UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

Facts:
Respondent Romeo Jader sued petitioner UE for damages for the moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence.

Jader alleged that he got an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took the removals exam for
said subject but he was belatedly inform that it was a 5. The graduation ceremony invitation
included his name as one of the candidates but the invitation had a footnote that the list is
tentative and still subject to the completion of requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he
marched with his parents, was given a symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow- out
attended by neighbors, friends, and relatives, took a leave of absence without pay from work, and
enrolled at a pre-bar review class.

In its answer, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led Jader to believe that he
completed the requirements for an LLB degree when his name was included in the tentative list
of graduating students.

Issue:
May a university be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter
had satisfied all the requirements for graduation?

Held:
Yes, it may be held liable.

Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code states that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith and every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of
the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate.

Hence petitioner is liable for its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for
the course.
 Tan v.
Valeriano

The present case arose from a damages suit for malicious prosecution filed by Romeo H.
Valeriano (Valeriano) against Tan and Luzuriaga (petitioners), as well as Gonzales and Gilana.

The Holy Name Society of Bulan, Sorsogon (Holy Name Society), held a multi-sectoral
consultative conference at the Bulan Parish Compound. Valeriano, the president of the
religious organization, delivered a welcome address. In his address, Valeriano allegedly
lambasted certain local officials of Bulan, Sorsogon, speciffically Municipal Councilors Tan,
Luzuriaga, and Gilana and Vice-Mayor Gonzales.

The following day, Tan and Luzuriaga, together with Gilana and Gonzales, filed before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) an administrative complaint against Valeriano who was an
incumbent resident auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA). Believing that the real purpose
of the conference was to choose the candidates who will be endorsed by the Holy Name
Society for the 2001 elections, petitioners, Gilana and Gonzales, charged Valeriano with acts of
electioneering and engaging in partisan politics. They were convinced that, through his
opening remarks, Valeriano had set the political tone of the conference. They also claimed that
Valeriano did not advise or prevent the other speakers from criticizing the local administration
with which they are politically aligned or identified.

The COA was furnished with a copy of the administrative complaint against Valeriano. The COA,
however, did not take any action on the complaint in view of the pendency of the case before
the CSC.

The CSC dismissed the complaint due to a procedural defect, particularly that the complaint-
affidavit was not filed under oath. Tan and Luzuriaga re-filed a Complaint-Affidavit but later on
withdrew their complaint. In the meantime, the petitioners and Gilana filed on another
administrative before the Office of the Ombudsman, this time for violation of Republic Act No.
6713, in relation to Section 55 of the Revised Administrative Code. This complaint was
dismissed by the Ombudsman for want of evidence.

Aggrieved by the turn of events, Valeriano filed before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City
a complaint for damages against the petitioners.

The RTC ruled that the act of filing of numerous cases against Valeriano by Tan, Luzuriaga
Gilana, and Gonzales was attended by malice, vindictiveness, and bad faith.The RTC observed
that Valeriano earned the ire of petitioners, Gilana, and Gonzales because he was the one who
organized and led the sponsorship of the conference which was attended by some opposition
leaders who were allowed to air their views freely relative to the theme: "Facing Socio-
Economic Challenges in the 3rd Millennium, Its Alternative for Good Governance," a theme
which is not totally apolitical considering that it pertains to alternative good governance. The
RTC noted that the fact that Valeriano was singled out by the complainants, although his
participation was only to deliver the Welcome Address, is indicative of malice. The RTC further
held that the act of filing numerous cases before the CSC, COA, and the Ombudsman, which
cases were subsequently found to be unsubstantiated, is reective of ill will or the desire for
revenge.
By reason of his physical suffering, mental anguish, and social humiliation, the RTC awarded
Valeriano P300,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P30,000.00
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

The CA reversed the trial court's ruling insofar as Gonzales and Gilana were concerned, but
affirmed that Tan and Luzuriaga should be held liable for damages. It held that Gonzales and
Gilana did not act with malice to vex or humiliate Valeriano by the mere act of initiating an
administrative case against him with the CSC and the Ombudsman. On the other hand, the CA
held that p Tan and Luzuriaga’s act of re-filing their complaint with the CSC notwithstanding the
pendency of the administrative case with the Ombudsman, shows bad faith. The CA further
held that Tan and Luzuriaga's intent to prejudice and injure Valeriano was revealed when they
did not inform their lawyer of the pending case with the Ombudsman.

Whether or not the petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in filing the administrative
complaints against Valeriano. – NO.

The issue raised in the present petition is clearly not a question of law as it requires a re-
examination of the weight and probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants and,
thus, asking us to make a different factual conclusion. In other words, what is being asked of us
now is to review the factual circumstances that led to the filing of numerous administrative
complaints against Valeriano, and to determine the presence of ill motive, malice or bad faith
to justify the award for damages.

After reviewing the records and the conclusions arrived at by the lower courts, however, we
find that they had misappreciated the factual circumstances in this case thereby qualifying this
case as an exception to the rule that a petition for review on certiorari is limited to questions of
law.

Article 19 of the Civil Code contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights which requires that everyone must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The law recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following:

(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;

(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and

(c) with the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

The existence of malice or bad faith is the fundamental element in abuse of right. In an action
to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the
prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was patently
malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code or that
the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. There is malice when the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The award
of damages arising from malicious prosecution is justified if and only if it is proved that there
was a misuse or abuse of judicial processes. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

In this case, what prompted petitioners to initiate the complaint against Valeriano was his vital
participation in the multi-sectoral conference that was held wherein certain local officials were
the subject of criticisms.

No less than the Constitution prohibits such officers and employees in the civil service in
engaging in partisan political activity. The same prohibition is imposed by the Revised
Administrative Code in its provisions on the Civil Service.

During the consultative conference held by the Holy Name Society, speakers were allowed to
criticize certain incumbent local officials. The conference was held at a time so close to the
holding of the 2001 elections. Valeriano, an employee of the COA, was, incidentally, the
president of said religious organization. Given the law's prohibition on public officers and
employees, such as Valeriano, from engaging in certain forms of political activities, it could
reasonably be said that those who had filed the complaints against Valeriano before the CSC
and the Office of the Ombudsman had done so as they had reason to believe that Valeriano
was violating the prohibition. Given the circumstances of the conference, it can reasonably be
said that the complaints were filed out of a belief in a viable cause of action against Valeriano.
Put in another way, it cannot be said, for certain, that the complaints against Valeriano were
filed simply out of malice.

This Court disagrees with the CA that the mere re-filing of the complaint with the CSC is reason
to hold petitioners liable for damages. It must remembered that the same complaint had
earlier been dismissed on a technicality, and that the CSC directed that the dismissal was
without prejudice, i.e., the complaint may be re-fuiled after compliance with the technical
rules. Following the discussion of the CA as quoted above, we can say that this same complaint
was likewise not filed out of malice. It was borne out of a reasonable belief on the illegality of
Valeriano's acts. Parenthetically, whether Valeriano's acts do amount to illegalities is another
question altogether, one that is not within the purview of the present review.

It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution, of and by itself, does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

Valeriano failed to prove that the subject complaints against him were motivated purely by a
sinister design. It is an elementary rule that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same.

A new judgment is rendered DISMISSING the complaint filed by Valeriano before the Regional
Trial Court for lack of merit.
 California Clothing, Inc. vs Shirley Quiñones

Facts:
In July 2001, Shirley Quiñones, after receiving an official receipt from the cashier as proof of
payment for a pair of jeans, went out of the Guess USA Boutique (California Clothing, Inc.) located
in Robinsons Cebu. A few moments later, Michelle Ybañez and another Guess employee ran after
Quiñones. When they caught up with her, they asked Quiñones if she already paid for the pair of
jeans. Quiñones said she did as she even has the receipt and the pair of jeans.

Unconvinced, the Guess employees wrote a letter to Quiñones’ employer (Cebu Pacific) and its
human resources department seeking help and accusing Quiñones of not paying for the pair of
jeans.

Due to these incidents, Quiñones felt humiliated and so she sued Guess and its employees for
moral damages.

Issue:

Whether or not there was abuse of right on the part the Guess employees.

Held:

Yes. The employees, when they initially cannot locate the payment made by Quiñones, had the
right to confront Quiñones if she indeed paid the pair of jeans – they have the right to do so
despite the fact that Quiñones was holding a receipt and the pair of jeans.

What constituted abuse of right was their act of writing the employer of Quiñones as well as the
employer’s HR Office. A reading of the letter revealed it to be accusatory and and its tenor
showed that the Guess employees intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the
disputed amount but to tarnish the reputation of Quiñones in the eyes of her employer. To
malign Quiñones without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible.

The rule is: a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
 Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation

FACTS:

The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly defamatory
articles against petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing
Corporation.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Makati City under three
separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H.
Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle,
and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and
Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the respondents.

On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. Aggrieved,
respondents sought recourse before the CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the
decision of the RTC. Respondents then filed an MR. The CA rendered an Amended Decision
reversing the earlier Decision. Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this
Court. On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the petition.
Respondents later filed a MR dated which the Court denied. Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr.
also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental MR with Attached Supplemental Motion.

On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution grant Coyiuto, Jr.s motion for leave to file
supplemental motion for reconsideration, and require petitioner to comment on the motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed his Comment.

It is apparent that the MR of respondents generally reiterates the arguments previously

advanced by respondents.

However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto, Jr.
raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings below. This notwithstanding,
basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be given all the opportunity to ventilate his
arguments in the present action, but more importantly, in order to write finis to the present
controversy.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether Coyuito, Jr., was Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when the
libelous articles were published.

(2) Whether petitioners cause of action based on Abuse of Rights warrants the award of
damages.

HELD:

FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE LOWER COURT, WHEN CONFIRMED BY THE CA, CONCLUSIVE UPON
THIS COURT
From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, it was substantially established
that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when the subject articles
were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even admitted this fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for
Admission. Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual findings
of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this
Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.

AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON ABUSE OF RIGHT, PROPER

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Here, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed
abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the
libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in
relation to Article

20. Coyuito, Jr.'s supplemental MR is partially granted.

 Heirs of PURISIMA NALA vs. ARTEMIO CABANSAG, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Cabansag filed a Civil Case for damages in October 1991. According to respondent,
he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is
part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991,
he received a demand letter from Atty. Del Prado, in behalf of Purisima Nala, asking for the
payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by
Nala, failing which, criminal and civil actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was
sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and was
constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely
acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged
that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio
Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property was
conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely
held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the
property which he occupies.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent. Nala and Atty. Del Prado
appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification. Hence, herein petition by
the heirs of Nala.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any basis.

RULING:

YES

The Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law
under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in
respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19
of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith,
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.11

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on
the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose
or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty.
Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first
place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by
her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same.

Respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole
intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however,
there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal
right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand
letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over
the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him. Nala's acts
in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the property
has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs.
 Hermosisima v. CA

Nature of the Case: Acknowledgment

Doctrine: "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was
almost 10 years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.

One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February,
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as
for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.

Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but
denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.

The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50
a month, which was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing defendant to
pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as
moral damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees

CA affirmed this decision.

Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

Ruling:

NO
Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * *
* upon the faith of such promise".

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in
many of the American States.
 Wassmer v. Velez

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding
including making and sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding dress and other apparels,
and other wedding necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to
attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that
nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not appear and
was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default. On April
29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the
costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of
fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his
promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be
grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in
part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for
moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in
breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Bunag v. CA

FACTS:

On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-

appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said
defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days,
or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage
license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant

Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.

ISSUE:

Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.

RULING:

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material
and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234
of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on
the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal
of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury
to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it
is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for
rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
 Baksh v. CA

FACTS:

Private respondent is a 22 year old Filipino citizen residing in Dagupan CIty. Petitioner is an
Iranian medical exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Petitioner allegedly courted and proposed to marry her. Thereafter, private respondent began
living with him. She allegedly was a virgin before such arrangement.

A week before the filing of private respondent’s complaint, petitioner’s attitute towards her
started to change;; he maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a result, she sustained injuries.
Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked not to live with her anymore.

Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable. Petitioner denied the claims of private respondent. Accordingly, he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent nor he forced her to live with
him.

The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private
respondent. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WON a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code?

HELD:
Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Petitoner’s profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life’s partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied
by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage,
she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article
19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
Manila Gas Corporation vs Court of Appeals (1980)

FACTS:

Manila Gas Corporation is authorized to conduct and operate the business of servicing
and supplying gas in the City of Manila and its suburbs. Respondent Ongsip applied for gas
service connection for his kitchen and 48door apartment with petitioner Manila Gas
Corporation. As a result, two 20gallon capacity water storage heaters were installed and two
heavyduty gas burners.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's
employees.

In May and June no gas consumption was registered in the meter, prompting petitioner
to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence. At
around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner's employee went to Ongsip's place. Without
notifying or informing respondent, they changed the gas meter and installed new tube
connections. At the time the work was being undertaken, private respondent was taking a nap.

Ongsip inquired why they were taking pictures of the premises but the employee
simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his (Coronel's) office. There, he was
informed about the existence of a bypass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that
unless he gave Coronel P3,000.00, he would be deported. He refused. By the end of August, a
reading was made on the new meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas
consumption.

A complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip.
Pending investigation, petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure to
pay his gas consumptions. The complaint was dismissed by the city fiscal. Ongsip later filed a
complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner based on two causes of action,
firstly: the malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint; and, secondly:
the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and
without notice of warning.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the filing of criminal complaint was not actuated by malice on the
part of petitioner
2) Whether or not the closure of Ongsip's gas service was made after due notice to
pay his back accounts

HELD:

1) To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a siniter design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was
malicious
intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. This intent is traceable to that early
afternoon of August 17, 1966, when petitioner's employees, upon being ordered, came to
private respondent's residence and changed the defective gas meter and tube connections
without notice. In other words, respondent Ongsip had no opportunity to observe the works.
Nonetheless, if indeed he had installed an illegal bypass tube or jumper, he could have easily
asked for its immediate removal soon after his houseboy told him what petitioner's employees
did. As established by the facts, he had not even attempted to refuse entrance to petitioner's
employees headed by Mariano Coronel nor to question their authority upon their return later
that same afternoon with a photographer. Little did he realize that the pictures of the premises
that were being taken would be used as evidence against him.

Evidently, Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the
gas meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for
qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false.

1) On the second cause of action which is based on the illegal disconnection of

respondent Ongsip's gas service constituting breach of contract, petitioner's act in
disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of
contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an
intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear
violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages." Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by
Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith".

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER MANILA GAS CORPORATION IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY

(1) RESPONDENT ISIDRO M. ONGSIP P25,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, P15,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES
AND P5,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, AND
P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND
(2) THE COSTS.
 Carpio v. Valmonte

FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon
Sierra engaged her services for their church weddinng on October 10, 1996. At about 4:30 pm on
that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel and when she arrived at Suite 326-A, several
persons were already there including Soledad Carpio, the aunt of the bride.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to go to the reception hall to give the
meal allowance to the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed
the people staring at her and it was at this juncture that Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag?
Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed ins i de the comfort room in a paper bag were lost and these include diamond
rings, earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of about 1M pesos. Valmonte
was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by the police officers, but the pe titioner
kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte’s car was also searched
but the search yielded nothing.

Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter
of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem
her smeared reputation but the petitioner did not respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for the loss of
her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his
legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to
show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai th in pointing to her as the culprit.

The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was
singled out by the petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the court
find no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages

HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral damages but not to actual
damages.

In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is the principle
known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of an abuse of
right, the following elements must be present: 1) there is legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised
in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly, petitioner
transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 20 for which she should be held
accountable.
 University of the Philippines vs Philab Industries, Inc.

Facts:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

In 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system of
research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory
equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation
(FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the
fabrication thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a
corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive
Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to
fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building
Project, for the account of the FEMF.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and
downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus: 1) Supply and
Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and 2) Fabrication and
Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and paying the downpayment of 50%
or P286,687.50

Ten days after, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after
having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.

On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory
furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On
October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the
latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn
by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.

On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF,
represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the
construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed P29,000,000.00.

The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA with Philab on November 25, 1982.
Later, President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On
April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the payment
of the amount due from the FEMF. In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of
the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal.

PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB
prayed that it be paid the following: (1) P702,939.40 plus an additional amount (as shall be
determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction
the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%) percent interest
on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
and (3) Cost of suit.

In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because
it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the
FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory
furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by
PHILAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principle of unjust enrichment
when it held that UP and not FEMF, is liable to Philab?

Held:

There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and
FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the
parties and their assigns. A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one
who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof. Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed
by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and
laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner
and the respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact
contract of sale was entered into between the Philab and FEMF.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or
for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by
mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather,
it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this
case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact
contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory
furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
The petition is granted. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is reinstated with no costs.

Casupanan v. Laroya

● An order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65.

● The offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.

● The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of
in the criminal case.

Facts:

Two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and the other owned by Capitulo and driven by Casupanan,
figured in an accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage toproperty. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
and dismiss the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the RTC.

The RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the
case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. It further held that a special
civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, it declared that even on the
premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment
and not an abuse of discretion.

Issues:

1. Was the petition for certiorari a proper remedy?

2. Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. Was there a forum-shopping?
Held:

1. Yes. The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice. Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is
deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal
without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65.
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs
order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal, is erroneous.

2. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights of action and reliefs sought. However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission,
they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke
these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules
for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil
action.

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action
since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil
action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous. (Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002)