SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43

https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-020-00034-0

ORIGINAL PAPER

Methodology and political science: the discipline needs

three fundamentally different methodological traditions

Johann Lauer1 

Received: 2 May 2020 / Accepted: 17 November 2020 / Published online: 11 January 2021
© The Author(s) 2021

Abstract
Science is driven by methodology. In this article, I will show that political science,
like all other social sciences, can draw on three fundamentally different methodolog-
ical traditions. The first is a descriptive tradition to generate descriptive knowledge
to describe political phenomena and interpret political symbols (text, image, audio
and video). The second is an explanatory-prognostic tradition to generate explana-
tory and prognostic knowledge to explain and predict political events. The third is
a genuine practical (not applied!) tradition to generate and scientifically legitimate
practical knowledge for political standardization and regulation. Furthermore, I will
show that political science would greatly increase its relevance to practical politics
and to society if all methodological traditions within the discipline were used com-
plementarily and applied in their updated forms. The descriptive tradition makes it
possible to describe political reality as well as sociologists, for example, do. The
explanatory-prognostic tradition is necessary to be heard alongside the economic
sciences. The practical tradition allows catching up with jurisprudence.

Keywords  Political methodology · Descriptive · Explanatory-prognostic and

practical tradition · Practical political science methodology

Introduction

State of research: the methodological science war (Methodenstreit)

at the beginning of the twenty‑first century

Since the nineteenth century, there have been methodological disputes (“science
war”, Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 1) within the social sciences, which are also classified
in the English-speaking world under the German term “Methodenstreit” (Lauer
2017). In political science, the beginning of the twenty-first century witnesses two

* Johann Lauer
johann@lauer.biz
1
Leimen, Germany

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methodological traditions that are often irreconcilable. A comparison of the two tra-
ditions can be found in Moses and Knutsen (2012 [2007]), while the historical back-
ground is described by von Wright (1971).
Today the most influential political scientists are the naturalists, (neo-) positiv-
ists or scientistic scientists, who are oriented towards the natural sciences and pre-
fer a logical-mathematical methodology (King et al. 1994; Brady and Collier 2010
[2004]; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2010 [2008]). The constructivists, interpretivists or
perestroikans are oriented towards the humanities and prefer an interpretive or lin-
guistic-hermeneutic methodology (Bevir and Rhodes 2016; Creswell 2013 [1998];
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014a [2006]; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).

Questions

The following questions require investigation:

(1) What relevance do rational methodologies have for science?

(2) What methodological traditions does political science require?
(3) How can the methodological science war (Methodenstreit) be overcome?
(4) How can political science increase its relevance to practical politics and to soci-
ety?

Goals

Science is methodology‑driven (chapter 2)

The role of methodology is a major point of contention in the science war men-
tioned above. The naturalists are criticized for their reliance on method and theory;
keywords here are method-driven and theory-driven. Furthermore, their critics (con-
structivists, interpretivists and perestroikans) point out the alleged lack of public rel-
evance (Flyvbjerg 2001), sterile method orientation (Green and Shapiro 1994; Sha-
piro 2005; Héretier 2016) or unworldly self-centeredness in the form of methodical
scholasticism (Mead 2010).
However, a problem-oriented science (problem-driven, problem-based) is
required, which pays particular attention to substantive research and also includes
the active involvement of those concerned and of researchers. This would increase
the public’s attention both to those affected and to political science, and ultimately
generate more influence and relevance for both. In addition, they demand methodi-
cal pluralism.
The theory and method levels are at the center of the science war. I point out
that methodology is far broader. Theory and method are only two of ten methodo-
logical levels; there are also the philosophical, knowledge, concept, sentence, logic
and argumentation levels, the level of ideals and properties, and the methodical
approaches level (see Table 1, first column).
In this article, I want to show that science is always methodology-driven, regardless
of whether it deals with theoretical or practical questions and problems. In antiquity,
Table 1  Three traditions and ten levels of political methodology
Scientific methodologies and types of I. Descriptive tradition: empirical- II. Explanatory-prognostic tradition: III. Practical tradition: practical (norma-
science descriptive methodology (sciences) empirical-explanatory and empirical- tive, pragmatic and technical) methodol-
prognostic methodology (sciences) ogy (sciences)

1. Philosophical level Descriptions: description of (visible) Explanations and predictions: recogni- Valuations:
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phenomena, interpretation of symbols tion and explanation of invisible World change, design of the political
(text, image, audio and video), mainly causalities using especially logic and order, practical (normative, pragmatic
by means of language mathematics and technical) standards (norms) and
regulations using logic, language and
mathematics
2. Knowledge level Empirical-descriptive Empirical-explanatory and empirical- Practical (normative, pragmatic and tech-
Knowledge predictive knowledge nical) knowledge
3. Level of ideals and properties Ideal of truth Ideal of rightness (ethics): right/wrong
Predicates: true or false Ideal of justice (politics): just/unjust
Ideal of phronesis (Klugheit): wise/unwise
Ideal of efficacy: effective/ineffective
4. Concept level Qualitative, interpretative or classifica- Quantitative, mathematical or metric Practical (normative, pragmatic and tech-
tory concepts concepts nical) concepts
5. Sentence level Descriptive propositions Explanatory and predictive propositions Norms, i.e. justice standards, pragmatic
and technical rules
6. Theory level Empirical theories consist of systems of propositions, including propositions about Practical theories consist of regulations,
standards and rules i.e. systems of empirical statements and
practical standards and regulations
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Table 1  (continued)
Scientific methodologies and types of
science
7. Logic level
Formal inference and inference rules
related to scientific concepts and scien-
tific sentences
8. Argumentation level
Argumentation inside scientific theories
or logical structure of scientific argu-
ments, logic of scientific research
43 
I. Descriptive tradition: empirical- II. Explanatory-prognostic tradition: III. Practical tradition: practical (norma-
descriptive methodology (sciences) empirical-explanatory and empirical- tive, pragmatic and technical) methodol-
prognostic methodology (sciences) ogy (sciences)
Page 4 of 29
Truth-apt logic: Unlike classical logic, these are not truth-
Propositional logic: It is the case that […] apt (Jørgensen’s dilemma)
Predicate logic: F “is a human” Logic of norms (act-ought/Tun-Sollen, not
Modal logic, e.g. alethic modal logic: is-ought/Sein-Sollen), logic of impera-
It is necessary/impossible/possible/contingent that […] tives, interrogative logic, legal logic,
Epistemic (doxastic) logic: logic of implementation (Durchführung-
It is believed/considered impossible/conceivable that […] slogik)
Tense logic: It was/will be/always will be/always was the case that […] Efficacy and rightness, prima facie
Deontic logic (is-ought/Sein-Sollen): property of ethical norms and political
It ought to be/it is forbidden/permitted/indifferent that […] maxims of action
Conflicts of justice standards and media-
tion of justice standards
Analytical, dialectical, empirical, evolutionary or hermeneutic means of argumen- Practical (normative, pragmatic and tech-
tation nical) argumentation
Explaining-understanding-debate thought of as complementary Practical, substantive argumentation: prac-
tical syllogism and pragmatic syllogism
Understanding Explaining
Abductive, inductive, substantial, Deductive, analytical, warrant-estab-
warrant-using, tentative, formally lishing, conclusive, formally valid
invalid, epagogic argumentation: argumentation: deductive-nomological
Hegelian dialectics, hermeneutic circle model (or HO schema), evolutionary
explanatory model
Aristotelian topic (dialectics)
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Table 1  (continued)
Scientific methodologies and types of
science
9. Methods level
with reference to political science
Scientific investigation of facts and
judgments,
generation and evaluation of facts
10. Methodical approaches level with
reference to political science
Generation and evaluation of theories
Source: Lauer (2017), p. 52, edited
version
I. Descriptive tradition: empirical- II. Explanatory-prognostic tradition: III. Practical tradition: practical (norma-
descriptive methodology (sciences) empirical-explanatory and empirical- tive, pragmatic and technical) methodol-
prognostic methodology (sciences) ogy (sciences)
Empirical-descriptive methods Empirical-explanatory and empirical- Practical (normative, pragmatic and tech-
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predictive methods nical) methods
Qualitative methods: Quantitative methods: quantitative data Arguing, discourse, deliberation, media-
analysis, document analysis, participa- collection, correlation and regression tion, synopsis, categorical imperative,
tory observation analyses evaluation, implementation planning,
technology assessment (TA)
Triangulation: The application of quantitative and qualitative methods to a phe-
nomenon
Approaches with empirical and practical elements
Socio-technological, synoptic, practical-normative, critical-dialectical, empirical-normative, argumentative and pragmatic
approach, rational choice approach, advocacy coalition approach, governance approaches, actor-centered approaches (deci-
sion arenas, networks, exchange and negotiation systems, regimes)
Empirical approaches Practical approaches
Historical, institutional and structur- Behavioral, functional and quantitative Participatory policy approach, decision-
alist approach, narratives, frames, approach ist, synoptic, normative, pragmatic and
discourses technical approach
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scientific methodology established the transition from myth to logos. The methodology
therefore used is found especially in the Aristotelian Organon. The central relevance
of scientific methodology is a given, because methodology forms a demarcation line
between rational (scientific) knowledge and other forms of knowledge. Incidentally,
this demarcation line is constantly changing, precisely because of the methodological
developments, and indeed the limits of scientific knowledge are ceaselessly expanding
and contracting again. Furthermore, the methodology plays a special role in the train-
ing and socialization of professional representatives, in hiring at scientific institutes,
and later in the promotion of research, such as in the allocation of research funding or
in the enabling of publications.

Three (descriptive, explanatory‑prognostic and practical) methodological traditions

for political science (chapter 3)

The principal differences between three methodological traditions (empirical, explan-

atory-prognostic and practical) will be elaborated in chapter 3. The explanatory-prog-
nostic methodology of the naturalists is the most complex and developed methodology.
Therefore, its reconstruction and criticism occupy the widest space in this article. An
overview of the possibilities and limitations of these three traditions or a logical geog-
raphy of an extended political science methodology can be found in the table “Three
Traditions and Ten Levels of Political Science Methodology” (Table 1).
The second focus is my criticism, directed both at the naturalists and at the construc-
tivists, that their methodology is not suitable for the generation of practical knowledge.
Thus, only empirical knowledge can be justified with their methodology. Because of
these shortcomings, I introduce a third, genuinely practical methodology and briefly
outline its basics.
The aim of this article is not to use empirical cases to show how concrete research
is carried out within political science. Rather, it is to critically examine the norma-
tive requirements using method handbooks. Therefore, only method handbooks are
addressed in this article, and no key examples of real political research.
The Methodenstreit can be overcome if a complementarity between the three meth-
odological traditions is recognized and these traditions are used in a complementary
way. The political methodology must first be explained, explicated, clarified and recon-
structed. Of course, existing methodologies must be further developed, expanded and
complemented by further methodological innovations. The complementarity of these
three traditions arises from their limitations and possibilities, so their complementarity
is shown.
Finally, I end the article with a summary of the main findings and with recommen-
dations and avenues for further research.
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Methodology and science: science is methodology‑driven

The terms “method” and “methodology” are not synonymous. Methodology is

the broader term and refers to the totality of all methodological discussions, or
what is often referred to as methods in a broader sense. In methodological dis-
courses, it is discussed which methodology should be used for the generation of
knowledge and how one can distinguish science from other forms of knowledge.
The term “method” is used in a narrower sense: only the tools that enable
the scientific identification of facts (such as correlation and regression analysis,
content analysis, participant observation) are called methods. In addition to the
method level, I have elaborated nine other methodological levels: the others are
the philosophical, knowledge, concept, sentence, theory, logic and argumenta-
tion, ideals and properties, and the methodical approaches levels (see Table  1,
first column).

Relevance of methodology for science

Firstly, the central relevance of scientific methodology lies in the fact that it is
methodology alone that legitimizes the difference between science and other
forms of recognition. Science is the place where scientific knowledge is gener-
ated. In this place, by means of methodology, the scientificity of knowledge is
guaranteed and constituted, so that science provides scientific authority to this
knowledge. In antiquity, methodology established the transition from myth to
logos, and also today it still makes it possible to distinguish between scientific
knowledge and other forms of knowledge that are not scientifically, i.e., not meth-
odologically and not systematically, generated.
Methodology simply delimits the boundaries of “science”; the terms “knowl-
edge” and “science” belong together. In Latin the word scientia means both sci-
ence and knowledge, in German one speaks of Wissenschaft (science) and Wissen
(knowledge).
In the German science tradition those who pursue a rational and systematic
approach are categorized as scientists; therefore, there are human, cultural, nat-
ural, social and technical sciences (Geistes-, Kultur-, Natur-, Sozial- und Tech-
nikwissenschaften). In American political science, in contrast, the word “science”
is used in a narrower sense. The term is reserved, at least by the scientistic estab-
lishment, for those who follow a reductionist agenda with a logical-mathematical
methodology (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2010 [2008]).
The naturalists construct a contrast between disciplined political scientists
(Goodin 2011 [2009], p. 32) and undisciplined political theorists: “Political the-
ory is an interdisciplinary endeavour whose centre of gravity lies at the humani-
ties end of the happily still undisciplined discipline of political science” (Dryzek
et  al. 2011 [2009], p. 62, see p. 63, scientist versus theorist). The contrast lies
between the scientists who want to explain and the artists who want to understand
the world, between the scientists and the theorists, both want to change the world.
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Methodology is a tool (Organon) and object of science

Scientists generate knowledge within scientific institutions with the help of various
scientific tools. Methodology is both the tool and the object of science. As a tool, it
serves to generate content in the form of scientific knowledge. Methodology itself
is also the subject of scientific research, through which methodology is critically
evaluated, enhanced and further developed. Scientific methodology establishes a
demarcation line between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. This
line of demarcation is constantly changing, especially because of the methodologi-
cal developments, and indeed the limits of methodology and therefore of scientific
knowledge are frequently widened or narrowed.
Secondly, methodology also plays a special role in fields other than knowledge
generation, such as the training and socialization of professional representatives,
recruitment to scientific institutes and, later, the promotion of research, for instance
through the allocation of research funding in scientific institutes or the facilitation of
publications (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014a [2006], pp. 421–422).
In principle, one can distinguish between two different meanings of methodology.
The endogenous significance of methodology lies in distinguishing scientifically
legitimized knowledge from other forms of knowledge. The exogenous importance
of methodology on the other hand governs the socialization and co-optation of new
members in the science system and furthermore in contributing to the promotion of
research and the development of society.

Three traditions of political methodology

The distinction between different traditions makes it possible to identify the funda-
mental differences within political methodology. I have identified three methodo-
logical traditions (Table 1, column 2–4, Lauer 2017) with the help of the concepts
of von Wright (1971) and Lakatos (1978), which I will briefly introduce below. The
foundations of these traditions can be found in the Aristotelian Organon (Aristo-
tle 2019, fourth century BC).
In a first step, I will establish not just the limits, but above all the possibilities of
the descriptive and the explanative-prognostic traditions (“Descriptive tradition” and
“Explanatory-prognostic tradition”). The applied methodologies of these two tradi-
tions are discussed separately in “Problem-driven methodology: applied phronesis”
and "Applied methodology: social technology". The limitations of the descriptive
and the explanative-prognostic traditions, the barriers that political scientists cannot
overcome, are established by showing first the possibilities of the two traditions in
“Descriptive tradition” and “Explanatory-prognostic tradition”, and then their lim-
its in “Problem-driven methodology: applied phronesis” and "Applied methodol-
ogy: social technology". The fundamental limits of these applied methodologies are
established, the foundations of which go back primarily to pragmatism and, for the
scientistic tradition, to Bacon, Weber and Popper.
In “Philosophical foundations of the practical tradition” I reconstruct the philo-
sophical foundations of the practical tradition. I then explain why applied or better
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 9 of 29  43

practical political questions require their own methodology ("Applied methodology:

social technology"). Then I briefly outline the fundamentals of a practical methodol-
ogy, which is based above all on the fundamentals developed by Aristotle and Kant
(“Practical methodology (normative, pragmatic and technical)”).
It is certainly true that there is better and worse work by qualitative research-
ers, just as there is by quantitative researchers. But that is not my point. Above all,
I examine the method books that actually define the criteria for good research. My
aim is not to show good and bad scientific work using individual examples, but to
illustrate the discussions using the example of the methodological manuals.

Descriptive tradition

The descriptive tradition can be explained very briefly because there is no great con-
troversy about the limits and possibilities of this methodology. This methodologi-
cal tradition stands on its own and cannot be reduced to any other methodological
tradition.

Philosophical foundations of the descriptive tradition

The goal of the empirical-descriptive tradition is understanding (sense making,

meaning making). It is firstly about describing (visible) phenomena and secondly
about the interpretation of symbols (text, image, audio and video), above all through
language. It uses an empirical-descriptive methodology. Sense making and mean-
ing making can be found above all in the human and cultural sciences (humanities),
which is where hermeneutic, phenomenological and structuralist explorations of
meanings and contexts have commonly been based. Hermeneutics, phenomenolo-
gists, structuralists, interpretivists and perestroikans all belong to this very heteroge-
neous tradition.
Creswell includes the following interpretative frameworks of qualitative research:
postpositivism, social constructivism, transformative frameworks, postmodern
perspectives, pragmatism, feminist theory, critical theory and critical race theory
(CRT), queer theory, and disability theory (Creswell 2013 [1998], 22 ff.). Creswell
distinguishes five qualitative approaches: narrative research, phenomenology,
grounded theory, ethnography, case study.
All the scientists working in these fields criticize the naturalists, (neo)positivists,
or scientistic scientists who constitute a very homogenous tradition which will be
presented in the next section. A so-called Methodenstreit (Lauer 2017) erupted in
the nineteenth century on the philosophical (axiological, epistemic, methodological
and ontological) level between the descriptive and the explanatory-prognostic tradi-
tion. In the second half of the twentieth century, the fight shifted primarily to the
methodical level in the strict sense of the term, namely between quantitative and
qualitative methods. Since the turn of this century, the Methodenstreit has yet shifted
from the methods level back to the philosophical level. The phronetic perestroikans’
argumentation for a “real social science” (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012) is also made on the
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philosophical level. The phronetic perestroikans are the latest (counter-) revolution
to the scientistic Establishment.

Empirical‑descriptive methodology

Scientists who are primarily interested in hermeneutics and phenomenology, and

thus not in the natural sciences but in the humanities, can in the meantime resort to a
very differentiated and elaborate methodology, i.e., hermeneutic-interpretative ways
of reasoning and qualitative-interpretive methods (Bevir and Rhodes 2016; Creswell
2013 [1998]; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014a [2006]). For some years now, logi-
cal-mathematical methods have also found their way into the humanities. The digital
humanities are increasingly using logical-mathematical methods for text interpreta-
tion due to the emergence of big data (Budrick et al. 2012).

Explanatory‑prognostic tradition

The explanatory-prognostic tradition works with an empirical explanatory-prognostic

methodology. The scientistic scientists in political science wish to set themselves apart
from the humanist traditions through their orientation on the natural sciences and their
introduction of a logical-mathematical research methodology. This requires its own axi-
ological, epistemic, methodological and ontological foundations. For the most up-to-
date and comprehensive overview of the explanatory-prognostic methodology, see The
Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2010 [2008]).
According to Goodin (2011 [2009], p. 13), there have been three revolutions in
American political science. The first was the establishment of politics as a science
and its orientation on the natural sciences, above all through the introduction of
causal and empirical thinking, deductive and inductive argumentations, the intro-
duction of professional and systematic approaches and the establishment of political
science as a discipline especially at American universities at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The second revolution, the “behavioral revolution”, came in the
1950s, and the “rational choice revolution” took place in the 1970s.
The explanatory-prognostic tradition has by far the most developed methodology.
Therefore, its explanation takes up the most space. The methodology of the explana-
tive-prognostic traditions consists of several methodological scientistic research pro-
grams that complement each other and are constantly evolving (Lauer 2017, pp. 53
and 56):

A. Orientation on the natural sciences

B. Causal thinking or causal reductionism
C. Empiricism or empirical reductionism
D. Rationalism
E. Quantitative research program
F. Model thinking (especially rational choice approach)
G. Qualitative-mathematical research program
H. Experimental-simulative research program based on experiment and simulation.
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Empiricism and rationality are the overriding principles to which scientific

research must adhere, since scientific theories consist of logical formalism and an
empirical foundation. Science requires both a rational formalization and an empir-
ical anchoring. These principles are fundamental for both empirical and practical
knowledge and therefore for empirical and practical methodology.
In the following, I shall deal with three core elements: causal reductionism,
empirical reductionism, and rationalism. This will be preceded by a quantitative
overview of the dissemination of this tradition.

Dissemination of the explanatory‑prognostic tradition

The explanatory-prognostic tradition does not dominate the mainstream of political

science, as is claimed by many scholars. Quantitative analyses show that since the
1950s only a minority of researchers have carried out such investigations. Only 5%
of US scientists, especially behavioralists and rational choice theorists, use a quan-
titative methodology. Only one-third of authors publish causal analyses in scientific
journals. Although that number has risen to about 35% in the APSR and has been
constant since the 1970s, the number for all articles in JSTOR was under 20% in the
1990s (Goodin 2011 [2009], p. 13).
Furthermore, there is a gap between causal (roughly one-third) and linguistic-
interpretive (6%) studies (narrative and interpretative), the latter increasing only
in the 1980s within the most important American publications (Brady et  al. 2011
[2009], p. 1036).
Considering furthermore that quantitative researchers prefer to publish their
results as articles, while qualitative-interpretive researchers more often publish their
results in book form, causal thinking and quantitative research are clearly far from
forming the majority of political science publications.
However, quantitative researchers of the explanatory-prognostic tradition have a
very strong influence within political science institutions, not least because, accord-
ing to some scientists, they dominate the APSA and other scientific institutions
(Monroe 2005). Based on these analyses, it is not possible to speak of “mainstream”,
but since this is a very influential minority, I call it the “scientistic establishment”
(Lauer 2017). Representatives of this tradition can be found in every political sci-
ence department worldwide. In his critique of the establishment, Mr. Perestroika
writes of “East Coast Brahmins” (Mr. Perestroika 2005 [2000], p. 9) who control
the APSA and the editorial board of APSR. However, the phenomenon is in no way
restricted to the East Coast of the United States.

Causal reductionism

Objectives of causal thinking  Causality is the ontological condition par excellence.

Like Goethe’s Faust, causal reductionists search only for what holds the world
together at its core. More pragmatically, causality is “The Cement of the Universe”
(Mackie 1974). Those who identify causalities can recognize and change the world:
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“Causal statements explain events, allow predictions about the future, and make it
possible to take action to affect the future” (Brady 2011 [2009], p. 1054).
The search for invisible causalities is the common thread that holds together
the explanatory-prognostic tradition. While phenomena or appearances are vis-
ible (the Greek word phainómenon means visible, appearance), causality is invis-
ible, so one can describe appearances, but only explain causalities: “To explain
is to expose the internal workings, to lay bare the hidden mechanisms, to open
the black boxes nature presents to us” (Salmon 1989, p. 134). This is stated by
philosophers of science and is also taught in the corresponding political methods
books.
Causality is primarily about inferences: “Obviously, we do not thereby mean
that one directly observes causation. Rather, this involves inference, not direct
observation” (Seawright and Collier 2010 [2004], p. 318, emphasis in the origi-
nal). “Inference” is the magic word: “The goal is inference [emphasis in the origi-
nal]” (King et  al. 1994, p. 7). Secondarily, it is about observations (data-set or
causal-process observations, Brady and Collier 2010 [2004]).
All methodological innovations (quantitative methods, model thinking, quali-
tative-mathematical methods, experiments, simulations) only serve the purpose of
identifying invisible causalities and therefore causal regularities between different
events on the macro level and concrete causal mechanisms at the micro level. Within
this tradition, therefore, only causalities are sought; causality is the only relation that
counts, and other relations or even contexts are of no interest (see also King et al.
1994, p. 75). I therefore speak of causal reductionism (Lauer 2017).

From correlation to  causality Causal thinking requires different, very com-

plex methodological approaches to identify causalities. These methodological
approaches are based on corresponding philosophical theories of causality, which
were developed primarily by philosophers of science. In this case, the methodo-
logical approaches presented by Brady (2011 [2009]) ultimately form the core of
four causal theories (Salmon 1989), which have been operationalized in such a
way that the procedure for finding causalities can be specified. The main purpose
of these theories is to establish the properties of causality and criteria that can be
used to distinguish valid from invalid causal explanations.
Brady (2011 [2009]) has presented four methodological approaches, all of
which are necessary to identify causalities or explain events causally:

I. Regularity or neo-Humean approach to determine regularities (correlations,

not causalities!).
II. Counterfactual approach to eliminate random correlations.
III. Manipulative approach to determine the time arrow or the identification of
cause and effect.
IV. Mechanism approach for the exact determination of the causal mechanism.

With the regularity approach, a conjunction between two events, technically

speaking between two variables, is established. Thus, a regular and constant
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 13 of 29  43

correlation between two events can be demonstrated with correlation and regres-
sion analysis. With the help of experiments (thought experiments, but also labo-
ratory and field experiments) and/or simulations, one can imagine, but also arti-
ficially generate, possible worlds in which the cause does not appear, and then
see what happens. The aim of the counterfactual approach is to sort out random
correlations. With the regulative and counterfactual approaches, one can recog-
nize correlations and probabilities and thus confirm the simultaneous existence
of two variables, but identify neither the cause (independent, explanatory vari-
able) nor the effect (dependent, explained variable). That is, one can recognize
the symmetrical, but not the asymmetrical property of causality. The manipula-
tive approach, which also draws on experiments and/or simulations, should first
determine the direction of causality or the arrow of time and thus identify one
variable as a cause and the other as an effect. Since, by definition, the cause of an
action precedes the action, cause and effect can also be identified.
These approaches are macro-level studies that cannot answer the following
questions: How can a specific correlation at the micro level be identified? How
does the causal mechanism work?
The first question is about solving the pairing problem at the micro level, with
the micro level simply forming each case. The second question aims at the ontic
conception of causality (Salmon 1989). In other words, causality also has an
ontological property as well as being nomological.
Regulative, counterfactual and manipulative theories of causation, methodi-
cally generated using correlation methods, experiments and simulations, can
demonstrate the nomological aspect of causality and even partially answer the
“why” question. However, the question of “how” is an ontological question and
should above all explain how a cause produces an effect. Macro-analysis consist-
ing of hypothesis-testing methods is therefore not enough to move from correla-
tion to causality; microanalysis is required.
Here we come to the fundamental limitation of deduction: there is no deduc-
tive certainty, just as there can be no inductive certainty. Even if one has recog-
nized the biological causal mechanism at the micro level, one cannot conclude
that this relationship applies in all cases at the macro level. Smoking cannot
explain lung cancer in all cases (limitation of induction), and smoking causes
lung cancer only usually, but not in every single case (limitation of deduction).
Both deduction and induction therefore have structural limitations. This is also
an argument against fallibilism. There is no asymmetry between induction and
deduction in causal analysis, as Popper (1968 [1934]) claimed. However, it makes
no sense to demonize deduction as Popper demonized induction. The covering
law model was the most popular scientific argumentation in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. This model is now ignored for good reasons; it is not even
mentioned in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Box-Steffens-
meier et al. 2010 [2008]).
Today, quantitative-mathematical methods are used at the macro level, and
qualitative-mathematical methods (not to be confused with the qualitative-interpre-
tative methods) at the micro level, e.g., process analysis and qualitative compara-
tive analysis (QCA). Qualitative-mathematical methods are used in case studies or
43 
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small-N studies to identify specific causal mechanisms as well as to solve the pairing
problem.
Interpretivists also speak of “qualitative-positivist” methods (Schwartz-Shea
2014 [2006], p. 143, footnote 6). I use the term qualitative-mathematical methods,
since they are based on logic and mathematics, more precisely on modal logic, set
theory and statistics (Lauer 2017).
The four methodical approaches for determining causality will now be described
using an example. With the regularity approach, one can, e.g., discover that there is
a correlation, regularity or probabilistic law between smoking and lung cancer. The
counterfactual approach can be used to show that this is not a random correlation,
and the manipulative approach allows us to identify smoking as the cause of lung
cancer and lung cancer as the effect of smoking; more specifically, it shows what
temporal occurrences between these two variables exist.
The complexity is increased by the existence of other causal relations. Further
causal analysis shows that other environmental contaminants also lead to lung can-
cer (equifinality), and that some people do not develop lung cancer despite intensive
smoking while others who do not smoke get lung cancer (asymmetric causality).
In other words, different effects may have a common cause (equifinality), and con-
versely, a cause in combination with other conditions may produce different effects
(multicollinearity, conjunctural causality).
This brings us to the pairing problem. Now, if someone who has smoked dies of
lung cancer, the question of the cause of death remains unsolved: smoking, or other
environmental factors? Only when all these questions have been clarified can one
state that this specific individual died from smoking.
Science is characterized by specialization, so reducing complexity is generally
the beginning of any scientific work. Every scientist has to apply Occam’s razor.
Unfortunately, there is no safe way to separate important from unimportant factors.
A central goal in methodological handbooks is to determine how to filter out unim-
portant factors (King et  al. 1994; Brady and Collier 2010 [2004]). But in spite of
all caution, there is typically the danger that one overlooks or ignores a third fac-
tor. This already describes the Galton problem (Moses and Knutsen 2012 [2007], p.
105).
With the causal approaches presented so far, only a correlation was established
and the chronology was clarified. But this does not yet explain the how, or what
mechanism is at work. Yet this is necessary for the causal explanation to be com-
plete. The next major problem is therefore the Mill problem. Statistical and compar-
ative methods cannot specify any necessity for the different variables studied (Moses
and Knutsen 2012 [2007], p. 105).
The causal mechanism of how smoking causes lung cancer has not yet been
explained, i.e., the ontic property of causality still needs to be explained. In other
words, only the “why”, but not the “how” question has been answered. Therefore,
the mechanism approach is needed to identify the underlying causal mechanism
(Salmon 1989, p. 181).
The existence of a variety of qualitative-mathematical methods for determining
causality at the micro level within case studies and small-N studies shows that even
scientistic studies use not only nomothetic but also idiographic investigations. This
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 15 of 29  43

is precisely what the perestroikans and other interpretivists deny. Windelband (1900
[1894]) was the first author to make a distinction between natural sciences, which
aim at recognizing the general by means of nomothetic methods, and humanities,
which aim at recognizing the individual by means of idiographic methods.

Actor‑centered or  teleological explanations  Causal reductionism is criticized for

being insufficient to explain actions. Explaining only the effects of actions is not
enough; one also wants to explain the intentions of the actors. von Wright (1971) has
pointed out that in addition to causal explanations, an action theory also requires fun-
damentally different teleological explanations. To use his terminology, the Galilean
tradition needs to be complemented by the Aristotelian tradition.
The rational choice approach aimed at providing a comprehensive explanation of
social and political behavior. While systems theory and (neo-) Marxism offer expla-
nations from a holistic viewpoint and with methodological holism, rational choice
models attempt explanations through methodological individualism, generated from
the point of view of actors, where the actors can be individuals acting individually
but also collectives (organizations, classes or the state): “‘Bringing men back’ was
an achievement of the rational choice approach” (von Beyme 2000 [1972], p. 145,
my translation). The rational choice approach deserves the credit for bringing actors
and thus people back into the field of research. Coleman explicitly uses the tele-
ological action theory put forward by Weber (Coleman 1990, p. 13).
Depending on the point of view—individual or collective, i.e., holistic or aggre-
gate level—from which explanations are made, causal or teleological ways of argu-
mentation will be used. Both are necessary for explaining political reality.

Empirical foundation and empirical reductionism

Empiricism plays a fundamental role in science. No scientist calls into question the
need for an empirical foundation as a general criterion. What has frequently been
controversial, however, is how the empirical foundations can be realized in concrete
terms and which fundamental limits must be considered.
Many political scientists advocate an empirical reductionism, which states that
all scientific knowledge requires an empirical foundation. Therefore, only an empiri-
cal political science can claim the status of a science. Others consider that there are
important issues that can be rationally discussed but cannot be determined empiri-
cally, and therefore require no empirical foundation.

Objectives of empiricism: verificationism and fallibilism  Locke (1975 [1690]) is con-

sidered the founder of empiricism. But Bacon (2000 [1620]) is the first to assert
that theories can be clearly confirmed empirically by means of decision experiments.
These mark a theoretical dividing line and should enable a clear identification of
causes. Two alternatives are designed, and one of these is refuted by the experiment
while the other is confirmed (Bacon 2000 [1620], p. 159).
Verificationism was then extended and differentiated especially in the twentieth
century by logical positivism and logical empiricism (neopositivism). Popper (1968
43 
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[1934]) also represents a form of empirical reductionism. According to him, theories

are not confirmed but are falsified as much as possible by the experiment. Popper’s
fallibilism is mainly directed against holism.

Quine–Duhem or holism thesis  Duhem (1978 [1906]) first denied that such experi-
menta crucis (Bacon 2000 [1620]) exist and propagated a holistic view of science.
Quine generalized the relation established by Duhem for physics to all of science:
“The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (Quine 1964 [1953], p.
42), because the “dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each state-
ment, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation
at all” (Quine 1964 [1953], p. 41). This is wrong because “our statements about the
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a cor-
porate body” (Quine 1964 [1953], p. 41), and secondly because “[t]aken collectively,
science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is
not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one” (Quine
1964 [1953], p. 42).

Criticism of empirical reductionism  In the case of ontological questions, an empirical

examination or decision is not possible in principle because it can neither be falsified
nor reasonably made empirical at all: “the question of structure and agency, or any
other ontological issue for that matter, cannot be falsified—for they make no neces-
sary empirical claim” (Hay 2011 [2009], p. 469). Empiricism (sometimes referred
to as “hyperfactualism”) anchored in logical positivism and critical rationalism is
an ontological premise. Hyperfactualism and hypermethodologism without proper
philosophical reflection are criticized in an article in the Oxford Handbook without
any noticeable impact on the other articles (Bevir 2010 [2008], pp. 68–69).

Rationalism (more geometrico)

Rationality postulates  Knowledge criteria serve to evaluate the success of empiri-

cism and rationality. With the help of rationality postulates, general criteria of sci-
entific research are formulated so that methodological precision can be guaranteed.
The following general criteria are recognized by all scientists who prefer a logi-
cal-mathematical research methodology:

a. Intersubjectivity Science seeks ways to find justifications that any rational and
knowledgeable person can understand.
b. Objectivity Subjective desires or prejudices must not be incorporated into the
work, only intersubjective reasons.
c. Reliability The results of scientific investigations should be reproducible under
the same conditions.
d. Validity A scientific result must have an argumentative weight and meet meth-
odological quality criteria. A distinction is made between internal validity (cred-
ibility) and external validity (transferability).
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 17 of 29  43

Rejecting criteria, as qualitative researchers and postmodernists often do, is not a

convincing approach. This has now also been recognized, with restrictions, by quali-
tative researchers: “The tendency to increasingly view qualitative research as an art
doctrine (see Denzin and Lincoln 1994) or ‘research style’ (Strauss 1987, 1985) and
less as a formalizable approach does not relieve one of the application of evalua-
tion criteria” (Steinke 2015 [2000], p. 322), my translation, see also Schwartz-Shea
2014 [2006] and Yanow 2014 [2006]). Even qualitative researchers no longer gener-
ally reject intersubjective or objective criteria, even if one speaks of “intersubjective
comprehensibility” as a criterion for qualitative research and “intersubjective verifi-
ability” (Steinke 2015 [2000], p. 323, 324) for quantitative research.

Subjective versus intersubjective language  Some interpretivists dispute that one can

formulate all recognition objectively or intersubjectively. Instead, they claim to repro-
duce subjective experiences in a subjective way by means of language. They refer
especially to Wittgenstein’s (1953) late work. But Wittgenstein himself expressed
doubts about this in his famous arguments against a private language, illustrated with
the example of one’s own pain (Schmerz). Even when one speaks about a subjec-
tive feeling like pain, one uses an intersubjective tool, namely an intersubjective,
objective and public language. In other words, since there is no private language, we
are also required, when formulating subjective experiences and subjective views, to
reproduce them with the help of an intersubjective and public language.
The generation, evaluation or justification of scientific knowledge requires both
general and specific criteria at ten methodological levels. The ten vertical and three
horizontal levels are the systematic foundation upon which knowledge is methodo-
logically generated and evaluated (Table 1, Lauer 2017).

Logical‑mathematical methodology  Empirical causal analyses have been produced

in political science since the 1950s with the help of quantitative tools as well as
deductive and inductive arguments. In the 1970s, logical-mathematical model analy-
ses were introduced; in political science these were mainly rational choice models. In
the same decade, qualitative-mathematical methods were added. Experiments were
included in the 1990s (Morton and Williams 2010 [2008]; Gerber and Green 2011
[2009]). In political science, in contrast to sociology, simulations are rare.

Practical tradition

Differentiation and specialization, the two salient features of modernity, have also
been integrated into political science since the emergence of the discipline as a sci-
ence. This is especially true for analytic-empirical theories. Methodology (form)
and theory (content) are here usually treated separately; therefore, there is a variety
of methodological manuals.
In political philosophy or political theory on the other hand, form and content
are very rarely treated separately when it comes to the generation of practical theo-
ries. There simply are no methodological manuals dealing with the methodology of
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practical knowledge and theories. Political philosophy and theory thus remains stuck
with one foot in the pre-modern era.
The second shortcoming in political science methodology is that scientistic sci-
entists and interpretivists believe that the same methodology can be used to generate
empirical and practical knowledge. A practical discourse that satisfies the current
logical-analytical considerations is not possible neither with the scientistic nor with
the interpretive methodology. A practical discourse requires a genuinely practical
methodology and not a reductionist one.
In the following, I will first discuss the philosophical foundations of a practi-
cal tradition (“Philosophical foundations of the practical tradition”). Second, I will
briefly explain the practical methodology of the constructivist using the example of
the perestroikans (applied phronesis and pragmatism) and will show their limita-
tions (“Problem-driven methodology: applied phronesis”). Third, I will do the same
with the practical methodology of the explanatory-prognostic tradition, i.e., norma-
tive rational choice theory ("Applied methodology: social technology"). Fourth, I
will provide an overview of a genuinely practical methodology (“Practical method-
ology (normative, pragmatic and technical)”).

Philosophical foundations of the practical tradition

The discussion of axiological questions or value problems is very controversial

within the scientific community (Lauer 2017). Only two central problems can and
must be addressed here: the is–ought problem and the foundations of an applied
methodology.

Is–ought problem, fact–value gap  The separation into theoretical and practical
philosophy made in antiquity is based above all on the fact that “is” and “ought”
are different objects and therefore require fundamentally different methodologies.
Following this tradition, affirmed by Kant, Wieland used the example of medicine
to highlight the fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical science
(Wieland 1986).
Much more influential are the methodological distinctions made by Weber, which
continue to characterize the axiological arguments even today. Weber uncondition-
ally adopts the distinction between is and ought, since he is guided by the spirit of
neo-Kantianism (Weber 2011 [1904], p. 50). However, he does not use the Aristote-
lian or Kantian terminology, preferring the terms “empirical discipline” and “empir-
ical science” (Weber 2011 [1904], p. 52, 54 and 55) on the one hand and “practical
social science” (Weber 2011 [1904], p, 56) and “social policy” (Weber 2011 [1904],
p. 60 and 67) on the other. In his methodological writings, Weber’s main concern
are the limitations and possibilities of an empirical science. The limits of empiri-
cal sciences that Weber identified have generally been accepted by the scientistic
scientists until today. Weber demands that scientists should make a clear distinction
between logical-analytical discussions, empirical analyses and practical valuations.
Hume (2007 [1739/1740], pp. 469–470) was the first who speaks of a fact–value
gap; and according to Moore (1965 [1903], § 12, 40), one makes a naturalistic fal-
lacy when one concludes from an “is” to an “ought”.
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 19 of 29  43

Foundations of  applied methodology  Applied means the inversion of causal sen-
tences, i.e., empirically determined causal sentences in the form of if–then statements
are transformed into prescriptive instructions or regulations in the form of technical
rules.
The foundations of applied methodology are rarely addressed, at least in political
science handbooks. Two implicit assumptions, inversion of causal statements and
equivalence of causality and action, are discussed below. Furthermore, the criticism
that is directed against applied methodology and comes especially from philoso-
phers of technology is also addressed. I have also compiled structural differences
between empirical and practical methodology at ten methodological levels (Table 1;
structural differences between sciences and engineering have been worked out by
Poser 2001, 2016; Lauer 2017).
(a) Is–ought bridge The causal reductionists claim that causal statements provide
scientifically valid world knowledge. At the same time, almost as the other side of
the coin, causal statements make it possible to take action to affect the future (see
“Causal reductionism”). This would make the identification of causality sufficient
by itself. An applied methodology is then simply the inversion of causal sentences.
This is only possible because Weber and others have built a bridge from “is” to the
technical (not normative or pragmatical) “ought”.
Through the simple “inversion of causal sentences”, technical rules necessary for
a success-oriented (purpose-rational) action are generated. Only means discourses
for this purpose are possible within empirical science (Weber 1973 [1917], p. 517
[479]).
Weber’s is–ought bridge was later adopted by critical rationalism: “The task of
science is partly theoretical—explanations—and partly practical—prediction and
technical application. I shall try to show that these two aims are, in a way, two dif-
ferent aspects of one and the same activity” (Popper 1981 [1972], p. 349, emphasis
in the original). And a few pages later: “This makes it clear now, from a logical
point of view, both the derivations of predictions and the technical application of
scientific theories may be regarded as mere inversions [my emphasis] of the basic
schema of scientific explanation” (Popper 1981 [1972], p. 353).
Albert, the most famous German critical rationalist, speaks of a tautological
transformation that needs no additional premises (Albert 1967 [1965], p. 192). This
reasoning is untenable, as will now be shown.
(b) Equivalence between causality and action The inversion of causal statements
requires a premise. Causality can only form the basis of both world knowledge and
world change if there is an equivalence between causality and action. Today this is
assumed and rarely discussed. Bacon was aware of the connection between causality
and action: “Human knowledge and human power come to the same thing, because
ignorance of cause frustrates effect. For Nature is conquered only by obedience;
and that which in thought is a cause, is like a rule in practice” (Bacon 2000 [1620],
p. 33). In today’s casuistic terminology, one would say: theory and practice come
together, statements that are true in theory are efficient in practice.
In pragmatism, there is an equivalence between usefulness and truth: anything
that is useful is true: “You can say of it then either that ‘it is useful because it is true’
43 
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or that ‘it is true because it is useful’. Both these phrases mean exactly the same
thing” (James 1975 [1907], p. 98).
Likewise, Bacon argues that what is useful is also true: “The two pronounce-
ments, the active and the contemplative, are one and the same; and what is most use-
ful in operating is truest in knowing” (Bacon 2000 [1620], p. 104).
Thus, pragmatists and scientistic scientists share the same premise when it comes
to the foundations of an applied methodology. The equivalence between causality
and action and an equivalence between statements and rules thus leads to the divi-
sion into empirical (theoretical) and applied sciences. Causalities are determined
within the former; the applied sciences only need to invert them. Thus, instructions
or advice can be formulated almost incidentally in applied (not practical!) political
science.
I will now point to some objections advanced by philosophers of technology to
such a reductionist methodology.

(c) Criticism of applied methodology Today, the inversion of causal sentences or

of the fundamental explanatory scheme is one of those hidden or tacit assumptions
that rarely being mentioned or even discussed. The equivalence between causality
and action is a “transmission rule from knowledge of nature to the rule of action
in nature” (Kornwachs 2012, p. 42, my translation). Mario Bunge calls this a prag-
matic syllogism (Bunge 1967, pp. 132–139).
Importantly, pragmatic syllogism is not formally valid. The first sentence is a
statement of the form “if x, then y”. Inversion is a (technical) rule of the form: “if
you want to reach y then do x”. There is only a pragmatic, but no logical, relation-
ship between regulative propositions, e.g., “if A, then B”, and associated (technical)
rules, e.g., “B by A”, “if you want to achieve B, then try A” (Kornwachs 2008, p.
139, 2012, p. 64. Kornwachs takes over this notation from Bunge 1967).

Problem‑driven methodology: applied phronesis

The practical methodology of the constructivists, interpretivists and perestroikans

will now be briefly explained and criticized using the example of the perestroikans
(applied phronesis). The perestroikans as well as most interpretivists reject a separa-
tion between “is” and “ought”, referring to pragmatism and the Frankfurt School.
They go a step further, claiming that the axiological values of researchers almost
necessarily influence research in the shape of guiding interests (Habermas 1968;
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014b [2006]).
There is agreement between the perestroikans and the scientistic scientists on the
idea that with a reductionist methodology one can both recognize and change the
world. The difference is that the perestroikans do not begin by recognizing the world
but by solving problems. Cognition and truth then emerge as a by-product, just as
the scientistic scientists think that the application is a by-product. For the perestroi-
kans, political science should operate with a problem-driven approach rather than
with a method-driven or theory-driven approach that is the hallmark of the scien-
tistic scientists (Shapiro 2005).
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 21 of 29  43

Applied phronesis The phronetic perestroikans question the methodological

approach of the scientistic scientists and want to use an applied phronesis to revo-
lutionize political science and to achieve greater public relevance for the discipline
(Flyvbjerg 2001; Schram and Caterino 2006; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).
The phronetic perestroikans, using the Aristotelian phronesis and the inclusion
of questions of power, want to establish a better and, above all, a relevant alterna-
tive discipline to contemporary social and political science, a phronetic or real
science. Consequently, the social sciences that are based on the natural sciences
are criticized as unreal (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012, p. 1).
The goal of the phronetic perestroikans is to create a problem-driven meth-
odology with the help of applied phronesis. The phronetic scientists aspire to a
philosophy of engagement that can change unjust states. The applied phronesis
consists not only in the practical knowledge of how to transform unjust states by
discovering the tension points, but also in the revolutionary ability to transform
these tension points (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012). In doing so, the phronetic perestroi-
kans act together with the affected groups, to whom they convey the knowledge
and the practical skills to enforce their concerns and achieve empowerment. Thus,
scientists become both scientists and revolutionaries at the same time (Flyvbjerg
et al. 2012, p. 10).

Limits of applied phronesis  The general goal of the phronetic perestroikans is “to
make the world a better place” (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012, p. 11). But who knows what
is better, and above all, who justifies this and how? A practical science must not
just answer technical questions, but also justify them. The answer of the perestroi-
kans is: the justification lies in the moral attitudes of the researching scientists and
those of the groups involved.
Unfortunately, they fail to explain how one can justify these goals with an
applied phronesis and which other scientific tools are necessary for this. Applied
phronesis is sufficient only for the generation of technical knowledge. Thus, only
a technical means discourse is possible, and neither a normative value discourse
nor a pragmatic target discourse can be conducted with it.

Applied methodology: social technology

Normative methodology: normative rational choice theory I will now examine

Hardin’s (2011 [2009]) contribution to how applied knowledge can be generated
within the explanatory-prognostic tradition. According to Hardin, the rational choice
approach suffices to recognize the world (positive rational choice theory), and a nor-
mative rational choice theory also makes possible the normative assessment and
practical changing of political reality.
The scientistic establishment believes not only that normative rational choice
theory offers an adequate practical methodology, but also that it is the best prac-
tical-normative methodology available today. The normative rational choice the-
ory is considered the only valid normative methodology and theory (it is seen as
43 
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both); all other normative theories are dismissed as irrelevant and even esoteric
(Hardin 2011 [2009], p. 99).

Limits of  the  normative rational choice theory  This work is not interested in
how to formulate social-technological regulations with the help of game theory.
According to Hardin, this is relatively simple (Hardin 2011 [2009], p. 99). What
is important is the character of a practical discourse that works with the help of
this methodical approach. The normative rational choice approach is a techni-
cal means discourse. Thus, technical regulations can be formulated as part of an
applied (not practical) political science. The ethical-normative and pragmatic
dimensions are not addressed at all, as has been the case since antiquity in politi-
cal philosophy. Rational choice theory, positive and normative, therefore oper-
ates with an instrumental reason. Normative discourses are only of interest to
the extent that they are concerned with the discussion of means. This is also
clearly recognized by the adepts of rational choice theory. The criticism of the
Frankfurt School, that the explanatory-prognostic tradition would produce only
“technically competent barbarians” (Rothstein 2005; Horkheimer 1947), is still
supported. However, this criticism is only partially justified. Norms and values
are properly considered, but while the perestroikans refer to the values of the
researchers and the disadvantaged groups they are committed to and engaged
with, the scientistic scientists refer primarily to liberal and utilitarian values.
However, neither perestroikans nor scientistic scientists can justify their val-
ues, norms and goals. Just like other ontological and epistemological ideas,
these are simply assumed. In other words, rational choice theory, if used for
practical purposes, is concerned only with technical discourse, and any legiti-
mating intention is simply banished to its underlying ontological (individualism,
self-interest) and ethical assumptions (utilitarianism). These prerequisites can-
not now be justified by the rational choice approach.
Hidden assumptions also include the philosophical foundations of practi-
cal methodology discussed above. Thus, an equivalence between causality and
action is assumed by not differentiating between normative and positive theory.
If, as Hardin believes, method and theory coincide, one has the problem that it
is difficult to distinguish between empirical or normative assumptions and the
empirical or normative knowledge that this approach generates (Hardin 2011
[2009], pp. 93–94).
The terms “rational choice approach” and “rational choice theory” are often
used interchangeably (Hardin 2011 [2009], p. 99). This leads to some misun-
derstandings and problems. I find it necessary that scientific knowledge should
be differentiate between methodology (formal knowledge and tools) on the one
hand and theories (content knowledge) on the other. In addition to the rational
choice approach, it also makes a fundamental difference whether one wants to
use the rational choice approach to produce truth-apt statements about the politi-
cal reality or to generate technical rules that are not truth-apt (Table 1, the fourth
row, level of ideals and properties).
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 23 of 29  43

Practical methodology (normative, pragmatic and technical)

Now the possibility and necessity of a genuine practical political science, and
certainly also a practical social science, will be outlined, building on the fun-
damental distinction between empirical and practical social sciences made by
Weber (2011 [1904]) and between theoretical and practical sciences made by
Wieland (1986). This practical methodology establishes a practical political sci-
ence that is also in the Aristotelian and Kantian tradition. Neither the norma-
tive rational choice approach of the naturalists nor the applied phronesis of the
perestroikans are rejected, but these are only very small parts of a much broader
practical methodology.
The practical tradition works with a practical methodology, with the aim of
formulating practical norms and regulations with which the political system
can be changed. In the following, the basics of a practical methodology will be
explained, before the normative, pragmatic and technical methodology are fur-
ther developed on this basis. Practical norms and regulations are generated in
three different discourses (normative, pragmatic and technical).

Practical discourses  Höffe (2009 [2007]) has presented a complex ethical rational
design that draws on the entire Western ethical tradition. Höffe succeeds in prov-
ing that two of the most important types of Western ethics, the eudaemonistic/
Aristotelian and the deontological/Kantian ethics, are not necessarily mutually
exclusive but can be viewed as complementary. The basis for this is a practical
methodology, which consists of three different methodologies and goes back to
Aristotle and Kant.
At the lowest level, one evaluates ways and means for their suitability for
any purpose or goal. By means of technical rationality, technical imperatives
are generated within these discourses, be it technical individual rules or social-
technological regulations (Höffe 2009 [2007], p. 23).
At the second level of evaluation, the objective that is only assumed at the
lowest level is now assessed. Pragmatic rationality is used to generate pragmatic
imperatives in the pragmatic objective discourse, be it individual-pragmatic
rules or socio-pragmatic regulations (Höffe 2009 [2007], p. 24).
The third and highest stage in practical philosophy is the normative discourse
of value. Here ethical-moral rationality is used. Höffe distinguishes between
virtuous morality and ethical-moral norms on the one hand, and legal morality,
(political) justice and legal norms on the other (Höffe 2009 [2007], p. 26).

Normative or  value discourses  In a practical political science, one can first of
all justify maxims of action (constitutional norms) and political values within
normative value discourses. Here the question in the foreground is: Why should
something be done? In this case, the political maxims of action which are decisive
for the standardization or regulation of the political system as a whole or of a
policy area should be discussed.
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Pragmatic objective discourses  Pragmatic reasons, goals and purposes are to be jus-
tified within pragmatic objective discourses. The aim is to pragmatically tackle the
goals set in normative discourses.

Technical discourses  How should something be done? Technical justifications are

generated within technical means discourses. The objective is concrete technical
means for the regulation of political problems.
However, it is not possible to derive technical regulations or individual instruc-
tions for action from pragmatic objectives or from maxims of action. Subsumption
under action strategies or action maxims is not possible, although this is claimed and
demanded by normative-ontological political scientists (details Lauer 2017).

Complementarity between three methodological traditions

Empirical explanative-prognostic methodology as a political methodology is not

enough. Before one can determine a causal relation between events, one must
describe these events (von Wright 1971). Political phenomena must be described
and politically important symbols interpreted. This is not possible without an empir-
ical-descriptive methodology. To recognize the political reality, therefore, a logical-
mathematical as well as a linguistic-interpretive research methodology is necessary;
only then is an adequate empirical (descriptive, explanatory and prognostic) knowl-
edge (descriptions, explanations and forecasts) generated.
The methodological science war (Methodenstreit, Lauer 2017) is conducted in
revolutionary mode. If a complementarity between the methodological traditions
discussed above is recognized, then this “science war” (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 1) can
be overcome. There is complementarity between the descriptive and explanatory-
prognostic traditions as well as between the empirical (descriptive, explanatory and
prognostic) and practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) traditions.
The political methodology must first be explained, explicated, clarified and
reconstructed. Of course, existing methodologies must be further developed and
complemented by innovations. Progress is possible and meaningful only on the basis
of tradition. Tradition and progress must be connected.
A practical methodology differs in principle from an empirical methodology.
With an empirical methodology adequate descriptions, explanations and predictions
about political reality can be generated, but not practical ones can, not even techni-
cal-instrumental regulatory proposals. Genuinely practical discourses (value, target
and means discourses) require a practical methodology that is complementary to an
empirical methodology. The arguments for this have been explained in detail else-
where (Table 1, Lauer 2017).
A practical political science that supplements an empirical (descriptive, explan-
atory and prognostic) political science with a practical (normative, pragmatic and
technical) methodology is the appropriate place to discuss political-practical issues.
A practical methodology can justify a practical social science and thus also a practi-
cal political science.
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 25 of 29  43

I am only suggesting that within political science, all three traditions should be
used complementarily. Because of their specialization, political scientists can only
bake small rolls. As a rule, one cannot even use all methodological approaches to
determine causalities in one article. Completely different methodical approaches and
methods are used for the identification of correlations, for causal regularities and
then for the determination of causal mechanisms (see “Causal reductionism”). These
methods are also used complementarily in political science, but due to the complex-
ity of the questions, this is done in different articles and even by different scientists.

Conclusions and recommendations for further methodological

research

I would like to end this article with some conclusions and recommendations for fur-
ther research.

Methodology and science: science is methodology‑driven

The importance of methodology for science can be summarized as follows, follow-

ing Kant’s preface to the Critique of Pure Reason: the methodology guarantees the
safe course of a science (“sicheren Gang einer Wissenschaft”, Kant 1956 [1781 and
1787]: p. 14). Hence, all science is methodology-driven. Rigor and relevance can-
not, as Mead (2010) suggests, play off against each other. On the contrary, rigor
determines the relevance, as can be seen in the example of physics or economics.
The Gulbenkian Commission (Wallerstein 1996) discussed ways of restructuring
the social sciences and has produced various proposals for opening them up. I have
shown that an opening up of the social sciences depends crucially on a methodology
debate that takes into account the latest research within the philosophy of science,
with a particular focus on the expansion and further development of political meth-
odology. Due to the central relevance of the methodology for science, a restructuring
of the social sciences must include an extension and opening up of its methodology.

Three methodological traditions (descriptive, explanatory‑prognostic

and practical) for political science

In the meantime, hardly anyone questions the need for a methodical pluralism that
recommends both quantitative and qualitative methods. In this article, I have advo-
cated methodological pluralism that goes far beyond methodical pluralism. The
principal limits and possibilities of the three methodological traditions have been
discussed here. With the help of Table 1, one can clearly compare the three tradi-
tions on ten levels.
In order to generate rational political knowledge, political science needs all three,
fundamentally different, methodologies. The first is a descriptive tradition. Its goal
is understanding (sense making, meaning making) to describe visible political phe-
nomena and interpret political symbols (text, image, audio and video). The second is
43 
Page 26 of 29 SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43

an explanatory-prognostic tradition with an empirical explanatory-prognostic meth-

odology to explain the invisible causal relations between political events and make
predictions about the future. The third is the practical tradition. This works with a
practical methodology (normative, pragmatic and technical).
Due to the enormous complexity of the various methodologies, differentiation
and specialization are necessary, so that individual political scientists are not able
to apply all methodologies when generating political knowledge and therefore spe-
cialize in one of the three methodologies. In doing so, they must also use results
obtained by other scientists with a different methodological tradition.

Practical, not applied, methodology for political philosophy and political theory

Political philosophy or political theory is often criticized as being superficial, ide-

ological and backward-looking, the domain of happily still undisciplined political
theorists (Dryzek et al. 2011 [2009]). Questions of content and method are not dis-
cussed separately. There are also no methodological manuals for practical method-
ology. This desideratum must also be overcome, and it can only be overcome by
a practical methodology that does justice to the current state of the philosophy of
science as well as a philosophy of the social sciences and political science. Only
with a genuinely practical methodology and not an applied methodology can politi-
cal standardization and political regulations be scientifically justified. A practical
political science that seeks to justify realistic political regulatory proposals, and not
alien dystopias or utopias, is dependent on scientific empirical knowledge that has
been developed with the help of empirical-descriptive and empirical explanative-
prognostic methodologies (Table 1).
Dealing with methodological issues and updating their current form can increase
the relevance of political science research for society and practical politics. The
descriptive tradition makes it possible to describe political reality as well as soci-
ologists, for example, do. The explanatory-prognostic tradition  is necessary to be
heard alongside the economic sciences. The practical tradition allows catching up
with jurisprudence.

Acknowledgements  The basis for this article was laid in a dissertation that was accepted at Heidelberg
University: supervisors Klaus von Beyme and Michael Haus (Lauer 2017). The most important change
concerns the terminology. I have given up the terminology used by von Wright (Aristotelian and Galilean
tradition) and introduced a new one: descriptive, explanatory-prognostic and practical tradition. Earlier
versions of this article were presented in the seminars of Klaus von Beyme and Michael Haus at the
Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University. I would like to thank all participants for critical
comments. Thanks also go to Karim Elawar, Julian Tobias Klar, Doris Kloor and Ute Rill for linguistic
advice. Any remaining deficiencies are mine alone.

Open Access  This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
SN Soc Sci (2021) 1:43 Page 27 of 29  43

directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat​iveco​mmons​.org/licen​
ses/by/4.0/.

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