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Savings and borrowing
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1. The time value of money
• What would you prefer: £1000 today or £1000 in one year’s time?
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1. The time value of money
£1000 £1000(1 + 𝑟)
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1. The time value of money
• In general:
Present value Future value
𝑦
(1 + 𝑟) 𝑦
£"
• is the ‘price’ of one extra unit of consumption in the next time period -
("$%)
what you must save today to have £1 more next period
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Present discounted value
𝑦' , 𝑦" , 𝑦( , … 𝑦) … 𝑦*
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Present discounted value
• The present discounted value of lifetime wealth:
+! +" +# +$
𝑦' + "$%
+ "$% "
+⋯ "$% #
+⋯ "$% $
,! ," ,# ,$
𝑐' + "$%
+ "$% "
+⋯ "$% #
+⋯ "$% $
• The consumer derives utility from consumption in the two periods, with
preferences described 𝑢 𝑐' , 𝑐"
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Assume perfect capital markets
This is a strong assumption which implies:
1. No uncertainty
2. Can borrow and lend at the same interest rate 𝑟
3. The only constraint on borrowing is that the consumer has enough
income to repay debt
4. There is a perfect and costless mechanism that ensures no one takes on
loans that they cannot repay and that all debts are repaid
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3. The intertemporal budget constraint
• Consider each time period:
𝑦! ● Borrowing
0 𝑦! 𝑐'
𝑦" 𝑦" +
1+𝑟
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3. The intertemporal budget constraint
• Lets have a closer look at the budget constraint
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4. Saving and borrowing decisions
• Assume consumer preferences satisfy completeness, transitivity and
continuity so can be represented by a utility function 𝑢 𝑐' , 𝑐"
• The consumer chooses 𝑐' and 𝑐" to maximise 𝑢 𝑐' , 𝑐" subject to:
1. The intertemporal budget constraint: 𝑐! = 𝑦! + 1 + 𝑟 𝑦" − 1 + 𝑟 𝑐"
2. Non-negativity constraints 𝑐' ≥ 0, 𝑐" ≥ 0
𝑦! ● Borrowing household
𝑐! ●
0 𝑦! 𝑐'
𝑦" 𝑐" 𝑦" +
1+𝑟
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Optimal consumption
𝑐"
Endowment: 𝑦' , 𝑦"
𝑦! + 1 + 𝑟 𝑦" Utility maximised where:
𝑐! ● 𝑀𝑅𝑆 = 1 + 𝑟
𝑦! ● Saving household
0 𝑐" 𝑦! 𝑐'
𝑦" 𝑦" +
1+𝑟
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5. Effects of an interest rate increase
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5. Effects of an interest rate increase
𝑐" • The interest rate rises from 𝑟𝐴 to 𝑟𝐵
− 1 + 𝑟$
𝑦! ●
Endowment
• New budget line is steeper
− 1 + 𝑟#
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 19
Borrower
𝑐" • Any household that borrows before
− 1 + 𝑟$
and after the rate increase is worse
off after the rate increase
𝑦! ●
● 𝐵 ●𝐴
− 1 + 𝑟#
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 20
Borrower: income and substitution effect
𝑐" • Substitution effect: A to D
− 1 + 𝑟$
• Income effect: D to B
𝑦! ●
●𝐷
● 𝐵 ●𝐴
− 1 + 𝑟#
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 21
Borrower: income and substitution effect
𝑐" Substitution effect: A to D
− 1 + 𝑟$ • Borrowing more expensive so reduces
𝑐' and increases 𝑐(
• negative effect on 𝑐'
Income effect: D to B
𝑦! ● • Borrowing more expensive so poorer
●𝐷
• reduces 𝑐' and 𝑐( if normal
● 𝐵 ●𝐴 • negative effect on 𝑐'
− 1 + 𝑟#
0 • Both effects decrease borrowing
𝑦" 𝑐' 22
Saver
𝑐" • Any household that saves before
− 1 + 𝑟$
the rate increase is better off after
the rate increase
●𝐵
− 1 + 𝑟#
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 23
Saver: income and substitution effect
Substitution effect: A to D
𝑐" • Saving more rewarding so increases
− 1 + 𝑟$ saving
●𝐵 • negative effect on 𝑐'
●
𝐷 ●
𝐴 Income effect: D to B
𝑦! ●
• Saving more rewarding so richer
• raises 𝑐' and 𝑐( if normal
• positive effect on 𝑐'
− 1 + 𝑟#
Ambiguous effect on saving
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 24
Borrower could become a saver!
𝑐" • Household that switches from
− 1 + 𝑟$
borrowing to saving is better off
after the rate change
●𝐵
• Income and substitution effects as
𝑦! in saver case
●
𝐴
− 1 + 𝑟#
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 25
6. Different borrowing and lending rates
• So far we have assumed the borrowing and lending rates are equal
• But banks profit from the difference between the rate at which they borrow
and the rate at which they lend or invest their money
• Also, if some borrowers default then banks must charge a higher interest
rate so as not to make losses overall
• So in general 𝑟- > 𝑟.
• Banks might also impose credit limits; in 2008 banks were unwilling to lend
to each other, due to worries about default due to bank failure
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6. Different borrowing and lending rates
𝑐"
• Kinked budget line
− 1 + 𝑟& • Borrowing segment with slope
− 1 + 𝑟-
𝑦!
• Saving segment with slope
− 1 + 𝑟.
− 1 + 𝑟%
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 27
6. Different borrowing and lending rates
𝑐"
Borrower
− 1 + 𝑟&
𝑦!
●
− 1 + 𝑟%
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 28
6. Different borrowing and lending rates
𝑐"
Saver
− 1 + 𝑟&
●
𝑦!
− 1 + 𝑟%
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 29
6. Different borrowing and lending rates
𝑐"
Neither borrow nor save
− 1 + 𝑟& • Many households would
optimise at the kink
𝑦! ●
− 1 + 𝑟%
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 30
Let’s add a credit limit
𝑐"
• Borrowing limited
− 1 + 𝑟& • If the credit limit binds, then the
borrower is worse off
𝑦! ● − 1+𝑟
%
●
●
0
𝑦" 𝑐' 31
What have we achieved?
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Appendix:
A closer look at non-satiation in this model
Non-satiation
• The consumer chooses the income stream with the highest present value
• Consider:
𝑐"
• Income stream A: 𝑦') , 𝑦()
• Income stream B: 𝑦'* , 𝑦(*
● 𝑦"# , 𝑦!#
●𝐵
0 𝑐'