Andréi Kozyrev

Former Foreign Minister of Russia

The Russia Challenge

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We hoped for Russian-American partnership.

It is hard to believe now how promising were the initial contacts

between United States and Russian federation that emerged upon the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. A declaration signed only
a month after the birth of the new state by presidents George Bush and
Boris Yeltsin stated "Russia and the United States do not regard each
other as potential adversaries." Thus the document intended to signal
official end of the Cold War. And went further "From now on, the
relationship will be characterized by friendship and partnership founded
on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and
economic freedom."

It was the common commitment to democracy and economic freedom

that made the difference. Countries that share this commitment have
never fought with each other. More over they entered into alliances in
order to protect themselves against potentially aggressive undemocratic
regimes. Of the latter the former Soviet Union was the most powerful and
not surprisingly in Cold War with the West. In contrast the leader of new
Russia vowed to switch to western style democracy and free market.

For us in Russia it looked like a lifetime opportunity. Trying to seize it

we counted on a number of fundamental factors.

The Russian nation is based on European culture and perceives itself in

interaction with the West. Even in the USSR the obligatory high school
program included Leo Tolstoy’s “War and Peace” with opening pages
written by the author in French and digest of European and American
literature. The main problem of the nation for centuries has been desire to
be a member of the European family and inability to match the level of
economic and social development.

The stumbling block was tyrannical political system lagging behind the
western mainstream by 100-150 years. Russian tsars till 1917 cherished
medieval absolutism. Stalin largely returned to the model and bequeathed
the politburo to perform a collective monarch in the USSR. His ruthless
mobilization produced some industrial wonders including nuclear and
space technology, but failed to build a sustainable economy that finally
had to be crutched by oil exports.

The Soviet Union collapsed when in 1980s the oil price went down. Now
Yeltsin was popularly elected with the support of mass movement whose
name spoke for itself: “Democratic Russia”. The first attempt of
establishing a western style political system had been undertaken in 1917
after the collapse of the Tsar rule, but it failed in 6 months mostly because
the Provisional Government inherited the backbreaking burden of the
WWI. This time it was radically different. No country was in war or even in
political conflict with Russia. Moreover we counted on support from the
West, particularly from the US. This bet was neither unprecedented nor
unrealistic. Less than 50 years ago Winston Churchill called to stand up to
the challenge of the downing “iron curtain” of Stalin’s domination, and
America generously helped fragile democracies in Europe to survive and
grow. Why couldn’t similar effort been done as Russia tried to get rid of
the “iron curtain” once and for all? It would have been not only in best
interest of America and its allies, but existentially important for them.
Behind the curtain sat a nuclear-missile force able to destroy America that
also could’ve been got rid of had democracy taken hold in Russia.

Apparently George Bush realized that. Seasoned in the Cold war and
the former director of the CIA, he saw both historical scope of the
opportunity and monumental difficulty of the transformation we tried to
achieve. He said that was "totally convinced" of Russia's commitment to
democracy and hoped to assist "in any way possible." And he appeared to
have a bipartisan support. Representative

Richard A. Gephardt, Democrat of Missouri, the House majority leader,

said Mr. Yeltsin "delivered a loud, clear message that if there's going to be
help, it needs to come now." Senator Bob Dole, Republican of Kansas, the
minority leader, said of Mr. Yeltsin: "He may be the last hope. That's the
message he gave us. This may be the last chance." In his turn Yeltsin was
straightforward too. He said that his country needed far more than money
if it was to make the transition to democracy, and that the cost of failure
would be great.

"I didn't come here just to stretch out my hand and ask for help," the
Russian President said. "No, we're calling for cooperation, cooperation for
the whole world, because if the reform in Russia goes under, that means
there will be a cold war. The cold war is going to turn into a hot war. This
is, again, going to be an arms race."* Unfortunately that warning became
an omen few years later.

Today it’s the reality.

In 1992 tangible results were achieved exactly in the area of reducing

the nuclear threat and curbing the arms race. We proposed cutting
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads to 2,500 for each nation. That
figure was roughly half the number that Mr. Bush suggested retaining in a
proposal he made in his State of the Union address only few days earlier.
US Secretary of State Jim Baker and I as Russian foreign minister were
put in charge of finding a compromise. It was tough, but rewarding job
due to professionalism, dedication and integrity of my counterpart. By the
time President Yeltsin made a state visit to Washington for the next
summit meeting held June 16-17 it was agreed to set a goal of reducing
each countries' strategic nuclear arsenals by 3,000-3,500 warheads. Not
only were the numbers 2-3 times lower than allowed by the previous
START agreement negotiated for 18 year, but also first time ever a
qualitative component was included and it was groundbreaking. Russia
would cut her superiority in ICBMs, supposedly the most destabilizing first
strike force, and the US does the same in SLBMs and strategic bombers.
Upon return to Moscow a journalist asked what my hope was for the
future. I said it was getting rid of disarmament agenda by reducing the
arsenals to minimal levels and concentrating on building wide framework
for cooperation and alliance with the US.

To be sure now there are no negotiations on cuts of strategic nuclear

missiles, and Russia spends dearly on their modernization along with
being suspected of violating an agreement on eliminations of the medium
range rockets that had been signed by Gorbachev.

No wonder. Strategic relations could not develop unless Russian

transformed to democracy and free market economy. Yet, in that crucial
area American contribution was much less impressive. While assessments
and preparations for the cooperation with democrats in Russia were in
progress, Bush was losing to Democrats in America. In summer of 1992
reassignment of Jim Backer from running the State Department to
managing the reelection campaign epitomized that foreign policy with
Russia being “not a potential adversary” was not priority any more. The
new president Clinton was elected under purely domestic motto: “it’s
economy, stupid!” He had little exposure to foreign policy and apparently
took absence of Russian threat for granted. His administration promised
to help, but mostly by money contributions to IMF programs. These
happened to be rather narrow and conditioned to implementation exactly
of the policies that the government in Moscow swore to, but needed help
to set up in practical manner.

Following the American leadership Europe too with irritating loudness

talked the talk of supporting Russian democrats but barely walked the
walk. Simply put the social cost and complexity of the reforms were too
heavy a lift for the government in Moscow without commensurate western
assistance. Soon a pattern of mutual financial and economic promises
predictably unrealistic and thus damaging both for reformers and for
partnership was established. Something of the kind followed also in
foreign policy field after initial success in defining the framework of the
new relationship.

In the 1990s there was no Churchill. Neither in the West, nor, I have to
admit, in Russia.
  

What went wrong between NATO and Russia.

The fall of 1991 after the hardline coup attempt was defeated by
prodemocracy forces the new Russia substituted the Soviet Union with the
movement aspiring on building a European type society. “On this basis of
deep reforms and common values,” President of Russia Yeltsin rote in the
letter addressed to NATO, Russia was eager to develop dialog and
contacts with NATO both in political and military fields. “Today we do not
ask for Russian membership in NATO, but regard it as our long-term
political objective” the letter went on. This statement of the new policy
was widely published and publicized in Russian media.

A Russian saying goes that misfortune often leads to fortune.

Unfortunately the text of the letter was given to press with a technical
mistake. The word “not” was absent. So it read as “Today we do ask for.
Russian membership in NATO, but regard it as our long-term objective.”

Next day we issued a correction. Fortunately this drew additional

attention to the document and its meaning which in essence was the same
with or without “not”. At that time nobody except the Communists
challenged the concept directly. Some doubts were expressed only on
ability and good will of NATO to welcome Russia to the club. I knew
though that there were many in the bureaucracy who did not like this
“pro-Western” approach and would try to strike back.

In early 1990s the rapprochement of Russia with and integration of East

European states into western economic institutions was reluctantly
accepted even by hardliners in Moscow as inevitable. Yet I knew that they
would not “swallow” as easily cooperation with NATO. Different from
other institutions it was a military block built pointedly to counter the
Soviet Union and for that matter most hated and demonized by communist
propaganda. The adversary image of NATO was the last line of defense for
old guards in the military-security complex as it guaranteed them a
privileged position in the power-structure of the “ceased fortress” whether
it was called Soviet Union or Russian Federation.
 I was convinced that there was a sound alternative to that attitude if
national interests were put before the vested ones. The military and
security forces of democratic Russia could and should become partners of
their western counterparts in fighting common enemies like rogue states,
terrorists, drug-traffickers and so on.

Advocating this I won in December 1993 more than 70% of popular

votes in a competitive election for the parliament membership in the
region of Murmansk which included the major naval base hosting the core
of Russian nuclear armed fleet. This was a rare free and fair election, and
the returns reflected the mood of grass root citizens and service men.

Clearly though my solution required radical and resolute reform of the

military and security institutions, and in many cases firing or retiring
soviet-indoctrinated personnel, particularly of high age and rank. Yet
President Yeltsin chose exactly a veteran Evgeny Primakov for the chief of
foreign intelligence service and felt comfortable keeping personally loyal
but hardly democracy zealous heads of other relevant bodies. He argued
that the reform was a tough and multifaceted process that should be
carefully controlled to maintain stability on the way. That was true, but in
my view testified for urgency of a robust action.

Bearing in mind complexity of the issue we had a confidential

understanding on avoidance of ruff moves with Warren Christopher, the
Secretary of State in the new Democratic administration. More or less
similar kind of discussions and understandings I had with some Eastern
European leaders who recognized that their desire to join NATO should be
realized in stages and in consonance with Moscow.

Lech Walesa, the President of Poland, was not on the patience list. Upon
arrival of the Russian President to Warsaw in a hot August day of 1993
Walesa invited him to a private dinner with no note-takers. After midnight
I was awakened up by a call from Yeltsin. When I walked in his suite, he
could hardly utter an apology for the late call and handled a piece of paper
with a ragged handwriting and his signature. It was an insertion in the
declaration prepared for signature ceremony next morning with
endorsement of Poland’s desire to join NATO as soon as possible. In my
heart I welcomed it. In my mind though was no doubt that the statement
would wake up sleeping dogs without any practical purpose. Like all East
European nations Poland could not be ready for NATO earlier then in 3-4
years. Also Russia had to work out its membership or a special treaty with
the alliance. Early next dawn the defense minister Grachev and I asked
Yeltsin to have a more sober look at the matter. After that a compromise
formulation was agreed with the Poles – Russia recognized the right of
Poland to join NATO.

The incident, including the “late night” formulation, leaked to press. I

had to apologize to my American and other partners who were caught by
surprise. Most importantly we all lost ability to calmly address the matter
without politicized domestic and international pressures.

The task of bridging the gap between Russia and NATO became
burning. Nevertheless, Washington was in no hurry to negotiate a pivotal
political deal.

The military contacts were sluggish too. Yet the official visit of Russian
defense minister Grachev to Washington in early fall went well. As I
expected Grachev was impressed by quality of the US military and their
status in society. He also seemed more receptive to the idea of Russian
armed forces becoming allies of the best armies of the world. Grachev
reported to Yeltsin that the Pentagon chief Bill Perry preferred developing
military contacts, joint planning, exercises and peacekeeping missions to
enlargement.

Soon after, that the Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to

Moscow as

“Personal envoy” of the US president to brief his Russian friend on the

new NATO policy. The meeting is vividly described in Strobe Talbot
Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. “Chris laid out our decision on NATO:
we would not proceed immediately with enlargement but concentrate
instead on developing the “Partnership for Peace”…

Without letting Chris finish, Yeltsin spread his arms and intoned,
drawing out the words, “Genialno. Zdorovo.” (Brilliant. Terrific). “Tell Bill
this is a wonderful decision.” …After a brief review of other issues,
Kozyrev and Yeltsin’s other aids virtually booted us out the door.” In his
memoir “Chances of a Lifetime” Warren Christopher recalled “My first
reaction [to Yeltsin’s cheerful interruption] was that it just couldn’t be this
easy…Had Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign minister, deliberately failed to alert
Yeltsin to the full scope of Clinton’s decision, or was Yeltsin simply
relieved that NATO’s expansion would not be immediate?” I also was
puzzled - and worried - why the envoy did not finish the presentation after
the interruption and instead drifted to other issues. Logically Yeltsin
preferred to brush away interpretations of Clinton’s policy and stuck to
what he heard directly from his top representative. Thus he felt offended
and betrayed when in early February his friend Bill made public statement
in Prague that the PFP “sets in motion a process that leads to the
enlargement of NATO.”.

The hard-liners were winning the day in Moscow. Primakov made public
a report of the intelligence service that implied that NATO was still a
threat to Russia and thus Kozyrev’s formula “No hasty enlargement. Yes
partnership.” should be replaced with: “no enlargement.” Of course, this
only incited the Easter European states to seek membership in NATO, but
the prize was in Russia. NATO attitude was seen in the Kremlin and in the
bulk of the media as deceptive and its expansion without Russia menacing.
Yeltsin signed a program of modernization of Russian strategic nuclear
forces.

The historic opportunity for Russia to become a NATO ally instead of foe
closed in Moscow as Washington failed to seize it. This US reaction was in
sharp contrast with the resolute response to the emergence of the Russian
enemy at the beginning of the Cold war. One year after the famous
Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech in

March 1946 the Truman doctrine was announced backed by $400

million aid to Turkey and Greece, and two years later NATO was
established. Four years after collapse of the USSR, NATO was offering
Russia a 5 page document on PFP that could be gradually implemented in
future.

In summer of 1995 Yeltsin authorized me to sign to the offer. In

exchange he got a promise of no major steps towards NATO expansion in
1996, the year of presidential elections in Russia. Thus it was a mutual
understanding that he will run under anti-NATO banners. In the beginning
of 1996 Primakov succeeded me. (later became the prime minister) and
Grachev was changed to even more traditionalist general from soviet
nuclear command.

In 1997 the "Founding Act” between NATO and the Russia was added to
the PFP agreement that had being implemented as halfheartedly as
signed. Yeltsin, in his radio address to the Russian people on May 30,
described the Act as an effort "to minimize the negative consequences of
NATO's expansion and prevent a new split in Europe." He then described
the agreement—inaccurately, according to Western officials—as
"enshrining NATO's pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territories of its new member countries and not [to] build up its armed
forces near our borders...nor carry out relevant infrastructure
preparations.” (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm) Instead of
alliance NATO and Russia returned to controlled hostility. There was no
Churchill or Truman in that crucial time. And the time was lost.

 
  

It’s high time the West treated Russia in robust, straightforward

way. is crucial for preservation of peace and international order.

By mid 1990s the democratic flow of the early years ebbed, and old
habits proved hard to die in Russia. In the second part of the decade the
basic feature of the new system crystallized. The ruling elite, after seizing
control of the oil export and other assets, preferred to spend proceeds in
the comfortable West instead of wrestling with hard challenges at home.
The less lucky compatriots were left in custody of unreformed
bureaucracy and security apparatus. No wonder, in the next decade under
Putin, former KGB lieutenant colonel whom Yeltsin appointed the
successor, traditional style authoritarian regime consolidated its grip on
Russia.

Like Yeltsin and most of other predecessors on the Russian throne,

Putin started his tenure with an idea of catching up with the West by
attempting at least some urgent and long overdue reforms. Yet, he also
found that the endeavor was easier named then done, and most
importantly could’ve undermined the system that provided him with
unchallenged power. Reforms able to unlock development, especially in
modern economy, must have a general thrust towards liberalization and
competitiveness. The corrupt elite with traditionally strong security and
military components learned the lesson of late 1980 - early 1990s.

In search for strengthening the system by modernizing the ailing

economy the then soviet leader Gorbachev soon had hit the barrier of the
suffocating “monopolism” of bureaucracy (later joined by crony oligarchs).
He tried to overcome, first by command, second by liberalization. Yet,
European oriented society pushed liberalization into political field aspiring
to emulate the western patterns of free market and democracy. As
Gorbachev refused to use force to rein in that push, the system crumbled
from periphery to the center. In Eastern Europe the Berlin Wall fell and
former Soviet satellites one after another got rid of KGB control, chose the
European model and decided to join EU and NATO. In 1991 the KGB
headquarters in Moscow were under siege and the Soviet Union ceased to
exist. Putin appointed first to lead the successor security service and then
the country, was determined not to repeat that reckless experiment.
 The inherited inability of the political system to allow sustainable socio-
economic modernization was veiled by the rising oil price that provided
for the rulers and also for the people. Per capita GDP rose from $ 1,771.6
in 2000 to $14,611.7 in 2013 according to the World Bank.

Nevertheless the Russia European identity made impossible to build a

Chinese wall between GDP growth and politics. Impressive rallies rolled
over Moscow and some other cities in protest of ragged elections in 2012.
In response the regime strengthened police control and elevated
traditional anti western propaganda to the level of state ideology guiding
domestic and foreign policy. And it was not just a tactical maneuver. Let
there be no mistake, a dream of some day “living like other people”, i.e. of
emulating the western model, is deep seated in Russian people. That’s
why for the autocrats the very existence of the democratic West, above all
the US, mounts to real and present danger, and relations with it degrade
to a zero sum game. Undermining the opposite camp and supporting anti-
western forces close to home or in remote places like Syria and Venezuela,
is simply a foreign policy dimension of securing their power in Russia.

For them the “Cold War” never ended. And as long as they are in power
will not end. As foreign minister of Russia I met long-term dictator of Syria
Hafez Al-Assad who expressed bewilderment at my request to change
policy while for decades my predecessors coming from

Moscow praised him as loyal “soldier at the forefront of fight against

American imperialism”. I guess he exhaled when my successor and his old
friend Primakov paid a visit to him. His heir Bashar Al-Assad also has no
illusion why he is needed to Moscow. Said he: "Syria and Iran and Russia
see eye to eye regarding this conflict," meaning bloodbath he unleashed in
his country. “It's not about having a huge interest in Syria. They could
have it anywhere else," he told the US public television network. "So, it's
about the future of the world.” (http://news.yahoo.com/russia-iran-syria-
share-same-vision-assad-024341461.html)

The Cold war mongering can be contained now as it was during soviet
period. More over there is potential for carefully defined cooperation in
specific areas like nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
prevention of terrorist attacks on each other homeland and curb of
narcotic trafficking. Whether it will be done depends on ability of the
West, especially of the US, to realize the driving forces of Kremlin’s policy
and follow an effective strategy towards Russia.
 Some lessons to this effect could be drawn from the Ukraine crisis. It is
almost a conventional wisdom to interpret Russian actions there by
analyzing intentions of Mr. Putin. Either he wants to restore the empire or
just to teach the west a lesson for encouraging

“Euromaidan” that he interpreted as inroad into his sphere of interest.

Or simply boost his domestic popularity on the nationalist hysteria.
Moscow insists on supporting (a euphemism for fomenting) a rebellion in
Eastern Ukraine against pro western government in Kiev.

Stephen Kinzer argues that Putin’s reaction to encirclement isn’t

surprising and to extend a rationale for aggression in Ukraine, offers the
concept of “strategic depth,” or the taking of enough adjacent territory to
protect the homeland (Opinion, March 1). All these explanations are valid.
And there is the fundamental ground underlying all of them. Eastern
Ukraine is a strategically important battleground of the continuing Cold
war aimed at undermining the west and its influence everywhere possible.
The hostility to the west and its values is a constant driver of the
autocratic system in Russia. It is pursued as far as the resisting forces
permit, and that’s why the Ukrainian front turned hot and bloody.

On the flip side Russian rulers have always been expected and dreamed
(European identity speaks in them too) to win recognition and a place
among leaders of developed countries. That’s why Putin took it to the
heart when Obama and many others did not show at the Sochi Olympics in
protest to the Kremlin’s anti-western pivot. Yet, the signal was so weak
and muted (the preparations for the G-8 meeting in Sochi just two months
later went in full speed) that it only incited hardliners.

Unfortunately the pattern of weak responses to Kremlin growing

militancy has been followed on. Apparently this kind of reaction was
supposed as a measured and incremental methodical encouragement to
deescalate while leaving space for face saving negotiations and
maneuvers. At least the wording used by western leaders suggested that.
President Obama constantly called on Putin to deescalate. The sanctions
following annexation of Crimea and initial stages of intervention in
Eastern Ukraine were imposed on a very limited number of persons then
on more individuals and a couple of rather secondary institutions. Kremlin
scornfully shrugged them.

Only after the civilian aircraft with about three hundred international
passengers was shot over part of Ukrainian territory seized by Russian
proxy fighters, the US and European Union announced some biting
measures. Even these are to hurt more in the long run, and accompanied
with conciliatory rhetoric and protestations of readiness and indeed desire
to lift the sanctions as soon as possible.

De-escalation techniques are suitable in dealing with distressed

individuals suffering from dementia or with a post-war syndrome in
military veterans. Yet they are hardly productive in relations with a regime
in control of large country guided not so much by distressed individuals,
but also – and primarily – by its interests, and determined to test and
constantly push the limits of its policy contesting the others.

It is now widely recognized that the challengers to the world order are
up to a hybrid warfare that combines cyber and information (or rather
disinformation) operations going on non-stop, i.e. in normal times, and the
use of Special Forces to support subversion in crisis.

And they act resolutely counting on surprise effect. Yet a surprise it

should not be. An autocratic regime pursuing anti western propaganda
and militarization at home provided enough ground for alert and adequate
correction of the defense strategy for other nations.

The reactions of the West were too slow and too weak already at two
pivotal turns of history. First when Russia tried to part with its
authoritarian and aggressive legacy and join the West. Ironically a
protracted transition to post-cold war strategies in western capitals
gained momentum and extended long after the situation in Russia turned
back to a more traditional model.

Second, when they were taken by surprise by annexation and

subversion in Ukraine, it is the third call now – a hybrid version the Cold
War. So far, the Western response to has been marked by confusion and
bewilderment, sporadic tough talk of red lines, and very cautious moves or
no action when those lines were crossed. Empty threats are no better than
empty promises. They are misleading and provocative.

The results are opposite to de-escalation. Especially in dealing with

Russia where as Julia Ioffe keenly pointed out “if one shows some
weakness, then one is all weakness—and therefore prey.” No wonder
Western pundits and politicians are again playing the blame game of “Who
Lost Russia?”
 It’s high time the West treated Russia in robust, straightforward and
resolute way both when she opts for good and for bad. That’s the least of
what the great country deserves. And that is crucial for preservation of
peace and international order.

The end

Andrei Kozyrev 2015

Former Foreign Minister of Russia