The Economist, March 19th 2023

https://www.economist.com/international/2023/03/19/what-does-xi-jinping-want-from-vladimir-putin
International | Peacemaker or provocateur?

What does Xi Jinping want from Vladimir Putin?

Big questions loom as the Chinese leader heads to Moscow

Ever since the second world war geopolitics have been moulded by the “strategic triangle” between China,
Russia and America. Co-ordination between Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin in the early 1950s fuelled American
determination to halt the spread of communism. That led to America fighting wars in Korea and Vietnam, its
commitment to defend Taiwan, and multiple proxy conflicts elsewhere.
A decade later Mao’s schism with Nikita Khrushchev laid the ground for an American rapprochement with China.
That brought covert Chinese assistance in the fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which helped to end
the cold war. It also underpinned the decades-long run of economic growth that has transformed China into a
global power—and a geopolitical rival to America.
Now another shift of the triad looms. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, is due in Moscow on March 20th for a three-day
visit: his first since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. At the very least it will be an emphatic display of
solidarity with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. It may be more, too: American officials believe Mr Xi is
weighing Russia’s request to supply it with lethal weapons, including artillery shells and attack drones, for use
in Ukraine. If Mr Xi agrees, it would draw China into a proxy war with nato.
In China’s telling, Mr Xi heads to Moscow as a peacemaker, and with no offer of arms. He is likely to use his trip
to repeat his call for an end to the war, and to promote a 12-point peace plan first proposed by China in
February. Mr Xi will echo recent Chinese statements urging respect for all countries’ territorial integrity and
opposing any use of—or talk of using—nuclear weapons.
As evidence of Mr Xi’s peacemaking credentials Chinese officials point to their country’s role in brokering an
agreement on March 10th to re-establish diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To offset Western criticism
of his Moscow visit, Mr Xi is likely to follow it with virtual talks with Ukraine’s president, Volodymr Zelensky. It would
be the pair’s first official exchange since Russia’s invasion. That will play well in many poor and middle-income
countries, and among some Westerners keen for America to be less confrontational towards China.
Yet Mr Xi’s true intentions are hidden in plain sight. While professing neutrality, he still refuses to condemn
Russia’s invasion or its soldiers’ atrocities. In Moscow he will almost certainly join Mr Putin in blaming the war,
yet again, on the expansion of nato. (Chinese officials and state media draw parallels with America’s bid to
strengthen its alliances in Asia in preparation for a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan.) And even if Mr Xi stops
short of sending Russia weapons, he will probably offer more non-military support to help sustain Mr Putin’s
war. Although China largely avoids violating Western sanctions on Russia, it has not joined them. Indeed, it helps
Russia offset their impact by buying more of its oil and gas, and selling it more electronics and other goods.

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You call that a plan?
China’s peace plan, meanwhile, is a non-starter for Ukraine and its Western backers. It advocates an end to
Western sanctions without requiring Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. It sticks closely to Kremlin
talking points in arguing that security “should not be pursued at the expense of others”, nor by “strengthening
or expanding military blocs”. Such points echo Mr Xi’s “Global Security Initiative”, which he proposed last year
as an alternative to the American-led “rules-based international order” and will probably promote
enthusiastically over the next few days.
Mr Xi’s stance unsettles some in China’s elite. It shreds the country’s claim to be pursuing a foreign policy rooted
in respect for sovereignty, and undermines a guarantee it made in 2013 to help Ukraine if it were threatened
with nuclear attack. It makes Chinese attempts to cleave Europe from America much harder. Chinese strategists
are clear-eyed, too, about Russia’s unpredictable politics and dismal economic prospects. Arming it would
expose China to severe sanctions from America and the European Union, its two biggest trading partners,
hobbling efforts to revive its economy. Talk of a new cold war would harden into reality.
Yet Mr Xi’s calculations are dominated by his conviction that China is locked in a long-term confrontation with
America that might lead to a war over Taiwan, which it claims as its territory. In that context Russia still
represents an indispensable source of energy, military technology and diplomatic support. A Russian defeat in
Ukraine would embolden America and its allies. If Mr Putin’s grip on power slipped, instability on China’s vast
northern border with Russia could follow. Worst of all, it could usher into the Kremlin a pro-Western leader
tempted to help America to contain Chinese power, in a mirror image of China’s own strategic shift in the 1970s.
“That is the nightmare for China,” says Li Mingjiang, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore. In Mr Xi’s eyes America represents the greatest potential threat, and
China has no other big power on its side to help resist Western economic or military pressure. “Russia is the
only option,” he says. “It’s the same logic as in the cold war, when Mao saw the Soviet Union as China’s number-
one enemy, and decided to pursue rapprochement with the United States.”
Mr Xi’s strategic considerations are underpinned by a personal connection with Russia. His father, Xi Zhongxun,
was a prominent revolutionary who later oversaw the Soviet experts who helped build up Chinese industry in
the 1950s. As vice-premier, the elder Xi visited Moscow in 1959. He returned full of admiration, bearing Soviet-
made toys that delighted his six-year-old son.
The younger Xi’s interest in Russia seems to have deepened during the seven years he spent in a remote village
to which he was sent at the age of 15 in 1969, during the Cultural Revolution. The books he read are still
displayed there, including “War and Peace”, a selection of Lenin’s writings, an account of Soviet battles in the
second world war and “How the Steel was Tempered”, a socialist-realist novel about a man who fights the
Germans, joins the Bolsheviks and becomes an ideal Soviet citizen.
Mr Xi was not alone in his regard for Russia. Senior Chinese military officers developed close ties with their
Russian counterparts after Western governments placed arms embargoes on China over the crushing of pro-
democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in 1989. (They remain in place.) Since then, China has bought
tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian weapons. Attitudes towards America within China’s military
leadership hardened after American warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, during the
Kosovo conflict. (America apologised, insisting it was a mistake.)
In the decade before Mr Xi took power in 2012, he also appears to have been influenced by leftist academics and
fellow “princelings” (as offspring of Communist Party leaders are known) who became disillusioned with the West,
especially after the financial crisis in 2007-09. Inspired by Mr Putin, then near the height of his power, they began to
see Russia as a potential partner and to question Chinese historians’ conclusions that the Soviet Union collapsed
owing to problems dating back to Stalin. Instead, they blamed Mikhail Gorbachev and his liberalising reforms.
By the time Mr Xi assumed office, he and his advisers were already bent on closer alignment with Russia. He
chose Moscow for his first trip abroad, and hinted there that the two countries would work together against
the West. “Our characters are alike,” he told Mr Putin. Mr Xi has since met him some 39 times, far more than
any other leader, apparently bonding over common disdain for democracy and fears of American encirclement.

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Sneak attack
Some of the shine may have come off the pair’s relationship after Mr Putin’s scheming last year. In February
2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, he visited Mr Xi in Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Winter
Olympics, and the two sides declared that their partnership had “no limits”. Whatever the pair discussed,
Chinese officials appear to have been wrong-footed by the scale of the invasion: they had no prepared talking
points or plans to evacuate Chinese citizens. Soon after the war began, China’s vice-foreign minister responsible
for Russia was transferred to the radio and television administration.
Chinese perceptions of Russian military prowess have also changed since the war began. Russian successes in
Crimea, Georgia and Syria had convinced Chinese generals that Mr Putin was a great strategist with an effective
army. Drills between the two countries’ armed forces have focused on interoperability. Recent Chinese military
reforms have replicated those in Russia. But Chinese commanders have been shocked by Mr Putin’s
miscalculations over Ukraine and the lacklustre performance of Russian soldiers and weaponry.
Disillusion is not confined to military types. In December Feng Yujun, a prominent Russia expert at Fudan
University, in Shanghai, made a scathing speech in which he noted that Russia had annexed millions of square
miles of Chinese territory between 1860 and 1945. The Soviet Union then forced China to distance itself from
the West and pushed it to enter the Korean war, in which “countless” Chinese troops were killed, he argued.
Modern Russia, he went on, had not accepted its weakness relative to China and was obsessed with rebuilding
its empire. “The weakest party in the China-America-Russia triangle always benefits the most,” he concluded.
Such views are now common among Chinese scholars and business figures familiar with Russia. But their impact
on decision-making is limited in a system that depends increasingly on the will of one man.
Late last year some Western officials expressed hope that China was starting to distance itself from Russia,
especially after Mr Putin promised to address Chinese “questions and concerns” about the situation in Ukraine
when he met Mr Xi in Uzbekistan in September. Those hopes grew stronger after Mr Xi and other senior Chinese
officials, without explicitly mentioning Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling over Ukraine, voiced disapproval of any
such threat or attack. The statements coincided with a diplomatic push by Mr Xi to repair some of the damage
to China’s economy and international relations after its long self-imposed isolation to counter covid-19.
For a while, Mr Xi appeared keen to try to reduce tensions with America. That approach seemed to gain
momentum when he met President Joe Biden in Bali in November. Both men said they would try to find areas
of potential co-operation. But that attempt at detente ground to a halt in February after America shot down a
high-altitude Chinese balloon that it said was part of a global surveillance operation. Chinese officials have been
frustrated, too, by their lack of progress in undermining support for nato within Europe.
Beyond the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing there is little hard evidence that China is distancing itself from Russia.
In 2022 Russian exports of crude oil and gas to China rose, in dollar terms, by 44% and more than 100%
respectively. Chinese exports to Russia increased by 12.8%. China’s shipments of microchips—which are used
in military as well as civilian kit, and which the West has tried to deny to Russia—more than doubled. Some
Chinese companies have even provided items for direct military use, such as satellite images, jamming
technology and parts for fighter jets—although only in small quantities. Some of these deals may pre-date the
war, or involve entities already under American sanctions.
China has also continued to take part in joint military drills with Russia. In November Chinese and Russian
strategic bombers flew on a joint patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and landed on each others’
airfields for the first time. On the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Russian, Chinese
and South African warships were exercising together in the Indian Ocean. And on March 15th Russia, China and
Iran began joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman.
Double or nothing
Rather than downgrade the relationship Mr Xi appears to be strengthening it, while exploiting Russia’s
miscalculations in Ukraine to tilt the balance of power in his favour. It is easy to see why. Mr Xi has won access
to discounted energy supplies. And he has almost certainly extracted an assurance that Mr Putin will back him
diplomatically in a war over Taiwan.
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He has also gained leverage to seek high-end Russian military technology, such as surface-to-air missile systems
and nuclear reactors designed to power submarines—and to press Mr Putin to withhold or delay supplies of
similar items to other Russian customers that have territorial disputes with China, such as India and Vietnam.
Russia could also help upgrade China’s nuclear arsenal, or work on a joint missile-warning system.
In recent weeks Mr Xi appears to have doubled down. Two days before the anniversary of Russia’s invasion he
sent Wang Yi, his top diplomat, to meet Mr Putin in Moscow. There, Mr Wang said China’s strategic partnership
with Russia was “as firm as Mount Tai” and pledged to work with Russia to “strengthen strategic co-ordination,
expand practical co-operation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries.” One expected item on the
agenda for Mr Xi’s visit will be Russia’s proposal to build a new gas pipeline to China that would divert supplies
once earmarked for Europe.
Even as China extracts concessions its officials will be anxious to keep Mr Xi’s hands clean, especially after the
International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr Putin on March 17th, accusing him of war crimes.
Having been surprised once by the scale of Russia’s invasion, officials in Beijing will be keen to ensure that there
is no big new offensive or egregious attack on civilians while their boss is in Moscow. Recalling Mr Biden’s
surprise visit to Kyiv during Mr Wang’s trip to Moscow, they will also be wary of any American counter-moves.
Mr Xi’s proposed call with Mr Zelensky, long advocated by European and American officials, may improve the
optics of his trip, especially if the Ukrainian leader makes positive noises about China’s peacemaking potential.
But Mr Xi probably has little immediate interest in mediation. The Iran-Saudi deal was brewing for some time
before China stepped in, and elsewhere its record as an intermediary is poor. The “six-party talks” it hosted for
years over North Korea came to nothing. Likewise efforts to broker peace in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Chinese
officials also calculate (correctly) that neither Russia nor Ukraine wants peace talks at the moment, as both
believe they can make advances on the battlefield. Mr Xi’s peace posturing is thus more about burnishing his
international image while undermining America’s, and positioning China to take advantage of whatever
emerges from the war.
As for Russia’s request for lethal weapons, China is most likely undecided. America’s allegation that China is
mulling sending arms may be more of a pre-emptive public warning than evidence of imminent action. Chinese
officials deny any such plans exist. But China may see another opportunity to gain leverage. In public statements
and private discussions its officials increasingly draw a link with America’s provision of weapons to Taiwan. “Why
does the US ask China not to provide weapons to Russia while it keeps selling arms to Taiwan?” asked Qin Gang,
China’s new foreign minister, at his debut news conference on March 7th.
If Mr Xi does decide to arm Russia, he may do so covertly. China has a long history of clandestine arms exports.
In the 1980s it secretly supplied Chinese-made variants of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle to CIA-backed
mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan. Providing Russia with artillery shells would be easy: Chinese arms-makers
produce similar models and can remove markings, or add ones suggesting they originate elsewhere, says Dennis
Wilder, a former CIA officer who used to track Chinese arms exports. China could also supply weaponry via third
countries, like North Korea or Iran, or provide them with incentives to ship their own arms to Russia. America
might detect such moves, but proving them will be harder. “All China needs is plausible deniability,” says Mr
Wilder.
But the quiet approach has limits. To truly alter the course of the war might require China to supply bigger,
more sophisticated weapons, such as attack drones. Those would be harder to conceal, especially if any were
to fall into Ukrainian hands. And public exposure would significantly undermine Mr Xi’s efforts to present
himself as a peacemaker and to undermine relations between Europe and America.
In the end Mr Xi’s decision could depend on how the war plays out, and especially on the outcome of the
expected Ukrainian counter-offensive in the coming months. It could hinge, too, on the level of tensions
between China and America over Taiwan, suggests Alexander Korolev, who studies China-Russia relations at the
University of New South Wales in Australia. “If, by sending weapons to Ukraine, China can control the level of
escalation and keep Russia going for as long as needed, then it can keep the West busy,” he says. “That makes
it more feasible to deal with Taiwan.”