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Exploring the Role of Emotions in Injustice Perceptions and Retaliation

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Journal of Applied Psychology Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association
2005, Vol. 90, No. 4, 629 – 643 0021-9010/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.90.4.629

Exploring the Role of Emotions in Injustice Perceptions and Retaliation

Laurie J. Barclay and Daniel P. Skarlicki S. Douglas Pugh

University of British Columbia University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Although organizational justice scholars often describe unfairness as an emotionally laden experience,
the role of emotion is underresearched. In a study of individuals who experienced being laid off (N ⫽
173), the authors found that outcome favorability interacts with both procedural and interactional justice
to predict participants’ emotions. The pattern of interaction differed for inward-focused (i.e., shame and
guilt) and outward-focused (i.e., anger and hostility) negative emotions. Attributions of blame mediated
the relationship between fairness perceptions and outward-focused negative emotion. Outward-focused
emotion mediated the relationship between fairness perceptions and retaliation.

Keywords: fairness, justice, emotion, retaliation, attribution

Organizational justice scholars have long considered that emo-
tions play an important role in the experience of injustice. Homans
(1961), for example, argued that people feel anger when they are
underrewarded and guilt when they are overrewarded. Other writ-
ers have argued that emotions such as anger are particularly likely
to result when individuals perceive that organizational decisions or
managerial actions are unfair and attribute responsibility for the
unfairness to others (e.g., Folger, 1986; Sheppard, Lewicki, &
Minton, 1992; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Individuals
who experience injustice often describe a “hot and burning” ex-
perience (Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Tripp, 2002; Mikula, 1986),
which can involve different emotions including anger, hostility,
shame, and guilt (Harlos & Pinder, 2000).
Although emotions are often discussed in justice theories, they
have been largely underresearched (Weiss, Suckow, & Cropan-
zano, 1999). This is surprising because (a) emotions are an im-
portant part of organizational life, characterizing and informing
organizational processes as well as acting as communication sys-
tems that help individuals navigate through the basic problems that
arise in social relations (Fineman, 1993; Morris & Keltner, 2000)
and (b) there is a strong theoretical association between (in)justice
and emotion. Weiss et al., for instance, argued that (in)justice
could be understood as a special instance of more general appraisal
models of emotion.
Our goal in the present study was to contribute to the under-
standing of emotion within an organizational justice framework in
Laurie J. Barclay and Daniel P. Skarlicki, Sauder School of Business,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia; S. Douglas
Pugh, Department of Management, University of North Carolina at
Charlotte.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Academy of
Management conference, Seattle, Washington, August 2003. This research
was partially supported by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada awarded to Laurie J. Barclay and Daniel P.
Skarlicki. We thank Russell Cropanzano and Tina Kiefer for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laurie J.
Barclay, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053
Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada. E-mail:
laurie.barclay@sauder.ubc.ca
at least three ways. First, there has been a dearth of justice research
examining emotions as an outcome variable. Recent research on
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes by Brockner and colleagues
(Brockner, 2002; Brockner et al., 2003) suggests it is important to
understand (a) how different justice facets interact to predict
outcomes and (b) how patterns of interaction might differ depend-
ing on whether the outcome variables consist of self-evaluations or
evaluations aimed at others (i.e., decision makers or organiza-
tions). We extended this research to emotional outcomes and
examined the relationships between interactions of outcome
favorability–procedural justice and outcome favorability–
interactional justice with two types of emotions: inward-focused
emotions (i.e., shame and guilt) and outward-focused emotions
(i.e., anger and hostility).
Second, although previous justice theories and research suggest
emotions are part of the relationship between the experience of
injustice and the tendency to retaliate (Allred, 2000; Bies & Tripp,
2002; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), little empirical research has
examined the mediating role of emotion. We investigated whether
outward-focused negative emotions (i.e., anger and hostility) me-
diate the relationship between fairness perceptions and retaliation.
Third, the few studies of emotion and fairness that exist have
been conducted in the laboratory using undergraduate participants
(e.g., Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, & Grandey, 2000; Krehbiel &
Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). Although laboratory stud-
ies provide researchers with control of extraneous variables, they
can be limited by problems associated with demand characteristics
and the artificiality of the research setting (Gordon, Slade, &
Schmitt, 1986, 1987). We examined the relationship between
fairness, emotions, and retaliation in a field study among a sample
of individuals who experienced being laid off.
Building on an Organizational Justice Framework
Previous research examining the relationships between (in)jus-
tice and outcomes suggests that it is important to understand how
different justice facets interact to predict outcomes. Studies of the
interactive effects of justice facets have typically focused on
combinations of (a) outcome favorability, defined as whether or
not an outcome is personally beneficial, and (b) procedural justice,

629
630 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH
defined as the fairness of the procedures used to derive outcomes
(Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The
pattern of the outcome favorability–procedural justice interaction,
however, has been shown to differ depending on whether the
dependent variable consists of employees’ self-evaluations or their
evaluations of others (i.e., decision makers or organizations;
Brockner, 2002; Brockner et al., 2003). When the dependent
variable consists of self-evaluations (e.g., self-esteem), fair proce-
dures heighten the effect of outcome favorability on the dependent
variable (Gilliland, 1994; Schroth & Shah, 2000). In contrast,
when the dependent variable consists of organizational or other-
focused evaluations (e.g., support for decision/decision maker,
organizational commitment), fair procedures can mitigate the neg-
ative effects of outcome favorability on the dependent variable
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Scholars have explained these findings using a two-stage model
of justice (e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1991; Montada, 1994).
Specifically, unfavorable outcomes activate information process-
ing (Stage 1) in which individuals draw upon procedural informa-
tion in order to understand whether the outcome was justified
(Stage 2). When unfavorable outcomes result from unfair proce-
dures, individuals tend to make external attributions (e.g., “The
procedure led to my unfavorable outcome”). Externalizing blame
for an unfavorable outcome is associated with negative evaluations
of the other (i.e., the organization or its agents). In contrast, when
fair procedures are used to derive unfavorable outcomes, individ-
uals are less able to make external attributions and instead can
focus on their own responsibility (e.g., “Since the procedure was
fair, perhaps the unfavorable outcome was my fault”). Holding
oneself responsible for an unfavorable outcome can negatively
affect how the individual evaluates himself or herself (Schroth &
Shah, 2000).
In the present study, we extended this research in two ways.
First, we examined the interactive effects of outcome favorability
with both procedural justice and interactional justice on emotions.
Interactional justice is defined as the fairness of interpersonal
treatment, including treating individuals with interpersonal sensi-
tivity and providing an explanation (Bies & Moag, 1986).1 Second,
consistent with Brockner and colleagues’ (Brockner, 2002; Brock-
ner et al., 2003) distinction between self- versus other-focused
dependent variables, we distinguished between two types of emo-
tional outcomes: inward focused (self) and outward focused
(other). We reasoned that the pattern of interaction could differ
depending on the type of emotional outcome.
Viewing Emotions as Inward Versus Outward Focused
Emotions are often characterized as individuals’ reactions to an
event or object (e.g., a person is angry at someone or something;
Frijda, 1993) and are fundamentally (although not always) a social
phenomenon (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Positive emotions such
as pride or joy are associated with events that facilitate the fulfill-
ment of an individual’s objectives, whereas negative emotions
such as shame or anger are associated with events that hinder the
fulfillment of objectives (Lazarus, 1991). Emotions can play an
important role in human functioning by molding, constraining, and
structuring behaviors as well as thoughts (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
1991). Lazarus argued that negative emotions occur when individ-
uals experience an event that involves a change or violation of
their expectations and they appraise the event to determine its
affective meaning. To test the efficacy of the two-stage model to
predict emotions, we focused on situations in which a search for
blame would most likely occur—subsequent to receiving an un-
favorable outcome. As noted above, research on differences be-
tween attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that are self- versus
other-focused has demonstrated different interaction patterns (e.g.,
Brockner, 2002; Brockner et al., 2003). Because emotion apprais-
als have similarly been differentiated based on their focus on the
self versus other (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1985), we distin-
guished between inward-focused (self-focused) and outward-
focused (other-focused) negative emotions as outcomes of
(in)justice.
Inward-focused negative emotions are defined as self-conscious
emotions that occur when individuals evaluate themselves nega-
tively and/or when they feel that others are passing negative
judgment on them (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Lazarus, 1991;
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Inward-focused emotions can
arise when individuals’ behavior or some aspect of their self is at
odds with personally held morals or ideals, when individuals feel
that someone (i.e., self and/or other) is making negative judgments
about their personal characteristics or behaviors, or when there is
a loss or threat of loss to their social or personal identity (Lazarus
& Cohen-Charash, 2001; Tangney, 1995). Inward-focused emo-
tions are reflections of internal attributions of responsibility (i.e.,
what “I” did; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Examples of inward-
focused negative emotions include shame and guilt.
Although shame and guilt are distinct emotions (for a review,
see Tangney, 1995), we combined them in this study for two
reasons. First, Lewis (1971) contended that both shame and guilt
deal with blame directed toward oneself and discrepancies be-
tween actual and ideal selves. Second, shame and guilt belong to
the same family of emotions (Ortony et al., 1988; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Lazarus (1991), for instance, proposed that shame
and guilt are likely “variants of one basic emotion” (p. 240).
Outward-focused negative emotions (e.g., anger and hostility)
occur when individuals evaluate others and assess the other per-
son’s role in causing the injustice (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Anger, for instance, is founded on the beliefs that (a) individuals
can influence the object of their anger, (b) others are deemed
responsible for the actions, and (c) the other person(s) ought to
have behaved differently (Tavris, 1982). The experience of anger
can be associated with attempts to clarify and resolve a source of
disagreement or conflict (Averill, 1982). Anger can signal a vari-
ety of messages, including dissatisfaction with an action, dissatis-
faction with treatment, or a violation of justice (Tavris, 1982).
Negative outward-focused emotions are associated with blaming
the other party for the situation (i.e., what “the other” did).
1
Although some writers separate interactional justice into interpersonal
and informational facets of justice (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter,
& Ng, 2001), in the present study we combined informational and inter-
personal justice into one measure, labeled interactional justice. We found
that the two facets were highly interrelated. Moreover, from the perspective
of the individual who is being laid off, when managers take the time to
provide an adequate explanation (informational justice), they are also
demonstrating interpersonal sensitivity and treating the employee with
dignity and respect (interpersonal justice; for further discussion, see Bies,
2001; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION
One way of understanding the relationship between (in)justice
and emotion is to examine the way in which both are appraised.
General models of emotion typically assume that the appraisal
occurs in two stages: primary and secondary (e.g., Lazarus, 1991;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Primary
appraisals are generally directed toward determining the relevance
of the event to one’s well-being, goals, and/or values, whereas
secondary appraisals involve interpreting and assigning meaning
to an event. Although emotion scholars have identified several
components of secondary appraisals, these appraisals typically
include identifying who is responsible for the event (e.g., self vs.
other; e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Outcomes appear to be the driving force behind the initiation of
an appraisal process. As noted earlier, primary justice appraisals
are activated when unfavorable outcomes are experienced, and
procedures are afforded a secondary role because they are consid-
ered in secondary appraisals (i.e., subsequent to unfavorable out-
comes). Thus, procedural fairness, for example, is often found to be
more important to fairness judgments when outcomes are unfavorable
than when they are favorable (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Recent theoretical advances, however, suggest that unfavorable
distributive outcomes are not the only facet of fairness that can
trigger an appraisal. Justice scholars (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano,
2001) have argued that all three justice facets (outcomes, proce-
dures, and supervisor treatment) are, in some sense, derived from
individuals’ expectations of outcomes, which can be economic or
socioemotional. Procedural and interactional justice can serve dual
roles because both of these justice facets can be used in secondary
appraisals (i.e., to help assess why unfavorable outcomes occur),
and they can also act as outcomes in and of themselves (Cropan-
zano & Ambrose, 2001). Procedural and interactional justice can
be considered as socioemotional outcomes because of their sym-
bolic value but for different reasons. Fair procedures can convey
socioemotional benefits by signaling one’s standing and value to
the group (Tyler & Lind, 1992), whereas fair interpersonal treat-
ment can acknowledge one’s dignity and intrinsic worth (Bies &
Moag, 1986). Unfair procedures or interpersonal treatment, on the
other hand, not only fails to provide these socioemotional benefits
but also violates individuals’ expectations regarding the way they
are entitled to be treated. Because these reasons are distinct, we
provide separate hypotheses for interactional and procedural
justice.
Support for the importance of procedural and interactional jus-
tice, even in the presence of favorable outcomes, can be observed
in uncertainty management theories (e.g., van den Bos, 2001; van
den Bos & Lind, 2002) and research on affirmative action. Uncer-
tainty management theories suggest that when confronted with
uncertain or unclear situations (e.g., layoffs or promotions), indi-
viduals can attend to procedural and interactional justice informa-
tion as a way to help them better understand the situation and its
implications for them. Research on affirmative action (e.g., Heil-
man & Alcott, 2001; Heilman, Block, & Stathatos, 1997) similarly
has found that despite receiving fair outcomes, individuals expe-
rienced negative reactions when they believed that the procedure
leading to those outcomes was unfair. In other words, individuals
can react to violations of procedural or interactional justice when
outcomes are favorable or unfavorable.
In summary, procedural and interactional justice can serve a
dual role: as outcomes in their own right and as sources of
631
information that individuals use to interpret their distributive out-
comes. Viewing the three fairness facets in this way is important
for predicting emotion, which we discuss in greater detail in the
next section.
Predicting Inward-Focused Negative Emotions
Inward-focused negative emotions, such as shame and guilt, are
activated when individuals hold themselves responsible for their
negative behavior or outcomes (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). We
proposed that procedural or interactional justice can moderate the
relationship between outcome favorability and inward-focused
negative emotions. Brockner (2002) argued that in the presence of
unfavorable outcomes, individuals use procedural and interactional
justice information to make attributions of personal responsibility
for their outcome. Specifically, when procedural or interactional
justice is high, outcome favorability will be negatively related to
inward-focused emotions. This is because in the presence of an
unfavorable outcome, fair procedures can (a) make it more diffi-
cult to deny one’s responsibility for the outcome, (b) illuminate
personal deficiencies, and (c) compel an internal attribution
(Schroth & Shah, 2000). Leung, Su, and Morris (2001) observed a
similar effect for interactional justice; individuals who received
negative feedback from a supervisor who displayed interpersonal
sensitivity were more likely to feel responsible for the negative
feedback than individuals who received the feedback from a su-
pervisor deemed unfair. Inward-focused negative emotions should
be experienced to the degree that outcomes are unfavorable be-
cause individuals who hold themselves personally responsible for
unfavorable outcomes have a greater tendency to evaluate them-
selves negatively (Mark & Folger, 1984).
When procedural or interactional justice is low, inward-focused
emotions such as shame and guilt will likely be low notwithstand-
ing the level of outcome favorability. Specifically, when low
outcome favorability is combined with low procedural or interac-
tional justice, individuals can readily externalize the blame for the
poor outcome.2 When individuals hold others responsible for an
outcome, the outcome is less self-relevant and has less negative
influence on their self-evaluations than when they hold themselves
responsible (Weiner, 1985). When outcomes are favorable, on the
other hand, individuals are unlikely to experience shame and guilt
because they can use procedural or interactional information in a
self-serving or defensive manner (i.e., I received this favorable
outcome in spite of an unfair decision maker or process).
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between outcome favorability
and negative inward-focused emotions is more pronounced
when procedural justice (Hypothesis 1a) or interactional jus-
tice (Hypothesis 1b) is high than when it is low.
Predicting Outward-Focused Negative Emotions
Outward-focused negative emotions, such as anger, arise when
events are regarded as sufficiently serious or threatening (e.g., low
outcome, unfair procedures, or unfair supervisory treatment) and
2
In rare cases people can blame themselves for unfair outcomes and
treatment in that they are not deserving of others’ respect (see Lerner,
1980).
632 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH
are particularly likely when individuals attribute responsibility to
others (Smith et al., 1993). They can occur when individuals
experience a personal slight, demeaning offense, or harmful action
(Lazarus, 1991). When either procedural or interactional justice is
low, we expected that individuals could experience relatively high
levels of outward-focused negative emotions regardless of out-
come favorability. As explained earlier, low procedural or inter-
actional justice can be a negative outcome in its own right and can
trigger unfairness perceptions independent of outcome favorability
(Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).
This is because both steps of the two-stage model are satisfied.
First, an expected outcome (in this case a socioemotional outcome)
has been violated. Second, the violation can be attributed to an
unfair procedure or person (i.e., a supervisor).
Our theorizing is consistent with fairness theory (Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998, 2001), which holds that violations of proce-
dural and/or interactional justice can be associated with outward-
focused negative emotions independent of outcome favorability.
Fairness theory suggests that regardless of the type of violation
that occurs, when individuals try to make sense of it, they are
likely to imagine how the situation would, could, or should have
been different. Thus, notwithstanding a favorable distributive out-
come, individuals can still take issue with why their manager
violated procedural or interactional justice principles and consider
how things could have been different if they had been treated in
ways to which they are entitled (i.e., fair procedures and/or inter-
personal sensitivity). Moreover, group values models of fairness
suggest that individuals are sensitive to violations of procedural
and interactional justice because they signal the degree to which
individuals are valued, have standing, and/or are respected in the
group (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992). As suggested by uncertainty
theory, even in the presence of a favorable outcome, individuals
can react negatively to procedural or interactional violations.
Although individuals can be particularly prone toward outward
negative emotions when two violations occur (i.e., either proce-
dural or interactional justice is low and outcomes are unfavorable),
we expected that experiencing either low procedural or interac-
tional justice would be sufficient to activate outward-focused
emotions. In contrast, when procedural or interactional justice is
high, negative outward-focused emotions are likely to decrease as
outcome favorability increases. This is because fair procedures can
maintain one’s sense of social identity (Tyler & Lind, 1992) and
fair interpersonal treatment can maintain individuals’ sense of
dignity and respect (Bies & Moag, 1986).
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between outcome favorability
and negative outward-focused emotions is more pronounced
when procedural justice (Hypothesis 2a) or interactional jus-
tice (Hypothesis 2b) is high than when it is low.
The Role of Attributions
Explicit in our theory is the assumption that attributions of
blame mediate the relationship between (in)justice perceptions and
emotions. In the context of outward-focused negative emotions,
we reasoned that although violations of any of the three justice
facets can initiate a search for attributions, procedural and inter-
actional justice can carry attributional information, which can be
used in the appraisal process. Low procedural or interactional
justice allows individuals to externalize their attributions, whereas
high procedural or interactional justice can reduce their ability to
externalize blame for an unfavorable outcome. Attributions of
blame have implications for outward-focused negative emotions
(i.e., anger and hostility). By definition, outward-focused negative
emotions are an emotional response that occurs when individuals
(a) blame another person for an offense and (b) believe that the
offense could have been avoided (Lazarus, 1991). Unfair proce-
dures or interpersonal treatment not only allow individuals to
externalize blame but can also provoke referent cognitions in
which individuals consider what would, could, or should have
happened differently (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). In summary,
unfair procedures or interpersonal treatment allow individuals to
externalize blame, and when individuals are able to hold others
accountable for an offense, they are likely to experience outward-
focused negative emotions (i.e., anger and hostility).
Hypothesis 3: Attributions of blame mediate the relationship
between both procedural (Hypothesis 3a) and interactional
justice (Hypothesis 3b) and outward-focused negative
emotion.
Emotions as Mediating Variables
Emotions are important not only as outcome variables but also
as a mechanism in the link between perceptions of (in)justice and
behavior (Weiss et al., 1999). Outward-focused negative emotions,
such as anger, have been thought to play a primary role in the
relationship between injustice and retaliatory behaviors. Although
previous research has demonstrated that injustice is related to
retaliation (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), relatively few studies
have empirically tested the mediating role of outward-focused
emotions (i.e., anger and hostility).
Emotions have been associated with particular behavioral re-
sponses (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991). Outward-focused negative
emotions (i.e., anger and hostility), for example, are associated
with the desire for revenge, directing action against the perpetrator,
punishing behavior, and retaliatory impulses (e.g., Allred, 1999;
Averill, 1982; Weiner, 1985). When individuals experience anger,
they may hold less positive regard for the transgressor’s interests
and may engage in “anger-driven retaliation” in order to stop the
transgressor’s harmful behavior, prevent future occurrences, or
“balance the scales” (Allred, 2000; Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, &
Raia, 1997). That is, anger can motivate individuals to “right
wrongs” and deter future injustices (Bies & Tripp, 2002). Once
these emotions are triggered, they can energize the individual to
retaliate against the perpetrator.
Hypothesis 4: Outward-focused negative emotions mediate
the relationship between the interaction of outcome favorabil-
ity and procedural justice (Hypothesis 4a) and the interaction
of outcome favorability and interactional justice (Hypothesis
4b) with organizational retaliatory behavior.
In this study, we explored the mediating role of outward- but not
inward-focused negative emotions. Although inward-focused neg-
ative emotions are theoretically related to attributions and behav-
iors, these relationships are difficult to study within a layoff
context for several reasons. First, when individuals have difficulty
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION
coping with the consequences of holding themselves responsible
for a negative event (such as a layoff), they can also diffuse their
negative inward-focused emotions by externalizing blame (i.e.,
shifting the blame away from themselves and toward others such
as the manager or organization; Lewis, 1971). Externalizing blame
for a wrongdoing can be empowering and has the potential to
increase retaliatory behaviors. Thus, inward-focused emotions can
be linked to retaliation through shifts in attributions. Second,
inward-focused negative emotions such as shame and guilt are
primarily associated with withdrawal or reconciliation behaviors
(Tangney, 1995). Being laid off, however, signals the end of the
relationship, which minimizes opportunities for reconciliation and
restricts withdrawal reactions because individuals who have been
laid off are no longer with the same employer. Thus, we did not
hypothesize inward-focused emotions as mediators in the relation-
ship between injustice and retaliation.
Method
Participants
Surveys were mailed to 730 clients of an international outplacement
services firm in Southern California and were returned directly to the
researchers. Participants were assured that their responses were completely
anonymous. One hundred seventy-three surveys were returned (a 24%
response rate). Participants were an average of 46 years of age, were 64%
male, were 87% White, and had been employed by their former organiza-
tion for an average of 3.22 years prior to the layoff. Respondents worked
in a variety of industries including technology, energy, finance, telecom-
munications, and biosciences. Using the outplacement agency records, we
ensured that none of the individuals were terminated “for cause” (e.g., poor
performance, insubordination). Instead, the layoffs involved groups of
employees and were guided by business strategies such as cost cutting or
restructuring.
Measures
Unless otherwise noted, the response set for the measures was a 5-point
Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from strongly disagree (1) to
strongly agree (5). The items were averaged to form the scale such that
greater values signify higher levels of each measure than lower values.
Outcome favorability. We developed an 8-item measure of outcome
favorability based on Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, and Reed (1990). Items
included “I received a favorable severance package,” “I was given ade-
quate assistance to find new employment,” “The overall outcome of this
layoff was unfavorable to me” (reverse coded), and “The amount of
severance pay I received was adequate.”
Procedural justice. Procedural justice was assessed with three items
based on previous research (Brockner et al., 1994; Konovsky & Folger,
1991). The items were “The procedures used by the company to conduct
the layoffs were fair,” “During the layoff, my company treated employees
consistently,” and “I received adequate notice regarding the layoff.”
Interactional justice. Interactional justice was measured with four
items modified from Moorman (1991). The items were “My supervisor
treated me with dignity and respect,” “My supervisor listened to my
personal concerns,” “My supervisor showed concern for my rights,” and “I
was given an adequate explanation for the layoff.”
Inward-focused emotions. Inward-focused negative emotions were as-
sessed with two items modified from Weiss et al. (1999). Participants were
asked to think about how they felt when they were being laid off and to
indicate the extent to which they felt specific inward-focused emotions.
The items were “Indicate to what extent you felt guilty when you found out
about the layoff” and “Indicate to what extent you felt ashamed when you
633
found out about the layoff.” The response set was a 5-point Likert-type
scale, with responses ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (5).
Outward-focused emotions. Outward-focused negative emotions were
assessed with three items modified from Weiss et al. (1999). The items
were “I felt angry about being laid off,” “I felt angry about the way I was
laid off,” and “I felt hostile toward my former company.”
Attributions of blame. We assessed the laid-off individuals’ attribu-
tions of blame for the layoff using three items modified from Konovsky
and Folger (1991). The items were “I believe my company chose to use a
layoff even though there were other options available,” “Given the circum-
stances, my company had no choice but to conduct a layoff,” and “The
cause of the layoff was outside of my company’s control.” For ease of
presentation, the responses were coded such that larger values signified the
respondents’ beliefs that the layoff was avoidable (i.e., the company was to
blame), whereas lower values signified that the layoff was unavoidable
(i.e., the company was not to blame).
Retaliation. Retaliation was assessed by asking participants to write
out a half-page description of how they reacted to the layoff and whether
they tried to get even for the layoff. Two coders, who were blind to how
the participants responded to the other survey measures, independently
content coded the qualitative responses using the following coding proce-
dures: (1) no retaliation, (2) minor retaliation was considered (e.g., “I did
not follow through with thoughts of stealing products sold but considered
it”), (3) major retaliation was considered (e.g., “I thought of putting a pile
of ____ on the Vice President’s desk”), (4) minor or legal retaliation was
enacted (e.g., “I spoke with my lawyer”), and (5) major retaliation was
enacted (e.g., “I destroyed important company documents”). This coding
system was based on the assumption that intentions are less serious than
enacted retaliation and that major retaliation is more severe to the organi-
zation than minor. The two raters had identical coding on 94% of their
ratings. Differences were resolved by consensus. Higher numbers signify
greater levels of retaliation than lower numbers.
Control variables. M. D. Robinson and Clore (2002) argued that the
accuracy of retrospective emotion reports can be subject to recency and
accessibility (i.e., the degree that the event can be recalled) biases. In order
to minimize the effect of recency biases on our results, we controlled for
the length of time since the layoff occurred using one item: “How long ago
(in months) were you laid off from your job?” To minimize accessibility
biases, we also controlled for outcome valence. Outcome valence is asso-
ciated with the saliency of the event and individuals’ ability to accurately
recall the event (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2000). Moreover,
outcome valence can qualify individuals’ reactions to outcomes (Brockner
& Wiesenfeld, 1996). Greenberg (1994), for example, found that the
introduction of a smoking ban had stronger effects on smokers than
nonsmokers. We controlled for outcome valence with one item, “I intended
to stay at that job for a long time (i.e., over 2–3 years).”
The salience of the layoff can also be associated with whether the
individuals who had been laid off, at the time of data collection, had found
a new job. We dummy coded whether participants had found a new job:
new job ⫽ 1, no new job ⫽ 0. Salience and impact of the layoff can also
be a function of age and tenure. Tenure was assessed with one item: “How
long (in years) did you work for your former employer?”
Results
Means, reliabilities, and intercorrelations between the variables
are shown in Table 1. Given the high correlation between proce-
dural and interactional justice, we investigated whether the data
supported distinguishing between these two justice dimensions.
Because we had modified the items from their original use, we
subjected the items to principal-components analysis. Results
showed that the data were best represented by two oblique factors
and that the items loaded onto their respective factors. The factors
explained 72.4% of the total variance in the measure. We also took
634 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH

steps to ensure that one dimension of justice was not driving the

12

—
results of the other. To do this, we statistically controlled for one
form of justice when testing the effects of the other form of justice

.06
11

—
(i.e., when examining the outcome favorability–procedural justice
interaction, we controlled for interactional justice and vice versa).
The results were identical regardless of whether the other facet of

⫺.07
.03
10

—
justice was controlled. For simplicity, the analyses and results are
presented without these additional controls.
We reasoned that attributions regarding the appropriateness of

.27**
.21**
the business strategies used in the layoff could provoke an unfair-

—
9

.15
ness reaction in our participants, which could confound how they
evaluated the fairness of the actual layoff. Thus, in the analyses for
Hypotheses 1 and 2, we controlled for general attributions of
⫺.27**
⫺.42**
⫺.11
⫺.09
—

blame for the layoff (i.e., whether the layoff was deemed justified
8

in the first place).

Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested using moderated regression.
Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the predictor
(.83)
⫺.08
.00
.04
.10
⫺.02
7

variables used in these hypotheses (outcome favorability, proce-

dural justice, and interactional justice) were centered (i.e., put in
deviation score form with a mean of zero) and interaction terms
(.94)

were created by multiplying centered predictors. This procedure

.15
.03
.05
⫺.06
⫺.08
⫺.03
6

has been found to have two main benefits: (a) It yields meaningful,
straightforward interpretations of the effects of the individual
predictors, and (b) it eliminates nonessential multicollinearity.
.27**
.48**
⫺.17*

Note. Reliabilities are shown along the diagonal in parentheses. New job is coded 1 ⫽ new job; 0 ⫽ no new job.
(.76)

Hypothesis 1 stated that outcome favorability interacts with

.14
.12
.05
.02
5

procedural (Hypothesis 1a) and interactional justice (Hypothesis

1b) to predict inward-focused negative emotions, such that out-
come favorability will have a more pronounced relationship with
.28**
(.64)

inward-focused emotions at high rather than low levels of proce-

.07
.15
⫺.06
⫺.09
.10
⫺.15
⫺.02
4

dural and interactional justice.3 To test this prediction, we con-

Means, Standard Deviations, Intercorrelations, and Reliabilities of the Study Variables

ducted hierarchical regression analysis following procedures rec-

ommended by Aiken and West (1991). In Step 1 we entered the
⫺.52**

⫺.47**

.18*
(.86)

control variables, in Step 2 we entered the main effects (outcome

⫺.05

⫺.17

.05
.01
⫺.02
⫺.03
3

favorability and procedural or interactional justice), and in Step 3

we entered the respective interaction term. As shown in Table 2,
the two-way interaction between outcome favorability and proce-
.70**

⫺.49**

⫺.47**
(.74)

dural justice was a significant predictor of inward-focused emo-

⫺.05

⫺.14

.08
.04
⫺.06
.10
.03
2

tions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.24, p ⬍ .01; 95% confidence interval [CI] ⫽ ⫺.41

to ⫺.08). We probed the interaction by conducting simple slope
analyses. Results indicated that at high levels of procedural justice,
.39**
.32**

⫺.32**

⫺.40**

outcome favorability was negatively related to inward-focused

(.80)

⫺.11

⫺.13

.00
⫺.08
.07
⫺.13
⫺.07
1

emotions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.42, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.82 to ⫺.20), whereas

at low levels of procedural justice, outcome favorability was not
significantly related to inward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ .03, p ⬎
0.71
1.13
1.10
0.86
1.08
1.40
1.06
1.10
7.94
0.36
8.75
1.00

.05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.24 to .26). This relationship is shown in Figure 1.

SD

Results for Hypothesis 1b similarly indicated that the two-way

interaction between outcome favorability and interactional justice
3.61
2.86
2.93
1.52
3.12
2.05
3.74
1.73
14.00
0.84
45.81
3.22

was a significant predictor of inward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.19,

M

p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.37 to ⫺.03; see Table 3). Simple slope

analyses indicated that at high levels of interactional justice, out-
Attributions of blame
Outcome favorability

* p ⬍ .05. ** p ⬍ .01.
Months since layoff
Interactional justice

Outward emotions
Procedural justice

Outcome valence
Inward emotions

3
Given that our measure of inward-focused negative emotions exhibited
marginal reliability, we also conducted separate analyses to examine
Variable

Retaliation

whether the pattern of interaction was the same for guilt and shame. Results
New job

showed that the patterns were identical. In order to preserve our distinction
Tenure
Table 1

Age

between inward- and outward-focused emotions as well as maintain par-

simony, we present the analyses with guilt and shame combined into one
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

measure.
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION 635

Table 2
Summary of Hierachical Regression Analysis for Relationship Between Outcome Favorability–
Procedural Justice Interaction and Emotions (Inward and Outward Focused)

Inward emotiona Outward emotionb

Variable B SE B ␤ B SE B ␤

Step 1
Attributions of blame 0.14 0.07 .17* 0.45 0.08 .45*
Outcome valence ⫺0.09 0.08 ⫺.10 ⫺0.16 0.09 ⫺.16*
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.06 0.02 0.01 .14
New job 0.20 0.24 .07 0.10 0.26 .03
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.15 0.00 0.01 ⫺.04
Tenure ⫺0.02 0.08 ⫺.03 ⫺0.04 0.09 ⫺.04
Step 2
Attributions of blame 0.13 0.08 .16 0.26 0.08 .26*
Outcome valence ⫺0.11 0.08 ⫺.13 ⫺0.14 0.08 ⫺.13
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.08 0.02 0.01 .15*
New job 0.26 0.24 .10 0.06 0.25 .02
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.17* 0.00 0.01 .00
Tenure ⫺0.04 0.08 ⫺.04 ⫺0.04 0.08 ⫺.04
Outcome favorability ⫺0.16 0.12 ⫺.13 ⫺0.09 0.12 ⫺.06
Procedural justice 0.08 0.08 .11 ⫺0.33 0.08 ⫺.35*
Step 3
Attributions of blame 0.14 0.08 .17 0.26 0.08 .26*
Outcome valence ⫺0.12 0.08 ⫺.14 ⫺0.14 0.08 ⫺.14
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.09 0.02 0.01 .14*
New job 0.32 0.23 .12 0.11 0.24 .03
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.20* 0.00 0.01 ⫺.01
Tenure ⫺0.06 0.08 ⫺.07 ⫺0.06 0.08 ⫺.06
Outcome favorability ⫺0.24 0.12 ⫺.20* ⫺0.17 0.12 ⫺.11
Procedural justice 0.13 0.08 .16 ⫺0.30 0.08 ⫺.31*
Interaction term ⫺0.24 0.08 ⫺.24* ⫺0.22 0.09 ⫺.17*
a
For Step 1, R2 ⫽ .06; for Step 2, R2 ⫽ .08, ⌬R2 ⫽ .02; for Step 3, R2 ⫽ .13, ⌬R2 ⫽ .05, p ⬍ .05. b For Step
1, R2 ⫽ .24, p ⬍ .05; for Step 2, R2 ⫽ .35, ⌬R2 ⫽ .11, p ⬍ .05; for Step 3, R2 ⫽ .38, ⌬R2 ⫽ .03, p ⬍ .05.
* p ⬍ .05.

come favorability was negatively related to inward-focused emo-
tions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.32, p ⫽ .06; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.69 to ⫺.11), whereas at
low levels of interactional justice, outcome favorability was not
significantly related to inward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ .05, p ⬎
Figure 1. Interactive effects of outcome favorability and procedural
justice on inward-focused negative emotions.
.05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.22 to .32). This relationship is shown in Figure
2. Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.
Hypothesis 2 stated that outward-focused emotions are pre-
dicted by the interaction between outcome favorability and proce-
dural justice (Hypothesis 2a) and the interaction between outcome
favorability and interactional justice (Hypothesis 2b), such that
outcome favorability has a more pronounced relationship with
outward-focused emotions at high rather than low levels of pro-
cedural and interactional justice. Using the analytic procedure
described for Hypothesis 1, the results for Hypothesis 2a indicated
the interaction between outcome favorability and procedural jus-
tice was a significant predictor of outward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽
⫺.17, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.39 to ⫺.04; see Table 2). Simple
slope analyses indicated that at high levels of procedural justice,
outcome favorability was negatively related to outward-focused
emotions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.27, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.40 to ⫺.08), whereas
at low levels of procedural justice, outcome favorability was not
significantly related to outward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ .05, p ⬎
.05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.21 to .32). This relationship is shown in Figure 3.
The results for Hypothesis 2b indicated that the two-way inter-
action between outcome favorability and interactional justice was
a significant predictor of outward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.14,
p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.35 to ⫺.01; see Table 3). Simple slope
analyses indicated that at high levels of interactional justice, out-
come favorability was negatively related to outward-focused emo-
tions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.25, p ⬍ .01; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.67 to ⫺.09), whereas at
636 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH

Table 3
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Relationship Between Outcome Favorability–
Interactional Justice Interaction and Emotion (Inward and Outward Focused)

Inward emotionsa Outward emotionsb

Variable B SE B ␤ B SE B ␤

Step 1
Attributions of blame 0.13 0.07 .16 0.45 0.08 .44*
Outcome valence ⫺0.11 0.08 ⫺.13 ⫺0.15 0.08 ⫺.15
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.06 0.02 0.01 .13
New job 0.22 0.24 .08 0.13 0.26 .04
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.15 0.00 0.01 ⫺.03
Tenure ⫺0.04 0.08 ⫺.04 ⫺0.05 0.09 ⫺.04
Step 2
Attributions of blame 0.11 0.08 .13 0.23 0.08 .22*
Outcome valence ⫺0.12 0.08 ⫺.15 ⫺0.11 0.08 ⫺.11
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.08 0.02 0.01 .13
New job 0.26 0.24 .09 0.14 0.24 .04
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.16 0.00 0.01 ⫺.03
Tenure ⫺0.06 0.09 ⫺.06 0.03 0.09 .03
Outcome favorability ⫺0.15 0.11 ⫺.12 ⫺0.16 0.11 ⫺.11
Interactional justice 0.04 0.08 .05 ⫺0.37 0.08 ⫺.39*
Step 3
Attributions of blame 0.10 0.08 .12 0.22 0.08 .22*
Outcome valence ⫺0.14 0.08 ⫺.17 ⫺0.12 0.08 ⫺.12
Months since layoff ⫺0.01 0.01 ⫺.09 0.02 0.01 .12
New job 0.29 0.24 .10 0.17 0.24 .05
Age ⫺0.02 0.01 ⫺.16 0.00 0.01 ⫺.03
Tenure ⫺0.09 0.09 ⫺.10 0.01 0.09 .01
Outcome favorability ⫺0.16 0.11 ⫺.13 ⫺0.18 0.11 ⫺.12
Interactional justice 0.06 0.08 .08 ⫺0.36 0.08 ⫺.37*
Interaction term ⫺0.20 0.09 ⫺.19* ⫺0.18 0.09 ⫺.14*
a
For Step 1, R2 ⫽ .07; for Step 2, R2 ⫽ .08, ⌬R2 ⫽ .01; for Step 3, R2 ⫽ .11, ⌬R2 ⫽ .03, p ⬍ .05. b For Step
1, R2 ⫽ .24, p ⬍ .05; for Step 2, R2 ⫽ .37, ⌬R2 ⫽ .13, p ⬍ .05; for Step 3, R2 ⫽ .39, ⌬R2 ⫽ .02, p ⬍ .05.
* p ⬍ .05.

low levels of interactional justice, outcome favorability was not Hypothesis 3 stated that attributions of blame mediate the rela-
significantly related to outward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ .01, p ⬎ tionship between procedural (Hypothesis 3a) and interactional
.05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.25 to .30; see Figure 4). Thus, Hypotheses 2a (Hypothesis 3b) justice with outward-focused negative emotion.
and 2b were supported. To test for mediation, we followed procedures recommended by

Figure 2. Interactive effects of outcome favorability and interactional Figure 3. Interactive effects of outcome favorability and procedural
justice on inward-focused negative emotions. justice on outward-focused negative emotions.
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION
Figure 4. Interactive effects of outcome favorability and interactional
justice on outward-focused negative emotions.
Baron and Kenny (1986). To establish mediation, three conditions
must hold: (a) The predictor (fairness: procedural–interactional
justice) must also be related to the criterion variable (outward-
focused negative emotion; Condition 1); (b) the predictor must be
related to the mediator (attributions of blame; Condition 2); and (c)
when the criterion is regressed on both the predictor and the
mediator variables, the strength of the predictor drops relative to
the first condition and the mediator must be related to the criterion
variable (Condition 3). Results indicated that procedural justice
significantly predicted attributions of blame (␤ ⫽ ⫺.48, p ⬍ .001;
95% CI ⫽ ⫺.59 to ⫺.31) and outward-focused negative emotions
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.50, p ⬍ .001; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.61 to ⫺.35). When outward-
focused negative emotions were regressed on procedural justice
and attributions, both procedural justice (␤ ⫽ ⫺.37, p ⬍ .001; 95%
CI ⫽ ⫺.50 to ⫺.21) and attributions (␤ ⫽ .27, p ⬍ .001; 95%
CI ⫽ .12 to .43) remained significant, suggesting partial media-
tion. We used Sobel’s (1988) equation to test whether the rela-
tionship between the predictor (procedural justice) and criterion
(outward-focused emotions) dropped significantly from Condition
1 to Condition 3. Results indicated that the drop in beta between
the two conditions was significant (z ⫽ ⫺3.24, p ⬍ .05,
one-tailed).
Results for Hypothesis 3b indicated that interactional justice
significantly predicted attributions of blame (␤ ⫽ ⫺.46, p ⬍ .001;
95% ⫽ CI ⫺.59 to ⫺.30) and outward-focused negative emotions
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.53, p ⬍ .001; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.65 to ⫺.38). When outward-
focused negative emotions were regressed on both interactional
justice and attributions of blame, interactional justice (␤ ⫽ ⫺.41,
p ⬍ .001; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.54 to ⫺.25) and attributions remained
significant (␤ ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .001; 95% CI ⫽ .12 to .41), suggesting
partial mediation. Results from the Sobel (1988) equation indi-
cated that the relationship between interactional justice and
outward-focused negative emotion significantly dropped from
Condition 1 to Condition 3 (z ⫽ ⫺3.22, p ⬍ .05, one-tailed). Thus,
Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported.
Hypothesis 4 stated that outward-focused negative emotions
mediate the relationship between interactions of outcome favor-
ability and procedural justice (Hypothesis 4a) and outcome favor-
637
ability and interactional justice (Hypothesis 4b) with retaliation. In
this case, we followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure for
testing mediated moderation. This procedure is identical to the
steps outlined for Hypothesis 3, with two exceptions: (a) The
predictor is an interaction term, and (b) regression equations in-
volving the predictor must include the main effects of the interac-
tion term. After we controlled for our control variables and the
main effects of outcome favorability and procedural or interac-
tional justice, results indicated that the interaction between out-
come favorability and procedural justice did not significantly
predict retaliation (␤ ⫽ ⫺.06, p ⬎ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.39 to .20).
Hypothesis 4a was not supported. Results for Hypothesis 4b
showed that after we entered the control variables and the main
effects into the regression equation, the interaction between out-
come favorability and interactional justice predicted retaliation
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.20, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.64 to ⫺.04; Condition 1) and
outward-focused emotions (␤ ⫽ ⫺.14, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.35
to ⫺.01; Condition 2). When retaliation was regressed on both
outward-focused emotions and the interaction term, outward-
focused emotions (␤ ⫽ .21, p ⬍ .05; 95% CI ⫽ .01 to .54)
remained significant, however, the interaction term (␤ ⫽ ⫺.17,
p ⬎ .05; 95% CI ⫽ ⫺.59 to .01) became nonsignificant. Using the
Sobel (1988) test, we found that the relationship between the
interaction term and retaliation significantly dropped from Condi-
tion 1 to Condition 3 (z ⫽ ⫺1.57, p ⬍ .05, one-tailed). Thus,
Hypothesis 4b was supported.
Discussion
To date, studies of organizational justice have focused on atti-
tudinal and behavioral outcomes of (in)justice. Emotional out-
comes associated with unfairness are underresearched. Justice
theories that are devoid of emotion, however, are likely missing
the fundamental aspects of the experience of injustice (Cropanzano
et al., 2000). Building on recent advances in organizational justice
research, we distinguished between inward- versus outward-
focused emotions. The significance of our study is fourfold.
First, we found that outcome favorability interacts with both
procedural and interactional justice to predict inward-focused neg-
ative emotions (i.e., shame and guilt). Specifically, the relationship
between outcome favorability and inward-focused emotions was
more pronounced when either procedural or interactional justice
was high versus low. When either procedural or interactional
justice was low, employees reported relatively low levels of shame
and guilt notwithstanding the favorability of their outcome. We
propose that this occurs because when either procedural or inter-
actional justice is low, employees attribute the cause of their low
outcomes to external sources (i.e., to the procedures or their
manager). In contrast, when procedural or interactional justice is
high, then the less favorable individuals’ distributive outcome is,
the greater the shame and guilt that they can experience. Stated
differently, the more that employees deem the process or interper-
sonal treatment as fair, the less they attribute the blame for their
unfavorable outcome to external sources and the more they can
experience inward-focused negative emotions.
These results are consistent with Brockner’s (2002; Brockner et
al., 2003) argument that the relationship between outcome favor-
ability and self-evaluations can be heightened by fair implemen-
tation (procedural or interpersonal). Our study extends this re-
638 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH
search in two ways: (a) We showed that this interaction pattern
extends to self-focused (i.e., inward) emotional outcomes, and (b)
we demonstrated that the interactive effects observed for outcome
favorability and procedural justice can also hold for the interactive
effects of outcome favorability and interactional justice.
Second, we found that outcome favorability interacts with pro-
cedural and interactional justice to predict outward-focused nega-
tive emotions (i.e., anger and hostility). Results indicated that the
relationship between outcome favorability and anger and hostility
was greater when procedural or interactional fairness was high
than when it was low. When either procedural or interactional
justice was low, negative outward-focused emotions were high
regardless of outcome favorability. This suggests that violations of
procedures or treatment can each predict emotions such as anger.
These results contrast with previous conceptual and empirical
research on the interactive effects of procedural justice and out-
come favorability on other-focused attitudinal and behavioral out-
comes. Whereas Brockner and colleagues (Brockner, 2002; Brock-
ner et al., 2003) found that high procedural justice reduces the
effect of outcome favorability on outward evaluations, we pre-
dicted and found that high procedural or interactional justice
heightens the relationship between outcome favorability and
outward-focused negative emotions. Of importance, Brockner
found that high outcome favorability mitigated the effects of low
procedural justice for outward evaluations, whereas in our study,
favorable outcomes had little, if any, mitigating effects on the
negative outward-focused emotions associated with low proce-
dural or interactional justice.
Our findings support the dual role of procedural and interac-
tional justice. First, our results are consistent with the notion that
procedural justice and interactional justice serve as carriers of
attribution information. That is, when individuals experience un-
favorable distributive outcomes, they can draw upon either proce-
dural or interactional justice as a source of information for deter-
mining the other party’s responsibility for the outcome. When
procedural or interactional justice is low, individuals can attribute
the blame for their unfavorable outcomes to the other party, which,
in turn, is associated with negative evaluations and/or negative
outward-focused emotions. Unfavorable outcomes that are re-
ceived in procedurally or interactionally fair ways, however, can
be threatening to oneself because it is more difficult to deflect
blame for the outcome to another party (Schroth & Shah, 2000).
Second, these results lend support to conceptual discussions that
procedural and interactional justice can be viewed as outcomes in
their own right (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Folger & Cropan-
zano, 2001). In brief, most individuals expect that moral norms
should prevail and that they are entitled to fair procedures and
treatment that reflects dignity and respect. When individuals’
expectations for these socioemotional outcomes are violated, they
can experience emotional reactions regardless of whether their
economic expectations have been violated. In other words, indi-
viduals need not receive unfavorable outcomes in order for
outward-focused negative emotions to occur.
Of importance, favorable outcomes did not mitigate the effects
of low procedural or interactional justice on outward-focused
negative emotions. Stated differently, unfair procedures or inter-
personal treatment were associated with relatively high levels of
negative emotions notwithstanding favorable outcomes. From a
practical perspective, even if an organization takes care to ensure
that employees who are laid off receive favorable economic out-
comes (i.e., severance packages), improper implementation (i.e.,
unfair procedures or interpersonal treatment) of these outcomes
can offset their positive benefits. Thus, ensuring the layoff process
is fair, as well as treating individuals with dignity and respect, is
critical in order for favorable outcomes to provide benefits in terms
of minimizing outward-focused negative emotions (e.g., anger).
Our results differ from those of previous studies on the emo-
tional outcomes of unfairness (e.g., Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000;
Weiss et al., 1999). Specifically, whereas previous studies have
found relatively low levels of anger in the presence of favorable
outcomes, we found that low procedural or interactional justice
was predictive of outward-focused negative emotions (i.e., anger
and hostility) notwithstanding favorable outcomes. One possible
explanation for this difference is a restriction of range. That is,
whereas previous research has examined both favorable and unfa-
vorable outcomes (e.g., winning or losing a prize), all of our
participants had been laid off, which is likely to be interpreted as
an unfavorable outcome. The mean of our outcome favorability
measure, however, was highly similar to the means reported in
previous research. Thus, range restriction is not believed to explain
the differences between our results and those of previous research.
Another possible explanation regards some important differences
between the studies themselves. Specifically, whereas previous
laboratory studies (e.g., Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et
al., 1999) investigated undergraduate students’ emotional reactions
to whether they won or lost a small prize after completing a 7-min
task, our field study examined laid-off individuals’ emotional
reactions to their termination. It is possible that the impact and
relevance of the situation for the individuals were different. Indi-
viduals may be more likely to evaluate and respond to fairness
concerns when they are responding to a serious violation (i.e., a
layoff) than when they are competing for a small prize. Thus, the
importance of the outcome may have loomed larger for our par-
ticipants than for participants in previous research.
A second difference pertains to the perceived uncertainty of the
situation. Uncertainty management models of fairness (van den
Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Lind, 2002) suggest that fairness is
particularly important to individuals when they are in an unclear
situation or when they are unsure of exactly how the situation will
affect them. Lind, Greenberg, Scott, and Welchans (2000), for
instance, found that how people were treated in a layoff (i.e., when
uncertainty is likely greatest) was more predictive of employees’
intentions to file wrongful termination claims than employees’
fairness perceptions over the course of their employment. In our
study, it is likely that laid-off individuals were highly attentive to
procedural or interactional information, even in the presence of
favorable outcomes, because these fairness facets help them cope
with the uncertainty resulting from their termination.
Uncertainty management models (e.g., van den Bos & Lind,
2002) suggest that whenever a change (positive or negative) occurs
or is expected to occur, individuals become particularly attentive to
fairness-related information. Although our study focused on reac-
tions to a negative event (i.e., a layoff), we speculate that individ-
uals are also likely to experience similar emotional reactions to
procedural and interactional violations in situations in which the
outcome is positive. If an employee, for example, receives a
promotion (i.e., a positive outcome) but perceives that the promo-
tion was given in a procedurally or interactionally unfair way (e.g.,
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION
the procedure was deemed unethical or biased; the recognition was
not seen as sincere), the employee can experience anger or hostility
toward the organization or supervisor because a socioemotional
violation has occurred. Thus, even in the presence of a positive
outcome, individuals can attend and react to procedural or inter-
actional information because it helps reduce the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the situation. Future research should investigate uncer-
tainty as a moderator of individuals’ emotional reactions and
whether individuals’ attention to procedural or interactional vio-
lations in uncertain situations can undermine positive outcomes
(e.g., employees may perceive a promotion as less rewarding when
it is communicated to them disrespectfully).
A third contribution of our study is the finding that attributions
of blame mediated the relationships between outward-focused
emotions and both procedural and interactional justice. We argued
that although the appraisal processes (i.e., primary–secondary)
through which individuals draw upon procedural and interactional
justice information may differ depending on outcome favorability,
the resulting attributions should be similar within the context of
outward-focused negative emotions. That is, regardless of outcome
favorability, individuals can externalize blame and experience
outward-focused negative emotions when they experience low
procedural or interactional justice. This finding lends support to
arguments that procedural and interactional justice can act as
sources of information that inform attributions and that attributions
function as a mechanism through which appraisals of a(n) (in)jus-
tice event may contribute to outward-focused negative emotion.
We operationalized attributions of blame as the extent to which
individuals blamed the organization for the layoff (externalized
attribution), assuming that individuals who did not blame the
organization were more likely to blame themselves (internalized
attribution). Externalized and internalized attributions of blame,
however, may not be mutually exclusive. Future research would
benefit from including more specific measures of attribution that
focus on the organization, manager, and individual’s perceived
responsibility.
Fourth, outward-focused negative emotions (e.g., anger) were
found to partially mediate the relationship between the interaction
of outcome favorability–interactional justice and retaliation. Al-
though previous research (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) theorized
these effects, this is the first study to empirically test these rela-
tionships. Our results suggest that when individuals feel outward-
focused negative emotions in response to perceived violations,
these emotions can increase their need to right a wrong or engage
in retaliatory behaviors. Our effects were significant but small,
suggesting that researchers might need to consider additional fac-
tors in this relationship. Affective event theory (Weiss & Cropan-
zano, 1996) suggests that emotions can affect behaviors in two
ways: directly (i.e., affect-driven behaviors) or indirectly through
work attitudes (i.e., judgment-driven behaviors). Although we
found some evidence for direct effects, our results suggest that it
may also be important to examine how emotions impact attitudes
and how this, in turn, impacts behavior.
We note in Table 1 a negative relationship between outcome
valence and outward-focused emotions. This finding suggests that
the more individuals intended to stay with their company, the less
anger they felt due to the layoff. Previous research has produced
similar findings. S. L. Robinson (1996), for instance, reported that
individuals maintained their positive attitudes toward an organiza-
639
tion despite its transgressions. It is possible that in our study, prior
attitudes toward the organization may have affected individuals’
emotional reactions. This explanation is speculative and warrants
further testing.
In our mediation tests, we found that outcome favorability and
interactional justice combined to predict retaliation, whereas the
interaction between outcomes favorability and procedural justice
was not related to retaliation. One possible explanation for this
finding concerns the central role of accountability to unfairness
perceptions. In their discussion of fairness theory, Folger and
Cropanzano (2001) proposed that the more the individual experi-
encing the mistreatment is able to identify the transgressor who is
accountable for the mistreatment, the stronger are that individual’s
reactions to the mistreatment. We propose that interactional justice
might differ from procedural justice in the following way. In
violations concerning interactional justice, the transgressor (i.e.,
the supervisor) is readily identifiable. In violations concerning
procedural justice, in contrast, identifying who is responsible for
the transgression is relatively less clear and less “personalistic.”
This distinction might help explain why interactional justice can
have stronger effects as a moderator of outcome favorability on
retaliation than procedural justice. This explanation warrants fur-
ther research.
As noted previously, we focused on the relationship between
behaviors (i.e., retaliation) and outward-focused negative emotions
rather than between behaviors and inward-focused emotions be-
cause (a) inward-focused negative emotions have been theoreti-
cally associated with shifts in attributions (internal to external;
Lewis, 1971) and (b) the behaviors primarily associated with
inward-focused negative emotions (i.e., withdrawal, reconcilia-
tion) are less likely relevant in a layoff context (Tangney, 1995).
The exploratory nature of the present study precluded detailed
examination involving shifts in attributions and related changes in
behaviors. Future research, however, should examine the attribu-
tion process and whether changes in attributions are associated
with changes in emotion and behavior.
A unique feature of this study is that retaliation was assessed
using qualitative responses from individuals who were laid off.
Two raters independently coded the responses, with high agree-
ment between the two coders. An open-ended questionnaire was
used because it tends to exhibit higher retrospective accuracy than
forced reports (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Given that all the data
for each participant came from a single source, however, the
possibility of common method bias cannot be ruled out. Also,
because our research was cross-sectional, no claims are made
regarding the causal nature of the relationships among the vari-
ables. For example, it is plausible that emotions can contribute to
fairness perceptions (Schacter & Singer, 1962; for a discussion see
Bies & Tripp, 2002).
Self-reports of emotion are the most common and potentially the
best way to measure emotional experiences (Clore, 1994; Diener,
2000). We used retrospective self-reports to assess individuals’
reactions to layoffs. Although in some cases the use of retrospec-
tive data can be problematic (e.g., Golden, 1992; M. D. Robinson
& Clore, 2002), we believe that this technique is appropriate for
the present study for several reasons. First, obtaining online (i.e.,
in the moment) emotional reports within a layoff setting not only
is difficult but may also be inappropriate from an ethical stand-
point. Second, a concern regarding retrospective reports is whether
640 BARCLAY, SKARLICKI, AND PUGH
individuals are able to accurately recall the event and their reac-
tions. M. D. Robinson and Clore, for instance, argued that over
time, individuals are less able to recall details of an emotional
event and this may affect their ability to accurately retrospectively
report emotions. Prior research, however, has also demonstrated
that (a) individuals are better able to accurately recall more salient
events than less salient events (e.g., Fabiani & Donchin, 1995) and
(b) memories associated with some affect or emotional arousal are
better remembered than those that are affectively neutral (Kihl-
strom et al., 2000). We propose that losing one’s job not only is a
salient experience but also can involve emotional reactions. Thus,
the characteristics of a layoff event itself may help to reduce
memory biases. Third, and related to the above point, Kleinsmith
and Kaplan (1963, 1964) found that when memories involve a high
level of arousal, they tend to be remembered more poorly in the
short term than in the long term. The overwhelming nature of the
layoff could pose a challenge for the individual to initially process,
and in fact it might take some time for individuals to acknowledge
and cope with the specific types of emotions they were experienc-
ing. Thus, a delay in measurement might be necessary in these
situations. Fourth, we controlled for several variables in our anal-
yses in order to reduce the potential impact of recall biases on our
results. M. D. Robinson and Clore argued that the two main
sources of biases are recency and accessibility effects. We ad-
dressed recency biases by controlling for the amount of time that
had elapsed since the layoff, and we addressed accessibility biases
by controlling outcome valence, tenure, age, and whether the
individual who was laid off had found a new job.
Although we used numerous strategies to minimize any poten-
tial problems with respect to retrospective self-report of emotions,
it is possible that our participants’ responses were affected by their
beliefs about how they should have felt (i.e., semantic memory)
rather than how they actually felt at the time of the layoff (i.e.,
episodic memory). M. D. Robinson and Clore (2002) argued that
although emotions reported from semantic memory are considered
valid, they may not perfectly match online emotions. That is, the
emotions reported by our participants may have been affected to
some degree by their self-concept, personality, and/or cultural
beliefs. Individuals’ beliefs about how they should have felt may
impact not only the emotions they report but also behaviors.
Specifically, beliefs about how one should have felt may be more
consequential for behaviors than online emotions. For instance, in
the current study, the retaliatory behaviors reported by our partic-
ipants (e.g., spreading rumors, trying to steal away other employ-
ees) might have been prompted by their beliefs that they felt
emotions such as anger when they were laid off rather than by
whether they actually had experienced outward-focused negative
emotions at the time of the layoff. Future research using retrospec-
tive data should consider how individuals’ disposition (e.g., trait
negative affectivity) and/or beliefs about how individuals should
react to layoffs may impact their ability to accurately retrospec-
tively recall emotions.4 Moreover, further examination concerning
whether episodic and semantic accounts of emotion differ in their
ability to predict behavioral outcomes is also warranted.
Our measure of inward-focused negative emotions had a fairly
low mean (1.52 on a 5-point scale) compared with outward-
focused negative emotions (3.12 on a 5-point scale). These means,
however, are not surprising for two reasons. From a theoretical
perspective, individuals have a greater tendency to react with
emotions such as anger rather than guilt (Lazarus, 1991). This may
be due to the tendency for shame and guilt to be more self-
conscious and/or threatening to the self as compared with anger
and hostility, which are directed toward others. Empirically, the
two studies that have examined interactive effects of outcome
favorability and procedural justice on guilt have similarly reported
low means. Weiss et al. (1999), for instance, reported a mean of
1.67 on a 7-point scale, and Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000)
reported a mean of 2.1 on a 7-point scale. In summary, these means
are consistent with theory and with prior studies.
In this study, we combined measures of different emotions to
develop scales to assess inward- and outward-focused emotions.
We deemed this strategy appropriate because we were interested in
testing for more general differences between self- versus outward
evaluations. To assess inward-focused emotions, we averaged
single-item measures for guilt and shame. Single-item measures
that asked participants to rate how they were feeling on each
emotion were used because this technique, commonly used in
emotion research, has been found to have significant face validity
(Larsen, Diener, & Lucas, 2002). Moreover, single-item scales are
useful to researchers targeting discrete emotions because any emo-
tion term can anchor the single-item scale (Ekman, Friesen, &
Ancoli, 1980; Gross & Levenson, 1993). Although single-item
measures of emotion tend to have high face validity, these mea-
sures may exhibit low reliability when combined (i.e., averaged to
construct our measure of inward-focused emotions). Internal con-
sistency estimates are dependent on the number of items used in a
measure, with internal consistency estimates increasing as the
number of items increases (e.g., Crocker & Algina, 1986). Larsen
et al. argued that when single-item measures (i.e., shame and guilt)
are combined in emotion research to generate a measure (i.e.,
inward-focused emotions), the resulting measure should not be
judged based on internal consistency. Future studies might explore
alternative measures and methods to study emotion.
Because our response rate was low, we assessed whether our
participants were somehow unique from the population of poten-
tial respondents. We compared the demographic characteristics of
our respondents with those of the clients served by the outplace-
ment firm. Results showed that our participants’ demographic
profile mirrored the profile of their clients. Our respondents,
however, may not necessarily be representative of all individuals
who are laid off. They resided in Southern California, where
reemployment opportunities were, at the time of this study, highly
abundant, and all participants received the services of an outplace-
ment agency—that is, the organization was treating employees in
a manner that may have softened some of the negative impact of
the layoff and could have increased perceptions of fairness in the
eyes of the employees. In addition to sampling employees with a
wide range of layoff experiences, future research needs to deter-
mine whether these emotional effects subside over time.
Emotional reactions often involve a constellation of emotions
(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). As Table 1 shows, inward- and
outward-focused emotions were highly intercorrelated, which may
imply that individuals can experience both inward- and outward-
focused emotions simultaneously. Theoretically, this finding sug-
gests that justice research not only should take into account which
4
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
 EMOTIONS, INJUSTICE, AND RETALIATION
emotions are associated with perceptions of fairness but also could
consider how emotions are interrelated or interact with each other.
From a practical perspective, our study points to the importance
of ensuring fair procedures and supervisory treatment when im-
plementing human resources initiatives such as layoffs. First,
although managers might not be able to control whether or not a
layoff becomes necessary, they can make the process less painful
for their employees by ensuring the process is fair, treating their
employees with dignity and respect, and providing explanations.
This is a critical issue because the benefits associated with pro-
viding employees with favorable outcomes in layoffs (in terms of
reducing employees’ anger and retaliation) can be offset by unfair
procedures or supervisory treatment. This, however, tells only part
of the story. Managers also run the risk of employees’ feeling guilt
and shame when they receive an unfavorable outcome that is
accompanied by fair implementation (i.e., procedures or treat-
ment). Brockner (2002) suggested that managers might respond to
this dilemma by supporting the self-esteem of individuals who are
being laid off and encouraging them to engage in activities that are
inherently self-restorative and/or self-affirming.
Future research is needed to examine the generalizability of
these results. Individuals who are laid off are likely to be highly
sensitized to some facets of justice. In addition, in this context,
participants are no longer organizational members and their out-
comes may be more severe than those experienced in day-to-day
organizational life. Whether the results generalize to other work-
place contexts, such as ongoing relationships, requires testing.
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Received August 26, 2003
Revision received May 11, 2004
Accepted July 27, 2004 䡲