto be seen as one, lest they become victims
of a needless injustice"(p. 68). Although Tamir's distinctionbetween
self-determinationand sovereigntyis meant to downplayfears of sepa-
ratistclaims thatmay arise from this subjectiveconceptionof national-
ity, I believe the argumentto be unsatisfactory.The cultural contests
between nationalgroupstoday involve strugglesfor power anddomina-
tion in situationsof relativelyscarceresources.Subjectivedefinitionsof
the nationmay be too weak to carrythe burdenof moraldemandsmade
in its name-especially so in a world where political identity is identi-
fied with statehood.
Tamir'stheoryof liberalnationalismultimatelygeneratestwo opposing attitudes
towardsthe nation-state.On the one hand, the theory is premisedon the reality
of the nation-stateand the need to recognize this reality in liberaltheory. On the
other hand, Tamir ends her book with a vision of transcendingthe nation-state
throughtrans-nationalregional groupingssuch as the EC. This vision pushes her
distinctionbetween self-determinationand sovereigntyto the point of undermin-
ing the nation-state.Regional political groupings can allow the flourishing of
nationswithoutassertingpolitical sovereignty.Regional groupingscan lead to an
openness of politicalcultureand "a readinessto compensateculturallydisadvan-
taged membersof minoritygroups"(p. 163). But this conflict does not grow out
of an inconsistencyin Tamir'sworkbut from closely listeningto politicalreality.
It reflects the conflicting currentsin global politics today and the urgentneed for
new sources of political legitimacy.

Departmentof Jewish Philosophy MENACHEMLORBERBAUM

School of Education
TelAviv University
RamatAviv
TelAviv69978
Israel

TheShalomHartmanInstitute
POB 8029
Jerusalem93228
Israel

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