Professional Documents
Culture Documents
prepared the grounds for the 1936 Arab revolt. Following Lebanon (1979– Former support:
the death of al-Qassam at the hands of the British in late
1984) Soviet Union
1935, tensions erupted in 1936 into the Arab general strike
and general boycott. The strike soon deteriorated into (1965–1991)[3]
Lebanese
violence and the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine was
Forces (1975–
bloodily repressed by the British assisted by associated
1990)
forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, the Jewish
Supernumerary Police, and Special Night Squads.[31] In the Casualties and losses
first wave of organized violence, lasting until early 1937, 21,500+ casualties (1965–2013)[5]
most of the Arab groups were defeated by the British and
forced expulsion of much of the Arab leadership was
performed. The revolt led to the establishment of the Peel
Commission towards partitioning of Palestine, though it was
subsequently rejected by the Palestinian Arabs. The two main
Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion,
accepted the recommendations but some secondary Jewish
leaders disapproved of it.[34][35][36]
Through the 1950s, Jordan and Egypt supported the Palestinian Fedayeen militants' cross-border
attacks into Israel, while Israel carried out reprisal operations in the host countries. The 1956 Suez
Crisis resulted in a short-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and exile of the All-Palestine
Government, which was later restored with Israeli withdrawal. The All-Palestine Government was
completely abandoned by Egypt in 1959 and was officially merged into the United Arab Republic,
to the detriment of the Palestinian national movement. Gaza Strip then was put under the
authority of the Egyptian military administrator, making it a de facto military occupation. In 1964,
however, a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was established by
Yasser Arafat.[38] It immediately won the support of most Arab League governments and was
granted a seat in the Arab League.
The 1967 Six-Day War exerted a significant effect upon Palestinian nationalism, as Israel gained
military control of the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Consequently, the
PLO was unable to establish any control on the ground and established its headquarters in Jordan,
home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and supported the Jordanian army during the War
of Attrition, which included the Battle of Karameh. However, the Palestinian base in Jordan
collapsed with the Jordanian–Palestinian civil war in 1970. The PLO defeat by the Jordanians
caused most of the Palestinian militants to relocate to South Lebanon, where they soon took over
large areas, creating the so-called "Fatahland".
Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon peaked in the early 1970s, as Lebanon was used as a base
to launch attacks on northern Israel and airplane hijacking campaigns worldwide, which drew
Israeli retaliation. During the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian militants continued to launch
attacks against Israel while also battling opponents within Lebanon. In 1978, the Coastal Road
massacre led to the Israeli full-scale invasion known as Operation Litani. Israeli forces, however,
quickly withdrew from Lebanon, and the attacks against Israel resumed. In 1982, following an
assassination attempt on one of its diplomats by Palestinians, the Israeli government decided to
take sides in the Lebanese Civil War and the 1982 Lebanon War commenced. The initial results for
Israel were successful. Most Palestinian militants were defeated within several weeks, Beirut was
captured, and the PLO headquarters were evacuated to Tunisia in June by Yasser Arafat's
decision.[31]
The first Palestinian uprising began in 1987 as a response to escalating attacks and the endless
occupation. By the early 1990s, international efforts to settle the conflict had begun, in light of the
success of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1982. Eventually, the Israeli–Palestinian peace
process led to the Oslo Accords of 1993, allowing the PLO to relocate from Tunisia and take ground
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, establishing the Palestinian National Authority. The peace
process also had significant opposition among radical Islamic elements of Palestinian society, such
as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who immediately initiated a campaign of attacks
targeting Israelis. Following hundreds of casualties and a wave of radical anti-government
propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli fanatic who objected to
the peace initiative. This struck a serious blow to the peace process, from which the newly elected
government of Israel in 1996 backed off.[29]
Following several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the conflict re-erupted as the Second Intifada
in September 2000.[31] The violence, escalating into an open conflict between the Palestinian
National Security Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, lasted until 2004/2005 and led to
approximately 130 fatalities. In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon ordered the removal of Israeli
settlers and soldiers from Gaza. Israel and its Supreme Court formally declared an end to
occupation, saying it "had no effective control over what occurred" in Gaza.[40] However, the
United Nations, Human Rights Watch and many other international bodies and NGOs continue to
consider Israel to be the occupying power of the Gaza Strip as Israel controls Gaza Strip's airspace,
territorial waters and controls the movement of people or goods in or out of Gaza by air or
sea.[40][41][42]
In 2006, Hamas won a plurality of 44% in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Israel responded
it would begin economic sanctions unless Hamas agreed to accept prior Israeli-Palestinian
agreements, forswear violence, and recognize Israel's right to exist, which Hamas rejected.[43]
After internal Palestinian political struggle between Fatah and Hamas erupted into the Battle of
Gaza (2007), Hamas took full control of the area.[44] In 2007, Israel imposed a naval blockade on
the Gaza Strip, and cooperation with Egypt allowed a ground blockade of the Egyptian border
The tensions between Israel and Hamas escalated until late 2008, when Israel launched operation
Cast Lead upon Gaza, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties and billions of dollars in
damage. By February 2009, a ceasefire was signed with international mediation between the
parties, though the occupation and small and sporadic eruptions of violence continued.
In 2011, a Palestinian Authority attempt to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed.
In Hamas-controlled Gaza, sporadic rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air raids still take
place.[45][46][47][48] In November 2012, the representation of Palestine in UN was upgraded to a
non-member observer State, and its mission title was changed from "Palestine (represented by
PLO)" to "State of Palestine".
Peace process
Arafat rejected this offer.[53][57][58][59][60][61] According to the Palestinian negotiators the offer did
not remove many of the elements of the Israeli occupation regarding land, security, settlements,
and Jerusalem.[62] President Clinton reportedly requested that Arafat make a counter-offer, but he
proposed none. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami who kept a diary of the
negotiations said in an interview in 2001, when asked whether the Palestinians made a
counterproposal: "No. And that is the heart of the matter. Never, in the negotiations between us
and the Palestinians, was there a Palestinian counterproposal."[63] In a separate interview in 2006
Ben Ami stated that were he a Palestinian he would have rejected the Camp David offer.[64]
No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even
under intense US pressure. Clinton has long blamed Arafat for the collapse of the summit.[65] In
the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead
a fact-finding committee aiming to identify strategies for restoring the peace process. The
committee's findings were published in 2001 with the dismantlement of existing Israeli
settlements and Palestinian crackdown on militant activity being one strategy.[66]
Following the failed summit Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued to meet in small groups
through August and September 2000 to try to bridge the gaps between their respective positions.
The United States prepared its own plan to resolve the outstanding issues. Clinton's presentation
of the US proposals was delayed by the advent of the Second Intifada at the end of September.[62]
The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map at the Taba Summit in Taba, Egypt in January
2001. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side
accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. With Israeli elections looming the talks ended
without an agreement but the two sides issued a joint statement attesting to the progress they had
made: "The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus
our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations
following the Israeli elections." The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon
defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 7
February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.[62]
One peace proposal, presented by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations
and the United States on 17 September 2002, was the Road Map for Peace. This plan did not
attempt to resolve difficult questions such as the fate of Jerusalem or Israeli settlements, but left
that to be negotiated in later phases of the process. The proposal never made it beyond the first
phase, whose goals called for a halt to both Israeli settlement construction and Israeli–Palestinian
violence. Neither goal has been achieved as of November 2015.[69][70][71]
The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: مبادرة السالم العربيةMubādirat as-Salām al-ʿArabīyyah) was first
proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at the Beirut Summit (2002). The peace
initiative is a proposed solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole, and the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict in particular.[72]
The initiative was initially published on 28 March 2002, at the Beirut Summit, and agreed upon
again in 2007 in the Riyadh Summit.
Unlike the Road Map for Peace, it spelled out "final-solution" borders based explicitly on the UN
borders established before the 1967 Six-Day War. It offered full normalization of relations with
Israel, in exchange for the withdrawal of its forces from all the occupied territories, including the
Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital"
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.[73]
A number of Israeli officials have responded to the initiative with both support and criticism. The
Israeli government has expressed reservations on 'red line,' issues such as the Palestinian refugee
problem, homeland security concerns, and the nature of Jerusalem.[74] However, the Arab League
continues to raise it as a possible solution, and meetings between the Arab League and Israel have
been held.[75]
Present status
The peace process has been predicated on a "two-state solution" thus far, but questions have been
raised towards both sides' resolve to end the dispute.[76] An article by S. Daniel Abraham, an
American entrepreneur and founder of the Center for Middle East Peace in Washington, US,
published on the website of the Atlantic magazine in March 2013, cited the following statistics:
"Right now, the total number of Jews and Arabs living... in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza is just
under 12 million people. At the moment, a shade under 50 percent of the population is Jewish."[77]
Since the April 2021 release of the Human Rights Watch report A Threshold Crossed, accusations
have been mounting that the policies of Israel towards Palestinians living in Israel, the West Bank
and Gaza now constitute the crime of apartheid.[78] A report titled Israel's Apartheid Against
Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity was released by
Amnesty International on 1 February 2022.[79]
In a report published in February 2014 covering incidents over the three-year period of 2011–
2013, Amnesty International asserted that Israeli forces employed reckless violence in the West
Bank, and in some instances appeared to engage in wilful killings which would be tantamount to
war crimes. Besides the numerous fatalities, Amnesty said at least 261 Palestinians, including 67
children, had been gravely injured by Israeli use of live ammunition. In this same period, 45
Palestinians, including 6 children had been killed. Amnesty's review of 25 civilians deaths
concluded that in no case was there evidence of the Palestinians posing an imminent threat. At the
same time, over 8,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries from other means, including rubber-
coated metal bullets. Only one IDF soldier was convicted, killing a Palestinian attempting to enter
Israel illegally. The soldier was demoted and given a 1-year sentence with a five-month suspension.
The IDF answered the charges stating that its army held itself "to the highest of professional
standards", adding that when there was suspicion of wrongdoing, it investigated and took action
"where appropriate".[89][90]
Incitement
Following the Oslo Accords, which was to set up regulative bodies to rein in frictions, Palestinian
incitement against Israel, Jews, and Zionism continued, parallel with Israel's pursuance of
settlements in the Palestinian territories,[91] though under Abu Mazen it has reportedly dwindled
significantly.[92] Charges of incitement have been reciprocal,[93][94] both sides interpreting media
statements in the Palestinian and Israeli press as constituting incitement.[92] Schoolbooks
published for both Israeli and Palestinian schools have been found to have encouraged one-sided
narrative and even hatred of the other side.[95][96][97][98][99][100] Perpetrators of murderous
attacks, whether against Israelis or Palestinians, often find strong vocal support from sections of
their communities despite varying levels of condemnation from politicians.[101][102][103]
Both parties to the conflict have been criticized by third-parties for teaching incitement to their
children by downplaying each side's historical ties to the area, teaching propagandist maps, or
indoctrinate their children to one day join the armed forces.[104][105]
The PLO have campaigned for full member status for the state of Palestine at the UN and for
recognition on the 1967 borders. The campaign has received widespread support,[106][107]
although it has been criticised by the US and Israel for allegedly avoiding bilateral
negotiation.[108][109] Netanyahu has criticized the Palestinians of purportedly trying to bypass
direct talks,[110] whereas Abbas has argued that the continued construction of Israeli-Jewish
settlements is "undermining the realistic potential" for the two-state solution.[111] Although
Palestine has been denied full member status by the UN Security Council,[112] in late 2012 the UN
General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the de facto recognition of sovereign Palestine by
granting non-member state status.[113]
Public support
Polling data has produced mixed results regarding the level of support among Palestinians for the
two-state solution. A poll was carried out in 2011 by the Hebrew University; it indicated that
support for a two-state solution was growing among both Israelis and Palestinians. The poll found
that 58% of Israelis and 50% of Palestinians supported a two-state solution based on the Clinton
Parameters, compared with 47% of Israelis and 39% of Palestinians in 2003, the first year the poll
was carried out. The poll also found that an increasing percentage of both populations supported
an end to violence—63% of Palestinians and 70% of Israelis expressing their support for an end to
violence, an increase of 2% for Israelis and 5% for Palestinians from the previous year.[114]
Issues in dispute
The following outlined positions are the official positions of the two parties; however, it is
important to note that neither side holds a single position. Both the Israeli and the Palestinian
sides include both moderate and extremist bodies as well as dovish and hawkish bodies.
One of the primary obstacles to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a deep-set and growing
distrust between its participants. Unilateral strategies and the rhetoric of hardline political
factions, coupled with violence and incitements by civilians against one another, have fostered
mutual embitterment and hostility and a loss of faith in the peace process. Support among
Palestinians for Hamas is considerable, and as its members consistently call for the destruction of
Israel and violence remains a threat,[115] security becomes a prime concern for many Israelis. The
expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has led the majority of Palestinians to believe
that Israel is not committed to reaching an agreement, but rather to a pursuit of establishing
permanent control over this territory in order to provide that security.[116]
Jerusalem
The control of Jerusalem is a particularly delicate issue, with each side asserting claims over the
city. The three largest Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—hold Jerusalem as
an important setting for their religious and historical narratives. Jerusalem is the holiest city for
Judaism, being the former location of the Jewish temples on the Temple Mount and the capital of
the ancient Israelite kingdom. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the third holiest site, being the location
of Isra and Mi'raj event, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. For Christians, Jerusalem is the site of Jesus'
crucifixion and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
The Israeli government, including the Knesset and Supreme Court, is located in the "new city" of
West Jerusalem and has been since Israel's founding in 1948. After Israel captured the Jordanian-
controlled East Jerusalem in the Six-Day War, it assumed complete administrative control of East
Jerusalem. In 1980, Israel passed the Jerusalem Law declaring "Jerusalem, complete and united,
is the capital of Israel."[117]
Many countries do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital,
with exceptions being the United States,[118] and Russia.[119]
The majority of UN member states and most international
organisations do not recognise Israel's claims to East
Jerusalem which occurred after the 1967 Six-Day War, nor its
1980 Jerusalem Law proclamation.[120] The International
Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory opinion on the "Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory" described East Jerusalem as "occupied
Palestinian territory".[121]
Israel expresses concern over the security of its residents if neighborhoods of Jerusalem are placed
under Palestinian control. Jerusalem has been a prime target for attacks by militant groups against
civilian targets since 1967. Many Jewish neighborhoods have been fired upon from Arab areas. The
proximity of the Arab areas, if these regions were to fall in the boundaries of a Palestinian state,
would be so close as to threaten the safety of Jewish residents.[124]
Holy sites
Israel has concerns regarding the welfare of Jewish holy places under possible Palestinian control.
When Jerusalem was under Jordanian control, no Jews were allowed to visit the Western Wall or
other Jewish holy places, and the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives was desecrated.[123]
Since 1975, Israel has banned Muslims from worshiping at Joseph's Tomb, a shrine considered
sacred by both Jews and Muslims. Settlers established a yeshiva, installed a Torah scroll and
covered the mihrab. During the Second Intifada the site was looted and burned.[125][126] Israeli
security agencies routinely monitor and arrest Jewish extremists that plan attacks, though many
serious incidents have still occurred.[127] Israel has allowed almost complete autonomy to the
Muslim trust (Waqf) over the Temple Mount.[123]
Palestinians have voiced concerns regarding the welfare of Christian and Muslim holy places
under Israeli control.[128] Additionally, some Palestinian advocates have made statements alleging
that the Western Wall Tunnel was re-opened with the intent of causing the mosque's collapse.[129]
Palestinian refugees
Palestinian refugees are people who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of
the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict[130] and the 1967 Six-Day War.[131] The number of Palestinians who
fled or were expelled from Israel following its creation was estimated at 711,000 in 1949.[132]
Descendants of these original Palestinian Refugees are also eligible for registration and services
provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), and as of 2010 number 4.7 million people.[133] Between
350,000 and 400,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1967
Arab–Israeli war.[131] A third of the refugees live in recognized refugee
camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The remainder live in and around the cities and towns of these host
countries.[130]
Most of these people were born outside Israel, but are descendants of
original Palestinian refugees.[130] Palestinian negotiators, such as
Yasser Arafat,[134] have so far publicly insisted that refugees have a
right to return to the places where they lived before 1948 and 1967,
including those within the 1949 Armistice lines, citing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution Palestinian refugees, 1948
194 as evidence. However, according to reports of private peace
negotiations with Israel they have countenanced the return of only
10,000 refugees and their families to Israel as part of a peace settlement. Mahmoud Abbas, the
current Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization was reported to have said in private
discussion that it is "illogical to ask Israel to take 5 million, or indeed 1 million. That would mean
the end of Israel."[135] In a further interview Abbas stated that he no longer had an automatic right
to return to Safed in the northern Galilee where he was born in 1935. He later clarified that the
remark was his personal opinion and not official policy.[136]
Palestinian and international authors have justified the right of return of the Palestinian refugees
on several grounds:[137][138][139]
Several scholars included in the broader New Historians argue that the Palestinian refugees
fled or were chased out or expelled by the actions of the Haganah, Lehi and Irgun, Zionist
paramilitary groups.[140][141] A number have also characterized this as an ethnic
cleansing.[142][143][144][145] The New Historians cite indications of Arab leaders' desire for the
Palestinian Arab population to stay put.[146]
Throughout the conflict, Palestinian violence has been a concern for Israelis. Israel,[164] along with
the United States[165] and the European Union, refer to the violence against Israeli civilians and
military forces by Palestinian militants as terrorism. The motivations behind Palestinian violence
against Israeli civilians are many, and not all violent Palestinian groups agree with each other on
specifics. Nonetheless, a common motive is the desire to
destroy Israel and replace it with a Palestinian Arab state.[166]
The most prominent Islamist groups, such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, view the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
as a religious jihad.[167]
The Israeli government initiated the construction of a security barrier following scores of suicide
bombings and terrorist attacks in July 2003. Israel's coalition government approved the security
barrier in the northern part of the green line between Israel and the West Bank. According to the
IDF, since the erection of the fence, terrorist acts have declined by approximately 90%.[171]
Since 2001, the threat of Qassam rockets fired from Palestinian territories into Israel continues to
be of great concern for Israeli defense officials.[172] In 2006—the year following Israel's
disengagement from the Gaza Strip—the Israeli government claimed to have recorded 1,726 such
launches, more than four times the total rockets fired in 2005.[164] As of January 2009, over 8,600
rockets have been launched,[173][174] causing widespread psychological trauma and disruption of
daily life.[175] Over 500 rockets and mortars hit Israel in January–September 2010 and over 1,947
rockets hit Israel in January–November 2012.
According to a study conducted by University of Haifa, one in five Israelis have lost a relative or
friend in a Palestinian terrorist attack.[176]
There is significant debate within Israel about how to deal with the country's security concerns.
Options have included military action (including targeted killings and house demolitions of
terrorist operatives), diplomacy, unilateral gestures toward peace, and increased security measures
such as checkpoints, roadblocks and security barriers. The legality and the wisdom of all of the
above tactics have been called into question by various commentators.[17]
Since mid-June 2007, Israel's primary means of dealing with security concerns in the West Bank
has been to cooperate with and permit United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding
of the Palestinian Authority's security forces, which with Israeli help have largely succeeded in
quelling West Bank supporters of Hamas.[177]
Some Palestinians have committed violent acts over the globe on the pretext of a struggle against
Israel.[178][179]
During the late 1960s, the PLO became increasingly infamous for its use of international terror. In
1969 alone, the PLO was responsible for hijacking 82 planes. El Al Airlines became a regular
hijacking target.[180][181] The hijacking of Air France Flight 139 by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine culminated during a hostage-rescue mission, where Israeli special forces
successfully rescued the majority of the hostages.
However, one of the most well-known and notorious terrorist acts was the capture and eventual
murder of 11 Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games.[182]
Fighting among rival Palestinian and Arab movements has played a crucial role in shaping Israel's
security policy towards Palestinian militants, as well as in the Palestinian leadership's own
policies. As early as the 1930s revolts in Palestine, Arab forces fought each other while also
skirmishing with Zionist and British forces, and internal conflicts continue to the present day.
During the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian baathists broke from the Palestine Liberation
Organization and allied with the Shia Amal Movement, fighting a bloody civil war that killed
thousands of Palestinians.[183][184]
In the First Intifada, more than a thousand Palestinians were killed in a campaign initiated by the
Palestine Liberation Organization to crack down on suspected Israeli security service informers
and collaborators. The Palestinian Authority was strongly criticized for its treatment of alleged
collaborators, rights groups complaining that those labeled collaborators were denied fair trials.
According to a report released by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, less than 45
percent of those killed were actually guilty of informing for Israel.[185]
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas officials have tortured and killed thousands of Fatah members and other
Palestinians who oppose their rule. During the Battle of Gaza, more than 150 Palestinians died
over a four-day period.[186] The violence among Palestinians was described as a civil war by some
commentators. By 2007, more than 600 Palestinian people had died during the struggle between
Hamas and Fatah.[187]
International status
Water resources
In the Middle East, water resources are of great political concern. Since Israel receives much of its
water from two large underground aquifers which continue under the Green Line, the use of this
water has been contentious in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel withdraws most water from
these areas, but it also supplies the West Bank with approximately 40 million cubic metres
annually, contributing to 77% of Palestinians' water supply in the West Bank, which is to be shared
for a population of about 2.6 million.[188]
While Israel's consumption of this water has decreased since it began its occupation of the West
Bank, it still consumes the majority of it: in the 1950s, Israel consumed 95% of the water output of
the Western Aquifer, and 82% of that produced by the Northeastern Aquifer. Although this water
was drawn entirely on Israel's own side of the pre-1967 border, the sources of the water are
nevertheless from the shared groundwater basins located under both West Bank and Israel.[189]
In the Oslo II Accord, both sides agreed to maintain "existing quantities of utilization from the
resources." In so doing, the Palestinian Authority established the legality of Israeli water
production in the West Bank, subject to a Joint Water Committee (JWC). Moreover, Israel
obligated itself in this agreement to provide water to supplement Palestinian production, and
further agreed to allow additional Palestinian drilling in the Eastern Aquifer, also subject to the
Joint Water Committee.[190] The water that Israel receives comes mainly from the Jordan River
system, the Sea of Galilee and two underground sources. According to a 2003 BBC article the
Palestinians lack access to the Jordan River system.[191]
According to a report of 2008 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
water resources were confiscated for the benefit of the Israeli settlements in the Ghor. Palestinian
irrigation pumps on the Jordan River were destroyed or confiscated after the 1967 war and
Palestinians were not allowed to use water from the Jordan River system. Furthermore, the
authorities did not allow any new irrigation wells to be drilled by Palestinian farmers, while it
provided fresh water and allowed drilling wells for irrigation purposes at the Jewish settlements in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[192]
A report was released by the UN in August 2012 and Max Gaylard, the UN Resident and
Humanitarian Coordinator in the occupied Palestinian territory, explained at the launch of the
publication: "Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only
slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking
water and electricity, or sending their children to school". Gaylard present alongside Jean Gough,
of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Robert Turner, of the UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The report projects that Gaza's population will
increase from 1.6 million people to 2.1 million people in 2020, leading to a density of more than
5,800 people per square kilometre.[193]
Numerous foreign nations and international organizations have established bilateral agreements
with the Palestinian and Israeli water authorities. It is estimated that a future investment of about
US$1.1bn for the West Bank and $0.8bn is needed for the planning period from 2003 to 2015.[194]
In late 2012, a donation of $21.6 million was announced by the Government of the Netherlands—
the Dutch government stated that the funds would be provided to the UN Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), for the specific benefit of Palestinian
children. An article, published by the UN News website, stated that: "Of the $21.6 million, $5.7 will
be allocated to UNRWA's 2012 Emergency Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territory, which
will support programmes in the West Bank and Gaza aiming to mitigate the effects on refugees of
the deteriorating situation they face."[193]
It has been the position of Israel that the most Arab-populated parts of West Bank (without major
Jewish settlements), as well as the entire Gaza Strip, must eventually be part of an independent
Palestinian State; however, the precise borders of this state are in question. At Camp David, for
example, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered Arafat an opportunity to establish a non-
militarized Palestinian State. The proposed state would consist of 77% of the West Bank split into
two or three areas, followed by: an increase of 86–91% of the West Bank after six to twenty-one
years; autonomy, but not sovereignty for some of the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
surrounded by Israeli territory; the entire Gaza Strip; and the dismantling of most settlements.[56]
Arafat rejected the proposal without providing a counter-offer.
Some Palestinians say they are entitled to all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.
Israel says it is justified in not ceding all this land, because of security concerns, and also because
the lack of any valid diplomatic agreement at the time means that ownership and boundaries of
this land is open for discussion.[134] Palestinians claim any reduction of this claim is a severe
deprivation of their rights. In negotiations, they claim that any moves to reduce the boundaries of
this land is a hostile move against their key interests. Israel considers this land to be in dispute and
feels the purpose of negotiations is to define what the final borders will be. In 2017 Hamas
announced that it was ready to support a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders "without
recognising Israel or ceding any rights".[203] Hamas has previously viewed the peace process "as
religiously forbidden and politically inconceivable".[167]
However, Israel disputes this;[210] several scholars and commentators disagree with the
assessment that settlements are illegal, citing in 2005 recent historical trends to back up their
argument.[211][212] Those who justify the legality of the settlements use arguments based upon
Articles 2 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as UN Security Council Resolution
242.[213] On a practical level, some objections voiced by Palestinians are that settlements divert
resources needed by Palestinian towns, such as arable land, water, and other resources; and, that
settlements reduce Palestinians' ability to travel freely via local roads, owing to security
considerations.
Israel's position that it needs to retain some West Bank land and settlements as a buffer in case of
future aggression,[214] and Israel's position that some settlements are legitimate, as they took
shape when there was no operative diplomatic arrangement, and thus they did not violate any
agreement.[215]
Former US President George W. Bush has stated that he does not expect Israel to return entirely to
the 1949 armistice lines because of "new realities on the ground".[216] One of the main compromise
plans put forth by the Clinton Administration would have allowed Israel to keep some settlements
in the West Bank, especially those which were in large blocs near the pre-1967 borders of Israel. In
return, Palestinians would have received some concessions of land in other parts of the country.
The Obama administration viewed a complete freeze of construction in settlements on the West
Bank as a critical step toward peace. In May and June 2009, President Barack Obama said, "The
United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements,"[217] and the
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated that the President "wants to see a stop to settlements—
not some settlements, not outposts, not 'natural growth' exceptions."[218] However, Obama has
since declared that the United States will no longer press Israel to stop West Bank settlement
construction as a precondition for continued peace-process negotiations with the Palestinian
Authority.[219]
Gaza blockade
The State of Israel has been engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with terrorist
organizations operating in the Gaza strip. This armed conflict has intensified after
Hamas violently took over Gaza, in June 2007, and turned the territory under its de
facto control into a launching pad of mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli towns
and villages in southern Israel.[223]
According to Oxfam, because of an import-export ban imposed on Gaza in 2007, 95% of Gaza's
industrial operations were suspended. Out of 35,000 people employed by 3,900 factories in June
2005, only 1,750 people remained employed by 195 factories in June 2007.[224] By 2010, Gaza's
unemployment rate had risen to 40% with 80% of the population living on less than 2 dollars a
day.[225]
In January 2008, the Israeli government calculated how many calories per person were needed to
prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza strip, and then subtracted eight percent to adjust for the
"culture and experience" of the Gazans. Details of the calculations were released following Israeli
human rights organization Gisha's application to the high court. Israel's Coordinator of
Government Activities in the Territories, who drafted the plan, stated that the scheme was never
formally adopted, this was not accepted by Gisha.[226][227][228]
Starting 7 February 2008, the Israeli Government reduced the electricity it sells directly to Gaza.
This follows the ruling of Israel's High Court of Justice's decision, which held, with respect to the
amount of industrial fuel supplied to Gaza, that, "The clarification that we made indicates that the
supply of industrial diesel fuel to the Gaza Strip in the winter months of last year was comparable
to the amount that the Respondents now undertake to allow into the Gaza Strip. This fact also
indicates that the amount is reasonable and sufficient to meet the vital humanitarian needs in the
Gaza Strip." Palestinian militants killed two Israelis in the process of delivering fuel to the Nahal
Oz fuel depot.[229]
With regard to Israel's plan, the Court stated that, "calls for a reduction of five percent of the
power supply in three of the ten power lines that supply electricity from Israel to the Gaza Strip, to
a level of 13.5 megawatts in two of the lines and 12.5 megawatts in the third line, we [the Court]
were convinced that this reduction does not breach the humanitarian obligations imposed on the
State of Israel in the framework of the armed conflict being waged between it and the Hamas
organization that controls the Gaza Strip. Our conclusion is based, in part, on the affidavit of the
Respondents indicating that the relevant Palestinian officials stated that they can reduce the load
in the event limitations are placed on the power lines, and that they had used this capability in the
past."
On 20 June 2010, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that
would allow practically all non-military or dual-use items to enter the Gaza strip. According to a
cabinet statement, Israel would "expand the transfer of construction materials designated for
projects that have been approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health
institutions, water, sanitation and more – as well as (projects) that are under international
supervision."[230] Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel will continue to inspect all goods
bound for Gaza by sea at the port of Ashdod.[231]
Prior to a Gaza visit, scheduled for April 2013, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
explained to Turkish newspaper Hürriyet that the fulfilment of three conditions by Israel was
necessary for friendly relations to resume between Turkey and Israel: an apology for the May 2010
Gaza flotilla raid (Prime Minister Netanyahu had delivered an apology to Erdogan by telephone on
22 March 2013), the awarding of compensation to the families affected by the raid, and the lifting
of the Gaza blockade by Israel. The Turkish prime minister also explained in the Hürriyet
interview, in relation to the April 2013 Gaza visit, "We will monitor the situation to see if the
promises are kept or not."[232] At the same time, Netanyahu affirmed that Israel would only
consider exploring the removal of the Gaza blockade if peace ("quiet") is achieved in the area.[233]
Agriculture
Since the beginning of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the conflict has been about land.[234] When
Israel became a state after the war in 1948, 77% of Palestine's land was used for the creation on the
state. The majority of those living in Palestine at the time became refugees in other countries and
this first land crisis became the root of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[235] Because the root of the
conflict is with land, the disputes between Israel and Palestine are well-manifested in the
agriculture of Palestine.
Palestinian agriculture suffers from numerous problems including Israeli military and civilian
attacks on farms and farmers, blockades to exportation of produce and importation of necessary
inputs, widespread confiscation of land for nature reserves as well as military and settler use,
confiscation and destruction of wells, and physical barriers within the West Bank.[238]
With the construction of the separation barrier, the Israeli state promised free movement across
regions. However, border closures, curfews, and checkpoints has significantly restricted
Palestinian movement.[239] In 2012, there were 99 fixed check points and 310 flying
checkpoints.[240] The border restrictions impacted the imports and exports in Palestine and
weakened the industrial and agricultural sectors because of the constant Israeli control in the West
Bank and Gaza.[241] In order for the Palestinian economy to be prosperous, the restrictions on
Palestinian land must be removed.[238] According to The
Guardian and a report for World Bank, the Palestinian
economy lost $3.4bn (%35 of the annual GDP) to Israeli
restrictions in the West Bank alone.[242]
Boycotts
In response to a weakening trend in Palestinian violence and growing economic and security
cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli military removed over 120
check points in 2010 and planned on disengaging from major Palestinian population areas.
According to the IDF, terrorist activity in the West Bank decreased by 97% compared to violence in
2002.[244]
PA–Israel efforts in the West Bank have "significantly increased investor confidence", and the
Palestinian economy grew 6.8% in 2009.[245][246][247][248]
Since the Second Intifada, Israel has banned Jewish Israelis from
entering Palestinian cities. However, Israeli Arabs are allowed to
enter West Bank cities on weekends.
Mutual recognition
Beginning in 1993 with the Oslo peace process, Israel recognizes "the PLO as the representative of
the Palestinian people", though Israel does not recognize the State of Palestine.[250] In return, it
was agreed that Palestinians would promote peaceful co-existence, renounce violence and promote
recognition of Israel among their own people. Despite Yasser Arafat's official renunciation of
terrorism and recognition of Israel, some Palestinian groups continue to practice and advocate
violence against civilians and do not recognize Israel as a legitimate political entity.[29][251]
Palestinians state that their ability to spread acceptance of Israel was greatly hampered by Israeli
restrictions on Palestinian political freedoms, economic freedoms, civil liberties, and quality of life.
The Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has in recent years refused to recognize Israel as a
Jewish state, citing concerns for Israeli Arabs and a possible future right to return for Palestinian
refugees, though Palestine continues to recognize Israel as a state.[252][253]
The leader of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, which is Fatah's official military wing, has stated that any
peace agreement must include the right of return of Palestinian refugees into lands now part of
Israel, which some Israeli commenters view as "destroying the Jewish state".[254] In 2006, Hamas
won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, where it remains the majority party. Hamas'
charter openly states they seek Israel's destruction, though Hamas leaders have spoken of long-
term truces with Israel in exchange for an end to the occupation of Palestinian territory.[251][255]
Government
The Palestinian Authority is considered corrupt by a wide variety of sources, including some
Palestinians.[256][257][258] Some Israelis argue that it provides tacit support for militants via its
relationship with Hamas and other Islamic militant movements, and that therefore it is unsuitable
for governing any putative Palestinian state or (especially according to the right wing of Israeli
politics), even negotiating about the character of such a state.[134] Because of that, a number of
organizations, including the previously ruling Likud party, declared they would not accept a
Palestinian state based on the current PA.
Societal attitudes
Societal attitudes in both Israel and Palestine are a source of concern to those promoting dispute
resolution.
According to a June 2022 poll carried out by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
that asked Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, "which
of the following means is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an
independent state", 50% supported "armed struggle", 22% favored negotiations until an
agreement could be reached, and 21% supported non-violent popular resistance.[21] 59% of
respondents cite the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known
armed groups as contributing to ending the occupation; 37% disagree. Residents of the Gaza Strip,
youth, students, low-income workers, public sector employees, and Hamas supporters are more
likely to believe that armed attacks contribute to the national interest.[21] An unconditional
resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations is opposed by 69% of Palestinians and supported by
22%. A return to dialogue with the new US administration under Joe Biden is opposed by 65% of
Palestinians, while 29% are in favor.[21]
Palestinian army
Starting in 2006, the United States began training, equipping, and funding the Palestinian
Authority's security forces, which had been cooperating with Israel at unprecedented levels in the
West Bank to quell supporters of Hamas.[177] The US government has spent over $500 million
building and training the Palestinian National Security Forces and Presidential Guard.[177] The
IDF maintains that the US-trained forces will soon be capable of "overrunning small IDF outposts
and isolated Israeli communities" in the event of a conflict.[259]
Fatalities
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Human Affairs database, as of 20 March 2023, there have been
6,269 Palestinian and 293 Israeli fatalities since 1 January
2008.[260] According to B'tselem, during the first intifada from
1987 until 2000, 1,551 Palestinians and 421 Israelis lost their
lives.[261]
Bar chart showing Israeli and
A variety of other studies provide aggregated casualty data for Palestinian deaths from September
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to the Stockholm 2000 to July 2014
International Peace Research Institute, 13,000 Israelis and
Palestinians were killed in conflict with each other between
1948 and 1997.[262] Other estimations give 14,500 killed between 1948 and 2009.[262][263]
Palestinian fatalities during the 1982 Lebanon War were 2,000 PLO combatants killed in armed
conflict with Israel.[264]
Demographic percentages for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict according to Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs from September 2000 until the end of July 2007.[265]
Children Children
Belligerent Combatant Civilian Male Female Children
male female
Palestinian 41% 59% 94% 6% 20% 87% 13%
Not Not
Israeli 31% 69% 69% 31% 12%
available available
Partial casualty figures for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict from the OCHAoPt (http://www.och
aopt.org/)[266]
(numbers in parentheses represent casualties under age 18)
Deaths Injuries
Year
Palestinians Israelis Palestinians Israelis
Figures include both Israeli civilians and security forces casualties in West Bank, Gaza and Israel.
All numbers refer to casualties of direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians including in IDF
military operations, artillery shelling, search and arrest campaigns, barrier demonstrations,
targeted killings, settler violence etc. The figures do not include events indirectly related to the
conflict such as casualties from unexploded ordnance, etc., or events when the circumstances
remain unclear or are in dispute. The figures include all reported casualties of all ages and both
genders.[266]
As reported by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, since 29 September 2000 a total of 7,454
Palestinian and Israeli individuals were killed due to the conflict. According to the report, 1,317 of
the 6,371 Palestinians were minors, and at least 2,996 did not participate in fighting at the time of
death. Palestinians killed 1,083 Israelis, including 741 civilians, of whom 124 were minors.[268]
The Israeli-based International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism criticized the methodology
of Israeli and Palestinian rights groups, including B'tselem, and questioned their accuracy in
classifying civilian/combatant ratios.[269][270]
A comprehensive collection mechanism to gather land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
casualty data does not exist for the Palestinian territories.[271] In 2009, the United Nations Mine
Action Centre reported that more than 2,500 mine and explosive remnants of war casualties
occurred between 1967 and 1998, at least 794 casualties (127 killed, 654 injured and 13 unknown)
occurred between 1999 and 2008 and that 12 people had been killed and 27 injured since the Gaza
War.[271] The UN Mine Action Centre identified the main risks as coming from "ERW left behind
by Israeli aerial and artillery weapon systems, or from militant caches targeted by the Israeli
forces."[271] There are at least 15 confirmed minefields in the West Bank on the border with
Jordan. The Palestinian National Security Forces do not have maps or records of the
minefields.[271]
See also
Israel portal
Palestine portal
Explanatory notes
1. Three factors made Israel's territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the
91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by
approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area
of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 km2
near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 km2), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea
(195 km2), which reduces the total to 5,538 km2. Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent (of
5,538 km2 of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective.
Jeremy Pressman, International Security, vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, "Visions in Collision: What
Happened at Camp David and Taba?" (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160304082619/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/file
s/pressman.pdf) 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. On [1] (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvar
d.edu/publication/322/visions_in_collision.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2011072
2061359/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/322/visions_in_collision.html) 22 July
2011 at the Wayback Machine. See pp. 16–17
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External links
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