Research Article

Journal of Asian Security

India–China and Their and International Affairs
8(1) 33–61, 2021
War-making Capacities © The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/2347797021993962
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Christopher K. Colley1 and

Prashant Hosur Suhas2

Abstract
Much has been said about how China’s rapidly growing economy has led to
increasing power disparity between India and China over the last two decades.
China’s economic growth in this period has been spectacular, but it is not clear
whether that gives a good sense of how effective its military capabilities are
against India. In the context of the escalating Sino-Indian rivalry, this article asks
the question: what is the nature of India’s power disparity vis-à-vis China? And
does the existing power disparity between India and China give China a clear
and uncontestable advantage? We argue that while there is significant asymmetry
between India and China, the asymmetry is not as overwhelming when we
consider certain facets of war-making capacity such as capital intensiveness
of the military, military mobilisation, extractive capacity of the state and the
institutional capacities to mobilise forces on a large scale, should the occasion
demand. Moreover, India, with a more defensive posture against China, is in a
better position to counter it because it mitigates the effects of power disparity.
Therefore, we seek to understand the variation in asymmetries across different
parameters of war-making capacity and force structure to better assess where
the two countries may have advantages and disadvantages in the months and
years to come.This article’s main contribution is to demonstrate through publicly
available data the various levels of asymmetry between India and China. It also
contributes to the security studies, rising powers and conflict literature.

Keywords
India, China, military capabilities, war, power disparity

1
National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
2
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY, USA.

Corresponding author:
Christopher K. Colley, National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates; Wilson Center, Washington, DC 20004, USA.
E-mail: christopher.colley@ndc.ac.ae
34 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

Introduction
Recent tensions between India and China have led many to argue that the growing
power disparity between India and China favouring China explains China’s
aggressive actions against India on the Line of Actual Control (Ganguly & Pardesi,
2020; Mohan, 2020). While power disparity is a major factor in explaining changes
in state behaviour, a single event cannot be explained by structural changes that
often occur at a relatively glacial pace as opposed to more dynamic factors on
the ground. However, whether increasing power disparity would lead to more or
less conflict in general has been a widely studied topic in international relations
(Chan, 2008; Ikenberry, 2014; Kim & Morrow, 1992; Kugler & Lemke, 1996).
In this article, we ask the following questions: (a) What is the nature of India’s
power disparity vis-à-vis China? (b) Does the existing power disparity between
India and China give China a clear and uncontestable advantage? We argue that
while there is no doubt that there is a power disparity between India and China
that favours the latter, the magnitude of such differentials varies depending on
how we conceptualise material power. Furthermore, despite the presence of power
disparity, there are geographical and strategic factors that mitigate the effects of
power disparity to India’s advantage. While China has a substantial advantage
over India in terms military hardware and advanced technology, any military
confrontation between China and India will most likely occur in areas where India
has a distinct geographical advantage. As will be elaborated below, conflict along
the disputed western border will happen much closer to Indian airfields and troop
concentrations. Any confrontation in the maritime domain will likely take place in
the Indian Ocean in the vicinity of Indian naval bases.
In this article, we assess the nature of power differentials between India and
China using different conceptualisation and measures of war-making capacity and
present our assessment of whether the current power disparity gives an undisputed
advantage to China or whether there are areas where India can compensate for the
current power disparity. We believe while China has an advantage in resources,
the prevailing disparity is not significantly wide and India still has the chance to
catch-up when it comes to closing the gap on certain variables of power. We also
show that, qualitatively, China still lags behind in terms of its naval capabilities,
especially if it seeks to establish dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
This article is divided into three parts. First, we discuss how military capacity has
been defined and operationalised in the field of international relations. Second, we
discuss the scope of power disparity based on critical variables related to war-
making capacity such as military expenditures, military personnel, level of
industrialisation and measures of GDP and GDP per capita. Third, we provide a
qualitative assessment of the weapons platforms and troops’ battle preparedness.
Finally, we highlight avenues for future research and make our concluding remarks.

Assessment of Military Strength: A Literature Review

Any discussion regarding India’s ‘relative decline’1 vis-à-vis China requires us to
elaborate on how we measure power and what do the measures of military capacity
Colley and Hosur Suhas 35

seek to approximate in terms of a state’s ability to further its national interests.

Political scientists have for long dwelled on these issues and have categorised
state capacity into three major concepts: (a) military capacity, (b) bureaucratic
capacity and (c) political institution and their coherence (Hendrix, 2010). Given
that our article deals with the Sino-Indian power disparity in the wake of recent
tensions, we limit our scope to analysing concepts and measures of power most
relevant for a state’s military capacity. Scholars have relied on several indicators
to measure the military capacity of states. The list of indicators typically used has
been summarised in Table 1. While political scientists have conceptualised and
measured state capacity in several different ways, the different measurements do
not always show a strong correlation with each other, making it difficult to assess
the practical implications of power disparity between states.
For instance, GDP per capita and the Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC) are considered to be measures of latent state capacity. GDP per capita is
used as a general proxy for military, administrative and bureaucratic capacity
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hendrix, 2010). CINC scores approach national
capabilities differently. The CINC takes the average of six measures of state
capacity and generates a single score for each state per year. Furthermore, ‘CINC
reflects an average of a state’s share of the [global] system total of each element
of capabilities in each year, weighting each component equally’ (Singer et al.,
1972). The six variables used to calculate CINC are: (a) military expenditures,
(b) military personnel, (c) iron and steel production, (d) energy consumption,
(e) urban population and (f) total population. Therefore, the CINC reflects the
distribution of material capabilities in the global system along demographic,
industrial and military variables.
Figure 1 shows the association between real GDP per capita (US$, 2005 prices)
and the CINC (in Asia in the year 2010). The two variables have a very low
correlation despite the fact they are both widely used measures of state capacity.
In Figure 1, the CINC suggests that China accounted for a little over 20% of the
global material capability along demographic, industrial and material variables,
although it lags behind many Asian countries in terms of GDP per capita. Even
after we exclude the two outliers, India and China, in Figure 2, we see that the
correlation between these two variables is fairly low with a value of 0.343. The
low correlation between two well-known indicators of state capacity helps clarify
the point that any comparison of India and China cannot be based on one or two
variables. In the subsequent four subsections, we evaluate how China and India
look in comparison in terms of their aggregate state capacity, extractive ability,
level of military mobilisation and capital intensiveness of their militaries.
Thereafter, we give a more granular account of the strategic advantages and
disadvantages the two states may have under current circumstances.
Table 1 shows the major indicators used by political scientists to measure
military strength. This section briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of the different indicators used to measure military strength. As shown in Table 1,
the indicators of military strength can be conceptually divided into four categories:
(a) aggregate state capacity, (b) extractive capacity of state institutions, (c) state’s
ability to raise large militaries and (d) sophistication of a state’s military.
36 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

Figure 1.  Real GDP per Capita (Gleditsch, 2002); CINC (Singer et al., 1972) in 2010 in Asia
Source: Gleditsch (2002) for real GDP per capita; Singer et al. (1972) for CINC in 2010 in Asia.

Figure 2.  Real GDP per Capita (Gleditsch, 2002); CINC (Singer et al.,1972) in 2010 in Asia
Source: Gleditsch (2002) for real GDP per capita; Singer et al. (1972) for CINC in 2010 in Asia.
Colley and Hosur Suhas 37

Table 1.  Indicators Used to Measure States’ Military Power

Indicator Citation
Aggregate state capacity
GDP per capita (Beckley, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003)
GDP (Casetti, 2003; Karabell, 2014)
National materials (Singer et al., 1972)
capability (CINC)
Extractive capacity
Tax to GDP ratios/relative (Arbetman & Kugler, 1997; Hans & Thies, 2019; Kugler &
political extraction Tammen, 2012; Lu & Thies, 2013; Organski & Kugler, 1980;
Thies, 2004)
Military mobilisation
Military personnel per (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008;
capita Diehl, 1983; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Buhaug, 2010; Ganguly
& Thompson, 2017; Jones et al., 1996; Mason & Fett, 1996;
Mason et al., 1999; Walter, 2006; Wayman et al., 1983)
Capital intensiveness of the military
Military expenditures per (Henderson & Singer, 2000)
capita
Military expenditures per (Kentor & Kick, 2008; Kentor et al., 2012; Olofin, 2012)
military personnel

Aggregate state capacity looks to account for a state’s latent power and
resources that it can mobilise during times of crises. Countries with larger resource
bases tend to fair better on these parameters. The GDP of a country is usually used
as a standard indicator that helps account for a state’s general level of resource
availability (Casetti, 2003; Karabell, 2014). GDP per capita is also considered as
an important variable that measures a general level of economic development of
a country (Beckley, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The CINC also looks at the
latent state capacity. A general problem with variables that measure the
accumulation of resources is that they tend to give us a low-resolution picture on
the exact nature of a state’s military capacity in terms of effectiveness or readiness.
It is not uncommon for countries with a larger GDP to lose wars to countries
with a smaller GDP (Organski & Kugler, 1980). A state’s military capacity is tied
closely to a state’s effectiveness in extracting taxes from its population. The ability
of tax extraction demonstrates institutional and bureaucratic professionalism
(Hendrix, 2010). It is natural that states with professional bureaucracies and
institutions that are able to extract and mobilise resources will be able to raise
better militaries. Scholars have also argued that in the presence of security
competitions and strategic rivalries, states tend to improve their revenue extraction
capacity (Lu & Thies, 2013; Thies, 2004, 2005, 2007). Additionally, the level of
military mobilisation also plays a key role in the ability of states to deploy troops.
Larger armies are also associated with higher probability of conflicts. At the same
time, larger armies have been shown to be associated with shorter war duration
38 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

(Hendrix, 2010). Scholars have usually relied on military personnel per capita to
assess the extent of mobilisations within a state (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Balch-
Lindsay et al., 2008).
Finally, some scholars have argued that rather than looking at the size of the
military or the size of the country’s resource base, scholars must consider whether
a military is capital intensive or not. Simply put, it is argued that militaries that are
capital intensive are more likely to be technologically more sophisticated or
hi-tech, thereby enhancing their war-fighting capabilities (Kentor et al., 2012).
There are some problems with this approach, as it does not account for issues such
as proportion of money spent on wages and pensions versus military modernisation
or inefficiencies that may exist with the defence sectors due to corruption
and mismanagement (Ali et al., 2014). Despite such problems, scholars have
used measures such as military expenditures per capita and military expenditures
per personnel to assess the capital intensives of a military and how it has evolved
over time.

The Scope of Power Disparity

This section conducts a comparative study of the different indicators of military
strength as categorised in Table 1.

Comparison of Aggregate State Capacity

Figure 3 shows the variation in Sino-Indian power asymmetry based on their GDP
and GDP per capita. There is clearly a growing asymmetry favouring China over
the last four decades. This has been a cause for concern among many writers who
see the relative decline of India as a major problem for India if it seeks to balance
against Chinese power in the medium and long run (Ganguly & Pardesi, 2020;
Mohan, 2020). The asymmetry ratio between China and India stands just under
4:1 for GDP, and just above 3.5:1 for GDP per capita. Simply put, the Chinese
economy is a little under four times the size of the Indian economy as of 2019.
The level of asymmetry becomes significantly lower when we consider CINC
in Figure 4 which is between 2.5:1 and 3:1. While we do observe a consistent
increase in asymmetry from 2005, the asymmetry, while present is much less
pronounced than is the case with GDP and GDP per capita.
A potential problem with the CINC is that it includes the population variables
(urban population and total population), which tends to suppress the level of
asymmetry between China and India. The question remains whether population is
irrelevant in the Sino-Indian rivalry. India’s population can effectively be an
advantage as it provides a ready resource base for the state to mobilise in times of
crises. As India finds a way to increase its economic growth, it will have a large
taxable population, which will significantly increase its state capacity. We
understand that India’s recent economic performance has been dismal, but the
latent capacity of larger countries usually provides them with possibilities
Colley and Hosur Suhas 39

Figure 3.  Asymmetry in GDP and GDP per Capita

Source: World Bank: GDP (US$ Constant Prices). World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD

Figure 4.  Asymmetry in Composite Index of National Capability

Source: Singer et al. (1972).
40 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

unavailable to smaller countries. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor

drawing the United States into the war, Churchill rejoiced and later stated that
‘Hitler’s fate was sealed. Mussolini’s fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they
would be ground to powder’ (Kennedy, 1987, p. 347). His colourful language
notwithstanding, his point was that America’s entry into the war would alter the
overall balance of forces once it was properly effectively mobilised. Russia was
not well mobilised even in as late as 1943. After suffering at the hands of the
Germans initially, Russia managed to mobilise and field numerically large number
of forces (Kennedy, 1987, pp. 348–349). India with its large landmass, market and
population (relative to other Asian countries) can hope to narrow the widening
capability gap.

Comparison of Military Mobilisation

Military personnel per capita (Singer et al., 1972) has been used as a measure of
larger armies and to what extent the population may be mobilised for security
purposes. Scholars have also found that larger armies are associated with lower
likelihood of war onset, higher likelihood of war termination, and shorter war
durations (Hendrix, 2010). Figure 5 shows a fairly low level of asymmetry
between China and India—less than 2:1. An alternative measurement of military
mobilisation in Figure 5,2 looks at armed forces personnel as a percentage of the

Figure 5.  Military Mobilisation

Source: Singer et al. (1972); World Bank: GDP (US$ Constant Prices). World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National Accounts data files. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD
Colley and Hosur Suhas 41

country’s economically active labour force.3 Here too, we see that China and India
are roughly at parity. Unsurprisingly, both countries are capable of raising large
armies, which is a direct function of their large populations. However, in the years
to come, India with a younger population will have a larger pool of working age
population to recruit for its armed forces.

Comparison of Extractive Capacity

Extractive capacity has been one of the central concepts used by political
scientists to determine state capacity. Tilly (1975, p. 42) argues that ‘states make
war, and war makes the state’. Tilly argued that states extracted resources from its
population in order to fund activities such as: (a) neutralise domestic competitors,
(b) deter external rivals, and (c) protect allies both within and outside their territory
(Tilly, 1992). These activities were a part of state building activities. Similarly,
to facilitate war-making, European leaders had to improve their efficiency in
revenue collection and strengthen civilian administration in exchange for civilian
cooperation (Tilly, 1992). The connection between war-making and state building
means that during war or the threat of war, citizens are willing to bear greater
degree of resource extraction because they understand the benefit of having a
strong state that is able to provide public goods such as security against external
or internal threat (Tilly, 1985). Scholars have operationalised extractive capacity

Figure 6.  Extractive Capacity

Source: Kugler & Tammen (2012); World Bank: GDP (US$ Constant Prices). World Bank national
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD
42 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

in two related ways. One is by calculating the tax-to-GDP ratio (Hans & Thies,
2019; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Rasler & Thompson, 2018; Thies, 2004).
A second measure accounts for the fact that many developing countries do not
necessarily have a very high tax to GDP ratio but have other ways to extract
resources (Lu & Thies, 2013). To do so, some scholars use a fiscal indicator that
measures the governmental efficiency in extracting resources from its population
relative to other states with similar resources and endowments and levels of
development (Arbetman & Kugler, 1997; Johnson & Robinowitz, 2005; Lu &
Thies, 2013). The measure is designed to capture the extractive capacity of states
that rely on their natural resource endowments to generate wealth, rather than
levying taxes on their populations.
Figure 6 shows that when it comes to the extractive capacity of the state, India
and China are largely at parity.4 While China has marginally lagged behind India
historically, at present, the two countries are roughly similar in their extractive
capacity. It indicates that institutional capacity of the two countries domestically
is similar. While tax revenue as percentage of GDP has largely been at parity,
China is showing the intent to improve its relative political capacity as it has been
working towards the goal since the early 1990s.

Comparison of Capital Intensiveness of Militaries

Perhaps among the more concerning aspects of the growing asymmetry between
India and China is the increasing capital intensiveness of the Chinese military.
Simply put, capital intensiveness refers to an increase in military expenditures
per military personnel, where an increase in military expenditures does not
correspond with an increase in military personnel recruitment (Kentor et al.,
2012). It shows the increasing emphasis placed on building hi-tech militaries
that are technologically advanced. Utilising the military expenditures data from
SIPRI and the military personnel data from the World Bank, in Figure 7,5 we
show that the asymmetry between India and China in capital intensiveness of their
respective militaries has been growing at very fast pace. In the early 2000s, India
and China were roughly equal in terms of capital intensiveness of their militaries.
However, between the year 2000 and 2019, the asymmetry between India and
China has gone from roughly being equal to a little under 4:1 asymmetry ratio,6
where China is spending four times per military personnel than India does. We
acknowledge that the measure also includes wages which tends to skew the true
extent of capital intensiveness of a military. For example, a large portion of India’s
military budget goes into wages and pensions, which prohibits any major efforts
towards genuine military modernisation. India will have to significantly increase
its military budgets so that it can look after the pensioners, attract talented
people by offering decent salaries and benefits, and ensure substantial military
modernisation (Pandit, 2020). However, the measure inherently seeks to look at
the trajectory of a military towards capital intensiveness which is a proxy for
technologically sophisticated militaries.
The gap between India and China on military expenditures per capita has
also been widening over the last two decades too. While increasing military
Colley and Hosur Suhas 43

Figure 7.  Capital Intensiveness Based on SIPRI and World Bank Data (1990–2019)
Source: World Bank: GDP (US$ Constant Prices). World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD

expenditures can be a sign of an increasingly sophisticated military, Henderson

and Singer (2000) also point out that it may also represent the privileged position
of the military in the society and may also be a sign of corruption and patronage.
Despite the cautionary note regarding corruption and patronage, Indian policy
makers must pay attention to the growing asymmetry in capital intensiveness of
the two militaries which is rather sobering. In the next section of the article, we
look at contextual and local factors that may neutralise the Chinese advantages in
terms of military and economic variables.

A Qualitative Assessment of India’s Advantages

along the Border and in the IOR
On paper, the Chinese military has a clear advantage over India. The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a military industrial complex that is
producing weapons systems that are increasingly world-class. From the production
of stealthy fighters, to missiles, to destroyers, the PLA has a massive lead over
India. When coupled with the numbers of such weapons systems and a military
budget that is a little under four times larger than India’s, it is understandable why
former Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta stated in 2009 that ‘India is
no match for China’, and that there is no way for India to be able to bridge the
capabilities gap with its northern rival (Singh, 2009). Since then, the asymmetry
has only grown. For example, Pant and Bommakanti (2019, p. 846) point out that
the Indian navy only has 16 submarines, while the People’s Liberation Army Navy
44 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

(PLAN) has 59. This article does not question the reality of China’s large lead
over India in terms of military hardware and in its ability to produce a favourable
outcome for China in a conventional war on a neutral battlefield. However, as the
events of the June 2020 demonstrated, any kinetic confrontation between China
and India will take place at a specific location; it will take place on India’s border
with China, or in India’s backyard in the Indian Ocean. While China is in no way
a weak opponent and would certainly have the capacity to prevail on a land or
maritime battlefield, we argue that the PLA would be at a relative disadvantage
on the disputed land borders, and the PLAN would be at a major disadvantage in
the Indian Ocean.
This section is divided into two parts. First, we analyse the forward military
deployments of both India and China along the disputed Himalayan border. We
argue that despite China’s larger military and perceived technological superiority,
India actually has a distinct advantage in the event of a large military confrontation.
A combination of geographical and strategic factors, ranging from altitude to pre-
positioned equipment, accounts for this advantage. The second part examines the
maritime domain and argues that the structural factor of geography as well as
strategic and tactical advantages provide India with crucial leverage over the
PLAN in the event of war on the open ocean. While China is making great
progress in reducing these disadvantages, the fact remains that in any naval battle
in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN would be fighting in India’s backyard and its
logistical supply lines would be dangerously exposed.

The Border Dispute: Asymmetry at 5,000 m

On paper, the PLA’s overall force number of just over 2 million active-duty
personnel is considerably larger than India’s roughly 1.4 million active-duty
troops (see Table 2). While this piece of data is relevant in terms of total force
structure and the military resources India and China possess, it misrepresents the
actual advantage India holds over China in the vicinity of the border.

Importance of Geography: Chinese Positions

In 2016, the Chinese military carried out reforms that reduced the seven military
regions into five new theatre commands. The new Western Theatre Command
(WTC) has between 200,000–230,000 active-duty ground forces and includes
Tibet. On the surface this force structure, which is increasingly well-armed,
represents a formidable military presence. However, the majority of these forces
are not located in Tibet itself. Only 40,000 (or 22% of troops in this theatre
command) Chinese troops are stationed in the Tibet military district itself, with
the rest spread out in Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing and other western provinces.
Crucially, because of the potential for civil unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the WTC
does not have authority over ground forces in these two regions (O’Donnell &
Bolfrass, 2020). For our argument that India has a strategic advantage over China
Table 2.  Relevant Chinese and Indian Ground Forces, 2020

Total Active Duty Total Ground Ground Forces in Percentage of Total Ground
Forces in all Services Forces Border Region7 Forces in Border Region Forces in Close Proximity to Border.
8
China 2,035,000 975,000 200,000–230,000 22% 40,000 (4% of total ground forces.
India 1,455,550 1,237,000 225,000 18% 225,000 (18% of total ground forces)
Source: O’Donnell & Bolfrass (2020); The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2019).
46 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

along the border, it must be pointed out that the area covered by the WTC is
the largest of China’s theatre commands and encompasses an enormous amount
of terrain that varies from low altitude urban mega-cities such as Chongqing, to
the highest mountains on earth (McCauley, 2017). Importantly, the wide dispersal
of these ground troops means that large portions of them are not stationed in
high altitude locations. Considering that the most likely points of confrontation
between Chinese and Indian ground troops are located at over 4,000 m, the ability
of the PLA to rapidly respond to a border confrontation with tens of thousands of
reinforcements is questionable. Ground forces that are quickly transported from
low altitudes to elevations over 4,000 m would be at considerable risk of acute
mountain sickness and their ability to perform combat duties would be limited for
at least first three days after arrival.
Of equal importance, the ability to supply such troops (especially in the western
sector) would require supply lines stretching over thousands of kilometres. While
some have argued that the absence of heavy industry and major population centres
is an advantage for China, we argue that roads leading to western Tibet would be
highly vulnerable to Indian missile and aircraft strikes (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020).
In the event of open warfare, it is extremely unlikely that China would try to take
territory beyond what is currently disputed. The vast majority of fighting would
fall squarely in the vicinity of the border. Thus, the close proximity of logistical
centres such as Leh can be seen as an advantage. Furthermore, Chinese transport
aircraft dropping supplies in or near the combat zone would be susceptible to anti-
aircraft missiles. (The same applies to India, but India’s multiple logistics bases
are much closer to any potential front lines, thus shortening the time needed to
reach the battlefield.)
The People’s Liberation Army’s Air Force (PLAAF) would also face challenges
in carrying out prolonged airstrikes and in providing air-cover. The PLAAF has
157 fighters stationed in the Western Command. While the Indian Air Force (IAF)
has 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft positioned in the Western, Central
and Eastern Air Commands (O’Donnell & Bolfrass, 2020, pp. 19–22). While
India’s warplanes are based close to the border region, especially in the western
sector due to the rivalry with Pakistan, many of the PLAAF’s are not stationed in
Tibet. Even for the warplanes that are based in Tibet, the high altitude means that
aircraft such as the J-10 and SU-27UBK (based at Lhasa/Gonggar Airfield) would
not be able to take off with a full weapons payload and with limited fuel (O’Donnell
& Bolfrass, 2020, p. 19). PLAAF fighters coming from other parts of China, such
as Hotan in Xinjiang and Chongqing, (China’s Armed Forces, 2020; O’Donnell &
Bolfrass, 2020, p. 19) would be able to be fully fuelled and could carry a full
ordinance payload, but they would burn up valuable fuel in their flight to the
combat zone, thus significantly reducing their time to linger and provide air
support (China’s Armed Forces, 2020; O’Donnell & Bolfrass, 2020).

Indian Positions
The Indian Army has 225,000 ground troops located close in the border region
with China. While the majority of these (175,000) are located in the Eastern
Colley and Hosur Suhas 47

Command, 34,000 and 15,500 troops are in the Northern and Central commands
respectively (O’Donnell & Bolfrass, 2020, p. 7). India’s rivalry with Pakistan
means that it must keep a sizable number of forces and supplies close to the
Pakistani border; this area also happens to closely overlap with the disputed
border with China. Thus, ground resources that could be used against Pakistan can
quickly be diverted towards a Chinese contingency. While Indian supply lines are
also exposed, they are significantly shorter and the border regions on the Indian
side do have small but strategic population centres that already serve as regional
logistics facilities. Many of these Indian forces are already based at high altitudes
as they protect the high-altitude areas around the border with Pakistan.
It is also noteworthy that although India and China did engage in lethal hand-to-
hand combat in mid-June 2020, this episode does not measure either side’s ability to
conduct high-altitude warfare. Of greater relevance, India prevailed in a brief, but
bloody war with Pakistan near Kargil in 1999, at elevations over 5,000 m. This
conflict witnessed heavy fighting between India and Pakistani infantry along the
Siachen Glacier, as well as combat between the Indian and Pakistani air forces.
Crucially, India was able to mobilise 200,000 troops in a combined effort by the army
and the IAF. While India lost an estimated 499 troops to Pakistan’s 772, the war
demonstrated India’s ability to fight mechanised wars at high altitude where Indian
forces attacked uphill and utilised artillery to destroy entire enemy hilltop positions.
Crucially, the IAF was not familiar with delivering ordnance at such altitudes, but
quickly devised new tactics during the conflict (Kapur, 2018, pp. 104–105). Of note,
India has also authorised the creation of a mountain strike corp (Pardesi, 2018,
p. 118). Although this was suspended in 2018 (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020), given the
clashes along the border in June 2020, it is highly likely it will be a top priority in the
near future. Indian experience at mountain warfare may also help explain their
tactical success during the 2017 Doklam border crisis, where they were able to
prevail (no shots were fired) over the PLA (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020).
On the air power front, India may not have the industrial capacity or technology
to produce hundreds of fighter aircraft, but with their forwardly positioned
squadrons of mostly Russian Mig-29s, Mirage 2000s and SU-30s, they have the
ability to hold their own against the PLAAF. The Indian military has also stationed
Apache attack and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters near the border areas, and
especially in Ladakh (Pandit, 2020).

Infrastructure Projects in Border Region

Over the past two decades the Chinese government has spent tens of billions
of dollars developing the infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau (Reuters, 2011).
While much of this work has been done in the name of economic development,
it also includes a strong security component. The completion of the railway from
Qinghai to Lhasa in 2006 and the various extensions of the rail line into other parts
of Tibet have strengthened Beijing’s ability to mobilise and dispatch troops. The
railway allowed the PLA to send two divisions to Tibet in 20 days, thus greatly
increasing threat perceptions in New Delhi. Prior to this, it was estimated that it
would take Beijing up to 90 days to mobilise such forces (Garver, 2016, p. 740).
48 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

Since 2016, under the 13th Five-year Plan, Beijing has expanded infrastructure
projects in the border regions (Office of the State Council, 2017). Under the ‘Civil
Military Fusion Strategy’, the PLA and local governments have pursued road
projects to increase connectivity with foreign states. Road construction directed at
India has been a priority in the 13th Five Year Plan (Sun, 2020) and this century
has seen an enormous increase in the number of roads in Tibet. In 1998,
Tibet had 22,455 km of roads; by 2020, it is expected to have nearly 100,000 km
of roads, most of which are located above 4,000 m (China Global Television
Network, 2020).
For most of the twentieth century, India purposely neglected infrastructure in
the border regions with China. The justification was that in the event of war with
China, poor roads would greatly hinder the PLA’s ability to invade India (Garver,
2001). However, over the past decade, this attitude has changed, and India is now
building roads, tunnels and other forms of infrastructure along the disputed border
(Kalyanaraman, 2018). New Delhi has called for the construction of 61 strategic
roads on the border with China to be completed by 2022. As of 2019, of the 3,417
km of roads under development, 2,350 km had been completed. They are spread
out in various states bordering China, including Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in
the east, and Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in
the west. According to Lieutenant General Singh, the Chief of the Border Roads
Organization, New Delhi, is deliberately matching infrastructure projects on the
Chinese side of the border and expects to complete these by 2024–2025. Of great
interest, the Central Public Works Department is currently building 12 strategic
roads along the Chinese border, and the government is planning an additional 44
‘strategically important roads’ along the border as well. The estimated cost of
such infrastructure is `21,040 crore (Singh, 2019), or approximately $2.86 billion.
Apart from road projects, India has also reactivated 14 advance landing grounds,
which are bare airbases that have not been in use since the 1962 war (Mastro &
Tarapore, 2020). This is in comparison to the eight Chinese airbases (many of
them dual use civilian facilities) that can be utilised to strike India (O’Donnell &
Bolfrass, 2020).
A final note is in order on the capability of Indian and Chinese missiles. A
confrontation between the two states could involve cruise missiles and short to
medium range ballistic missiles. In the event that local hostilities were to escalate
to a level of open land warfare on the Tibetan plateau, both New Delhi and Beijing
might try to limit the other’s ability to supply reinforcements by targeting roads,
and bridges with missiles. Strategists from both sides may also seek to disrupt
airpower by cratering airfields with missiles or with cluster munitions dispersed
from missiles. This approach would constitute an extremely dangerous escalation
in the conflict as neither side would know if the incoming missiles would be
armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. (Both India and China have a
no-first-use nuclear policy). There is evidence to suggest that Chinese missiles
may be far more accurate than previously believed and would have the ability to
pinpoint Indian airfields, roads and bridges leading to the battlefield (Colley,
2020). China is thought to have at least 104 missiles that could strike any part of
Colley and Hosur Suhas 49

India while India is believed to have 10 missiles that can reach all of China
(O’Donnell & Bolfrass, 2020). While this gap in capabilities gives a powerful
edge to China, if a confrontation were to escalate to attacks on major Chinese and
Indian cities far removed from the border area, this would be a very different type
of war. Such a conflict would extend beyond limited engagements along the border
and would involve heavy casualties and likely extend to the maritime domain.
While geography and logistics play vital roles in India’s strategic advantages
over China along the border, another key issue to take into account is the fact that
China’s main concerns are not on the border but are located in other parts of China
or in the maritime domain in East Asia. India is well prepared in the vicinity of the
disputed region around Aksai Chin, because it is next to Pakistan (Garver, 2001).
For its part, China’s primary security concerns are both internal, where it regularly
spends more on domestic security than on its own military, and in East Asia,
where it perceives American actions in the region as part of a strategy of
containment (Tan, 2018). While China has at times dealt with major unrest in
western China, this sort of unrest does not require heavy armour or air support but
is better handled by internal security forces who specialise more in law enforcement.

The Maritime Domain

The rise of the PLAN has been one of the most watched naval developments of
the new century. It has gone from a force unable to prevent the American navy
from sending three aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during
the 1995/96 Taiwan Crisis, to a force that can now hold the American Navy at
a safe distance of at least 1,000 km in the event of a confrontation over Taiwan
(Cole, 2016; Christopher K. Colley’s interviews in Beijing, 2016). Importantly,
the modernisation of the PLAN has been centred on preventing the USN from
intervening in a Taiwan scenario (Goldstein & Murry 2004, p. 176). It is only
in the last decade that the PLAN has started to enter the IOR on a regular basis,
which raises concerns in New Delhi. Beijing’s interests are quickly expanding
in the IOR where 95% of Chinese trade with Europe, Africa, and Middle East
transits (Erickson et al., 2012, p. 39). In addition, an estimated 80% of China’s
oil imports transit the Indian Ocean (Congressional Research Service, 2018,
p. 2). Both of these statistics increase concern in Beijing that the PLAN needs
to possess the ability to protect Chinese Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs)
(Li et al., 2014, p. 8). The 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper specifically called
for the Chinese navy to:

Safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security
of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime
cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.
(The State Council the People’s Republic of China, 2015)

In addition, Chinese analysts have discussed the potential for a maritime conflict
against India in the ‘1.5 war scenarios where China would seek to protect its
50 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

SLOCs’ (You, 2016, p. 12). Due to China’s rapidly increasing interests in the
Indian Ocean, it has significantly expanded its naval footprint in the region
over the past decade. With a base/logistics facility in Djibouti and rumours of
potential bases in Pakistan and even Sri Lanka, Beijing appears to be on the verge
of becoming a major naval power in the IOR. Furthermore, according to the
former chief of the Indian navy, the PLAN maintains a constant presence of six to
eight vessels in the Indian Ocean (Singh, 2018). When looking at the number of
warships possessed by China and India in Figures 8 and 9, it is clear that China
has a powerful advantage, and it would appear that India would be outgunned in
any confrontation.

Figure 8.  IISS Multiple Years

Source: Erickson et al. (2017).

Figure 9.  IISS Multiple Years

Source: Erickson et al. (2017).
Colley and Hosur Suhas 51

Advantage India
In naval warfare geography matters, any confrontation between the Indian and
Chinese navies would likely take place in the Indian and not the Pacific Ocean.
Such a scenario transforms the symmetry and gives the advantage to India. The
distance from Guangdong province to Sri Lanka by sea is roughly 5,000 km
(https://sea-distances.org/). Any major PLAN foray into the Indian Ocean would
be preceded by a diplomatic crisis between New Delhi and Beijing, thus allowing
the Indian navy to monitor any unusual PLAN build-up. Such a task force would
require supply ships ranging from oilers, to vessels carrying munitions and general
supplies. Given the advanced warning, the Indian navy would certainly send its
small but well trained and lethal force of diesel electric submarines (SSKs) to
the key choke points where the PLAN would almost certainly have to transit: the
Straits of Malacca, Sudra and Lombok (Garver, 2016, p. 753).9 The Indian tri-
service base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located just to the north of the
Strait of Malacca, would provide India with a forward base from which it could
dispatch warships, submarines, and of equal if not greater importance, launch
fighter bombers against the PLAN as it made its way into the Bay of Bengal.
Such close proximity to China’s SLOCs has raised concern in Beijing as Chinese
strategists have argued that these islands can serve as an ‘iron curtain’ and can
be used to block China’s access to the Indian Ocean (Shi, 2012, p. 8). In fact, 10
Jaguar fighter bombers armed with harpoon anti-ship missiles have been stationed
at this base (Pandit, 2020).

Run Silent, Run Deep: India’s Submarine Strategy

Analysts of Indian naval modernisation are familiar with many of the problems the
navy has encountered in its quest to build a world-class navy. Regular challenges
ranging from procurement delays, to overdependence on foreign designs, to near
catastrophic accidents have hampered the navy (Mizokami, 2018). In spite of
all this, the Indian navy does have a small but modern fleet of SSKs, with the
backbone composed of Russian Sindhoghosh/Kilo-class and French Kalvari/
Scorpene-class vessels, which are equipped with anti-ship missiles (Dougherty,
2019). These SSKs would almost certainly lay-in-wait while fully submerged in
the narrow straits where the PLAN would be forced to cross. Of strategic and
tactical relevance, these submarines would be aided by decades of accumulated
knowledge on the underwater topography, salinity levels, undersea thermals and
seasonal currents prevalent in the region. From a naval warfare perspective, these
vessels represent a significant threat to the PLAN’s ability to prosecute a war in
the Indian Ocean.
One defect in the modernisation of the PLAN is its anti-submarine warfare
capability. While China does have some of the most modern SSKs in the world in
its inventory, it has neglected its ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare (Brooks
& Wohlforth, 2015–2016, p. 39). While the PLAN does have an emerging nuclear
powered hunter killer program (SSN), these vessels are vulnerable because of
52 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

high levels of noise (Christopher K. Colley’s interviews Washington DC, 2017).

While China’s SSKs, such as the Yuan-class, have received high marks by foreign
observers (Christopher K. Colley’s discussions with foreign experts in Beijing,
2010–2018), they would be of limited utility in a confrontation with India. Away
from their bases on mainland China, or even in the South China Sea, Chinese
SSKs would be forced to regularly surface or at least expose their snorkels in
order to charge their batteries. Once exposed, they can be easily detected and
attacked. India has invested over six billion dollars on American P-8I Neptune
aircraft, which are dedicated to hunting submarines (Gady, 2019). Of possible
greater importance to Indian attempts to neutralise Chinese submarines is the fact
that the American navy is assisting the Indians in tracking Chinese naval
movements in the IOR (Congressional Research Service, 2018, p. 6). An important
note is in order on PLAN SSKs ability to employ air independent propulsion
(AIP). This technology uses liquefied oxygen in order to allow an SSK to stay
submerged for much longer periods of time of up to 40 days. However, when
utilising AIP, SSKs are much slower and require larger tanks. Moreover, it is a
dangerous process and once initiated it cannot be shut down quickly and the SSK
still only has several hours of power from the main battery (Cole, 2016, p. 62;
Erickson et al., 2017; Goldstein & Murry, 2004, p. 168). While India is in the
process of obtaining AIP for its SSKs, the advantage of geography means that its
subs would be able to return to home ports on a regular basis and would not need
to remain hidden for likely weeks at a time as would the PLAN’s SSKs
(Rajagopalan, 2015, p. 36).

A ‘String of Pearls’
Since the mid-2000s, there has been increasing concern in New Delhi of Beijing’s
ability to establish military bases in IOR states. Such bases would enable China
to ‘encircle’ or ‘contain’ India, thus greatly diminishing India’s overall security.
In addition to the Chinese base in Djibouti, possible future PLAN bases could
be established in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. There are several issues that need to
be taken into consideration regarding these potential ‘bases’. First, there is little
concrete evidence that Beijing is actively seeking basing rights in these states. In
fact, the frequently mentioned Sri Lankan port of Hambantota is forbidden by the
Sri Lankan government from being utilised as a PLAN base (Paul, 2019, p. 53).
Even if Beijing is able to establish bases in the vicinity of India, they would be
vulnerable to attacks by Indian missiles and Indian fighter bombers. Furthermore,
in order to properly supply such bases, supplies would have to transit the same
choke points that India has the ability to severely disrupt, if not shut down. The
potential Pakistan base and facility near Gwadar, or close to Gwadar, would be
vulnerable to an Indian naval blockade (as the Indian Navy did to Karachi during
the 1999 Kargil War; Rehman, 2012, p. 63), or if supplied overland from the
Karakoram Highway, the highway would be susceptible to sabotage, missile
strikes, or bombing from Indian warplanes. The key take away is that any ‘string’
of Chinese bases in the region, would at best only slightly alleviate China’s
strategic vulnerabilities in the maritime domain.
Colley and Hosur Suhas 53

Absence of Air Cover

Another key liability of a potential Chinese naval foray against India in the Indian
Ocean is the likely total absence of meaningful and reliable Chinese air cover
for the foreseeable future. Much has been written about Chinese first aircraft
carrier the Liaoning purchased from Ukraine and the development of at least
two indigenous carriers (Erickson & Wilson, 2007; Erickson et al., 2012; Scobell
et al., 2015). However, the Liaoning is not a fully functioning carrier and is
best seen as a training carrier (Christopher K. Colley’s interviews at Beijing,
2016–2018). While the PLAN is slowly obtaining the necessary skills required
to operate a carrier, it still has a long way to go before it would be able to utilise
such a vessel in a conflict with a state that has the capacity to defend itself and
strike back. Of greater importance, China’s land-based fighters are stationed too
far away from India to be able to make any meaningful impact in a confrontation
involving the maritime domain (even in the unlikely event that naval hostilities
took place in the northern Bay of Bengal, Chinese warplanes would have to
transit Indian airspace to take part in the fight). More to the point, the Indian
Navy has decades of experience of naval aviation and would be able to launch
missile strikes against Chinese surface combatants from great distances. It is also
likely that the Indian navy would not have to engage the PLAN with sea-based
fighters, as the theatre of combat operations would likely be in range of Indian
territory where fully fuelled Indian fighters with a full weapons payload would be
able to operate and make repeated airstrikes on Chinese surface combatants. This
absence of dependable air cover is perhaps the single greatest liability for Chinese
military planners in the event of a war with India on the high seas. It should also
be noted that even if the PLAN is able to deploy several carriers to the Indian
Ocean to engage the Indians, they would represent enormous targets for Indian
submarines, fighter bombers and long-range anti-ship missiles. Chinese strategists
are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of carriers and have spent over two decades
devising tactics and strategies to deter and, if necessary, destroy American carriers
(Cole, 2016).

Geography Is Not Destiny

Geography by itself does not determine who would win a naval confrontation
between India and China. China does have an increasingly sophisticated navy
that is expanding its focus and is expected to be able to defend Chinese interests
both in East Asia and in distant oceans. As of 2020, the PLAN was equipped
with 20 modern Aegis type destroyers and this number is expected to double by
2025 (Joe, 2020). In addition, the PLAN’s budget continues to expand. While the
specific budgetary allocations to each service are not known, experts estimate that
the PLAN budget hovers around 30% of the overall military budget. This number
has doubled since 2000 (Christopher K. Colley’s interviews in Washington
DC, 2017). In contrast, the Indian naval budget has actually declined over the
past 5 years, from around 19% of the defence budget in 2013 to 15% in 2020
(Laxman, 2019).
54 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

In the event of a war with India, with the notable exception of Pakistan, Beijing
would likely not find any allies in a confrontation with India. (Most states in the
region would likely try to stay neutral). For its part, New Delhi can almost certainly
depend on Washington to assist it in a conflict with China. For example, during the
2017 stand-off at Doklam, the Americans shared intelligence with India (Parpiani
& Singh, 2020). Chinese maritime experts based in China are not as concerned
with India on its own, but when coupled with the United States, their threat
perceptions dramatically increase (Christopher K. Colley’s discussions with
Chinese security experts, Beijing, 2018). With the signing of several foundational
defence agreements between New Delhi and Washington that allow for logistical
support and enhance interoperability, Chinese leaders know that while it is unlikely
they would deal with the American navy directly, it must be assumed that
Washington will assist India in any way short of actual kinetic contact.

Future Research
In this article, we discussed the scope of power disparity between India and China
across different parameters of military strength. We then examined how doctrinal
and geographical scope of India’s defence plans may mitigate the disadvantages
it faces in terms of power disparity vis-à-vis China. Future research will have
to contend with other related questions regarding the India–China rivalry. For
instance, different theatres of conflict in the eastern and western sectors may have
different types of force postures and different conflict dynamics. How power
disparity plays a role in resource management in different conflict theatres like
Ladakh and Doklam will require more in-depth analysis that engages with the
scholarship on military planning and conflict management. Secondly, how the
rising prominence of the Quad will affect existing dyadic-level power disparity
will be of interest to scholars in the time to come. Whether close cooperation
between the Quad countries will see state-level increases in military capacity or
not and whether it will lead to a robust collective security regime will need detailed
analysis based on further developments on the ground. Alliances have been shown
to improve collective security via resource pooling (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966,
1967; Thies, 1987). On the other hand, alliances have also been shown to lead to
state level increases in military expenditures and military capacity more generally
(Sandler & Hartley, 2001; Wallace, 1973, 1979). Finally, how the systemic shock
due to COVID-19 will affect future expansions in state capacity are questions
that require detailed analysis. Despite the economic costs incurred due to the
pandemic, it is possible that the simmering conflict on the border with China
will cause the Indian leadership to continue to devote substantial monetary and
military resources to countering China. It also needs to be stressed that in the
likely event of a vaccine in the first half of 2021, the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic may prove to be ephemeral and have only a limited impact on Indian
state capacity. However, only time can tell how this currently fluid situation may
evolve in the future.
Colley and Hosur Suhas 55

Conclusion
This article analysed the nature of India’s power disparity vis-à-vis China and
whether the existing power disparity between India and China gave China a clear
and uncontestable advantage. This article utilised several indicators of military
capacity to show that power disparity between India and China has increased,
particularly over the past two decades or so. This article goes on to analyse various
geographic and strategic factors that mitigate the effects of power disparity
between India and China, giving the military and strategists some advantages.
In the decades to come, the India–China comparison will be a subject of much
interest as both countries along with their allies will compete for regional influence
in Asia and the IOR. To that end, our article examined the state of power disparity
between the two rising Asian giants. All standard measures of state capacity show
that the asymmetry between the two countries favours China. India nevertheless
is comparable to China when it comes to the GDP-to-tax ratio, which usually is
used as a state’s institutional capacity. Furthermore, the rate at which the power
disparity in terms of GDP and military expenditures is rising is also alarming from
India’s point of view. Even per measures of capital-intensive militaries such as
military expenditures per capita and military expenditures per military personnel
suggests that China is ahead of India in terms of building a more sophisticated
military. However, figures measuring capital intensiveness of the militaries do not
account for expenditures on wages and pensions which make it harder to assess
how modern the two militaries really are. However, the level of asymmetry varies
across indicators of state capacity and the local contexts have a significant impact
on whether China’s state level asymmetric advantage holds well on the ground.
For the past several decades, the prospect of a full-scale war between India and
China has been a remote possibility. The violence during the summer of 2020 has
resurrected concerns that the two Asian powers may actually engage in some form
of kinetic confrontation beyond hand-to-hand combat with clubs and metal rods.
Contrary to popular perceptions, if a mechanised conflict does breakout on either
the disputed Himalayan border or in the Indian Ocean, India will actually be at a
distinct advantage. The Indian military enjoys a substantial geographic advantage
in both theatres, and especially in the maritime domain. If war, even in the form
of a limited conflict, does break out, China will have to contend with both exposed
supply lines and with potential threats emanating from other rivals in East Asia. In
addition, New Delhi would likely receive substantial assistance from the United
States. The possibility of American involvement in a Sino-Indian contingency
may in itself act as a powerful deterrent to Beijing. The geographic advantages
that India holds over China would be significantly amplified with American
support for New Delhi. It is important to note that future military conflict is not a
preordained event as both China and India have commendable records on
resolving territorial disputes in a manner that is acceptable to different claimants.
A crucial challenge in the months and years ahead would be the willingness of the
Chinese and Indian leaders to negotiating a satisfactory border settlement.
56 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(1)

Disclaimer
Christopher K. Colley is an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the National Defense
College of the United Arab Emirates. The opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not reflect the views of the National Defense College, or the United
Arab Emirates government. The authors have contributed equally and names have been
set alphabetically.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication
of this article.

ORCID iDs
Christopher K. Colley https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6793-1796
Prashant Hosur Suhas https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6648-2140

Notes
1. The term relative decline refers to a situation where a country does not perform as
well as its competitors due to better performance by its competitors or due to its
own inefficiencies. For a detailed account of relative decline and relative gains (see
Friedberg, 2010; Powell, 1991; Snidal, 1991; Thompson, 1990).
2. We use different measures of military mobilization to check the robustness of our
claims regarding power disparity between India and China.
3. The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS
4. We use different measures of extractive capacity to check the robustness of our claims
regarding power disparity between India and China.
5. For this graph, we chose data from different sources because of issues regarding data
availability for the time frame used in the graph. The Correlates of War Datasets stop
in year 2012 giving us a rather dated version of the state of power disparity between
India and China. Given the context of this piece, we choose to rely on other sources,
namely SIPRI and the World Bank which include the values for recent years.
6. This figure is slightly lower as per the National Materials Capability Dataset. We do not
use the NMC dataset because it stops in the year 2012. However, in both datasets, the
asymmetry favors China. The graph based on NMC data can be found in the Appendix.
7. For China, this constitutes the Western Theatre Command. For India, it constitutes the
Army’s Northern, Central and Eastern Commands.
8. This number is derived from the difference between 200,000 and 230,000.
9. Garver notes that for the PLAN transited the Straits of Sudra and Lombok for the first
time in 2014.

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