From The Greeks To The Arabs and Beyond

From the Greeks to the Arabs and Beyond
Volume 2
Islamic Philosophy, Theology
and Science
texts and studies
Edited by
Anna Akasoy
Emilie Savage-Smith
volume 114/2
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ipts

From the Greeks
to the Arabs and Beyond
Volume 2
Islamic Philosophy
By
Hans Daiber
In collaboration with
Helga Daiber
leiden | boston
Cover illustration: Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, part of his famous philosophical
encyclopaedia, on Metaphysics. Old copy from the year 865/146, Daiber Collection III, MS 61, fol. 1 v.
Back cover illustration: Abū l-Mawāhib aš-Šāḏilī al-Wafāʾī (d. 882/1477), Dīwān ḥaqāʾiq al-Mawāhib, a
complete copy of Sufi poems, possibly from the lifetime of the author. Copy from the 2nd half of the
9th/15th century, Daiber Collection III, MS 78, fol. 1 r.
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Contents
Abbreviations xi
Rules of Transliteration xiv
1 What Is the Meaning of and to What End Do We Study the History of

Islamic Philosophy? 1
2 Die Fortsetzung der philosophischen Tradition bei den syrischen

Christen des 9.–14. Jahrhunderts 27
3 Naẓar 57
4 Ruʾyā
In Its Philosophical-Mystical Meaning 63
5 Saʿāda 70
6 Fārābī – Kindī – Arabisch-islamische Theologie und Philosophie –

Avicebron 80
7 Fārābī – Kindī 87
8 Political Philosophy 90
9 Essential Features of Islamic Political Philosophy 146
10 De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica

The Category of Relation in Arabic-Islamic Philosophy 153
11 Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Ausdruck

griechischer Ethik, islamischer Ideologie und iranisch-sassanidischer
Hofetikette 224
12 Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an Kindīs Metaphysik 243
13 Kindī in Andalus
Ibn Ḥazm’s Critique of His Metaphysics 266
14 Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī 271

vi contents
15 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (4th/10th c.) on the Unity and Diversity of

Religions 314
16 The Ismailite Background of Fārābī’s Political Philosophy

Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī as a Forerunner of Fārābī 338
17 Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (258/872–339/950 oder 951) 347
18 The Ruler as Philosopher

A New Interpretation of Fārābī’s View 375
19 The Problem of Teaching Philosophy to the Citizen

Persian Translation 395
20 Philosopher-King 406
21 Fārābīs Aristoteles
Grundlagen seiner Erkenntnislehre 409
22 Fārābī on the Role of Philosophy in Society 423
23 Philosophy and Law in the Context of Fārābī’s Epistemology and

Theory of Communication 430
24 Das Fārābī-Bild des Maimonides

Ideentransfer als hermeneutischer Weg zu Maimonides’
Philosophie 453
25 Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī in der

Forschung 466
26 Miskawayh’s Purity of the Soul as a Program Leading to Ethicization of

Knowledge 501
27 Ethics as Likeness to God in Miskawayh

An Overlooked Tradition 519
28 The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sīnā

Epistemological and Theological Aspects and the Consequences 536
contents vii
29 Bahmanyār 548
30 Griechische Ethik in islamischem Gewande

Das Beispiel von Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5./11. Jh.) 553
31 God versus Causality

Ġazālī’s Solution and Its Historical Background 564
32 Magie und Kausalität im Islam 587
33 Ibn Rušd, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh 611
34 Ṭūsī, Naṣīr ad-Dīn 614
35 Ibn Khaldūn
Leben und Werk 629
36 Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad 658
37 Mullā Ṣadrā on the Problem of Creation and the Role of Greek

Philosophers
New Light on Mullā Ṣadrā as a Historian of Greek Philosophers 661
38 Ambiguity (taškīk) of Being in Mullā Ṣadrā

A Common Philosophical Problem between Cordoba and Iṣfahān 675
39 The Reception of Islamic Philosophy at Oxford in the 17th Century

The Pocock(e)s’ (Father and Son) Contribution to the Understanding of
Islamic Philosophy in Europe 687
40 The Humanism of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas

An Evaluation of His Concept of Education in View of Classical Islamic
Sources 705
viii contents
Reviews
41 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant (1970) 727
42 Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy

(1985) 746
43 Farhad Daftary (ed.), Mediaeval Ismaʿili History and Thought

(1996) 749
44 George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics

(1985) 753
45 Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and

Christian Thinkers (1983) 758
46 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (1971) 762
47 Richard Walzer (ed. and transl.), Al-Farabi on the Perfect State

(1985) 765
48 Shukri B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in

Alfārābī (1991) 768
49 Joel L. Kraemer, Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam (1986) 771
50 Constantine K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character – A

Translation from the Arabic of Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad Miskawayh’s
Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (1968) 774
51 Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der

Enzyklopädie Kitāb Ihwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (III) (1975) 779
52 Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists (1982) 790
53 Douglas Morton Dunlop (ed.), The Muntakhab Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah

of Abū Sulaimān As-Sijistānī (1979) 794
contents ix
54 Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and Admonitions, part one: Logic. Translated from
the Original Arabic with an Introduction and Notes by Shams
Constantine Inati (1984) 796
55 Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim, Charles E. Butterworth,

Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Magīd Harīdī (eds.), Averrois Cordubensis in
Librum Aristotelis De interpretatione (1981); Charles E.
Butterworth (transl.), Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on
Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione (1983) 798
56 Charles E. Butterworth, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on

Aristotle’s Poetics. Translated, with Introduction and Notes
(1986) 801
57 Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation

(1985) 805
58 Fathallah Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His

Controversies in Transoxiana (1966) 807
59 Imām Rāzī’s ʿIlm Al-Ak̲h̲lāq. English Translation of His Kitāb al-Nafs

Wa’l-Rūḥ wa S̲h̲arḥ Quwāhumā with Introduction and Commentary
by M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Maʿṣūmī (1969) 814
60 Braulio Justel Calabozo (ed. and transl.), La Hidāya de

Al-Raȳrāȳī (un Espejo de Principes Medieval) (1983) 816
Abbreviations
AAL.R Atti dell’(a R.) Accademia dei Lincei. Rendiconti. Classe di Scienze Morali,
Storiche e Filologiche. Roma
AAWG.PH Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philolo-
gisch-historische Klasse. Göttingen
AAWLM.G Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz.
Geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse. Wiesbaden
AIVS Atti del (R.) Istituto Veneto i Scienze Lettere ed Arti. Venezia
AJSL American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures. Chicago
AKM Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Leipzig
ANRW Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Ed. Wolfgang Haase. Ber-
lin/New York
APAW.PH Abhandlungen der (K.) Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philoso-
phisch-historische Klasse. Berlin
ArOr Archiv Orientálni. Praha
ASL Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus. Leiden/Boston/New York/Köln
ASP Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. Cambridge
BGA Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum. Lugduni Batavorum
BiOr Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leiden
BIPh Hans Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy. I: Alphabetical List of
Publications. II: Index of Names, Terms and Topics. Leiden/Boston/Köln
1999. = Handbuch der Orientalistik I, 43/1–2. Supplement. Leiden/Boston
2007. = Handbuch der Orientalistik I, 89
BO Beiträge zur Orientalistik. Leipzig
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. London
BTS Beiruter Texte und Studien. Beirut/Wiesbaden
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Berolini
CCAA Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Cambridge, Mass.
CGAL Georg Graf, Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur. Città del
Vaticano
CNWS Center voor Niet-Westerse Studies. Leiden
CQ Classical Quarterly. Oxford.
CSCO Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium. Roma (etc.)
EI Enzyklopädie des Islam. Leiden. I–IV, 1913–1934. Ergänzungsband 1938
EI2 The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden. New edition. 1ff., 1960ff. Supplement
1980ff.
EnAC Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique. Genève
EPhM Études de la philosophie médiévale. Paris
xii abbreviations
GAL Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. 2., den Sup-
plementbänden angepaßte Auflage. Vol. 1. 2. Supplementband 1–3. Leiden
1937–1949
GAL S GAL Supplementband
GALex A Greek and Arabic Lexicon (GALex). Materials for a Dictionary of the Medi-
aeval Translations from Greek into Arabic. Ed. Gerhard Endress and
Dimitri Gutas. Fasc. 1ff. Leiden/New York/Köln 1992ff. = Handbuch der
Orientalistik I, 11.
GAS Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. I–XV. Leiden/Frank-
furt a.M. 1967–2010.
GSL Anton Baumstark, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur. Bonn 1922
HWPh Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Darmstadt 1971–2007
IC Islamic Culture. Hyderabad
IHC Islamic History and Civilization. Studies and Texts. Leiden/Boston
IOS Israel Oriental Studies. Tel Aviv
IPTS Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies. Leiden/Boston
IS Islamic Studies. Karachi
IslQ Islamic Quarterly. A review of Islamic culture. London
JA Journal asiatique. Paris
JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society. Baltimore
JHI Journal of the History of Ideas. New York
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies. London
JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Chicago, Illinois
JPh Journal of Philosophy. New York (etc.)
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. London
JSAI Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam
JSSt Journal of Semitic Studies. Oxford
KNAW.L Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde
→ MNAW.L → VNAW.L
MFOB Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université Saint Joseph. Beyrouth
MIDEO Mélanges de l’Institut Dominicain d’Études Orientales du Caire. Cairo
MME Manuscripts of the Middle East. Ed. Jan Just Witkam. Leiden
MNAW.L Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen,
afd. Letterkunde. Amsterdam
Mus Helv Museum Helveticum. Basel
MUSJ Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph. Beyrouth
MW Muslim World. Hartford, Conn.
NAWG Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Göttingen
OC Oriens Christianus. Wiesbaden
OCP Orientalia Christiana Periodica. Roma
abbreviations xiii
OLZ Orientalistische Literaturzeitung. Berlin (etc.)

OrChr Oriens Christianus. Roma
PhAnt Philosophia Antiqua. Leiden
RAC Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum. Stuttgart
RE Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbei-
tung. Hrsg. v. August Friedrich Pauly und Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart
1894ff.
Rech.ILO, nouv. sér. Recherches publiées sous la direction de l’Institut de Lettres Ori-
entales de Beyrouth. Beyrouth
REI Revue des Études Islamiques. Paris
REI. HS Revue des Études Islamiques. Hors Série. Paris
ROC Revue de l’Orient Chrétien. Paris
RRAL Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei. Classe di Scienze Morali, Sto-
riche e Filologiche. Roma
RSO Rivista degli Studi Orientali. Roma
RUSCH Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities. New Brunswick/Oxford/
London
SGA Studia Graeco-Arabica. Pisa
SI Studia Islamica. Paris
SIFC Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica. Firenze
SPAW.PH Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philoso-
phisch-Historische Klasse. Berlin
SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Ed. Hans von Arnim. Stutgardiae 1903–
1905
TAPhS Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. Philadelphia, Pa.
VNAW.L Verhandelingen der (K.) Nederlands(ch)e Akademie van Wetenschappen (te
Amsterdam). Afdeling Letterkunde. Amsterdam
WBG Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Darmstadt
WdF Wege der Forschung. Darmstadt
WI Die Welt des Islam. Berlin
WKAS Wörterbuch der Klassischen Arabischen Sprache. Wiesbaden
ZA Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie. Leipzig
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden
ZGAIW Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften. Frank-
furt a.M.
ZKG Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte. Stuttgart
ZS Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete. Leipzig
Rules of Transliteration
The transliteration follows the rules of the German Oriental Society.
In addition:
– īy → iyy
– ūw → uww
– au → aw
– ai → ay
chapter 1
What Is the Meaning of and to What End

Do We Study the History of Islamic Philosophy?
On the 26th of March 1789, the German poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller
presented an inaugural lecture commemorating his appointment to the Chair
of History at Jena University, an honorary post. The lecture, entitled “What is
the meaning of and to what end do we study universal history?”,1 was a passion-
ate and highly regarded plea for the search for knowledge by the “philosophic
mind”, which – not content with fragments – seeks the meaning of history.2
Influenced by contemporary philosophy, and in particular by Kant, Schiller
was referring to the universal epistemological value of historical study. In this
context, we have good reason to turn our attention to the history of Islamic
philosophy3 and, | following the footsteps of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833– 178
1 Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe, XVII (Historische Schriften), part 1. Ed. by Karl-Heinz

Hahn. Weimar 1970, pp. 359–376.
2 Schillers Werke, p. 360. On the other side of the coin, “the sole concern of the hack scholar is
to fulfil, through his industriousness, the conditions befitting his office” (dem Brodgelehrten
… [ist es] bey seinem Fleiß einzig und allein darum zu thun, die Bedingungen zu erfüllen,
under denen er in einem Amte fähig ist).
3 The term “Islamic philosophy”, now generally adopted by modern historians of philosophy,
replaces the term “Arabic philosophy”, which had often been used by Western scholars. – See
Michael Vollmer, “Philosophie, arabische”. In HWPh, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karl-
fried Gründer, 3, Darmstadt 1989, col. 882–886. – Gerhard Endress, “Die arabisch-
islamische Philosophie: Ein Forschungsbericht”. In ZGAIW 5, 1989, pp. 1–47, and the refer-
ences given on pp. 1 f. – Emilio Panella, “Esiste una ‘filosofia araba’?”. In Memorie domeni-
cane 6, 1975, pp. 380–397.
Moreover, cf. the discussions of the term “Jewish philosophy” in Colette Sirat, A His-
tory of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Cambridge 1985, pp. 1ff. – Heinrich Simon
and Marie Simon, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie. Munich 1984, pp. 9ff. – Bruno
Chiesa, “Simon’s Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie”. In The Jewish Quarterly Review 78,
1987, pp. 120–121.
Evidently, the terms “Jewish” and “Islamic” philosophy each require a different interpreta-
tion and do not form a unity. Cf. Parviz Morewedge, “Contemporary Scholarship on Near
Eastern Philosophy”. In Philosophical Forum 2/1, Boston 1970, pp. 122–140. P. Morewedge
correctly concludes: “Near Eastern philosophy is far more than the reflection of Islamic theo-
logy and Greek classical philosophy” (pp. 137f.). Moreover, Islamic philosophy is not restricted
to the classical period till Ibn Rušd (pp. 130 f.).
Cf. now the survey of modern debates about Arabic / Islamic philosophy by Shahab
Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic. Princeton 2016, pp. 5–109.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789

2 chapter 1
1911),4 to consider its role in the universal historical development of philo-

sophic thought. Moreover, it is interesting to consider why Islamic philosophy
evoqued such interest in the past, and what our motivation might be for study-
ing Islamic philosophy within the study of Islam today.
From the 3rd/9th century onwards, Muslims and Islamic scholars followed
the lead of patristic theology in developing an avid interest in Greek philosophy
and logic, despite continuous resistance from Islamic orthodoxy.5 Even before
the great philosophers, such as Kindī (185/801–between 247/861 and 259/873),
Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951), Ibn Sīnā / Avicenna (370/980–428/1037),
Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111), and Ibn Rušd / Averroes (520/1126–595/1198), the
“Muʿtazila school” at the turn of the 3rd/9th century sought a rational explana-
tion of the Islamic faith, in the form of an ingenious doctrine of divine attrib-
utes and a natural-scientific cosmology that fit the context of the Koranic theo-
179 logy of | creation. Greek metaphysics, logic and natural philosophy seemed
to offer the foundation they required, and to provide a defense of their faith
against new forces arising in non-Islamic movements, especially Christianity,
4 See Wilhelm Dilthey, Grundriß der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie. Ed. Hans-
Georg Gadamer. Frankfurt a.M. 1949, p. 12. – On Wilhelm Dilthey cf. Esther Seidel,
Jüdische Philosophie in nichtjüdischer und jüdischer Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung. Frank-
furt a.M./Bern/New York 1984. = Europäische Hochschulschriften XX, vol. 116, p. 55. – W.
Dilthey, Grundriß, pp. 131–134 contain a short chapter on “Die auf den Griechen, besonders
den Aristotelismus gegründete arabische Vernunftwissenschaft”. – Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey,
Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften I. Leipzig/Berlin 1883. = Gesammelte Schriften I, 1914
(21923), pp. 293f. This work seems to view Islamic philosophical thought mainly as a con-
tinuation of Greek thought (“selbständige Fortschritte” only exist in alchemy and math-
ematics, pp. 294 f.). – Cf. also Paul Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen II/2, Part II: Philosophie des Mittelalters. Leipzig
1915, pp. 392–423, esp. p. 402: “Eklektische Mischphilosophie”; “Aristotelismus”; “in vielfacher
Durchtränkung mit neuplatonischen Elementen”. – Karl Vorländer, Geschichte der Philo-
sophie. Leipzig 71927 (11903), pp. 264–269. – Ernst von Aster, Geschichte der Philosophie.
Stuttgart 151968, pp. 145–147. – Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie.
Stuttgart 1950, pp. 250 f. (influenced by E. von Aster and – s. n. 43 – by J. E. Erdmann).
5 Cf. Ignaz Goldziher, “Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wis-
senschaften”. In I. Goldziher, Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Joseph Desomogyi, V. Hildes-
heim 1970, pp. 357–400 / Engl. transl. in I. Goldziher, Studies on Islam. Ed. Merlin L.
Swartz. Oxford 1981. – In his article “Hellenism in Islam” in Carol G. Thomas (ed.), Paths
from Ancient Greece, Leiden (etc.) 1988, pp. 77–91, Francis Edward Peters expresses the
following exaggerated and, I think, somewhat misleading opinion: “But in their own society
the philosophers, the Muslim heirs of Plato and Aristotle, were a small and isolated band, self-
taught or privately tutored – the ‘foreign sciences’ found no place in any Islamic curriculum –
who founded no schools and produced no disciples, were harassed and denounced by their
contemporaries, and went generally unmarked in the enormous body of Arabic literature”
(p. 90).
what is the meaning of the history of islamic philosophy? 3
Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Manichaeism. Therefore, it is no coincidence

that, at the beginning of the 4th/10th century, a cognizance of the universal-
ity of philosophical wisdom and its prophetic inspirational source had grown
up in Ismailite circles. That very cognizance pointed to the superiority of the
Islamic revelation, which was said to proffer unadulterated divine truth.6
In constructing their own conception of the world, the scholars of the Islam’s
emergent philosophical thought welcome reflections on and support to the
ideas of earlier thinkers. They drew on a wide array of ancient philosophical
doctrines, though frequently criticizing them, and on translations and doxo-
graphic studies of earlier philosophers.7 For similar reasons, at the end of
the 6th/12th century Arabic-Latin translators, including those of the famous
“Toledo school”, started to render the writings of Aristotle and his Islamic com-
mentators Fārābī and, most important, Avicenna and Averroes more accessible
to the rest of the medieval world.8 Logic and ontology, epistemology and nat-
ural philosophy were at the forefront. With the influence of Aristotle and his
Neoplatonizing Arabic interpreters they left a new and distinctive mark on
the medieval Christian conception of the world.9 Many contemporary schol-
ars adopted Avicenna’s doctrine of the unity of the active intellect, the dator
formarum, together with Averroes’ teaching of immortality of the active and
passive intellect and the doctrine of the duality of truth, theological and philo-
6 Cf. Hans Daiber, “Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (10th century A.D.) on the Unity and Diversity of
Relgions”. In Jerald D. Gort et al. (eds.), Dialogue and Syncretism. An Interdisciplinary
Approach. Grand Rapids/Amsterdam 1989, pp. 87–104. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to
the Arabs II/15. – Hans Daiber, “Die Autonomie der Philosophie im Islam”. In Monika
Asztalos, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), Knowledge and the Sciences in
Medieval Philosophy, Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philo-
sophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki 24–29 August 1987, I. = Acta Philosophica Fennica 48, pp. 228–249,
esp. pp. 235f. / English version in Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures.
Leiden/Boston 2012, pp. 65–87, esp. pp. 73 f.
7 Cf. Hans Daiber, “Hellenistisch-kaiserzeitliche Doxographie und philosophischer Synkre-
tismus in islamischer Zeit”. In ANRW II, 36/7, Berlin/New York 1994, pp. 4974–4992. = H.
Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/3.
8 Cf. Hans Daiber, “Lateinische Übersetzungen arabischer Texte zur Philosophie und ihre
Bedeutung für die Scholastik des Mittelalters. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung”. In Ren-
contres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l’antiquité
tardive au XIVe siècle, Louvain-la-Neuve/Cassino 1990, pp. 203–250. = Revised English version
in H. Daiber, Islamic Thought (s. n. 6), pp. 89–166.
9 Cf. Fernand van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism.
Engl. transl. by Leonard Johnston. Louvain 1955. – F. van Steenberghen, Die Philo-
sophie im 13. Jahrhundert. Munich 1977. – Jean Jolivet, “The Arabic Heritage”. In Peter
Dronke (ed.), A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy. Cambridge 1988 (pp. 113–150),
pp. 117 ff.
4 chapter 1
sophical, which was derived from Averroes’ philosophy.10 Thus, the medieval
180 Islamic philosophers were not only teachers of philosophy but | also transmit-
ters of Greek philosophy,11 in the form of what Fernand van Steenberghen
described as “heterodox” or “radical” Aristotelianism.
As on previous occasions, the philosophy in Islam was increasingly applied
to theology, and metaphysics was linked with natural philosophy, with the aim
to form a theological conception of the world,12 backed by an Alexandrian-
inspired,13 Aristotelian-Arabic theory of science.14 At the same time, animosity
towards philosophy began to gather strength, culminating in the condemna-
tion of heterodox Aristotelianism in Paris on the 10th of December 1270 and,
decisively, on the 7th of March 1277.15 However, this condemnation could not
stop medieval scholars being attracted by the thoughts and expressions of
the Arabic-Latin translations and selectively integrating them into their own
theological and philosophical doctrines.16 This convergence of developments,
supplemented by further influences, resulted in the emergence of those move-
ments that researchers ever since have called “Aristotelianising” and “Avicen-
nising Augustinianism”, or “Latin Averroism”.17
The development of related ideas, such as the Augustinian theory of illu-
mination, permitted the integration of Avicennian ideas and expressions into
European thought in the Middle Ages. Arabic Aristotelianism and its Arabic
commentators became attractive. However, this does not mean that all medi-
eval scholars should be pigeon-holed as “Avicennian” or “Averroist”, as has often
been the case since the publication of Ernest Renan’s classic work, Averroès
10 Cf. F. van Steenberghen, Philosophie (s. n. 9), pp. 343ff.

11 Historians of philosophy held differing views on this issue in the 18th and 19th centur-
ies. – Cf. M. le Chanoine Jacques Forget, “Dans quelle mesure les philosophes arabes,
continuateurs des philosophes grecs, ont-ils contribué au progrès de la philosophie scol-
astique?”. In Compte rendu du troisième congrès scientifique international des catholiques
tenu à Bruxelles du 3 au 8 septembre 1894, Section I, Brussels 1895, pp. 233–268.
13 Cf. Hans Daiber, “Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (9. Jh.) über die Einteilung der Wissenschaften”. In
ZGAIW 6, 1990 (1991), pp. 94–129. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III B/6.
14 In this connection Dominicus Gundissalinus’ work, De divisione philosophiae (written
after 1140 AD), was very influential. See the critical edition and analysis by Ludwig
Baur, Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae. Münster 1903. = Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen IV/2–3.
15 Cf. F. van Steenberghen, Philosophie (s. n. 9), pp. 442ff. – Luca Bianchi, Il Vescovo e
i filosofi: La condanna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione dell’aristotelismo scolastico. Bergamo
1990. = Quodlibet 6.
16 See Jean Jolivet’s informative survey (s. n. 9).
et l’Averroïsme18 in 1853. Moreover, scholastic philosophers did not shy away | 181
from criticizing their sources of inspiration. Such criticism is evident in philo-
sophical tracts from the Renaissance,19 following the 15th-century AD popular-
ization of Islamic philosophy that came about with the publication in Venice
of Latin translations of works by Avicenna, Averroes, Ġazālī and Fārābī.20 Here,
it was not merely an interest in Aristotle that drew attention to Islamic philo-
sophers and their reflections on his thought.
The motivating force of the Arabic-Latin translations began to diminish,
when Byzantine scholars, fleeing the Turks, brought Greek manuscripts to the
West, making it possible to study the ancient writings in the Greek originals.
The humanist cry ad fontes reinforced an increasing animosity towards the
Islamic scholars who were inspired by antiquity, and towards those who stud-
ied them – the Arabists.21 But by the same token, the movement for direct
recourse to the source also inspired Arabists, from the latter half of the 16th cen-
tury onwards, to increase their philological activity22 in an endeavour to derive
a picture of Islamic culture directly from Arabic sources.23 The Swiss Reformed
theologian, Johann Heinrich Hottinger (1620–1667), included a chapter
on “The Usefulness of Arabic in Theology, Medicine, Law, Philosophy and Philo-
logy” in his Analecta historico-theologica, published in Zurich in 1652.24 To be
sure, he had to rely on details appearing in Arabic biobibliographical works,
particularly the Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ of Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/1270) and the
18 Third, revised edition, Paris 1867. = Œuvres complètes III. Ed. by Henriette Psichari.
Paris 1949, pp. 9–365, 1153–1238 (index). – A reprint of the third edition appeared in 1985 in
Frankfurt, ed. by Fuat Sezgin, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte der arabisch-
islamischen Wissenschaften, Series B: Nachdrucke, Abt. Philosophie, I. – On translations
into other languages and reviews see Philipp W. Rosemann in Bulletin de philosophie
médiévale 30, 1988, pp. 204 f.
19 See Charles B. Schmitt et al. (eds.). The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy.
Cambridge 1988, index, s.v. “Averroism”, “Avicennian tradition”.
20 Cf. H. Daiber, “Lateinische Übersetzungen” (s. n. 8).
21 Cf. Felix Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike in der Tradition des Islam. Darmstadt
1980. = Erträge der Forschung 136, pp. 18 ff.
22 Cf. F. Klein-Franke, Die Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 48ff.
23 On the details that follow cf. Hans Daiber, “The Reception of Islamic Philosophy at
Oxford in the 17th century: The Pocock(e)s’ (Father and Son) Contribution to the Under-
standing of Islamic Philosophy in Europe”. In Charles E. Butterworth and B. A. Kes-
sel (eds.), The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe. Leiden/New York/Köln 1994.
= Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 39, pp. 65–82. = H. Daiber, From
the Greeks to the Arabs II/39.
24 Johann Heinrich Hottinger, Analecta historico-theologica. Zurich 1652, pp. 233–
316.
6 chapter 1
Kitāb al-Fihrist of Ibn an-Nadīm (d. 380/990), and on Leo Africanus’ De viris
quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes from 1527.
The first who made any further progress in the study of Arabic philosoph-
ical sources was the English Arabist Pocock(e) (1604–1691). He travelled to the
Orient and collected Arabic manuscripts. In 1650 he published a chapter of an
important Islamic historical source, Barhebraeus’ Muḫtaṣar fī d-duwal, under
the title Specimen historiae Arabum. The publication included a detailed com-
mentary and a wealth of information on the history of Islamic philosophy,
based on other Arabic manuscripts. He went on to publish the entire treat-
ise with an accompanying Latin translation in 1663. Pocock(e) was not yet in
the position to sift critically through the material, and therefore the individual
details are in need of some revision. Nevertheless, his book from 1650 repres-
182 ents the first collection of | historiographical material on Islamic philosophy,
and, as the sole Arabic philosophical text in Europe known in the original
tongue, it served historians as a source for their research right up to the 19th
century AD.25 In 1671 Pocock(e), together with his son, published Ibn Ṭufayl’s
philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān in the Arabic original, accompanied by a
Latin translation. In the 17th and 18th centuries this work was translated into
English, Dutch and German.
Systematic study of Islamic philosophy from original texts did not imme-
diately become common practice. Nevertheless, several secondary works on
Islamic philosophy were published in the ensuing period. The most noteworthy
are those of Georg Horn, Henricus Balthasar Seelmann, Johann
Gottfried Lakemacher, Giovanni Baptista Capasso, André-Fran-
çois Boureau-Deslandes, Christophorus Carolus Fabricius, and
above all the Historia critica philosophiae of Johann Jakob Brucker.26
25 S. nn. 26 and 36. – Cf. H. Daiber, “Reception” (s. n. 23), ch. 3.

26 See the Bibliographical Supplement I. – On Georg Horn see also Esther Seidel,
Jüdische Philosophie (s. n. 4), pp. 20 f. – On André-François Boureau-Deslandes
see Gregorio Piaia, “Diderot e la trasfigurazione ideologica e letteraria della filosofia
araba”. In Giampiero Bellingeri and Giorgio Vercellin (eds.), Studi Eurasiatici in
onore di Mario Grignaschi, Venice 1988. = Eurasiatica 5, pp. 87–101. – For a comparison of
the approaches of A.-F. Boureau-Deslandes and G. B. Capasso (the history of philo-
sophy is a history of the progress of human thinking) with that of J. J. Brucker (the
history of philosophy is a history of the human mind, a history of the truth) see Walter
E. Ehrhardt, Philosphiegeschichte und Geschichte des Skeptizismus. Bern/Munich 1967,
p. 43; and Lucien Braun, Histoire de l’ histoire de la philosophie. Paris 1973, pp. 144ff. and
166 ff. – On Johann Jakob Brucker, the founder of the scientific historiography of philo-
sophy, see L. Braun, Histoire, pp. 119ff.; E. Seidel, Jüdische Philosophie (s. n. 4), pp. 27ff.;
W. E. Ehrhardt, Philosophiegeschichte, p. 43; J. Ree in Jonathan Ree, Michael Ayers
and Adam Westoby, Philosophy and its Past. Sussex 1978, pp. 3ff.; Jonathan Ree, “The
The conclusions, reached by these historians of Islamic philosophy, range

from rejection to admiration, and the various interpretations of the aims of
philosophical historiography were almost certainly instrumental in this diver-
gence of opinions.27 In Brucker’s view, while some Islamic philosophers may
well have been good metaphysicians and adherents of Aristotle, this was by no
means sufficient reason to venerate Islamic philosophy.28 This basically | negat- 183
ive stance remained influential for some time to come.29 However, the Kantian
commentator Dieterich Tiedemann criticized Brucker’s attitude in the
fourth volume of his Geist der spekulativen Philosophie (1795),30 which deals
with the Arabs before Raimundus Lullus (1232–1315 or 1316AD). Islamic philo-
sophy too, writes Tiedemann, deserves “the thanks of posterity for correcting
and expanding in the spheres of reason … There is much clarity and certainty to
be found in Avicenna’s terminology; in his conclusions there is great profundity,
in his thoughts tremendous order and strict correlation. He was an autonomous
thinker in the true sense”.31
Tiedemann refers to the Latin translation of Avicenna’s metaphysics, Kitāb
aš-Šifāʾ, published in Venice in 1493AD. It was only with great difficulty, he
End of Metaphysics: Philosophy’s Supreme Fiction?”. In A. J. Holland (ed.), Philosophy,

its History and Historiography. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo 1985. = Royal Institute
of Philosophy Conferences (1983), pp. 3–26, pp. 12 f.; and see the next note. – On Georg
Horn cf. also Models of the History of Philosophy I: From Its Origins in the Renaissance
to the ‘Historia Philosophica’. Ed. Constance W. T. Blackwell and Philipp Weller.
Dordrecht 1993, pp. 236–258. – On J. J. Brucker cf. also Models of the History of Philosophy
II: From Cartesian Age to Brucker. Ed. Giovanni Santinello and Gregorio Piaia.
Dordrecht 2011, ch. 8 (Mario Longo).
27 Cf. Harold R. Smart, Philosophy and its History. La Salle, Illinois 1962, pp. 3ff., and the
references given there in note 29.
28 “Arabes quosdam satis subtiliter fuisse de rebus naturam transcendentibus philosopha-
tos, et interdum mentem Aristotelis satis feliciter fuisse assecutos … Verum ne sic quidem
causam videmus, philosophiam Saracenicam magnifice depraedicandi” (J. J. Brucker,
Historia (s. Bibliographical Supplement I/7), p. 153); cf. F. Klein-Franke, Klassische
Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 107 f.
29 See for example Johannes Gurlitt, Abriß der Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipzig 1786,
pp. 180–188, and the references given below in n. 35.
30 Bibliographical Supplement I/8. – On Dieterich Tiedemann cf. L. Braun, Histoire (s.
n. 26), pp. 184 ff.; E. Seidel, Jüdische Philosophie (s. n. 4), pp. 37–39.
31 “Dank der Nachkommen für Berichtigungen und Erweiterungen im Gebiete der Ver-
nunft … In Avicennas Begriffen ist viel Klarheit und Bestimmtheit; in seinen Schlüssen
viel Tiefsinn, und in seinen Gedanken ungemeine Ordnung und strenge Verknüpfung. Er
war wahrhafter Selbstdenker”, Dieterich Tiedemann, Geist (Bibliographical Supple-
ment I/8), p. 111. – F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike, (s. n. 21), pp. 110–112.
8 chapter 1
claims, that he was able to gain access to the work. His other primary philo-
sophical sources were the published Latin translations of Averroes32 and Ibn
Ṭufayl,33 and he incorporates doxographic details based on the Latin transla-
tion of Maimonides’ More Nevukhim.34
Tiedemann’s work precipitated no revolution in the study of Islamic philo-
sophy, in favour of original texts and the appraisal thereof.35 In the 18th cen-
184 tury, | neither Johann Gottlieb Buhle’s Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philo-
sophie und einer kritischen Literatur derselben36 nor Wilhelm Gottlieb Ten-
nemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie37 made any real headway in this direc-
32 Cf. H. Daiber, “Lateinische Übersetzungen”, pp. 236ff. = Revised English version in H.

Daiber, Islamic Thought (s. n. 8), pp. 138 ff.
33 See H. Daiber, “Reception” (s. n. 23), ch. 3.
34 Printed in Basel in 1629. – Cf. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Success and Supression. Cambridge,
Mass./London 2016, p. 387. – Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Übersetzer des
Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher. Graz 1956, §250, p. 432, mentions a Latin trans-
lation published in 1520 (in Paris) by Augustin Justinian. It is unclear whether that
translation is identical with the translation already available in the 13th century AD (cf. H.
Daiber, “Lateinische Übersetzungen”, p. 234 n. 161. = H. Daiber, Islamic Thought (s. n. 6)),
pp. 134. – Cf. the discussion of both versions in Joseph Rodriguez de Castro, Biblio-
theca Española I: La noticia de los escritores rabinos españoles desde la epoca conocida
de su literatura hasta el presente. Madrid 1781, pp. 51–56.
35 Cf. F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 112ff. and 119ff.
The subject of Islamic philosophy was also addressed by Jakob Friedrich Fries
in his Die Geschichte der Philosophie (Bibliographical Supplement I/11), pp. 212ff., esp.
p. 213: “Doch liegt ihrer einfacheren positiven Lehre kein Philosophem zu Grunde”. In
his description, J. F. Fries follows Josef Maria Gerando (Degerando, 1772–1842), Ver-
gleichende Geschichte der Systeme der Philosophie (Bibliographical Supplement I/12),
pp. 162ff. – On Josef Maria Gerando see F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21),
p. 115.
Finally, in this context we should mention Georg Wilhelm Hegel, who discussed
“Arabic philosophy” in his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (Bibliographical
Supplement I/13). G. W. Hegel based himself above all on J. J. Brucker, whose negat-
ive attitude he absorbed. “Sie ist nicht durch ihren Inhalt interessant, bei diesem kann
man nicht stehen bleiben; es ist keine Philosophie, sondern eigentlich Manier” (p. 125).
G. W. Hegel criticizes the “abstrakte Negativität” of this philosophy; in his opinion, it did
not make an effort, “die konkrete Idee weiter zu bestimmen” (p. 129); “sie (sc. die Araber)
haben kein höheres Princip der sich bewußten Vernunft aufgestellt” (p. 125). – On G. W.
Hegel’s conception of the historiography of philosophy see Klaus Düsing, Hegel und
die Geschichte der Philosophie. Darmstadt 1983. = Erträge der Forschung 206.
36 Bibliographical Supplement I/9. – On Johann Gottlieb Buhle see L. Braun, Histoire
(s. n. 26), pp. 250 ff.
37 Bibliographical Supplement I/10. – On the whole, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s
summary is based on the same sources as the preceding works by D. Tiedemann und J.
G. Buhle. – On W. G. Tennemann see L. Braun, Histoire (s. n. 26), pp. 240ff.
tion. But both works, alongside Tiedemann, became primary points of ref-
erence for philosophical historians in the 19th century, when the real change
came about.38
The 19th-century orientalists Johann Georg Wenrich (1787–1847), Gus-
tav Flügel (1802–1870), Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (1808–1899), and finally
Moritz Steinschneider (1816–1907) systematically recorded Arabic mater-
ial for research into the continuation of antiquity in Islam.39 For the first
time, editorial activity gathered momentum, and it extended to Jewish and
Judaeo-Arabic philosophy as well. Names worth mentioning in this connec-
tion40 are Franz Delitzsch, who offered a wealth of material, mainly on
kalām, in his Anekdota zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik unter
Juden und Moslemen. Leipzig 1841;41 August Schmölders (1809–1880); Wil-
liam Cureton (1808–1864); Salomon Munk (1803–1867);42 Marcus
Joseph Müller (1809–1874); and Friedrich Dieterici (1821–1903).
August Schmölders did not consider Islamic philosophy particularly
original.43 For this view he was criticized by the historian of philosophy Hein-
rich Ritter | in a lecture on the subject of Arabic philosophy and the ortho- 185
dox Arabic dogmatists.44 The first true champion of Islamic philosophy was
Ernest Renan (1823–1892), with his book Averroès et l’ Averroïsme, published
in Paris in 1853,45 Renan emphasized the originality (vraie originalité) of “Arab-
ic philosophy”, particularly in the 11th and 12th centuries, even though Islam –
that is, the theology of Islam – opposed it.46
38 Cf., e.g., Friedrich Ast, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie. Landshut 1801; second,
enlarged and revised edition 1825, pp. 196–203.
39 F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 120f. and 127.
40 F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 121ff.
41 Not mentioned in F. Klein-Franke. – Cf. H. Daiber, “Reception” (s. n. 23), p. 74 n. 75.
42 In his Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe (Paris 1857 / Repr. 1955, 1979), Salomon
Munk identified Avicebron’s Fons vitae for the first time. S. Munk’s exemplary recourse
to Hebrew and Arabic sources did not find many imitators.
43 Cf. F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), pp. 121f. – August Schmölders’ opin-
ion apparently influenced Johann Eduard Erdmann’s Grundriß der Geschichte der
Philosophie I (second revised edition Berlin 1869). His chapter on “Muselmänner und
Juden als Vorläufer der christlichen Aristoteliker”, pp. 298–311, begins with the following
crushing statement: “Ein Synkretismus wie der Islam, noch dazu ein Reactionsversuch wie
jene Weltanschauung es gegen die christliche ist, trägt keinen Entwicklungskeim in sich.”
J. E. Erdmann based his chapter on the above-mentioned works by A. Schmölders and
S. Munk.
44 The lecture, entitled “Über unsere Kenntnis der arabischen Philosophie und besonders
über die Philosophie der orthodoxen arabischen Dogmatiker”, was held in 1844 at the Göt-
tingen Academy.
45 S. n. 18.
46 Likewise, Gustave Dugat defends the originality of Islamic philosophy in his Histoire
10 chapter 1
Renan expanded on this latter reflection in a lecture given at the Sorbonne

on March 29th, 1883, entitled “Islam and the Sciences”. The lecture drew the
direct criticism of Renan’s contemporary Ǧamāl ad-Dīn al-Afġānī, who
put greater importance on the role of the Arabs in the adoption and cultiva-
tion of the “Hellenic-Sassanian sciences” and judged not only reason but also
the Islamic religion to have had a part to play in the education of humanity
towards a “higher civilization”.47 Even Ǧamāl ad-Dīn al-Afġānī was not
able, in his final analysis, to visualize a reconciliation between religion and
philosophy or the sciences. Nevertheless, his thesis on the education of human-
ity through reason and religion of Islam, which is reminiscent of Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing’s work on the “education of humankind”, Erziehung des
Menchengeschlechtes, presupposes a positive evaluation of Islam.
A forerunner to this thesis is to be found in the Judaist’s Samuel Mod-
linger obituary of Salomon Munk. Modlinger urged that “orientalism
… in the spirit of Munk (is) true and permanent”, and asserted that it forms
“the oldest foundation of all sciences” and the origin of “our moral customs”,
in view of which a “complete reappraisal of world history becomes imperat-
ive”.48 Such positive assessments, however, remained few and far between, and
it happened only under the growing influence of Munk and Renan that they
began to find their way into works on the history of philosophy, particularly in
186 French. Names worth | being mentioned in this regard are Victor Cousin,
Barthélemy Hauréau, Pierre Vallet and François Picavet.49
The orientalists themselves were generally somewhat reserved in their
judgement about Islamic philosophy. They limited themselves to critical edi-
tions, thematic studies and monographs on individual philosophers. The first
des philosophes et des théologiens musulmans de 632 à 1258 (Paris 1878, reprinted 1973), fol-
lowing Ernest Renan and based on Salomon Munk (s. n. 42). E. Renan’s point of view,
however, is not correctly reproduced, though we could note that E. Renan’s formulations
are not always clear. – Cf. Jean Jolivet, “Émergences de la philosophie au Moyen Âge”.
In Revue de Synthèse 108, 4th series, Paris 1987 (pp. 381–416), pp. 413ff.
47 Cf. Ernest Renan, Der Islam und die Wissenschaften. Basel 1883, and the response by
Ğamāl ad-Dīn al-Afġānī, ibid., pp. 38ff. – Muhsin Mahdi, “Islamic Philosophy in
Contemporary Islamic Thought”. In Al-Abḥāṯ 20/4, 1967, pp. 1–17. – H. Daiber, “Science
and Technology versus Islam: A controversy from Renan and Afghānī to Nasr and Need-
ham and its Historical Background”. In Annals of the Japan Association for Middle East
Studies 8 (1993), pp. 169–187. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III B/3. (Revised
version: The Way from God’s Wisdom).
48 Samuel Modlinger, Reminiszenz an Munk oder über den Werth des Orientalismus für
die Kulturgeschichte. Lemberg 1867, p. 12.
49 See the Bibliographical Supplement II/4. Note the negative attitude expressed by P. Val-
let in Histoire de la philosophie, pp. 201 f.: “Or, la philosophie arabe, il faut bien le recon-
naître, ne se recommande ni par des conceptions élevées, ni par l’originalité de ses vues”.
history of Islamic philosophy written by an Arabist and incorporating consid-

erable knowledge of the original sources was Tjitze J. de Boer’s Geschichte
der Philosophie im Islam (1901).50 De Boer considered “Muslim philosophy” to
be the product of an eclectic assimilation of Greek philosophy. In his view, it
had made no significant contribution to intellectual progress. Nevertheless, he
claimed that it deserves our historical interest: “Beneath the Greek drapes, the
shape of its own limbs is visible, and perhaps it is also able to provide an insight
into the circumstances under which philosophy in general comes into being”.51
In his depiction of Islamic philosophy, de Boer deals with the Aristotelian
influence and places greater emphasis than his predecessors on the Platonic
legacy. In doing this, however, he fails to be sufficiently differentiating the vari-
ous comparisons he draws – e.g., in that between Fārābī’s philosopher-king
and “Plato in the prophet’s mantle of Mohammed”.52 Another shortcoming is
the absence of a chapter on kalām, and in connection with this, his reticence
regarding the religious context of Islamic philosophizing and its importance
for the development of the Islamic dogma. Ignaz Goldziher attempted to
redress these shortcomings in his short but for that period very informative
compendium on Islamic and Jewish philosophy “Die islamische und die jüdis-
che Philosophie” (1909).53
The German Orientalist Max Horten (1874–1945) failed to follow up these
ideas in his historical study Die Philosophie des Islam in ihren Beziehungen
zu den philosophischen Weltanschauungen des westlichen Orients.54 Though he
pays greater attention to Islamic mysticism than his predecessors, he | over- 187
emphasizes the Indian influence on Islamic thought.55 By deploying irrelevant
terminology oriented towards scholasticism and above all towards contem-
porary philosophy, he often gives a false, unclear and misleading picture of
Islamic thought, neglecting textual evidence and the Islamic context. Horten
50 See the Bibliographical Supplement III/1.

51 Cf. T. J. de Boer, History (s. n. 50), pp. 29 f. – Incidentally, a parallel opinion was expressed
by a specialist in Indian and Chinese philosophy, Moritz von Straszewski, in his Über
die Bedeutung der Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der orientalischen Philosophie für das Ver-
ständnis der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Philosophie im Allgemeinen. Vienna/Leipzig
1895.
52 T. J. de Boer, History (s. n. 50), p. 123. Cf. F. Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21),
p. 128.
53 See the Bibliographical Supplement III/2.
54 For this and other works by Max Horten s. the Bibliographical Supplement III/3–6.
55 Cf. the reviews by Hans Heinrich Schaeder in OLZ 30, 1927, col. 834–848, and by
Joseph Schacht in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 17, 1927, col. 795–799; see, moreover, F.
Klein-Franke, Klassische Antike (s. n. 21), p. 128.
12 chapter 1
assumes an Eastern “view of the world which was already firmly bedded and
rooted in authoritative ground” and which could only use “the Greek view to
help build upon its own”.56 In Islamic philosophy he sees the “visually intu-
itive Persian wrestling with a Semitic worldview”, in which “influences from
all civilized countries of the known world coincided”. Horten’s explanation
culminates in the following bold thesis: “Islamic philosophy was conceived by
Persians. It shows us the type of thoughts of which a member of the Aryan race
is capable under the southern sun and the multi-coloured influences of the
East and West”.57
Horten’s work is brimming with such clichés. He speaks of “elements of
the Brahman theory of evolution”, of “ethical heroism” as an integral part of
Islamic mysticism,58 and of the “ideal man” (Idealmensch) as “underlying all
truth” (Tiefenschicht des gesamten Wirklichen), as a “modification of the primor-
dial being, of the primordial spirit” (Modifikation des Urwesens, des Urgeistes),
as “a form of God’s self-knowledge” (Form der Selbsterkenntnis Gottes), as a
“starting point for the existence of all wordly things” (Ausgangspunkt für das
Dasein aller Weltdinge),59 and so on. In Die kulturelle Entwicklungsfähigkeit des
Islam auf geistigem Gebiete Horten refers to the “expansiveness of the Islamic
intellect which knows no bounds”.60 The echoes of late 19th-century philo-
sophical tendencies cannot be overheard – Nietzsche’s “primordial exper-
ience” (Urerfahrung) of man as something to be overcome by the “superman”
188 (Übermensch), the “master man” (Herren|mensch)61 that Nietzsche saw in the
Europeans.62 Moreover, in overestimating the Persian element of Islamic philo-
56 M. Horten, “Die Philosophie im Islam”, p. 289. Moreover, cf. M. Horten’s popular treat-
ise, Die kulturelle Entwicklungsfähigkeit des Islam auf geistigem Gebiete, esp. pp. 17 and 27
(Bibliographical Supplement III/5 and 6).
57 “Die islamische Philosophie ist von Persern erdacht worden. Sie zeigt uns, welcher Ge-
danken ein arischer Menschentyp unter südlicher Sonne und den buntesten Einflüssen
von Osten und Westen fähig ist”: M. Horten, Philosophie, p. 12 (Bibliographical Supple-
ment III/3). – An echo of this allegation can still be heard in Kurt Schilling’s Welt-
geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin 1964, p. 313: “Aber als Philosophie ist sie keine Schöpfung
der Araber, sondern vorzüglich der unterworfenen und zum Islam bekehrten Perser”. K.
Schilling attests to M. Horten’s “profound knowledge of Islamic philosophy”, but he
adds: “However, he presented such a confused description that it is not of much use to
anybody” (p. 315).
58 M. Horten, Philosophie (s. n. 57), pp. 12 and 15.
59 M. Horten, Philosophie (s. n. 57), pp. 161 and 162.
60 M. Horten, Die kulturelle Entwickungsfähigkeit (s. n. 56), p. 27.
61 On this see, e.g., Michael Landmann, Philosophische Anthropologie. Berlin 31969, pp. 139
and 178 f.
62 On this cf. Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Hamburg 91986, pp. 282f.
sophy – that is to say, in overestimating the “Aryan human type” – Horten

reveals an ethnocentrism reminiscent of Ernest Renan.63 Horten’s ethno-
centrism, however, appears to be restricted to his reflections on the “potential
for development in Islam” through external influences.
Horten’s claim that “modern phenomenology” had “created an ideology
and clarity of concept” far superior “even to scholasticism”64 also points to
a different trend in contemporary philosophy, that of the phenomenology of
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). The allusions to Nietzsche, however, indic-
ate that phenomenology is not the only Leitmotiv that affected Horten’s
interpretation and depiction of Islamic philosophy. Furthermore, his extensive
use of terms such as “primordial experience” (Urerlebnis), “primordial spirit”
(Urgeist), “primordial being” (Ursein), “primordial truth” (Urwahrheit), “prim-
ordial existence” (Urwesenheit) and “primordial reality” (Urwirklichkeit),65 as
well as his comparison of “primordial existence” with “primordial truth and
thought” (Urwahrheit, Urgedanken),66 are reminiscent of the transcendental
idealism of the Kantian Robert Reininger (1869–1955), who speaks of “prim-
ordial facts” (Urtatsachen) being predetermined as “primordial experiences”
(Urerlebnisse).67 Horten’s presentation ultimately proves to be a flimsy at-
tempt to interpret Islamic philosophy by imposing terms and categories of
contemporary philosophy. As a result, the facts of the Islamic texts are obscured
and misinterpreted.
Since Horten, our knowledge of Islamic philosophy has been expanded
by the publication of a vast range of edited Arabic texts, individual studies
and general historical works, which increasingly include Iranian philosophers
and correct the traditional view that Islamic philosophy came to an end with
Averroes. European and Arabic-Islamic secondary literature on Islamic | philo- 189
sophy has now become too extensive to keep track of it.68 If we temporarily
63 Taking a racist perspective, Ernest Renan views science and philosophy as “Hellenistic-
Sassanian” (cf. n. 47) and as contributions of the Aryans. – On this s. Albert Hourani,
Europe and the Middle Ages. London 1980, pp. 61 f.
64 M. Horten, Philosophie (s. n. 57), pp. 19 f.
65 M. Horten, Philosophie (s. n. 57), index p. 384.
66 M. Horten, Philosophie (s. n. 57), p. 166.
67 Cf., e.g., Robert Reininger, Einführung in die Probleme und Grundbegriffe der Philo-
sophie. Auf Grund des nachgelassenen Manuskripts hrsg. v. Karl Nawratil. Vienna
1978, p. 113. The book mentions “Arabic Sufism” as an example of “eines Philosophie-
rens aus dem tiefsten Erleben heraus, aus dem religiösen Urerlebnis, welches ein Gefühl
der Wiedervereinigung mit dem Weltgrund ist (‘Unio mystica’)”. Cf. pp. 179f. – See K.
Nawratil’s Introduction to Robert Reininger, Philosophie des Erlebens. Vienna 1976,
pp. 7 ff. – Wolfgang Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, 4th
enlarged edition. Stuttgart 1969, pp. 288 ff. and 300 ff.
68 For noteworthy historical monographs written in European languages and based on pri-
14 chapter 1
overlook weaknesses in individual interpretations, such as the anachronistic

use of modern terminology, irrelevant author’s notes or an overemphasis of
specific elements, such as mysticism and Shiʿa,69 we find a growing tendency to
regard philosophy and theology as interdependent and to pay greater attention
to the Islamic context of the philosophies in question.
This is particularly appropriate concerning historical studies by Muslim
writers, although they tend to be descriptive rather than historically critical
and analytical. A comparison with Greek precursors – essential for the inter-
pretation and for understanding historical developments – is frequently neg-
lected, while too much stress is placed on the originality of Islamic philosophy.
This trend partly seems to be a reaction against the past negative attitudes of
European historiography, but it has been reinforced by islamicizing tendencies
in today’s Muslim world, which have been extended to philosophy. Muslim his-
torians emphasize the originality and independence of Islamic thought also by
referring to religious authorities (Ġazālī, Ibn Taymiyya) or leading rationalistic
figures (Averroes).70
The establishment of Islamic philosophy as a subject of enquiry in its own
right is clearly borne out by the increasing number of monographs on the gen-
eral subject of Islamic philosophy, and also by chapters on Islamic philosophers
in modern works on medieval philosophy and in encyclopaedias, as well as by
190 new editions and studies.71 Islamic philosophy is now regarded as a | continu-
mary sources (either in the original or in translation) see the Bibliographical Supplement
III. – For Arabic monographs by Islamic (and some Christian) authors see the Bibliograph-
ical Supplement IV.
69 See the works by Henri Corbin cited in the Biographical Supplement III/16–19. – See
Egbert Meyer, “Tendenzen der Schiaforschung – Corbin’s Auffassung von der Schia”.
In ZDMG, Suppl. III/1, 1977, pp. 551–558. – Dariush Shayegan, Henry Corbin: La topo-
graphie spirituelle de l’ Islam Iranien. Paris 1990. – Dariush Shayegan, “Corbin”. In
Encyclopaedia Iranica VI, 1993, pp. 268–272.
70 Cf. Ekkehard Rudolph, Westliche Islamwissenschaft im Spiegel muslimischer Kritik:
Grundzüge und aktuelle Merkmale einer innerislamischen Diskussion. Berlin 1991. = Islam-
kundliche Untersuchungen 137, pp. 104ff. (on Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Ǧābirī see id., at-
Turāṯ wa-l-ḥadāṯa. Beirut 1991, pp. 63ff.) and 152 ff. – Ǧābirī, al-Falsafa fī l-waṭan al-ʿarabī
al-muʿāṣir: Buḥūṯ al-muʾtamar al-falsafī al-ʿarabī al-awwal allaḏī naẓẓamathā al-ǧāmiʿa al-
urdunniyya. Beirut 1985. – On Averroes (Ibn Rušd) see the book by Anke von Kügelgen,
Averroes und die arabische Moderne – Ansätze zu einer Neubegründung des Rationalismus
im Islam. Leiden 1994. = IPTS 19.
71 For chapters on Islamic philosophers in modern works on medieval philosophy and in
encyclopaedias see the Bibliographical Supplement V and VI.
For new editions and studies cf. G. Endress, “Die arabisch-islamische Philosophie”
(s. n. 3). – Charles E. Butterworth, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy Today”. In
Thérèse-Anne Druart (ed.), Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interac-
ation of Greek philosophy only insofar as it is “a continuation of the search for

truth and wisdom … which first began in ancient Greece”.72 Those, wishing to
participate in the search for truth, must study the records of that search.
In this respect, there is still a need for critical editions of unpublished or
neglected material. The study of Islamic philosophy should encompass Greek-
Arabic translation literature,73 commentaries on Greek thinkers by Islamic
philosophers, and also the Islamic environment of specific thinkers and ideas.74
The comparison of sources and the study of the historical influence of Islamic
thought represent a hermeneutic path towards truth.75 Similarly, it would seem
to be appropriate to draw attention to the frequently ignored variety and sub-
tleties of Islamic thought by comparing Islamic and non-Islamic philosophers
of the past and their Islamic and non-Islamic posterity. In doing this, emphasis
must be put on the role of medieval Jewish and scholastic thought, which
hitherto had been underestimated. Greek-Syriac-Arabic translations and stud-
ies of philosophical texts, as well as Arabic works translated into Latin and
Hebrew,76 are useful tools in the reconstruction and “understanding” of Islamic
thought in all its diversity.
tion, Washington 1988, pp. 55–140. – Thérèse-Anne Druart and Michael E. Mar-
mura, “Medieval Islamic Philosophy and Theology: Bibliographical Guide (1986–1998)”. In
Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 32, 1990, pp. 106–135 and 37, 1995, pp. 193–232. – Rüdiger
Arnzen, “Ausgewählte Literatur in ‘westlichen’ Sprachen für das Studium der mittelal-
terlichen Philosophie in arabischer und persischer Sprache”. In Bochumer Philosophisches
Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 7, 2002, pp. 125–178.
The increasing importance of Islamic philosophy for modern historians of philosophy
is attached by the inclusion of Islamic philosophical works even in collective publications
for a broader public, such as Franco Volpi and Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Lexikon
der philosophischen Werke. Stuttgart 1988.
72 M. E. Marmura, “Die islamische Philosophie” (Bibliographical Supplement III/22),
p. 320. According to Wolfgang Kluxen, the efforts of the historian of philosophy “ulti-
mately do not contribute to the historical, but to the philosophical truth”. See
his “Leitideen und Zielsetzungen philosophiegeschichtlicher Mittelalterforschung”. In
Wolfgang Kluxen, Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter I, Berlin/New York 1981. = Mis-
cellanea mediaevalia 31/1, pp. 1–16.
73 This approach is adopted in Richard Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire de philosophes antiques
I. Paris 1989, which includes Arabic-Latin translations of Greek philosophical works.
74 This is the aim of the series Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus. Ed. by Hans Daiber and Remke
Kruk (founded by Hendrik Joan Drossaart Lulofs as a project of the Koninklijke
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Amsterdam), and the series Islamic Philo-
sophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies. Ed. by Hans Daiber and David E. Pin-
gree. Leiden 1984 ff.
75 Cf. H. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulamī
(gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, pp. 19f.
76 Cf. H. Daiber, “Semitische Sprachen als Kulturvermittler zwischen Antike und Mittel-
16 chapter 1
The vast array of modern interpretations of Islamic philosophy can provide

only an incomplete picture. Nevertheless, they should not be ignored in the
study of Islamic philosophy. Our expectations, however, should not be too
191 great, since | they frequently deal only with specialized aspects or have strayed
too far from the textual evidence.
In evaluating the present status of the historiography of Islamic philosophy,
we may say that the humanist cry ad fontes has lost none of its force, while the
universal historical significance of Islamic philosophy77 has proved its worth.
Equally obvious is the importance to understand the Islamic context with its
essentially metaphysical-theological and natural-philosophical conception of
the world, in which faith appears in conjunction with the religious and philo-
sophical search for knowledge.78 The search for knowledge, the main founda-
tion for the development of the Islamic sciences,79 also forms their link with
Islamic religion and philosophy. The latter emerges as a historical example of
preoccupation with the problems and cognitions of human thought. The inter-
relationship between philosophy and sciences, and between philosophy and
metaphysics or Islamic theology becomes clear, as does the mediating role of
Islamic philosophy between Antiquity and the Middle Ages.80
These conclusions are significant in several respects. As the orientalist Mar-
tin Plessner put it in his lecture “Die Geschichte der Wissenschaften im
alter: Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung”. In ZDMG 136, 1986, pp. 292–313. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs I/1. – On the Latin translations see H. Daiber, “Lateinische
Übersetzungen” (s. n. 8).
77 Moreover, cf. Osman Amin, “The Originality and the Message of Moslem Philosophy”. In
Atti del XII congresso internazionale di filosofia (Venezia 12–18 settembre 1958) X, Florence
1960, pp. 1–8.
78 On this see Hans Daiber, “Anfänge und Entstehung der Wissenschaft im Islam”. In Saecu-
lum 29, Freiburg/München 1978, pp. 356–366. = Revised English version in H. Daiber,
Islamic Thought (s. n. 6), pp. 5–20.
This harmony between “religion” (dīn) and philosophy is discussed by Aḥmad Fuʾād
al-Ahwānī, a Muslim specialist in Islamic philosophy, as a distinctive feature of Islamic
thought; see his “Faḍl al-ʿArab ʿalā falsafat al-yūnān”. In Maǧallat al-Azhar 24, Cairo 1952/
1953, pp. 62–67, esp. pp. 63 f. – Cf. also Roger Arnaldez, “Comment s’est ankylosée
la pensée philosophique dans l’ Islam?”. In Classicisme et declin culturel dans l’histoire de
l’ Islam, Paris 1957, pp. 247–259.
79 Cf. also Hans Daiber, “Die Technik im Islam”. In Ansgar Stöcklein and Mohammed
Rassem (eds.), Technik und Religion, Düsseldorf 1990. = Technik und Kultur 2, pp. 102–116.
= H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III B/1.
80 Cf. Richard Walzer, “The Achievement of the Falāsifa and Their Eventual Failure”. In
Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane, 11–14 septembre 1961, Brussels 1962. = Correspondence
d’ Orient 5, pp. 1–13. – W. Kluxen, “Leitideen” (s. n. 72), esp. pp. 13f.
Islam als Aufgabe der modernen Islamwissenschaften” given in Frankfurt 1931,81

it is no longer only the history of science in Islam that should be accepted as
the responsibility of modern Islamic studies, but the history of philosophy as
well. This inquiry promises to make an important contribution to the general
history of philosophy and science, and also to herald a better understanding of
the Islamic spiritual world with its symbiosis of rationality and religion.82
Finally, our scientific consciousness will find, in the historiography of Islamic 192
philosophy, a confirmation for the importance of the history of philosophy,83
which proves to be no mere description of the error of human thought.84 The
preoccupation with Islamic philosophy goes far beyond the enthusiasm for
“Eastern wisdom”, which was a commonplace in 18th and 19th-centuries Ger-
man Romanticism and a partial motivating force for orientalists right up to the
20th century.85 Quite the contrary: Islamic philosophy exercises our mind and
trains it to grasp structures and methods revealed through the passage of time.
81 = Philosophie und Geschichte. Tübingen 31. – Martin Plessner discussed the same
theme again in his Die Bedeutung der Wissenschaftsgeschichte für das Verständnis der
geistigen Welt des Islam. Tübingen 1966. = Philosophie und Geschichte 82.
82 This symbiosis in the concept of Islamic philosophy, of ḥikma, is stressed by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr in “The Meaning and Role of ‘Philosophy’ in Islam”. In Studia Islamica
37, 1973, pp. 57–80. Similarly to Henri Corbin (Bibliographical Supplement III/16–19),
S. H. Nasr considers philosophy “a handmaid to illumination and gnosis, thus creating
a bridge between the rigour of logic and the ecstasy of spiritual union”, p. 79. Islamic
philosophy is thus “prophetic philosophy”, the vision of truth that connects everything; it
becomes the “intellectual” tool in the confrontation with modern non-Islamic philosophy
and science. – Cf. the chapters “The Pertinence of Studying Islamic Philosophy Today” and
“Islamic Philosophy – Reorientation or Re-Understanding”. In S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and
Thought. Albany 1981, pp. 145–152 and 153–157. – Cf. S. H. Nasr, “Conditions for Meaningful
Comparative Philosophy”. In Philosophy East and West XXII, Honolulu 1972, pp. 53–61. –
On S. H. Nasr see J. I. Smith in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World III,
New York/Oxford 1995, pp. 230f. – On S. H. Nasr’s concept of Islamic philosophy and the
Sufi tradition see Kamila Hromova, The Critical Analysis of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a Mod-
ern Iranian Philosopher. PhD Diss. USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, 1993
(in Russian); and see the review by Marietta Tigranovna Stepaniants. In Sufī Wis-
dom. Albany 1994, pp. 103–109.
83 Cf. Lorenz Krüger, “Why do We Study the History of Philosophy?”. In Richard Rorty,
Jerome B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History: Essays on
the Historiography of Philosophy. Cambridge 1984, pp. 77–101. L. Krüger discusses the
importance of the history of science to the history of philosophy, and of the latter to
the functioning of philosophy “as something like a professionalized consciousness of the
scientific-technological world – and, we may hope, as its conscience”, p. 99.
84 Cf. J. Ree, “The End of Metaphysics” (s. n. 26), and the comments by A. Manser and J.
Ree in the same volume, pp. 41–46 and 47 f.
85 Cf. Muhsin Mahdi, “Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy”. In Journal of
Islamic Studies 1, 1990, pp. 73–98.
18 chapter 1
Its comprehension represents a constant challenge to the powers of human

understanding and its creative force – imagination.86 The controversy about
originality and autonomy of Islamic thought, a problem discussed as much by
Islamic scholars87 as by orientalists88 and historians of philosophy, recedes to
the background.
Delivered at The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem, on the

18th January 1994.
193 Bibliographical Supplement
I Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Centuries Secondary Works

on Islamic Philosophy
II Nineteenth-Century Secondary Works on Islamic Philosophy
III Works on Islamic Philosophy in European Languages Since the Twentieth
Century
IV Works on Islamic Philosophy in Arabic, Prsian and Turkish Since the Twen-
tieth Century. A selection
V Chapters on Islamic Philosophers in Modern Western Works on Medieval
Philosophy. A selection
VI Modern Encyclopaedias Containing Entries on Islamic Philosophy. A selec-
tion
I Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Centuries Secondary

Works on Islamic Philosophy
– Georg Horn, Historiae philosophiae libri VII quibus de origine, successione, sectis et
vita philosophorum. Leiden 1655, pp. 283–294.
– Henricus Balthasar Seelmann, Historia rationalis philosophiae apud Turcas.
Halae 1691.
– Johann Gottfried Lakemacher, Dissertatio inauguralis historico-litteraria de
fatis studiorum apud Arabes. Helmstadii 1719. – This is actually a description of philo-
86 Impressed by the German Romantic movement, M. Mahdi (s. n. 85), by contrast, intro-
duces the old alleged conflict between philosophy and poetry – a conflict which, in my
opinion, is overemphasized.
87 See the Bibliographical Supplement IV, and E. Rudolph, Westliche Islamwissenschaft (s.
n. 70).
88 See above nn. 43 ff., and cf. Jörg Kraemer, Das Problem der islamischen Kulturgeschichte.
Tübingen 1959.
sophy among the Arabs, based mainly on Pocock(e) and his annotated transla-
tion of Barhebraeus and also on the work of Johann Heinrich Hottinger (s.
n. 24). – A new edition was published by Christian Ernst von Windheim in his
Fragmenta historiae philosophicae, sive commentarii philosophorum vitas et dogmata
illustrantes. Erlangen 1753.
– Giovanni Baptista Capasso, Historiae philosophiae synopsis sive de origine et pro-
gressu philosophiae. Neapoli 1728, pp. 291–294: “Philosophi Arabes: Avicenna, Aver-
rhoes; reliqui Arabes.”
– André-François Boureau-Deslandes, Histoire critique de la philosophie. Lon-
don 1737; Amsterdam 1756.
– Christophorus Carolus Fabricius, Specimen academicum de studio philo-
sophiae graecae inter Arabes. Altorfii 1745 / Repr. in Christian Ernst von Wind-
heim, Fragmenta (s. I/3).
– Johann Jakob Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae. I–V. Lipsiae 1742–1744.
– Dieterich Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie. Marburg 1791–1797,
vol. IV.
– Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und einer krit-
ischen Literatur derselben. Göttingen 1796–1804 (11 vols.), V, pp. 3–109 (bibliography,
pp. 5–10).
– Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipzig 1798–1819
(11 vols.), VIII, pp. 362–448. | 194
– Jakob Friedrich Fries, Die Geschichte der Philosophie. II. Halle 1840. = J. F. Fries,
Schriften zur Geschichte der Philosophie. II/2. = Sämtliche Schriften, vol. XIX. Ed. by
Gert König and Lutz Geldsetzer. Aalen 1969, pp. 212ff.
– Josef Maria Gerando, Vergleichende Geschichte der Systeme der Philosophie /
German transl. by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann. I. Marburg 1806, pp. 162ff.
– Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ed. by
D. K. L. Michelet. III. = Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe. Berlin 1836, pp. 121–131.
II Nineteenth-Century Secondary Works on Islamic Philosophy

– Ernest Renan, Averroès et l’Averroïsme. Paris 1853.
– Victor Cousin, Histoire générale de la philosophie depuis les temps les plus anciens
jusqu’au XIXe siècle. 8th edition, revised and expanded. Paris 1867, pp. 229ff.
– Barthélemy Hauréau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique. Part II, vol. I.
Paris 1880 / Repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1966, pp. 15ff.
– Pierre Vallet, Histoire de la philosophie. 3rd, revised edition. Paris 1886,
pp. 201ff.
– François Picavet, Esquisse d’une histoire générale et comparée des philosophes
médiévales. Paris 1905. 10th edition, revised and expanded Paris 1907 / Repr. Frank-
furt a.M. 1968.
20 chapter 1
III Works on Islamic Philosophy in European Languages Since the

Twentieth Century
– Tjitze J. de Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam. Stuttgart 1901. – An English
translation entitled History of Philosophy in Islam appeared in London in 1903 / Repr.
1967. – An annotated Arabic translation, Taʾrīḫ al-falsafa fī l-Islām, was published by
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rīda. Cairo 1938 / Beirut 21981. – See the reviews
by Ignaz Goldziher in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 22, 1901, col. 1676–1680, and by
Léon Gauthier in JA 1901, pp. 393–397. – T. J. de Boer followed up this work with
a revised edition intended for a wider Dutch audience, De wijsbegeerte in den Islam.
Haarlem 1921. = Volksuniversiteitsbibliotheek 11.
– Ignaz Goldziher, “Die islamische und die jüdische Philosophie”. In Allgemeine
Geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin/Leipzig. = Die Kultur der Gegenwart I/5, pp. 45–
77.
– Max Horten, Die Philosophie des Islam in ihren Beziehungen zu den philosophischen
Weltanschauungen des westlichen Orients. Munich 1924 / Repr. 1973. – A partial trans-
lation into English by V. June Hager appeared in Islamic Studies 11, 1972, pp. 231–
195 249; 12, 1973, pp. 1–36; 81–101; 193–211 and 231–260; 13, 1974, pp. 1–23 and 67–93. |
– Max Horten, Einführung in die höhere Geisteskultur des Islam. Bonn 1914.
– Max Horten, “Die Philosophie im Islam”. In Friedrich Überweg, Grundriß der
Geschichte der Philosophie. II. Ed. by Bernhard Geyer. Darmstadt 1967 / Repr. of
the 11th edition, 1927, pp. 289–325.
– Max Horten, Die kulturelle Entwicklungsfähigkeit des Islam auf geistigem Gebiete.
Bonn 1915.
– Goffredo Quadri, La filosofia degli arabi nel suo fiori. I–II. Florence 1939. – A
French translation entitled La philosophie arabe dans l’Europe médiévale des origines
à Averroès appeared in Paris in 1947. This description is mainly based on medieval
Latin translations of philosophical works.
– Ali Mahdi Khan, The Elements of Islamic Philosophy, Based on Original Texts.
Lahore 1947 / Repr. 1973. This booklet does not give any references. It stresses the uni-
versality of Islamic philosophical thought, which showed the way even to Europe:
“Muslim philosophy forms the background and context of European thought” (p. 3).
Such overstatements risk a levelling of ideas belonging to different cultures.
– Hilmi Ziya Ülken, La pensée de l’Islam / French transl. by Gauthier Dubois,
Max Bilen and the author. Istanbul 1953.
– Miguel Cruz Hernandez, Historia de la filosofía española: Filosofía hispano-
musulmana. I–II. Madrid 1957. An extract entitled La filosofía arabe appeared in
Madrid in 1963. – See the reviews by Josef van Ess in Erasmus 20, 1968, col. 321f.;
by Salvador Gómez Nogales in Revista de Occidente 5, 1964, pp. 374–381; and by
James T. Monroe, Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship (Sixteenth Century to
the Present). Leiden 1970. = Medieval Iberian Peninsula. Texts and Studies 3, p. 231.
– Miguel Cruz Hernandez, Historia del pensamiento en el mundo islamico. I–II.

Madrid 1981.
– Miguel Cruz Hernandez, Historia del pensamiento en el-Andalus. I–II. Madrid
1985. A revised and expanded version in three volumes appeared in 1996.
– William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Edinburgh 1962.
A heavily revised edition appeared in 1985.
– M. Saeed Sheikh, Islamic Philosophy. Lahore 1962 / Repr. London 1982.
– Mian Muhammad Sharif (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy. I–II. Wiesbaden
1963–1966. – See the review (of volume I) by Helmut Gätje in OLZ 62, 1967,
col. 380–382.
– Henri / Henry Corbin, Histoire de la philosophie islamique des origins jusqu’à la
mort d’Averroès. Paris 1964 (with Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Osman Yahya). – See
the review by Georges Vajda in JA 252, 1964, pp. 273–278. – H. Corbin’s historical
description can be found in a slightly revised form in François Châtelet (ed.),
Histoire de la philosophie. I. Paris 1969, pp. 1048–1197, and in H. Corbin, Histoire de la
philosophie islamique (s. below 1986), pp. 21–348 / Span. transl. in Historia de la filo-
sofía III: Del mundo romano al Islam. | Madrid 1972 / 61984. – An Arabic translation 196
(ending with the chapter on Suhrawardī) appeared in Beirut in 1983: Taʾrīḫ al-falsafa
al-islāmiyya.
– Henri / Henry Corbin, “La philosophie islamique depuis la mort d’Averroès
jusqu’à nos jours”. In Histoire de la philosophie. Ed. François Châtelet. III, Paris
1974, pp. 1067–1188. With additions republished in H. Corbin, Histoire de la philo-
sophie islamique (s. above 1964), pp. 349–522. – A Spanish translation by Francisco
Torres Oliver appeared in Madrid in 1981: Historia de la filosofía II: La filosofía en
oriente.
– Henri / Henry Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique au XVIIe et XVIIIe
siècles. Paris 1981. – Includes Iranian-Islamic philosophers.
– Henri / Henry Corbin, Histoire de la philosophie islamique. Paris 1986. – A repub-
lication in one volume of the books which appeared in 1964 (s. above 1964) and in
1974 (s. above 1974). – An English translation with revised bibliography appeared in
London in 1993: History of Islamic Philosophy.
– Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy. London 1970; 2nd, revised edition
1983; paperback 1987. – Cf. the reviews of the 1st edition by Parviz Morewedge, “A
Major Contribution to the History of Islamic Philosophy”. In MW 62, 1972, pp. 148–
157; and by Georges C. Anawati in BiOr 33, 1966, pp. 65–69. – A shortened Arabic
version of the 1970 edition appeared in Beirut in 1981: Muḫtaṣar taʾrīḫ al-falsafa al-
ʿarabiyya.
– ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Histoire de la philosophie en Islam. I–II. Paris 1972. –
Part I was originally published in Arabic: Maḏāhib al-Islāmiyīn: al-Muʿtazila wa-l-
Ašāʿira. Beirut 1971; 21979. – The 2nd volume of this Arabic version deals with the
22 chapter 1
Ismailis, Qarmates, Nusairis and Druzes; it is not translated into French. – The 2nd
volume of the French version deals with Islamic philosophers from Kindī to Ibn
Rušd, on whom cf. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, al-Falsafa wa-l-falāsifa fī l-ḥaḍāra
al-ʿarabiyya in Mawsūʿat al-ḥaḍāra al-ʿarabiyya al-islāmiyya. I. Beirut 1986 (Kindī,
Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Ibn Rušd).
– Michael Marmura, Die islamische Philosophie des Mittelalters. In William
Montgomery Watt and Michael Marmura, Der Islam. II. Stuttgart (etc.) 1985.
= Die Religionen der Menschheit 25/2, pp. 320–392.
– Raffael Ramón Guerrero, El pensamiento filosófico arabe. Prólogo de Sal-
vador Gómez Nogales. Madrid 1985.
– Taufic Ibrahim and Arthur Sagadeev, Classical Islamic Philosophy. Moscow
1990. Based on primary sources; secondary literature is not mentioned.
– Carmela Baffioni, Storia della filosofia islamica. Milano 1991.
– Carmela Baffioni, I grandi pensatori dell’Islam. Roma 1996.
– Pinharanda Gomes, A Filosofia Arábigo-Portuguesa. Lisboa 1991. = História da filo-
sofia portuguesa 3.
– Mohammad Sharif Khan and M. Anwar Saleem, Muslim Philosophy and Philo-
sophers. Delhi 1994.
– Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), History of Islamic Philosophy.
I–II. London/New York 1996. = Routledge History of World Philosophies. I–II.
– Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, Muslim Philosophy, Science and Mysticism. New Delhi
2001. An expanded version of Muslim Philosophy and Science. Srinagar 1998.
– Ulrich Rudolph, Islamische Philosophie. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart.
Munich 2004.
– Cristina D’Ancona (ed.), Storia della filosofia nell’Islam medievale. I. II. Torino
2005.
– Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to
Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge 2005.
– Arif Ali Khan and Mohammed Razi Khan Afridi, History of Islamic Philo-
sophy. New Delhi 2007.
– Ahmad Sharif, Fundamentals of Islamic Philosophy. New Delhi 2009.
– Raj Kumar and Jagmohan Kulkarni, Islamic Philosophy. I–II. Delhi 2012.
– Heidrun Eichner, Matthias Perkams and Christian Schäfer (eds.),
Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter. Ein Handbuch. Darmstadt 2013.
– Mohammed Mazhar, Islamic Philosophy. New Delhi 2014.
– Richard C. Taylor and Luis Xavier López-Farjeat (eds.), The Routledge Com-
panion to Islamic Philosophy. London/New York 2016.
– Philosophy in the Islamic World I: 8th–10th Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph,
Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook
of Oriental Studies. Section I: The Near and Middle East 115/1. / German original:
Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I: 8.–10. Jahrhundert. Ed. Ulrich Rudolph with
the collaboration of Renate Würsch. Basel 2012.
– Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Islamic Philosophy. Oxford 2017.
IV Works on Islamic Philosophy in Arabic, Persian89 and Turkish Since

the Twentieth Century – A Selection
– Muḥammad Luṭfī Ǧumʿa, Taʾrīḫ falāsifat al-Islām. Cairo 1927 / Repr. Beirut 1980. –
On Muḥammad Luṭfī Ǧumʿa cf. A. von Kügelgen (s. n. 70), pp. 97f.
– Ismail Hakkı, Islamda felsefe ceryanları. In Ilahiyat Fakultesi mecmuası 12, Istan-
bul 1929, pp. 21–40; 13, 1929, pp. 18–33; 14, 1930, pp. 28–45; 15, 1930, pp. 22–44; 16, 1930,
pp. 20–45; 17, 1930, pp. 9–24; 18, 1931, pp. 68–80; 19, 1931, pp. 17–32; 20, 1931, pp. 43–56;
21, 1931, pp. 17–35; 22, 1932, pp. 27–50; 23, 1932, pp. 24–38; 24, 1932, pp. 1–17; 25, 1933,
pp. 56–64.
– Kamāl al-Yāziǧī and Anṭūn Ġaṭṭās Karam, Aʿlām al-falsafa al-ʿarabiyya. Dir-
āsāt mufaṣṣala wa-nuṣūṣ mubawwaba mašrūḥa. Beirut 1957. – On Anṭūn Ġaṭṭās
Karam cf. A. von Kügelgen (s. n. 70), pp. 146–148.
– Ḥannā al-Faḫūrī and Ḫalīl al-Ǧurr, Taʾrīḫ al-falsafa al-ʿarabiyya. I–II. Beirut
1958 / Repr. 1982.
– Ṭayyib Ṭīzīnī, Mašrūʿ ruʾya ǧadīda li-l-fikr al-ʿarabī fī l-ʿaṣr al-wasīṭ. Damascus
1971. – On Ṭayyib Ṭīzīnī cf. A. von Kügelgen (s. n. 70), pp. 237ff.
– ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, al-Falsafa wa-l-falāsifa fī l-ḥaḍāra al-ʿarabiyya. In Maw-
sūʿat al-ḥaḍāra al-ʿarabiyya al-islāmiyya I. Beirut 1986 (s. above 1972).
– ʿUmar Farrūḫ, Taʾrīḫ al-fikr al-ʿarabī ilā ayyām Ibn Ḫaldūn. Beirut 1972. 41983.
– ʿAlī Aṣġar Ḥalabī, Taʾrīḫ-i falāsifa-i īrānī az āġāz-i islām tā imrūz. Tehran 1972. One
of the few comprehensive works which includes Iranian philosophers (who mostly
wrote in Arabic) until the 19th century (Sabzawārī).
– Muḥammad ʿAlī Abū Rayyān, Taʾrīḫ al-fikr al-falsafī fī l-Islām. Beirut 1976. | 198
– Ibrāhīm Maḏkūr, Fī l-falsafa al-islāmiyya. I–II, Cairo 41976. – On Ibrāhīm Maḏ-
kūr cf. A. von Kügelgen (s. n. 70), pp. 149–151.
– Majid Fakhry, Muḫtaṣar taʾrīḫ al-falsafa al-ʿarabiyya. Beirut 1981. – A shortened
version of Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy. London 1970 (s. above
1970).
– Ibrāhīm Maḏkūr, Fī l-fikr al-islāmī. Cairo (?) 1984.
– Muḥammad ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Marḥabā, Min al-falsafa al-yūnāniyya ilā l-falsafa
al-islāmiyya. Beirut/Paris 21981.
89 On works in Persian cf. Muḥsin Kadīwar and Muḥammad Nūrī, Maʾḫaḏ-šināsi-i

ʿulūm-i ʿaqlī. Bibliography of Islamic Sciences. 1–3. Tehran 1378–1379 h.š./1999–2000.
24 chapter 1
– Ǧamīl Ṣalībā, Taʾrīḫ al-falsafa al-ʿarabiyya. Beirut 1981.

– Muḥammad ʿĀṭif al-ʿIrāqī, al-Falsafa al-ʿarabiyya: madḫal ǧadīd. Cairo 2000.
– M. Cüneyt Kaya (ed.), Islam Felsefesi: Tarih ve Problemler. Istanbul 2016.
V Chapters on Islamic Philosophers in Modern Western Works on

Medieval Philosophy – A Selection
– Frederick Charles Coplestone, A History of Philosophy. II (Mediaeval
Philosophy, part I). New York 1950 (followed by several later editions), pp. 211–226. –
An extended description of Islamic (and Jewish) philosophy appeared in Freder-
ick Charles Coplestone, A History of Medieval Philosophy. London 1972, ch. 8
and 9.
– Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham. Harmondsworth 1958,
pp. 141–167.
– Ignatius Brady, A History of Ancient Philosophy. Milwaukee 1959, pp. 193–217
(“Oriental Scholasticism, I: Arabian philosophers”).
– Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy. Toronto 1962 / 2nd, revised and expan-
ded edition 1982, pp. 93–104.
– Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy. Princeton 1964,
pp. 92–139.
– José Ignacio Saranyana, Historia de la filosofía medieval. Pamplona 1985, pp. 151–
171 (“La filosofía arabe”).
– Michael Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from An-
tiquity to the 13th Century. Houndmills/London 1985, pp. 118–132 (“Arabic Thought”).
– John Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350): An Introduction. London/
New York 1987, pp. 50–65 (“Philosophy: The Ancients, the Arabs and the Jews”).
– Kurt Flasch, Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter. Stuttgart 1987, pp. 262–290
(“Die islamische Herausforderung”).
– Kurt Flasch, Einführung in die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Darmstadt 1987,
pp. 94–133.
– Georg Scherer, Philosophie des Mittelalters. Stuttgart/Weimar 1993, pp. 88–98.
– Alain de Libera, La philosophie médiévale. Paris 1993 (21995), pp. 53–185.
– The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. II. Cambridge 2010.
VI Modern Encyclopaedias Containing Entries on Islamic Philosophy –

A Selection
– The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy. Ed. Oliver Leaman. I–II. Lon-
don 2015.
– Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition. Leiden.
– Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Leiden/Boston.
– Encyclopaedia Iranica. London.
– Encyclopaedia Judaica. Jerusalem.

– Encyclopaedia of Religion. New York.
– Dictionary of Literary Biography. Detroit.
– Dictionary of Scientific Biography. New York.
– Dictionary of the History of Ideas. New York.
– Dictionary of the Middle Ages. New York.
– Dictionnaire des philosophes. Paris.
– Encyclopaedia of Islamic Philosophy. Ed. by Arif Ali Khan and Mohammed Razi
Khan Afridi. 1–5. New Delhi 2006.
– Encyclopaedia universalis. Paris.
– Encyclopedia Americana. New York.
– Encyclopedia filosofica. Florence/Rome.
– Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Dordrecht.
– Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York/London.
– Encyclopédie philosophique universelle. Paris.
– Islam Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul.
– Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford.
– Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul.
26 chapter 1
Supplementary Remarks
A slightly different version (without “Bibliographical Supplement”) appeared

in Hans Daiber, BIPh I, pp. XI–XXXIII, and in Hans Daiber, The Struggle
for Knowledge in Islam: Some Historical Aspects. Sarajevo 2004, pp. 7–39 / Bos-
nian transl. in the same volume pp. 11–43. – The English version was translated
into Turkish by M. Cüneyt Kaya (“Islâm felsefesi tarih calışmamızın anlamı
ve amacı nedir?”). In Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 45, 2004,
pp. 355–377.
Cf. Dimitri Gutas, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Cen-
tury. An Essay on the Historiography of Arabic Philosophy”. In British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies 29, 2002, pp. 5–25. – The collection of articles in La
philosophie arabe à l’Étude. Sens, limites et défis d’ une discipline moderne. –
Studying Arabic Philosophy. Meaning, limits and challenges of a modern discip-
lin. Ed. Jean-Baptiste Brenet and Olga L. Lizzini. Paris 2019.
On more bibliographical details s. Hans Daiber, BIPh, index “history of
philosophy/thought in Islam”.
On more details about the discussion of Islamic philosophy in the history of
philosophy in the 18th/19th centuries cf. Catherine König-Pralong, Alteri-
tät, fremde Nähe und Hybridisierung. Die Araber in der Philosophiegeschichte
um 1800. In Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung in globaler Perspektive. Ed. Rolf
Elberfeld. Hamburg 2017, pp. 231–252. – Cf. also Catherine König-
Pralong, La philosophie arabe dans la médiévistique des XVIIIe–XIXe siècles.
In La philosophie arabe à l’Étude (s. above), pp. 47–64.
Republished, with some additions, from The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.
Proceedings 7, no. 5, Jerusalem 1998, pp. 327–345. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 2
Die Fortsetzung der philosophischen Tradition

bei den syrischen Christen des 9.–14. Jahrhunderts
Inhalt
1 Primärliteratur 27
2 Jakobitische Autoren 31
2.1 Mošeh Bar Kepha 31
2.2 Dionysius Jakob Bar Ṣalībī 36
2.3 Yaʿqōḇ / Severus Bar Šakkō 36
2.4 Barhebraeus 40
3 Nestorianische Autoren 47
3.1 Yōḥannān Bar Zoʿbī 47
3.2 ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā 49
4 Sekundärliteratur 50
Bibliographien [*1–*2] 50
Textüberlieferung und Textgeschichte [*11–*16] 50
Biographien, Einführungen, Gesamtdarstellungen [*21–*31] 51
Einzelne Werkgruppen, Schriften, Probleme, Begriffe [*41–*64] 52
Wirkungsgeschichte [*71–*93] 53
Summary 55
1 Primärliteratur
*1 Aristoteles, Meteorologie. (Kompendium, arab., dt.). – Hans Daiber, Ein Kom-

pendium der aristotelischen Meteorologie in der Fassung des Ḥunain Ibn Isḥāq.
Amsterdam/Oxford 1975. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/10.
*2 Pseudo-Aristoteles, De mundo (Edition und syr. Übersetzung des Sergius von
Rēšʿaynā). In Paul de Lagarde, Analecta Syriaca. Leipzig 1858 / Nachdruck
Osnabrück 1967, S. 134–158.
*3 Theophrastos, Meteorologie (syr., arab., engl.). – Hans Daiber, The Meteoro-

28 chapter 2
logy of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic translation. In William W. Forten-

baugh und Dimitri Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus. His psychological, doxographi-
cal, and scientific writings. New Brunswick/London 1992, S. 166–293. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs I/12.
*4 Nicolaus Damascenus (Philosophie des Aristoteles, Teiledition und Überset-
zung). – Hendrik Joan Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus Damascenus on the Phi-
losophy of Aristotle. Leiden 1969.
*5 Patrologia Graeca = Patrologiae cursus completus, seu, Bibliotheca universalis, inte-
gra, uniformis, commoda, oeconomica, omnium SS. Patrum, doctorum scriptorum-
que ecclesiasticorum. Series Graeca. Ed. Jacques Paul Migne. I–CLXI. Paris
1857–1866.
*6 Plotinus (Werke, arab., engl.). – Plotini opera, II. Ed. Paul Henry und Hans-
Rudolf Schwyzer, Plotiniana arabica ad codicum fidem anglice vertit Geof-
frey Lewis. Paris/Bruxelles 1959.
*7 Nemesios von Emesa, De natura hominis. Ed. Moreno Morani. Leipzig 1987.
*8 Proklos, Elementatio theologica. – Proclus, The Elements of Theology. A revised
text with translation, introduction and commentary by Eric Robertson
Dodds. Oxford 21963.
*9 Mošeh Bar Kepha, Buch über die Seele (dt. Übersetzung). – Oskar Braun, Moses
Bar Kepha und sein Buch von der Seele. Freiburg i.Br. 1891.
*10 Mošeh Bar Kepha, Hexaemeronkommentar (dt. Übersetzung). – Lorenz
Schlimme, Der Hexaemeronkommentar des Moses Bar Kepha. Einleitung, Über-
setzung und Untersuchungen. I–II. Wiesbaden 1977.
*11 Ḫwārizmī, al-: Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm. Ed. Gerlof van Vloten. Lugduni Batavorum
1895.
*12 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt. Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. Kairo 1971.
*13 Bīrūnī, al-: Kitāb at-Tafhīm li-awāʾil ṣināʿat at-tanǧīm. – Edition und engl. Über-
setzung R. Ramsay Wright, The Book of Instruction in the Elements of the Art of
Astrology. London 1934.
*14 Ġazālī, al-: Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn. Ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḫālidī. I–V. Beirut 1998.
*15 Ġazālī, al-: Maqāṣid al-falāsifa. Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. Kairo 1960.
*16 Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Muʿtabar fī l-ḥikma. Ed. Şerefettin Yalt-
kaya. Hyderabad 1357–1358/1938–1939.
*17 Bar Zoʿbī (Grammatik, Abschnitt über Punktation, Edition). – Jean Pierre Pau-
lin Martin, Traité sur l’accentuation chez les Syriens orientaux. Paris 1877. –
Sonderdruck aus Actes de la Société philologique VII no. 1.
*18 Bar Zoʿbī (Unterschied zwischen Natur und Hypostase sowie zwischen ‘Person’
(prosopon, parṣōpā) und ‘Antlitz’ (appē)). Ed. und übers. von Giuseppe Fur-
lani, Yohannān Bar Zōʿbī sulla differenza tra natura, ipostasi, persona e faccia.
In RSO 12, 1929–1930, S. 272–285.
die fortsetzung der philosophischen tradition 29
*19 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Kitāb al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya. Hyderabad 1343/1924–1925.

*20 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Grammatik, Edition). – Adalbert Merx, Historia artis
grammaticae apud Syros. Leipzig 1889.
*21 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Logik, Teileditionen, Übersetzung), Buch II, Memrā 1, Pro-
log, Anfang (Edition, Übersetzung), vgl. Julius Ruska 1897 [*42], S. 146–147. –
Buch II, Memrā 1, Frage 7–18 (Edition, Übersetzung), vgl. Anton Baumstark
1900 [*11] S. 25, 16–33 (syr. Text), S. 202, -3. Z. – 210, 16 (Übersetzung). – Buch II,
Memrā 1, Frage 20 (Edition, Übersetzung), vgl. Anton Baumstark 1900 [*11],
S. 20, 10–27 (syr. Text), S. 197 (Übersetzung). – Ital. Übersetzung des gesamten
Textes, mit Anmerkungen v. Giuseppe Furlani, La logica nei Dialoghi di Severo
bar Shakkō. In Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti 86/2, Venezia
1926–1927, S. 289–348.
*22 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Philosophie, Teileditionen, Übersetzung), 1. Einleitung, ed.
Julius Ruska 1897 [*42] S. 147–148. – 2. Buch II, Memrā 2 a, Frage 1 und 5, ed.
Anton Baumstark 1900 [*11] S. 15, 20–20, 9 (syr. Text), S. 192–197, 14 (Überset-
zung). – 3. Buch II, Memrā 2 a, nicht nummerierte Frage, ed. Anton Baumstark
1900 [*11] S. 25, 16–20 (syr. Text), S. 202, 16–26 (Übersetzung). – 4. Buch II, Memrā
2 a, Frage 8. Ed. Giuseppe Furlani, Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca
in oriente. Testi siriaci. III: Frammenti di una versione siriaca del commento di
Pseudo-Olimpiodoro alle Categorie d’Aristotele. In RSO 7 (1916–1918, S. 131–163)
S. 148–150. – Ed. (mit kommentierter dt. Übersetzung) Julius Ruska 1897 [*42]
S. 149–151.
*23 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Physik, Teileditionen, Übersetzung), Frage 6, ed. und übers.
v. Julius Ruska 1897 [*42] S. 155–157. – Frage 19, ed. und übers. v. Julius Ruska
1897 [*42] S. 157–160.
*24 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Poetik, Frage 1–11, syr. Text mit franz. Übersetzung). – Jean
Pierre Paulin Martin, De la métrique chez les Syriens. Leipzig 1879. = AKM
VII/2, S. 8–67.
*25 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Poetik, Frage 12–20 (Ende), syr. Text mit engl. Übersetzung
von Frage 12–13). – Martin Sprengling, Severus Bar Shakko’s Poetics, Part II.
In AJSL 32 (1915), S. 293–308.
*26 Bar Šakkō (Dialoge: Quadrivium, Edition, Übersetzung). – Julius Ruska, Das
Quadrivium aus Severus Bar Šakkū’s Buch der Dialoge. Diss. Heidelberg/Leipzig
1896. – Frage 1, 3 und 4 (syr. Text, S. 7, 10–8, 5 und 10, 18–14, 11) hat auch Anton
Baumstark 1900 [*11: 23, 15–25, 15] (syr. Text) herausgegeben und S. 200, 15–202,
15 übersetzt.
*27 Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī. Ed. Muǧtabā Mīnuwī und ʿAlī Riḍā Ḥay-
darī. Ṭihrān 1356/1937. – Engl. Übersetzung von George Michael Wickens,
The Nasirean Ethics by Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī. London 1964.
*28 Ibn Ḫallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān. Ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās. V. Beirut o.J.
30 chapter 2
*29 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (De anima, Edition von Auszügen, Zusammen-
fassung). – Giuseppe Furlani, La psicologia di Barhebreo secondo il libro La
Crema della Sapienza. In RSO 13 (1931), S. 24–52.
*30 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (De plantis, Edition, engl. Übersetzung). – Edi-
tion und engl. Übersetzung von Hendrik Joan Drossaart Lulofs. In H. J.
Drossaart Lulofs und E. L. J. Poortman, Nicolaus Damascenus, De plantis.
Five translations. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1989, S. 56–113.
*31 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (Ethik, Ökonomie, Politik, Edition, engl. Über-
setzung). – Peter N. Joosse, A Syriac Encyclopaedia of Aristotelian Philosophy.
Barhebraeus (13th c.), Butyrum sapientiae, books of ethics, economy and politics. A
critical edition, with introduction, translation, commentary and glossaries. Lei-
den/Boston 2004.
*32 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (Meteorologie, Mineralogie, Edition, engl.
Übersetzung). – Hidemi Takahashi, Aristotelian meteorology in Syriac. Barhe-
braeus, Butyrum sapientiae, books of mineralogy and meteorology. Leiden/Boston
2004.
*33 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (Poetik, Edition). – David Samuel Margo-
liouth, Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam. London 1887 / Nachdruck
Hildesheim 2000, S. 114–139.
*34 Barhebraeus, Butyrum sapientiae (Rhetorik, Edition, engl. Übersetzung). – John
W. Watt, with the assistance of Daniel Isaac, Julian Faultless and Ayman
Shihadeh, Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Leiden/Boston 2005.
*35 Barhebraeus, Candelabrum sanctuarii (‘Fundament’ I–II, Edition, franz. Überset-
zung). – Ján Bakoš, Le candélabre des sanctuaires. In Patrologia orientalis 22/4,
Paris 1930, S. 491–628 und 24/3, 1933, S. 297–439.
*36 Barhebraeus, Candelabrum sanctuarii (‘Fundament’ VIII, Edition, franz. Überset-
zung). – Ján Bakoš, Psychologie de Grégoire Aboulfaradj dit Barhebraeus. Leiden
1948.
*37 Barhebraeus, Chronicon ecclesiasticum. – Edition und lat. Übersetzung von Joan-
nes Baptista Abbeloos und Thomas Josephus Lamy. Lovanii 1872.
*38 Barhebraeus, Kṯāḇā da-swāḏ sofiyā. – Edition und franz. Übersetzung von Her-
man F. Janssens, L’entretien de la sagesse. Liège/Paris 1937.
*39 Barhebraeus, Kṯāḇā d-ḇāḇāṯā. – Edition mit dt. Teilübersetzung von Curt
Steyer, Buch der Pupillen von Gregor Bar Hebräus. Diss. Leipzig 1908. – Herman
F. Janssens, Barhebraeus’ Book of the pupils of the eye. In AJSL 47, 1930–1931,
S. 26–49 und 94–134; 48, 1932, S. 209–263; 52, 1935–1936, S. 1–21.
*40 Barhebraeus, Kṯāḇā d-huddāyē. Ed. Yulius Y. Çiçek. Glane/Losser (NL) 1986.
*41 Barhebraeus, Kṯāḇā d-īṯīqon. Ed. Paulus Bedjan. Paris/Leipzig 1898. Photome-
chanischer Nachdruck einer Abschrift hiervon: Glane/Losser (NL) 1985. – Eine
Neuedition (mit engl. Übersetzung) von Memrā I: Herman G. B. Teule, Gregory
Barhebraeus, Ethicon. Memrā I. Lovanii 1993. = CSCO 534. 535. = Scriptores Syri
218. 219. – Engl. Teilübersetzung v. Arent Jan Wensinck, Bar Hebraeus’ Book of
the Dove, together with some chapters from his Ethikon. Leiden 1919, S. 85–117.
*42 Barhebraeus, Kṯāḇā d-yaunā (engl. Übersetzung). – Arent Jan Wensinck, Bar
Hebraeus’ Book of the Dove, together with some chapters from his Ethikon. Leiden
1919, S. 1–81.
*43 Barhebraeus, Muḫtaṣar fī ʿilm an-nafs al-insāniyya. Ed. Paul Sbath. Kairo 1928.
*44 Barhebraeus, Maqāla muḫtaṣara fī ʿilm an-nafs al-bašariyya. Ed. Louis
Cheikho. In Traités inédits d’anciens philosophes arabes, Beyrouth 21911 / Nach-
druck Frankfurt a.M. 1974, Le Caire 1985, S. 76–102.
*45 ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā, Carmen Ebedjesu Metropolitae Sobae et Armeniae continens
catalogum librorum omnium Ecclesiasticorum. In Josephus Simonius Asse-
manus, Bibliotheca Orientalis [*47: III/1 (1728/1975)], S. 1–362. – Engl. Teilüber-
setzung in George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and their Rituals. II. London
1852 / Nachdruck 1957, S. 361–379.
*46 ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā, Kṯāḇā d-Margānīṯā. – Edition und lat. Übersetzung von
Angelo Mai, Scriptorum veterum nova collectio e vaticanis codicibus edita 10/2.
Romae 1838, S. 317–366. – Engl. Übersetzung in George Percy Badger 1852
[*45: II, S. 380–422].
*47 Josephus Simonius Assemanus, Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana.
Avec une postface par Joseph-Marie Sauget. I–III/1. Hildesheim/New York
1975. Nachdruck der Ausgaben Romae 1719, 1721, 1728.
II Jakobitische Autoren
2.1 Mošeh Bar Kepha

Mošeh Bar Kepha (gest. 290/903) gilt als angesehener Theologe und Philosoph
seiner Zeit (Assemanus 1721 [*47: II 127–131], GSL [*22: 281–282], Braun 1891
[*9: 3–18], Griffith 1987 [*47: 147–148]). Er wurde in Balad, einer Stadt am
Tigris in der Nähe von Mosul, um 197/813 oder 217/833 (Reller 1994 [*51: 33])
geboren und studierte im Kloster Mar Sergius (zwischen Sinǧar und Balad)
unter dessen Abt Kyriakos die Bibel sowie Philosophie und Theologie. Im
Jahre 248/863 wurde er zum Bischof der Diözesen von Bēṯ Raman (bei
Balad am Tigris, nordöstlich von Mosul) und Bēṯ Kiyōnayā sowie von Mosul
gewählt. Wahrscheinlich um 274/888 wurde er für zehn Jahre Periodeut von
Tagrit. Unter seinen zahlreichen theologischen und bibelexegetischen Schrif-
ten (Schlimme 1977 [*10: I 4–14], Griffith 1987 [*47: 147–148]) finden sich
einige Werke, die sein Interesse an der Philosophie und den Naturwissenschaf-
ten erkennen lassen. Nach einem Bericht in Barhebraeus’ Chronicon ecclesiasti-
32 chapter 2
cum [*37: II 215] kommentierte Bar Kepha Bücher zur Logik (kṯāḇē da-mlīlūṯā).
Eine dieser kommentierenden Schriften, ein Fragment zu Aristoteles’ Katego-
rien, scheint handschriftlich erhalten zu sein (GSL [*22: 281, Anm. 4]).
Über die Seele

In seiner auch ins Arabische übersetzten (CGAL [*24: 230]) und im 7./13. Jh.
von Barhebraeus in der Maqāla muḫtaṣara fī ʿilm an-nafs al-bašariyya (“Kurze
Abhandlung über die menschliche Seele”) [*44] herangezogenen Monogra-
phie Memrā d-ʿal nafšā (“Abhandlung über die Seele”) [*9] zitiert Bar Kepha
neben griechisch und syrisch schreibenden christlichen Autoren eine bemer-
kenswerte Anzahl von griechischen Philosophen, u.a. die Vorsokratiker Anaxi-
menes, Demokrit, Empedokles, Heraklit und Thales, ferner Pythagoras, Platon,
Aristoteles und Johannes Philoponus. Angelehnt an die aristotelische Psycho-
logie und mit steten Verweisen auf die Bibel gibt Mošeh Bar Kepha zunächst
eine Definition der Seele (Kap. 1), um dann einen Beweis zu führen für deren
Existenz – besonders der vernünftigen Seele des Menschen – aus der Bewe-
gung der unterschiedlichen Seelenkräfte und -tätigkeiten (Kap. 2). Einem doxo-
graphischen Kapitel über die Lehren der “heidnischen Philosophen” (Kap. 3)
folgt eine Widerlegung der stoischen Lehre von der Körperlichkeit der Seele
und eine Verteidigung der “richtigen” Ansichten (Kap. 4). Die doxographischen
Angaben hier und in anderen Kapiteln berühren sich vielfach mit den Pla-
cita philosophorum des Aetius (Daiber 1980 [*75: 457; Index s.v.], Daiber 1991
[*14: 46]), gehen aber – wie ein Vergleich zeigt – nicht direkt auf diese zurück
(Braun 1891[9: 40]), sondern auf eine griechische Kompilation, die ihrerseits
die Placita herangezogen hat. Möglicherweise handelt es sich dabei um De
natura hominis des Nemesius von Emesa, eine um 400 AD verfasste Anthropo-
logie, die mittel- und neuplatonische Lehren mit christlichem Dogma harmo-
nisiert und auch doxographische Passagen enthält. Die Kapitel 5 bis 7 enthalten
eine Beweisführung zur Substantialität, zur Unkörperlichkeit und Einfachheit
der Seele. Kapitel 8 bis 10 sind der Natur, den Kräften und den Tätigkeiten der
Seele gewidmet. Während in Kapitel 11 und 12 nochmals der Vernunftcharakter
und die Bewegung der Seele diskutiert werden, soll in den folgenden Abschnit-
ten die Denkfähigkeit der Seele bewiesen und eine Definition der Seele auf der
Grundlage von Porphyrius’Isagoge entwickelt werden (Kap. 13–15). In Kapitel 16
wird erneut ein Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele geführt, anschließend
sucht Bar Kepha die Unkörperlichkeit der Seele aus ihrer Unteilbarkeit abzu-
leiten (Kap. 17 und 18). Das 19. Kapitel thematisiert die antike Lehre (Daiber
1975 [*73: 352–354]) von der Seele als Organon des Körpers. Die Kapitel 20 bis
22 orientieren sich an Porphyrius’ Isagoge; sie behandeln die Unterschiedlich-
keit der Seelen in ihrem Dasein und ihrer Zahl, betonen aber, dass sie in ihrer
Substanz durchaus gleich seien. In Kap. 23 wird die daraus zu ziehende Kon-
sequenz für die Seelen, die den Körper verlassen haben, dargelegt; in Überein-
stimmung mit seiner Schöpfungslehre im Hexaemeronkommentar [*10] sucht
Bar Kepha dort gegen Mani, Bardesanes und Markion zu beweisen, dass die
Seele von Gott aus dem Nichts geschaffen ist. In den folgenden Kapiteln wird
die Geschaffenheit der Seele und ihr Verhältnis zum Leib thematisiert (Kap.
24–26). Die Kapitel 27 bis 41 behandeln Spezialfragen zum Verhältnis von Kör-
per und Seele, zum Fortleben der Seele nach dem Tod und ihrer Auferstehung.
Bar Kepha will beweisen, dass die Seele ein “Bild und Gleichnis Gottes” ist (Kap.
40), das auf den Träger der Seele, den Körper, nur solange übertragbar ist, wie
beide verbunden sind. Im letzten, dem 41. Kapitel soll schließlich gezeigt wer-
den, dass es sich lohnt, für die Toten zu beten und zu opfern, da sie bzw. ihre
Seelen auferstehen werden (Braun 1891 [*9: 158–161]). – Bar Kephas Abhand-
lung über die Seele orientiert sich an der Psychologie des Aristoteles, greift auf
das Instrumentarium von dessen Organon und auf Porphyrius’ Isagoge zurück,
verbindet aber das aristotelische Gedankengut in starkem Maße mit dem pla-
tonischen. Die Leitthemen des Buches, namentlich in den Kapiteln 2, 5, 6, 7,
13 und 16, sind von einem Kompendium über die Seele inspiriert, dessen grie-
chisches Original mit dem Titel Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν
fälschlicherweise dem Gregor Thaumatourgos (3. Jh. AD) zugeschrieben wor-
den ist (Patrologia Graeca [*5: X 1137–1146]), in Wirklichkeit jedoch auf Neme-
sios von Emesas De natura hominis zurückgeht [*7]. Der Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης lag
bereits im 1./7. Jh. in einer anonymen syrischen Übersetzung vor und ist später
in einer langen und einer gekürzten Version ins Arabische übertragen worden
(Gätje 1971 [*13: 95–113;114–129]). Wie ein Vergleich mit den sieben Abschnit-
ten des Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης zeigt, folgt Kap. 2 von Bar Kephas Buch Λόγος §§ 1
und 2; Kap. 5 Λόγος §3; Kap. 6 Λόγος §4; Kap. 7 Λόγος § 5; Kap. 13 Λόγος § 7, und
Kap. 16 Λόγος §6. Doch hat Mošeh Bar Kepha nicht nur den Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης
des Pseudo-Gregor Thaumatourgos benutzt, sondern auch dessen Vorlage, also
Nemesios’ De natura hominis (Klinge 1939 [*72: 226–227], Zonta 1991 [*15:
226–227]), sowie ein weiteres Werk, das von Nemesios abhängig ist, nämlich
die nur in Fragmenten erhaltene Schrift Über die Seele des monophysitischen
Bischofs Iwannīs von Dārā (GSL [*22: 277]) aus der Generation vor Mošeh Bar
Kepha (Zonta 1991 [*15: 229–230], Reller 1999 [*16]).
Der Hexaemeronkommentar
Sein naturwissenschaftliches Interesse zeigt Bar Kepha im bislang unedierten,
aber in einer deutschen Übersetzung vorliegenden Kommentar zum Hexaeme-
ron, einer exegetischen Behandlung der biblischen Schöpfungsgeschichte, die
in Teilen Jakob von Edessa folgt (Schlimme 1977 [*10: II 684–740]). Die bibli-
34 chapter 2
sche Schöpfungsgeschichte wird dort im zweiten Buch ausgelegt und erscheint

traditionell im Rahmen eines kosmologischen Gottesbeweises. Dieser Exegese
lässt Bar Kepha eine Beschreibung des Kosmos folgen, die von den Gestir-
nen und den Tieren (Buch III) über die vier Elemente Erde, Wasser, Luft und
Feuer (Buch IV) bis zu einer umfangreichen Diskussion der Meteorologie führt
(Buch V). Für dieses letzte Buch hat er die im griechischen Original verlorene
Meteorologie des Theophrast benutzt, die uns lediglich in syrischer Überset-
zung und in einer auf dieser beruhenden arabischen Übertragung überliefert
ist (Daiber 1992 [*3: bes. 171–174]). Weiter liegt dem fünften Buch ein im grie-
chischen Original und in dessen syrischen Übertragungen verlorenes Kompen-
dium der aristotelischen Meteorologie zugrunde, das uns in arabischer, dem
Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq zugeschriebener und vielleicht aus dessen “Schule” stam-
mender Version vorliegt (Daiber 1975 [*1], 1980 [*75: 822–823], 1991 [*14: 47–
48]). – Von philosophischem Interesse ist aber vor allem die dogmatische Ein-
leitung in den Hexaemeronkommentar, die im ersten Buch erfolgt. Hier werden
zunächst die verschiedenen Quellen der Wahrheitserkenntnis aufgelistet, dar-
unter die göttliche Offenbarung, die gegen Ende des Buches (Kap. 31–38) im
Rahmen einer Diskussion über das Prophetentum nochmals behandelt wird.
Dann werden die Geschaffenheit und Zeitlichkeit der Welt (Kap. 2) mit der
Einzigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unendlichkeit, Unbegreiflichkeit und Unveränderlichkeit
Gottes kontrastiert (Kap. 3–7). Demzufolge hat Gott drei, hinsichtlich οὐσία
und Göttlichkeit (Kap. 8, Z. 99–100) gleiche Hypostasen, nämlich Gott Vater
(die wirkende Ursache und der Herrscher), seinen Sohn (seine Wirkungen bzw.
sein Wort), und den Heiligen Geist (Kap. 8–10). Hierauf folgt (Kap. 11–22) eine
Widerlegung “häretischer” Lehren über den Ursprung der Welt, im Besonderen
der These von der Ewigkeit der Welt, namentlich bei Aristoteles und Proklos
(Kap. 12), und der Leugnung der creatio ex nihilo durch die Sophisten. Mošeh
Bar Kepha betont die Geschaffenheit der Materie, der vier Elemente, aus dem
Nichts, wobei er an dieser Stelle (Kap. 12) die vier Elemente – nämlich Was-
ser, Feuer, Erde und Luft nicht nennt, sondern nur deren “Beschaffenheiten”,
nämlich “Leichtigkeit, Schwere, Dichte, Dünnheit, Weichheit, Härte, Feuchtig-
keit, Trockenheit, Kälte, Wärme, Farbe, Gestalt, Zeichen und Maß” (Schlimme
1977 [*10: 175; zum Inhalt 504–538]). Im Hintergrund steht hier offensichtlich
die Lehre der islamischen Dahriten, welche die Existenz eines Schöpfers leug-
neten und alle Dinge auf die vier “Naturen” (aṭ-ṭabāʾiʿ), nämlich Feuchtigkeit,
Trockenheit, Kälte und Hitze zurückführten – eine Lehre, auf die auch Theo-
dor Bar Konai in seinem Buch der Scholien anspielt und die von christlichen
Kreisen wie auch von dem Muʿtaziliten Naẓẓām kritisiert wurde (Daiber 1999
[*81: 29–32]). – Aufbau und Inhalt von Buch I des Hexaemeronkommentars
folgen einem Schema der muʿtazilitischen Tawḥīd-Literatur (Rudolph 1994
[*52], 1997 [*53: 243–245]) – ausgenommen der an monophysitischer Theo-

logie (Bruns 2003 [*85: 35]) orientierte Einschub über die drei Hypostasen,
die christliche Trinität, wobei die von Mošeh Bar Kepha mit den christlichen
Theologen geteilte griechisch-philosophische Terminologie nicht unbedingt
deren identische Anwendung impliziert. So ist die auf Aristoteles’ Kategorien
und die Aristoteleskommentatoren sowie auf Porphyrius’ Isagoge zurückführ-
bare Unterscheidung von Substanz und Akzidens zwar schon bei den syrischen
Scholastikern des 5. Jh. AD nachweisbar (Bruns 2003 [*85: 14]), sie findet
sich aber auch in der Theologie der Muʿtazila (Daiber 1975 [*73: 62–76]) und
erscheint bei Mošeh Bar Kepha nicht mehr im Zusammenhang mit der Tri-
nitätstheologie, sondern in Anlehnung an die muʿtazilitische These von der
Veränderlichkeit und Vergänglichkeit der Akzidentien (Daiber 1975 [*73: 72–
73]). Auch soll mit dieser Unterscheidung – ähnlich wie bei den muslimischen
Theologen – sowohl die Geschaffenheit der Akzidentien als auch die Existenz
ihres Schöpfers bewiesen werden (Rudolph 1994 [*52: 311–312]). Mošeh Bar
Kepha fügt seiner Gottesauffassung, in Modifikation der traditionellen Trini-
tätslehren der Kirchenväter (Schlimme 1977 [*10: 143], Wolfson 1976 [*74:
120–132]), eine neuplatonische Komponente hinzu, wenn er den Schöpfer mit
dem “ersten Nous” gleichsetzt, der als eine selbst nicht verursachte, unver-
änderliche, ewige und autarke erste Ursache und als Licht beschrieben wird
(Plotin, Enneaden V 4–6 und VI 7–9; Plotini opera [*6: 332–369; 430–488],
Proklos [*8: prop. 160–162]). Dies vermag jedoch nicht darüber hinwegzutäu-
schen, dass sich Mošeh Bar Kepha in seiner Theologie von der Sprache und den
Inhalten der islamisch-muʿtazilitischen Theologie inspirieren ließ, besonders
dann, wenn dort mit Spolien der griechisch-christlichen Theologie gearbeitet
wurde. – Es überrascht denn auch nicht, dass Mošeh Bar Kepha in seiner ohne
Titel überlieferten Abhandlung über den freien Willen und die Prädestination
die islamischen Deterministen und deren explizit genannte These von Gottes
Vorherwissen im Auge hat. Dort polemisiert er gegen die Muslime, d.h. “gegen
die Mhaggrāyē, die ebenfalls die Freiheit aufheben und behaupten, dass Gut
und Böse uns von Gott vorgeschrieben ist” (Griffith 1987 [*47: 151–159]). Bar
Kepha selbst lehnt die Prädestination ab und kennzeichnet sie als eine Lehre
der Heiden, der Manichäer und des Markion (Barsoum 2000 [*30: 401 Nr. 9],
Griffith 1987 [*47]). Damit folgt er einer seit Ephrem dem Syrer im 4. Jahr-
hundert geläufigen Tradition, deren Hauptargument gegen den Dualismus, ins-
besondere den der Manichäer, die menschliche Freiheit im Wählen zwischen
Gut und Böse war (Griffith 1987 [*47: 143]).
36 chapter 2
2.2 Dionysius Jakob Bar Ṣalībī

Dionysius Jakob Bar Ṣalībī (gest. 566/1171), Bischof von Amid (Diyarbakir),
hatte in Melitene neben Theologie auch alle damaligen Wissenschaften stu-
diert (Assemanus 1721 [*47: II, 156–211], Wright 1894 [*21: 246–250], GSL
[*22: 295–298], Ortiz de Urbina 1965 [*27: 220–221], Barsoum 2000 [*30:
432–441]). Barhebraeus nennt ihn in seinem Chronicon ecclesiasticum [*37:
I 561/562] als Verfasser von “Kommentaren zur Logik (nämlich des Aristoteles)”.
Diese sind in einer Handschrift in Cambridge (Signatur: 2.14) erhalten, gehen
dort einer Sammlung von Texten des Nicolaus Damascenus voraus (falsch Bar-
soum 2000 [*30: 439]) und umfassen Bearbeitungen von Porphyrius’ Isagoge
sowie des aristotelischen Organons bis zu den Analytica priora. Sie sind in der
Handschrift auf das Jahr 1148 datiert (GSL [*22: 298, Anm. 11]). Gemäß der
Inhaltsangabe von Barsoum 2000 [*30: 438–439] hat Bar Ṣalībī seinem Kom-
mentar der Analytica priora schwierige Teile aus den Analytica posteriora hin-
zugefügt und in diesem Zusammenhang festgestellt, dass Georg dem Araber-
bischof zufolge die Analytica priora und die Analytica posteriora thematisch
zusammenhingen, weshalb Bar Ṣalībī beide Bücher als erstes Buch der Apodeik-
tik betrachtete. Bar Ṣalībī hat nach seinen eigenen Worten auf einen Kommen-
tar zu den Analytica posteriora verzichtet, weil die Überlieferung mangelhaft
sei und überdies – wie Bar Ṣalībī mit Rekurs auf syrische Gelehrte, die sich auf
eine Behandlung der Analytica priora bis Kapitel I 7 beschränkten, bemerkt
(Daiber 2001 [*83: 334–335]), – das Buch überflüssig sei, denn es sei dem Inhalt
nach den Philosophiestudenten bereits bekannt (Barsoum 2000 [*30: 439]).
2.3 Yaʿqōḇ / Severus Bar Šakkō

Yaʿqōḇ / Severus Bar Šakkō (gest. 638/1241) wurde in Barṭellā bei Mosul gebo-
ren (Wright 1894 [*21: 260–263], GSL [*22: 311–312], Barsoum 2000 [*30:
455–458], Yousif 2003 [*31: 246], Teule 2007 [*59: 143–154). Er war Mönch
im Kloster Mar(y) Mattai, wo er 629/1232 Bischof mit dem Namen Severus
wurde. Sein Zeitgenosse Barhebraeus berichtet im Chronicon ecclesiasticum
([*37: II 409/411], Ruska 1897 [*42: 24–25]), dass Bar Šakkō beim nestoria-
nischen Mönch Bar Zoʿbī Grammatik sowie “das erste Buch der Logik” stu-
diert habe und vom Philosophen Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus in Mosul in die
“arabischen Schriften über Logik und Philosophie” eingeführt worden sei. Im
Übrigen aber sei Bar Šakkō Autodidakt gewesen. Er habe eine Menge Bücher
besessen, die nach seinem Tod “in die Schatzkammer des Fürsten von Mosul
gebracht wurden”. Barhebraeus nennt ihn ausdrücklich als Verfasser der Dia-
loge. – Bar Šakkō gehörte neben Barhebraeus und Dionysius Bar Ṣalībī zu den
wenigen Gelehrten seiner Zeit, die wie der damalige Patriarch Ignatius III.
(618/1222–649/1252) das Ziel verfolgten, die Kenntnis der kirchlichen Lehre
und der weltlichen Wissenschaften zu verbreiten. Ignatius II. (878/1473–883/

1478) hat nach Barhebraeus’ Worten (Chronicon [*37: I 671], Ruska 1897 [*42:
34–35], Kawerau 1960 [*26: 56–60]) mit der Anstellung von Lehrern “in Wahr-
heit die heilige Kirche Gottes aus der einreißenden Roheit zu neuem Leben
erweckt”. Dem Patriarchen Ignatius IV. (650/1253–655/1258) galt Barhebraeus
als Autorität auf den Gebieten der Medizin, Logik und Philosophie (Kawerau
1960 [*26: 59]) – eine Einschätzung, die auch der Nachfolger Ignatius’ IV. teilte.
Es ist zu Recht darauf verwiesen worden, dass die Wissenschaften neutrales
Gebiet waren, “auf dem sich Jakobiten und Nestorianer, Christen und Muslime
freundschaftlich begegneten” (Kawerau 1960 [*26: 60]). So konnte der Jakobit
Bar Šakkō beim Nestorianer Bar Zoʿbī und bei dem zu seiner Zeit berühmten
muslimischen Gelehrten Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (gest. 639/1242) studieren,
von dem uns Abhandlungen zur Mathematik und Geometrie überliefert sind
(GAL [*23: 859], GAS [*29: V 134, 141, 324; VII 402–403]).
Die Dialoge
Der arabischen biographischen Literatur zufolge galt Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus
als Universalgelehrter, der sich in Philosophie, Logik, Physik, Theologie und
Medizin auskannte und von seinen Zeitgenossen in schwierigen Fragen kon-
sultiert wurde (Ibn Ḫallikān [*28: 311–317, bes. 312, 4–7.], Übers. Ruska 1897
[*42: 27–29]). Es ist daher mit gutem Grund darauf hingewiesen worden, dass
Bar Šakkōs Dialoge ihre Entstehung den Vorlesungen des Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn
Yūnus verdanken (Ruska 1897 [*42: 30–31]). Bar Šakkō soll sie auf Bitte eines
mit ihm befreundeten Mönchs namens Basilius verfasst haben (Ruska 1897
[*42: 148]), als nützliches “Werkzeug” (Ruska 1897 [*42: 33]), um die “Absich-
ten und Meinungen der Philosophen” ohne jede Polemik darzustellen – was
de facto jedoch nicht immer der Fall war (Ruska 1897 [*42: 148]). Aber natür-
lich war die Schrift auch für die Nachwelt gedacht, der in syrischer Sprache
ein enzyklopädisches Wissen überliefert werden sollte. – Bar Šakkō bediente
sich dabei eines Verfahrens, das damals von Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus und ande-
ren Gelehrten (Ibn Ḫallikān [*28: 314–315. / Übers. Ruska 1897 [*42: 29]), aber
auch von Friedrich II. von Hohenstaufen angewandt wurde (Schramm 2001
[*84: 301–308]): Das Frage-Antwort-Schema (Daiber 1991 [*49]). Die Dialoge
werfen nämlich auf didaktische Weise zunächst eine Frage auf, die dann in
den nachfolgenden Ausführungen beantwortet wird. Der Titel der Schrift ist
also in ihrer Struktur begründet. Entsprechend lässt sich das Buch nicht auf
die literarische Gestaltung eines Schulprogramms in syrischer Sprache redu-
zieren. Die Dialoge sind vielmehr entstanden aus der fruchtbaren Begegnung
von islamischen Gelehrten, die über ein reiches, von antiken Schriften in ara-
bischer Übersetzung angeregtes Wissen verfügten, und christlichen Gelehrten,
38 chapter 2
die das im Syrischen tradierte Wissen einbringen konnten (Ruska 1897 [*42:
20–21]). Letztere pflegten dabei die syrische Sprache und vermittelten zugleich
den Mitgliedern ihrer Kirche das reiche Wissen der arabisch-islamischen Kul-
tur. – Die bislang noch nicht in ihrer Gesamtheit edierten Dialoge sind in zwei
Teile gegliedert: Im ersten werden in vier Dialogen nacheinander Grammatik, –
gefolgt von deren metrischer Behandlung (Merx 1889 [*20]) – Rhetorik, Poetik
(Martin 1879 [*24], Sprengling 1915 [*25]) und die Vorzüge des Syrischen
dargelegt. Der zweite Teil behandelt in zwei Dialogen die Logik [*21] und die
Philosophie [*22]. – In der Einleitung zum Dialog über die Philosophie [*22:
1.] zeigt sich Bar Šakkō angetan von der platonisch-alexandrinischen Defini-
tion der Philosophie (Daiber 1990 [*79: 118–120]) als Verähnlichung mit Gott,
soweit der Mensch dazu in der Lage ist. Dabei betrachtet er die Weltentsa-
gung als Voraussetzung für die Meditation über “die wahre Weisheit”. Beach-
tung verdient die Anordnung des Logikkapitels vor dem zur Philosophie: Die
Logik scheint hier durch ihre separate Voranstellung nicht Teil der nachfolgen-
den Philosophie zu sein, sondern deren Instrument. Bar Šakkō folgt damit in
einer im Syrischen seit Sergius von Rēšʿaynā diskutierten Frage einer Tradition,
die er selbst, in einer doxographischen Aufzählung von drei unterschiedlichen
Aussagen, Aristoteles zuschreibt (Furlani 1926–1927 [*21: 294]). Auffälliger-
weise steht dieser Passus fast wortwörtlich auch bei Ḫwārizmī in seinem im
4./10. Jahrhundert verfassten Abriss der Wissenschaften Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm (“Die
Schlüssel der Wissenschaften”) [*11: 132–133], dort allerdings ohne Nennung der
Vertreter der einzelnen Positionen. Dies lässt zumindest hier die These frag-
lich erscheinen, wonach Ḫwārizmīs Werk – etwa durch Vermittlung des Kamāl
ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus – Bar Šakkō bekannt gewesen sei. Eher scheint es für beide
Werke eine gemeinsame Quelle zu geben (vgl. Daiber 1980 [*75: 329–330]). –
Der Hauptteil des Dialogs über die Philosophie ist in fünf Abschnitte (memrā)
gegliedert: (1) Definitionen, Teile und Schulen der Philosophie [*22: 2.–4.]; hier
folgt Bar Šakkō der alexandrinischen Tradition der Ammoniusschule (Daiber
1985 [*46: 76–77], Hein 1985 [*77: 39. 65–103. 133–148. 155. 227. 245–246. 260]). –
(2) Praktische Philosophie bzw. Ethik, wobei eine Darstellung der Unterschiede
zwischen Platon und Aristoteles gegeben wird (Ruska 1897 [*42: 152]). – (3)
Physik, worin nach einem in hellenistischen Lehrbüchern üblichen Aufbau-
schema (Daiber 1980 [*75: 327]) zunächst (Ruska 1897 [*42: 152–153]) in 9
Fragen die Grundbegriffe behandelt werden (Frage 6: [*23]), dann die Bewe-
gung des Himmels (Frage 10 und 11), die einfachen und zusammengesetzten
Elemente (Frage 12), die Meteorologie (Frage 13–18), die chemischen Stoffe und
die Entstehung der sieben Metalle aus Schwefel und Quecksilber (Frage 19:
[*23]; vgl. Takahashi 2006 [*90]), die Pflanzen- und Tierwelt, gefolgt von einer
Diskussion über die Seele und deren Vermögen (Frage 20–27; vgl. Havard 1994
[*50]). Bar Šakkō will hier im Wesentlichen den aristotelischen Standpunkt

darstellen. Im thematisch entsprechenden 4. Kapitel seines älteren, im Jahre
628/1231 verfassten Buches, des Kṯāḇā d-sīmāṯā (“Buch der Schätze”) (GSL [*22:
311–312, Titel dort falsch], Barsoum 2000 [*30: 456], vgl. auch Nau 1896 [*41]
und Teule 2007 [*59]), hatte er sich noch auf die biblische Schöpfungsge-
schichte konzentriert und astronomische, geographische und meteorologische
Kapitel eingefügt. Hin und wieder nannte er im “Buch der Schätze” auch seine
Quellen, nämlich Aristoteles, Ephrem, Jakob von Edessa, Mošeh Bar Kepha
und Theodor der Nestorianer (womit Theodor Bar Konai gemeint sein könnte)
(Nau 1896 [*41: 290, 293, 321]). – (4) Das Quadrivium, bestehend aus Mathe-
matik, Arithmetik, Geometrie und Astronomie [*26] und schließlich (5) Meta-
physik bzw. Theologie. – In der Reihenfolge der in den Dialogen behandelten
Themen folgt Bar Šakkō mit gewissen Modifikationen Fārābīs von den Alex-
andrinern inspirierter Aufzählung der Wissenschaften (Gutas 1983 [*76: 257–
267]), beginnend mit dem Komplex der Sprache, gefolgt von der Poetik, der
Rhetorik, der Logik, der praktischen und schließlich der theoretischen Philo-
sophie (Daiber 1990 [*79: 120–121]), die in Physik, Mathematik und Metaphy-
sik bzw. Theologie gegliedert ist. Sie integriert das antike und byzantinische
Bildungsideal der ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, der propädeutischen Fächer bzw. der mit-
telalterlichen artes liberales, die aus dem Trivium Grammatik, Rhetorik und
Dialektik sowie aus dem Quadrivium Geometrie, Arithmetik, Astronomie und
Musiktheorie bestehen (Daiber 1980 [*75: 68–69]). – Bar Šakkō hat auch ara-
bische Quellen benutzt, so z.B. im Kapitel über das Quadrivium Abū ʿAbd
Allāh Muḥammad al-Ḫwārizmī’s Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm (“Die Schlüssel der Wissen-
schaften”) und “Die Epistel der Lauteren Brüder” von Basra, die Rasāʾil Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (Ruska 1896 [*26: 5–6. 33–79]). Beide Texte könnten ihm über eine
unbekannte arabische Quelle zugänglich gewesen sein, die ihm über seinen
Lehrer Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus bekannt geworden sein mag oder gar von die-
sem stammt. Dieser Quelle können auch Bar Šakkōs meteorologische Anga-
ben entstammen, die auf Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzīs al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya (“Die
östlichen Untersuchungen”) zurückgehen und auch vom späteren Zakariyāʾ
Ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (gest. 682/1283) in dessen Kosmographie ʿAǧāʾib
al-maḫlūqāt (“Die Wunder der Geschöpfe”) aufgegriffen wurden (Takahashi
2004 [*32: 41], Takahashi 2006 [*90]). Neben solchen arabischen Quellen
wird Bar Šakkō syrische Texte herangezogen haben, d.h. syrische Übersetzun-
gen und Bearbeitungen griechischer Überlieferungen. Es ist allerdings nicht
immer geklärt, ob Bar Šakkō über eine syrische oder über eine arabische Quelle
Kenntnis von der griechischen Tradition erhielt. Mit Sicherheit hat er jedoch
in der 11. bis 13. Frage Auszüge aus Sergius von Rēšʿaynās syrischer Übersetzung
von (Pseudo-)Aristoteles’ De mundo eingefügt (Ruska 1897 [*42: 154–155]). In
40 chapter 2
den meteorologischen Angaben dürfte er auch das Kṯāḇā d-sīmāṯā (“Buch der
Schätze”) des Hiob von Edessa (gest. 220/835) herangezogen haben (Takaha-
shi 2004 [*32: 41]). Für den Dialog über die Logik hat er nicht nur auf syri-
sche Übersetzungen von Aristoteles’ Organon zurückgegriffen. In der 26. Frage
(Furlani 1926–1927 [*21: 342]) finden sich Passagen aus Paulus Persas Kom-
pendium der Logik (vgl. Band I 44), in der 34. und 36. Frage (Furlani 1926–1927
[*21: 343–344]) schöpft Bar Šakkō aus Severus Seḇōḵts Abhandlung über die
Syllogismen (vgl. Band I 43), und in der 49. Frage (Furlani 1926–1927 [*21:
346]) aus Athanasius von Balads Einführung in die aristotelische Logik und
Syllogistik (vgl. Band I 44). Weitere Parallelen, etwa zu Sergius von Rēšʿaynās
Abhandlung über die Kategorien (Hugonnard-Roche 2004 [*88: 143–164.
187–231, Furlani 1926–1927 [*21: 336. 338–339]), lassen sich nicht eindeutig
auf eine Quelle zurückführen, sei es, weil Bar Šakkō paraphrasiert oder weil
er auf eine Vorlage zurückgreift, die ihrerseits identische griechische Traditio-
nen widerspiegelt. Seine Quelle mag hier eine Textsammlung gewesen sein,
die neben Aristoteles’ Organon und Porphyrius’ Isagoge die alexandrinischen
Kommentare aus der Schule des Ammonius heranzog (Furlani 1916–1918 [*22:
148–150]) und entgegen Baumstark, dem Wolska-Conus folgt (1989 [*48:
69–82]), nicht eindeutig auf Johannes Philoponus und dessen Zeitgenossen
Stephanus Alexandrinus zurückgeführt werden kann (Daiber 1985 [*46: 75–
80]).
2.4 Barhebraeus
Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-ʿIbrī (Barhebraeus, geb. 620/1225 oder 622/1226 in Melitene /
Malatya), gilt als bedeutendster syrischer Schriftsteller in beinahe allen Wis-
sensgebieten der damaligen Zeit (Wright 1894 [*21: 265–281], GSL [*22: 312–
320], Barsoum 2000 [*30: 463–481], Yousif 2003 [*31: 246–255], Teule 2003
[*57], Takahashi 2005 [*2], Hugonnard-Roche 2008 [*60: 129–143]). Er
erhielt eine gründliche Ausbildung in Theologie in Antiochia, später in Tri-
polis, bei einem nestorianischen Lehrer. In dieser Zeit studierte er Rhetorik
und Medizin, ferner Philosophie, Mathematik, Astronomie und Naturkunde.
Als kaum Zwanzigjähriger wurde Barhebraeus 643/1246 mit dem Amtsnamen
Gregor zum Bischof von Gūbos (bei Melitene) geweiht. Ein Jahr später hielt
er sich im nahegelegenen Lāqābīn auf. Es folgte eine unruhige Zeit ständiger
Rivalitäten, aus denen Barhebraeus als Sieger hervorging. Zwischen 650/1253
und 657/1259 wurde er Bischof im bedeutenderen Bischofssitz Aleppo, wo
der umfassend gebildete Gelehrte zur einflussreichen Kirchenpersönlichkeit
avancierte. Im Jahr 662/1264 wurde er zum Maphrian von Tagrit und dem
Osten gewählt, d.h. zum Oberbischof über die östliche Hälfte der jakobiti-
schen Kirche, und residierte als solcher bis zu seinem Lebensende im Kloster
Mar(y) Mattai (nördlich von Mosul). Aufgrund seiner zahlreichen Verpflich-

tungen und seiner guten Beziehungen zu den damals noch christenfreund-
lichen mongolischen Ilchanen im Osten und den Nestorianern des Ostens
unternahm er zahlreiche Reisen, die nicht selten mit längeren Aufenthalten
einhergingen. So weilte er monatelang in Bagdad, wo er ehrenvoll vom nesto-
rianischen Katholikos-Patriarchen empfangen wurde, und 675/1277 in dessen
Titular-Residenz Tagrit. Zweimal reiste er in den Westen, nach Kleinarmenien
(schwere Erkrankung 665/1267–666/1268). Immer wieder begab er sich in das
ruhigere Aserbaidschan, nach Maragha, der Hauptstadt der Ilchane (neben
Täbris), wo er die dortigen reichen Bibliotheksschätze nutzen und ungestört
wissenschaftlich arbeiten konnte. Als Barhebraeus 685/1286 in Maragha starb,
war er ein von Christen und Muslimen gleichermaßen geschätzter Gelehrter.
Sein Leichnam wurde später nach Mar(y) Mattai überführt, wo man bis heute
sein Grab besichtigen kann. – Barhebraeus ist der Hauptvertreter der soge-
nannten Syrischen Renaissance auf westsyrisch-jakobitischer Seite. Bemer-
kenswert ist seine außerordentliche literarische Produktivität und seine Fähig-
keit, aus syrischen, arabischen und persischen Quellen neue Werke zu kom-
pilieren. Traditionell wird Barhebraeus wenig Originalität zugesprochen. Sein
Werk erweist ihn jedoch als einen Kompilator, der oft präziser formuliert als
die Autoren seiner Vorlagen und zuweilen Nuancierungen bietet, die von eige-
ner Reflexion und guter Beobachtung zeugen. Sein enzyklopädisches Wissen
macht ihn zum wertvollen Zeugen damaliger Gelehrsamkeit, die christlich-
syrische und antike Tradition mit der arabisch-islamischen zu verbinden ver-
stand (Watt 2010 [*61]). In über dreißig, bis heute noch nicht vollständig
edierten, teils auf Arabisch, meist jedoch auf Syrisch abgefassten Schriften
(von denen einige später ins Arabische übersetzt worden sind) (CGAL [*24:
275–281]) hat Barhebraeus seinen Kenntnisreichtum in Theologie und Bibelex-
egese, Philosophie, Geschichte, Grammatik, Naturwissenschaft und Medizin
bewiesen und sich auch als Dichter einen Namen gemacht. Darüber hinaus
genoss er das Renommee des Kompilators eines in syrischer Sprache einzig-
artigen, nach arabischen Vorbildern verfassten Buches, nämlich des Kṯāḇā d-
ṯunnāyē mgaḥḥḵānē (“Buch der ergötzlichen Erzählungen”). Die Sammlung
von 727 Anekdoten, Fabeln, Traumdeutungen u.a. verwertet griechisches, ara-
bisches, persisches und indisches Material sowie die Apophthegmata Patrum
(Ed. und Lit.: GSL [*22: 318 Anm. 2], Takahashi 2005 [*2]). Ferner schuf Barhe-
braeus ein unter den syrischen Jakobiten maßgebend gewordenes Rechtswerk,
eine Kodifizierung kirchlichen wie säkularen Rechts, das Kṯāḇā d-huddāyē
(“Buch der Leitungen”) ([*40, GSL [*22: 315 Anm. 3], Takahashi 2005 [*2]),
worin Ġazālīs al-Waǧīz fī fiqh maḏhab al-Imām aš-Šāfiʿī und al-Wasīṭ fī l-maḏ-
hab benutzt wurden (Takahashi 2015 [*91: 306–309). Nachfolgend beschrän-
42 chapter 2
ken wir uns auf die philosophisch-theologischen Werke des Barhebraeus

(Übersicht: Takahashi 2003 [*86]).
Candelabrum sanctuarii
Vermutlich in den Jahren zwischen 664/1266–665/1267 und 669/1271–670/1272
(Takahashi 2002 [*55: 167]), als er bereits das Maphrianat von Tagrit und
dem Osten innehatte, schrieb Barhebraeus sein erstes großes theologisches
Werk, das Kṯāḇā da-mnāraṯ quḏšē oder Candelabrum sanctuarii (“Buch der
Leuchte des Allerheiligsten”) (Editionen bei Takahashi 2005 [*2]). Von dieser
enzyklopädisch angelegten summa theologiae fertigte er später eine kompen-
dienartige Zusammenfassung an, das Kṯāḇā ḏ-zalgē (“Buch der Blitze”) (GSL
[*22: 314 Anm. 4], Takahashi 2002 [*56: 243–244], 2004 [*32: 44–45], 2005
[*58: 407–422]). Das Candelabrum sanctuarii ist in 12 Fundamente, d.h. Haupt-
lehren der Kirche, eingeteilt, nämlich: (1) Wissen im Allgemeinen [*35]. – (2)
Natur des Universums [*35]. – (3) Lehre von der Gottheit. – (4) Menschwer-
dung. – (5) Engellehre. – (6) Priestertum und Sakramentenlehre. – (7) Dämo-
nenlehre. – (8) Lehre von der Vernunft-Seele ([*36], vgl. Furlani 1932 [*43];
1934 [*71]), wovon unter dem Namen des Barhebraeus eine arabische Zusam-
menfassung als Muḫtaṣar fī ʿilm an-nafs al-insāniyya (“Kompendium über die
Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Seele”) vorliegt ([*43], vgl. Furlani 1932
[*43: 3], CGAL [*24: 276–277], Doru 2017 [*93: 930]). Letztere ist im Wort-
laut weitgehend verschieden von Barhebraeus’ Maqāla muḫtaṣara fī n-nafs al-
bašariyya (“Kurze Abhandlung über die menschliche Seele”) [*44], die eine
Zusammenfassung von Mošeh Bar Kephas Monographie über die Seele dar-
stellt (CGAL [*24: 273–274]). – (9) Freier Wille und Schicksal. – (10) Aufer-
stehung der Toten. – (11) Jüngstes Gericht. – (12) Paradies. Ziel des Werkes
ist es, das gesamte theologische, philosophische und naturwissenschaftliche
Wissen der damaligen Zeit zu erfassen. Es vereint den syrischen Aristoteles
mit dem geographischen und patristischen sowie naturkundlich-antiken Wis-
sen der arabischen Welt. Philosophisch interessant sind vor allem die bei-
den ersten Abschnitte, in denen Barhebraeus nach dem Vorbild von Mošeh
Bar Kephas Hexaemeronkommentar die Quellen der Erkenntnis und die Kos-
mologie vorstellt. Dabei greift er auf zahlreiche Quellen zurück, insbeson-
dere im Abschnitt über die Kosmologie, in dem mehrere von aristotelischen
Schriften inspirierte griechische und arabische Werke ausgeschrieben wurden.
Für die Passagen über Minerale und Meteorologie (Takahashi 2002 [*56])
sind unter den griechisch-syrischen Quellen der Aristotelesschüler Nicolaus
Damascenus (1. Jh. AC) nachgewiesen, dessen im griechischen Original verlore-
nes Kompendium der aristotelischen Philosophie (περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους φιλο-
σοφίας) in einer fragmentarischen und bislang nur zu einem kleinen Teil edier-
ten syrischen Übersetzung erhalten ist (Drossaart Lulofs 1969 [*4]); weiter
Pseudo-Aristoteles’ De mundo nach der Sergius von Rēšʿaynā zugeschriebenen
syrischen Übersetzung [*2] sowie Dioskurides’Materia medica, die von Ḥunayn
Ibn Isḥāq ins Syrische und danach, zusammen mit Iṣṭifān Ibn Basīl, aus dem
Griechischen ins Arabische übersetzt und später nochmals übertragen oder
bearbeitet wurde (Ullmann 1970 [*28: 258–263]). Als griechisch-arabische
Quelle ist Ptolemaios’ Almagest zu nennen, der seit dem Ende des 2./8. Jahr-
hunderts mehrfach ins Arabische übersetzt worden war (GAS 1978 [*29: VI 88–
89]). Noch wichtiger sind schließlich arabische Quellen, die in der Tradition
von Ibn Sīnās Enzyklopädie Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ (“Buch der Heilung”) standen, vor
allem Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzīs al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya (“Die östlichen Untersu-
chungen”) [*19] das häufig den konzeptuellen Rahmen für Barhebraeus’ Ktāḇā
ḏa-mnāraṯ quḏšē (“Buch der Leuchte des Allerheiligsten”) bildet, in geringerem
Maße auch Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādīs Kitāb al-Muʿtabar (“Buch der sorgfältig
abgewogenen Lehren”) [*16] und schließlich, für geographische Informationen,
Bīrūnīs astronomisches Werk at-Tafhīm li-awāʾil ṣināʿat at-tanǧīm (“Erklärung
der Prinzipien der Kunst der Sterndeutung”) [*13], das dazu diente, den Alma-
gest des Ptolemaios sowie Jakob von Edessas Hexaemeron (vgl. Band I 45) und
Mošeh Bar Kephas Kommentar dazu zu ergänzen.
Butyrum sapientiae
Barhebraeus’ umfangreichstes und vielleicht bedeutendstes Werk auf philo-
sophischem und naturwissenschaftlichem Gebiet ist das am 12.12.684/8.2.1286
abgeschlossene Spätwerk (Takahashi 2004 [*32: 9]) Kṯāḇā ḏ-ḥēwaṯ ḥeḵmṯā,
traditionell bekannt als Butyrum sapientiae (“Buch des Rahms der Weisheit”).
Es ist die umfassendste – oder, um Anton Baumstarks Ausdruck zu gebrau-
chen (GSL [*22: 316]) – “großartigste” jemals in syrischer Sprache erschienene
Beschreibung des gesamten aristotelischen Lehrgebäudes. Das bislang nur teil-
weise edierte Werk orientiert sich – wie übrigens auch Barhebraeus’ Buch
über Metalle und Meteorologie (Takahashi 2003 [*86: 253; 261–271], 2004
[10: 48–53]) – weitgehend an Ibn Sīnās Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ (Bakoš 1948 [*36: 75 ff.],
Doru 2017 [*93: 921–924]). In Anlehnung an Nicolaus Damascenus’ Kom-
pendium der aristotelischen Philosophie veränderte Barhebraeus den Aufbau
gegenüber seiner Vorlage nur geringfügig (Takahashi 2004 [*32: 13–14]), denn
sein Werk umfasst die Abschnitte: (I) Logik mit den Teilen Isagoge, Catego-
riae, De interpretatione, Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora (Schmitt 2012
[*92]), Topica, Sophistici elenchi, Rhetorik (Ed./Übers. Watt 2005 [*34]) und
Poetik (Ed. Margoliouth 1887 [*33]). – (II) Die Naturwissenschaften mit
den Teilen Physik, De caelo (Takahashi 2012 [*64]), De generatione et corrup-
tione; Mineralogie und Meteorologie (Ed./Übers. Takahashi 2004 [*32]), De
44 chapter 2
plantis (Ed./Übers. Drossaart Lulofs 1989 [*30]), De animalibus; De anima

(Auszüge ed. Furlani 1931 [*29]). – (III) Metaphysik mit den Teilen Metaphy-
sica und Theologia. – (IV) Praktische Philosophie mit den Teilen Ethik, Ökono-
mie und Politik (Ed./Übers. Joosse 2004 [*31], Joosse 2010 [*62]). – Trotz der
starken Anlehnung an Ibn Sīnās Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ bezog sich Barhebraeus auch
kritisch auf sein Vorbild, indem er eigene Beobachtungen und Überlegungen
vortrug und weitere Quellen berücksichtigte. Er erweitert indes den Themen-
katalog um ein Kapitel über praktische Philosophie, das von Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī
(“Die Ethik für Nāṣir”) [*27] (vgl. Daiber 2002 [*54: X 747]) seines Zeitgenossen
in Maragha, Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, inspiriert und stark geprägt ist. An philosophi-
schen Quellen benutzt er ferner Miskawayhs (gest. 421/1030) Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq
(“Läuterung des Charakters”), durch das er sich Kenntnisse der Nikomachischen
Ethik des Aristoteles in der Fassung der Summa Alexandrinorum erworben
hatte (Dunlop 2005 [*89: 28–31]), außerdem Abū Qurras arabische Version
von Aristoteles’ De virtutibus et vitiis, Nicolaus Damascenus’ bereits genanntes
Kompendium der aristotelischen Philosophie, Galens verlorene, aber auf Ara-
bisch erhaltene Abhandlung De moribus, die “Episteln der Lauteren Brüder”
(Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ) und Ġazālīs (gest. 505/1111]) Kīmiyāʾ as-saʿāda (“Eli-
xier der Glückseligkeit”), eine persische Zusammenfassung des Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-
dīn (“Die Wiederbelebung der religiösen Wissenschaften”) desselben Autors
(Joosse 2004 [*31: 11–12], Joosse 2010 [*62], Doru 2017 [*93: 931–934]). Die
Reihe der griechisch-syrischen, syrischen und griechisch-arabischen sowie ara-
bischen Quellen lässt sich sicherlich noch erweitern, wenn das Butyrum sapi-
entiae in seiner Gesamtheit vorliegen wird.
Weitere philosophische Schriften

Andere philosophische Bücher des Barhebraeus erlangten nicht die Bedeu-
tung der Summa theologiae, also des Candelabrum, oder des philosophisch
ausgerichteten Spätwerkes, des Butyrum. Sie beschränkten sich vielmehr auf
Teilaspekte seiner Summa theologiae und bildeten gleichsam Vorstudien zu
den Hauptwerken. Die datierbaren Schriften des Barhebraeus vermitteln den
Eindruck, als seien die meisten, wenn nicht alle Werke, nach seiner im Jahr
662/1264 erfolgten Wahl zum Maphrian von Tagrit und dem Osten entstanden.
Das Kṯāḇā ḏ-teḡraṯ teḡrāṯā (“Buch der Ware der Waren” – bessere Wiedergabe:
“Abhandlung der Abhandlungen”) (Janssens 1937 [*38: 5, Anm. 1]) beschrän-
ken sich auf Logik, Physik und Metaphysik. Letztere ist entgegen der häufig
vertretenen Meinung keine Zusammenfassung des Butyrum, sondern das frü-
heste philosophische Kompendium, das sich – entgegen Anton Baumstarks
Auffassung (GSL [*22: 317]) – nicht auf Ibn Sīnās ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (“Quellen
der Weisheit”) stützt, sondern auf Ġazālīs Maqāṣid al-falāsifa (“Die Absich-
ten der Philosophen”) (Takahashi 2002 [*55: 153–154], Takahashi 2015 [*91:
314–319], Doru 2017 [*93: 929]). Wie ein Vergleich zeigt, wurden nämlich ein-
zelne Passagen des Kapitels über die Seele in Barhebraeus’ Candelabrum inte-
griert (Furlani 1934 [*44: 299–305]). Das Kṯāḇā ḏa-swāḏ sofiyā (“Buch der
Unterhaltung der Weisheit”) [*38] stellt den Inhalt der Logik, Physik und Meta-
physik in gekürzter Form als Einführung für Anfänger dar und ist nach dem
Kṯāḇā ḏ-teḡraṯ teḡrāṯā verfasst worden (Takahashi 2002 [*55: 153], 2004 [*32:
42], Doru 2017 [*93: 924–929, 942]). Das Kṯāḇā ḏ-ḇāḇāṯā (“Buch der Pupillen”)
[*39] behandelt nur die aristotelische Logik und die Isagoge des Porphyrius,
wobei die gelegentlichen Hinweise auf Ibn Sīnā in der Edition und Übersetzung
von Janssens ([*39: 47, 41–44 und 52, 1–21], vgl. Doru 2017 [*93: 929–930])
kein eindeutiges Bild davon vermitteln, inwieweit Barhebraeus von Ibn Sīnā
abhängig war. Ein systematischer Vergleich, auch des zuvor genannten Kṯāḇā
ḏa-swāḏ sofiyā mit Ibn Sīnās Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt (“Buch der Weisun-
gen und Belehrungen”) [*12] und Barhebraeus’ syrischer Übersetzung dieses
Werkes (Furlani 1946 [*12: 89–101], Takahashi 2003 [*86: 257–258]), wäre in
dieser Frage zweifellos aufschlussreich. – Barhebraeus bietet die letzte syrisch-
jakobitische Bearbeitung der aristotelischen Philosophie. Sein Werk entwickelt
kein eigenes philosophisches System, sondern hat enzyklopädischen Charak-
ter, denn Barhebraeus war im arabischen wie im syrischen Kulturkreis zuhause.
Er schrieb arabische Werke und wollte seinen syrischen Landsleuten das ara-
bische Kulturgut in syrischer Sprache vermitteln. Hierbei hat er eine syrische
Terminologie geschaffen, die sich teilweise auf griechisch-syrische Vorlagen
stützen konnte, aber auch auf Neuschöpfungen angewiesen war. Außerdem
orientierte er sich nicht zuletzt an der arabischen wissenschaftlichen Literatur,
die durch den griechisch-arabischen Kulturaustausch maßgebend geworden
war. – Sie findet ihren unmittelbaren Niederschlag in seinen theologischen
Werken. Dabei ist neben dem Candelabrum vor allem das im letzten Jahrzehnt
seines Lebens, von Dezember 1277 bis Anfang August 1278 (Raǧab 676 bis Rabīʿ
I 677), verfasste Auṣar rāzē (“Schatzhaus der Mysterien”) (GSL [*22: 314 Anm. 1])
zu nennen: Es bietet einen umfangreichen Kommentar zu fast allen Büchern
der Bibel in Form von Scholien und erklärenden Anmerkungen, die u.a. mysti-
sche Gedanken enthalten. Ferner zog Barhebraeus sein Wissen auf philosophi-
schem, theologischem, naturkundlichem, astronomischem, geographischem
und medizinischem Gebiet für die Exegese heran (Takahashi 2004 [*32: 47])
und verband es mit der durch Dionysius Bar Ṣalībī (gest. 566/1171) vermittelten
Materialsammlung des Mošeh Bar Kepha aus dem 3./9. Jahrhundert.
46 chapter 2
Ethikon
Barhebraeus’ Interesse an der Mystik finden wir gegen Ende seines Lebens
auch im 677/1279 verfassten Kṯāḇā ḏ-īṯīqon (“Buch der Ethik”) [*41]. Dieses
Werk hält sich nicht nur an die mystisch-asketische Tradition der östlichen
Christenheit, sondern verdankt strukturell und inhaltlich Wesentliches Ġazālīs
(gest. 505/1111) Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn (“Die Wiederbelebung der religiösen Wis-
senschaften”) [*14] (Teule 1993 [*41: CSCO 535, XXX ff.], Teule 2003 [*57:
27–30], Takahashi 2015 [*91: 309–314], Doru 2017 [*93: 934–942]) und den
dort dargestellten islamisch-mystischen Traditionen. Ferner weist das Werk
Echos aus Ibn Sīnā (Teule 1992 [*80]) und Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (Teule 1999
[*82]) auf. Mit dem Titel Ethikon knüpfte Barhebraeus an Aristoteles’ Dreitei-
lung der praktischen Philosophie in Ethik, Ökonomie und Politik an (anders
Teule 1993 [*41: CSCO 535, XIX]). Aristoteles sprach in der Nikomachischen
Ethik (VI 9, 1142a9–10) indes von φρόνησις, οἰκονομία und πολιτεία. Die Wie-
dergabe von φρόνησις durch ἠθικόν ist bemerkenswert: Diese Modifikation teilt
Barhebraeus mit den alexandrinischen Aristoteleskommentatoren David, Elias
und Pseudo-Elias. Entsprechend benutzte Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (3./9. Jh.) in seiner
Wissenschaftseinteilung hierfür den Terminus siyāsat ad-daʾb (Ethik) (Daiber
1990 [*79: 124]). – Barhebraeus’ Ethikon besteht aus 4 Abhandlungen (memrā):
Memrā 1 beschreibt die asketischen Handlungen, wie Gebet, Rezitation, Medi-
tation etc. – Memrā 2 erörtert den richtigen Umgang mit dem eigenen Körper
(Essen, Trinken, Ehe, Reinheit) und mit anderen Menschen (Arbeit, Almo-
sen). – Memrā 3 behandelt die Reinigung der Seele von den Leidenschaften.
Barhebraeus geht auf eine Vielzahl von praktischen Fragen ein wie Maßnah-
men gegen Gier, Neid, Zorn, Heuchelei und Überheblichkeit. – Memrā 4 dis-
kutiert alles, was mit der Unterweisung der Novizen zu tun hat. Es beginnt mit
den Grundlagen des Unterrichts, der entweder an kirchlichen Traditionen, z.B.
am Alten und Neuen Testament, orientiert ist, oder weltlichen Charakter hat
und entweder ‘gut’ (Medizin, Sprachenunterricht) oder ‘schlecht’ (Astrologie,
Magie) oder eine Mischung von beidem (Philosophie) ist. Anschließend wer-
den in den Kapiteln 2 bis 16 Themen wie Ermahnung und Tadel, Glaube, Reue,
Geduld, Dankbarkeit, Hoffnung, Gottesfurcht, Armut, Vertrauen, Liebe zum
Nächsten, “Gotteserinnern” (ḏikr), Meditation, Reinheit der Gedanken, Got-
tesliebe und das memento mori ausgeführt. – Den Inhalt des Ethikon hat Bar-
hebraeus wahrscheinlich am Ende seines Lebens nochmals zusammengefasst
in einer Art Leitfaden für den Mönchsstand, dem Kṯāḇā ḏ-yaunā (“Buch der
Taube”) [*42]. Der Anhang zu dieser Schrift, die in Reimprosa abgefasste Tašʿīṯā
ʿal ṭalyūṯeh ḏ-haunā (“Erzählung über die Jugend der Vernunft”) ist unvollendet
geblieben. Das “Buch der Taube” ist insofern aufschlussreich für die letzten
Lebensjahre Barhebraeus’, als es im Schlusskapitel Barhebraeus’ Weg zur mys-
tischen Frömmigkeit beschreibt. Er begann vielleicht im Jahr 666/1268, als Bar-

hebraeus nach eigenem Zeugnis das dem Mystiker Stephan Bar Ṣudayli (5. Jh.
AD) zugeschriebene Kṯāḇā ḏ-Īraṯāwus (“Buch des Hierotheos”) mit dem Kom-
mentar des Patriarchen Theodosius (gest. 283/896) gefunden und daraus ein
Exzerpt angefertigt hatte. Gleichzeitig scheint Barhebraeus hier von Ġazālīs al-
Munqiḏ min aḍ-ḍalāl (“Der Erretter aus dem Irrtum”) angeregt worden zu sein
(Takahashi 2015 [*91: 313–314).]
3 Nestorianische Autoren
3.1 Yōḥannān Bar Zoʿbī

Yōḥannān Bar Zoʿbī lebte Ende des 6./12., Anfang des 7./13. Jahrhunderts (Asse-
manus 1728 [*47: III/1, 307–308], Wright 1894 [*21: 258–259], GSL [*22: 310–
311]). Er war Mönch im Kloster Bēṯ Qūqā bei Arbil und wurde vor allem als
Grammatiker bekannt. Seine große syrische Grammatik, von der bisher nur der
Abschnitt über die Punktation ediert ist [*17], bildet den Abschluss der Gram-
matikstudien bei den Nestorianern (GSL [*22: 310 Anm. 12]). Dabei zeigt sich
der Autor mit dem aristotelischen Organon vertraut (Merx 1889 [*20: 159–160])
und entnimmt Beispiele aus Aristoteles’ Meteorologie, Historia animalium und
De plantis (Bohas 2015 [*63]). Von Barhebraeus ist die Aussage überliefert, sein
Zeitgenosse Bar Šakkō sei Bar Zoʿbīs Schüler auf den Gebieten der Grammatik
und “des ersten Buches der Logik” gewesen. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass er damit
Aristoteles’ Kategorien meinte, die zusammen mit der Isagoge des Porphyrius
den Beginn des aristotelischen Organons bildeten.
Memrā ḏʿal pullāgē

Als Indiz für die Richtigkeit dieser These kann Bar Zoʿbīs in siebensilbigem
Metrum geschriebene und aus 43 kurzen Kapiteln bestehende Memrā ḏʿal pul-
lāgē (“Abhandlung über die Teile [der Philosophie]”) gelten, die in drei Hand-
schriften überliefert ist (Daiber 1985 [*46: 73–80]). Diese Abhandlung setzt
die alexandrinische Dihairesis-Tradition fort, indem sie – in Anlehnung an die
alexandrinischen Kommentare (v.a.) zu Aristoteles’Kategorien und Porphyrius’
Isagoge – zunächst die Aufteilung der Philosophie erklärt. Diese besteht nach
Bar Zoʿbī aus einem theoretischen Teil, der die Theologie, die Naturwissen-
schaften und die Mathematik umfasse, und einem praktischen Teil, bestehend
aus Politik, Ökonomie und Ethik. Weiter heißt es, die Mathematik sei etwas,
das weder materiell, noch immateriell, sondern allein im Verstand existiere
und aus Geometrie, Astronomie, Arithmetik sowie Musik bestehe. – Dann wird
die praktische Philosophie diskutiert mit einem an Aristoteles’Nikomachischer
48 chapter 2
Ethik orientierten Exkurs über die vier platonischen Kardinaltugenden “Weis-

heit”, “Mut”, “Mäßigung” und “Gerechtigkeit”, die den letztlich platonischen
Seelenteilen λογιστικόν, θυμικόν und ἐπιθυμητικόν zugeordnet sind und das Prin-
zip des Mittelmaßes erfordern. Danach behandelt der Autor die Kategorien
Quantität, Qualität, Wo, Wann, Kategorien des Handelns, des Unterschiedes,
die Arten von Hyle, ferner Genus, Eidos, Spezies und Akzidens sowie deren
Gemeinsamkeiten und contraria. In den Beginn der Diskussion der Kategorien
ist ein Exkurs über den Ursprung der sieben griechischen Philosophenschu-
len eingefügt, der gleichfalls der alexandrinischen Aristotelesexegese folgt. –
Inhaltliche Parallelen beim arabischen Historiker Yaʿqūbī (gest. 284/897) und
beim Philosophen Fārābī (gest. 339/950 oder 951) (Daiber 1985 [*46: 80]) bele-
gen das Alter der von Bar Zoʿbī überlieferten Dihairesis-Schrift, die auch in Bar
Šakkōs Buch der Dialoge nachgewirkt hat. Dies kann als weiteres Indiz für die
Richtigkeit von Barhebraeus’ Nachricht über das Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnis von
Bar Zoʿbī und Bar Šakkō gewertet werden. Allerdings ergibt ein näherer Ver-
gleich, dass Bar Šakkō viel ausführlicher und systematischer schrieb als Bar
Zoʿbī und – wie das Kapitel über die sieben griechischen Philosophenschulen
zeigt (Daiber 1985 [*46: 76–77]) – unabhängig von ihm auf dieselben Quel-
len zugegriffen haben dürfte. Im Einzelnen bleibt allerdings zu klären, ob und
inwieweit beide jeweils nicht nur Textsammlungen alexandrinischer Herkunft
verwendet haben, sondern auch syrische Übersetzungen griechischer Texte. So
lassen sich bei Bar Zoʿbī Zitate aus Athanasius van Balads syrischer Überset-
zung von Porphyrius’ Isagoge nachweisen (Daiber 1985 [*46: 79]) und in Bar
Šakkōs Buch der Dialoge Zitate aus Athanasius von Balads Einführung in die
aristotelische Logik und Syllogistik (vgl. Bd. I 44). – Bar Zoʿbīs Memrā ḏʿal pul-
lāgē (“Abhandlung über die Teile (der Philosophie)”) findet eine Fortsetzung
in seiner an seine Schüler Ṣlīḇā, Gīwargīs und ʿAbd Allāh gerichteten, ebenfalls
in siebensilbigem Metrum geschriebenen und in vier Handschriften erhalte-
nen titellosen Abhandlung über die vier Grundprobleme der Philosophie. Im
Anschluss an Aristoteles’ Analytica posteriora und unter Zugrundelegung eines
von den Alexandrinern Elias und David und wahrscheinlich auch von Olym-
piodor entwickelten Vier-Fragen-Schemas muss die Wesensbestimmung der
Philosophie vier Fragen beantworten: Gibt es die Philosophie? Was ist sie?
Warum bzw. wozu ist sie? und Wie ist sie? (Daiber 1985 [*46: 73–74], Hein
1985 [*77: 57–70]).
Memrā ḏa-mḥawwē ḇeh puršān kyānā men qnōmā wa-ḏ-parṣōpā

men appē und Memrā ḏ-puššāq rāzē
Bar Zoʿbīs Interesse an den aristotelischen Kategorien wird auch in einer wie-
derum metrischen Memrā ḏa-mḥawwē ḇeh puršān kyānā men qnōmā wa-ḏ-
parṣōpā men appē (“Abhandlung über den Nachweis des Unterschiedes zwi-
schen Natur und Hypostase sowie zwischen Prosopon (πρόσωπον, parṣōpā,
“Person”) und Antlitz (appē)”) (Furlani 1929–1930 [*18], 1942 [*1: 140–141])
deutlich. “Prosopon” ist gemäß Bar Zoʿbī Bestandteil der Hypostase, die ihrer-
seits Bestandteil der Natur sei – dies beweise entgegen den Monophysiten die
Existenz von zwei Naturen und zwei Hypostasen im “Prosopon” des Sohnes
Gottes, der zu Gott Vater ein Kindschaftsverhältnis habe. Bar Zoʿbī geht, wie
seine im zwölfsilbigen Metrum geschriebene Memrā ḏ-puššāq rāzē (“Abhand-
lung über die Erklärung der (göttlichen) Geheimnisse”) zeigt (de Vries 1943
[*45: 193–196]), von einer nicht uneingeschränkten Wesenseinheit der drei
göttlichen Hypostasen aus, wobei er von zwei in ihren Naturen vollendeten
Hypostasen (der göttlichen und der menschlichen) in einem “Prosopon” in
Christus spricht.
Puššāqā ḏa-šmāhē ʿasqē

Ein weiteres Ergebnis von Bar Zoʿbīs Beschäftigung mit den Begriffen und ihren
Teilen ist seine handschriftlich erhaltene Puššāqā ḏa-šmāhē ʿasqē (“Erklärung
schwieriger philosophischer Termini”) (GSL [*22: 311 Anm. 9], Daiber 1985
[*46: 73–74]).
Memrā ḏ-ʿal fīlāsōfiyā

Schließlich ist es denkbar, dass die von Aristoteles in den Analytica posteriora
gestellte Frage nach dem ‘Warum’ der Philosophie Bar Zoʿbī zu seiner im zwölf-
silbigen Metrum verfassten Memrā ḏ-ʿal fīlāsōfiyā (“Abhandlung über die Phi-
losophie”) (GSL [*22: 311 Anm. 11]) inspiriert hat, in der er dem Kausalprinzip
in seiner Auswirkung auf Grammatik, Logik und Naturphilosophie nachgeht.
3.2 ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā

ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā (gest. 717/1318) wurde vor 689/1290 Metropolit von Nisibis
und Armenien und war in vielfältiger Weise schriftstellerisch tätig (Wright
1894 [*21: 285–289], GSL [*22: 323–325], Yousif 2003 [*31: 257–261]). Neben
Werken zu Dogmatik und Kirchenrecht sowie einer die gesamte Bibel kom-
mentierenden, jedoch heute verlorenen Schrift, stehen wissenschaftliche Trak-
tate, etwa zur Zeitrechnung, sowie Gedichte. Von unschätzbarem Wert ist
sein Bücherkatalog, den Josephus Simonius Assemanus in seiner 1728 in
Rom veröffentlichten Bibliotheca orientalis unter dem Titel Carmen Ebedjesu
50 chapter 2
Metropolitae Sobae et Armeniae continens catalogum librorum omnium Eccle-

siasticorum [*45] zum ersten Mal mit lateinischer Übersetzung und Anmer-
kungen zugänglich gemacht hat. – Nicht erhalten sind die philosophischen
Werke ʿAḇdīšōs, die uns hier vorrangig interessieren: Kṯāḇā ḏ-rāzē gnīzē ḏ-
fīlāwsōfiyā ḏ-yaunāyē (“Das Buch der verborgenen Geheimnisse der Philoso-
phie der Griechen”), Puššāq eggarṯeh d-rabbā Arisṭaṭalīs tmīhā hāy da-ḵṯaḇ
l-Aleksandrāws ʿal umānūṯā rabbṯā (“Die Erklärung von Aristoteles’ Brief an
Alexander (den Großen) über “die große Kunst” (d.h. Alchemie)”) und Treʿsar
mēmrin ḥāḇōšē ḏ-kull yulfānīn (“Zwölf Abhandlungen, die alle Wissenschaften
umfassen”) (Assemanus 1728 [*47: III/1, 360–361]; Badger 1852 [*45: 379]).
Einen Einblick in seine philosophische Theologie vermittelt jedoch sein Werk
Kṯāḇā ḏ-Margānīṯā (“Buch der Perle”), das von der Wahrheit im Christentum
handelt [*46]. In fünf Teilen werden Gott, die Schöpfung, einzelne, von ihm
als häretisch abgelehnte Lehren, die Sakramente der Kirche, das Festjahr und
die kirchlichen Pflichten sowie die Wiederauferstehung dargestellt. In seiner
Gotteslehre (Badger 1852 [*46: 382–387]), die die Einzigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unfass-
barkeit und Unkörperlichkeit Gottes betont und die Trinität Gottes als die
Triade von Verstand (Gott Vater), Weisheit (Gott Sohn) und Leben (Gott Hei-
liger Geist) darstellt, folgt er einer modifizierten Adaptation einer neuplato-
nischen, seit dem 3./9. Jahrhundert in christlichen Kreisen übernommenen
Triadenlehre (Holmberg 1989 [*78: 37–38. 84–87. 131–138], Daiber 2004 [*87:
158–159]). Im Übrigen vertritt er die nestorianische Lehre von Christi Existenz
in den beiden Naturen und Personen, der göttlichen und der menschlichen.
4 Sekundärliteratur
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Textüberlieferung und Textgeschichte

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52 chapter 2
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54 chapter 2
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fenbütteler Mittelalter-Studien 12, S. 23–44. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs III A/4.
*82 Herman G. B. Teule, «La critique du Prince». Quelques aspects d’une philo-
sophie politique dans l’œuvre de Barhebraeus. In Gerrit Jan Reinink and
Alexander Cornelius Klugkist (eds.), After Bardaisan. Studies on conti-
nuity and change in Syriac Christianity in honour of Professor Han J. W. Drijvers.
Leuven 1999, S. 287–294.
*83 Hans Daiber, Die Aristotelesrezeption in der syrischen Literatur. In Dieter
Kuhn und Helga Stahl (eds.), Die Gegenwart des Altertums. Formen und
Funktionen des Altertumsbezugs in den Hochkulturen der Alten Welt. Heidel-
berg 2001, S. 327–345. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/8.
*84 Matthias Schramm, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and Arabic Science. In Sci-
ence in Context 14/1–2, 2001, S. 289–312.
*85 Peter Bruns, Aristoteles-Rezeption und Entstehung einer syrischen Scholas-
tik. In Peter Bruns (ed.), Von Athen nach Bagdad. Bonn 2003. = Hereditas 22,
S. 29–41.
*86 Hidemi Takahashi, The reception of Ibn Sīnā in Syriac. The case of Gregory
Barhebraeus. In David C. Reisman and Ahmed H. Al-Rahim (eds.), Before and
after Avicenna. Proceedings of the first conference of the Avicenna Study Group.
Leiden/Boston 2003. = IPTS 52, S. 249–281.
*87 Hans Daiber, Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam. In
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann und Alexander Fidora (eds.), Juden, Christen
und Muslime. Darmstadt 2004, S. 136–172.
*88 Henri Hugonnard-Roche, La logique d’Aristote du grec au syriaque. Paris
2004.
*89 The Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. by Anna A. Akasoy and Alex-
ander Fidora, with an introduction and annotated translation by Douglas
Morton Dunlop. Leiden/Boston 2005. = ASL 17.
*90 Hidemi Takahashi, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Qazwīnī and Bar Shakkō. In The Harp
19, 2006, S. 365–379.
*91 Hidemi Takahashi, The Influence of al-Ghazālī on the Juridical, Theological
and Philosophical Works of Barhebraeus. In Georges Tamer (ed.), Islam and
Rationality. The Impact of al-Ghazālī. Papers Collected on His 900th Annivers-
ary. I. Leiden/Boston 2015 = IPTS 94, S. 303–325.
*92 Jens Ole Schmitt, Barhebraeus’s Analytics: Medical Analytics. In Aafke M. I.
van Oppenraay, with the collaboration of Resianne Fontaine (eds.), The Let-
ter before the Spirit: The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Recep-
tion of Aristotle. Leiden/Boston 2012. = ASL 22, S. 131–157.
*93 M. Nesim Doru, The Influence of Islamic Philosophy on Bar Hebraeus (Abu ’l-
Faraj Ibn Al-Ibrī). In Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi – Cumhuriyet Theology Journal
21 (2), Sivas 2017, S. 913–946.
Summary
As a continuation of the chapter on The Syriac Tradition in the Early Islamic Era
(= H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/2) this publication concentrates on
the philosophical tradition of Syriac Christians from the 9th to the 14th century.
They have used Greek-Syriac sources and increasingly Arabic and Persian texts.
We discuss and analyse philosophical treatises and their sources by Mošeh Bar
Kepha (833–903AD), Dionysius Jacob Bar Ṣalībī (d. 1171AD), Jacob / Severus
Bar Šakkō (d. 1241AD), Barhebraeus (1226–1286AD), Yōḥannān Bar Zoʿbī (lived
at the turn of the 12th c. AD) and ʿAḇdīšōʿ Bar Berīḵā (d. 1318AD). Christian
theology is corroborated by Aristotelian logic, by Aristotelian, Platonic and
Neoplatonic concepts, often in the shape of the Alexandrian school, and by
Islamic theology. The encyclopaedic interest of Syriac scholars included Ara-
bic and Persian texts on philosophy and sciences, mainly written by Ibn Sīnā
and his “school”.
Supplementary Remark
On Barhebraeus’ sources cf. the survey by Jens Ole Schmitt, Some Remarks
on East Syrian Influences Found in Barhebraeus’s Works. In Griechische Philo-
sophie und Wissenschaft bei den Ostsyrern. Ed. Matthias Perkams and Alex-
56 chapter 2
ander M. Schilling. Berlin/Boston 2020. = Transmissions 3, pp. 157–175. On

individual topics and authors cf. the collection of articles in John W. Watt,
The Aristotelian Tradition in Syriac. New York/Abingdon 2019 and in La philoso-
phie en syriaque. Ed. by Emiliano Schmidt Fiori and Henri Hugonnard-
Roche. Paris 2019. = Études syriaques 16 (esp. S. Rassi, From Greco-Syrian to
Syro-Arabic Thought: The Philosophical Writings of Dionysius bar Salibi and
Jacob bar Shakko, pp. 329–379, and Hidemi Takahashi, Barhebraeus comme
philosophe: ‘La philosophie de Barhebraeus’ ou ‘les œuvres philosophiques de
Barhebraeus’, pp. 381–388).
Republication from the original, which will be published in Ueberweg. Grundriss der
Geschichte der Philosophie: Philosophie in der islamischen Welt II: 11. und 12. Jahrhundert.
II/1: Zentrale und östliche Gebiete. Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph with the collaboration of
Renate Würsch. By courtesy of Schwabe Verlag, Basel.
chapter 3
Naẓar
Tjitze de Boer, revision by Hans Daiber
Naẓar (Arabic), literally “theory, philosophical speculation”, probably until the

9th century AD did not get the meaning of “research” in the sense of “scientific
investigation” as translation of the Greek θεωρία. In the footsteps of Aristotle,
e.g. Metaph. 1064 b 2 (translated by Eustathius / Uṣtāṯ at the beginning of the
9th c. AD), and the Greek Prolegomena, Προλεγόμενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, to the
commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, the philosophies were divided into “the-
oretical” (naẓariyya) and “practical” (ʿamaliyya). The practical philosophy seeks
to obtain the useful or the good for men, the theoretical seeks pure truth in
physics, mathematics and metaphysics (see C. Hein, Definition, pp. 146 ff.).
Naẓar is primarily an epistemological conception and – following the ex-
ample of Ammonius Hermiae (ca. 440–ca. 520AD), a pupil | of Proclus – dealt 1050 b
with among the Arabs in the footsteps of the already mentioned Prolegomena
prefixed to the Isagoge of Porphyry. Naẓar is also discussed as an activity of the
human ʿaql in psychology, but in this case as a rule under synonyms like fikr,
tafakkur, etc. Cf. e.g. ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār: See J. R. T. M. Peters, God’s, pp. 58 f., and
M. Bernand, Le problème, pp. 202ff.
The history of this terminology has still to be written. In the oldest ver-
sion of Aristotle’s logic, a compendium written by ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
(d. 137/755 or 139/756) or his son Muḥammad, ʿilm and ʿamal are already distin-
guished as branches of “philosophy” (ḥikma), but ʿilm is defined as a tabaṣṣur
and tafakkur of the qalb (i.e. of the mind). Cf. Giuseppe Furlani, Di una pre-
sunta versione araba di alcuni scritti di Porfirio e di Aristotele. In AAL.R ser. VI,
vol. VI, 1926, p. 207. = al-Manṭiq li-Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. Ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dān-
išpažūh. Tehran 1977, p. 2, 21ff.
The oldest speculative theologians of Islam were perhaps more familiar with
the distinction ʿilm ʿaqlī / šarʿī than with naẓarī / ʿamalī. The ʿaql is gener-
ally recognized as a “root” of the Muʿtazilite system. The Zaydite Qāsim (ca.
168/785–245/860) mentioned it among his uṣūl: ʿaql, Qurʾān and Sunna (W.
Madelung, Imam, p. 129). Naẓar was seen to be an innovation like raʾy and
qiyās in fiqh. The Hanbalite school objected to the adoption of naẓar (see
H. Laoust, La profession, p. 9 n. 1). Contrary to this, the Zahirite theologian
Ibn Ḥazm admitted ʿaql without hesitation – of course the ʿaql created and
equipped by God – as a source of knowledge. Not “uncritical faith” (taqlīd)

58 chapter 3
nor deduction from the unknown (qiyās) were to lead it to the acceptance of
the Qurʾān, Sunna and iǧmāʿ, but quite certain knowledge. There is nothing
whereon Ibn Ḥazm insisted so often and so emphatically as this; there is no
other way to certainty than that of tracing it to “sensual perception” (ḥiss) and
intuition of the “intellect” (ʿaql). Indeed, sensual perception is so much pre-
ferred by him that the comprehension by reason is called a sixth idrāk (Kitāb
al-Fiṣal. I. Cairo 1899, pp. 4–7). The philosophical position of Ibn Ḥazm recalls
Hellenistic eclecticism, according to which all human cognition arises either
from sensual perception or from intuition, or it is derived from these sources
through the intermediary of proof. Many scholars, however, emphasize the dir-
ect evidence of sensual perception (cf. also Sura 10:101 etc.; J. van Ess, Erkennt-
nislehre, p. 239), and they regard the method of proof as a difficult and uncer-
tain one. Hence, we laid emphasis on the “general agreement” (iǧmāʿ / iǧtimāʿ)
as a possible, but often doubted (cf. J. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, pp. 308 ff.) cri-
terion of truth. Only where there is no agreement, investigation is necessary.
The dualistic epistemology of the eclectics (senses × reason) was greatly
modified in Islam by the penetration of intellectual monism into Neoplatonic
mysticism and Aristotelian logic. While different stages in human knowledge
were distinguished, true knowledge was only to be attained by rational intu-
ition and the intermediary activity of the mind. The main thing for the Neopla-
tonist was intuition (naẓar, baṣar). It is remarkable, how in the Neoplatonic
Theology of Aristotle the latter is alleged to have said (Arabic text. Ed. by F.
Dieterici. Leipzig 1881, p. 163): “Plato recognized all things bi-naẓar al-ʿaql
(intuition), lā bi-manṭiq wa-qiyās”, i.e., Plato, as the divine, perceives everything
at once like God Himself, and as pure ʿaql. Naẓar in this sense of direct percep-
tion is constructed with ilā, in other passages, however, with fī. Instead of naẓar
fī – transmitted reflection of the human intellect – the Theology of Aristotle
generally uses fikr and rawiyya. The world of senses, by which our soul is associ-
1051 a ated, is called ʿālam al-fikra wa-r-rawiyya. Following the Theology, the | Muslim
mystics generally used naẓar for spiritual perception (cf. Louis Massignon,
Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane. Paris 1922,
index).
In kalām, however, in the disputes of the theological sects, whose mem-
bers sometimes are called ahl an-naẓar, the term naẓar receives the dialectical
meaning of “reflection”, “rational, discursive thinking”. This is an obligation of
man, it can produce knowledge (ʿilm; see L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati,
Introduction, pp. 350ff.), and may be classified as naẓar al-qalb (cf. J. van Ess,
Erkenntnislehre, pp. 238ff.; J. R. T. M. Peters, God’s, pp. 57 ff.; M. Bernand, Le
problème, pp. 201 ff.). In his Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn (Ed. Hellmut Ritter. Wies-
baden 21963, pp. 51–52), Ašʿarī gives a survey of the different views of the eight
naẓar 59
parties of the Rawāfiḍ fī n-naẓar wa l-qiyās. According to him, the groups 1–3
consider all kinds of cognition (maʿārif ) as necessary (iḍṭirār) – i.e. given or
not given through the mind itself – so that naẓar and qiyās can add nothing
to them; these, as well as group 8 which traces all kinds of knowledge to God’s
Prophet and to the Imam, in this respect differ from the rest. The other four
groups recognize some kind of acquired knowledge (in both cases it is related
to the apprehension of God) as follows: Group 4 (the adherents of Hišām Ibn
al-Ḥakam) by naẓar wa-l-istidlāl; group 5 (Ḥasan Ibn Mūsā) possibly by a kind
of kasb “acquisition”, “learning” which cannot be defined more exactly (cf. this
kasb with the kasb al-afʿāl of the later Ashʿarite school); the groups 6 and 7
(anonymous) by naẓar wa-l-qiyās, with an appeal to the “argument” (ḥuǧǧa)
of the ʿaql. We are also told (p. 144) of a section of the Murǧiʾīs who hold, that
“faith” (īmān) without naẓar in their opinion is not a perfect faith.
Ašʿarī himself is probably the best evidence of the fact, that the speculation
of the human ʿaql was not regarded as a source (or method) of knowledge of
God – for the first time in his school, but already before him by several sects.
Naẓar (like raʾy in fiqh) was most probably applied to the activity of the mind of
a reflecting theologian (besides naẓar we find terms often used with differing
connotations, like baḥṯ, ḥads, raʾy, faḥṣ, fikr, fikra, ḥadīṯ an-nafs (see J. van Ess,
Erkenntnislehre, pp. 240f.), tafakkur, taʾammul, ṭalab; perhaps also others). The
logical methods used here are called (perhaps here still synonymously) qiyās
(deduction by analogy) and istidlāl (proof by circumstantial evidence). From
what we know of qiyās in fiqh (and of qiyās in medicine: See Masʿūdī, Murūǧ
IV, p. 40, and VII, pp. 172ff. = §§1368 and 2857ff.), we can conclude that it was a
process mixing induction and deduction, often used very arbitrarily. Analogous
cases, often superficially regarded as similar (cf. Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḫwārizmī,
Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm. Ed. Gerlof van Vloten. Leiden 1895 / Repr. 1968, pp. 8–9),
were sought for the ʿilla, i.e. not the actual “cause” (causa) but a “reason” (ratio)
in the higher conception of a method or species, under which the further cases
could be grouped. For Aristotle and his followers in Islam (Fārābī, etc.), deduc-
tion had one meaning; they believed in causality or even in the creative activity
of the abstract thought. The great majority of Muslim theologians, jurists and
physicians did not go so far. It was not till the school of Ašʿarī that the method
of naẓar superficially grasped penetrated into kalām, and kalām was defined as
ʿilm an-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl. At first rejected by the majority, gradually tolerated
and used as an instrument against heretics and sophists, naẓar in the orthodox
school was finally recognized as a religious obligation.
Let us now turn back to the general conception of the ʿulūm naẓariyya. Fā-
rābī (d. 339/950 or 951) distributed them, seen from the philosophical point of
view, in a special treatise (Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm. Ed. ʿUṯmān Amīn. Cairo | 21968), in 1051 b
60 chapter 3
a way that became the model for later times. It was Fārābī who was the first to
work extensively on the logic of Aristotle, whence his school was often called
that of the Manṭiqiyūn. He assumed, like Aristotle, that the ʿaql contained in
itself the fundamental principles of all kinds of knowledge, of which the evid-
ence simply had to be acknowledged. But the way of reflection and proof leads
to the non-evident, the culmination of which, the “apodictic proof” (burhān),
is described in the Posterior Analytics. From this culmination the branches of
knowledge can be surveyed. After some observations on philology (ch. 1; cf. the
Stoics) there follows the chapter on logic – whether as instrument of philo-
sophy or as a part of it, is a matter of indifference. Logic itself is, of course, a
naẓar with its specific object. As next come the sciences of physics, mathemat-
ics and metaphysics, with main and subsidiary branches. Each is a naẓar. But it
is noted, for example among the physical sciences, that medicine is a mixture of
theory and practice, and similarly are music and mathematical subjects. Meta-
physics, however, like logic, is purely theoretical. Finally, the three practical
sciences of Aristotle, sc. ethics, economics and politics, are united under the
head of political science, with the addition of fiqh and kalām. Fārābī remarks,
that the science of fiqh and the “art” (ṣināʿa) of kalām partly have to do with
“insights” (ārāʾ), partly with “actions” (afʿāl).
In conclusion, let us compare with this philosophical division that of the
Ashʿarite theologian ʿAbd al-Qāhir Ibn Ṭāhir al-Baġdādī (d. 428/1037) in his Uṣūl
ad-dīn (Istanbul 1928, pp. 8–14. Cf. A. J. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, pp. 250–263).
After the distinction between divine knowledge and the knowledge possessed
by other living creatures is laid down, the latter is classified as follows:
I. ḍarūrī
(necessary, directly evident)
1. badīhī 2. ḥissī
(internal and external perception)
II. muktasab (= ʿulūm naẓariyya)
(acquired)
1. ʿaqliyya 2. šarʿiyya
(knowledge acquired by reason and by law)
The ʿulūm naẓariyya are further divided into four parts, according to the way in
which they are acquired:
– Istidlāl bi-l-ʿaql min ǧihat al-qiyās wa-n-naẓar (speculative theology)
– Maʿlūm min ǧihat at-taǧārib wa-l-ʿādāt (e.g. medicine)
– Maʿlūm min ǧihat aš-šarʿ (legal science)
– Maʿlūm min ǧihat al-ilhām (intuitive knowledge).
naẓar 61
Compared with the ʿaql-monism of Fārābī, this division still looks rather
eclectic. But from the 11th to the 13th centuries AD philosophy and theology,
without becoming united, were approaching one another. Ibn Sīnā, who builds
upon Fārābī, was the intermediary. Ġazālī sought to combine the naẓar ilā of
the Neoplatonic mysticism with the naẓar fī of the rationalist thinkers, and
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) appropriated the methods of proof of Aris-
totelian logic to a much greater extent than his theological predecessors.
Bibliography
In addition to the works mentioned in the text
1 Texts
Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya. In Maǧmūʿat ar-rasāʾil. Cairo 1328/1910, pp. 229–
230.
Also in Tisʿ rasāʾil. Istanbul 1298/1881, pp. 71–72.
Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn. III. Cairo 1322/1905, pp. 13ff.
Ġazālī, Maʿāriǧ al-quds fī madāriǧ maʿrifat an-nafs. Beirut 21975, pp. 49ff.
Based on Ibn Sīnā, cf. aš-Šifāʾ, De anima. Ed. Fazlur Rahman. London 1959, pp.
47ff., and index s.n. “ʿaql”.
Ġazālī, Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī l-manṭiq = Manṭiq Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā.
Cairo 1961. | 1052 a
2 Studies
Bernand, Marie: La notion de ʿilm chez les premiers Muʿtazilites. In Studia Islamica
36, 1972, pp. 23–45, and 37, 1973, pp. 27–56.
Bernand, Marie: Le problème de la connaissance d’après le Muġnī du Cadi ʿAbd Al-
Ǧabbār. Algiers 1982.
Bernand, Marie: Le savoir entre la volonté et la spontanéité selon an-Naẓẓām et al-
Ǧāḥiẓ. In Studia Islamica 39, 1974, pp. 25–57.
Ess, Josef van: Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn al-Īcī. Wiesbaden 1966.
Gardet, Louis and Marie-Marcel Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musul-
mane. Paris 21970.
Hein, Christel: Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie. Frankfurt a.M. (etc.) 1985.
Horten, Max: Die philosophischen Ansichten von Razi und Tusi. Bonn 1910.
Laoust, Henri: La profession de foi d’Ibn Baṭṭa. Damascus 1958.
Madelung, Wilferd: Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der
Zaiditen. Berlin 1965.
Peters, J. R. T. M.: God’s Created Speech. Leiden 1976.
62 chapter 3
Rosenthal, Franz: Knowledge Triumphant. Leiden 1970.

Vajda, Georges: Autour de la théorie de la connaissance chez Saadia. In Revue des
Études Juives, sér. 6, vol. 126, 1967–1968, pp. 135–189, and 375–397, esp. pp. 145ff.
Also in Mélanges Georges Vajda. Études de pensée, de philosophie et de littérature
juives et arabes. In memoriam. Ed. Gérard E. Weil. Hildesheim 1982, pp. 71–150.
Vajda, Georges: Pour le dossier de naẓar. In Recherches d’Islamologie. Recueil
d’articles offert à Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis. Ed.
Roger Arnaldez and Simone van Riet. Louvain 1977, pp. 333–336.
Wensinck, Arent Jan: The Muslim Creed. London 1965.
On naẓar cf. the index s.v. “naẓar” in BIPh, and in Josef van Ess, Theology
and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra. Translated from
German by John O’Kane (vol. I) and Gwendolin Goldbloom (vol. II).
Leiden/Boston 2017ff. = Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section One, The Near
and Middle East 116/1ff.
Republished from EI2 VII, 1993, col. 1050 a–1052 a. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 4
Ruʾyā
In Its Philosophical-Mystical Meaning
The term ruʾyā (Arabic), like manām, describes the dream as a means to trans-
mit fictitious observations or, at best, information and knowledge which con-
vey another, a higher reality. As such, this information has its origin in God
or in persons near to God, such as prophets, holy men and Sufis. Starting
points in this interpretation of dreams are found in the Qurʾān (Suras 8:43 (45);
12:43; 37:102 (101) etc.) and in the tripartite subdivision of dreams, found in the
Islamic Hadith and in other cultures (see H. Gätje, Philosophische Traum-
lehren, p. 258): True dreams, which have their origin in God and bear a proph-
etic character; false dreams, which come from Satan; and dreams connected
with man’s nature and therefore cannot predict anything about the future. In
Sufi literature, the dream mainly appears as a means for having a dialogue with
deceased Sufis and holy men, or even with the Prophet, and to receive mes-
sages, warnings or advices (see A. Schimmel, Mystische Dimensionen, and M.
Smith, Rābiʿa).
Islamic philosophy, going back to the Koranic mystical interpretation of the
dream, considers dreams as a means to transmit the truth, its prophetic-divine
origin serving as a criterion. This criterion, however, caused discussions about
the postulates of dreams. Galen’s explanation that they originate in a mixture
of the fluids in the human body, and Galen’s localizing (contrary to Aristotle)
fantasy and thought in the brain and not in the heart, is often used as argument-
ation. Beyond this, with reference to the Neoplatonic philosophy of the divine
emanations as well as to the Aristotelian-Peripatetic doctrine of the soul and
of the divine intellect, the dream is given an important part in the process of
human perception. This development culminates in the superiority of divinely
inspired prophetic knowledge over human knowledge (see H. Daiber, Abū
Ḥātim), defended by the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī against Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī,
and in the transmission of this prophetic knowledge as portentous dreams,
which owe their existence to the divine “active intellect”. The latter view is rep-
resented by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī.
The origin of this development can already be found in Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī,
who links up with Aristotle (De anima), but puts new accents, which he owes
to the Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle and which presuppose a Neoplatonic-
hermetic concept of the soul (see C. Genequand, Platonism). In Kindī’s Fī

64 chapter 4
Māhiyat an-nawm wa-l-ruʾyā (in Rasāʾil I, pp. 293–311), which was translated
into Latin by Gerhard of Cremona (ed. A. Nagy, Die philosophischen Abhand-
lungen, pp. 12–27), and in his treatise on the anamnesis of the soul (see G.
Endress, Al-Kindī’s Theory), the soul appears in an intermediate position
between the perception of matter and the eternal ideas of the divine intellect.
In the process of its purification, and in its endeavour to return to its divine
origin, the soul avails itself of the “shaping capacity” (al-quwwa al-muṣawwira),
i.e. of the fantasy, the carrier of the dreaming activity, which increasingly liber-
ates itself from sensory perceptions. After that, the soul remembers more and
more its originally divine situation, i.e. the world of the intellect. In its most
complete form, the dreams are no longer “confused dreams” (aḍġāṯ), or mere
647 b opinion, but the remembrance of the shape of sensible objects, or of the genus |
and species of intelligible objects. Thus, the soul is capable of anticipating the
future in a dream (Kindī, Rasāʾil, I, p. 303).
Kindī’s doctrine of the dream is part of his doctrine of the intellect (see
J. Jolivet, L’intellect, esp. pp. 128ff.), in which the cognitional constituent
appears as being integrated in a Neoplatonic doctrine of anamnesis. This accen-
tuation was not continued by Fārābī. In the latter’s doctrine of the dream, the
remembrance of intelligibles is not mentioned. On the contrary, in a newly
created terminology Fārābī speaks of the “imitation” (muḥākāt) of perceptible
“particulars” (al-ǧuzʾiyāt) and of the “separated intelligibles” (al-maʿqūlāt al-
mufāriqa) which end up in a dream. The imaginative pictures in a dream are
thus the result of a cooperation between perception, imitating imagination
or fantasy, and the divine “active intellect”. If this imitation is not limited to
sensible phenomena, if it is not solely oriented towards the activities of nutri-
tion and desire, and if it is not shaped by the constitution of the body (see
Galen, De dignotione ex insomniis), then the dream represents “exalted objects”
(mawǧūdāt šarīfa), i.e. the intelligibles of the divine “active intellect”. The point
at issue then is prophecy, prophesying “divine things”. From this, Fārābī, while
modifying Plato’s doctrine of the philosopher-king, deduces his well-known
thesis on the sovereign of the perfect state, who should be both philosopher
and prophet. His starting points in literature are first of all Aristotle’s works,
in particular De anima, the Nicomachaean Ethics and the theory of the dream
and divination in the Parva naturalia, and also the exegesis of Aristotle by Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias. The parallel between Fārābī and the new accentuation
of Aristotelian doctrines, found in the transmitted Arabic version of the Parva
naturalia, is remarkable. Deviating from the Greek text, the latter emphasizes
the divinity of the intellect, which causes the “images” (ṣuwar) which come
into being in “true dreams” (see the Arabic MS Raza Library, Rampur, 1752, dat-
ing from the 11th/17th century, fol. 7 a–54 b, of which fol. 44 b 11–47 b 25 deal
ruʾyā 65
with the dream; cf. H. A. Davidson, Alfarabi, pp. 340 ff.; S. Pines, The Arabic
Recension, and A. Ravitzky, Hebrew Quotations).
Above all, Fārābī is convinced that, as Aristotle said, the soul thinks in
images, and for this it needs perception; its imaginative power imitates reality
and produces imitating images. The most perfect imitations of the particulars
and intelligibles, which originate in the divine “active intellect” and are real-
ized in a dream by the imaginative power, are turned into statements about
the future and into prophecies. They are then transmitted to mankind by the
sovereign, either in the form of philosophical argumentations or in the form
of prophetic “warnings”. At the same time, Fārābī in his thesis on the perfect
“religion” as imitation of “philosophy” presupposes the reciprocal dependence
of the two. Religion is an indispensable “instrument” of philosophy because, in
“the perfect state” (al-madīna al-fāḍila), it realizes the practical part of the lat-
ter, namely ethics. In agreement with Aristotelian epistemology, according to
which the soul does not think without the images of perception, religion is at
the same time a perceptible image of philosophy and of the intelligibles, which
experience their realization in the most perfect form in the prophetical revel-
ation (for further details, see H. Daiber, Prophetie; H. Daiber, Ruler). In this
way, prophetic revelation in a dream is not only a perceptive representation of
what had been preexisting in mind, and what has been inspired by the “active
intellect”. Therefore, by transmitting laws and prescriptions of “religion”, this
revelation also clears | the way for realizing the practical part of philosophy, 648 a
namely the ethics of every single person in the perfect state.
Later philosophers, above all Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, were decisively influ-
enced by Fārābī’s doctrine of the divine “active intellect” as the cause of proph-
etic dreams. They took up Fārābī’s Neoplatonic attachment of separate intel-
lects to heavenly spheres, a doctrine which had further developed Aristotle’s
conception of the spirits of the spheres, as well as Kindī’s doctrine of the intel-
lect. In their works, the divine “active intellect” (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl / al-fāʿil), the
tenth and last category of these intellects, appears as an emanation of the ninth
intellect which rules the sphere of the moon. However, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd
did not adopt Fārābī’s idea of religion as being the visualization of philosophy.
Contrary to Aristotle, but in consequent continuation of Kindī’s Neoplatonism,
they maintain, that thinking does not need a perception through the senses; the
“active intellect” leads the thinking soul out of the stage of potentiality.
Ibn Sīnā’s explanations in his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ and in his Risāla al-manāmiyya
show that Fārābī’s doctrine of dreams was modified. He gives more attention
to the elements mentioned by Galen, and Fārābī’s explanations are supple-
mented: In the “common sense” (ḥiss muštarak), a dream is the sensorial rep-
resentation of the forms which have been abstracted from matter. This rep-
66 chapter 4
resentation has been realized by the preserving “forming power” (muṣawwira),

together with the combining “fantasy” (mutaḫayyila). The “interpretation of
dreams” (taʿbīr ar-ruʾyā) deals with the maʿānī, the intentiones of these abstrac-
tions, which belong to the realm of the perception, of the intellect, or of the
heavenly world. In Ibn Sīnā’s work the function of the prophetic dream appears,
in a modified form, as “providence” (ʿināya) of the “divine power”, or of the
“intellectual” and “heavenly angels”; the ʿināya becomes their tool and is allot-
ted to just rulers, to outstanding scholars and, beyond them, to all mankind; it
is no longer the privilege to a prophet.
Ibn Rušd in his Epitome of the Parva naturalia essentially follows Ibn Sīnā
and does not bring any new elements. The dream is a spiritual process and gets
its bearings from the maʿānī, which are deposited in “the faculty of memory”
(ḥāfiẓa, ḏākira), abstracted by “the faculty of thought” (al-mufakkira) from the
individual perceptions, which at first had been united in the common sense,
then preserved by the “imaginative power” (muṣawwira, mutaḫayyila). Beyond
that, the prophetic dream is an activity of the “active intellect”. In as much as
the sensorial representations and their maʿānī are already potentially present
in the soul, the dream enables – under the influence of the active eternal intel-
lect – the actualization of the potential intelligence in a human being, the
“material” intellect. Certainly, the possibility of scientific knowledge through
dreams, admitted by Fārābī and, to a certain extent also by Ibn Sīnā, is limited
by Ibn Rušd (as already had been the case with Ibn Bāǧǧa) (see H. Davidson,
Alfarabi, pp. 342ff.). The inspiration given by dreams is limited to what is useful
or harmful, and to a few practical arts. It does not extend to theoretical science.
Prophetic revelation here recedes into the background.
Instead, Ibn Rušd propagates a connection between the form of the soul,
understood as eternal potentiality of the “material intellect”, and the divine,
eternal, “active intellect”. This connection is said to be the road to the most per-
648 b fect form of human knowledge. For Ibn Rušd universality of this | general form
of the soul excludes any individuality (and thus also the individual immortal-
ity of the soul). Here, too, we can detect a basic tenet of Islamic philosophical
thinking, which had become apparent with Kindī and which could appeal to
the Qurʾān, to mystics, and to the religious tradition of Islam. It is tracing back
human knowledge to God, considering prophetical knowledge as superior to
human knowledge and dreams as the road along which God transmits know-
ledge to mankind. However, Ibn Rušd had limited the traditional appreciation
of this road.
ruʾyā 67
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the publisher.
chapter 5
Saʿāda
Saʿāda (Arabic), “happiness”, “bliss”, a central concept in Islamic philosophy to

describe the highest aim of human striving, which can be reached through eth-
ical perfection and increasing knowledge. In non-philosophical literature, the
term (as opposed to šaqāwa, šaqwa, šaqāʾ, šaqā) describes either happy circum-
stances in life (see for instance Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, ed. Cairo 1313/1895–1896,
I, p. 168, 29–30; III, p. 407, last section), the unexpected happiness of a long life
(Musnad, III, p. 332, 28), preservation from temptations (Musnad, I, p. 327, 9–
10; Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, Kitāb al-Fitan, 2 = vol. IV, Homs 1973, no. 4263), or the
eternal stay in paradise.
The last meaning is based on the Qurʾān (e.g. Sura 11:105 (107) and 108 (110)),
whose eschatological implications led to the newly-created term yawm as-
saʿāda = “Day of Resurrection” (cf. R. Dozy, Supplément I, p. 654). The Qurʾān,
and occasionally the Hadith (e.g. Tirmiḏī, Sunan, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, ed. Homs,
658 a vol. IX, no. | 3341) already indicate that mankind, because of divine predes-
tination, is divided into “happy” inhabitants of paradise and “unhappy” dwell-
ers in hell. However, the impact of predestination is mitigated by utterances
according to which an active effort of the human being is required. Next to
human “acceptance” (riḍā) of what God has predestined, Ibn Ḥanbal’s Musnad
(I, p. 168, 26–27) also mentions the “prayer to God for obtaining what is good”
(istiḫāra) as a way to saʿāda.
Under the influence of various classical doctrines (cf. R. Spaemann, Glück),
namely of Platonic political philosophy, of Aristotelian ethics, of Neoplaton-
ism, and partly also of Islamic mysticism, the possibility for a human being
to strive after saʿāda is often described in Islamic philosophy as the pursuit of
“assimilation to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, Plato, Theaet. 176 B), of nearness to God,
and of knowledge of God through a virtuous life. At the beginning of Islamic
philosophy, this interpretation is found in Kindī’s works. His Risāla fī ḥudūd al-
ašyāʾ wa-rusūmihā (ed. M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, Rasāʾil, I, pp. 177ff. = Cinq épîtres,
pp. 37ff.), his utterances transmitted in the Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma of Abū
Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī (ed. D. M. Dunlop, §§246–248), his Risāla fī alfāẓ Suqrāṭ
(ed. M. Fakhry, Dirāsāt, pp. 45–60), his Risāla fī Alkibiades wa-Suqrāṭ (cf. G. N.
Atiyeh, Al-Kindi, pp. 123ff.; I. Alon, Socrates, pp. 131ff.; C. E. Butterworth,
Al-Kindī, pp. 32ff.) and his Risāla fī l-ḥīla li-dafʿ al-aḥẓān (ed. R. Walzer and
H. Ritter, Studi, 1938), which goes back to a lost Hellenistic treatise, describe
a concept of virtue inspired by the Platonic cardinal virtues. Socrates is named

saʿāda 71
as the ideal of moderation and of spiritual values, which are superior to wordly
possessions. The person who turns his attention to intelligibles, and who in his
doings keeps to the virtues, will “not be unhappy” (šaqiyy) in the hereafter, will
be near to his Creator and will know Him (Siǧistānī, Muntaḫab, § 248 / Engl.
transl. G. N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindi, p. 225).
This image of Socrates was adopted, with some modifications, by Abū Bakr
ar-Rāzī in his as-Sīra al-falsafiyya (Rasāʾil, ed. P. Kraus, pp. 99 ff. / Engl. transl.
A. J. Arberry, Aspects, pp. 120ff.; cf. P. E. Walker, Political Implications,
pp. 77ff.). The person who leads a moderate life and who, as far as possible,
restrains his passions, “assimilates himself to God as far as possible” (Rasāʾil,
ed. P. Kraus, p. 108, 8ff.). In his Maqāla fī amārāt al-iqbāl wa-d-dawla (“polit-
ical success”), Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī expresses this as follows (Rasāʾil, ed. P. Kraus,
p. 145, 8): “Progress” (tanaqqul) and “knowledge” (ʿilm) belong to the symptoms
of “happiness” (iqbāl) and indicate that a person “is attentive to happiness”
(tayaqquẓ as-saʿāda lahū). Knowledge and justice are named as the main aims
of a human being.
This ideal of virtue was adopted by Abū Bakr’s opponent, the Ismailite Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, with one alteration: The bearer par excellence of the Platonic
cardinal virtues and of the Aristotelian principle of the golden centre is Prophet
Mohammed, who possesses knowledge revealed by God. He who follows Him
and does not rely upon his own intuition is able to understand the religious
laws and can be sure of “salvation” (naǧāt): Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy,
pp. 77ff., esp. p. 110, 9ff.; cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim.
The high appreciation of reason as a guideline for practical philosophy,
understood as ethics in the first place, is characteristic of the philosophers
mentioned so far, and culminates in Fārābī’s thesis of the philosopher and
prophet as the ideal sovereign (cf. H. Daiber, Ruler). His knowledge, inspired
by the divine active intellect, enables him to govern the perfect state by order-
ing religious laws. Religion appears as an imitating picture (“imitation”) and
an “instrument” of philosophy, which here is essentially understood | as prac- 658 b
tical philosophy and as ethics of the individual person in the state. In this way,
philosophy, thus understood, realizes itself through religion and becomes an
ethical insight into “what is good and evil in the actions usually performed by
human beings” (Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. R. Walzer, p. 204, 1–2). Similar to Aris-
totle (Nicomachean Ethics 1144 a 5–6), philosophy is not exclusively “scientific
perception” or theoretical philosophy; rather, it provides a human being with
an “ultimate degree of happiness” (as-saʿāda al-quṣwā = εὐδαιμωνία. – Cf. H.
Daiber, Prophetie, pp. 733–734; M. Shahjahan, Introduction) with the help
of the above-mentioned ethical insight, i.e. practical philosophy. Whenever
Fārābī speaks of “political happiness” (see M. Galston, Theoretical, pp. 100 ff.),
72 chapter 5
he has in mind the Aristotelian concept of the human being as ζῷον πολιτικόν
(Politics, 1253 a 2), who needs the help of his fellow-citizen in a perfect state,
governed by a philosopher who possesses prophetical knowledge.
This “political happiness” is reflected in the practical aspect of Fārābī’s
concept of saʿāda. It is part of the ultimate happiness, namely that of the here-
after. A human being can reach this, when his soul liberates itself from its
corporeal existence, actualizes its potential intellect and arrives at the level of
the active intellect. But happiness, in its complete form, is at the same time
practical perfection. For practical philosophy, on the one hand, shows the way
to theoretical perfection, to contemplation; on the other hand, theoretical per-
fection is the signpost towards practical philosophy, the ethical insight into the
perfect state. The latter’s sovereign, the philosopher-prophet, transmits it to his
subjects, the state’s citizens, in the form of religious laws, religion being the total
sum of these laws.
In this way, theoretical philosophy develops into practical-ethical perfection
through practical philosophy and through religion that is, through the guid-
ance of religious prescriptions, transmitted by the philosopher-prophet. At the
same time, practical-ethical perfection in the perfect state, in society, is the
prerequisite for theoretical perfection, i.e. contemplation. The theoretical and
practical aspects of knowledge, of moral-ethical insight respectively, are thus
inseparably united in Fārābī’s concept of saʿāda.
This link between ethics and knowledge is also found in the Epistles (Rasāʾil)
of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, possibly composed in 959–960 AD. Their political philo-
sophy betrays the influence of Fārābī (H. Enayat, An Outline; O. Abouzeid,
Comparative Study), but they accentuate more strongly the Neoplatonic ele-
ments and are eschatologically inspired. Through “purification” of his soul and
reform of his character, the human being acquires increasing knowledge of
“intelligibles” (al-umūr al-ʿaqliyya), for it is only “knowledge” (maʿrifa) of God
which leads to ultimate happiness and to salvation in the hereafter (Rasāʾil, III,
pp. 241 and 322–323 / German transl. and commented by S. Diwald, pp. 203ff.
and 419ff.). For this, a human being needs as a preliminary step the fraternal
society, a society which is aware of its solidarity in being obedient to the divine
“law” (nāmūs), and jointly pursues “the good of the religion and of the world”
(ṣalāḥ ad-dīn wa-d-dunyā): Rasāʾil, I, p. 223, 16.
The stronger accentuation of individual ethics, already expressed by the
Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, led Miskawayh in his Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq to declare that a human
being certainly does need the help of his fellow-citizen, and therefore must live
with him in “love” (maḥabba) and “friendship” (ṣadāqa), but also that inequal-
ity is the reason why everyone must strive after his own happiness by bringing
659 a his character to perfec|tion (al-kamāl al-ḫulqī): Cf. Tahḏīb, p. 72, 10 ff. For the
saʿāda 73
individual in society, he thus offers ethics which are inspired by the Platonic-
Aristotelian doctrine of virtues (M. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, pp. 107 ff.). Just
and virtuous acts and increasing knowledge of the “spiritual things” (Tahḏīb,
p. 83 at the end) purify the soul of the “physical things” (al-umūr aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya;
see Tahḏīb, p. 91, 18; cf. Plotinus, Enneade I 6), lead to “tranquillity of the heart”
(Tahḏīb, p. 40, 5) and to “nearness to God” (ǧiwār rabb al-ʿālamīn; see Tahḏīb,
p. 13 at the end). This is the state of perfect knowledge and of wisdom, in
which the human being resembles the divine first principle, the divine intel-
lect (Tahḏīb, pp. 88–89). Miskawayh called it the ultimate happiness, which is
preceded by several preliminary steps (saʿādāt): Cf. Miskawayh, as-Saʿāda; M.
Ansari, Miskawayh’s Conception; M. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, pp. 121 f.
Among the Islamic thinkers who followed Miskawayh’s ethics (M. Fakhry,
Ethical Theories, pp. 131ff.), mention may be made here of Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī.
In his Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa he offers an original adaptation
of Greek ethics as it was known to him through Fārābī, Miskawayh, and the
Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, to the statements of the Qurʾān (H. Daiber, Griechische
Ethik; Y. Mohamed, The Path). He replaces Miskawayh’s Platonic-Neoplatonic
concept of the assimilation to God by the Koranic concept of ḫilāfa (Sura 2:30
and 6:165). As the “representative” (ḫalīfa) of God in this world, the human
being imitates God as much as he is able to, by following the Sharia and by con-
cerning himself with his sustenance on earth (cf. Sura 11:61 (64): istaʿmarakum).
Thus, a human being acquires happiness in this world which, as in Miskawayh,
is a preliminary one to the “real happiness” in the hereafter (aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, p. 128,
4ff.; cf. Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl an-našʾatayn).
In Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī’s ethics, by which Ġazālī was deeply impressed, a mys-
tical tendency can be detected, which was already visible in the Rasāʾil Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ and in Miskawayh’s work. There is not that much concern about the
role of the individual in society, but rather more about striving after happi-
ness lying in the knowledge of and in the nearness to God; it is a happiness in
the hereafter. This corresponds to the Neoplatonic ἀπράγμων-βίος-ideal of the
philosopher who withdraws from society (cf. J. L. Kraemer, Humanism, p. 128).
Ibn Sīnā followed this view and developed the concept of a prophet, who
is a Sufi and who preaches the divine laws as a way to the mystical path, to
the liberation of the soul from the body, to its intellectual perfection, and to
the vision of God (Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī s-saʿāda; M. Ansari, Ibn Sina’s Ethics;
E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought, pp. 144ff.). But for Ibn Sīnā, too, life in
society remains an indispensable preliminary to happiness in the hereafter.
Obedience to the lawgiver, to the prophet, is a postulate, as is the fulfilment
of duties towards God and towards the fellow-being. According to Ibn Sīnā’s
view, which is clearly associated with that of Fārābī, the sovereign, who is a
74 chapter 5
prophet and a Sufi, unites in his person practical and theoretical wisdom (J.
W. Morris, Philosopher-Prophet, pp. 153ff.). This union creates happiness (aš-
Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, ed. and transl. by M. E. Marmura, p. 354, l. 8 ff. = book 9, ch. 7,
section 20ff., and ed. and transl. by M. E. Marmura, p. 369, l. 33 ff. = book 10,
ch. 3, section 6), but it is also a postulate for the sovereign, who combines it
with prophetical qualities.
It were the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Bāǧǧa and, above all, his younger
contemporary Ibn Ṭufayl who drew the final conclusion from the increasing
mystic-Neoplatonic orientation of the saʿāda concept. Society is no longer a
postulate for the individual to strive after happiness. On the contrary, it is only
the “isolated” philosopher (al-mutawaḥḥid), the Sufi, who, withdrawing from
659 b society, obtains ultimate | happiness through his “self-government” (tadbīr)
and his vision of the truth (A. Altmann, Ibn Bājja; H. Daiber, Autonomie,
pp. 242ff. / English version pp. 80ff.; S. Harvey, Place of the Philosopher). For
him it is possible to achieve a mystical ascent to higher forms of knowledge,
namely by liberating his soul from the matter and by the “union” (ittiṣāl) with
the divine active intellect, which is an emanation from God. Society is only a
place to “meet” (liqāʾ, iltiqāʾ), which may be useful for the individual and may
stimulate his emulation in striving after intellectual perfection. In opposition
to Plato’s view, the citizen no longer serves society; at best, society can stim-
ulate the individual in his striving after happiness, to be found in intellectual
perfection.
In his philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, Ibn Ṭufayl (cf. H. Fradkin,
Political Thought) consequently developed the thesis that the individual’s phi-
losophy and society’s religion are not contradictory, but do not support each
other either. Ibn Ṭufayl’s compatriot Ibn Rušd did not share with him this rad-
ical turning-away from Fārābī (H. Daiber, Autonomie, pp. 246–247 / English
version pp. 84f.). In his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active
Intellect, he declares that in this life, too, it is possible to strive after happiness
as long as this is not hampered by society. For this theoretical study should be
combined with acts (Engl. transl. K. P. Bland, pp. 108–109). The aim of such a
striving is the immortality of the soul, which is achieved when the soul unites
increasingly its acquired knowledge with the active intellect. This union, which
is the most perfect form of human cognition, is possible because the active
intellect is the form of the intellectus materialis, which in its turn is the form
of the soul, i.e. its eternal potentiality. It is not only remarkable that Ibn Rušd
denies (in contrast to Ġazālī) the individual immortality, deriving this denial
from the union of the soul with the eternal form of the active intellect. More
important is his conclusion that striving after philosophical knowledge, i.e.
after happiness, is not a duty of individuals or of individual states, but a task of
saʿāda 75
mankind. This philosophical knowledge is the most perfect form of the uni-
versal human knowledge of religious truth which is reflected in the Sharia.
Accordingly, the perfect state, i.e. the philosophical state, comprises all man-
kind. The best Islamic state, a state which only existed during the period of the
first four caliphs, is at best an imitation of such a philosophical state.
Ibn Ḫaldūn, the last great Islamic thinker, incorporated into his philosophy
of history Ibn Rušd’s universalistic opinion, as well as Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s
doctrines (M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn’s). He put new accents and, by introducing
the term ʿaṣabiyya, he gave a new significance to the concept of society. The
polis, the state, is indispensable for the entire human society, for its progress
(Muqaddima, III, p. 54 at the end: iṣlāḥ al-bašar) and for its preservation. In
his philosophy, which he preaches to mankind in the form of “political laws”
(aḥkām as-siyāsa), the sovereign of the perfect state, the prophetical lawgiver,
deals with the “well-being of the world” (maṣāliḥ ad-dunyā) and with the “sal-
vation” of mankind “in the hereafter” (ṣalāḥ āḫiratihim) (Muqaddima, I, p. 343).
Philosophy, understood as ethics and politics, as well as religion and the society
of the state, here are seen as indispensable materials for the well-being of all
mankind in this world and for their happiness (saʿāda: Muqaddima, I, p. 343, 4)
in the hereafter.
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Additional Remark
Related to the article is the Islamic concept of paradise, on which cf. the col-
lection of articles in Roads to Paradise. Eschatology and Concepts of the Here-
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the publisher.
chapter 6
Fārābī – Kindī – Arabisch-islamische Theologie und

Philosophie – Avicebron
Lexikoneinträge
Alfārābī, arabisch-islamischer Philosoph, geb. 258/872 in Fārāb (Transoxa-

nien), gest. 339/950 oder 951 in Damaskus, auch “der zweite Lehrer” (nach Aris-
toteles) genannt und nach Alkindī der einflussreichste islamische Philosoph. Er
studierte und lehrte hauptsächlich in Bagdad, wo er mit christlichen Gelehr-
ten in Verbindung stand und mit der griechisch-alexandrinischen Tradition,
häufig neuplatonischer Färbung, in Berührung kam. Alfārābī, auch ein bedeu-
tender Musiktheoretiker, ist hauptsächlich bekannt geworden durch Kommen-
tare und Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Logik, Darstellungen der aristo-
telischen und platonischen Philosophie sowie v.a. durch eine Monographie
zum Musterstaat und seinem Regenten, dem Philosophen-König mit prophe-
tischen Qualitäten. Alfārābī benutzt Paraphrasen platonischer Werke (v.a. der
Nomoi), Aristoteleskommentare (v.a. Alexander von Aphrodisias) sowie Aristo-
teles’ Nikomachische Ethik. Unter dem Eindruck schiʿitisch-ismailitischer Dis-
kussionen über das Imamat entwickelt er eine originelle politische Philoso-
phie. In der universalistisch verstandenen Religion, in der Einhaltung der reli-
giösen Gesetze in der Gemeinschaft, verwirklicht sich die Philosophie.
Lit.: → Arabisch-islamische Theologie und Philosophie. – Miriam Galston,

Politics and Excellence. The political philosophy of Alfarabi. Princeton, New Jer-
sey 1990 (Lit.). – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Alkindī, erster islamischer Philosoph, auch “Philosoph der Araber” genannt

(um 185/801–zw. 247/861 und 259/873). Alkindī bewies die creatio ex nihilo im
Anschluss an die koranische Theologie und unter Rückgriff auf Aristoteles, Pro-
clus und Plotin. Er entwickelte eine Lehre von zwei Intellekten in vier Stufen,
die alexandrinischer Interpretation von Aristoteles’De anima folgt. Alkindī phi-
losophierte in muʿtazilitischer Umgebung sowie ausgehend vom koranischen
Begriff der Transzendenz Gottes und von der grundsätzlichen Übereinstim-
mung von Philosophie und Offenbarung. Einige, z.T. im Arabischen verlorene
Schriften wurden im Mittelalter ins Lateinische übersetzt.
Lit.: → Arabisch-islamische Theologie und Philosophie. – Jean Jolivet, L’ intel-

lect selon Kindī. Leiden 1971 (vgl. Gerhard Endress in ZDMG 130, 1980,

fārābī – kindī – arabisch-islamische theologie und philosophie 81
S. 422–435). – Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Kindiana. In Archives d’histoire

doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 47, 1980, S. 277–287 (Lit.). – Hans Daiber,
Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an Kindīs Metaphysik. In Der Islam 63, 1986, S. 284–
302. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/12. – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Arabisch-islamische Theologie und Philosophie. Islamische Theologie (ʿilm

al-kalām) entwickelte sich im frühen Islam unter dem Einfluss politisch-ideo-
logischer Strömungen. Ihr Gegenstand ist die nicht fassbare Allmacht Gottes,
sowie die Stellung des Menschen zwischen altarabisch-koranischer Prädesti-
nation und Eigenverantwortlichkeit. Sie geriet seit dem Ende des 2./8. Jahr-
hunderts zunehmend unter den Einfluss von zunächst mündlich vermittelter
griechischer Philosophie und hellenistisch-christlicher Theologie.
Die in Basra und Bagdad entstehende erste große theologische Bewegung
der Muʿtaziliten konzentrierte sich in ihrer rationalen Begründung des Glau-
bens auf die als Allmacht und als Abgrenzung von Polytheismus und christ-
licher Trinität verstandene “Einzigkeit” (tawḥīd) sowie auf die Gerechtigkeit
Gottes. Gleichzeitig betonte sie die Willensfreiheit des Menschen, die bereits
Thema des Predigers al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (21/642–110/728) war. Der Schiite Hišām
Ibn al-Ḥakam (gest. 179/795 oder 796) und der Muʿtazilite Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmr (ca.
111/730–ca. 184/800) interpretierten sie als verantwortliches Tun dessen, was
Gott “geschaffen” hat – ein Standpunkt, | den Ašʿarī (260/873–324/935 oder 936) 908
übernahm und in die orthodoxe Theologie einführte. Er modifizierte damit den
muʿtazilitischen Standpunkt vom “Zwang” der “Natur”, die Gott den Dingen
“anerschaffen” habe (Naẓẓām, gest. vor 232/847).
Auch in der Gotteslehre wich Ašʿarī nach dem Vorbild des Ibn Ḥanbal (gest.
241/855) und des Ibn Kullāb (gest. nach 239/854) von seinen muʿtazilitischen
Lehrern ab, welche Gott für unbeschreibbar hielten, daher die göttlichen Attri-
bute leugneten und den Koran, Gottes “Wort”, für erschaffen bzw. zu einem
Produkt menschlichen Sprechens erklärten. Dem aschʿaritischen Standpunkt
zufolge, der in die sunnitische, d.h. orthodoxe Theologie Eingang gefunden
hat, waren Rezitation und Niederschrift des Korans erschaffen, nicht aber sein
Inhalt. Die aschʿaritische Richtung mit ihren Hauptvertretern Bāqillānī (gest.
403/1013), Ǧuwayni (gest. 478/1085 oder 1086), Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111) oder
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (gest. 607/1210) ist der Polemik hanbalitischer Kreise aus-
gesetzt gewesen, deren prominentester Vertreter Ibn Taymiyya (gest. 728/1328)
war. Zankapfel war v.a. die Lehre vom Koran und von den göttlichen Attributen.
Diese wurden von späteren Aschʿariten metaphorisch interpretiert.
Dem ursprünglich hanbalitischen Standpunkt, wonach die koranischen
Gottesattribute in der vorliegenden Weise unbesehen zu akzeptieren sind, folg-
ten die Anhänger des Māturīdī (gest. 333/944) in Samarkand bzw. Transoxanien
82 chapter 6
(Usbekistan), die sich unter den Mamluken ab dem 8./14. Jahrhundert zur zwei-
ten großen sunnitischen Theologenbewegung entwickelten und sich in dog-
matischen Details von ihren aschʿaritischen Kontrahenten unterschieden. Sie
betonten stärker die muʿtazilitische These von der Willensfreiheit, die unein-
schränkbar neben die auch hanbalitische und aschʿaritische These von der
“Geschaffenheit” menschlichen Handelns durch Gott gestellt wurde.
Seit dem Ausgang des 3./9. Jahrhunderts haben die Muʿtaziliten zunehmend
an Bedeutung verloren. Letzter Höhepunkt war ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār (gest. 415/1025),
der eine Summe bisherigen muʿtazilitischen Wissens bietet und lange die Zai-
diten im Jemen beeinflusst hat. Logisch begründete Theologumena zu Gottes
Attributen, zur Prophetie, zum Glaubensbegriff und zum Handeln des Men-
schen stehen neben Theorien der von Ratio und Intuition gespeisten Erkennt-
nis in ihrer Auswirkung auf die Entwicklung ethischer Werte als objektive Grö-
ßen. Diskussionen über Substanz, Akzidens und die kleinsten Bausteine, die
Atome, die noch die Muʿtaziliten des ausgehenden 2./8., des 3./9. und 4./10.
Jahrhunderts beschäftigt hatten, sind in den Hintergrund getreten – offensicht-
lich weil sie vom physikalischen Weltbild der seit dem frühen 3./9. Jahrhundert
sich entwickelnden Philosophie verdrängt worden sind.
Diese konnte sich auf griechisch-syrisch-arabische Übersetzungen durch
Ibn al-Biṭrīq (gest. um 830AD) und v.a. durch Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (gest. 873AD)
und seine Schule stützen. Zugänglich wurden v.a. Werke des Aristoteles (aus-
genommen Politik, Dialoge, Eudemische Ethik und Magna Moralia), Kommen-
tare und Einleitungsschriften der Alexandriner hierzu, Auszüge aus Plotins
Enneaden (in der pseudoaristotelischen Theologie), Proclus’ Institutio theolo-
gica (auch in der Bearbeitung des Liber de causis), Schriften des Porphyrius und
Paraphrasen platonischer Werke. Man hatte sich, auch für die Theologie, aris-
totelische Logik und Beweisführung zu eigen gemacht. Philosophie wurde ein
Mittel zur Kenntnis der Welt und Erkenntnis Gottes in der Schöpfung und ver-
band sich in der neuplatonischen Emanations-Theologie mit dem koranisch-
islamischen Begriff von Gottes Transzendenz.
909 Der erste große Philosoph, Alkindī, ent|wickelt unter aristotelisch-neuplato-
nischem Einfluss eine Philosophie der göttlichen ersten Ursache, aus der in
Emanationen in einer koranisch verstandenen creatio ex nihilo die sichtbare
Welt entsteht. Alkindīs Philosophie-Begriff wurde von nachfolgenden Philo-
sophen zunehmend in Verbindung gebracht mit dem islamischen Begriff der
göttlichen Offenbarung an den Propheten Mohammed.
Während Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī / Rhazes (250/864 oder 251/865–313/925) noch
von der Unabhängigkeit menschlicher Erkenntnis und Intuition ausgegangen
war, hatten sein ismailitischer Kontrahent Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (gest. 322/934)
und kurz danach Alfārābī im Anschluss an den koranischen Begriff der göttli-
chen Offenbarung auf die Abhängigkeit von Wissen und Erkenntnis von gött-
licher Inspiration hingewiesen. Alfārābī kombinierte dies mit der aristoteli-
schen und von Alexander von Aphrodisias (2./3. Jh. AD) weiter ausgebauten
Lehre vom göttlichen intellectus agens und ist damit wegweisend geworden
für nachfolgende Philosophen (v.a. Ibn Sīnā / Avicenna) und durch arabisch-
lateinische Übersetzungen auch für die Scholastik des Mittelalters. Alfārābī
entwickelte einen Philosophiebegriff, der im Anschluss an aristotelische Ethik
und islamische Religion in der Religion den einzigen Weg zur Verwirklichung
der Philosophie sah, weil sie die Ethik des Einzelnen im Musterstaat regele
und den Weg zur philosophischen Erkenntnis in der göttlichen Offenbarung
weise.
Ibn Sīnā (370/980–428/1037) hat Alfārābīs Philosophie weiter ausgebaut,
allerdings wesentlich modifiziert: Erkenntnis wird nicht dem mit propheti-
scher Inspiration begnadeten Philosophen-König zuteil, sondern dem Mys-
tiker, der Gott schaut und sich von der Gesellschaft zurückgezogen hat. Bei
Ġazālī wurde Philosophie sogar reduziert auf ihre Rolle als logisches Instru-
ment theologischer Erkenntnis. Ebenso haben Philosophen wie Ibn Bāǧǧa /
Avempace (ca. 488/1095–532/1138 oder 533/1139) und noch viel prononcier-
ter Ibn Ṭufayl (gest. 581/1185) die platonisch-aristotelische Staatsphilosophie
Alfārābīs aufgegeben zugunsten von Ibn Sīnās These vom Mystiker-Philoso-
phen. In dieser Rückkehr zu Alkindīs Begriff der göttlichen ersten Ursache
erscheint Religion nicht mehr als Symbol philosophischer Wahrheit und Phi-
losophie bedarf nicht mehr der Religion als Instrument zu ihrer eigenen Ver-
wirklichung. Sie ist zum Privileg philosophischer Elite geworden.
Dies hat der Aristoteleskommentator Ibn Rušd / Averroes (520/1126–595/
1198) modifiziert, wobei ihm zufolge jeglicher Konflikt zwischen Religion und
philosophischer Erkenntnis nur scheinbar sei und auf falscher Auslegung reli-
giöser Offenbarung beruhe. Der Philosoph sei noch am ehesten in der Lage,
erworbenes Wissen mit dem intellectus agens zu verbinden und damit Glück-
seligkeit, d.h. Unsterblichkeit (keine individuelle Unsterblichkeit der Seele) zu
erlangen. Doch könne sich auch der Philosoph irren. Die bei Ibn Rušd anklin-
gende universelle Bedeutung der Philosophie als Aufgabe eines jeden hat der
Historiker Ibn Ḫaldūn (732/1332–808/1406) einer Geschichtsschau integriert,
in der islamisches Gesetz, Religion und Philosophie zu allgemeingültigen Fak-
toren werden, deren Erkenntnis zur philosophischen Wahrheit mit universeller
Bedeutung für die gesamte Menschheit wird.
Lit.: EI2. – Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalam. Cambridge,

Mass./London 1976. – Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy. New
York/London 21983. – George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic
84 chapter 6
Ethics. Cambridge (etc.) 1985. – William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Phi-

losophy and Theology. An extended survey. Edinburgh 1985 (Lit.). – William
Montgomery Watt und Michael E. Marmura, Der Islam. II: Politische
Entwicklungen und theologische Konzepte. Stuttgart 1985. – Henri Corbin,
History of Islamic Philosophy. London 1993 (Lit.). – Robert Caspar, Traité de
910 théolo|gie musulmane. Nouv. éd. I. Rom 1987 (Lit.). – Gerhard Endress, Die
arabisch-islamische Philosophie. Ein Forschungs-Bericht. In ZGAIW 5, 1989,
S. 1–47. – Hans Daiber, Die Autonomie der Philosophie im Islam. In Monika
Asztalos, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), Knowledge and
the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, Proceedings of the Eighth International
Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki, 24–29 August 1987, I.
= Acta Philosophica Fennica 48, pp. 228–249. (Lit.); Ergänzte englische Version
in Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures. Leiden/Boston
2012, S. 65–87. – Hans Daiber, Lateinische Übersetzungen arabischer Texte
zur Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung für die Scholastik des Mittelalters. In Ren-
contres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Louvain/Cassino 1990, S. 203–
250 (Lit.); Ergänzte englische Version in Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the
Dialogue of Cultures. Leiden/Boston 2012, S. 89–166. – Thérèse-Anne Dru-
art and Michael E. Marmura, Medieval Islamic Philosophy and Theology.
Bibliographical guide (1986–1989). In Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 32, 1990,
S. 106–135. – Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert
Hidschra. 1ff. Berlin 1991ff. – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Avicebron, auch Avencebrol / Salomon Ben Judah Ibn Gabirol, jüdischer

Dichter und Philosoph, geb. um 1020AD in Málaga, gest. 1067/1068 oder
1070AD in Valencia. Avicebrons Lehren spiegeln seine Gedichte, v.a. Keter Mal-
kut (Königskrone) wider, ferner sein arabisches und später ins Hebräische über-
setztes ethisches Werk Iṣlāḥ al-aḫlāq (Die Vervollkommnung des Charakters)
sowie sein arabisches Hauptwerk, das vollständig nur in lateinischer Über-
setzung durch Johannes Hispanus (1100–1180AD) und Dominicus Gundissa-
linus (1110–nach 1181AD) mit dem Titel Fons vitae (Lebensquelle) erhalten ist
und von Ibn Falaquera (1225–ca. 1295AD) teilweise ins Hebräische übertragen
wurde. Avicebron bietet hauptsächlich eine neuplatonische Emanationslehre.
Ausgehend von der aristotelischen Hyle-morphe-Lehre und vom neuplatoni-
schen Begriff einer universellen Materie entwickelt er in der literarischen Form
eines Dialogs zwischen Lehrer und Schüler eine Stufung des Kosmos in erste,
universelle Materie und Form sowie nachfolgende Hypostasen von universel-
ler Intelligenz und universeller Seele. Diese besteht aus Geistseele, Sinnenseele
und vegetativer Seele und gibt der sichtbaren Welt ihre individuelle Form.
Quelle aller Formen ist der göttliche Wille, der zwischen der ersten Substanz,
nämlich Gott, und der absoluten Materie sowie Form vermittelt und als alles
durchdringende Kraft über die genannten Hypostasen der Körperwelt Mate-
rie und Form vermittelt. Dabei klassifiziert Avicebron die universelle Materie
als Aspekt von Gottes Wesen und die universelle Form als Ausdruck göttlichen
Willens. Hier schimmern die platonische Unterscheidung zwischen Gottes
Sein und Wirken (vgl. Pseudo-Aristoteles, De mundo) und der hieran anknüp-
fende neuplatonische Dynamis-Begriff durch, wobei Avicebron von der ara-
bischen Enzyklopädie der “Lauteren Brüder” (Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ) und von den
arabischen Plotiniana, eventuell in der Rezeption des Isaac Israeli (ca. 855–
ca. 955AD) oder des Pseudo-Empedokles, angeregt gewesen sein mag. Mit
ihnen teilt seine Schrift das Streben der menschlichen Seele nach Erkennt-
nis Gottes und seines Willens, wodurch sie Unsterblichkeit erlangt, zu Gott
aufsteigt und Avicebron zufolge zur “Lebensquelle” zurückkehrt. Avicebrons
Metaphysik hat nur bei wenigen jüdischen Denkern nachgewirkt, z.B. bei
Mošeh Ibn Ezra (gest. 1138AD), Joseph Ibn Ṣaddīq (1075–1149AD) und Abra-
ham Ibn Ezra (1089–1167AD). Größeres | Ansehen genoss die lateinische Ver- 1314
sion in der Scholastik des Mittelalters, etwa bei Wilhelm von Auvergne und in
der Franziskanerschule des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts AD (Alexander von Hales,
Duns Scotus u.a.). Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin haben sie scharf
kritisiert.
Lit.: Clemens Baeumker (Hrsg.), Avencebrolis Fons vitae. Münster 1892. –

Max Horten, Die syrische und arabische Philosophie. In Friedrich Über-
weg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. II. Hrsg. v. Bernhard Geyer.
Darmstadt 1967 (Nachdruck der Ausgabe 1927), S. 335–338 und 726 (Lit.). –
Jacques Schlanger (Übers.), Salomon ibn Gabirol, Livre de la source de vie
(Fons vitae). Paris 1970. – Shlomo Pines, Ibn Gabirol. In Encyclopaedia Judaica
(1971ff.) Bd. VIII, S. 235–246 (Lit.). – Heinrich Simon und Marie Simon,
Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie. München 1984 (Lit.). – Colette Sirat,
A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Cambridge u.a. 1985 (Lit.). –
Raphael Loewe, Ibn Gabirol. London 1989 (Lit.). – Sarah Pessin, Ibn Gabi-
rol’s Emanationism. On the Plotinian (v. Augustinian) Theology of “Divine
irāda”. In Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical and Theo-
logical Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditi-
ons. Ed. Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni. Turnhout 2017. = Textes
et Études du Moyen Âge 88, pp. 1–18. – Marienza Benedetto, Alle origini
della controversa medievale sulla pluralità delle forme sostanziali: il Fons vitae
di Avicebron. In Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism (s. prec. entry),
pp. 137–183. – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
86 chapter 6
Republished, with some modifications, from Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 134, Frei-
burg i.Br. 1993, col. 383 (Alfārābī), col. 395 (Alkindī); col. 907–910 (Arabisch-islamische
Theologie und Philosophie); col. 1313–1314 (Avicebron). By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 7
Fārābī – Kindī
Lexikoneinträge
Abū Naṣr Ibn Tarkhān al-Fārābī
258/872 Fārāb/Turkistan (Transoxanien) – 339/950 oder 951 Damaskus (Syrien)

Studium in Khorasan und Baghdad
942AD Wechsel nach Damaskus, Zwischenaufenthalt in Aleppo, um 948/
949AD Aufenthalt in Ägypten
Fārābī, “der zweite Lehrer” (nach Aristoteles) in der islamischen Welt, trug
wesentlich zur Kenntnis der Logik des Aristoteles im arabischen Raum bei,
indem er Einleitungen, Kommentare zu dessen Werken sowie selbstständige
Schriften schrieb und dafür alexandrinische Kommentare und Einführungs-
schriften heranzog. Fārābī verfasste ferner Schriften zur Physik, Ethik und Poli-
tik sowie eine Monographie über Die Aufzählung der Wissenschaften, die im
Mittelalter durch eine lateinische Übersetzung bekannt wurde.
Die Nikomachische Ethik und das Buch Über die Seele des Aristoteles, der
Aristoteleskommentar des Alexander von Aphrodisias sowie platonische und
neuplatonische Schriften inspirierten Fārābī zu Werken über die Ethik des Ein-
zelnen und dessen Aufgabe in der Gesellschaft, v.a. zu seinem Alterswerk Die
Prinzipien der Einsichten der Bürger des Musterstaates. Fārābī erklärte Religion
als symbolische Wiedergabe philosophischer Wahrheit und begründete dies
mit der aristotelischen Wechselbeziehung zwischen Wahrnehmung und Den-
ken. Religion wird zum Instrument der Philosophie, die sich in ihr verwirklicht.
Dieser originelle Gedanke mündet – unter Zugrundelegung der | platonischen 192
Stufung der Gesellschaft – in die These vom Regenten im Musterstaat, der
gleichzeitig Prophet und Philosoph sein müsse. Fārābī schuf so die Grundla-
gen für einen islamischen Philophiebegriff, wonach Wissen religiöse Wahrheit
ist, die sich im ethischen Handeln des Einzelnen im Musterstaat manifestiert
und die Rückkehr der Seele zu ihrem göttlichen Ursprung, die “Glückseligkeit”
des Menschen im Jenseits anstrebt.
Werke: Alfārābīs philosophische Abhandlungen. Hrsg. v. Friedrich Diete-

rici. Leiden 1890. Dt. Übers. v. Friedrich Dieterici. Leiden 1892 / Neu-
druck Frankfurt 1976. – Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Hrsg. u. übers. v. Richard

88 chapter 7
Walzer. Oxford 1985. – al-Mantiqiyāt li-l-Fārābī. Hrsg. v. Muḥammad Taqī

Dānišpažūh, 3 Bde. Qumm 1987–1990. – Fārābī, al-Aʿmāl al-falsafiyya. Hrsg. v.
Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn. Beirut 1992. – Obras filosó fico-politicas. Hrsg. und ins Spani-
sche übersetzt v. Rafael Ramón Guerrero. Madrid 1992.
Literatur: Joshua Parens, An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions. New

York 2007. – Hans Daiber, Al-Fārābīs Aristoteles. Grundlagen seiner Erkennt-
nislehre. In O ye Gentlemen. Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture. In
Honor of Remke Kruk. Leiden 2007. = IPTS 74, S. 99–112. = H. Daiber, From the
Greeks to the Arabs II/21. – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb Ibn Isḥāq Ibn aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ al-Kindī
Ca. 185/801 Kufa (Irak)–zw. 247/861 und 259/873 vermutlich Baghdad

Studium in Kufa, Basra und Baghdad
813–833AD am Hofe des Kalifen al-Maʾmūn, 833–842 AD am Hofe des Kalifen
al-Muʿtaṣim in Baghdad
Kindī, der auch “Philosoph der Araber” genannt wird, regte die Übersetzung
und Bearbeitung der naturwissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Werke des
Aristoteles, des Proclus und Plotin an. Er selbst soll 270 Werke zu zahlreichen
philosophischen Disziplinen geschrieben haben, von denen jedoch nur wenige
und teilweise ausschließlich in lateinischer Übersetzung erhalten sind.
Kindī verfasste auf der Grundlage der koranischen Gottes- und Schöpfungs-
lehre eine teilweise erhaltene Abhandlung über Metaphysik (Die erste Philoso-
phie), die unter dem Eindruck von Aristoteles’Metaphysik sowie Plotins Ennea-
den und Proclus’Institutio theologica das Wissen um die göttliche erste Ursache
301 als Ziel philoso|phischer Erkenntnis in den Vordergrund stellt. Unter Rückgriff
auf Johannes Philoponus versuchte er, die aristotelische Lehre von der Ewigkeit
der Materie mit der Geschaffenbeit der Welt aus dem Nichts und ihrer End-
lichkeit zu harmonisieren. Die Vielheit der geschaffenen Dinge weist auf die
Einzigkeit und Einheit der göttlichen Ursache. Kindī widmete sich daher natur-
wissenschaftlichen Fragen, die Aristoteles z.B. in seiner Meteorologie, in De
caelo und in der Physik thematisiert hatte. Nach platonisch-neuplatonischem
Vorbild und unter Einbeziehung von Interpretamenten der alexandrinischen
Exegese von Aristoteles, De anima III 5, äußerte sich Kindī darüber hinaus
mehrmals über die Seele und schuf eine auch ins Lateinische übersetzte Mono-
graphie Über den Intellekt. Damit versuchte er, eine Brücke zu schlagen zwi-
schen dem göttlichen aktiven und dem menschlichen passiven Intellekt, wobei
fārābī – kindī 89
die menschliche Seele für ihn das einzige Instrument ist, das sich von den
rationalen und metaphysischen Dingen ein “Abbild” formen kann und das
sich im Streben nach zunehmendem Wissen um die erste Ursache sowie im
“wahrheitsgetreuen Handeln” seinem göttlichen Ursprung annähert. Kindī ist
ebenfalls Autor von großenteils verlorenen Abhandlungen zu einer stark indi-
vidualistischen Ethik und zur Politik. Die islamisch-religiöse Komponente zeigt
seine Abbandlung zur Erklärung der Verehrung (Gottes) durch den am weitesten
entfernten (Himmels)körper und dessen Gehorsam Ihm gegenüber, eine philo-
sophische Auslegung von Sure 55, 6, die Kindīs Eingeständnis impliziert, dass
letzten Endes das prophetische, auf göttliche Eingebung beruhende Wissen
dem philosophischen überlegen ist.
Werke: Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya. Hrsg. v. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū

Rīda, 2 Bde. Kairo 1950, 1953. – Œuvres philosophiques & scientifiques. Bd. 2:
Metaphysique et cosmologie. Hrsg. und übers. v. Roshdi Rashed und Jean
Joli|vet. Leiden 1998. = IPTS 29/2. – Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des 302
Jaʿqūb Ben Isḥāq Al-Kindī. Lat. Version hrsg. v. Albino Nagy. Münster 1897. =
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Texte und
Untersuchungen II/5.
Literatur: George N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindī, the Philosopher of the Arabs. Rawal-

pindi 1966. – Jean Jolivet, L’intellect selon Kindī. Leiden 1971. – Alfred L.
Ivry, Al-Kindī’s Metaphysics. Albany 1974. – Peter Adamson, Al-Kindī. Oxford
2007. – Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Republished, with some modifications, from Philosophenlexikon. Ed. Stefan Jor-

dan and Burkhard Mojsisch. Stuttgart 2009, pp. 191–192 (Fārābī) and pp. 300–302
(Kindī). By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 8
Political Philosophy*
Historical Background 90 – Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ 91 – Sources of Philosophical Ethics 93 –

Kindī 95 – Abū Zayd al-Balḫī 97 – Qudāma Ibn Ǧaʿfar 98 – Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī 99 – Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī 100 – Fārābī 103 – Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ 106 – Miskawayh 108 – Rāġib al-
Iṣfahānī and Ġazālī 110 – Ibn Sīnā 112 – Ibn Bāǧǧa 114 – Ibn Ṭufayl 117 – Ibn Rušd 118 –
Ibn Ḫaldūn 120 – Bibliography 122
Historical Background
As the leader of the new Islamic community (umma),1 Prophet Mohammed

combined religious interests with the requirements of politics (siyāsa, liter-
ally “government”).2 In the so-called “Constitution of Medina” the community
of the believers declared their solidarity against common enemies and they
accepted Mohammed as their prophet and as an arbiter between rival clans.3
His leadership was legitimized by the divine revelation.
The successors of the Prophet, the caliphs, received their legitimacy by an
appointment by the community, either because of their merits or because
of their affiliation to the family of the Prophet. But there was no consensus
on the legitimacy of the caliphs. Early debates, starting immediately after the
death of the Prophet,4 created among the Muslims a consciousness of com-
munity and leadership, of hierarchical structures in society and of dependence
and responsibility within the individual freedom of man as a member of the
* A Bosnian translation appeared in Hans Daiber, Borba za znanje u Islamu: Neki historijski
aspekti. Sarajevo 2004, pp. 110–153. – Slightly different versions are Hans Daiber, Wissen
und Handeln in der philosophischen Ethik des Islam. Griechische Wurzeln und islamische Trans-
formation. In Phronêsis – Prudentia – Klugheit. Das Wissen des Klugen in Mittelalter, Renais-
sance und Neuzeit. Il sapere del saggio nel Medioevo, nel Rinascimento e nell’età moderna.
Ed. Alexander Fidora, Andreas Niederberger, Merio Scattola. Porto 2013, pp. 36–
61. – Hans Daiber, Critical Thinking in Early Islam. In A Life with the Prophet? Examining
Hadith, Sira and Qurʾan in Honor of Wim Raven. Berlin 2017. = Bonner Islamstudien 36, pp. 119–
139.
1 On the concept of umma cf. A. K. S. Lambton (1981), pp. 13ff.
2 On the term and its history cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1971a), pp. 20ff.; B. Lewis (1984); F. M.
Najjar (1984).
3 Cf. W. M. Watt (1968), pp. 4 ff.
4 Cf. W. M. Watt (1968).

political philosophy 91
new Islamic community. The deterministic character of the Islamic concep-

tion of belief in an Almighty God induced members of this Islamic umma to
reflect again and again on the role of men as related to the leader of a reli-
gious state and to define the task and qualities of the leader, who became ḫalīfa
by God’s decree. Therefore, we find among the Umayyads tendencies of ǧabr,
divine omnipotence, and qadar, human freedom, as a description of the polar-
ization resulting from a developing critical attitude towards the rulers. Men are
free to rebel against the rulers if they are sinful – that means to disobey the
Qurʾān, God’s Book, or the Sunna of the Prophet.5 Simultaneously, it became
evident that political leadership depends on divine inspiration based on the
revelation of the Qurʾān, the ethical guiding principle of the community for
what is good and just.6
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
This ideological background of early Islam was the starting point of political
philosophy, which from the 3rd/9th century onwards | developed under the 842
influence of Hellenism and integrated political thoughts and ideas reflected
in the early “mirrors of princes”, written in the 2nd/8th century, and in Islamic
theology. The Persian Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 137/755 or 139/756), one of the early
famous writers of Arabic literary prose, gives in his Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr = ad-
Durra al-yatīma, in his Risāla fī ṣ-ṣaḥāba and in his version Kalīla wa Dimna,
originally a collection of Indian fables, practical advices to the prince.7 The
texts give a picture of society as consisting of a minority of people with excel-
lent judgement, solid friendship, integrity and fraternity, the ḫāṣṣa – in contrast
to the masses, the ʿāmma.8 The texts reveal a rather rationalistic morality aimed
at savoir vivre. In the domination of political authority over the Islamic Sharia
they show a rationalistic-critical and perhaps Manichaean-inspired attitude
towards religion, without, however, totally denying the value of religion: Reli-
gion gives people what they deserve and directs them to what is their duty.9 The
5 Cf. H. Q. Murad (1991).

6 Cf. H. K. Sherwani (1977), pp. 21 ff.; F. M. Denny (1985); G. F. Hourani (1985), pp. 23ff.
7 Several editions are available, e.g., in Āṯār Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (1978). The Kitāb al-ādāb al-kabīr
is translated into German by O. Rescher (1917); The Risāla fī ṣ-ṣaḥāba is available in an edi-
tion, French translation and glossary by C. Pellat (1976). – For details s. G. Richter (1932):
pp. 4 ff.; A. K. S. Lambton (1981), pp. 43 ff.; F. Gabrieli, “Ibn al-Muḳaffaʿ” in EI2 III, 1965,
col. 884 f. and the references given there.
8 Cf. P. Charles-Dominique (1965), pp. 53 f.
9 G. Richter (1932), p. 6; P. Charles-Dominique (1965), pp. 62f.
92 chapter 8
prince, the ruler, appears to be a worldly and a religious leader. He should be

prudent and just, but at the same time the ruled should be distrustful towards
him. This sceptical attitude towards religious and political authority seems to
have revived – in the footsteps of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics – the value of
friendship as creating community and as improving human character.10
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ was indebted to Indian material. However, like later authors
of “mirrors of princes”11 or authors of political thought,12 he mainly followed
Persian-Sassanian ethical traditions. Those were combined with gnomological
sayings by the wise men of the past: Sassanian wisdom-literature is corrob-
orated by sayings of wise men from the Greek, from pre-Islamic and Islamic
past.13 Aristotle’s pupil Alexander the Great becomes the ideal figure of a king14
and appears as addressee in a collection of advices attributed to Aristotle.15
These letters are based on Byzantine handbooks on warfare and administra-
tion. They include material from classical and later Hellenistic–hermetical
literature. At the suggestion of Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ, the secretary of the caliph
Hišām Ibn Abd al-Malik (regn. 105/724–125/743), these letters were translated
from Greek and used in Arabic revisions. An example is the famous Pseudo-
Aristotelian Sirr al-asrār,16 a “mirror of princes” from the 4th/10th century,
which in its Latin version played a major role in the Middle Ages.17
10 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Kitāb al-ādāb al-kabīr, ch. 3; cf. P. Charles-Dominique (1965), pp. 53ff.;
I. T. Kristo-Nagy (2013). – On the Iranian-Sassanian traditions in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s Kitāb
al-ādāb al-kabīr, on traces of Islamic parenetic literature and on adaptations of ethical
concepts in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics cf. H. Daiber (2015).
11 Cf. G. Richter (1932), pp. 33 ff.; G. Salinger (1956) (on Qāḍī an-Nuʿmān, Daʿāʾim al-Islām;
cf. also W. al-Qāḍī (1978)); H. Busse (1968); A. K. S. Lambton (1954); (1963); (1971); C.
E. Butterworth (1980), pp. 21 ff.; W. C. Chittick (1988) and the bibliography by M. T.
Dānišpažūh (1988). – An until now neglected example, which shows the influence of the
old “mirrors of princes” and of philosophical ethics (cf. Miskawayh’s Platonic doctrine of
the virtues of the soul, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 16 ff.) is Abū l-Qāsim al-Ḥusaynī Ibn ʿAlī al-
Maġribī (d. 418/1027 or 428/1037), Kitāb fī s-siyāsa, ed. S. ad-Dahhān (1948) and F. ʿAbd
al-Munʿim Aḥmad (1982), pp. 35–60.
12 Like Māwardī (d. 450/1058), on whom cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 27ff.; H. Laoust
(1968); R. as-Sayyid (1985); J. Kleidosty (2018).
13 Cf. D. Gutas (1990), pp. 347 ff.; C.-H. de Fouchécour (1986). – On traces of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics s. n. 10.
14 Cf. G. Richter (1932), pp. 93 ff.
15 Cf. M. Grignaschi (1967a); (1967b); cf. S. M. Stern (1968). The texts are in J. Bielawski
and M. Plezia (1970), and in M. Grignaschi (1975).
16 Ed. ʿA. R. Badawī (1954), pp. 65–171 and S. S. Aʿwar (1986). Cf. M. Grignaschi (1976).
17 Cf. M. A. Manzalaoui (1974) and M. Grignaschi (1980).
Sources of Philosophical Ethics
Ethical literature of Islam is classified as adab and aims at the moral educa-
tion of men – ruler and ruled. Authorities of the past, Islamic and non-Islamic,
justify practical advice in contemporary political situations. Above all, Greek
gnomological literature becomes integrated in Arabic compilations like the
Nawādir al-falāsifa by the famous translator Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (d. 260/873),
widely used in later times.18 The Greek heritage became a guideline for popu-
lar philosophical ethics that relied on gnomological sayings and, in addition, on
translations of Greek texts like the Pseudo-Aristotelian De virtutibus et vitiis,19
Plutarch’s De cohibenda ira,20 Galen’s treatise on ethics, of which | only an 843
Arabic summary is preserved,21 Themistius’ letter to the Roman Emperor Julian
on Politics,22 the Oikonomikos by the Neopythagorean Bryson,23 and a treat-
ise on the banishment of sorrow, perhaps by Themistius or by Plutarch.24 The
18 The text is available only in a summary by Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Aḥmad
Ibn Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, edited by ʿA. R. Badawī (1985); cf. J. K. Walsh (1976); D. Gutas
(1990), pp. 350–352.
19 F. E. Peters (1968), pp. 74 f.; the translations are edited by M. Kellermann (1965).
20 D. Gutas (1975), pp. 320 f.
21 Περὶ ἤθων = Kitāb al-aḫlāq. The Arabic summary is edited by P. Kraus (1939) and by ʿA. R.
Badawī (1981), pp. 190–211; it is translated into English by J. N. Mattock (1972). – On the
text cf. the studies listed in M. Ullmann (1970), p. 63; F. Rundgren (1976); M. Fakhry
(1991), pp. 63 f.
22 Risāla ilā Julian al-malik fī s-siyāsa wa-tadbīr al-mamlaka, ed. L. Cheikho (1920–1922); M.
S. Sālim (1970) and (with Latin translation) I. Shahid (1974). The text is lost in the Greek
original. Some remarks can be found in M. Bouyges (1924).
23 Lost in the Greek original. The Arabic translation is edited by M. Plessner (1928),
together with a German version and with the medieval Arabic-Hebrew and Arabic-Latin
translations. As M. Plessner has shown, the text was highly influential in Islamic texts
on economics (tadbīr al-manzil), especially through the revised version by Naṣīr ad-Dīn
aṭ-Ṭūsī in his Aḫlāq. Less known to the Arabs was the Pseudo-Aristotelian Economics (cf.
U. Victor (1983)), of which an Arabic paraphrase, perhaps by Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib,
book I 1343 a 1–1345 b 4 is preserved; the text is preserved in a collection of texts by Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib in MS Escorial 888, fol. 145 v–149 v, and MS Nuruosmaniye 3610 (new number 3095),
fol. 138 r–140 v, and is edited by ʿĪ. I. Maʾlūf (1921). Both texts are different from the Maqāla
fī t-tadbīr ascribed to Aristotle and said to be translated by ʿĪsā Ibn Zurʿa, ed. L. Cheikho
(1903). The text seems to be an Arabic compilation and is a general discussion of the ways
to deal with other persons of differing ranks. – On two Hebrew tranlations cf. S. Pines
(1954–1955).
24 The title of the lost Greek text was perhaps Περὶ ἀλυπίας. The text is transmitted by Kindī,
ed. R. Walzer and H. Ritter (1938); M. K. Ṭurayḥī (1962), pp. 110–125; ʿA. R. Badawī
(1973), pp. 6–32, and M. Fakhry (1979), II, pp. 13–26, and excerpted (with changes) from
Kindī’s version by Miskawayh and in the anonymous Risāla fī l-ḫawf min al-mawt (s.
94 chapter 8
material of these books was integrated in Islamic philosophical ethics and

formed the basis of political philosophy in Islam. This elaborated the political
idea of justice25 and the hierarchical structure of a society, wherein the position
of the people is determined by their behaviour (virtues and self-control) and
their achievements, and wherein friendship is a key factor for their solidarity.
Friendship and love are central themes in Miskawayh (s. below) and continue
the discussion started by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (s. above).
These ethical traditions formed the basis of Islamic political philosophy,
which began to arise in the 3rd/9th century. The origin of Islamic political
philosophy is correlated with the translation of political writings mainly by
Plato (summaries of his Republic, Laws and Statesman)26 and by Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, which became available to the Arabs in translations by
Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (of which the books I–IV are preserved) and by Eustath-
ius (of which the books V–X are preserved), moreover in a translation of a
lost Greek summary perhaps by Nicolaus Damascenus, the Summa Alexan-
drinorum; in addition, the Arabs knew Porphyry’s commentary on the Nico-
machean Ethics.27
n. 154). A paraphrase of the beginning of the Kindī-text, ed. R. Walzer and H. Ritter
(1938), pp. 31, 8–32, 2, is separately transmitted with the title Risāla fī māhiyat al-ḥuzn wa
asbābihī and ascribed to Ibn Sīnā, ed. M. H. Tura 1937; on this and on other later excerpts
cf. R. Walzer and H. Ritter (1938), pp. 8 ff., and F. Rosenthal in his review in Ori-
entalia, n.s. 9, 1940, pp. 182–191. F. Rosenthal considers Plutarch as a possible author.
M. Pohlenz (1938) and H. Gätje (1956), p. 228, refrain from any identification, however,
without denying its Hellenistic origin. According to M. Pohlenz, the author might indir-
ectly be influenced by Epictetus (ca. 50–ca. 138AD). – On the history of the text in Arabic
cf. P. Adamson and H. H. Biesterfeldt (2017); M. Turner (2018), pp. 87–137.
25 On the concept of justice among Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites and Maturidites in Averroes and
Ibn ʿArabī cf. the survey by H. Kassem (1972).
26 On the reception of Plato in the Islamic world cf. F. Rosenthal (1940); F. Klein-Franke
(1973) and R. Walzer, “Aflāṭūn” in EI2; M. Mahdi (1991), pp. 14ff. – Some Arabic fragments
from Plato’s works are collected by ʿA. R. Badawī (1974), pp. 121–170. – On the quotations
in Bīrūnī cf. F. Gabrieli (1951). – Not mentioned by ʿA. R. Badawī and still insufficiently
known is the relation of Aḥmad Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn ad-Dāya (d. ca. 340/951),
Kitāb al-ʿUhūd al-yūnāniyya al-mustaḫraǧa min rumūz Kitāb as-Siyāsa li-Aflāṭūn, ed. ʿA.
R. Badawī (1954), pp. 1–64; ed. ʿU. al-Mālikī (1971), pp. 45–126. – Cf. G. C. Anawati
(1955), pp. 61–63 and ʿU. al-Mālikī’s introduction, pp. 33ff., on Plato’s political works. –
Ibn ad-Dāya’s work is a compilation that tries to show the superiority of the Greeks to the
Persians in politics. It is said to be an extract from Plato’s Politics (sic). The text was used in
the 8th/14th century by the Granadine historian Lisān ad-Dīn Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb, Kitāb al-Išāra
ilā adab al-wizāra, ed. ʿA. Q. Zamāma; cf. D. M. Dunlop (1959), pp. 52–54; W. al-Qāḍī
(1976), pp. 206 f.
27 On the Nicomachean Ethics, its afterlife in Arabic and on the Arabic-Latin translation of
the Summaria Alexandrinorum by Hermannus Alemannus cf. D. M. Dunlop (1971) and
(1983). D. M. Dunlop prepared an extensive study, where he showed, that the text inser-
Finally, besides the early development of the caliphate and ethical Islamic
and non-Islamic traditions, the theological discussions on the just Imamate by
Shiʿites and Muʿtazilites from the 2nd/8th century and by the Ashʿarites from
the 4th/10th century – cf. e.g. Bāqillānī28 – redefined the role of the leader, the
Imām, and his function within the community. He is liable for the community
and must have knowledge of law, moral and religious matters and must be inde-
pendent in his judgement. Only the most excellent can be the rightful Imām.
The Twelver Shiʿa based their Imāmī doctrine on the necessity of an infallible
leader for humanity, an Imām who is a God-inspired teacher of religion and
thus comparable to the Prophet, without, however, being the transmitter of the
Holy Book.29 This conception of a divinely guided leadership deeply impressed
political philosophers of Islam in the 4th/10th century.
Kindī
The forerunners of the Islamic political philosophers in the 3rd/9th century

restricted themselves to the ethics of the single individual in a community
and continued the tradition of Islamic and non-Islamic gnomological sayings.
The first great philosopher of the Arabs, Kindī (ca. 185/801–between 247/861
and 259/873),30 and his younger contemporary Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (ca. 205/820–
300/912)31 knew the Aristotelian tripartition of practical philosophy in ethics,
economics and politics and they attributed to Aristotle works in these fields.
Apparently, the works were not available to them in complete translations. The
first translation of the Nicomachean Ethics can be attributed to Eustathius, a
contemporary of Kindī, and to Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn.32 From Aristotle’s treatise on
ted after book 6 in the only available MS in Fez (ed. ʿA. R. Badawī, 1979, pp. 363–387; ed.
A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, 2005, pp. 334–369, with English translation by D. M. Dun-
lop) and can be identified with the first part of Porphyry’s commentary on the first half
of the Nicomachean Ethics. The Arabic texts are edited by ʿA. R. Badawī (1979), and by A.
A. Akasoy and A. Fidora together with introduction and English translation by D. M.
Dunlop (2005). Cf. the remarks by H. Daiber (1971–1972).
28 Cf. Y. Ibish (1966), pp. 97 ff.
29 Cf. W. Madelung, “Imāma”. In EI2 III, 1971.
30 Risāla fī kammiyyat kutub Arisṭāṭālīs, ed. M. Guidi and R. Walzer, p. 403, 12ff.; ed. M.
ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, p. 384, 11 ff. – On the text cf. C. Hein (1985), pp. 318f. – On Kindī cf. E.
Tornero Poveda (1992).
31 Min kalām Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā, ed. and transl. H. Daiber (1990b), 80 v 15–81 r 4; cf. the com-
mentary by H. Daiber (1990b), pp. 124 and 128.
32 S. n. 27.
96 chapter 8
Politics only a part seems to have been available to the Arabs, in a paraphrase
or abridgement written in the Hellenistic or Roman period.33
844 Nevertheless, the Fihrist by Ibn an-Nadīm lists several “political books”
(kutubuhū as-siyāsiyāt) by Kindī,34 among them a treatise on “politics” (siy-
āsa) and another one on the “government of the people” (siyāsat al-ʿāmma) –
both are lost. The rest of the listed treatises primarily discusses ethical themes,
including the virtues of the individual. This interest of Kindī in ethics as the
main feature of politics can be confirmed from his preserved work. In his Ris-
āla fī ḥudūd al-ašyāʾ wa-rusūmihā35 Kindī betrays knowledge of the Platonic-
Aristotelian anthropology,36 of the soul–body dichotomy and of the Platonic
tripartition of the soul into a reasonable, a desiring and an irascible part. These
parts cause the four Platonic cardinal virtues:37 “Wisdom” (ḥikma), “temper-
ance” (ʿiffa), “courage” (naǧda), and “justice” (ʿadl). If the “equilibrium” (iʿtidāl)
in them is disturbed, the opposite of them is caused, i.e. vices. “Real virtue” (al-
faḍīla al-ḥaqqiyya) is part of “ethics in the soul” and also part of its “righteous”
(ʿadl) “acting” (afʿāl an-nafs).38 This Platonic-Aristotelian conception of ethics
also appears in the sayings ascribed to Kindī.39 His Risāla fī alfāẓ Suqrāṭ40 and
his Risāla fī Alcibiades wa-Suqrāṭ41 describe Socrates as an ideal of moderation
and spiritual values, which are superior to worldly possession.42 Kindī’s interest
in the figure of Socrates reveals his sympathy with this conception of ethics. In
a similar manner, his treatise On the Means to Drive Away Sorrow (Risāla fī l-ḥīla
li-dafʿ al-aḥzān), which in fact reproduces a lost Hellenistic treatise,43 advises
the neglect of worldly things and concentration on the intelligible world by
33 Cf. S. Pines (1986), pp. 146–156.

34 Ed. G. Flügel, p. 260, 1–6 / ed. Riḍā Taǧaddud, pp. 319 and 812 / Engl. transl. B. Dodge,
p. 623; cf. G. N. Atiyeh (1966), pp. 195 f.
35 Ed. M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya I, pp. 177–179; French commented
tranlation by D. Gimaret in Al-Kindī, Cinq épîtres (1976), pp. 37 and 65–68 / Engl. transl.
by P. Adamson and P. E. Pormann (2012), pp. 307–309. The passage is not in the version
edited by F. Klein-Franke (1982).
36 Cf. Plato, Rep., 4. 435 B ff.; Laws, 653 A–C; Aristotle, On the Soul, 432 a 25, and above all
Nicomachean Ethics, 1102 b 28 ff.; 1116 b 23 ff. and 1119 b.
37 Cf. Plato, Rep., 4. 435 B ff.
38 Ed. M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, Rasāʾil I, p. 179, 4 ff. – Cf. G. N. Atiyeh (1980).
39 Preserved in Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī, Muntaḫab Ṣīwān al-ḥikma, ed. D. M. Dunlop,
pp. 246–248, esp. p. 248 / Engl. transl. in G. N. Atiyeh (1966), pp. 239–257.
40 M. Fakhry (1977), pp. 45–50.
41 MS Köprülü 1608, fol. 21 v 11–22 r 1.
42 Cf. G. N. Atiyeh (1966), pp. 123ff., esp. pp. 133ff.; I. Alon (1991), pp. 131ff. (references
quoted with the abbreviations KAS and KKS). – The Arabic texts with translation can
be found in I. Alon (1995).
43 Editions s. n. 24.
“imitating God”.44 This is attained through the human virtues, by our goodness
in behaviour and act. If we neglect worldly things, we will not be “unlucky”
(šaqiyy) in the hereafter, we will be “near to our Creator” and will “know Him”.45
Kindī’s political philosophy combines Platonic-Aristotelian features with
Neoplatonic trends and appears to be restricted to an individualistic ethics of
the divine soul, to the behaviour of man as striving for happiness46 in the here-
after, by neglecting the world, and by increasing knowledge of spiritual things –
of his Creator. It is not exclusively contemplative. In its concept of “wisdom”
(ḥikma) it implies man’s righteous action, in relation to his fellow being, as a
means to a higher, spiritual goal.
Abū Zayd al-Balḫī
After Kindī and before Fārābī, the political philosophers par excellence, the
following authors of books on “politics” (siyāsa) are listed in the Fihrist of
Ibn an-Nadīm: The historian Aḥmad Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr (204/819–280/893),
the Christian translator Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (ca. 205/820–300/912), Kindī’s student
Saraḫsī (220/835–286/899), his contemporary ʿUbayd Allāh Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn
Ṭāhir (223/838–300/913) and Abū Zayd al-Balḫī (ca. 236/850–323/934).47 As far
as the preserved fragments allow a judgement, they do not take up and develop
Kindī’s Platonic-Aristotelian idea of politics as ethics and seem to follow mainly
the above-described Persian heritage as reflected in the | “mirrors of princes”: 845
Good people can be guided by “making them interested” (tarġīb) through pleas-
urable things, and ordinary people can be guided by means of “intimidation”
(tarhīb).48 To this manner of leading Abū Zayd al-Balḫī added the concept49
of maṣlaḥa (“welfare”) of the people, which is a task of the ruler.50 Finally,
44 Cf. G. N. Atiyeh (1966), pp. 129 ff.

45 Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī, Muntaḫab, ed. D. M. Dunlop, pp. 248, 264–268ff. / Engl.
transl. in G. N. Atiyeh (1966), p. 225; cf. p. 127.
46 On the concept of happiness in Kindī (Fārābī, Ibn Bāǧǧa and Ibn Rušd) cf. M. Abdul
Haqq Ansari (1964). – Cf. M.-T. Druart (1993).
47 Cf. F. Rosenthal (1989), pp. 296 and 287 ff.
48 Cf. F. Rosenthal (1989), p. 294 and the references given there. F. Rosenthal compares
the terms tarġīb and tarhīb with Qurʾān 21:90.
49 Ultimately, it recurs to the Persian tradition of the “mirror of princes” (s. F. Rosenthal
(1989), pp. 293f.); at the same time, there is some parallelism with a doctrine of the
Muʿtazilites, who described God’s creative act as “welfare” (maṣlaḥa; cf. aṣlaḥ) of man,
cf. H. Daiber (1975), pp. 220 f.; esp. p. 232.
50 Cf. the fragment in Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, al-Baṣāʾir, ed. I. al-Kaylānī, 2/2, pp. 763–765
/ Engl. transl. F. Rosenthal (1989), pp. 289 f., and the comments by F. Rosenthal.
98 chapter 8
Balḫī’s classification of politics as one of the most important “crafts” – because

it allows the “cultivation” (ʿimāra) of a country and the “protection” (ḥimāya) of
its people – is directly or indirectly inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
(1094 a 27ff.).51 As in Aristotle the object of politics is not one single person, but
all the people and their country. Here, the welfare of the community outweighs
the interests of the individual. In contrast to Kindī’s approach to the ethical
behaviour of the individual, the virtue of humanity as a means to happiness is
neglected in the available fragment of Balḫī’s treatise. Contrary to Balḫī’s pupil
Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī,52 the available text does not mention the importance of
religion, especially of the Islamic religion, which, according to ʿĀmirī, is super-
ior to other religions and a moral guide for the individual in the perfect state,
leading to individual improvement.
Qudāma Ibn Ǧaʿfar
Balḫī’s realistic attitude reappears in Qudāma Ibn Ǧaʿfar (259/873–between

320/932 and 336/948), Kitāb al-ḫarāǧ, ch. 8 (on as-Siyāsa).53 Like Balḫī, he
combines Persian, Islamic and Greek traditions.54 His definition of politics,
however, is different and emphasizes the necessity of a leader because of the
differences between men,55 the role and ethical qualities of rulers56 and their
subjects,57 as well as the necessity of the consolidation of people inside a com-
munity, because they need each other.58 Reflections on science of politics and
its bases (asbāb/ʿilal, “causes”) are duties of the leader.59
51 Cf. F. Rosenthal (1989), p. 290.

52 Cf. F. Rosenthal (1956). – The text by ʿĀmirī, his Kitāb al-iʿlām (Engl. transl. F. Rosen-
thal, pp. 46–52), can be found in the edition by A. ʿA. Ḥ. Ġurāb, pp. 151–161. – On ʿĀmirī’s
view of religion as superior to knowledge and on his harmonization of philosophy and
religion cf. E. K. Rowson (1988), pp. 19 ff.
53 Ed. by M. al-Ḥiyārī, as-Siyāsa min kitāb al-ḫarāǧ wa ṣināʿat al-kitāba. – The complete
version of Qudāma’s Kitāb al-ḫarāǧ is now available in a facsimile edition (1989).
54 Cf. M. al-Ḥiyārī (1983), pp. 91 ff. – F. Rosenthal (1989), pp. 296f.
55 Ed. M. al-Ḥiyārī, pp. 49 ff.
59 Ed. M. al-Ḥiyārī, pp. 53 ff. – Cf. M. al-Ḥiyārī (1983), pp. 97f.
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī
The treatment of politics by Qudāma Ibn Ǧaʿfar presupposes an advanced stage

of discussion. State, ruler and ruled call for a new definition and evaluation,
inspired by and orientated to new developments in Islamic intellectual his-
tory. Politics became a part of ethics, a development which, under the influ-
ence of Aristotle, had already started in Kindī and was built up to a unique
system of political philosophy by Qudāma’s contemporary Fārābī (258/872–
339/950 or 951). This philosopher (s. below) developed, under the influence
of Aristotle, the Peripatetic tradition, Plato and Neoplatonic trends, a philo-
sophical system which at the same time is a reaction to current discussions
on the role of the Imām: Must his knowledge be based on divine inspiration
and does prophecy confirm political authority? These problems arose in discus-
sions between the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī and the well-known physician
and philosopher Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. Their disputes took place in Rayy between
318/930 and 320/932 or 933 or perhaps already before 313/925 in the presence of
the Governor Mardāwīǧ. These discussions are mirrored in Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s
book The Proofs of Prophecy (Aʿlām an-nubuwwa).60 It shows | that Abū Bakr ar- 846
Rāzī denied the existence and value of prophecy: Man can obtain knowledge
on his own, he has no need of an authority, for example a prophet, and can
learn from the ancestors, previous scholars and philosophers, even from their
mistakes.61 An example is Socrates, who is called “our Imām” in Abū Bakr ar-
Rāzī’s as-Sīrat al-falsafiyya:62 Even if Socrates is not the perfect man as he is
commonly described, he is a philosophical model for man’s way from extrem-
ism to moderation (through asceticism), to morality by acquiring knowledge
and practising justice in society. This way releases the soul from the darkness
of this world, and might save man for the world to come. The Sīrat al-falsafiyya,
“the philosophical way of life”, is once described in a Neoplatonic manner as
“becoming godlike as far as man is capable to that” (“at-tašabbuh bi-llāh – ʿazza
wa-ǧalla – bi-qadri mā fī ṭāqati l-insān”).63 Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī did not develop
60 Ed. by S. Al-Sawy / Reedition with Engl. transl. by T. Khalidi. – On the text cf. H. Daiber
(1989).
61 H. Daiber (1989), p. 91.
62 Ed. P. Kraus in Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, Rasāʾil falsafiyya, pp. 97–111. – A reprint with introduc-
tion by M. Mohaghegh appeared in Tehran in 1964. – Engl. transl. in A. J. Arberry
(1967). – On the text cf. here F. Rosenthal (1940), p. 388; L. E. Goodman (1971); C. W.
Shawer (1973), pp. 38ff.; 62 and 68; G. Strohmaier (1974); A. Bausani (1981), pp. 9–13;
I. Alon (1990), pp. 48 and 51 f.; C. E. Butterworth (1993b); (1993c).
63 As-Sīra al-falsafiyya, ed. P. Kraus (Rasāʾil falsafiyya), p. 108, 8f. – Cf. C. E. Butterworth
(1993b).
100 chapter 8
these soteriological aspects in his other available works, nor their relevance
for political philosophy. His Spiritual Physic (aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī)64 expounds
Plato (especially Timaeus) and Galen.65 Within a “hedonistic” philosophy the
moral virtues of the soul restrain desire with the help of the reason as the
only guide to proper behaviour. Pleasure is the abolition of pain, of distress
caused by desire. As such it is a return to the original state of relaxation by
moderation and by minimization of desire.66 This ethics of the soul can har-
monize with “leadership” (riʾāsa) and assist and strengthen it. Actions based
on it belong to The Symptoms of Fortune and Political Success, as Abū Bakr ar-
Rāzī entitled a small political treatise.67 According to this treatise, which is our
only source of his remarks on political philosophy, additional symptoms are
intuitive knowledge,68 love for leadership, “justice” (ʿadl), excellent “truthful-
ness” (ṣidq), “perception” (ḥiss) and “memory” (iddikār) of the soul; whoever
is “successful” (muwaffaq) and “shown the right way” (musaddad) through “a
divine power” (quwwa ilāhiyya) becomes an “outstanding” person ( fāḍil) and
leader, as he is required by the people. There must be a conformity between the
people and their leader. Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s remark on the “divine power” that
makes man a leader, is quite interesting: The leader is dependent on it and at
the same time he needs his own insight, the intuition of reason.
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s high estimation of reason as a principle of ethical philo-

sophy and his not uncritical high esteem for ancient philosophers – espe-
64 Ed. P. Kraus, Rasāʾil falsafiyya, pp. 1–96; M. Fakhry (1979), pp. 27–64 / Engl. transl. A. J.
Arberry (1950). – For textcritical notes cf. D. Gutas (1997). – On the text cf. M. Mohag-
hegh (1967) and the interpretation by L. E. Goodman (1971); L. E. Goodman (1973),
pp. 31 ff. – The text by Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī inspired Miskawayh’s chapter on “health of the
soul”, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 175ff. (cf. H. H. Lauer (1984), pp. 76f.) and
was refuted by the Ismailite Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. ca. 411/1020 or 1021), al-Aqwāl
aḏ-ḏahabiyya (several editions s. bibliography).
65 On the Galenic sources (above all Περὶ ἀλυπίας = Maqāla fī nafy al-ġamm = Kitāb fī ṣarf al-
iġtimām, which is lost in the Greek original and of which only fragments are preserved;
cf. M. Ullmann (1970), p. 65, and above s. n. 24). – On Rāzī’s ethics cf. T. de Boer (1920),
pp. 3 ff.; M. M. Bar-Asher (1989) and H. Daiber (2017), §5.1, pp. 401–405.
66 Cf. L. E. Goodman (1971) and L. E. Goodman (1973).
67 Maqāla fī amārāt iqbāl wa-d-dawla, ed. P. Kraus, Rasāʾil (pp. 135–138), p. 137, 3ff. – An
Italian summary can be found in A. Bausani (1981), pp. 21f. – On the translation of dawla
cf. F. Rosenthal in EI2 II, col. 178 a.
68 Ed. P. Kraus, Rasāʾil, p. 136, 6 f.
cially for Socrates as “leader” (Imām) – was strongly contradicted by his Ismail-
ite opponent Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 322/934) in his book The Proofs of Prophecy.
This work follows Muʿtazilite,69 Zaidite70 and Ismailite71 tradition, according to
which people are imperfect and therefore require a leader whose perfect know-
ledge is based on prophetic inspiration.72 People have different opinions and
are commanded by God (Qurʾān 3:93 (87)) to “examine” (al-naẓar) and to “fol-
low what is most excellent, suitable, true, and necessary”.73 There is no equality
among men, in contrast to the Kharijites, who, in accordance with ancient
Arab egalitarianism, | defended the equality of men and did not attribute to 847
the leader of a community any charisma or make him primus inter pares.74 In
accordance with the Hanbalites,75 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī here explicitly criticized
the Kharijites, their radicalism in belief (taʿammuq fī d-dīn), which, according
to him, cannot be compared with “independent judgement” (iǧtihād).76 He
concludes that there are different classes of men with regard to their intelli-
gence, insight, and power of distinction and perception. Men are not equally
created in their nature, as for instance animals are, which do not differ (tata-
fāḍalu) in their perception of what is needed by them. Every class of animals is
equal by nature with regard to their awareness of the obligation to look for food
and to reproduce. There are no differences, as they exist in differing classes of
men, concerning their intelligence and insight.77
Men can be divided into two classes, into those who “know” (ʿālim) and
those who “learn” (mutaʿallim), into “leaders” (imām) and people “guided” by
them (maʾmūm).78 God forgives the weak, who have not the same obligation
as the strong ones;79 “it is possible that God bestows His wisdom and mercy
on men, chooses them from His creation, makes them prophets, helps them,
69 Cf. Ǧāḥiẓ, Maqālat az-Zaydiyya, ed. ʿA. S. Hārūn, Rasāʾil al-Ǧāḥiẓ IV, p. 320, 3ff. / German
transl. C. Pellat (1967), pp. 104 ff.
70 Cf. e.g. Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm (ca. 168/785–245/860) and cf. B. Abrahamov (1987).
71 Cf. W. Madelung (1977), pp. 54 ff.; S. N. Makarem (1967); S. N. Makarem (1972),
pp. 35 ff. – A later example is the Ismailite Abū l-Fawāris Aḥmad Ibn Yaʿqūb, Risāla fī l-
imāma. Cf. edition and translation by S. N. Makarem (1977).
72 Cf. Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 301, 11 ff. and 314 ff.
73 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 36, 4–6.
74 I. Goldziher (1988), pp. 138f. = Muslim Studies I, pp. 130f.; W. M. Watt and M. E. Mar-
mura (1985), pp. 27 ff.
75 Cf. H. Laoust (1958), pp. 55 f.
76 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 43, 6 ff.
77 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 185, 6–10; cf. p. 61, 3 ff.
78 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 6, 21 ff.; 8, 7 f.; 55; 72, 5 ff. and 184, 12ff.
79 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 64 f.
102 chapter 8
and gives them prophecy”.80 Because of their intellectual differences people

require a leader who is elected by God and equipped with divine knowledge. A
prophet is the divinely inspired leader par excellence. People must obey him,
the teacher of the divinely revealed law.81 Otherwise they must be “forced”
to “accept the external forms of (the prophetic) prescriptions”.82 Neverthe-
less, men have the capacity to choose.83 Who does not obey the prophetic
guidance is “ignorant” (ǧāhil), “vicious” (ṭāliḥ), “desecrating” (muntahik) and
unwise84 and causes enmity and injustice.85 People without knowledge love
power and struggle for wordly things,86 “they have preferred the world to reli-
gion, even though they are convinced of the reward and punishment of those
to whom these are promised and threatened”.87 Wars do not arise primarily for
the sake of belief, but because of the insatiability and avarice of men for worldly
things. They are “kept in check” ( yuqhar) by religion, by the divinely inspired
religious leader.88 Men cannot attain knowledge and judgement by their own
“inventiveness” (istinbāṭ).89 The divinely inspired leader teaches them to dis-
tinguish between truth and error and to find the true meaning of the religious
symbols, of the “external” forms by way of “interpretaion” (taʾwīl).90 Among
the prophetic leaders Prophet Mohammed has the highest rank and is per-
fect in his “intellect” (ʿaql), magnanimity, patience, leadership and guidance
of all people.91 In his “good qualities” (šamāʾil, ḥilya) the Prophet appears as an
ideal of perfect moral life.92 He is the bearer of prophetic knowledge, equipped
848 with the | Platonic cardinal virtues of wisdom, abstinence, courage and justice,
which appear combined with the Aristotelian happy “mean” (μεσότης).93 Who-
ever follows him understands the meaning of the religious laws, avoids error
80 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 8, 8–10; cf. pp. 183, 15 ff. and 185, 2ff.
82 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 111, 9 ff., with reference to Qurʾān 8:39–40.
83 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 111, 13 ff., with reference to Qur’ān 2:256–257.
86 Cf. Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 173, 4 f. and 186, 6 ff.
88 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 189, 1 f.; cf. pp. 189, 14 f. and 188, 13ff.
89 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 273 ff.
90 Cf. H. Daiber (1989), pp. 97 f.
91 Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 73, 17–19.
92 Cf. Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 77–93. – Abū Ḥātim keeps to the orthodox picture of the
Prophet; cf. T. Andrae (1918), pp. 190 ff. and 245 ff.
93 Cf. H. Daiber (1989), pp. 98 f. – On the term μεσότης = iʿtidāl (cf. Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy,
pp. 85 f.) cf. C. Bürgel (1967).
and controversy, and so can attain “salvation” (naǧāt).94 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī
keeps to the superiority of Prophet Mohammed, but at the same time defends
the universality of his laws. Religion and prophetic knowledge are common to
all people and nations and not a privilege of one nation.95
Fārābī
Inequality of the people in society requires a leader, a “teacher” of univer-

sal knowledge. This is not the result of the leader’s own inventiveness, but
it is based on divine revelation. This idea reappers shortly after Abū Ḥātim
ar-Rāzī’s discussions with Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī in the political philosophy of Fārā-
bī (258/872–339/950 or 951), also called “the Second Teacher” (after Aristole).
Fārābī developed these ideas into an elaborate system of political philosophy,96
which in its originality betrays a unique combination of Platonic and Aris-
totelian elements on the basis of Ismailite doctrines about the Imamate.97
Like Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, Fārābī distinguishes within society between people
who can be classified as “knowing” or as “learning” people. Even more than Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, he stresses among the listed twelve qualifications,98 besides the
ethical features, the intellectual qualities of the “first ruler” and Imām, who is
“understanding and conceiving very well all he is told, so that it becomes com-
prehensible to him according to the matter itself”.99 To the Ismailite notion of
interpretation of religious symbols, of parables indicating the same universal
meaning of differing external forms, the laws,100 Fārābī adds the Aristotelian
doctrine of conception and understanding based on Aristotle’s Organon and
Rhetoric.101 According to him, “religion” (milla) is a description of the “insights”
and “actions” which are imposed upon society by its rulers in the shape of
laws.102 This explanation is combined with doctrines taken from Aristotle’s
94 Cf. Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 110, 9 ff.

95 Cf. H. Daiber (1989), pp. 95 f. and 99 f.
96 Cf. the articles by F. M. Najjar (1958; 1960; 1961; 1978; 1980). – M. Mahdi in History of Polit-
ical Philosophy, 182ff. – M. Galston (1990). – A survey of the relevant Fārābīan texts can
be found in E. I. J. Rosenthal (1955); (1962), pp. 122–142.
97 On the Ismailite background of Fārābī’s political philosophy see H. Daiber (1991b).
98 Cf. R. Walzer (1985), pp. 445 f.; H. Daiber (1986a), pp. 6f.
99 al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 16 ff. / ed. R. Walzer, p. 246, 12ff.; cf. H.
Daiber (1991b). – On the edition and translation by R. Walzer cf. M. Mahdi (1990).
100 S. n. 95.
101 Cf. H. Daiber (1986b), pp. 7 f.; H. Daiber (1991b), pp. 145f.
102 Cf. H. Daiber (1986b), pp. 11 f.; C. E. Butterworth (1987), pp. 232ff.
104 chapter 8
epistemology, psychology and ethics, and from Alexander of Aphrodisias as

commentator on Aristotle’s De anima.103 Religion is an imitation, a picture
of philosophy that can prove and justify the “insights” of religion; it mirrors
Aristotle’s practical “prudence” (σωφροσύνη) as developed in the Nicomachean
Ethics. Religion is an aspect of philosophy which uses religion as its instrument:
Through religion philosophy realizes itself, becomes moral insight and prac-
tical prudence, leading to “supreme happiness” (as-saʿāda al-quṣwā).104
Here, Fārābī presupposes the epistemological and Aristotle-inspired doc-
trine, that the universals of philosophy are only imaginable to human think-
ing by using the imaginative powers which conceive them through “imitation”
(muḥākāt) of the perceptible things, the particulars: On the basis of the Aris-
totelian interrelation between thought and perception, man can only think and
849 be a philospher by using pictures “imitating” | the intelligible things. Ultimately,
they are inspired by the divine intellectus agens; it transmits them to a prophet,
who thus – in Platonic terms in his “assimilation” to God105 – becomes author-
ized as the ruler of a “perfect state”. In this doctrine philosophy appears as prac-
tical philosophy in the shape of religion, of “insights” and “actions” imposed on
society in the shape of laws by the divinely inspired ruler, the prophet-ruler.106
In contrast to Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, who considered Mohammed as a prophet
with the highest rank, Fārābī is silent on the best prophet and speaks only in
general terms of the “prophet”, Imām and “first ruler”. Apparently he did so,
because he strictly kept to the Ismailite notion of the universality of true reli-
gion, of the belief in one single God and in the justness of His laws, common
to all nations.107
Fārābī also took up the Ismailite concept of a society consisting of different
ranks, which apparently induced him to modify similar ideas108 from Plato’s
Republic and Laws.109 At the same time he stressed the Aristotelian notion
of man as ζῷον πολιτικόν, who wants to be part of an association, of the city-
state, and needs his fellow citizens.110 The cooperation of people, who obey
103 For details here and in the following cf. H. Daiber (1986a) and (1986b).
104 On the concept of happiness in Fārābī cf. M. Shahjahan (1985).
105 Cf. H. Daiber (1986a), p. 17 n. 79. – On the Platonic notion of “assimilation” to God cf.
Plato, Theaet., 176 B; L. V. Berman (1961).
106 Cf. H. Daiber (1986a), pp. 11 ff.
107 Cf. H. Daiber (1991b), pp. 147 f.
108 Cf. R. Walzer (1985), pp. 424 ff.
109 Cf. F. A. Sankari (1970); cf. S. A. Sajjad (1983). – On Fārābī’s hierarchical structure of
the feudalistic city (and cosmos) and on the Porphyrian principle of its division cf. M.
Maroth (1978).
110 Cf. R. Walzer (1985), pp. 429 ff.
the divinely inspired philosopher-king, leads to real happiness in the utopian

perfect state111 through virtues, primarily intellectual virtues and through good
deeds by keeping to the law, the Sharia. Therefore, the study of politics becomes
a guide to man’s good actions and behaviour112 and it is necessary as a means
to individual ultimate happiness. It enables man to distinguish between good
and bad.113 At the same time, philosophers like Plato and Aristotle prove the
correctness and justness of the religious law, the Sharia.
This islamization of Greek political philosophy implies the already men-
tioned universal validity of religious laws. Therefore, Fārābī does not restrict
himself to the Platonic description of the perfect state and the imperfect
states.114 He is more interested in the description of the perfect philosopher-
ruler and legislator, who bases his knowledge on the prophetic inspiration from
God and thus becomes a guide to the perfect virtuous behaviour of man in
society, in the perfect state. As a teacher of men, the perfect ruler is not only
addressing philosophically minded elites. True philosophy is practical philo-
sophy in the state and as such “religion”, which aims at the fulfilment of the
“law” (šarīʿa) in the virtuous behaviour of the individual. Therefore, religion is
not more than a disguise of its real insight, of philosophy. Religion appears to be
an alternative language in Fārābī’s summary of Plato’s Laws.115 Religion in the
perfect state is the cornerstone of politics and the means of the individual to
reach ultimate happiness with the cooperation of the fellow citizen. The final
stage is the release of the soul from matter and its eternal afterlife.116
111 Fārābī is the first Muslim philosopher to have developed the utopian idea of the perfect
state; cf. H. Simon (1963); (1971).
112 Cf. Fārābī, Falsafat Aflāṭūn, ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, chapters 4ff. / Engl. transl.
M. Mahdi (1969), pp. 57ff. – The text used various Platonic sources: Cf., besides the notes
by F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, Isaac Rabinowitz in American Journal of Philo-
logy 67 (1946), pp. 76–79 (review of Fārābī, Falsafat Aflāṭūn, ed. F. Rosenthal and R.
Walzer).
113 Cf. besides Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāḍila, the following works: Kitāb at-tanbīh ʿalā sabīl as-
saʿāda (French transl. D. Mallet (1989)); Kitāb taḥṣīl as-saʿāda (Engl. transl. M. Mahdi
(1969), pp. 13–50); Fuṣūl muntazaʿa, transl. into Persian in Quṭb ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī (634/1236–
710/1311), Durrat at-tāǧ li-ġurrat ad-dubāǧ, ed. S. M. Miškāt (cf. S. H. Nasr (1974), p. 249);
Kitāb as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya and his Risāla fī s-siyāsa (German transl. G. Graf (1902)),
an ethical treatise on man’s behaviour towards those who are above him, below him or
equal to him in rank, and on man’s own conduct.
114 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1972), pp. 164–166; E. I. J. Rosenthal (1973).
115 Talḫīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭūn. Cf. F. Gabrieli (1949); L. Strauss (1957); O. Leaman (1985),
pp. 195ff., and H. Daiber (1986b), pp. 17f. – On a summary of this Talḫīṣ, written by Abū
l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, cf. T.-A. Druart (1977).
116 Cf. Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. R. Walzer, section 5, ch. 16, and commentary pp. 457ff.
106 chapter 8
Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ
This aim of Fārābī’s political philosophy slightly later is shared by the Rasāʾil
Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (“Epistles of the Sincere Brethren”), an encyclopaedia com-
850 piled before 349/959–960 by anonymous authors and | sympathizers of the
Ismailites. Their didactic purpose is to purify the soul and to improve the char-
acter through the knowledge of “intellectual things” (al-umūr al-ʿaqliyya).117
Knowledge leads to salvation in the hereafter. In addition, the Rasāʾil contain
incidental passages which reveal rather complex ideas of political philosophy
based on Fārābī.118 People are divided into three groups: The “elite” (ḫawāṣṣ)
which can know the “mysteries of religion”; the “masses” (ʿawāmm) which have
access to the exoteric aspect of religion, namely the religious obligations like
prayer, fasting, etc.; finally the “middle” class (mutawassiṭūn) who can con-
template the religious dogma, interpret the Qurʾān in its literal and allegorical
sense and can use “independent judgement” (iǧtihād). The inequality of people
induces the Iḫwān to distinguish seven classes: Craftsmen, businessmen, con-
struction engineers, rulers, servants, unemployed, and scholars of religion and
other sciences. The privileged and rich people are attacked, because they take
no moral responsibility for their poor fellow beings, who are content with little
and strongly believe in the hereafter. The Iḫwān criticize social conditions of
their time and the immorality of people. They list the imperfections of several
professions, including the unjust ruler and the caliph who is not appointed by
the designation of the Prophet.119 Social and moral grievances are caused by the
inequality of living beings120 who do not help one another. This necessitates a
ruling authority, the prophet-ruler, who establishes the divine law, the Nāmūs,
which he received through divine revelation.121 As to Fārābī,122 he must have
twelve qualities.123 He and his designated successors of prophetic descent, the
Imams,124 are assisted by eight classes of people: The reciters and transmitters
117 Rasāʾil III, p. 241, 6 / German transl. and commentary by S. Diwald (1975), pp. 203 and
206–208.
118 On the following cf. the details in H. Enayat (1977). – For a detailed comparison of Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ and Fārābī cf. O. A. Abouzeid (1987).
119 Cf. H. Enayat (1977), pp. 34 ff.
120 Cf. the parable on the animal rebellion against human domination in Rasāʾil II, pp. 182ff.
/ Engl. transl. L. E. Goodman (1978) / Spanish transl. E. Tornero Poveda (1984) and
German transl. A. Giese (1990).
121 Cf. H. Enayat (1977), pp. 39 ff.
122 al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. and Engl. transl. R. Walzer, pp. 246–247. – Cf. n. 98.
123 Rasāʾil IV, pp. 128 f.; cf. H. Enayat (1977), p. 42.
124 Cf. Y. Marquet (1962).
of the Qurʾān; the transmitters of prophetical sayings; the experts of the divine
law; the commentators on the text of the Qurʾān; the warriors; caliphs and lead-
ers of the community; the ascetics and the worshippers of God; the allegorical
interpreters of the Qurʾān and the theologians.125
Contrary to the Shiʿite doctrine of ġayba (“occultation”), the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ
maintain that people have an imam even when they “refuse to acknowledge”
(munkirūn) his existence.126 Imams are the caliphs who combine in their per-
son the functions of prophecy and kingship, like David, Solomon, Joseph and
Mohammed (who, however, is not an imām).127 But the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ are
aware that a prophetic state like that of Mohammed must still be fulfilled.
Under the influence of the Shiʿite Imamate and Fārābī’s Platonic-Aristotelian
political philosophy they developed a utopian state, the “virtuous spiritual
state” (madīna fāḍila rūḥāniyya)128 in contrast to the “government of evil peo-
ple”. This utopian state consists of virtuous, wise and sincere men who in a
hierarchy of “artisans”, “leaders”, “kings” and “divine people” help one another
to reach the ultimate happiness in the hereafter.129 People, the artisans, need
the guidance of the divine law, the Nāmūs, because man is a combination of
four souls, the vegetative, animal, rational and angelic soul, which reflect four
stages of | man’s way to perfection and which let man waver between good and 851
bad; in accordance with man’s varying natural “disposition” (ǧibilla) includ-
ing his intelligence,130 his rational soul induces him to acquire knowledge, to
obey the divine law as revealed to the Prophet and taught by the imams, and
to realize the “virtuous spiritual state”.131 In their view of the utopian perfect
state the Iḫwān indicate some optimism as regards their belief in the pro-
gress of mankind and in cyclical revolutionary changes. Things are in motion
and change, primarily because man can mould his environment with his will
and with his increasing knowledge of “prophetic” (as-siyāsa an-nabawiyya)
and “kingly politics” (as-siyāsa al-mulūkiyya), of “popular politics” (as-siyāsa al-
ʿāmmiya) related to the ruling of the masses, of “individual politics” (as-siyāsa
al-ḫāṣṣiyya), i.e. economy, and of “personal politics” (as-siyāsa aḏ-ḏātiyya), i.e.
ethics of men.132 At the same time, however, his natural disposition depends
125 Rasāʾil I, pp. 249 f.; cf. H. Enayat (1977), p. 42.

126 Rasāʾil IV, p. 199, 20 ff.
127 Cf. H. Enayat (1977), p. 45.
128 Rasāʾil IV, p. 220, 7.
129 Rasāʾil IV, pp. 220 f.; cf. H. Enayat (1977), p. 44.
130 H. Enayat (1977), p. 29.
131 Cf. H. Enayat (1977), pp. 40 f. – On the conflicting parts of the soul cf. S. Diwald (1972),
pp. 49 ff. (lists the parallels in Fārābī, possibly the source of the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ).
132 Rasāʾil I, p. 207; cf. H. Enayat (1977), pp. 32–34. – This division clearly shows the Aris-
108 chapter 8
on the constitution of his body, on the geographical environment, on his cleav-

ing to transmitted ideas of religion and on the astrological ordinances.133 The
political philosophy of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ appears to be a complex amalgam-
ation of contemporary politics and Fārābīan notions of the perfect state in a
system which is orientated at traditional Islamic eschatology and at the Neo-
platonic notion of the soul. In the virtuous state, where the divine law of the
Prophet or his successors is obeyed, the soul frees itself from the body and thus
will reach ultimate happiness in the hereafter. The first beginning is a fraternal
community in this world, a community which remains united in its obedience
to the divine law and thus strives, with the cooperation of its members, after
the “welfare of religion and the world” (ṣalāḥ ad-dīn wa-d-dunyā).134
In their discussions on the community, its ruler and the ruled, the Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ did not pay too much attention to the individual and his ethical beha-
viour.135 The main purpose of their Rasāʾil was an encyclopaedic education of
man to a new consciousness, which should enable him to avoid blind obedi-
ence to a wicked ruler, to develop an “independent judgement” (iǧtihād) and
thus find the way to ultimate happiness by growing knowledge of the “intellec-
tual things”.
As the political ideas of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ are rather scattered in the Rasāʾil,
they did not influence later authors very much, although they share with Fārābī
the originally Ismailite136 idea of the universality of prophecy as the ultimate
source of human knowledge, the idea of inequality of the people and the ideas
about the ruler and the ruled.
Miskawayh
A new approach can be found in Miskawayh (born in Rayy and said to have
died 421/1030), who – as will be shown – stresses “personal politics” – a term
used by the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (s. above) – and developed an ethical model of the
individual in the community. His Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq,137 like the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ,
totelian tripartition of practical philosophy in politics, economy and ethics (s. n. 31), with
an additional beginning section on prophetic and kingly politics.
133 Rasāʾil I, p. 229, 12 ff.; cf. H. Enayat (1977), pp. 26 ff.
134 Rasāʾil I, p. 223, 16.
135 Cf. I. R. Faruqi (1960).
136 S. above n. 100. The Ismailite impact on the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ seems to be much greater
than could be concluded from I. R. Netton (1991), ch. 6.
137 Ed. C. K. Zurayk (1966) / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk (1968). – Cf. H. Daiber in OLZ 67,
1972, col. 370–373; M. Arkoun (1970).
aims to educate man to good actions based on the Platonic cardinal virtues
and in accordance with knowledge: | “Wisdom” (ḥikma), which leads him to the 852
“spiritual things”,138 to “happiness” (as-saʿāda)139 and “calmness of the soul”140
by purification of the soul from “the physical things” (al-umūr aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya) and
from the “bodily desires” (šahawāt al-abdān).141 Therefore, Miskawayh called
his ethics also Book on the Purification (of the Soul) (Kitāb aṭ-ṭahāra).142 As
in Plato and above all in Aristotle,143 virtues are defined as “means” (iʿtidāl)
between two extremes. Thus, man’s justice to God, to his fellow beings and to
the ancestors, plays a crucial role in Miskawayh’s ethics.144 The virtues are pre-
scribed by “wisdom” (al-ḥikma), “law” (aš-šarīʿa) and “tradition” (as-sunna).145
Miskawayh is convinced that man’s character can be formed by “practice” (ʿāda,
tadarrub),146 but, because of inequality of the people,147 man needs the assist-
ance of his fellow being148 and must live together with him in “love” (maḥabba)
and “friendship” (ṣadāqa).149 In addition, the inequality of people is the very
reason why everyone must seek his own happiness150 by developing “the per-
fect character” (al-kamāl al-ḫulqī).151 Here, the welfare of the individual pre-
vails over the welfare of the state. The welfare of the individual requires vir-
tuous acts that lead to increasing likeness of man to God and to the return of
man’s soul to its divine origin.152
138 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 83.

139 Cf. also Miskawayh’s monograph as-Saʿāda fī falsafat al-aḫlāq, ed. ʿA. aṭ-Ṭūbǧī. – On the
concept of saʿāda in Miskawayh cf. M. Abdul Haqq Ansari (1963).
140 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 40, 5.
141 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 91, 18. – Cf. Plotinus, Enn. I 6.
142 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 91 f.
143 Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, De virtutibus et vitiis, Arabic transl. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, ed. M. Keller-
mann (1965), p. 59, 18 ff. / German transl. pp. 77–79 (not preserved in Greek). – On the
history of “mean” (μεσότης) in Islamic philosophical ethics cf. C. Bürgel (1967), p. 101.
144 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 105 ff. – Cf. Miskawayh, Risāla fī māhiyat al-ʿadl, ed. and transl. M. S.
Khan; M. Fakhry (1975).
145 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 62, 11.
146 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 31, 8.
147 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 46 ff.
148 As Miskawayh (ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 29, 8) formulates: inna l-insāna madanī bi-ṭ-ṭabʿ (cf.
ζῷον πολιτικόν in Aristotle, Politica I 1. 1253 a 2 ff.).
149 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 135 ff.
150 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 72, 10 ff.
151 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 40, 9.
152 Cf. H. Daiber (2020).
110 chapter 8
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī and Ġazālī
With his combination of Greek, Persian and Arabic traditions Miskawayh

deeply impressed later authors like Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5th/11th c.), Ġazālī
(450/1058–505/1111), Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ (wrote 655/1256),153 Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī
(597/1201–672/1274), Daw(w)ānī (830/1427–908/1502), and even Muḥammad
ʿAbduh (1265/1849–1323/1905).154 Here we should pay special attention to Mis-
kawayh’s younger fellow citizen of the town of Isfahan, Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī.155
His comprehensive book on aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa combines essential
ideas of Miskawayh with those of Fārābī156 and the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ and
offers a unique integration of Koranic passages confirming his philosophical
ethics. Because of their inequality, as we find it in the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (s.
above), people can be divided into elite, masses and middle class,157 and there-
fore need one another.158 As in Miskawayh, harmony among people is based
on love, friendship and justice.159 In addition, Rāġib follows Fārābī’s political
philosophy of the divinely inspired ruler. People need “prophets” (anbiyāʾ),160
because “most of the people are not able to get knowledge of what is useful and
153 In his “mirror of princes”, the Sulūk al-mālik fī tadbīr al-mamālik, cf. edition and study by
N. Takrītī (1980). – On the text cf. also M. Plessner (1928), pp. 30ff.; G. Richter (1932),
pp. 105 f.; D. M. Dunlop in his edition of Fārābī’s Fuṣūl muntazaʿa, p. 6 (on Fārābī’s Fuṣūl
as source); and H. K. Sherwani (1977), pp. 35–57 (considers wrongly Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ as a
thinker of the 3rd/9th century).
154 Cf. M. Arkoun, s.v. “Miskawayh” in EI2 VII (1991), col. 143 b, and on the mentioned authors
E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 210 ff.; F. Rahman (1985); P. Sprachman (1985); G. M. Wi-
ckens (1985); M. Fakhry (1991). – On Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī cf. also B. Badie (1977). – On
the influence of Miskawayh on Ġazālī cf. also C. K. Zurayk (1968), p. 207, remark on p. 157,
10 n. 2. – With the title Risāla fī dafʿ al-ġamm min al-mawt the text in Tahḏīb, ed. C. K.
Zurayk, pp. 209, 5–217, 9, is transmitted separately as a work attributed to Ibn Sīnā (ed.
A. F. M. van Mehren (1891)); cf. C. K. Zurayk (1968), p. 209, remark on p. 185, 10 n. 18 and
as anonymous Risāla fī l-ḫawf min al-mawt wa-ḥaqīqatihī wa ḥāl an-nafs baʿdahū, edited
from MS Paris 4946 by L. Cheikho (1911), Maqālāt falsafiyya, pp. 103–114, with an addi-
tional passage (= ed. L. Cheikho, pp. 114–117), which is derived from Miskawayh (= ed. C.
K. Zurayk, pp. 217, 10–221, 19). Both texts are identical with Kindī, Risāla fī l-ḥīla li-dafʿal-
aḥzān (s. n. 24).
155 On him cf. M. Fakhry (1991), pp. 176 ff.; H. Daiber (1991a).
156 Very influential appears to be Fārābī’s Kitāb at-Tanbīh ʿalā sabīl as-saʿāda; cf. Ṣ. M. Ḫalīfāt
(1990), p. 149.
157 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 163.
158 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 374.
159 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, pp. 364 f.
160 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, pp. 204 f.
harmful to them in the hereafter”.161 Miskawayh’s notion of law is specified as

“the honourable actions of law” (makārim aš-šarīʿa), as “most honourable reli-
gious duties” (ašraf al-ʿibādāt), as knowledge and action, which both require
purity of the soul and make man a “viceroy” (ḫalīfa) of God.162 Rāġib refers
to Qurʾān 2:30 and 6:165 and develops the Neoplatonic and Fārābīan notion
of ruling as “assimilation” to God: To be ḫalīfa means “to imitate the Creator
in ruling, according to human ability, namely by applying the noble qual-
ities of law”.163 A precondition of ḫilāfa and ʿibāda is man’s “earning” (taḥ-
ṣīl)164 his “livelihood” (maʿāš), which is classified in accordance with Qurʾān
11:61 (64) as “cultivation of earth” (ʿimārat al-arḍ).165 Thus, the task of man in
society becomes ʿimāra, ʿibāda and ḫilāfa.166 The ultimate aim is happiness
of the individual | in the hereafter, which cannot be reached without assist- 853
ance of the fellow being, and happiness in this world, in a community with
harmony, love and friendship. Rāġib’s ideas deeply impressed Ġazālī (Mīzān
al-ʿamal,167 Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn) and by this they became widespread in the
Islamic world. Different from his “mirror of princes”, his at-Tibr al-masbūk fī
naṣīḥat al-mulūk, Ġazālī aimed at a synthesis of the Sufi virtues of love of
God, of Koranic ethics and of the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as golden
mean.168 The mystical path of the believer, who inside an essentially Koranic-
eschatological world view keeps to the Islamic law, is the only way to perfection
and happiness in the hereafter. This notion thrusts Fārābī’s notion of society as
means to happiness of the citizen into the background. It mirrors a develop-
ment that, after Fārābī, increasingly gave political philosophy new accents. It
is akin to the Neoplatonic ἀπράγμων βίος-ideal of the philosopher, who prefer-
ably retreats from society.169 Already the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ included mys-
ticism in their philosophy170 and influenced the great philosopher Ibn Sīnā /
161 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 204, 4.

162 Cf. Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 59.
163 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 91, 5 f.; cf. p. 96, 8 f.
164 Cf. takassub in aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, pp. 380f.
165 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, p. 90, 11–13.
166 Aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, pp. 90, 11–91, 6.
167 Ed. S. Dunyā / French transl. H. Hachem (1945).
168 Cf. O. E. Chahine (1972), pp. 105 ff. – On at-Tibr al-masbūk fī naṣīḥat al-mulūk cf. T. M.
Muhammad (2008) and (2016).
169 This topic is discussed by the Nestorian Christian Ibn al-Ḫammār (330/942–407/1017) in
his Maqāla fī ṣifat ar-raǧul ar-faylasūf, ed. and transl. B. Lewin (1955). – On the text cf.
also J. L. Kraemer (1986), p. 128.
170 On their conception of philosophy cf. Rasāʾil III, pp. 325ff. / German transl. S. Diwald
(1975), pp. 427 ff.
112 chapter 8
Avicenna with their philosophical-scientific explanation of Sufism as a

means to purify the human soul.171
Ibn Sīnā
Ibn Sīnā (370/980–428/1037) from Bukhara gives in his allegory Ḥayy Ibn Yaq-
ẓān172 and in his poem On the Soul173 symbolical descriptions of the way, how
the soul returns from the chains of the body, and of the darkness of matter com-
pared to the heavenly light of the pure divine intellect. Therefore, the prophet is
a Sufi who proclaims the divine laws as a way to the mystical path174 which frees
the rational soul from the body and leads to the “vision” (mušāhada) of God.175
He has spontaneous perceptions and intuitions, and therefore he is higher than
the philosopher and not identical with Fārābī’s philosopher-king, imam and
first ruler; he administers man’s life in this world and in the hereafter.176 Man,
however, “cannot lead a proper life when isolated as a single individual”.177
He needs society, and because of the hierarchical structure of society – as in
Plato, it can be divided into rulers, artisans and guardians178 – its members
are dependent on one another. Therefore, there must be social relations and
justice between men; man must obey the lawgiver, the prophet, by “fulfilling his
duties” to God (ʿibādāt) and men (muʿāmalāt).179 Different from Plato’s Laws,
the Islamic Sharia is the only way of life in this world to the hereafter.180
Life on earth as a precondition for life in the hereafter explains Ibn Sīnā’s
interest in politics. Thus, much more than it can be found in Fārābī, community
as the context of men’s life is a precondition for human perfection. There-
171 On Ibn Sīnā’s knowledge of the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ cf. S. Diwald (1981).
172 Ed. by A. Amīn, pp. 40–49 / French transl. A.-M. Goichon (1959). – Cf. “Ḥayy B. Yaḳẓān”
in EI2 III.
173 Ed. and commented by F. A. Ḫulayf (1974), pp. 129–131 / French transl. A. Noureddine
(1961), pp. 30–36.
174 Cf. M. E. Marmura (1963); M. E. Marmura (1964).
175 Cf. M. E. Marmura (1985), p. 363.
176 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 144 ff. – On the qualities of a prophet and ruler cf.
pp. 152 ff.
177 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, II, p. 441, 4 f. / Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura in Medieval Polit-
ical Philosophy (1962), p. 99.
178 Aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, II, p. 447, 4 f. / Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura in Medieval Political Philo-
sophy, p. 104.
179 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 154 f.
180 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 148 ff.
fore, “citizens are made good so that cities can exist”, whereas “for Alfarabi,
cities exist to make men good”.181 Besides the remarks in his Fī aqsām al-
ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya,182 in his Fī iṯbāt an-nubuwwāt,183 and above all in the Šifāʾ,
al-Ilāhiyāt,184 an idea of Ibn Sīnā’s political philosophy can be found in his
treatise Fī s-siyāsa al-manziliyya.185 In accordance with his division of practical
philosophy into politics, ethics and economics in Aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya, he
first discusses the inequality of men | who need a ruler,186 then ethics,187 and 854
finally188 economics with the subdivisions successively discussing the admin-
istration of money, women, children and servants. Ibn Sīnā follows Bryson’s
Oeconomica,189 however, with a slightly differing sequence,190 new formula-
tions and Islamic examples. Ibn Sīnā handled his sources independently and
adds new considerations:191 For example in his Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, Ibn Sīnā recom-
mends taking care of the sick and infirm and of those unable to earn their live-
lihood. He explains, that rebellion is allowed, even against the virtuous caliph,
if he is inferior in power and intelligence: Here, political power appears to be
more important than the virtue of a pious but weak caliph. This realistic atti-
tude does not contradict, however, the necessity of harmony between state and
religion.
181 M. Galston (1979), p. 570.

182 Published in Tisʿ rasāʾil (1298/1881), pp. 71–80; ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn (1988), pp. 261–272 /
Engl. transl. M. Mahdi in Medieval Political Philosophy, pp. 95–97. – Analysis by L. Baur
(1903), pp. 346–349 (based on the Latin translation by Andrea Alpago, Avicennae opera
(Venice, 1546 / Reprint Westmead 1969), fol. 139–146).
183 Ed. M. E. Marmura; ed. ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn (1988), pp. 298–309 / Engl. transl. M. E. Mar-
mura in Medieval Political Philosophy, pp. 112–121.
184 Part 2, pp. 441–455 / Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, Medieval Political Philosophy, pp. 98–111
/ German transl. in M. Horten (1907). Cf. the comments by J. Kohler (1908–1909) and
by M. Galston (1979), who presents a comparison with Fārābī’s more idealistic polit-
ical philosophy. Avicenna’s political ideas described in this text influenced the medieval
author Francese Eiximenes, Regiment de la cosa publica (Valencia 1383); cf. U. Lindgren
(1980).
185 Several editions (s. bibliography); the latest edition is in ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn (1988),
pp. 232–260. – Cf. the remarks in ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn (1988), pp. 60ff.; M. Plessner (1928),
pp. 42 ff., and A. Ibrahim (1980).
186 Ed. ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn (1988), pp. 233–239.
187 Ed. ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn, pp. 240–245. – On Ibn Sīnā’s views about ethics cf. M. Abdul
Haqq Ansari (1962–1963); C. E. Butterworth (1987), pp. 238ff.; M. Fakhry (1991),
pp. 85 ff. and 207 ff.
188 Ed. ʿA. A. Šams ad-Dīn, pp. 246–258.
189 On this s. n. 23.
190 On which cf. M. Plessner (1928), p. 43.
114 chapter 8
The legislator must excel in the cardinal virtues of temperance, practical wis-
dom (related to actions in this world) and courage, which together result in
“justice” (ʿadāla), the “golden mean” (wasāṭa).192 If he combines with it “theor-
etical wisdom” (al-ḥikma an-naẓariyya) through the study of philosophy, “he is
happy” ( fa-qad saʿida / suʿida).193 And if he in addition has prophetical qualit-
ies, he becomes ḫalīfat Allāh, “God’s deputy” on earth. Although there might be
other “praiseworthy laws” (sunna ḥamīda), “the revealed divine laws” (as-sunna
an-nāzila) should be preferred to any other law and even imposed on other
cities by war, in case this can “restore the conditions of corrupted cities to “wel-
fare” (ṣalāḥ)”.194 Here, Ibn Sīnā presupposes the inequality of men in religion,
which reminds us of a similar statement by Bīrūnī: According to this contem-
porary of Ibn Sīnā, Hindus, Christians and Muslims cannot understand one
another, because of their inequality in religion, although there might be gen-
eral equality between man and man, and a common belief in one God.195 As in
Fārābī’s political philosophy, the ideal ruler remains a prophet or someone with
prophetical qualities. He becomes perfect not through his “theoretical wisdom”
but through his additional actions as a lawgiver and ruler; those pave the way,
the mystical path to his life in the hereafter, to the spiritual world of the intel-
lect.196 Who seeks after God thus becomes an “ascetic” (zāhid), someone who
“worships” God by ritual (ʿābid) and finally “knows” (ʿārif ) God. The ultimate
consequence of this doctrine, the total retreat from society, is not yet drawn
and remains for the Andalusian philosophers Ibn Bāǧǧa and his younger con-
temporary Ibn Ṭufayl.
Ibn Bāǧǧa
Ibn Bāǧǧa / Avempace, who was born in Zaragossa (488/1095–532/1138 or 533/

1139),197 knew Plato and Aristotle and the political philosophy of Fārābī. He is,
however, less interested in the preceding discussions on the ruler and the ruled,
192 On the mentioned terms and their Aristotelian origin s. n. 93.

193 Aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, II, p. 455, 14.
194 Aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyāt, II, p. 453, 14. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 155f. (instead of ǧamīla
read ḥamīda; the interpretation given there slightly differs from ours).
195 A. S. Khurshid (1979); cf. G. Strohmaier (1979).
196 Avicenna discussed his eschatological views mainly in his ar-Risāla al-aḍḥawiyya fī l-
maʿād (ed. and transl. F. Lucchetta (1969)) and in his al-Mabdaʾ wa-ʾl-maʿād (ed. ʿA. A.
Nūrānī). Cf. now the monograph by J. R. Michot (1986), esp. pp. 190ff.
197 On him cf. here the discussion in E. I. J. Rosenthal (1937); (1951); (1962), pp. 158–174; M.
Chemli (1969); M. Allard (1974); G. Zainaty (1979); O. Leaman (1980). – On Ibn Bāǧǧa’s
on law, justice and welfare of the community. He is convinced that virtuous

men as “experts” (ʿurafāʾ)198 might improve imperfect states “because social
relations (al-muʿāšara), which perfect the state, can | be improved by eth- 855
ical virtues (al-faḍāʾil aš-šakliyya)”.199 State and society, however, are no longer
preconditions for the attainment of ultimate happiness200 by the indvidual.
Resuming Fārābī’s notion of the virtuous man and philosopher, who sometimes
lives under a vicious rule and is “like a stranger in the world”,201 the notion of
the solitary philosopher, the Sufi, receives a positive accentuation: Not solely by
moral virtue as ultimate end, but exclusively in isolation from society, as mu-
tawaḥḥid, through “self-determination” (tadbīr)202 and contemplation of truth
he can seek ultimate happiness.203 Although people of a state need the author-
ity of the ʿurafāʾ, regents who have philosophical knowledge, separation from
society might become good under certain “circumstances” (bi-l-ʿaraḍ),204 espe-
cially in imperfect states which do not assist the individual in his search for hap-
piness. Mystical ascension to higher forms of knowledge, to liberation of the
soul from matter and to a “union” (ittiṣāl) with the divine active intellect,205 an
emanation of God, is possible only for the mutawaḥḥid. He may, however, profit
from the “encounter” (liqāʾ, iltiqāʾ) with others and from striving after intellec-
tual perfection in the perfect state by emulating one another. The perfect state
thus becomes indispensable for the attainment of happiness – not as guarantor
for the physical life but as a place of “encounter, which assists for (one’s) bene-
(and Ibn Ṭufayl’s) influence in Jewish medieval philosophy (Moshe Narboni) cf. M.-R.
Hayoun (1989); (1990), pp. 39 ff.; 77 f.; 137 ff.; 168 ff.; 188ff. and (on politics) 242ff.
198 The guardians in Plato, cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 287 n. 9.
199 Risālat al-Wadāʿ, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 136, 11–13; quoted by E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962),
p. 161.
200 On Ibn Bāǧǧa’s concept of ultimate happiness cf. A. Altmann (1969).
201 Cf. Fārābī, Fuṣūl muntazaʿa, ed. F. M. Najjar, p. 95; Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 56f. –
Cf. M. E. Marmura in W. M. Watt and M. E. Marmura (1985), p. 354; G. Endress (1986),
pp. 233 ff.
202 Accordingly, Ibn Bāǧǧa wrote a treatise called Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid, ed. M. Fakhry,
Rasāʾil, pp. 37–96 / ed. M. Ziyādeh. The first two chapters (= ed. M. Fakhry, pp. 37–48)
are edited with Engl. transl. by D. M. Dunlop (1945). – On the concept of tadbīr in this
text cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 164 ff.
203 This thesis by Ibn Bāǧǧa, a polarization of moral virtue in society and contemplation
in solitude, reappears in Maimonides (cf. J. L. Kraemer (1983)) and above all in Ibn
Falaquera: Cf. the comparison by E. I. J. Rosenthal (1968); M. Galston (1978); J. L.
Kraemer (1979); S. Pines (1979); J. Macy (1982; 1986); R. Jospe (1986), and L. V. Berman
(1988).
204 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 91, 1 ff. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 170;
O. Leaman (1980), pp. 118 f.; M. E. Marmura (1985), pp. 375f.; G. Endress (1986), p. 236.
205 This is the subject of Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Risālat Ittiṣāl al-ʿaql bi-l-insān, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil,
pp. 155–173. – Cf. M. Chemli (1969); G. Zainaty (1979); J. L. Kraemer (1983).
116 chapter 8
fit”.206 The most perfect state is the “Imāmī state” (al-madīna al-imāmiyya),
which excels “states of timocracy” (madīnat al-karāma),207 “democracy” (al-
madīna al-ǧamāʿiyya) and “tyranny” (madīnat at-taġallub).208 According to Ibn
Bāǧǧa, these states are often corrupted by the ruling of descendants of “people
living in ease and luxury” (al-mutrafūn) or even of “people with noble descent”
(ḏawū l-aḥsāb).209 There might be, however, among them individuals who have
“true insights” (ārāʾ ṣādiqa) and those who Ibn Bāǧǧa identifies with Fārābī’s
nawābit210 and with the “strangers” (al-ġurabāʾ) of the Sufis.211 Ibn Bāǧǧa men-
tions them as a separate class besides the “judges” (ḥukkām) and “physicians”
(aṭibbāʾ).212
On the aforementioned “assisting encounter”, which is also called “the polit-
ical encounter of man” (al-liqāʾ al-madanī al-insānī), follows “the encounter of
reason” (al-liqāʾ al-ʿaqlī) “for the sake of teaching and learning” (li-t-taʿlīm wa-
t-taʿallum) and “the divine encounter” (al-liqāʾ al-ilāhī), which presents “the-
oretical knowledge” (al-ʿilm an-naẓarī).213 Here, as in Fārābī, man appears to
be in need of the assistance of divinely inspired persons, of prophets, who
would grant him knowledge.214 He must isolate himself from society, if the
above-mentioned kinds of encounter are not achievable within it. He can do so,
because he is gifted with “free will” (iḫtiyār) based on reflection;215 he can reach
different “spiritual forms” (ṣuwar rūḥāniyya)216 depending on his “insights” and
ethical virtues as he developed them in one of these four forms of states. The
highest form of spiritual knowledge can be reached in the Imāmī state, the per-
fect state, which can contribute to man’s increasing knowledge and happiness
206 al-iltiqāʾ al-muʿāwin ʿalā manāfiʿ: Ibn Bāǧǧa, Risālat al-Wadāʿ, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 142,
16 f.; cf. p. 142, 13 ff. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 161f.
207 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 166: “oligarchy (?)”. – However, cf. Fārābī, as-Siyāsa al-
madaniyya, ed. F. M. Najjar, p. 89, 14 ff. / Engl. transl. F. M. Najjar in Medieval Political
Philosophy, pp. 43 f.
208 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 74, 16 f.
209 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 74, 13 f.
210 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 42, 15 ff. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 167.
The philosophers, who are like strangers in the world, are called nawābit in the sense of
“opponents”. In Fārābī they are opponents of the perfect city and in Ibn Baǧǧa they are
identical with the solitary philosopher. On the term nawābit cf. I. Alon (1990).
211 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 43, 12.
212 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 43, 9. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 167f.
213 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Risālat al-Wadāʿ, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 142, 17ff.
214 Cf. Ṣ. Ḥ. Maʿṣūmī (1961).
215 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, p. 64,7ff. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 169.
216 Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, pp. 49 ff. – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 107f.
in a | most perfect manner and thus becomes indispensable.217 Contrary to 856

Plato, the citizen is not at the service of the community; the community,
however, might assist the individual in his search for spiritual knowledge.218
Ibn Ṭufayl
A younger contemporary of Ibn Bāǧǧa, the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl

(ca. 498/1105–581/1185) took over Ibn Bāǧǧa’s thesis of the solitary philosopher
in his philosophical romance Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān.219 Strongly inspired by the mys-
tical views of Ibn Sīnā’s allegory Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān (on this s. above), Ibn Ṭufayl
narrates the story of Ḥayy, who on an island and without the help of a com-
munity educates himself to mystical contemplation of God. His mystical know-
ledge of God appears to be identical with the inner meaning of imaged sym-
bolic forms, which the monotheistic religion on a nearby island had developed.
According to Ibn Ṭufayl, this religious community, to which Salāmān belongs,
kept to a literal interpretation of religion. Absāl, however, studied its inner
meaning. He and Ḥayy were unable to teach it to the “literalists” and therefore
returned to the island of Ḥayy. Ibn Ṭufayl turned out to be radically proscriptive
against community. He deviated from Fārābī in a much stricter sense than Ibn
Bāǧǧa, who had admitted the perfect state as assistance for the individual who
seeks divine spiritual knowledge. According to Ibn Ṭufayl, the only possible
form of society appears to be a religious community, which does not under-
stand the inner meaning of religious symbols, but can content itself by follow-
ing the ritual prescriptions of religion, which turns out to be a Farabian mirror
image of philosophy. Only the solitary “philosopher” has access to the inner
meaning of religious symbols and – he cannot teach it to the religious com-
munity. At the same time, the community cannot assist the individual seeking
divine knowledge. Philosophy of the solitary and religion of the community do
not contradict one another. At the same time they cannot assist one another
and are independent from one another.
217 Cf. also Ibn Bāǧǧa, Tadbīr, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil, pp. 90f.
219 Ed. L. Gauthier (1936) and A. Nader (1968) / Engl. annotated translation by L. E. Good-
man. There are other editions and translations. – On the text cf. G. Piaia (1973); M.
Arkoun (1977); M. E. Marmura (1979), pp. 318 ff.; L. Rubio (1981); H. Daiber (1990a),
pp. 243 f. – On Moshe Narboni’s commentary on Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and its polit-
ical ideas cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1980) and M.-R. Hayoun (1988).
118 chapter 8
Ibn Rušd
Ibn Ṭufayl’s anti-Fārābīan attitude was not shared by his younger contempor-
ary Ibn Rušd / Averroes from Cordova (520/1126–595/1198).220 In his Epistle on
the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect221 he declares that “felicity
will not be attained by study alone or by action alone, but it will be attained
by both things together. And that it is only attainable in this life”. However, as
man in this life is part of a society, he can reach felicity and attain “theoretical
sciences”, which “are indeed useful for action and necessary for action”222 and
are reflected in the laws as God’s will,223 as long as society does not impede
this.224 Man needs the society for his life, but only a virtuous society is an aid
in the attainment of felicity. Thus, neither happiness of the solitary as pro-
posed by Ibn Bāǧǧa and Ibn Ṭufayl exists, nor happiness in the virtuous city
as described by Fārābī. According to Ibn Rušd, happiness is immortality of the
soul, which can be attained in a growing conjunction of man’s acquired know-
ledge with the active intellect, the connective link between absolute simplicity
857 and the eternity of God’s | knowledge and the multiplicity of acquired know-
ledge of the visible and perishable world.225 Man’s “progress from science to
science”226 leads to “conjunction” (ittiṣāl) with the active intellect, to happi-
ness, and is declared by Ibn Rušd to be a task of mankind.227 Philosophical
knowledge and happiness are not any longer the aim of a single individual,
neither the philosopher-ruler who is inspired by the divine intellect (Fārābī),
nor the solitary (Ibn Bāǧǧa, Ibn Ṭufayl). Happiness of the individual as the ulti-
mate aim of man is specified by the universal knowledge of mankind. Because
man’s soul, striving for immortality, can attain its conjunction with the active
intellect only through its form, which, according to Ibn Rušd, is a universal intel-
lectus materialis, a potentiality and disposition to connect acquired knowledge
with the active intellect. Philosophy is the highest form of universal human
220 On him cf. here E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 175ff.; C. E. Butterworth (1992); (1993a);
A. L. Ivry (2008).
221 Transl. and ed. K. P. Bland, pp. 108 f.
222 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 71; R. Lerner (1974), p. 89. – Cf. C. E. Butterworth (1986),
pp. 19 ff.
223 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal, p. 66; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 80f.
224 The translation by K. P. Bland is not quite clear. – However, cf. G. Endress (1986), p. 239;
M. Cruz Hernández (1960), pp. 281 ff.
225 Cf. Ibn Rušd, Epistle, transl. K. P. Bland, pp. 36, 69 and 103ff.; E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956),
p. 74; R. Lerner (1974), p. 94; H. Daiber (1990a), pp. 245ff. (with additional references).
226 Ibn Rušd, Epistle, transl. K. P. Bland, p. 36.
227 Cf. S. Pines (1978); G. Endress (1986), pp. 239 f.
knowledge of religious truth, as reflected in the Sharia.228 But like Fārābī, Ibn
Sīnā, Ibn Bāǧǧa and Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rušd holds the view that it is not accessible
to everyone. Even philosophers might err.
This realistic attitude is reflected in Ibn Rušd’s commentary on Plato’s Repub-
lic,229 in which he also referred to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Ibn Bāǧǧa
and above all Fārābī. As in Fārābī (s. above) the virtuous ruler is qualified as
king, philosopher, lawgiver and imam230 with cogitative and moral virtues.231
The starting point is the diversity of people, who can be divided into ruler and
ruled.232 This diversity necessitates the joining together and formation of a
community as proposed by Plato.233 Here, Ibn Rušd concedes: It is “perhaps
impossible” that there is “only one rank of humans in a city”; therefore, only
some people can attain “all or most of (the human perfections)”.234 Anywhere
else this is explained with lack of submission of the citizens to the ruler and
the “defectiveness of most of those giving themselves to wisdom”.235 Here, Ibn
Rušd has in mind the city of his own time, in which the true philosopher is like
a man “among perilous animals” and therefore “turns to isolation and lives the
life of a solitary”.236 The role of the city is restricted to something “necessary
for man’s existence”, a “necessity-association”.237 Based on Fārābī, Ibn Rušd dis-
tinguishes between virtuous governance, timocratic governance (primacy of
228 Cf. Ibn Rušd, Faṣl al-maqāl fī mā bayna l-ḥikma wa-š-šarīʿa min al-ittiṣāl, ed. G. F. Hou-
rani / Engl. transl. G. F. Hourani (1976); E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 179ff.; M. Mahdi
(1964); M. A. Bertman (1971a, 1971b); M. E. Marmura (1983), esp. pp. 100f.; H. Daiber
(1990a), pp. 244 f.
229 Hebrew version ed. and Engl. transl. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956); new Engl. transl. R. Lerner
(1974). – Cf. also the commentary by E. I. J. Rosenthal (1953; 1958); G. Piaia (1973),
pp. 43 ff.; M. Mahdi (1978); C. E. Butterworth (1986); O. Leaman (1988), pp. 119ff.
230 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 60 ff.; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 71ff.
231 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 71 ff.; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 90ff.
232 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 65; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 79f.; E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962),
p. 186. – Ibn Rušd did not go so far as to deny the equality of men and women: “They
will differ only in less or more; i.e., the man in most human activities is more diligent
than the woman, though it is not impossible that women should be more diligent in some
activities”; therefore, “women in this city will practise the (same) activities as the men,
except that they are weaker at it” (E. I. J. Rosenthal, p. 53; R. Lerner, pp. 57f.). – Cf. E.
I. J. Rosenthal (1953), pp. 251 f.; E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), p. 191; C. E. Butterworth
(1986), pp. 36 ff.
233 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 57 f.; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 64–66; Plato, Rep., 462ff.
234 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 64; R. Lerner (1974), p. 79.
235 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 63; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 76f.
236 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 64; R. Lerner (1974), p. 78. – Here, Ibn Rušd follows the for-
mulation of Ibn Bāǧǧa and Ibn Ṭufayl.
237 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), p. 65; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 79f.
120 chapter 8
honour), oligarchy (primacy of the vile, thirst for money), democracy (primacy
of the assembly of the multitude, desire for liberty)238 and tyranny (greed for
power).239 According to Ibn Rušd, only in the time of Mohammed and the first
four caliphs the Arabs “used to imitate the virtuous governance”, based on “law”
(Šarīʿa). Thus, the best Muslim state is only an imitation of a philosophical
state, which Ibn Rušd considered as something including all mankind.240
Ibn Rušd maintains, that after the four caliphs, in the time of the Umayyad
caliph Muʿāwiya (regn. 41/661–60/680), the Muslims became timocrats, as also
happened during his own time, in the period of the Almohad dynasty and its
predecessors, the Almoravids,241 and finally (after 540/1145) in Cordova they
858 changed | democratic governance into hedonistic tyranny.242 Therefore, Ibn
Rušd could say that “citizens today receive no advantage from the wise who are
truly wise”.243 This might have confirmed his conviction that man’s “progress
from science to science” is a task for all mankind and not only for single nations
or individuals. As in Fārābī,244 such a duty might justify war with the inten-
tion to bring wisdom to those who cannot be persuaded through rhetorical and
poetical or demonstrative arguments245 and who thus are not able to adopt vir-
tues except through coercion.246
Ibn Ḫaldūn
Ibn Rušd’s theories strongly influenced the political philosophy of Ibn Ḫal-
dūn (732/1332–808/1406), as reflected in his Muqaddima.247 The striving for
supremacy, for domination over others, becomes an aspect of ʿaṣabiyyaʾ social
238 Already Fārābī and similarly Ibn Bāǧǧa considered democracy as a corruption of the vir-
tuous city; cf. F. M. Najjar (1980), pp. 110 ff.
239 E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 79ff.; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 104ff. – Cf. C. E. Butterworth
(1986), pp. 72ff.; M. Fakhry (1988), pp. 90 ff. (comparison with Ibn Ḫaldūn, who here was
influenced by Ibn Rušd).
240 Cf. S. Pines (1957; 1978), contrary to E. I. J. Rosenthal (1971a), who ascribed to Ibn Ḫal-
dūn the identification of the superior state with Islam.
241 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 89 and 92; R. Lerner (1974), pp. 121 and 125.
244 Cf. J. L. Kraemer (1987).
245 On the role of rhetoric in Averroes’ political philosophy cf. C. E. Butterworth (1972a);
(1972b); L. Lazar (1980).
246 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956), pp. 25 f.; R. Lerner (1974), p. 11.
247 Ed. E. M. Quatremère (1858) / Engl. transl. F. Rosenthal (1958). – Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal
(1932); M. Mahdi (1957). – On Ibn Ḫaldūn’s forerunners Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd
“solidarity” – a central notion in Ibn Ḫaldūn’s philosophy of the state.248 In

addition, the solidarity in tribes is based on man’s longing for “affiliation”
(ṣuḥba) with others, which includes desires for companionship, cooperation
and friendship.249 Thus, human society and its development in its correlation
to the environment250 needs the existence of a community, of the polis, the
state.251 If the life of society becomes easier and luxury increases in the “seden-
tary” period, the community might become weak and die.
As in Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, we find in Ibn Ḫaldūn the distinc-
tion between the “elite” (ḫāṣṣa) and the “masses” (ʿāmma).252 As with Fā-
rābī, the leader of the virtuous, law-based community (which after the rise of
the Umayyad dynasty ceased to exist)253 should be a prophet with practical
wisdom, including political and legal wisdom.254 Accordingly, politics is con-
cerned with the behaviour of man as part of the household255 and the city
“in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements, for the purpose
of directing the masses towards behaviour that will result in the preservation
and permanence of the (human) species”.256 A prophet must instruct mankind
in the laws, in what is the best for it and protects it.257
What is remarkable here is the universalistic attitude. The perfect city can-
not be realized; it becomes a standard, which is the permanent aim of man-
kind.258 Here, the message of the prophet, the lawgiver, becomes philosophy
for mankind,259 which should guide mankind and lead to an “improvement of
mankind” (iṣlāh al-bašar).260 In the shape of “political laws” (aḥkām as-siyāsa)
cf. M. Mahdi (1962). – A summarizing survey of Ibn Ḫaldūn’s political views can be found
in H. Laoust (1981).
248 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 196ff., 253 ff. and 263ff.; E. I. J. Rosenthal (1962), pp. 84ff.; E. I.
J. Rosenthal (1971b); M. M. Rabiʾ (1967), pp. 48 ff.; H. Daiber (2000).
249 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 177 f.; P. v. Sivers (1968), pp. 81ff.
250 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 190 f.
251 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 175 ff.; P. v. Sivers (1968), pp. 71ff.
252 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 91 f.
253 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), p. 127. – For a comparison with Fārābī and Ibn Rušd cf. S. Pines
(1971).
254 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 89 ff.
255 Cf. I. M. Oweiss (1988).
256 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), p. 157.
257 Ed. E. M. Quatremère (1858), I, p. 62, 7–9 / Engl. transl. F. Rosenthal (1958), I, p. 78. –
Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), p. 193.
258 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 274 f.
259 Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), pp. 84 ff. and 116 f.
260 Ed. E. M. Quatremère (1858), III, p. 54 / Engl. transl. F. Rosenthal (1958), III, p. 70. –
Cf. M. Mahdi (1957), p. 89.
122 chapter 8
it is concerned with “worldly interests” (maṣāliḥ ad-dunyā) of mankind,261 but

also with its “welfare in the other world” (ṣalāḥ āḫiratihim).262 This utterance
appears to be a compromise, combining the interests of society and individual:
The utopian state is a model for man’s behaviour in the society of this world;
at the same time the religious laws of the prophet-ruler became a guideline
to welfare in the other world, to “happiness” (saʿāda).263 Religion and its laws
859 remain an indispensable tool of society.264 They regulate the behaviour of the |
individual, make it conformable with ethics, which is the first part of practical
philosophy and, in agreement with the requirements of politics, its second part.
Moral wisdom of the ruler and wisdom including economics and management
of the household, lead to the noble things, to happiness of man in society.
In this manner, by shaping the consciousness of men, Islamic philosophers
contributed to the formation of the Islamic society and its ruling powers, the
caliphs, sultans, viziers, jurists, and theologians. They were scarcely influential
in Latin political thought.265 With their metaphysical world view they sup-
ported the traditional Islamic nexus between religion and politics. This link is
provided with a rational, scientific basis, presupposing the universality of val-
ues. These values reappear in the modern self-image of Islam.266
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chapter 9
Essential Features of Islamic Political Philosophy
The beginnings of political thought in Islam are discussions about the ruler and
the ruled. In the focus of the reflections we find the legitimacy and the tasks
of a ruler. He must face the requirements of qualification and he depends on
divine inspiration. At the same time, the role of the individual is reflected. The
individual has responsibilities and choices, and in addition he is determined
by God’s omnipotence.
Since the 3rd/9th century political philosophy is constantly developing. It is
influenced by Hellenism and political ideas, which are reflected in the early
“mirrors of princes” from the 2nd/8th century. The Iranian Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
(d. 137/755 or 139/756), who followed Iranian-Sassanian ethical and Greek gno-
mological traditions, gives in his writings practical advices to the prince. Here,
it turns out that he must be a worldy and a religious ruler. He must be prudent
and must act justly. And at the same time, the ruled must be distrustful of the
ruler. This sceptical attitude towards religious and political authorities appears
to have revived the value of friendship as something creating community and
improving human character. Ideas in the “mirrors of princes” and in Greek
treatises on ethics, available in Arabic translations and adaptations, were integ-
rated in Islamic philosophical ethics. This formed the basis of Islamic political
philosophy, which elaborated the political idea of justice and the hierarchical
structure of society, where the virtues of man, especially the virtue of friend-
ship, are cornerstones of solidarity.
The development of Islamic political philosophy owes a lot to the transla-
tion of political writings, mainly by Plato (summaries of his Republic, Laws
and Politics), by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the commentary by Por-
phyry. Moreover, theological discussions by Sunnites and Shiʿites about the just
imamate had considerable influence. Despite this, the first great philosopher
of the Arabs, Kindī (ca. 185/801–between 247/861 and 259/873) is concen-
trated on ethics of the individual in the community and developed a Platonic-
Aristotelian anthropology, based on the dichotomy soul – body and on the
Platonic tripartition of the soul in a reasonable, a desiring and an irascible part.
These parts cause the four Platonic cardinal virtues “wisdom” (ḥikma), “temper-
ance” (ʿiffa), “courage” (naǧda), and “justice” (ʿadl). They are preconditions for
man’s striving after happiness in the other world: Righteous actions in relation
to his fellow citizen, neglecting the material world, and increasing knowledge
about his Creator and the spiritual things.

essential features of islamic political philosophy 147
After Kindī we find the above described Persian heritage reflected in the
“mirrors of princes”, combined with a concept of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth-
ics (I 2. 1094 a 27ff.), according to which the aim of politics is not only the single
person, but furthermore the welfare for the community. Based on this, Qudāma
Ibn Ǧaʿfar (259/873–betw. 320/932 and 336/948) emphasizes the necessity of a
ruler because of the differences between men, the role and ethical qualities of
a ruler and his subjects, as well as the necessity of the consolidation of people,
because they need one another.
These ideas resulted in a unique system of political philosophy by Qudāma’s
contemporary Fārābī in his book The Perfect State. This philosopher developed,
under the influence of Aristotle, Plato and Neoplatonic trends, a philosophical
system which at the same time was a reaction on current discussions about the
role of the imam: Must his knowledge be based on divine inspiration and does
prophecy authorize political authority? This problem had arisen in discussions
between the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 322/934) and the well-known
physician and philosopher Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (250/864 or 251/865–313/925).
Contrary to Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, and at a later
time Fārābī defended the value of prophecy as a source of knowledge for the
ruler. He is indispensable for his people, because they are inferior. According
to Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, the ruler is elected by God and endowed with divine
knowledge. A prophet is the divinely inspired ruler par excellence. People must
obey him, the teacher of the divinely revealed law – otherwise they must be
“forced”. This avoids enmity and “injustice” (baġy). Wars do not arise primarily
for the sake of belief, but because of insatiability of men and their avarice for
worldly goods. People are “kept in check” ( yuqhar) by religion, by the divinely
inspired religious ruler. Among the prophetic rulers Prophet Mohammed has
the highest rank and is perfect in his “intellect” (ʿaql). He is a model of perfect
moral life. Interestingly, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī at the same time defends the uni-
versality of religions, concerning their belief in one single God and the justness
of His law. Religion and knowledge revealed to a prophet can be shared by all
people and nations and is not a privilege to a single person.
These ideas reappear in the political philosophy of Fārābī (258/872–339/950
or 951). He stresses the ethical features and the intellectual qualities of the
divinely inspired “first ruler” and “imam”, the prophet. Contrary to the Ismailite
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī and at the same time in accordance with the Ismailite
concept of universality of true religion, Fārābī offers no comment on the best
prophet. He stresses the Aristotelian concept, that the individual needs his fel-
low citizen, the cooperation of people, and that they have to obey the divinely
inspired philosopher-king. This, in his opinion, leads to real happiness in the
utopian perfect state, built on virtues. The study of politics becomes a guide to
148 chapter 9
man’s good actions and behaviour and is the way to individual ultimate hap-
piness. The final stage of man is the soul’s liberation from the material world,
leading to its eternal life.
Shortly after, Fārābī’s political philosophy and his concept of a utopian state
is adapted in a slightly modified way in the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (“Epistles
of the Sincere Brethren”), an encyclopaedia compiled before 409/959–960 by
anonymous authors and sympathisants of the Ismailites. In the Rasāʾil they cri-
ticize social conditions of their time and the immorality of the people. Social
and moral grievances are caused by inequality of men. People should help one
another and they do not. This requires a ruling authority, at the best a prophet,
because he receives the law through divine revelation. The main purpose of
the Rasāʾil was an encyclopaedic education to a new consciousness that could
enable men to avoid blind obedience towards the wicked ruler, to develop an
independent “judgement” (iǧtihād), and thus find the way to ultimate happi-
ness through growing knowledge.
A new accentuation can be found in Miskawayh (born in Rayy and said
to have died in 421/1030). He preferred to develop an ethical system of the
individual in the community. His “Refinement of Characters” (Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq)
aims to educate men to good actions based on the Platonic cardinal virtues, in
accordance with knowledge, “wisdom” (ḥikma), which leads him to the “spir-
itual things” (al-ašyāʾ ar-rūḥāniyya), to “happiness” (as-saʿāda) and “calmness
of the soul” ( yuṭmiʾinnu qalbuhū) by purifying his soul from “physical things”
(al-umūr aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya) and from “bodily desires” (šahawāt al-abdān). Man’s
proper relation to God, to his fellow citizen and his ancestors plays a crucial role
in Miskawayh’s ethics. Man’s character can be formed by practice, but, because
of inequality of people, man needs the assistance of his fellow beings and must
live with them in “love” (maḥabba) and “friendship” (ṣadāqa). Then, the welfare
of the individual will prevail over the welfare of the state.
With his combination of Greek, Persian and Arabic traditions Miskawayh
deeply impressed later authors like Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, Ġazālī, Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ
(wrote 655/1256), Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (597/1201–672/1274), Daw(w)ānī (830/
1427–908/1502) and Muḥammad ʿAbdūh (1265/1849–1323/1905).
In this list Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5th/11th c.) holds a key position with his philo-
sophical ethics “The Means to the Honourable Actions of Law” (aḏ-Ḏ̣ arīʿa
ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa). There, he integrated Koranic passages, following Fā-
rābī’s political philosophy about the divinely inspired ruler. In his doctrine “the
honourable actions of law”, the “most honourable religious duties” lead to an
increasing “assimilation” to God: To be ḫalīfa, “caliph”, means “to imitate the
Creator in ruling, according to human ability, that is realizing the honourable
actions of law”. The ultimate aim is happiness of the individual in the other
world, which only can be reached with the assistance of the fellow being. This
will lead to happiness in this world, in a community provided with harmony,
love and friendship.
Rāġib’s ideas deeply impressed Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111) (Mīzān al-ʿamal,
Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn) and through his works they were widely spread in the
Islamic world. Ġazālī intended a synthesis of Sufi virtues of love for God, Kor-
anic ethics, and the Aristotelian doctrine of virtues as the golden mean. Thus,
he pushed into the background Fārābī’s concept of a society as a requirement
to reach happiness in this world.
The inclusion of mysticism as a means to purify the human soul can already
be found in the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ and became influential in the works of the
great philosopher Ibn Sīnā / Avicenna (370/980–428/1037) from Bukhara. In
his allegory Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and in his poem On the Soul he formulates the
concept of a prophet who is a Sufi and who proclaims the divine laws as a way
to the mystical path that frees the rational soul from the body, and finally leads
to the “vision” (mušāhada) of God. Man in this world, however, needs the com-
munity. Social relations between people and justice are indispensable. Man
must obey the lawgiver, the prophet. The Islamic Sharia is the only way of life
in this world. The concept of inequality of men and their need for a ruler urged
Ibn Sīnā to make practical recommendations as e.g. taking care of the sick and
infirm and of those who are not able to earn their livelihood. He explains, that
rebellion is allowed even against the virtuous caliph, in case that he is deficient
in power and intelligence: Here, political power appears to be more import-
ant than the virtue of a pious but weak caliph. Ibn Sīnā saw the ideal ruler as
someone instructing man on his way of life in a society in this world, and thus
can pave the way to the spiritual world of the intellect and the mystical path for
his life in the other world. The ultimate consequence of this doctrine, the total
retreat from society, is not yet drawn and remains reserved for the Andalusian
philosophers Ibn Bāǧǧa and his younger contemporary Ibn Ṭufayl.
Ibn Bāǧǧa / Avempace (ca. 488/1095–532/1138 or 533/1139), born in Zara-
gossa, is convinced that virtuous men, “people with knowledge” (ʿurafāʾ), might
improve imperfect states “because social relations (al-muʿāšara), which per-
fect the state, can be improved by ethical virtues (al-faḍāʾil aš-šakliyya)”. State
and society, however, are no more preconditions for the attainment of ultimate
happiness. Here, the concept of the solitary philosopher, the Sufi, receives a
positive accentuation: Not solely by moral virtue as ultimate end, but exclus-
ively in isolation from society, as mutawaḥḥid, through “self-determination”
(tadbīr) and contemplation he can search for ultimate happiness. Separation
from society might be good in imperfect states which do not assist the indi-
vidual in his search for happiness. Mystical ascension to higher forms of know-
150 chapter 9
ledge, to liberation of the soul from matter, and to the “union” (ittiṣāl) with the
divine active intellect, an emanation of God is only possible for the mutawaḥ-
ḥid. He may, however, profit from the “encounter” (liqāʾ, iltiqāʾ) with others and
from striving after intellectual perfection in a perfect state by emulating one
another. The most perfect state is the “Imāmī state” (al-madīna al-imāmiyya),
which excells “states” of “timocracy” (madīnat al-karāma), “democracy” (al-
madīna al-ǧamāʿiyya) and “tyranny” (madīnat at-taġallub). According to Ibn
Bāǧǧa, these states are often corrupted by being ruled by offsprings descend-
ing from people “living in ease and luxury” (al-mutrafūn) or from “people with
noble descent” (ḏawū l-aḥsāb). As in the doctrine of Fārābī, man appears to be
in need of the assistance of divinely inspired persons, of prophets who would
grant him knowledge. Contrary to Plato’s concept, here the citizen is not in ser-
vice of the community, which might, however, assist the individual in his search
for spiritual knowledge.
A younger contemporary of Ibn Bāǧǧa, the Andalusian philosopher Ibn
Ṭufayl (ca. 498/1105–581/1185) in his philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān adop-
ted Ibn Bāǧǧa’s thesis of the solitary philosopher. This novel is strongly inspired
by the mystical views of Ibn Sīnā’s allegory Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and intends to
demonstrate, that the only possible form of society is a religious community
which does not understand the inner meaning of religious symbols, but on the
other hand can content itself with the observance of religious prescriptions. In
Ibn Ṭufayl, as in Fārābī, religion turns out to be an image reflecting philosophy.
Only the solitary, the “philosopher” has access to the inner meaning of religious
symbols, but he is not able to pass his knowledge to the religious community.
Simultaneously, the community cannot assist the one who strives after divine
knowledge. Philosophy of the solitary and religion of the community do not
contradict each other. At the same time, they cannot support each other, and
they are independent from each other.
Ibn Ṭufayl’s anti-Farabian attitude was not shared by his younger contem-
porary Ibn Rušd / Averroes from Córdoba (520/1126–595/1198). In his Epistle on
the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect he declares, that the attain-
ment of felicity requires study and action, and that is the reason why man needs
society. But only a virtuous society can help man to attain felicity. Different
from Ibn Bāǧǧa and Ibn Ṭufayl, there is no happiness for the solitary, and differ-
ent from Fārābī, there is no ultimate happiness in the virtuous state. According
to Ibn Rušd, happiness is immortality of the soul which can be attained in a
growing conjunction of man’s acquired knowledge with the divine active intel-
lect. This acquisition of knowledge, universal knowledge, is a task of mankind
and not any longer the aim of a single individual, neither the philosopher-ruler
who is inspired by the divine intellect (Fārābī) nor the solitary (Ibn Bāǧǧa,
Ibn Ṭufayl). If people cannot be persuaded with rhetorical and poetical or

demonstrative arguments, the duty to bring wisdom to them might even justify
war. In his commentary on Plato’s Republic, in which he also referred to Aris-
totle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Ibn Bāǧǧa, Ibn Rušd describes, in the footsteps
of Fārābī, the virtuous ruler as being qualified as king, philosopher, lawgiver
and imam, endowed with cognitive and moral virtues. Starting point is the
diversity of people who can be divided into ruler and ruled, and who need the
formation of a community as propagated by Plato. Based on Fārābī, Ibn Rušd
distinguishes between virtuous governance, timocratic governance (primacy of
honour), oligarchy (primacy of the vile, thirst for money), democracy (primacy
of the assembly of the multitude, desire for liberty), and tyranny (greed for
power). According to Ibn Rušd, only in the time of Mohammed and the first
four caliphs the Arabs “used to imitate the virtuous governance”, based on “law”
(šarīʿa). Thus, the best Muslim state is only an imitation of a philosophical state,
which Ibn Rušd considered as something including the whole of mankind.
Ibn Rušd’s theories deeply influenced the political philosophy of the histor-
ian Ibn Ḫaldūn (732/1332–808/1406), as reflected in his “Introduction” (Muqad-
dima). The striving for supremacy, the domination over others, becomes an
aspect of ʿaṣabiyya, social “solidarity”. In addition, solidarity in tribes is based
on man’s longing for “affiliation” (ṣuḥba) with others, which includes the desire
for companionship, cooperation and friendship. Thus, human society and its
development in its correlation with the environment requires the existence of
a community. However, when life of the community becomes easier and luxury
increases in the “sedentary” period, community might become weak and finally
deceases. Similar to the doctrine of Fārābī, the ruler of the virtuous community,
embodied in the law – which since the rise of the Umayyad dynasty ceased
to exist – should be a prophet with practical wisdom, including political and
legal wisdom. With his instruction of the law he leads “the masses towards a
behaviour that will result in the preservation and permanence of the (human)
species”.
To the “worldly interests” (maṣāliḥ ad-dunyā) of mankind Ibn Rušd had
added the “welfare in the other world” (ṣalāḥ āḫiratihim). This utterance
appears to be a compromise, combining the interests of the community and the
individual: The utopian state is a model for man’s behaviour in the community
of this world. At the same time, the religious laws of the prophet-ruler became
a guideline for the welfare in the other world, for “happiness” (saʿāda). Religion
and its laws remain an indispensable part of the community. They regulate the
behaviour of individuals, conformable to ethics, which is the first part of prac-
tical philosophy – and in agreement with the requirements of politics, that is
its second part. Moral wisdom and wisdom of ruling (including economics,
152 chapter 9
management of the household) lead to the noble things, finally to happiness

of man in society. So, by moulding consciousness of men, Islamic philosophers
contributed to the formation of the Islamic society and its ruling powers – the
caliphs, sultans, wezirs, jurists, and theologians. With their metaphysical world
view they contributed to the traditional and Islamic nexus between religion
and politics – existing until today.
Literature
Crone, Patricia: God’s Rule. Government and Islam. Six centuries of Medieval Islamic
Political Thought. New York 2004.
Daiber, Hans: Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Ausdruck griechi-
scher Ethik, islamischer Ideologie und iranisch-sassanidischer Hofetikette. In Oriens
43, 2015, pp. 273–292. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/11.
Daiber, Hans: Political Philosophy. In History of Islamic Philosophy. II. Ed. by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. London/New York 1996. = Routledge History
of World Philosophies I, pp. 841–885. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/8.
Yasien, Mohamed: The Path to Virtue. The Ethical Philosophy of Al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahānī.
Kuala Lumpur 2006.
Unpublished paper.
chapter 10
De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica

et islamica
The Category of Relation in Arabic-Islamic Philosophy
Summary 432
Theological interests, intercultural relations between Antiquity, Syriac Chris-

tianity and the arising Islam stimulated the interest in Aristotle’s philosophy
and his Organon. It was transmitted and enriched with explanations by Alex-
andrian commentators from the 4th till the 6th centuries AD. A Syriac example
from pre-Islamic time is the monophysite priest Sergius of Rēšʿaynā in the 6th
century AD, who – similar to Augustinus, in the footsteps of Aristotle – con-
sidered relation as something determined by the related subject.
The first Arabic adaptation of Aristotle’s Categories in the 2nd/8th century,
attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and presumably based on a Syriac handbook,
deplored Aristotle’s unclear definition, but could not offer another solution.
Decades after 800AD, The Book of Stones attributed to the alchemist Ǧābir
Ibn Ḥayyān (second half of the 2nd/8th c.) offers in an excerpt from Aristotle’s
Categories the interesting solution, that only genera – not particulars – are rel-
atives.
Shortly after, this first attempt culminated in Kindī’s (ca. 185/801–between
247/861 and 259/873) classification of relativa as something without matter, as
a predicate connected with the substance and as something existing in mind.
Kindī, the first great philosopher of the Arabs, considered, different from Aris-
totle and in accordance with the Alexandrians, the first four categories – sub-
stance, quantity, quality and relation – as simple, and the following six categor-
ies – where, when, position, possession, action and passion – as something that
can be connected with a substance. This is further elucidated by Kindī’s student
Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī (220/286–835/899), whose short text on cat-
egories – until now unknown – will be published here for the first time.
As a reaction on discussions about the value of logic as a universal valid
vehicle of intelligible things, superior to individual languages – I refer to the
dispute in 319/932 between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and
the Muslim scholar Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī – the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm
(384/994–456/1064) offers a compromise: He preferred “clear Arabic language”
as revealed in the | Qurʾān and he combined it with his estimation of categories 433

154 chapter 10
as universals of Arabic and non-Arabic languages and as a tool for the reflexion
on Creator, creation and the fundaments of religion. Similar to Kindī, for Ibn
Ḥazm relation is one of the four “fundamentals” substance, quantity, quality
and relation. The attributes of the transcendent God are mere names without
any relation to the world: They do not require correlatives and the relation
between God and creation is asymmetrical.
Ibn Ḥazm continues the Neoplatonic trend of the “Brethren of Purity”, who
shortly before him developed in their Epistles, in the paraphrase of Aristotle’s
Categories, the concept of a “mental logic”, of “mental forms”, which emanate
from the divine active intellect. Every language, the linguistic logic, mirrors this
“mental logic”, which is a higher reality.
The tendency of the “Brethren of Purity” to shape the Aristotelian categor-
ies by Neoplatonic philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emana-
tions is further developed by the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib
in Baghdad (d. 1043AD). In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories he
combined Alexandrian tradition, especially Olympiodorus, with the Stoic-
Neoplatonic concept of a transcendental relation. The Stoics had detected rela-
tion as a universal valid category, in which all single entities are connected in
the totality of all things – which themselves are penetrated by the pneuma, the
hegemonikon, the tonos – that determines the dynamic process of interaction.
Consequently, relation appears to be the form, the primary structure of differ-
ent relata, which correspond to this form. Similarly, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib assumed an
interdependence of form, matter and accident, and an identity of the whole
with the parts of it. For this reason, their relativa can be understood with the
help of the comparing intellect, which creates an image of the perceived in the
soul. The Stoic interrelation of the whole and the parts in the universal valid cat-
egory of relation appears to be integrated in the Epistles and in Ibn Ḥazm in the
Neoplatonic concept of the divine One with subsequent emanations from the
divine intellect, which determine the concept of relation created in the human
soul.
The interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories, Alexandrian traditions, Stoic
and Neoplatonic concepts, constituted the background for a shift to an ontolo-
gical and metaphysical orientation, already prepared in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951) did not yet fully develop this metaphysical line
and considered relation primarily as a problem of language. He selected the
three Aristotelian categories time, place and possession, which shape relation,
and he distinguished between a relation called iḍāfa in a specific sense and
a relation called nisba in an arbritrary manner by the general public and by
orators and poets. To avoid arbitrary use, Fārābī stressed the necessity of clear
definitions of relation and relatives. He introduced the “particles of relation”,
de praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica 155
like “in”, as an additional indication of a real relation with regard to “place”: In

the example “Zayd is in the house” the relation is “surrounding”, because Zayd
is surrounded by the house. The relation appears to be determined by the state
of “surrounding” and – contrary to Aristotle – not by the relatives and their
essences. Moreover, Fārābī’s discussion of relation became a part of his the-
ory of communication, in which elements of other logical works by Aristotle
were integrated and in which he tried | to reconciliate two contrary positions of 434
the already mentioned dispute between Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender
of logic as a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things and the grammarian
Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defender of language as the only access to intelligible
things.
The perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, the Iranian Ibn Sīnā /
Avicenna (370/980–428/1037) was aware of earlier discussions and knew, be-
sides Aristotle’s work and its commentators, Fārābī and Neoplatonism. In con-
trast to Fārābī, he made a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the
ontological, by elaborating Aristotle’s discussion in his Metaphysics (V 15. 1020
b 26–1021 b 10). Relation is based on some “notion” (maʿnā) in one of the two
relatives, e.g. in the asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the
relation fatherhood, which is a “notion” or “description of its existence”, of its
“being with respect to something else in the father”. The “existential” relation
can be apprehended in the intellect, which also can “invent” relations. In addi-
tion to the notion of a relation between father and son in the intellect, the
relation is also something related to the categories action and affection, cause
and effect. This kind of relation is integrated in an emanational Neoplatonic
system of the divine first cause and the inferior effects. This first cause is the
divine universal intellect, the giver of forms, from which emanate, in an hier-
archical order, the ten Aristotelian categories. These categories determine the
causal relation between the divine necessarily existing One and the multipli-
city of the caused, of existing matter.
The Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd / Averroes (520/1126–595/1198) con-
tinued the Neoplatonic trend and the ontological orientation. He knew Fārābī
and Ibn Sīnā, from whom he deviated in an interesting return to Aristotle: He
again concentrated on the substance, according to him, the fundaments of any
relation. However, he tried to clarify Aristotle by distinguishing between an
essential relation of a substance and an accidental relation, depending on the
substrate, the substance. In addition, the relationship is something “conceptu-
alized” in a “conceptualization” (taṣawwur), which is dependent on the soul.
Herewith, he criticized Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111), who spoke of a plurality
of knowledge with regard to the relation, e.g. between father and son. Ġazālī
considered relation as part of an epistemological process: Knowledge connects
156 chapter 10
two relatives, which condition each other and which have as their principle
the divine First, who knows Himself and who knows the individual genera. Ibn
Rušd denied Ġazālī’s epistemological aspects and did not give a clear picture of
his concept of a Neoplatonizing indeterminate relation in its connection with
the concept of potentiality as “a disposition” in a thing and as its inherent pos-
sibility of existing in actuality. He did not develop this to a clear concept of a
dynamic process of relation between substance and relative.
The ambivalence of relation as something essential and as something acci-
dental to the substance, as well as the Neoplatonic background of Ibn Rušd and
Ibn Sīnā, have some parallels in the Andalusian Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). This
Sufi considered the Aristotelian categories as something “applicable” to the
order in the world and as correlated to the divine aspects of the Creator, mani-
festing Himself in the world with His attributes and who is an all-permeating
435 infinite power | and infinite divine acting. Relation, the causal relation between
God and world, appears to be transformed to a dynamic process in which the
infinite is procreated from the One. The Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (614/1217–
668/1269 or 669/1271) disagreed with him.
Ibn ʿArabī’s concept, however, appears to be favoured by the Catalan philo-
sopher and mystic Ramon Llull (1232–1315 or 1316AD), who in his Logica nova
developed a concept of relatio substantialis, which shares with the Neopla-
tonizing Islamic philosophers, including the Sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabī, the
classification of relation as a dynamic and active principle. Moreover, he has in
common with Ibn ʿArabī the correlation of divine attributes and Aristotelian
categories: In his concept of correlatives he correlates God’s act of creating with
the category of action, God’s being a Creator with the category of substance
and God’s ruling the world with the category of passion. The category of pas-
sion implies a causal relation between God and His creation. Here, the category
of relation appears as a dynamic principle and herewith it received a new ori-
entation. It is the result of a long process of the rehabilitation of relation since
John Scotus Eriugena (ca. 800–ca. 877AD) and it is the result of Neoplatoniz-
ing Islamic thinkers.
Contents
Summary 153
Contents 157
I Introduction 158
II The Category of Relation in Christian and Syriac Transmission 158
III A 2nd/8th-Century Arabic Adaptation Attributed to Ibn

al-Muqaffaʿ 161
IV Other Channels of Transmission

Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān 164
V Alexandrian Repercussions on Kindī and his Student Saraḫsī 165
VI Language, Logic and Relation

Ibn Ḥazm and the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity 168
VII Stoic-Neoplatonic Repercussions of Relation on Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn

aṭ-Ṭayyib 173
VIII Fārābī 176
IX Ibn Sīnā 189
X Ibn Rušd and his Critique of Ġazālī 198
XI Ibn ʿArabī 203
XII Ibn Sabʿīn 206
XIII A Medieval Latin Echo of Neoplatonizing Islamic Thought

Ramon Llull 207
Bibliography 210
Supplementary Remarks 223

158 chapter 10
435 I Introduction
The increasing interest in the concept of relation in modern philosophy1 is the

result of dicussions about the ontology of relations in Bertrand Russell
(1872–1970) and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924).2 The controversy
about internal and external relations becomes part of a linguistic philosophy,
which since Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) is regarding the category
of relation as a triadic relation of a linguistic sign between speaker and inter-
preting listener.3 The relation R between a and b (= aRb) became a topic with
many perspectives, which in different manners concentrate on the different
identities of a, b and R and the different interpretations of R with regard to its
relata. Moreover, in modern linguistics relation plays a central role. Relation
became part of the relational logic, discussed by Bertrand Russell in The
Principles of Mathematics4 and by some forerunners and contemporaries in the
19th century.5 A survey of the discussions in Islamic philosophy will be inter-
esting, as they mirror aspects which reappear in medieval and modern thought
with modifications or were taken up in a selective manner with some actu-
alizing and new accentuations. Simultaneously, our survey will try to give an
idea of the context of discussions about the concept of relation in a historical
interpretation that sheds light on continuities and discrepancies between past
436 and modern philosophical debates.6 We will exclude the field of | relational
syllogism7 in Arabic Logic, which since 2010 is available in an exhaustive mono-
graph.8
II The Category of Relation in Christian and Syriac Transmission
Our survey of the discussion of the category of relation in Islamic philosophy9

must begin with the impact of Aristotle’s Categories in the Islamic world. This
1 Cf. J. Heil, Relations, pp. 310–332. – J. Heil, Relations and Relational Truths, pp. 310–321. – J.
Heil, Causal Relations, pp. 127–137.
2 Cf. R.-P. Horstmann, Ontologie und Relationen.
3 Cf. K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien, p. 54.
4 §§ 27–30, 94–99, 208–216.
5 Cf. J. Geyser, Logistik, pp. 123–143.
6 Cf. P. Thom, On Formalizing, pp. 204 f.
7 Cf. K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien, pp. 254 f.
8 K. El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms.
9 Some lexicographical remarks on the term in oriental languages can be found in M. Zonta,
Saggio, pp. 253–258.
book, which is part of the Organon10, especially the chapters 7. 6 a 35–8 b 24,
was – besides Aristotle, Metaphysics11 V 15. 1020 b 26–1021 b 10 – the main source
for discussions about relation.12 The first transmitters already in pre-Islamic
times were Syriac scholars who had a great interest in Aristotle’s Organon,
including the Categories.13 Their translations of the Organon, their extracts and
comments mirror the philosophical curriculum of late antiquity, which com-
bines Aristotle with Neoplatonic and Christian elements and appears to be
a symbiosis of philosophy and theology.14 Primarily, the motivation of Syriac
scholars for their study of Aristotle’s Organon was the Christian theology of
Trinity, moreover, the use of dialectic in christological discussions and later
in the dialogue with Islam.15 Already Augustinus (354–430 AD) betrays in his
work De trinitate knowledge of Aristotle’s Categories, especially of the chapter
on relation (ch. 7).16 Against this background, the chapter on relation in the
Syriac commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories deserves our interest. We will
use as an example the discussion of the relatives in a Treatise on the Categor-
ies of Aristotle, the Philosopher, addressed to Philotheos and written by Sergius
of Rēšʿaynāʾ (d. 536AD).17 As in Aristotle, the related subject, the “relative” (da-
lwaṯ meddem) determines the relation and not conversely. Sergius mentions the
same examples as Aristotle and adds some more from the Aristotelian com-
mentaries, mostly Ammonius and Philoponus. An addi|tion is the example 437
10 On the transmission of the Organon in Syriac and Arabic, cf. Dictionnaire des philo-
sophes antiques I, pp. 502–513 (Henri Hugonnard-Roche) and pp. 510–512 (Abdelali
Elamrani-Jamal).
11 On the transmission in Syriac and Arabic cf. Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques I,
pp. 528–531 (Aubert Martin), and Supplement (2003), pp. 259–264 (Cecilia Martini
Bonadeo).
12 We use the Greek text in the edition of L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae /
Engl. transl. Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle I, pp. 3–24 / German
transl. K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien. – A symbolization (cf. P. Thom, On Formaliz-
ing, pp. 193f.) of Aristotle’s chapter on relatives can be found in M. Mignucci, Aristotle’s
Definitions of Relatives, pp. 101–127.
13 On the oldest Syriac translation of Aristotle’s Categories, perhaps in the first half of the
6th century AD, s. the edition and translation by D. King, The Earliest Syriac Translation,
pp. 18–38; D. King, The First Translator, pp. 67–84.
14 This is the conclusion of D. King, Logic in the Service, pp. 1–33; cf. also his edition of the
oldest Syriac translation of Aristotle’s Categories (s. n. 13), pp. 6f.
15 Cf. H. Daiber, Die Aristotelesrezeption in der syrischen Literatur, pp. 328f. and 340. On
the reception of Aristotle’s Categories cf. esp. pp. 332, 337–342. – H. Daiber, Die syrische
Tradition in frühislamischer Zeit, pp. 45–49 / English version, pp. 81–85.
16 Cf. Aurelius Augustinus, De trinitate, XLVf. – R. Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, pp. 66–
71 and 497–500.
17 Ed. and Engl. transl. S. Aydın, Sergius of Reshaina, pp. 145–149 (= §§74–79).
160 chapter 10
of a symmetrical relation R (x,y) ⟨--⟩ R (y,x) saying that “equal is equal to

equal”18 and the example of a “friend which is friend of a friend”.19 Contrary
to what Sergius and his sources Ammonius20 and Philoponus21 in accordance
with Aristotle22 called relatives “homonymously”, “heteronymously” is called
a relative23 in the Aristotelian examples master and slave24 or knower and
known25. To these examples Sergius and his Greek sources add the relation
of father and son – without realizing the asymmetrical feature of this rela-
tion:26 R (father, son) is not identical with R (son, father). Nor do they realize
the internal relation between father and son:27 Only that person can be called
father, who can be father of a child. In this sense Augustinus could say in a long
discussion and critic of Arians and Sabellians: Dicitur ergo relatiue pater idem-
que relatiue dicitur principium …; sed pater ad filium dicitur, principium uero
ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. item dicitur relatiue filius.28 Aristotle’s discussion
of relation appears to be integrated in Augustinus’ concept of Christian Trin-
ity, which is based on the dichotomy of the independent divine essence and
the relative.29 Augustinus belonged to those Christian theologians who paved
the way for the empathy for Aristotelian logic in Christian and later in Muslim
circles.30
After the rise of Islam these Christian theologians became the transmitters
of Greek texts and thoughts.31 They knew Greek, they spoke Syriac-Aramaic and
Arabic in the West – or Pehlevi during or after the end of the Sassanian Empire
(224–651AD) in the East. They took over the logical curriculum of Alexan-
drian philosophers, however, in a shortening shape, which included Porphyry’s
18 Olympiodorus, Prolegomena et in Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, p. 99, 24.

19 Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria, ed. A. Busse, p. 202,
33 f.
20 Ammonius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius, ed. A. Busse, p. 67, 16f.
21 Philoponus (olim Ammonius), In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse,
p. 105, 1 f.
22 Cat. 1. 1 a 1–13.
23 Ammonius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, p. 67, 17–26; Philopo-
nus, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, p. 105, 3–11.
24 Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 a 30 and 7 a 35–39.
25 Aristotle “knowledge” and “knowledge of the knowable”, Cat. 7. 6 b 34.
26 Cf. K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien, pp. 243 f.
27 K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien, p. 248.
28 Augustinus, De trinitate V 13. 14, pp. 386–387.
29 Cf. R. Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, pp. 498 f.
30 S. below ch. VI.
31 Cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 25–30 / English version, pp. 54–60 (U. Ru-
dolph); pp. 66–71 / English version, pp. 108–113 (D. Gutas).
Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione and Analytica priora – this

work mostly32 only until book I 7.33
III A 2nd/8th-Century Arabic Adaptation Attributed to Ibn

al-Muqaffaʿ
The earliest example in Arabic of this shortening version is a systematizing

paraphrase attributed to Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ34 in the
2nd/8th centu|ry.35 The colophon of the unique Beyrouth-manuscript men- 438
tions as translator of the work until Analytica priora I 7 the Melkite Chris-
tian Hīlyā, whom we cannot identify and whom D. Gutas36 assumes as the
real translator of the work in the midst of the 2nd/8th century. According to
Dimitri Gutas, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, the famous prosewriter or translator from
Pehlevi, or his son, might have improved the Arabic of the translation, which
later might have been improved again by two other translators also mentioned
in the colophon of the manuscript, namely the Christian Abū Nūḥ and the Per-
sian Salm from Harran. This explanation has indeed some probability, and in
view of the name of the translator, Hīlyā, a rendering of the Christian name
Elias with Aramaic ending -ā and the initial “H”, which in Syriac script is a vocal
letter for Greek ε,37 the text might be an Arabic version of one of the numer-
ous Syriac handbooks38 on Aristotle’s Organon, discussing in a systematic way
32 On the reasons for this shortening version and on exceptions cf. H. Daiber, Aristoteles-
rezeption, pp. 332–336.
33 Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 69 f. / English version, pp. 111f. (D. Gutas).
34 On him cf. J. D. Latham, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, pp. 48–77; J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft,
p. 27.
35 Kitāb Qaṭūġūriyūs, ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh, pp. 9–24. At the end of the 4th/10th century the
catalogue of books, the Fihrist by Ibn an-Nadīm, mentions the work by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ as
one of the “abbreviations and epitomes”. – Cf. the translation by F. E. Peters, Aristoteles
Arabus, p. 6.
36 In Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 72–74 / English version, pp. 114–116. – Regret-
tably D. Gutas’ proposal is not discussed by E. Hermans, A Persian Origin of the Arabic
Aristotle? E. Hermans assumes a Middle Persian version of the Greek text.
37 Cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus, p. 306 n. 350.
38 Possible syriacisms: The term qisma in the expressions qismat bāb al- “the part with the
chapter” and qismat al-muḍāf an minhū “the part on the relative consists” is possibly an
incorrect rendering of the Syriac purrāšā with the two meanings “separation” and “explan-
ation”, of which the translator erroneously rendered the first meaning “separation” and
literally translated it with qisma, apparently with the assumption that qisma has also
the second meaning of purrāšā, i.e. “explanation”. – Another example might be ḥilya
“ornament, quality” (E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon I), which we translated with
162 chapter 10
the main topics from Porphyry’s Isagoge until the Analytica priora I 7. Here, we
include a translation of the chapter on the relative:39 (p. 16, § 44).
After he (sc. Aristotle) had finished the part with the chapter (qismat bāb)
on the quantity40 and (his) record of its specification (ḥilya),41 he began the
chapter on the relative (al-muḍāf ). He said: The part on the relative consists
of homonyma (al-muttafiq al-asmāʾ) and heteronyma (al-muḫtalif al-asmāʾ).
Examples of the homonyma are the brother, the friend, the comrade (aṣ-ṣāḥib),
the companion (al-ʿašīr), the partner (aš-šarīk), the neighbour and the similar
and so on. Because a man is the brother of his brother, the friend of his friend,
the comrade of his comrade and the similar of what is similar to him.
Examples of the heteronyma are the height and the bottom, “the funda-
mental” (al-aṣl) and “the derivative” (al-farʿ), the father and the child, “the pat-
ron and the citizens” (ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿiyya, also “the shepherd and the herd” or
439 “the pastor and the parish”), “the ruler and the ruled” | (al-mālik wa-l-mamlūk),
the half and the double, the container and the contained, the knower and the
knowledge.
(§45) He said: The substances of things (aʿyān al-umūr) should not be con-
fused with the relation to them (iḍāfatuhā). And nobody should maintain the
relation of a riding animal to people with the expression “the horse of so and
so” or “the donkey of so and so”. Thus, the horses and the donkeys belong to
the category of the relative (al-muḍāf ), not to the substances (al-aʿyān). It can
be said “the hand of so and so” and “the foot of so and so”: The hands and the
feet belong to the relative. Therefore, they do not belong to the substances, but
let people know, that the horse and the donkey are not related to so and so
“specification” (= peculiarity of the relative): Among possible Syriac renderings the Syriac
dīlāytā “proprietas”, “property, quality, characteristic” or dīlāyūṯā “proprietas”, “property,
quality, attribute” or dīlānāyūṯā “proprietas, peculiarity, property” seem to have misled the
translator to the assumption, that ḥilya has the same semantic field and connotations as
dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā or dīlānāyūṯā. On the Syriac words cf. R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syri-
acus, col. 882 and 883 (dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā, dīlānāyūṯā); col. 3304f. (purrāšā) and the English
renderings in R. Payne Smith, A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, p. 439. – Possibly, this
Syriac background affected in Greek-Arabic translations of the 3rd/9th century the ren-
dering of ἰδέα “Aussehen, Form, Erscheinung” and of χαρακτήρ with ḥilya: For references
cf. M. Ullmann, Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhun-
derts, pp. 304 f., and Supplement II, p. 796.
39 Ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh, pp. 16, 11–17, 10 (§§ 44–46).
40 al-ʿadad for ποσόν (= Aristotle, Cat. 6) also used by Ibn ʿArabī (cf. H. S. Nyberg, Kleinere
Schriften des Ibn Al-ʿArabī, p. 33). The traditional term is kamm. – On the possible syriacism
of the expression qismat bāb s. n. 38.
41 On this term, possibly a syriacism, s. n. 38.
through their fundamentals. However, both are related to (so and so), because
he has both (as owner), without being in him some horseness or donkeyness
(al-farasiyya wa-l-ḥimāriyya). It is said “the hand of so and so” and “the foot of
so and so”; both are related (to so and so) only through interpretation (taʾwīl)
of the fundamentals and the derivatives. The fundamentals and the derivat-
ives are related to one another. In this way it can be said “the father of so and
so” without occurence of the relation (between father and child) because of
the humanness (al-insāniyya). The father, but not the child, is indeed (p. 17)
a human before he gets a child. However, they both are related to each other
through (their) humanness which exists between both. Each of both belongs
to the category of the substances with regard to the fundamental (al-aṣl) and
to the category of the relative (al-muḍāf ) with regard to (its) relationship (an-
nasab).
(§46) He (Aristotle) has searched for a definiton of the relative (al-muḍāf ),
but was not able. He was content with (its) specification (al-ḥilya) and said:
(With regard to) the knowledge of the relative, the one shall not precede the
other: The father is not known until the child is known; the right side is not
known until the left side is known; and the half is not known until the double
is known. If one of the two names ceases to exist, (also) the other ceases to
exist.
The Relative
To (the relative) belong the homonyma (al-muttafiq al-asmāʾ), like the similar
and dissimilar, the (one) brother and the (other) brother, the (one) partner (aš-
šarīk) and the (other) partner.
The specification (ḥilya) of the relative is (the fact) that the one (the sub-
stance) precedes the other (the relative).
To (the relative) belong the heteronyma, like the height and the bottom, the
father and the child and the fundamental (al-aṣl) and the derivative (al-farʿ).
The text allows two observations:
– It is written as a guideline to Aristotle’s discussion by concentrating on
the crucial points and by admitting, that Aristotle was not able to give a
clear definition of the relative (Arabic text 17, 3). The explanation of “rela-
tion” is included in a short survey, from which it becomes evident, that “the
fundamental” (al-aṣl) of “the | substance” (al-ʿayn) precedes “the relative” 440
(al-muḍāf ), also called “the derivative” (al-farʿ) and determines “the rela-
tion” (al-iḍāfa). The relatives are “homonyma”, in case they have identical
names and the same identities, like “humanness” – we can add: If they
correlate or if there is a symmetrical relation – otherwise they are “het-
eronyma”.
164 chapter 10
– The examples for “homonyma” and “heteronyma” correspond to those found

in Aristotle and the Alexandrian commentators (s. above) – with the fol-
lowing exceptions: Different from the main points at the end of the chapter
on the relative, the text at the beginning mentions the additional examples
“comrade” (aṣ-ṣāḥib), “companion” (al-ʿašīr), “neighbour” (al-ǧār) and “pat-
ron and the citizens” (ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿiyya). These examples and the example
of the “partner” (aš-šarīk) were missing in Aristotle and the commentators.
They might be added by the translator or, in our case more likely, by the
redactor, supposedly Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, who in his Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, an
instruction in the behaviour of rulers and ruled, used different names for
the “friend” and the “comrade”,42 including those added in our text to the
examples of Aristotle and the commentators.
IV Other Channels of Transmission

Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān
The text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ scarcely had any echo in later philo-
sophical literature.43 We can assume, that before the Arabic translation of the
Categories by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910 or 911) there existed more channels
of transmission. A slightly expanded paraphrase of the Categories is excerpted
in the Book of Stones (Kitāb al-Aḥǧār) attributed to Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān (second
42 Cf. H. Daiber, Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, pp. 277–279.
43 An echo might be Dāwūd Ibn Marwān al-Muqammiṣ / Muqammaṣ, ʿIšrūn Maqāla, the
earliest extant work of Jewish philosophy written in Arabic in the first half of the 9th
century AD in the style of a kalām-work and using Aristotelian logic as a tool for his theo-
logy. See the edition and annotated translation by S. Stroumsa, Dāwūd Ibn Marwān Al-
Muqammiṣ’s Twenty Chapters. A new edition with revised introduction recently appeared
in 2016 (s. here bibliography). – Muqammiṣ gives a list of the 10 categories substance and
the accidents quantity, quality, relative, when, where, position, possession, action and pas-
sion (ed. and Engl. transl. S. Stroumsa, pp. 55/54) similar to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (al-Manṭiq,
ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh, p. 11, 2–8; cf. pp. 11, 24–12, 5): They both use the Arabic term ǧida
“possession” (cf. E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon I, p. 2924 col. c.). The same term can
be found in Ibn Sīnā, al-Hidāya, ed. M. ʿAbduh, p. 75, 3. – S. Stroumsa has wrongly “state
(attribution)”. – However, there are terminological differences and moreover, Muqammiṣ
(ch. 1 § 8, ed. and Engl. transl. S. Stroumsa, pp. 49/48) contains among other references
a quotation from Aristotle, Cat. 8. 11 a 16–20, on the category of quality, which cannot be
found in the text of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. As Muqammiṣ seems to have known Syriac (cf. S.
Stroumsa, p. 19), he might have used a Greek-Syriac textbook which was also a source
of the text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. – It might be tempting to draw a parallel of
the concept of substance and relative in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ with the noun and its adject-
ive, musnad and musnad ilayhi and to see a similarity to early grammarians like al-Farrāʾ
and Sībawayh: Cf. A. Ighbariah, Grammatical Features, pp. 254–258.
half of the 2nd/8th c.) and perhaps written “decades after 800 A.D.”44 Regret-
tably, this excerpt is restricted to Aristotle, Categories 8. 8 b 25–11 a | 37,45 on 441
“quality” (kayfiyya); only at its end, in the section (Arabic text, p. 33, 11–17 /
Engl. transl. S. Nomanul Haq, pp. 240f.) corresponding to Aristotle, Cat. 8.
11 a 20–39, we find a remarkable addition to Aristotle’s explanation: Only gen-
era and not particulars can be relatives; knowledge is related to the known, but
not to particular knowledge: The Ǧābir-text identifies the “genera” (aǧnās) with
“universals” (kulliyya) in contrast to “the particulars” (al-ǧuzwiyāt = al-ǧuzʾiyāt;
al-ašḫāṣ).
V Alexandrian Repercussions on Kindī and His Student Saraḫsī
In a similar manner and presumably during the same time, perhaps in the first
half of the 3rd/9th century, the first great Islamic philosopher Kindī (d. between
247/861 and 259/873), also called “philosopher of the Arabs” ( faylasūf al-ʿarab),
declared the relative to be something “existing without matter” (al-mawǧūd lā
maʿa ṭīna). He reckoned it among the “connected predicates of the substance”
(al-murakkaba min maḥmūlāt al-ǧawhar) and argued that “fatherhood and
sonship derive from the relation that each of the two has to the other and exists
because of the existence of the other, (just) like the part because of the whole.
Both are thus in their characterization not connected with matter”.46 Kindī,
44 D. E. Pingree in the foreword to S. Nomanul Haq, Names, Natures and Things, X. – E.

Gannagé, Sur les Catégories d’ Aristote, pp. 85 and 92, concludes from her comparison
with the translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, that the version of the Kitāb al-Aḥǧār is later
than Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn and must be in its terminology later than the 2nd half of the 9th
century AD. Presumably, the text is not a paraphrase by Ǧābir and instead based on a
Greek Hellenistic paraphrase. – On the attribution of the corpus Ǧabirianum to different
periods cf. H. Daiber, review of Paul Kraus, Jabir Ibn Ḥayyān (1942 / Repr. Paris 1986).
In BiOr 47, 1990, col. 236 f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III B/17.
45 = Arabic paraphrase, ed. S. Nomanul Haq, pp. 30, 1–33, ult. / Partly translated and com-
pared with the translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, pp. 230–242. – The Arabic text in trans-
literation, with additional collation of two more MSS and adding a comparison with the
translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, can also be found in E. Gannagé, Sur les Catégories
d’ Aristote, pp. 93–101; additional passages can be found on pp. 101–103.
46 Kindī, Risāla fī kammiyyat kutub Arisṭūṭālīs wa-mā yuḥtāǧu ilayhi fī taḥṣīl al-falsafa, pp.
370, 14–371, 3. An English translation by D. Gutas (slightly differing from ours), in addi-
tion to some more passages (ed. M. ʿA. Abū Rīda I, pp. 370, 11–13 and 371, 4–372, 1) can
be found in P. Thom, Division, p. 31 n. 3. – Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann
published an English translation of Kindī’s Risāla. See their The Philosophical Works of Al-
Kindī, pp. 281–296, and the quoted passage p. 285, partly differing from our translation;
instead of “(just) like the part because of the whole. Both are thus in their characteriza-
166 chapter 10
additionally in his division of the categories,47 as well as the paraphrase of the

Aristotelian text in Ǧābir, follow in their specifications and deviations Alexan-
drian tradition, as parallels in the commentaries by Olympiodorus, Elias and
Simplicius show.48 These commentators consider categories in singular cases
as something existing in mind.49
Kindī’s distinction between “simple” (mufrada) and connected “predicates
of substances” (maḥmūlāt al-ǧawāhir) is a part of the Alexandrian50 distinc-
442 tion between | simple and connected categories.51 Differing from Aristotle, who
regarded the ten categories “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”,
“when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” as something existing
absolutely and “without connection (συμπλοκή)” with something else,52 only
the first four categories were considered by the Alexandrians as something
“simple” (ἁπλαῖ) and the remaining six as “connected” (σύνθετοι).53 Interest-
ingly, this division of the categories reappears in a short summary of the cat-
egories by Kindī’s student Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, until now assumed
to be lost.54
We edit the text from the unique MS:55
tion not connected with matter” the translators have: “But part and whole are not separate
from matter in position”, apparently replacing Arabic fī waṣfihā by fī waḍʿihā.
47 Cf. P. Thom, Division, pp. 30–33.
48 Cf. P. Thom, Division, pp. 32 f. – On Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in
Arabic transmission cf. M. Chase, The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius’ Commentary on
the Categories, pp. 11 f., and on Fārābī, pp. 17–19.
49 Cf. ἐνθύμημα in Olympiodorus, Prolegomena, ed. A. Busse, p. 55, 28; νοεῖται in Elias, In Por-
phyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 15, and below n. 141. – Simplicius differs insofar as
he considers relation (σχέσις) as εἶδος and λόγος, in which the relatives participate (Sim-
plicius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 174, 30–175, 3 / French transl. C. Luna,
La relation chez Simplicius, pp. 122f.). – Simplicius apparently did not consider the rela-
tion as product of the intellect, which compares the things (cf. C. Luna, La relation chez
Simplicius, p. 116).
50 Cf. Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 21 (άπλαῖ σύνθετοι).
51 Cf. Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 14–24.
52 Aristotle, Cat. 4. 1 b 25–26.
53 Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 20–21.
54 Muḫtaṣar (Iḫtiṣār) Kitāb Qāṭīġūriyās. The title is mentioned by F. Rosenthal, Aḥmad
B. Aṭ-Ṭayyib As-Saraḫsī, p. 54 (with reference to Arabic biobibliographical sources), fol-
lowed by Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, p. 151 /
English version, p. 223.
55 Aya Sofya 4855 (copied 733/1333), fol. 71 r 1–9.
‫من رسالة احمد بن الطيب السر خسي‬

‫ جوهر كسماء‬: ‫ والبسيطة ار بعة اقسام‬٠‫المقولات عشرة وهى تنقسم قسمين اما بسيطة واما مركبة‬
‫وارض وكم كذراعين وثلثة وكيف كبياض وسواد ومضاف كضعف النصف ونصف الضعف؛‬
‫ اين وهى من تركيب جوهر مع مكان كفلان في السوق ومتى وهى من تركيب‬: ‫والمركبة ستة اقسام‬
‫جوهر مع زمان ككان فلان امس و يكون غدا وملك وهى من تركيب جوهر مع جوهر كلفلان‬
‫على الارض وفاعل وهى‬56 ‫عبد وخادم ونصبة وهى من تركيب جوهر مع جوهر كفلان مستقيم‬
‫من تركيب جوهر مع كيف كفلان يقطع وفلان يحرق ومنفعل وهى من تركيب جوهر مع كيف‬
‫كمنقطع ومحـترق؛‬
From a Treatise by Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī

The categories are ten. They can be divided into two parts, into simple
and into connected. The simple consist of four parts: “Substance”, for example
heaven and earth; “quantity”, for example two or three cubits;57 “quality”, for
example whiteness58 and blackness; “relative”, for example double of the half
and half of the double.59 The connected (categories) consist of six parts:
“Where”, that means a | substance can be connected with a place, for example 443
so-and-so in the market;60 “when”, that means a substance can be connected
with time, for example so-and-so was yesterday61 and will be tomorrow; “pos-
session”, that means a substance can be connected with another substance, for
example so-and-so has a slave and a servant;62 “position” (nuṣba), that means
a substance can be connected with another substance, for example so-and-so
stands upright on the earth;63 “action”, that means a substance can be connec-
56 MS ‫مستلق‬.
57 The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 1 b 30 and in Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed.
A. Busse, p. 158, 35.
58 The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1 and in Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed.
A. Busse, p. 158, 35.
59 Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1 (“double”, “half”, “greater”); Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse
p. 159, 1 has the example of father and son.
60 The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1.
61 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1.
62 A different example in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 2 (“has shoes on”, “has armour on”).
63 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 2; Elias, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 2 (κεῖται, καθή-
μενος, ‘εστώς).
168 chapter 10
ted with quality, for example so-and-so cuts and so-and-so burns;64 “passion”
means, that a substance can be connected with quality, for example being cut
and being burnt.65
VI Language, Logic and Relation

Ibn Ḥazm and the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity
Like his teacher Kindī,66 Saraḫsī was engaged in disputes with Christians and
could use his knowledge of the Aristotelian Organon in his arguments against
the Christians, especially against the doctrine of Trinity.67
The method to use Greek logic against Christian doctrine and belief contin-
ued to be a standard in the 4th/10th century – despite some disputes between
Christian and Muslim scholars about the value of logic: I refer to the discussion
in 932AD between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim
scholar Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979), a commentator of the grammar by
Sībawayh (d. 180/796).68 Acccording to Abū Bišr (d. 328/940), logic is a univer-
sal valid vehicle of intelligible things for all nations and superior to languages
which differ among the people and require logic in their grammar. Despite the
compromise of Abū Bišr’s pupil Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) to identify logic with
universal grammar, that is behind any particular language, Sīrāfī defends lan-
guage as only access to intelligible things. Contrary to Hellenism, he propagates
“clear Arabic language” as it is revealed by God in the Qurʾān.
This reminds us of the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm who, through his teach-
ers, seems to have had some links with the Baghdad school of logic, including
Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus.69 He used the Aristotelian Organon in his critique
64 The examples can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 4, and (“cut”) in Elias, In Porphyrii
Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 1.
65 The examples can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 4, and (“cut”) in Elias, In Porphyrii
Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 1.
66 On Kindī’s use of Aristotelian logic for his refutation of Christian Trinity cf. G. Endress
and P. Adamson in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 126f. / English version,
pp. 192 f.
67 Cf. the references given by H. H. Biesterfeldt in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I,
p. 150 / English version, p. 224.
68 Cf. G. Endress, Grammatik und Logik, pp. 163–299. – G. Endress in Philosophie in der
islamischen Welt I, pp. 202f.; pp. 299–301 / English version, pp. 295f.; pp. 432–434. – K.
Versteegh, Landmarks, pp. 52–63. – P. Adamson and A. Key, Philosophy of Language,
pp. 74–99.
69 Cf. R. Ramón Guerrero, Aristotle and Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 413f. – J. Lameer, Ibn Ḥazm’s
Logical Pedigree, pp. 417–428, esp. pp. 421–426.
of Christian belief and in addition based his refutation on the textual basis of
the Qurʾān and its “clear” (ẓāhir) meanings. His logical work at-Taqrīb | li-ḥadd 444
al-manṭiq70 (written between 1025 and 1029AD) is written as a methodolo-
gical introduction to his theology and his refutation of Christianity. It begins
with Porphyry’s Isagoge and continues with the Categories, On Interpretation,
followed by Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora, Topics and Sophistical Refut-
ations, which Ibn Ḥazm joins together under the title Kitāb al-Burhān “Book on
Demonstration”, finally Rhetorics and Poetics. As in his critique of Kindī’s meta-
physics, which is mainly based on the Neoplatonism of Proclus,71 Ibn Ḥazm
propagates in his refuation of Christianity a strict concept of God’s transcend-
ence, of God’s tawḥīd. Ibn Ḥazm based his critique on concepts of logic and
language in the Organon and the clear meanings of the Qurʾān. The Christi-
ans, however, “distorted” and “falsified” (tabdīl, taḥrīf ) their fundaments, the
gospels which were full of “contradictions” (munāqaḍāt).72 Aristotle’s categor-
ies (Cat. 2–5) are universals73 of language (not only of Arabic).74 Similar to the
nominalism of medieval scholastics they are mere terms,75 which on the basis
of logic are a tool for the correct reflexion and knowledge of the Creator, cre-
ation and the fundaments of religion, its texts, which must be interpreted as
they are and not allegorically. Language and logic are in the service of Islamic
theology and polemics against Christianity.
Here, Aristotle’s concept of relation in his Categories becomes fundament-
ally important. Ibn Ḥazm76 mentions it as one of the “four fundamentals”
(ar-ruʾūs al-arbaʿa)77 “substance”, “quantity”, “quality” and “relation”,78 which,
as we have seen,79 in accordance with the Alexandrian and Kindian tradition,
70 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, Rasāʾil Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī IV, pp. 91–356. – A short analytical survey of
the contents can be found in R. Ramón Guerrero, Aristotle and Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 407–415,
and in J. M. Puerta Vílchez, Inventory, pp. 743–746.
71 Cf. H. Daiber, Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm, pp. 284–302.
72 See the monograph by S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik. – S.-M. Behloul, The
Testimony of Reason, pp. 457–483.
73 Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, p. 38.
74 Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, pp. 61–67. Herewith Ibn Ḥazm differs from
Sīrāfī, who contradicts Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus (s. above).
75 Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, pp. 41–43.
76 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, pp. 134–173. – Cf. the analysis (of which we deviate in several
points) in S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, pp. 44–96.
77 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 165, 3. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, p. 57,
and at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 144, 7.
78 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, pp. 161, 13–165, 3.
79 S. above ch. V.
170 chapter 10
appear as “simple” categories and can be “connected” with the categories

“when” (az-zamān),80 “where” (al-makān),81 “position” (an-nuṣba),82 “posses-
sion” (al-milk),83 “action” (al-fāʿil)84 and “passion” (al-munfaʿil)85. According
to Ibn Ḥazm, God’s names, His attributes, correctly must be understood as
categories without relation to the created, as this would contradict God’s tran-
scendence. Through “reason” (al-ʿaql) the soul comes to know, that “the (divine)
445 actor (al-fāʿil) is acting | ( fāʿil) through (his) action (bi-l-fiʿl) or endowed with
action (ḏū l-fiʿl)”.86 Herewith, Ibn Ḥazm contradicts those, who maintain in an
inacceptable syllogism:
The actor is a body because of its action

the Creator is acting
therefore the Creator is a body87
Ibn Ḥazm was aware of the existence of an asymmetrical relation between God
and creation. God’s acting, hearing, seeing and living, as it is mentioned in the
Qurʾān, do not require a correlative. These attributes are proper names of the
Creator, who is neither genus nor species or bearer of accidents.88 Herewith,
the Creator cannot be called one of the simple or connected categories. The
expression “God is acting” has the meaning, that the predicate “is acting” has
a relation to God – not because God is a substance and has the accident “act-
ing”. Simultaneously, God’s acting does not require an object. God’s autarkeia89
became a first step in a deviation from the concept of a substance. God is
not a substance with accidents, to which God’s creation is “related” (muḍāf ),
because of the accidents of this substance. Therefore, Kindī’s concept of a rela-
tion between the divine ʿilla, the cause, and its creation, the maʿlūl, the caused,
restricts God’s transcendence.

82 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 170, 17–20.
83 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 171, 1–7.
86 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 164, 10 f. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik,
p. 55.
87 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 164, 8. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, p. 55.
88 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, p. 164, 11–18. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik,
pp. 55 f.
89 On this Neoplatonic concept in Ibn Ḥazm cf. H. Daiber, Kritik, pp. 289f.
Ibn Ḥazm combines his concept of logic as a tool for everyone90 with his
ideal of striving after knowledge by everyone, as far as he is capable to do
so.91
Here, it is helpful to draw the attention to an encyclopaedia, compiled
shortly before Ibn Ḥazm in scholarly circles of the Irak, the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-
Ṣafāʾ, The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. They propagate the striving after
encyclopaedic knowledge with the aim to “purify the soul and improve the
character” as a way of salvation leading to the final stage in the other world.92
Knowledge includes logic, one of the propaedeutical sciences preceding nat-
ural sciences, psychology and epistemology, finally theology and religious sci-
ences. The section on logic (Epistles 10–14)93 is considered as the best way to
truth, to God, a tool to help men to imitate God.94 It starts with a paraphrase
(with deviations) of Porphyry’s Isago|ge (Epistle 10)95 and continues with Aris- 446
totle’s Categories (Epistle 11)96 and De Interpretatione (Epistle 12).97 The follow-
ing references to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (Epistle 13)98 and Posterior Analytics
(Epistle 14)99 are limited. As Epistle 13 mainly quotes from the first six chapters
of Aristotle’s Analytica priora book I,100 and as Aristotle’s Topics, Sophistical
90 Herewith, he differs from Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, and apparently also from scholars in
Alexandria, according to whom Aristotle was understandable only by those who were cap-
able to do. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, pp. 30–33, with reference to
D. Gutas. – With regard to Ibn Sīnā we should be aware that this philosopher regarded
philosophical truth as something based on intuition and divine inspiration which is not
accessible to everyone. According to Ibn Sīnā, the limitations of knowledge do not justify
to attribute to him an obfuscatory method with the purpose to hide knowledge from the
unworthy. – Cf. H. Daiber, The Limitations of Knowledge, pp. 25–34.
91 at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, pp. 100 f. – Cf. S.-M. Behloul, Ibn Ḥazms Evangelienkritik, pp. 28–
30.
92 Cf. H. Daiber, review of Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in
der Enzyklopädie, Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Wiesbaden 1975. In OLZ 76, 1981, col. 46f. =
H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/51. – Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, p. 536
/ English version I, p. 756 (Daniel De Smet).
93 C. Baffioni, Epistles.
94 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 2–3 and 16.
95 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 5–9.
96 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 9–12; Arabic text, ed. C. Baffioni, pp. 45–76; English ver-
sion, C. Baffioni, pp. 87–99 (cf. C. Baffioni, pp. 9–12, and the summary C. Baffioni,
pp. 21 f.).
99 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 16–21.
100 As has been observed by C. Baffioni, Epistles, p. 23.
172 chapter 10
Refutations, Rhetoric and Poetics are omitted,101 we are reminded of the restric-
ted curricula of the Alexandrians and their echo in Syriac and early Arabic
textbooks on logic, beginning with Porphyry’s Isagoge and ending with Aris-
totle’s Analytica priora I 7. A confirmation of the Alexandrian background102 is
the classification of logic as “mental logic” (al-manṭiq al-fikrī) or “mental con-
cepts” or “forms”.103 Following Neoplatonic philosophy, the Epistles let them
emanate from God into the active intellect, then into the Universal Soul, into
prime matter and finally into the human souls.104 Consequently, any spoken
language, the linguistic logic, mirrors this mental logic, a higher reality. This
linguistic logic is more than grammar and enables reason, by using syllogism,
to reveal contradictions of speeches and to distinguish between falsehood and
truth.105
Further Alexandrian traditions are mirrored in the chapter on the relat-
ives:106
– The Epistles distinguish between “parallel” (an-naẓīr) and “non-parallel”
(ġayr an-naẓīr) relatives, what corresponds to the Alexandrian distinction
between “homonyma” and “synonyma”107. To the examples of both kinds,
taken from Aristotle,108 the Epistles add examples found in Alexandrian
commentators, in the Syriac text of Sergius and in the Arabic Epitome attrib-
447 uted to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ.109 |
101 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, p. 3.

102 S. above ch. II and V.
103 C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 7 and 9.
104 C. Baffioni, Epistles, p. 7 and Epistle nr. 10, ch. 11; C. Baffioni’s “Conclusion”, pp. 31–33,
which gives a clear picture of the interesting combination of Neoplatonic emanationism
with Islamic revelation, of religion and logic. – Cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I,
pp. 536 f. / English version, pp. 757 f. (D. De Smet).
105 Cf. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 28–30. – On the theory of speaking in the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ cf.
also K. Versteegh, Landmarks, pp. 93–97.
106 Arabic text, ed. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 65, 1–68, 7 / Engl. transl. C. Baffioni, pp. 94f. –
Some echoes can be found in Ibn Sabʿīn, s. below ch. XII.
107 S. above ch. II. – Accordingly, the explanation by C. Baffioni, Epistles, p. 11, must be
revised. – The same distinction with mostly identical examples (taken from the Alexan-
drian tradition) reappears later in Ibn Ḥazm, at-Taqrīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās, pp. 162, 14–163, 5. –
Contrary to R. Ramón Guerrero, Aristotle and Ibn Ḥazm, p. 413, this can be taken as an
indication that Ibn Ḥazm had some knowledge of the Epistles which seem to have been
known in Al-Andalus around 1000 AD.
108 See the references to Aristotle given in the notes in C. Baffioni, Epistles, p. 94.
109 Namely the examples of the brother, the neighbour and the friend. S. above ch. II and
III.
– The Epistles distinguish between four simple and six composite relatives,110
without giving clear information about the simple four categories (i.e. sub-
stance, quality, quantity, relation). They can be combined with the six cat-
egories where, when, position, possession, action and passion, which are
described in detail.111
The texts and their authors, whom we have discussed so far, mirror the Aris-
totelian concept of categories and Aristotle’s explanation of the category “rela-
tion”, often shaped by the Alexandrian commentators and increasingly by
Neoplatonic philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emanations. This
reveals to be an important background for new accentuations after the first
great philosopher Kindī – namely in Fārabī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd.
VII Stoic-Neoplatonic Repercussions of Relation on Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn

aṭ-Ṭayyib
Before we enter into discussion of these philosophers, we should mention for

the sake of completeness, an epigone of the Aristotelian-Alexandrian tradition
at the turn from the 4th/10th to the 5th/11th century, the Nestorian Christian
Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in Baghdad (d. 435/1043).112 His commentary on Aris-
totle’s Categories follows Alexandrian tradition, especially Olympiodorus.113
The section on “relation”114 had been analysed by the editor of the Arabic text.115
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was mainly concerned with an explanation of the Aristotelian
text, which is in parts included and systematically commented along Alex-
andrian tradition, mainly with regard to formal aspects, the arrangement of
the categories, their kinds, their nature, their description and their termino-
logy. At first sight, the result is not very original. But it deserves our attention,
because his Alexandrian distinction between “homonymy” and “heteronymy”
of the relative (al-muttafiqa asmāʾuhā and al-mutabāyina asmāʾuhā),116 which
110 On this s. above ch. V the texts by Kindī and his pupil Saraḫsī and their Alexandrian back-
ground.
111 Arabic text, ed. C. Baffioni, Epistles, pp. 66, 7–68, 7 / Engl. transl. C. Baffioni, pp. 94f.
112 On him cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 346–352 / English version, pp. 496–506
(C. Ferrari).
113 See edition and analysis by C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar.
114 Ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, pp. 251–300.
115 C. Ferrari, Die Kategorie der Relation, pp. 471–476. – The article appeared, slightly
changed, also in C. Ferrari’s edition Der Kategorienkommentar, pp. 85–91.
116 Cf. (partly with varying terminology) ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, pp. 253,
2 (nisbat al-wifāq wa-l-ḫilāf ); 253, 6 and 14 f.; 257, 32 f.; 258, 1; 261, 16–262, 2; 288, 21–28 etc.
174 chapter 10
we come across since the 2nd/8th century,117 stimulated Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib to some
reflexion on the role of “the intellect” (al-ʿaql) in the “comparison” (muqāy-
asa).118 Relativa, which are “distant from one another” (al-mutabāʿidāt), can
only be “understood” ( yufham) by “analogy” (qiyās).119 And in the discussion
of Aristotle, Cat. I 7. 8 a 13–8 b 21 and 7 b 15–8 a 12 about the relativa of the
448 whole and the part of it, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib distinguishes between “the perceived” |
(al-maḥsūs) of a “corporal substance” (al-ǧawhar al-ǧusmānī) and “the intelli-
gible” (al-maʿqūl), “the form occuring in the soul” (aṣ-ṣūra al-ḥāṣila fī n-nafs),120
also called “the image of the perceived” (miṯāl al-maḥsūs).121 This distinction
appears to be important in another discussion of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, namely in his
commentary on Aristotle, Cat. 2. 1 a 16–1 b 9, on the qualities of substance and
accident.122 How can the form be part and not accident of what is composed
of form and matter? What is the relation between accident and its substrate?
In his report on the different solutions, which partly are mirrored in the Alex-
andrian commentaries, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib tends to assume a similarity between the
being of the accident and the being of the form in the substrate. Because acci-
dents require the perceivable matter (hayūla qarība “near matter”) as a sub-
strate, which is composed of matter and its accident “form”,123 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib
can declare the whole and its parts as identical; the form becomes the com-
position of all its parts and thus makes its substrate, the matter, perceivable.124
Here, we must pay attention to the interdependence of form, matter and acci-
dent. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib illustrates this with his example of the aroma / smell of
an apple, which, according to him, shapes the surrounding air, and the form
of this shaped air will be imprinted in our senses. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib refutes other
proposals which he found in the Alexandrian commentaries125 and remark-
ably declares the imprint of the air in the senses to be a “spiritual” (rūḥānī)
imprint, different from the “bodily” (ǧusmānī) imprint of the form in the mat-
ter.126 As Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib considers the imprints in the air and subsequently in
117 S. above ch. III.

118 Cf. ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, p. 256, 10–14.
119 Ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, p. 288, 16; cf. pp. 291, 16–292, 7.
120 Ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, p. 285, 28–32.
121 Ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, p. 285, 31.
122 Ed. C. Ferrari, Der Kategorienkommentar, pp. 55–69. – Cf. the article by C. Ferrari,
Duft, pp. 85–106 (pp. 92–105, 1st section, are nearly identical with pp. 63–74 in C. Ferrari,
Der Kategorienkommentar).
123 C. Ferrari, Duft, pp. 94 f.
124 Cf. C. Ferrari, Duft, p. 96.
125 Cf. C. Ferrari, Duft, pp. 98–103.
126 C. Ferrari, Duft, p. 100.
the senses as substrates with corresponding forms, his proposal is not very dis-
tant from the explanation attributed to Plotinus, according to which the smell
of the apple is a substance and not an accident.127 Even the second solution,
according to which the bodily vapour of the smell is dissolved and then shapes
the air, is similar to the proposal attributed to Plotinus and ascribed to him by
Olympiodorus.128
The allusion to Plotinus and the classification of sensory perceptions, like
the smell of an apple, as a “spiritual” imprint in the senses, does not allow an
explanation against the background of Aristotle’s doctrine of sensory percep-
tion (De anima, book II 419 a), as has been proposed129 under the impression of
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib himself, who attributed his solution to the school of Aristotle.130
We should have a look in another direction, in the Stoic discussion of “relation”
and its transcendental aspects. Its echo in Neoplatonic philosophy became
influential in the 4th/10th century, in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity and | 449
their classification of the intellect as mediator between God and the human
soul.131 As has been shown in a monograph from the year 1986,132 the Stoics
detected the “relation” as a universal valid category, in which all single entities
are connected in the totality of all things. This totality of all things is the cosmos
which is penetrated by the pneuma, the hegemonikon, the tonos, that determ-
ines the dynamic process of interaction. The Stoic concept of the immanence
of the pneuma, the divine dynamic and continuous medium, is mirrored in the
Stoic doctrine of the interpenetration of all substances, of the total mixture of
matter and pneuma.133 This interpenetration of all substances became import-
ant for the Stoic theory of the relations of “place” (prerequisites of quantitative
and qualitative identity, similarity and dissimilarity), “time” and “movement” as
well as “action” and “passion”:134 Because of their universality, these relations
were considered as primary structures, which were object of thought and per-
ceivable in a dynamic and “time”-related process of realization, the physis in
127 C. Ferrari, Duft, p. 98; cf. pp. 102 f.

131 S. n. 103.
132 R. Löbl, Relation. – M. Forschner, Philosophie, pp. 101–104 (“Die sogenannten Kate-
gorien”), does not discuss the aspects of relation as discussed by R. Löbl (although R.
Löbl is mentioned in his bibliography).
133 Alexander of Aphrodisias dedicated a work to this doctrine. – R. Todd, Alexander of
Aphrodisias, quoted by R. Löbl, p. 120.
134 R. Löbl, Relation, pp. 120–129.
176 chapter 10
the relatives, the secondary things.135 As these secondary things, the beings,
are dynamic processes, they can only be the object of a propositional logic, in
which names and concepts remain incomplete statements.136 Their primary
structure of “relation” is something transcendental,137 which, as determining
norm of all single realizations, becomes the logos, and in the unity beyond the
objective reality the divine Nous.138 Consequently, in this theory of “relation”,
the “relation” appears to be the form, the primary structure of different relata,
which correspond to this form.139
Only spolia of this Stoic concept of “relation” did enter Islamic philosophy,
namely through the mediation of Neoplatonism, in which the Stoic imman-
ence of the divine dynamic medium, the pneuma, is replaced by a concept
of the divine One, who as divine intellect is both immanent and transcend-
ent.140 Here, two aspects become important in the Islamic period: The role of
reason and intellect in the reflexion on the category of “relation” and the eman-
ation of the divine intellect determining the concept of “relation” created in the
human soul. We mentioned Ibn Ḥazm, the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity and
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, who possibly were inspired by some Alexandrian Neoplatonizing
commentators of Aristotle.141
We shall consider now the place of the great philosophers Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā
and Ibn Rušd between philosophical linguistic and metaphysical interpreta-
tion of “relation”. Here, the texts, which we have discussed so far, will be a
450 helpful background for their interpretation. |
VIII Fārābī
Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951) seems to have been the first Muslim philo-
sopher, who had written a word-by-word commentary on Aristotle’s Categories,
which is classified as “Long commentary” (Tafsīr, Šarḥ). Only fragments are
available in a Hebrew version, perhaps by Šemuʾel of Marseilles from the 14th
century AD.142 Regrettably they do not contain Fārābī’s comments on the cat-
egory of “relation”. Another treatise by Fārābī, his Book on the Categories (Kitāb
135 R. Löbl, Relation, p. 132.

136 R. Löbl, Relation, pp. 132 f.
137 R. Löbl, Relation, pp. 134–141.
140 Cf. H. Daiber, God versus Causality, p. 9.
141 Cf. ἐνθύμημα in Olympiodorus, Prolegomena, ed. A. Busse, p. 55, 28; νοεῖται in Elias, In Por-
phyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, p. 159, 15. – S. n. 49.
142 M. Zonta, Al-Fārābī’s Long Commentary, pp. 185–254.
Qāṭāġūriyās), in fact is an expanding version based on the Arabic translation by

Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn and not a “paraphrase”.143 It is a kind of preparatory work to
Fārābī’s Book of Letters, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, which we will discuss later. Fārābī men-
tions the main points of Aristotle, but in a slightly differing order, with new
accentuations and with additions. The chapter on the relatives144 is followed
by aspects which were discussed by Aristotle separately on different places,
and which were studied by Fārābī as something referring to “relation”, namely
“time”145 and “place”.146 The last-mentioned category is followed in the Fārābī-
text by sections on the categories “position”,147 “possession”,148 “passion” (an
yanfaʿila) and “action” (an yafʿala)149. The complete sequence corresponds to
Aristotle.150 Fārābī, however, does not consider “position”, “possession”, “pas-
sion” and “action” as belonging to the category “relation”, nor does he include
143 Cf. D. M. Dunlop, Al-Fārābī’s Paraphrase of the Categories. – The Arabic text can also be
found in R. al-ʿAǧam, al-Manṭiq ʿind al-Fārābī, pp. 89–131, and in al-Manṭiqiyāt li-l-Fārābī
I, ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh, pp. 41–82.
144 D. M. Dunlop, §§ 21–28; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 7. – An excerpt from the section on relation can
be found in Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Taʿālīq ʿalā Kitāb al-Maqūlāt li-l-Fārābī, ed. M. Fakhry, p. 91, 13–
17. = Fārābī, ed. D. M. Dunlop, p. 182, 4–8. – The following passage in Ibn Bāǧǧa, ed. M.
Fakhry, pp. 91, 17–92, 15, does not exist in Fārābī and is not part of the “exercise” (irtiyāḍ)
on the relation (ed. M. Fakhry, pp. 115, 4–116, 15). Both passages add more examples. –
Further excerpts from Fārābī are in Ibn Ṭumlūs, Kitāb al-Madḫal li-ṣināʿat al-manṭiq, ed.
and Span. transl. M. Asin, the section on relation, pp. 56–59 / Span. transl., pp. 89–93 / new
edition F. Ben Ahmed, pp. 124–126: Sometimes Ibn Ṭumlūs inserts a nearly literal quota-
tion from Fārābī’s paraphrase (ed. D. M. Dunlop, p. 179, 15 = Ibn Ṭumlūs, ed. M. Asin,
p. 56, 6 f. / ed. F. Ben Ahmed, p. 124, 6 f.; ed. D. M. Dunlop, p. 181, 11 = Ibn Ṭumlūs, ed. M.
Asin, p. 57, 9 f. / ed. F. Ben Ahmed, p. 125, 3; ed. D. M. Dunlop, p. 182, 4f. = Ibn Ṭumlūs, ed.
M. Asin, p. 58, 13 f. / ed. F. Ben Ahmed, p. 126, 1 f.) and continues with his own illustrating
examples, partly introduced by miṯla ḏālika or wa-ḏālika miṯla. – At the beginning, after
having quoted Fārābī’s definition of relation (ed. M. Asin, p. 56, 6f. / ed. F. Ben Ahmed,
p. 124, 6 f.), Ibn Ṭumlūs adds the remark (ed. M. Asin, p. 56, 7f. / ed. F. Ben Ahmed, p. 124,
7 f.), that Ibn Sīnā “opposed” (iʿtaraḍa) to Fārābī’s definition of relation which, according
to him, turned out to be correct. Regrettably, we do not get more details. – On Ibn Ṭumlūs’
high estimation of Fārābī cf. A. Elamrani-Jamal, Éléments nouveaux, pp. 465–483. – On
Ibn Ṭumlūs as a critic of Fārābī cf. F. Ben Ahmed, Three Masters, pp. 545–548; cf. id., Ibn
Ṭumlūs on Dialectical Reasoning. The extent of His Reliance on al-Fārābī and Averroes.
In The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jew-
ish, and Christian Thought. Ed. Nadja Germann & Steven Harvey. Turnhout 2020. =
Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 20, pp. 245–276.
145 §§ 29–31; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 12 and 13; as part of quantity Cat. 6. 5 b 5f.
146 §§ 32–33; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6. 6 a 12, as part of quantity.
147 §§ 34–35; cf. the short note in Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 10.
148 § 36 (D. M. Dunlop wrongly “state”); cf. Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 13f.; 10. 12 a 26ff.; 15. 15 b 18–32.
149 §§ 37–40; cf. the short note Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 1–4.
150 Cat. 4. 1 b 26–28; in the following text the sections themselves keep to this sequence, with
the exception of the sections on time (s. n. 145) and place (s. n. 146).
178 chapter 10
“quantity”151 and “quality”152. According to him, the category “quality” can be

451 confused with “relation”, because of its ambiguity with regard to genus and |
species.153 In his view the same ambiguity exists in “the other categories, for
example substance (al-ǧawhar), position (al-waḍʿ) etc.”154
This is the reason why Fārābī does not follow the Alexandrians and the
school of Kindī, where the categories “substance” (Aristotle, Cat. 5), “quality”
(Aristotle, Cat. 8), “quantity” (Aristotle, Cat. 6) and “relation” (Aristotle, Cat.
7) were considered as belonging to the “simple” part and as combinable with
the “connective” categories “time”, “place”, “position”, “possession”, “passion” and
“action”. In the section on the category “when” Fārābī explicitly dissociates him-
self from unnamed scholars (apparently the Alexandrians and the school of
Kindī) who declare the meaning of “when” as “time” (zamān) or as something
composed from “substance” (ǧawhar) and “time”.155 And in his Book on the Let-
ters Fārābī criticizes unnamed scholars who in a differing manner declare kinds
of “connections” (aṣnāf an-nisab) between things as “relation” (iḍāfa).156 Not
everything that has a kind of connection with something else can be classified
as “relation”. First indications of Fārābī’s own view we find in the mentioned
Book on the Categories: Here, Fārabī mentions the “particles of connections”
(ḥurūf an-nisab),157 which are “employed in referring each one (of the relat-
ives) to the other” and he mentions the condition, that “essence” (māhiya)
and “existence” (wuǧūd) of the correlated things “have a certain kind of rela-
tion”. In addition, in the description ( yūṣafu) of the “relation” the “names”
(asmāʾ) should indicate the “essence” and “existence” of both relatives.158 In
case there are no “generally accepted names” (asmāʾ mašhūra),159 “common
people” (al-ǧumhūr) in a careless and arbitrary way use names, which actu-
ally belong to another category and they add “particles of connection”.160 Here,
Fārābī adds chapters on the “peculiarities” (ḫawāṣṣ) of the “relation”, which
should avoid confusion about the relation between two things: He mentions as
conditions the “homogeneity in the speech” (at-takāfuʾ fī l-qawl) with regard to
151 §§ 6–15; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6.

152 §§ 16–20; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 8.
153 Cf. ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 28, pp. 182 f.
154 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 28, p. 183.
155 Ed. D. M. Dunlop (1959), § 29, p. 21, 3 f. / Engl. transl., p. 37. – On Fārābī’s dissociation from
Kindī cf. P. Thom, Division, pp. 33 f.
156 Cf. Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 53.
157 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 21, p. 179, 19.
158 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 22, p. 180, 17–20.
159 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 23, p. 181, 8; cf. ed. D. M. Dunlop, §27, p. 182, 23.
160 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 23, p. 180, 27–181, 10.
two relatives (“the son” is “the son of the father”),161 the “simultaneousness” of
two relatives (wuǧūduhumā maʿan),162 the equality of the relatives with regard
to their genus, species or individuality,163 and the existence of “generally accep-
ted names” (al-asmāʾ al-mašhūra).164
Against this background we shall have a look at the section on “relation” in Fā-
rābī’s Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf ) where he clarifies and above all specifies
his own position:165
§41 (p. 85, 9) Each of two relatives is related to the other through one com- 452
mon notion (maʿnā), which simultaneously exists for each one. An example is
two relatives being Alif and Bāʾ: If that common notion is taken to be the letters
“Alif until Bāʾ”, (thereby the letter Alif is related to Bāʾ). If it is taken to be the
letters “Bāʾ (until Alif )”, thereby the letter Bāʾ is related to Alif. That common
notion is “relation” (iḍāfa). Herewith, each of both can be said to be related to
the other. That single notion is the way (ṭarīq) between the roof and the ground
of the house, which is called descent (hubūṭ), if its beginning is taken from the
roof and its ending (p. 85, 15) on the ground; and it is called ascent (ṣuʿūd), if
its beginning is made from the ground and (if) its ending is the roof. There is
no difference (in the notion), taken its two outermost points. Similarly, the two
relatives are the outermost points of the relation, so that (the relation) one time
can be taken from Alif to Bāʾ and the other time from Bāʾ to Alif.
§42. Some of the kinds of relation do not at all have a name (ism). Con-
sequently, two relatives have no name insofar as they have that kind of relation.
Thus, the names of both, which (p. 85, 20) indicate their essences, cannot be
deduced from their being two relatives, so that they both could be used in the
relation. (p. 86, 1) The notion of relation does not become evident in both.
Some (of the kinds of relation) have a name, if (that name) is taken for one
of both (outermost points). (Some) have no name, if (that name) is taken for
the other (outermost point), so that the name of that other (outermost point),
which indicates its essence through the relation, could be used and (so) the
name of the first (outermost point), which indicates its (essence), (could be
used), because it has that kind of relation.
⟨Some (of the kinds of relation) have two names, of which each one (of
the relatives) indicates one of the two relatives, insofar as it has that (p. 86,
5) kind of relation⟩. Thus, the name (of the “relative”), indicating it insofar as
161 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 24, p. 181, 11 f.

162 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 25, p. 181, 20.
163 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, §§ 26 and 27.
164 Ed. D. M. Dunlop, § 27, p. 182, 23; cf. above § 23, ed. D. M. Dunlop, p. 181, 8.
165 Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 85, 8–91, 11 (§§ 41–50).
180 chapter 10
it has that kind of relation, can be taken for both in the relation of each one
to the other. To these (kinds of relation) belong (two relatives), of which the
names differ from each other – for example “father” and “son”. To that belong
(two relatives), that have two names, (each) derivable from something, like
“the owner” (al-mālik) and “the owned” (al-mamlūk); to that belong (two rel-
atives), where the name of the one can be derived from the other, like “the
knower” (al-ʿalīm) and “the known” (al-maʿlūm); to that belong (two relatives),
where the names of both are completely identical, like “the friend” and “the
friend” (aṣ-ṣadīq), “the partner” (p. 86, 10) and “the partner” (aš-šarīk). In many
things, which have two names, the speaker in a careless manner can take the
one or each one in relation to the other and pertaining to the other, being
indicated through the names of both, which indicate the very essence of both
(muǧarrad ḏātayhimā). He does so, without taking the names of both (relat-
ives), which give an indication of themselves, because of some kind of relation,
through which each one could be related to the other – as we can say “the ox
of Zayd”. For, neither the ox nor Zayd indicate a kind of relation, because of
which the ox could be attributed (p. 86, 15) to Zayd. However, if we say “the ox,
owned (by someone) – Zayd is his owner”, (the words) “owned” (al-mamlūk)
and “the owner” (al-mālik) are the names of both, insofar they both have that
kind of relation. “Zayd” is his name, which indicates the essence of what is
453 related to him, but it | does not indicate it, because he has this kind of rela-
tion. If we would say “so-and-so is the slave of Zayd, his master”, we would
designate both with their names, which indicate both, because they both have
this kind of relation. To the relatives belong two correlatives (al-mutaḍāyifāni),
the genus of which is a name for each of both, because they both possess
the genus of the relation(ship), which they both have; they both do not pos-
sess a (common) name, because they both have some kind of relation(ship)
belonging to that genus, (p. 87, 1) for example “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) and “the
known” (al-maʿlūm). Thus, “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) is knowledge belonging to
“the known” (al-maʿlūm) and “the known” (al-maʿlūm) is known as belong-
ing to “knowledge” (al-ʿilm). The (different) kinds of knowledge do not have
a name, because kinds of relation belong to them – of which knowledge is its
genus – with the kinds of the known, which is the genus of (the “relative”). An
example (is) “grammar” (an-naḥw) and “rhetoric” (al-ḫaṭāba): With regard to
that it is not possible to say: “The grammar is grammar of something which
is known as grammar”; however, if we want to relate grammar to something
(p. 87, 5) from the known things of grammar, to which it (can) have a rela-
tion, we take (grammar) as something with the attribute of a genus and we
say: “Grammar is knowledge of something (aš-šayʾ) which is known as gram-
mar.”
§43. The condition of two relatives is, that each of them is taken as some-
thing which is indicated by its name, which indicates it because it has that kind
of relation. Therefore, Aristotle said: “Two relatives are those, which are found
to be related in some kind of relation”.166 And therefore, (p. 87, 10) when we
find in the language something related to something else through some particle
(ḥarf ) of relation or if the shape of (the two relatives) or of one of them is the
shape of a “relative”, it is not appropriate to say that they both are relatives until
their names indicate them, because they both have that kind of relation. But it
is appropriate to say, that they both are relatives.
§44. The general public, the orators (al-ḫuṭabāʾ) and the poets are careless
and arbitrary in their expression. (p. 87, 15) Therefore, they declare each of both
(relatives), of which the one is said to be with regard (bi-l-qiyās) to the other,
to be a relative: (These two relatives) exist through their names which indic-
ate them, because they have that kind of relation; or they exist through their
names, which indicate their essences (ḏāt); or one of (both relatives) can be
obtained through its name, which indicates its essence. Herewith, the “relat-
ive” can be described ( yursamu) primarily, as the “relative” unhesitatingly has
this description. Therefore, (p. 87, 20) Aristotle described (the related) at the
beginning of the chapter on the “relative” in his Book of the Categories with
the words: “About things it is maintained, that they belong to the relatives,
when their essences (māhiyātuhā) are maintained with regard to the other, in
some manner of connection (nisba), whatever manner it is”.167 (Aristotle) had
in mind with his saying “their essences” what its expressions (alfāẓuhā) indic-
ate at any rate168 and generally. (The expression) indicates | (the essences), 454
because (the essences) are kinds (p. 88, 1) of relation, belonging to them. Or,
what is indicated through its expressions is its essences (ḏawātuhā). There-
fore, as Aristotle was eager to outline the notions of the “relative”, from them
necessarily resulted what is evident in (the situation), that the first descrip-
tion (by Aristotle)169 is not (yet) a sufficient definition of the “relative”. – Then
(Aristotle) allotted another description (rasm) to the “relative”170 and thus the
notion of the “relative” is accomplished by that (description) as one single
166 Cf. the beginning of the chapter on relation in Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 a 36 / Arabic transl. Isḥāq
Ibn Ḥunayn, ed. ʿA. R. Badawī, p. 48, 8 f. (not literally).
167 The quotation is a literal rendering (with a few deviations, perhaps due to the transmis-
sion of Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf ) of the Arabic translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, ed. ʿA. R.
Badawī, p. 48, 8–9 = Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 a 36 f.
168 Read kayfamā instead of kayfa.
169 Given at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7.
170 In the sections following the introductory definition in Aristotle, Cat. 7.
182 chapter 10
notion, which is reached through a definition (ḥadd)171 of the relatives, without

any disturbance.172
§45 (p. 88, 5). These are the relatives, this is the relation and these are the
names that should be maintained with regard to the “relative” and the relation.
All you hear the Arabic grammarians say about (the relatives), that they are
related, belongs to the “relative” of which we mentioned the aspects that exist
among the orators and poets, and which correspond to the first (insufficient)173
description which Aristotle applied to the “relative” in his book On Categories.
They are, however, relatives (in which) the relater (al-muḍīf ) is remiss or arbit-
rary in making (p. 88, 10) one thing related to the other in an equal relation.
This is not in accordance with (the second-mentioned)174 description, which
Aristotle dedicated in that book to the “relative”. You should call the “relative”
only what belongs to the second-mentioned description. This is a relation in
which the one is related to the other in an equal relation.
§46 (p. 88, 15). The way to give an answer on “where is something?” is
primarily by (mentioning) “the place” (al-makān) in connection with one of
the relational particles, mostly with the particle “in” ( fī), as we say: “Where
is Zayd?”, whereupon it is answered: “In the house” or “in the market”. – The
notion of these particles, that precedes in the thought of man, is the relation
of something to a place or to its place, which it has in particular (ḫāṣṣatan),
either because of its kind (li-nawʿihī) or because of its genus (li-ǧinsihī). It
seems that these particles can be transferred to all things, whenever in them
a relation to the place can be imagined (tuḫayyal). As the place is enclosing
and surrounding something and as the thing related to the place is surroun-
ded by the place – thus, the surrounded is surrounding the surrounded and
the sourrounded (p. 89, 1) herewith is surrounded by the surrounding – there-
fore, the place with this notion belongs to the “relative”. In addition, as Aristotle
defined the place in his Physics175 and said “it is the limit of the sourround-
ing (nihāyat al-muḥīṭ)”, he made the surrounding a part of the definition of
place and he made the “essence” (māhiyya) (of the place) complete through
171 On rasm and ḥadd cf. S. B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic, pp. 35–59. – On the Alexandrian
distinction between definition and description cf. H. Daiber, review in ZDMG 142, 1992
(pp. 382–384), p. 383 below. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/48.
172 wa-lam yuḫalla. Cf. the expression fa-lā taḫtalla in Fārābī’s Kitāb Qāṭāġūriyās, ed. D. M.
Dunlop, p. 181, 10.
173 S. above § 43 in Fārābī’s text.
174 Fārābī means Aristotle’s detailed discussion after his first short and thus insufficient defin-
ition at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7; s. above § 44 in Fārābī’s text.
175 Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV 4.
its being surrounding. Through its “being” (in(n)iyya / an(n)iyya) it is surround-

ing; the surrounding is | surrounding that what is surrounded and the surroun- 455
ded by it is what (exists) in a place. If the notion (p. 89, 5) of our saying “in”
is “surrounded”, then our saying “in” here indicates the relatives. Consequently,
the answer to “where?” belongs to the relatives. Hence, “where” belongs to the
relatives.
§47. However, if we do not mean with our saying “Zayd is in the house”, that
he is surrounded by the house – although, in accordance with the definiton of
the place, he necessarily must be surrounded – and (if) we do not mean with
our saying “in the house” this (kind) of relation, but another connection (nisba),
which does not belong to (p. 89, 10) the relatives, in that case the category of
“where” does not belong to the relatives and it happens to (that category), that it
is (assigned) to the relatives not with respect to what the category “where” (nor-
mally) is and because herewith an answer is given to the question “where?”. The
meaning of the particle (ḥarf ) “in” here becomes another connection (nisba),
different from the connection of relation (nisbat al-iḍāfa). Now, if to that (con-
nection) at the same time the connection of relation is attached, it has two
kinds of connections with the place: One is appropriate for giving an answer
to (the question) “where?” and the other through that (connection) becomes a
part of (p. 89, 15) the relation.
§48. However, someone could utter in for example our saying “the ox of
Zayd”, and “the slave (ġulām) of Zayd” something that prevents (this connec-
tion) to have two connections, in one of which exists the name of each of
both, that indicates its essence (ḏāt). That does not belong to the relatives (al-
muḍāf ). It belongs to the relatives (al-muḍāf ) (only), if the description (rasm)
of each of both is kept, that indicates (the “relative”), because it has some kind
of relation (iḍāfa). – (p. 89, 20) In case it is not like this and instead this and
similar things are relatives, the expression of which is tolerated – how should
our saying “Zayd is in the house” not be a “relative”, the expression of which
is tolerated? If its expression is presented, then it could be said: “Zayd, who is
surrounded by it, is in the house, which surrounds him” and then it would be
clear, that (this) belongs to the relatives. If our saying “this ox belongs to Zayd”
and “this speech belongs to Zayd” do not receive two connections, ⟨one con-
nection that is not (p. 90, 1) a relation (iḍāfa) and⟩ (another) connection which
is indicated in our saying “this ox which is owned by Zayd who possesses him” –
then the connected in that first connection, which is not a relation (iḍāfa), has a
relation in another respect. Moreover, even or saying “this ox belongs to Zayd”
from the beginning can be made a relation, the expression of which is toler-
ated, relying (ittikālan) on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and on
(the fact) that only the possession of Zayd can be known about it. – (p. 90, 5)
184 chapter 10
How can, in addition, our saying “Zayd is in the house” from the very beginning
not be made a relation which is tolerated in its expression, relying on what is
in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and (on the fact) that only he is surrounded
by the house. Consequently, the meaning of the particle (ḥarf ) “in” is from the
very beginning the surrounding (al-iḥāṭa).
§49. We say: This is correct – I mean: Zayd is surrounded by the house and
the house is surrounding Zayd. Both are relatives, whenever both are taken
(uḫiḏā) in this way. However, that with regard to which we maintain (p. 90, 10)
a connection (nisba), consists of two kinds: One kind is one common notion
(maʿnā) between two (things), namely its two outermost parts (ṭarafāhu), of
which each of both is understood as beginning and the other as the end. Some-
456 times this can be made a | beginning and that an end, so that this can be said
between two (things); even more: It is only from one (side) of both to the
other, so that one of both is the beginning and not the other and that other
is the end and not the first. It is not possible to understand the other as begin-
ning with exactly that notion. On the contrary, the first can only be said to be
something with regard to the second. This (p. 90, 15) can be called “connection”
(an-nisba) particularly and that (other) can be specified with the name “rela-
tion” (al-iḍāfa). With this kind only one of both can be described and only (this
one) has (this kind of relation), because this and not the other can be attributed
to it (maḥmūl ʿalayhi). If that other occurs simultaneously with it and is a part
by which the attribute (al-maḥmūl) is completed – in our saying “Zayd is the
father of ʿAmr” “ʿAmr” occurs simultaneously with “the father” because he is an
attributive part (ǧuzʾ maḥmūl), and in our saying “ʿAmr, the son of Zayd” “Zayd”
occurs simultaneously with “the son”, because (p. 90, 20) he is an attributive
part (ǧuzʾ maḥmūl) – then each of both is at times an object (mawḍūʿ) and at
times an attributive part, if both are taken as relatives. In our saying “Zayd is
in the house” “the house” is an attributive part and we cannot make “Zayd” an
attributive part176 of the house with the meaning of what we said about Zayd,
that he is “in the house”. (p. 91, 1) However, if we say “the house is the possession
of Zayd”, then “Zayd” is the attributive part177 with the meaning different from
the first (case). This comprises the “where”, the “when” and “that it belongs to
him”.
§50. These two kinds are the two kinds of a connection (nisba), because it
is a common name, in which does not exist the condition that is peculiar to
176 al-ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūla. The edition of M. Mahdi has instead ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūli “part of the
attributed”.
177 al-ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūla. The edition of M. Mahdi has instead ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūli “part of the
attributed”.
each of both kinds. However, (the common name) is understood in an abso-

lute manner, namely as a connection (an-nisba), (p. 91, 5) which includes each
of both kinds and which includes the “where”, the “when” and the “belonging
to him”. (What has a common name, can) differ, according to the different gen-
era which the connection (an-nisba) can come across. One does not fall under
the other: Neither “place” (falls) under “time”, nor “time” under “place”, nor the
clothing under one of both (mentioned). For, the clothing is a body laid around
the body which is connected with it; “place” is not a body, but the surface and
the limit of a body; “time” is remote from clothes. The fact, that each of (p. 91,
10) these things with connection (al-ašyāʾ al-mansūba), which we can reckon
among the category of the relatives, should not make us doubt the relation
attached to it. The relation can be attached to every other category.178
The translated text gives rise to the following observations:
1) The examples, which were used by Fārābī, were taken from Aristotle
(examples of father – son,179 slave – master,180 knower – known181) and in
one case can be traced to the Alexandrians (friend – friend)182 and to Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ (partner – | partner)183. These examples and Fārābī’s own examples 457
(house,184 owner – own, with the example ox – Zayd,185 speech,186 grammar,187
Zayd the father of ʿAmr188) were interpreted by Fārābī in a manner that differs
considerably from Aristotle and his commentators.
Fārābī introduced three factors which he selected from Aristotle and which,
according to him, solely can determine a “relation”, namely “time”, “place” and
“possession”.
In addition,189 he distinguished between the “relation” (iḍāfa) in the true
sense of the word (because of its “kind” or its “genus”)190 and the “connec-
178 The MS has al-maʿqūlāt “intelligibilia” instead of al-maqūlāt “categories”.

179 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §§ 42, 49.
181 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 42.
184 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §§ 41, 46, 47, 48.
189 Cf. the conclusion Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §49.
190 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 46. – Cf. S. B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic, pp. 11–15.
The genus as factor of a real relation can also be found in a fragment of the Aristotelian
Categories in the Kitāb al-Aḥǧār attributed to Ǧābir (s. above ch. IV).
186 chapter 10
tion” (nisba)191 which in arbitrary use of the language by the “general public”,
“orators” and “poets” wrongly might be considered as real relation.192
He introduced the “particles of relation”, i.e. prepositions like “in”, as an addi-
tional indication of a real relation.193 A real and complete relation in “Zayd in
the house” is the notion, that Zayd is surrounded by the house. The relation is
“surrounding” (iḥāṭa).194
He defined relation as a “way” (ṭarīq) between two outermost points, in case
of the roof of a house built on the ground Fārābī speaks of “descent” from the
roof and “ascent” from the ground. As in the definition of the preposition “in”
in “Zayd in the house” relation appears here to be determined by the state of
“surrounding” and not by the relatives and their essences.
In this sense Fārābī considered, besides “place”, also “time” and “possession”
as states of relation. Simultaneousness of “time” appears in the example of
“Zayd is the father of ʿAmr”,195 in addition it is evident in the examples of two
friends and two companions; moreover, the example of “grammar (which) is
knowledge of something which is known as gammar”: Here, “knowledge” (ʿilm)
is a relation qua genus, a generic state of relation between grammar and what
is “known” (maʿlūm) as grammar.196 – The relation of “possession”, its state of
relation, is exemplified by the examples “the ox of Zayd”, “the speech of Zayd”,
“the slave of Zayd”197 and “the house owned by Zayd”198.
458 Fārābī’s discussion of relation bears witness to his endeavour, to give a clear
definition of relation and “relative” and the names used for both. He refers to
Aristotle’s statement at the beginning of Cat. 7, which he found an insufficient
description that Aristotle is said to have supplemented with his subsequent
descriptions. On this occasion, Fārābī’s text stresses the necessity of a clear and
unmistakable (“without any disturbance”) “definition” (ḥadd) of the relative
things, leading to a uniform (“one single”) notion.199 Here, Fārābī is criticizing
the “general public, the orators and the poets”, moreover the grammarians, who
were “remiss and arbitrary” in their expressions, who restrict themselves to the
191 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §§ 47, 48.

192 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 44.
193 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §§ 43, 46, 47, 48, 49.
194 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 48 end.
198 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 49 end.
199 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 44. – On some echoes of the grammarians
(Sībawayh) in Fārābī’s discussion cf. S. Türker, The Arabico-Islamic Background, esp.
§§ 4.2 and 7.10.
still insufficient description of relation at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7, and

who claim to relate things to each other in an “equal relation”.200 In his quo-
tation from Aristotle, Cat. 7, Fārābī could explain Aristotle’s term “essences”
(māhiyāt) of the relations as “what their expressions indicate at any rate and
generally”.201
However, at the same time Fārābī seems to be aware, that the meaning of an
expression is also “something what is in the mind of the listener”202 and that
expressions might be used in an arbitrary way.203 This remark is an indication,
that Fārābī’s discussion of the category “relation” with the aspects of “place”,
“time” and “possession” and its classification as a state between two outermost
points evolves to be an essential element in his theory of communication. This
is not yet fully elaborated in an article by the late Stéphane Diebler,204 who
analysed Fārābī’s doctrine of categories as part of Fārābī’s theory of commu-
nication, in which Aristotle’s Categories are combined with Aristotle’s art of
scientific demonstration (Analytica posteriora), Aristotle’s dialectic (Topica),
sophistic art (Sophistical Refutations), Rhetoric, and Poetics. Fārābī integrated
his theory of communication in his doctrine of the perfect state and its ruler,
who must be a philosopher and teacher with intellectual qualities necessary for
communication and teaching205 his subjects, and for gaining increasing know-
ledge, inspired by the divine active intellect.206
Fārābī’s theory of communication presupposes a concept of language, which
becomes clear in his discussion of relation: Language is conditional on descrip-
tions and definitions, which are the constituents of relations between relatives;
200 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §§ 44 and 45.

201 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 44, p. 87, 22 f.
202 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, § 48, p. 90, 3 and 6.
203 S. above § 45 in Fārābī’s text.
204 In his innovative article “Categories, conversation et philosophie chez Al-Fārābī”, pp. 286–
290. The article on pp. 295–305 contains a list of the topics of Fārābī’s “Book of Letters”,
his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf.
205 Fārābī’s method of instruction, described in his Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq,
p. 87, 11 ff. (cf. H. Daiber, Ruler, p. 8), is alluded to in Fārābī’s Long Commentary on Aris-
totle’s Categories (fragments are preserved in a Hebrew version perhaps by Šemuʾel of
Marseilles in the 14th century AD), cf. Engl. transl. M. Zonta, Al-Fārābī’s Long Comment-
ary, pp. 202 f.
206 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler, esp. pp. 135f., with reference to Aristotle’s Organon, esp. his Ana-
lytica posteriora. – H. Daiber, Al-Fārābīs Aristoteles, pp. 99–112. – H. Daiber, Al-Fārābī
on the Role of Philosophy in Society, pp. 71–77. – Cf. also U. Rudolph in Philosophie
in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 428–433 / English version, pp. 616–621 (on Fārābī’s Neopla-
tonic concept of emanations from the divine intellect), and pp. 434–447 / English version,
pp. 622–636.
188 chapter 10
relations are correlated to “time”, “place” and “possession”; their linguistic tool
459 are the | so-called “particles” (ḥurūf ), e.g. the preposition “in”, which herewith
are not restricted to a grammatical function. They mainly have a logical func-
tion and simultaneously they create the context for descriptions and defini-
tions, for the correct understanding of the meaning of “expressions” (alfāẓ) and
herewith for the communication. In this manner, Fārābī gives a clear indication
of his own standpoint in the discussion (which might have been known to Fār-
ābī)207 from the year 932AD between Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender of
logic as a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things, and the grammarian Abū
Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defender of language as the only access to intelligible things.208
Fārābī dissociates himself from the grammarians, whom he criticizes for their
arbitrary use of expressions209 and he favours the exact descriptions and defin-
itions in the use of categories (including “relation”, “time”, “place” and “pos-
session”). As Fārābī elsewhere explains,210 the sensible objects (mušār ilayhi),
our “statements” (maqūlāt) and our thinking (maʿqūl “what is conceived in the
intellect”, the “intelligible”) are interrelated. Fārābī apparently was followed by
Abū Bišr’s pupil Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī,211 who identified logic with universal grammar
that is behind any particular language.212 Fārābī tried to reconciliate grammar
and logic; both are interrelated and require each other.213
In view of his borrowings from Neoplatonic emanational thought, especially
in his doctrine of the divine intellect,214 we should expect some impact of Fā-
207 Cf. K. Versteegh, Landmarks, p. 78. – Fārābī is said to have studied grammar with Ibn as-
Sarrāǧ (d. 316/928), the teacher of Sīrāfī, and Ibn as-Sarrāǧ himself is said to have studied
logic and music with Fārābī: Cf. K. Versteegh, Landmarks, l.c.
208 S. above ch. VI.
209 On this cf. K. Versteegh, Landmarks, pp. 76f., with a quotation from Fārābī’s Kitāb al-
Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq (ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 41–43), according to which Fārābī
criticizes unnamed grammarians who recognize only those meanings of grammatical cat-
egories which were used by the general public, not by logicians. On the deficiencies of
Arabic grammarians since Sībawayh, whose classifications of the parts of speech were
insufficient according to Fārābī, cf. K. Versteegh, Landmarks, p. 84.
210 Cf. the references given by U. Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 414f.
/ English version, pp. 601 f. – T.-A. Druart, Al-Fārābī, the Categories, pp. 15–37.
211 On the teacher-student-relationship between Fārābī and Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī cf. G. Endress in
Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 304f. / English version, pp. 440f. – K. Versteegh,
Landmarks, pp. 60 f.
213 The rules of grammar guarantee the correct expression of a particular nation, and logic
creates universal rules valid for the expressions of all nations: K. Versteegh, Landmarks,
p. 86.
214 Cf. U. Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, pp. 427–434 / English version,
pp. 615–622.
rābī’s metaphysics on his concept of “relation”. This is not the case, and Fārābī
remains to be heavily indebted to Aristotle’s Organon. His thesis of an interrela-
tion between grammar and logic is based on the interrelation of language and
thought,215 which in the person of the ruler of the perfect state gets inspirations
from the divine intellect.216 There are no Stoic-Neoplatonic tendencies, as we | 460
find them in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity217 or in Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib218. Fā-
rābī and the discussions in his time about the relation of grammar and logic
prepared the ground for the concept of a “mental logic” (al-manṭiq al-fikrī),
mirrored in any language, as we find it in the Epistles of the Brethren of Pur-
ity. Moreover, reason and intellect begin to rate highly in the reflexion on the
category of “relation”, as we can see in Ibn Ḥazm.219
IX Ibn Sīnā
Now we turn to the perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, to Ibn
Sīnā / Avicenna (370/980–428/1037). He was acquainted with Fārābī’s thought
and he developed different accentuations of it. Ibn Sīnā had a critical attitude
towards placing the Categories in the logical section of his encyclopaedia aš-
Šifāʾ.220 He had some doubts about the value of the categories for the student
of logic and therefore he did not extensively discuss them in the logic sections
of his books an-Naǧāt,221 al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya,222 al-Mašriqiyūn, al-Išārāt wa-
215 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler, pp. 8 f.

216 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler, pp. 15 f. – In view of this, it appears to be worthwhile to investi-
gate Fārābī’s concept of “being” (mawǧūd), including the interrelation of language and
thought, not only as something shaped by Aristotle’s Metaphysics (thus S. Menn, Al-
Fārābī’s Kitāb Al-Ḥurūf ), but also against the background of the Neoplatonic hierarchy
of emanations from the divine cause and active intellect and against the background of
the intelligibles, which include the being as “second intelligible” (al-maʿqūl aṯ-ṯānī; cf. S.
Menn, p. 81). – On a possible role of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in
Fārābī’s Neoplatonizing doctrine of the intelligibles and the soul cf. M. Chase, The Medi-
eval Posterity, pp. 17–19.
218 S. above ch. VII.
220 aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, ii, p. 143, 15 f. – For details cf. A. Kalbarczyk, The Kitāb al-Maqūlāt,
pp. 320 f.; P. Thom, Division, p. 38.
221 Ed. M. Fakhry, pp. 116, 4–117, 22 / Engl. transl. A. G. Ahmed, Avicenna’s Deliverance,
pp. 120–123 (on relation s. p. 121).
222 On these two books, their comparison with al-Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq and his aš-
Šifāʾ, cf. H. Eichner, Categories, pp. 64–85.
190 chapter 10
t-tanbīhāt, ʿUyūn al-ḥikma,223 and al-Hidāya.224 Nevertheless, he devoted to

them a separate discussion in his encyclopaedia aš-Šifāʾ225 and in the earlier
written al-Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq.226 In his al-Muḫtaṣar Ibn Sīnā mainly
follows the contents of Aristotle,227 including moderate criticism directed
against some traditions of Aristotle’s commentators, esp. Simplicius.228 At the
end of the short section on “the relative” (al-muḍāf )229 he lists the 10 cat-
egories “substance” (ǧawhar), “quantity” (kamm), “quality” (kayf ), “relative”,
“where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” and adds, that
the “relative” according to its nature concerns all of them.230 This and its echo
in Ibn Sīnā’s Dāniš-nāma231 appears to be further developed in Ibn Sīnā’s aš-
461 Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt: Here he desribes a modified division | of the categories which,
according to him, is “widely accepted” and which corresponds to a Latin para-
phrase from the 4th century AD, attributed to Augustine, but possibly com-
posed or translated by a follower of Themistius.232 As recently Paul Thom233
tried to show, this modified division is elaborated by Ibn Sīnā to a complex
system on the assumption of a relationship to an external thing and on the
basis of dichotomous divisions, for example the division of non-relational acci-
dents into those, that involve an internal relationship of the subject’s parts, and
those, that do not. Non-relational accidents, that do not involve an internal rela-
tionship of the subject’s parts, either involve number (= “quantity”) or do not
(= “quality”). As elaborated by Paul Thom, Ibn Sīnā modifies the common
assumptions about the categories “position”, “action”, “passion” and “posses-
sion”234 and contrasts the category “substance” with the accidental categories,
which are divided into “quantity” and “quality” on the one side and “relat-
ive”, “where”, “when”, “action”, “passion”, “position” and “possession” (the last
is mentioned with some doubts) on the other side.235 The mentioned seven
categories depend on comparison, the category of relatives is related to the
223 Ed. ʿA. R. Badawī, pp. 2, 17–3, 9 (the 10 categories ǧawhar, kammiyya, kayfiyya, iḍāfa, ayna,
matā, al-waḍʿ, al-milk, an yafʿala šayʾan, an yanfaʿila šayʾun).
224 Ed. M. ʿAbduh, pp. 71–76.
225 aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, II: al-Maqūlāt, ed. G. Anawati (a.o.), s. n. 220.
226 Ed. A. Kalbarczyk, pp. 326–349.
227 Ed. A. Kalbarczyk, p. 351.
228 Ed. A. Kalbarczyk, pp. 313–320.
229 Ed. A. Kalbarczyk, pp. 338 f.
230 On this cf. also O. Lizzini, Causality as Relation, p. 175 n. 45.
231 Cf. the figure in P. Thom, Division, p. 45.
232 P. Thom, Division, pp. 36 f.
233 P. Thom, Division, pp. 37–49.
234 P. Thom, Division, pp. 42–45.
235 P. Thom, Division, pp. 44 f.
intrinsic nature of the subject and the six remaining to something extrinsic.236
We mention an example given by Ibn Sīnā.237 It discusses the relationship
between a man in the house and this house: Ibn Sīnā argues, that an additional
word between “man” and “the house”, namely “the owner of” creates a relation-
ship between “man” and “house”. Here, the “intrinsic nature”238 of the subject
“man / owner” points at the same time to something extrinsic, the “house”.
Already Fārābī had used this example:239 He used grammar and additional
particles and distinguished between “the house owned by Zayd” and “the house
surrounding Zayd” (= Zayd in the house). However, the relationship is neither
something intrinsic of the inhabitant of the house nor something extrinsic
depending on the house; it is something, the expression of which is tolerated,
“relying on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and relying on (the
fact) that only the possession (or the habitation) of Zayd can be known about
it”.240
Here, we realize a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological.
The ontological level is existing as well in Ibn Sīnā’s aš-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt241 and
has affected Ibn Sīnā’s concept of homonymy, which Aristotle mentioned at
the beginning of his Categories (1. 1 a 1–6).242 The ontological level is further
developed | in Ibn Sīnā’s aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, in the chapter on relatives.243 462
This chapter is an elaboration of the section on “relation” in Aristotle’s Meta-
physics V 15. 1020 b 26–1021 b 10. In this elaboration Ibn Sīnā declares the
236 P. Thom, Division, p. 45.

237 aš-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt, ed. G. Anawati (a.o.), p. 144, 11 f. / Engl. transl. and commented by P.
Thom, Division, p. 46.
238 I follow the terminology of P. Thom, Division.
239 S. above ch. VIII, Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, §§ 46–49. – Further examples, used by Ibn Sīnā,
ed. G. Anawati a.o., p. 145, are also inspired by Fārābī.
240 S. above ch. VIII, Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, §48 end.
241 E.g. ed. G. Anawati (a.o.), p. 145, 7–12. – Cf. O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 174.
242 Cf. A. Bäck, Avicenna the Commentator, pp. 31–72, esp. pp. 54–64.
243 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, Avicenna – The Metaphysics of The Healing, pp. 116–
123. – An earlier version of the translation, with commentary, is M. E. Marmura, Avi-
cenna’s Chapter “On the Relative”, pp. 83–99. – In the medieval Latin tanslation from
the 12th century AD and made in Toledo, we find this chapter (Capitulum de ad aliquid)
in the edition by S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus, pp. 173–183. – It became an inspirative
source e.g. for Henry of Ghent (13th c. AD): Cf. J. Decorte, “Relatio as Modus Essendi”,
pp. 321 f., and his earlier articles: “Henri de Gand”, pp. 59–64; “ʿModusʾ or ʿResʾ”, pp. 407–
429; “Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation”, pp. 197–224. – On relation in medieval philosophy
cf. J. R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction; M. G. Henninger, Relations; B.
Mojsisch, Relation. Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance; R. Schönberger, Relation
als Vergleich; J. Brower, Medieval Theories of Relations.
192 chapter 10
“relation” (iḍāfa) to be based on some “notion” (maʿnā)244 in one of the two “rel-
atives” (muḍāfāt), e.g. in the asymmetrical relation father–son only the father
has the relation fatherhood, which Ibn Sīnā called “notion” or “description of
its existence” (waṣf wuǧūdihī), of its “being with respect to something else in
the father”.245 Because of this “description” the “relative” has its external exist-
ence.246 The “definition” (ḥadd) of the “relative” “in its existence” ( fī l-wuǧūd)
makes of the “relative” an “accident” (ʿaraḍ),247 “which has the mentioned
description (i.e. fatherhood al-abuwwa),248 when it is in the intellect appre-
hended (ʿuqila)”249.
Consequently, Ibn Sīnā distinguished between “intellectual relation” (al-
iḍāfa al-ʿaqliyya) and “existential relation” (al-iḍāfa al-wuǧūdiyya).250 Accord-
ing to him, the “existential relation”, the existence of the “relative” is in con-
244 M. E. Marmura translates “idea”.

245 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 118, 8–17, esp. pp. 11–14.
246 Cf. also ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 120, 14–121, 18; the section pp. 120, 14–
121, 8 is excerpted in the Istanbul MS Aya Sofya 4855 (copied 733/1333), fol. 71 r 12–71 v 8,
and begins with “the Sheikh said in his books”. The excerpt is followed by a comment-
ary (fol. 71 v 8–72 r 2), beginning with waʿlam ann ḥāṣila l-ǧawābi huwa anna l-abuwwata
maṯalan mawṣūfatun bi-iḍāfatin uḫrā.
247 Perhaps an inspiration and elaboration of Aristotle, Metaph. 1021 b 8f., where Aristotle
declares the human being to be a relative in an accidental manner, because an accident
of a human being is his being a double of another human being. – Accordingly, Ġazālī
mentions in his Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, “Doctrines of the philosophers” (on the translation
of maqāṣid cf. A. Shihadeh, New Light, pp. 90–92), a description of Ibn Sīnā’s doc-
trines, “relation” (iḍāfa) among the “accidents” (aʿrāḍ) together with “quantity”, “quality”,
“place”, “time”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” (s. also Ġazālī, Miʿyār al-
ʿilm, ed. S. Dunyā, pp. 107, 13–108, 4) and explains it as “a state (ḥāla) of the substance
(ǧawhar), which occurs because of something different opposite to it. For example fath-
erhood (al-abuwwa), sonship (al-banuwwa), brotherhood (al-aḫuwwa), friendship (aṣ-
ṣadāqa), neighbourhood (al-muǧāwara) and consanguinity (muwāfāt?; cf. Dāniš-nāma),
or its being on the right or left side, since fatherhood is only because of the father, insofar
a son is opposite to him”: Cf. Ġazālī, Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, ed. A. F. al-Mizyadī, p. 79, 12–14.
The text is based on Ibn Sīnā’s Dāniš-nāma, s. Engl. transl. P. Morewedge, The Metaphys-
ics of Avicenna, p. 26, and the echo in Ramon Llull’s Compendium Logicae Algazelis, who
mixed the text with Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales, s. ed. C. H. Lohr, Raimundus
Lullus’ Compendium Logicae Algazelis, p. 113, and on the sources, pp. 27f., and the cor-
rect remark on the Maqāṣid, p. 40: “Eine intelligente Umarbeitung von Ibn Sīnās Dāniš-
nāma”. – As C. H. Lohr has shown, Llull’s text is based on the Arabic and independent
from the medieval Latin translation, on which cf. now A. H. Minnema, Algazel Latinus,
pp. 153–215 (on Llull s. p. 170).
248 Cf. ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 121, 5–6.
249 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 122, 5–7.
250 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 122, 5–12. – Cf. O. Lizzini, Causality, pp. 192f.
crete things (al-aʿyān). However, the “intellectual relation” must not always
have a corresponding relation in existence.251 He argues: “It is possible to have
invent|ed relations (iḍāfāt muḫtaraʿa) in the intellect by reason of the special 463
property the intellect has with respect of them”.252
In aš-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt Ibn Sīnā follows the same ontological line, when he
declares, that the “conception” (taṣawwur) of the “notion” (maʿnā) of some-
thing requires the conception of the notion of something outside, as for ex-
ample the conception of the notion of the roof requires simultaneously the
conception of the notion of the wall, although the “quiddity” (māhiyya) of the
roof is not predicated “in relationship with” (bi-l-qiyās ilā) the wall.253
In the same manner, Ibn Sīnā could, with regard to the example of father
and son, formulate an asymmetrical relation: “The relation (of the father) to
fatherhood (al-abuwwa) – which is the description of (the father) – is in the
father alone. However, (the description) belongs only to the father with respect
to another thing in the father. And his being with respect to the other (thing)
does not make him exist in the other. Because fatherhood is not in the son …
Rather fatherhood is in the father. The case is similar with the state (ḥāl) of the
son with respect to the father. There is nothing at all which is in both of them.
Here, we have nothing but fatherhood o r sonship. As for a state (ḥāla) posited
for (both) fatherhood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has
no name”.254
Ibn Sīnā’s student Bahmanyār Ibn Marzubān did not follow this idea and was
not aware of Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the particular relation of father and son
versus relation related to the species father and son, i.e. particular multiplicity
versus the oneness of “one notion” (maʿnā wāḥid), namely “humanity” (insān-
iyya): Cf. Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura,
pp. 247, 17–248, 1, with Bahmanyār, at-Taḥṣīl, ed. Murtaḍā al-Muṭahharī,
p. 31, 1–3: “(To the categories) belongs the relation, which is a notion (maʿnā),
which in case of its existence or mental conception is definitely conceived
in the mind (maʿqūl) with respect to something other and together with that
other. It has no other existence – just as fatherhood (al-abuwwa) with respect to
sonship (al-banuwwa) and not like a father who has another existence different
from him (and preceding him). This (notion of relation) is “humanity”.”
251 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 122, 13–15.

252 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 122, 11 f. – Cf. O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 191.
253 Cf. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt, ed. G. Anawati (a.o.), p. 145, 7–12. – O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 174. –
Ed. G. Anawati (a.o.), p. 146, 2–15. – O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 171.
254 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 118, 13–17, and M. E. Marmura’s remarks, p. 413
nn. 8 and 9.
194 chapter 10
However, this statement, based on the distinction between real and mental
relation in Ibn Sīnā,255 seems to be an echo of summarizing remarks or dis-
cussions in two other works by Ibn Sīnā: His Kitāb an-Naǧāt, ed. M. Fakhry,
p. 116, 19–21 (partly literal; cf. translation by F. B. Ahmed, Avicenna’s Deliver-
ance: Logic, p. 121), and Ibn Sīnā, at-Taʿlīqāt, ed. ʿA. R. Badawī, pp. 94, 8–95, 4;
96, 25–28; 143–144 and 146, 3–14. An echo of these discussions can be found
in Zayn ad-Dīn ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī from Sāwa between Ray and Hama-
dan (d. 450/1058), al-Baṣāʾir an-Naṣīriyya fī ʿilm al-manṭiq, ed. R. al-ʿAǧam,
pp. 65, 16–68, ult. (ch. 8). – The concept of a mental relation (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya,
464 mulāḥaẓāt | ʿaqliyya) is defended in Šihāb ad-Dīn Yaḥyā Ibn Ḥabaš Ibn Amīrak
as-Suhrawardī (549/1154–587/1191), Ḥikmat al-Išrāq, ed. and Engl. transl. J. Wal-
bridge and H. Ziai, Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, p. 49 § 65.
Suhrawardī is said to have studied Sāwī’s book al-Baṣāʾir an-Naṣīriyya (s. J. H.
Walbridge and H. Ziai, introduction, p. V). Cf. H. A. Beidokhti, Suhrawardī,
pp. 394ff. – The Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and following
Ibn Kammūna also the Iranian philosopher Quṭb ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī (d. 710/1311)
in his Persian Durrat at-tāǧ Ǧumla 2, fann 2, maqāla 6 (s. R. Pourjavady and
S. Schmidtke, Quṭb Al-Dīn Al-Šīrāzī’s, p. 327) integrated Ibn Sīnā’s concept
of a mental relation into his discussion of relation in his al-Kāšif (al-ǧadīd fī l-
ḥikma), ed. H. N. Isfahani, p. 89, 4–10; “fatherhood” (abuwwa) is a “relation”
(iḍāfa) “added to the notion (mafhūm) of two related things, although it is
something in (our) reflection (amr iʿtibārī)”; it does not constitute the “essence”
(ḏāt) and the “humanness” (insāniyya) of a person, who became father, “after
he was not (a father)”.
Interestingly, the Andalusian scholar Abū ṣ-Ṣalt Umayya Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
Ibn Abī ṣ-Ṣalt ad-Dānī, commonly known as Abu Salt de Denia (459/1067–
528/1134), seems to be inspired by Ibn Sīnā, when he describes in his sum-
mary of the Aristotelian logic, his Taqwīm aḏ-ḏihn, the relation between father
and son or between slave and master as something existing “potentially” (bi-
l-quwwa) or “really” (bi-l-fiʿl): “Each one of both (e.g. father and son) can be
designated ( yuʿabbaru) by its name, which indicates it insofar it has a relation
(muḍāf )”: Cf. ed. and Span. transl. C. Á. González Palencia, Rectificación de
la mente, p. 11, 24–12, 1 / Span. transl., p. 66. The terminology bi-l-quwwa and
bi-l-fiʿl has a parallel in Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb al-Muḫtāṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq, ed. A.
Kalbarczyk, The Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, p. 339, 3.
255 Cf. on this H. Zghal, La relation chez Avicenne, pp. 237–286. – Worthwhile mentioning
is the discussion in Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya, pp. 560–563.
A late echo, shaped by intermediate sources, is the distinction between

“accidental” and “existing” (ʿaraḍ mawǧūd) “relation” (iḍāfa, nisba) and “reflect-
ive” (iʿtibārī), “non-existing relation” (an-nisba al-ʿadamiyya) in Muḥammad
Ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥasanī al-Andalusī al-Mālikī al-Bulaydī (from al-Bulayda,
a town in Algeria; a student of Zabīdī, who came to Cairo in 1167/1754), al-
Maqūlāt al-ʿašr or Nayl as-Saʿādāt fī ʿilm al-maqūlāt, ed. M. Ḥaqqī, p. 44, 11–15.
Ibn Sīnā later argues, that the assumption of relations in things would lead
to an infinite chain of relations, e.g. between father and son, who each will have
the same relation.256
This relation between father and son is classified by Ibn Sīnā as pertaining
to “action and passion” (al-fiʿl wa-l-infiʿāl), one of the categories related to rela-
tion.257 “Action and passion” is an alternative rendering of cause and effect.
It confirms a recent interpretation of causality as relation in Ibn Sīnā and in
Ġazālī and its exemplification in the God-world relationship, as elaborated by
Ibn Sīnā.258 | However, Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of intermediate causes between the 465
absolute first cause and the effect is not only a “reinterpretation” of Aristotle’s
“analysis of causality”.259 It is an elaboration of Aristotle’s denial of an infin-
ite chain of causes in favour of the first unmoved mover,260 by integrating the
Neoplatonic doctrine of a transcendent God and of intermediate causes, eman-
ating from the divine first cause.261 Simultaneously, the intermediate causes
are ontologically inferior to the divine first cause, and for this reason Ibn Sīnā
differed from Aristotle’s principle of “man begets man” (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον
γεννᾷ) and assumed a difference between cause and effect. The cause is super-
ior to existence and there are different modes of “existence” (esse, wuǧūd) with
regard to priority and posteriority, self-sufficiency and need, necessity and pos-
256 Cf. ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 120, 7–13 and 122, 13–15.
257 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 117, 14, in a chapter which enumerates “substance”,
“quantity”, “quality”, “place”, “time”, “action”, “passion” (M. E. Marmura: “affection”) and
“relatives” as categories. – Cf. O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 175.
258 Cf. the article by O. Lizzini, Causality. – On echoes of the concept of relation as caus-
ality cf. Ibn Sīnā’s theory of demonstration in his Kitāb al-Burhān, inspired by Aristotle’s
Analytica posteriora, cf. R. Strobino, Avicenna on Knowledge (ʿilm), Certainty ( yaqīn),
Cause (ʿilla / sabab) and the Relative (muḍāf ), pp. 426–446.
259 O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 169.
260 Cf. the references in Aristotle and a parallel in early Islamic theology (Muʿammar Ibn
ʿAbbād as-Sulamī) in H. Daiber, Muʿammar, pp. 89 f. – H. Daiber, Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād,
p. 259.
261 On the Neoplatonic doctrine and its impact on Ġazālī’s theory of causality cf. H. Daiber,
God versus causality. – O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 180 n. 67 (with reference to C. D’Ancona,
p. 189 below), mentions possible Neoplatonic echoes only incidentally and does not elab-
orate this important and decisive detail.
196 chapter 10
sibility. Consequently, the divine first cause has more “truth” than the effect and
the cause-effect-relationship includes both, similarity and dissimilarity.262
This observation is momentous for the relation between cause and effect,
including the relation between father and son, respectively between father-
hood and sonship. Ibn Sīnā declares: “As for a state (ḥāla) posited for (both)
fatherhood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”.263
Ibn Sīnā dissociates himself from Fārābī’s assumption of a common notion
between e.g. roof and house or father and son264 and consequently dissociates
himself from Fārābī’s suggestion, that the name of a “relative” “can be taken
for both in the relation of each one to the other”.265 For Ibn Sīnā any relation
assumed between two relatives is something developed in the human intel-
lect – equally any relation between the first divine cause and the world. He says:
“We do not mean by “the First” an idea (maʿnā) that is added to the necessity
of His existence so that, by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple,
but by it we mean a consideration (iʿtibār) of His relation to (what is) other
(than Him).”266 This aspect of relation as something developed in the human
intellect was taken over in the Middle Ages: Through the Latin translation of
his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ in the 12th century AD in Toledo Ibn Sīnā might have inspired
medieval theories about relations as entia rationis.267
466 As has been shown recently,268 Ibn Sīnā considered the ten Aristotelian cat-
egories as emanations from the divine “universal intellect” (al-ʿaql al-kullī),
which later is called “the active intellect” (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), the giver of forms.269
The process of the integration of the ten categories in his emanationist doctrine
begins with early texts like Ibn Sīnā’s Compendium of the Soul (Kitāb fī n-nafs
ʿalā sunnat al-iḫtiṣār) and al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya and is followed by al-Muḫtaṣar
al-awsaṭ and finally the Šifāʾ. During this process Ibn Sīnā began to distin-
guish between substantial forms and accidental qualities270 and to develop his
262 Cf. H. Daiber, Limitations, p. 32.

263 S. n. 253.
264 Cf. his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 85, 9–17 / translated above in ch. VIII, in the text
§ 41, and referred to by M. E. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on the Relative, p. 87 n. 16.
265 Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 86, 5 f. / translated above in ch. VIII, in the text §42.
266 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 273, 10 f. – Cf. O. Lizzini, Causality, pp. 185 and
188–194.
267 Cf. the references given in O. Lizzini, Causality, p. 168 n. 9. – On the reception of Ibn
Sīnā’s discussion in Albertus Magnus (who perhaps used a Latin collection of Avicennian
excerpts) cf. N. Caminada, A Latin Translation?, pp. 86–97.
268 H. Eichner, Categories.
269 H. Eichner, Categories, p. 62. – On Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of the active intellect cf. H. A. Da-
vidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, pp. 74–126.
270 For details see the article by H. Eichner.
“metaphysics of the rational soul (an-nafs an-nāṭiqa)”, which through its intel-
lectual activity can return to its divine first cause.271
Interestingly, Ibn Sīnā mentions in his early al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya272 the
ten Aristotelian categories in two lists, one containing all categories (includ-
ing “substance”) and another one distinguishing between substances and their
accidents “quality”, “quantity”, “passion”, “where”, “position” and “relation” –
omitting “when”, “possession” and “action”. This omission can be explained with
the observation, that the accidental “concomitants” (lawāzim),273 the categor-
ies related to the substances, cannot be “action”, cannot have “possession” on
their own and cannot have their own space of “time” (“when”). Moreover, it
seems that Ibn Sīnā considered the “first body” to be identical with the “mater-
ial form”,274 to be endowed with “quality” and “quantity” and “passion”. Con-
sequently, the existence of the “second” (body) is related to “where” and “pos-
ition”, and this in addition to the other categories (except “substance”). The
categories have a hierarchical order with “substance” at the beginning followed
by the “accidents”, “in accordance with their (kinds of) existence due to them”
( fī istiḥqāq al-wuǧūd). A central role is attributed to “relation”, which is said
to exist “with the existence of the first caused”. Relation here is causal relation
between the divine necessarily existing One, and the multiplicity of the caused,
of existing matter.275 This multiplicity can be interpreted as something determ-
ined by the categories which shape the accidents of the substance.
At the same time, any relation, assumed between two relatives is – as already
said – something developed in the human intellect – equally any relation
between the first divine cause and the world; Ibn Sīnā says: “We do not mean
by ‘the First’ an idea (maʿnā) that is added to the necessity of His existence so
that, by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple, but by it we mean
a consideration (iʿtibār) of His relation to (what is) other (than Him).”276
Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of relation appears to be a complex combination of
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts, in which Fārābī played a considerable
role. | His echo in Ibn Sīnā mirrors sympathy and critique and through Ibn 467
Sīnā and the Latin translations of Ibn Sīnā’s works his ideas became known
in Islamic philosophy in the West, although may it be in a modified manner.
271 Cf. H. Eichner, p. 66.

272 Ed. M. Ṣāliḥ, p. 163, 13–19 / Germ. transl. H. Eichner, p. 69.
273 Cf. H. Eichner, pp. 71 f.
276 S. n. 266.
198 chapter 10
X Ibn Rušd and His Critique of Ġazālī
After Ibn Sīnā the great Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd / Averroes (519/1126–
595/1198) and the Latin translations of his works disseminated essential ideas
of Ibn Sīnā (including Fārābī), although in the shape of critical objections.
Ibn Rušd kept to the Neoplatonic background and the ontological interpreta-
tion, combined with the Farabian-Avicennian logic of relation. Simultaneously,
Ibn Rušd deviated from Ibn Sīnā in an interesting return to Aristotle. Like Aris-
totle he concentrated on the relata, the fundaments of any relation, and in his
so-called Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Ibn Rušd does not only
present a faithful description:277 In one point he tries to clarify Aristotle’s dis-
cussion of the “substance” as a “relative”, a classification, which – according to
Aristotle – must be denied in the case of e.g. a head or a hand, which both
cannot be related to someone, whose head or hand they are definitely, accord-
ing to our knowledge.278 Ibn Rušd missed a clear judgement about categories
belonging to relation279 and in view of Aristotle’s vagueness with regard to a
clear classification of categories as relatives he refers in his commentary on
Aristotle, Cat. 7 b 15–8 a 12, at the end of ch. 6, to Aristotle, Metaphysics, where
Aristotle is said to distinguish280 between essential and accidental correlatives.
Accordingly, Ibn Rušd explains Aristotle’s example of the head belonging to a
man not as being a “true relation” (iḍāfa ḥaqīqiyya), but as an “accidental rela-
tion” (iḍāfa ʿaraḍiyya).281
In his monograph on metaphysics, called Epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
a rearrangement of the Aristotelian material, Ibn Rušd refined his classification
of the categories, namely “substance”, and the accidents “quantity”, “quality”,
“relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”.282
277 Cf. Ibn Rušd, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Talḫīṣ Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-
manṭiq, pp. 107–119 / Engl. transl. C. E. Butterworth, pp. 50–60 / medieval Latin transl.,
pp. 56–76.
278 Aristotle, Cat. 8 a 14–8 b 21.
279 Talḫīṣ, ed. M. M. Kassem, p. 119, 12 f. / Engl. transl. C. E. Butterworth, p. 60. This passage
is at the same time a rendering of Aristotle, Cat. 8 b 22–24, in a wrong way.
280 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V 15. 1021 b 3–11, and Ibn Rušd, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. M.
Bouyges, pp. 619, 12–621, 6 / medieval Latin transl. (begun between 1220 and 1224AD by
Michel Scot: Cf. H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, p. 141), ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 177 l. 160–p. 178
l. 180.
281 Talḫīṣ Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, ed. M. M. Kassem, p. 118, 4 f. / Engl. transl. C. E. Butterworth,
p. 59.
282 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 13, 5–14, 14 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, pp. 32f. –
Ibn Rušd’s Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. and Span. transl. by C. Quirós Rodríguez was
the basis of the only article on relation in Ibn Rušd by S. Gómez Nogales, La categoría,
From these ten categories the category “substance” is extensively discussed by

Ibn Rušd, because it is the only category which can become | a “relative” essen- 468
tially, e.g. “fatherhood and sonship (al-abuwwa wa-l-banuwwa)”.283 The thing’s
essence and its quiddity is declared as the numerical one in allusion to Aris-
totle, Metaph. V 6. 1016 b 3–5, and defended against Ibn Sīnā’s classification of
the numerical one only as an accident in the substance “or anything else that is
isolated”.284 It is also “one essentially intelligible concept”285 and “one” in genus
and species.286 “The category of “substance” is self-constituted and with respect
to its existence independent from any of the accidental categories, while these
in turn depend for their existence on “substance” and are caused by it”.287 To
these categories, depending on “substance”, belongs “relation”, which neither
can be separated from its substrate “substance”, nor from the remaining cat-
egories because of their relatedness to substrates.288
Ibn Rušd did not confine himself to a substance-orientated concept of “rela-
tion” and reveals indications of a new evaluation of “relation”: He says, with
regard to Aristotle’s simultaneousness of two correlatives,289 that “both are
simultaneous in being and in knowledge” and argues that “this category (sc.
“relation”) is something the soul introduces into the existents”. He adds, that
through this “relationship” (al-iḍāfa) the two subjects of the correlated things
can be “conceptualized” (taṣawwur) and vice versa the relationship of the two
subjects can be conceptualized.290 The conceptualization is dependent on the
soul.
This is further explained in Ibn Rušd’s Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, in a critique of
Ġazālī’s statement, that “the relation and two relatives form a plurality of know-
ledge, and that for instance our knowledge of fatherhood is different from our
knowledge of the father and the son”.291
pp. 302–305, supplemented by other texts. This article (regrettably often without exact
references to the sources) can still be recommended, although we differ in details and
accentuations, because of additional texts and interpretations which appeared in the
meantime.
283 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 14, ult. / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 33.
284 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 19, 12–20, 5 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, pp. 38f.
285 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 20, 6–12 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 39, with
reference in n. 78 to Aristotle, Metaph. X (I) 1. 1052 a 29f.
286 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 20, 13–21, 2 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 40.
287 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 35, 14 f. / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 54.
288 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 36, 1–15 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 54.
289 Cf. Cat. 7. 7 b 15–31 and 13. 14 b 24–35.
290 Cf. Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 82, 13–83, 9 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, pp. 98f.
291 Ed. M. Bouyges, p. 350, 12 f. / Engl. transl. S. van den Bergh, p. 211. – The passage from
200 chapter 10
According to Ġazālī, there are three kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the

“essence” (ḏāt) of the father, knowledge of the essence of the son and know-
ledge of the “relation”, which is “enclosed” (muḍamman) in the two preced-
ing kinds of knowledge. They “condition each other” (baʿḍuhā mašrūṭatun fī
l-baʿḍ).292 Ġazālī explains this293 with the divine “First” knowing Himself and
the “individual genera” (āḥād al-aǧnās), to which He has a relation as their
“principle” (mabdaʾ). “Otherwise, the relation’s being known to Him becomes
“unintelligible” (lam yuʿqal)”. Ġazālī’s statement is remarkable for several reas-
469 ons: |
– He considers “relation” as causal connection between two relatives.
– Relation is part of an epistemological process and knowledge is the bridge
between two relatives.
– The example of the divine “principle” illustrates the causal relation between
knower and known, and also between cause and effect.
– Aristotle’s classification of “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) as a “relative”, because
knowledge and knowable things condition each other,294 appears to tend
to a new evaluation of “relation” and the “relative”, which is already alluded
to in Aristotle’s statement “and if those things are relatives for which being is
the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer
may be found”.295 Ġazālī did not develop this into a new concept of “relation”,
but added to this the concept of knowledge as connecting relation between
knower and known.296 Regrettably, other logical works by Ġazālī do not dis-
cuss this in a more detailed manner and instead give – in the footsteps of
Ibn Sīnā – summarizing reports of the ten Aristotelian categories, including
the substance and the nine accidental categories.297
In his critique of Ġazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers Ibn Rušd did not
realize the subtleties of Ġazālī’s remarks and denied Ġazālī’s epistemological
aspects. Instead he says:
Ġazālī is a shortened rendering of Ġazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed. and Engl. transl. M. E.
Marmura, p. 105, 5–9.
292 Ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 105, 9.
293 Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed. and Engl. transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 105, 9–12. – The passage is not
discussed in F. Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology.
294 Cat. 7. 6 b 2; cf. 6 b 34–36.
295 8 a 31 f. – Engl. transl. J. Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle I, p. 13. – Cf. Germ. transl.
K. Oehler, Aristoteles: Kategorien, pp. 252 f.
296 On this cf. now F. Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111), p. 203.
297 S. n. 247.
“Now, the truth is that the relation is an attribute additional to two correl-
ated things, from outside the soul and in the existents; however, the relation in
the concepts (al-maʿqūlāt) is rather a state (ḥāl) than an attribute (ṣifa) addi-
tional to two correlated things.” The following passage can be interpreted as
an indication of the inexplicability of this state of fatherhood; “the human
knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-insānī) of it cannot reach the stage of Divine “eternal
knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-azalī) in a way “from the visible to the invisible” (min aš-
šāhid ilā l-ġāʾib).298 Only accessible to human knowledge are existents, which
share the same genus or species.299 This looks like an elaboration of Ibn Sīnā’s
already quoted statement “as for a state (ḥāla) posited for (both) fatherhood
and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”.300 Ibn Rušd’s
declaration is, as in Ibn Sīnā, based on the Neoplatonic doctrine of the first
intellect, which “is pure act and cause; (God’s) knowledge cannot be compared
to human knowledge”.301 It culminates in Ibn Rušd’s description of the human
intellect as “conceptualization (taṣawwur) of the | order and system present in 470
this world and in each of its parts and (as) the knowledge of all that is in this
(world) through its remote and proximate causes up to a complete (knowledge
of) the world”.302 In accordance with the Neoplatonic system of emanations
in gradations from first, intermediate to last effects303 and the assumed dis-
298 Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, ed. M. Bouyges, p. 351, 1–4 / Engl. transl. S. van den Bergh, Averroes’
Tahafut Al-Tahafut I, p. 211.
299 Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, ed. M. Bouyges, p. 351, 4 f. / Engl. transl. S. van den Bergh, Averroes’
Tahafut Al-Tahafut I, p. 211.
300 S. n. 254.
301 Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, ed. M. Bouyges, p. 462, 9 f. / Engl. transl. S. van den Bergh, Aver-
roes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut I, p. 280. – Cf. also Ibn Rušd, aḍ-Ḍamīma, appendix to Ibn Rušd,
Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl, ed. G. F. Hourani, Ibn Rušd, Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl, pp. 43, 1–45, ult. /
Germ. transl. F. Griffel, pp. 54–57 / Commentary, pp. 210–212. – According to Ibn Rušd,
knowledge of existing things is not identical with God’s causing knowledge, which has no
beginning (qadīm; on this cf. F. Griffel, pp. 122–127). For this reason Ibn Rušd denies
God’s knowledge of “the particulars” (al-guzʾiyāt) which are something “effected in time”
(muḥdaṯ); this would affect God’s “transcendence” (tanzīh, ed. G. F. Hourani, p. 44, 6 /
F. Griffel, p. 56). – Cf. Jean-Baptiste Brenet, Relation as Key to God’s Knowledge of
Particulars in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut and the Ḍamīma. In ASP 2020, pp. 1–26. – On Aver-
roes’ doctrine of the active intellect as a cause of existence cf. H. A. Davidson, Alfarabi,
Avicenna, and Averroes, pp. 220–356; the article by G. Freudenthal, Medieval Astrolo-
gization, pp. 111–137.
302 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 144, 18-ult. / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 159.
303 Cf. also Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 116, 14–117, 2 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen,
p. 131; ed. ʿU. Amīn, pp. 144, 1–146, 7 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, pp. 159–161; ed. ʿU. Amīn,
pp. 153, 8–155, 2 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, pp. 169–170. – On Ibn Rušd’s concept of causality,
which in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut and in his Great Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics
202 chapter 10
similarity between cause and effect, the epistemological consequence for the
human conceptualization of relationship can be summarized as follows:
– As the subject of human “conceptualization” (taṣawwur) “consists of
material things (al-umūr al-hayūlāniyya) only”,304 human concepts of rela-
tion are restricted to the substances and its accidents, the categories “quant-
ity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and
“passion”.
– The process of conceptualization is effected by the soul.
– The imperfectness of this conceptualization is an echo of the indetermin-
ateness of the relation between the relatives.
– The Neoplatonic concept of indeterminate relation305 appears in Ibn Rušd
to be connected with the concept of potentiality as “a disposition (istiʿdād)
in a thing and (as) its inherent possibility (imkān) of existing inactuality”.306
– The indeterminateness of relation and its correlation with the concept of
potentiality is not developed to a clear concept of a dynamic process be-
tween relation, relatives and linguistic conceptualization. In his Great Com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Physics, on Aristotle’s classification of the continu-
ous and of matter and form as “relative”,307 Ibn Rušd declares relation as
something accompanying any transmutation.308 This explanation must be
understood from the context of Aristotle’s concept of motion as a process
from potentiality to actuality, namely with regard to the three categories
appears to be overshadowed by the Aristotelian model: Cf. B. S. Kogan, Averroes and the
Metaphysics, and the review by H. Daiber in Der Islam 64, 1987, pp. 310f.
304 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 145, 17 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 161.
305 Cf. Plotinus, Enn. VI 3. 28 and VI 1. 7 and 8; the “existence” (ὑπόστασις) of relation depends
on the “state” of relation (σχέσις) and not on the related “subjects” (ὑποκείμενα), s. Enn.
VI 1. 7, 24–28; moreover, “states” of relation (σχέσεις) are “rational principles” (λόγοι) and
their “causes” are “participations in forms” καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις αἰτίας (Enn. VI 1. 9, 7–
9).
306 Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed. ʿU. Amīn, p. 83, 14 f. / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 99.
307 Cf. Aristotle, Physics II 2. 194 b 8.
308 Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis IV: Physica. Venice 1562–1574 / Repr. Frankfurt
a.M. 1962, tex. comm. 9, p. 345, quoted by S. Gómez Nogales, p. 301 n. 41. According to
S. Gómez Nogales, the concept of relation as accident and as something affecting all
categories, including the substances, has similarity to relativism in modern philosophy:
“Toda la realidad está afectada de cierto relativismo”. – Cf. also Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, ed.
ʿU. Amīn, p. 38, 10–12 / Engl. transl. R. Arnzen, p. 56: “For a thing is related to time only in
so far as it is changeable or one conceives a process of change in it. But the changeable is
necessarily a body, as has been shown in Physics”. R. Arnzen, p. 277 n. 190, refers to Aris-
totle, Physics IV 10. 218 b 22–219 a 14, and to Ibn Rušd, Ǧawāmiʿ Kitāb as-Samāʿ aṭ-ṭabīʿī, ed.
J. Puig, pp. 96–101.
“quality”, “quantity” and “place”,309 a concept which Ibn Rušd | took over 471
from Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Physics, where he had added the category of “posi-
tion” as fourth category and where he considered “substance” as an object of
motion, and no more as a substrate for accidents, herein followed later in the
13th century AD by Barhebraeus, a scholar of the Syriac orthodox church and
archbishop of Persia, in his encyclopaedia Butyrum sapientiae, the book on
Physics.310 He explained motion in the category of “substance” as the change
of man from potentiality – i.e. seed – into actuality – i.e. humanness; in a cor-
responding manner motion is in the category of “relation” the change from
fatherhood in potentiality into fatherhood in reality, the father of a son.311
Relation is causality, as explained by Ibn Sīnā312 and taken over by Barheb-
raeus313. As in the late Aristotle categories are universals existing as “mere
potencies in other existents”314
XI Ibn ʿArabī
“Relation” in Ibn Rušd appears to be something accidental to the “substance”

and simultaneously something essential.315 This ambivalence and the Neopla-
tonic background, which Ibn Rušd shares with Ibn Sina, have parallels in the
younger contemporary Ibn ʿArabī, a Sufi born in Murcia in 1165 and died 1240
AD in Damascus. He was a representative of a trend introducing philosoph-
ical elements in sufism in the footsteps of Ġazālī,316 his model.317 Ibn ʿArabī is
perhaps inspired by Ibn Rušd’s and Ibn Sīnā’s concept of categories and their
Neoplatonic idea of the emanational connection between the divine absolute
being and the world of creation. This would explain, why Ibn ʿArabī related the
ten divine aspects of “the Creator” (al-mūǧid) to the ten Aristotelian categories
applicable to “every order in the world”:318
309 Aristotle, Physics VII 2. 243 a 35–37.

310 Cf. J. O. Schmitt, Barhebraeus, Engl. transl. § 3.4.1, in print.
311 Cf. J. O. Schmitt, Barhebraeus, Engl. transl. § 3.4.2, in print.
312 S. n. 258.
313 Cf. also Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae, Metaphysics, ed. and Germ. transl. Y. Kou-
riyhe, p. 105. – I owe this reference to Jens Ole Schmitt, University of Würzburg,
Germany.
314 Cf. G. Brakas, Aristotle’s Concept, pp. 52 and 93–107.
315 This ambivalence caused Pico della Mirandola in the 15th century to reject the accident-
ality of relations and to defend its essentiality with a reference to Averroes: Cf. K. Flasch,
Zur Rehabilitierung der Relation, pp. 20–22.
316 Cf. A. A. Akasoy, Al-Ghazālī, p. 36.
317 Cf. F. Rosenthal, Ibn ʿArabī, p. 35.
318 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya II, p. 304, 14–18 / Engl. transl. F. Rosenthal, Ibn ʿArabī,
204 chapter 10
– God’s “essence” (ḏāt) to the “substance (ǧawhar) of the world”

– God’s “attributes” (ṣifāt) to the “accident” (ʿaraḍ)
– God’s “eternity” (azal) to the “time” (zamān)
– God’s “sitting” on the throne (istiwāʾ) to the “place” (makān)
– God’s “names” (asmāʾ) to the “quantity” (kamm)
– God’s “assent” and “indignation” (riḍāʾ and ġaḍab) to the “quality” (kayf )
– God’s “word” (kalām) to the “position” (al-waḍʿ)
472 – God’s “lordship” (rubūbiyya) to the “relation” (iḍāfa) |
– His “creating” (īǧād) to “action” (an yafʿala)
– God’s “response” (iǧāba) to man’s prayers to “passion” (an yanfaʿila)319
These ten relations can explain, why Ibn Arabī describes the bridge between
God and the world with the Sufi term an-nafas ar-raḥmānī (Ibn ʿArabī: at-
tanaffus ar-raḥmānī or nafas ar-raḥmān)320 “the breath of compassion”, which
became a vehicle for God’s words, His creatures. The divine essence (= the cat-
egory “substance”) is manifested in the world in the divine attributes (they cor-
respond in the world to the category “accident”), namely “Living”, “Knowing”,
“Willing” and “Saying” or “the First”, “the Last”, “the Manifest” and “the Hid-
den”.321 Mere explaining analogies are the “fundamental categories” (ummahāt
al-maqūlāt) “substance”, “accident”, “time” and “place”.322 Moreover, within the
Sufi concept of an identity of the all-permeating infinite divine power and
infinite divine acting323 we find the category of “relation” of God’s sovereignty
p. 23: “Every order in the world of lights and darkness, subtle and coarse (matters), simple
and composite (matters), substances, accidents, times, places, relations, qualities, quant-
ities, positions, activa and passiva”.
319 See Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya II, p. 211, 29–33, and on the equation with the divine
aspects, p. 435, 8–11. – Remarkable is the identical terminology an yafʿala and an yanfaʿila
in Ibn Sīnā (s. n. 223) and before him in Fārābī (s. n. 149). – On the reception of the
Aristotelian categories in Ibn Arabī cf. H. S. Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-ʿArabī,
pp. 33–38; F. Rosenthal, Ibn ʿArabī, p. 23; the article by D. Gril, Ibn ʿArabī et les catégo-
ries, pp. 147–165. – On the equation of the divine aspects with the ten categories D. Gril,
p. 160; interestingly, the divine attributes appear to be replaced by the category “accident”.
H. S. Nyberg, F. Rosenthal and D. Gril refrain from a detailed comparison with Islamic
philosophers. – J. A. Pacheco, Ibn ʿArabī and Aristotelian Logic, does not discuss the Aris-
totelian categories.
320 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya III, p. 197, 29 f. – On the term and its Ismailite back-
ground, shaped by the Brethren of Purity (Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ) cf. M. Ebstein, Mysticism
and Philosophy, pp. 53–56 and index s.t.
321 Cf. D. Gril, p. 162 n. 23.
322 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya III, p. 404, 22; cf. D. Gril, p. 162 n. 24; and F. Rosen-
thal, Ibn Arabī, pp. 28 f.
323 On Ibn Arabī (and his impact of his concept of the descents of the divine absolute being
on Mullā Ṣadrā) cf. H. Daiber, Ambiguity (tashkīk) of Being in Mullā Ṣadrā.
to the world and the category of “passion” (an yanfaʿila) of God, “who answers”
(al-muǧīb) man’s prayer of request.324
Ibn ʿArabī’s integration of the categories in a Neoplatonic concept of an
emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world of
creation through the all-permeating divine power transformed “relation” into
a dynamic process, in which the infinite is procreated from the One.325
Herewith, Ibn ʿArabī gave his own answer in contemporary discussions
about the often discussed question, if and how the divine One creates multipli-
city. Ibn Sīnā and in his footsteps William of Auvergne (born between 1180 and
1190 AD), but also Ibn Rušd326 defended the principle “Ex Uno, secundum quod
unum, non nisi unum”.327 Ibn ʿArabī, who met Ibn Rušd in Cordoba around 1185
AD,328 expressis verbis denies this dictum, which he attributes to al-ḥakīm “the
philosopher”.329 | He might have encouraged his younger contemporary Naṣīr- 473
ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī in his critical attitude towards Ibn Sīnā’s dictum that “from the
truly One only one can proceed”.330
324 Cf. D. Gril, p. 163, with reference to Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya IV, p. 255 (ch. on
Ḥaḍrat al-iǧāba).
325 On Ibn ʿArabī’s concept of what can be called “ex uno potest fieri infinitum” cf. A. Bausani,
Note su alcuni aspetti, pp. 209 f.
326 Cf. G. Freudenthal, Medieval Astrologization, pp. 114f.
327 Cf. R. J. Teske, William of Auvergne’s Use, pp. 1–15. – This dictum was condemned as an
Averroistic doctrine in 1277 AD by Bishop Stephan Tempier and denied by Albertus Mag-
nus: Cf. M. Grabmann, Die Lehre des heiligen Albertus Magnus; A. de Libera, Ex uno
non fit nisi unum; Wahid M. Amin, “From the One, Only One Proceeds”. The Post-classical
Reception of a Key Principle of Avicenna’s Metaphysics. In Oriens 48, 2020, pp. 123–155.
328 Cf. E. Meyer, Ibn ʿArabī begegnet Ibn Rušd.
329 al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya II, p. 458, 19f.; F. Rosenthal, Ibn ʿArabī, p. 31, tentatively attrib-
utes this to Aristotelianism, by referring to Aristotle, Metaph. 1016 b 3–5 and Ibn Rušd’s
Great Commentary, his Tafsīr, ed. M. Bouyges II, p. 540, 17. – Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya,
who was visited by Ibn ʿArabī in 709/1309–1310 in Alexandria, denied the same dictum, but
simultaneously he criticized Ibn ʿArabī’s monism of being, the waḥdat al-wuǧūd (a term
which Ibn ʿArabī himself did not yet use): Cf. A. von Kügelgen, Ibn Taymīyas Kritik,
pp. 171 and 175. – On the echo of Ibn ʿArabī in Ibn Taymiyya cf. A. D. Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī in
the Later Islamic Tradition, pp. 87–111.
330 According to H. Landolt, Ṭūsī modified Ibn Sīnā’s explanation by referring to Ismailite
and Ishraqi philosophy: Cf. H. Landolt, Khwājā Naṣīr Al-Dīn Al-Ṭūsī, pp. 22–28. Ṭūsī’s
solution to introduce the (Neoplatonic) intermediary between the divine One and the
many things also appears in Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284), al-Kāšif (al-ǧadīd) fī l-ḥikma, ed.
H. N. Isfahani, p. 124, 5–7. The Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna, a contemporary of
Ṭūsī, however, does not follow the Ismailites, who identified the intermediary with God’s
“Command” or “Word”.
206 chapter 10
XII Ibn Sabʿīn
A younger contemporary of Ibn ʿArabī, the Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (ca. 613/
1216–668/1270) appears to have disagreed with the position of Ibn ʿArabī in
his philosophical work Budd al-ʿārif wa-ʿaqīdat al-muḥaqqiq al-muqarrib al-
kāšif wa-ṭarīq as-sālik al-mutabattil al-ʿākif “The escape of the knower and the
belief of the seeker of truth, who is approaching and investigating (it) and
the way of the traveller, who remains retired and secluded (from the world).”
The chapter on “relation” (iḍāfa)331 begins with the bipartition of the relation
into naẓīr and ġayr an-naẓīr, and classifies it as a “simple” category, which like
substance, quantity and quality can be combined with the six “composed” cat-
egories “where” (ayna), “when” (matā), “possession” (lahū), “position” (nuṣba),
“action” ( fāʿil) and “passion” ( yanfaʿil).332
This appears to be based on the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity.333 The
chapter ends334 with a critical evaluation of the relation belonging to the
“kind of quality” like the relation between “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) and “known”
(al-maʿlūm) or “perceived” (al-maḥsūs) and other “contrary things” (mutaqā-
bilāt):335 they are “imperfect” (nāqiṣa wa-mankūsa)336 because of their “multi-
plicity” (kaṯra),337 they are opposing the “supreme (divine) attributes” (aṣ-ṣifāt
al-ʿaliyya) and the “unity (tawḥīd) of the (divine) attributes (al-ḫawāṣṣ)”.338
Ibn Sabʿīn remarks: “Strictly speaking from relation only imagination (wahm)
remains, which vanishes ( yaḏhab); through its disappearance (ḏahāb) perfec-
tion (kamāl) can occur among those who investigate the truth (al-muḥaqqi-
474 qīn)”.339 Apparently, Ibn Sabʿīn criticized the use of the | categories in Sufi theo-
logy, especially the category “relation” as something ending in “imagination”.
Their use implies multiplicity and affects God’s unity. It might be a critical allu-
sion to the school of Ibn ʿArabī and his model Ġazālī and prefers the position
of Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd. This critical attitude is perhaps an additional reason
331 Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, Beirut 1978, pp. 71 f.

332 Described in Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, pp. 72–79, and in Ibn Sabʿīn’s al-Masāʾil aṣ-
ṣiqilliyya, addressed to Emperor Frederick II, ed. A. A. Akasoy, Philosophie und Mystik,
pp. 388, 16–389, 2 / Germ. transl., pp. 515 f.
333 S. above ch. VI. – On further parallels between Ibn Sabʿīn and the Epistles cf. C. H. Lohr,
Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus, pp. 71f.
334 Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, p. 72, 3–17.
335 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6 b 34 f.; 11 a 25–27, and on the opposite quality 10 b 13.
336 Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, p. 72, 4.
339 Cf. Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, p. 72, 6.
why Ibn Sabʿīn could say about Ġazālī: “One time he is a Sufi, another time a
philosopher, a third time an Ashʿarite, a fourth time a jurist, and a fifth time a
perplexed man”.340
Remarkably, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical attitude towards the Sufism of Ibn Arabī
is not yet developed in his Masāʾil as-siqilliyya addressed to Emperor Freder-
ick II, in which he does not consider the categories as something imperfect
and instead assesses the ten categories as “the world in general” (al-ʿālam bi-l-
ǧumla) and man as a being in which the categories are “collected” (maǧmūʿa);
“this is necessarily comprehended in the intellect (maʿqūl), and in the con-
ception (taṣawwur) and necessarily accepted as true (taṣdīq)”; man and world
“resemble each other” (mutamāṯil); “man and world are one”.341 This is an allu-
sion to Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of macrocosm and microcosm, according to which
God manifests Himself in the heart of man.342 It confirms Ibn ʿArabī’s assess-
ment of the categories as fundamentals of the world (s. above). According to
Ibn Sabʿīn’s al-Masāʾil as-siqilliyya the categories are in a Neoplatonizing man-
ner necessary, have no cause, exist by themselves, are permanently, do not
change and are essentially one.343
XIII A Medieval Latin Echo of Neoplatonizing Islamic Thought

Ramon Llull
Interestingly, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical view of the category of “relation” in his Budd
al-ʿārif is not shared by his younger contemporary Ramon Llull (1232–1315 or
1316AD). This Catalan philosopher and mystic had knowledge of the Aris-
totelian Organon, including the categories and he wrote a Compendium logicae
Algazelis, in which he used Ġazālī’s Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, a description of Ibn
Sīnā’s philosophy on the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s Persian Dāniš-nāma.344 In addi-
tion, Llull must have known other Arabic sources, including Ibn Sabʿīn.345 With
regard to Llull’s concept of the categories, especially of relation, we detect par-
allels with the Sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabī. With Llull’s concept of the relatio
340 Budd al-ʿārif, ed. Ǧ. Kattūra, p. 144 / Engl. transl. A. A. Akasoy, Al-Ghazālī, p. 38.
341 Ibn Sabʿīn, al-Masāʾil aṣ-ṣiqilliyya, ed. A. A. Akasoy, p. 383, 14–17 / Germ. transl. pp. 507f.
342 Cf. M. Takeshita, Ibn ʿArabī’s Theory, pp. 100 ff. and 113ff. – M. Ebstein, Mysticism and
Philosophy in al-Andalus, pp. 189–212.
343 Ibn Sabʿīn, al-Masāʾil aṣ-ṣiqilliyya, ed. A. A. Akasoy, p. 392, 8–393, 2 / Germ. transl. pp. 521f.
344 S. n. 247. – On echoes of Aristotle’s Categories in Ramon Llull cf. the articles by J. Higuera
Rubio, La perspectiva sincrónico-diacrónica; Aspectos gramaticales del léxico luliano;
Física y teología, passim; From Metaphors to Categories; El silencio de Aristóteles.
345 Cf. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, Ibn Sabʿīn and Raimundus Lullus.
208 chapter 10
substantialis we can contrast Ibn ʿArabī’s category (1) “substance” qua “Cre-
ator” or divine “essence”, (2) “relation” qua divine “lordship” and (3) “action”
qua act of “creating”:346 Llull gives as an example the substantial relation, exist-
475 ing in God, between Father, Son and Holy | Ghost347 and the corresponding
relation in created things, e.g., the relation between form and matter in the sub-
stance fire; this relation qua form indicates multiplicity, “like the multiplicity
(pluralitas) between father and son”.348 Relation is a “coessential” (coessen-
tiale) (real) relative, something that coessentially can have a relation (referibile)
and (coessentially) is the act of relation (referre). In the same way substance,
which has relation, is something that makes it a (real) substance (substan-
tiativum), a substance potentially (substantiabile) and the act of being sub-
stance (substantiare).349 Relation is a basic principle (principium primitivum)
and like substance it can have coessential principles, like action and passion
or quantity (maioritas, minoritas) and quality.350 Relation can be an accident,
inferior to the substantial relation.351 It is a cause of accidental or substan-
tial action (actio) and passion (passio).352 These few selected descriptions353
clearly reveal the new evaluation of relation, which in contrast to Aristotle is
no more concentrating on relation as something dependent on the substance.
With the Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers – including the Sufi philosopher
Ibn ʿArabī – he shares the classification of relation as a dynamic and active prin-
ciple, and with Ibn ʿArabī he shares the use of the categories as universal forms
with a “naturally physical and metaphysical status”:354 Ibn ʿArabī developed
his concept of categories as something applicable to the order of the world
and as something mirrored in the divine aspects of the Creator it is striking
that Ibn ʿArabī’s divine categories 1) “substance” = Creator, 2) “relation” = God’s
“Lordship” and 3) “acting” = God’s act of creating,355 can be paralleled with
Llull’s Trinitarian concept of the substantial relation, existing in God, between
Father, Son and Holy Ghost and also with Llull’s concept of the correlatives,
in which the divine attributes appear in a correlation of “acting” (= Ibn ʿArabī:
346 S. above ch. XI.

347 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 106 B.
348 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 112 I; cf. pp. 114 L and 108 C.1.
349 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 108 C.2.
350 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 110 D.2.
351 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 110 D.3.
352 Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr, p. 110 E.1.
353 Cf. also the chapters on categories in M. D. Johnston, The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull,
pp. LXVII–LXXV.
354 On Llull cf. M. D. Johnston, p. 66.
355 S. above ch. XI.
God’s act of creating), “action” (= Ibn ʿArabī: Creator = substance) and “pas-
sion” (= Ibn ʿArabī: God’s “Lordship” = relation),356 e.g., in the correlation of
the divine act of intellegere, the divine intellectus intelligens and the divine
objectum intellectum.357 Apparently, Llull did not follow the alleged Avicen-
nian and the Averroistic thesis of “ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi
unum”,358 and similar to Ibn ʿArabī he developed a relationship between God
and His crea|tion, in which the category “relation” received a new orientation. 476
In “relation” cause and effect are correlated, and “relation” is a dynamic process
between substance and relative.359 Its integration in Llull’s Christian Trinit-
arian theology, in which the created world is an image of the divine Trinity,360
offers an interesting alternative to the Augustinian Trinitarian theology, which
is also based on Aristotle’s Categories, especially his concept of relation.361 The
rehabilitation of relation since John Scotus Eriugena (ca. 801–ca. 877AD) until
Bonaventura (1221–1274AD) and, in an inconsistent manner, Thomas Aquinas
(1225–1274AD)362 culminated in new accentuations of Ramon Llull, developed
under the impression of Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers including the
Sufi Ibn ʿArabī. His discussion of relation363 forms an essential part of his con-
tributions to logic, which according to Alexander Fidora consists in the
“dynamization of logical predicates”.364
356 Here, we should be aware that Ibn ʿArabī’s “Lordship” not only means God’s rule over the
world, but also the world being ruled by God. Moreover, we should be aware that Ibn ʿArabī
in a differing manner correlates the category “passion” as something related to God, His
“response” to man’s prayers.
357 Cf. H. Daiber, Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam, pp. 151, 158
and 161 f.
358 S. nn. 326–329.
359 Cf. V. Hösle in the introduction to Raimundus Lullus, Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr,
pp. LXVI–LXVII.
360 Cf. V. Hösle, in the introduction to Raimundus Lullus, Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr,
pp. LI f.
361 Cf. H. Daiber, Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam, p. 161, and R.
Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, p. 356.
362 Cf. V. Hösle in the introduction to Raimundus Lullus, Logica Nova, ed. C. H. Lohr,
pp. LXX–LXXII.
363 Cf. the articles by E. W. Platzeck, who stresses the Aristotelian and Platonic background:
Raimundus Lulls allgemeiner Relationsbegriff; Der Platonismus bei Raimund Lull, esp.
pp. 73–81.
364 A. Fidora, From “Manifying” to “Pegasizing”, p. 86. – A recent publication has the aim to
include Llull’s theory of communication (affatus) in the discussion of Ramon Llull as a
forerunner of modern semiotics and relational logic: Cf. J.-L. Navarro Lluch, Teoría lul-
liana de la comunicació. Regrettably, the monograph does not sufficiently refer to Lullian
texts and their context.
210 chapter 10
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218 chapter 10
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chapter 11
Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als

Ausdruck griechischer Ethik, islamischer Ideologie
und iranisch-sassanidischer Hofetikette*
Gerhard Endress zum 75. Geburtstag

und in guter Erinnerung an unsere gemeinsamen
Werk- und Wirkstätten
∵
Summary
In the 2nd/8th century Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ wrote his book about instructions for the ruler,
the Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr. Central themes are friendship, prudence, justice, and mode-
ration. Knowledge and reason are cornerstones, which explicitly do not exclude the
values of religion. We detect central concepts of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. At the
same time, in the comparison with the letters of his contemporary ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-
Kātib, with the apocryphal exchange of letters between Aristotle and Alexander the
Great in the translation of his contemporary Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ, with the letter of the
Zoroastrian priest Tansar / Tosar, and with parallels in the Zoroastrian encyclopaedia
Dēnkard, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ turns out to be a representative of Iranian-Sassanian traditi-
ons of the “mirror of princes”, including their Greek sources, and of Islamic parenetic
literature, as reflected in his contemporary Ṣāliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-Quddūs. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s
Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr can only be understood, if we take into account the meanings of
concepts, as shaped in their historical context, by reflecting the process of association
and dissociation.
* Dem anonymen Gutachter des vorliegenden Aufsatzes danke ich für seine Hinweise, Verbes-
serungsvorschläge und Anregungen.

das kitāb al-ādāb al-kabīr des ibn al-muqaffaʿ 225
Schlagwörter
Mirror of princes – Greek ethics – Sassanian etiquette of the court – friendship – know-
ledge – reason and religion
Der traditionell deterministische Charakter des islamischen Glaubensbegrif- 274

fes, des koranischen Glaubens an einen allmächtigen Gott, veranlasste die
Mitglieder der damaligen islamischen Gemeinschaft, das Verhältnis zu ihrem
Regenten stets neu zu reflektieren und dessen Aufgaben und Eigenschaften neu
zu definieren.
Wir entdecken daher unter den Omayyaden des 2./8. Jahrhunderts Ten-
denzen zu göttlicher Allmacht (ǧabr) und zu menschlicher Willensfreiheit
(qadar).1 Beide deuten eine Polarisation an, die das Resultat ist einer zuneh-
mend kritischen Einstellung gegenüber den Regenten: Der Mensch ist frei,
gegen sie zu rebellieren, wenn sie in ihren Bemühungen scheitern und sich
nicht an den Koran, Gottes Buch oder an die Sunna des Propheten halten.2
Gleichzeitig wird zunehmend deutlich, dass eine politische Führerrolle von
der göttlichen Inspiration abhängig ist. Sie orientiert sich an der Offenbarung
des Korans. Dieser ist eine ethische Richtschnur für die Gemeinschaft und
bestimmt, was gut und gerecht ist.3
Der geschilderte ideologische Hintergrund des frühen Islam war der Aus-
gangspunkt für eine politische Philosophie, die sich seit dem 2./8. Jahrhundert
unter hellenistischem Einfluss entwickelte.4 Sie erlebte ihren ersten Höhe-
punkt in der iranisch-sassanidisch geprägten Fürstenspiegelliteratur des 2./8.
Jahrhunderts und prägte die Diskussionen über das Imamat und die Ethik.
Hier müssen wir den Perser Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ nennen, der von 102/721 bis 275
140/757 lebte.5 Er ist einer der frühen arabischen Prosaschreiber, übersetzte aus
dem Persischen eine Sammlung von indischen Fabeln, Kalīla wa-Dimna, ferner
die älteste uns erhaltene arabische Bearbeitung von Aristoteles’ Organon, die
1 Vgl. zu den Diskussionen im frühen Islam über göttliche Vorherbestimmung und menschli-
che Willensfreiheit H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, S. 21 ff.
2 Vgl. H. Q. Murad, “Jabr and Qadar”, S. 117–132.
3 Vgl. F. M. Denny, “Ethics and the Qurʾān”, S. 103–121. – G. F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition,
S. 23 ff.
4 Vgl. den Überblick in H. Daiber, “Political Philosophy”. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs II/8.
5 Vgl. J. D. Latham, “Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ”. – Vgl. ferner die umfassende Monographie von I. T.
Kristó-Nagy, Pensée.
226 chapter 11
allerdings möglicherweise von seinem Sohn stammt,6 und stellte in verschie-

denen Werken als eine Art Erziehungsprogramm praktische Ratschläge für
den Fürsten zusammen.7 In seinem Großen Buch der Verhaltensregeln (ādāb)8
beschreibt er eine Gesellschaft, an deren Spitze eine Minderheit von Leuten
mit einem vortrefflichen Urteilsvermögen steht, die den Idealen von Freund-
schaft, Integrität und Brüderlichkeit nachstreben. Das Kennzeichen dieser
Elite9 ist eine rationalistische Moral, die dem savoir vivre nachstrebt.
276 Diese in der Fachliteratur gängige Beurteilung wird im Nachfolgenden er-
gänzt und modifiziert. Hierzu betrachten wir die Leitgedanken des Großen
Buches der Verhaltensregeln. Es enthält viele praktische und subtile Verhaltens-
regeln und wurde mit der Überzeugung geschrieben, dass die Menschen von
den in religiösen und weltlichen Dingen bewanderten Gelehrten der Vergan-
genheit über “Verhaltensregeln” (ādāb) und “Ethik” (aḫlāq)10 “Wissen” (ʿilm)
erwerben können.
Wissen sei primär Wissen um den “Ursprung” (aṣl) bzw. das Prinzip oder
den erforderlichen Ausgangspunkt einer Sache. So sei “Religion” (dīn)11 rich-
tiger Glaube (an taʿtaqida l-īmān ʿalā ṣ-ṣawāb), das Vermeiden von schwe-
ren Sünden und die Erfüllung der religiösen Pflicht.12 Gesundheit des Kör-
pers sei das gesunde Mittelmaß und setze Wissen um Nützliches und Schäd-
liches voraus.13 “Tapferkeit” (baʾs) und “Mut” (šaǧāʿa) beweise, wer mit ste-
6 Vgl. die Hinweise in J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft. II, S. 27. – M. Cooperson, “Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ” – I. T. Kristó-Nagy, pensée, S. 175–179.
7 Vgl. die Hinweise in F. Gabrieli, “Ibn al-Mukaffaʿ”, Sp. 884–885. – A. K. S. Lambton,
Theory and Practice, S. 43 ff. – J. D. Latham, “Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ”, S. 57ff. – I. T. Kristó-Nagy,
“Who shall educate whom?”.
8 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr. Die traditionelle Titelform Kitāb al-Adab al-kabīr ist nicht kor-
rekt: Cf. I. Abbas, “Adab Al-Kabīr”, Sp. 445. – Zum Text vgl. noch G. Richter, Studien
zur Geschichte, S. 5 ff.; M. Cassarino, L’aspetto morale, S. 47ff.; A. Hámori, “Prudence”,
S. 163–173; J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 168ff.; I. T. Kristó-Nagy, Pensée,
S. 181–210.
9 Vgl. P. Charles-Dominique, “Le système”, S. 53 f.
10 Vgl. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 65, 4ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 38. – Wir
folgen hier und im Nachfolgenden nicht immer der Übersetzung von O. Rescher, die
in Details verbesserungswürdig ist und auf der Basis einer kritischen Textedition neu
geschrieben werden sollte.
11 Der Begriff dīn wird in seiner vollen Bedeutung bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ erst erfassbar, wenn
wir das mittelpersische Konzept von dēn berücksichtigen. M. Shaki, “dēn”, Sp. 279, über-
setzt ihn mit “the sum of man’s spirituality, attributes and individuality, vision, inner self,
conscience, religion”. – Vgl. dazu J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 182f.
12 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 65, 6 / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 38.
13 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 66, 3 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 38.
ter “Umsicht” (ḥiḏr / ḥaḏar) als erster angreift und als letzter zurückweicht.14
“Freigebigkeit” (ǧūd) liege vor, wenn jemand anderen nichts vorenthält und
im Gegenteil ihnen mehr zukommen lässt als sie verdienen.15 “Beredsamkeit”
(kalām) beweise, wer mit aller “Vorsicht” (taḥaffuẓ) Fehler vermeidet und “das
Richtige” (aṣ-ṣawāb) in geschickter Weise sagt.16 Die richtige “Lebensweise”
(maʿīša) sei der besonnene und erlaubte Erwerb des zum Leben Notwendi-
gen.17
Nach diesen Vorbemerkungen beginnt der Autor das erste Kapitel seines
Buches, nämlich die Beschreibung von “Verhaltensregeln” (adab) für den
“Regenten” (sulṭān), die sowohl an den Regenten als auch an den über ihm ste-
henden | “Souverän” (rabb) gerichtet sind.18 Zentral stehen die Warnung vor 277
“Übertreibung” (ifrāṭ) vor allem im Zorn, vor voreiligem Handeln und die Emp-
fehlung, die “Einsicht” (raʾy)19 auf “das Wichtige” (al-muhimm) und “das Rich-
tige” (al-ḥaqq) zu richten.20 Hierbei stützen “Religion” (dīn) und “Entschlos-
senheit” (ḥazm) die “Herrschaft” (mulk), nicht aber die “Willkür” (hawā).21 Wer
Herrschaft ausübt, soll selbst “Glauben” (dīn), “Frömmigkeit” (birr) und “Ehr-
gefühl” (murūʾa) besitzen22 und sich auf Leute mit Glauben und Ehrgefühl
“in jedem Distrikt, Dorf und Stamm” verlassen, die seine “Brüder”, “Helfer”,
“Gefährten” (aḫdān), “aufrichtige Freunde” (aṣfiyāʾ), und “Vertraute” (biṭāna)
sein sollen.23 Er soll sich von “Einsichtigen” (ahl ar-raʾy) beraten lassen24 und
gleichzeitig ist er verpflichtet, “die Angelegenheiten der Leute” (umūr an-nās)
14 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 66, 6 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 38 unten.

16 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 66, 12 f. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 39.
18 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 68 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 39ff.
19 Zum Begriff raʾy bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ und zum alternativen Ausdruck ʿaql bei Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿs Zeitgenossen Ṣāliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-Quddūs (zu ihm vgl. Anm. 48–52) s. J. Joseph-
son, “Hellenistic Heritage”, S. 180; J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 184f.
20 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 72, 4 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 41ff.
21 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 73, 7 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 43. – Vgl. M. Mahassine,
“Deux genres d’ autorité”, S. 98–120. – Zum Begriff hawā vgl. J. Josephson, “Multicultural
Background”, S. 186.
22 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 79, 9 f. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 46. – Zur Rolle der Religion bei
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ vgl. P. Charles-Dominique, “Le système”, S. 62f.; I. T. Kristó-Nagy,
“On the Authenticity”; I. T. Kristó-Nagy, “Reason, Religion and Power”; I. T. Kristó-
Nagy, Pensée, S. 75–79. – Zu murūʾa vgl. A. Hámori, “Shameful and Injurious”, S. 192–195;
J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 183 f.
228 chapter 11
misstrauisch25 und erforderlichenfalls mit Abneigung zu betrachten.26 Er soll

gerecht sein27 und der “Lasterhaftigkeit” ( fuǧūr) und “Gemeinheit” (danāʾa)
keine Chance geben.28
278 Auch das folgende Kapitel über den Umgang mit dem Fürsten29 betont
immer wieder die Notwendigkeit von “Einsicht” (raʾy) und “Scharfsinn”
(naẓar)30 als Weg zum “Richtigen” (ṣawāb). Die Erkenntnis des Richtigen ist
ein Prozess, in dessen Verlauf eine Teilerkenntnis zur nächsten und schließ-
lich zur “entscheidenden Einsicht” (taḥkīm ar-raʾy) führt.31 Lügenhafter Verun-
glimpfung soll man mit “Besonnenheit” (ḥilm) und nicht mit Zorn begegnen.32
Der Dialog mit dem Gegner setzt Hinhören, reifliche “Überlegung” (tafkīr) und
argumentierende Antwort voraus, die auf die “guten” gehörten “Dinge” (maḥā-
sin) zurückgreift.33
Da der Regent – wie bereits im ersten Kapitel erklärt – auf die Unterstüt-
zung durch Vertraute und Freunde angewiesen ist, nimmt es nicht Wunder,
dass das folgende und abschließende Kapitel der Freundschaft gewidmet ist,
bzw. dem Umgang mit “Freunden” (aṣdiqāʾ).34 Es wiederholt viele Tugend-
ideale aus den vorangegangenen Kapiteln und konzentriert sich auf die Tugend
der “Aufrichtigkeit” (ṣidq), wovon das Wort “Freund” (ṣadīq) abgeleitet ist.35
Der Autor erklärt Aufrichtigkeit als “Aufrichtigkeit des Herzens” (ṣidq al-qalb),
die nur dann “in Zweifel gezogen wird” ( yuttahamu), wenn die Zunge lügt.36
Dies wird mit dem platonisch anmutenden Widerstreit zwischen “Verstand”
(ʿaql), “Zorn” (ġaḍab), “Begierde” (hawā) und “Unwissenheit” (ǧahl) eines Men-
schen erklärt. Jede dieser Kräfte beansprucht für sich die “Zunge” (lisān) als
Werkzeug für ihre eigenen Zwecke. Wenn sie nicht Werkzeug des Verstandes
ist, wird sie zum Werkzeug des Feindes, Werkzeug der genannten Kräfte Zorn,
Begierde und Unwissenheit.37 Diesen “Naturen” (ṭabāʾiʿ)38 genannten und in
25 yattahim naẓarahū bi-ʿayn ar-rība, S. 76, ult.s. – Vgl. S. 77, 3.

26 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 76, 13 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 45 (missverständlich).
27 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 77, 6 f. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 45.
29 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 80 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 47ff.
32 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 85, 14 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 50f.
33 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 89,4 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher S. 52f.
34 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 98–134 (Ende) / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 59–82.
36 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 105, 4 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 63.
38 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 109, 10 / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 66 (“Regungen”).
jedem verborgen vorhandenen39 negativen Kräften40 setzt unser Autor die

bereits genannte “Besonnenheit” (ḥilm) entgegen, ferner “Nachdenken” (ta-
fakkur), “Reflexion” (rawiyya), das “Hinweisen” (ḏikr) auf Konsequenzen und
das “Streben nach Tugend” (ṭalab | al-faḍīla). Diesen Eigenschaften kann der 279
Mensch durch “Anstrengung” (iǧtihād) und “Vortrefflichkeit” ( faḍl) zum Sieg
verhelfen.41 Dies setzt bei ihm die “Geduld” (ṣabr) voraus, die Begierden zu
bekämpfen und “seine Einsicht mit festem Willen zu verwirklichen” (wa-(an
yakuna) li-baṣīratihī bi-ʿazmihī munaffiḏan).42 Die genannten intellektuellen
Tätigkeiten führen zu praktischem “Wissen um das Nützliche” (ʿilm li-l-manāfiʿ)
und zur “Schärfung des Verstandes” (taḏkiyat al-ʿuqūl).43 Hierbei könne jemand
von einem Mitmenschen profitieren, der mehr weiß und überhaupt besser ist,
auch in der Religion, sodass er durch die “Redlichkeit” (ṣalāḥ) des in der Reli-
gion Vortrefflichen an Redlichkeit zunimmt.44
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ beendet seine Abhandlung mit einer bemerkenswerten
Skizze über einen nicht namentlich genannten und von ihm hoch geschätz-
ten “Gefährten” oder “Freund” (ṣāḥib); denn dieser habe den weltlichen Din-
gen wenig Bedeutung beigemessen,45 sich von Begierden ferngehalten und
im Kampf gegen “Unwissenheit” (ǧahāla) sich am “Nutzen” (manfaʿa) ori-
entiert,46 sei zurückhaltend, besonnen und klug im Gespräch gewesen und
habe im Umgang mit seinen “Nächsten” (iḫwān) “Aufmerksamkeit” (ihtimām),
“Umsicht” (ḥīla) und “Tatkraft” (quwwa) bewiesen.47 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ empfiehlt,
solche “Charaktereigenschaften” (aḫlāq) sich soweit wie möglich anzueignen.
Die besten Menschen seien diejenigen, die sich nicht über die Niedrigen erha-
ben fühlen und sich nicht vor den Hohen erniedrigen.
Diese abschließende Skizze klingt wie eine Zusammenfassung zentraler
Gedanken des Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr. Wer ist die hier von Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ ange-
sprochene Person? Ich möchte die Vermutung aussprechen, dass hier sein Zeit-
genosse Ṣāliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-Quddūs gemeint ist, der in Basra als Moralprediger
39 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 109, 10 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 66f.

40 Vgl. auch die Aufzählung Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 109, 6f.: sawrat al-ġaḍab “heftiger Zorn”,
sawrat al-ḥamiyya “heftige Wut”, sawrat al-ḥiqd “heftiger Groll”, sawrat al-ǧahl “große
Unwissenheit”.
41 Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 109, 7 f. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 66.
43 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 111, 7 ff. / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 67.
45 wa-kāna raʾsu mā aʿẓamahū fī ʿaynī ṣiġara d-dunyā fī ʿaynihī, s. Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, S. 133,
6 / Übers. O. Rescher, S. 82.
230 chapter 11
aufgetreten ist und von der späteren Überlieferung zu Unrecht zum “Ketzer”
280 (zindīq) gestempelt wurde.48 Die von ihm überlieferten Sprichwörter | prei-
sen Mäßigung in der Rede, wahre Freundschaft, Gerechtigkeit sowie Klugheit.
Sie weisen auf die Vergänglichkeit der Welt sowie auf den Wert der Vernunft49
und des Wissens der Kundigen.50 Es klingt Kritik an Herrschenden an, die sich
mit Unwissenden umgeben.51 Somit kann der Vergleich mit Ṣāliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-
Quddūs den historischen Hintergrund für das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ liefern und umgekehrt. Gleichzeitig wird die Vermutung bestätigt,
dass Ṣāliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-Quddūs kein Ketzer war, sondern ein Vertreter paräneti-
scher Literatur seiner Zeit, worin die Bedeutung der Vernunft für das “Verhal-
ten” (adab) des Menschen, für seine Lebensweise unterstrichen wird.52
Die detaillierten Gedankengänge in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿs Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr
sind indessen nicht nur ein Spiegelbild seiner Zeit, sondern führen bei sys-
tematischer Betrachtung der Begriffe zu einem überraschenden Resultat, das
meines Erachtens nicht nur als Parallelität und Konvergenz von Gedanken zu
erklären ist. Es gibt Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zu Gedanken in Aristo-
teles’ Nikomachischer Ethik.53 Sie war zu Ibn al-Muqaffaʿs Zeit noch nicht in
das Arabische übersetzt. Dennoch gibt es Echos, die das Urteil von Frithiof
Rundgren in seinem 1976 erschienenen Aufsatz bestätigen, wonach das Kitāb
al-Ādāb al-kabīr seinen Autor “als einen vom Hellenismus beeinflussten Mann”
zeige.54 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ unterstreicht in viel stärkerem Maße als Aristoteles55
die Rolle der Freundschaft für die Gemeinschaft – bei Aristoteles die Polis.
48 Vgl. J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft. II, S. 15 ff. – Zur Erwähnung des Ṣāliḥ als Ketzer
bei Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī, Risālat al-Ġufrān, vgl. Text und Übersetzung von G. van Gelder
und G. Schöler, Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī, S. 56/57 und 58/59.
49 Vgl. hierzu Anm. 19, und zu Anm. 30–33.
50 Vgl. I. Goldziher, “Ṣāliḥ B. ʿAbd-al-Kuddūs”, S. 1(104)–26(129), bes. S. 7(110)ff. – J. Joseph-
son, “Hellenistic Heritage”, S. 180 ff.
51 Vgl. J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft. II, S. 18.
52 Vgl. J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft. II, S. 19 f.
53 In den bislang vorliegenden Analysen des Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr ist nur vereinzelt auf Par-
allelen zur Nikomachischen Ethik hingewiesen worden: s. A. Hámori, “Prudence”, S. 169
und 171 f. – I. T. Kristó-Nagy, Pensée, S. 194 f.
54 F. Rundgren, “Über den griechischen Einfluss”, S. 139f.; F. Rundgrens Vergleich (S. 140)
von arabischem baʾs mit griechischem ἀρετή und der Hinweis auf das Mittelpersische
überzeugen nicht, da Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ durchaus den Begriff faḍīla für ἀρετή gebraucht
und neben baʾs auch das übliche šaǧāʿa benutzt (s.o.). – J. Josephson, “Multicultural
Background”, S. 166, stellt die Hypothese auf, dass das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr ein späthelle-
nistisches ethisches System widerspiegele “with a definite Stoic tinge mixed with Iranian
political thought”. Doch vgl. hierzu unten zu Anm. 84.
55 Nikomachische Ethik Buch VIII und IX.
Freundschaft hat | bei Aristoteles wie bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ einen höheren Stel- 281
lenwert als Gerechtigkeit.56 Die Tugend der Aufrichtigkeit (ἀλήθεια) erscheint
bei Aristoteles als Mitte zwischen Aufschneiderei und heuchlerischer Beschei-
denheit, wird auf das Reden und Tun der Menschen im Umgang mit den Mit-
bürgern bezogen und ist Freundschaft (φιλία).57 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ benutzt aller-
dings nicht das aristotelische Konzept58 von der Mitte zwischen zwei Extre-
men, um die Tugenden des Einzelnen zu erklären, sondern spricht vom Kampf
der Vernunft, der Reflexion gegen Zorn, Begierde und Unwissenheit, um zu ver-
hindern, dass die Zunge deren Sprachrohr wird.
Bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ ist das Ziel der Anstrengung Erkenntnis und Wissen
um das Nützliche sowie Einsichten, die “mit festem Willen verwirklicht wer-
den” sollen. Aristoteles meint dasselbe, wenn er sagt, dass der Besonnene “ers-
tens wissentlich (εἰδῶς), zweitens auf Grund einer klaren Willensentscheidung
(προαιρούμενος) handeln muss, einer Entscheidung, die um der Sache selbst
willen gefällt ist und drittens muss er mit fester und unerschütterlicher Sicher-
heit (βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως) handeln”.59 Allerdings fügt Aristoteles als wei-
tere Motivation für das Handeln das Gute und das Angenehme hinzu.60 Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ zufolge ist Freundschaft als Baustein des harmonischen Miteinan-
ders von Herrschern und Mitregenten ausschließlich am Nutzen orientiert. Sie
bedient sich des “Wissens um das Nützliche”, das sich auf die stützt, die mehr
wissen und konsultiert werden können, und des Wissens der Gelehrten in Ver-
gangenheit und Gegenwart, die in religiösen und weltlichen Dingen bewandert
sind.
Eine solche Spezifizierung der Quellen des Wissens, die übrigens wegwei-
send geworden ist für die nachfolgende Fürstenspiegelliteratur61 und sich letzt-
lich auf eine iranisch-zoroastrische Tradition berufen kann,62 fehlt bei | Aris- 282
toteles63. Darüber hinaus teilen weder Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ noch Aristoteles eine
56 Vgl. zu Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik VIII 1. 1155 a 22ff. den Artikel “Freundschaft” in
HWPh 2, 1972, Sp. 1106.
57 Vgl. Nikomachische Ethik II 7. 1108 a 11 ff. und 27 ff.
58 Vgl. Nikomachische Ethik II 7 zu Tapferkeit, Besonnenheit, Großzügigkeit, Hochsinnigkeit,
Zorn und Freundschaft.
59 Nikomachische Ethik II 7. 1105 a 31 ff. / Übers. F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles – Nikomachische
Ethik, S. 33.
60 Vgl. Nikomachische Ethik VIII 2 ff.
61 Vgl. etwa Ṭāhir Ibn al-Ḥusayn (gest. 207/822): s. S. Leder, “Aspekte”, S. 28ff., bes. S. 30.
62 Vgl. J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 168f., und die zoroastrische Enzyklopä-
die des Dênkard, eine aus dem 10. Jh. AD stammende Kompilation aus älteren Quellen,
Buch VI, das eine Sammlung religiöser und weltlicher Weisheit (andarz) der Vorfahren
ist. Vgl. hierzu P. Gignoux, “Dênkard”, S. 284–289 und dort gegebene Hinweise.
63 Aristoteles spricht lediglich allgemein von den Altvorderen als Quelle des Wissens: z.B.
232 chapter 11
inhaltliche Spezifizierung dieses Wissens mit. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ nennt es auch

“Einsicht” (raʾy), Aristoteles “sittliche Einsicht” oder “Klugheit”, phronesis.64
Doch beide beschränken sich auf einen allgemeinen Hinweis auf ethische
Tugenden wie Tapferkeit, Besonnenheit,65 Freigebigkeit und Mäßigung von
Zorn und Begierden. Nach Aristoteles können diese allenfalls als Mitte zwi-
schen zwei Extremen definiert werden. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ spricht dahingegen
von “Verhaltensregeln” (adab), die sich an der Rechtschaffenheit bzw. “Red-
lichkeit” (ṣalāḥ) dessen orientieren, der den “richtigen Glauben” bzw. “Religion”
(dīn) hat und “Frömmigkeit” (birr) und “Ehrgefühl” (murūʾa) besitzt. Von einem
festgelegten Gesetz oder Verhaltenscodex ist nicht die Rede. Bei Aristoteles66
wie bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ bietet das Wissen, die Reflexion, die Beratschlagung
mit sich selbst und mit anderen lediglich eine Orientierung für das Handeln:
Bei Aristoteles für die “Entscheidung” (proairesis), den Handlungsentschluss,67
bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ für die Verwirklichung “mit festem Willen” (ʿazm) und
nach “entscheidender Einsicht”. Wie bei Aristoteles68 liegt keine “Kontextde-
terminiertheit der Klugheit”69 vor. Aristoteles’ Begriff der Klugheit ist daher zu
283 Recht | als “vernünftiges Streben” und “strebende Vernunft” bezeichnet wor-
den.70 Er gibt dem Einzelnen Orientierung im Verhalten und Handeln, in seiner
Selbstgestaltung, die bei Aristoteles im Zusammenhang mit der Polis geschieht,
bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ im Kontext einer Gemeinschaft, die aus Herrschern und
Beherrschten besteht. Der Einzelne muss sich im Umgang mit dem anderen
ständig kritisch neu orientieren. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ sprach vom erforderlichen
“Misstrauen” gegenüber den Leuten, dem gegebenenfalls “Abneigung” folgt.
Fassen wir zusammen: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ erscheint inspiriert von zentralen
Gedanken in Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik. Gleichzeitig haben wir gravie-
rende Unterschiede zu Aristoteles feststellen können, die für die Beurteilung
von Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ und seine Position bedeutsam sind:
Metaph. I 3; Physics I 2; De caelo I 10; De anima I 2 (den Hinweis auf die genannten Stellen
verdanke ich dem anonymen Gutachter).
64 Vgl. Nikomachische Ethik VI 5 und F. Dirlmeier, S. 449. – Hierzu P. Aubenque, Begriff
der Klugheit, S. 41 ff.; A. Luckner, Klugheit, S. 94 ff.
65 Bei Aristoteles σωφροσύνη; Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ hat ḥilm; wogegen die arabische Überlieferung
der Nikomachischen Ethik (z.B. I 13. 1103 a 6 oder II 2. 1104 a 19 etc.) ʿiffa “Mäßigkeit” bietet:
Vgl. die arabische Edition hrsg. v. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, The Arabic Version, S. 153,
10 oder 161, 1. – Dazu L. V. Berman, “Σωφροσύνη and Ἐγκράτεια”, S. 274–287.
66 Vgl. hierzu A. Luckner, Klugheit, S. 75 ff.
67 Vgl. Nikomachische Ethik III 4 und VI 2. 1139 a 22 ff.; P. Aubenque, Begriff der Klugheit,
S. 107 ff.; A. Luckner, Klugheit, S. 89 ff.
68 Vgl. A. Luckner, Klugheit, S. 94 ff.
69 A. Luckner, Klugheit, S. 98.
70 Vgl. M. Riedenauer, Orexis und Eupraxia, S. 218 ff.
– Abweichend von Aristoteles betont Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ die Rolle des Wissens,
primär des Wissens um “Verhaltensregeln” und “Ethik”, das von den in reli-
giösen und weltlichen Dingen bewanderten Gelehrten der Vergangenheit
überliefert werde. Dieses Wissen beschert den Menschen Wissen um den
richtigen Ausgangspunkt für das Tun des Nützlichen und Notwendigen bzw.
um die hierzu erforderlichen Verhaltensweisen des Regenten.
– Der Regent muss “Glauben” (dīn) bzw. “Frömmigkeit” (birr) und “Ehrgefühl”
(murūʾa) besitzen.
– Zentral stehen die Konzepte von “Einsicht” und “Misstrauen”.
– Einsicht und Misstrauen erscheinen gepaart mit “Freundschaft”, auf die der
Regent angewiesen ist. Sie ist der Baustein für das gemeinsame Streben von
Herrschern und Mitregenten nach dem “Nützlichen”.
– Die “Vernunft” soll den Kampf gegen Unwissenheit, Unbeherrschtheit und
Begierde bestimmen.
– Die mehrmalige Aufforderung, die Begierden zu bekämpfen, mündet in den
Hinweis auf einen “Gefährten” und “Freund”, der möglicherweise mit Ṣāliḥ
ʿAbd al-Quddūs identisch ist.
– Religion und “Entschlossenheit” (ḥazm) sind Stützen der “Herrschaft”
(mulk).
Die genannten Abweichungen von Aristoteles’ Vorstellungen in seiner Nikoma-
chischen Ethik haben wir in einem Fall auf Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-Quddūs zurückführen
können. Dieser hat “weltlichen Dingen” wenig Bedeutung beigemessen und
hat als paränetischer Prediger in Basra die Ideale von Mäßigung, Freundschaft,
Gerechtigkeit und Klugheit propagiert.
Doch es gibt noch einen weiteren Zeitgenossen, mit dem Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, 284
abweichend von Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik, zahlreiche Gedanken teilt,
nämlich ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib, der als Begründer der Briefschreibekunst in
omayyadischer Zeit gilt.71 Die von ihm bei späteren Autoren72 erhaltenen Briefe
zeigen eine große Nähe zu Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. Er verfasste einen “Brief über
Freundschaft”.73 In seinem “Brief an die Sekretäre”74 beschreibt er die Pflich-
71 Vgl. J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 164 ff. – Vgl. jetzt auch den umfangreichen Aufsatz
von W. al-Qāḍī, “The Myriad Sources”, worin allerdings kein näherer Vergleich mit Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ sowie den beiden gemeinsamen Traditionen geboten wird, die sich auf Aris-
toteles’ Nikomachische Ethik zurückführen lassen.
72 Vor allem bei Aḥmad Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr (204/819–280/893); hiernach sind die Briefe von
A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II und von M. Kurd ʿAlī, Rasāʾil herausgegeben worden.
73 Hrsg. v. A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II, S. 434–438 / hrsg. v. M. Kurd ʿAlī, Rasāʾil, S. 218–220. –
Vgl. J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 173.
74 Hrsg. v. A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II, S. 534–540 / hrsg. v. M. Kurd ʿAlī, Rasāʾil, S. 222–226. –
Vgl. J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 166 f.
234 chapter 11
ten und all die Eigenschaften, die ein Sekretär haben soll und die – ähnlich
wie Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ – menschliche Tugenden des klugen Verhaltens, der Loya-
lität, der Anpassungsfähigkeit und des Maßhaltens umfassen. Ausgangspunkt
jeglicher Etikette sei das Wissen um den Koran und um die religiösen Verpflich-
tungen. Weitere Details erfahren wir in ʿAbd al-Ḥamīds “Brief an den Kronprin-
zen”, nämlich an ʿAbd Allāh, den Sohn des omayyadischen Kalifen Marwān II
(reg. 127/744–132/750).75 Der Text gleicht, wie bereits festgestellt worden ist,
der literarischen Gattung der “Fürstenspiegel” und propagiert im Vorspann,76
zu einem Teil über militärische Logistik, mit anderen Worten all die Ziele, die
wir auch aus Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ kennen77 und die sich am religiösen Wissen –
hier speziell am Koran – orientieren, ferner an den Tugenden gut überlegter
Bedachtsamkeit bzw. “Besonnenheit” (ḥilm)78 und Zurückhaltung, der Mäßi-
285 gung, der Gerechtigkeit | und der Nachsicht. Ähnlich wie bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
wird vor menschlichen Leidenschaften, vor Hochmut, Zorn und vor Unbe-
herrschtheit im Gespräch mit dem anderen gewarnt. Religion und kritisches
Denken erscheinen in ähnlicher Weise wie bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Grundlage
richtigen Umgangs des Herrschers mit seinen Untertanen und sind Voraus-
setzung für das Ansehen des Regenten sowie für den Respekt der Untertanen
gegenüber dem Regenten.
Es wird zu Recht darauf hingewiesen, dass ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd und somit auch
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ hier der iranisch-sassanidischen Tradition der Etikette des
königlichen Hofes folgen.79 Die im Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr sich widerspiegelnde
iranisch-sassanidische Tradition hat Judith Josephson zu Recht mit zahlrei-
chen Parallelen in einer in vorliegender Form allerdings aus dem 10. Jahrhun-
dert AD stammenden zoroastrischen Enzyklopädie, im Dēnkard, verglichen
und in diesem Zusammenhang auf mittelpersisches Kolorit der Sprache des
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ hingewiesen.80 Nach iranisch-sassanidischem Vorbild wird bei
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ sowie bei ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd das aus Erfahrung gewonnene Wissen,
75 Hrsg. v. A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II, S. 473–533 / hrsg. v. M. Kurd ʿAlī, Rasāʾil, S. 173–210 /
dt. Übers. H. Schönig, Sendschreiben, S. 17–73 (Kommentar, S. 74ff.). – Vgl. J. D. Latham,
“Beginnings”, S. 167–172, bes. S. 167–170.
76 Hrsg. v. A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II, S. 473–495 / dt. Übers. H. Schönig, Sendschreiben,
S. 18–38.
77 Beide Autoren hat H. Schönig, Sendschreiben, S. 122–127, verglichen und auf Gemein-
samkeiten wie Unterschiede hingewiesen. H. Schönig ist der Meinung, dass nur in ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīds Werk “der gottesfürchtige Muslim” spreche, nicht aber in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿs Kitāb
al-Ādāb al-kabīr (H. Schönig, S. 126). – Vgl. jedoch oben zu Anm. 11, 21 und 22.
78 Hrsg. v. A. Z. Ṣafwat, Ǧamhara II, S. 480 / dt. Übers. H. Schönig, Sendschreiben, S. 24.
79 Vgl. J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 177.
80 J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 170 ff.
wie es in der persischen Weisheitsliteratur einen Niederschlag gefunden hat,81

um das religiöse Wissen ergänzt.
Nun ist in ambivalenter Weise82 darauf aufmerksam gemacht worden, dass
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ethisch-moralische Vorstellungen direkt aus griechisch-helle-
nistischen Quellen bezogen habe und dass diese – ich zitiere John Derek
Latham – “could, and most likely did, filter through from Persian sources”.83
Diese persischen Quellen und ihre griechischen Vorlagen haben sich bis-
lang nicht eindeutig identifizieren lassen. Judith Josephson denkt bei ihrem
oben genannten Vergleich mit dem Dēnkard an griechisch-stoische Quellen.84
Abgesehen von der Tatsache, dass die Stoa ein Schmelztiegel unterschiedli-
cher älterer griechischer Gedankenströme ist, kann sich der Leser nicht des
Eindrucks erwehren, dass hier eine größere Nähe zu iranisch-sassanidischen
Traditionen vorliegt. Sie haben ihren Niederschlag in persisch-arabischen Gno-
mologien gefunden, wobei Einzelnes eine Parallele zur griechischen Ethik auf-
weist. Hierbei kann es fraglich sein, ob eine solche Parallele auf tatsächlicher
Abhängigkeit beruht oder auf unabhängiger Parallelentwicklung, die nachträg-
lich eine Überlagerung mit griechischem Gedankengut erleichterte.
Einen Eindruck von persisch-arabischen und teilweise auf griechische Tra- 286
ditionen zurückgreifende gnomologische Textsammlungen bietet die zu
Beginn des 3./9. Jahrhunderts von ʿAlī Ibn ʿUbayda (gest. 219/834) verfasste
Kompilation Ǧawāhir al-kilam wa-farāʾid al-ḥikam.85
Eine weitere Quelle haben wir in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles
wahrscheinlich machen können.
Und schließlich müssen wir hier eine fingierte arabische Korrespondenz
zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander dem Großen nennen, die griechisch-
byzantinisches und iranisch-sassanidisches Material enthält und mit großer
Wahrscheinlichkeit auf die redigierende Übersetzertätigkeit des Mawlā Sālim
Abū l-ʿAlāʾ zurückgeht, eines Sekretärs des omayyadischen Kalifen Hišām (reg.
105/724–125/743).86 Die Bezeichnung des Übersetzers als Mawlā weist auf seine
nichtarabische oder nichtmuslimische Herkunft.87 Die in unterschiedlichen,
noch nicht vollständig erschlossenen Versionen88 überlieferte Korrespondenz,
81 Vgl. den Hinweis bei J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 177.

82 J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 177 unten.
83 J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 178.
84 J. Josephson, “Multicultural Background”, S. 172 ff.
85 Hrsg. und übers. v. M. Zakeri, Persian Wisdom.
86 Vgl. zu dieser Korrespondenz J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 154–164; M. Maróth, Corre-
spondence; D. Gutas, “On Graeco-Arabic”, S. 59–70; D. Gutas, “Populäre Ethik”, S. 473.
87 Vgl. “Mawlā” in EI2 VI, 1991, Sp. 877 a.
88 M. Maróth, Correspondence, (und vor ihm M. Grignaschi) hat in seiner Ausgabe die
236 chapter 11
eine Sammlung von ethischen und praktischen Ratschlägen des Aristoteles,

können wir als Vorstufe eines Fürstenspiegels mit Vorbildfunktion für zeitge-
nössische Regenten einstufen. Wir finden in den Ermahnungen des Aristote-
les an Alexander89 all die Ideale wieder, denen wir auch bei ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd
und Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ begegneten, nämlich Mäßigung und Zurückhaltung, Milde
und Großmut, freundschaftlicher Umgang mit den Mitmenschen, das Stre-
287 ben | nach Wissen, Frömmigkeit, Wahrhaftigkeit und Gerechtigkeit. Miklós
Maróth hat im Kommentar zu seiner Edition der Aristoteles-Alexander-
Korrespondenz auf christliche, stoische und neuplatonische Elemente hinge-
wiesen,90 aber auch auf Berührungen mit Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik,91
mit der pseudo-aristotelischen Schrift De virtutibus et vitiis92 sowie mit Platons
Res publica.93 Anklänge an iranisches Gedankengut sind Miklós Maróth
zufolge nur vereinzelt.94 Der Übersetzer sei wohl ein syrischer Christ aus dem
6. Jahrhundert AD mit griechischer Bildung gewesen. Erst in späterer redaktio-
neller Bearbeitung in omayyadischer Zeit seien iranische Elemente eingedrun-
gen.95
Auffälligerweise erscheint ein Bruchstück dieser Korrespondenz in dem
Brief des Tansar / Tosar, einer sassanidischen politischen Abhandlung.96 Dem
zoroastrischen Priester Tansar / Tosar, Berater des ersten sassanischen König
Ardašir (reg. ca. 224/839–240/855), wird ein an einen lokalen König namens
Gušnasp gerichteter Brief zugeschrieben, der ihn zur Loyalität gegenüber
Hss. Fatih 5323 und Aya Sofya 4260 benutzt. Einzelne Teile sind in weiteren Handschriften
und Editionen überliefert, s. M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 2f.; Köprülü Halk Kütüpha-
nesi 1608 (11./17. Jh.), fol. 78 r–101 v; 102 v–110 v; 111 v–115 v; 127 v–135 v; 137 r–138 v; 182 v–189
v; 190 v–191 v. – Eine bislang übersehene abweichende Redaktion enthält die Hs. Aya Sofya
2456 (nicht datiert), fol. 52 v–75 r: Risālat Arisṭūṭālīs fī s-siyāsa al-ʿāmmiyya llatī awwaluhā
“al-mulūku arbaʿatun”. Zu ersten Beobachtungen s. Daiber Collection IV, und zu den Texten
in der oben genannten Köprülü-Hs. s. Daiber Collection IV.
89 Arabischer Text hrsg. v. M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 12–19; 23–84 und 85–101; Inhalts-
übersicht M. Maróth, S. 7 und 26–30.
90 M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 30 ff. und 35 ff.
91 M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 50 ff.
92 M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 52 f.; vgl. S. 55 f.
93 M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 54 f. – Es ist theoretisch vorstellbar (aber nicht wirklich
nachweisbar), dass die von Miklós Maróth genannten Berührungen der Aristoteles-
Alexander-Korrespondenz mit griechischen und christlichen Quellen auch bei Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ anklingen. Unsere Analyse des Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr weist jedoch unübersehbar
auf die Nikomachische Ethik als hermeneutisches Leitmotiv.
94 Vgl. M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 67 ff.
95 Vgl. M. Maróth, Correspondence, S. 74 ff.
96 Vgl. zu den Details des Briefes J. D. Latham, “Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ”, S. 56f.; I. T. Kristó-Nagy,
Pensée, S. 149–169, und v.a. M. Boyce, The Letter, Einleitung.
Ardašir überzeugen soll. In der vorliegenden Gestalt ist das Original des Briefes
wohl zur Zeit des sassanidischen Königs Khosrow I Anuširwan im 6. Jahrhun-
dert AD überarbeitet worden. Diese Überarbeitung und das Original, beide
Texte in Pehlevi verfasst, sind verloren – ebenso die hieraus geflossene arabi-
sche Übersetzung des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ.
Erhalten ist uns aber eine im 7./13. Jahrhundert von dem persischen Histo-
riker Ibn Isfandiyār angefertigte neupersische Übersetzung dieser arabischen
Version. Auch dort gibt es redaktionelle Änderungen und Zufügungen.
Hier verdient die genannte Zufügung unsere Aufmerksamkeit, nämlich das
Bruchstück aus der Aristoteles-Alexander-Korrespondenz, worin Aristoteles
Alexander dem Großen davon abrät, alle Adligen Persiens umzubringen, mit
der Absicht, damit seinen Zug in den fernen Osten abzusichern. Stattdessen | 288
solle er Persien unter den Prinzen dieses Landes aufteilen, die dann durch ihre
Uneinigkeit untereinander keine Möglichkeit hätten, sich ihm entgegenzustel-
len.97 Der Text dient als Einleitung zum Brief des Tansar / Tosar und endet mit
dem Hinweis auf den Untergang des Alexanderreiches und die Vergänglichkeit
der Welt. Es liegt nahe, anzunehmen, dass bereits Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ dieses Bruch-
stück aus der Alexander-Aristoteles-Korrespondenz nach der kurz zuvor von
Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ angefertigten Version seiner Übersetzung des Tansar / Tosar-
Briefes zugefügt hat und damit vor der Gefahr der Zersplitterung des omayyadi-
schen Reiches warnen wollte.98 Es bestätigt sich die Beobachtung von Miklós
Maróth,99 dass das Bruchstück keiner iranischen Quelle entstammt, sondern
aus dem hellenistischen Aristoteles-Alexander-Briefwechsel zugefügt worden
ist.
Darüber hinaus dokumentiert Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ mit seiner Übersetzung des
Briefes von Tansar / Tosar sein Interesse an iranisch-sassanidischer Königsideo-
logie. Wir finden in dem Brief zahlreiche menschliche Tugenden beschrieben,
die zum großen Teil und in ähnlicher Weise auch bei ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd und in
ausgefeilter Weise bei Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ auftauchen. Zu nennen sind hier Ent-
haltsamkeit von weltlichen Dingen100 und von Gier;101 Orientierung an der
97 Vgl. M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 26–29. – Dazu J. D. Latham, “Beginnings”, S. 163, und zu dem
Bruchstück aus der Korrespondenz s. S. 156 f.
98 Unwahrscheinlich ist die Alternative, dass dieses Bruchstück bereits der im 6. Jahrhun-
dert AD angefertigten Redaktion des Briefes an Tansar / Tosar einverleibt wurde oder gar
auf den neupersischen Übersetzer Ibn al-Isfandiyār zurückgeht.
99 Correspondence, S. 71–73. M. Maróth weicht hier von M. Grignaschi und S. M. Stern
ab.
100 Vgl. auch M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 50.
101 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 40: Freiheit von Gier ist die Voraussetzung für Keuschheit,
238 chapter 11
Religion,102 sowie an den gläubigen und wissenden Vorfahren bzw. den Tra-
ditionen der Vergangenheit;103 Großzügigkeit und Freundlichkeit gegenüber
dem einfachen Volk;104 Gerechtigkeit105 und wahres Urteil;106 Bescheidenheit
und Anstand;107 Vernunft;108 das Suchen nach Wissen in kritischer Weise;109
Freundschaft;110 Loyalität und Treue;111 der Mittelweg zwischen Streben und
Schicksalsergebenheit.112
Trotz Unterschieden überwiegen Gemeinsamkeiten mit Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ und
seinem älteren Zeitgenossen ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd. Was beide Autoren in Abweichung
von Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik miteinander teilen und im Brief des Tan-
sar / Tosar anklingt, entpuppt sich als Erbe iranisch-sassanidischer Königs-
ideologie. Gleichzeitig sollten wir uns bewusst bleiben, dass beide Autoren an
griechische und iranisch-sassanidische Traditionen anknüpften, die sich mit
islamischer Religion und Ideologie vereinbaren ließen oder eine Kritik an zeit-
genössischer Politik beinhalten. Hiermit läuteten sie die Geburtsstunde des
arabisch-islamischen Fürstenspiegels ein, dessen Sprache auf Begriffe zurück-
greift, die teilweise altarabische und frühislamische Wertevorstellungen um-
schreiben.113 Er ist das Produkt des Dialogs zwischen drei Kulturen – Hellenis-
mus, Iran und Islam.114
Bescheidenheit, Zufriedenheit, Freundschaft, wahres Urteil und Bewahrung der Bluts-

bande.
102 Vgl. auch M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 40 und 42.
103 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 31 f.; vgl. S. 36 und 37.
104 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 34.
107 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 39 und 40.
108 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 40; vgl. S. 46.
110 M. Boyce, The Letter, S. 40; vgl. S. 51.
113 Ich nenne hier die Begriffe murūʾa / muruwwa (s. Anm. 22; dazu H. Daiber, Islamic
Thought, S. 22 f.) und ḥilm (s. Anm. 65; dazu C. Pellat, “ḥilm”, Sp. 391f.).
114 Hier werden wir uns bewusst, dass literarische Gestaltungen eines solchen Dialogs uns
an die Grenzen von Textvergleichen bringen. So erschloss sich uns der Text des Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ, Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr, nicht in der Gegenüberstellung von Textpassagen, son-
dern in der Interpretation von Begriffen, die sich an den Inhalten der Nikomachischen
Ethik orientiert und hierbei die Modifikationen aus iranisch-sassanidischer Tradition und
zeitgenössischem islamischem Kontext ableiten kann.
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grammatik”. In Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Nova series 2/5, 1976, S. 119–144.
Ṣafwat, Aḥmad Zakī: Ǧamharat rasāʾil al-ʿArab. II. Kairo 1356/1937.
Schöler, Gregor → G. van Gelder
Schönig, Hannelore: Das Sendschreiben des ʿAbdalḥamīd B. Yaḥyā (gest. 132/750)
an den Kronprinzen ʿAbdallāh B. Marwān II. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der frühen
arabischen Prosaliteratur. Wiesbaden 1985. = Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen
Kommission, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz 38.
Shaki, Mansour: “dēn” in Encyclopaedia Iranica VII, New York 1994, Sp. 279–281.
Zakeri, Mohsen: Persian Wisdom in Arabic Garb. I–II. Leiden 2006. = IPTS 66.
Republished from Oriens 43, 2015, pp. 273–292. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 12
Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an Kindīs Metaphysik*
i Die Unvereinbarkeit von ʿilla und tawḥīd Gottes 245 – ii Die Einzigkeit und Urewig-
keit Gottes 246 – iii Gottes Autarkie 248 – iv Die Attribute Gottes 250 – v Die Lehre von
den Naturen 252 – vi Das Verhältnis der “Naturen” zu Gottes Handeln 254 – Anhang:
Die Auszüge des Ibn Ḥazm aus Kindīs al-Falsafa l-ūlā 258 – Literaturverzeichnis 262
Der berühmte andalusische Gelehrte Ibn Ḥazm (384/994–456/1064)1 hat in

den letzten Jahren erneut die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Wir sind mit
Neueditionen seines Kitāb al-Aḫlāq wa-s-siyar,2 aber auch vieler anderer Ab-
handlungen3 beschenkt worden. Hierbei sind allerdings einige kleinere phi-
losophische und theologische Texte außer Acht geblieben, die Iḥsān ʿAbbās
im Jahre 1960 in Kairo herausgegeben hatte.4 Einer dieser Texte enthält in 61
Paragraphen eine | ausführliche Widerlegung von Kindīs Metaphysik, genauer 285
gesagt von Kindīs Bezeichung Gottes als “Ursache” (ʿilla). Diese Widerlegung ist
* Erweiterte und mit Anmerkungen versehene deutsche Version des Vortrages “Al-Kindī in
Andalus. Ibn Ḥazm’s Critique of His Metaphysics”, gehalten auf dem “XII Congress of the
European Union of Arabists and Islamologists (Malaga, 24.–28. 9. 1984)” und erschienen in
Actas del XII congreso de la U.E.A.I. (Malaga 1984). Madrid 1986, S. 229–235. = H. Daiber, From
1 Vgl. zu ihm R. Arnaldez, EI2 III, 1971, S. 790–799 und die dortigen Literaturverweise. – Zur
philosophiegeschichtlichen Literatur über Ibn Ḥazm s. auch G. Diaz Diaz und C. Santos
Escuderos, Bibliografia, S. 742f. – Zur alten arabischen biobibliographischen Literatur über
Ibn Ḥazm s. Maqqarī, Nafḥ aṭ-ṭīb, ed. I. ʿAbbās II, S. 77ff., und von I. ʿAbbās S. 77 Anm. 2 gege-
bene Verweise; N. Tomiche, Ibn Ḥazm, S. IX ff. – Vgl. den Sammelband Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba
und A. Baer, Ibn Ḥazms Rationalismus.
2 Im Jahre 1980 v. I. ʿAbbās (Rasāʾil I, S. 323–415) und E. Riad. – Im Jahre 1981 v. Ṭ. A. Makkī.
3 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, Rasāʾil, 1–3.
4 Unter dem Titel ar-Radd ʿalā Ibn an-Naġrīla al-Yahūdī wa-rasāʾil uḫrā li-bn Ḥazm al-Andalusī.
Der Herausgeber hat diese Texte auf den Seiten 187–235 als 4. Abhandlung unter dem Titel
Risālat ar-Radd ʿalā l-Kindī al-faylasūf zusammengefasst. In Wirklichkeit beschäftigen sich
nur die Seiten 187–216 (in der Handschrift ohne Titel) mit Kindīs Widerlegung, die wir nach
dieser Ausgabe zitieren.
Anschließend findet man folgende Texte: 1) Notizen und Definitionen philosophischer
Begriffe (S. 217–219, 14; titellos). – 2) Antwort auf eine Frage nach der Bedeutung der Gottes-
attribute lam yazal mutakalliman (S. 219, 15–220, 2; titellos). – 3) Bericht über ein Streitge-
spräch zwischen Ibn Ḥazm und einem Dahriten (S. 220, 3–225, 2; titellos). – 4) Teilprobleme
philosophisch-theologischer Art (S. 225, 3–227, 13; titellos). – 5) Über Murǧiʾiten, Charidschi-
ten, Ǧahmiten und Muʿtaziliten (S. 227, 14–229, 5; titellos). – 6) Risālat Ittifāq al-ʿadl bi-l-qadar
(S. 229, 6–234, 2). – 7) Abhandlung über “das Pneuma” ar-rūḥ (S. 234, 3–235; titellos).

244 chapter 12
von der Kindīforschung bislang übersehen worden.5 Sie ist in zweierlei Hin-
sicht von Bedeutung: Zunächst gibt sie uns einen Eindruck von Ibn Ḥazms
Philosophie und vermag unsere bisherige, auf dem Kitāb al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wa-
l-ahwāʾ wa-n-niḥal und anderen Werken basierende Kenntnis über den Phi-
losophen Ibn Ḥazm6 in einigen Punkten zu modifizieren. Ferner enthält die
Widerlegung zahlreiche Textauszüge aus Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā.7 Wenngleich
Ibn Ḥazm hier zuweilen kürzt oder den Wortlaut ändert, ergibt der Vergleich,
dass diese Auszüge für die Textkritik nützlich sind.8 Außerdem gibt es mehrere
Anzeichen, die dafür sprechen, dass der Kindītext des Ibn Ḥazm vollständiger
war, nämlich den verlorenen zweiten Teil enthielt.9 Das Buch des Kindī hat Ibn
Ḥazm mit dem Titel Kitāb at-Tawḥīd vorgelegen.10 Hieraus können wir folgern,
dass das Fragment aus Kindīs Kitāb at-Tawḥīd in Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihīs al-ʿIqd al-
farīd11 gleichfalls einem vollständigeren Exemplar von Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā
entstammen muss.
Die Kritik an Kindīs Metaphysik ergänzt unser bisheriges Bild von Ibn Ḥazm
als einem Kenner und Kritiker aristotelischer Philosophie. Sie zeigt auf bis-
lang unbekannte Weise,12 dass Ibn Ḥazm auch in neuplatonischen, haupt-
286 sächlich auf Proclus’ | Institutio theologica oder dessen Adaption im Liber de
causis13 zurückgehenden Spekulationen über Gottes Transzendenz bewandert
war. Diese werden auf originelle Weise in die islamische, zahiritische Theologie
eingeordnet. Im Rahmen dieser Theologie und an koranische Belege anknüp-
5 A. L. Ivry ist in seiner 1974 erschienenen englischen Übersetzung von Kindīs al-Falsafa
al-ūlā nicht auf sie eingegangen. Erst M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda hat in der zweiten Auflage sei-
ner Edition der Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya (1978) den Text sporadisch herangezogen (s.
u. Anhang).
6 Behandelt von R. Arnaldez, Grammaire; vgl. auch R. Arnaldez “Ibn Ḥazm” in EI2 III,
1971, Sp. 790–799; sowie A. G. Chejne, Ibn Ḥazm on Logic.
7 S.u. Anhang.
8 S. die im Anhang genannten Textverbesserungen.
9 S.u. Anm. 133 und Ibn Ḥazm § 58, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 213, 19–214, 1: Dieser Stelle
zufolge akzeptiert Ibn Ḥazm nur die Äußerungen in Kindīs Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, in denen
er die Lehren der “alten Monotheisten” (al-awāʾil al-muwaḥḥidūn) wie Aristoteles, Pla-
ton und Hippokrates überliefert habe. Solche Äußerungen finden wir nicht im erhaltenen
Teil von Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā. Ebensowenig Kindīs Opposition gegen die Manichäer (al-
Manāniyya), die Ibn Ḥazm § 61, ed. I. ʿAbbās, S. 216, 6 und 15 erwähnt.
10 S. § 57 und dazu unten Anm. 29.
11 Ed. A. Amīn, I. al-Abyārī und ʿAbd as-Salām Hārūn, II, S. 382, 11–383, 4. – Vgl. dazu H.
Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 234 Anm. 1.
12 Der Artikel von M. Cruz Hernández, El neoplatonismo, hat auf einige neuplatonische
Reminiszenzen im Kitāb al-Fiṣal hingewiesen, ohne allerdings ihren Platz in Ibn Ḥazms
Philosophie bestimmen zu können.
13 Vgl. Anm. 128.
die kritik des ibn ḥazm an kindīs metaphysik 245
fend wirft Ibn Ḥazm Kindī vor, dass er Gott zum “Körper” (ǧism) gemacht
habe, ferner zu “Begrenztem” (maḥdūd) und “Endlichem” (mutanāhin), das
“mit einer der bestehenden Eigenschaften der Schöpfung” versehen ist.14 Es ist
die alte und von den ẓāhiritischen Theologen aufgegriffene Polemik gegen die
anthropomorphistische Deutung des Korans.15 Doch spart Ibn Ḥazm nicht mit
lobenden Äußerungen über Kindī: Kindī sei zwar zuweilen etwas weitschweifig
und widerspreche sich selbst; aber sein “Disputationsprinzip” (aṣlu munāẓara-
tihī) sei richtig.16 Man müsse sich aber bewusst bleiben, dass jeglicher Disput
über Gott “in gewisser Hinsicht”17 die Gefahr des Anthropomorphismus her-
aufbeschwöre.
I Die Unvereinbarkeit von ʿilla und tawḥīd Gottes
Ibn Ḥazm ist von der Sorge erfüllt, dass nicht nur die Polytheisten und Dua-
listen,18 sondern auch die philosophischen Spekulationen über Gott und seine
Schöpfung Gottes “Einheit” (tawḥīd)19 zerstören könnten. Hier setzt seine Kri-
tik an Kindī ein, der in seiner Lehre von Gottes Transzendenz nicht immer
konsequent gewesen sei. Dies weist Ibn Ḥazm nach an Kindīs – und von Pro-
clus’ Institutio theologica20 inspirierter – Bezeichnung Gottes als “Ursache”:21
Gott ist nicht “Ursache”; diese Bezeichnung zerstöre Gottes Einheit. Denn eine
Ursache gebe es nur in Bezug auf Verursachtes – ebenso wie Verursachtes nur
wegen einer Ursache Verursachtes sei. Ibn Ḥazm geht hier von einem letztlich
aristotelischen22 Prinzip aus, das er in seiner Widerlegung mehrmals erläu-
14 § 61, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 216, 7 ff.

15 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 140.
16 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 216, 7 f.
17 Min ǧihatin min-a-l-ǧihāti, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 216, 10f.
18 Vgl. N. Tomiche, S. XXXII–XXXIV und die dort gegebenen Verweise auf Ibn Ḥazm, Kitāb
al-Fiṣal.
19 Vgl. zur islamischen Lehre von Gottes “Einheit” H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 117ff. – J. van
Ess, Theologie IV, Index s.n. tauḥīd.
20 Prop. 11; 57, hrsg. u. übers. v. E. R. Dodds. – Vgl. die arab. Version, dt. Übers. v. G. Endress,
Proclus Arabus, S. 254.
21 In der Regel gebraucht Ibn Ḥazm ʿilla; nur § 53 ist auch sabab belegt. – Zu Kindīs Bezeich-
nung von Gott als ʿilla vgl. ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 97, 12, und den Kommentar von A. L.
Ivry in seiner englischen Übersetzung von Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā, S. 119f. – Auch Kindī
benutzt neben ʿilla gelegentlich sabab: s. Rasāʾil al-Kindī, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda II, S. 40,
12.
22 Vgl. Aristoteles, Metaph. X 3, bes. 1054 a 27 ff.
246 chapter 12
tert.23 Es gebe eine Stufung zwischen der quantitativ größeren und vorausge-
henden Ursache und dem kleineren, sekundär Verursachten; denn man könne
287 ja auch “die Idee des Kleineren nur | durch das Große und die Idee des Gro-
ßen nur durch das Kleine haben”.24 Diese Tatsache bedeute die Abgrenzung
des Größeren, der Ursache vom Kleineren, dem Verursachten. Gott aber hat –
in Anlehnung an Proclus25 – “keine Grenze” (lā ġāyata lahū).26 Er steht somit
auch in keiner Beziehung zum Verursachten.27
Wenn nun Kindī Gott als “Ursache” bezeichnet und somit zu ihm das Ver-
ursachte in Beziehung setzt, widerspeche Kindī sich selbst und sei inkonse-
quent.28 Denn auch Kindī zufolge gilt,29 dass “der in Wahrheit Eine nicht in
Beziehung (iḍāfa) gesetzt werden kann zu etwas, das dasselbe Genus besitze”;
der Eine “hat kein Genus”. Auf diese Stelle bezieht sich die Kritik des Ibn
Ḥazm,30 wonach man nicht einerseits an Gott alle Kategorien wie “Art” (nawʿ),
“Gattung” (ǧins) und jegliches “Relativum” (muḍāf ) leugnen und ihm ande-
rerseits das Genus “Ursache” zuschreiben dürfe.31 – Wer ferner Gott als “Ursa-
che” bezeichnet, impliziere Teilung und Begrenzung.32 Auch hier widerspreche
Kindī sich selbst, da doch auch er Gott jegliche “Vielheit” (kaṯra) abspreche.33
II Die Einzigkeit und Urewigkeit Gottes
Ibn Ḥazm zufolge34 ist Gott der “Einzige” (al-wāḥid), “der Erste” (al-awwal), der
“unveränderlich in sich selbst ruht” (aṣ-ṣamad), “der Schöpfer der Ursachen”
23 § 29; vgl. § 34, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 202, 3 und § 41.

24 § 30, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 200, 10 f.; vgl. § 31, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 200, 16ff.
25 Inst. theol., prop. 91 / E. R. Dodds, S. 82, 17–22 / arab. Version und dt. Übers. v. G. Endress,
26 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 200, 8; vgl. S. 199, 15 f.
27 § 18, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 195, 3–11. – Vgl. zum hier anklingenden Gedanken von Gottes
Autarkie unten Kap. III.
28 S. hier und zum Nachfolgenden § 19, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 195, 12–196, 2. Vgl. §57, sowie
zum Vorwurf der Inkonsequenz auch § 56.
29 Ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 153, 1 f. und 4.
30 § 58.
31 Ibn Ḥazm beruft sich hier ausdrücklich auf ein Kindībuch mit dem Titel Kitāb at-Tawḥīd.
Der Nachweis der genannten Stelle in Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā (s.o. Anm. 28) beweist die
Identität beider Titel. – Die Terminologie “Art”, “Gattung” und “Relativum” geht auf Aris-
toteles’ Categoriae Kap. 5 und 7 zurück. – Zu Ibn Ḥazms Kenntnis dieser Schrift vgl. H.
Daiber, De praedicamento relationis, § 6.
32 Vgl. dazu unten Kap. IV.
33 S. Kindī, al-Falsafa al-ūlā, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 153, 5ff.
34 § 19; vgl. auch § 22 und § 52, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd. – Dazu I. Goldziher, Ẓāhiriten, S. 147f.
(mubdiʿ al-ʿilal).35 “Er ist derjenige, welcher alle verursachten (Dinge) wegen
jener Ursachen geschaffen hat (ibtadaʿa), die von ihm herrühren”.36 Hier hat
Ibn Ḥazm Gedanken und Termini des arabischen Plotin und Proclus37 über-
nommen, greift aber nicht wie sein älterer Zeitgenosse Ibn Sīnā auf neuplato-
nische Emanationsleh|ren zurück38 und vermeidet die Bezeichnung Gottes als 288
“Ursache”. Stattdessen verwendet er den neuplatonischen mubdiʿ-Begriff, um
in Einklang mit islamischer Lehre39 Gottes creatio ex nihilo40 zu umschreiben.
Er kombiniert ihn mit dem schwer zu deutenden koranischen Gottesattribut
ṣamad in Sure 112:2. Dabei mag Ibn Ḥazm von dem dortigen Zusatz inspi-
riert gewesen sein, dass Gott “weder Kinder gezeugt hat, noch (selber) gezeugt
worden ist”.41 Die hier angesprochene Unerschaffenheit Gottes sowie die von
Ibn Ḥazm uminterpretierte antichristologische Haltung des Korans, dass Gott
keine Kinder gezeugt habe, passt gut in das neuplatonische Konzept des Ibn
Ḥazm.
Die Islamisierung dieses neuplatonischen Konzepts wird verstärkt: 1) durch
die bereits erwähnten Begriffe al-wāḥid und al-awwal, die es nicht nur im
arabischen Plotin und bei Proclus gibt,42 sondern auch im Koran;43 2) durch
den Aspekt von Gottes Unerschaffenheit im koranischen Terminus ṣamad;
dieser kann im Zusammenhang mit der muʿtazilitischen Bezeichnung Gottes
als qadīm “urewig” gesehen werden,44 aber auch vom Hintergrund der neu-
platonischen Bezeichnung Gottes als αἴδιος bei Proclus;45 3) schließlich kön-
nen wir eine Islamisierung neuplatonischen Denkens in der Übernahme der
35 Vgl. auch § 54, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 211, 19. – Die Übersetzung von ṣamad (vgl. dazu
unten) folgt der Übersetzung von R. Paret, Der Koran (Sure 112:2).
36 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar Radd, S. 195, 19 f. – Vgl. dazu unten Kap. V.
37 Vgl. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 209 f., 231 und 254; dazu Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 2 /
E. R. Dodds S. 2, 20. – Ferner Ibn Ḥazm § 53, Anfang.
38 Vgl. zu Ibn Sīnās fayḍ L. Gardet, La pensée, S. 62ff. – P. Morewedge, The Logic of Ema-
nationism.
39 Vgl. H. E. Al-Alūsī, The Problem of Creation, S. 86 ff. und 188ff. – L. Gardet, “ibdāʿ” in
EI2.
40 S. dazu unten Kap. V. – Vgl. auch Ibn Ḥazm § 43.
41 Sure 112:3.
42 Vgl. zur Bezeichnung Gottes als wāḥid und awwal Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 5 / G. Endress,
Proclus Arabus, S. 256f. (vgl. G. Endress, S. 244), sowie die pseudo-aristotelische Theolo-
gie (s. G. Endress, S. 210). – Ferner zu Proclus’ Philosophie vom Einen W. Beierwaltes,
Philosophische Marginalien, S. 50 ff.
43 Vgl. im Koran al-wāḥid, Sure 12:39 ect., und huwa l-awwal wa-l-āḫir, Sure 57:3.
44 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 150 ff. – Das Attribut hat im arabischen Proclus Eingang
gefunden in einer Zufügung zum griechischen Text von Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 5: Vgl. G.
Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 256 Anm. 3 und S. 148 f.
45 Inst. theol., prop. 49 (nicht im Arabischen erhalten).
248 chapter 12
koranischen46 Bezeichnung Gottes als ḥaqq “Wahrheit” entdecken.47 Mit die-

sem Terminus kongruiert die neuplatonische48 und von Kindī49 übernommene
Klassifizierung Gottes als al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq. Unter Einbeziehung dieser Lehre
289 bezeichnet Ibn Ḥazm Gott, “den höchsten Herrn” (ar-|rabb al-aʿlā)50 als “erste
Wahrheit” (al-ḥaqq al-awwal)51. Er sei “Wahrheit” nicht durch etwas anderes,
nämlich durch die Wahrheit; “vielmehr erweist Er sich bei uns in Wahrheit
(allein) in dem Sinne als wahr, als dass Er die reine Wahrheit ist”.52 Hier klingt
der Gedanke von Gottes Autarkie an, dem wir uns jetzt zuwenden wollen.
III Gottes Autarkie
Ibn Ḥazm53 argumentiert zunächst folgendermaßen: Obwohl Gott alles Ver-

ursachte “wegen der Ursachen” “geschaffen hat”,54 sind die Ursachen und die
von ihnen herrührende “Erschaffenheit” (ibdāʿ) von Ihm total verschieden –
entsprechend der koranischen Maxime, dass mit Gott nichts vergleichbar ist.55
Diese Verschiedenheit geht soweit, dass keine ursächliche Beziehung zwischen
Gott und den geschaffenen, verursachten Dingen besteht. Gott bedarf infolge-
dessen auch nicht der Ursachen.56 Ibn Ḥazm bezeichnet Gott als “den vollkom-
men Unabhängigen”.57 Er greift hier auf das koranische Gottesattribut ġaniyy58
46 S. Sure 10:32 (33).

47 § 32, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 201, 1–8.
48 Vgl. die Belege bei Proclus und Plotin in G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 152. – Vgl. dazu G.
Endress, S. 286 Anm. 1.
49 Ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 153, 2 ff.; 160, 6 und 161, 1. – Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 134,
und oben zu Anm. 28.
50 Nach Sure 79:24 (etc.).
51 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 201, 1.
52 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 201, 6 f. – al-ḥaqq al-mubīn ist koranisch (s. Sure 24:25).
53 § 20, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 196, 3–10.
54 S.o. Kap. II.
55 Sure 42:11 (9); vgl. auch hier § 22, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 6, und §45, ed. I. ʿAbbās,
ar-Radd, S. 205, 12 f. (dazu unten Anm. 109); ferner §54, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 212, 2–4;
§ 58, bes. ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 213, 16; § 59, bes. ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 214, 9ff. und
17 ff. – Gottes Wissen kann als etwas Unbegerenztes nicht etwas anderes umfassen, also
auch nicht das Wissen um sich selbst. Vgl. zu dieser neuplatonischen Lehre Plotin, Enn.
VI, und H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 181 f.
56 Vgl. auch § 22, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 5 ff.
57 tāmmu l-ġinan § 34, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 202, 14. – Zu tāmm vgl. Proclus, Inst. theol.,
prop. 78 / arab. Version, dt. Übers. v. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 281f. die Beschreibung
der “vollkommenen göttlichen Kraft”.
58 Z.B. Sure 2:267 (270).
zurück und lehnt sich gleichzeitig an Proclus’ Lehre von Gottes αὐτάρκεια an.59
Gleichzeitig weicht Ibn Ḥazm von Proclus’ Lehre ab, dass alles Verursachte
wegen einer göttlichen “Ursache” sei.60 Er lehnt61 zugunsten des islamischen
Dogmas von der Einheit Gottes62 Proclus’ Theorie von der göttlichen “Ursa-
che” ab und formuliert, dass Gott | die verursachten Dinge “wegen jener von 290
Ihm herrührenden Ursachen geschaffen habe”.63 Im Gegensatz zur Autarkie
Gottes sind Ursache und Verursachtes “Korrelativa” (muḍāf )64 und “sind ein-
ander ähnlich”65. “Sie kommen einander in actu zuvor”,66 weil man im ande-
ren Fall, d.h. bei Gleichzeitigkeit von Ursache und Verursachtem,67 der These
der Dahriten68 von der Urewigkeit und Unerschaffenheit der Schöpfung Vor-
schub leisten würde.69 – Das eine “bedarf”70 des anderen,71 wohingegen Gott
der Schöpfung “entbehren” kann (ġaniyy). “Der erste Schöpfer existierte, bevor
er etwas erschuf”.72 Ferner “inhärierte Ihm kein (bestimmter) Zustand (ḥāl);
denn von Ihm hat die Veränderung (istiḥāla) nicht Besitz ergriffen,73 sodass
Er von Autarkie (ġinan) zur Abhängigkeit (iḥtiyāǧ) zurückkehren würde, oder
von Abgesondertheit (infirād) zur Verbundenheit (ittiṣāl), oder von Einzigkeit
(waḥdāniyya) zur Vervielfältigung (takṯīr)”.74
59 Vgl. Inst. theol., prop. 10 / E. R. Dodds, S. 12, 4 ff.; ferner v.a. prop. 127 und ihre Nachwirkung
im Liber de Causis prop. 20 / ed. R. C. Taylor, S. 229ff. / Übers. S. 317ff. – Zu einer muʿtazi-
litischen Parallele zu Gottes Autarkie vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 382f. Anm. 3. – Zur
Geschichte des αὐτάρκεια-Begriffes in der griechischen Philosophie und im jüdischen und
christlichen Hellenismus vgl. B. Gärtner, The Areopagus Speech, S. 216–218; A. J. Festu-
gière, La révélation IV, S. 108 (zu Anm. 3).
60 Vgl. auch § 60, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 215, 13 ff.; und § 61, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 216,
3 f.
61 Vgl. oben Kap. I.
62 Vgl. oben Kap. I und II.
63 S. § 19 und dazu oben Kap. II.
64 Vgl. zum Nachfolgenden § 21. – Dazu auch § 61, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 216, 4f. – Vgl. dazu
unten zu Anm. 110.
65 § 37, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 203, 10. – Vgl. dazu unten zu Anm. 161.
67 Vgl. auch § 60, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 215, 18 ff.
68 Vgl. zu diesen hier EI2 II, Sp. 95 f. – Es ist denkar, dass Ibn Ḥazm hier auch Naẓẓāms kumūn-
Lehre im Auge hat: Vgl. zu ihr H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 110ff., und J. van Ess, “kumūn” in
EI2. – Ibn Ḥazm erwähnt die kumūn-Lehre § 59, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 225, 6ff., und
lehnt sie ab.
70 Vgl. die Substantive ḥāǧa und iḥtiyāǧ.
71 Vgl. dazu auch § 18.
73 Vgl. auch § 24 und dazu unten Kap. VI.
74 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 196, 16 f.; vgl. § 27.
250 chapter 12
Gleichzeitig erscheint hier Proclus’ Lehre von Gottes Autarkie75 verbunden

mit der aschʿaritisch-orthodoxen und antimuʿtazilitischen Lehre von der Nicht-
notwendigkeit der Dinge für Gott.76 Gott wird deutlich in Anlehnung an den
koranischen Ausspruch,77 dass Er “tut, was er will”, beschrieben als “mit einem
freien Willen versehen” (muḫtār).78 Im freien “Willen” (iḫtiyār) Gottes sind
“Tun” ( fiʿl) und “Unterlassen” (tark) in der Weise “in gleichem Maße” vorhan-
den, dass Gott weder das Tun noch das Unterlassen einer Sache zugeschrieben
werden kann.79 Ibn Ḥazm distanziert sich hier vom aschʿaritischen Modell von
291 Tun und Unterlassen einer Sache; | Ašʿarī hatte das Unterlassen als “Unvermö-
gen zu etwas” und das Tun als das Gegenteil davon erklärt.80
IV Die Attribute Gottes
Wie die Lehre von Gottes Autarkie gezeigt hat, ist Gott in keiner Weise fass-
bar und beschreibbar. Hierbei wendet sich die bereits genannte Ablehnung der
Zuschreibung eines bestimmten “Zustandes” (ḥāl) an Gott81 gegen die muʿtazi-
litische Schule des Abū Hāšim.82 Ibn Ḥazm bergründet sie mit der Interpreta-
tion des ḥal als etwas, das “Veränderung” (istiḥāla) impliziere.83 Gott hinge-
gen besitzt – in Anlehnung an Proclus’84 Beschreibung des Unkörperlichen,
des “Einfachen”, welches ohne “Teil” und “Zusammensetzung” sei und “keine
Wandlung erfahre” – lediglich die Attribute der “Abgesondertheit” und “Einzig-
keit”, nicht aber “Verbundenheit” und “Vervielfältigung”.85 Da Er somit nicht in
einem ursächlichen Zusammenhang mit dem Verursachten steht, kann Er auch
nicht ein Teilbereich sein, der Ursache für Anderes wäre. Dies würde “Teilung”
75 Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang auch Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 78/74, 15.16. – G. Endress,
76 Vgl. zu dieser Lehre H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 233 f. und 220f.
77 Sure 11:107 (109); vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 272.
78 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 1. – Vgl. § 34, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 202, 13 (muṭlaqu
l-iḫtiyār). – Zu Ibn Ḥazms Lehre vom göttlichen Willen vgl. im Einzelnen noch R. Arnal-
dez, Grammaire, S. 294 ff., und unten zu Anm. 134 ff.
81 S.o. Kap. III.
82 Vgl. zum ḥāl des Abū Hāšim H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 206f. – R. M. Frank, Beings and
Their Attributes. – J. van Ess, Theologie IV, Index.
83 S.o. zu Anm. 71.
84 Inst. theol., prop. 80 / E. R. Dodds, S. 74, 31 und 76, 1 / arab. Version, dt. Übers. v. G. En-
dress, Proclus Arabus, S. 284. – Vgl. prop. 3.
85 S. o. zu Anm. 72. – Vgl. Ibn Ḥazm § 27.
(tabʿīḍ, taǧziya)86 Gottes bedeuten. Unüberbrückbar bleibt die Kluft zwischen

dem “in der Zeit Entstehenden” (ḥādiṯ) bzw. Verursachten und der anfangslo-
sen “Ewigkeit” (qidam) Gottes; zwischen “Begrenztem” (maḥṣūr) und “Absolu-
tem” (muṭlaq), zwischen “Erschaffenem” (maḫlūq) und “Schöpfer” (ḫāliq).87
Im Gegensatz zur “Einfachheit” Gottes gehören auch die Gott beigelegten
Attribute88 zu den “zusammengesetzten” Dingen. Sie enthalten den Aspekt der
“Schöpfung”, sind “Schöpfungen” (badāʾiʿ) Gottes – ohne mit Gott verbunden
zu sein.89 Somit sind die Attribute lediglich “hinweisende Zeichen des Verstan-
des, welche auf Ihn hinweisen – gepriesen sei Er – und Seinem Lobe, (dem
Lobe) des Einen und Unveränderlichen (aṣ-ṣamad) dienen”.90 Dieser Gedanke
ergänzt in origineller Weise die bei Ibn Ḥazm anderswo nachweisbare alle-
gorische Interpretation der | koranischen Gottesattribute als Umschreibung 292
für Gottes “Herrschaft” (tadbīr) über seine Schöpfung.91 Ibn Ḥazm92 geht der
alten Frage93 aus dem Wege, ob die göttlichen Attribute des Korans “erschaf-
fend” (ḫāliq) oder “erschaffen” (maḫlūq) seien. Er distanziert sich indirekt von
der hanbalitischen These der Unerschaffenheit des Korans sowie der aschʿari-
tischen Unterscheidung zwischen erschaffener Rezitation und unerschaffe-
nem Gotteswort.94 Die der Umschreibung der göttlichen Attribute dienenden
Namen seien “Bilder (miṯālāt)95 von den Attributen, indem sie sind, was diese
“Laute” (aṣwāt) sind – gleichgültig, ob sie eine Folge von Gottes Tun sind – erha-
ben ist Er – oder vom Tun der Menschen”.96 Die Gottesnamen sind somit, über
86 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 199, 3. – Vgl. oben zu Anm. 30.

88 Vgl. zum Nachfolgenden § 22.
89 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 9. – Vgl. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 37ff.
90 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 12 f. – Vgl. Sure 51:56 “Ich habe die Dschinn und die Men-
schen nur dazu geschaffen, dass sie mir dienen” (Übers. nach R. Paret). – Zu Ibn Ḥazms
Attributenlehre vgl. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 284f., und R. Arnaldez, EI2 III, 1971,
col. 793 b. – Vgl. zu den dalālāt dālla R. Arnaldez, La raison, S. 113ff. (zu dalīl).
91 Vgl. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 290 f.
92 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 1 ff.
94 Vgl. zum hanbalitischen und aschʿaritischen Standpunkt H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 176f.
(S. 177, 2 lies: “nicht dieses Wort ‘werde!’, wohl aber die Ausdrucksform (ʿibāra) des Befehls
ist erschaffen”).
95 Der Terminus miṯāl setzt die platonische Entwertung der wahrnehmbaren Dinge zu blo-
ßen Bildern und ihre Unterscheidung von den Ideen voraus (vgl. Plato, Phaedrus 250 B;
“Bild” in HWPh 1, 1971). Ibn Ḥazm ist hier möglicherweise von Proclus, Inst. theol., prop.
195 nach der Bearbeitung des Liber de Causis, prop. 13 (ed. R. C. Taylor, S. 195ff.) angeregt
worden: Dort stehen miṯāl und ʿalam jeweils für παραδεικματικῶς und εἰκονικῶς. Vgl. aber
auch ὅμοιον und ὁμοιότης in prop. 29, wozu man unten Anm. 161 vergleiche.
252 chapter 12
mit Ibn Ḥazms Sprachtheorie,97 nur etwas Geschriebenes oder Gehörtes, nicht
mehr. Das äußerlich Wahrnehmbare, der ẓāhir ist die vollständige Wirklichkeit
und hat keinen tieferen Sinn (bāṭin).98 Die Attribute sind daher eine Art von
“ans Licht kommenden Ursachen” (ʿilal bādiya) und existieren “bevor es eine
durch (göttliche) Beeinflussungen (infiʿālāt) schließlich entstandene Wirkung
( fiʿl) gibt”.99
V Die Lehre von den Naturen
Wir haben bereits mehrmals mit dem Begriff “Ursache” zu tun gehabt. Die Ursa-
che rühre von Gott her, und Gott habe “ihretwegen” alle verursachten Dinge
geschaffen.100 Doch mit dieser vagen Umschreibung gibt sich Ibn Ḥazm nicht
zufrieden. Er identifizert sie101 mit den vier “Elementen” (usṭuqussāt) bzw.
“Naturen” (ṭabāʾiʿ) Erde, Wasser, Feuer und Luft. Diese gehen der Schöpfung
durch Gott voraus und werden an den “sie umfassenden Platz”102 verwiesen.
293 Hier, sowie in der | Einteilung dieser Elemente in Schweres, nach unten Sinken-
des, Leichtes, obenauf Schwimmendes und in der Mitte Befindliches,103 ferner
in Heisses und Kaltes, Feuchtes und Trockenes104 folgt Ibn Ḥazm einem aristo-
telischen Vorbild.105
Jedoch im Folgenden weicht Ibn Ḥazm in einigen Details von Aristoteles ab.
Er vermittelt uns einen Eindruck davon, dass entgegen üblicher Meinung106
seine Kritik nicht primär auf Aristoteles’ Begriff von der Ursache gerichtet ist.
Überdies hat er nicht nur kritisiert, sondern auch kombiniert und weiterge-
97 Vgl. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 222 ff. – R. Arnaldez in EI2 III, 1971, col. 793 b.
98 Vgl. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 65 ff. und 70ff. – Zu Ibn Ḥazms Lehre vom Koran vgl. I.
Goldziher, Ẓāhiriten, S. 139 ff.
99 § 55, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 212, 5 f.
100 Siehe Ibn Ḥazm § 19 und oben Kap. II.
101 § 23, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 197, 18–198, 3.
103 § 33, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 201, 13 ff. und 19 ff.
105 Z.B. De caelo I 3. 269 b 23f. und II 4. 287 a 32 ff. – Zu den vier Qualitäten Wärme, Kälte,
Feuchtigkeit und Trockenheit vgl. Aristoteles, De gener. et corr. II 2. 329 b 24f. – Wenn
allerdings Ibn Ḥazm § 33, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 201, 20, das Wasser in den untersten
Bereich “des Makrokosmos” (al-ʿālam al-akbar) versetzt wird, drängt sich die nichtaris-
totelische, auf Thales zurückführbare und den Muslimen wohlbekannte Vorstellung vom
Ruhen der Erde auf dem Wasser auf; vgl. zu dieser Vorstellung H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus,
S. 448 f.
106 So z.B. R. Arnaldez, Grammaire, S. 207.
dacht. So hat Ibn Ḥazm zufolge107 Gott die Naturen “mit einem Zwang verse-
hen” (bi-ḍṭirārihī), welcher das Verursachte notwendig mache. Diesen “Zwang”
bezeichnet Ibn Ḥazm108 als “Zwang aus sich selbst” (ḍarūra bi-nafsihā), wel-
cher keiner weiteren Ursache bedarf. Durch ihn haben die Ursachen – aris-
totelisch formuliert109 – potentiell in sich, was notwendigerweise aktuell ent-
stehen muss.110 Gott selbst sei mit nichts, somit weder mit der Ursache noch
mit dem Verursachten vergleichbar.111 Zwischen Ihm und Seiner Schöpfung
bestehe keine Wechselbeziehung und Ähnlichkeit, wie man sie – auch Proclus
zufolge112 – zwischen Ursache und Verursachtem finde.
Hier wird deutlich zwischen Gottes kreativem Schaffen – Ibn Ḥazm ge-
braucht113 den neuplatonischen Begriff ibdāʿ – und Natur unterschieden. Diese
Unterscheidung hat Ibn Ḥazm von Kindī übernommen,114 welcher selbst hier
von | Proclus115 inspiriert gewesen sein wird.116 Allerdings sei hier auf einen 294
Unterschied hingwiesen: Die neuplatonischen Quellen und Kindī sprechen in
ihrer Beschreibung der “zweiten Ursache”, der Natur, nirgendwo vom “Zwang”,
den Gott ihr auferlegt habe. Hier hat Ibn Ḥazm offensichtlich auf muʿtazili-
tisches Erbe zurückgegriffen, nämlich auf Naẓẓāms Lehre des von Gott den
Dingen auferlegten “Zwanges” (īǧāb) der Natur.117
107 § 33, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 120, 17; vgl. S. 201, 10 f.

108 § 43, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 205, 11 f.
109 Vgl. Aristoteles, Metaph. IX 8 und zum Begriff der Möglichkeit als Realmöglichkeit die bei
H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 92 gegebenen Verweise und Parallelen aus islamischer Zeit.
110 Vgl. § 52, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 211, 9–11.
111 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 205, 12 f. – Vgl. oben Kap. III.
112 Inst. theol., prop. 28.
113 § 19. – Vgl. oben Kap. II.
114 Vgl. dessen Risāla fī l-ibāna ʿan anna ṭabiʿat al-falak muḫālifatun li-ṭabāʾiʿ al-ʿanāṣir al-
arbaʿa, in Rasāʾil al-Kindī l-falsafiyya, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda II, S. 40, 11. – Übersetzung
und Deutung von R. Walzer, Greek, S. 193. – Vgl. dazu C. Genequand, Quelques aspects,
S. 121 f. – Zu Kindīs ibdāʿ-Begriff siehe T. Z. Frank, Al-Kindī’s Book of Definitions, S. 45ff.; F.
Klein-Franke, Al-Kindī’s “On Definitions”, S. 200 f.
115 Inst. theol., prop. 76 / E. R. Dodds, S. 72, 5–19. – Vgl. die arabische Version, dt. Übers. v. G.
Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 279 f.
116 R. Walzer (s. Anm. 114) hatte hier noch an einen direkten Einfluss des Johannes Philo-
ponus gedacht. Aber nach den Ergebnissen von G. Endress, welcher bei Kindī Spuren
der Proclusübersetzung nachgewiesen hat (S. 242 ff.), wird man eher an Proclus denken
müssen, der den Schöpfungsbegriff des Philoponus übernommen hatte (vgl. G. Endress,
Proclus Arabus, S. 229–232).
117 Vgl. zu dieser Lehre H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 402ff., und J. van Ess, Theologie IV, Index. –
īǧāb ist für Ibn Ḥazm auch § 54, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 211, 21, belegt. – Ibn Ḥazm hat
sich in seinem Kitāb al-Fiṣal fī l-milal III, S. 80, 12 ff., mit der von Naẓẓām differierenden
Naturlehre des Muʿammar kritisch auseinandergesetzt. Muʿammar ließ im Unterschied
254 chapter 12
VI Das Verhältnis der “Naturen” zu Gottes Handeln
Den geschilderten neuplatonisch-muʿtazilitischen Naturbegriff hat Ibn Ḥazm

mit einem aristotelischen Kolorit versehen: Er spricht in Anlehnung an Aristo-
teles118 und Kindī119 vom “Beweger” (muḥarrik), von welchem die “Bewegung
der Zusammensetzung” (ḥarakat at-taʾlīf ) herrühre120. Ferner folgt er121 der
aristotelischen Ablehnung122 einer unendlichen Reihe von Ursachen – ohne
jedoch eine erste göttliche “Ursache” anzunehmen: Der Begriff “Ursachen” sei
etwas “Umfassendes” (ǧāmiʿ), welches die Ursachen zu einem “Zustand” (ḥāl)
zusammenfasse; “durch (diesen) werden sie zu Ursachen” und bedürfen keiner
weiteren Ursachen.123 Und da Gott – wie bereits gesagt124 – keinen ḥāl besitzt,
lässt er sich auch nicht dem ḥāl der Ursachen einfügen.125 Vielmehr lässt Gott
295 die | Ursachen “in der Zeit enststehen” (muḥdiṯ), “setzt sie fest” (wāḍiʿ)126 und
gibt ihnen ihren “Namen” (ism) und “Zustand” (ḥāl). Ibn Ḥazm127 spricht hier
in Anlehnung an den Koran128 auch von der “Bestimmung” (taqdīr) “des Mäch-
tigen und Wissenden” (al-ʿazīz al-ʿalīm).
Hierbei kritisiert Ibn Ḥazm129 die These, dass Gott durch Sein “Sein” (an-
niyya) handle. Er wendet sich dabei ausdrücklich gegen Kindī,130 welcher hier
seinerseits Proclus131 folgt. In diesem Zusammenhang argumentiert Ibn Ḥazm
zu Naẓẓām die Naturwirkungen nicht mehr von Gott verursacht sein: Vgl. H. Daiber,
Muʿammar, S. 256.
118 Z.B. Metaph. II 1. 994 a 18.
119 al-Falsafa al-ūlā, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 162, 7 f.
120 § 34, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 202, 4. – Zu taʾlīf vgl. die Umschreibung von tarkīb als ḥaraka
bei Kindī, al-Falsafa al-ūlā, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 120, 11f. (dazu A. L. Ivry, S. 161f.); fer-
ner Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 48 (σύνθετον).
121 Siehe zum Nachfolgenden Ibn Ḥazm, ar-Radd, § 24.
122 Z.B. Aristoteles, Physics VII 1–2 und VIII 5–6.
123 § 24, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 198, 5 f.; vgl. auch § 28.
124 S.o. zu Anm. 71 und 81.
125 Vgl. § 25, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 198, 13–17. – § 26, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 198, 18–199, 1.
126 Vgl. auch § 35.
127 § 33, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 202, 2.
128 Z.B. Sure 6:96.
129 § 36. Der Druck von I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, hat die Vokalisation inniyya statt anniyya; es sind
beide Lesarten möglich: Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 146f. – Für Ibn Ḥazm hat Gott eine
anniyya (im Sinne von māʾiyya): s. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal (s. Anm. 115) II, S. 173–175 = S. Gómez
Nogales, Constitutivos metafisicos, S. 227–229, gefolgt von einer spanischen Überset-
zung; vgl. unten den Kommentar S. 218 ff.
130 Vgl. dessen al-Falsafa al-ūlā, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 162, 3. – Kindī hat huwiyya anstelle
von anniyya, die man im arabischen Proclus findet; vgl. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 245,
und R. C. Taylor, The Liber de Causis, S. 348 f. und 394f.
131 Vgl. Inst. theol., prop. 18 und 122. Möglicherweise hat Kindī hier Proclus in der Bearbeitung
folgendermaßen: Würde Gott durch Sein “Sein” handeln, müsste dieses dann
absurderweise dem Bewirkten als eine “Einheit” (waḥda) vorausgehen, “wel-
che keine Ursache in sich habe”.132 Oder das von Gott Bewirkte müsste wie Gott
gleichfalls unaufhörlich sein.133 Oder man kommt zur Unterscheidung zweier
Arten von Ursachen, nämlich der in Gottes Sein liegenden Ursache einer Wir-
kung und der Naturnotwendigkeit einer Wirkung.134
Daher schafft Gott nicht durch Sein “Sein”, sondern – wie wir gesehen
haben135 – durch Vermittlung von Ursachen, von “Naturen”, welche “Er mit
einem Zwang versehen hat”. Ibn Ḥazm zufolge habe Kindī eine solche
Annahme vom schöpferischen Handeln Gottes “wegen etwas Anderem” (sc.
wegen einer Ursache) mit der Begründung abgelehnt, dass in diesem Falle jenes
Andere Gott absurderweise vorausgehen müsste.136 Ibn Ḥazm argumentiert
jedoch folgendermaßen: Ebenso wie | Verursachtes eine Ursache haben muss, 296
ist das von Gott Bewirkte nicht ohne Gott denkbar. Hierbei “ist das Bewirkte
wegen (Gottes) Willen, sowie wegen des Bewirkten der (göttliche) Wille”.137
Dies wird mit der interessanten These begründet, dass “das Bewirkte von Gott
nur zu erkennen gebe, dass es bewirkt sei und (dass) Gottes Wille von Ihm
nur zu erkennen gebe, dass (jener Wille) die Ursache des von Ihm Bewirkten
sei”.138 Somit ist Gott nur deswegen, “um von sich Sein Wirken zu erkennen
des Liber de Causis (vgl. Kap. 19, ed. R. C. Taylor, S. 225, 24ff.) herangezogen, wo man die
Lehre von Gottes Handeln αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι (= bi-anniyyatihī!) prononcierter findet (vgl. auch
G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 211). Denkbar ist aber auch eine arabische Plotinquelle
(vgl. die Belege bei G. Endress, S. 209 f.).
132 Vgl. § 38, ed. I. ʿabbās, ar-Radd, S. 203, 18 ff.
133 Vgl. §§ 40 und 54.
134 Vgl. § 39.
135 S.o. Kap. V.
136 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 203, 1 f. – Diese Lehre ist im erhaltenen Text des Kindī nicht
nachweisbar und entstammt möglicherweise dem verlorenen zweiten Teil von Kindīs
al-Falsafa al-ūlā (vgl. oben Anm. 9). Es ist wohl kein Zufall, dass sie auf Kindīs oben
(Anm. 127) zitierte und dem Schluss von Teil I entstammende Äußerung über Gottes
schöpferisches Handeln folgt.
137 § 37, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 203, 11 f. – Ähnlich sah bereits Kindī, Risāla fī l-fāʿil al-ḥaqq al-
awwal at-tāmm wa-l-fāʿil an-nāqiṣ allaḏī huwa bi-l-maǧāz (in Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya,
ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda I, S. 236, 15 f.) im “Willen des Schöpfers” die Ursache für Werden
und Vergehen.
138 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 203, 10 f.; vgl. § 40; ferner §41, wonach Gottes Wille nicht wegen
etwas Anderem, dem Gewollten ist – analog der Korrelation von Ursache und Verursach-
tem, sondern “aus sich selbst” (bi-nafsihī); er sei “die erste Grenze” (al-ḥadd al-awwal),
“das entfernteste Ende” (an-nihāya al-quṣwā) und “die erste Ursache” (al-ʿilla al-ūlā), wel-
che jeweils keine Grenze, kein Ende und keine Ursache habe (vgl. auch §45, ed. I. ʿAbbās,
ar-Radd, S. 206, 6).
256 chapter 12
zu geben”.139 Dieses Wirken wird mit Gottes Willen identifiziert, “dessentwe-

gen Er gehandelt hat”140 – ohne dass Gott in Seiner urewigen und unendlichen
“Einzigkeit” (waḥdāniyya) mit diesem identisch wäre.141 Gott kann nur insofern
gewusst werden, als das von Ihm Gewollte und Bewirkte wegen Seines Willens
und Handelns existiert.
So gelingt es Ibn Ḥazm, die neuplatonische Lehre142 von Gottes Transzen-
denz143 und von der unendlichen, für die menschliche Erkenntnis unfassba-
ren144 Potentialität Gottes zu vertiefen. In Anlehnung an muʿtazilitisch-theo-
logische Terminologie145 und unter Einbeziehung koranischer Parallelen146
lehrt Ibn Ḥazm, dass Gott vor dem Wirkvollzug die “Möglichkeit” (imkān) bzw.
“Macht” (qudra) hierzu besitzen muss.147 Sie ist Gottes unbegrenzter Wille,148
297 welchen Ibn Ḥazm | mit folgenden koranischen Termini umschreibt:149 “Herr-
schaft” (mulk);150 “Thron” (ʿarš);151 “alles umfassende Wahrheit” (al-ḥaqq al-
muḥīṭ bi-l-kull);152 “oberster Befehl (Gottes)” (al-amr al-aʿlā);153 “das größte

141 Vgl. § 52, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 211, 2 ff.
142 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 166 und 216 f.
143 Hiervon ausgehend kritisiert Ibn Ḥazm in § 48 an Christen, Dahriten, Daiṣaniten, Magiern,
Mani-Anhängern und Anthropmorphisten sowie an Kindī, dass sie eine Beziehung zwi-
schen Schöpfer und Schöpfung herstellen (vgl. § 54, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 211, 21ff.). –
Zur Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an den Christen vgl. R. Arnaldez, Controverses théologiques,
S. 219 ff.
144 Vgl. z.B. Proclus, Inst. theol., prop. 123 und die Adaption im Liber de Causis, prop. 5 / ed. R.
C. Taylor, S. 160 / Übers. R. C. Taylor, S. 292 f.
145 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 93–95.
146 Man vergleiche z.B. Sure 5:120 (wa-huwa ʿalā kulli šayʾin qadīrun).
147 Vgl. § 44, bes. ed I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 205, 15 ff. – § 54, ed. I. ʿAbbās, S. 211, 17f., wo qudra
neben irāda und qawl als Ursache der Schöpfung genannt werden. – Zu qawl vgl. Sure
16:40 (42) und unten Anm. 150.
148 Vgl. auch §§ 46 und 52. – Die Unbegrenztheit von Gottes Willen macht es unmöglich, im
Zusammenhang mit Gott von “Wollen” oder “Wollender” zu sprechen. Dies beweist die
im Koran belegbare (z.B. Sure 2:117 (111)) Wechselbeziehung zwischen Gottes Willen und
Gewolltem; ferner die Tatsache, dass im Koran nur das Verbum der Umschreibung von
Gottes Wollen diene: s. I. Goldziher, Ẓāhiriten, S. 158.
150 Nach Sure 25:26 (28) usw. – Der Terminus ist auch §52, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 210, 8
belegt.
151 Nach Sure 23:116 usw. – Auch § 46, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 206, 17 belegt.
152 Nach Sure 4:126 (125). – Vgl. zu ḥaqq oben zu Anm. 45–50.
153 Nach Sure 2:117 (111), die Ibn Ḥazm § 52, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 210, 10f., zu der Formulie-
rung veranlasst hat, dass Gott “durch sein Wort (qawl) wegen des Willens wirkt, welcher
Licht”154 sowie “der erhabenste Schleier” (al-ḥiǧāb al-arfaʿ)155 zwischen Schöp-

fer und Schöpfung. Letztere bezeichnet Ibn Ḥazm156 als “Ort der Beeinflussung”
(makān al-infiʿāl), “Bild” (miṯāl)157 und “Stuhl” (kursī),158 welcher sich unter
dem Thron Gottes erhebe.159 Im Unterschied zur alles umfassenden endlosen
“Zeit” (dahr), welche mit dem göttlichen Willen identifiziert wird,160 sei dieses
Gewordene die Summe “der Bewegungen der Bilder” (ḥarakāt aṣ-ṣuwar),157 der
Körper, welche die drei Dimensionen Länge, Breite und Tiefe haben.
Diese Bewegungen der Körper gliedern die begrenzten “Zeiträume” (al-
awqāt, az-zamān), welche Ibn Ḥazm161 auch als “Dauer des Beeinflusstseins des
Bewirkten” (muddatu infiʿāli l-mafʿūl) bezeichnet. Hier hat Proclus162 als Vor-
bild gedient; diesem zufolge misst (vgl. μέτρον) die “Ewigkeit” (αἰών) “die ewigen
Dinge” (τὰ αἰώνια) und die “Zeit” (χρόνος) “die zeitlichen” (τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ). Gleich-
zeitig modifiziert Ibn Ḥazm den platonisch-neuplatonischen Begriff der Zeit
als “bewegtes Bild der Ewigkeit” (αἰῶνος εἰκόνα κινητήν).163 Hierbei integriert
er Proclus’ Klassifikation des Verursach|ten als etwas der Ursache “Ähnliches” 298
(ὅμοιον);164 ferner integriert er Kindīs aristotelisch-neuplatonische Auffassung
der Zeit als Dauer der Bewegung der Körper.165
Hiermit sind wir am Ende unserer Analyse der Kindīkritik des Ibn Ḥazm
angelangt. Seine Diskussion über Kindīs ʿilla-Begriff hat sich als ein eindrucks-
volles Beispiel für die Symbiose von islamischem tawḥīd-Begriff und neupla-
tonischer Transzendenz Gottes erwiesen. Ibn Ḥazm – nach seinen eigenen
Worten166 ein Schüler des uns nicht näher bekannten andalusischen Philoso-
phen Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Madḥiǧī (Ibn al-Kattānī) – ist
vor dem Wirken von ihm komme”. Weitere Belege findet Ibn Ḥazm in den Suren 11:107
(109) (“Er tut immer was er will”) und 16, 40 (42). Vgl. oben Anm. 144.
154 Vgl. z.B. Sure 24:35.
155 Vgl. z.B. Sure 41:5 (4).
156 Vgl. hierzu oben Anm. 93.
157 Vgl. Sure 2 255 (256).
158 Ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 206, 8 ff.
159 § 46, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 206, ult.ss. – Vgl. §§ 47–51.
160 § 46, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 206, 19. – Zu aṣ-ṣuwar vgl. die oben Anm. 93 genannten
miṯālāt.
161 § 49, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, S. 208, 9. – Vgl. § 51, ed. I. ʿAbbās, S. 209, 6.
162 Inst. theol., prop. 54 / arab. Version, dt. Übers. v. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, S. 271. – Vgl.
prop. 50.
163 Vgl. Plato, Timaeus 37 D. – Plotin, Enn. III 7; II 9. – Dazu H. Daiber, Aetius, S. 364.
164 Inst. theol., prop. 29. – Vgl. aber auch miṯāl oben Anm. 93.
165 S. Kindī, al-Falsafa al-ūlā, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, S. 117, 5ff. – Vgl. den Kommentar von A.
L. Ivry, S. 153 f. und H. Daiber, Aetius, S. 365.
166 Risālā fī faḍl al-Andalus wa-ḏikri riǧālihā, ed. I. ʿAbbās, Rasāʾil Ibn Ḥazm II, S. 185, 8–10.
258 chapter 12
somit nicht nur ein Kenner aristotelischer Logik gewesen, sondern auch Meta-
physiker. Er entpuppt sich hier einerseits als ein Schüler des Kindī und dessen
neuplatonischen Vorbildes Proclus; andererseits bemüht er sich, Korrekturen
an deren philosophischen Lehren anzubringen. Diese gehen ihm zufolge nicht
weit genug und haben Gottes Transzendenz gleichsam durchlöchert. Hierin
bestehe im Wesentlichen Kindīs Inkonsequenz. Gegen diese und nicht in ers-
ter Linie gegen seine Lehren wendet sich die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm. Er basiert
seine Argumente nicht nur auf Traditionen und Gedankensplittern, die nach
unseren Ergebnissen weniger auf Aristoteles, als vielmehr auf Proclus und des-
sen arabische Bearbeitungen zurückgehen: Er stützt sich auch auf eine reiche
koranisch-islamitische Tradition ẓāhiritischer Prägung. Hier erweist sich die
Philosophie des Ibn Ḥazm als eine Symbiose von aristotelisch-neuplatonischer
Philosophie und Islam – als islamische Philosophie.167
Anhang
Die Auszüge des Ibn Ḥazm aus Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā
Ibn Ḥazm hat in seine Kritik an Kindīs Metaphysik zahlreiche als solche
gekennzeichnete Passagen aus Kindīs al-Falsafa al-ūlā aufgenommen. Es han-
delt sich um folgende Stellen:
Ibn Ḥazm, ed. I. ʿAbbās, ar-Radd, 189, 1–15 = Kindī, Rasāʾil, ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū
Rīda (Kairo 1950) I 97, 8–101, 14; Ibn Ḥazm 189, 17–190, 8 = Kindī 104, 4-ult.;
Ibn Ḥazm 190, 9–191, 3 = Kindī 106, 5–107, 8; Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6–9 = Kindī 107,
11–108, 3 (malmūs); Ibn Ḥazm 191, 10–12 (iḍṭirāran); = Kindī 109, 1 (ka-qawlinā)
-4 (iḍṭirāran); Ibn Ḥazm 191, 12 ( fa-ḥfaz) -16 = Kindī 110, 9–14; Ibn Ḥazm 191,
17–18 = Kindī 111, 1 (li-anna l-hayūlā) -2; Ibn Ḥazm 192, 3–5 = Kindī 111, 10–13 (bi-
299 mutaḥarrikin); Ibn Ḥazm 192, 9–13 = Kindī 111, 14–112, 3 (al-battata); | Ibn Ḥazm
193, 3–4 = Kindī 112, 6–7; Ibn Ḥazm 193, 6–8 = Kindī 112, 14 (wa-lā naṭlubu) -16
(al-burhāni burhānan); Ibn Ḥazm 193, 18–194 ult. = Kindī 112, 19–114, 9.
In den Kindī-Auszügen des Ibn Ḥazm findet man eine Anzahl von Auslas-
sungen; teilweise können sie bereits in der von Ibn Ḥazm benutzten Vorlage
vorhanden gewesen sein. An einigen Stellen ist der Wortlaut gekürzt und ver-
einfacht worden. Hin und wieder ersetzt Ibn Ḥazm einen Terminus durch
einen anderen. Dennoch bieten die Auszüge auch in ihrem fragmentarischen
167 Ibn Ḥazm setzt hier eine mit Kindī einsetzende Tradition fort, die Philosophie und islami-
sche Dogmatik zu vereinigen sucht. Vor ihm erstrebte Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (gest. 381/992)
in seinem Kitāb al-Iʿlām den Nachweis, dass Philosophie und Islam sich gegenseitig ergän-
zen. Vgl. hierzu M. Arkoun, Essais, S. 185–231; Everett K. Rowson, “al-ʿĀmirī” in EI2
Suppl. fasc. 1–2, 1980, S. 72 f.
Zustand zumindest an zwölf Stellen eine bessere Lesart als das aus dem 5./11.
Jh. stammende Unikum Aya Sofya 4832 (fol. 43 a–53 a), auf welches sich die
Herausgeber A. F. AHWĀNĪ (Kairo 1367/1948) und M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīda (Kairo
1369/1950; 21978) stützen mussten. Wie die unten abgedruckte Kollation zeigt,
handelt es sich um folgende Stellen (in der ersten Edition von M. ʿA. H. Abū
Rīda): 97, 13f.; 104, 10.13; 107, 2; 108, 3; 110, 10; 112, 6.7.19; 113, 14; 114, 5.9. – Ferner
findet man abweichende, erwägenswerte Lesarten zu den Stellen S. 106, 12; 109,
3 und 112, 16 (al-iqnāʿiyya).
In der jetzt folgenden Kollation wird der Kindītext nach M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīdas
erster Edition zitiert. Die zweite Auflage, deren drucktechnische Ausführung
leider sehr gelitten hat, weist im vorliegenden Text nur wenige Verbesserungen
gegenüber der ersten auf. Zudem ist auf abweichende Lesungen im Text des
Ibn Ḥazm vom Herausgeber nur an zwei Stellen (M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda I2 26, 4;
35 Anm. 3: s.u. zu M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda 97, 13f. und 104, 13) hingewiesen worden;
der Herausgeber nennt hierbei “Ibn Ḥazm” oder “Nuṣūṣ Ibn Ḥazm” als Quelle,
ohne nähere Angaben zu machen. S. 46, 10 übernimmt er die bessere Lesart
des Ibn Ḥazm (s.u. zu 113, 14), ohne diesen zu nennen. Es erwies sich daher als
wünschenswert, einmal alle Auszüge mit dem Kindītext genau zu vergleichen
und das Resultat hier vorzulegen:
Ed. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda (Kairo 1950) 97, 5–7: om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 3 // 97, 8
inna aʿlā : qāla l-Kindī: iʿlam asʿadaka llāhu anna aʿlā Ibn Ḥazm 189, 8 // man-
zilatan : daraǧatan Ibn Ḥazm 189, 4 // 97, 9–11 li-anna ġaraḍa … ilā l-ḥaqq :
om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 5 // 97, 12 wa-lasnā : wa-lā Ibn Ḥazm 189, 5 // maṭlūbātinā
: maṭluban Ibn Ḥazm 189, 5 // wuǧūd : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 5 // 97, 13f. iḏan li-
inniyyātin : iḏ-il-inniyyātu Ibn Ḥazm 189, 6 (bessere Lesart, erwähnt von M.ʿA.
H. Abū Rīda, I2 26, 4) // 98, 1–101, 1 (al-maʿlūl) : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 8 // 101, 1 li-
anna innamā : wa-innamā Ibn Ḥazm 189, 8 // 101, 2 wāḥidin mina-l-maʿlūmāti
ʿilman tāmman : maʿlūmin Ibn Ḥazm 189, 8 // 101, 5 al-ʿilmiyya : al-ʿamma Ibn
Ḥazm 189, 10 // 101, 5–6 ka-mā ḥaddadnā … immā : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 10 //
101, 6 wa-immā (3mal) : wa-Ibn Ḥazm 189, 10–11 (3mal) // 101, 7 fa-ammā hal
fa-innahā : fa-hal Ibn Ḥazm 189, 11 // fa-qaṭ : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 11 // 101, 8 fa-
ammā kullu inniyyatin : … ʿan ǧinshā : wa-mā fa-baḥaṯa ʿan-i-l-ǧinisi fi kulli mā
lahū ǧinsun Ibn Ḥazm 189, 11 // 101, 9 tabḥaṯu : fa-baḥaṯa Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12 //
faṣlihā : al-faṣl Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12 // 101, 10 tabḥaṯāni : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12 //
nawʿihā : an-nawʿ Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12 // 101, 11 ʿillatihā : al-ʿillati Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12
// iḏ hiya … al-muṭlaqa : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 12 // 101, 12–13 fa-qad aḥaṭnā bi-ʿilm
ǧinsihā wa-matā aḥaṭnā bi-ʿilmi ṣūrati : om. Ibn Ḥazm 189, 13 (homoeotel.) //
101, 13–14 ʿunṣurihā wa-ṣūratihā wa-l-ʿillatihā : al-ʿunṣuri wa-ṣ-ṣūrati wa-l-ʿillati
Ibn Ḥazm 189, 14 // 104, 4 ḏabban ʿan : naṣabū Ibn Ḥazm 189, 17 // 104, 6 fa-man
: wa-man Ibn Ḥazm 190, 2 // wa-yaḥiqqu : wa-ḥaqqa Ibn Ḥazm 190, 2 // 104, 8 al-
260 chapter 12
faḍīla : al-faḍīliyya Ibn Ḥazm 190, 4 // 104, 10 alladī : ad-dīnu llaḏī Ibn Ḥazm 190,
5 f. (bessere Lesart) // 104, 11 aṣ-ṣādiqa : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 6 // ʿalayhā : ʿalayhim
300 Ibn Ḥazm 190, 6 // 104, 12 wa-bi-luzūmi : wa-luzūmi Ibn Ḥazm | 190, 7 // al-faḍāʾil
: al-qaḍāyā Ibn Ḥazm 190, 7 (vgl. jedoch nachfolgendes ar-raḏāʾil) // wa-tark :
wa-rafḍ Ibn Ḥazm 190, 7 // ḏawātiha : ḏātihā Ibn Ḥazm 190, 7 // 104, 13 wa-
īṯārihā : wa-ʿawāqibihā Ibn Ḥazm 190, 8. Dies bestätigt die Korrektur von M.ʿA.
H. Abū Rīda, welcher die Verbesserung zu wa-āṯārihā vorgeschlagen hatte (s.
auch Rasāʾil I2 35 Anm. 3) // 106, 5 inna : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 10 // aqrabu … wa-
huwa : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 10 // hiya lanā : huwa li-ǧamīʿi l-ḥayawāni maʿanā Ibn
Ḥazm 190, 10f. // 106, 7 badʾi : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 11 // nušūwinā : nušūʾihī Ibn
Ḥazm 190, 11 // 106, 7–12 wa-l-ǧinsi … munfaṣili : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 11 // 106, 12
wa-huwa : wa-hāḏa l-wuǧūdu Ibn Ḥazm 190, 11 // ṣuwaruhū : ṣūratuhū Ibn Ḥazm
190, 11 // al-muṣawwira (M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda) : al-muṣawwir MS Kindī und Ibn
Ḥazm 190, 11 // fatuʾaddīhā : fa-addāhā l-ḥissu Ibn Ḥazm 190, 11 // 106, 13 fa-
huwa mutamṯṯilum wa-mutaṣawwirun : fa-tuṣawwaru wa-tumaṯṯalu Ibn Ḥazm
190, 12 // fī nafsi l-ḥayyi : fīhi n-nafs Ibn Ḥazm 190, 12 (schlechte Lesart) // 106,
13–15 fa-huwa … iyyāhu : wa-l-ḥissu yubāširu-hā bi-lā zamānin wa-lā māʾūnatin
Ibn Ḥazm 190, 12 // 107, 1 abadan : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 13 // fa-l-maḥsūsu : fa-
kulluhā Ibn Ḥazm 190, 13 // abadan (sec. loc.) : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 13 // ǧirmun
wa-l-bi-l-ǧirmi : ḏū ǧirmin Ibn Ḥazm 190, 13 // 107, 2 wa-l-āḫaru : wa-l-wuǧūdu
ṯ-ṯāni Ibn Ḥazm 190, 14 // ʿindanā : ʿannā Ibn Ḥazm 190, 14 (bessere Lesart) //
107, 3 mā : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 14 // wuǧūdun … ʿaqliyyun : om. Ibn Ḥazm 190, 15
// 107, 4 bi-l-kulliyyi : bi-l-kulliyati Ibn Ḥazm 190, 15 // li-l-anwāʿi : li-kulli l-anwāʿi
Ibn Ḥazm 190, 16 // 107, 5 li-l-ašḫāṣi : li-kulli l-ašḫāṣi aǧzāʾun min-a-n-nawʿi wa-
l-anwāʿu aǧzāʾun min-a-l-ǧinsi Ibn Ḥazm 190, 16 om. 191, 1 // 107, 6 wa-l-ašḫāṣu :
fa-l-ašḫāṣu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 1 // wa-ammā l-aǧnāsu : wa-l-aǧnāsu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 2
// 107, 7 fa-ġayru … bal taḥta qūwatin : lā tūǧadu illā bi-qūwatin Ibn Ḥazm 191, 1
// 107, 8 aʿnī … al-insāniyya : wa-tilka l-qūwatu : hiya l-ʿaqlu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 3 // 107,
11 fa-ammā kullu : wa-kullu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6 // maʿnan : mutmaṯṯilin Ibn Ḥazm
191, 6 // nawʿiyyin : nawʿiyyun ǧuzʾiyyun Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6 // an-nawʿi : an-nawʿiyyi
Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6 // fa-laysa mutamaṯṯilun (M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda mutamaṯṯilan) :
lā yatamaṯṯalu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6 // li-n-nafsi : li-n-nufūsi Ibn Ḥazm 191, 6 // 107, 12
bal [huwa] : wa-lākinnahū Ibn Ḥazm 191, 7 // fī n-nafsi : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 7 //
muḥaqqiqun : wa-muḥaqqiqun Ibn Ḥazm 191, 7 // 107, 12 f. bi-sidqi … al-maʿqūlati
: om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 7 // 107, 13 ka-huwa : ka-qawlika : huwa Ibn Ḥazm 191, 7 f. (vgl.
jedoch 193, 14) // 107, 13–108, 1 laysa bi-ġayriyyin : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 8 // 108,
1 fa-inna hāḏā : wahāḏā Ibn Ḥazm 191, 8 // lā ḥissiyyun iḍṭirāriyyun : om. Ibn
Ḥazm 191, 8 // 108, 2 wa-laysa yatamaṯṯalu li-hāḏā miṯālun : wa-lā miṯāla lahū
Ibn Ḥazm 191, 9 (vgl. folg. Z.) // li-annahū lā miṯāla [lahū] : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 9
// 108, 3 wa-lā ṭaʿmun : post wa-lā rāʾiḥatun Ibn Ḥazm 191, 9 // [lahū] (ergänzt
von M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda) : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 9 // 109, 1 ka-qawlinā : wa-miṯlahū
law qāla lanā Ibn Ḥazm 191, 10 // ḫalāʾun : lā ḫalāʾun Ibn Ḥazm 191, 10 // 109, 2
aʿnī lā faġārun wa-lā ǧismun : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 10 // al-qawlu : om. Ibn Ḥazm
191, 10 // fi n-nafsi : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 11 // 109, 3 šayʾun : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 11
// wa-lā laḥiqa l-ḥissa : wa-lā laḥiqathu n-nafsu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 11 (bessere Les-
art?) // fi n-nafsi : fīhā Ibn Ḥazm 191, 12 // 109, 4 aw yuẓannu lahū miṯālun :
om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 12 // 109, 4f. bi-hāḏihi … tuqaddamu : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 12
// 110, 9 ʿan : min Ibn Ḥazm 191, 13 // 110, 10 sawāʾa : ilā Ibn Ḥazm 191, 14 (bes-
sere Lesart) // 110, 10–11 wa-šihāban … al-ḥayrati : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191, 14 // 110,
13 ʿasīram : ʿasīran Ibn Ḥazm 191, 15 // tamaṯṯula : tamaṯila Ibn Ḥazm 191, 15 //
al-maʿqūli … fi l-ʿaqli : mā lā yatamaṯṯalu Ibn Ḥazm 191, 15 // ʿamiya : ʿašiya Ibn
Ḥazm 191, 15 // 110, 14 ʿayn: aʿyun Ibn Ḥazm 191, 15 //al-waṭwāṭi : al-waṭāwiṭi Ibn
Ḥazm 191, 15 // nayl : dark Ibn Ḥazm 191, 16 // al-bayyinati : om. Ibn Ḥazm 191,
16 // | 111, 1 li-anna l-hayūlā : wa-l-hayūlā Ibn Ḥazm 191, 17 // 111, 2 li-l-infiʿāli : al- 301
infiʿāli Ibn Ḥazm 191, 17 // 111, 10 fa-iḏan ʿilmu ṭ-ṭabiʿiyāti : wa-ʿilmu ṭ-ṭabiʿati Ibn
Ḥazm 192, 3 // huwa : om. Ibn Ḥazm 192, 3 // fa-iḏan mā : fa-mā Ibn Ḥazm 192, 3
// aṭ-ṭabīʿiyāti : aṭ-ṭabīʿati min-a-l-muḥdaṯāti Ibn Ḥazm 192, 3 // huwa (nach aṭ-
ṭabīʿiyāti) : ayḍan Ibn Ḥazm 192, 4 // 111, 11 laysa : om. Ibn Ḥazm 192, 4 // kawni
ḏātihī : kawnihī Ibn Ḥazm 192, 4 // ka-mā sa-nubayyinu baʿda qalīlin : om. Ibn
Ḥazm 192, 4 // 111, 11f. fa-iḏan laysa : fa-laysa Ibn Ḥazm 192, 4 // 111, 12 fa-iḏan
mā : fa-mā Ibn Ḥazm 192, 5 // aṭ-ṭabiʿiyāti : aṭ-ṭabiʿa Ibn Ḥazm 192, 5 // 111, 13 bi-
mutaḥarrikin : mutaḥarrikan Ibn Ḥazm 192, 5 // 111, 14 fa-innahū : li-annahū Ibn
Ḥazm 192, 10 // 112, 1 [ fī] (ergänzt v. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda) : om. Ibn Ḥazm 192,
11 // 112, 1f. wa-laysa … burhānun : wa-law kāna li-l-burhāni burhānun la-kāna
hāḏā bi-lā nihāyatin Ibn Ḥazm 192, 11 // 112, 2 fa-lā yakūna : wa-lam yakun Ibn
Ḥazm 192, 11 // al-battata : battatan Ibn Ḥazm 192, 12 // 112, 3 ʿilman-i-l-battata
: ʿilmun battatan Ibn Ḥazm 192, 12f. // 112, 6 wa-kaḏālika yanbaġī an [lā] : fa-
lā yanbaġī an Ibn Ḥazm 193, 3 (bessere Lesart) // naṭluba : yuṭlaba Ibn Ḥazm
193, 3 // al-iqnāʿāti : al-iqnāʿu Ibn Ḥazm 193, 3 // 112, 7 fa-ammā : li-annā Ibn
Ḥazm 193, 4 (bessere Lesart) // lā ʿilmiyyatan : om. Ibn Ḥazm 193, 4 // 112, 14 wa-
lā naṭlubu : fa-lā yuṭlabu Ibn Ḥazm 193, 6 // 112, 15 iqnāʿan : iqnāʿun Ibn Ḥazm
193, 6 // ḥissan – tamṯilan : ḥissan – tamṯīlun Ibn Ḥazm 193, 6 (vgl. jedoch 193,
13) // 112, 16 al-balāġa : al-iqnāʿiyya Ibn Ḥazm 193, 7 // 112, 19 fa-iḏ … fa-yanbaġī
: yanbaġī Ibn Ḥazm 193, 18 // al-fawāʾida : al-qarāʾina Ibn Ḥazm 193, 18 (bes-
sere Lesart) // 112, 20 fī hāḏihi ṣ-ṣināʿati : om. Ibn Ḥazm 193, 19 // 113, 1 laysa :
li-šayʾin Ibn Ḥazm 194, 1 // muṭlaqan : muṭlaqun Ibn Ḥazm 194, 1 (+ ay bal huwa
muṭlaqun) // kawniyyan : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 2 // 113, 2 fa-l-azaliyya : huwa Ibn
Ḥazm 194, 2 // fa-l-azaliyyu lā : wa-lā Ibn Ḥazm 194, 2 // 113, 3 lahū : nach fāʿila
Ibn Ḥazm 194, 3 // 113, 3f. li-anna l-ʿilala … ġayra hāḏihī : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 3
// 113, 5 fa-l-azaliyya lā : fa-lā Ibn Ḥazm 194, 3 // 113, 6 al-ʿāmmiyyi : al-ʿāmmi
262 chapter 12
Ibn Ḥazm 194, 3 //113, 7 al-ḫāṣṣatu : al-ḫāṣṣiyyatu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 6 // fa-lahū :
fa-n-nawʿu kulluhū Ibn Ḥazm 194, 6 // 113, 9f. wa-qad kāna … lā ǧinsa lahū : om.
Ibn Ḥazm 194, 6 // 113, 12 fasāduhū : tatabayyanu inniyyatuhū 194, 8 //113, 12 f.
bi-taʾyīsi aysiyyatihī : bi-tabāyuni abniyyatihī Ibn Ḥazm 194, 8 // 113, 13 tabad-
duluhū : yatabaddalu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 9 // aʿnī llaḏi : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 9 // 113,
14 al-mutabaddilati bi-l-burūdati : ilā l-burūdati Ibn Ḥazm 194, 10 // li-annā lā
naʿuddu : lā bi-l-abʿadi Ibn Ḥazm 194, 10 (bessere Lesart, auch in M.ʿA. H. Abū
Rīda, Rasāʾil I2 46, 10) // 113, 15 aw mā kāna ka-ḏālika : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 10 //
wa-l-aḍdādu : wa-l-aḍwāʾu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 11 // ǧinsun : fī ǧinisin Ibn Ḥazm 194, 11
// 114, 1 fa-in fasada l-azaliyyu fa-lahū ǧinsun : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 11 // wa-huwa
: wa-l-azaliyyu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 11 // 114, 1–3 hāḏā ḫulfun … yastaḥīlu : om. Ibn
Ḥazm 194, 11 // 114, 3 li-annahū : fa-huwa Ibn Ḥazm 194, 12 // 114, 3 f. an-naqṣi –
at-tamāmi : naqṣin – tamāmin Ibn Ḥazm 194, 12 // 114, 4 fa-l-intiqālu : li-anna
l-intiqāla Ibn Ḥazm 194, 12 // mā : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 12 // fa-l-azaliyyu … tamā-
min : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 12 // li-annahū : wa-huwa Ibn Ḥazm 194, 13 // 114, 5 lahū
(Verbesserung v. M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda) : laysat lahū Hs. Kindī und Ibn Ḥazm 194,
13! // 114, 5f. lā ḥāla lahū : lahū ḥālun uḫrā Ibn Ḥazm 194, 14 // 114, 6 fa-l-azaliyu
: wa-l-azaliyyu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 14 // 114, 7 fa-yakūna : yakūnu Ibn Ḥazm 194, 15
// 114, 7f. ilā afḍala … anqaṣa minhū : om. Ibn Ḥazm 194, 15 // 114, 8 f. wa-iḏ-i-l-
ǧirmu ḏū ǧinsin wa-anwāʿin wa-l-azaliyyu lā ǧinsa lahū : wa-iḏan kāna l-azaliyyu
lā ǧinsa lahu; fa-mā lahū ǧinsum wa-anwaʿun ġayru azaliyyin Ibn Ḥazm 194, 16 f.
// 114, 9 laysa huwa l-azaliyyu (M.ʿA. H. Abū Rīda) : lā azaliyyun Ibn Ḥazm 194,
17.
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José Bellver, The Beginnings of Rational Theology in al-Andalus: Ibn Mas-

arra and his Refutation of al-Kindī’s On First Philosophy, in Al-Qanṭara 41/2, 2020,
pp. 323–371, has informed us about the mention of a refutation of Kindī’s First
Philosophy by the Andalusian theologian Ibn Masarra (d. 319/913) in Ibn al-
Uqlīšī (d. 550 or 551/1155 or 1157), al-Inbāʾ fī šarḥ ḥaqāʾiq aṣ-ṣifāt wa-l-asmāʾ.
Bellver considers the refutation attributed to Ibn Ḥazm to be a work by Ibn
Masarra and announces a monograph with a detailed proof.
Republished, with some modifications and additions, from Der Islam 63, 1986, pp. 284–
285. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 13
Kindī in Andalus
Ibn Ḥazm’s Critique of His Metaphysics*
The famous Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (384/994–456/1064) has recently

attracted fresh attention from orientalists, and we have been provided with new
editions of his Kitāb al-Aḫlāq wa-s-siyar, and many other treatises. Some minor
philosophical and theological texts, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās in 1960,1 however,
remained neglected.
One of these texts contains an extensive refutation of Kindīʾs metaphysics, to
be precise, of Kindī’s classification of God as a “cause” (ʿilla). This refutation has
totally been overlooked by the specialists of Kindī, although it contains many
extracts from Kindī’s al-Falsafa al-ūlā, which can be used for textual criticism.
Moreover, there are some indications that Ibn Ḥazm had a more complete ver-
sion of Kindī’s al-Falsafa al-ūlā at his disposal. It was a text that included the
lost second part and bore the title Kitāb at-Tawḥīd. Under the same title a fur-
ther fragment has been transmitted in Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihī’s al-ʿIqd al-farīd.
Ibn Ḥazm’s refutation of Kindī is extremely interesting. It enables us to
deepen our knowledge about the philosopher Ibn Ḥazm in many details, and
to modify. We can show that Ibn Ḥazm is not only an expert and a critic of
Aristotelian philosophy, as is commonly believed, but he is also trained in Neo-
platonic speculations about God’s transcendence. These speculations appear
to be inspired mainly by Proclus’Institutio theologica or its adaption in the Liber
de causis. They are integrated in an original manner into Islamic Zahirite theo-
logy. Within the context of this theology and starting from Koranic quotations,
230 Ibn Ḥazm reproaches Kindī for his description of God as | a “body” (ǧism), as
something “limited” (maḥdūd), “finite” (mutanāhin), and as “provided with one
of the existing qualities of creation”. This is in conformity with the old Islamic
polemic against anthropomorphic interpretations of the Qurʾān taken up by
the Zahirites.
Nevertheless, Ibn Ḥazm does not refrain from speaking in high terms about
Kindī. Although Kindī appears verbose and inconsistent, his “principle of dis-
* This is a summary of a fully annotated German version, which appeared in Der Islam 63, 1986,
1 In ar-Radd ʿalā Ibn Naġrīla al-Yahūdī wa-rasāʾil uḫrā, pp. 187–235. The refutation of Kindī ends
on p. 216.

kindī in andalus 267
putation” (aṣlu munāẓaratihī) is said to be correct. However, as Ibn Ḥazm

reminds us, one should not forget that every discussion about God evokes “in
some respect” the danger of anthropomorphism. Ibn Ḥazm is concerned about
the danger that, apart from the polytheists and dualists, philosophical specu-
lations about God and His creation could destroy God’s “unity” (tawḥīd).
This is the starting point of his critical attitude towards Kindī, who is said
to have been inconsistent in this doctrine of God’s transcendence. Ibn Ḥazm
refers to Kindī’s classification of God as “cause” (ʿilla, sabab), which is inspired
by Proclus, Institutio theologica. According to Ibn Ḥazm, God cannot be a
“cause”. This name destroys God’s unity because of the interrelation of cause
and caused. Ibn Ḥazm starts from the Aristotelian principle, that the idea of
the great, the cause, is evoked by the idea of the small, the caused, and vice
versa. This means the demarcation of the great, the cause, from the small, the
caused. As Proclus also taught, God, however, has no limit. Therefore, He has
no relation to the caused and cannot be a “cause”. Everyone who, like Kindī,
classifies God as a cause, implicates division and limitation in Him. This is con-
tradictory to Kindī’s own philosophy, which denies all “multiplicity” (kaṯra) in
God.
According to Ibn Ḥazm, God is “the One” (al-wāḥid), “the First” (al-awwal),
“the Everlasting” (aṣ-ṣamad), the “Creator of causes” (mubdiʿ al-ʿilal). He has
“created (ibtadaʿa) all caused things be|cause of those causes which come from 231
Him”. These ideas and their terminology betray the influence of the Arabic
Plotinus and Proclus. However, contrary to his older contemporary Ibn Sīnā,
Ibn Ḥazm does not refer to Neoplatonic doctrines of emanation and avoids the
classification of God as “cause”. Instead, he uses the Neoplatonic term mubdiʿ
for the description of God’s creatio ex nihilo in accordance with Islamic dogma.
He combines mubdiʿ with Koranic ṣamad (Sura 112:2), perhaps inspired by the
additional explanation in the Qurʾān, that God “has neither given birth to a
child nor is brought forth (like a child)”.
This Islamization of a Neoplatonic concept is supported firstly by the already
mentioned terms al-wāḥid and al-awwal, which can be found in the Qurʾān
as well as in the Arabic Plotinus and Proclus. Secondly by the aspect of God’s
eternity in Koranic ṣamad: We can take into account the Muʿtazilite classifica-
tion of God as qadīm, “pre-existent”, but also Proclus’ designation of God as
αἴδιος. Finally, we can detect an Islamization of Neoplatonic thinking in the
parallel of Koranic ḥaqq, and the Neoplatonic classification of God as ḥaqq,
which has been taken over by Kindī and by Ibn Ḥazm. However, in the eyes
of Ibn Ḥazm, God is the truth not because of something else, namely truth.
God turns out to be true in the sense of being the “pure truth” (al-ḥaqq al-
mubīn).
268 chapter 13
Here we are reminded of the idea of God’s self-sufficiency, which plays an

important role in Ibn Ḥazm’s argumentation. He argues as follows: Although
God has created all caused things, the causes and the act of “creation” (ibdāʿ)
are totally distinct from Him, according to the Koranic doctrine that nothing is
comparable with Him. Because of this dissimilarity, there cannot be any rela-
tion between God and the created, the caused things. Therefore, God does not
need any causes and He is self-sufficient. Here, Ibn Ḥazm has combined Kor-
anic ġaniyy and Neoplatonic αὐτάρκεια by stressing the impossibility for all
things as being caused by a divine cause.
232 Furthermore, Ibn Ḥazm has combined the Neoplatonic doctrine of God’s
self-sufficiency with the Ashʿarite orthodox and anti-Muʿtazilite teaching of the
non-necessity of all things for God. In accordance with the Koranic saying that
God “does what He wants”, He is muḫtār, “has” an unrestricted “will”, in which
“acting” and “desisting”, fiʿl and tark, exist in such a manner that neither act-
ing nor desisting can be ascribed to Him. This is a modification of the Ashʿarite
teaching.
Here, too, Ibn Ḥazm does not spare any pains to stress the transcendence
of God. He is beyond description. The sole attributes, which can be ascribed to
Him, are “separateness” (infirād) and “oneness” (tawḥīd), which are opposite to
“conjunction” (ittiṣāl) and “multiplicity” (kaṯra). God cannot be identical with
that part, which is a cause for the caused things. This would mean “division”
(tabʿīḍ, taǧziya) and destroy God’s unity. Consequently, any attributes ascribed
to God can only be – as Ibn Ḥazm formulates – “indicative” signs of reason
“pointing at God” and “serving for God’s praise”. The names, which are suit-
able for the description of God’s attributes, are mere “pictures” (miṯālāt) of the
divine attributes, because they are these sounds regardless of their classifica-
tion as results of divine or human acts. In accordance with Ibn Ḥazm’s theory
of language, the names of God are only things written or heard, nothing else.
The perceptible, the ẓāhir is the complete reality and has no hidden sense, no
bāṭin. Therefore, attributes are “causes which come to light” (ʿilal bādiya) and
exist prior to any “effect” ( fiʿl) which is caused by divine “influences” (infiʿālāt).
What precisely are these causes, which are said to come from God? Ibn Ḥazm
has identified these causes with the four “elements” (usṭuqussāt) or “natures”
(ṭabāʾiʿ) earth, water, fire, and air. They are prior to the creation and can be
classified as heavy and falling, light and rising, or something in between. This
233 differentiation | is taken over from Aristotle.
The following details, however, cannot be found in Aristotle: According to
Ibn Ḥazm, God has provided the above-mentioned “natures” with “compul-
sion” (iḍṭirār), which necessitates the things that are caused. This “compulsion”
is called “necessity in itself” (ḍarūra bi-nafsihā) and does not require any fur-
kindī in andalus 269
ther cause. By using an Aristotelian concept, Ibn Ḥazm declares the causes
to have potentiality by this “compulsion”, that must necessarily be realized in
actu. God, however, has no relation to anything, neither to causes nor to the
caused.
Here, we can recognize a distinction between God’s creative action, the Neo-
platonic ibdāʿ or creatio ex nihilo and nature. Ibn Ḥazm has taken over this
distinction between ibdāʿ and nature from Kindī, who himself here is inspired
by Proclus. Kindī and his source, however, never ascribe to nature any “compul-
sion” imposed on things by God. This doctrine goes back to the Muʿtazilites, to
Naẓẓām’s teaching of God-created īǧāb aṭ-ṭabʿ.
This Neplatonic-Muʿtazilite concept of nature has received an Aristotelian
tint. Following Aristotle and Kindī, Ibn Ḥazm calls God the “mover” (muḥarrik)
from whom the “movement of composition” (ḥarakat at-taʾlīf ) comes. Further-
more, he accepts the Aristotelian rejection of an endless sequence of causes
without, however, assuming a first divine “cause”. The “cause” is only something
“comprehensive” (ǧāmiʿ) that combines all causes into a “state” (ḥāl), by which
they become a real cause and do not require any further cause. God, however,
has no ḥāl and therefore cannot be inserted in the ḥāl of causes. He “brings
forth” (muḥdiṯ) the causes, establishes them and gives them their names and
state. In accordance with Koranic terminology, they exist through the “determ-
ination” (taqdīr) by God, the Mighty and Omniscient.
Ibn Ḥazm severely criticizes the thesis of Kindī and his source Proclus that
God acts through His “being” (anniyya). This | would entail the existence of 234
God’s being as a unity without causes in itself prior to the effect, which is
absurd. Or God’s action would be eternal like Him; and finally there would
exist two different kinds of causes, namely God’s being and the compulsion
of nature. Therefore, God does not create through His being but by means of
causes, of natures, which He has provided with compulsion. What is effected
by God exists because of God’s will – just as God’s will exists because of God’s
action. According to Ibn Ḥazm, any action can inform us that it is effected, and
merely God’s will can let us know that it is the cause of God’s action. God has
only modus operandi to “indicate” His own action that is His will because of
which He has acted. However, as an eternal and unlimited “unity” (waḥdāniyya)
He is not identical with His action or will.
With this doctrine Ibn Ḥazm has deepened the Neoplatonic doctrine of
God’s transcendence and His endless potentiality, which is incomprehensible
to the human mind. By using Muʿtazilite theological terminology and referring
to the Qurʾān, Ibn Ḥazm defends the doctrine that, prior to the action, God has
potentiality, power, which is His unlimited will. This will is described with dif-
ferent Koranic terms like “reign” (mulk), “throne” (ʿarš), “allcomprising truth”
270 chapter 13
and “highest command” (al-amr al-aʿlā). He is the “eternity” (dahr) in contrast

to the created, which is the sum of all “movements of pictures” (ḥarakāt aṣ-
ṣuwar), of bodies with three dimensions. These movements of the bodies can
divide time into limited periods. Here, Ibn Ḥazm follows Proclus and at the
same time modifies the Platonic-Neoplatonic doctrine of time as “moved pic-
ture of eternity” (αἰώνος εἰκόνα κινητήν) by using Kindī’s Aristotelian and Neo-
platonic concept of time as the period of the movement of bodies.
We have reached the end of our summary. We have not been able to refer
to all details of Ibn Ḥazm’s doctrine, but it will be clear that his refutation
235 of Kindī’s concept of cause is an im|pressive example of a combination of
Islamic tawḥīd and Neoplatonic divine transcendence. Ibn Ḥazm, a pupil of the
Andalusian philosopher Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Madḥiǧī –
also known under the name Ibn al-Kattānī, and about whom we have little
information – turns out to be not only a specialist of Aristotelian logic, but
also a metaphysician: He follows Kindī and his Neoplatonic source Proclus and
modifies their doctrines. In addition, he criticizes the inconsistency of Kindī,
who in his classification of God as a “cause” has contradicted his own doctrine
of God’s transcendence.
Ibn Ḥazm has based his arguments on ideas that can be derived from Aris-
totle and even more from Proclus and his Arabic adaptions. Besides, Ibn Ḥazm
has used a rich Koranic-Islamic tradition as embodied in the contemporary
Zahirite school. His philosophy appears as an interesting symbiosis of Aris-
totelian-Neoplatonic concepts and Islamic thought. – It is Islamic philosophy.
Republished, with some modifications, from Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E.A.I. (Union
Européenne d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants) (Málaga, 1984). Madrid 1986, pp. 229–235. By
courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 14
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī
Contents
1 Primary Sources 272

1.1 Sources for Rāzī’s Life, Work, and Influence *1–*22 272
1.2 Sources Used by Rāzī *31–*35 274
1.3 Works *41–*51 274
1.3.1 Collections 274
1.3.2 Individual Editions 275
2 Translations Available in Rāzī’s Time 275
3 Life 277
4 Works 280
4.1 List of Works [LW °1-°35] 281
4.2 Description of Works 287
5 Doctrine 293
5.1 Rāzī’s Basic Philosophical Principles and Ethics 293
5.2 Epistemology: Philosophy versus Revelation 297
5.3 The Doctrine of the Creation of the World 300
6 Secondary Literature 304

6.1 Bibliographies 304
6.2 Textual Transmission and Textual History 305
6.3 Biography 305
6.4 Introductions, General Accounts 305
6.5 Individual Groups of Works, Writings, Problems, and Concepts 306
6.6 Reception 312
7 Supplementary Remarks 312

272 chapter 14
1 Primary Sources
1.1 Sources for Rāzī’s Life, Work, and Influence

*1 Ṭabarī, Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad Ibn Ǧarīr aṭ- (d. 310/923): Aḫbār ar-rusul wa-
l-mulūk. – Ed. by Michael Jan de Goeje, Annales quos scripsit Abu Djafar
Mohammed Ibn Djarir at-Tabari. I–XV. Leiden 1879–1901.
*2 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥamdān (d. 322/934): Aʿlām an-nubuwwa. – Ed.
by Ṣalāḥ aṣ-Ṣāwī and Ġulāmriḍā Aʿwānī, with Engl. introd. by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr. Tehran 1397/1977. – Partial French transl. by Fabienne Brion,
“Philosophie et révélation: Traduction annotée de six extraits du Kitāb Aʿlām an-
nubuwwa d’Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī”. In Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 28, 1986, 134–
162. – Partial French transl. by Fabienne Brion, “Le temps, l’espace et la genèse
du monde selon Abū Bakr al-Rāzī: Présentation et traduction des chapîtres I, 3–4
du Kitāb aʿlām al-nubuwwa d’Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī”. In Revue philosophique de Lou-
vain 87, 1989, 139–164. – Complete Engl. transl. with parallel Arabic text by Tarif
Khalidi, The Proofs of Prophecy. Provo, Utah 2012.
*3 Balḫī, Abū Zayd Aḥmad Ibn Sahl al- (d. 323/934): Maṣāliḥ al-abdān wa-l-anfus. –
Facsimile, ed. Frankfurt a.M. 1984. – Germ. transl. by Zahide Özkan, Die Psycho-
somatik bei Abū Zaid al-Balḫī (gest. 934A.D.). Frankfurt a.M. 1990.
*4 Masʿūdī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥusayn al- (d. 345/956): Kitāb at-Tanbīh wa-l-
išrāf [composed 345/956] – Ed. by Michael Jan de Goeje, Kitâb at-tanbîh
wa’l-ischrâf auctore al-Masûdî. Leiden 1894. – Ed. by ʿAbd Allāh Ismāʿīl aṣ-
Ṣāwī. Cairo 1357/1938.
*5 Ibn an-Nadīm, Abū l-Faraǧ Muḥammad Ibn Isḥāq (d. 380/990): Kitāb al-Fihrist
[composed 377/988]. – Ed. by Gustav Flügel, August Müller and Johan-
nes Roediger. I–II. Leipzig 1871–1872. – Repr. Beirut 1964; Frankfurt a.M. 2005. –
382 Ed. by Riḍā Taǧaddud. Tehran 1350/1971. – Ed. by Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid. I–II. |
London 1430/2009. – Engl. transl. by Bayard Dodge, The Fihrist of al-Nadīm.
I–II. New York 1970.
*6 Ibn Ǧulǧul, Sulaymān Ibn Ḥassān (d. ca. 384/994): Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ wa-l-ḥu-
kamāʾ. – Ed. by Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid, Les générations des médecins et des sages.
Cairo 1955.
*7 Ibn al-Ǧazzār, Abū Ǧaʿfar Aḥmad Ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 395/1004 or 1005): Ṭibb al-
fuqarāʾ wa-l-masākīn. – Ed. by Waǧīha Kāẓim Āl Ṭuʿma, with Pers. and Engl.
introd. by Mehdi Mohaghegh. Tehran 1996.
*8 Kirmānī, Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al- (d. ca. 411/1020 or 1021): Al-Aqwāl aḏ-ḏahabiyya. – Ed.
by Ṣalāḥ aṣ-Ṣāwī, with Pers. introd. by Ġulāmriḍā Aʿwānī, Engl. introd. by
Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Tehran 1977.
*9 Miskawayh, Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Yaʿqūb (d. 421/1030): Tahḏīb
al-aḫlāq. – Ed. by Constantine K. Zurayk. Beirut 1967. – Engl. transl. by Con-
stantine K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character. Beirut 1968.
abū bakr ar-rāzī 273
*10 Bīrūnī, Abū r-Rayḥān Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al- (d. ca. 442/1050): Risāla fī fihrist
kutub Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyāʾ ar-Rāzī. – Ed. by Mehdi Mohaghegh, Fihrist-i
kitāb-hā-yi Rāzī wa nām-hā-yi kitāb-hā-yi Bīrūnī. Tehran 1366/1987. – Older ed. by
Paul Kraus, Risāla li-l-Bīrūnī fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyāʾ ar-Rāzī.
Paris 1936. – Germ. transl. by Julius Ruska, “Al-Bīrūnī als Quelle für das Leben
und die Schriften al-Rāzī’s”. In Isis 5, 1923, 26–50. – Engl. transl. by Nurdeng
Deuraseh, “Risālah al-Bīrūnī fī Fihrist kutub al-Rāzī: A comprehensive biblio-
graphy of the works of Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. 313/925) and al-Bīrūnī (d. 443/1051)”.
In Afkār: Journal of ʿAqīdah & Islamic Thought 9, 2008, 51–99.
*11 Ṣāʿid Ibn Aḥmad Abū l-Qāsim al-Andalusī (d. 462/1070): Ṭabaqāt al-umam. – Ed.
by Louis Cheikho. Beirut 1912. – Ed. by Ġulāmriḍā Ǧamšīdnižād-i Awwal,
at-Taʿrīf bi-ṭabaqāt al-umam. Tehran 1997.
*12 Ibn ʿEzra (d. 532/1138): Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara wa-l-muḏākara. – Ed. by Montser-
rat Abumalham Mas, with Span. transl. I–II. Madrid 1985.
*13 Bayhaqī, Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn Zayd Ibn Funduq al- (d. 565/1169 or
1170): Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. – Ed. by Rafīq al-ʿAǧam. Beirut 1994.
*14 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn ʿUmar (d. 607/1210): Al-
Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī. – Ed. by Aḥmad Ḥiǧāzī as-Saqqā. I–IX.
Beirut 1407/1987.
*15 Yāqūt Ibn ʿAbd Allāh ar-Rūmī al-Baġdādī al-Ḥamawī (d. 626/1229): Iršād al-arīb. –
Ed. by David Samuel Margoliouth, The Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb or
Dictionary of Learned Men of Yāqūt. I–VII. London 1923–1926.
*16 Yāqūt Ibn ʿAbd Allāh ar-Rūmī al-Baġdādī al-Ḥamawī: Muʿǧam al-buldān. – Ed. by
Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, Jacut’s Geographisches Wörterbuch aus den Hand-
schriften zu Berlin, St. Petersburg und Paris. I–VI. Leipzig 1867. – Repr. Tehran
1965.
*17 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ǧamāl ad-Dīn ʿAlī Ibn Yūsuf (d. 646/1248): Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ (Iḫbār
al-ʿulamāʾ bi-aḫbār al-ḥukamāʾ, epitome by Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī az-Zawzanī). –
Ed. | by Julius Lippert, Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ, auf Grund der Vor- 383
arbeiten August Müllers. Leipzig 1903.
*18 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Muwaffaq ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 668/1270): ʿUyūn
al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ. – Ed. by August Müller. I–II. Cairo 1299/1882;
Königsberg i.Pr. 1884. – Repr. Westmead 1972.
*19 Ibn Ḫallikān, Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad (d. 681/1282). Wafayāt al-aʿyān. – Ed. by
Iḥsān ʿAbbās. I–VIII. Beirut 1968.
*20 Ibn al-ʿIbrī, Abū l-Faraǧ Gregorius (Barhebraeus) (d. 685/1286): Taʾrīḫ muḫtaṣar
ad-duwal. – Ed. by Anṭūn Ṣāliḥānī. Beirut 1890, 21958.
*21 Šahrazūrī, Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Maḥmūd aš- (d. after 687/1288): Nuzhat
al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-arwāḥ fī taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-falāsifa. – Ed. by Ḫūršīd
Aḥmad. I–II. Hyderabad 1976.
274 chapter 14
*22 Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī (d. 749/1349): Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār. – Ed.
by Fuat Sezgin, in collaboration with A. Jokosha and Eckhard Neubauer,
Routes Toward Insight into the Capital Empires Book 9. Frankfurt a.M. 1988. – Fac-
simile.
1.2 Sources Used by Rāzī

*31 Galen, Compendium Timaei Platonis aliorumque dialogorum synopsis quae
exstant fragmenta [Plato Arabus 1]. – Ed. by Paul Kraus and Richard Walzer.
London 1951.
*32 Galen, De moribus [Arabic Epitome: Fī l-Aḫlāq]. – Ed. by Paul Kraus, “Dirāsāt
fī taʾrīḫ at-tarǧama fī l-Islām”. I. In Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts 5, 1937 [1939], 1–
51. – Also in Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ [*35], 190–211. – Engl. transl. by Daniel Davies,
“Character Traits”. In Galen. Psychological Writings. Ed. by Peter N. Singer.
Cambridge 2013, 135–150.
*33 Galen, Galens Abhandlung darüber, dass der vorzügliche Arzt Philosoph sein muss
[Kitāb fī anna aṭ-ṭabīb al-fāḍil faylasūf ]. – Ed. by Peter Bachmann, with Germ.
transl. Göttingen 1965.
*34 Ǧāḥiẓ, al-: Fī ṣināʿat al-kalām. – Ed. by ʿAbd as-Salām Hārūn, Rasāʾil al-Ǧāḥiẓ.
I–IV. Cairo 1979, 241–250.
*35 Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ fī l-falsafa wa-l-ʿulūm ʿind al-ʿArab. – Ed. by ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān
Badawī. Beirut 1981.
*36 Galen, De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione. Ed.
Wilko de Boer. Stuttgart 1937. = Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V. – Engl. transl.
by Paul W. Harkins. With an Introduction by Walther Riese, Galen on the
Passions and Errors of the Soul. Ohio 1963, 25–69: “The Diagnosis and Cure of the
Soul’s Passions”.
1.3 Works
For further editions
cf. Hans Daiber, BIPh [6.1 *3] II, 4–6.
1.3.1 Collections
*41 Rasāʾil falsafiyya li-Abī Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyāʾ ar-Rāzī. Ed. by Paul
384 Kraus. Cairo 1939. – Contents summarized in Alessandro Bausani [*31]. |
1.3.2 Individual Editions

*45 Kitāb al-Muršid aw al-fuṣūl. – Ed. by Albert Zaki Iskandar. Cairo 1995.
*46 Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya. – Ed. by Paul Kraus in Rasāʾil falsafiyya [*41] 97–
111. – Engl. transl. by Arthur John Arberry, “Rhazes on the philosophic life”.
In Asiatic Review 45, 1949, 703–713. – Also in Arthur John Arberry, Aspects of
Islamic Civilization. London 1964, 120–130. – Engl. transl. by Charles E. Butter-
worth, “The Book of the Philosophic Life”. In Interpretation 20/3, 1993, 227–236
(cf. ibid., 237–257, the comments by Charles E. Butterworth, The origins
of al-Rāzī’s political philosophy). – French transl. by Paul Kraus, “Raziana I.
La conduite du philosophe. Traité d’éthique d’Abū Muḥammad b. Zakariyya al-
Rāzī”. In Orientalia N.S. 4, 1935, 300–334. – Repr. in Paul Kraus, Alchemie, Ket-
zerei, Apokryphen im frühen Islam. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Ed. by Rémi Brague.
Hildesheim/Zurich/New York 1994, 221–255. – Span. transl. by Emilio Tornero
Poveda, La conducta virtuosa del filósofo al-Rāzī. Traducción, introducción y
notas. Madrid 2004, 95–104.
*47 Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs. – Ed. by Mehdi Mohaghegh. Tehran 1993.
*48 Kitāb aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī. – Ed. by Paul Kraus in Rasāʾil falsafiyya [*41], 1–96. –
Repr. in Mehdi Mohaghegh, ad-Dirāsāt at-taḥlīliyya. Analytical Studies on the
Spiritual Physic of Rāzī. Tehran 1999, 67–164. – Engl. transl. by Arthur John
Arberry, The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes. London, 1950. – French transl. by Rémi
Brague, Muhammad Ibn Zakariyā Al-Razi (Rhazès). La médecine spirituelle.
Paris, 2003. – Span. transl. by Emilio Tornero Poveda, La conducta virtuosa
del filósofo al-Rāzī. Traducción, introducción y notas. Madrid, 2004, 27–91.
*49 Maqāla fī amārāt al-iqbāl wa-d-dawla. – Ed. by Paul Kraus in Rasāʾil falsafiyya
[*41], 135–138.
*50 Maqāla fī Mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa. – Ed. by Paul Kraus in Rasāʾil falsafiyya [*41], 113–
134. – Ital. transl. by Giulio A. Lucchetta [*87], 359–378.
*51 al-Mudḫal aṣ-ṣaġīr ilā ʿilm aṭ-ṭibb. – Ed. by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-ʿAbd. Cairo 1397/
1977.
2 Translations Available in Rāzī’s Time
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s comprehensive collection of medical excerpts, Kitāb al-

Ḥāwī (translated into Latin under the title Continens), provides us with an idea
of the vast number of medical texts which were available in Arabic transla-
tion in the 3rd/9th century. The decisive texts from the Greek medical corpus
(Sezgin 1970 [*1: 20–171], Ullmann 1970 [*2: 25–100]) were the translations of
Hippocrates, available already in the early 3rd/9th century, and, later on, those
of Galen in particular. The Arabic and Syriac versions of Galen’s texts, which
276 chapter 14
in part were based on compendia, i.e. the so-called Summaria Alexandrinorum

(Endress 1992 [*32: 118–119]), were produced or commissioned by arguably the
most eminent translator, Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (d. 260/873) (cf. Philosophy in the
385 Islamic World I, §9.2.1 |); sometimes earlier translations were utilized or con-
sulted in the process of translation (cf. Endress 1987 [*32: 424–426]). Rāzī’s
medical works are fundamentally based on the Arabic Galenic corpus, even
though he also draws on other Greek authors (Ullmann 1970 [*2: 128–135]).
Thus, he was the first to compose systematic textbooks to replace the Galenic
corpus (Endress 1992 [*32: 121–122]).
Among the rare philosophical works translated by Ḥunayn (or his school),
that are relevant in the present context, is Galen’s Compendium of Plato’s
Timaeus (lost in the original Greek), which may well have been known to Rāzī
(see below 405). Ḥunayn’s son Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910 or 911) continued
his father’s translation activities, though focusing more on Aristotle’s physical
and scientific works. He translated Aristotle’s Physics into Arabic, thus creat-
ing a basis for the study of the Physics in the Baghdad school under Yaḥyā
Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) (Lettinck 1994 [*108: 3–33]; on Yaḥyā cf. Philosophy in
the Islamic World I, §7.2). A roughly contemporary version by Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā
(ca. 204/820–300/912), which apparently incorporated parts of the comment-
aries by John Philoponus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, is not extant; nor is the
translation produced by Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī (d. 4th/10th c.). In his treatise
on metaphysics, Rāzī appears to have drawn upon Qusṭā’s version: In his defin-
ition of nature he refers to Aristotle’s Physics book II, shortly before (Maqāla
[*50: 117, 11. 118, 1. 121, 4. 123, 9; Ital. transl. 360–361. 364. 367]) mentioning John
Philoponus and his commentary on the Physics several times (cf. Lettinck,
Urmson 1994 [*109: 210: 684, 34]). That Rāzī furthermore was familiar with
Qusṭā’s translation of the Placita philosophorum, a Greek doxography ascribed
to Plutarch, is confirmed by a reference to Metrodorus and Seleucus in his
treatise on metaphysics (Maqāla [*50: 132, 13–15. 133, 13–18; Ital. transl. 376–
377]; Daiber 1980 [*78: 81, on I 5,4; 377–378, on II 1,5]). Rāzī will also have
benefitted from Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s translation activity: The fact, that he mentions
Aristotle’s On the Heavens (Maqāla [*50: 133, 1–12; Ital. transl. 376–377]) as well
as Proclus (Maqāla [*50: 128, 16; Ital. transl. 372]), indicates, that he knew the
translations of the Aristotelian corpus and of some Neoplatonic works by Pro-
clus which were produced in the early 3rd/9th century by Yaḥyā Ibn al-Biṭrīq
(or his school) under the auspices of the philosopher Kindī (d. between 247/861
and 259/873). This applies in particular to the translation of Proclus’ Elements
of Theology (Endress 1973 [*68: 185–193]), which, together with further works
of a Neoplatonic bent, e.g. the so-called Theology of Aristotle and the Liber de
Causis, had a lasting influence on the way in which Aristotle was perceived
during the Islamic era. This is in fact exemplified by Rāzī, who took a critical
stance towards Aristotle and sympathized with John Philoponus, whose works
Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World, Against Aristotle On the Eternity of
the World and On the Contingency of the World may well have been known to
him. He explicitly professes himself to be a follower of Plato’s, whose Timaeus
was supposedly translated by Yaḥyā Ibn al-Biṭrīq (Dunlop 1959 [*54: 144]). By
contrast, Aristotle’s Organon does not play any significant role in Rāzī’s philo-
sophy, even though it was available to him in | translations produced by Ḥunayn 386
and his school (Peters 1968 [*59: 7–30]), and he himself composed summar-
ies of its individual books, including Porphyry’s Isagoge (LW °24-°28). It seems
that he regarded logic as indispensable for theologians (LW °30).
3 Life
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī earned his fame first and foremost as a physician. From the
6th/12th century onwards, some of his medical works were translated into
Latin (Sezgin 1970 [*1: 274–294], Ullmann 1970 [*2: 128–135], Richter-
Bernburg 1994 [*8: 377–392]). The few extant remains of his philosophical
and scientific writings were collectively edited by Kraus in 1939. Any further
material from Rāzī’s pen, that has since been discovered, belongs to the field of
medicine. The most noteworthy is Rāzī’s book on his Doubts on Galen (aš-Šukūk
ʿalā Ǧālīnūs), edited by Mohaghegh in 1993 [*47], and is still awaiting proper
study (Pines 1953 [*52: 256–263], Bürgel 1968 [*57: 284–286], Strohmaier
1998 [*114: 263–287]).
Our knowledge of Rāzī’s life is just as fragmentary as that of his work. The
scholar Bīrūnī (d. ca. 442/1050) reports, in his Risāla fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad
Ibn Zakariyāʾ ar-Rāzī ([*10: 4, 8–5, 10] Mohaghegh), that he was born on 1
Šaʿbān 250 / August 28th, 865 in Rayy, a suburb of today’s Tehran, where he
died on 5 Šaʿbān 313 / October 26th, 925 (cf. Ṣāʿid [*11: 53, 3–4 Cheikho; 222, 2
Ǧamšīdnižād-i Awwal]; Barhebraeus [*20: 158, 4]). Apart from that, Bīrūnī
is merely able to report that Rāzī had first been interested in chemistry, and
switched to medicine because his occupation with chemistry had harmed his
eyes. When exactly this happened, however, he does not tell us.
According to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, though [*18: I 309, 16–18], Rāzī came to Bagh-
dad aged about 30, i.e. in 282/895, after first (min ṣiġarihi) having studied philo-
sophy (al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya), literature (ʿilm al-adab), and poetry, and it was only
after his arrival there that he turned to medicine. This is already reported by Ibn
Ǧulǧul (Ṭabaqāt [*6: 77–78]), and later by Ibn Ḫallikān [*19: V 158, 1–3] and Ibn
Faḍl Allāh [*22: 27, 3–4], albeit coupled with the somewhat different and not
278 chapter 14
entirely consistent remark, that Rāzī first concerned himself with music, before
later turning to medicine and philosophy (thus also Barhebraeus [*20: 158, 4–
5]). Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī (d. 462/1070), on the other hand, tells us that Rāzī turned
to philosophy after first having pursued music (Ṣāʿid [*11: 52, 22–23 Cheikho;
221, 10–11 Ǧamšīdnižād-i Awwal]).
Deviating from these reports, Ẓahīr ad-Dīn al-Bayhaqī (d. 565/1169 or 1170)
relates in an anecdotal account (Tatimma [*13: 34, 10–35, 5]; cf. Meyerhof
387 1948 | [*13: 136]) that Rāzī used to be a goldsmith who practiced “alchemy” (ʿilm
al-iksīr) and got an inflammation of the eyes, on account of which he turned
to medicine. The same story appears again in the 7th/13th century in Šahrazūrī
(Nuzha [*21: II 7, 2–10]).
After his study of medicine in Baghdad, he seems to have returned to Rayy,
since he first became head of the hospital in Rayy, before being appointed to the
same position in Baghdad’. Without giving a specific date, Ibn Ǧulǧul reports:
‘He was head of the hospital in Rayy, and after that, for some time (zamānan),
of the hospital in Baghdad’ (Ṭabaqāt [*6: 77, 3–4]; likewise Barhebraeus [*20:
158, 6]). Some excerpts from Ibn Ǧulǧul, however, deviate from this text: Ibn al-
Qifṭī writes ṭawīlan ‘for a long time’ instead of ‘for some time’ (Taʾrīḫ [*17: 272, 6;
cf. 271, 21]). Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (ʿUyūn [*18: I 310, 22–23]) modifies the statement
so as to report that Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī ‘was head of the hospital in Rayy for some
time’ before taking up his post at the hospital in Baghdad. In the same excerpt
from Ibn Ǧulǧul, Ibn Ḫallikān (Wafayāt [*19: V 157, ult.]) replaces zamānan by
fī ayyām al-Muktafī, ‘in the days of al-Muktafī’.
Al-Muktafī bi-llāh was the governor of Rayy and other cities between 281/894
and 286/899, and after that of Mesopotamia, before becoming caliph for the six
years leading up to his death in 295/908. If Ibn Ḫallikān’s information is cor-
rect, we can interpret it to mean, that Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī probably was head of
the hospital in Baghdad during Muktafī’s caliphate, i.e. between 289/902 and
295/908. Rāzī dedicated his two books aṭ-Ṭibb al-Manṣūrī and aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī
to the Samanid prince Manṣūr Ibn Ismāʿīl, who apparently was a friend of his
(Ibn an-Nadīm [*5: 299, 3–4 Flügel; 356, 25 Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 704;
cf. there n. 169 on variants of Manṣūr’s name]); if we can trust Yāqūt’s report
(Muʿǧam [*16: II 901, 15–16]), this prince had arrived in Rayy in 290/902 or 903
and was governor there for six years, i.e. up to 295/908–297/909. Perhaps Rāzī
wanted to secure his return to Rayy with the help of these dedications, or gen-
erally by means of his friendship to Manṣūr (for a different view, see Sezgin
1970 [*1: III 274–275]). Anyhow, aṭ-Ṭibb al-Manṣūrī and aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī must
have been composed before 296/908–297/909.
Rāzī may well have alternated several times between positions in Baghdad
and Rayy, before he finally settled in Rayy. Perhaps this is what the Baghdad
bookseller Ibn an-Nadīm alludes to in his Fihrist (completed in 377/988), when

he notes, that Rāzī ‘travelled around in the countries’ (intaqala fī l-buldān)
(Fihrist [*5: 299, 3 Flügel; 356, 25 Taǧaddud]; following him Šahrazūrī [*21:
II 8, 1]). We do not know, when exactly Rāzī ultimately settled in Rayy, i.e.
whether it was during the reign of the governor (before 296/908–297/909), or
afterwards. The biographies transmit various anecdotes (Ullmann 1970 [*2:
128]), in particular about his eye disease and the resulting blindness at the
end | of his life. According to Ibn an-Nadīm, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī had wet eyes 388
because he always ate beans, and he became blind at the end of his life. Ibn
an-Nadīm furthermore reports, that Rāzī treated people in a “polite, friendly,
and respectful manner” (karīm mutafaḍḍil bārr), that he was particularly kind
to the poor (cf. Ibn al-Ǧazzār [*7: 38, 6–39, 8]) and the sick, generously send-
ing them food every day or nursing them. One would always find him busy
with writing (thus also Barhebraeus [*20: 158, 11–12], Šahrazūrī [*21: II 8, 3–
4]).
At the end of his entry on Rāzī, Ibn an-Nadīm adds, that he had studied
philosophy with a man named Balḫī (Fihrist [*5: 299, 10–11 Flügel; 357, 4–5
Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 701–702]; following him, Šahrazūrī [*21: II 8, 5–6]).
He follows up this remark with a brief entry on this scholar, who was proficient
in philosophy and the ancient sciences. At this point, Ibn an-Nadīm adds the
intriguing note which prompted Kraus and Pines (1936 [*22: III 1225a]) to
suggest an identification of this person with Rāzī’s role model Īrānšahrī: wa-
qad yuqālu inna r-Rāziya ddaʿā kutubahu fī ḏālika ‘people allege sometimes
that Rāzī claimed his (Balḫī’s) books on this (sc. on philosophy and ancient
sciences) as his own’. He, Ibn an-Nadīm, had seen many works of his, notably
drafts and sketches that were not meant for publication.
Ibn an-Nadīm follows this up with a chapter on a man called Šahīd Ibn al-
Ḥusayn, known by the kunya Abū l-Ḥasan, whom he reports to have published
books, and to have engaged in disputes with Rāzī (Fihrist [*5: 299, 17–19 Flü-
gel; 357, 10–12 Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 701–702]). He is probably identical
with a person named Šuhayd / Šahīd al-Balḫī (de Blois 1996 [*15: 333–337]),
who is mentioned shortly afterwards (Fihrist [*5: 301, 5 Flügel; 358, 22 Taǧad-
dud, who, incorrectly, has ‘Suhayl’]), and whose critique of the treatise on
“pleasure” (al-laḏḏa) – the title probably refers to Rāzī’s work of the same name
(Fihrist [*5: 299, 25 Flügel; 357, 18 Taǧaddud]) – Rāzī is said to have refuted
[*5: 301, 5–6 Flügel; 358, 22 Taǧaddud], along with two further works by
Šuhayd / Šahīd al-Balḫī, namely a critique of Rāzī’s theology (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī)
and a work on eschatology (Taṯbīt al-maʿād) [*5: 301, 10–11. 14 Flügel; 358, 26.
29 Taǧaddud]. Ibn an-Nadīm rightly assumes that this Šuhayd / Šahīd al-Balḫī
is not identical with the subsequently mentioned Abū Zayd al-Balḫī, another
280 chapter 14
contemporary of Rāzī [*5: 301, 10–11. 14 Flügel; 358, 26. 29 Taǧaddud] (on
Abū Zayd al-Balḫī cf. Philosophy in the Islamic World I, § 5.1.2).
Apart from the two refutations of Rāzī and the eschatological work, no fur-
ther writings by Šuhayd / Šahīd al-Balḫī are known to us. This is different in
what concerns Abū Zayd: His long list of works is presented by Ibn an-Nadīm
elsewhere (Fihrist [*5: 138, 14-ult. Flügel; 153, 12-ult. Taǧaddud; Engl. transl.
I 303–304]; based on that, Yāqūt [*15: I 142, 4–143, 6]; Rowson 1990 [*14: 61–
389 70]). | However, Ibn an-Nadīm does not discuss, whether this Abū Zayd al-
Balḫī might be identical with the Balḫī whom he mentions as Rāzī’s teacher.
If we compare the list of works of Abū Zayd al-Balḫī with that of Rāzī him-
self, we will notice that both wrote on psychology, on prophets, and on theo-
logy.
Only one of Abū Zayd al-Balḫī’s works is extant today: The psychosomatic
treatise Maṣāliḥ al-abdān wa-l-anfus (Hygiene of Body and Soul, [*3]). In an
appendix to this work (Maṣāliḥ [*3: 360, 11–14]), Balḫī’s now lost writings Kitāb
al-Amad al-aqṣā fī l-ḥikma, Kitāb Bayān wuǧūh al-ḥikma fī l-awāmir wa-n-
nawāhī aš-šarʿiyya, also known as Kitāb al-Ibāna ʿan ʿilal ad-diyāna, Kitāb fī l-
Ḫilāf, and Kitāb as-Siyāsa are mentioned. A few reverberations of the latter,
Kitāb as-Siyāsa (Book on Politics) (see also Fihrist [*5: 138, 15 Flügel; 153, 13–14
Taǧaddud]; based on that, Yāqūt [*15: I 142, 5]) have been preserved in later lit-
erature; they have been investigated by Rosenthal (1989 [*91]). Balḫī’s polti-
tical thought is informed not so much by Kindī’s Platonic-Aristotelian notion
of politics as religious ethics as by the Persian literary tradition of ‘mirrors for
princes’, where religion takes the second place and the common good of society
assumes priority over the interest of the individual (Daiber 1996 [*111: 844–
845]).
Abū Zayd al-Balḫī’s view of religion as of secondary importance provides us
with a point of comparison with Rāzī and his rationalistic attitude towards reli-
gion. On the whole, it therefore does not seem too fanciful to contemplate the
possibility, that Abū Zayd al-Balḫī’s critical stance on religion may have stim-
ulated Rāzī’s thought (for a different view, see Kraus and Pines 1936 [*22:
III 1225a]). In this context it is intriguing to note, that Rāzī’s medical corpus
includes a treatise addressed to Abū Zayd al-Balḫī, advising him on the topic of
hay fever (Bīrūnī [*10: 8, 1 no. 38], Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 319, 19]).
4 Works
The following list of Rāzī’s philosophical writings, including those lost for
us, comprises works on ethics, political philosophy, Aristotelian logic, meta-
physics, theology, cosmology, physics, psychology, as well as commentaries

on Greek works, in which Rāzī took a critical stance towards Aristotle and
Proclus. The few works that are left provide us with a relatively clear idea
about his sources. They are, in the main, Platonic and can often be traced
back to Plato’s Timaeus (Fakhry 1994 [*107: 70–77]), but they | also com- 390
prise Aristotelian-Alexandrian traditions – including Aristotle’s Physics and its
commentary by John Philoponus (Lucchetta 1987 [*87: 35–38]) –, as well as
Galenic (Bar-Asher 1989 [*89: 130–142], Zonta 1995 [*110: 84–85; cf. 116. 119–
120]) and Presocratic traditions (Aetius: LW °21). Gnostic-Manichaean and Ira-
nian material recedes into the background (Pines 1937 [*49: 54–60], Corbin
1951/1982 [*50: 41–43/185–188], Pines 1955 [*53: 58–60], Peters 1990 [*93:
207–209]).
The list below mainly follows Pines (1997 [*39: 99–107]), whose annot-
ated compilation of Rāzī’s works is based on the catalogues assembled by
Bīrūnī (Risāla [*10: 9–18]), Ibn an-Nadīm (Fihrist [*5: 299–302 Flügel; 357–359
Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 703–709), Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (ʿUyūn [*18: I 315, 14–321,
20]) and Ibn al-Qifṭī (Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ [*17: 273, 9–277, 7]), as well as on some
data retrieved from Rāzī’s autobiography (as-Sīra [*46: 108–109]). Ibn Ǧulǧul’s
catalogue (Ṭabaqāt [*6: 77, 4–78, 1]), which since has come to light, does not
add anything of significance. The list begins with the extant works and frag-
ments, edited by Kraus, and enumerates them according to their sequence in
Kraus’ edition.
4.1 List of Works [LW °1-°35]

°1 Kitāb aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī (The Spiritual Medicine). – On ethics. Ed. by Kraus [*41:
1–96]. This edition is reprinted in Mohaghegh 1999 [*48: 67–164], followed by
a facsimile edition of the oldest manuscript, which was not used by Kraus for
his edition. It dates from 636/1238–1239, and is in possession of Yaḥyā Mah-
dawī, Tehran [165–228]. Further editions (Daiber 1999 [*3: II 6]) are based on
Kraus’ edition. On a manuscript (fragment), that has not been considered in
any of the editions, cf. Gutas 1977 [*7]. – For translations cf. [*48]. Rāzī’s Kitāb
aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī was criticized by the Ismailite Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī, al-
Aqwāl aḏ-ḏahabiyya [*8]; Kirmānī here often continues discussions developed
by Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī in Aʿlām an-nubuwwa (see 407 below; on Kirmānī and
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī cf. Philosophy in the Islamic World I, §9.4.1 below). Similar-
ities between aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī and the ethical treatise Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq by the
later Christian philosopher Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974 aged 84; on him cf. Philo-
sophy in the Islamic World I, §7.2 below) are listed by Takrītī 1978 [*74: 207–208].
According to Masʿūdī, at-Tanbīh [*4: 106, 3–4], Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī was an adherent of
Rāzī’s doctrine.
282 chapter 14
°2 Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya (The Philosophical Life). – An apologetic autobiography,

which Rāzī composed at the end of his life. Due to the advancing weakness of his
eyesight and muscles he had to dictate it rather than writing it down himself. –
Ed. Kraus [*41: 97–111]; for Engl. and French transl. cf. [*46].
°3 Maqāla fī mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa (Metaphysics). – Ed. Kraus 1939 [*41: 113–134]. – Ital.
transl. Lucchetta 1987 [*87: 359–378].
°4 Maqāla fī amārāt al-iqbāl wa-d-dawla (Treatise on the Signs of Well-Being and of
Political Success). – On political philosophy. – Ed. Kraus [*41: 135–138]. – Ital.
391 summary in Bausani 1981 [*31: 21–22]; cf. Daiber 1996 [*111: 846]. |
°5 Kitāb al-Laḏḏa (On Pleasure). – This also formed the topic of a dispute with
Šuhayd / Šahīd al-Balḫī (Bīrūnī [*10: 10 no. 65]). The Persian fragments in Nāṣir-i
Ḫusraw, Zād al-musāfirīn, have been edited by Kraus 1939 [*41: 148–164] together
with an Arabic transl. Cf. Bausani 1981 [*31: 23–26].
°6 Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī (On Theology). – The Arabic and Persian (Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw,
Zād al-musāfirīn) fragments have been edited by Kraus 1939 [*41: 165–190] (par-
tial Engl. transl. in Pines 1997 [*39: 100–101]). Cf. Bausani 1981 [*31: 27–32]. It is
possible that the next item (LW °7) also belongs to this work (Kraus [*41: 166]).
The titles given in the work catalogues alternate, but it is not possible to establish
whether they refer to different works of another scope (Pines 1997 [*39: 101]).
It remains uncertain whether the title Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī ʿalā raʾy Aflāṭūn (On
Theology According to Plato), which is only mentioned by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (ʿUyūn
[*18: I 317, 1–2]) and was included by Pines on that basis (1997 [*39: 103 no. 6]),
represents an independent work by Rāzī. – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (ʿUyūn [*18: I 317,
1–2]) further refers to a poem (qaṣīda) on theology. Moreover, the biographies
mention, by various titles, refutations composed by the Muʿtazilite Abū l-Qāsim
al-Balḫī, to which Rāzī is said to have responded in writing (Kraus [*41: 166–
168], Pines 1997 [*39: 104 nos. 13, 14, 15]): Kitāb ar-Radd ʿalā Abī l-Qāsim al-Balḫī
fī naqḍihi al-maqāla aṯ-ṯāniya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī (On the Objection against Abū l-
Qāsim al-Balḫī on account of his Refutation of the Second Treatise of the Theology
[by Rāzī]) (Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 13]) seems to be identical with the title Kitāb
Naqḍ an-naqḍ ʿalā l-Balḫī fī l-ʿilm al-ilāhī (Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 14]), recor-
ded by Ibn al-Qifṭī and Ibn an-Nadīm. Also, both works are probably identical
with the titles Kitāb ilā Abī l-Qāsim al-Balḫī fī z-Ziyāda ʿalā ǧawābihi wa-ʿalā
ǧawāb hāḏā l-ǧawāb (Against Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī concerning the Addition to his
Response, and to the Response to that Response) (Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 15]) and
Mā ǧarā baynahū wa-bayna Abī l-Qāsim fī z-zamān (On [the Disputes] between
him and Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī concerning Time) (Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 16],
based on Bīrūnī). Fragments are extant in Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya
[*14: IV 413–419] (Rashed 2000 [*117: 39–54]; see also Vallat 2015 [*128: 183–
200], who adds Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbīʾs reports on Rāzī in Muṭahhar Ibn
Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī [4th/10th c.], Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-t-taʾrīkh). – The work Kitāb Mun-
āqaḍat al-Ǧāḥiẓ fī kitābihi fī faḍīlat al-kalām, mentioned by Ibn an-Nadīm (Fihrist
[*5: 300, 24–25 Flügel; 328, 14 Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 705]) and, based on
him, by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (ʿUyūn [*18: I 316, 22], slightly extended), by Ibn al-Qifṭī
(Taʾrīḫ [*17: 274, 19]) and Pines (1997 [*39: 104 no. 17]) does not belong to this
group of titles. Bīrūnī (Fihrist [*10: 11 no. 89]) has Fīmā waqaʿa li-l-Ǧāḥiẓ min al-
tanāquḍ fī faḍīlat ṣināʿat al-kalām instead. From this it | clearly emerges that the 392
work in question is a treatise on the inconsistencies which Ǧāḥiẓ falls into in
Fī ṣināʿat al-kalām, a work that is available in print [*34] and is concerned with
rhetoric. Bīrūnī classifies it as belonging to the category of ṭabīʿiyyāt (works on
physics), while Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa appears to have regarded it as a work ‘against
the philosophers’, just as did his Latin translator Salomon Negri (d. 1728 or 1729)
(Graf 1951 [*51: 279]). The Latin translation of the entry on Rāzī was published
by Ranking (1914 [*11]); there, the relevant passage runs as follows: ‘Liber contra-
dictionibus Giahezi in libro suo de metaphysica et de iis quae Philosophis perperam
attribuit’.
°7 Kitāb fī naqḍ Kitāb Anābū ilā Furfūriyūs fī šarḥ maḏāhib Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿilm al-ilāhī
(On the Refutation of Anebo’s Letter to Porphyry, Commenting on Aristotle’s Doc-
trines on Metaphysics). – Cf. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 317, 9–10], Ranking 1914 [*11:
254 no. 85], Bīrūnī [*10: 14 no. 128], Peters 1973 [*69: 291–292].
°8 al-Qawl fī l-qudamāʾ al-ḫamsa (On the Five Eternals), i.e. Creator, Soul, Matter,
Space, and Time. – This may have been a part of Rāzī’s Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī (LW
°6). The Arabic fragments of the work have been edited by Kraus 1939 [*41: 191–
216]. Rāzī seems to have discussed his five principles individually as well; they
form the topic of a dispute between Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī and the Ismailite Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, which the latter recorded in his Aʿlām an-nubuwwa (ed. Kraus
[*41: 300, 21–313]; this corresponds to Abū Ḥātim, ed. Ṣāwī [*2: 10–27, 15]). Cf.
Bausani 1981 [*31: 33–36].
°9 al-Qawl fī l-hayūlā (On Matter). – Quotations and testimonies are assembled in
Kraus [*41: 217–240], where the various titles of the work are listed as well. Cf.
Bausani 1981 [*31: 37–39]. The Kitāb al-Hayūlā al-kabīr, mentioned by Pines
1997 [*39: 103 no. 5], is classified by Kraus – and probably rightly so – as a vari-
ant of Kitāb al-Hayūlā al-muṭlaqa wa-l-ǧuzʾiyya. – Bīrūnī is the only bibliographer
to mention (after the Kitāb al-Hayūlā al-kabīr) a further work by the title of al-
Hay(y)ūlā aṣ-ṣaġīr (Bīrūnī [*10: no. 59]) (Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 18]). We may
assume that Rāzī will furthermore have discussed the topic in his Theology (Kitāb
al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī) (Kraus [*41: 173]), as well as in his Reply to the Theologian Mismaʿī
concerning his Refutation of the Materialists (Pines 1997 [*39: 105 no. 19]) and his
Reply to Ibn al-Yammān / Tammār concerning his Refutation of Mismaʿī on Mat-
ter (Pines 1997 [*39: 105 no. 20]). The latter may possibly have formed a part of
Rāzī’s Reply to the theologian Mismaʿī.
284 chapter 14
°10 Kitāb fī l-mudda wa-hiya z-zamān wa-fī l-ḫalāʾ wa-l-malāʾ wa-humā l-makān (On
Duration, i.e. on Time; on Filled and Vacant Space, i.e. on Space). – Quotations and
references are compiled in Kraus [*41: 241–279] (Meier 1992 [*101: 15–16]). Cf.
Bausani 1981 [*31: 40–44]. The topic was also discussed in Rāzī’s Theology. Per-
haps the text entitled Fī l-farq bayna ibtidāʾ al-mudda wa-btidāʾ al-ḥarakāt (On
393 the Difference Between the Beginning of Time and the Beginning of Movement), |
only mentioned in Bīrūnī (Fihrist [*10: 9 no. 63]; cf. Pines 1997 [*39: 103 no. 4]),
was part of this work.
°11 Kitāb fī anna n-nafs laysat bi-ǧism (On the Fact that the Soul is not a Body); Kitāb
an-Nafs al-kabīr (Long Book on the Soul); Kitāb fī n-nafs aṣ-ṣaġīr (Short Book on the
Soul). – Cf. Fihrist [*5: 301, 15–16 Flügel; 358, ult. Taǧaddud], Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa
[*18: I 320, 12–13], Ranking 1914 [*11: 263 no. 164–165].
°12 Kitāb ʿIllat ǧaḏb ḥaǧar al-maġnāṭīs li-l-ḥadīd (On Why a Magnetic Stone Attracts
Iron). – Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 10; cf. 162–164]. According to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa
[*18: I 320, 11], the treatise contained an extensive discussion of the vacuum.
°13 Kitāb fī anna li-l-insān ḫāliqan mutqinan ḥakīman (On the Fact that Man has a
Perfect, Wise Creator). – Pines 1997 [*39: 105 no. 23]. The work seems to have
an alternative title, Kitāb fī anna li-l-ʿālam ḫāliqan ḥakīman (Pines 1997 [*39: 105
no. 24]). A fragment of the latter is preserved by Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw, in Zād al-musāfir:
Cf. Kraus [*41: 282–286]. It shows that the discussion included the issue of soul
and matter (cf. also the fragments edited in Kraus [*41: 286–290]).
°14 Maqāla fīmā istadrakahu min al-faṣl fī l-kalām fī l-qāʾilīn bi-ḥudūṯ al-aǧsām wa-
ʿalā l-qāʾilīn bi-qidamihā (On the Section He has Added to the Treatise on Those
Who Teach the Temporal Generation of Bodies, and Against Those Who Claim their
Eternity). – Pines 1997 [*39: 106 no. 26]; Fihrist [*5: 302, 8–9 Flügel; 359, 18
Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 708]. This might be part of Rāzī’s Kalām ǧarā bay-
nahu wa-bayna l-Masʿūdī fī ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam (Dispute between him and Masʿūdī on
the Temporal Generation of the World) (only in Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 321, 6]; cf.
Pines 1997 [*39: 107 no. 29]). Another work that possibly belongs in this con-
text is mentioned by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 319, 26–28] (cf. Ranking 1914 [*11:
262 no. 140]) and, in shorter form, by Bīrūnī (Fihrist [*10: 15 no. 143]): Kitāb fī
anna l-munāqaḍa llatī bayna ahl ad-dahr wa-ahl at-tawḥīd fī sabab iḥdāṯ al-ʿālam
innamā ǧāza min nuqṣān as-sima [Bīrūnī: al-qisma] fī asbāb al-fiʿl – baʿḍuhu ʿalā
t-Tamādiyya (= Māddiyya?) wa-baʿḍuhu ʿalā l-qāʾilīn bi-qidam al-ʿālam (That the
Contradiction between Materialists and Monotheists concerning the Cause of the
Origin of the World is only Possible because the Efficient Causes have not been suffi-
ciently Specified; against the Tamādiyya (= Māddiyya: ‘materialists’?), and all those
who profess the eternity of the world).
°15 Kitāb fī an lā yumkin al-ʿālam an yakūna lam yazal ʿalā miṯāl mā nušāhiduhu (That
it is not Possible for the World Continuously to Be as we Perceive it). – Pines 1997
[*39: 104 no. 9].
°16 Kitāb al-Intiqād wa-t-taḥrīr ʿalā l-Muʿtazila (Critique and Clarification directed
against the Muʿtazila). – Pines 1997 [*39: 104 no. 11]. This is probably identical
with a further title listed by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 319, 32], Kitāb al-Intiqād ʿalā
ahl al-Muʿtazila (Critique of the Muʿtazila). Part of this critique may well have
been constituted by the treatise On the Proof of Transformation (istiḥāla), and of 394
this being inconsistent with the claim that transformation equals latency and mani-
festation (kumūn wa-ẓuhūr), mentioned by Bīrūnī [*10: 10 no. 66], which evidently
is directed against the Muʿtazilite Naẓẓām (cf. van Ess 1986 [*84]).
°17 Kitāb Mā ǧarā baynahu wa-bayna Sīsin al-Manānī (or: aṯ-Ṯanawī) yurīhi ḫaṭaʾ
mawḍūʿātihi wa-fasād nāmūsihi fī sabʿ mabāḥiṯ (On [the Dispute] between him and
the Manichaean [or: dualist] Sīsin, for the sake of demonstrating to him the defect-
iveness of his hypotheses and the inadequacy of his law. In seven studies). – Cf. Ibn
Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 315, 29–30], Ranking 1914 [*11: 248 no. 10], Pines 1997 [*39:
105 no. 21].
°18 Kitāb Samʿ al-kiyān (On Physics). – Pines 1997 [*39: 105 no. 22]. The book is men-
tioned by Rāzī in his Šukūk ʿalā Ǧalīnūs (Doubts about Galen) [*47: 30, 14–15].
In his Sīra al-falsafiyya he also calls it Introduction to the Natural Sciences (al-
Mudḫal ilā l-ʿilm aṭ-ṭabīʿī) (as-Sīra [*46: 109,1]). Apparently, his Risāla yabḥaṯu
fīhā ʿan al-arḍ aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya: ṭīn hiya am ḥaǧar? Dāḫil Samʿ al-kiyān (Treatise in
which he investigates whether the natural earth is clay or stone; a component of
[his work on] Physics) (Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 319, 2–3], Ranking 1914 [*11: 259
no. 111]) also forms a part of this work. Three further titles Rāzī mentions in as-
Sīra al-falsafiyya [*46: 109, 2–4] may conceivably belong to the work, although this
cannot be proved: Fī Šakl al-ʿālam (On the Shape of the World), Sabab qiyām al-
arḍ fī wasaṭ al-falak (The Cause of the Earth’s Position in the Middle of the Heavenly
Sphere); Sabab taḥarruk al-falak ʿalā istidāra (The Cause of the Circular Motion of
the Heavenly Sphere).
°19 Kitāb fī anna l-ǧism yataḥarraku min ḏātihi wa-anna l-ḥaraka mabdaʾ ṭabīʿatihi
(That a body moves on its own accord, and that motion is a principle of its nature). –
Fihrist [*5: 301, 3 Flügel; 358, 20 Taǧaddud]; cf. Ibn al-Qifṭī [*17: 275, 2]; Ibn Abī
Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 316, 32–33]; Bīrūnī [*10: 10 no. 9]; as-Sīra [*46: 109, 4–5]. As we can
see from Rāzī’s Maqāla fī mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa [*50: 116–134], he polemizes against
the Peripatetic notion (cf. Aristotle, Physics III 1) of nature as a source of motion
(Pines 1997 [*39: 105 no. 172]; cf. Lucchetta 1987 [*87: 49–55]). Motion appears
as something temporary and transient in a treatise mentioned by Bīrūnī [*10: 10
no. 72], On the Fact that Rest (sukūn) and [the State of ] Separation (iftirāq) may be
Everlasting, but not so Motion (ḥaraka) and Conjunction (iǧtimāʿ).
°20 Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā Buruqlus (Doubts about Proclus). – Pines 1997 [*39: 106
no. 27]. This work is obviously directed against Proclus’ doctrine of the etern-
ity of the world; Rāzī seems to refer to it in his Maqāla fī Mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa [*50:
128, 6–17. 129, 11–12].
286 chapter 14
°21 Kitāb al-Ārāʾ aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya (Opinions on Natural Science). – Pines 1997 [*39: 106
no. 28]. The title is formulated in an identical manner to the beginning of the title
of the Arabic translation of Pseudo-Plutarch (i.e. Aetius), Placita philosophorum,
395 which was produced by the Syriac Christian Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (d. ca. 300/912) and |
was used by Rāzī several times (Daiber 1980 [*78: Index s.v. Rāzī, Abū Bekr];
Lucchetta 1987 [*87: Index s.v. Aezio; Ps.-Plutarco]). Perhaps we are looking at
an excerpt from Rāzī’s hand.
°22 Mā qālat al-qudamāʾ fī l-mabādiʾ wa-l-kayfiyyāt (What the Ancients taught on Prin-
ciples and Qualities). – Bīrūnī [*10: 11 no. 87].
°23 Kitāb fī tafsīr Kitāb Aflūṭarḫūs fī tafsīr Kitāb Tīmāwūs (Commentary on Plutarch’s
Commentary on the Timaeus). – According to Pines (1997 [*39: 103 n. 169]), this
must be either a commentary on Plutarch’s On the Generation of Soul in the
Timaeus (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας), or on his On the World’s Having Come
into Being According to Plato (Περὶ τοῦ γεγονέναι κατὰ Πλάτονα τὸν κόσμον). It may
be the work Rāzī sought to complement in writing his Supplement to Plutarch’s
Book (Kitāb fī itmām Kitāb Aflūṭarḫūs) (Pines 1997 [*39: 103 no. 8]).
°24 Kitāb Īsāġūǧī wa-huwa l-Mudḫal ilā l-manṭiq (Isagoge, i.e. Introduction to Logic). –
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 315, 20]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 247 no. 6]; Bīrūnī [*10: 11
no. 90]. Probably a summary of Porphyry’s Isagoge to Aristotle’s Organon. This is
indicated by the works listed in the following.
°25 Ǧumal maʿānī Qāṭīġūriyās (Compendium of the contents of [Aristotle’s] Categor-
ies). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 315, 23]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 247 no. 6]. The treatise
Kitāb fī ǧawāhir al-aǧsām (On the Substances of Bodies), mentioned by Ibn Abī
Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 321, 13]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 267 no. 221], may possibly be part
of this work.
°26 Ǧumal maʿānī Bārīmīniyās (Compendium of the Contents of [Aristotle’s] On Inter-
pretation). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 315, 23–24]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 247 no. 6].
°27 Ǧumal maʿānī Anālūṭīqā l-ūlā ilā tamām al-qiyāsāt al-ḥamliyya (Compendium of
the Contents of [Aristotle’s] Prior Analytics up to the end of [the Chapter on] Cat-
egorical Syllogisms [Aristotle, Analytica priora I 7]). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 315,
23–24]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 247 no. 6]. On this restriction, which is already
found in Syriac Aristotelianism and seems to be based on the fact that the section
on the three figures of the syllogism accepted by Aristotle forms a self-contained
part of the text, cf. Daiber 2001 [*118: 330–335].
°28 Kitāb al-Mudḫal al-burhānī (Introduction to Demonstration [i.e. in Aristotle’s Pos-
terior Analytics]). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 316, 6]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 248
no. 21]; cf. Bīrūnī [*10: 11 no. 93] and Rāzī, as-Sīra [*46: 108, 20].
°29 Qaṣīda fī l-Manṭiqiyāt (Poem on Logical Topics). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 317, 1];
cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 254 no. 73].
°30 Kitāb fī l-manṭiq yaḏkuru fīhi ǧamīʿ mā yuḥtāǧu ilayhi minhu bi-alfāẓ mutakallimī
l-Islām (On Anything that is Required in the Field of Logic, in the Terminology of
Muslim Theologians). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 318, 31–32]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11:
259 no. 108]; more briefly Bīrūnī [*10: 11 no. 92]
°31 Kitāb al-Maḥabba (On Love). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 316, 9]; cf. Ranking 1914
[*11: 249 no. 30]. | 396
°32 Kitāb fī ṯ-ṯubūt fī l-ḥikma (On Certainty in Philosophy). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18:
I 317, 14–15]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 254 no. 92].
°33 Kitāb Mīzān al-ʿaql (On the Criterion of the Intellect). – Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 320,
13]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 264 no. 266]; Bīrūnī [*10: 14 no. 121] has the variant May-
dān al-ʿaql (Domain of the Intellect).
°34 Kitāb Naqḍ Kitāb al-Wuǧūd li-Manṣūr Ibn Ṭalḥa (Refutation of Manṣūr Ibn Ṭalḥa,
On Existence). – Ibn an-Nadīm [*5: 301, 18–19 Flügel; 359, 2 Taǧaddud]; Ibn
Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*18: I 320, 16]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 264 no. 172]. Manṣūr Ibn Ṭalḥa
was the son of Ṭalḥa Ibn Ṭāhir (d. 213/828 or 829), who, like his father Ṭāhir Ibn
al-Ḥusayn, was governor of Khorasan (Ṭabarī [*1: III 1064–1065. 1099]).
°35 Kitāb Maḫārīq al-anbiyāʾ (The Fabrications of the Prophets), also called Ḥiyal al-
mutanabbiyīn (The Tricks of Those Who Claim to be Prophets), probably identical
to the treatise Fī n-nubuwwāt (On the Prophetic Religions), which is supposedly
identical with Rāzī’s Naqḍ al-adyān (Refutation of the Religions) and extant in
quotations within Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s refutation Aʿlām an-nubuwwa. – Ibn an-
Nadīm [*5: 301, 19 Flügel; 359, 2–3 Taǧaddud; Engl. transl. II 707]; Bīrūnī
[*10: 17 nos. 173–174]; cf. Meier 1992 [*101: 14], Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 93–107],
Dodikhudoev 2013 [*125]. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa doubts Rāzī’s authorship of the
book and attributes the information to the polemical stance of the Egyptian ʿAlī
Ibn Riḍwān [*18: I 320, 16–20]; cf. Ranking 1914 [*11: 264 no. 173].
4.2 Description of Works

The following description is limited to the three philosophical works by Rāzī
that alone are extant in their entirety. Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya and Kitāb aṭ-
Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī, the first two of them, are briefly sketched in Großes Werklexikon
der Philosophie [*34: 1260–1261]. Their main concern is ethics. – Medical works
are excluded here, also those which might contain philosophical remarks and
criticism of Galen’s logical argumentation, as e.g. Rāzī’s Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā
Ǧālīnūs (cf. Mohaghegh’s English introduction to [*47]; Strohmaier 1998
[*114: 263–287]), or those which are of a primarily doxographical nature, as e.g.
Maqāla fī Mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa [*50]. Treatises extant in fragments (cf. Philosophy
in the Islamic World I, §6.4; °5, °8, °9, °10 and °13 above) are briefly summarized
by Bausani [*31: 23–45].
288 chapter 14
Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya

Book of the Philosophical Life
In the opening paragraphs of this small and rather late work, Rāzī justifies its
composition by referring to the criticism he was subjected to by the intellec-
tual circles of his days on account of his claim to be leading a philosophical
life: Due to his preoccupation with his fellow human beings and the care for his
livelihood (so they said) he departed from the Socratic ideal of a philosopher,
397 who was supposed to lead an | ascetic and solitary life and to adhere to a veget-
arian diet. For Rāzī, the Socratic ideal of an ascetic and abstemious life was
unnatural, since it would lead to the extinction of mankind. Rāzī concedes this
last point to his critics, and then goes on criticizing his opponents’ image of
Socrates. He points out that later in life, Socrates had left the ascetic way of
life behind, leading a moderate life like other people; he had eaten good food –
with the exception of meat – and had fathered daughters. Rāzī thus sets out the
principle of the mean, to which Socrates himself – after initial exaggeration –
finally came to aspire. Socrates, nevertheless, remained the good example with
whom he, Rāzī, shared his quest for a just life, knowledge, and the suppression
of desire. Even though, he never could reach Socrates’ level of achievement in
these respects. Referring to several of his earlier works, in particular to his Spir-
itual Medicine (aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī), Rāzī establishes six hypotheses concerning
a ‘philosophical life’:
– Praise and blame in the afterlife are determined by our conduct in this world.
– The supreme goal does not consist in bodily pleasures, but in the attainment
of knowledge and in acting justly. In this manner we are freed from this world
for the sake of another, where there is neither death nor pain.
– Our reason urges us to give up the delights of this world, with the exemption
of ‘nature’ and ‘desire’.
– God, to whom we look for our reward and whose punishment we fear, is
opposed to causing pain and detests our injustice and ignorance.
– One ought not to tolerate pain for the sake of a greater pleasure.
– God has charged us with the particulars of daily life that are inevitable for
our continuing existence.
The permanent delights of the hereafter are to be preferred to the ephem-
eral and transient delights of this world, because the latter cannot enable us for
the world of the soul. Pain in this world derives from nature, not from God. In
this way, Rāzī justifies his maxim, that human beings may only cause pain to
other living beings under the condition, that greater pain is avoided. Maxim-
izing pleasures, for instance, by hunting animals or by utilizing domesticated
animals, is only permissible in moderation and when serving reasonable and
just intentions. Here, Rāzī gives the example of a man who spurs on a horse,
thereby hurting it, for the sake of a higher goal, the rescue of a man from the
hands of his enemy – in particular if the man is good, intelligent and bene-
ficial to his fellow human beings. Animals may only be hunted and killed if
they destroy other animals and eat the flesh of other animals, if they cause
harm and do not offer any benefit, or if their numbers are getting out of con-
trol. Socrates himself already had banned hunting animals for the purpose of
eating their meat. – Reason and justice demand, that no pain may be inflicted
on anyone, including oneself. In this context, Rāzī explicitly criticizes Hindus
who burn their bodies or throw them onto shards of iron, Manichaens who 398
castrate themselves and are chasten by hunger and thirst, as well as Christians
who live a monastic life and Muslims who do nothing but pray in the mosque
and content themselves with the bare necessities. Such behaviour, Rāzī says,
constitutes an injustice against one’s own self, as it causes pain without extin-
guishing other pain. It is the way of living that Socrates abandoned in his later
years. – Rāzī then goes on with discussing the various degrees of sensitivity
towards pain that are found in different people, depending on how much they
are accustomed to it. This is why not everybody and everything can be judged
according to the same standard. Nevertheless, there is unanimous agreement
that pleasures must not be sought through injustice and murder, or through
contravening God’s will. Likewise, it is not permitted to overstep a certain limit
within asceticism and abstinence, for instance if someone leads a life that is
harmful and makes him ill. What is permitted is the mean between extreme
pleasure and extreme pain: It represents the temperate life of a philosopher
who is just, does not cause unnecessary pain to anyone, and does not act against
God’s will. God is the source of reason, dispels sorrow and fear, and guides and
supports human beings in everything that brings them closer to Him. – Since
God is omniscient and just, His servants, who are closest to Him, will reach the
highest possible degree of knowledge, justice, and compassion. Hence ‘philo-
sophy makes people God-like, as far as this is possible for human beings’. Rāzī
here once again refers to his earlier work The Spiritual Medicine, which (he
points out) explains in detail to what extent the soul ought to liberate itself
from bad habits, and to what extent a person, striving for philosophy, ought to
devote himself to the demands of daily life and of governing others. Producing
a list of some of his works, Rāzī then demonstrates that, more than anybody
among his contemporaries, he possesses knowledge that deserves the name
‘philosophy’. The same goes for his actions, which he describes as follows: He
ever mixed with rulers only in order to heal them, or to advise them of what
is beneficial for them and their followers. He has not accumulated wealth, he
has been just to his fellow human beings, and more than once has relinquished
claims and entitlements. He has occupied himself incessantly with writing, so
290 chapter 14
much that he now is no longer able to read or write, due to fading eyesight and
failing strength. – Rāzī concludes his apology by calling on his opponents to
conduct an open dispute with him. He concedes that, in his actions, he may
not have fulfilled every possible expectation. But, his knowledge is a different
matter. His opponents could not but profit from it, and then turn it into action.
Kitāb aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī

Book of the Spiritual Medicine
This is the only one of Rāzī’s more extensive works that is extant in its complete
form, comprising 20 chapters. Containing frequent repetitions and occasion-
399 ally drifting off | tangentially into digressions which do not reach the level
of maturity found in Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya, it provides us with an ethics
that does not lay any claim to being heavy philosophical fare, and frequently
includes examples taken from Greek anecdotal literature, or from the author’s
own experience. Addressing the healing of the soul, the book appears to be
a companion volume to Rāzī’s medical work on the healing of the body, al-
Kitāb al-Manṣūrī, and is likely to have been dedicated to the same person, i.e.
the governor of Kirmān and Khorasan, Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Manṣūr Ibn Ismaʿīl Ibn
Aḥmad Ibn Nūḥ. – Rāzī begins with a praise of reason, God’s gift to mankind.
Reason is what distinguishes man, in his thinking and desiring, from the anim-
als: It is by reason that man is able to rule over his natural instincts and his
passions and develop discipline. It is the philosopher who attains this state to
the greatest extent. Reflection enables a human being to weigh up pleasure
and pain against each other. Someone who only follows his pleasures will, in
the hereafter, suffer extremely harsh and long-lasting pain once his soul will
have left his body, and hence will come to regret his actions. For Rāzī, pleasure
and desire are expressive of the inability of men to attain everything. However,
philosophers are able to rise above this. They are described as people who do
not seek wealth and affluence, in some cases even retiring to locations that have
been deserted by others. Their arguments refer to the state of the soul, which is
striving to liberate itself from the body. Hence, any discussion of the soul must
deal with the ‘improvement of character’. Here, Rāzī mentions Plato’s doctrine
(Rep. IV) of the tripartite soul, where the rational part of the soul directs the
two others, i.e. the appetitive and the spirited parts. A theory that he claimed
was held by Socrates, too. Controlling one’s desires always involves pain, which,
however, will be followed by even greater delights. Besides, the suppression
of desire becomes easier once one grows accustomed to discipline, and when
the resulting delights increase. This, however, presupposes that a human being
recognizes his own vices, be it through his own efforts or with the help of
others. Here, Rāzī refers to Galen’s “How a Man May Uncover (taʿarruf ) the
Vices of His Soul” [not: “his own vices”] = Galen, De propriorum animi cuiuslibet
affectuum dignotione et curatione ed. de Boer ch. III / 32–36 transl. Harkins
[*36]. – Chapters 5–16 follow this up with a detailed description of the vices:
“Passionate love” (hawā), whose excesses reveal lack of self-control and intel-
ligence (ch. 5); arrogance is denounced as a consequence of the inability to
assess one’s own capabilities (ch. 6); envy (which usurps the place of mod-
est competitiveness) is presented as a combination of meanness and avarice,
and as a sign of spitefulness. In truth it will never bring any joy; on the con-
trary, it is detrimental for body and soul: It robs the soul of rational thought,
deprives the body of sleep and induces it to take in insufficient amounts of
food (ch. 7); anger is explained as the feeling of revenge against somebody who
has inflicted harm on the one who takes revenge; it points to a lack of reason
when this passion escalates and ends up causing the angry person even more
grief than before (ch. 8); mendacity is interpreted as a consequence of the lust
for power; reason demands that we should be wary of liars | (ch. 9); avarice, 400
that results from passion alone and does not have any rational justification, is
frowned upon (ch. 10); solicitousness and anxiousness lead to success, as long
as they are kept to the rational mean rather than becoming too much or too
little. Rāzī cites philosophy as an example, whose illustrious representatives
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Chrysippus, Themistius and
Alexander remain forever beyond reach, irrespective of one’s greatest efforts, of
one’s having relinquished food and sleep, or of unrivalled study (ch. 11); grief,
caused for instance by the loss of a loved one, should be reined in by previous
training and strengthening of the rational soul and its awareness of the change-
ability and transitoriness of all things (ch. 12); greed and gluttony do nothing
but cause pain and harm; they are a product of the appetitive soul which lacks
the corrective of the rational soul and hence procures more pain for itself than
pleasure (ch. 13); drunkenness harms the body, especially by virtue of its excess-
iveness, and leads to the loss of reason (ch. 14); excessive sexual intercourse for
the sake of pleasure weakens the body and causes premature ageing, which is
why reason demands moderation through the control of one’s passions (ch. 15);
obsessiveness and hypersensitivity, by affecting a person’s behaviour or, for
instance, giving rise to a fixation upon cleanliness, render life unbearable in
an irrational way (ch. 16). The following two chapters demonstrate how reason
demands us to exercise moderation in acquiring good and necessary things, as
well as in spending our money. In this pursuit, human beings are dependent
on one another and support one another through the exchange of goods. After
that, Rāzī discusses people’s striving to attain ever higher positions, which on
the one hand affords them pleasure, but on the other hand saddles them with
new burdens. Thus, they do not gain anything in terms of their passions, but,
nevertheless, they will have done what, according to reason, is preferable, more
292 chapter 14
excellent, and more salutary. Ch. 19 summarizes the virtuous life (led by all great
philosophers in the past) as consisting in acting justly towards people. To be just
and moderate, and to treat other people with peacefulness and benevolence, is
a precondition for being accepted in society. The last chapter establishes why
one should not fear death: After death, the human souls reach a better state
in which they feel no pain. Such freedom of pain cannot be compared to the
pleasure that follows pain in this world. Hence, no rational person needs to be
grieved by death, or to give much thought to it. Anybody who is just and virtu-
ous, and adheres to the rules of the true religious law, will attain “tranquillity”
(rāḥa) and eternal “happiness” (naʿīm).
Maqāla fī amārāt al-iqbāl wa-l-dawla

Treatise on the Signs of Well-Being and Political Success
This brief treatise, which may have been composed for a ruler of his time, trans-
fers some basic ideas of Rāzī’s ethics onto politics: It sketches the qualities a
political leader ought to have. First of all, he needs to have knowledge that will
401 come to him in a | sudden inspiration due to ‘a divine or a natural cause’. This
will afford him an eminent position, because his attention will be focused on
happiness. Further signs of well-being and political success, which Rāzī lists
in a prosaic manner, are: (1) Harmony and continuity of things; (2) harmony
between the soul’s character and leadership, which is hereby strengthened;
(3) an exclusive love of leadership, which cannot be impaired by anything; (4)
“insight” (ḥilm) and “thoughtfulness” (tuʾada) in respect of problematic mat-
ters, which will result in the avoidance of mistakes and the detection of truth;
(5) truthfulness and sensitivity of the soul, as well as the ability to remember
things and to judge them correctly; this presupposes right guidance by a ‘divine
force’ and hence makes it possible to lead those who are in need of an excel-
lent, knowledgeable leader who is in harmony with them; (6) harmony among
companions and followers, and a predilection for their well-being; (7) the well-
being of the servants and their deferential conduct; (8) the banishment, from
the heart of the leader, of hate and malice against his peers and noblemen;
(9) the heart’s predilection for justice and its abhorrence of “violence” (ǧawr),
even in trying times. All these signs point to the presence of a supporting divine
power.
5 Doctrine
5.1 Rāzī’s Basic Philosophical Principles and Ethics

Rāzī won his fame primarily as a physician; the tradition hails him as the
‘unsurpassed physician of the Muslims’ (Ṣāʿid [*11: 52, 21 Cheikho; 221, 9
Ǧamšīdnižād-i Awwal]). Knowing his Galen, he will most certainly have fol-
lowed a maxim Galen discussed in a monograph that was also translated into
Arabic: That ‘the best physician should be a philosopher’ (De moribus [*32]). In
his Book on the Philosophical Life (Kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya), which has auto-
biographical traits and should be read together with his earlier work aṭ-Ṭibb
ar-rūḥānī (Druart 1997 [*113]), Rāzī defends himself against the allegation of
having strayed from the path of the philosophical life as it was led by Socrates,
due to his constant dealings with people (apparently in his role as a physician)
and his engagement in activities designed to earn a living (as-Sīra [*46: 99, 3–
10; transl. Butterworth 227]). Here, Rāzī is taking up the traditional image
of Socrates as a pious ascetic, as we find it sporadically in a handful of Platonic
dialogues (e.g. Apology 23b7–c1), but more particularly in Stoic and Cynic lit-
erature, as well as in works of the Islamic era, where it was very widely spread
(Alon 1991 [*94: 47–52], Döring 1979 [*76: 17. 25. 33. 59. 96. 98. 117. | 121–122. 402
132]). What is new in Rāzī, however, is his claim that Socrates later on gave up
his initially ascetic lifestyle, because he realized that in its excessive form, the
ascetic life – that is to say, people who do not procreate – will lead to the demise
of the world and of mankind (as-Sīra [*46: 100, 19–101, 4; transl. Butterworth
228–229]). Therefore, Rāzī differs from Socrates only with regard to the extent
of his pursuit of a just life, knowledge, and suppression of the passions [*46:
100, 11–14; 228 §6].
The principles of a philosophical life [*46: 101, 5–102, 4; 229 § 9] that connects
“knowledge” (ʿilm) with “practice” (ʿamal) [*46: 108, 16; 234 § 30] (cf. Daiber
1980 [*78: 330]), do not consist in the pursuit of bodily pleasure, but in the
acquisition of knowledge and the exercise of justice on one’s way to the here-
after, to a world which knows neither pain nor death. ‘Our Lord, by Whom we
hope to be rewarded and fear to be punished, watches over us and is merciful
to us. He does not want us to cause pain, and He hates injustice and ignorance
on our part, loving our knowledge and justice’ [*46: 101, 19–20; 229]. However,
“nature” (aṭ-ṭabīʿa) and “passion” (al-hawā) induce people to prefer “immediate
pleasure” (al-laḏḏa al-ḥāḍira), whereas reason (al-ʿaql) urges them towards the
opposite [*46: 101, 17–18; 229].
Any pain that is not caused voluntarily by human beings originates in the
necessity of nature. Thus, Rāzī uses examples from the human and the animal
kingdom to argue that one ought not to cause pain to any being equipped with
294 chapter 14
sensory faculties (muḥiss) – unless this is done to prevent even greater pain.
In this respect one ought to act according to ‘intention, custom, approach and
policy that conform to reason and justice’. The considerations, which Rāzī fol-
lows here, are quite utilitarian, as it were: Should there be only enough water
left for one person on a trip through the desert, one must save the person who
is of the most benefit for society [*46: 103, 14–104, 14; 231 § 15. 16]. Carnivorous
animals and those that create more harm than benefit, cause pain and can-
not be put to use by humankind (e.g. snakes, scorpions, wasps) may be killed –
this in the additional hope that their souls may attain ‘more suitable’ bodies
[*46: 105, 6; 232] (cf. Adamson 2012 [*123]). Shortly before this reference to
metempsychosis (only) in animals (Walker 1991 [*98: 224–225], Sorabji 1993
[*106: 188–189. 197], Alexandrin 2002 [*134]) Rāzī has said explicitly that only
human souls could be liberated from their bodies (taḫlīṣ), which was ‘like pav-
ing and smoothing the way to deliverance (ḫalāṣ) (from the body)’ [*46: 105,4;
231].
Rāzī does not any further explain this liberation of the soul from the body –
to which he already alludes in the earlier aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī [*48: 27, 9–11; transl.
29], – but later on, in his concluding discussion of the true philosophical life,
403 he emphasizes the necessity for ‘virtuous souls’ to adhere to a mean between |
extreme asceticism and extreme dissipation (in keeping with the example of
Socrates). Furthermore, ‘it is better to tend (mayl) towards the lower, rather
than the upper limit’ (as-Sīra [*46: 107, 13; cf. Butterworth 233 § 27]).
Therein, people must let themselves be guided by the judgement and principles
of “reason” (al-ʿaql) and “justice” (al-ʿadl) [*46: 107, 1; 233 § 25].
Rāzī creatively fashions a parallel [*46: 108, 4–13; 234 § 29] between said prin-
ciples of reason and justice and the divine attributes of “knowledge” (ʿilm) and
justice, to which he adds the attribute of “mercy” (raḥma). He compares the
relation between God and man to that between a master and his servants:
‘Because the servants who are most beloved of their lords are those who adopt
their way of life and conduct themselves according to their customs, thus,
the servant who is closest to God, the exalted and mighty, is the one among
them who is most knowing, most just, most merciful, and most compassion-
ate’. According to Rāzī, this leads us straight to the philosophers’ affirmation
that ‘philosophy is the assimilation to God in accordance with human capa-
city’; this is exactly what is meant by the ‘philosophical life’ as described in
Rāzī’s The Spiritual Medicine (aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī), a book that Rāzī had written
as a ‘companion volume’ to his well-known work aṭ-Ṭibb al-Manṣūrī (translated
into Latin under the title Liber Almansoris). This latter book Rāzī had composed
for the sake of the ‘improvement of character’ (iṣlāḥ al-aḫlāq) (aṭ-Ṭibb [*48: 44,
3; transl. 18]). He called it The Spiritual Medicine, because it intends to show how
the soul, by increasing its knowledge and acting justly, can liberate itself from
the rule of the passions. The person who improves his character in this way
is the philosopher, the ‘sage’ (ḥakīm), who is familiar with the ‘conditions and
fundamental rules of logical demonstration, and is able to comprehend and
attain mathematics, physics, and theology (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) in accordance with
human capacity’ [*48: 43, 7–8; 45] (Druart 1997 [*113: 49]). – This late work of
Rāzī’s is significant in several respects:
– God holds a firm position in his philosophy; his attributes of knowledge and
justice are reminiscent of the very same attributes featuring within the Kor-
anic theology of the Muʿtazilites (Sura 21:47; 35:38) (van Ess 1991–1997 [*99:
IV 442. 507–512]; cf. Rashed 2000 [*117: 49]). They place a high value on
reason and rationality, even if the definition of ʿaql occurs rather late (van
Ess 1991–1997 [*99: III 251; IV 205]). Again, the attribute of ‘mercy’ should
not be traced back to the Koranic attribute alone, but also to the ideas of the
Muʿtazilite Bišr Ibn al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825), who held that God is free to
afford human beings demonstrations of His “grace” (luṭf ), or to grant them
“benefits” (ṣalāḥ) (van Ess 1991–1997 [*99: III 123–124; IV 509–510]). | 404
– The concept, that God’s attributes of omniscience, justice and mercy are
parallel to the attributes of knowledge, justice and sympathy or gentleness
as ways, in which man can assimilate himself to God within a ‘philosoph-
ical life’, is an original idea of Rāzī. In order to support his idea, he refers to
the Platonic doctrine of the assimilation to God ‘as far as it is possible for
man’ (cf. Theaetetus 176 B), which was later picked up by Galen (De moribus
[*32: 40, 6–41, 4], Dirāsāt [*35: 201, 12–202, 4]; cf. Mattock 1972 [*65: 248–
249]); just as in Neoplatonism and in Islamic thought since Kindī in the early
3rd/9th century (Druart 1993 [*104: esp. 336–357]) it here appears recast as
a doctrine of the soul’s liberation from the body through increasing intellec-
tual insight acquired in the course of the ascension to the divine, as well as
through good actions (cf. Daiber 1980 [*78: 327–328]).
– The interpretation of ‘nature’ (Genequand 1984 [*82: 123–125]) as the ne-
cessity to prefer present pleasure – a necessity that prevails in this world and
is dictated by passion, and which man ought to counter with his reason –
evokes the Platonic thought of a conflict between reason and desire (cf.
Plato, Phaedrus 246 A–257 A; Rāzī, aṭ-Ṭibb [*48: 20–32, esp. 27, 14–31, 3; transl.
22–34, esp. 30–33]; Druart 1997 [*113: 49–50]). Like the Platonic notion of
the assimilation to God outlined above, it went on in the 5th/11th century to
serve as a basis for the philosophical ethics of Miskawayh, and, after him, of
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (Daiber 1991 [*96: 182–187]). Miskawayh dedicates a sep-
arate chapter to the virtue of justice (Tahḏīb [*9: 105–134; transl. 95–119]).
Following the Platonic tradition, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, as well as
296 chapter 14
Plotinus (cf. Enneaden III 6. 2 and II 3. 8), he describes it as the mean

between two extremes and as harmony of the parts of the soul, united
in their obedience to reason (Daiber 1971 [*61: 39]); cf. Philosophy in the
Islamic World I, §4.4.
– This principle of the mean is also brought to mind when Rāzī emphasizes
the virtue of justice and condemns the philosophical life of pure asceticism,
because excessive asceticism will lead to the demise of the world and of
mankind. A text that Miskawayh used – a work ascribed to Plato which only
survived in Arabic and as Syriac fragments (cf. Daiber, From the Greeks to
the Arabs I/2, §4.1) – therefore ends with the conclusion, that the perfection
of happiness requires not only the goods of the soul, but also those of the
body and ‘of what surrounds the body’. Someone who possesses them all is
more excellent than ‘all those who possess virtue (only) on account of asceti-
cism, poverty, separation and exile. (For) giving up the body and relinquish-
ing one’s possessions may well be a magnificent thing, but at the same time
it is something entirely imperfect’ (Daiber 1971 [*61: 34 = Arab. text 31, 58–
60; commentary 39–40]). This text, which follows the Platonic-Aristotelian
tradition, has evoked criticism (Fakhry 1994 [*107: 71–77]; Adamson 2008
[*121]) of Goodman’s (1971 [*63: 5–26], 1972 [*64: 26–48], 1996 [*38: 207],
2015 [*126]) classification of Rāzī as an ‘Epicurean’. For despite structural par-
405 allels it is | more plausible to assume that Rāzī’s pronouncements on pleas-
ure and pain were first and foremost inspired by Plato’s Timaeus – possibly
the only work by Plato which he actually knew (Pines 1955 [*53: 60–61]).
According to our biobibliographical sources, Rāzī apparently wrote an inter-
pretation of this text, together with Plutarch’s commentary (LW °23). As a
matter of fact, we do not know any Arabic version of such a commentary by
Plutarch. However, in his medical writings Rāzī quotes Galen’s commentary
on the Timaeus (Pines 1997 [*39: 86 n. 116]). Hence, it is quite conceivable,
that he may have encountered the views Plato expresses in the Timaeus on
these matters in a compendium by Galen which is only extant in Arabic.
Just as Plato’s Timaeus, this compendium emphasizes the balance between
body and soul (Plato, Tim. 88 B 5–C; Galen [*31: 32, 5–33, 6]), while a “lack
of reason” (ἄνοια), divided into two types, “insanity” (μανία) and “ignorance”
(ἀμαθία), is explained as one of the diseases of the soul, among which excess-
ive “pleasure” (ἡδοναί) and excessive “pain” (λύπαι) rank supreme (Plato, Tim.
86 B 2–7; Galen [*31: 31, 15–32, 4]). A sudden impression that is contrary to
nature is painful, whereas a sudden return to the natural state is pleasant
(Plato, Tim. 64 C 7–D 2; Galen [*31: 19, 10–14]). – Rāzī would have encountered
the same Platonic thought in Galen’s treatise De moribus, a work lost in the
Greek original, which would have been accessible to him in Ḥunayn Ibn
Isḥāq’s Arabic translation. Here again, the topic of pain and pleasure is dis-
cussed in a Platonic vein: The Arabic epitome which is extant to us – perhaps
from the pen of Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī (first half of the 4th/10th century) –
takes up Plato’s tripartition of the soul into a rational or thinking, an irascible
or animalistic, and an appetitive or vegetative soul (Rundgren 1974–1975
[*71: 88–98]), and describes pleasure as part of the appetitive soul, which
God has given to mankind since it is necessary for life and procreation (De
moribus [*32: 26, 6–27, 5], Dirāsāt [*35: 190, 22–191, 20]; cf. Rosenthal 1965
[*55: 121–122], Mattock 1972 [*65: 237]). If it becomes excessive, it will cause
harm, and hence it must be kept under regulation of the rational soul which
‘must love the beautiful [and] hunger for truth’ (De moribus [*32: 28, 7; Engl.
transl. 141, 7–8], Dirāsāt [*35: 192, 11–12]; cf. Rosenthal 1965 [*55: 124], Mat-
tock 1972 [*65: 238]). Galen mentions Socrates and Plato as examples of
people who ‘have dedicated their lives entirely to the rational soul’ rather
than to pleasure (De moribus [*32: 35, 18–19], Dirāsāt [*35: 192, 19–20]; cf.
Mattock 1972 [*65: 245]). – There is no doubt, that Rāzī knew Galen’s De
moribus (probably in the unabridged translation by Ḥunayn), since in his
Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs he mentions the work and, taking up the discus-
sion in his aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī, [*48: 36, 12–39, 1; transl. 39–40] emphasizes in
a critical tone that pleasure is not ‘the intended good’ (aš-Šukūk [*47: 17, 18–
19]). | 406
5.2 Epistemology
Philosophy versus Revelation
A good philosopher is someone whose soul strives for knowledge, and who,
in his conduct, increasingly assimilates himself to God in justice and mercy,
thus liberating his soul from the shackles of the body and letting it return
to its divine origins. This is, first of all, reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction
between theory and practice (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1026 a 19; Topics 145 a 14–18;
Nicomachean Ethics 117 8 b 20–21). In accordance with Aristotle’s view, ‘practice’
is here identified with acting ethically (Nicomachean Ethics X 8). In a Neopla-
tonic vein, the aim of such ethical actions is said to be the liberation of the soul
from the body – Plotinus (Ennead I 6) spoke of the ‘purification’ of the soul.
It is also termed the ‘assimilation to God, as far as this is possible for a human
being’. This combination of Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus follows the footsteps
of the Alexandrian philosophers of the 5th–6th centuries, who, in this respect,
also inspired a short treatise on the classification of the sciences by Qusṭā Ibn
Lūqā (Daiber 1990 [*92: 114. 116–117. 118–119]).
It is remarkable that Rāzī only mentions logic (‘logical demonstration’),
mathematics, physics, and theology in his definition of philosophy (s. above),
298 chapter 14
without providing an analysis of the practical part of philosophy. In urging the

reader to act justly he only addresses ethics, while leaving out economics and
politics. Here, Rāzī deviates from the Alexandrians, who, following Aristotle
(Metaphysics 1064 b 1–3; cf. Daiber 1990 [*92: 120]), divided philosophy into a
theoretical part on the one hand, whose subdivisions progressing from the vis-
ible to the invisible, comprised physics, mathematics, and theology, and into a
practical part on the other, which was subdivided into ethics, economics, and
politics (Gutas 1983 [*81: 261]).
Apart from the marginally different order given to the subdivisions of the
theoretical part, there is yet another aspect in which Rāzī notably deviates
from the Alexandrian classification of philosophy: In aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī [*48:
43, 5–6; transl. 45] he explicitly rejects ‘grammar, poetry, correctness of speech
( faṣāḥa) and eloquence’ as proper parts of philosophy. This is a consequence
arising from the Alexandrian division of the syllogism into five kinds, i.e. the
demonstrative, the dialectical, the rhetorical, the sophistical, and the poetical,
of whom only the first one is said to be true in every respect (Gutas 1983 [*81:
264], Daiber 1990 [*92: 115–116]).
Rāzī therefore modifies the Alexandrian concept of a ‘philosopher’: He pos-
sesses theoretical knowledge, since he ‘knows the conditions and fundamental
rules of logical demonstration and is able to grasp and attain knowledge of
mathematics, physics, and theology (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) in accordance with human
capacity’. In addition, he is guided in his actions by ‘the judgement and prin-
407 ciple of “reason” (al-ʿaql) and “justice” (al-ʿadl)’ (cf. above 404). – | The ‘excellent
philosopher’ (ar-raǧul al-faylasūf al-fāḍil), who is superior to the majority of
people, will, according to Rāzī, achieve the control of reason over passion to
the greatest extent (aṭ-Ṭibb [*48: 21, 3–5; transl. 23]; cf. also Vallat 2015 [*128:
208–211]). ‘He who reflects (naẓara) and exerts oneself (iǧtahada) is walking on
the path of truth (muḥiqq), even if he will not reach its furthest limit’, as Rāzī
declares, according to the report of his Ismailite opponent Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī
(Aʿlām [*41: 303, 2–3; *2: 12, 18–19]). Even a small amount of reflection is cap-
able of liberating the soul from its “unhappy state” (kudūra) (Aʿlām [*41: 302,
13–14; *2: 12, 7–8]; cf. Gutas 1988 [*88: 207–209]). In his dispute with Abū Bakr
ar-Rāzī, Abū Ḥātim had reached another conclusion: From the dissimilarity of
people who can be separated in leaders and followers, teachers and learners, he
had deduced the necessity for a prophet sent by God, to lead and instruct the
people (Aʿlām [*41: 299, 17–300, 4; *2: 8, 7–16]; cf. Daiber 1989 [*90: 91–92], 1996
[*111: 846–847]). Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, on the other hand, had replaced people’s
need for guidance and their submissiveness to authority by active initiative,
reflection, and the striving endeavour of the individual – the emulation of God,
the assimilation to God in accordance with the capacity of a human being.
As can be seen from this, Rāzī’s denial of prophecy within this argument
does not involve any ‘atheism’. What he says here does not sound so much like
a ‘rebellion against Islam’ (Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 93]), as like the criticism of
a ‘free thinker’ who does not deny the existence of a God. Rāzī arrived at a
different, negative assessment of prophecy, which provoked the criticism of
his opponent Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī. Following Ibn ar-Rāwandī, who lived in the
3rd/9th century (van Ess 1991–1997 [*99: IV 322–326]), Abū Ḥātim had defen-
ded Muḥammad’s prophethood and prophecy as a source of knowledge in his
book on Signs of Prophecy (Aʿlām an-nubuwwa), within which he quotes from
Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s Maḫārīq al-anbiyāʾ (On the Fabrications of the Prophets) (LW
°35). He explained, that people need prophetic guidance because of their dis-
similarity in their natural abilities and behaviour. An evaluation of prophecy
as source of knowledge, backed by this type of justification, prefigures Fārābī’s
(d. 339/950 or 951) formulation, that religion, based on the divine revelation of
the prophet, is a symbolic image and metaphorical ‘imitation’ of philosophical
truth. The ruler and philosopher also is a prophet (Daiber 1989 [*90: 90–92],
1991 [*96: 144–145], 1999 [*115: 35]).
Rāzī dismissed the idea that any such prophetic quality should constitute
a precondition for leading people, on the grounds that this would mean that
God had favoured those with a prophetic gift over the others. They would take
over the leadership of the people, which would involve conflict and enmity
between different groups, who were only prepared to accept their own “leader” | 408
(imām). ‘What is most fitting for the wisdom of the Wise and the mercy of
the Merciful is to give all His servants (without discrimination) His know-
ledge (maʿrifa) about those things, which will be beneficial or harmful to them
on this earth as well as in the hereafter’ (Abū Ḥātim [*2: 3, 11–12]). In Rāzī’s
view, differences between people only exist, because they focus their “zeal”
(himma), their “sagacity” ( fiṭna), and their “intellect” (ʿaql) on different things
(Abū Ḥātim [*2: 4, 19–6, 12]). However, when people blindly follow tradition
(taqlīd) and avoid or even ban the “reflection” (naẓar) about and the “invest-
igation” (baḥṯ) of the principles of religion, as is the case with the adher-
ents of revealed religions (ahl aš-šarāʾiʿ) – here, Rāzī will have been thinking
of certain people among the followers of Islam, as well as of intolerant and
tyrannical religious authorities (Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 97–98. 105]) – truth
will be oppressed (Abū Ḥātim [*2: 31, 12–32, 3]; cf. Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 97–
98]).
Rāzī’s criticism extends to other revealed religions. One issue he criticizes
extensively is the prophets’ claim to be performing miracles (Abū Ḥātim [*2:
191, 3–4]; cf. Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 102–103]). In this context he opposes the
doctrine of the inimitability of the Qurʾān and its status as a miracle. There
300 chapter 14
are, Rāzī says, better compositions, in terms of literary form as well as content
(Abū Ḥātim [*2: 228, 4–7]; cf. Stroumsa 1999 [*116: 103–104]). Rāzī designates
the Qurʾān by an expression which, in the Qurʾān itself (Sura 6:25), is used
by the unbelievers to challenge the revelation received by a prophet: asāṭīr
al-awwalīn ‘the fairy tales of the ancient ones’ (transl. Arberry); it is ‘full of
contradictions, without any information ( fāʾida) or clear (bayyina) directions’
(Abū Ḥātim [*2: 228, 5–6]).
5.3 The Doctrine of the Creation of the World

Three important elements of Rāzī’s thought appear as the foundation for his
doctrine of the creation of the world: (1) The soul, which returns to its divine
origin through increasing knowledge (following Neoplatonic tradition) and
through acting justly (following the tradition of Aristotelian ethics). (2) The
characterization of this increasing knowledge as ‘reflection’ and as ‘endeavour’,
as ‘imitation’ of God, i.e. as ‘the assimilation to God in accordance with human
capacity’. (3) The denial of prophecy as a source of knowledge and the dismissal
of the Qurʾān as divine miracle and as source of divine revelation.
These three elements are components of an essentially Neoplatonic view
of the world, even though the attempt to bridge the gap between the tran-
scendent God and His creation through a mediating process of emanation has
been abandoned. The only connecting link is the soul of the reflecting human
409 being, which endeavours to assimilate itself to God through knowledge and |
just action. In Rāzī’s account, the soul’s divinity is tarnished by the body, i.e. by
matter, and that is why it strives to return to its divine origin.
Here we can begin to discern a certain contradiction that Rāzī had to deal
with. How can the divine soul be something divine, uncreated, and primordial,
as well as something that has been created by God and presupposes the cat-
egories of space, time, and matter? Can anything ever emerge from God that is
not equal to him? Let us first quote a report by Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw from the 5th/11th
century (Zād al-musāfirīn, in: Rasāʾil [*41: 282, 3–284, 3]; German transl. Meier
1992 [*101: 8–9]): ‘He taught: The existence of the world can relate to the wise
Creator in two ways only: Either the world has been generated from (His) nature
(ṭabʿ), and thus is a thing of nature (maṭbūʿ) and created (muḥdaṯ). In that case,
however, the Creator must be created too, because this (creative) nature will
never cease to act (or to make something). But when a being, that arises from
the giver of being, is of the nature of the giver of being, then there must be a
finite period of time between the giver of being and the being that was gener-
ated from (His) nature, in which it is possible (mumkin), that the thing exists
which has been generated from the other thing, from which it comes into being
… From this follows, that the world must have come into being later than its
Creator, by one finite period of time. However, if He is older than a created

thing by a finite period of time, He must be created too. Therefore, the Creator
of the world, from whom, and through whose nature the world came into being,
would have to be created.
[Or else], if the world has come into being through the Creator’s will (ḫwāst)
[rather than automatically through His nature], and there was nothing in being
beside Him throughout sempiternity, which could have moved Him from that
will which He had had throughout sempiternity, i.e. not to create the world, to
this will, i.e. to create the world – [if it was like that], why then did He create
the world after all?’ Rāzī concludes: ‘Since we see that God has made a trans-
ition from the will not to create the world, to the will to create it, something
else that is uncreated must have been with God which induced Him to this
action’.
This text is revealing in several respects. First of all, it indicates the equality
that obtains between the divine cause and its effect: If the created being has
come to be a certain period of time after the Creator, the Creator of the world
must be created, too, especially as the world has been generated from God,
through God’s nature. Furthermore, Rāzī points out, that God’s sempiternal
will was not originally bent on creating the world (cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI 8.
13, 37–38 and VI 8. 18, 49). Since this will has changed, another uncreated being
must have existed before God’s act of creation, in order to provoke Him to this
act.
This further uncreated thing, Rāzī identifies as ‘the soul, which was alive
and ignorant’ (Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw [*41: 284, 6–7]). He explains this with a creation | 410
myth, which is available to us in two similar versions, in Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw, Zād
al-musāfirīn (Rasāʾil [*41: 284, 7–286, 6]), and in Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, Aʿlām an-
nubuwwa [*2: 20, 3–24, 16] (cf. Meier 1992 [*101: 10–11. 16–17]; Goodman 1975
[*72: 25–40], Daiber 1999 [*3: 36–37]): The ignorant, primordial soul falls in
love with matter, which is equally uncreated and, before its formation into bod-
ies and elements, consists in atoms and empty space (Pines 1997 [*39: 49];
cf. Pines 1970 [*25: 802]; Baffioni 1982 [*80: 115–141]). Following Aristotle’s
example (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II 1. 329 a 26), it is called al-
ha(y)yūlā al-muṭlaqa, ‘absolute matter’. Driven by lust, the soul wants to shape
forms out of matter. As it fails to do so, since the primordial matter is resist-
ing this treatment and the soul only manages to move it about in ‘irregular and
confused movements without any order’, God takes pity on it (cf. Abū Ḥātim
[*2: 24, 17–27, 1]; Meier 1992 [*101: 18–20]) and helps the soul to create the
world. Thus, the soul becomes a cause for the creation of the world. Nāṣir-i
Ḫusraw’s report [*41: 285, 2–12] (Meier 1992 [*101: 10]) adds a note about the
human soul, which says, that, when man was created, God sent him “reason”
302 chapter 14
(ʿaql) in order to ‘awake his soul from sleep’, so that the soul might liberate
itself from matter through knowledge of the superlunary world, and return
to its original world, to the seat of joy and happiness. The instrument for this,
however, was philosophy. In the style of Rāzī’s as-Sīra al-falsafiyya, the report
adds: ‘Whoever studies philosophy, recognizes his world, does not harm any-
body as far as possible, and acquires knowledge, will liberate himself from the
present adversity’. Thus, the souls are able to return to their original worlds, the
lower world can dissolve itself and ‘matter is released from being bound up [in
forms], just as it was from eternity’ [*41: 285, 12–286, 6] (Meier 1992 [*101: 10–
11]).
Rāzī’s creation myth stands opposed to creatio ex nihilo (Davidson 1987
[*86: 9–16]) as well as the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world
(Lucchetta 1987 [*87: 231–241]; Koetschet 2015 [*127]). It assumes the
uncreatedness of God, soul and matter, to which Rāzī adds space and time. At
this point, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s Aʿlām an-nubuwwa transmits a dispute between
himself and Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (Abū Ḥātim [*2: 14, 3–24, 16]; cf. Meier 1992
[*101: 14–16]). According to this report, “absolute time” (az-zamān al-muṭlaq),
which is “duration” (al-mudda) and “eternity” (ad-dahr) (Meier 1992 [*101: 15]),
as opposed to “limited” time (maḥṣūr), which is measured by the heavenly
motions, is uncreated (qadīm) (Walker 1978 [*75: 360–361], Goldman 1981
[*79: 61. 66. 68], Goodman 1992/1993 [*100: 11–13/151–154], Pines 1997 [*39: 57–
64]). The same goes for “space” (al-makān), where Rāzī distinguishes between
absolute and “relative” (muḍāf ) space. Absolute space ‘does not have a body
which could be pointed to, but can only be conceived of in the imagination’
(Abū Ḥātim [*2: 19, 6–7]). Rāzī here refers to Plato, distancing himself from the
Aristotelian concept of time and space (Physics VIII 8. 256 a 11–12; IV 14. 223
411 b 21–23; cf. Daiber | 1980 [*78: 365–366]; Physics IV 4. 212 a 20–21) of his oppon-
ent Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī. What he says about time partly follows a Neoplatonic
pattern (Pines 1986 [*85: 368–369], 1997 [*39: 57–60]; on a comparison with
Galen cf. Adamson 2012 [*124]; on a comparison with Ibn Ḥazm cf. Escobar
Gómez 2010 [*122]).
In Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw’s report, ar-Rāzī justifies his introduction of absolute space
and absolute time, pointing out that matter, which is as such uncreated, needs
space; hence, space must be uncreated as well [*41: 259, 7] (cf. Meier 1992 [*101:
13]). The uncreatedness of God, soul, matter, and space presupposes a concept
of time, which is not related to motion or, more specifically, to generation and
corruption, but is something eternal and unmeasurable.
With his doctrine of five uncreated, primordial beings, i.e. God, soul, mat-
ter, space, and time, Rāzī modifies the teachings of his predecessor Īrānšahrī
(second half 3rd/9th c.). As far as we can glean his doctrine from later reports,
Īrānšahrī took four uncreated and eternal things as basic principles: Time,
space, motion, and body, which signified God’s “knowledge” (ʿilm), “power”
(qudra), “act” ( fiʿl), and “strength” (quwwa) respectively, and were subordin-
ated to God (Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw [*41: 266, 7–267, 5]; cf. Meier 1992 [*101: 11]). In
Rāzī’s account, this subordination is not expressed in an equally pronounced
fashion, which is why he was criticized in Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw’s report, if not with
perfect justification (Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw [*41: 255, 10–257, 3]; cf. Meier 1992 [*101:
12]).
Nor did Rāzī adopt Īrānšahrī’s idea of God’s unceasing creative activity.
Instead, he held the view that God’s will only creates when prompted to it by
something else equally uncreated. On account of this, Rāzī incurred censure
from Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw, who remarks that Īrānšahrī deduced from God’s unceas-
ing creative activity that ‘that in which [God’s] work manifests itself must be
uncreated and that His work manifests itself in matter’ (Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw [*41: 258,
11–12]; cf. Meier 1992 [*101: 12]). On Rāzī’s view a direct “creative act” by God
(ibdāʿ) was impossible, since something cannot be created from nothing. This
criticism is aimed at Rāzī’s model of the soul which, through its conjunction
with matter, prompts God to help it to create the world.
With this move, Rāzī, in contrast to Īrānšahrī, had tried consciously to create
some distance between God and His creation, in order to avoid the accusa-
tion, resting on the alleged equality of the divine cause and its effect, that
the Creator must be created, if the world had been generated from Him and
through His nature, and if God’s creative nature then did not cease to create.
Here, Rāzī shows himself to be a Neoplatonist much more than Īrānšahrī. He
introduces soul, matter, and space as intermediate entities, as it were. Compar-
able to the Neoplatonic emanations, they stand between God and His creation,
and ensure that the world has not been generated from God or through His
nature, thus implying God’s createdness. Contrary to Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw’s | criti- 412
cism that Rāzī had ‘joined the Creator and His creatures together in a single
genus’ [*41: 257, 2–3] (cf. Meier 1992 [*101: 12]), his account in fact takes a new
approach, whereby the Aristotelian model of equality between cause and effect
(ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ‘man begets man’ Metaph. 1032 a 25) is replaced by
the notion of the ancillary causes soul, matter, space, and time, which mediate
between God and the world He created. This account, which differs essentially
from John Philoponus’ proof for the creation of the world in time (Troupeau
1984 [*83: 79–88], Pines 1986 [*85: 294–320]), modifies the Neoplatonic (and
later, Avicennian) model of a differentiation between the divine One, the intel-
lect, and the soul, which led to a hierarchy of causes and effects, and prompted
Ibn Sīnā to introduce his distinction between essence and existence (Daiber
2004 [*120: 32–33]). Here again, Rāzī presents himself as an independent and
304 chapter 14
critical spirit, who felt free to draw on his Platonic, Neoplatonic, Aristotelian,
and Gnostic-Manichaean heritage, and to combine it with his own insights as a
physician and an expert on Galen. His criticism of some of the fundamentals of
Islamic religion is part of his generally critical attitude towards all religions – an
attitude which led him to a concept of God, which essentially has Neoplatonic
features, without departing from the Koranic-Islamic belief in God, when he
characterizes human knowledge and ethical conduct as an increasing ‘assimil-
ation to God’. Nevertheless, it does not come as a surprise that, a few exceptions
notwithstanding, Rāzī’s thoughts did not receive much appreciation from his
contemporaries, especially among the Ismailites, nor from later thinkers up
to and including Mošeh Ben Maimon (Maimonides) (Peters 1968 [*60: 172],
Meier 1992 [*101], Bar-Asher 1995 [*36: 110–111]). Writing in the 6th/12th cen-
tury, Maimonides, in his Guide of the Perplexed (Book III, ch. 12), calls Rāzī’s
pronouncements in his theological work Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī (LW °6) ‘sense-
less jabber’ (haḏayān) (Stroumsa 2001 [*119: 146–152]). However, in another
work he used Rāzī’s Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs (Doubts about Galen) [*47: 87, 3–12] as
a source for Galen, in particular for his statements about the most perfect lan-
guage (Schreiner 1983 [*131: 224–225]), as did Mošeh Ibn ʿEzra before him in
his Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara wa-l-muḏākara [*12: I 44, 14–45, 6; Span. transl. II 44–45].
In the Latin Middle Ages again only a fraction of Rāzī’s philosophy was
known, in stark contrast to his medical work. We find evidence of it in Petrus
Alfonsi (ca. 1060–1140) and Ramón Martí (ca. 1230–1285). Both had mastered
Arabic and knew Rāzī’s Doubts about Galen (aš-Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs) or quoted
from it (Burnett 1998 [*132: 979–981]). In the 20th century, it seems that
Rāzī’s psychology held some fascination for Thomas Mann, who came it across
in a 1925 article by Schaeder on ‘Die islamische Lehre vom vollkommenen
Menschen’ (‘The Islamic Doctrine of the Perfect Man’) [*21: 232–235]; it found
an echo in Mann’s tetralogy Joseph und seine Brüder ( Joseph and His Brothers)
413 (Tornero Poveda 2001 [*133: 746–750]). |
6 Secondary Literature
6.1 Bibliographies
*1 Sezgin, Fuat: Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. III.: Medizin, Pharmazie,
Zoologie, Tierheilkunde. Leiden 1970.
*2 Ullmann, Manfred: Die Medizin im Islam. Leiden 1970.
*3 Daiber, Hans: Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy. I–II. Leiden/Boston 1999. –
Supplement 2007.
6.2 Textual Transmission and Textual History

*7 Gutas, Dimitri: “Notes and Texts from Cairo Mss. I”. In Arabica 24 (1977), 91–
93.
*8 Richter-Bernburg, Lutz: “Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Rāzī’s (Rhazes) Medical
Works”. In Medicina nei secoli: Arte e scienza 6 (1994), 377–392.
6.3 Biography
*11 Ranking, George S. A.: “The Life and Works of Rhazes (Abū Bakr Muḥammad
Bin Zakariyā Ar-Rāzī)”. In 17th International Congress of Medicine, London 1913,
Section XXIII. London 1914, 237–268.
*12 Ruska, Julius: “Al-Bīrūnī als Quelle für das Leben und die Schriften al-Rāzī’s”.
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*13 Meyerhof, Max: “ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī’s Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma”. In Osiris 8 (1948),
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*14 Rowson, Everett K.: “The Philosopher as Litterateur: Al-Tawḥīdī and His Pre-
decessors”. In ZGAIW 6 (1990), 50–92.
*15 Blois, François de: “Shuhayd al-Balkhī, a Poet and Philosopher of the Time of
Rāzī”. In BSOAS 59 (1996), 333–337.
6.4 Introductions, General Accounts

*21 Schaeder, Hans Heinrich: “Die islamische Lehre vom vollkommenen
Menschen”. In ZDMG 79 (1925): 192–268. | 414
*22 Kraus, Paul and Shlomo Pines, “al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammed b. Zakarīyāʾ”.
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*23 Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Maurice: “Er-Razi philosophe d’après des ou-
vrages récents”. In Revue de l’histoire des religions 124 (1941), 142–190.
*24 Meyerhof, Max: “The Philosophy of the Physician ar-Râzî”. In Islamic Culture 15
(1941), 45–58. – Summaries of the contents of Rāzī’s writings. Ed. by Paul Kraus,
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*25 Pines, Shlomo: “Philosophy”. In The Cambridge History of Islam II. Ed. by Peter
Malcolm Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis. Cambridge 1970,
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*26 Muḥaqqiq, Mahdī (Mehdi Mohaghegh): Failasūf-i Raiy Muḥammad ibn-i
Zakariyā-yi Rāzī. Tehran 21974.
*27 Bazmee Ansari, A. S.: “Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Rāzī, Universal Scholar
and Scientist”. In IS 15/3, 1976, 155–166.
*28 ʿAbd, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Muḥammad al-: Uṣūl al-fikr al-falsafī ʿind Abī Bakr ar-
Rāzī. Cairo 1977.
*29 Bazmee Ansari, A. S.: “Philosophical and Religious Views of Muḥammad ibn
Zakariyyā al-Rāzī”. In IS 16/3, 1977, 157–177.
306 chapter 14
*30 Badawī, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān: Quelques figures et thèmes de la philosophie

islamique. Paris 1979. – Contains 79–94: Repr. of “Muḥammad b. Zakariyyāʾ al-
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*31 Bausani, Alessandro: Un filosofo ‘laico’ del medioevo musulmano: Abū Bakr
Muḥammad ben Zakariyyāʾ Rāzī. Rome 1981.
*32 Endress, Gerhard: “Die wissenschaftliche Literatur”. In Grundriss der ara-
bischen Philologie. II: Literaturwissenschaft. Ed. by Wolfdietrich Fischer and
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*33 Iskandar, Albert Zaki: “Al-Rāzī”. In Religion, Learning and Science in the
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*34 Brague, Rémi. “Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn-Zakarīyā ar-Rāzī”. In Grosses Werk-
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*35 Escobar Gómez, Santiago: “Abū Bakr Zakariyyā Al-Rāzī, un filósofo de una
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60.
*36 Bar-Asher, Meir M.: “Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (865–925)”. In Klassiker der Religions-
philosophie. Ed. by Friedrich Niewöhner. Munich 1995, 99–111 and 356–
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*37 Escobar Gómez, Santiago: “Orígenes y evolución de la filosofía ética de Abū
Bakr al-Rāzī”. In Actas del II congreso nacional de filosofía medieval. Ed. by J. M.
415 Ayala Martinez. Zaragoza 1996, 265–270. |
*38 Goodman, Lenn Evan: “Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyāʾ al-Rāzī”. In History of
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*39 Pines, Shlomo: Studies in Islamic Atomism [= Beiträge zur islamischen Atomen-
lehre, Berlin 1936]. Transl. from Germ. by Michael Schwarz. Ed. by Tzvi Lan-
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*40 Ḥamd, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd: Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyyāʾ ar-Rāzī aṭ-
ṭabīb wa-l-faylasūf: Dirāsa. Damascus 1999.
*41 Adamson, Peter: “Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī”. In Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter.
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tian Schäfer. Darmstadt 2013, 199–217.
6.5 Individual Groups of Works, Writings, Problems, and Concepts

*48 Boer, Tjitze J. de: De ‘Medicina mentis’ van den arts Razi. Amsterdam, 1920. –
Repr. in Muḥammad ibn Zakariyāʾ al-Rāzī (d. 313/925): Texts and Studies. II. Ed. by
Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt 1996, 137–153.
*49 Pines, Shlomo: “Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy”. In Islamic Culture 11,
1937, 66–80. – Repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy.
Ed. by Sarah Stroumsa. Jerusalem 1996, 47–61.
*50 Corbin, Henry: “Le temps cyclique dans le mazdéisme et dans l’ismaélisme”. In
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*51 Graf, Georg: Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur. IV. Vatican City
1951.
*52 Pines, Shlomo: “Rāzī critique de Galien”. In Actes du VIIe congrès international
d’histoire des sciences. Paris 1953, 480–487. – Repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in
Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Mediaeval Science [cf. *85], 256–263.
*53 Pines, Shlomo: Nouvelles études sur Awḥad al-Zamān Abu’l-Barakāt al-Bagh-
dādī. Paris 1955. – Repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī.
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*54 Dunlop, Douglas Morton: “The Translations of al-Biṭrīq and Yaḥyā
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*55 Rosenthal, Franz: Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam. Zurich 1965.
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*57 Bürgel, Johann Christoph: Averroes “contra Galenum”: das Kapitel von der
Atmung im Colliget des Averroes als Zeugnis mittelalterlich-islamischer Kritik an
Galen. Göttingen 1968, 284–286. | 416
*58 Fakhry, Majid: “A Tenth-Century Arabic Interpretation of Plato’s Cosmology”.
In Journal of the History of Philosophy 6, 1968, 15–22. – Repr. in Majid Fakhry,
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no. IV.
*59 Peters, Francis Edward: Aristoteles Arabus: The Oriental Translations and
Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus. Leiden 1968.
*60 Peters, Francis Edward: Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in
Islam. New York 1968.
*61 Daiber, Hans: “Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text über die
Tugenden der Seele in arabischer Überlieferung”. In Der Islam 47 (1971), 25–42. –
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*62 Giffen, Lois Anita: Theory of Profane Love Among the Arabs: The Development
of the Genre. New York 1971. – 141–142: Analysis of Rāzī’s aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī, ch. 5.
*63 Goodman, Lenn Evan: “The Epicurean Ethic of Muḥammad ibn Zakariyāʾ ar-
Rāzī”. In Studia Islamica 34, 1971, 5–26.
*64 Goodman, Lenn Evan: “Rāzī’s Psychology”. In The Philosophical Forum 4/1
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308 chapter 14
*65 Mattock, John Nicolas: “A Translation of the Arabic Epitome of Galen’s Book
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*66 Pines, Shlomo: “An Arabic Summary of a Lost Work of John Philoponus”. In IOS
2, 1972, 320–359. – Repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek
Texts and in Mediaeval Science [*85], 294–326.
*67 Mohaghegh, Mehdi: “Rāzī’s Kitāb al-ʿilm al-ilāhī and the Five Eternals”. In
Abr-Nahrain 13, 1972/1973, 16–23. – Also in Mehdi Mohaghegh, Faylasūf-i Raiy
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*68 Endress, Gerhard: Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio theo-
logica in arabischer Übersetzung, eingeleitet, herausgegeben und erklärt. Beirut
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*69 Peters, Francis Edward: Allah’s Commonwealth: A History of Islam in the Near
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*70 Pines, Shlomo: “Philosophy, Mathematics and the Concepts of Space in the
Middle Ages”. In The Interaction Between Science and Philosophy. Ed. by Yehuda
Elkana. Atlantic Highlands, 1974, 165–174. – Repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in
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*71 Rundgren, Frithiof: “Das Muxtaṣar min Kitāb al’Axlāq des Galenos, einige
Bemerkungen”. In Orientalia Suecana 23–24, 1974–1975, 84–105.
*72 Goodman, Lenn Evan: “Rāzī’s Myth of the Fall of Soul: Its Function in His Philo-
sophy”. In Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science. Ed. by George F. Hourani.
417 Albany 1975, 25–40. |
*73 Mohaghegh, Mehdi: “Maqām-i falsafī-yi Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyāʾ-i Rāzī”. In
Mehdi Mohaghegh, Bīst Guftār dar mabāḥiṯ wa falsāfī wa kalāmī wa firaqi
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*74 Takrītī, Nāǧī at-: Yahya Ibn ʿAdi: A Critical Edition and Study of his Tahdhib al-
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*75 Walker, Paul E.: “Eternal Cosmos and the Womb of History: Time in Early
Ismaili Thought”. In International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, 1978, 355–366.
*76 Döring, Klaus: Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der
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*77 Takrītī, Nāǧī at-: Al-Falsafa al-aḫlāqiyya al-Aflāṭūniyya ʿind mufakkirī l-Islām.
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*78 Daiber, Hans: Aetius Arabus: Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung.
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*79 Goldman, Steven Louis: “On the Beginnings and Endings of Time in Medi-
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*80 Baffioni, Carmela. Atomismo e antiatomismo nel pensiero islamico. Naples
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*81 Gutas, Dimitri: “Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle’s
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*82 Genequand, Charles: “Quelques aspects de l’idée de nature, d’Aristote à al-
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*83 Troupeau, Gérard: “Un épitomé arabe du ‘de contingentia mundi’ de Jean
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*84 Ess, Josef van: “Kumūn”. In EI2 V. Leiden 1986, 384–385.
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*86 Davidson, Herbert Alan: Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God
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*88 Gutas, Dimitri: Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading
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*89 Bar-Asher, Meir M.: “Quelques aspects de l’éthique d’Abū-Bakr al-Rāzī et ses
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*92 Daiber, Hans: “Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (9. Jh.) über die Einteilung der Wissenschaften”.
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*101 Meier, Fritz: “Der ‘Urknall’: Eine Idee des Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī”. In Oriens 33, 1992,
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*102 Walker, Paul E.: “The Political Implications of al-Rāzī’s Philosophy”. In The
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*104 Druart, Thérèse-Anne: “Al-Kindī’s Ethics”. In Review of Metaphysics 47, 1993,
419 329–357. |
*105 Druart, Thérèse-Anne: “Al-Rāzī (Rhazes) and Normative Ethics”. In Tradition
and Renewal: Philosophical Essays Commemorating the Centennial of Louvain’s
Institute of Philosophy. II. Ed. by David A. Boileau and John A. Dick. Leuven
1993, 167–181.
*106 Sorabji, Richard: Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western
Debate. Ithaca 1993.
*107 Fakhry, Majid: Ethical Theories in Islam. 2nd expanded edition. Leiden 1994.
*108 Lettinck, Paul: Aristotle’s Physics and Its Reception in the Arabic World. Leiden
1994.
*109 Lettinck, Paul and James Opie Urmson, Engl. transl.: Philoponus on Aris-
totle’s Physics 5–8 with Simplicius: On Aristotle on the Void. London 1994.
*110 Zonta, Mauro: Un interprete ebreo della filosofia di Galeno: gli scritti filosofici di
Galeno nell’opera di Shem Tob ibn Falaquera. Turin 1995.
*111 Daiber, Hans: “Political Philosophy”. In History of Islamic Philosophy. II. Ed.
by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. London 1996, 841–885. = H.
Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/8.
*112 Druart, Thérèse-Anne: “Al-Rāzī’s Conception of the Soul: Psychological
Background to His Ethics”. In Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5, 1996, 245–263.
*113 Druart, Thérèse-Anne: “The Ethics of al-Razi (865–925?)”. In Medieval Philo-
sophy and Theology 6, 1997, 47–71.
*114 Strohmaier, Gotthard: “Bekannte und unbekannte Zitate in den Zweifeln an
Galen des Rhazes”. In Text and Tradition: Studies in Ancient Medicine and its Trans-
mission, Presented to Jutta Kollesch. Ed. by Klaus-Dietrich Fischer, Diet-
hard Nickel and Paul Potter. Leiden 1998, 263–287.
*115 Daiber, Hans: “Rebellion gegen Gott: Formen atheistischen Denkens im frühen
Islam”. In Atheismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance. Ed. by Friedrich
Niewöhner and Olaf Pluta. Wiesbaden 1999, 23–44. = H. Daiber, From the
Greeks to the Arabs III A/4.
*116 Stroumsa, Sarah: Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī, and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. Leiden 1999. – Repr. (paperback) 2016.
*117 Rashed, Marwan: “Abû Bakr al-Râzî et le kalâm”. In MUSJ 24, 2000, 39–54.
*118 Daiber, Hans: “Die Aristotelesrezeption in der syrischen Literatur”. In Die Ge-
genwart des Altertums: Formen und Funktionen des Altertumsbezugs in den Hoch-
kulturen der Alten Welt. Ed. by Dieter Kuhn and Helga Stahl. Heidelberg
2001, 327–345. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/8.
*119 Stroumsa, Sarah: “‘Ravings’: Maimonides’ Concept of Pseudo-Science.” In
Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism 1, 2001, 141–163.
*120 Daiber, Hans: “The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sīnā: Epistem-
ological and Theological Aspects and the Consequences”. In Erkenntnis und Wis-
senschaft: Probleme der Epistemologie in der Philosophie des Mittelalters. | Ed. by 420
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora and Pia Antolic. Berlin
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*121 Adamson, Peter: “Platonic Pleasures in Epicurus and al-Rāzī”. In In the Age of
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son. London 2008, 71–94. – Repr. in Peter Adamson, Studies on Early Arabic
Philosophy. Farnham, Surrey 2015, no. VI.
*122 Escobar Gómez, Santiago: “Los conceptos de tiempo y espacio en Ibn Hazm
de Córdoba en su relación con Abū Bakr Al-Rāzī y Newton”. In El pensamiento
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*123 Adamson, Peter: “Abū Bakr al-Rāzī on Animals”. In Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 94, 2012, 249–273. – Repr. in Peter Adamson 2015 [cf. *121], no. VII.
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*124 Adamson, Peter: “Galen and al-Rāzī on Time”. In Medieval Arabic Thought:
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*125 Dodikhudoev, Khayolbek: “The Polemic between the Two Razis”. In Ishraq
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*126 Goodman, Lenn Evan: “How Epicurean was al-Rāzī?”. In SGA 5, 2015, 247–
280.
*127 Koetschet, Pauline: “Galien, al-Rāzī, et lʾéternité du monde. Les fragments du
traité sur la démonstration, IV, dans les Doutes sur Galien”. In ASP 25, 2015, 167–
198.
*128 Vallat, Philippe: “Between Hellenism, Islam, and Christianity: Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī and His Controversies with Contemporary Muʿtazilite Theologians as Repor-
ted by the Ashʿarite Theologian and Philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī”. In Ideas in
Motion in Baghdad and Beyond. Ed. by Damian Janos. Leiden/Boston, 2016, 178–
220.
6.6 Reception
*131 Schreiner, Martin: Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. by Moshe Perlman. Hildes-
heim 1983.
*132 Burnett, Charles: “Encounters with Rāzī the Philosopher: Constantine the
African, Petrus Alfonsi and Ramón Martí”. In Pensamiento medieval hispano.
Homenaje a Horacio Santiago-Otero. Ed. by José M. Soto Rábanos. Madrid
1998, 973–992.
*133 Tornero Poveda, Emilio: “Filosofía árabe y literatura del siglo XX”. In Anaquel
de estudios árabes 12, 2001, 743–750.
*134 Alexandrin, Elizabeth R.: “Rāzī and His Mediaeval Opponents: Discussions
Concerning tanāsukh and the Afterlife”. In Iran, questions et connaissances: Actes
du IVe congrès européen des études iraniennes. II. Ed. by Philip Huyse and
Maria Szuppe. Paris 2002, 397–409.
7 Supplementary Remarks
P. 295: On Rāzī’s knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus cf. Aileen R. Das, Galen and the
Arabic Reception of Plato’s Timaeus. Cambridge 2020.
P. 386: Rāzī’s Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs is now available in a new edition,
French translation and introduction by Pauline Koetschet, Abū Bakr Al-
Rāzī ⟩Doutes sur Galien⟨. Introduction, édition et traduction. Berlin/Boston
2019.
P. 391 n. 6: On the debate between Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī and Abū Bakr ar-
Rāzī, its afterlife, and on Rāzī’s concept of pleasure cf. Gregor Schwarb,
Early Kalām and the Medical Tradition. In Philosophy and Medicine in the Form-
ative Period of Islam. Ed. Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann. London
2017 (104–169), 128–143.
P. 399 (ch. 7) and pp. 402f.: On a comparison of Abū Zayd al-Balḫī, Maṣā-
liḥ al-abdān and Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī cf. Peter Adamson and
Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt, The Consolations of Philosophy: Abū Zayd al-
Balḫī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī on Sorrow and Anger. In Philosophy and Medicine in
the Formative Period of Islam, 190–205. – The same volume contains, Pauline
Koetschet, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī on Vision, 170–189. – On a possible influence
of Galen’s recently discovered Περὶ ἀλυπίας in Rāzī’s Spiritual Medicine cf. An-
toine Pietrobelli, Arabic Περὶ ἀλυπίας: Did al-Kindī and Rāzī Read Galen?
In Galen’s Treatise Περὶ ἀλυπίας (De indolentia) in Context. A Tale of Resilience.
Ed. by Caroline Petit. Leiden/Boston 2019. = Studies in Ancient Medicine 52,
265–284 (Rāzī “read and imitated” Galen’s Περὶ ἀλυπίας).
Pp. 401–405: Cf. Janne Mattila, The Ethical Progression of the Philosopher
in Al-Rāzī and Al-Fārābī. In ASP 27, 2017, 115–137.
P. 410: cf. Loredana Carpentieri, Antecedenti greci nell’atomismo di Abū
Bakr al-Rāzī. In Labor limae. Atti in onore di Carmela Baffioni. Prefazione di
Wilferd Madelung. A cura di Antonella Straface, Carlo De
Angelo, Andrea Manzo. I. Napoli 2014–2015 [2017]. = Studi Maġrebini.
Nuova Serie XII, 103–121.
P. 395, works on logic: On fragments of a lost treatise about the theory of
sign-inference (al-istidlāl bi-š-šāhid ʿalā l-ġāʾib) in Pseudo-Ǧābir, Kitāb at-Taṣrīf
and in Rāzī’s Kitāb aš-Šukūk ʿalā Ǧālīnūs cf. Pauline Koetschet, Abū Bakr
Al-Rāzī et le signe: Fragment retrouvé d’un traité logique perdue. In ASP 27,
2017, 75–114.
Republished, with some modifications, from Philosophy in the Islamic World I: 8th–10th
Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson.
English translation by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook of
Oriental Studies I: The Near and Middle East. 115/19, pp. 381–420. By courtesy of the
publisher.
chapter 15
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (4th/10th c.) on the Unity and

Diversity of Religions
Summary
This article describes the way, how the Muslim philosopher Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (10th
c. AD) attempted to account for the phenomenon of religious diversity and to deal
with it. He defended the absolute necessity and authority of Mohammed’s prophecy
against the attacks of contemporaries who denied his divine inspiration or consider
it not to be essential. Adhering to the orthodox tradition, Abū Ḥātim claims, that
Mohammed’s prophecy is necessary to separate authoritatively truth from wrong addi-
tions and errors, since these tend to appear in sole human knowledge. In distinction to
any strict interpretations, he also wants to show, that prophecy does not deny human
knowledge. On the contrary, prophecy appeals to and even demands, that people have
to use their mind. Thus, the attainment of the universal belief in one single God and
in the justness of His laws is the historical result of prophetic revelation to mankind,
and it is a permanently renewed intellectual process, seeking for the universal meaning
of diverse forms of tradition and religion, respectively. The present article approaches
these issues in the light of present-day historical scholarship, and in the context of intel-
lectual discussions and cosmopolitan ferment during Abū Ḥātim’s time.
As we know, Prophet Mohammed has adopted many biblical stories. He con-

sidered himself to be the last link in a universal history of salvation, with its
prophetic forerunners in Judaism and Christianity. Divine revelation already
had been brought to the “people of the Book” before him.1 In later times,
however, shortly after the Hijra from Mecca to Medina (622AD), Mohammed
modified his attitude.2 Obstinacy of Medinan Jews induced his change of mind.
It entailed, that the divine message, revealed to him, had to replace the religious
conceptions of Jews and Christians. He considered himself as the restorer of
the religion of Abraham, the religion that preceded Moses and Jesus. In this
88 sense, Mohammed | regarded himself as the successor to the earlier proph-
1 R. Paret, Mohammed, pp. 92 ff.

2 R. Paret, Mohammed, pp. 117 ff.

abū ḥātim ar-rāzī on the unity and diversity of religions 315
ets in Judaism and Christianity. The universal, pre-Islamic divine knowledge

was transmitted through his person to the people in an unadulterated man-
ner. And this, too, served to legitimate his religious-political authority.3 After
Mohammed’s death, the combination of political power and divine knowledge,
revealed to the Prophet, let arise unending debates on the legitimacy of the
caliphs.4 Against the background of these debates, a contemporary of Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzi, the philosopher Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951) in his book
“The Perfect State” argued the thesis, that the leader of a perfect state, who is
endowed with knowledge and as a philosopher, has to be a prophet too. For
his knowledge is bestowed on him by the divine active intellect in the shape of
prophetical inspiration.5
This combination of, respectively, authority and prophecy, knowledge and
divine inspiration, can also be found in the Ismailite scholar Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzi
(d. 322/934).6 In his book on “The Proofs of Prophecy”7 he endeavours to prove,
in accordance with the Muʿtazilite-Zaydite8 and Ismailite tradition,9 that the
imperfection of human knowledge requires prophetic inspiration. Abū Ḥātim
takes up the Koranic view of universal divine knowledge, already revealed to
the Jews and Christians, in an original manner. He offers an interesting explan-
ation for the unity and diversity of religions. The occasion for his argument
was a dispute with the famous physician and philosopher Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī in
Rayy (today Tehran) between 318/930 and 320/932–933, in the presence of the
3 Cf. Suras 2:251 (252); 4:54 and 12 101 (102).

4 Cf. M. Sharon, Black Banners, ch. 2.
5 H. Daiber, Ruler, pp. 15 f.
6 His complete name is Abū Ḥātim Ibn Ḥamdān Ibn Aḥmad al-Warsinānī al-Layṯī ar-Rāzī. Cf. F.
Sezgin, GAS I, p. 573. – I. K. Poonawala, Bibliography, pp. 36–39. – H. Halm, Kosmologie,
pp. 173 f. – M. Jalali-Moqaddam, “Abū Ḥātim Al-Rāzī”.
7 Edited by S. Al-Sawy with introduction and notes. English introduction by S. H. Nasr. Por-
tions (3.3–13.15; 69.3–76.12; 104.3–116.3) have been translated into French (F. Brion, “Philo-
sophie”). – A new edition, based on the edition by S. Al-Sawy and with English translation,
was published by T. Khalidi. The text still requires a detailed commentary, which could con-
tribute to a better understanding and which could modify the translation in several details.
Passages quoted in this article follow my own translation. – Abū Ḥātim’s argumentation was
adopted a generation later by the Ismailite Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 411/1020 or 1021), who
recapitulates the discussion between Abū Ḥātim and Abū Bakr in the introduction (pp. 9–19)
to his al-Aqwāl aḏ-Ḏahabiyya (ed. S. Al-Sawy), a refutation of Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s aṭ-Ṭibb ar-
rūḥānī.
8 Cf. Ǧāḥiẓ, al-Ǧawābāt wa-stiḥqāq (ed. ʿA. S. M. Hārūn, Rasāʾil, p. 320, 3ff.) / German transl. by
C. Pellat, Arabische Geisteswelt, pp. 104ff. – Comments by T. Nagel, Studien, pp. 147–149. –
On the Zaydites, especially Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm (ca. 168/785–245/860), cf. B. Abrahamov,
“Al-Qāsim”.
9 W. Madelung, “Das Imamat”. – W. Madelung, “Aspects”. – S. N. Makarem, Doctrine, p. 35.
316 chapter 15
governor Mardāwīǧ – or perhaps already before 313/925.10 Here, Abū Bakr ar-
89 Rāzī denied the necessity of prophecy,11 and defended – following Aristotle’s |
teaching of the eternity of matter, the impossibility of the creatio ex nihilo, and
the createdness of form – the following thesis: The world came into being,
when God showed mercy to the eternal soul and “assisted her” to lead the
unsettled movement of the eternal soul to an orderly one.12 Abū Bakr defen-
ded his thesis of the eternity of the five principles: “creator”, “soul”, “matter”,
“space”, and “time”.13 He maintained the classical doctrine of atoms, adding
a Neoplatonic component:14 His theories on space and time were apparently
influenced by Proclus’ Institutio theologica,15 and to a greater degree than has
been assumed until today.16 Contrary to the Platonic-Neoplatonic tendencies
of Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, his Ismailite opponent Abū Ḥātim followed Aristotle’s
theories on time17 and space:18 There is no absolute, eternal time, and no abso-
lute, eternal space. Here, we will not enter into details, and shall focus our
attention on Abū Ḥātim’s emphasis on intellectuality. The latter enables man
to speculate on space and time as something that can be imagined, but not
as something absolute. For Fārābī man can only reflect what is conceivable
10 S. M. Stern, Studies, pp. 199 and 202 f.

11 Strange enough, Abū Ḥātim does not refer to Ibn ar-Rāwandī (3rd/9th c.), and does not
criticize him, as was done more than a century later by the Ismailite al-Muʾayyad fī d-
Dīn aš-Šīrāzī (d. 470/1077). The circumstance, that Abū Ḥātim was better informed on Ibn
ar-Rāwandī who by the posterity was incorrectly reckoned among those who deny proph-
ecy, possibly forms an explanation. According to Ibn ar-Rāwandī, divine revelation does
not contradict reason (human knowledge). He only denies the possibility of proving the
“infallibility” (ʿiṣma) of the Prophet. For this and for a reverberation of it in Fārābī cf. J.
van Ess, “Ibn Al-Rēwandī” and J. van Ess, “Al-Fārābī”.
12 Cf. the report by Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 20ff. / ed. and transl. T. Kha-
lidi, pp. 17 ff. – H. A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 14 f., has a short note on Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, but
unfortunately does not take into account this important report.
13 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 14 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 12ff. – M.
Mohaghegh, “Rāzī’s Kitāb al-ʿilm al-ilāhī”, pp. 16–23. – M. Fakhry, “Tenth Century”.
14 Cf. S. Pines, Beiträge, pp. 34 ff.
15 With regard to Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s concept of space (S. Pines, Beiträge, p. 48), cf. “mag-
nitude” and “extension”, μέγεθος and πλῆθος of the ὄντως ὄν, in Proclus’Institutio theologica
(ed. and Engl. transl. E. R. Dodds 1963), prop. 86 / Arabic transl. (perhaps by Yaḥyā Ibn al-
Biṭrīq in the 9th c. AD) G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, p. 33 / German transl. by G. Endress,
Proclus Arabus, pp. 286 f., s.v. ʿiẓam, ʿuẓm, kaṯra.
16 S. Pines only in his discussion of Rāzī’s conception of time mentions a parallel with Pro-
clus. – M. Jammer, Problem des Raumes, unfortunately does not discuss our authors.
17 Aristotle, Physics VIII 8. 256 a 11–12, and IV 14. 223 b 21–23. – Cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus,
pp. 365 f. – J. Bilinski, “Concept of Time”, does not discuss our authors.
18 Aristotle, Physics IV 4. 212 a 20 f. – Cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus, p. 362.
for his imagination.19 Otherwise it does not exist – just as absolute space and
time do not exist. God, of course, is an exception to this rule. God exists, but
He transcends human experience. His existence can be proved, but only by
evidence of His creation. Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī follows Hanbalite and Muʿtazilite
theology, according to which no one can enquire into the “nature” (kayfiyya)
of the Creator.20 In conformity with the Qurʾān’s prescriptions,21 man is asked
to “reflect” (tafakkara, iʿtabara) on God’s creation.22 Here, we find a kind of
cosmological proof for God’s existence on the evidence of His creation. This
has a parallel in the Kitāb al-ʿAẓama of his younger contemporary Abū Šayḫ
(274/887–369/979)23 from Iṣfahan, as well as in the Kitāb ad-Dalāʾil wa-l-iʿtibār
ʿalā l-ḫalq wa-t-tadbīr ascribed to Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 869), which is identical
with the Kitāb al-Fikar wa-l-iʿtibār ascribed to Ǧāḥiẓ’ contemporary Ǧibrīl Ibn
Nūḥ Ibn Abī Nūḥ al-Anbāri.24 These books follow patristic-Hellenistic tradi-
tion, which has been the starting point | for Islamic cosmology ever since the 90
9th/10th centuries AD.25 The recommendation to think about God’s creation
received an interesting accentuation in Abū Ḥātim: By referring to the Qurʾān,26
he corroborates God’s command to lend one’s ear to “people with differing
opinions” (al-muḫtalifūn), “to examine” (an-naẓar), “to be critical” (an-naẓar),
and “to follow what is most excellent, suitable, true, and necessary”.27 Accord-
ing to Abū Ḥātim,28 the “adherents of the laws” (ahl aš-šarāʾiʿ) are enabled to
“examination” and “enquiry” (baḥṯ). This is totally different from “controversy”
(ǧadal), “quarrel” (ḫuṣūma), or “strife” (tanāzuʿ), which is in fact “unbelief”
(kufr). Abū Ḥātim here criticizes the disputes of the mutakallimūn, the theo-
logians; it is not legitimate to get the upper hand in a dispute in an unlawful
manner, but it is legitimate to enquire “in a legal way” (bi-l-inṣāf wa-l-ʿadl).29
Furthermore, “radicalism in belief” (taʿammuq fī d-dīn) is not acceptable. This
would be “exaggeration” (ġuluww) and has nothing to do with “attaining an
independent judgement” (iǧtihād).30 Abū Ḥātim here explicitly criticizes the
19 Cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”.

20 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 38, 6 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 29, 2ff.
21 Abū Ḥātim refers to Suras 2:164 (159); 3:189 f. (186 f.); 13:3 and 16:8–10.
23 Cf. A. Heinen, Islamic Cosmology, pp. 37 ff.
24 Cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, pp. 159 f. – H. A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 219f.
25 Cf. B. Radtke, “Kosmographie”.
26 Sura 3:93 (87).
27 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 36, 5 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 27, 12f.
28 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 35, 1 ff. and 36, 10ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 27,
1 ff. and 17 ff.
30 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 43, 6 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 33, 5ff. –
318 chapter 15
Kharijite sect,31 which had gained a reputation for its radicalism in the early his-
tory of Islam, denying the claim of ʿUṯmān (regn. 23/644–35/656) and ʿAlī (regn.
35/656–40/661) to the caliphate.32 The critical attitude towards mutakallimūn
and Kharijites was in accordance with the view of the Hanbalites.33 Moreover,
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s book shows a clearly anti-Kharijite import in its thesis on
the differences between people. The Kharijites defended the equality of men, a
similarity with the old Arabic egalitarianism. The leader of the community does
not – contrary to Shiʿite ideas – have charisma. Just as in the old Arabic tribal
ideal, he is primus inter pares. The Kharijite-Ibadite sect of Yazīdiyya, founded
by Yazīd Ibn Abī Anīsa / Unaysa even assumed the equality of Persians and
Arabs, as to maintain, that in the future there would come a Persian prophet
who would replace Mohammed and bring a new revelation.34 And his revela-
tion would be as divine as those in Judaism and Christianity.35
Against the background of such tendencies and trends, Abū Ḥātim tried to
develop his own position. He presupposed the diversity of men, giving way to
pro-Shiʿite and anti-Kharijite tendencies. He writes:36
91 … (This is) because there are different classes of men as concerns their
intelligence, insight, power of distinction and knowledge. For men are not
created equal to one another in their natures, as are animals, for instance,
which do not differ37 in their knowledge of what they need. Since every
class of animals is equal by nature as regards their consciousness of the
iǧtihād must be accompanied by orientation to the prophetic revelation – taqlīd: Cf. Abū
Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 72, 9 ff. and 73, 1 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 13ff.
and 53, 1 ff. – Cf. below p. /97/. Herewith, Abū Ḥātim anticipates Ġazālī. – On Ġazālī’s con-
ception of iǧtihād as opposed to taqlīd cf. H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, pp. 488ff. – Ġazālī,
a critic of the Bāṭiniyya (= Ismailites; s. n. 110) has at the same time been influenced by the
Bāṭiniyya, as F. Jabre, Notion, already has shown with other examples.
32 Cf. G. Levi Della Vida, “Kharidjites”. – W. M. Watt and M. E. Marmura, Der Islam II,
pp. 1 ff.
33 Cf. H. Laoust, Profession, pp. 55 f., on the Hanbalite attitude towards the kalām of the
mutakallimūn. He mentions the Hadith-scholar Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 277/890) on p. 56,
2, who should not be confused with the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 322/934).
34 Cf. I. Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien I, pp. 138f. – W. M. Watt and M. E. Mar-
mura, Der Islam II, pp. 27 ff.: read Yazīd Ibn Abī Anīsa / Unaysa and add to the mentioned
sources Saʿīd Ibn Našwān al-Ḥimyarī (d. 573/1178), al-Ḥūr al-ʿīn, ed. K. Muṣṭafā, p. 175, 5ff.
35 Cf. G. Levi Della Vida, “Kharidjites”, col. 1076 b.
36 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 185, 6–10 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 134, 8–12. –
Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 6, 13 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 4, 8ff.
37 tafāḍalū: The term can also be found with this meaning in the later Fārābī, al-Madīna
al-fāḍila (s. R. Walzer, Al-Farabi, pp. 226, 5 and 230, 14). The diversity of ranks among
obligation to look for food and to reproduce, they do not differ in a man-
ner, comparable to the mentioned diversity of the classes of men as con-
cerns their intelligence and insight.
By way of explanation, Abū Ḥātim offers the notion that God “is too just, wise,
and merciful to equate men with animals”.38 Men are different from anim-
als, but also differ among one another: There are people “who know” (ʿālim)
and people “who learn” (mutaʿallim), “leaders” (imām) and people “guided” by
them (maʾmūm).39 God therefore forgives the weak, who are not obliged to the
same extent as the strong.40 For this reason, “it is possible that God bestows
His wisdom and mercy on men, chooses them from His creation, makes them
prophets, helps them, and gives them prophecy”.41 People require guidance on
account of these intellectual differences. The Prophet is their guide par excel-
lence, elected by God and equipped with divine knowledge. Here we find the
first beginnings of ideas, which were later developed in a unique system of
political philosophy by Fārābī. The diversity of men and their need of guid-
ance proves – in the eyes of Abū Ḥātim – the necessity of prophecy. He thus
kept distance from his opponent Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, who denied the existence
of prophecy: Man could obtain knowledge on his own, and has no need of any
authority, e.g. a prophet. Man can even learn from the imperfect knowledge
of previous scholars and philosophers, because he can “discover” (istadraka)
“other things” (ašyāʾ uḫar) through “intelligence” ( fīṭna), and through intensive
“investigation” (naẓar) and “study” (baḥṯ).42 However, Abū Ḥātim was not blind
people in different states is a central theme of Fārābī; cf. the commentary by R. Walzer,
Al-Farabi, pp. 423 ff.
39 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 6, 20 ff.; 8, 7f.; 55; 72, 5ff. and 184, 12ff. / ed. and
transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 4, 15 ff.; 6, 2 f.; 42; 52, 9 ff. and 133, 15ff. – It is striking that Abū Ḥātim
does not use the Ismailite term dāʿī instead of ʿālim, maybe because his book was written
for a wider circle of readers: Cf. W. Ivanow, Studies, pp. 13f., and the end of this paper. This
may also be an explanation for the fact, that typical details of Ismailite doctrines are miss-
ing in Abū Ḥātim’s book: Cf. the overview of W. Madelung, “Aspects”, or S. N. Makarem,
Doctrine. – Finally, we should point out the parallelism between Abū Ḥātim and the later
Fārābī with respect to this terminology. On the latter cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 7f.
40 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 64 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 47f.
41 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 8, 8–10; cf. 183, 15ff. and 185, 2ff. / ed. and transl. T.
Khalidi, p. 6, 3 f.; cf. 133, 15 ff. and 134, 5 ff.
42 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 11, 2 ff.; cf. 273, 7ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 8,
14 ff.; cf. p. 206, 1 ff. – Cf. p. /93/, and on the contrast of this doctrine of intellect to the
theory of intuition by “illumination” (išrāq) – Abū Ḥātim uses the terminology waḥy and
ilhām – cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 273ff., esp. p. 274, 1ff. / ed. and transl.
320 chapter 15
to the inconsistency among the ancestors, serving as models on one hand and
needing correction on the other.43 According to him, man has need of author-
92 ity. God takes care for the unity of men, despite | their different intellectual
capacities and opinions, through the mediation of a prophetic authority.
A prophet is a teacher of men. Among their ranks, they count the “knowing
(ʿālim) and the ignorant (ǧāhil)”, the “virtuous (ṣāliḥ) and the vicious (ṭāliḥ)”,
the “godfearing (wariʿ) and the desecrating (muntahik)”, the “wise (ʿāqil) and
the unwise (ġabiy)”.44 For this reason, men must be “forced” – Abū Ḥātim
writes, referring to the Qurʾān (Sura 8:39 (40)) – “to accept the external form
of their (i.e. the prophets’) prescriptions”.45
For the well-being (ṣalāḥ) of this world can only be completed by force
(iǧbār), coertion (qahr), and suppression (ġalaba). For men’s natures are
different, just as are their intentions in their religions (adyān) and worldly
affairs.46
The authority of the prophet thus becomes a test for the obedience and dis-
obedience of all men, who have to be guided by the revealed divine law.47 Some
of them even must be forced, because of their dissenting opinions. Notwith-
standing, there is something akin to freedom of conscience, and Abū Ḥātim
ascribes to men the capacity to choose, referring to Sura 2:256–257.48 He con-
tinues: 49
God has ordered men to seek (ṭalab) the deeper meanings (maʿānin)
which exist beneath the external form of their laws, and which bring
T. Khalidi, pp. 206 ff., esp. p. 206, 18 ff., and S. H. Nasr, “Intellect and Intuition”. – This
idea of “progress” was certainly not new. Cf. the philosopher Kindī (ca. 185/801–between
247/861 and 259/873), Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya, ed. M. ʿA. H. Abū Rīda, p. 102 / Engl.
transl. A. L. Ivry, p. 57, and commentary, p. 126. – On the Aristotelian source of inspira-
tion cf. A. Cortabarría Beíta, “Método de Al-Kindī” pp. 210–212. – Or compare Kindī’s
contemporary Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 869): T. Khalidi, “A Mosquito’s Wing”. – S. Ender-
witz, Gesellschaftlicher Rang, pp. 136ff. – T. Khalidi, “Idea of Progress”. – H. Daiber,
“Autonomie”.
45 qabūl ẓāhir rusūmihim, Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 111, 9 / ed. and transl. T. Kha-
lidi, p. 82, 17.
46 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 110, 18–111, 2 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 82, 9f.
49 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 112, 2–5 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 83, 6–9.
salvation. He has urged them to do so in a most beautiful manner by

forgiving them (bi-l-iʿḏār), by warning them (al-inḏār), and by (speaking
to them in a) beautiful exhortation, as, for example: “Seek knowledge,
even if it were in China!” or “The search for knowledge is a duty for every
Muslim”.50
Ignorance thus is disobedience to the prophets,
who endowed without any restriction knowledge of the law’s content to

those who deserve it, who are obedient. (The prophets) defend it against
the unjust and the enemy who does not deserve it.51
According to Abū Ḥātim, ignorance, which means acting without knowledge,

“causes enmity and injustice (baġy)”.52 People without knowledge “mix heresies
(al-bidaʿ) with the prophetic norms (as-sunan)”53 which are passed on, and
only do this, strictly speaking, “for the love of power and in the struggle for the
irrelevant things (aʿrāḍ – “accidents”) of the world”.54 Wars between “adherents
of religions” (ahl al-milal), consequently, arise “mostly” because
they combat their opponents (muḫālifūhum) in their struggle and fight

for the world. Just as we see conflicts on behalf of kingdoms and towns in
the country of Islam, the same happens with all adherents of religions in
their countries.55
Abū Ḥātim adds, Muslims and non Muslims by no means doubt their religion
in doing so. However, “they have preferred the world to religion, | although they 93
are convinced of the reward and punishment of those to whom these are prom-
ised and threatened”.56 He adds:
50 Also recorded by Ibn Māǧa (d. 273/886), Sunan Muqaddima 17.

52 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 113, 2 ff., esp. p. 113, 5 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
p. 84, 5 ff., esp. p. 84, 7.
53 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 173, 2 f.; cf. p. 173, 9ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
p. 127, 1; cf. 127, 15 ff.
p. 127, 10 f.; cf. p. 135, 7 ff.
56 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 187, 3 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 135, 13f. – Abū
Ḥātim here refers to the Muʿtazilite principle of waʿd and waʿīd. On this cf. H. Daiber,
Wāṣil, pp. 13 and 15; J. van Ess, Theologie IV, index s.n.
322 chapter 15
Nevertheless their natural desire drives them to this and dominates their
intellect, so that they prefer the bad to the excellent.57
In addition, Abū Ḥātim notes the insatiability of men, who want to have more
and more of the “irrelevant things” (“accidents”) of the world.58 In order to
limitate this,
God has elected leaders for men, who guide them and give them regu-
lations, so that the world is kept in order, so that men act properly with
respect to (their) religions and worldly affairs, and so that mankind can
live and do not perish, as God – exalted is He – has said: “Had God not
driven the people, some by means of others” (Sura 2:251 (252))59 by what
the prophets have imposed on the people, by what they had laid down,
and by what (people) had been induced to by them.60
Abū Ḥātim in addition remarks, that “certainly not everyone who wins can get
upper hand”.61 Ultimately, men must keep to religion and “are kept in check”
( yuqhar) by religion.62 He then makes the following – remarkable – statement:
In case a Jew, a Christian, or any adherent of a non-Muslim religion would

be desirous of gaining the upper hand in the country of Islam, he would
not be in a position to do so, and would be unable to do it. Although they
prefer irrelevant things (“accidents”) of the world, they do not doubt reli-
gion (milla).63
Wars between adherents of different religions do not arise primarily for the
sake of belief, but because of the insatiability and avarice of men for “worldly
things”. Religious authority regulates the world, “keeping it in check”. Man
must keep to his religious duties, and is unable, contrary to what Abū Ḥātim’s
opponent Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī maintained, to attain knowledge and judgement
59 The translation follows A. J. Arberry.
60 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 188, 13–16 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 136, 19–137,
2.
61 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 188, ult.s. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 137, 3f.
62 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 189, 1 f.; cf. p. 189, 14f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
p. 137, 4; cf. p. 137, 16.
by his own “inventiveness” (istinbāṭ) and “inspiration” (ilhām).64 He is depend-

ent on the divine revelation of a prophet, the leader of the religious com-
munity. Abū Ḥātim adds a further remarkable proposition to this juncture:
The learned books of the Greeks, such as Galen, Hippocrates, Euclid, and
Ptolemy, “are based upon true wisdom and well-arranged principles (al-uṣūl al-
muntaẓima)”.65 This wisdom is not a privilege of the revelation in Islam. Those,
who deliver divine wisdom, have different names and belong to different reli-
gions. They are prophets, who – as was later explained by the philosopher Fā-
rābī as well, expanding the thesis by including the Peripatetic-Aristotelian doc-
trine (Alexander of Aphrodisias)66 – received divine revelation in a dream.67
Irrespective of | his affiliation to a religious community, “(God) only let par- 94
ticipate the prophet in His knowledge – (God), however, knows the religious
secret (ʿālim al-ġayb) and He reveals His secret only to a prophet, with whom
He is pleased”.68 The prophet therefore is “the first wise” (al-ḥakīm al-awwal),69
the mediator of the divine revelation. Their “instinct” ( fiṭra) and nature do not
enable prophets and scholars “to ascend to heaven and to understand these
secret things (al-ġuyūb); rather, God has informed them about these and has
revealed (the secrets) to them”.70 As we have seen, Abū Ḥātim did not restrict
prophetic revelation to Islamic religion. And as was already emphasized by
the Qurʾān, the “people of the Book”, Jews and Christians, are in possession of
prophetic truth, too. However, they have falsified it.71 In Islam, the universal
truth, which was already present among earlier prophets, has been restored, for
they had mingled it with error. In a similar way, there are differences of quality
in between languages: Best are – next to Arabic72 – Syriac, Hebrew, and Persian.
64 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 273ff., esp. p. 274, 1ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
pp. 205 ff., esp. p. 206, 1 ff.
65 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 275, 15 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 207, 6f.
66 H. Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 737 ff. – H. Daiber, “Ruler”, p. 15.
67 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 287f. and 288, 13ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
pp. 216, 13 ff. and 218, 1 ff.
68 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 318, 16 f.; cf. p. 301, 11ff. / ed. and transl. T. Kha-
lidi, p. 243, 7 f.; cf. p. 228, 14 ff. (in the translation read “the wise men” instead of “human
being” and “mankind”). – On the originally Koranic term ġayb cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar,
pp. 117 ff.
69 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 314 ff., esp. p. 318, 4ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
pp. 239 ff., esp. p. 242, 14 ff.
71 Cf. p. /87/f.
72 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Kitāb az-Zīna, ed. H. I. F. A. al-Hamadānī, pp. 60ff., on the superiority of
Arabic to Hebrew, Syriac, and Persian.
324 chapter 15
They have their origin in the “instruction” (tawqīf ) by God.73 According to Abū
Ḥātim’s presentation of divine revelation, this is the source of all knowledge.
Background for this is the early Islamic exegesis of Sura 2:31 (29),74 as reflected
in contemporary traditions.75 This “revelationist”76 theory appears to be com-
bined with the thesis of the “natural relation” between word and meaning or
language and content in Abū Ḥātim – a thesis which had first been defended
by the Muʿtazilite ʿAbbād Ibn Sulaymān (d. 250/864),77 and which had been
generally assumed by the Ismailites.78 Discrepancies only arise, when human
interpretation of prophetic records mix truth and error. Abū Ḥātim writes:79
The exterior (pl. ẓawāhir) of the prophetic records in people’s hands is

true (ḥaqq). However, the heresies, which heretics combine with it, are
wrong. Whoever adheres to these records, which are mixed with heresies,
95 combines truth and falsehood. This has been done by Christianity in |
Byzantium, by Judaism in Ḫazar,80 and by the Magians81 living in some
mountain regions.
Abū Ḥātim bases his explanation on the Qurʾān (Sura 3:78 (72)).82 People who
had too little understanding, “the weak who did not recognize the truth of the
Books’ contents”,83 have been misled by “leaders” (ruʾasāʾ) who have combined
74 “And he taught Adam the names, all of them” (A. J. Arberry).
75 As representatives of this doctrine, we find the Muʿtazilites Abū ʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 303/
916), his pupil Kaʿbī al-Balhī (d. 319/931), Ašʿarī (d. 324/935 or 936), and some grammari-
ans from the 4th/10th c. – Cf. B. G. Weiss, “Medieval Muslim Discussions”, pp. 33ff. – U.
Haarmann, “Religiöses Recht”, pp. 149–169, esp. pp. 153f.
76 I have adopted this term from B. G. Weiss, “Medieval Muslim Discussions”.
77 Cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, p. 211.
78 Ibn Ḥawšab = Manṣūr al-Yaman (d. ca. 303/915), Kitāb ar-Rušd wa-l-hidāya, transl. W.
Ivanow, Studies, pp. 32 ff. – Or Ibn Ḥawšab, Kitāb al-ʿĀlim wa-l-ġulām (cf. I. K. Poona-
wala, Bibliography, p. 64), English summary in W. Ivanow, Studies, p. 73. – Or Abū l-
Fawāris al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad al-Mīmaḏī (or al-Mīhaḏī / Mayhaḏī, end of the 10th c.
AD), Risāla ilā ǧamāʿat ahl ar-Rayy, English summary in W. Ivanow, Studies, pp. 129ff.
79 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 173, 14–17 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 127, 18–128,
1.
80 This is the district around Darband (Caspian Sea). Cf. on it and its religious minorities
Yāqūt, Muʿǧam, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, II, p. 436, 14 ff.
81 The Magians are sometimes called “dualists” (cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 131,
7 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 96, 8), i.e. adherents of the sects of Mani or Mazdak. Cf.
G. Monnot, Penseurs, pp. 77 ff., on these adherents during Islamic times.
83 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 173, 7 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 127, 12f.
the records of the prophets with heretical doctrines84 as a result of a variety

of their “intentions” (ahwāʾ).85 This was all the easier since the revealed Scrip-
tures contain “clear” (wāḍiḥa) as well as “complicated” (mustaġliqa) “thoughts”
(maʿānī).86 “The majority of the prophetic utterances are rendered in a symbol-
ical manner (marmūz)”.87 The “symbol” (ramz), or the “parable” (maṯal), plays
an important part in Abū Ḥātim’s philosophy. He traces it in Islam (Qurʾān)
as well as in the Jewish and Christian religion, by presenting quotations and
fragments from the Old and the New Testaments.88 The conclusion which
this yields is, that “the prophets’ expressions and symbols vary, although their
meaning is identical”.89 Who does not know their meaning, gets the impression
that revelations contain “contradictions” (tanāquḍ, iḫtilāf ).90 Abū Ḥātim gives
the explanation that prophets “do not differ in the principle(s) of (their) reli-
gion and in the confession of the unity (tawḥīd) of God”.91 He thereupon adds a
complete creed which emphasizes the oneness and eternity of God, who Him-
self has created His creatures, not out of something else which is eternal;92 who
has sent the elected prophets to the people as messengers and warning; who in
the future will raise men from the dead; who will reward or punish them; and
who has imposed commands and prohibitions on them. This creed demon-
strates its affinity to the credo of the Ismailites.93 It includes the šahāda, which
84 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 173, 9 ff.; cf. pp. 171–177 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
p. 127, 14 ff.; cf. pp. 126–130. – Disparate traditions arose around the prophets on account
of this combining truth with error; cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 168, 6ff. / ed.
and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 124, 8 ff. – Jesus is crucified according to the gospels, but not
according to the Qurʾān (Sura 4:157 (156)). Cf. O. H. Schumann, Christus, pp. 37f.
86 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 71, 14 ff.; cf. p. 116, 2–4 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
p. 52, 3 ff.; cf. p. 86, 15–17.
87 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 173, 7 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 127, 12.
88 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 94 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 70ff. – Cf. the
index in the edition of S. Al-Sawy, pp. 345 ff., which requires some correction. A precise
comparison should include the biblical quotations in Abū Ḥātim’s Kitāb al-Iṣlāḥ (cf. W.
Ivanow, Studies, pp. 118 ff.; I. K. Poonawala, Bibliography, p. 38) and would be helpful
for the identification of the Vorlage of the quotations. Ismailite circles were acquainted
with Hebrew and Syriac, as is shown by P. Kraus, “Hebräische und syrische Zitate”. Cf. A.
Baumstark, “Zu den Schriftzitaten”, pp. 308–313.
p. 115, 1 f.; cf. p. 70, 3 ff.
90 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 72, 7 f. and 104, 6ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
pp. 52, 12 f. and 77, 6 ff.
92 This includes critique of Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī; cf. p. /89/.
93 Cf. the creed of Abū Yaʿqūb as-Siǧistānī (d. between 386/996 and 393/1002 or 1003), Kitāb
326 chapter 15
96 has been modified in accordance with Abū | Ḥātim’s intentions,94 and which
incorporates elements of the orthodox creed.95 Abū Ḥātim writes:96
The (prophets) unanimously confess: God is one single God: There is

no (other) God besides Him. He is eternal, without any (second) eternal
(god) besides Him. He did not cease to be and shall not cease to be. He is
the creator of all creatures, which have not been created out of something
(else eternal). There is no creator besides Him. – (The prophets) have
described Him – great is His reputation – with the most beautiful attrib-
utes, as He deserves. They concurred in the following insight: He has sent
the prophets as messengers of good news and as warning. – He has chosen
and elected them out of His creation with the purpose of delivering His
good news to them. – He has created two places of abode, one for trouble
(saʿy) and labour, the other for reward and punishment. – He has imposed
on (the people) commands and prohibitions. – He will raise them from
the dead, and will call them to account for their deeds, sentencing them
accordingly. God “may recompense those who do evil for what they have
done, and recompense those who have done good with the reward most
fair” (Sura 53:31 (32)). At the end will be paradise and hell. – Here, (the
prophets) follow one way, not at all disagreeing, and demanding from
all men that they praise God in their deeds, being unanimous in their
principles. For example: The practice of prayer, giving alms, fasting, sac-
rificial ceremonies (manāsik), and immolation (qarābīn), as well as all
religious duties and norms. They do not disagree in any of these, and they
all demand that these (should be observed). – They ascribed truth and
prophecy to one another. And they order (men) to follow the only way,
by being subject (to God). – They disagree, however, in the establishment
of laws, as, for example, about the prayer-times, the number of bendings
Sullām an-naǧāt, ed. M. A. Alibhai: Belief in God, His unity, His books, His angels,
His prophets, the Last Judgement, resurrection, heaven and hell guarantee the salvation
(naǧāt) of believers (cf. M. A. Alibhai, pp. 150 ff.).
94 Instead of Mohammed, only “the prophets” are mentioned.
95 There are some similarities to the Hanafite Fiqh akbar (published in Ḥaydarābād 1321/1903,
with commentary by Abū l-Muntahā); s. the English translation in A. J. Wensinck,
Muslim Creed, pp. 188 ff.; compare, for example, art. 5 (A. J. Wensinck, p. 190; comment-
ary, pp. 201–212) with Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 156, 5f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 115,
3 f.: The creation of the world not from something else, which is eternal, presupposes the
denial of the Aristotelian proposition of the eternity of matter; cf. p. /89/.
96 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 156, 4–157, 5 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 115,
3–18.
of the torso (along with two prostrations), the instructions on almsgiving,

the times of fasting, and other practical rules by which God – mighty and
exalted is He – has examined and put to the test His creation – just as
Moses has ordered prayer, which forms the principle of religion in every
law. He has, however, ordered (people) to orientate themselves towards
Jerusalem in prayer. Likewise, Jesus commanded prayer, with an eastward
orientation. At the same time, (Jesus) ascribes truth as well as prophecy
to Moses.
Abū Ḥātim explains the fact that religions do not differ in their essence, but are
different in the details of law, in their practices,97 as follows: The prophets have
to be blamed for this because they intended,
to make visible the obedient, in contrast to the disobedient … as God has

said: ‘And we did not appoint the direction you were facing, except that
we might know who followed the Messenger from him who turned on his
heels’.
Sura 2:143 (138), Engl. transl. A. J. Arberry
Such an explanation enables Abū Ḥātim to explain to his opponent Abū Bakr
ar-Rāzī, why religion seems to be true in a certain country at a | certain time, 97
but wrong in other countries at other times.98 God
… has sent the prophets in different epochs and times to warn (people), to
inform them about the way of truth, leading away from falsehood, about
the way of right guidance, leading away from error, and to free the proph-
etic norms (as-sunan) from heresies.99
At the same time, Abū Ḥātim seizes the occasion to point out the didactic
value of the circumstances he describes, i.e. the seeming differences between
religions: Men must exert themselves, inspecting and examining these differ-
ences with their intellect. Man is put to the test (cf. imtiḥān),100 so that he gets
the ability to distinguish between truth and error.101 Abū Ḥātim never tires to
97 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 157, 6–10; cf. pp. 158, 3ff. and 172, 13 / ed. and transl.
T. Khalidi, p. 116, 1–4; cf. pp. 116, 12 ff. and 127, 1 f.
98 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 171–172, 3 and 172, 5ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi,
pp. 126, 1–12 and 126, 15 ff.
1.
328 chapter 15
stress, that man should not trust in subjective “opinions” (raʾy),102 but is in
need of a prophet, the “teacher” who informs his pupil, offering the “learn-
ing” about utterances which are difficult to comprehend,103 and who shows
him how to distinguish between truth and error, and how to find the true
“meanings” (maʿānī) of the symbols, of the “external” forms by way of “inter-
pretation” (taʾwīl).104 According to Abū Ḥātim, the Qurʾān commands people
to turn to the Prophet and to the “authorities” (ūlū l-amr), whom Abū Ḥātim
calls “scholars” (ʿulamāʾ).105 These “scholars” are identified with “the philo-
sophers who speak the truth” (al-falāsifa al-muḥiqqūn).106 They, too, speak in
a “corporeal” (ǧusmānī) or in a “spiritual” manner, as Abū Ḥātim explains with
reference to the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus.107 The “corporeal” manner
of speaking is the parable, while the symbol and the spiritual manner are
98 the “meaning” (maʿnā).108 Abū Ḥātim sometimes also uses the | terminology
102 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 72, 14 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 17.
103 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 72, 13ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 16ff. – Cf.
Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 71, 14 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 3ff.
104 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 115, 3 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 86, 1ff. –
On the Ismailite and originally Shiʿite term taʾwīl cf. I. Goldziher, Richtungen, pp. 181ff.;
H. Halm, Kosmologie, pp. 22 and 123, and the index.
105 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 115, 7–12 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 86, 5–9.
The passage contains a reference to Sura 4:83 (85) (ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 115, 10–12 / T. Kha-
lidi, p. 86, 7–9). Shortly afterwards, Abū Ḥātim adds Sura 4:59 (ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 115,
15–17 / T. Khalidi, p. 86, 12 f.). The last mentioned Sura has also been used by the Ismailite
Kirmānī (d. 411/1020 or 1021) in his Kitāb al-Maṣābīḥ fī iṯbāt al-imāma (S. N. Makarem,
Doctrine, p. 38). – The Zaydite al-Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 860AD) had already referred to
the Sura as an argument for the necessity of the Imamate (cf. B. Abrahamov, “Al-Ḳāsim
Ibn Ibrāhīm’s Theory”, p. 87).
107 Abū Ḥātim has based his statement on a doxographical text ascribed to Ammonius, and
which has been preserved in the unique Arabic MS Aya Sofya (Istanbul) 2450, fol. 132 v 5,
counting from below, and ff. (the MS has BRMNS; this may be an incorrect rendering of
BRKL = Proclus). This distinction is indeed the Hellenistic antithesis between σωματικόν
and πνευματικόν, as I. Goldziher, Richtungen, p. 182, has already shown. – The passage in
Abū Ḥātim, our oldest dated reference to the Ammoniustext (cf. H. Daiber, “Democritus”,
p. 260, n. 57), certainly proves that Ammonius’ doxography (edition and translation by U.
Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonius) was the source of this distinction in
Islam. It may first have entered Ismailite circles and it plays a central role in Ismailite philo-
sophy (cf. M. A. Alibhai, Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī, pp. 18ff.). M. A. Alibhai (pp. 74f.) was at
a loss to explain the origin of this distinction and assumed a Christian Neoplatonic source.
108 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 107, 7–9; cf. pp. 126, 11f. and 105 / ed. and transl.
T. Khalidī, p. 79, 12 f.; cf. pp. 94, 6 f. and 77f. – Abū Ḥātim (ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 107, 11ff. / ed.
and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 79, 16 ff.) subsequently validates this distinction by appealing to
Democritus (following the Ammoniustext, s. n. 108, fol. 134 r 12ff.) and Pseudo-Apollonius
of “external” (ẓahr, ẓāhir) and “internal” (baṭn, bāṭin).109 He refers to a tradi-

tion ascribed to Prophet Mohammed and to ʿAlī, and therein follows an old
Ismailite terminology.110 Even among the philosophers there are people who
mix up truth and error. They are called mutafalsifa, “those who pretend to be
philosophers”,111 and who have developed diverging opinions. Abū Ḥātim has
elaborated this in a long doxographical chapter on the disagreement of these
philosophers, concerning their doctrines of elements.112 In this chapter he used
translations of partially lost Greek works.113 Aristotle is apparently reckoned
among the true philosophers, although his symbolical utterances are misun-
derstood by some people, as Abū Ḥātim declares, and therefore they fail to
classify him as a “monotheist” (muwaḥḥid).114 Despite their high estimation,
the true philosophers do not attain the rank of Prophet Mohammed – neither
did the prophets before Mohammed. Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and the other
prophets “have been recognized because of their perfection, intellect (ʿaql),
judgement (tamyīz), guidance (siyāsa), and because of their combination of
every kind of a praiseworthy character (ḫulq maḥmūd)”.115 However, Moses and
Jesus are inferior to Mohammed,116 and
= Balīnās, Sirr al-ḫalīqa (ed. U. Weisser, p. 2, 5 f.). – The Sirr al-ḫalīqa is cited by Abū
Ḥātim several times, not only in his Aʿlām an-nubuwwa, but also in his Kitāb az-Zīna; cf.
H. Daiber in Der Islam 59, 1982, pp. 328 f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/26.
110 Cf. the Ismailite Ibn Ḥawšab, Kitāb al-ʿĀlim wa-l-ġulām; summary by W. Ivanow,
Studies, pp. 69 ff.; H. Halm, Kosmologie, p. 23; S. N. Makarem, Doctrine, p. 49; A. Esmail
and A. Nanji, “Ismāʿīlīs in History”, pp. 239 ff. – The Ismailites are called “Bāṭiniyya” by their
critics because of their allegorical interpretation, distinguishing between the allegorical,
“interior” (bāṭin) meaning of a word, and its “external” (ẓāhir) meaning. Cf. M. G. S.
Hodgson, “Bāṭiniyya”; Ġazālī, Faḍāʾiḥ, ed. I. Goldziher, Streitschrift / Engl. transl. R.
J. McCarthy, Freedom, pp. 175ff. – Cf. the analysis by I. Goldziher, Streitschrift, and
F. Jabre, La Notion, pp. 415 ff. – Ġazālī’s book was refuted by the Ismailite Ibn al-Walīd
(d. 612/1215), Dāmiġ al-bāṭil wa-ḥatf al munāḍil (ed. M. Ġālib).
111 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 131 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 96f.
112 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 133–138, summary pp. 149–151 / ed. and transl. T.
Khalidi, pp. 98–109, summary pp. 110–111.
113 On the not yet completely identified sources cf. H. Daiber, Aetius, p. 817. – We can add
the quotation from Pseudo-Apollonius, Sirr al-ḫalīqa, ed. U. Weisser, p. 28, 1–2; 7–9 = Abū
Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 140, 2–6 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 103, 4–7.
114 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 72, 15 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 18ff. – Per-
haps Abū Ḥātim here has in mind the so-called Theology of Aristotle, an Arabic redaction
of Plotinus’ Enneads. On this book cf. H. Daiber, review of Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle
Ages.
330 chapter 15
the peoples which have seen Mohammed, agree in their estimation of

Mohammed as perfect in his intellect (ʿaql), mercy (ḥilm), patience
(anāt), leadership, and guidance of all men.117
Abū Ḥātim has devoted a long chapter to the “good qualities” (šamāʾil, ḥilya)
of Prophet Mohammed.118 Here, as well as in the tafḍīl, the “priority” of Mo-
hammed over other prophets, Abū Ḥātim adheres to the orthodox picture of
the Prophet as the ideal of a perfect moral life.119 As bearer of prophetic know-
ledge, the Prophet is equipped at the same time with ethical qualities which
clearly betray influences of the Platonic doctrine120 on the cardinal virtues of
“wisdom” (cf. σοφία), “abstinence” (cf. σωφροσύνη with tawāḍuʿ),121 “courage” (cf.
99 ἀνδρεία with šaǧāʿa),122 and “justice” (cf. δικαιοσύνη).123 They are | combined
with the Aristotelian doctrine of the happy mean (cf. μεσότης).124 Abū Ḥātim
here presents a combination of the tradition of the Islamic prophetic ideal and
Greek ethics. This combination reappears and is refined by later philosophers
such as Fārābī,125 Miskawayh (d. 421/1030),126 and Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5th/11th
c.).127 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s orthodox idea of the priority of Mohammed to
earlier prophets appears to be combined in an original manner with his thesis
of the universality of divine knowledge, which already had been revealed to
earlier prophets. Mohammed is not only the last prophet who confirms the
117 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 73, 17–19 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 53, 15f.
118 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 77–93/ ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 57–69.
119 Cf. T. Andrae, Die Person Muhammeds, pp. 190 ff. and 245ff.
120 Plato, Rep. IV 435 B ff.
121 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 84, 10–85, 5 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 62,
13–63, 5.
122 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 80, 16–82, 1 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 59,
14–60, 12.
123 Cf. Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 94, 5 f. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 70, 5f., on
justice (and “veracity” = ṣidq) as a feature of the prophets.
124 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics II 6. 1107a ff.; the Arabic term is iʿtidāl, cf. Abū Ḥātim,
Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, p. 85, 7 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 63, 6ff., where we find an
interesting description of its effect on the “physiognomy” ( firāsa) of the prophets. – On
iʿtidāl cf. J. C. Bürgel, “Adab und iʿtidāl”.
125 Cf. H. Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 751 f.
126 In his book Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq. – On Miskawayh, whose recourse to the terminology of the
current picture of Prophet Mohammed deserves to be investigated, cf. H. Daiber, review
of C. K. Zurayk (transl.), The Refinement of Character.
127 In his book aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa. – Cf. H. Daiber, “Griechische Ethik”. – Y.
Mohamed, The Path to Virtue.
authenticity of earlier prophets. According to the Koranic-orthodox doc-

trine,128 he is indeed the best prophet as well.129 Non-Islamic traditions of
prophetic revelations contain clear signs of Mohammed’s prophecy;130 Book
Daniel in the Old Testament, to be precise, Daniel’s interpretation of Nebuchad-
nezzar’s dream, is the clearest reference to Mohammed and his prophecy. The
fourth kingdom prophesied by Daniel may be the Islam which succeeded the
Jews, the Christians, and the Magians.131 Islam, then, is the completion of what
had already been announced by earlier prophets and wise men, namely, the
belief in one single God. Their symbols and parables, however, have not been
understood by the people. Only the Qurʾān, God’s message to men as delivered
by Prophet Mohammed, is the perfect formulation of belief in one single God.
The miracle of the inimitable Qurʾān thus is the final proof of the superiority
of Islam to other religions.132 Former prophetic revelations remain important
nevertheless, as a passing on of the universal belief in one single God, and as
presaging the coming of Prophet Mohammed. Their mistakes, as well as those
of philosophers in the past, are caused by mixing truth and error. Mankind can
attain “salvation” (naǧāt) by “seeking” (ṭalab) “the well-ordered sense” (pl. al-
maʿānī al-muʾtalifa) of “the exterior shape of laws” (ẓāhir aš-šarāʾiʿ), namely,
of God’s word. This is the only way to avoid “error” (ḍalāl) and “controversy”
(iḫtilāf ), with the “guidance” (hidāya) of God and “His saints” (awliyāʾuhū =
prophets).133 Moreover, according to Abū Ḥātim, the pre-Islamic revelations
turn out to be an informative example for the present. They do not only prove
the necessity of a prophet and the superiority of the prophecy of Mohammed.
In addition, they show, how ignorance | and the mixing up of truth and error 100
result in apparent contradictions between divine revelations. People, with their
different capacities, are confronted with the challenge of looking at them crit-
ically, of examining them, and of reaching the true and universal meaning of
all religions. The attainment of the universal belief in one single God and in
the justness of His laws thus is the historical result of prophetic revelations to
128 Cf. Sura 33:40. – On Mohammed as the “seal” (ḫātam) of the prophets cf. H. Speyer, Die
biblischen Erzählungen, pp. 422 f.
129 On this interpretation of ḫātam s. Y. Friedmann, “Finality of Prophethood”. – Cf. also U.
Rubin, “The Seal of the Prophets”.
130 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 195 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 142ff.
131 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 52, 9–53, 15 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 40, 1–20.
132 Abū Ḥātim, Aʿlām, ed. S. Al-Sawy, pp. 191–194, and on the Qurʾān pp. 227ff. / ed. and transl.
T. Khalidi, pp. 139–141, and on the Qurʾān pp. 167 ff.
3.
332 chapter 15
mankind, and it is the result of a permanently renewable intellectual process –

the search for a universal meaning of the diverse forms of religious tradition.
With these fascinating ideas, which reappeared shortly after in the Rasāʾil
Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ,134 an encyclopaedia compiled before 348/959 or 349/960 by
sympathizers of the Ismailites,135 Abū Ḥātim sketched the design for a universal
religion which enables the peaceful coexistence of different forms of religions.
Although the idea of the identity of prophetic messages from different times
is not quite new136 and may have been inspired by the Koranic tradition about
the renewal of the religions of Abraham by Mohammed – the Ismailite Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī lent it a new currency. His reaction to Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s denial of
prophecy turns out to be a very impressive proposal on the universality of reli-
gious knowledge. Abū Ḥātim wrote his validation of Mohammed’s prophecy
at a time of peaceful coexistence of different religions and sects in the Islamic
empire. He cited books of Jews, Christians, and Greeks. And perhaps he has
written his book for the benefit of non-Islamic readers as well, in accordance
with a principle of Ismailite apologetics – the conversion of people by referring
to their own doctrines.
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chapter 16
The Ismailite Background of Fārābī’s Political

Philosophy
Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī as a Forerunner of Fārābī
The complexity of Fārābī’s philosophy remains a promising field of ideas for ori-
entalists and historians. As more and more texts are being published we may
now profit from Fārābī’s logical treatises* as well as from akin texts written by
older contemporaries. A comparison between them may be helpful for the solu-
tion of problems like: What was Fārābī’s starting point to write his treatise on
The Virtuous City, the Madīna al-fāḍila?1 Why did he integrate the Platonic idea
of a philosopher-king into a doctrine which, at first sight, seems to be a strange
combination of Islamic prophetology and religion with Platonic-Aristotelian
political philosophy?
In two papers, published in 1986,2 I argued against Richard Walzer that
Fārābī’s prophetology should not be traced back to Middle Platonic traditions.
Rather, his interesting thesis of religion as a picture of philosophy is based on
Aristotle’s doctrine of practical philosophy, of political ethics as the realiza-
tion of theory and at the same time on Aristotle’s explanation that we only
can think, “philosophize”, in the shape of pictures: Universals are accessible to
human thinking only by using the imaginative powers which conceive them
by imitating (cf. muḥākāt) the perceptible things, the particulars. Ultimately,
they are inspirations coming from the divine intellectus agens to the prophet-
king, who transmits them to the people. This original explanation appears to
be a unique combination of different philosophical trends in Plato, Aristotle,
* Ed. by Rafīq al-ʿAǧam, al-Manṭiqi ʿind al-Fārābī. 1–3. Beirut 1985–1986. – Ed. by Majid
Fakhry, Kitāb al-Burhān wa-Kitāb Šarāʾiṭ al-yaqīn maʿa taʿālīq Ibn Bāǧǧa ʿalā l-Burhān. Beirut
1986. – An edition of Fārābī’s logical texts is also published by Muḥammad Taqī Dānešpa-
žūh, al-Manṭiqiyāt li-l-Fārābī. 1–3. Qumm 1987–1989.
1 Ed. Friedrich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s Abhandlung: Der Musterstaat. Leiden 1895 / Reprint
1964. – Ed. with Engl. transl. and commentary by Richard Walzer, al-Farabi on the Perfect
State. Oxford 1985. – Cf. the review by Paul Wernst in Oriens 31, 1988 (pp. 314–334), p. 360.
2 Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view. In MNAW.L
n.r. 49/4, pp. 128–149. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18. – Hans Daiber,
Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (gest. 339/950). In L’ homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. Ed.
Christian Wenin. II. Louvain-la-Neuve 1986. = Philosophes médiévaux 27, pp. 729–753. = H.

the ismailite background of fārābī’s political philosophy 339
and the commentaries – especially Alexander of Aphrodisias’ doctrine of the

divine Nous as explained in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima.
However, we do not yet know much about the background of Fārābī’s doc-
trine. Fārābī’s philosophy is not a creatio ex nihilo. His book on The Virtuous City,
a late work that he may have written some time before 339/950 or 951 (the year
of his death), appears to be the result of long discussions he had during his
lifetime. As I will try to show, these discussions concentrate on the notion of
leadership based on universal divine truth. We find them in Ismailite circles in
Iran. A vivid expression is the Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa by the Ismailite Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzi.3 The author composed it on the occasion of a dispute with
the well-known physician and philosopher Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī in Rayy between
318/930 and 320/932–933, or perhaps already before 313/925 in the presence of
the Governor Mardāwīǧ. This book has not yet been the object of a detailed
study that could compare its contents with Fārābī’s ideas.4
Some similarities between Fārābī’s prophetology and Ismailite doctrines of
authors like Abū Yaʿqūb as-Siǧistānī (mid-4th/10th century), Ḥamīd ad-Dīn
al-Kirmānī (d. 411/1020 or 1021), and the authors of the encyclopaedia Rasāʾil
lḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ have already been stated by Susanne Diwald, Heinz Halm,
Shlomo Pines, and Richard Walzer.5 These scholars, however, have not
tried to explain the similarities and to answer the question, whether Fārābī | 144
influenced Ismailite thinkers like Kirmānī or sympathisants of the Ismailites
like the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, or, whether he himself follows Ismailite discussions of
his time.
3 Ed. Salah Al-Sawy, Tehran 1977. – A new edition, based on that by S. Al-Sawy, was pub-
lished with Engl. transl. by Tarif Khalidi. Provo, Utah 2011.
4 Some observations can be found in Hans Daiber, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (10th century A.D.) on
Unity and Diversity of Religions. In Dialogue and Syncretism. An interdisciplinary approach.
Ed. Jerald D. Gort (a.o.). Grand Rapids/Amsterdam 1989, pp. 87–104. = H. Daiber, From
5 Cf. H. Daiber, Prophetie (s. n. 2), pp. 740f. – On the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ cf. also Hamid Enayat,
An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasaʾil of the Ikhwan al-Safaʾ. In Ismaili Contri-
butions to Islamic Culture. Ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Tehran 1977, pp. 23–49. – Shlomo
Pines, Philosophy. In The Cambridge History of Islam II, Cambridge 1970, p. 804; cf. p. 800. –
To the mentioned authors we may add Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī from the 7th/13th century, who in
his Nasirean Ethics integrated in his ideology of prophets and imams ideas from Fārābī’s Vir-
tuous City; cf. Wilferd Madelung, Ismaʿilism: The Old and the New Daʿwa. In Wilferd
Madelung, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran. Albany, N.Y. 1988 (pp. 93–105), p. 104. –
We may add here, with regard to Fārābī’s concept of happiness and similarities to Ismailite
philosophy, the study of Janne Mattila, Philosophy as a Path to Happiness. Attainment of
Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy. Thesis Helsinki 2011.
340 chapter 16
I think, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa definitely proves, that
Fārābī’s al-Madīna al-fāḍila was inspired by ideas of contemporary Ismailites
and not vice versa. At the same time, however, we should keep in mind, that
Fārābī, a native of the district Fārāb in Turkestan, visited Baghdad, Damascus
and Egypt. And about a year before his death he joined a circle of learned men
who were around Sayf ad-Dawla, the Hamdanid ruler.6 Thus, Fārābī’s books and
ideas could easily have spread in the Middle East and Iran. In his Tatimmat
Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, the biographer Ẓahīr ad-Dīn al-Bayhaqī (d. 565/1169 or 1170)
gives us the interesting information, that most of Fārābī’s books existed in Syria.
Among those available in Khurasan, East Persia, he mentions The Insights of the
People of the Virtuous City.7 This wide dissemination of Fārābī’s books and ideas
clearly has something to do with the vivid interest within Shiʿite circles – espe-
cially Ismailite missionaries8 – in Fārābī’s political doctrine. At the same time,
however, akin theories in older or contemporary Ismailite sources prove the
dependence of Fārābī himself on Ismailite political philosophy in which the
theory of the imamate, of leadership, played a central role. As an example of
the Ismailite thesis, that the disparity of the people requires the appointment
of a “leader” (imām) by God and not by the community, I may mention the Ris-
āla fī l-imāma by Abū l-Fawāris Aḥmad Ibn Yaʿqūb (d. 413/1029).9 The inequality
of living beings as a reason for the establishment of a ruling authority we also
find in the encyclopaedia Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. It is a fable about an animal
rebellion against human domination.10
According to the Shiʿites and their Ismailite branch, the legitimation of a
ruling authority is the appointment by God. At the same time, we find here
a continuation of the Islamic-Koranic idea of Mohammed as the restorer of
the religion of Abraham, as the successor to earlier prophets in Judaism and
Christianity. He transmits the universal, pre-Islamic divine knowledge to the
6 Cf. Muhsin Mahdi, Al-Fārābī. In Dictionary of Scientific Biography 6, New York 1971,
pp. 523–525, esp. col. 524 b. – Cf. also the article on Fārābī in Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt I.
Ed. Hellmut Ritter. Wiesbaden 1962. = Bibliotheca Islamica 6a, pp. 106–113.
7 Ed. Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Taʾrīḫ ḥukamāʾ al-Islām. Damascus 1946, p. 31, 4ff.
8 On the spread of Ismailite propaganda in the 9th/10th centuries cf. Samuel Miklos
Stern, Studies in Early Ismaʿilism. Jerusalem/Leiden 1983. = The Max Schloessinger Me-
morial Series. Monograph I, pp. 290 ff.
9 Ed. and transl. by Sami Nasib Makarem, The Political Doctrine of the Ismaʿilis. The Imam-
ate. Delmar, N.Y. 1977.
10 Cf. the Engl. transl. by Lenn Evan Goodman, The Case of the Animals versus Man
before the King of the Jinn. A tenth-century ecological fable of the Pure Brethren of Basra.
Boston 1978. = Library of Classical Arabic Literature 3. – Span. transl. by Emilio Tornero
Poveda, La disputa de los animales contra el hombre. Madrid 1984.
people in an unadulterated manner, and herewith he is legitimated as religio-

political authority. The combination of political power with divine knowledge
is remarkable, and, after the death of the Prophet, it gave rise to endless debates
on the legitimacy of the caliphs. These debates culminated in the 9th/10th
centuries in Shiʿite discussions on the imamate and led to the creation of a
political philosophy in Ismailite circles. They deeply impressed Fārābī. Sim-
ultaneously, his sketch of the Virtuous City may have – as S. Pines put it –
“serve(d) for the Ismailite revolutionaries as an example of the ideal policy”.11
Here, however, our concern will be to get a closer idea of the impact of Ismailite
ideology on Fārābī’s political philosophy. The Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī,
who died 17 years before Fārābī, defended the combination of authority and
prophecy, knowledge and divine inspiration. In accordance with Muʿtazilite-
Zaidite and Ismailite tradition, he proves, that the imperfection of human
knowledge requires divine inspiration given to the Prophet. Forerunners of the
Prophet had been earlier prophets among the Jews and the Christians. Abū
Ḥātim ar-Rāzī in an original manner took up this | Koranic view of univer- 145
sal divine knowledge, that already had been revealed to Jews and Christians
before.
Abū Ḥātim’s opponent, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī, denied the necessity of proph-
ecy and argued: Man can obtain knowledge by himself and has no need of
any authority, such as a prophet. Man can even learn something from the
imperfect knowledge of previous scholars and philosophers, because he can
“discover” (istadraka) “other things” (ašyāʾ uḫar) through “intelligence” ( fiṭna)
and through “intensive investigation” (naẓar) and “study” (baḥṯ).12 Abū Bakr
ar-Rāzī’s positive idea of progress, his concept that man can gain knowledge
even from the mistakes of his ancestors, can already be found in Kindī and
Ǧāḥiẓ. It is not shared by Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī,13 whose explanation appears to
be a forerunner of Fārābī’s differentiating picture of an hierarchical structure
of the city, which can be paralleled with that of a human body and its soul. Abū
Ḥātim explicitly informs us, that “the wise men (al-ḥukamāʾ) cannot find any-
thing with their intelligence ( fiṭna) and nature. (Everything) originates from
revelation (waḥy). They cannot ascend to heaven and understand these secret
things (al-ġuyūb). Rather, God has informed them in his revelation. God knows
11 Shlomo Pines, Shiite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi Kuzari. In JSAI 2, 1980
(pp. 165–251), p. 243.
12 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 11, 2 ff.; cf. p. 273, 7 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 8, 14ff.; cf.
p. 206, 1 ff. – Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), p. 91.
13 Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), p. 91 n. 20.
342 chapter 16
the secret things and informs of His secrets only that (person) whom He has
accepted as His apostle”.14
This passage implies the rejection of any kind of astrology and reminds us
of Fārābī’s refutation of “astrologers” (al-munaǧǧimūn).15
More important is the fact, that it shows the necessity of a prophetic medi-
ator between God’s knowledge and ignorant mankind. Even the wise men “can-
not find anything with their intelligence”. Thus, like Fārābī later, Abū Ḥātim
ar-Rāzī proves the necessity of a prophetic mediator by referring to the imper-
fection of the human mind. Both offer a differentiating picture of mankind by
emphasizing the variety of men and societies. Abū Ḥātim states, using the same
terminology as Fārābī:
… (This is) because there are different classes of men as concerns their
intelligence, insight, power of distinction and knowledge. For men are not
created equal to each other in their natures, as are animals, for instance,
which do not differ in their knowledge of what they need.16
The term “differ” (tafāḍalū) is a key term in Fārābī’s Virtuous City.17 On the one
hand, men are superior to animals and – as the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ formulated it
later in the already mentioned fable of an animal rebellion against human
domination – use animals as their tools. On the other hand, mankind con-
sists of different classes: The highest perfection culminates in the person of the
prophet who receives his knowledge from God’s revelation and transmits it to
men. Consequently, mankind consists of “knowing” (ʿālim) people and “learn-
ing” (mutaʿallim) ones.18
The same distinction can be found in Fārābī, who classifies the philosopher-
ruler as teacher and offers a much more elaborate description of the intellec-
tual qualities of a teacher.19 We find Fārābī stressing the intellectual ability of
the “first ruler” and “imam”, “understanding and conceiving very well (ǧayyid
146 al-fahm wa-t-taṣawwur) all he is told, so that it becomes | comprehensible to
him according to the matter itself”.20 Fārābī adds, “if he sees something even
14 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 301, 11–15 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 282, 14–17.
15 Preserved in two treatises (s. Fuat Sezgin, GAS VI, 1978, pp. 196f.), one is published by
Friedrich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s philosophische Abandlungen. Leiden 1890, pp. 104ff.
16 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 185, 5–7 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 134, 8–10.
17 Ed. F. Dieterici (s. n. 1), pp. 52, ult. and 54, -4 / ed. R. Walzer (s. n. 1), pp. 226, 5 and 232, 5.
18 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 72, 6 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 52, 10.
19 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), pp. 6 ff.
20 al-Madīna al-fāḍila ed. F. Dieterici (s. n. 1), p. 59, 16ff. / ed. R. Walzer (s. n. 1), p. 246,
12 ff. – Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), pp. 7 f.
with a meagre indication, he should understand it according to this indication”.

These qualifications of men’s ability to conceive and understand have a striking
parallel in Abū Ḥātim, who is less elaborate than Fārābī and – unlike Fārābī –
does not include elements of Aristotle’s Organon and Rhetoric.21 However, Abū
Ḥātim shows us the Sitz im Leben of Fārābī’s accentuation of teaching and
learning, conception and understanding. He writes:22
In the chapter on parables and (their) meaning I will relate to you a par-
able by which you are referred to the records (rusūm) of the prophets, to
what the prophets have written down about it, from which you get an idea
of their doctrine, conceive it and are informed about how (the prophets)
have spoken to their people in parables, how their utterances had been
different, their contents however being identical. (Finally, I will mention
to you a parable) which may serve as a landmark and should enable one
to conclude much from little.23
The Sitz im Leben of Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī and of Fārābī’s similar statements is
the Ismailite distinction between symbols, between “external” forms and their
true meaning. The utterances of prophets may differ – their meanings, however,
are identical.24 Mankind can attain “salvation” (naǧāt) by “seeking” (ṭalab)
“the well-ordered sense” (al-maʿānī al-muʾtalifa) of the “exterior shape of laws”
(ẓāhir aš-šarāʾiʿ), namely of God’s word. This is the only way to avoid “error”
(ḍalāl) and “controversy” (iḫtilāf ) and to have “guidance” by God (hidāya).25
This formulation by Abū Ḥātim appears to be a first step towards Fārābī’s
development of the term “religion” (milla) as a description of the “insights” and
“actions” which are imposed upon society by its rulers in the shape of laws.26
Fārābī extended the concept of religion as a way to “salvation” by following “the
exterior shape of laws” and gave it an inventive Aristotelian orientation: Reli-
gion appears to be an imitation of philosophy, and its theoretical “insights” can
be proved and justified by philosophy. Aristotle’s model of theory and prac-
tice and his idea of “practical prudence” (phronesis) appear to be combined in
such a manner, that religion is classified as a picture of this concept of philo-
21 On Fārābī cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), pp. 7 f.

22 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 105, 6 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 77, 17f.
23 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 105, 6–9 / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, pp. 77, 17–78, 1.
24 Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), pp. 97 f.
25 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3), p. 110, 9 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 81, 16ff. – Cf. H. Daiber,
Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), p. 99.
26 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), pp. 11 f.
344 chapter 16
sophy and is the only way to realize, to “practice” philosophy in the Aristotelian
sense.27 Fārābī appears to be strongly interested in elements of Aristotle’s philo-
sophy and its commentator Alexander of Ahrodisias. He integrates elements
of Aristotle’s logic, psychology, ethics, and perhaps even of his Parva naturalia.
This text, of which an incomplete Arabic translation with an anonymous com-
mentary is available in a library of India,28 may also have influenced Fārābī’s
doctrine of the interrelationship between thought and perception, and it found
an interesting reflection in this doctrine of “imitation” (muḥākāt), according to
which everything perceptible and intelligible reaches the reasonable part of
a human soul only in the shape of imitations performed by the imaginative
power. Man, i.e. his soul, can only think in the shape of such pictures.
147 This doctrine cannot be found in Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī. However, we detect
in his Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa the starting point for Fārābī’s explanation and
his justification of the integration of Aristotelian elements. To this integration
of Aristotle’s philosophy Fārābī was encouraged by a typical Ismailite thesis,
which for its part had forerunners, namely by the thesis of the natural relation
between word and meaning:29 The symbols, the “external” form of the proph-
etic records are true; their true meaning, their maʿānī must be found by “inter-
pretation” (taʾwīl). If people mix heresies with it, this does not prove their fals-
ity, but points to their connecting true with wrong. Thus, the “external” – the vis-
ible form of the symbol – is a reproduction of the “internal” – the meaning. This
coordination of “external” (ẓāhir) and “internal” (bāṭin) actually can be dis-
covered in Fārābī’s qualification of religion as a picture of philosophy. Accord-
ing to Fārābī, religion “imitates philosophy” and comprises the same subjects,
namely the “ultimate principles of beings” and the ultimate end of everyone,
his “supreme happiness” (as-saʿāda al-quṣwā).30 Religion is the instrument of
philosophy.31 Philosophy is only conceivable in the shape of a “picture” (miṯāl)
which “imitates” philosophy. Here, philosophy appears to be knowledge in the
shape of pictures which imitate the known object and, as such, is called “reli-
gion”.32 The essence of a thing and its only conceivable picture are identical,
27 For further details cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2).

28 Rampur, Raza Library 1752, fol. 7 r–54 v (copied in the 11th/17th century). Cf. Hans Daiber,
New Manuscript Findings from Indian Libraries. In Manuscripts of the Middle East 1,
Leiden 1986, pp. 26–48. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs IV B/1, p. 39 n. 133. –
An edition is being prepared by Rotraud Hansberger.
29 Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), p. 94.
30 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), p. 11.
just like Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s bāṭin and ẓāhir or “the well-ordered meanings”
(al-maʿānī al-miʾ talifa) and the “exterior shape of laws”, God’s word.33
When we consider Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī and Fārābī’s common identification of
religion and law and the common classification of religion as an reproduction
of an internal meaning (which by Fārābī is called philosophy), we may notice
Fārābī’s silence on typical Islamic features of the term “religion”. He mentions
the terms “revelation”, “prophet” and “imam”, but never Prophet Mohammed,
and he does not give a detailed description of milla, of “insights” and “actions”,
which are imposed upon society by its ruler.34
I may offer an explanation for this vaguenness35 by means of a compar-
ison with Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī. In his Aʿlām an-nubuwwa Abū Ḥātim is more
explicit as regards the Islamic character of religion and prophecy. In con-
trast to Fārābī, he does not overestimate the philosophers: Like the prophets
before Mohammed, they do not attain the rank of Prophet Mohammed. Con-
sequently, Moses and Jesus are inferior to Mohammed, who is the last prophet,
who confirms the authenticity of earlier prophets, and who is indeed the best
prophet as well. Islam appears to be the completion of what had already been
announced to earlier prophets and wise men, namely, the belief in one single
God. This had already been announced by earlier prophets, whose parables,
however, were not understood by the people. Only the Qurʾān, God’s message
to men as delivered by Prophet Mohammed, is the perfect formulation of the
belief in one single God. The miracle of the Qurʾān appears also to be a proof of
the superiority of Islam over other religions.36 In contrast to this, Fārābī does
not | at all discuss the superiority of Islam and its revelation, probably, because 148
he presupposes in a much stricter way than Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī the universality
of religion as representing universal truth, i.e. philosophy. He must have been
inspired by the Ismailite idea of the universality of true religion, of the belief in
33 Ed. S. Al-Sawy (s. n. 3) p. 110, 9 ff. / ed. and transl. T. Khalidi, p. 81, 16ff.
35 R. Walzer (s. n. 1), pp. 436 ff., could not offer a convincing explanation of Fārābī’s vague-
ness and variety of terminology for the ruler; he tends to a Shiʿite background. Especially
in the use of imam cf. R. Walzer, pp. 441 ff., and before him Fauzi M. Najjar, Fārābī’s
Political Philosophy and Shīʿism. In Studia Islamica 14, Paris 1961, pp. 57–72, esp. p. 64: “…
There are strong grounds for seeing in Fārābī’s political works a veiled attempt to support
the heterodox Shiʿite movement against the onslaught of Sunnī orthodoxy”. However, the
arguments are not convincing and the common ground of Fārābī and Shiism as described
by F. M. Najjar is restricted to vague and general similarities, which are interpreted in the
light of Leo Strauss’ one-sided thesis of religious law as exoteric expression of an inner,
philosophical meaning. Contrary to this thesis cf. H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 2), pp. 17f.
36 Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim (s. n. 4), p. 98.
346 chapter 16
one single God, and in the justness of His laws. This Ismailite idea found a vivid
expression in Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa. It enabled Fārābī
to integrate the Platonic notions of the ruler as philosopher-king and of the
perfect state, and the Aristotelian doctrine of practical philosophy into an ori-
ginally Ismailite concept of society with a hierarchical structure. Society needs
an authority par excellence, i.e. the God-inspired prophet. Men must keep to
the laws of religion, which, according to Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, is the exterior
shape of an interior universal meaning. This notion is also taken up by Fārābī,
who combined it with the Aristotelian dependence of thought on perception.
At the same time, he used Alexander of Aphrodisias’ notion of the divine intel-
lectus agens as the ultimate source of knowledge by integrating the Koranic and
Ismailite thesis of the God-inspired prophet as the teacher of mankind.
Fārābī could combine Greek and Islamic-Ismailite ideas, because he agreed
with the Ismailite idea of the universality of thinking. As Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī’s
Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa shows, Fārābī was essentially inspired in his political
philosophy by Ismailite ideology. However, he did not adopt the complexity of
the Ismailite “system”,37 but he selected what he could integrate into his own
“system”. For his part, he influenced later Ismailite authors and “dreamed – as
Dante did – of a world wide society based upon a common faith and organized
under one ruler, a philosopher-prophet”.38
Republished, with some modifications, from Gottes ist der Orient, Gottes ist der
Okzident. Festschrift für Abdoljavad Falaturi zum 65. Geburtstag. Ed. by Udo
Tworuschka. Köln/Wien 1991. = Kölner Veröffentlichungen zur Religionsgeschichte 21,
pp. 143–150. By courtesy of the publisher.
37 This may be seen from W. Madelung’s already mentioned article “Ismaʿilism” (s. n. 5). –
Cf. also Wilferd Madelung “Das Imamat in der frühen ismailitischen Lehre”. In Der
Islam 37, 1961, pp. 43–135. – Heinz Halm, Kosmologie und Heilslehre der frühen Ismāʿīlīya.
Wiesbaden 1978. = AKM 44/1, pp. 19ff. – Habib Feki, Les idées religieuses et philosophiques
de l’ ismaelisme fatimide. Tunis 1978, pp. 195 ff.
38 On this characterization see David Edward Luscombe and Gillian R. Evans, The
Twelfth-Century Renaissance. In The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought
c. 350–c. 1450. Ed. James H. Burns. Cambridge 1988 (pp. 306–338), p. 331.
chapter 17
Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (258/872–339/950

oder 951)
I Mimesis in Fārābīs “Musterstaat” 347 – II (Pseudo-?) Fārābī über die menschlichen

Tugenden 360 – II.1 Arabischer Text und Übersetzung 364 – II.2 Kommentar 368 – II.3
Anhang 373 – III Literatur, häufiger zitiert 373 – Summary 374
I Mimesis in Fārābīs “Musterstaat”

Eine mittelplatonische Tradition?
In den Jahren 1957 und 1958 haben Richard Walzer1 und Fazlur Rahman2
versucht, Fārābīs Theorie über die Prophetie auf den Platonismus zurückzu-
führen. Hierbei denken beide nicht nur an die Aristotelesinterpretation der
peripatetischen Schule (Alexander von Aphrodisias), sondern auch an stoische
und neuplatonische Einflüsse.
Während platonisch-neuplatonische und peripatetische Parallelen unbe-
streitbar sind, konnten Walzer und Rahman für die mit der Prophetie ver-
bundene Mimesistheorie keine griechischen Quellen ausfindig machen. Wal-
1 Al-Fārābī’s Theory of Prophecy and Divination. In Journal of Hellenic Studies 77, 1957, S. 142–
148. = Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic. Oxford 1962, S. 206–219. – Vgl. Richard Walzer,
Aspects of Islamic Political Thought: Al-Fārābī and Ibn Xaldūn. In Oriens 16, 1963 (S. 40–60),
S. 47. – Nichts Neues bietet Richard Walzer, L’ éveil de la philosophie islamique. Paris 1971
(Auszug aus REI 38/1–2, 1970), S. 55 f. – Die 1985 in Oxford erschienene kommentierte und
mit englischer Übersetzung versehene Edition von Richard Walzer, On the Perfect State
(Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍilah) / Nachdr. Chicago 1998, hat die angenommene mit-
telplatonische Tradition nicht weiterentwickelt. – Helmut Gätje, Studien zur Überlieferung
der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam. Heidelberg 1971. = Annales Universitatis Saraviensis.
Reihe: Philosophische Fakultät 11, S. 87f., schließt sich der These Walzers an und denkt in der
von ihm publizierten arabischen pseudoaristotelischen Abhandlung über den Traum, S. 133,
gleichfalls an eine solche mittelplatonische Tradition (Porphyrius). Indessen entpuppt sich
der arabische Text als eine kürzende Paraphrase aus Fārābīs MF (47, 22f.; 48, 1–3. 7–11; 50,
3–4. 9–12; 51, 14–52, 6). Ebenso wird man bei einer artverwandten Traumlehre, die man bei
dem Buyidenwezir Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd (gest. 360/970) beschrieben findet, eher an Fārābī
als Vorlage denken müssen, als an eine “gemeinsame mittelplatonische Tradition”, die ich in
meinem Artikel über “Die Briefe des Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd an ʿAḍudaddaula” in Der Islam
56, 1979 (S. 106–116), S. 115 Anm. 53, noch angenommen hatte.
2 Prophecy in Islam. London 1958, S. 12 f. und 30 ff.

348 chapter 17
zer denkt daher an eine verlorene mittelplatonische Quelle. Liest man indes-
sen Aristoteles’ De Anima sorgfältig durch – ein Buch, das Fārābī 200mal gele-
sen haben soll3 – zieht man ferner die von Fārābī kommentierte4 Nikomachi-
730 sche Ethik des Aristoteles heran und | berücksichtigt man die Nouslehre des
Alexander von Aphrodisias, erübrigt sich ein Rückgriff auf angeblich verlo-
rene griechische Quellen. Gleichzeitig erklärt der aristotelische Hintergrund
die Einbeziehung der Prophetie in eine Staatsethik, worin der Regent des “Mus-
terstaates” Philosoph und Prophet zugleich sein muss. Eine zentrale Rolle spie-
len hierbei die Mimesistätigkeit der Phantasie und die davon abhängige Ver-
wirklichung der Tugend im “Musterstaat”.
Im “Musterstaat” verwirklicht sich die absolute Tugend – das Beste der Ver-
nunft nach. Hierbei geht Fārābī nach dem Vorbild des Aristoteles5 von der
Interdependenz von Klugheit und sittlichen Tugenden aus. Man kann nicht all-
gemein tugendhaft sein, sondern nur, indem man das Gute praktiziert: Theorie
und Praxis gehören zusammen, aber nicht nur in der Weise, dass die Vernunft
bestimmt, was zum tugendhaften Handeln gehört; auch umgekehrt muss die
vernunftgemäße Einsicht dessen, was gut ist, an der Wirklichkeit, am Handeln
orientiert sein.
Hierbei ist erkenntnistheoretisch ein bedeutsamer Schritt vollzogen wor-
den, welcher von der Fārābīforschung übersehen wurde: Im Anschluss an die
aristotelische Verbindung von Klugheit und sittlichen Tugenden geht Fārābī
davon aus, dass das allgemein Gute nicht denkbar ist ohne sinnliche Wahrneh-
mung. Dabei nimmt nach Aristoteles,6 wie nach Fārābī,7 die Vorstellungskraft,
3 Ṣafadī, Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt. Ed. Hellmut Ritter. Wiesbaden 1962. = Bibliotheca Isla-
mica 6a, S. 107, 15 f.
4 Vgl. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ǧamʿ bayna raʾyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa-Arisṭūṭālīs. Ed. Fried-
rich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s Philosophische Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, S. 17, 9. – Ṣafadī (s.
Anm. 3), S. 109, 6. – Lawrence V. Berman, Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nico-
machean Ethics in Medieval Hebrew Literature. In Multiple Averroès, Paris 1978 (S. 287–301),
S. 299, zu einem hebräischen (wahrscheinlich aus dem Lateinischen übersetzten) Fragment
aus der Einleitung zu diesem Kommentar. – Dominique Salman, The Medieval Latin
Translations of Alfarabi’s Works. In New Scholasticism 13, 1939 (S. 245–261), S. 247f. (zu Spuren
der lateinischen Übersetzung von Fārābīs Kommentar zur NE).
5 Vgl. Viktor Cathrein, Der Zusammenhang der Klugheit und der sittlichen Tugenden nach
Aristoteles. In Ethik und Politik des Aristoteles. Hrsg. v. Fritz-Peter Hager. Darmstadt 1972.
= WdF 208 (S. 55–65), S. 64. – HWPh 4, Sp. 857 f.
6 W. K. C. Guthrie, S. 312 f. – HWPh 2, Sp. 346. – Auch Plotin, Enn. IV 4. 12, geht von einer
ähnlichen Zwischenstellung der Phantasie aus. Fārābīs Kontext lässt jedoch eher an aristote-
lischen Einfluss denken. Zudem nennt Fārābī an einer Stelle (MF, S. 51, 21ff.) zusätzlich den
aristotelischen “Gemeinsinn” (vgl. De anima 425 a 28. – Placita philosophorum. Ed. Hermann
Diels, Doxographi graeci. Berolini 1958, Buch III Kap. 10, 2. – HWPh 3, Sp. 243f., und unten
prophetie und ethik bei fārābī (258/872–339/950 oder 951) 349
die φαντασία, eine vermittelnde Stellung ein. Aristoteles argumentierte unter

anderem damit, dass “niemand ohne Wahrnehmung etwas lernen oder ver-
stehen (kann); und wenn man etwas erfasst, muss man es zugleich mit einem
Vorstellungsbild (φάντασμα) erfassen. Denn die Vorstellungsbilder sind gleich-
sam (ὥσπερ) | Wahrnehmungsbilder (αἰσθήματα), nur ohne Materie”.8 Die hier 731
angedeutete Abhängigkeit des Denkens vom Wahrgenommenen9 begründet
Aristoteles10 folgendermaßen: “Für die Denkseele (ψυχὴ διανοητική) sind die
Vorstellungsbilder wie Wahrnehmungsbilder. Wenn sie aber ein Gutes oder
Schlechtes bejaht oder verneint, meidet sie es oder erstrebt es. Deshalb denkt
die Seele nie ohne Vorstellungsbilder”.
Das Denken der Seele über das Gute zu Wollende und das Schlechte zu
Meidende ist somit an den Wahrnehmungsbildern, an der Wirklichkeit orien-
tiert. Hierbei vermittelt die Phantasie, die Vorstellungskraft bzw. Vorstellungs-
kraft der Denkseele, das Wahrnehmbare. Denn nur infolge der Trennung von
Denken und Wahrnehmen11 kann das Denken das Wahrnehmbare sich vorstel-
Anm. 50), welcher als vereinheitlichendes Wahrnehmungsvermögen zwischen die Sinne

und die Vorstellungskraft geschaltet wird. Vgl. dazu Aristoteles, De memoria 450 a 10, und
Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory. London 1972, S. 75f.
7 MF, S. 47, 17.
8 De anima 432 a 7 ff. Die Übersetzung folgt Willy Theiler.
9 Vgl. dazu Joseph Owens, The Universality of the Sensible in the Aristotelian Noetic.
In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Ed. by John P. Anton with George L. Kustas.
Albany, New York 1971, S. 462–477. – Malcolm Schofield, Aristotle on the Imagination.
In Aristotle on the Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristoteli-
cum. Ed. by G. E. R. Lloyd and Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen. Cambridge 1978 (S. 99–140),
S. 123 ff.
10 De anima 431 a 15 ff. Denselben Gedanken finden wir als Lehre des Aristoteles vor Fārābī
bereits bei ʿAlī Ibn Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī, Firdaws al-ḥikma. Ed. Muḥammad Zubayr Ṣid-
dīqī. Berlin, 1928, S. 69, 20 ff. / Übersetzung Alfred Siggel, Die propädeutischen Kapitel
in dem Paradies der Weisheit über die Medizin des ʿAlī b. Sahl Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī. Wiesbaden
1953. = Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozi-
alwissenschaftlichen KIasse, Jg. 1953/8, S. 439. – Vgl. ed. Muḥammad Zubayr Ṣiddīqī,
S. 76, 16 ff. / Übers. Alfred Siggel, S. 447. – Quelle des Ṭabarī könnte das im Fihrist
des Ibn an-Nadīm. Ed. Gustav Flügel. I. Beirut 1969, S. 251, 16, genannte “Kompen-
dium” (Ǧawāmi) des Ibn al-Biṭrīq sein. – Man vergleiche ferner Themistius’ ausführlichen
Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De anima in der anonymen arabischen Paraphrase. Ed. Mal-
colm Cameron Lyons, An Arabic Translation of Themistius’ Commentary on Aristoteles’
De Anima. Thetford 1973. = Oriental Studies II, S. 160, 15ff. / Übers. Helmut Gätje, Bemer-
kungen zur arabischen Fassung der Paraphrase der aristotelischen Schrift über die Seele
durch Themistios. In Der Islam 54, 1977 (S. 272–291), S. 283ff.
11 Vgl. De anima III 3. – Dazu die Kommentare von Robert Drew Hicks, Aristotle, De
Anima. With translation, introduction and notes. Cambridge 1907, pp. 452ff. – Georges
Rodier, Aristote, Traité de l’ âme, traduit et annoté. II. Paris 1900, S. 397ff., wo reichlich auf
350 chapter 17
len. Träger dieser Vorstellung ist die Vorstellungskraft, die Phantasie, welche
der Denkseele die “Form”12 des wahrgenommenen Objekts in der Gestalt von
Vorstellungsbildern vermittelt.13 Diese Vorstellungsbilder nennt Alexander von
Aphrodisias in seinem Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De Anima “Erinnerungsbild”
732 (ἀναζωγράφημα bzw. ἀναζωγράφησις).14 Die aus Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayns | Überset-
zung geflossene hebräische Version des Šemuʾel Ben Judah aus dem 14. Jh.15
spricht von “Dinge(n), welche in (der Phantasie) entstehen auf dem Wege der
Abbildung und Vorstellung”.16 Alexander nennt die Vorstellung auch ἀνάλογον17
und Abbild (εἰκών τις)18 des Wahrgenommenen. Ebenso wie bei Aristoteles19
kann das Wahrgenommene in der Form eines solchen Bildes von der Vorstel-
lungskraft bewahrt und gespeichert werden.20 So wird diese zum Erinnerungs-
vermögen.
Diese Funktion des Bewahrens formt auch bei Fārābī ein Charakteristi-
kum des Vorstellungsvermögens.21 Fārābī nennt als weitere Funktionen “Ver-
knüpfung” (tarkīb) und “Trennung” (tafṣīl), welche wahr oder falsch sein kön-
nen.22 Auch hier folgt er Aristoteles23 und dessen Schule.24 Aristoteles zufolge
gibt es dort, wo Irrtum und Wahrheit herrschen – z.B. in der Vorstellung –
die Aristoteleskommentare verwiesen wird. – Ferner HWPh 2, Sp. 67, und die oben Anm. 9
genannte Literatur.
12 εἶδος, De anima 431 b 31. – Fārābī spricht MF, S. 48, 22, von māhiya: Hier klingt die Unter-
scheidung von Wesenheit und Dasein an, als deren islamischer Begründer Fārābī gilt. –
Vgl. Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence. Tokyo 1971, S. 86ff.
13 Vgl. Carmona Quintín Racionero, Eidos, psique, phantasma. In Pensamiento 35, 1979,
S. 237–266.
14 Ed. Ivo Bruns. Berlin 1887. = CAG. Supplementum Aristotelicum II, S. 68, 6ff. – Vgl. die
kommentierte engl. Übers. v. Athanasios P. Fotinis, The “De anima” of Alexander of
Aphrodisias. PhD Marquette University 1978.
15 Vgl. Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die
Juden als Dolmetscher. Graz 1956, § 73b. – In der Ausgabe des griech. Textes (s. Anm. 14) ist
der (noch nicht herausgegebene) Text nach einer von M. Steinschneider angefertigten
deutschen Übersetzung in den Apparat eingearbeitet worden.
16 Vgl. ed. Ivo Bruns (s. Anm. 14), S. 69, 25 f., App. vgl. S. 68, 6 und 70, 18.
17 Ed. Ivo Bruns (s. Anm. 14), S. 68, 27 und 29.
18 Ed. Ivo Bruns (s. Anm. 14), S. 68, 9. – Vgl. Aristoteles, De memoria 450 a 22ff. Dazu Hen-
riette Wijsenbeek-Wijler, Aristotle’s Concept of Soul, Sleep and Dreams. Diss. Ams-
terdam 1976, S. 222, und Richard Sorabji (s. Anm. 6), S. 2ff.
19 De memoria 450 b 23 ff.
20 Ed. Ivo Bruns (s. Anm. 14), S. 68, 8 ff.
21 MF, S. 48, 3.
22 MF, S. 34, 21. Vgl. S. 35, 20–22; 43, 15 f. – Fuṣūl, S. 107, 8–10.
23 De anima 428 a 12 ff. und 18. – Vgl. dazu David Arthur Rees, Aristotle’s Treatment of
Φαντασία. In Essays (s. Anm. 9), S. 491–504, bes. S. 498.
24 Vgl. z.B. Themistius’ Kommentar zu De anima und die anonyme arabische Paraphrase (s.
Anm. 10).
“Verknüpfung” (σύνθεσις)25 und “Trennung” (διαίρεσις)26 von Zusammengehö-

rigem und Nichtzusammengehörigem.27
Die genannten Funktionen des Verknüpfens und Trennens sowie des
Bewahrens von Sinneseindrücken können nach Aristoteles nur auf die Bil-
der gerichtet sein, welche die Vorstellungskraft sich vom Wahrgenommenen
gemacht hat. Alexander von Aphrodisias spricht wie gesagt vom ἀνάλογον,
Fārābī gebraucht in einer terminologischen Neuschöpfung das Wort muḥākāt
“Nachahmung”. Diese “Nachahmung” ist nichts | anderes als eine Umschrei- 733
bung für die Entstehung der Vorstellung: Ebenso wie das Abbild eine Nachah-
mung von etwas Wirklichem ist – man beachte hier die rein äußerliche Ähn-
lichkeit zur platonischen Lehre von der künstlerischen Nachahmung28 – lässt
sich das Vorstellungsbild als Nachahmung der Wirklichkeit erklären. Zu die-
ser Wirklichkeit rechnet Fārābī nicht nur das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare29 oder
eventuelle von der Vorstellungskraft vollzogene Verknüpfungen von verschie-
denen Wahrnehmungen,30 sondern auch “die Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt), die
Tätigkeiten des Ernährungsvermögens und des Strebevemögens sowie – unter
dem Einfluss Galens31 – die Körperkonstitution.32 Diese Faktoren üben einen
maßgebenden Einfluss auf die Vorstellungsbilder aus.
Hierbei sind die Intelligibilia richtungweisend. Denn sie umfassen allge-
meingültige Prinzipien. Fārābī nennt unter dem Einfluss von Aristoteles drei
Gruppen von Intelligibilia:
– “Prinzipien der wissenschaftlichen Geometrie”.33
– “Prinzipien, deren Heranziehung zur Erkenntnis der Beschaffenheit (Plur.),
der Grundlage (Plur.) und des Ranges (Plur.) der von Menschen nicht be-
25 De anima 430 a 27; 430 b 1 f.

26 De anima 430 b 3.
27 Vgl. Willy Theiler, S. 144 f. – Eine Reminiszenz hieran steht bei ʿAli Ibn Rabban aṭ-
Ṭabarī, Firdaws (s. Anm. 10), ed. Muḥammad Zubayr Ṣiddīqī, S. 622, 11ff. / Übers.
Alfred Siggel, S. 488 Anm. 2 (dort nicht identifiziert).
28 Vgl. “Mimesis” in HWPh 5. – Willem Jacob Verdenius, Mimesis. Plato’s Doctrine of
Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to us. Leiden 1962. Der Künstler gibt nach Platon mit
seinem Kunstwerk in mehr oder weniger unvollkommener Weise eine höhere Wirklich-
keit wieder. Dieser metaphysische Hintergrund fehlt bei Fārābī: Er folgt der aristotelischen
Klassifizierung der phantasmata als Abbilder der wahrnehmbaren Welt und fügt diesen
wegen der Abhängigkeit des Denkens von der Wahrnehmung (s.o.) noch die Intelligibilia
zu (s.u.).
29 al-maḥsūsāt bi-l-ḥawāss al-ḫamsa: MF, S. 48, 6.
30 Tarkīb al-maḥsūsāt: MF, S. 48, 6 f.
31 Vgl. Rudolph E. Siegel, Galen on Psychology, Psychopathology and Function and Diseases
of the Nervous System. Basel (etc.) 1973, S. 167 ff.
32 MF, S. 48, 7 ff.
33 Awāʾilu (= ἀρχαί) li-l-handasa l-ʿilmiyya (MF, S. 45, 16f.): Vgl. Metaph. III 2. 25; XIV 2. 9; vgl.
352 chapter 17
wirkbaren seienden Dinge führt”. Beispiele seien34 “der Himmel,35 die erste
Ursache,36 alle anderen Prinzipien und was aus jenen Prinzipien zu entste-
hen pflegt”.37
– Als weitere und in diesem Zusammenhang wichtigste Gruppe von Prinzi-
734 pien nennt Fārābī diejenigen,38 “womit man sich über das | belehren lassen
kann, was von durch Menschen gewöhnlicherweise vollzogenen Handlun-
gen gut und böse ist”.
Demnach gehört zu den Intelligibilia nicht nur etwas, das Gegenstand wissen-
schaftlicher Erkenntnis ist, sondern auch das dem Urteilsvermögen Unterwor-
fene und zur sittlichen Einsicht Führende – die einzelne Handlung des Men-
schen. Hierin berühren sich die Intelligibilia mit dem aristotelischen Begriff
φρόνησις, sittliche Einsicht bzw. Klugheit.39 Diese erhält der Mensch durch den
intuitiven “Verstand” (νοῦς), dessen Gegenstand somit nicht nur “die obers-
ten Begrifflichkeiten” (οἱ πρώτοι ὅροι) sind, sondern auch “die letzten Einzel-
gegebenheiten” (τὰ ἔσχατα),40 das Handeln in der Polis.41 Der intuitive Ver-
stand geht also von der Wahrnehmung der einzelnen Dinge aus42 und ist
gleichzeitig am Wissen um das Allgemeingültige orientiert. Für Aristoteles
ist daher die philosophische Weisheit (σοφία) nicht nur “wissenschaftliche
Erkenntnis” (ἐπιστήμη) und “intuitives Verstehen” (νοῦς) “der ihrer Natur nach
erhabensten Seinsformen”.43 Sie bedient sich auch der sittlichen Einsicht –
ohne mit dieser identisch zu sein44 – und besorgt dem Menschen “Glück”
(εὐδαιμονία).45 Hierin hat dieser Mensch kraft seines Charakters das richtige
Ziel und besitzt dank seiner sittlichen Einsicht “die richtigen Wege zum Ziel”.46
NE 1098 a 31: Der γεωμέτρης sei “hingegeben an die Schau der Wahrheit” (θεατὴς γὰρ τἀλα-
θοῦς).
34 MF, S. 45, 19 f.
35 Vgl. dazu Aristoteles, Metaph. XII 7. 1: ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός (vgl. dazu Anm. 36).
36 Vgl. dazu im Anschluss an die genannte Metaphysikstelle: ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ (sc. den
ersten Himmel): Die Bewegung geht letztlich zurück auf den ersten unbewegten Beweger:
Metaph. III 7. 2. Vgl. IV 8. 8.
37 Vgl. dazu Aristoteles, Metaph. XII 5. 6–7.
38 MF, S. 45, 16.
39 Vgl. NE VI, 5; Kommentar v. F. Dirlmeier, S. 449. – In den Fuṣūl gibt Fārābī (§36; vgl. den
Kommentar von Douglas Morton Dunlop, S. 84 zu §30) φρόνεσις mit taʿaqqul wieder.
40 NE 1143 a 36.
41 Vgl. NE 1143 b 3 (dazu F. Dirlmeier, S. 466 zu S. 135, 7); 1140 b 10f.; 1141 b 23ff.
42 Vgl. NE 1143 b 5.
43 NE 1141 b 1 f.
44 Vgl. NE VI 13.
45 NE 1144 a 5 f.
46 NE 1144 a 7 ff. (vgl. F. Dirlmeier, S. 469 zu S. 137, 6). Vgl. Fārābī, Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs. Ed.
Voraussetzung dafür ist die Verbindung von ethischen und dianoetischen

Tugenden, welche jeweils die praktische47 und die theoretische bzw. wissen-
schaftliche Vernunft48 vervollkommnen.49 Dazu bedient50 der Mensch sich
dreier Seelen|vermögen, welche “das Handeln und die Erkenntnis des Richti- 735
gen steuern: Der Sinneswahrnehmung (αἴσθησις),51 des Verstandes (νοῦς) und
des Strebens (ὄρεξις)52”.53
Diese Gedanken der Nikomachischen Ethik hat Fārābī übernommen. Er
schreibt:
Die Vernunft (an-nāṭiqa) ist teils praktisch (ʿamaliyya), teils theoretisch

(naẓariyya);54 der praktischen ist es auferlegt, der theoretischen zu die-
nen, wobei die theoretische nichts anderes als der Weg zur Glückseligkeit
ist. All dieses ist mit dem Strebevermögen (al-quwwa n-nuzūʿiyya) ver-
bunden, wobei das Strebevermögen der Sinneswahrnehmung dem Vor-
stellungsvermögen und der Vernunft dient. Die dienenden Kräfte kön-
nen somit nur mit Hilfe des Strebevermögens dienen und handeln. Denn
Wahrnehmung, Vorstellung und Reflexion (rawiyya) können nur dann zur
Aktion kommen, wenn damit das Verlangen (tašawwuq) nach dem Wahr-
genommenen, Vorgestellten oder Reflektierten und das Wissen (ʿilm)
(darum) verbunden ist … Hat man mit Hilfe der theoretischen (Vernunft)
die Glückseligkeit (as-saʿāda) zur Kenntnis genommen, strengt man sich
aufs Äußerste an und verlangt (nach ihr) mit dem Strebe(vermögen), hat
man (ferner) mit der reflektierenden Kraft das notwendigerweise Zutu-
Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1961, S. 68, 7 ff. / Übers. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato
and Aristotle. Ithaca, NY 1969, S. 79.
47 τὸ λογιστικόν, d.h. τέχνη und φρόνησις.
48 τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, d.h. νοῦς, σοφία, ἐπιστήμη.
49 NE I 13. 1103 a 3–7. Vgl. Viktor Cathrein (s. Anm. 5), S. 57. – Kathleen V. Wilkes, The
Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics. In Mind 87, 1978, S. 553–571. – Zur
platonkritischen Unterscheidung von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie s. Gün-
ther Bien, Das Theorie-Praxis-Problem und die politische Philosophie bei Platon und
Aristoteles. In Philosophisches Jahrbuch 76, 1968/1969, S. 264–314, bes. S. 288f. und 295ff. –
Die aristotelische Einteilung in ethische und dianoetische Tugenden übernimmt Fārābī
ausdrücklich in den Fuṣūl § 7: ḫulqiyya und nuṭqiyya. – Vgl. auch das unten behandelte
Ethikkompendium fol. 61 v 12–16 und Kommentar.
50 Zum Dienergedanken vgl. auch NE 1102 b 31 ff.
51 Aristoteles (wie Fārābī: Vgl. Anm. 6) denkt hier an den abstrahierenden “Gemeinsinn”, der
sich auf die Wahrnehmungen der fünf Sinne stützt. – Vgl. William Francis Ross Har-
die, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory. Oxford 1968, S. 233 f.
52 Zu ὄρεξις vgl. J. B. Skemp, ὄρεξις in De anima III 10. In Aristotle on the Mind and the Senses
(s. Anm. 9), S. 181–189.
53 NE 1139 a 17 f.
54 Vgl. auch Anm. 49.
354 chapter 17
ende erschlossen, sodass man es mit Hilfe der Vorstellung und der Sinne
aufnehmen (kann) und hat man dann mit den Werkzeugen des Strebe-
vermögens jene Aktionen vollbracht, sind die Handlungen des Menschen
gut und schön.55
Der Text fügt hinzu, dass die Handlungen nicht gut sind, wenn Streben und
Wissen nicht auf die Glückseligkeit gerichtet sind. Diese definiert Fārābī in
Anlehnung an Aristoteles56 als “das Gute, das um seiner selbst willen erstrebt
wird”57 und als etwas, das nicht Mittel zum Zweck sei.58 Diejenigen “Willens-
handlungen”,59 welche die “Glückseligkeit” (saʿāda) zum Ziel haben, sind “gute
736 Handlungen”.60 Sie | werden ganz im Sinne des Aristoteles61 als reflektiertes
“Streben”62 und “Wählen”63 erklärt. Hierin unterscheidet sich der Mensch von
den übrigen Lebewesen, deren “Wollen” (irāda) ausschließlich auf Wahrneh-
mung und Vorstellung basiert.64 Gleichzeitig sind die “Glückseligkeit” und “das
Gute” (al-ḫayr) nicht nur etwas Theoretisches, das Resultat “der denkerischen
Bemühungen”,65 sondern auch “Handlungen des Körpers”.66 Ebenso ist für Aris-
toteles nur der sittlich wertvoll (ἀγαθός), der auch entsprechend handelt.67
55 MF, S. 47, 1–11.

56 NE 1094 a 18 ff. (vgl. 1097 a 34 f.) wird “das Gut” (τὸ ἀγαθόν) und “das oberste Gut” (τὸ ἄρι-
στον ἀγαθόν) als “Endziel” (τέλος) definiert, “das wir um seiner selbst willen erstreben” (ὁ δι
αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα). – Vgl. dazu Trond Berg Eriksen, Bios theoretikos. Oslo/Bergen/Tromsø
1976, S. 47 ff. – Zum platonischen Vorbild der Formulierung vgl. Platon, Rep. 357 B (dort
allerdings als Definition eines beliebigen ἀγαθόν).
57 al-ḫayr al-maṭlūb li-ḏātihī.
58 MF, S. 46, 14–16. – Vgl. Kitāb al-Milla. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1967, S. 52, 11ff.
59 afʿāl irādiyya.
60 afʿāl ǧamīla: MF, S. 46, 16 f.
61 NE III 4.
62 Nuzūʿun ilā baʿḍi mā ʿaqalahū (l-insānu): MF, S. 45, ult.
63 iḫtiyār: MF, S. 46, 3.
64 MF, S. 46, 1 ff.
65 al-afʿāl al-fikriyya.
66 al-afʿāl al-badaniyya: MF, S. 46, 11.
67 NE 1105 b 7 f. – Vgl. Trond Berg Eriksen (s. Anm. 56), S. 40ff. (Kap.: “What is happi-
ness?”). – Die Verbindung von Kenntnis und Tun und eventuelle stärkere Betonung des
einen gegenüber dem anderen ist in der jüdischen und islamischen Philosophie übernom-
men worden: Vgl. Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Griechisches Erbe in der jüdischen Religionsphi-
losophie des Mittelalters. Stuttgart 1960, S. 69 ff. (Exkurs I: Begriff und Bedeutungswandel
der Eudämonie). Hierbei mag auch die peripatetische Diskussion über das Verhältnis von
Theorie und Praxis und über das Ideal des “gemischten Lebens” (σύνθετος βίος = θεωρητικός
βίος + πρακτικὸς βίος) eine Rolle gespielt haben. Zu dieser Diskussion vgl. Paul Moraux,
Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. I. Berlin 1973. = Peripatoi 5, S. 417f.
Dieser Wirklichkeitsbezug ist von Fārābī weiter ausgebaut worden. Denn er

fügt den in der Nikomachischen Ethik genannten Seelenkräften, nämlich Sin-
neswahrnehmung, Verstand, Streben und vegetatives Vermögen,68 eine weitere
hinzu: Die “Vorstellungskraft” (al-quwwa al-mutaḫayyila).69 Wie wir eingangs
gesehen haben, gibt diese an die Denkseele die Wahrnehmungen in Form von
materielosen Vorstellungsbildern weiter. Durch diese Bilder bleibt das Denken,
die Erkenntnis von Gut und Böse, was zu tun und zu vermeiden ist, an der Wirk-
lichkeit orientiert. Die dadurch gewährleistete Verbindung von theoretischer
und praktischer Vernunft wird erkenntnistheoretisch mit einer Lehre aus Aris-
toteles’ De anima untermauert: Die Seele denkt nicht ohne die materielosen
und “Vorstellungsbilder” genannten Wahrnehmungsbilder der Phantasie.
Diese Kombination zweier aristotelischer Lehrkomplexe aus De anima und
aus der Nikomachischen Ethik, ihre Integration in eine philosophische Staats-
ethik und die Umschreibung der Tätigkeit der Vorstellungskraft mit muḥākāt
“Nachahmung” des Wahrgenommenen im Dienste | der Denkseele können wir 737
als originellen Beitrag des Fārābī betrachten. Es gibt meines Wissens hierfür
kein Vorbild in der hellenistischen Aristotelesexgese.70 Daher gilt, wer eine ver-
lorene griechische Quelle postulieren wollte, unterschätzt die Selbständigkeit
eines islamischen Phiosophen vom Formate Fārābīs.
Eine konsequente und Alexander von Aphrodisias’ Lehre vom göttlichen
intellectus agens71 einbeziehende Weiterbildung der naturalistischen Traum-
68 NE 1102 b 29, τὸ φυτικόν = θρεπτική, De anima 434 a 22ff., und Alexander von Aphrodisias
(s. Anm. 14), S. 29, 2, al-quwwa al-ġāḏiya, MF S. 34, 14. – Vgl. zu den aristotelischen Seelen-
kräften Henriette Wijsenbeek-Wijler (s. Anm. 18), S. 70ff. und 124ff.
69 Die Reihenfolge der MF S. 34, 13ff. genannten Seelenkräfte gleicht der bei Alexander von
Aphrodisias (s. Anm. 14), S. 29, 1 ff. und 22 ff.
70 Der uns verlorene und von Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ǧamʿ (s. Anm. 4), S. 17, 10, genannte Kommen-
tar des Porphyrius zur NE (vgl. auch Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic (s. Anm. 1),
S. 220ff.) zeigt den von ʿĀmirī im 10. Jh. AD überlieferten Fragmenten zufolge keine nähe-
ren Übereinstimmungen: Man vergleiche die Fragmentensammlung bei A. A. Ghorab,
The Greek Commentators on Aristotle quoted in Al-ʿĀmirī’s “as-Saʿāda waʾl-isʿād”. In Isla-
mic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays presented … to R. Walzer on his seventieth
birthday. Ed. Samuel Miklos Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown. London
1972, S. 77–88, bes. S. 78 ff.
71 Die zusätzliche Erwähnung des göttlichen (vgl. dazu Anm. 74) aktiven Intellektes bei
Fārābī knüpft letztlich an Aristoteles’ τὸ ποιητικόν-Lehre in De anima 430 a 12 (vgl. W. K. C.
Guthrie, S. 315 ff.) an und ist in der bei Fārābī (MF, S. 58, 1ff.) nachweisbaren Klassifizie-
rung eine Anleihe aus Alexander von Aphrodisias. Vgl. zu Letzterem und zur Geschichte
im Arabischen und Lateinischen R. P. G. Théry, Autour du décret de 1210. II: Alexandre
d’ Aphrodise. Kain 1926. = Bibliothèque thomiste VII. – HWPh 4, Sp. 432–435. – Zu Fārābīs
Intellektlehre vgl. Herbert Alan Davidson, Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intel-
lect. In Viator 3, 1972, S. 109–178. = Revidierte Version in Herbert Alan Davidson,
356 chapter 17
und Mantiktheorie des Aristoteles72 ist Fārābīs Traumlehre:73 Traumbilder wer-

den aus dem Zusammenwirken von Wahrnehmung, nachahmender Vorstel-
738 lung und göttlichem74 “aktivem Intellekt” | erklärt.75 Überwiegt die das Wahr-
Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. New York/Oxford 1992, Kap. 2–4. – Richard
Walzer, Aristotle’s Active Intellect νοψσ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ in Greek and Early Islamic Phi-
losophy. In Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente. Roma 1974. = Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei. Anno 371, S. 423–436. – Die Einleitung von Francesca Lucchetta,
Fārābī, Epistola sull’intelletto. Traduzione, introduzione e note. Padova 1974. – Jean Joli-
vet, L’ intellect selon al-Fārābī. In Bulletin d’ Études Orientales 29, 1977, S. 252–259.
72 Bei Aristoteles ist jedoch der Einfluss der Denkkraft auf ein Minimum zurückgedrängt;
vgl. De insomniis 459 a 8 ff.; Henriette Wijsenbeek-Wijler (s. Anm. 18), S. 211ff.; Paul
Moraux (s. Anm. 67), S. 237ff. – Zur Rezeption der genannten Aristotelespassage aus
De insomniis in der islamischen Philosophie s. Shlomo Pines, The Arabic Recension of
“Parva Naturalia” and the Doctrine Concerning Veridical Dreams According to al-Risāla
al-Manāmiyya and Other Sources. In IOS 4, 1974, S. 104–153, bes. 149f., wo Fārābī genannt
ist / Nachdr. in S. Pines, Studies in Arabic Versions οf Greek Texts and in Medieval Science.
Jerusalem/Leiden 1986. = The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines II, S. 96–145. – Aviezer
Ravitzky, Hebrew Quotations from the Lost Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia. In JSAI
3, 1981–1982, S. 191–201. = A. Ravitzky, From History and Faith. Studies in Jewish Philoso-
phy. Amsterdam 1996. = Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 2, S. 304–318.
73 Einige Bemerkungen zu ihr findet man außer in den eingangs (Anm. 1) erwähnten Arbei-
ten von Richard Walzer und Fazlur Rahman auch bei Helmut Gätje, Philosophi-
sche Traumlehren im Islam. In ZDMG 109, N. F. 34, 1959 (S. 258–285), S. 264ff. – Vgl. auch
Muʿtazid Wali Ur-Rahman, Al-Fārābī and his Theory of Dreams. In IC 10, 1936, S. 137–
151.
74 Die Göttlichkeit des νοῦς betonen auch Platon (z.B. Tim. 90 A) und Aristoteles (z.B. Ethica
Eudemia 1248 a 26; Metaph. 982 b 30 ff.); vgl. dazu Paul Moraux (s. Anm. 67), S. 230
Anm. 24. Aristoteles, De divinatione per somnium, leugnet jedoch die Existenz von gottge-
sandten Träumen und klassifiziert die Weissagung als etwas Abnormes und Irrationales
(vgl. Henriette Wijsenbeek-Wijler (s. Anm. 18), S. 234ff.). – Hier weicht die spät-
hellenistische Tradition ab: Der Neuplatoniker Synesius von Kyrene (370/375–413/414AD)
hält in der Nachfolge von Plotin und Porphyrius in seinem Traumbüchlein gleichfalls an
der Göttlichkeit des νοῦς fest. Dabei gehen Synesius wie Fārābī vom Zusammenwirken
zwischen Sinneswahrnehmung, bilderschaffender Phantasie und νοῦς aus. Im Falle des
Synesius denkt Wolfram Lang an Porphyrius’ fragmentarisch erhaltene Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς
τὰ νοητά: Vgl. Wolfram Lang, Das Traumbuch des Synesius von Kyrene. Tübingen 1926. =
Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte 10, S. 50. Angesichts der
weiteren Parallelen zu Porphyrius mag Synesius hier tatsächlich von diesem beeinflusst
sein. Für Fārābī indessen ist hier m.E. nicht Porphyrius maßgebend gewesen, sondern
(neben Alexander von Aphrodisias) eine von Porphyrius (und über ihn von Synesius)
benutzte und von W. Lang nicht genannte Quelle, nämlich Aristoteles’ Lehre über die
Phantasie. Bereits dort finden wir im Zusammenhang mit der Traumlehre (De insomniis
459 a) eine ähnliche Verselbständigung der Phantasie. Diese ist daher entgegen H. Gätje
(s. Anm. 73), S. 263 Anm. 6, kein Kriterium für eine neuplatonische Herleitung von Fārābīs
Traumlehre.
75 MF, S. 51, 14 ff.
genommene imitierende Vorstellungskraft, reproduziert sie das vom aktiven

Intellekt Eingegebene durch Nachahmungen von Wahrnehmungen, welche
“äußerst schön und vollkommen sind”.76 Als Beispiel wird Gottes “erhabene
und wunderbare Majestät”77 genannt. Hat hierbei die Nachahmung einen sehr
großen Vollkommenheitsgrad erreicht und ist sie auf die vom göttlichen Intel-
lekt eingegebenen gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen “Partikularia” (al-ǧuzʾiyāt)
und auf die “getrennten Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt al-mufāriqa) sowie auf “alle
erhabenen seienden Dinge” (sāʾir al-mawǧūdāt aš-šarīfa) gerichtet, spricht
man von “Prophetie” (nubuwwa), von der Prophezeiung “göttlicher Dinge”.78
Hier vermittelt nicht die an der Wahrnehmung orientierte Vernunftkraft,
sondern die von der Vorstellungskraft in vollkommenster Weise veranschau-
lichte göttliche “Eingebung” (waḥy)79 des göttlichen aktiven Intellektes80 die
richtige Einsicht. In beiden Fällen, d.h., sowohl beim Philosophen als auch
beim Propheten wird durch die Einschaltung der Vorstellungskraft das bereits
geschilderte aristotelische Wechselverhältnis von Denken und Wahrnehmung
vorausgesetzt. Der Prophet ist daher für | Fārābī keine Alternative zum Phi- 739
losophenherrscher. Vielmehr sind im vollkommenen Herrscher Philosophie
und Prophetentum verbunden.81 Denn seine Vernunft bedarf auch der Einge-
bung des aktiven göttlichen Intellektes, um zur Erkenntnis dessen zu kommen,
was gut ist. Hierbei werden Vernunft und Realität, Denken und Wahrnehmung
durch die vermittelnde Vorstellungskraft zueinander in Beziehung gebracht.
Ein Beispiel ist der “Musterstaat”: Sein Regent82 ist nicht nur jemand, der theo-
76 MF, S. 52, 4 f.
77 ʿaẓama ǧalīla ʿaǧība: MF, S. 52, 6.
78 MF, S. 52, 7–11.
79 Vgl. zum Begriff (auch bei Fārābī) Nagra Al-Tuhāmī, Le problème de la révélation
(waḥy) selon le credo musulman. In Islamo-christiana 4, 1978, S. 127–147, bes. S. 131–134. –
Die göttliche Eingebung wird bei Fārābī (MF, S. 58, 3) auch ʿaql mustafād genannt: Vgl.
Alexander von Aphrodisias’ ἐπίκτητος νοῦς und dazu die Anm. 71 genannte Arbeit von R.
P. G. Théry; dieser vermittelt zwischen dem “aktiven Intellekt” (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) und dem
“passiven Intellekt” (al-ʿaql al-munfaʿil): Vgl. SM, S. 79, ult.ss.
80 Auch rūḥ al-quds und ar-rūḥ al-amīn genannt: Vgl. z.B. SM, S. 32, 11. – Vgl. dazu Richard
Walzer (s. Anm. 71), S. 435. Diese Terminologie kommt übrigens auch bei dem Ismailiten
Kirmānī (s. Anm. 91) vor.
81 Dies hat Muhsin Mahdi in History of Political Philosophy. Ed. Leo Strauss und Joseph
Cropsey. Chicago 1972, S. 188 ff., gut herausgearbeitet, ohne allerdings auf den aristoteli-
schen Hintergrund zu weisen.
82 Raʾīs und imām genannt: Vgl. MF, S. 59, 11. – Vgl. Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda. Haidarabad 1345/1926,
S. 29, -2 ff. / Übers. Muhsin Mahdi (s. Anm. 46), S. 35ff. – Dazu M. Mahdi, Einl. S. XXIII–
XXV, und Muhsin Mahdi, Remarks on Alfarabi’s Attainment of Happiness. In Essays on
Islamic Philosophy and Science. Ed. George F. Hourani. Albany 1975 (S. 47–66), S. 61f. –
Zu einer ismailitischen Parallele s. hier Schluss von Kap. I.
358 chapter 17
retisches Wissen hat, sondern auch ein vom göttlichen Intellekt inspirierter
und wirklichkeitsorientierter Prophet. Denn ihm werden göttliche Vernunft-
eingebungen in Form von Nachahmungen der Wahrnehmungen und Intelligi-
bilia zuteil. Gleichzeitig kann durch diese “Nachahmungen” das philosophisch-
prophetische Wissen an die Menschen niedrigeren Ranges in Form von philo-
sophischen Beweisführungen oder prophetischen “Warnungen”83 weitergege-
ben und veranschaulicht werden.84
Hierbei bestätigt sich die von Wolfhart Heinrichs85 vorgeschlagene
Interpretation von Fārābīs muḥākāt “Nachahmung” als “Bildersprache”, wel-
che sich in aristotelischem Sinne der Redekunst und Dichtung bedient und
beide damit in den Dienst der Religion stellt. Allerdings übersieht Heinrichs
den oben beschriebenen erkenntnistheoretischen Aspekt der aristotelischen
Lehre von der φαντασία (De anima) und ihre Verbindung mit Aristoteles’ Lehre
von der sittlichen Tugend (Nikomachische Ethik). Die Kombination mit der
von Heinrichs herausgearbeiteten “logischen” Poetik aristotelisch-alexandri-
740 nischer Provenienz war für | Fārābī naheliegend. Denn sowohl in der Erkennt-
nis der philosophischen Wahrheit als auch in der Vermittlung dieser Wahrheit
in der religiösen “Bildersprache” an das Volk entpuppt sich Fārābīs Vorstel-
lungsbild als eine Nachahmung der Wirklichkeit. Die nachahmende Tätigkeit
ist nicht nur für den Denkprozess unerlässlich, sondern auch für die sprachli-
che Vermittlung der philosophischen Erkenntnis durch den Propheten an den
Zuhörer, den Bürger des “Musterstaates”. Religion und Philosophie schließen
sich nicht gegenseitig aus, sondern ergänzen sich. Denn die vom Propheten
vorgetragene “bildersprachliche” Formulierung der philosophischen Erkennt-
nis als religiöse Wahrheit erweist sich als bildhafte Nachahmung der philoso-
phischen Wahrheit mit Hilfe von Vorstellungsbildern: Die hier sich äußernde
Wirklichkeitsbezogenheit zeigt, dass die Nachahmung nicht etwas Unvollkom-
menes ist, obwohl sie nicht mit der göttlichen oder wahrgenommenen Realität
83 MF, S. 58 f. – Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1970, S. 131, 9, spricht von
iqnāʿ und taḫyīl.
84 Vgl. Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda (s. Anm. 46), S. 44, 2 ff. / Übers. M. Mahdi, S. 47ff. – SM, S. 55f., und
dazu M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 81), S. 189 f. – Ferner Kitāb al-Ḥurūf (s. Anm. 83), S. 131ff. und
153 ff., und dazu die englische kommentierte Übersetzung von Lawrence V. Berman,
Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfārābī. In IOS 4, 1974 (S. 154–178), S. 171ff.
85 Die antike Verknüpfung von phantasia und Dichtung bei den Arabern. In ZDMG 128, 1978
(S. 252–298), S. 267ff. und 273ff. – Meines Erachtens ist die bei Fārābī nachweisbare Deu-
tung der “Nachahmung” als Bildersprache von Fārābī selbst entwickelt worden; hier wird,
worauf Wolfhart Peter Heinrichs, S. 256f. und 294, hinweist, die vom alexandri-
nischen Organon vorgegebene “logische” Poetik des Aristoteles Ausgangspunkt gewesen
sein. – Vgl. auch Gregor Schoeler in ZDMG 133, 1983, S. 43–92.
identisch ist. Vielmehr sorgt die nachahmende Aktivität der menschlichen Vor-
stellungskraft auch dafür, dass das Streben der menschlichen Vernunft sowohl
in der Erkenntnis als auch in der prophetischen Vermittlung des höchsten
Guten an den Menschen wirklichkeitsorientiert bleibt. Ein konkretes Beispiel
ist der “Musterstaat”: Dort findet die sittliche Tugend ihren vollkommensten
Ausdruck im Handeln, in der Bezogenheit zum Anderen, in der Verwirklichung.
Hier hat Fārābī die platonische und in der Nikomachischen Ethik nur kurz
gestreifte86 Lehre vom Idealstaat in aristotelischem Geiste zu neuem Leben
erweckt.87 Die von ihm ausführlich beschriebene hierarchische Struktur des
“Musterstaates”, eines Organismus im Großen,88 erscheint bei Fārābī nach dem
Vorbild von Platon89 und Aristoteles90 vergleichbar mit derjenigen der
menschlichen Seele. Es ist daher kein Wunder, dass Fārābī Letzterer so viel Auf-
merksamkeit geschenkt hat.
In diesem Punkt berührt sich Fārābī interessanterweise mit der Ismāʿīliyya:
Auch dort finden wir mit zum Teil identischer Terminologie | dieselbe Paralle- 741
lität zwischen den hierarchischen Strukturen von Seele, menschlichem Kör-
per und Staat; ferner die Verbindung der Tugend mit der von den “Intellek-
ten” (ʿuqūl), d.h. von den Engeln gespeiste “Erkenntnis” (maʿrifa) im Gehorsam
gegenüber dem Imam und dem dāʿī, sowie die Rolle des Propheten als Ver-
mittler zwischen “Glaubensgemeinschaft” (milla) und göttlicher Vernunft.91 Es
86 Vgl. z.B. NE 1140 b 10 f. und 1194 b 7. – Ernst Howald, Alois Dempf und Theodor Litt,
Geschichte der Ethik vom Altertum bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. München/Wien
1978, 22015, Abschn. B, S. 45.
87 Vgl. Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of al-Fārābī. In IC 29,
1955, S. 157–178. = Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Studia Semitica. II. Cambridge 1971, S. 93–114.
88 Vgl. MF, S. 54, 12 ff. und dazu Hans H. Lauer, Der Arztphilosoph al-Fārābī und seine Lehre
vom Staat. In Ärzte-Blatt Baden-Württemberg 22, Stuttgart 1967 (S. 374–379), S. 376f., wo auf
Vorbilder bei Platon (Tim. 44 D ff. und 90 A) und Aristoteles verwiesen wird.
89 Tim. 69 A ff. – Vgl. unten Teil II, Kommentar zu fol. 62 r 8f.
90 Vgl. NE 1102 a 18 ff.; Polit. 1254 b 4; 1277 a 5 und 1290 b 21f. – Parallelen zu Aristoteles’ Politik
in Fārābīs MF hat Shlomo Pines, Aristotle’s Politics in Arabic Philosophy, in IOS 5, 1975
(S. 150–160), S. 156ff., zusammengestellt. – S. Pines’ Artikel ist nachgedruckt in Shlomo
Pines, Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy. Ed. Sarah Stroumsa. Jerusalem 1996.
= The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines II, S. 251–261.
91 Vgl. Aḥmad Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (gest. 411/1020 oder 1021, also 70 Jahre nach dem
Tode Fārābīs: Vgl. Ismail K. Poonawala, Biobibliography of Ismāʿīlī Literature. Malibu
1977, S. 9 f.) in seinem Werk Rāḥat al-ʿaql, hrsg. v. Muṣṭafā Ġālib, Beirut 1967, z.B. S. 431,
9 ff.; 437, 2 ff. und 9 ff.; 465, -6 ff. und 488, -9 ff. – Weitere Parallelen zwischen Fārābī (Lehre
von den zehn Intellekten) und Kirmānī nennt Heinz Halm, Kosmologie und Heilslehre
der frühen Ismāʿīlīya. Wiesbaden 1978. = AKM 44/1, S. 84f. – Außer Kirmānī vgl. man
ferner die Enzyklopädie der Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. Ed. Beirut 1957, II,
S. 237ff. / Ed. Kairo 1928, III, S. 237ff. / Übers. und Komm. v. Susanne Diwald, Ara-
360 chapter 17
ist denkbar, dass Fārābī mit seinen Theorien über den “Musterstaat” die späte-
ren Lehren der Ismailiten beeinflusste,92 aber auch seinerseits unter dem Ein-
druck zietgenössischer ismailitischer Diskussionen geschrieben hat.93 Doch
dies bedarf einer näheren Untersuchung.
II (Pseudo-?) Fārābī über die menschlichen Tugenden

Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyar al-marḍiyya fī qtināʾ al-faḍāʾil al-insiyya
Die Echtheit dieses allein in der Handschrift Leiden 1002 (fol. 61 v–62 r) über-
lieferten Textes lässt sich bislang nicht mit absoluter Sicherheit nachweisen.94
Der Titel wird nicht im Schriftenverzeichnis der alten arabischen Fārābī-Bio-
graphien genannt. Ferner ist der Text nicht in (bislang) vergleichbaren ethi-
schen Schriften des Fārābī nachweisbar und zeigt auch keine näheren Berüh-
742 rungen zu Ethikabhandlungen der | Schüler Fārābīs.95 – Die von Moritz
Steinschneider96 vorgeschlagene Identifizierung mit der von den arabi-
bische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (III). Wies-
baden 1975, S. 191ff. – Vgl. auch Susanne Diwald, Die Seele und ihre geistigen Kräfte im
K. Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. In Islamic Philosophy (s. Anm. 70), S. 49–61, bes. S. 53.
92 Nach der Darstellung des 745/1344 verstorbenen Ismailiten Yaḥyā Ibn Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī,
al-Ifḥām li-afʾidat al-Bāṭiniyya aṭ-ṭaġām. Ed. Fayṣal Badīr ʿAwn und ʿAlī Sāmī an-
Naššār. Alexandrien o.J., S. 53, ist die ismailitische Lehre von der Prophetie, von der “Ema-
nation” ( fayḍān) auf den Propheten, die strukturell eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit zu Fārābīs
Theorie besitzt, den “Philosophen” entnommen.
93 Hierher gehört etwa auch die Betonung des politischen Charakters der Prophetie, deren
islamische Grundlage E. I. J. Rosenthal (s. Anm. 67), S. 82, geahnt, aber nicht weiter her-
ausgerabeitet hat. – Fazlur Rahman (s. Anm. 2) hatte hier ein Erbe der Antike angenom-
men. – Auf ismailitische Tendenzen bei Fārābī haben hingewiesen Richard Walzer (s.
Anm. 71), S. 424 und 436; ferner Shlomo Pines, Shīʿite Terms and Conceptions in Judah
Halevi’s Kuzari. In JSAI 2, 1980 (S. 165–251), S. 243. – Vgl. dazu Hans Daiber, The Ismailite
Background of Fārābī’s Political Philosophy. Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī as a Forerunner of Fārābī.
In Gottes ist der Orient, Gottes ist der Okzident. Festschrift für Abdoljavad Falaturi zum 65.
Geburtstag. Ed. by Udo Tworuschka. Köln/Wien 1991, S. 143–150. = H. Daiber, From
94 Khalil Georr, Bibliographie critique de Fārābī. Diss. Paris 1945, S. 108, zweifelt an der
Echtheit.
95 Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī, Miskawayh, Ibn Bāǧǧa und Ibn Sīnā. – Zu Berührungen zwischen ethischen
Abhandlungen von Fārābī und Ibn Sīnā vgl. Martin Plessner, Beiträge zur islamischen
Literaturgeschichte, II: Über einige Schriften Avicennas und al-Fārābīs zur Psychologie
und Ethik. In Ignaz Goldziher Memorial. II. Jerusalem 1958, S. 71–82.
96 Al-Farabi, St.-Pétersbourg 1869. = Mémoires de l’ Académie Impérial des Sciences de St.-
Pétersbourg, VIIe série, t. XIII/4 (Nachdr. Frankfurt a.M. 1999), S. 72 Anm. 11 und S. 116
Anm. 20. – In gleicher Weise hat die Abhandlung nichts zu tun mit dem titellosen und
Fārābī zugeschriebenen Text in der Handschrift Bodleian Library (Oxford) 980 (= Marsh
schen Biobibliographen genannten Abhandlung Fī quwā n-nafs ist unwahr-

scheinlich, weil der Leidener Text hauptsächlich eine Tugendlehre nach dem
Vorbild von Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik und mit platonischem Einschlag
bietet (s.u.). Ebenso muss die von Moritz Steinschneider97 und Ḥusayn
ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ und Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn98 genannte Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen
werden, dass der Text ein Fragment aus Fārābī, as-Sīra al-fāḍila sei: Dieser Text
ist bei Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī99 neben dem Fārābī-Werk as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya ge-
nannt. Die von Ṣāʿid dann gegebene Inhaltsübersicht100 stützt sich hauptsäch-
lich auf Fārābīs “Musterstaat”. Die Sīra al-fāḍila ist daher ein Alternativtitel von
Mabādīʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila, Fārābīs “Musterstaat”. Der Leidener Text
entpuppt sich nicht als ein Fragment hieraus und teilt mit ihm lediglich Gedan-
ken der Nikomachischen Ethik. – Die von Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn101 vor-
genommene Identifizierung mit Fārābīs Kitāb al-Aḫlāq | trifft gleichfalls nicht 743
zu. Unter dem Titel Risāla fī l-aḫlāq bieten die Handschriften102 ein Werk, das
536), fol. 89 r–90 r. Dieser wurde von Edward Bouverie Pusey (Bibliothecae Bodlei-
anae … catalogus II/1, S. 605, Sp. a, Z. 10–12), danach von Moritz Steinschneider,
Al-Farabi, S. 109, und Hebr. Übers. (s. Anm. 15), § 162. 8, von Carl Brockelmann, GAL
I (s. Anm. 109), S. 212 Nr. 5, sowie von Ḥusayn ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ und Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn (s.
Anm. 98), S. 339 (Nr. 86), fälschlich als Abhandlung des Fārābī über die Seele bzw. über
das Wesen der Seele ausgegeben. – M. Steinschneider (l.c.) identifiziert zudem fälsch-
licherweise die Oxforder Hs. mit einer Fārābī (zu Recht?) zugeschriebenen hebräischen
Abhandlung über das Wesen der Seele: S. die Inhaltsangabe des hebräischen Textes bei
Ermenegildo Bertola, II trattato ‘Dell’essenza dell’anima’ di Al-Farabi. In Pubblica-
zioni dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, N.S. 58, Milano 1956, S. 169–179; edited and
transl. by Gerrit Bos in his MA Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 1985: Al-Farabi’s Al-Mahut
ha-Nefesh (On the Essence of the soul). – Da auch die von Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūẓ und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn
(l.c.) genannten weiteren Handschriften (Dānišgāh 2594/16; höchstwahrscheinlich iden-
tisch mit Ibn Sīnās Aḥwāl an-nafs) und Topkapı Sarayı (Ahmet III, 3195/2; = Fārābīs Kitāb
al-Aḫlāq!, s. Anm. 102) nichts damit zu tun haben, müssen wir vorläufig annehmen, dass
Fārābīs Abhandlung über die Seele im Arabischen verloren ist. Ob sie mit dem genann-
ten hebräischen Text identisch ist, bleibt m.E. zweifelhaft. Auch die im alten Katalog von
Rampur S. 395 erwähnte Handschrift ḥikma 100/3 mit einem angegebenen Umfang von 96
Seiten (S. 710 ist der Text unter fann mutafarriq Nr. 73/3 nochmals erwähnt) gehört wohl
nicht hierher: Die allein dort genannte Fārābīschrift Šarḥ Risālat an-Nafs li-Arisṭūṭālīs
(übernommen von C. Brockelmann (s. Anm. 109), GAL S I, S. 958 oben, und von Ḥ.
ʿA. Maḥfūẓ und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 98), S. 329 Nr. 60) verdankt ihre Existenz wohl
einem Irrtum. Der neue Rampurer Katalog (Bd. VI) enthält eine solche Fārābīschrift nicht.
Eine Überprüfung ist nicht möglich, da die alte Nummerierung im neuen Katalog nicht
erwähnt ist.
97 Al-Farabi (s. Anm. 96), S. 71.
98 Muʾallafāt al-Fārābī. Bagdad 1975, S. 291, 13.
99 Ṭabaqāt al-umam. Ed. Louis Cheikho. Beirut 1912, S. 54, 3f.
100 Ed. Louis Cheikho, S. 54, 4–8.
101 Muʾallafāt (s. Anm. 98), S. 291, 14; vgl. S. 238 unten.
102 Aya Sofya 1957, fol. 124 v–135 r; Aya Sofya 2818, fol. 104 r–112 v; Topkapı Sarayı Ahmet III 3195,
362 chapter 17
auch unter den Titeln Maqāla fī s-siyāsa,103 Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyāsa104 und Kitāb
al-Waṣāyā105 überliefert wird. Der Text ist unter dem Titel Kalām fī waṣāyā
oder Risāla fī s-siyāsa mehrmals herausgegeben106 und von Georg Graf107
nach der Ausgabe von Louis Cheikho (Beirut 1901) ins Deutsche übersetzt
worden. Das Fārābī-Schriftenverzeichnis von Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn
führt die genannten Titel als verschiedene Schriften an, ohne ihre Identität
erkannt zu haben.108 – Die von Carl Brockelmann109 in Erwägung gezo-
gene Identifizierung mit dem Fārābī zu Unrecht zugeschriebenen Kitāb al-
Alfāẓ al-aflāṭūniyya wa-taqwīm as-siyāsa al-mulūkiyya wa-l-aḫlāq muss gleich-
falls fallen gelassen werden, da es sich bei diesem Werk um ein auch Platon
zugeschriebenes 12teiliges Gnomologium handelt.110
fol. 167 v–182 v. Einer Überprüfung bedürfen noch die von Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn
als einzige genannten Hss. in Haidarabad (Āsafiyya II 176/13) und Kabul (s. Anm. 104): In
der Kabuler Hs. folgt auf Fārābīs Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyāsa eine anonyme Risāla fī l-aḫlāq (S. 142–
143).
103 Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3185, fol. 240 v–262 v.
104 Kabul, Bibliothèque du Ministère de l’ Information, Nr. 45, S. 139–142. – Weitere Hss. nen-
nen Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 98), S. 322 Nr. 39.
105 Milli Kütüphane MFA (C) 5 (s. Müjgan Cunbur, Ismet Binark, Nejat Sefercioğlu,
Farabi Bibliyografyası. Ankara 1973, S. 51); Aya Sofya 4855, fol. 61 v–62 r (umfasst nur ein
Fragment, nämlich ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (s. Anm. 110), S. 327, 10–329, 2).
106 Vgl. Nicholas Rescher, Al-Fārābī, An Annotated Bibliography. Pittsburgh 1962, S. 47. –
Hinzuzufügen ist die Edition von ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī in seiner Ausgabe von Mis-
kawayh, al-Ḥikma al-ḫālida, Kairo 1952, S. 327–346. – Eine Neuedition nach allen bisher
bekannt gewordenen Handschriften mit kommentierter Übersetzung würde sich lohnen.
107 Jahrbuch für Philosophie und speculative Theologie (Paderborn), 16 (1902), S. 385–406.
108 (s. Anm. 98), S. 311 Nr. 5; S. 322f. Nr. 39; S. 349 Nr. 115. Dasselbe Durcheinander herrscht in
der Anm. 105 genannten türkischen Fārābī-Bibliographie.
109 GAL S I, S. 376 BI.
110 Vgl. dazu und zu den Hss. Dimitri Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Transla-
tion. New Haven, Conn. 1975. = American Oriental Series 60, S. 377–379. – Weitere (z.T.
unvollständige) Hss. nennen Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz und Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 98), S. 313 Nr.
11. – Hinzuzufügen sind folgende Istanbuler Hss: Halet Efendi 765, fol. 91 v–110 r (Titel: al-
Kalimāt al-ḥikmiyya wa-n-naṣāʾiḥ al-ʿamaliyya, Platon zugeschrieben); Istanbul Universi-
tesi, Ay 1458, fol. 217 v–222 r; Şehit Ali Paşa 1545 (72 folia); Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 1116 (87
folia). Die beiden zuletzt genannten Hss. nennen keinen Verfasser (im Katalog der Süley-
maniye wird fälschlich Taǧ ad-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿUmar Ibn Muḥammad
as-Saraḫsī ad-Dimašqī genannt) und haben den Titel Kitāb as-Siyāsa al-mulūkiyya. – Eine
bisher übersehene Hs. ist Aya Sofya 2456, fol. 84 v–97 v (Titel: Waṣāyā Falāṭūn (Platon)
bzw. al-Waṣāyā al-aflāṭūniyya). Auch diese Hs. enthält nur ein Fragment, nämlich Teil I,
welcher bereits 2mal herausgegeben und von Ibn Hindū, al-Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya mit eini-
gen Umstellungen übernommen wurde. – Vgl. Hans Daiber, Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und
Abū Sulaimān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī in der Forschung. In Arabica 31, 1984, S. 47 Anm. 66.
= H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/25.
Obgleich der Leidener Text kein Echo in der arabischen biobibliographi- 744
schen und philosophischen Literatur gefunden hat, gibt es dennoch einige,
wenngleich nicht immer überzeugende Anzeichen, die für eine Verfasserschaft
Fārābīs sprechen.
Das Ethikkompendium basiert auf einem Text, der auch in anderen Schrif-
ten Fārābīs nachgewirkt hat und von Fārābī kommentiert worden ist, näm-
lich Aristoteles’ Nikomachische Ethik (s. II.3 Kommentar). Mit Fārābīs “Mus-
terstaat” teilt das Ethikkompendium den aristotelischen Begriff der Tugend,
wobei zusätzlich die platonischen Kardinaltugenden (Besonnenheit = σωφρο-
σύνη; Mut = ἀνδρεία; Weisheit = σοφία; Gerechtigkeit = δικαιοσύνη)111 genannt
und (nach Platon) zu den drei Seelenteilen des Begehrens, Zürnens und ver-
nünftigen Denkens in Beziehung gebracht worden sind. Während im Ethik-
kompendium in platonischer Weise die Gerechtigkeit als Einklang zwischen
den Seelenkräften definiert wird, welche zusätzlich nach aristotelischem Vor-
bild an der Verbindung von richtiger Erkenntnis und vernunftgemäßem Han-
deln, von dianoetischen und ethischen Tugenden orientiert sein muss, hat
Fārābī im “Musterstaat” zwar den eben genannten aristotelischen Gedanken
unter zusätzlicher Einschaltung der Vorstellungskraft und des göttlichen Intel-
lektes (s. I. Mimesis) seiner Tugendlehre integriert; aber er hat – in der Nach-
folge Platons: Vgl. Rep. IV 441 C–D – den Gerechtigkeitsgedanken nur in der
Staatslehre112 und – in der Nachfolge von Aristoteles’ De anima und Nikoma-
chischer Ethik – nicht aber in der Seelenlehre ausgearbeitet. In Akzentuie-
rung und Gedankenauswahl aus der Nikomachischen Ethik weicht daher das
Ethikkompendium von Fārābīs “Musterstaat” ab. Dies mag angesichts der übri-
gen Gemeinsamkeiten mit Fārābī seine Ursache in einer zur Zeit der Abfas-
sung der Abhandlung abweichenden Ausgangsposition des Verfassers haben:
Das ethische Gedankengut Platons findet hier stärkere Berücksichtigung als
in Fārābīs anderen Werken. Letztere weisen eine größere Komplexität auf
(und sind daher später verfasst?). – Beachtenswert ist – wenn wir einmal von
einigen unaristotelischen Formulierungen absehen (s. II.3 Kommentar) – die
Umschreibung der aristotelischen Tugenden mit Termini, welche auch in der
islamischen Frömmigkeit eine Rolle spielen (s. II.3 Kommentar, Schluss) und
ihre Zusammenfassung in einer dem Propheten zugeschriebenen Maxime.
Damit ist jedoch ein Problemkreis angeschnitten, der bisher noch keine Beach-
tung gefunden hat: Die Frage nach der Islamisierung griechischer Ethik.
111 Vgl. dazu unten Kommentar zu 61 v 7 ff., 16 ff.

112 MF, S. 75. Dass dies nicht ohne Kenntnis der platonischen Lehre von den Seelenkräften
geschah, zeigt die kurze Anspielung S. 76, 10.
‫‪364‬‬ ‫‪chapter 17‬‬
‫‪II.1‬‬ ‫)‪Arabischer Text und Übersetzung (Hs. Leiden Or 1005, fol. 61 v–62 r‬‬
‫‪745‬‬ ‫بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم و به نستعين‬
‫)الفارابي(‪ :‬جوامع السير المرضية في اقتناء الفضائل الانسية‬
‫)‪ (3‬تشتمل هذه الجوامع على ذكر قوى النفس التى بها تحصل للانسان الفضائل‬
‫)‪ (4‬وعلى ذكر الفضائل العظمى والفضائل الصغري التى تحصل للإنسان بتلك القوى )‪ (5‬وعلى ذكر‬
‫صل ⟩له من‬ ‫الجهات التى منها تحصل للانسان تلك الفضائل وعلى ذكر قدر ما بلغ )‪ (6‬الانسان مما َ‬
‫يح ُ‬
‫فضائل قوى النفس⟨‪ ،‬قوى النفس التى منها تحصل للانسان الفضائل ثلث‪ :‬القوة )‪ (7‬الشهو ية والقوة‬
‫الغضبية والقوة الناطقة‪،‬‬
‫الفضائل العظمى التى تحصل للانسان )‪ (8‬عن قوى النفس الثلث ار بع وهى العفة والشجاعة‬
‫والحكمة والعدالة‪ ،‬الفضائل )‪ (9‬الصغرى التى تحصل للانسان‪ ١‬اثنتان وهى جهة تضاف الى القوة‬
‫)‪ (10‬النزوعية‪ ،‬والقوة النزوعية هى التى بها تكون الارادة وهى التى تستعمل الشهو ية )‪ (11‬والغضبية‬
‫ل تكون فيها خ َد َما لً ها وجهة تضاف الى القوة )‪ (12‬الناطقة‪ ،‬والناطقة تنقسم قسمين‪:‬‬
‫والناطقة على سبي ٍ‬
‫نظرى وعملى‪ ،‬وكل واحد منهما تحصل ⟩به⟨ )‪ (13‬للانسان الفضائل فالنظرى تحصل به الحكمة و يتبعه‬
‫في هذه الفضيلة العلمى‪،‬‬
‫ن )‪ (15‬العدالة حّدها‬
‫ن الحكمة حّدها ان تقَ ْ رِنَ صحيح العلم بصواب العمل تحصل به العدالة‪ ،‬فا ّ‬
‫فا ّ‬
‫ان ترت ّب للقوى الثلث مراتبها التى تستحّقها‪،‬‬
‫ذ َكرَ َق َْدر َ ما بلغ )‪ (16‬الانسان مما‪ ٢‬يحصل له من فضائل قوى النفس‪ :‬اما من الفضائل العظمى فانه‬
‫)‪ (17‬بلغ الانسان من قوة نفسه التى هى الشهوانية ان يكفيه نيله للشهوات البدنية )‪ (18‬من المطاعم‬
‫والمشارب والمناكح والملابس وجمع الاموال بمقدار ما يجب وفي )‪ (19‬الوقت الذى يجب ومن الجهة‬
‫التى يجب‪ ،‬وهذه الفضيلة ⟩هى⟨ التى تسمى العفة و ينبغى )‪ (20‬ان تكون نهاية قصده فيها ان يقف‬
‫على قدر مقداره‪،‬‬
‫‪ +‬الفضائل‪ ،‬المخطوط |‬ ‫‪١‬‬

‫لان‪ ،‬المخطوط‪ ،‬صححت ← ‪ ٦١‬ا ‪| ٥‬‬ ‫‪٢‬‬
Im Namen Allahs des Barmherzigen und Erbarmers! Zu Ihm nehmen wir

unsere Zuflucht
Resümee der für den Erwerb menschlicher Tugenden lobenswerten

Lebensweisen
(61 v 3) Dieses Kompendium umfasst (1) eine Aufzählung der Seelenkräfte,
wodurch jemand Tugenden erhält; (2) eine Aufzählung der größten und der
kleinsten Tugenden, welche jemand durch jene Kräfte erhält; (61 v 5) (3) eine
Aufzählung der Weisen, wodurch jemand jene Tugenden erhält; (4) einen
Bericht über das Ausmaß dessen, was jemandem (durch die Tugenden der See-
lenkräfte) zuteil wird.
Die Seelenkräfte, wodurch jemand Tugenden erhält, sind drei: (61 v 7) Die
begehrende, die zürnende und die vernünftige Kraft.
Die größten Tugenden, welche jemand durch die drei Seelenkräfte erhält,
sind folgende vier: “Mäßigkeit” (ʿiffa), “Mut” (šaǧāʿa), “Weisheit” (ḥikma) und
“Gerechtigkeit” (ʿadāla). Die kleinsten Tugenden (61 v 9), welche jemand erhält,
sind folgende zwei: (1) Eine der “strebenden Kraft” (al-quwwa n-nuzūʿiyya)
zuzuschreibende Art und Weise; durch die strebende Kraft entsteht der Wille,
welche sich der begehrenden, (61 v 11) zürnenden und vernünfigen (Kraft) in
einer Weise bedient, wodurch (jene Kräfte) zum Diener (des Willens) wer-
den; (2) eine der vernünftigen Kraft zuzuschreibende Art und Weise. Die Ver-
nunft(kraft) lässt sich in zwei Arten einteilen, in eine theoretische und in eine
praktische. Jede der beiden besorgt (61 v 13) jemandem Tugenden: Die theo-
retische Art hat Weisheit zur Folge und wird in dieser Tugend von der prakti-
schen (Art) gefolgt. Weisheit lässt sich nun so definieren, dass sie die “richtige
Erkenntnis” (ṣaḥīḥ al-ʿilm) mit dem “vernünftigen Handeln” (ṣawāb al-ʿamal) so
verbindet, dass dadurch die Gerechtigkeit entsteht. – (61 v 15) Die Gerechtigkeit
lässt sich so umschreiben, dass den drei (Seelen)kräften die Stufen zugeordnet
werden, welche sie verdienen.
Er erwähnte den Umfang dessen, was jemand durch die Tugenden der See-
lenkräfte erreicht. Und zwar erreicht (jemand) durch die größten Tugenden
(61 v 17) vermittels seiner Seelenkraft, welche die begehrende ist, dass ihm
die Befriedigung (wörtl.: Der Erwerb) der körperlichen Begierden, wie Essen,
Trinken, Frauen, Kleider und Versammeln von Reichtümern im notwendigen
Ausmaß, zur (61 v 19) notwendigen Zeit und auf die nötige Art und Weise aus-
reicht. Eben diese Tugend wird “Mäßigkeit” (ʿiffa) genannt; hierbei muss das
Streben (des Menschen) letztlich am Umfang (dessen) orientiert bleiben (wor-
auf es gerichtet ist).
‫‪366‬‬ ‫‪chapter 17‬‬
‫‪746‬‬ ‫والغضبة تسوقه الى احمد المقيمات لبذله‪ ١‬والى احمد القنيات لغدفه‪ ،٢‬و يكفيه من قوة نفسه‬
‫الغضبية )‪ (22‬ان يكون طلبه الـكرامة والغلبة والظفر بمقدار ما يجب وفي الوقت الذى )‪ (62 r 1‬يجب‬
‫وفيها و يجب ومن الجهة التى تجب وكما يجب‪ ،‬وهذه الفضيلة هى )‪ (2‬التى تسمى الشجاعه‪ ،‬و ينبغى ان‬
‫ب المستحّق من الالباب )‪ (3‬البدنية والالباب النفسية مما لم يحصل وحف ِ َ‬
‫ظ‬ ‫تكون نهاية قصده فيها َطل ْ َ‬
‫الحاصل منها والاستهانة َ )‪ (4‬بالموت والمكروهات التى يكون البدن فيها‪،‬‬
‫و يكفيه من قوة نفسه الناطقة )‪ (5‬التى هى النظر ية أن يستفيد من العلوم بقدر وسعه و يعمل بها‬
‫فيها‪٣‬‬ ‫على حسب طاقته‪ (6) ،‬وهذه الفضيلة ⟩هى⟨ التى تسمى الحكمة‪ ،‬و ينبغي ان تكون نهاية قصده‬
‫)‪ (7‬ان يعلم الحّق و يعمل به‪،‬‬
‫و يكفيه من قوة نفسه الناطقة التى هى العملية )‪ (8‬ان توف ّق‪ ٤‬بين القوى الثلثة التى هى الشهو ية‬
‫والغضبية والناطقة )‪ (9‬موافقة ً لئلا يجور بعضها على بعض‪ ،‬وهذه ⟩الفضيلة⟨ هي التى تسمى العدالة‪،‬‬
‫و ينبغي ان تكون نهاية قصده فيها ان تصير الشهوة مسوسة ً بالغضبية والغضبية )‪ (11‬سائسة ً لها وان يصير‬
‫العملى من الناطقة مسوسا بالنظرى والنظرى )‪ (12‬سائسا له وسائر القوى الاخر‪،‬‬
‫واما من الفضائل الصغرى فانه بلغ )‪ (13‬الانسان من الرحمة انه لا ي َْظل ِم ومن السخاوة ان يواسى‬
‫يح ْل ُم َ‪،‬‬
‫ومن الحياء ان َ‬
‫)‪ (14‬وجماع هذه الفضائل ما يروى عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم‪َ :‬أرِْد للناس‬
‫)‪ (15‬من نفسك ما تر يد منهم لك‪،‬‬
‫تم ّ بحمد الله ومن ّه والصلوة على رسوله وآله‪،‬‬
‫غير منقوط في المخطوط‪،‬‬ ‫‪١‬‬

‫غير منقوط في المخطوط‪،‬‬ ‫‪٢‬‬
‫منها‪ ،‬المخطوط‪ ،‬صححت ← ‪ ٦٢‬ا ‪٢‬‬ ‫‪٣‬‬
‫نوفق‪ ،‬نوفعع‪، ،‬المخطوط‪ ،‬صححت‬ ‫‪٤‬‬
748 Der Zorn führt (61 v 21) zum lobenswertesten Akt der Freigebigkeit | und
Großzügigkeit des Menschen. Hinsichtlich der Zorneskraft der Seele ist es für
ihn ausreichend, dass sein Streben nach “Ehre” (karāma), Sieg und Triumph
im nötigen Umfang, zur nötigen Zeit (62 r 1), dort wo nötig, auf die nötige Art
und auf die nötige Weise geschieht. Eben diese Tugend wird “Mut” (šaǧāʿa)
genannt. In ihr muss das Streben (des Menschen) letztlich gerichtet sein auf
das hinsichtlich der körperlichen (62 r 3) und “seelischen Substanzen” (albāb)
Erforderliche und noch nicht Erreichte, sowie auf die Erhaltung des dadurch
Erreichten und auf die Geringschätzung des Todes und der widerwärtigen
Dinge, in die der Körper verstrickt ist.
(62 r 5) Hinsichtlich der theoretischen Verstandeskraft der (Menschen)seele
genügt es für ihn, dass er von den Erkenntnissen entsprechend seinem Ver-
mögen Gebrauch macht und nach Maßgabe seiner Fähigkeit entsprechend
handelt. Diese Tugend wird Weisheit genannt. In ihr muss das Streben (des
Menschen) letztlich (62 r 7) auf das Kennenlernen der Wahrheit und das ihr
entsprechende Handeln gerichtet sein.
Hinsichtlich der praktischen Verstandeskraft der (Menschen)seele genügt es
dem Menschen, die drei Kräfte – d.h. die begehrende, die zürnende und die ver-
nünftige – miteinander so sehr (62 r 9) in Einklang zu bringen, dass nicht eine
die andere tyrannisiert. Diese (Tugend) wird “Gerechtigkeit” (ʿadāla) genannt.
In ihr muss (der Mensch) letztlich dafür sorgen, dass die begehrende Kraft sich
durch die zürnende lenken lässt und die zürnende (62 r 11) ihr Lenker ist. Fer-
ner (muss er dafür sorgen,) dass der praktische (Teil) der Vernunft(kraft) sich
durch den theoretischen lenken lässt und dafür, dass der theoretische ihn und
alle übrigen (Seelen)kräfte lenkt.
Durch die kleinsten Tugenden erreicht (62 r 13) der Mensch einen solchen
Grad an “Nachsichtigkeit” (raḥma), dass er nicht ungerecht handelt, sowie an
“Freigebigkeit” (saḫāwa), dass er Wohltätigkeit übt, und an “Scheu” (ḥayāʾ), dass
er sich milde erweist.
Die Zusammenfassung dieser Tugenden ist das, was vom Propheten – Gott
segne ihn und schenke ihm Heil! – überliefert wird: Strebe danach, den Leuten
(62 r 15) das zu geben, was auch du von ihnen bekommen möchtest.
Dank Gottes Gnade und Güte ist (die Abhandlung) zu Ende. Sein Segen sei
über Seinem Gesandten und seiner Familie!
368 chapter 17
II.2 Kommentar
61 v 6–7: Zu dieser ursprünglich platonischen Dreiteilung der Seele, zur
Bezeichnung ihrer Teile als quwā (δυνάμεις) und zur Verbreitung im Ara-
749 bischen vgl. | H. Daiber, S. 35f. – Welche der möglichen Quellen hier benutzt
worden ist, lässt sich nicht mit Sicherheit sagen. Ein schwacher Nachklang
der platonischen Dreiteilung finden wir NE 1116 b 26 (vgl. F. Dirlmeier,
S. 343). – Die Dreiteilung gibt es mit derselben Terminologie bei Fārābī, SM,
S. 103, 2.
61 v 7ff.: Abweichend von Aristoteles und im Anschluss an Platon sind die
Seelenteile Sitz der (größten) Tugenden: Vgl. dazu H. Daiber, S. 38f., und Kom-
mentar zu 61 v 16ff. Ebenso ist die Klassifizierung in “größte” und “kleinste”
Tugenden (vgl. auch 62 r 12–13) nicht aristotelisch. Sie beruht auf der Kom-
bination der platonischen Kardinaltugenden (= hier die “größten” Tugenden)
mit der aristotelischen Definition der philosophischen Weisheit als Verbindung
von ethischen und dianoetischen Tugenden, welche jeweils die praktische und
die theoretische Vernunft vervollkommnen (s. Anm. 47–49). Nach Aristoteles
und Fārābī (“Musterstaat”; s. Anm. 51–55) stützt der Mensch sich hierbei auf die
Sinneswahrnehmung, den Verstand und das Streben. Das vorliegende Ethik-
kompendium lässt die Sinneswahrnehmung weg und nennt nur “die strebende
Kraft” (vgl. aristotelisches ὄρεξις) und “die vernünftige Kraft” (vgl. Aristoteles’
νοῦς). Diese Einteilung und die – auch platonische – Strukturierung in leitende
und gehorchende Seelenkräfte (s. Anm. 55) folgt Aristoteles’ Einteilung der
Seele in einen “irrationalen” und einen “rationalen” Teil: Vgl. NE 1102 a 27ff.;
vgl. F. Dirlmeier, S. 292f., und NE 1117 b 21–24, wo zum “irrationalen” Teil
Besonnenheit und Tapferkeit gerechnet werden. – Hierbei ist diese Einteilung
insofern durchbrochen, als die “strebende Kraft” (al-quwwa n-nuzūʿiyya) sich
nicht nur der “begehrenden” und “zürnenden” Kraft bedient, sondern auch der
“vernünftigen”: Vgl. dazu Aristoteles’ Definition des menschlichen Wollens als
ein “von Überlegung gesteuertes Streben” (ὄρεξις βουλευτική), welches in der
“Entscheidung” (προαίρεσις) die eine Handlung entschlossen verfolgt und die
andere vermeidet (NE 1139 a 21ff.). Hier ist im Unterschied zu Platon, wo der
Grundtrieb des menschlichen Wesens das Wollen des Guten ist (vgl. Hermann
Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie. I/1. Gotha 1880, S. 234) ὄρεξις λογική von
ἐπιθυμία unterschieden (vgl. H. Siebeck, I/2, 1884, S. 97 f.). Dies entspricht im
Ethikkompendium der Unterscheidung von irāda und nuzūʿ, wie sie in dersel-
ben aristotelischen Weise bei Fārābī, MF, S. 36, 1 ff., auftaucht. – Während nun
für Aristoteles Zorn und Begierde lediglich mitwirkendes Element sind und in
Einklang mit der ratio stehen sollen (vgl. NE 1116 b 23ff.; 1119 b), hält das arabi-
sche Ethikkompendium an der platonischen Klassifikation von Begehren, Zorn
und Vernunft als Seelenkräfte und Sitz von Besonnenheit, Mut und Weisheit
(s.o.) fest, ergänzt sie aber durch die folgende Einbeziehung der aristotelischen
theoretischen und praktischen Vernunft.
61 v 12–16: Zur hier nachweisbaren aristotelischen Definition von “Weisheit”
(ḥikma = σοφία) als Verbindung von ethischen und dianoetischen Tugenden
s. Anm. 43ff. Wie das Ethikkompendium fol. 62 r 8 f. (vgl. unten Kommentar)
zeigt, erscheint sie hier kombiniert mit der platonischen Definition der Gerech-
tigkeit als Harmonie der Seelenteile (vgl. H. Daiber, S. 39). Aristoteles hatte
hier modifiziert und Gerechtigkeit als Mitte zwischen zwei Extremen definiert
(vgl. F. Dirlmeier, S. 304f.).
61 v 16ff.: Im Folgenden werden nacheinander die bereits genannten (fol. 61
v 6–7) platonischen Kardinaltugenden Besonnenheit, Mut, Weisheit und
Gerechtigkeit | besprochen, wobei wie bisher gleichzeitig auf Aristoteles’ NE 750
zurückgegriffen wird.
61 v 16–20: Obwohl in der Definition der Gerechtigkeit das Ethikkompen-
dium sich nicht Aristoteles’ Erklärung als “Mitte” (μεσότης) zwischen zwei
Extremen zueigen gemacht hat (s. Kommentar zu fol. 61 v 12–16), hat diese wie
bei Fārābī, Fuṣūl, §16, und Miskawayh, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq, ed. Constantine K.
Zurayk, S. 27f., in der Definition von “Besonnenheit” und “Mut” (vgl. fol. 61
v 20ff.) nachgewirkt. Vgl. NE 1104 a 14ff., wonach das “richtige Maß” (τὰ σύμ-
μετρα) Besonnenheit, Tapferkeit und die übrigen “Tugenden” (ἀρεταί) ebenso
“erzeugt, steigert und erhält”, wie das richtige Maß an Speise und Trank die
Gesundheit. Aristotelisch ist die Definition “im notwendigen Ausmaß (1), zur
notwendigen Zeit (2) und auf die nötige Art und Weise (3)” (vgl. auch 61 v ult.s.):
Siehe (mit anderer Reihenfolge: 1–3–2) NE III 12. 1119 b 17 ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὧς δεῖ καὶ
ὅτε. Die Formulierung des Ethikkompendiums weicht vom Wortlaut der ara-
bischen, von Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn angefertigten Übersetzung dieses Buches der
NE ab: Vgl. ed. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, S. 235, 2 f. – Eine Konsequenz
des richtigen Maßes, der Tugend der Besonnenheit ist nicht nur das Maßhal-
ten in äußeren Gütern, sondern auch im menschlichen Streben (qaṣd fol. 61
v 20), d.h. in der vernunftgemäßen Tätigkeit der bereits genannten (fol. 61 v 7 ff.)
strebenden Kraft des Menschen, im Willen. Vgl. auch fol. 62 r 5 f. und Kommen-
tar.
61 v 20–62 r 5: Zur hier hergestellten platonischen Beziehung zwischen Zorn
und Mut sowie zur aristotelischen Sinngebung vgl. auch Kommentar zu fol. 61
v 77ff., Schluss und zu fol. 61 v 16–20. Zur “Freigebigkeit” und “Großzügig-
keit”, vgl. Aristoteles’ ἐλευθεριότης NE 1119 b 19ff. (Kommentar F. Dirlmeier,
S. 354ff.). – Die Umschreibung des Mutes als Streben nach “Ehre, Sieg und
Triumph” kommt der aristotelischen Definition als Streben nach Ruhm nahe
(vgl. NE 1116 b 30f.). Auf die aristotelische Mesoteslehre wird Bezug genom-
men – nicht in der Definition der Tapferkeit als “Mitte zwischen Leichtsinn
370 chapter 17
und Feigheit” (vgl. so Fārābīs Fuṣūl, S. 113, 13), sondern in der Definition als
Streben nach Ehre (etc.) “im nötigen Umfang (1), zur nötigen Zeit (2), dort wo
nötig (3), auf die nötige Art und auf die nötige Weise (4)” (61 v ult.s.): Man ver-
gleiche damit (in anderer Reihenfolge: 4–3–1–2) NE 1120 a 25 ὀρθῶς οἷς γὰρ δεῖ
καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε und die ähnliche Formulierung der σωφροσύνη (s. Kommentar
zu fol. 61 v 16–20). Hier wie dort folgt der Wortlaut des Ethikkompendiums
nicht Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayns oben genannter (s. Kommentar zu fol. 61 v 16–20)
Übersetzung der NE, ed. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, S. 239, 11 f. – Zur Defi-
nition der Tapferkeit als “Geringschätzung des Todes und der widerwärtigen
Dinge (etc.)”, vgl. NE 1117 b 7ff. Unvollständig ist hier die arabische Überset-
zung des Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (s.o.), ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, S. 132, 12 ff. /
ed. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, S. 227. – Der Gedanke der NE wirkt neben-
bei bemerkt auch nach in der Definition von “Mut” in Kindīs Risāla fī ḥudūd
al-ašyāʾ wa rusūmihā. Ed. Daniel Gimaret, Al-Kindī, Cinq épîtres. Paris 1976,
S. 28, 8f. (Stichwort naǧda), und in Ibn Sīnās ʿIlm al-aḫlāq, in Maǧmūʾat ar-
rasāʾil. Ed. Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ṣabrī Al-Kurdi. Kairo 1910, S. 193, 8 f. (Stichwort
šaǧāʿa).
62 r 4–12: Zur (aristotelischen) Unterscheidung von theoretischer und prak-
tischer Verstandeskraft, vgl. Kommentar zu fol. 61 v 7 ff. – Die Formulierung
“entsprechend seinem Vermögen” und “nach Maßgabe seiner Fähigkeit” (fol. 62
r 5) schließt an die Umschreibung von ʿiffa “Mäßigkeit” an, wie wir sie fol. 61
v 16–20 finden (s. Schluss des Kommentars hierzu). – Vgl. ferner NE 1112 b 32
751 ἡ δὲ βουλὴ | περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν. Gleichzeitig besteht deutlich – auch in der
Terminologie – eine gewisse Parallelität zu Kindīs Definition von Philosophie
als “Wissen um die wahre Natur der Dinge, entsprechend der Fähigkeit des
Menschen” (ʿilm al-ašyāʾ bi-ḥaqāʾiqihā bi-qadri ṭāqati l-insāni). Zum platonisch-
neuplatonischen, den Alexandrinern entstammenden Kolorit (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν)
der aristotelischen Philosophiedefinition (Aristoteles, Metaph. 993 b 20), vgl.
Alfred L. Ivry, Al-Kindī as Philosopher: the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic
Dimensions. In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays presented
… to Richard Walzer. Oxford 1972 (S. 117–139), S. 126 f. Dasselbe Kolorit hat in
Fārābīs Philosophiebegriff nachgewirkt: Vgl. Risāla fīmā yanbaġī an yuqaddam
qabla taʿallum al-falsafa. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici, Alfarabi’s Philosophische
Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, S. 53, -9f.
62 r 8f.: Hier erscheint der platonisch-neuplatonische Gedanke von der Har-
monie der Seelenteile (vgl. Kommentar zu fol. 62 v 12–16) – sie gehorchen der
Vernunft. Vgl. abgewandelt NE 1102 b 28ff. und 1119 b 15 f., wo von ὁμοφωνεῖν
bzw. συμφωνεῖν des menschlichen Strebens und Begehrens mit dem rationa-
len Element (τῷ λόγῳ) die Rede ist. Zum platonischen Modell vgl. F. Dirl-
meier, S. 353. Abweichend von Aristoteles dominiert im Ethikkompendium
die platonische Nuancierung der Gerechtigkeit als Gleichgewicht zwischen

Seelenkräften, welches ein Pendant im Staat hat: Zu diesem auch von Fārābī
im “Musterstaat” vorgetragenen Gedanken (s. Kap. I. Mimesis, Schluss) vgl.
Ottomar Wichmann, Platon. Darmstadt 1966, S. 322ff. – Das harmonische
Zusammenwirken der Seelenkräfte muss sich letzten Endes an der aristote-
lischen theoretischen Vernunft orientieren, welche aber auch entsprechen-
des Handeln verlangt, d.h. mit der praktischen Vernunft zusammenwirken
muss.
62 r 12–15: Zu den “kleinsten Tugenden”, vgl. oben Kommentar zu 61 v 7 ff. Die
hier genannten Tugenden raḥma (“Nachsichtigkeit”), saḫāwa (“Freigebigkeit”)
und ḥayāʾ (“Scheu”) und ihre Umschreibungen lassen unschwer die Tugenden
“Gerechtigkeit”, “Mut” und “Besonnenheit” erkennen. Auffallend ist die Erwäh-
nung der “Milde” (ḥilm) als Folge der “Scheu”: Beide Tugenden nennt Miska-
wayh, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq, ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 22, 1f. und S. 20, 3 f., jeweils innerhalb
der Aufzählung der zu šaǧāʿa und ʿiffa gehörenden Tugendeigenschaften. Eine
entfernte Ähnlichkeit existiert zu einer anonymen und im arabischen Unikum
Nicolaus Damascenus (zu Recht?)113 zugeschriebenen Einleitung in die Ethik,
die als “siebtes Buch” in die arabische Übersetzung der NE eingefügt ist: Vgl.
zu naǧda das sog. “siebte Buch”, ed. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, S. 337, 1 ff.,
sowie zu ʿiffa das sog. “siebte Buch”, ed. A. A. Akasoy und A. Fidora, S. 341,
8 ff. und 353, 12ff. (Z. 17: al-ḥayāʾ yaẓharu annahū ʿiffatun ǧuzʾiyyatun). – Ange-
sichts weiterer, entfernter Ähnlichkeiten zu Miskawayh scheint es nicht aus-
geschlossen, dass der Anonymus eine Textüberlieferung bietet, welche auch
von Miskawayh herangezogen wurde. Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic,
Oxford 1962, S. 222ff., der das sog. “siebte Buch” noch nicht kannte, hatte Mis-
kawayhs Quelle auf eine platonische Quelle aus der zweiten Hälfte des 4. Jh.
AD zurückgeführt und an Porphyrius’ verlorenen, den Arabern aber bekann-
ten (s. Anm. 70) Kommentar zu Aristoteles NE gedacht. – Die bei Miskawayh
und im sog. “siebten Buch” vorkommende Klassifizierung gleicht nicht Aristo-
teles’ Beschreibung von ἀνδρεία (NE III 9–10) und σωφροσύνη (NE III 13; vgl.
Kommentar von F. Dirlmeier, S. 347ff.) ähnelt aber Aristoteles’ Beschrei-
bung von πραότης “Milde” NE IV 5. 1125 b 26ff. und αἰδώς “Scheu” NE V 9. 1128
b 10ff. Die dortige Erklärung als Mitte zwischen zwei Extremen übernimmt
Fārābī, Fuṣūl, §16 / arab. Text, S. 113, 16–114, 1. | Doch nirgendwo kommt das 752
Nebeneinander von Milde und Scheu vor. Hier scheint es m.E. nicht überflüssig,
113 Vgl. Malcolm Cameron Lyons, A Greek Ethical Treatise. In Oriens 13–14, 1961 (S. 35–57),
S. 35 ff. u. 48 ff. – H. Daiber, Anm. 7 ff.
372 chapter 17
auf die zentrale Rolle von beiden Termini bereits im frühen Islam hinzuwei-
sen: Vgl. zu (auch koranischem) ḥilm, EI2, s.n. – Zu ḥayāʾ “Scheu” vgl. z.B. Ibn
Abī d-Dunyā, Makārim al-aḫlāq. Ed. James A. Bellamy. Wiesbaden 1973. =
Bibliotheca Islamica 25, S. 11 und 14. Dazu Hans Daiber in OLZ 75, 1980, Sp.
561f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III A/20. – Zu (auch korani-
schem) raḥma, welches übrigens allein noch bei dem Fārābī-Schüler Yaḥyā Ibn
ʿAdī, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq. Ed. Naji Al-Takriti. Beirut/Paris 1978, S. 86, 4 ff., vor-
kommt, vgl. Rudi Paret, Innerislamischer Pluralismus. In Die islamische Welt
zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65.
Geburtstag. Hrsg. v. Ulrich Haarmann und Peter Bachmann. Wiesbaden
1979. = BTS 22, S. 524. – Als Umschreibungen frommen Verhaltens werden ḥilm
und ḥayāʾ sowie raḥma in der Prophetenlegende zu Charaktereigenschaften
Mohammeds: Vgl. Tor Andrae, Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben
seiner Gemeinde. Stockholm 1918, S. 197 und 223ff. – Die islamische Propheten-
überlieferung, der Hadith, enthält zahlreiche Traditionen über ḥilm, ḥayāʾ und
saḫāʾ, welche als Tugenden des Propheten gepriesen werden: Vgl. Arent Jan
Wensinck, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane. Leiden 1936ff. I.
Sp. 543 a Mitte; I. Sp. 504 a 3 und II. Sp. 441 a 12. – Es erscheint daher nicht mehr
besonders verwunderlich, dass das arabische Ethikkompendium fol. 62 r 14 f.
mit einer Aufforderung schließt, die dem Propheten zugeschrieben wird (aber
nicht bei A. J. Wensinck nachweisbar ist): “Strebe danach, den Leuten das zu
geben, was auch du von ihnen bekommen möchtest!”.
II.3 Anhang
Schematische Darstellung der Zuordnung von Seelenkräften und Tugenden in
den “Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyar al-marḍiyya fī qtināʾ al-faḍāʾil al-insiyya”.
quwwa nuzūʿīyya
(Streben)
šahwiyya ġaḍabiyya nāṭiqa

(Begehren) (Zorn) (Vernunft)
theor. V. prakt. V.
irāda
(Wille)
ʿiffa šaǧāʿa ḥikma

(Mäßigkeit) (Mut) (Weisheit)
ʿadāla
muwāfaqa (Gerechtigkeit)
(Harmonie)
III Literatur, häufiger zitiert 753
Akasoy, Anna A. und Alexander Fidora → NE

Daiber = Hans Daiber, Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text über die
Tugenden der Seele in arabischer Überlieferung. In Der Islam 47, 1971, S. 25–42; 49,
1972, S. 122–123. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/7.
De anima = Aristoteles, Über die Seele. Übers. v. Willy Theiler. Darmstadt 21966.
= Aristoteles, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung 13. – Griech. Text hrsg. v. Georges
Rodier, Paris 1900.
Dirlmeier → NE
Fidora, Alexander und Anna A. Akasoy → NE
Fuṣūl = Fārābī, Fuṣūl al-madanī. Hrsg. u. übers. v. Douglas Morton Dunlop. Cam-
bridge 1961. = University of Cambridge Oriental Publications 5.
Guthrie = William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy. VI.
Cambridge 1981.
HWPh = Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Hrsg. v. Joachim Ritter. 1ff. Darm-
stadt 1971ff.
MF = Fārābī, Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. Hrsg. v. Friedrich Dieterici. Lei-
den 1895. 21964.
374 chapter 17
Miskawayh, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq. Ed. Constantine K. Zurayk. Beirut 1966. – Engl. Übers.
v. Constantine K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character (Tahdhib al-Akhlaq). Chi-
cago 2002.
NE = Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzung und Kommentar v. Franz Dirl-
meier. Berlin 71979. = Aristoteles, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung 6. – Griech. Text
hrsg. v. Franz Susemihl. Ed. altera curavit Otto Apelt. Lipsiae 1903. – Arabische
Übersetzung hrsg. v. Anna A. Akasoy und Alexander Fidora, with an introduc-
tion and annotated translation by Douglas Morton Dunlop, The Arabic Version
of the Nicomachean Ethis. Leiden/Boston 2005. = ASL 17.
SM = Fārābī, as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya. Hrsg. v. Fauzi M. Najjar. Beirut 1964.
Theiler → De anima
Summary
The imitation of philosophy by religion in Fārābī’s Perfect State appears to be

a combination of Aristotelian and Peripatetic doctrines of epistemology, taken
from Aristotle’s De anima and the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias,
from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Metaphysics. Starting point is the
interaction between thought and sensation through the mediation of phantasy
imitating the perceived object, moreover, the concepts of theory and practice,
of prudence and moral virtues of the citizen in the perfect state. The highest
form of interaction is prophecy, the divine inspiration to the leader, who is a
prophet and philosopher and who in the service of religion teaches the citizen
philosophical truth and its fulfillment in the perfect state, the moral virtues
of a perfect religion. – A continuation of this interpretation can be found in
H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/16, II/18, II/21, II/22 and II/23. – In
the second part of the article a small treatise attributed to Fārābī with the title
Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyar al-marḍiyya fī iqtināʾ al-faḍāʾil al-insiyya “Summary of ways of
life recommendable for the acquisition of human virtues” is edited (unique MS
Leiden 1002, fol. 61 v–62 r) and translated with commentary. The text is based
on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, it shares with Fārābī the Aristotelian con-
cept of virtue, and differs from him in the additional integration of the Platonic
cardinal virtues.
Republished, with some additions, from L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. Actes du
septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale (30 août–4 septembre 1982).
Ed. par Christian Wenin. II. Louvain-la-Neuve 1986. = Philosophes médiévaux XXVII,
pp. 729–753.
chapter 18
The Ruler as Philosopher

A New Interpretation of Fārābī’s View
Hendrik Joan Drossaart Lulofs

on his eightieth birthday
∵
Introduction – 1. The Intellectual Qualities of the Philosopher-Ruler 377 – 2. The
Philosopher-Ruler as Teacher 378 – 3. The Interrelation of Thought and Language and
Fārābī’s Theory of Conceived Pictures 380 – 4. The Role of Rhetoric 381 – 5. Fārābī’s
Thesis of “Religion” as Imitation of Philosophy 382 – 6. The Aristotelian Model of The-
ory and Praxis as a Common Structure of Philosophy and Religion. The Ethical and
Cognitional Component 383 – 7. The Limits of Human Cognition. Philosophy and Rev-
elation 387 – Bibliography and Abbreviations 390 – Additional Remarks 394
Introduction
In his treatise Zum ewigen Weltfrieden the German philosopher Immanuel 5=133
Kant criticizes Plato’s teaching of the philosopher-king as follows: “One should
neither expect nor wish that kings become philosophers and philosophers
become kings: for the possession of force inevitably destroys free judgement
of reason”.1
Plato had taught2 that “political force” (δύναμις πολιτική) and “love of wis-
dom” (φιλοσοφία) should be combined. He was convinced that the “divine
providence” (θεῖα μοῖρα) takes care of the coincidence of philosophical know-
ledge and capability to rule in the philosopher-king. The philosopher-king has
1 “Daß Könige philosophieren oder Philosophen-Könige würden, ist nicht zu erwarten, aber
auch nicht zu wünschen: weil der Besitz der Gewalt das freie Urteil der Vernunft unvermeid-
lich verdirbt”. The text is cited in E. Hoffmann, Platon, p. 146.
2 Rep. V 473 C–E. – Cf. O. Wichmann, Platon, p. 289.

376 chapter 18
the pedagogical duty to bring up guardians who in a Socratic manner can com-
bine knowledge, will and action.3
This idea has been taken over in the 10th century AD by the Islamic philo-
sopher Fārābī.4 We find it in his book The Perfect State (al-madīna al-fāḍila)
which is newly published with English translation and commentary by
Richard Walzer.5 Fārābī had knowledge of Plato’s Republic, Laws and Dia-
logues. These books may have been accessible to Fārābī in the form of para-
phrases and late redactions from Hellenistic times.6 However, Fārābī has not
taken over Plato’s teaching without modifications. It is possible to assume that
he found some new, partially Neoplatonic interpretations and additions in revi-
sions of Plato’s works. At the same time we should not forget that Fārābī had
a thorough knowledge of Aristotle. He was convinced that Plato and Aristotle
coincide in their philosophy, and he has written a monograph on this subject.7
However, we shall see that Fārābī, starting from this conviction, has given to
Plato’s political philosophy a new, Aristotle-orientated context.
6=134 The research in Fārābī’s teaching of the perfect state has until now mainly
been interested in the collection of parallels in Platonic, Middle Platonic, Neo-
platonic and Peripatetic texts. Frequently it did not pay enough attention to
similar ideas in other books by Fārābī, to the context of Fārābī’s ideas and to
their Aristotelian background. As we have already shown,8 assumed Peripa-
tetic and Middle Platonic ideas, which Richard Walzer had ascribed to lost
Greek sources, appear to be based on a combination of disparate Aristotelian
thoughts by Fārābī himself.
3 Cf. E. Hoffmann, Platon, p. 117.

4 Cf. on him R. Walzer, “al-Fārābī” in EI2 II, col. 778–781. – M. Fakhry, History, pp. 107ff. –
M. E. Marmura, Die islamische Philosophie, pp. 346 ff. – The so far best description of his
political philosophy is M. Mahdi, Alfarabi, circa 870–950. – On the historical context of Fā-
rābī’s philosophy the reader may compare E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought, esp. pp. 122ff.,
and E. I. J. Rosenthal, Politisches Denken. – On the contents of Fārābī’s different works con-
taining his ideas on prophecy s. the description by D. P. Brewster, Philosophical Discussions,
pp. 93–145.
5 Cf. Bibliography, Fārābī, al Madīna al-fāḍila.
6 Cf. R. Walzer, “Aflāṭūn” in EI2 I, col. 234. – Isaac Rabinowitz in his review of F. Rosen-
thal and R. Walzer (ed.), Alfarabius, De Platonis philosophia. In American Journal of Philo-
sophy 67, 1946, pp. 77 f. – M. Mahdi, Editio Princeps, pp. 4ff.
7 Kitāb al-Ǧamʿ bayna raʾyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa-Arisṭūṭālīs. Cf. on this book M.
Fakhry, Al-Farabi, pp. 467 ff.
8 Cf. H. Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī.
the ruler as philosopher 377
1 The Intellectual Qualities of the Philosopher-Ruler
Let us begin with the qualities which, according to Fārābī, the philosopher-king
should have. Their enumeration in Fārābī’s book on The Perfect State9 appears
to be a later summary of discussions which are echoed in other books by Fā-
rābī. We find them also in Fārābī’s book The Attainment of Happiness:10 There,
they are correctly traced back to Plato’s Republic.11 They are the background of
Fārābī’s Prolegomena to the Study of Aristotle’s Philosophy.12 These Prolegomena
are inspired by Alexandrian theories about the starting point of philosophical
studies13 and stress the necessity of ethical and intellectual qualities of the
philosopher.
This idea has undergone an interesting development in Fārābī. In his book
on The Perfect State he mentions ethical virtues like love of truth and justice,
resoluteness and contempt of wordly things. Furthermore, he has added several
intellectual qualities: Especially interesting are the qualities numbers five and
six,14 according to which the philosopher-ruler “should have an excellent mode
of expression so that he can completely explain every thought (muḍmar) with
his tongue; in addition, he should like to learn and acquire knowledge, being
guided by (this aim) and accepting (this) without being displeased by learning
which causes trouble to him and without being annoyed by anything acquired
in this way”.
A prerequisite for the activities of learning and explaining is of course a
thorough knowledge of the object itself. Fārābī informs us about this by men-
tioning the following qualities (nos. 2–4) of “the first ruler” (ar-raʾīs al-|awwal) 7=135
and imam:15 “He should by natural disposition understand and conceive very
well (ǧayyid al-fahm wa-t-taṣawwur) all he is told, so that it becomes com-
prehensible to him according to the intention of the speaker and according
9 al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 14 ff. / ed. and transl. R. Walzer, p. 246, 9ff.,
with commentary, pp. 444–446.
10 Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, ed. Hyderabad, p. 44, -3 ff. / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 44, ult.ss.
11 375 A ff.; 487 B ff. – Cf. R. Walzer’s commentary to his English translation of al-Madīna
al-fāḍila, p. 445.
12 Risāla fīmā yanbaġī, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 53, 3 ff.
13 Cf. D. Gutas, Starting Point, pp. 115 ff.
14 al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 21–23 / ed. and transl. R. Walzer, p. 246, 16ff. –
My translation here and on the following pages sometimes slightly differs from Walzer’s
version.
15 al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 16–20 / ed. and transl. R. Walzer, p. 246, 12–
16. – On the term imām which is applied to the Prophet and his successors cf. R. Walzer’s
commentary, pp. 436 and 441 f.
378 chapter 18
to the matter itself. – Furthermore, he should retain very well in his memory
what he understood, saw, heard and perceived, and on the whole forget almost
nothing. Moreover, he should have an excellent intelligence and he should be
sharp-witted: If he sees something even with a meagre indication, he should
understand it according to this indication”.
This is kind of a pedagogical theory. We are told that we can explain some-
thing only if we have understood it very well and if we are able to formulate it.
Fārābī16 gives the following summary: “… in formulating what (the ruler) knows
he should be able to present it very well17 in his speech”. The context of this doc-
trine18 is not yet recognized and taken into account by modern scholars.
2 The Philosopher-Ruler as Teacher
Indeed, Fārābī paid much attention to the problem of understanding and

explaining, i.e. teaching. He refers to it in his Prolegomena to the Study of Aris-
totle’s Philosophy,19 being immediately inspired here by Alexandrian introduc-
tions to the study of Aristotle.20 Furthermore, we have detailed discussions
8=136 in his book on Expressions used in Logic (Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala | fī l-
manṭiq)21 and in his Kitāb al-Burhān, a short treatise on Aristotle’s Analytica
posteriora.22 We shall present some main thoughts which are important for us
concerning their relation to the Perfect State.
The above-mentioned interrelation between understanding and teaching
means the subjection of teacher and pupil to the same process of understand-
ing and learning. Therefore, the intellectual qualities of the ruler described
16 al-Madīna l-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 5 f. / ed. and transl. R. Walzer, p. 246, 2f. – Cf.
below ch. 7.
17 ǧūdat at-taḫayyul. – taḫayyul here (contrary to R. Walzer) does not mean “imagination”,
but is an equivalent of taṣawwur: Cf. L. V. Berman in Oriens 23–24, p. 511 below.
18 Cf. also Fārābī, Fuṣūl al-madanī, ed. D. M. Dunlop, §54 / Engl. transl., p. 50 / ed. F. M.
Najjar, p. 66.
19 Risāla fīmā yanbaġī, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 54, 8 ff.
20 Cf. D. Gutas, Starting Point, p. 116. – Fārābī does not talk about psychological-anthropolo-
gical questions of education as Plato and Aristotle did (cf. W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle
on Emotion, pp. 45 ff.).
21 Ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 86–94.
22 This book has been used (on the basis of MS Hamidiye 812 in Istanbul, Süleimaniye,
fol. 61 r–84 v, esp. fol. 78ff.) by F. S. Haddad, Early Arab Theory. – The text is edited by
Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh, al-Manṭiqiyāt li-l-Fārābī I, Qumm 1987, pp. 265–349,
and by Majid Fakhry, al-Manṭiq ʿind al-Fārābī, Beirut 1987, pp. 17–96. – For further MSS
of this text cf. H. Daiber, New Manuscript Findings, ch. 3, end.
in the Perfect State of Fārābī are surprisingly similar to those of the “learner”
(mutaʿallim) described in Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq.23
According to this book, the learner “should (1) conceive ( yataṣawwaru) that
object (which he is taught) and he should understand ( yafham) the meaning
(maʿnā) of what he has heard from the teacher, namely the meaning inten-
ded by the statement of the teacher. (2) He should be convinced (taṣdīq) of
the real existence of what he conceived (taṣawwarahū) and understood ( fahi-
mahū) from the formulation (lafẓ) of his teacher. (3) He should keep in mind
what he has conceived and of what he is convinced”.
The above-mentioned texts of Fārābī show that the perception of existing
things and the keeping in mind of this perception are not only prerequisites
for the listener, the learner, but also for the teacher, the ruler of the perfect
state. Fārābī enumerates in his Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq24 the
following means which are useful for learning:
1) “Formulations (alfāẓ) which designate a thing” – 2) “the definition of a

thing” – 3) “the parts of a definition” – 4) “the particulars (ǧuzʾiyāt) (of a
thing)” – 5) “its universals (kulliyāt)” – 6) “its description (rusūm)” – 7) “its
specific qualities” – 8) “its accidents” – 9) “what is similar to it” – 10) “its
contrary” – 11) “division” – 12) “example (al-miṯāl)” – 13) “induction (al-
istiqrāʾ)” – 14) “syllogism (al-qiyās)” – 15) “placing something in front of
one’s eyes”.
We can recognize that Fārābī here has used elements of Aristotle’s Organon,
especially of his Analytica posteriora25 which have been translated from Syriac
into Arabic by Fārābī’s contemporary Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus26 and commen-
ted by Fārābī himself (s. above). We shall try to show that the starting point of
his enumeration is Aristotle’s thesis of the interrelation between thought and
perception.
23 Ed. M. Mahdi, p. 87, 11 ff. – Cf. F. S. Haddad, Early Arab Theory, pp. 245f.
24 Ed. M. Mahdi, p. 87, 11 ff. – Cf. L. V. Berman in Oriens 23–24, p. 511. – F. S. Haddad, Early
Arab Theory, pp. 247 ff. – W. Heinrichs, Die antike Verknüpfung, pp. 284f.
25 Cf. C. Prantl, Geschichte I, pp. 96 ff., 104 ff. and esp. pp. 108ff.
26 Edited by ʿA. R. Badawī, Manṭiq Arisṭū II, pp. 309 ff. – On the history of the translation cf.
F. E. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, pp. 17–20.
380 chapter 18
3 The Interrelation of Thought and Language and Fārābī’s Theory of

Conceived Pictures
In the preceding chapter on the means of learning Fārābī27 makes the import-
ant statement that difficult conceivable28 things can be “replaced” (abdala,
pass.) by easily conceivable things. Amongst these easily conceivable things
9=137 Fārābī ranks the mentioned means nos. 1–9. He comments on | no. 9: “What is
similar to a thing is clear too. For, if something similar to a thing is conceived
( yuḫayyalu), the thing itself can easily be conceived (sahila taṣawwuru š-šayʾi
nafsihī). For the conceived picture (ḫayāl) of a thing corresponds to the con-
ceived picture of what is similar to it. Both (conceived pictures) are in fact
similar to each other in so far as both have in common one thing, which is
imitated ( yuʾḫaḏu) at the same time in both (conceived pictures). They are sim-
ilar to each other by their mutual correspondence ( yatanāsabā) in a mutually
corresponding manner. For example the relation of a captain to his ship corres-
ponds to the relation of an army-leader to his army, or of the leader, the leader
of a town (mudabbir al-madīna), to his town. Herewith, the army-leader, the
leader of a town and the captain are similar to each other by having a similar
relation”.
The mentioned structural similarity in the relations enables us to illustrate
a thing by a conceived picture. However, Fārābī29 excludes such substitutions,
in which “extremely complex structures” (mā rukkiba tarkīban azyada kaṯīran)
are replaced by simplifying and falsifying pictures so that “the listener and the
learner are very far away from the intended thing”. Such wrong substitutions are
ascribed by Fārābī30 to some Greek philosophers, to the Pythagoreans, Plato
and Empedocles. Here, Fārābī follows in a partially not exact corresponding
manner the critique of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,31 a text which was accessible
to him in the 9th-century AD translation of Asṭāṯ / Eustathius.32 In Aristotle’s
report “being” (τὸ ὄν) and “unity” (τὸ ἕν) are not explainable according to Plato
and the Pythagoreans. But according to Empedocles, “unity” can be reduced to
27 al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 88–91 (§§ 42–45), esp. §44. – Cf. F. S. Haddad, Early Arab
Theory, p. 248.
28 We should take into account the synonymity of taṣawwur and taḫayyul; taḫayyala in this
context has nothing to do with “imagination”. S. n. 17.
29 al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 91, 6 ff. (§ 46). – Cf. L. V. Berman in Oriens 23–24, p. 512.
30 al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 91, 10 ff. – On Plato cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 41, 5ff.
/ ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 91, 4 ff. / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 45 (with
references to Aristotle in n. 7 on p. 134).
31 1001 a 10 ff. – Cf. 1000 a 9–19.
32 Ed. M. Bouyges in Ibn Rušd, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa I, p. 261, 2ff. – Cf. p. 247, 2ff.
something more comprehensible and well-known (γνωριμώτερον). However,

nearly with the same words as Aristotle33 Fārābī deems it unnecessary to deal
with the sayings of those, “whose philosophy is similar to embellishments”.34
He calls these sayings “allegories and riddles” (ar-rumūz wa-l-alġāz)35 which
“should be rejected in the teaching of philosophy” and which are only allowed
“in rhetoric and in sayings which are used in political affairs”.
4 The Role of Rhetoric 10=138
This doctrine of Fārābī should not give rise to the assumption36 that “philo-
sophy and certainty are not for the crowd”. This assumption is an exaggera-
tion. According to Fārābī’s treatise on rhetoric37 which here follows Aristotle,38
the art of rhetoric has the task “to teach the crowd (al-ǧumhūr) much of the
theoretical things” and is used in political “speeches”.39 However, rhetoric can
only “persuade”40 and cannot be applied in “reflexion” (ar-rawiyya) and con-
clusions.41 As in Aristotle42 rhetoric first of all aims at the contingent, the par-
ticulars and not at the universals, the necessary.43 It can bring about “opinions”
(ẓunūn), but not “certainty” (al-yaqīn).44 Rhetorical “persuasion” (iqnāʿ) must
be converted into conviction by “accepting the contents as true” (taṣdīq). This
33 1000 a 18 f. / Arab. transl. by Usṭāṯ, ed. M. Bouyges in Ibn Rušd, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa I,
p. 247, 11 f. – The mentioned Aristotelian passages have been pointed out by L. V. Berman
in Oriens 23–24, pp. 512 f.
34 A translation of τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων in Aristotle, Metaphysics 1000 a 18.
35 al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 92, 4. – We find the same terminology in Fārābī’s al-Madīna l-
fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 52, 16 / ed. and transl. R. Walzer, p. 224, 12 – besides aqāwīl
muḥākiya “imitating sayings”, ibdālāt “substitutions” and tašbīhāt “similarities”, which
describe sayings of those who see particulars in their dreams.
36 For example L. V. Berman in Oriens 23–24, p. 513.
37 Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade, p. 57, esp. l. 7–9. – Cf. Fārābī, Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs, ed.
M. Mahdi, pp. 84f. / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, pp. 92f. – J. Kraemer,
Alfarabi’s Opinions, p. 119 n. 20, and C. E. Butterworth, The Rhetorician, pp. 112ff.
38 Rhetorics 1357 a 1 ff.
39 Cf. ed. J. Langhade, p. 57, 9: al-muḫāṭabāt allatī tustaʿ malu fī l-muʿāmalāt al-madaniyya. –
This line has been continued by Averroes: s. C. E. Butterworth, Averroes, and C. E. But-
terworth, The Rhetorician, pp. 129 ff.
40 innamā uʿiddat li-t-taqannuʿ faqaṭ.
41 Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade, p. 59, 5 f. – Cf. F. W. Zimmermann, Al-Fārābī und die
philosophische Kritik, pp. 402 f. – Below ch. 6 n. 54.
42 Rhetorics 1355 b 26.
43 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade, p. 33, 11f. and 14.
44 Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade, p. 59, 11f.
382 chapter 18
is possible by “indisputable proofs” (al-barāhīn al-yaqīniyya).45 “Knowledge of

the beings” (ʿilm al-mawǧūdāt)46 acquired by the combination of rhetoric and
“indisputable proofs” deserves to be called “philosophy”.
Besides this kind of direct knowledge we find in Fārābī a second kind of
knowledge which is acquired indirectly.47 The “essence” (ḏāt) of a thing is
received by the mind not directly, but is only “conceivable” ( yutaḫayyal) in the
shape of a “picture” (miṯāl) which “imitates” (ḥākā) the thing. Thus, knowledge
is restricted to conceptions in the shape of “pictures” (miṯālāt) which imitate
the beings. Who is persuaded of them (in a rhetorical way) and who is con-
vinced of the reality of pictorial knowledge has acquired knowledge which,
according to Fārābī, is called “religion” (milla) by the ancient philosophers.48
11=139 5 Fārābī’s Thesis of “Religion” as Imitation of Philosophy
This classification of religion is refined by Fārābī. He presents the doctrine,

that religion “imitates philosophy” (muḥākiyatun li-l-falsafa).49 Both, religion
and philosophy, “comprise the same subjects (mawḍūʿāt bi-aʿyānihā) and both
give an account of the ultimate principles (al-mabādiʾ al-quṣwā) of beings (al-
mawǧūdāt). For both supply knowledge about the first principle (al-mabdaʾ
al-awwal) and cause (as-sabab al-awwal) of beings, and both give an account
of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made – that is, supreme hap-
piness (as-saʿāda al-quṣwā) – and the ultimate end (al-ġāya l-quṣwā) of every
one of the other beings”.50
45 Cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 40, 2 ff. / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 90, 3f. / Engl. transl. M.
Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 44.
46 Cf. also Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 69, 19ff. / ed. and transl. R.
Walzer, p. 278, 8 ff., and the commentary by R. Walzer, pp. 47ff.
47 Fārābī, Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 40, 13 / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 90, 14f.
48 Fārābī, Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 40, 9 ff. / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 90, 10ff. / Engl. transl. M.
Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 44.
49 Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 40, 13 / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn p. 90, 14f. / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi, Alfar-
abi’s Philosophy, p. 44.
50 Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 40, 13 / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn p. 90, 14–19. – We follow the translation of
M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 44. – On the term “supreme happiness” and its history
in Islamic and medieval philosophy some material can be found in M. Burbach, The The-
ory of Beatitude. M. Burbach has based his discussions of Islamic material on Latin trans-
lations. – The idea of the identity of philosophy and religion had been taken over by Ibn
Ṭufayl (d. 581/1185), Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, ed. A. N. Nader, pp. 92ff. / Engl. transl. and comm.
by L. E. Goodman, pp. 160 ff. Cf. S. Schreiner, Ibn Tufayl, Hajj ibn Yaqzan, pp. 113ff., and
S. S. Hawi, Islamic Naturalism, p. 183. – This parallelism between Fārābī and Ibn Ṭufayl
Consequently philosophy and religion differ only in the method, not in their
aim. Philosophy is based on philosophical proofs (mā tubarhinuhū l-falsafatu)
and on the knowledge acquired by this. Religion relies on conceptions which
“imitate” the essence of things and uses rhetorical means, metaphorical lan-
guage, pictorial conceptions.
6 The Aristotelian Model of Theory and Praxis as a Common

Structure of Philosophy and Religion
The Ethical and Cognitional Component
According to the quoted text of Fārābī, philosophy and religion do not only
inform about the “ultimate principles”, but also about “the ultimate aim” and
the way, how to reach “supreme happiness”. The originally Koranic term milla
“religion” therefore is a description of the “insights” and “actions”, which are
imposed on society by its ruler in the shape of laws.51
The same function is ascribed to philosophy. According to the wording of
Fārābī “the virtuous religion is similar to philosophy. (Like religion) philosophy
is partly theoretical, partly practical. The theoretical (philoso|phy) which is 12=140
related to thinking does not enable a human being – if he has knowledge
(of theoretical philosophy) – to act accordingly. However, the practical (philo-
sophy) enables the human being – if he has knowledge (of practical philo-
sophy) – to act accordingly. The practical (section) in religion is that section, of
which the universals (kulliyātuhā) are implied in the practical philosophy”.52
These universals become reality in religion in the shape of “rules” (šarāʾiṭ), of
“virtuous laws” (šarāʾiʿ fāḍila).53 Religion has the task to “persuade” (aqnaʿa,
qannaʿa) “the crowd” (al-ǧumhūr) of these laws and rules, to “instruct” (ʿallama)
them and “educate” (addaba) by using the already mentioned poetic-rhetorical
means.54
has already been described by M. E. Marmura, The Philosopher and Society, p. 322 below.
Cf. also M. E. Marmura, The Islamic Philosophers’ Conception of Islam, pp. 97ff. (on the
adoption of Fārābī’s concept of religion as the imitation of philosophy in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn
Ṭufayl, and Ibn Rušd).
51 al-Milla al-fāḍila, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 43, 3. – Cf. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 137 (in
§ 33 n. 2), and L. V. Berman, Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfārābī, pp. 159f.
52 al-Milla al-fāḍila, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 46, 22–47, 2.
53 al-Milla al-fāḍila, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 47, 2 ff.
54 Cf. above ch. 4. – Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 152, 14. – W. Heinrichs, Die
antike Verknüpfung, pp. 283 f.
384 chapter 18
Analogous to the parallelism of praxis in religion and philosophy the “the-

oretical insights” (al-ārāʾ an-naẓariyya) in religion have a counterpart in the
“proofs” (barāhīn) of theoretical philosophy.55 As in the case of the practical
“actions”, the “rules” and “laws”, the theoretical “insights” of religion can be
proved (barhana, pass.) and justified (cf. aʿṭā l-asbāb) by philosophy, by a com-
parison with its universals.56
Remarkable is the ethical component in Fārābī’s idea of philosophy and
religion. As already mentioned “philosophical” demonstration and “religious”
persuasion by using the pictorial language of rhetoric and poetics intend to
give ethical instructions to the individuals, instructions of the right way to
supreme happiness. Religion is instruction in the shape of “rules” and “laws”
and starts from philosophy which, according to Fārābī, is preceding religion57
and has the task to give a firm proof. This observation gives rise to a crucial
question: Is philosophical demonstration only something that is strived after
by educated people, by intellectuals? Is religion therefore on one side demon-
strable by philosophy, on the other side, however, assigned to the crowd, to non-
philosophers? I think, we can deny this. We have to start from the Aristotelian
theory-praxis-model which, according to Fārābī, is shared by philosophy and
religion. As Fārābī formulates, religion “imitates” philosophy which in the Aris-
totelian manner is interpreted as a combination of theory and praxis, “scientific
cognition” and moral insight, i.e. practical prudence.58 Following the doctrine
13=141 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and using Aristotle’s De anima as well as the |
commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on De anima, Fārābī in his Perfect
State developed a new doctrine. As in Aristotle’s doctrine, ethical actions of
human beings and their cognition of the right are controlled by three powers
of the soul: The perceptive power, the reason and the striving power. Fārābī
here follows the Aristotelian idea of φρόνησις, “practical prudence”: Intelligible
things are not only the object of scientific knowledge, but also something that
leads to moral insight, to the cognition of the desirable good and the avoid-
able bad; scientific knowledge and moral insight are related to each other. At
the same time, it is not possible to be virtuous in a general manner, but only
55 See Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 47, 6: wa-l-ārāʾ an-naẓariyya barāhīnuhā fī l-falsafa
an-naẓariyya.
56 Cf. F. S. Haddad, Early Arab Theory, p. 253.
57 See Fārābī, Taḥṣīl, ed. Hyderabad, p. 41, 12 / ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 91, 13 / Engl. transl. M.
Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy, p. 45. – Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 131. –
L. V. Berman, Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfārābī, pp. 156ff. and 161f. – Fārābī, Kitāb al-
Ḥurūf, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 154 f., and L. V. Berman, pp. 162f. – Below, end of this chapter.
58 For further details on the following discussion s. H. Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik bei Fā-
rābī, ch. I: Mimesis in Fārābīs Musterstaat: Eine mittelplatonische Tradition?
by doing the good. Theory and praxis belong to each other. Hereby, reason
determines virtuous actions. At the same time, moral insight in desirable good
and avoidable bad is oriented at human actions. It is something real, not the-
oretical.
In this ethical philosophy, which is practically orientated, Fārābī59 refers to
an Aristotelian doctrine, that has been neglected till now by modern scholars,
namely the doctrine of the interrelation of thought and perception: Accord-
ing to Fārābī, the general good is not conceivable without sensory perception.
Therefore, Aristotle and also Fārābī have introduced the “imaginative power”
(Aristotle: φαντασία) which as mediator sends to the reasonable part of the
soul “sensory perceptions” (Aristotle: αἰσθήματα), respectively “imaginations”
(Aristotle: φαντάσματα) of the perceived object. These imaginations by Fār-
ābī are called “imitations” (muḥākāt) – a terminological innovation of Fārābī.
All perceptible and even all “intelligible things” (maʿqūlāt) are imitated by the
imaginative power. For, not the perceived or reflected object itself reaches the
reasonable part of the soul, but only an imitation, a picture. The human soul
reflects only in such pictures.
With the described interrelation of thought and perception Fārābī has given
a further justification for the Aristotelian combination of scientific “know-
ledge” (ἐπιστήμη) and practical “prudence” (φρόνησις), of theoretical and prac-
tical reason. This combination found its expression in Fārābī’s Perfect State
(al-madīna al-fāḍila) and his Perfect Religion (al-milla al-fāḍila). For, “the partic-
ulars” (al-ǧuzʾiyāt) of religion have a counterpart in “the universals” (al-kulliyāt)
of philosophy which proves the particulars.60 As a consequence the perfect reli-
gion is an imitation of philosophy, it is “similar” (šabīha) to philosophy.61
As we have seen, this similarity is based on a common structure. At the same
time, religion does not turn out to be a useless copy of philosophy.62 Religion
persuades the citizen of the virtuous city, to believe and to act | for the sake of 14=142
obtaining supreme happiness – what can be proved by philosophy, but cannot
be deduced from philosophy. This, however, does not mean that philosophy is a
servant of religion. For, the relation of philosophy to reality in the eyes of Fārābī
is not only justified by the Aristotelian theory of cognition, of interrelation
between thought and perception; the virtuous religion is also the actualized
and by philosophy provable example for the relation between scientific cogni-
59 Cf. H. Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī, pp. 730ff., and also Fārābī, al-Ǧamʿ, ed. F.
Dieterici, p. 20, 22ff., and on this passage Aristotle, Analytica posteriora I 5; De anima
III 1. 424 b.
60 Cf. Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 47, 12–17.
61 Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 46, 22. – Cf. above ch. 5.
62 Cf. above ch. 3.
386 chapter 18
tion and moral insight. By “rules” and “laws” religion takes care for the relation
of ethics to reality and tries to actualize the practical prudence of philosophy.
Consequently, the relation of theory and praxis in philosophy and religion
also combines religion and philosophy. Philosophy and religion are depend-
ing on each other like thought and perception, theory and praxis, scientific
cognition and moral insight, religious belief (“insights”) and acts according to
religious regulations. By demonstrating these interrelations, Fārābī turns out to
be a very original thinker.
theory praxis
universals particulars
philosophy religion cognition

teaching of the
theory proofs insights thought ruler as philosopher
and prophet
praxis moral insight acts and rules perception,
language, rhetoric
supreme happiness
The reality of religion in the virtuous city means the realization of the virtues
and the imitating transformation of general ethics into virtuous acts. Religion
appears to be an instrument for the realization of the philosophical doctrine
concerning the relation between true virtues and reality. True virtues cannot
exist generally, but only in ethical acts. Therefore, philosophy needs religion as
an instrument. Accordingly, we must interpret the saying of Fārābī in his Kitāb
al-Ḥurūf,63 that “philosophy precedes the instruments in such a way that the
employer of instruments precedes the instruments in time”.
This utterance is an interesting modification of an Alexandrian64 teaching,
which has been taken over in the 10th century AD by philosophers in Bagh-
15=143 dad.65 According to this doctrine, logic is not | a part of philosophy, but its
instrument that enables man to distinguish between true and wrong in the-
oretical philosophy, and between good and bad in practical philosophy. Fārābī
63 Ed. M. Mahdi, p. 132, 7 f. / Engl. transl. L. V. Berman, Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfārābī,
p. 172.
64 For example Elias in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, in Commentaria in Aris-
totelem Graeca XVIII/1. Ed. Adolfus Busse. Berolini 1900 / Repr. 1961, p. 117, 9ff.
65 For example Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī: Cf. N. Rescher, Studies, p. 42. – F. W. Zimmermann, Al-
Farabi’s Commentary, Introduction, p. 123. – C. Hein, Definition, pp. 153ff.
has taken over this doctrine in a specific manner, by replacing logic by reli-
gion: In his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf he classifies religion not as a part of philosophy,
but as its instrument. In this quality religion actualizes what exists in philo-
sophy, namely the philosophical idea of moral insight, of practical prudence
leading to supreme happiness. Herewith, religion appears to be an instrument
of philosophy, and it also enables philosophy to actualize itself. Philosophy is
depending on religion – just as philosophy requires logic as an instrument.
The autonomy of philosophy appears to be restricted insofar as philosophy
and religion are depending on each other – analogous to the Aristotelian
relation between thought and perception, scientific knowledge and practical
prudence, human cognition and language, learning and teaching, theory and
praxis.66
7 The Limits of Human Cognition. Philosophy and Revelation
By describing religion in a specific manner Fārābī has not only limited the
autonomy of philosophy – he also has drawn our attention to the limits of
human cognition. This is shown by Fārābī’s teaching of the dream which has
starting points in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of the divine “active intel-
lect” (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) and in Aristotle’s teaching of dreams and divination.67
According to this doctrine, dreams are explained as a result of the interac-
tion between sensory perception, imitating imagination, and the divine “active
intellect” which is identified with the angel Gabriel and by following Sura 26:193
is called “faithful spirit” (ar-rūḥ al-amīn).68 If the imitating imagination aims
at present and future “particulars”, at “separate intelligibles” (al-maʿqūlāt al-
mufāriqa) and “exalted things”, which are all inspired by the divine intellect,
we can speak of “prophecy” (nubuwwa). We find prophecy, if philosophical
cognition of what is good appears to be insufficient and is supplemented by
“inspirations” (waḥy) of the divine intellect.
Therefore, the ruler of the perfect state is not only a philosopher, but also a
prophet. Since the divine inspirations of the active intellect reach the prophet
66 Cf. above ch. 2 and also C. Prantl, Geschichte I, pp. 108ff. and 116ff.
67 For further details s. H. Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī, pp. 737ff. – Fārābī may
have based his knowledge of Aristotle’s theory of dreams on the Arabic translation of Aris-
totle’s Parva naturalia MS Rampur (India) 1752, following fol. 7 r–54 v (incomplete). – Cf.
my article “New Manuscript Findings”, no. 133. – An edition of this text is being prepared
by Rotraud Hansberger, Munich.
68 S. Fārābī, as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, ed. F. M. Najjar, pp. 31f. – al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 64
§ 26.
388 chapter 18
16=144 in the shape of imitations of sensory perceptions and intelligibles, | people can
be taught these inspirations. In doing this, the ruler of the perfect state can use
philosophical demonstrations or he can confine himself to prophetical “warn-
ings”.69 In both cases the ruler must “be able to present” his knowledge “very
well in his speech”.70 He must have poetic-rhetorical capacities.71 In using these
capacities, the ruler should try to convince the philosophically educated man
by philosophical demonstrations, and to persuade the crowd which only has a
kind of “pictorial knowledge”72 by “warnings” and “rules”.73 As a philosopher he
can use in his instructions to the citizen different means of logic and demon-
stration,74 as a prophet he can use the metaphors of the poetic-rhetorical lan-
guage.75 This does not mean, that prophetical “warnings” are a kind of know-
ledge which is less perfect than philosophy and which is only an adaption to
the lower capacities of the adherents of religion. Since prophetic “warnings”
are inspired by the divine intellect they supplement philosophical knowledge.
This happens in a manner that corresponds to the completion of theoretical
cognition by practical orientation, moral insight and practical prudence. Thus,
religion and its particulars appear to be an imitation, a supplementing picture
of philosophy, of the universals, without being identical with philosophy.
This limits the possibilities of the philosopher-ruler. He must also be a
prophet – not only with regard to the adherents of religion, the crowd, but also
with regard to the limits of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy and poetic-
rhetorical means of language appear to be incomplete servants of religion.76
This is an interesting modification of the Alexandrian tradition77 of philo-
sophy and rhetoric as servants of theology,78 which may have reached Fārābī
69 Cf. the participle munḏir in Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 59, 1 / ed. and
transl. R. Walzer, p. 244, 13, and on its use in the sense of “informing” s. the commentary
of R. Walzer, p. 389 (ad 168 1.2).
70 See above ch. 1, end.
71 Cf. W. Heinrichs, Die antike Verknüpfung, pp. 292f., and above ch. 4.
72 Cf. Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 70, 1ff. / ed. and transl. R. Walzer,
p. 278, 12 ff. – J. Kraemer, Alfarabi’s Opinions, pp. 115f.
73 See above ch. 6.
74 See above ch. 2.
75 Cf. W. Heinrichs, Die antike Verknüpfung, pp. 269ff., and in addition cf. H. Daiber,
Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī, pp. 739 f.
76 In this interpretation we differ from R. Walzer, who has ascribed to Fārābī a reduced
estimation of prophecy (s. R. Walzer’s commentary to his Engl. transl. of al-Madīna l-
fāḍila, p. 422).
77 For example Clemens of Alexandria: Cf. R. W. Smith, The Art of Rhetoric, p. 142, and J.
Dolch, Lehrplan, p. 73.
78 Cf. R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pp. 130ff. – An example for the influence of Alexandrian
through the mediation of his Christian teacher Yuḥannā Ibn Ḥaylān. Accord-
ing to Fārābī’s modification, philosophical | knowledge has to be supplemented 17=145
by the divine intellectus agens, by prophetical inspirations. This knowledge
of the ruler the citizen can only be taught through imitating pictures. These
imitations substitute the original which only can be perceived and taught in
the shape of pictures. Consequently, those pictures appear to be orientated
at the reality, just like the philosophical thought with its interrelation of the-
ory and praxis. This analogy between religion and philosophy – Fārābī speaks
of religion as imitating philosophy – permits the philosophical proof of reli-
gious truth and religious actualization of philosophical cognition. Therefore,
the ruler in the perfect state is not only a philosopher, but also a prophet who
with the help of God’s inspiration – by “assimilation to God”, i.e. by emulating
God’s rule79 – rules the city.80 This is a reorientation of Greek thoughts and it
has Islamic roots.
At the same time, Fārābī has classified the knowledge of the philosopher-
ruler and prophet-ruler as imitations which follow the reality of the perfect
state. Here, the reality of man as a “political being” (ζῷον πολιτικόν) with eth-
ical obligations within the association of a city is strongly emphasized.81 This is
contrary to Alexandrian theologians who “left the perceivable and turned to the
spiritual”.82 Philosophy is no longer a privilege of specialists, but can be taught
by the prophet-ruler to the citizen – in the shape of “religion”. As an imitation of
philosophy religion appears to be the actualization of true philosophy, which
is practically orientated, of ethics.
traditions is Fārābī’s discussion of philosophic-theological terms; it has a parallel in the

Platonic school of Alexandria (Johannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa): Cf. J. Kraemer,
Alfarabi’s Opinions, pp. 110 ff. (following Shlomo Pines).
79 Cf. Fārābī, Risāla fīmā yanbaġī, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 53, 13ff., and al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi,
pp. 64–66, § 27 / Engl. transl. L. V. Berman, Maimonides on Political Leadership, pp. 122f. –
Fārābī here may be inspired by Plato, Rep. 613 B. – On the definition of philosophy as assim-
ilation to God cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus, pp. 327 f.
80 Cf. Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 64, 16 f.
81 On the comparison with Aristotle s. M. Maróth, Griechische Theorie. – On Platonic par-
allels cf. F. A. Sankari, Plato, pp. 1 ff. – This idea was widely accepted in the Islamic world:
Cf. T. Khalidi, Some Classical Islamic Views of the City, pp. 272f., and F. M. Najjar, Siy-
āsa, pp. 102 ff. – On Ibn Bāǧǧa / Avempace (d. 532/1138 or 533/1139) s. D. M. Dunlop, “Ibn
Bādjdja” in EI2 III, col. 728 b–729 a; O. Leaman, Ibn Bājja, pp. 109ff.; Ibn Bāǧǧa as well
as Fārābī have been criticized in this point by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 581/1185) in his philosophical
novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, which propagates the mystical union with God and the withdrawal
from the world as a way to knowledge and eternal felicity: Cf. Amélie-Marie Goichon,
“Ḥayy Ibn Yaḳẓān” in EI2 III, col. 333 f.; S. S. Hawi, Islamic Naturalism, pp. 70ff.; M. E. Mar-
mura, The Philosopher and Society, pp. 318 ff.
82 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis VI 11, 90 (cited in J. Dolch, Lehrplan, p. 73).
390 chapter 18
For this reason philosophy is not only an esoteric privilege of philosoph-

ically minded elites. True philosophy arises in the context of the city’s real-
ity in the shape of religion. In this manner also Fārābī’s Summary of Plato’s
Laws (Talḫīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭūn) should be interpreted. Contrary to Fārābī’s Philo-
sophy of Plato (Falsafat Aflāṭūn), it very often refers to God, the other life and
18=146 the revealed “law” (šarīʿa). Contrary to Leo Strauss,83 Fārābī here has not |
disguised his real opinions about Plato. He criticizes the esoteric attitude of
Plato84 and has written his Summary with the persuasion, that true philosophy
is religion.
This statement will have consequences for the interpretation of Fārābī’s
Summary of Plato’s Laws. However, we will not enter here into details85 and
conclude with the remark, that our view of Fārābī calls for a revision of the
standard interpretation by historians of Islamic philosophy: Philosophers of
Islam should not only be seen as being engaged in the conflict between religion
and philosophy,86 or as writers either on philosophy or on religious themes.87
19=147 Bibliography and Abbreviations
Aristotle, Analytica posteriora. Arabic translation by Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus. In
Manṭiq Arisṭū. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. II. Cairo 1949, pp. 307–465.
Aristotle, (Works, Greek and English). 1–23. London/Cambridge, Mass. 1956ff. (reprint).
= The Loeb Classical Library.
Badawī, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān → Aristotle, Analytica posteriora
Berman, Lawrence V.: Maimonides on Political Leadership. In Kinship and Consent.
The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses. Ed. by Daniel J. Elazer.
Ramat Gan/Philadelphia/London/Montreal 1981, pp. 113–125.
83 How Fārābī Read Plato’s Laws. – A critical review of L. Strauss’ classification of Fārābī’s
Summary as an esoteric interpretation can be found in O. Leaman, Introduction, pp. 195ff.
84 Cf. his Talḫīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭūn, ed. F. Gabrieli, p. 4, 10ff., and L. Strauss, How Farabi read
Plato’s Laws, p. 322. – On Plato’s esoteric attitude cf. K. Gaiser, Platons ungeschriebene
Lehre.
85 For a first discussion of Fārābī’s Summary as a link between Greek philosophy and Islamic
religion cf. M. Mahdi, Editio Princeps, pp. 7 ff.
86 Here, we agree with O. Leaman. Cf. his article “Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philo-
sophy Rest on a Mistake?” and his Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy, pp. 191ff.
87 Here, we differ from O. Leaman (s. n. 86), who classifies Islamic philosophers as being
“perfectly capable of writing on either religion or philosophy without worrying about the
relationship that one has to the other” (“Does the Interpretation”, p. 536). According to
O. Leaman, p. 535, “religion has” in Fārābī’s teaching “no relevance to philosophy”.
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178.
Berman, Lawrence V.: (Review of) Muhsin Mahdi (ed.), Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿ-
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Brewster, David Pearson: Philosophical Discussions of Prophecy in Medieval Islam.
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Butterworth, Charles E.: The Rhetorician and His Relationship to the Commu-
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Daiber, Hans: New Manuscript Findings from Indian Libraries. In MME 1, 1986,
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Dolch, Josef: Lehrplan des Abendlandes. Darmstadt 1982 / Repr. of the ed. Ratin-
gen/Wuppertal/Kastellaun 1971.
Fakhry, Majid: Al-Farabi and the Reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle. In Journal of
the History of Ideas 26, 1965, pp. 469–478.
Fakhry, Majid: A History of Islamic philosophy. London/New York 21983.
Fārābī, al-: al-Madīna al-fāḍila. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici. Leiden 1964 / Reprint of the
edition 1895. – New edition with English translation and commentary by Richard
Walzer, Al-Farabi On the Perfect State. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-
madīna al-fāḍila. Oxford 1985.
Fārābī, al-: Falsafat Aflāṭun wa-aǧẓāʾuhā wa-marātib aǧẓāʾihā min awwalihā ilā āḫirihā.
Ed. with Latin translation by Franz Rosenthal and Richard Walzer, Alfar-
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Fārābī, al-: Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1961. – English translation
in → M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 71–130.
Fārābī, al-: Fuṣūl al-madanī. Aphorisms of the Statesman. Ed. with an English transla-
tion, introduction and notes by Douglas Morton Dunlop. Cambridge 1961. –
New edition by Fauzi M. Najjar, Al-Fārābī, Fuṣūl muntaẓaʿa. Beirut 1971.
392 chapter 18
Fārābī, al-: Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1968.
Fārābī, al-: Kitāb al-Ǧamʿ bayna raʾyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa-Arisṭūṭālīs. Ed.
Friedrich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, pp. 1–
33. – German translation in Friedrich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s philosophische Ab-
20=148 handlungen. Leiden 1892, pp. 1–53. |
Fārābī, al-: Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba. In Deux ouvrages inédits sur la réthorique (sic). Public-
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Série I/48.
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al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Milla. Thesis Oxford 1981.
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Fauzi M. Najjar. Beyrouth 21983.
Fārābī, al-: Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila → Fārābī, al-: al-Madīna al-fāḍila
Fārābī, al-: Risāla fīmā yanbaġī an yuqaddam qabl taʿallum al-falsafa. Ed. Friedrich
Dieterici, Alfārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, pp. 49–55. – Ger-
man translation in Friedrich Dieterici, Alfārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen.
Leiden 1892, pp. 82–91.
Fārābī, al-: Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda. Hyderabad 1345/1926. – New edition by Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn.
Beirut 1401/1981.
Fārābī, al-: Talḫīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭūn. Ed. with Latin translation by Francesco Gabri-
eli, Alfarabius, Compendium Legum Platonis. London 1952. = Plato Arabus III.
Fortenbaugh, William Wall: Aristotle on Emotion. London 1975.
Gaiser, Konrad: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. Stuttgart ²1968.
Gutas, Dimitri: The Starting Point of Philosophical Studies in Alexandrian and
Arabic Aristotelianism. In Theophrastus of Eresus. On his life and work. Ed. by Wil-
liam W. Fortenbaugh, together with Pamela Margaret Huby and Anthony
A. Long. New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and Oxford (U.K.) 1985. = RUSCH II, pp. 115–123.
Haddad, Fuad Said: An Early Arab Theory of Instruction. In International Journal of
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Ḥayy Bin Yaqẓān. Leiden 1974.
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leitungsliteratur zur arabischen Enzyklopädie. Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York 1985.
= Europäische Hochschulschriften. XX/177.
Heinrichs, Wolfhart: Die antike Verknüpfung von phantasia und Dichtung bei den
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Hoffmann, Ernst: Platon. München 1967.

Ibn Rušd, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa. Ed. Maurice Bouyges. I. Beyrouth 1938. = Biblio-
theca Arabica Scholasticorum V/2.
Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān. Ed. Albert Nasri Nader. Beirut 21968.
English translation with commentary by Lenn Evan Goodman, Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Bin
Yaqẓān. New York 1972. – German commented translation by Stefan Schreiner,
Ibn Tufayl, Hajj ibn Yaqzan der Naturmensch. Leipzig/Weimar 1983. – Islamic Theo-
logy and Philosophy. Studies in honor of George F. Hourani. Ed. by Michael E.
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119.
Leaman, Oliver: An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge (etc.)
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Mahdi, Muhsin: Alfarabi, circa 870–950. In History of Political Philosophy. 2nd edition
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Mahdi, Muhsin: Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Translated, with an intro-
duction. Rev. ed. Ithaca/New York 1969. | 21=149
Mahdi, Muhsin: The Editio Princeps of Fārābī’s Compendium Legum Platonis. In
JNES 20, 1961, pp. 1–24.
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sophy, pp. 92–110.
394 chapter 18
Peters, Francis Edward: Aristoteles Arabus. Leiden 1968.

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Schreiner, Stefan → Ibn Ṭufayl
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Zimmermann, Fritz W.: Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De
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Additional Remarks
Continuations of this interpretation in:

H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/16, II/21, II/22 and II/23.
A first draft appeared in Persian translation in Dowwomīn yādnāma-l ʿAllāma

Ṭabāṭabāʾī / ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī. The Second Commemoration Volume. The Sec-
ond Cultural Congress on the Occasion of the Death Anniversary of the Late
Allama Seyyed Muhammad Husayn Ṭabātabāʾī (Tehran, 15.–18.11.1983). Tehran
1363/1985, pp. 353–369. → following chapter.
Republished, with a few additions and revisions, from MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, pp. 128–149.
Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986. By courtesy of the publisher.
‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫مسألٔه تعلیم فلسفه به اهل مدینه‬

‫در نظر فارابی‬
‫‪The Problem of Teaching Philosophy to the Citizen‬‬

‫‪Fārābī’s Solution‬‬
‫تعالیم‪ ۱‬فارابی در باب مدینٔه فاضله و حاکم آن‪ ،‬فیلسوف حاکم و و پیامبر واضع ]شر یعت[‪ ،‬ھنوز‬ ‫‪۳۵۵‬‬
‫شایان توجه است‪ .‬مطالعات علمی در باره فارابی تاکنون نتوانسته است تمام جوانب فکری وی را‬
‫روشن کند و زمینٔه صحیح آراء وی را در یابد‪ .‬این امر معلول پیچیدگی ھايی است که در تفکر وی‪،‬‬
‫کهگاھی بی انسجام است‪ ،‬وجود دارد‪ .‬چنانکه نواقصی که در تفسیر آراء فارابی وجود دارد شاید‬
‫ناشی از اجمال آثار دیگر فارابی باشد که برخی از آنھا ھنوز تصحیح وچاپ نشده است‪.‬‬
‫اوصاف عقلانی فیلسوف حاکم‬
‫مثال گو یای این امر فضائل دوازدهگانٔه فیلسوف حاکم است که در مدینٔه فاضلٔه فارابی بیان‬
‫شده است‪ .۱‬این ]فضائل[ خلاصه اخیر بحث ھای علمی ای است که در سایر آثار فارابی می یابیم‪.‬‬
‫از تمامی این اوصاف‪ ،‬خصوصا ًدو صفت پنجم وششم گیرائی خاصی دارد که بنابر آن حاکم ”باید‬
‫خوش بیان باشد به طوری که ز بانش به طور تمام وکمال بر اظھار اندیشه ھای درونیش با وی‬
‫ھمراھی کند“‪ .‬و”باید | دوستدار تعلیم و استفادت و منقاد آن باشد‪ .‬سھل القبول بوده‪ ،‬سختی تعلیم‬ ‫‪۳۵۶‬‬
‫اورا آزارده نکند و زحمت و مرارتی که در این راه متحمل می شود او را رنج ندھد‪“.‬‬
‫شرط لازم تعلیم وشرح ھر چیزی احاطٔهکامل علمی به آن است‪ .‬فارابی با ذکر اوصاف دّوم‬
‫وّسوم وچھارم ”رئیس اّول“ وامام ]مدینٔه فاضله[ این امر را چنین گوشزد می کند‪:‬‬
‫”در ادراک و فھم آنچه به او گفته می شود‪ ،‬بالطبع خوش فھم و تصو ّر باشد و ھم مقصود‬
‫گو ینده و ھم آن چیز را‪ ،‬آن طور که ھست و بر حسب واقع و نفس الامر می باشد‪ ،‬در یابد“‪.‬‬
‫‪© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789‬‬

‫‪396‬‬ ‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫و”آنچه راکه فهم کند یا ببیند یا بشنود و یا درک کند‪ ،‬به خو بی حفظ نماید و فی الجمله فراموشی به‬
‫آسانی به او راه نیابد“‪ .‬و»فطن وھوشمند بود‪ :‬ھر گاه به چیزی با دلیلی اندک توجهکند بر آن جھتی‬
‫که آن دلیل رھنمون آن است به خو بی واقف وآگاه شود‪«.‬‬
‫این یک نظر یٔه تعلیم وتر بیتی است‪ .‬به ما گفته شده است که فقط وقتی چیزی را به نحو احسن‬
‫فھمیدیم وتوانستیم آن را مجس ّم کنیم‪ ،‬می توانیم در مقام شرح آن برآئیم‪ .‬فارابی در این باره به طور‬
‫خلاصه می گو ید‪» :‬باید ز بان او را قدرت ونیرو یی بود که بتواند در گفتار خو یش ھر آنچه می‬
‫داند به خو بی مجس ّم کند‪«.‬‬
‫خر به درستی نشناخته و به حساب نیاورده اند‪.‬‬
‫مضمون این تعلیم را ھنوز علمای متا ّ‬
‫فیلسوف حاکم به منزلٔه یک معل ّم‬
‫فارابی جدا ً توجه کافی به مسأله تعل ّم وتعلیم کرده است‪ .‬بحثھای مفصلی ]در این باره[ در کتاب‬
‫‪۳۵۷‬‬ ‫الٔالفاظ المستعملة فی المنطق واثر تصحیح | نشده وی کتاب البرھان‪ ،‬که تعلیقاتی بر آنالوطیقای‬
‫اولی )‪ (Analytica priora‬ارسطو است‪ ،‬وجود دارد‪ ،‬که در اینجا به ذکر برخی از قسمتھای مھم‬
‫آن ھا که به موجب ارتباطشان با ”مدینٔه فاضلٔه“ فارابی حائز اھمیت ھستند‪ ،‬می پرداز یم‪.‬‬
‫ارتباط متقابل تعل ّم وتعلیم که در بالا بدان اشاره شد‪ ،‬به معنای قرار دادن معل ّم ومتعل ّم‪ ،‬ھردو‪،‬‬
‫در یک جر یان تعل ّم وتعلیم است‪ .‬لذا اوصاف عقلی رئیس مدینٔه فاضله به نحو اعجاب انگیزی شبیه‬
‫به اوصاف متعل ّم است که در کتاب الٔالفاظ المستعملة فی المنطق‪ ۲‬ذکر آن آمده است‪ .‬بنابر مفاد آن‬
‫کتاب‪ ،‬متعل ّم باید‪:‬‬
‫”چیزی را که به وی آموخته شده بتواند به تصور آورد ومعنی آن چه را که از معل ّم شنیده‬ ‫‪۱‬‬
‫است‪ ،‬یعنی مقصود وی را‪ ،‬بفھمد“‪.‬‬
‫”به تصدیق تصورات وفھم خود از بیان معل ّم دست یابد“‪.‬‬ ‫‪۲‬‬
‫”آنچه را که تصو ّر و سپس تصدیق کرده است در خاطر بسپارد“‪.‬‬ ‫‪۳‬‬
‫نصوص فوق الذکر از فارابی روشن می شازد که ادراک تصدیقات و به خاطر سپردن آنھا ھم‬
‫برای مستمع یعنی متعل ّم لازم است وھم برای معل ّم یعنی حاکم مدینٔە فاضله‪ .‬فارابی در کتاب الالفاظ‬
‫المستعملة فی المنطق‪ ۳‬عواملی را که در یاد گیری مفید می افتد‪ ،‬چنین می شمارد‪:‬‬
‫‪the problem of teaching philosophy to the citizen‬‬ ‫‪397‬‬
‫”الفاظی که دلالت بر شئ می کنند – حّد شئ – اجزاء حّد – جزئیات آن ]شئ[ – کلیات آن –‬

‫رسوم )اوصاف( شئ – خواص آن – اعراض آن – مشابه آن – مقابل آن – تقسیم کردن – مثال –‬
‫استقراء – قیاس – قراردادن آن شئ در معرض دید“‪.‬‬
‫حال می تواند فھمید که فارابی از قسمتھایی از ارغنون )‪ (Organon‬ارسطو بھره | گرفته است؛‬ ‫‪۳۵۸‬‬
‫خصوصا ًازکتاب آنالوطیقای اولی )‪ (Analytica priora‬آن؛ که از ز بان سر یانی به وسیله ابو بشر‬
‫متی بن یونس‪ ،‬معاصر فارابی‪ ،‬ترجمه شده وخود فارابی آن را تفسیر کرده بود‪ .‬در اینجا ما برآنیم که‬
‫نشان دھیم منشاء ”عوامل“ فوق الذکر‪ ،‬رٔای ارسطو در باره نسبت متقابل تفکر وادراک است‪.‬‬
‫نسبت متقابل تفکرو ز بان ونظر فارابی در باب خیال شئ‬
‫فارابی در فصل مذکور‪ ،‬در باب عوامل یادگیری‪ ،‬مطلب مھمی را اظھار می دارد که بنابر آن می‬
‫توان اشیائی را که تصورشان آسان است جایگز ین اشیائی کرد که تصو ّرشان مشکل است‪ .‬درمیان‬
‫اشیائی که تصورشان آسان است وی ”عوامل“ فوق را ذکر می کند‪ .‬وی در باره آخر ین عامل چنین‬
‫می گو ید‪” :‬شبیه یک شئ نیز واضح است؛ ز یرا اگر شبیه یک شئ را بتوان به خیال آورد‪ ،‬خود آن‬
‫شئ را می توان به آسانی تصو ّر کرد‪ .‬چون خیال یک شئ در نفس مطابق با خیال شبیه آن است‪.‬‬
‫وھر دو این )خیال( ھا به علت امر واحدی که در ھر دو آنھا مشترک است‪ ،‬شبیه به ھم ھستند‪.‬‬
‫وھر دو شبیه به ھم ھستند ز یرا به نسبت متشابھی متناسب ھستند‪ .‬مثلا نً سبت ناخدای یک کشتی‬
‫بهکشتی‪ ،‬مانند نسبت فرمانده لشکر به لشکر ومانند نسبت حاکم مدینه به مدینه است‪ ،‬پس فرمانده‬
‫لشکر وحاکم مدینه وناخدا به تشابه نسبشان متشابه ھستند“‪.‬‬
‫شباھت ترکیبی در نسب فوق مارا قادر می سازد که با استفاده از خیال شئ بتوانیم خود‬
‫شئ را توصیف کنیم‪ .‬جایگز ینی ھا را‪ ،‬که در آن تصو ّرات ساده وگمرامکننده جایگز ین ”ترکیبات‬
‫بسیار پیچیده“ گردد به نحوی که ”شنونده ومتعل ّم از مقصود | بسیار دور افتند“‪ ،‬نمی پذیرد‪ .۴‬فارابی‬ ‫‪۳۵۹‬‬
‫استعمال چنین جایگز ینی ھا را به بعضی از فیلسوفان یونانی‪ ،‬فیثاغور یان‪ ،‬افلاطون وامپدکلس‪،‬‬
‫نسبت می دھد‪۵‬۔ وی در اینجا به طور جزئی ونهکاملا ً دقیق به نقد کتاب ما بعد الطبیعه ارسطو‬
‫که باترجمه اسطاث )‪ ،(Eustathius‬در قرن نھم میلادی‪ ،‬در اختیاروی بوده است‪ ،‬می پردازد‪.‬‬
‫بنابر گزارش ارسطو ”وجود“ و ”وحدت“ آنطور که مورد اعتقاد افلاطون وفیثاغور یان است‪،‬‬
‫‪398‬‬ ‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫تبیین پذیر نیست امّا وحدت را‪ ،‬بدان نحو که مورد اعتقاد امپدکلس است‪ ،‬می توان به چیزی که‬
‫قابل فھم وشناسائی بیشتری باشد تحو یل کرد‪ .‬فارابی نیز با بیانی قر یب به بیان ارسطو‪ ،‬تحقیق در‬
‫اقوال کسانی را که ”فلسفٔه شان شبیه به زخارف است“ واجب نمی داند‪ .‬اوچنین اقوالی را ”رموز‬
‫والغاز“‪ ۶‬می نامد ”که در تعلیم فلسفه باید کنار گذاشته شوند“ وفقط باید ”در خطابه یا اقوالی که‬
‫در امور سیاسی بهکار برده می شوند‪ ،‬از آنھا بھره جست‪“.‬‬
‫نقش خطابه‬
‫این نظر فارابی نباید ما را به این تصور اغراق آمیز بکشاند که به نظر وی ”فلسفه و یقین برای جمھور‬
‫مردم نیست“‪ .‬بنابر رساله ای ازوی در باره خطابه‪ ۷‬که در آن از ارسطو متابعت می کند‪ ،‬فن خطابه‬
‫عھده دار ”تعلیم بسیاری از چیزھای نظری به مردم است“ و در خطابات مدنی از آن استفاده‬
‫می شود‪ .‬خطابه فقط می تواند اقناع کننده باشد ونمی توان در رو ی ّت )‪ (reflection‬واستنباط‬
‫]امر مورد اقناع[ از آن استفادهکرد‪ .۸‬ارسطو نیز خطابه را متوجّه ممکنات وجزئیات می داند‪ ،‬نه‬
‫ضرور یات و کلیات و آن را مفید ظّن می داند نه مفید یقین‪.‬‬
‫‪۳۶۰‬‬ ‫اقناع ناشی از خطابه با صدق مادّه آن به یقین تبدیل می شود‪ .‬این امر از طر یق براھین یقینی‬
‫ممکن پذیر می شود‪ .‬علم به موجودات اگر از ترکیب خطابه و براھین یقینی حاصل شود‪ ،‬شایسته‬
‫عنوان ”فلسفه“ است‪.۹‬‬
‫در آراء فارابی‪ ،‬بجز این نوع علم بی واسطه‪ ،‬علم دیگری نیز دیده می شود که با واسطه است‪:‬‬
‫ذات یک شئ مستقیما ً تعقل نمی شود بلـکه فقط می توان آن را از طر یق مثالی که محا کی شئ‬
‫است‪ ،‬به خیل درآورد‪ .‬پس علم محدود به صور ذھنی ای می شود که به شکل مثالاتی است که‬
‫محا کی موجودات است‪ .‬کسی که از طر یق این صور ذھنی‪ ،‬اقناع )از طر یق خطابی( می شود‬
‫وکسی که به واقعیت این معرفت مثالی یقین پیدا می کند‪ ،‬عالم است‪] .‬علمی[ که فارابی معتقد‬
‫است فلاسفه قدیم آن را مل ّت )دین( خوانده اند‪.۱۰‬‬
‫نظر فارابی در باره دین به عنوان محاکات فلسفه‬
‫فارابی چنین طبقه بندیی از دین را تھذیب کرده است‪ .‬به نظر او دین محاکی فلسفه است‪ .‬دین‬
‫وفلسفه ھر دو ”شامل موضوعات واحدی ھستند وھر دو خبر از مبادی قصوای موجودات می‬
‫دھند‪ .‬ز یرا ھر دو آنھا معطی علم به مبدأ اّول و سبب اول موجودات ھستند وھر دو خبر از غایت‬
‫قصوائی می کنند که انسان برای آن خلق شده است وآن سعادت قصوی وغایت قصوای ھر یک‬
‫ھست“‪۱۱.‬‬ ‫از موجودات دیگر نیز‬
‫در نتیجه فلسفه و دین فقط در روش با یکدیگر اختلاف دارند‪ ،‬نه در مقصد‪ ،‬فلسفه مبتنی بر‬
‫براھین فلسفی وعلم حاصل از آن است‪ .‬دین مبتنی بر مفاھیمی است که محاکی ذات اشیاء است‬
‫ودر آن طرق خطابی‪ ،‬ز بان استعاری‪ ،‬ومفاھیم مثالی بهکار می رود‪.‬‬
‫الـگوی ارسطوئی در بارٔه نظر وعمل به عنوان ساختمان مشترک فلسفه ودین‪ :‬اجزاء‬ ‫‪۳۶۱‬‬
‫معرفتی واخلاقی‬
‫مطابق متنی که از فارابی ذکر شد‪ ،‬فلسفه ودین فقط از مبادی قصوی خبر نمی دھند‪ ،‬بلـکه مقصد‬
‫قصوی وطر یق رسیدن به سعادت قصوی را نیز نشان می دھند‪ .‬لذا واژه مل ّت )دین(‪ ،‬که ر یشه‬
‫قرآنی دارد‪ ،‬شرحی از آراء وافعالی است که حاکم آنھا را به شکل قوانین بر جامعه تشر یع می کند‪.‬‬
‫عین ھمین جر یان را می توان به فلسفه نسبت داد‪ .‬بنابر قول فارابی ”مل ّت فاضله شبیه به فلسفه‬
‫است‪ .‬ومانند فلسفه است که جزئی از آن نظری وجزئی عملی است و با دانستن جزء نظری که‬
‫فکری است‪ ،‬انسان نمی تواند مطابق آن عمل کند ولی اگر جزء عملی را بداند‪ ،‬می تواند آن مطابق‬
‫عمل کند‪] .‬جزء[ عملی در دین ھمان است کهکلیاتش در فلسفه عملی آمده است“‪ ۱۲.‬این کلیات به‬
‫شکل شر یعت شرایع فاضله در دین تحقق می یابند‪ .‬وظیفه دین اقناع جمھور مردم نسبت به شر یعت‬
‫وتعالیم‪ ،‬وتعلیم وتر بیت آنھا با استفاده از وسایل ذکر شده خطابی – شعری است‪.۱۳‬‬
‫ھمانطور که ”عمل“ در دین مطابق ”عمل“ در فلسفه است‪ ،‬براھین آراء نظری موجود در دین‬
‫نیز در فلسفٔه نظری هست‪ .‬ومانند افعال‪ ،‬تعالیم وشر یعت دین‪ ،‬آراء نظری آن را نیز می توان به‬
‫وسیله فلسفه و یا تطبیق با کلیات آن مبرهن ساخت‪.‬‬
‫‪400‬‬ ‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫نکته درخور توجّه در رأی فارابی در بارٔه فلسفه ودین‪ ،‬جزء اخلاقی آن است‪ .‬چنانکهگفتیم‬
‫براهین فلسفی واقناعات دینی با استفاده از ز بان تمثیلی خطابه وشعر متوجّه صدور دستورات‬
‫‪۳۶۲‬‬ ‫اخلاقی به افراد است؛ دستوراتی که راه درست رسیدن به سعادات قصوی را نشان | می دهد‪.‬‬
‫دستورات دینی به شكل شر يعت و تعاليم است واز فلسفه شروع می كند كه به نظر فارابي مقدم‬
‫بردين است و موظف است كه اقامه براهين قاطع كند‪.‬‬
‫چنین دیدگاهی منجر به این سؤلات اساسی می شود که ٓایا ]در نظر فارابی[ براهین فلسفی فقط‬
‫برای خواص تعلیم یافته و انـدیـشـمـنـد ان است؟ و ٓایا‪ ،‬به این ترتیب‪ ،‬دین از جهتی باید از طر یق‬
‫فلسفه مبرهن شود واز جهت دیگر فقط مخصوص عوام‪ ،‬غیر فیلسوف است؟ به نظر من چنین‬
‫پنداری قابل قبول نیست‪] .‬در اثبات این مدعا[ از طرح ارسطو در باره نظر و عمل شروع می کنیم‬
‫که به نظر فارابی فلسفه و دین در ٓان سهیم هستند‪.‬‬
‫مطابق اظهار فارابی دین محاکی فلسفه است و فلسفه به معنای ارسطوئی ٓان ترکیبی از نظر‬
‫و عمل‪ ،‬معرفت علمی و بینش اخلاقی یا فرزانگی )‪ (practical prudence / φρόνησις‬است‪.‬‬
‫فارابی با ات ّـباع از نظر ارسطو‪ ،‬در اخلاق نیکوماخی )‪ (Nicomachean Ethics‬و استفاده از‬
‫کتاب در باره نفس )‪ (De anima‬وی ٓاراء جدیدی را در مدینٔه فاضله اش بسط داده است‬
‫۔ مطابق نظر ارسطو اعمال اخلاقی انسان و معرفت وی نسبت به حّق تحت فرمان سه قوه از‬
‫قوای نفس است‪ :‬قوه مدرکه‪ ،‬قو ّٔه ناطقه‪ ،‬وقو ّٔه عامله‪ .‬فارابی در اینجا ازفکر ”فرزانگی“ که مورد‬
‫نظر ارسطو بود تبعیت می کند‪ :‬معقولات فقط متعلق معرفت علمی نیستند بلـکه چیزهایی هستند‬
‫که به بینش اخلاقی وشناخت خیر مطلوب وشر منفور منجر می شوند‪ .‬معرفت علمی و بینش‬
‫اخلاقی بایکدیگر ارتباط دارند‪ .‬بدون عمل خیر و بی مقدمه نمی توان به طور کلی با فضیلت بود‪.‬‬
‫‪۳۶۳‬‬ ‫نظر وعمل متعلق به یکدیگر هستند‪ .‬به این | دلیل عقل می تواند اعمال تٔوام با فضیلت راتعیین کند‬
‫و بینش اخلاقی در بارٔه خیر مطلوب و شر منفور در اعمال انسانی جای دارد وامری است واقعی‬
‫نه نظری‪.‬‬
‫فارابی در این باب از اخلاق خود‪ ،‬که عملا ًجهت گیری شده است‪ ،‬اشاره به یکی از آراء‬
‫ارسطو می کند که محققان معاصر تاکنون ازآن غفلت کرده اند‪ :‬نظر یٔه ارتباط متقابل تفکر و‬
‫ادراک‪ .‬به نظر فارابی ”خیر کلی“ را نمی توان بدون ادراک حسی در یافت‪ ۰‬لذا ارسطو و به دنبال‬
‫وی فارابی به قوه ای به نام ”متخی ّله“ قائل شده اند که به عنوان واسطه ای‪ ،‬ادراکات حسی واز‬
‫آن جا خیالات شيء محسوس رابه جزء عاقلٔه نفس می فرستد‪ .‬فارابي این خیالات را ”محاکات“‬
‫می نامد۔‬
‫این اصطلاح بدیعي است که فارابي از آن استفاده می کند‪ .‬قؤه متخی ّله از تمامی محمسوسات‬
‫وحتی معقولات محاکات می کند‪ .‬ز یرا خود شیء محسوس یا مورد تأمل به جزء عاقلٔه نفس نمی‬
‫رسد بلـکه فقط محاکات یا خیالی از ٓان می رسد‪ .‬نفس انسانی فقط با چنین خیالاتی تفکر می کند۔‬
‫با توصیفی که از ارتباط متقابل تفکر و ادراک شد‪ ،‬فارابی در حقیقت توجیه دیگری از نظر‬
‫ارسطو در بارۂ ترکیب علم نظری و فرزانگی یا عقل نظری وعـمـلی کرده است‪ .‬در مدینٔه فاضلٔه و‬
‫ملٔه فاضلٔه فارابی نیز‪ ،‬صحبت از چنین تٔالیفی شده است‪” :‬جزئیات“ دین سهمی در ”کلیات“ فلسفه‬
‫دارند و ]این کلیات[ جزئیات را ثابت می کنند؛ در نتیجه ملة فاضله محاکاتی از فلسفه وشبیه به ٓان‬
‫است۔‬
‫چنانکه مشاهده شد این شباهت مبتنی بر ساختمان مشترکی است۔ دین )مل ّت( یک امر مشابه‬
‫بی استفادٔه فلسفه نیست‪ .‬دین‪ ،‬اهل | مدینٔه فاضله رابه اینکه به خاطر رسیدن به سعادت قصوی‬ ‫‪۳۶۴‬‬
‫ایمان ٓاورده و مطابق ٓان عمل کنند‪ ،‬اقناع می کند ۔ واین چیزی است که از طر یق فلسفه می توان‬
‫آن را اثبات کرد ولی حصول آن از طر یق فلسفه ممکن نیست‪ .‬اما نباید چنین پنداشت که فلسفه‬
‫خادمی برای دین است‪ ،‬ز یرا نمی توان ارتباط فلسفه با واقعیت‪ ،‬در نظر فارابی‪ ،‬رابا نظر یٔه معرفت‬
‫نزد ارسطو‪ ،‬که مبتنی برارتباط متقابل تفکر وادراک است‪ ،‬توجیهکرد‪ .‬ملت فاضله مثال واقعی‬
‫وقابل اثباتی ازنسبت بین معرفت علمی و بینش اخلاقی است‪ ،‬که اثبات آن از طر یق فلسفه است‪.‬‬
‫دین با شر یعت وتعالیمش محافظ نسبتی است که اخلاق با واقعیت دارد ومی کوشد تا فرزانگی‬
‫فلسفه را تحقق بخشد‪.‬‬
‫در نتیجه‪ ،‬رابطٔه بین نظر وعمل در فلسفه و دین‪ ،‬نیز دین و فلسفه را متحد می سازد‪ .‬فلسفه ودین‬
‫هر یک به دیگری متکی است‪ ،‬مانند‪ :‬تفکر وادراک‪ ،‬نظر وعمل‪ ،‬معرفت علمی و بینش اخلاقی‪،‬‬
‫وعقاید واعمال مبتنی برقوانین دینی‪ .‬فارابی بااثبات این رابطه خود رافیلسوف اصیلی نشان می‬
‫دهد‪.‬‬
‫‪402‬‬ ‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫‪۳۶۵‬‬ ‫حقیقت دین در مدینٔه فاضله به معنای تحقق فضائل وتبدیل محاکات کننده‪ ،‬اخلاق کلی به‬
‫اعمال فاضله است‪ ،‬بنابراین وسیله ای می شود برای تحقق تعالیم فلسفی در باره ارتباط بین فضائل‬
‫حقیقی و واقعیت۔ فضائل حقیقی به نحو کل ّی وجود ندارد بلـکه فقط با اعمال اخلاقی وجود‬
‫پیدا می کند‪ .‬بنابر این فلسفه به دین به عنوان یک وسیله نیازمند است‪ .‬حال باید به تفسیر قولی‬
‫از فارابی در کتاب الحروف‪ ۱۴‬بپرداز یم که ”فلسفه مقّدم بر وسیله ای است ]که از آن استفاده‬
‫می کند[ ز یرا بهکارگیرندٔه وسیله باید بر خود وسیله زمانا ً مقّدم باشد“‪ .‬این قول تبدیل جالب‬
‫توجه ای از تعلیمی اسکندرانی است که عده ای از فلاسفٔه بغداد در قرن دهم میلادی ٓان‬
‫را اخذ کرده بودند‪ .‬مطابق این تعلیم‪ ،‬منطق بخشی از فلسفه نیست‪ ،‬بلـکه ابز ار ٓان است و انسان‬
‫راقادر می سازد که بین حقیقت و خطا در فلسفٔه نظری و خیر و شر در فلسفٔه عملی فرق نهد‪،‬‬
‫فارابی این تعلیم رابه صورت مخصوصی اتخاذ کرده است که قرار دادن دین بجای منطق است۔‬
‫وی در کتاب الحروف خو یش دین را به عنوان جزئی از فلسفه طبقه بندی نمی کند بلـکه ٓان را‬
‫ابزار فلسفه می داند‪ .‬با این کیفیت‪ ،‬دین ٓانچه را که به طور کلی در فلسفه موجود است‪ ،‬یعنی‬
‫نظر یٔه فلسفی در باره بینش اخلاقی و فرزانگی را که منجر به سعادت قصوی می شود‪ ،‬تحقق می‬
‫بخشد ۔ بدین ترتیب دین فقط ابزاری برای فلسفه نیست بلـکه فلسفه را قادر می سازد تا خود‬
‫را تحقق بخشد۔ فلسفه متکی بر دین است؛ همچنانکه فلسفه به منطق به عنوان یک ابزار نیازمند‬
‫است‪.‬‬
‫پس حاکمیت فلسفه تا ٓانجا که فلسفه ودین به یکدیگر متکی هستند‪ ،‬محدود می شود‪ ،‬و این شبیه‬
‫به نسبتی است که ارسطو بین تفکر و ادراک‪ ،‬معرفت علمی و فرزانگی‪ ،‬معرفت انسانی وز بان‪ ،‬تعلیم‬
‫و| تعل ّم‪ ،‬و نظر و عمل برقرار می دانست‪.‬‬ ‫‪۳۶۶‬‬
‫حدود معرفت انسانی‪ :‬فلسفه ودین‬
‫نظر مخصوصی که فارابی در بارٔه دین ابراز می دارد حاکمیت فلسفه را محدود نمی کند بلـکه بالعکس‬
‫نظر ما را به محدودیت های معرفت انسانی جلب می کند۔ این امر در رأی که فارابی در بارٔه‬
‫”رٔو یا“ اظهار می دارد‪ ،‬مشهود است۔ مبدأ این نظر آراء اسکندر افرودیسی در باب عقل فع ّال و‬
‫تعالیم ارسطو در باب رٔو یا و تفٔا ّل )غیب گو یی( است‪ .‬مطابق این نظر‪ ،‬رٔو یاها نتیجٔه عمل متقابل‬
‫ادراک حسی‪ ،‬تخی ّل محاکات کننده وعقل فع ّال است۔ اگر تخی ّل محاکات کننده به ”جزئی ّات“‬
‫حال وآینده‪ ،‬معقولات مفارقه وموجودات شر یفه‪ ،‬که همه از طر یق عقل فع ّال وحی شده اند‪،‬‬
‫توجّهکند‪ ،‬نبو ّت حاصل می شود‪ .‬نبو ّت هنگامی حاصل می شود که معرفت فلسفی ”خیر“ ناکافی‬
‫باشد و با وحی عقل فع ّال تکمیل شود‪.‬‬
‫لذا حاکم مدینٔه فاضله یک فیلسوف بلـکه یک نبی است‪ .‬ز یرا وحی های الهی عقل فع ّال به شکل‬
‫محا کیات ادراکات حسی و معقولات به نبی می رسد؛ و می توان آن ها را به بشر آموخت‪ .‬بدین‬
‫نحو حاکم مدینه فاضله هم می تواند از براهین فلسفی استفادهکند و هم آنکه فقط به انذارهای نبوی‬
‫بـپـردازد‪ .‬در هر دو صورت حاکم باید ”علم خو یش را با کلام خود به نحو احسن اظهار دارد“‪.‬‬
‫او باید واجد استعدادهای خطابی – شعری باشد‪ .‬حاکم‪ ،‬از طر یق این استعدادها‪ ،‬باید بکوشد تا‬
‫کسانی را که تعالیم فلسفی یافته اند با براهین فلسفی به یقین آورد و جمهور مردم را‪ ،‬که فقط نوعی‬
‫”معرفت مثالی“‪ ۱۵‬دارند‪ ،‬با ”انذارها“ و ”تعالیم“ اقناع کند‪ .‬او از آن جهت که فیلسوف است | می‬ ‫‪۳۶۷‬‬
‫تواند در تعالیمش به اهل مدینه از طرق مختلف منطقی و برهانی استفادهکند و از آن جهت که‬
‫نبی است می تواند از استعارات ز بان خطابی – شعری استفادهکند‪ .‬البته نباید چنین پنداشت که‬
‫”انذارات“ نبوی نوعی معرفت است کهکمال فلسفه را ندارد و مناسب استعدادهای اخ ّ‬
‫س پیروان‬
‫دین است‪ .‬انذارات نبوی چون به واسطٔه عقل فعال وحی می شود مکـمّـل معرفت فلسفی است‪.‬‬
‫این امر به نحوی انجام می گیرد که متناسب با اکمال معرفت نظری به واسطٔه جهت گیری عـمـلی‪،‬‬
‫‪404‬‬ ‫‪chapter 19‬‬
‫بینش اخلاقي‪ ،‬و فرزانگی است‪.‬‬

‫بنابراین دین و ”جزئیات“ آن محاکات و مثالی از فلسفه – از کلیات – هستند؛ در حالیکه با فلسفه‬
‫یکی نیستند۔ ولی این باعث می شود که امکانات فیلسوف حاکم محدود شود‪ :‬او در نسبتی که با‬
‫پیروان دین یعنی جمهور مردم دارد و به خاطر محدودیت های موجود در معرفت فلسفی‪ ،‬باید یک‬
‫نبی نیز باشد‪ .‬لذا فلسفه و وسایل خطابی – شعری ز بان خادمان ناقص فلسفه به نظر می آیند‪.‬‬
‫این ]نظر[ تبدیل جالب توجهی از سنت فکری اسکندرانی است که طبق آن فلسفه وخطابه‬
‫خادم الهیات هستند‪] .‬این سنت[ شاید از طر یق معل ّم مسیحی فارابی یوحنا بن حیلان به وی رسیده‬
‫باشد‪ .‬به نظر فارابی معرفت فلسفی باید به وسیلٔە عقل فع ّال و وحی نبوی تکمیل شود‪ .‬واین معرفت‬
‫را فقط می توان با استفاده از مثال های محاکات کننده به اهل مدینه آموخت۔ این محاكي ّات جای‬
‫اصل خود را‪ ،‬که فقط در شکل مثالهای قادر ادراک و تعلیم است‪ ،‬می گیرند‪ .‬لذا این مثالها‬
‫متوجه واقعیت اند؛ چنانکه تفکر فلسفی با ارتباط متقابل نظر وعملش چنین است‪ .‬چنین مقایسه‬
‫ای بین دین وفلسفه – فارابی دین را محاکات فلسفه می داند – امکان اثبات فلسفي حقیقت دینی‬
‫‪۳۶۸‬‬ ‫ق دینی | معرفت فلسفي را مي دهد‪ .‬بنابر این حاکم مدینٔه فاضله فقط یک فیلسوف نیست؛‬‫و تحق ِ‬
‫وي همچنین پیامبری است که با کمک وحی الهی بر مدینه حکومت می کند‪ ۱۶.‬این جهت تازه ای‬
‫است درآراء یونانیان که ر یشه های اسلامي دارد‪.‬‬
‫فارابي همچنین معرفت فیلسوف حاکم و نبي حاکم را در طبقه محاکیاتی قراردادهکه پیرو حقیقت‬
‫مدینٔه فاضله است‪ .‬در اینجا به حقیقت انسان به عنوان ”موجودي مدني“ که تکالیفی اخلاقی دارد؛‬
‫تاکید بسیار شده است واین نظر مخالف متألهین اسکندرانی است که ”محسوسات را ترک کرده و‬
‫به معنو یات روي آوردند“‪ .‬فلسفه دیگر در انحصار خواص نیست و می توان آن را در شکل ”دین“‬
‫به أهل مدینه آموخت‪ .‬دین به منزله محاکات فلسفه یعنی تحّقق فلسفٔه حقیقی که عملا ًجهت گیری‬
‫شده‪ ،‬واخلاق است‪.‬‬
the problem of teaching philosophy to the citizen 405
1‫یادداشت ها‬
.۵۹ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح دیتر یسی‬،‫آراء اهل مدینٔە فاضله‬ .۱
.۸۷ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح محسن مهدی‬،‫الالفاظ المستعملة فی المنطق‬ .۲
.‫همانجا‬ .۳
.۹۱ ‫ ص‬،‫همان کتاب‬ .۴
.‫همانجا‬ .۵
.۹۲ ‫ ص‬،‫همان کتاب‬ .۶
.۵۷ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح لانگهد‬،‫کتاب الخطابه‬ .۷
‫۔‬۵۹ ‫ ص‬،‫همان کتاب‬ .۸
.۴۰ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح شده در حیدرآباد دکن‬،‫تحصیل السعادة‬ .۹
.‫همانجا‬ .۱۰
.‫همانجا‬ .۱۱
‫۔‬۴۶ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح محسن مهدي‬،‫الملة‬ .۱۲
.۱۵۲ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح محسن مهدي‬،‫کتاب الحروف‬ .۱۳
.۱۳۲ ‫ ص‬،‫همان کتاب‬ .۱۴
.۷۰ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح دیتر یسی‬،‫آراء اهل مدینٔە فاضله‬ .۱۵
.۶۴ ‫ ص‬،‫ تصحیح محسن مهدي‬،‫الملة‬ .۱۶
Translated into Persian by Šahrām Pāzūkī / ‫ترجمٔه شھرام پازوکى‬
An elaborated version in English appeared in 1986 with the title “The Ruler as Philo-
sopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view”. In MNAW.L n.r. 3 49/4, pp. 128–149. =
H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18.
Republished from Dowwomīn yādnāma-i ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī / ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī. The

Second Commemoration Volume. The Second Cultural Congress on the Occasion of the
Death Anniversary of the Late Allama Seyyed Muhammad Husayn Ṭabātabāʾī (Tehran,
15.–18.11.1983). Tehran 1363/1985, pp. 353–369. By courtesy of the publisher.
1 ‫ فقط‬،‫صل بودن ارجاعات نسبت به حجم مقاله وکم اهمی ّت بودن بعضی از آنها برای خوانندٔه فارسی‬
ّ ‫نظر به مف‬
.‫ م‬.‫بعضی از آنها ذکر شده است‬
chapter 20
Philosopher-King
The Platonic concept of the philosopher-king, who combines philosophical

knowledge with the capability to rule (Plato, Republic V 473 E), reappears in
Fārābī’s (258/872–339/950 or 951) work on the “Perfect State”. It became influ-
ential in later Islamic philosophical works – for the most part through the
mediation of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), who modified and combined it with ideas
taken from the originally Iranian-Sassanid “mirrors of princes”. These had, since
the translations of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 137/755 or 139/756), developed practical
rules regulating the way of acting of the rulers and the behaviour of the ruled.
Fārābī concentrated on the intellectual qualities of the ruler who, in his per-
suasion, should have the qualities of a prophet and should be a charismatic
person whose intuition is inspired by the divine revelation, comparable to the
revelations that Prophet Mohammed received from God. Fārābī, who appar-
ently dreamed of a worldwide society with common faith and laws under the
rule of a philosopher-prophet, did not mention in his “Perfect State” the Islamic
prophet Mohammed and instead used the terms “prophet”, “imam”, and “first
ruler” (ar-raʾīs al-awwal) – and they must have particular ethical and intellec-
tual qualities, such as love of truth and justice, resoluteness and contempt of
413 b worldly things, the capacity to acquire knowledge, and the rhetorical | ability
to persuade others. He was convinced – in a much stricter manner than his
Ismailite forerunner Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 322/934) – of the universality of reli-
gion and belief in one God, the ultimate source of knowledge, promulgated
by the ruler in the shape of laws, the guiding line for people in a hierarch-
ically structured society. An alternative expression of these laws is “religion”
(milla). Fārābī expanded the Ismailite combination of authority and prophecy,
knowledge and divine inspiration, by introducing notions taken from Aris-
totelian epistemology and ethics. Actions of human beings are subject to the
legal regulations imposed by the divinely inspired prophet-ruler. These actions,
which are based on religious laws, are part of “religion” and mirror the divinely
inspired knowledge of the ruler, a philosopher. Here, Fārābī introduced his
original idea of religion “imitating” philosophy and its universals. Religion
becomes a mirror image of philosophy and, at the same time, religion is under-
stood as an instrument used by philosophy. The practical “prudence” (sophro-
syne) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics appears in Fārābī as religious laws, as
religion that “imitates” the universals of philosophy. This “imitation” (muḥākāt)
of philosophical knowledge is interpreted by Fārābī as a kind of representation

philosopher-king 407
of the intelligible things through images that are the only way to develop a con-
ception of theoretical insights. In consonance with Aristotle’s persuasion that
humans only can think through images based on the perceivable things, Fārābī
considers religion as the only way, as an “instrument” of theoretical philosophy,
shaped and realized through the observance of the rules of religious laws.
Fārābī starts with Aristotle’s concept of practical prudence, his assumption of
an interrelation between human thought and perception, and his doctrine of
an interdependence between theory and practice. Religion is not only “insight”,
but, according to Fārābī, also the only way to philosophical knowledge, which
is moral insight in the shape of religious laws. The performance of the reli-
gious laws leads the individual to “supreme happiness” (al-saʿāda al-quṣwā);
it regulates the society, the city-state that requires a leader, an imam, and in
which the people need their fellow-citizens. The Aristotelian notion of man
as a political creature is integrated into a soteriological concept of a leader,
a person with charismatic qualities, who with his intellectual and rhetorical
qualities can lead the masses and persuade them of the prescriptions of reli-
gion. Here, religion appears as an image, an imitation of universal knowledge,
which is divinely inspired and becomes actualized through the performance of
the religious laws.
Fārābī’s notions reappear in a modified form in the encyclopaedia of the
“Brethren of Purity” (4th/10th c.) and later in the works of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bāǧǧa
(d. 532/1138 or 533/1139), Ibn Tufayl (d. 581/1185), Ibn Rušd (d. 595/1198), and
Ibn Ḫaldūn (d. 808/1406). Fārābī’s utopian state, guided by the prophet-ruler,
who is a philosopher with prophetic qualities, becomes a model for human
behaviour in society and for the individual’s path to welfare in the other world.
As for Fārābī, this perfect state is a generally valid model for humankind that
becomes reality and receives its shape through the observance of its rules or
religious laws, and stresses both the cooperation of fellow-citizens – Ibn Ḫal-
dūn’s ʿaṣabiyya “solidarity” – and | the required qualities of the leader, who must 414 a
be a philosopher and must have an access to divinely inspired knowledge.
Further Reading
Al-Azmeh, Aziz: Muslim Kingship. Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and
Pagan Polities. London/New York 1997. 22001.
Crone, Patricia: God’s Rule: Government and Islam. Six centuries of medieval Islamic
political thought. New York 2004.
Daiber, Hans: “Political Philosophy”. In History of Islamic Philosophy II. Edited by
Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. London/New York 1996. = Routledge
408 chapter 20
History of World Philosophies, pp. 841–885. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/8.
Heck, Paul L.: “Doubts about the Religious Community (Milla) in al-Fārābī and the
Brethren of Purity”. In In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth
Century. Edited by Peter Adamson. London 2008. = Warburg Institute Colloquia
12, pp. 195–213.
Republished, with some modifications, from Princeton Encyclopaedia of Islamic

Political Thought. Ed. Gerhard Böwering, Patricia Crone, Wadad Kadi, Devin
J. Stewart, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Mahan Mirza. Princeton, N.J. 2013,
pp. 413a–414a. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 21
Fārābīs Aristoteles
Grundlagen seiner Erkenntnislehre1
Fārābīs Regent des Musterstaats, der Prophet und Philosoph sein soll, teilt man-
che Züge mit Platos Vorstellung vom Philosophen, dem man den Staat anver-
trauen kann, weil er “Lust und Liebe” “zu solchem Lerngegenstande” hat, der
ihm “den Schleier zu lüften vermag von jenem Sein, das ewig ist und keiner
Veränderung unterworfen ist durch Entstehen und Vergehen”.2 Dieser Wahr-
heitsliebende hat seinen Blick auf eine Welt gerichtet, “worin eine ewige Ord-
nung und Unwandelbarkeit herrscht, worin die Wesen weder unrecht tun noch
voneinander leiden, und worin alles nach einer himmlischen Ordnung und
Vernunftmäßigkeit geht”. Er strebt danach, diese Welt der “ewigen Ordnung
und Unwandelbarkeit” “nachzuahmen und soviel als möglich davon in seinem
Leben ein Abbild darzustellen”.3 Die Ursache reiner Vernunfterkenntnis und
Wahrheit bezeichnet Plato als das eigentliche höchste Gut, das über der Ver-
nunfterkenntnis und Wahrheit stehe.4
Diese Aussagen sind Fārābī vielleicht in Form einer Paraphrase von Platos
Republik bekannt geworden, haben aber im Kontext islamischer Theologie ein
neues Gewand bekommen, das aristotelisch-peripatetisches und neuplatoni-
sches Kolorit verrät. Dies möchte ich versuchen zu zeigen, indem ich Fārābīs
Erkenntnislehre als eine von der aristotelischen Schule und vom Neuplatonis-
mus angeregte modifizierende Weiterführung von Plato skizziere.
In einer 1994 erschienenen Studie über Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics 100
hat Joep Lameer versucht, Fārābīs Gegenüberstellung von Philosophie und
Religion als Nachahmung der Philosophie auf die platonische Unterscheidung
zwischen Wissen und Meinung zurückzuführen, die in einen aristotelischen
Kontext eingefügt worden sei. Platos Staatsmann (297 C ff.; 300 C) sei letzlich
die Quelle für Fārābīs Auffassung von Religion gewesen, weil dort von mehr
1 Remke Kruk gewidmet mit guten Erinnerungen an unsere gemeinsame Zeit in Holland!
Diese Arbeit führt Überlegungen eines 1986 erschienenen Aufsatzes weiter: “The Ruler as
Philosopher. A new interpretation of Fārābī’s view”. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986. In
MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, pp. 128–149. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18.
2 Rep. 485 A / Übers. Wilhelm Wiegand in Plato, Sämtliche Werke. II. Heidelberg, o.J.
3 Rep. 500 C / Übers. W. Wiegand in Plato, Sämtliche Werke.
4 Vgl. Rep. 508 D.

410 chapter 21
oder weniger guten Nachahmungen des wahren Staates bzw. des “Wahren” die
Rede sei.5
Doch dieser Vergleich ist bereits durch eine Aussage in Platos Staatsmann
(301 B) in Frage gestellt, wonach derjenige, der “nach Gesetzen herrscht” und
“den Wissenden nachahmt” König genannt wird, wobei kein Unterschied sei
zwischen dem “mit Erkenntnis allein Herrschenden” und dem “nach guter Mei-
nung den Gesetzen gemäß allein Herrschenden” (Staatsmann 301 B). Erst der
Alleinherrscher, der vorgibt Wissender zu sein, sich aber nicht an Gesetze und
Gewohnheiten hält, wird zum Tyrannen.
Demnach ist bei Plato nicht apriori ein Gegensatz zwischen Wahrheit und
Gesetz. Im Gegenteil, Plato berührt sich mit Fārābīs Auffassung von Religion
bzw. Gesetz als philosophische Wahrheit, wobei Religion ebensowenig wie Pla-
tos Gesetz ein unvollkommenes Abbild von philosophischer Wahrheit sein
muss.
Fārābī6 hatte die Lehre entwickelt, dass die Religion “die Philosophie nach-
ahme” (muḥākiyatun li-l-falsafa). Hierbei umfassen beide, Religion und Philo-
sopie, dieselben Objekte, beide vermitteln “das Wissen um das erste Prinzip
und die erste Ursache” der seienden Dinge. Beide geben vor, was das Ziel des
Menschen ist, nämlich die Glückseligkeit. Doch sie unterscheiden sich in der
Art und Weise der Vermittlung des Wissens um das erste Prinzip. Philosophie
stütze sich auf philosophische Beweise, indem sie mit Begriffen des Verstan-
des arbeite (maʿqūlan mutaṣawwiran).7 Religion jedoch suche zu “überzeugen”
(iqnāʿ), indem sie die Prinzipien in Form von “Bildern” (miṯālāt) “vorstelle”
(tuḫayyiluhā), die “den körperartigen Prinzipien entnommen sind”. Religion
“ahme die Prinzipien mit dem ihnen Entsprechenden (naẓāʾir) nach”. So “ahme
101 sie | die göttlichen Handlungen (al-afʿāl al-ilāhiyya) mit den Wirkungen der
Prinzipien des (Muster)staates (afʿāl al-mabādiʾ al-madaniyya) nach sowie die
Wirkungen der Kräfte und Prinzipien der Natur mit dem ihnen Entsprechen-
den, nämlich mit den vom Willen bestimmten Fähigkeiten, Fertigkeiten und
handwerklichen Tätigkeiten”.8 Fārābī fügt interessanterweise hinzu, dass “Plato
im Timaeus in dieser Weise verfahren sei”. Fārābī bezieht sich hier offensicht-
5 Joep Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistic. Leiden 1994. = IPTS 20, S. 259ff. – Vgl.
auch Joep Lameer, “The Philosopher and the Prophet: Greek Parallels to Al-Fārābī’s Theory
of Religion and Philosophy in the State”. In Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition
scientifique et philosophique grecque. Ed. Ahmad Hasnawi, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal
und Maroun Aouad. Leuven/Paris 1997. = Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 79, S. 609–
622.
6 Kitāb Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda. Ed. Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn. Beirut 1981, S. 90, 14f. / Übers. Muhsin Mahdi,
Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Rev. ed. Ithaca/New York 1962, S. 44.
7 Kitāb Taḥṣīl, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 6), S. 90, 19.
8 Kitāb Taḥṣīl, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 6), S. 91, 1 ff.
fārābīs aristoteles 411
lich in lockerer Weise auf eine Stelle im Timaeus,9 wonach die Welt ein Abbild
von etwas ist, mit dem es verwandt bleibt und nachdem sie von ihrem Schöpfer
geschaffen worden ist. Galens Kompendium von Platos Timaeus – das vielleicht
von dem Ḥunaynschüler ʿĪsā Ibn Yaḥyā Ibn Ibrāhīm übersetzt wurde – kürzt
hier stark10 und kann schwerlich Vorlage für Fārābī gewesen sein.
Für Fārābī ist der Musterstaat ein Abbild göttlichen Handelns – er spricht
auch von der “Musterreligion” (al-milla al-fāḍila),11 die “der Philosophie ähn-
lich sei” und deren “Universalien” in der “Philosphie” existierten. Hierbei lasse
sich die theoretische Philosophie mit den “Einsichten” (ārāʾ) der Religion par-
allelisieren und die praktische Philosophie mit den “vortrefflichen Gesetzen”
(aš-šarāʾiʿ al-fāḍila).12
Abgesehen von der aristotelischen Unterscheidung zwischen theoretischer
und praktischer Philosophie wird man hier an den bereits genannten plato-
nischen Begriff der Nachahmung des “Wissenden” durch den König erinnert,
an die Nachahmung der “ewigen Ordnung und Unwandelbarkeit”, wovon der
“Wahrheitsliebende” in seinem Leben ein Abbild darzustellen trachtet. Hier-
bei ist, wie Plato im Timaeus an der von mir bereits genannten13 und von Fārābī
offensichtlich benutzten Stelle (29 A f.) feststellt, dieses Abbild mit dem Abge-
bildeten “verwandt”: Die “Darlegung” des “Bleibenden und Beständigen und
im Lichte der Vernunft Erkennbaren selber” “trägt das Gepräge des Bleiben-
den und Unumstößlichen an sich”. Dies schließt nicht aus, dass nachfolgende
Abbilder – Plato rechnet dazu die Dichtung – lediglich “Wahrscheinlichkeit”
besitzen.
Platos These der “Verwandtschaft” von Original und Abbild und ihre Begrün- 102
dung durch die Sache, die Original und Abbild gemeinsam haben, erscheint
ähnlich in Fārābīs Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq in einer Diskussion
über die Hilfsmittel des Lernens.14 Fārābī weist darauf hin, dass schwer vor-
stellbare Dinge durch leichter Vorstellbare ersetzt werden können. Er stellt fest,
9 29 B f.
10 Vgl. Galen, Compendium Timaei Platonis. Ed. Paul Kraus und Richard Walzer. Lon-
don 1951. = Plato arabus 1, S. 5, 4 ff.
11 Zur Austauschbarkeit beider Begriffe vgl. Ilai Alon, Al-Fārābī’s Philosophical Lexicon. I.
Warminster, Wiltshire 2002, S. 454.
12 Kitāb al-Milla. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1968, S. 46, 22ff.
13 S. Anm. 9.
14 Ed. Muhsin Mahdi, Beirut 1968, S. 88 ff. – Vgl. Fuad Said Haddad, Alfarabi’s theory
of communication. Beirut 1989, S. 135. = F. S. Haddad, “Early Arab Theory of Instruction”.
In International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, 1974, S. 240–259, hier S. 248. – Debo-
rah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy.
Leiden/New York/Kobenhavn 1990. = IPTS 7, S. 67 ff.
412 chapter 21
dass “das einer Sache Ähnliche gleichfalls deutlich sei”; “das in unserer Seele
vorhandene Vorstellungsbild (ḫayāl) einer Sache entspricht dem Vorstellungs-
bild dessen, was ihr ähnlich ist. Und zwei Dinge gleichen sich, indem sie eine
einzige Sache gemeinsam haben, die in allen beiden gleichzeitig nachgeahmt
wird”.15 Es gibt trotz Unterschiedlichkeiten im Detail gemeinsame Grundstruk-
turen.
Diese strukturelle Ähnlichkeit begründet die Ersetzbarkeit des Originals
durch ein Abbild. Sie ist Fārābī zufolge16 jedoch ausgeschlossen, wenn “überaus
komplexe Gebilde” durch vereinfachende und verfälschende Vorstellungsbil-
der ersetzt werden, sodass “der Zuhörer und der Lernende von der gemeinsa-
men Sache überaus weit entfernt sind”. Solche falschen Substitutionen schreibt
Fārābī17 in Anlehnung an Aristoteles’ Metaphysik18 griechischen Philosophen
zu, den Pythagoräern, Plato und Empedokles; es handle sich hier um “Allego-
rien” und “Rätsel”, die im Philosophieunterricht vermieden werden sollten und
allenfalls in der Rhetorik oder in der Politik erlaubt seien.
Hierbei hat die Rhetorik durchaus eine positive Funktion,19 nämlich in Über-
einstimmung mit Aristoteles20 “die Masse vieles von den theoretischen Dingen
zu unterrichten. Sie werde in politischen Ansprachen benutzt21 – wobei sie
103 lediglich die Aufgabe habe, zu überreden (taqannuʿ) – | und sie werde nicht für
die Reflexion (rawiyya) bzw. für Schlussfolgerungen herangezogen”.22 Wie in
15 Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 14), S. 88, 14–16. – Vgl. D. L. Black, Logic and Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric (s. Anm. 14), S. 188 ff.
16 Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 14), S. 91, 6 ff. – Vgl. Lawrence V. Berman in Oriens
23/4, 1974, S. 512. – Die Unterschiedlichkeit von Original und ähnlichem Abbild hat Fārābī
nochmals thematisiert in seinem Kitāb as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya al-mulaqqab bi-mabādiʾ
al-mawǧūdāt. Ed. Fauzi M. Najjar. Beirut 1964, 21993, S. 85, 3ff. / Übers. Friedrich Die-
terici, Die Staatsleitung von Alfārābī. Aus dem Nachlass hrsg. v. Paul Brönnle. Leiden
1904, S. 68 f.
17 Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 14), S. 91, 10 ff.
18 1001 a 10 ff.; vgl. 1000 a 9–19.
19 Vgl. im Einzelnen D. L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric (s. Anm. 14), Kap. 4 und 5.
20 Rhetorik 1357 a 1 ff.
21 Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba. Ed. Jacques Langhade & Mario Grignaschi, Deux
ouvrages inédits sur la réthorique (sic). Beyrouth 1971, S. 5, bes. Z. 7–9. – Vgl. Fārābī, Fal-
safat Arisṭūṭālīs. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beyrouth 1961, S. 84f. / Übers. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s
Philosophy (s. Anm. 6), S. 92 f. – Vgl. Joel L. Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s Opinions of the Virtuous
City and Maimonides’ Foundations of the Law”. In Studia Orientalia memoriae D.H. Baneth
dedicata. Ed. Joshua Blau (a.o.). Jerusalem 1979 (S. 107–153), S. 119 Anm. 21. – Charles E.
Butterworth, “The rhetorician and his relationship to the community. Three accounts
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric”. In Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Studies in honor of George
F. Hourani. Ed. Michael E. Marmura. New York 1984, S. 112ff.
22 Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade & M. Grignaschi (s. Anm. 21), S. 59, 5f. – Vgl. Fritz
Aristoteles’ Rhetorik23 hat sie die Partikularien und nicht die Universalien bzw.
das Notwendige im Auge.24 Sie vermittle in erster Linie “Meinungen” (ẓunūn),
nicht aber “Gewissheit” (al-yaqīn).25
Für Fārābī ist die rhetorische Überredung der erste Schritt zum Akzeptie-
ren des Inhaltes als wahr (taṣdīq). Wenn “die sicheren Beweise” (al-barāhīn
al-yaqīniyya) hinzukommen,26 dann verdiene das aus der Verbindung von Rhe-
torik und “sicheren Beweisen” erworbene “Wissen um die seienden Dinge” (ʿilm
al-mawǧūdāt) den Namen “Philosophie”.
Nun ist für Fārābī, wie bereits gesagt, auch die Religion ein Weg, um zu
“überzeugen” (iqnāʿ), indem sie die Prinzipien in Form von “Bildern” (miṯālāt)
“vorstelle” (tuḫayyiluhā), die “den körperartigen Prinzipien entnommen sind”.
Das Wissen ist auf Bilder gerichtet, die etwas “nachahmen”. Fārābī zufolge27
wird es von den antiken Philosophen “Religion” (milla) genannt.
Ist also die Religion eine Vorstufe der Philosophie, ebenso wie die Rhetorik
der erste Schritt zum “Wissen um die seienden Dinge” ist? Die Antwort hierauf
fällt komplex aus. Zunächst müssen wir darauf hinweisen, dass Religion bei
Fārābī nicht nur die “Einsichten” umschreibt, sondern auch “die Handlungen,
die in der Form von Regeln auferlegt und festgelegt sind, die der erste Regent
der Gesellschaft vorgeschrieben hat”.28
Nehmen wir hierzu den bereits aus Fārābī zitierten Passus, wonach der Mus- 104
terstaat ein Abbild göttlichen Handelns sei. Fārābī sprach auch von der “Mus-
terreligion” (al-milla al-fāḍila),29 die “der Philosophie ähnlich sei” und deren
“Universalien” in der “Philosophie” existierten.30 Hierbei lasse sich die theo-
retische Philosophie mit den “Einsichten” (ārāʾ) der Religion parallelisieren
und die praktische Philosophie mit den “vortrefflichen Gesetzen” (aš-šarāʾiʿ
al-fāḍila).31 Analog zum Parallelismus des praktischen Teils in Religion und Phi-
W. Zimmermann, “Al-Fārābī und die philosophische Kritik an Galen von Alexander zu

Averroes”. In Albert Dietrich (ed.), Akten des 7. Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwis-
senschaft. Göttingen 1976. = AAWG.PH 3. Folge, Nr. 98, S. 402f.
23 1355 b 26.
24 Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade & M. Grignaschi (s. Anm. 21), S. 33, 11f. und 14.
25 Vgl. Kitāb al-Ḫaṭāba, ed. J. Langhade & M. Grignaschi (s. Anm. 21), S. 59, 11f.
26 Vgl. Fārābī, Kitāb Taḥṣīl, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 6), S. 90, 3f. / Übers. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s
Philosophy (s. Anm. 6), S. 44.
27 Kitāb Taḥṣīl, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 6), S. 90, 10 ff. / Übers. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Philoso-
phy (s. Anm. 6), S. 44.
28 Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 43, 3 f. – Vgl. Lawrence V. Berman, “Mai-
monides, the Disciple of Alfarabi”. In IOS 4, 1974 (S. 154–178), S. 159f.
29 Zur Austauschbarkeit beider Begriffe s. Anm. 11.
30 Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 46, 22 ff.
31 Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 47, 5.
414 chapter 21
losophie haben die “theoretischen Einsichten” (al-ārāʾ al-naẓariyya) in der Reli-

gion ein Pendant in den “Beweisen” (barāhīn) der theoretischen Philosophie.32
Wie bei den praktischen “Handlungen” können die Regeln und Vorschriften,
die “theoretischen Einsichten” der Religion, “bewiesen” (burhina) und “begrün-
det” werden (vgl. aʿṭā l-asbāb) durch die Philosophie, durch einen Vergleich
mit ihren Universalien. Oder anders formuliert: Die Religion informiert die
Masse über “theoretische Einsichten” und praktische Handlungen, die sich in
der Philosophie beweisen und begründen lassen und im Vergleich mit den Uni-
versalien sich als wahr erweisen.
Bemerkenswert ist hier die ethische Komponente in Fārābīs Begriff von Phi-
losophie und Religion. Wir hatten bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass einerseits
“philosophische” Beweisführung und andererseits “religiöse” Überzeugungs-
kunst mit den Hilfsmitteln der Bildersprache von Rhetorik und Poetik zum Ziel
haben, dem Individuum ethische Instruktionen zu geben, Instruktionen über
den richtigen Weg zur “höchsten” Glückseligkeit.
Religion ist Instruktion in der Gestalt von “Vorschriften” und “Gesetzen”. Ihr
Ausgangspunkt ist die Philosophie, die Fārābī zufolge der Religion vorausgeht33
und die Aufgabe hat, eine für den Verstand akzeptable “Begründung” (burhān)
zu geben.
Diese Beobachtung gibt Anlass zu folgenden entscheidenden Fragen: Ent-
springt diese philosophische “Begründung” lediglich einem intellektuellen Be-
dürfnis des Gebildeten? Ist Religion daher einerseits zwar philosophisch be-
weisbar, andererseits aber nur für die ungebildete Masse, die Nichtphilosophen
gedacht?
105 Wir werden zu zeigen versuchen, warum diese Fragen zu verneinen sind.
Hierbei müssen wir vom aristotelischen Theorie-Praxis-Modell ausgehen, das
Philosophie und Religion gemeinsam haben. Fārābī zufolge “ahmt” Religion die
Philosophie “nach”, die nach aristotelischem Vorbild als ein Miteinander von
Theorie und Praxis, von “wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und sittlicher Einsicht”
verstanden wird.
In der Tradition von Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik stehend und unter
Heranziehung von Aristoteles’ De anima, sowie von Alexander von Aphrodi-
sias’ Kommentar hierzu, hat Fārābī im “Musterstaat” eine originelle Lehre ent-
wickelt.34 Er führt in der Nachfolge von Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik die
32 Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 47, 6.

33 Vgl. Kitāb Taḥṣīl, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn (s. Anm. 6), S. 91, 13 / Übers. M. Mahdi, Alfarabi’s Phi-
losophy (s. Anm. 6), S. 45. – Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beyrouth 1970,
S. 131 und 154 f. – L. V. Berman, “Maimonides” (s. Anm. 28), S. 156ff. und 161f.
34 Vgl. zu den Details Hans Daiber, “Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (gest. 339/950)”. In
drei Seelenkräfte Sinneswahrnehmung, Verstand und Streben ein, die das ethi-
sche Handeln des Menschen sowie seine Erkenntnis des Richtigen steuern.
Fārābī integriert hier den aristotelischen Begriff der phronesis, der praktischen
“Einsicht”: Die Intelligibilien sind nicht nur ein Gegenstand wissenschaftli-
cher Erkenntnis, sondern vermitteln auch sittliche Einsicht, Erkenntnis des
erstrebenswerten Guten und des zu meidenden Schlechten. Wissenschaftli-
che Erkenntnis und sittliche Einsicht hängen zusammen. Hierbei kann man
nicht allgemein tugendhaft sein, sondern nur, indem man das Gute praktiziert.
Theorie und Praxis gehören zusammen, wobei einerseits die Vernunft, die phi-
losophische Erkenntnis das tugendhafte Handeln bestimmt und andererseits
die vernunftorientierte Einsicht in das erstrebenswerte Gute und das zu mei-
dende Schlechte auf das Handeln des Menschen gerichtet ist. Es orientiert sich
an der Wirklichkeit des Musterstaates und ist nicht rein theoretisch.
In dieser an der Praxis orientierten Philosophie der Ethik35 kann Fārābī sich
auf eine aristotelische Lehre stützen, die in der Fārābī-Forschung bislang über-
sehen worden ist, nämlich auf die Interdependenz von Denken und Wahrneh-
mung: Das allgemein Gute, die Idee des Guten ist nicht denkbar ohne sinnliche
Wahrnehmung. Daher haben Aristoteles und in seiner Nachfolge Fārābī die
“Vorstellungskraft” (φαντασία) eingefügt: Diese schickt als Vermittler zur Denk-
seele die | “Sinneswahrnehmungen” (Aristoteles: αἰσθήματα) bzw. die “Vorstel- 106
lungsbilder” (Aristoteles: φαντάσματα) des wahrgenommenen Objektes.
Diese “Vorstellungsbilder” nennt Fārābī “Nachahmungen” (muḥākāt) – eine
terminologische Neuschöpfung des Fārābī. Alles sinnlich Wahrnehmbare, aber
auch alle “Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt) werden von der Vorstellungskraft nachge-
ahmt. Denn nicht das Wahrgenommene oder das Gedachte selbst gelangt in die
Denkseele des Menschen, sondern lediglich eine Imitation, ein Bild. Die Seele
denkt nur in Bildern.
Diese Interdependenz von Denken und Wahrnehmung ist für Fārābī eine
weitere Rechtfertigung für die aristotelische Kombination von wissenschaftli-
cher “Erkenntnis” (ἐπιστήμη) und sittlicher “Einsicht” (φρόνησις), von theore-
tischer und praktischer Vernunft. Dieses Miteinander von wissenschaftlicher
Christian Wenin (ed.), L’ homme et son univers au Moyen-Âge. Actes du septième con-
grès international de philosophie médiéval, 30 août–4 septembre 1982. Louvain-la-Neuve
1986. = Philosophes médiévaux 27, S. 729–753. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/17.
35 Vgl. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ǧamʿ bayn raʾyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa-Arisṭūṭālīs. In
Friedrich Dieterici (ed.), Alfārābī’s philosopische Abhandlungen aus Londoner, Leide-
ner und Berliner Handschriften. Leiden 1890, S. 20, 22ff., und dazu Aristoteles, Anal. post.
I 5; De anima III 1. 424 b.
416 chapter 21
Erkenntnis und sittlicher Einsicht kommt in Fārābīs “Musterstaat” (al-Madīna

al-fāḍila) und in seiner “Musterreligion” (al-milla al-fāḍila) zum Ausdruck.
Denn “die Partikularien” (al-ǧuzʾiyyāt) der Religion entsprechen den “Univer-
salien” (al-kulliyyāt) der Philosophie, die die Partikularien beweist.36 Insofern
erscheint die Musterreligion als Nachahmung der Philosophie – sie ist ihr “ähn-
lich” (šabīha).37
Diese Ähnlichkeit beruht, wie wir gesehen haben und wie Fārābī in der
von uns genannten Diskussion über die strukturelle Identität von Original und
Abbild gezeigt hat, auf gemeinsamer Struktur. Damit entpuppt sich die Reli-
gion keineswegs als wertloses Abbild der Philosophie. Überdies kann allein sie
die Bürger des Musterstaates überzeugen, das zu glauben und zum Erreichen
der höchsten Glückseligkeit das zu tun, was sich von der Philosophie her bewei-
sen, aber nicht von ihr herleiten lässt.
Dies bedeutet keineswegs, dass Philosophie eine Dienerin der Religion ist.
Denn die Wirklichkeitsbezogenheit der Philosophie ist Fārābī zufolge nicht nur
erkenntnistheoretisch beweisbar, nämlich mit der aristotelischen Lehre von
der Interdependenz von Denken und Wahrnehmung. Die Musterreligion ist
auch ein praktisches, durch die Philosophie als gültig erwiesenes Beispiel für
den Zusammenhang von wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und sittlicher Einsicht,
und insofern eine Nachahmung der Philosophie. Mit ihren Vorschriften und
Regeln bestimmt sie die Praxisbezogenheit der Philosophie und hat das Ziel,
die sittliche Einsicht der Philosophie zu verwirklichen.
107 Hier zeigt sich, dass der Zusammenhang von Theorie und Praxis in Philo-
sophie und Religion auch Religion und Philosophie strukturell miteinander
verbindet. Philosophie und Religion sind ebenso aufeinander bezogen, wie
Denken und Wahrnehmung, Theorie und Praxis, wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis
und sittliche Einsicht, religiöser Glaube (“Einsichten”) und Handeln nach den
Vorschriften der Gesetze. Der Nachweis dieser Zusammenhänge ist die origi-
nelle Leistung des Fārābī.
Die praktische Philosophie, die Aktualisierung der Religion im Musterstaat,
beinhaltet die Verwirklichung der Tugenden und die nachahmende Umset-
zung der Idee, bzw. des Begriffes Ethik, in tugendhaftes Handeln. Religion
erscheint als Instrument, das die Praxisbezogenheit der wahren Tugenden
garantiert: Wahre Tugenden existieren nicht als etwas Allgemeines, als Idee,
sondern lediglich im ethischen Handeln.
36 Vgl. Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 47, 12–17.
37 Vgl. auch Kitāb al-Milla, ed. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 46, 22.
Aus diesem Grund bedarf die Philosophie der Relgion als Instrument. In
entsprechender Weise müssen wir eine Aussage des Fārābī in seinem Kitāb
al-Ḥurūf 38 interpretieren, wonach “die Philosophie den Instrumenten in der-
selben Weise vorausgeht, wie der Benutzer der Instrumente den Instrumenten
zeitlich vorausgeht”.
Diese Äußerung ist eine interessante Modifikation einer alexandrinischen
Lehre,39 die im 10. Jh. AD von christlichen Philosophen in Bagdad übernom-
men wurde:40 Hiernach ist Logik nicht ein Teil der Philosophie, sondern ihr
Instrument, das den Menschen in die Lage versetzt, zwischen wahr und falsch
in theoretischer Philosophie sowie zwischen gut und schlecht in praktischer
Philosophie zu unterscheiden.
Fārābī übernahm diese Lehre in einer spezifischen Weise, indem er Logik
durch Religion ersetzte: Er klassifiziert in seinem Kitāb al-Ḥurūf Religion nicht
als Teil der Philosophie, sondern als ihr Instrument; in dieser Eigenschaft setzt
Religion in die Tat um, was allgemein in der Philosophie existiert, nämlich die
philosophische Idee moralischer Einsicht, praktischer Klugheit, die zu höchs-
ter Glückseligkeit führt. Hiermit erscheint Religion nicht nur als ein Instrument
der Philosophie; sie setzt die Philosophie auch in die Lage, zur praktischen Phi-
losophie zu | werden. Philosophie ist auf die Religion angewiesen, ebenso wie 108
Philosophie der Logik als Instrument bedarf.
Die Autonomie der Philosophie erscheint hier eingeschränkt, insofern als
Philosophie und Religion aufeinander angewiesen sind – analog zur aristoteli-
schen Lehre über Denken und Wahrnehmung, wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis
und praktischer Klugheit.
Diese Abhängigkeit der Philosophie von der Religion erscheint bei Fārābī
untermauert durch seine Lehre von der prophetischen Eingebung als Quelle
der Erkenntnis. Menschliche Erkenntnis hat ihre Grenzen und ist auf die Ein-
gebungen des göttlichen Intellekt an den Regenten des Musterstaates, den Pro-
pheten, angewiesen.
Dies zeigt Fārābīs Lehre vom Traum. Sie knüpft an Alexander von Aphro-
disias’ Lehre des göttlichen “aktiven Intellekts” (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) und an Aristo-
38 Ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 33), S. 132, 7 f. / Übers. L. V. Berman, “Maimonides” (s. Anm. 28),
S. 172.
39 Vgl. Elias’ Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ Kategorien. In Adolf Busse, CAG XVIII/I 1900 /
Repr. 1961, S. 117, 9 ff.
40 Vgl. Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Arabic philosophy. Pittsburgh 1966, S. 42. – Fritz
W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De interpre-
tatione. London 1981, S. 123. – Christel Hein, Definition und Einteilung der Philoso-
phie. Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York 1985. = Europäische Hochschulschriften, R. 20, Bd. 177,
S. 153 ff.
418 chapter 21
teles’ Lehre von Traum und Weissagung an.41 Er mag dabei Aristoteles’ Parva
naturalia konsultiert haben, die in arabischer Übersetzung erhalten sind.42
Für Fārābī sind die Träume das Resultat des Zusammenwirkens zwischen
Wahrnehmung, nachahmender Vorstellung und göttlichem “aktiven Intellekt”.
Wenn die nachahmende Vorstellung auf die gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen
“Partikularien” (al-ǧuzʾiyyāt), auf “die getrennten Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt al-
mufāriqa) und auf “alle erhabenen Dinge” gerichtet ist, kurzum auf dasje-
nige, was vom göttlichen Intellekt inspiriert ist, spricht man von “Prophetie”
(nubuwwa). Diese ist erforderlich, wenn philosophische Erkenntnis dessen,
was gut ist, nicht ausreicht und der Ergänzung durch die “Eingebung” (waḥy)
des göttlichen aktiven Intellekts bedarf.43
Es verwundert daher nicht, dass für Fārābī der Regent des Musterstaates
nicht nur Philosoph, sondern auch Prophet sein muss. Da den Regenten die
göttlichen Eingebungen des aktiven Intellekts in der Form von Bildern errei-
chen, die die Intelligibilia, die Universalien nachahmen, kann er sie auch in
dieser Form an die Menschen, seine Untertanen weitergeben. Hierbei kann
der Regent des Musterstaates sich der philosophischen Beweisführung bedie-
109 nen. Er kann sich aber auch auf | prophetische “Warnungen” beschränken.44 In
beiden Fällen muss er “in der Lage sein”, sein Wissen “durch (seine) Äußerun-
gen auf vortreffliche Weise vorzustellen”.45 Er muss über rhetorisch-poetische
Fähigkeiten verfügen. Er hat die Aufgabe, in philosophischen Beweisführun-
gen den philosophisch Gebildeten zu überzeugen und die Masse, die nur ein
“bildhaftes Wissen” habe,46 durch “Warnungen” und “Vorschriften” zu überzeu-
gen. Als Philosoph kann er sich in seiner Instruktion des Bürgers verschiedener
Hilfsmittel der Logik und Beweisführung bedienen, als Prophet bedient er sich
der Metaphern der rhetorisch-poetischen Sprache.
Hierbei entpuppen sich die prophetischen Warnungen nicht als unvollkom-
menes, der Philosophie unterlegenes Wissen, weil es an die Anhänger der
Religion und an solche gerichtet ist, die philosophische Wahrheit nur in ver-
einfachenden Bildern verstehen können. Eine solche vereinfachende bildhafte
41 Vgl. H. Daiber, “Prophetie” (s. Anm. 34), S. 737 ff.

42 MS Rampur (Indien) 1752. Eine Edition wird von Rotraud Hansberger vorbereitet.
43 Vgl. al-Madīna al-fāḍila. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici. Leiden 1964, S. 51, 14ff. / Ed. und
Übers. Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Oxford 1985, S. 220, 16ff.
44 Vgl. al-munḏir in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici (s. Anm. 43), S. 59, 1 / Ed. R. Walzer
(s. Anm. 43), S. 244, 13. – Vgl. R. Walzer, S. 389.
45 Vgl. al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici (s. Anm. 43), S. 59, 16ff. / Ed. R. Walzer (s.
Anm. 43), S. 246, 12 ff. – Bes. ed. F. Dieterici, S. 59, 5f. / Ed. R. Walzer, S. 246, 2f.
46 Vgl. al-Madīna al-fāḍila, ed. F. Dieterici (s. Anm. 43), S. 70, 1ff. / Ed. R. Walzer (s.
Anm. 43), S. 278, 12 ff. – J. L. Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s opinions” (s. Anm. 21), S. 115f.
Vermittlung von Wissen mag es geben. Doch als Eingebung des göttlichen
aktiven Intellekts an den Propheten ergänzt sie das philosophische Wissen.
Dies geschieht in einer Weise, die der Ergänzung der theoretischen Erkennt-
nis durch die praktische Orientierung, die moralische Einsicht und praktische
Klugheit dient. Die Religion und ihre Partikularien werden so zu einer “Nach-
ahmung”, zu einem ergänzenden Bild der Philosophie, der Universalien, ohne
mit dieser identisch zu sein. Sie ist ein Instrument der Philosophie und verhilft
dieser, so zur praktischen Philosophie zu werden. Philosophie erscheint hier
primär als praktische Ethik.
Die hier sichtbar werdende Grenze philosophischen Wissens bedeutet auch
eine Einschränkung des Herrschers ausschließlich als Philosoph. Er muss auch
ein Prophet sein – dies nicht nur im Hinblick auf die Anhänger der Religion,
die Masse, sondern auch angesichts der Grenzen philosophischen Wissens.
Philosophisches Wissen muss durch den göttlichen intellectus agens, näm-
lich durch prophetische Eingebungen vermittelt und ergänzt werden. Das Wis-
sen, das der Regent so erhält, kann nur in Form von nachahmenden Bildern an
den Untertanen vermittelt werden. Diese | Nachahmungen ersetzen das Origi- 110
nal, das nur in der Form von Abbildern wahrgenommen und weitervermittelt
werden kann. Folglich erscheinen diese Abbilder orientiert an der Wirklich-
keit – ebenso wie das philosophische Denken in seiner Interdependenz von
Theorie und Praxis.
Dieses Wechselverhältnis zwischen Religion und Philosophie – Fārābī
spricht von Religion als Nachahmung der Philosophie – erlaubt den philoso-
phischen Beweis für religiöse Wahrheiten, die von der Eingebung an den Pro-
pheten gespeist werden und sinnfällig im Musterstaat theoretische Einsicht
und praktische Philosophie symbolisieren. Der Regent im Musterstaat ist ein
Philosoph und ein Prophet, der mit Hilfe von Gottes Eingebung – platonisch
gesprochen47 durch “Angleichung” an Gott, d.h., indem er Gottes Vorschriften
nacheifert48 – den Staat regiert.49
Gleichzeitig hat Fārābī, wie wir schon gesehen haben, das Wissen des Philo-
soph-Regenten und des Prophet-Regenten als Nachahmungen klassifiziert, als
Abbilder göttlichen Handelns. Die bildhafte Gestaltung göttlichen Handelns
47 Vgl. Rep. 613 B.

48 Vgl. Fārābī, Risāla fī mā yanbaġī an yuqaddam qabl taʿallum al-falsafa. In Friedrich Die-
terici (ed.), Alfārābī’s philosopische Abhandlungen aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner
Handschriften. Leiden 1890, S. 53, 13ff. – Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 64–
66 / Übers. Lawrence V. Berman, “Maimonides on political leadership”. In Kinship and
Consent. The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Comtemporary Uses. Ed. Daniel J. Elazar.
Ramat Gan/Philadelphia/London/Montreal 1981 (S. 113–125), S. 122f.
49 Vgl. Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 12), S. 64, 16f.
420 chapter 21
entspricht Fārābī zufolge den von uns bereits genannten “Wirkungen der Prin-
zipien des (Muster)staates” (afʿāl al-mabādiʾ al-madaniyya).
Hier erscheint die Wirklichkeit des Menschen wie bei Plato und Aristote-
les als “politisches Wesen” (ζῷον πολιτικόν) mit ethischen Verpflichtungen in
der Gemeinschaft des Staates betont.50 Philosophie ist nicht mehr ein Privi-
leg der Spezialisten, der Elite, sondern kann durch den Philosoph-Regenten an
den Bürger vermittelt werden – nämlich in der Gestalt der Religion, der von
ihr vorgeschriebenen Regeln und Gesetze, im Musterstaat. In der bildhaften
Gestaltung der Philosophie erscheint Religion als einzig richtige Form des Phi-
losophierens, die sich an der Praxis des Musterstaates orientiert, als Ethik.
Gleichzeitig ist das Original der bildhaften Gestaltung, der Religion, näm-
111 lich die Universalien der Philosophie, Gegenstand des Strebens | nach philo-
sophischer Erkenntnis. Diese philosophische Erkenntnis konstituiert sich nur
in der bildhaften Gestaltung – wie Aristoteles in seiner in arabischer Berarbei-
tung zugänglichen Schrift Parva naturalia, in dem Buch über Gedächtnis und
Erinnerung formulierte: “Ein Denken ohne die Bilder der Vorstellung ist nicht
möglich” (449 b 30f.). So ist für Aristoteles “ein auf dem Bild gemaltes Tier so
gut wie ein Bild, ein und dasselbe ist dies beides, nur das Wesen ist beidemal
nicht das gleiche, und man kann es betrachten als Tier und Bild” (450 b 20 ff.).
Darüber hinaus zeigt Fārābī die Grenzen der Erkenntnis auf, die der Einge-
bung des göttlichen aktiven Intellekts an den Propheten bedarf. Dieser gibt als
Regent sein philosophisches Wissen in der bildhaften Gestaltung der Religion
weiter.
Fārābī zeigt sich hier beeinflusst von Plotin, Proclus, Aristoteles’ Metaphysik,
Themistius’ Kommentar hierzu und vor allem von Alexander von Aphrodi-
sias’ Abhandlung über die “Prinzipien des Universums”.51 In deren Fußspuren
geht er von einer hierarchischen Stufung zwischen dem göttlichen Einen, dem
nachfolgenden ersten Intellekt und den hieraus emanierenden neun Intellek-
50 Vgl. Miklós Marόt h, “Griechische Theorie und orientalische Praxis in der Staatskunst
von al-Fārābī”. In Acta antiqua 26, 1978, S. 465–469. – Farouk A. Sankari, “Plato and Alfa-
rabi. A comparison of some aspects of their political philosophies”. In Vivarium 8, 1970,
S. 1–9 (auch in MW 60, 1970, S. 218–225, und in Studia Islamica 7, 1970, S. 9ff.).
51 Vgl. Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Leiden/New York/
Köln 1994. = IPTS 17, S. 203 ff. – Der Traktat des Alexander ist hrsg. v. Charles Gene-
quand, Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. Leiden/New York/Köln 2001. = IPTS 44.
Den arabischen Text (ohne textkritischen Apparat) hat der Autor mit französischer Über-
setzung und Kommentar 2017 in Paris nochmals veröffentlicht: C. Genequand, Alex-
andre d’Aphrodise. Les principes du tout selon la doctrine d’Aristote. – Vgl. die Besprechung
v. Cristina D’Ancona in SGA 8, 2018, S. 436–444.
ten52 aus. Entsprechend der in Fārābīs Quellen vorausgesetzten Stufung des

Seins gelangen wir nicht zur letzten Wahrheit, sondern nur zum Ebenbild der
Wahrheit.
Die Ursache dieser Wahrheit hatte Plato als das eigentliche höchste Gut
bezeichnet, das über der Vernunfterkenntnis und Wahrheit stehe (s.o.). Fārābī
operierte hier mit den neuplatonischen Emanationen, den Zwischenursachen,
die die Präsenz des verursachenden göttlichen Intellekts in den verursachten
Dingen garantierte. Sie erlauben aber keine Erkenntnis der ersten Ursache,
ihres “Warum”, sondern sind nur eine Indikation ihrer Existenz.53
So ist in einer für Ibn Sīnā vorbildlichen und weiter entwickelten Weise54
Aristoteles’ These einer Gleichheit von Ursache und Verursachtem (vgl. | 112
Metaph. 1032 a 25) unter dem Eindruck der Tabula porphyriana eine Hierarchie
von Ursachen und Verursachtem entwickelt worden, wonach die erste Ursache
nur insofern alles Verursachte enthält, als dieses ihm ontologisch unterlegen ist
und sich von ihm durch die Vielheit der Unterschiedlichkeiten unterscheidet.
Fārābī sprach von den Partikularien der Religion, die als Abbild der Philosophie
eine Wiedergabe der philosophischen Wahrheit sind, nämlich ihrer Ursache.
Wenn Fārābī fernerhin, letztlich anknüpfend an die platonisch-neuplato-
nische55 Unterscheidung zwischen Gottes Wesen und Wirken, von “göttlichen
Wirkungen” sprach, die sich in den “Wirkungen der Prinzipien des Musterstaa-
tes”, den afʿāl al-mabādiʾ al-madaniyya bildhaft gestalten (s.o.), so hat er Platos
Modell des Stadtstaates und seiner hierarchischen Strukturen in ein aristoteli-
sches Konzept von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie integriert und
unter dem Eindruck des Neuplatonismus die aristotelische Auffassung vom
Denken in “Bildern der Vorstellung” ergänzt mit der Vorstellung von der pro-
phetischen Inspiration, die vom göttlichen Intellekt gespeist wird und vom
Regenten, der Prophet und Philosoph zugleich ist, weitergegeben wird. Hierbei
erscheint bei Fārābī Wissen in seiner hierarchischen Strukturierung primär an
den Bedürfnissen der Gesellschaft orientiert.
52 Vgl. M. Maróth, Die Araber (s. Anm. 51), S. 199 ff.

53 Vgl. M. Maróth, Die Araber (s. Anm. 51), S. 162 ff.
54 Vgl. H. Daiber, “The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sīnā. Epistemological
and Theological Aspects and the Consequences”. In Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft. Probleme
der Epistemologie in der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann,
Alexander Fidora und Pia Antolic. Berlin 2004, S. 25–34. = H. Daiber, The Struggle
for Knowledge in Islam. Some historical aspects. [Gefolgt von einer bosnischen Überset-
zung]: Borba za znanje u Islamu. Neki historijski aspekti. Sarajevo 2004, S. 87–104 / Bosni-
sche Übers., S. 92–109. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/28.
55 Vgl. H. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-
Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut 1975. = BTS 19, S. 166f.
422 chapter 21
Summary
The article continues II/17 and II/18 and contrasts the Platonic elements in
Fārābī with Aristotle’s epistemology, which is modified by the inclusion of Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias, a commentator of Aristotle. His doctrine of the divine
active intellect shaped Fārābī’s concept of dreams, divination, and the pro-
phecy of the ruler and philosopher in the perfect state. Concepts of Plato
and Aristotle, shared by Fārābī, do not conceal the fact, that the Aristotelian
epistemology, the interdependence of thought and perception were central in
Fārābī’s doctrine of religion and philosophy and were modified by the Neopla-
tonic hierarchy between the divine One, the subsequent first intellect and the
emanating nine intellects. Man seeks for likeness to God. His knowledge, how-
ever, remains limited and requires the divine inspiration.
Republished, with some corrections, modifications and additions, from O ye Gentle-

men. Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture. In Honour of Remke Kruk. Ed. by
Arnoud Vrolijk and Jan Hogendijk. Leiden 2007. = IPTS 74, pp. 99–112. By cour-
tesy of the publisher.
chapter 22
Fārābī on the Role of Philosophy in Society
Fārābī’s (258/872–339/950 or 951) concept of the perfect state (al-madīna al-

fāḍila) under the leadership of a philosopher-prophet presupposes the high
estimation of a charismatic ruler, whose knowledge is based on prophetic
inspiration and has to be transmitted to the ruled.
The community of the ruled forms a society as city, madīna, as nation,
umma, and in its greatest and most perfect shape as the inhabited world,
maʿmūra.
Fārābī’s global perspective1 is combined with the concept of universal valid
philosophical insight of a prophet-leader, who has rhetorical and intellectual
qualities and who in his emulation of God, the absolute Good, is seeking the
best for his subjects, the ruled.
Society can profit from his knowledge, which is transmitted to the individual
in the shape of laws and rules of religion, the instrument of philosophy. Proph-
etic rulership is based on the interaction of philosophy and religion leading
to ethics as a result of the everlasting interaction between theory and practice,
which both in their interdependence reveal the realistic attitude of Fārābī’s per-
fect state. This perfect state is the aim of a never ending process of charismatic-
prophetic inspiration of the ruler and his | communication to the ruled, who 72
must be persuaded and who should cooperate.
Fārābī’s political thought2 reveals realistic and universalistic tendencies and
it attracts our attention. Fārābī’s language and thoughts are not only a mir-
ror image of his time. His perfect state can be understood by the reader as a
model for a community, which gives religion its right place and considers it as
an instrument for the charismatic insights of a leader, who far away from his
own profit and expansion of his power aims at the absolute Good by building a
world community. This consists of nations, cities, villages, quarters, streets, and
single houses. They all serve one another and pave the way to the happiness of
the individual.
1 Perhaps inspired by the Pseudo-Aristotelian letter On Kingship, which was known to the
Arabs in the 10th century AD. Cf. Samuel Miklos Stern, Aristotle on the World-State.
Oxford 1968, pp. 3 ff. and 71 ff.
2 Cf. the summary in Hans Daiber, Political Philosophy. In History of Islamic Philosophy. Ed.
by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. = Routledge History of World Philosophies
I–II, London/New York 1996, II (pp. 841–885), pp. 848f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs II/8.

424 chapter 22
My survey requires a specification with regard to the following questions:

Why did Fārābī call his book “Principles of the Insights of the Citizens of the
Best State” – Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila? Why does his book end with
an undue long chapter on “ignorant” and “erring” cities whereas his ideas about
the perfect state are restricted to general remarks on the intellectual quali-
ties of the just ruler? Why does he not favour any political system or move-
ment?
We shall try to answer these questions by analyzing Fārābī’s main interest
in his description of the faulty states,3 the “ignorant state” (al-madīna al-ǧāhi-
liyya), the “criminal state” (al-madīna al-fāsiqa) in which people act against
their knowledge of the virtues of the perfect city, the “state which (willingly)
has changed” its character (al-madīna al-mubaddala) and the “misguided state”
(al-madīna aḍ-ḍālla). The features of these faulty states include peculiarities
known from Plato’s Republic, e.g. the “minimum state” or the state of “neces-
sity” (ḍarūra); the oligarchy – by Fārābī called the state of “meanness” (naḍāla,
naḍala); or the states which strive for recognition and honour – Plato’s (d. 348/
347AC) timocracy – respectively for power in a perpetual state of war.
Fārābī’s assessment of these faulty states reveals his deep interest in Platonic
psychology as a model for the description of the perfect state, a community of
people who do not indulge in their own desires and who have rational insight.
73 For this reason “democracy” (al-madīna al-ǧamāʿiyya) | in Fārābī’s eyes appears
as freedom in contrast to discipline and selfcontrol – although he seems to
have had in his early work as-Siyāsah al-madaniyya4 a more positive view of
democracy as a precondition for the development of a multitude of desires and
wishes, including the good ones.
According to Fārābī,5 the most important aim in life is true felicity in the
other world, which is different from the materialistic belief in property and
wealth in this world. It is release of the soul from matter. According to Fārābī,6
this release presupposes a good disposition of the individual soul: Its “will” (al-
irāda) and “habit” (al-ʿāda) have not spoiled their “faculty of representation”
(taḫayyul) and do not cause them to “believe” (ẓann) “that they are virtuous
3 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. Edition and English translation by Richard
Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-
fāḍila. A revised text with introduction, translation, and commentary. Oxford 1985, section
VI, ch. 18–20.
4 Fārābī, Kitāb as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya al-mulaqqab bi-mabādiʾ al-mawǧūdāt. Ed. Fauzi M.
Najjar. Beirut 1983, p. 100, 18 ff.
5 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 16.
6 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 16.6 ff.
fārābī on the role of philosophy in society 425
and healthy in their souls and hence do not listen at all to the words of a man
who leads them on the right path, teaches them and and puts them straight (lā
yuṣġī aṣlan ilā qawl muršid wa lā muʿallim wa la muqawwim)”.7
Fārābī considers the disposition of the soul as something conditioned by the
“temperament of the body” (mizāǧ al-badan)8 and by sense perception, which
affects the “rational part” (al-ǧuzʾ an-nāṭiq) of the soul. Apparently, he is here
inspired by Galen’s treatise “That the Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mix-
ture of the Body”, which was translated from Syriac into Arabic by Ḥunayn’s
(d. 260/873) nephew and student Ḥubayš.9
Here, Fārābī again reveals his strong interest in the role of the intellect in the
process of learning and acquiring knowledge.10 This knowledge he specifies11 as
knowledge of the divine “first cause” (as-sabab al-awwal), of the “things separ-
ated from matter” (al-ašyāʾ al-mufāraqa li-l-mādda), like the active intellect, of
the celestial substances and the natural bodies beneath them, of man and the
faculties of his soul, in which the light of the active intellect lets arise human
“will” (al-irāda) and “choice” (al-iḫtiyār) – moreover, knowledge of the first
ruler and of “revelation” (waḥy), of | his representatives, of the perfect city and 74
nation and their contraries, of felicity.
This list of topics, which deserve to be known, presupposes the Neoplatonic
system of emanations from the divine active intellect, which finally were trans-
mitted through revelation to the prophetic leader, who informs and teaches
his subjects by imposing on them the laws. The topics describe the way of get-
ting the knowledge which is required for building the perfect city. Interestingly,
Fārābī mentions human “will” (al-irāda) and “choice” (al-iḫtiyār) as something
caused by the active intellect in the faculties of the soul – evidently he has in
mind the ability of man to choose and to decide between good and bad. This
requires the knowledge of what is good and bad. Here, Fārābī speaks only in a
general way of “voluntary actions (afʿāl irādiyya) which are useful for attaining
felicity and therefore are good actions”.12
7 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 16.6 end.

8 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 16.3, p. 262, 16.
9 Edited with German translation by Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt, Galens Traktat “dass
die Kräfte der Seele den Mischungen des Körpers folgen” in arabischer Übersetzung. Wies-
baden 1973. = AKM XL/4.
10 Vgl. Fuad Said Haddad, Alfarabi’s Theory of Communication. Beirut 1989, esp. pp. 123ff.
11 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 17.1.
12 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, IV 13.6, p. 206, 10f. – Cf. Hans Daiber,
Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (gest. 339/950). In L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge.
Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale (30 août–4 septembre
426 chapter 22
Fārābī’s allusion to “good actions” as a way to happiness is not without

reason. It can be explained by Fārābī’s decision to avoid the definition of know-
ledge and instead to restrict himself to a description of the way to acquire
knowledge in a prefect state that leads to happiness. Fārābī clearly says,13 that
things can be known either by philosophical demonstration or – in a less per-
fect way – through symbols which imitate these things. Nations and cities
might differ in the symbolic representation of the common philosophical truth,
and in their religions. The symbolic representation of philosopical truth can
cause objections and disagreements.14 Some people might not be satisfied with
their knowledge and desire to acquire philosophical “wisdom” (ḥikma), which
they can attain, if they have the “strength” (munna).15
Fārābī’s remark,16 that people might disagree with regard to truth and that
they might become “perplexed” ( yataḥayyarū), justifies his own point of view
about the necessity of the divine inspiration as source of knowledge and recog-
nition of the truth. Imperfect cities (and nations) are “cities of ignorance and
75 erring” (al-mudun al-ǧāhiliyya wa-ḍ-ḍālla),17 insofar | as they do not know the
true good. Fārābī describes in a rather extensive way their “corrupt views of
the ancients” (al-ārāʾ al qadīma al-fāsida), without however refuting them. The
reader should be aware of them and he himself should draw the necessary con-
clusion.
Fārābī mentions as errors of faulty states the following:
– Permanent war in contrast to hierarchic order and justice and peace, alleged
to be the very essence of life.18
– Associations brought about by force.19
– Associations based on the bond of common ancestors or common kinship
or on oath and treatise of alliance or other aspects uniting people against
differing groups.20
– Seemingly peaceful negotiations and mutual relationships solely based on
fear of one another and not on justice.21
1982). Ed. par Christian Wenin. Louvain-la-Neuve II, 1986. = Philosophes médiévaux
XXVII (pp. 729–753), p. 735. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/17.
15 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 17.4 / p. 282, 4f.
17 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 18 and 19.
18 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 18.3–5.
19 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 18.7.
20 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 18.8 ff.
– The tricks of those men who are weak and who in their acquisition of goods
from people promise them in the name of religion reward and compensa-
tion with wonderful goods after death, if they give up their own goods.22
The main motive of many associations and actions is their striving for preser-
vation and increase of acquired goods by force, by war and not by commercial
actions.23 Here, even peace might require war and defence.24 Fārābī attributes
this behaviour to the ignorant cities, because it is motivated by their endeav-
our to preserve the goods in their own possession. For this reason wars exist
even between people belonging to the same species, although the very spe-
cies should be a uniting bond. “Mankind” / “humanity” (insāniyya) is a uniting
“bond” (ribāṭ) of people, “and thus men ought to live in peace ( yatasālamū) on
the basis of (the common species) mankind”.25 Here, as already briefly in earlier
chapters,26 Fārābī propagates the solidarity of mankind and the possibility of
a peaceful world state which, however, should be ruled by a charismatic or – as
he formulates – divinely inspired philosopher-king who informs his subjects
about the desirable good and avoidable bad and thus paves the way to true feli-
city in a peaceful society.
At the end of Fārābī’s description of the faulty states we are still in the dark
about the place of philosophy in the perfect state. And to make the situation
worse: If we look at the final chapter of Fārābī’s Perfect State, a chapter on erro-
neous views of individual felicity and perfection,27 | combined with erroneous 76
views on soul, body and human existence, we can make a surprising observa-
tion: The chapter ends with a long reflection on sceptical relativism against
philosophy. Fārābī explains, that in “philosophy” (ḥikma) “impossible things”
(ašyāʾ muḥāla) are not true; all things cannot “possibly exist in their substances
in opposite existences (wuǧūdāt mutaqābila) and in an unlimited number of
existences in their substances and accidents”.28
In the light of this statement Fārābī’s discussion of the concept of man turns
out to be the proof, that man exists as he is apprehended by the senses and by
reason. He exists not “by chance” (bi-l-ittifāq) but “because an outside agent
brought him into existence” (li-anna fāʿilan min ḫāriǧ awǧadahū).29 Fārābī’s

23 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 18.14 ff.
26 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, V 15.2.3.11; cf. commentary of R. Walzer,
p. 497.
27 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 19.
28 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 19.9, p. 328, 10–12.
29 Fārābī, Mabādiʾ, ed. and transl. R. Walzer, VI 19.8, p. 324, 15.
428 chapter 22
statements are not quite clear, as he offers a kind of epilogue which is mainly a
report of pernicious views, here of sophists and their sceptical fallacies. Few
remarks, however, betray Fārābī’s point of view about the truth of existing
things. They are identical with the “meaning” (mafhūm) of their terms. In their
essence and meaning they are created by a divine creator.
Fārābī’s explanations appear to be rather puzzling at first sight. In the con-
text of the preceding chapters about the first divine cause, the subsequent
worlds till the human soul, about reason, divination, and the perfect and imper-
fect associations and the rulers, Fārābī seeks to confirm the reality of concepts
and terms. What senses and reason apprehend really exists, insofar as it derives
from a divine creator.
Consequently, knowledge of what derives from the divine first cause,
through mediation of the prophet and ruler, is philosophical truth. This philo-
sophical truth is imitated by religion, and this imitation is not only an easy
comprehensive picture of what in philosophy is based on philosophical proofs.
It is the reality of philosophical truth, the ethical actualization of the theory of
philosophy and its universals. Philosophy, scientific cognition, becomes moral
insight, it becomes reality in the shape of the imitating religion and its laws and
rules.30
77 Scientific cognition and moral insight, practical prudence, arise in the frame
of the perfect state, of a universal world state of ruler and ruled, consisting of
smaller units of nations and communities which serve each other. Fārābī con-
fines himself to a general description of a perfect state and pays quite a lot of
attention to the imperfect state, partly in the footsteps of Plato’s Republic. He
does not explicitly refute the pernicious views.
Fārābī’s reluctance to criticize is remarkable. He did not offer a practical
handbook on politics in the perfect state. He did not write a “mirror of princes”.
He even restrained from criticizing faulty associations and confined himself
to their description. He is more interested in presenting an epistemology, a
method to acquire knowledge. The way to obtain knowledge is a constantly
necessary interaction between divinely inspired insight – par excellence in the
person of a prophet-ruler – and its formation in the perfect association of ruler
30 Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view. In

MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, 1986 (pp. 128–149), pp. 11 ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/18. – Cf. Hans Daiber, Fārābī’s Aristoteles: Grundlagen seiner Erkenntnislehre. In O ye
Gentlemen. Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture in Honour of Remke Kruk. Eds.
Arnoud Vrolijk and Jan P. Hogendijk. Leiden/Boston 2007. = IPTS 74, pp. 99–112. =
H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/21.
and ruled, served and servants. Theoretical insight and practical prudence in
the perfect state is an endless process of assimilation to God.31
The perfect state, the world state is never perfect. Knowledge of the soul,
its release from the body and its return to its divine origin, remain a task for
ever. We should not interpret this as scepticism. Fārābī was not a scepticist.
His report on scepticists in the epilogue can be understood as an invitation
to reflect permanently the role of man in society, to acquire knowledge in the
frame of its practical orientation, of religion. Here, religion appears not primar-
ily as a religious system, consisting of laws and prescriptions. It is, instead, the
actualization of wisdom, it is real wisdom and it is rational religion in a con-
stant process of assimilation to God.
Republished, with some modifications, from Philosophia Islamica. The Journal of the
International Society for Islamic Philosophy (ISIP). Published in cooperation with the
Iranian Philosophical Society (IPS). Tehran I, Nov. 2010, pp. 71–77. By courtesy of the
publisher.
31 H. Daiber, Ruler (s. n. 30), p. 17.
chapter 23
Philosophy and Law in the Context of Fārābī’s

Epistemology and Theory of Communication
1. Introduction 430 – 2. Classes of Men with Insight 431 – 3. Stages of Knowledge and the
Aristotelian Background 432 – 4. Religion as Method of Teaching “Philosophy” and Its
Tools 434 – 5. Religion as Imperfect Image and “Imitation” of the Universal Intelligible
436 – 6. Limits of Teaching Philosophy to the Mass 439 – 7. Gradation of Knowledge
between Philosophy and Religion 441 – 8. The Role of Language in Religion 443 – 9.
Conclusion 446 – Appendix 447 – Bibliography 448
1 Introduction
Leo Strauss’ (1899–1973) iuxtaposition of “Philosophy and Law” and his

recourse to Fārābī became a heuristic model for the research in Fārābī’s
political thought.1 In the meantime, we have at our disposal a lot of addi-
tional texts written by Fārābī, and a lot of new interpretations and insights
in Fārābī’s thought.2 These enable us to modify and even correct Strauss’
interpretation. Despite additional texts, recent interpretations do not yet give
us a clear picture of Fārābī’s starting points: 1) His iuxtaposition of “philo-
sophy” ( falsafa) and “religion” (milla), and 2) his adaptation of Platonic con-
cepts of the perfect state, of Aristotelian-Alexandrian concepts of theoretical
and practical-ethical philosophy, and of Neoplatonic concepts of emanations
from the divine active intellect. These concepts are integrated in a framework
of Aristotelian epistemology and in a theory of communication, based on Aris-
totle’s Organon, especially his Analytica posteriora. We have discussed them on
different occasions since 1986.3 Here, we will supplement our earlier observa-
1 See M. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation. – Cf. G. Tamer, Islamische Philosophie. – J. L.
Kraemer, “The Medieval Arabic Enlightenment”. – J. Monserrat Molas, “La descoberta
‘platónica’ de Maimónides”, pp. 60–62 and 66 f.
2 Cf. U. Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī”, pp. 363–457 / English version, pp. 526–654. – The ref-
erences given in two articles on “Al-Fārābī” (T.-A. Druart) and on “Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of
Society and Religion” (N. Germann) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2016.
3 H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 133–149. – H. Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 729–753. – H. Daiber, “Al-
Fārābīs Aristoteles”, pp. 99–112. – H. Daiber, “Al-Fārābī on the Role”, pp. 71–77. – H. Daiber,
Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures, pp. 74 f.

philosophy and law in the context of fārābī’s epistemology 431
tions by concentrating on Fārābī’s long chapters on philosophy and religion in

his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf.4
The chapters, perhaps originally a part of “Prolegomena”, belonging to part I
and III of the Kitāb al-Ḥurūf,5 appear to be a rather unsystematic collec-
tion of reflections on philosophy and religion, their relation to each other, as
well as their instruments and methods. Fārābī assumes the existence of reli-
gions, which are “created” (unšiʾat)6 and not related to philosophy. They can be
improved through philosophy in a process starting with “theology” (kalām),7
continuing with “dialectic” (ǧadal) and “sophistry” (sūfisṭāʾiyya), and ending in
indisputable proofs. Therefore, Fārābī distinguishes, in accordance with Aris-
totle,8 between philosophers with the highest rank, followed by “the dialec-
ticians” (al-ǧadaliyūn) and “the sophists” (as-sūfisṭāʾiyūn). To these classes Fā-
rābī adds “the lawgivers” (wāḍiʿū n-nawāmīs), finally “the theologians and the
jurists” (al-mutakallimūn wa-l-fuqahāʾ).9
2 Classes of Men with Insight
The “theologians and the jurists”10 belong to the elite of religion, whereas the
socalled “prudent” (al-mutaʿaqqil)11 belongs to the elite of the mass. The theolo-
4 Ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 131–134 (§§ 108–113) and pp. 153–157 (§§147–153) / English summary by
M. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation, pp. 208–228 / Span. transl. by J. A. Paredes Gan-
día, Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī, pp. 57–62 and 89–93 / Engl. transl. by M. A. Khalidi in Medieval
Islamic Philosophical Writings, pp. 1–23. – On a French translation (A. Hilal, 1997) s. U.
Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī”, p. 364 / Engl. version by R. Hansberger, p. 529. – Our
translation is independent of the mentioned scholars, because we try to take into account
the context of Fārābī’s reflexions and the Aristotelian sources.
5 Cf. S. Menn, “Al-Fārābī’s Kitāb Al-Ḥurūf”, p. 66.
6 al-Ḥurūf, § 147 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 153, ult.
7 On the meaning of kalām (“theology”) cf. Fārābī, Fī l-ʿilm al-madanī, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 75,
9–76, 5. – Fārābī, Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm, ed. C. Á. González Palencia, pp. 100–107 / French
transl. R. Brague, “La philosophie islamique contre le ‘kalam’”, pp. 67–71.
8 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. IV 2. 1004 b 16–26; XI 3. 1061 b 5–11, and Aristotle, Topica 100 a 25–
101 a 5. – On Aristotle’s three kinds of reasoning, the syllogistic sciences demonstration,
dialectics and sophistry, and their reception in Fārābī, cf. A. F. Kis, “Theory of Research”.
9 al-Ḥurūf, § 113 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 134, 12–14. – Remarkably, Fārābī mentions the “lawgivers”
first, then the “theologians and the jurists”, apparently because they have, also as founders
of the religion (s. below ch. 8), a higher rank. – On them cf. Fārābī’s “Summary of Plato’s
Laws”, available in a fully annotated translation by C. E. Butterworth, Alfarabi: The
Political Writings, II, pp. 131–173.
10 On the relation between theologians and jurists s. n. 43.
11 On the term cf. U. Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī”, p. 426 / Engl. version, pp. 613f. – On its
432 chapter 23
gian, the jurist and the prudent respectively differ in their method, their “prin-
ciples of insight” (mabādiʾ ar-raʾy):12 The one acts on the basis of “premises”
(muqaddimāt) transmitted by his religion and its founder, the other on the basis
of commonly accepted premises and by “experience” (taǧriba).13
Generally, Fārābī assumes the possible existence of “skillfull” (ḥāḏiq) people
in every “practical art” (ṣināʿa ʿamaliyya), who “intensified what among artists
(ahl aṣ-ṣināʿa) is taken up in a superficial manner (only)”.14
He mentions the example of the physician and says:15
In addition, also the physicians call themselves participants of the elite,

either because they took over the care of seriously ill people; or because
their art participates in the natural science of philosophy; or because they
need in their art to rectify to the utmost point their “immediate insight”
(bādiʾ ar-raʾy) more than the other arts, due to the danger and the dam-
age – even resulting from a very small mistake coming from them – from
which people cannot be safe; or because the art of medicine makes use of
many of the practical arts, for example the art of cooking or “prevention”
(ḥard)16 and in general the arts useful for the health of man. In all these
(arts) is in a certain manner something that is similar to philosophy.
3 Stages of Knowledge and the Aristotelian Background
This statement takes up Aristotle’s discussion of “knowledge” (episteme) and

“art” (techne) in his Metaphysics (I 1).17 Aristotle exemplifies his concept of
source, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, cf. D. Gutas, “The Meaning of madanī”, pp. 272–
276.
12 Here, as in other places, we translate the term raʾy, pl. ārāʾ with “insight”. Fārābī here fol-
lows an old, originally Aristotelian tradition (cf. in addition Aristotle, Metaph. I 2. 982 b 24),
which can be traced back to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ from the 8th century AD: Cf. H. Daiber, “Das
Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr”, pp. 277f. and 282. – Specialists on Fārābī have wrongly translated
the term raʾy with “view”, “opinion” or “Ansicht” etc.; this translation implies the Platonic
distinction between “knowledge” (episteme) and “opinion” (doxa), on which cf. J. Lameer,
Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistic, pp. 261–264 and ff. This is recently defended by U.
Rudolph, “Reflections on al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila”, pp. 2–4.
13 al-Ḥurūf, § 112 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 133, 8–12. – On taǧriba in Fārābī cf. J. L. Janssens,
“ ‘Experience’ (tajriba)”, pp. 47–52.
14 al-Ḥurūf, § 113 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 133, 20 f.
15 al-Ḥurūf, § 113 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 134, 4–11.
16 See E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon. 2, p. 544 col. a.
17 Cf. R. Parry, “Episteme and Techne”.
knowledge and art with the process of healing that must be based on “exper-
iences” (empeiria).18 Many “thoughts” (ennoemata) gained from experiences19
lead to knowledge of the “causes” (aitiai), and for this reason the “art” (techne)
deserves to be called “science” / “knowledge” (episteme) much more than
“experience”.20 Aristotle speaks of “first causes” (ta prota aitia) and “principles”
(archai), which are the object of “wisdom” (sophia).21 Fārābī adopted this Aris-
totelian terminology and added the term “premise” (muqaddima) as an altern-
ative expression for the causes or principles. This term has its origin in Aris-
totle’s Posterior Analytics II 19, where Aristotle explains, that the Nous, the
insight or intuition or intelligence of man, knows the indemonstrable first,
“immediate” (amesa) “premises” (axiomata) of sciences. They are the causes
of the things (Post. Anal. I 2) and part of the “demonstration” (apodeixis), of a
deduction that produces knowledge.22 – Finally, Fārābī’s concept of knowledge
is not restricted to the causes of principles. In addition, he refers to Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, in which the Nous of man is focussed on man’s acting in
the community, in the Polis. Man’s Nous is a way to moral insight, to prudence
(phronesis). Fārābī adapted this ethical practical orientation of human insight
in his concept of philosophy and religion as a combination of theory and
practice, culminating in the moral “insights” (ārāʾ) and “actions” (afʿāl)23 of
“the prudent” (al-mutaʿaqqil)24 within the frame of religion.25 Conform with
Aristotle,26 the owner of knowledge, in the view of Fārābī par excellence the
philosopher-ruler, has the task to teach the ignorant people, who have at best
only experience and are hierarchically organized, and who in their striving for
perfection require the cooperation of the other individuals in the political asso-
ciation of a “city” (madīna) and a “nation” (umma).27 Herewith, Fārābī takes
up Plato’s concept of the philosophers who are not restricted to theoretical
18 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I 1. 981 a 1–7.

19 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I 1. 981 a 6.
20 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I 1. 981 b 8 f.
21 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I 1. 981 b 28 f.
22 Cf. R. Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic”, §§ 6. 1 and 6. 4. – On the echo of the concept of the
premises, muqaddimāt, also called mabādiʾ “principles” in Fārābī (and Ibn Sīnā) cf. H.
Eichner, “Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā”, pp. 74–93.
23 Cf. n. 82.
24 Cf. n. 11.
25 On the details and the references in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics cf. H. Daiber, “Proph-
etie”, pp. 733–735.
26 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I 1. 981 b 5–9.
27 Cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, pp. 61, 14–62, 3 / Engl. transl., p. 23, and Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, pp. 63,
13–64, 7 / Engl. transl., pp. 24 f.
434 chapter 23
contemplation of the good and who propagate their knowledge in the city for
the benefit of the ruled.28
4 Religion as Method of Teaching “Philosophy” and Its Tools
Starting from the Platonic and Aristotelian background, Fārābī has classified
philosophy as “philosophy of certainty” (al-falsafa al-yaqīniyya),29 as the “abso-
lute truth” (al-ḥaqq al-yaqīn).30 It is based on undisputable proofs and attain-
able in a long process, beginning with dialectic and sophistry and first incom-
plete results in “philosophy based on mere opinions (al-falsafa al-maẓnūna) or
misrepresentations (al-falsafa al-mumawwaha)”.31
The best form of philosophy, “philosophy of certainty”, the absolute truth,
should be taught to the mass through religion. As Fārābī says: “When reli-
gion is considered to be something ‘related to man’ (insāniyya), it is later in
time than philosophy. (This is the case) generally, since through (religion) the
instruction of the mass is sought in theoretical and practical things, which
in philosophy are discovered in (those) ways, through which (the mass) can
‘understand’ ( fahm) that (instruction) either by ‘persuasion’ (iqnāʿ) or by ‘ima-
gination’ (taḫyīl) or by both at once”.32
This passage informs us, that religion can use the persuasion and the imagin-
ation evoked by the theologian, the jurist and the lawgiver, imaginations and
pictures which should not be grounded on “philosophy based on mere opinions
or misrepresentations” and which the “lawgiver” (wāḍiʿ an-nawāmīs)33 “seeks to
verify” (taṣḥīḥ).34
Fārābī’s concept of these imaginations and pictures might be inspired by
Aristotle’s Rhetoric35 and Poetics36 and appears to be an expanding reinterpret-
ation of a passage in Plato’s Laws, a passage on the role of the judges in musical
28 Cf. Plato, Rep. VII. 519 c–d.

29 al-Ḥurūf, § 108 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 131, 6.
30 al-Ḥurūf, § 109 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 131, 14. – For details cf. D. Black, “Knowledge and Cer-
titude”.
34 Cf. al-Ḥurūf, § 109 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 132, 3–4.
35 Cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 10 and 16.
36 On the completion of the syllogistic sciences demonstration, dialectics and sophistry (s.
n. 8) by rhetoric and poetics (cf. also n. 40), already in antiquity and in Fārābī, followed by
Ibn Sīnā, cf. G. Schoeler, “Poetischer Syllogismus”. – Cf. in addition Fārābī’s discussion
of what he calls the five syllogistic arts in his Risāla ṣudira bihā l-kitāb, ed. D. M. Dunlop,
and gymnastic contests and of the “lawgiver” (nomothetes) who uses “noble
and laudable phrases to persuade (the poet)”.37 Fārābī’s concept of imagina-
tions and pictures has a parallel in the allegorization and use of symbols in
late antiquity,38 including Neoplatonism.39 However, Fārābī expanded his view,
based on the Neoplatonic additional inclusion of rhetoric and poetics,40 with
aspects of Aristotle’s epistemology. He added concepts of theoretical and prac-
tical philosophy, including ethics, based primarily on Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics.41
Remarkably, Fārābī considers it important to mention the posteriority of
“the art of theology” (ṣināʿat al-kalām) and jurisprudence after religion, and
the anteriority of dialectic and sophistry to philosophy, which on its part pre-
cedes religion.42 He argues, that “philosophy in general precedes religion in
the manner of the user of instruments, who precedes in time the instruments”,
and he compares the anteriority of dialectic and sophistry to philosophy with
“the tree’s nourishment, which precedes the fruit” and with “the tree’s blossom,
which precedes the fruit”. “Nourishment” and “blossom of the tree” appear as
conditions or causes for the fruits of the tree.
Similarly, Fārābī explains the anteriority of religion to theology and jurispru-
dence with its anteriority as user of the instruments “theology” and “jurispru-
dence”. In addition, he compares religion with “a ruler, who employs a servant
and is anterior to the servant”, namely “theology” and “jurisprudence”.43
The described relations have the following pattern:
“Al-Fārābī’s Introductory Risāla on Logic”, § 2 / Arabic text, pp. 225, ult.–226, ult. / Engl.
transl., pp. 230 f.
37 Plato, Laws 659 A–660 A; cf. Fārābī, Compendium Legum Platonis, 2nd discourse, p. 13, 5–
19, and the English translation by C. E. Butterworth, Alfarabi: The Political Writings II,
p. 140. Fārābī (or his source?) changes Plato’s information into a “paraphrase” about the
“lawgiver” (wāḍiʿ an-nawāmīs) who “ought to address every group of people with what is
closer to their understanding and intellects” (translation C. E. Butterworth). – On the
discussions about Fārābī’s knowledge of Plato’s Laws cf. C. E. Butterworth, pp. 100–
107. – On the Arabic transmission of Plato’s Laws cf. D. Gutas, “Platon – tradition arabe”,
pp. 852 f.
38 Cf. J. W. Watt, “The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition”, pp. 31–35.
39 Cf. D. J. O’Meara, Platonopolis. – On Fārābī cf. ch. 14, esp. pp. 104–197 (“Religion as sym-
bolic representation of metaphysical truths”), and the German summary “Religion als
Abbild der Philosophie”.
40 Rhetoric and poetics complete the Aristotelian list of the syllogistic sciences demonstra-
tion, dialectics and sophistry (s. n. 36).
41 Cf. H. Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 734 f., and H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 12f.
43 Cf. also al-Ḥurūf, § 111 / ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 132, 12–133, 7.
436 chapter 23
dialectic and sophistry / nourishment and blossom of the tree

↓
= anterior condition / cause of
↓
philosophy / fruit of the tree
= anterior user of
↓
religion
= posterior instrument and servant of philosophy
= anterior user and ruler of
↓
theology and jurisprudence
= posterior instrument and servant of religion
= teaching the mass knowledge
through
persuasion, imagination, “creating pictures” (tamṯīl),
“verification” (taṣḥīḥ) of pictures,
rhetorical ways
5 Religion as Imperfect Image and “Imitation” of the Universal

Intelligible
It is evident, that Fārābī’s concepts of anteriority as an indication of prior-

ity and conditionality,44 as well as his example of the ruler and the servant,
were inspired by Aristotle’s book on Categories, the chapters on anteriority45
and reciprocal correlatives.46 Moreover, in his concept of the relation between
philosophy and religion Fārābī adapted Aristotle’s discussion of the substance
in Categories ch. 5. He modified Aristotle’s distinction between the first and
the second substance, and his distinction in the second substance between the
species individual / particular man and the genus living being,47 and he added
44 Cf. also Fārābī’s Fuṣūl fī t-tawṭiʾa, section IV, ed. D. M. Dunlop, “Al-Fārābī’s Introductory
Sections on Logic”, p. 269, 3–16 / Engl. transl., p. 277.
45 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 12 and Fārābī’s paraphrase. Ed. and transl. by D. M. Dunlop, “Al-Fārābī’s
Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle”. In IslQ 5/1–2, 1959, §59.
46 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 b 28–31 and Fārābī’s paraphrase. Ed. and transl. by D. M. Dunlop,
“Al-Fārābī’s Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle”. In IslQ 4/3, 1957, §25. – The topic
did not find an echo in Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, the sections on the categories; on this cf. S.
Diebler, “Catégories, conversation et philosophie chez Al-Fārābī”, pp. 275–305.
47 Cf. the commentary by K. Oehler, Aristoteles – Kategorien, pp. 213–220.
an epistemological aspect, which we already found in Fārābī’s paraphrase of

Aristotle’s Categories. There, he says:
A thing is “grasped by the intellect” (maʿqūl)48 only by its “quiddity”

(māhiya) being known. The “individuals” (ašḫāṣ) of “the substance” (al-
ǧawhar) thus become “intelligible” (maʿqūla) only by their “universals”
(kulliyāt) being grasped by the intellect. Their “intelligibles” (maʿqūlāt)
come into existence only by the “existence” (wuǧūd) of their individu-
als.
The individuals of the substance then need their universals in order to
be intellected, while their universals need their individuals in order to be
in existence, since – if their individuals do not exist – what is “imagined”
( yutawahhamu) of them in the soul, that would be “invented” (muḫtaraʿ)
and would be false, and what is false does not exist.
Hence, the universals come into existence only through their individu-
als, and the individuals are intellected through their universals. Therefore,
their universals are also substance, since they are “the intelligibles of sub-
stances” (maʿqūlāt al-ǧawhar) which are plainly substances, and they are
second in order of becoming, since their existence depends on the exist-
ence of their individuals.49
This passage is crucial for the understanding of Fārābī’s comparison of

“philosophy” with “religion”. In his Kitāb al-Milla50 he writes:
The excellent religion is similar to philosophy. Just as one part of philo-

sophy is theoretical and another part practical – so that the theoretical
and intellectual (part), if it is known to man, cannot be done by him, but
the practical (part), if it is known to man, can be done by him – (like-
wise is the religion). The universals of the practical (part) in religion are in
48 On maʿqūl cf. S. Menn, “Al-Fārābī’s Kitāb Al-Ḥurūf ”, p. 79 n. 28 and p. 81.

49 Translation D. M. Dunlop, “Al-Fārābī’s Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle”. In IslQ
4/3, 1957, § 4 / p. 185 (our version differs sometimes from Dunlop’s translation) / Arabic
text, pp. 170, 22–171, 4. – On the echo of Fārābī’s discussion in Ibn Sīnā cf. J. L. Janssens,
“Ibn Sīnā on Substance”, pp. 353–360.
50 Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, Alfārābī’s Book of Religion and Related Texts, pp. 46, 22–47, 7
/ Span. transl. R. Ramón Guerrero, p. 141 / Engl. transl. C. E. Butterworth, “Alfarabi –
The Book of Religion”, p. 27. – On the interrelation between universals, first intelligibles
and ethics cf. the observations by T.-A. Druart, “Al-Farabi, Ethics, and First Intelligibles”,
pp. 403–423.
438 chapter 23
the practical philosophy, namely: The practical (part) in religion are those
universals, being determined by “conditions” (šarāʾiṭ),51 which were
bound to them, because what is bound to conditions is more specific
than what is applied without conditions, as for example our saying ‘the
writing man’, which is more specific than our saying ‘man’. Consequently,
all “the excellent laws” (aš-šarāʾiʿ al-fāḍila) fall under the category of the
universals in the practical philosophy.52 “The theoretical insights” (al-ārāʾ
an-naẓariyya) in religion (however) can be proven (only) in the theoret-
ical philosophy, whereas they are taken up in religion without proofs.
Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Milla and his paraphrase of the Categories assume an inter-
relation between universals (intelligibles, theoretical and practical philosophy)
and particulars (individuals, “conditions”, excellent laws, insights proven by
theoretical philosophy). Instead of mentioning the “similarity” between philo-
sophy and religion and instead of mentioning the presence of the universals
of philosophy in religion, Fārābī’s paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories points to
the dependence of the knowledge of universals on the individual existence of
the thing, thus following the Aristotelian concept of the interdependence of
thought and perception.53 A starting point of this is Aristotle’s dissociation54
from Plato’s paradigmatic idea and clear orientation towards the individual
as something which is an “independent” (xoriste) and “sensible” (aisthete)
“essence” (ousia), which can be object of “thinking” (noesis).55 The universal
and the individual are correlated, insofar as the individual, the only realm of
being and and essential species, is the principle of the universal, the “general”
(koinon).56
According to Fārābī, the interdependence of thought and perception deter-
mines the relation between philosophy and religion, which is developed in the
footsteps of his Neoplatonizing interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories. In the
51 See E. W. Lane, s.v. šarṭ.

52 Cf. also Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 52, 3–9 / Span. transl. R. Ramón Guer-
rero, p. 146.
53 On this and its echo in Fārābī cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 11–14.
54 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. IX 10. 1052 a 1 f.
55 For details and on Aristotle’s starting points Speusippus and Xenocrates, cf. H. J. Krämer,
“Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre”, pp. 119–190.
56 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 5. 2 b 11–14: “For example, it would be more informative to say of the indi-
vidual man that he is a man than that he is an animal (since the one is more distinctive of
the individual man while the other is more general)”. – Cf. H. J. Krämer, “Aristoteles und
die akademische Eidoslehre”, pp. 166, 170 and 183, and on unsolved problems of Aristotle’s
solution H. J. Krämer, pp. 183 f.
view of Fārābī there never exists a perfect knowledge of philosophy. Human

insight depends on the prophetic inspiration from the divine active intellect57
and remains restricted to the imperfect images of the universals of philosophy
in an “excellent religion”, which resembles philosophy and which is its “imit-
ation”.58 It remains a task of the prophet-ruler to teach the community philo-
sophy and to enable it to partake in the universal knowledge, emanating from
the divine intellect and ending in its particular and imitating picture, the reli-
gion.59
6 Limits of Teaching Philosophy to the Mass
What is the aim of teaching knowledge of a certain philosophy? What is the task
of religion? We begin with the observation, that, according to Fārābī, the jurist
follows the principles, “premises” (muqaddimāt) transmitted by the founder of
the religion – whereas “the prudent” (al-mutaʿaqqil) bases his “insight” (ar-raʾy)
on premises which are commonly accepted and developed through “exper-
ience” (taǧriba).60 The prudent belongs to the elite of the mass, the jurist,
however, to the elite of religion. The real elite are the philosophers61 and “every-
one who is entrusted with or takes over the rulership of a town or is fitting to
take it over or is reckoned among those who can take it over – makes himself
a member of the elite, since he has something similar to philosophy, because
one of the parts (of philosophy) is the principal practical art (aṣ-ṣināʿa ar-raʾīsa
al-ʿamaliyya)”.62
This statement is based on Fārābī’s thesis of the philosopher-ruler in the
excellent state, which is the excellent religion that follows “philosophy, which
became excellent after all the syllogistic arts (aṣ-ṣanāʾiʿ al-qiyāsiyya)63 are dis-
tinguished from one another in their orientation (al-ǧiha) and arrangement
(at-tartīb), as demanded by us”.64
57 For details cf. F. Griffel, “Philosophy and Prophecy”, pp. 388–391.

58 Cf. below ch. 8 and 9.
59 On a convergence between Fārābī and the Neoplatonic pedagogy of Simplicius in his com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Categories cf. M. Chase, “The Medieval Posterity”, pp. 18f.
60 S. n. 13.
63 Rhetoric, dialectic (“dispute”), sophistic, demonstrative science (“proofs”); cf. S. Menn,
“Al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf ”, p. 63.
440 chapter 23
However, Fārābī is not very optimistic with regard to the realization of the
excellent religion in the excellent state. He says:65
If religion follows excellent philosophy, without being imposed on (reli-

gion) the theoretical things of (philosophy) as in philosophy by using
those words, with which (the theoretical things) are explained, and (if)
on the contrary instead of them its pictures are taken up in it either
entirely or mostly; (if) that religion is transmitted to other people, who
do not know, whether it follows philosophy and whether its contents
are pictures of theoretical things, which prove to be true in philosophy
through “indisputable proofs” (barāhīn yaqīniyya), which however are
passed over in silence, so that people believe, that the pictures, which that
religion encloses, are the truth and that they are the theoretical things
themselves; moreover, (if) thereupon is transmitted to them philosophy,
which in its excellency is followed by religion – then one cannot be sure,
that this religion is contradictory to philosophy and that its adherents
oppose and reject philosophy; and the adherents of philosophy oppose
that religion, unless they know that this religion is a picture of what is in
philosophy.
It is noteworthy, that Fārābī explains religion, he means the excellent reli-

gion, as “a picture of what is in philosophy”. Fārābī is aware of the danger, that
in philosophy might exist mere opinions and misrepresentations,66 “insights”
(ārāʾ) which “are false” (kāḏiba), “do not present knowledge” (lam yušʿir) and
“are (still) in the process of verification (tuṣaḥḥaḥ) through rhetoric, disputa-
tion and sophistry”.67 This could lead to critique by philosophers, to an oppos-
ition between philosophy and religion and even to contradictions in religious
beliefs.68
The situation becomes complicated in view of the danger, that it might be
unclear, whether a picture of what is proven to be the truth in philosophy
is accepted in religion. Adherents of religion might wrongly have concluded
from existing pictures for philosophical knowledge, that an opposition exists
between religion and philosophy. Philosophers are repudiated and therefore

68 On these contradictions and parallels in the Brethren of Purity (Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ) cf. P. L.
Heck, “Doubts about the Religious Community”, pp. 201f.
cannot assist adherents of religion. They are afraid of “damage from religion”
and oppose the adherents of religion in their opinion, that religion contradicts
philosophy. Fārābī says:69
Whenever (the adherents of philosophy) know that (religion) is a pic-

ture of what is in (philosophy), they do not oppose her. However, the
adherents of religion oppose the adherents of that philosophy. Philo-
sophy and its adherents have no “leadership role” (riʾāsa) in that religion
and among its adherents. It is even repudiated and its adherents are repu-
diated. (Therefore) religion does not experience much assistance from
philosophy and (on the other side) one cannot “be sure” ( yaʾman) that
philosophy and its adherents experience a great damage from that reli-
gion and its adherents. Therefore, the adherents of philosophy are at that
moment possibly forced to oppose the adherents of religion in search for
“integrity” (salāma) of the adherents of philosophy. They aspire not to
oppose religion itself. However, they oppose them in their opinion, that
religion contradicts philosophy and they “take pains” ( yaǧtahidūna) to
remove from them this opinion by seeking to make them understand, that
their religion contains pictures.
7 Gradation of Knowledge between Philosophy and Religion
Fārābī’s interesting explanation of oppositions between philosophy and reli-

gion, which, according to him, is based on insufficient knowledge, false accus-
ations and repudiations, indicates Fārābī’s starting point, his epistemology and
his theory of language and communication.
Fārābī’s epistemology implies, that philosophy and religion have in com-
mon the knowledge of theoretical and practical things which in philosophy
are proved with undisputable proofs, and which are explained in religion in a
persuasive manner by those pictures which do not require verifications.
Between the certain knowledge of philosophy and the pictures of religion,
Fārābī presupposes a gradation in the process of human cognition:
The first step is the “insight” (raʾy) of “the prudent” (al-mutaʿaqqil), of which
the “principles” (mabādiʾ), the “premises” (muqaddimāt), are found through the
means of “experience” (taǧriba) and are “commonly accepted by all (people)”.

442 chapter 23
The second step is the insight of the jurist,70 who resembles the “prudent”
with regard to his insight. However, the jurist uses in his “particular activity”
(al-ʿamaliyya al-ǧuzʾiyya) only those principles as premises, which are “taken
over and transmitted from the founder of the religion”71 and which he seeks
to “assess” (taqdīr) and “verify” (taṣḥīḥ) in accordance with the “intention”
(ġaraḍ) of the “founder of the religion”.72 To these principles, coming from
the “founder of the religion”, Fārābī adds “dialectic” (ǧadal) and “sophistry”
(sūfisṭāʾiyya), which can either “confirm” (taṯbīt) something or “refute” (ibṭāl)
it.73 If these ways, which should lead to certain philosophy, are based on mere
opinions and false pictures, this will not lead to true philosophy and it will be
harmful to religion:
⟨Therefore,⟩ the use of methods of dialectic (and sophistry in “insights”

(ārāʾ)), which in the souls gained influence on the religion, puts an end to
the “influence” (tamakkun) (of religion), fills it with doubts and places it
on an equal footing with something that is not yet “verified” ( yaṣiḥḥu) and
of which the truth “is expected” ( yuntaẓar), or in which still “exists con-
fusion” ( yataḥayyar) so that it is believed, that neither (this religion) nor
its contrary is true. For this reason “the lawgivers” (wāḍiʿū n-nawāmīs) got
into a situation where they prohibited dialectic and sophistry and preven-
ted this completely. Similarly, the kings – which were appointed to protect
religion, whichever religion it is – hindered its adherents completely from
that and warned them intensively against that.74
Again, Fārābī is not very optimistic in achieving the aim of true philosophy,75
and he says:76
It is evident: In every religion exists (some) opposition to philosophy. In

the “art of theology” (kalām) exists (some) opposition to philosophy. Its
70 Fārābī does not mention the theologians, apparently, because their task is restricted to the
“support” (nuṣra) of the principles fixed by the jurists (s. n. 83).
72 Cf. Fārābī, Fī l-ʿilm al-madanī, ed. M. Mahdi, p. 75, 2–4. – Cf. Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla, ed.
M. Mahdi, pp. 50, 9–52, 2 / Engl. transl. C. E. Butterworth, “Alfarabi – The Book of
Religion”, p. 28.
75 Cf. also § 4.
adherents are opposing to the adherents (of philosophy) to the degree of

the opposition of that religion to philosophy.
8 The Role of Language in Religion
Against the background of this rather reserved attitude, Fārābī paid much
attention to the process of teaching and communication with the instrument
of language.
Language enables the founder of religion to create laws, either by creating a
new terminology (“terms” asmāʾ) of laws or by adjusting the existing termino-
logy of laws:77
If a religion arises among people, which had no religion before and if that
religion was not in the possession of another people before, then the laws
(now valid) among them, evidently were not known before that among
that people. Therefore, (the laws) had no terms among them.
Now, if the founder of the religion wanted to term them, then he cre-
ated terms for (the laws), which were not known among them before; or
“he transferred” ( yanqulu) to the (laws) terms, which among the things
endowed with terms and used by them had the greatest similarity to the
laws, which (the founder of the religion) imposed (on the people).
Language, despite its universal aspects, can be an inadequate tool for ren-
dering mental concepts.78 Language is conditional on descriptions and defini-
tions.79 Its terminology constantly must be adjusted to “the greatest similarity
to the laws, which are imposed on the people” by the founder of the religion. It is
a vehicle for the jurist and generally for the “theologian” (mutakallim), who tries
to persuade the mass with pictures, which are proximate to philosophical truth
and who at the best can “turn in his (act of) refutation (his) insight into dialectic
(ǧadaliyyan)”.80 Both, theology and dialectic, are in the service of philosoph-
77 al-Ḥurūf, § 154 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 157, 5–9. – On the text cf. also J. L. Janssens, “Al-Farabi:
la religion”, pp. 504f. – Insofar as we can speak of an interrelation between religion/gram-
mar/language and philosophy/logic, as proposed by E. Gannagé, “Y a-t-il une pensée”,
pp. 253–257.
78 On this point cf. P. Adamson and A. Key, “Philosophy of Language”, pp. 84f. – T.-A. Dru-
art, “Al-Fārābī: An Arabic Account of the Origin of Language”, pp. 11f.
79 Cf. H. Daiber, “De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica”, §8 (al-
Fārābī).
444 chapter 23
ical truth. Disputation and sophistry can lead to certain philosophy, whereas
theology in the service of religion can only persuade. Fārābī says:81
The persuasion rather occurs through premises, which are in an “immedi-

ate insight” ( fī bādiʾ ar-raʾy) “preferable” (muʾṯara) and “commonly accep-
ted” (mašhūra), (moreover) in the minds, through creating “pictures” (at-
tamṯīlāt) and generally in rhetorical ways, may be through statements or
things resulting from them.
Consequently, “the theologian” (al-mutakallim) confines himself in
theoretical things, which “he verifies” ( yuṣaḥḥiḥuhā) to what is “common”
(muštarak) in an immediate insight. Thus, he shares this with the mass.
But sometimes, he also follows “the immediate insight” (bādiʾ ar-raʾy).
However, he follows the immediate insight of something else, which
equally is immediate insight.
The maximum “consolidation” (tawṯīq) which (the theologian) can
reach is to turn, in his (act of) refutation, (his) insight into “dialectic”
(ǧadaliyyan).
For the most part, however, the function of the theologian is to “support”
(nuṣra) “the principles” (al-uṣūl). Herewith, he differs from the jurist, who from
the principles – presumably the traditional uṣūl al-fiqh, Qurʾān, Sunna of the
Prophet, “consensus” (iǧmāʿ) and “analogy” (qiyās) – derives “the obligations”
(al-ašyāʾ al-lāzima) for the people. The principles were taken from “insights and
actions” (al-ārāʾ wa-l-afʿāl),82 which explicitly were “approved” (musallama) by
the “founder of the religion and the law (aš-šarīʿa)”.83
Fārābī’s reflexions on “instructing the mass” “in theoretical and practical
things, which in philosophy are discovered – in (those) ways, through which
(the mass) can understand ( fahm) that (instruction) either by persuasion
(iqnāʿ) or by imagination (taḫyīl) or by both together”84 – appear to be fur-
ther developed by Fārābī in other works, focussing on teaching and learning
and on the intellectual qualities of the ruler in the perfect state.85 There, he
gives a clear idea of the way from rhetorical persuasion to conviction on the
basis of “indisputable proofs” (al-barāhīn al-yaqīniyya) to “knowledge of the

82 Cf. n. 23.
83 Cf. Fārābī, Fī l-ʿilm al-madanī, ed. M. Mahdi, pp. 75, 1–4 and 75, 12–76, 3.
84 al-Ḥurūf, § 108 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 131, 7–9. – Cf. above ch. 4.
85 Cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 6–8. – Cf. S. Günther, “The principles of instruction”, pp. 15–
20.
beings” (ʿilm al-mawǧūdāt). This knowledge is shared by religion which “imi-

tates philosophy” (muḥākiyatun li-l-falsafa)86 and by philosophy. Religion and
its intended purpose to arouse man’s “resolution” (ʿazāʾim) to do “the moral vir-
tues” (al-faḍāʾil al-ḫulqiyya) and “the practical arts” (aṣ-ṣināʿāt al-ʿamaliyya)87
can instruct and “educate” “with pictures of truth”, “through actions, activ-
ities and things related to activity”, “not through theoretical things or only
through something of them, that is simple” – provided, that religion is not
wicked and its founder and ruler uses religion not solely for his own “happi-
ness” (saʿāda):88
Some of (the adherents of religion) sympathize with philosophy, others

made no restrictions on it,89 others passed (philosophy) over in silence,
and others prohibited it.
(This happens) either because those people cannot be taught the pure
truth and not the theoretical things as they are, and on the contrary they
can, in accordance with their nature or interest in (philosophy) or dis-
gust at it, not obtain the truth itself and instead “are educated” (tuʾaddab)
only with “pictures” (miṯālāt) of the truth. Or people can only be edu-
cated through actions, activities and things related to activity, not through
theoretical things or only through something simple of them.
Or (this happens) because the religion, which is braught to (the
people), is wicked and from pre-Islamic times and by means of it (the
founder of the religion) cannot seek happiness for (the people), and on
the contrary he seeks happiness for himself. His purpose is to use (reli-
gion) for something that brings only him to happiness, not the others. He
was afraid, that the people remain in their wicked state, in a wicked state
of which its establishment is sought in the souls when they pay attention
to philosophy.
86 Cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, p. 11. – On the Platonic starting point and its combination with
Aristotelian concepts cf. H. Daiber, “Al-Fārābīs Aristoteles”, pp. 99–103.
87 Cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 78, 1–9 / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi, p. 35.
88 al-Ḥurūf, § 152 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 156, 12–21. – On Fārābī’s concept of happiness cf. H.
Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 734–736; H. Daiber, “Al-Fārābī on the Role”, pp. 73f.
89 aṭlaqū fīhā. Cf. E. W. Lane, s.v., and G. Vajda, “Langage”, p. 257.
446 chapter 23
9 Conclusion
Fārābī has developed his concept of teaching philosophy through the medi-
ation of religion and its laws to an epistemology, in which theoretical and prac-
tical philosophy are combined. Practical philosophy is concerned with ethics
in the Aristotelian sense, which Fārābī integrated in his concept of the laws of
religion. Moreover, practical philosophy is developed, in the footsteps of Aris-
totle, into a concept of thinking through pictures of imagination, of “religion”,
“imitating” philosophy.90 The particulars of religion are an image, a picture
of universal philosophy,91 indicating philosophical truth that is given to the
ruler, who must not only be a “philosopher”, but also a “prophet” who with the
help of God’s inspiration and by “assimilation” to God rules the perfect state.92
This concept, which Fārābī fully developed in his late work Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl
al-madīna al-fāḍila, “The Principles of the Insights of the Citizens in the Per-
fect State”, appears to be integrated into a Neoplatonic concept of a hierarchi-
cal gradation of the universe, beginning with the divine One, followed by the
first intellect and nine intellects emanating from that.93 Because of this sys-
tem of intermediate causes, man does never reach the cause of philosophical
truth, but only an image of it.94 The image, the picture of human imagination,
is always imperfect with regard to philosophical truth. It constantly requires
“verification” (taṣḥīḥ).95 At the same time, the image, the picture is for men the
only way of thinking in an endless process of assimilation to God within a state
and religion, ruled by a philosopher-king with intellectual qualities and proph-
etic inspiration. Indispensable tools for the ruler are the language and the laws,
formulated in a language whose terminology constantly must be adjusted or
“verified”. The endless process of “assimilation” to God means a never ending
struggle for knowledge and the right laws of religion in a society that mirrors
changing times and places.96 This is a dynamic concept of universal philosophy,
particular religion and laws.
90 Cf. H. Daiber, “Prophetie”, pp. 730–741. – H. Daiber, “Ruler”, pp. 8f. and 11–14.
91 Cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, pp. 90, paenult.–91, 13 / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi,
pp. 44 f. – Cf. also al-Ḥurūf, § 111 / ed. M. Mahdi, p. 133, 6f.: “The peculiarity of the philo-
sopher is his relation to all people and to the nations”.
92 Cf. H. Daiber, “Ruler”, p. 17. – On the assimilation of the ruler to God cf. G. Tamer, “Mono-
theismus und Politik bei Alfarabi”, pp. 204–212.
93 U. Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī”, pp. 428–434 / English version, pp. 616–622. – Cf. D.
Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology and Causality”, pp. 364–369.
94 Cf. H. Daiber, “Al-Fārābīs Aristoteles”, pp. 111 f.
95 Cf. n. 67.
96 On Fārābī’s concept of man who “suffers” “temporal variations” and who has differing
Simultaneously, Fārābī prepared the basis for discussions, which culminated

in Ghazālī’s giving preference to divine revelation over demonstrative argu-
ments of philosophy.97
Appendix
God’s transcendence / Neoplatonism

↓
divine active intellect
↓
waḥy in the prophet, philosopher and ruler of the perfect state
cognition and knowledge / Aristotelianism
universal philosophy and demonstration
↓
experience, knowledge of premises
↓
application in religion, its jurisprudence and theology
religion as a particular, an “imitating” picture of philosophy
↓
language and communication
↓
teaching the mass / “education” with “imitating” pictures of rhetoric, learning
↓
“verification” (taṣḥīḥ) of knowledge
↓
“insight” (raʾy) as assimilation of man to God
theory → practice
↓
man’s “acting” (afʿāl) in the perfect state / Platonism
“places” cf. Fārābī, Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, ed. Ǧ. Āl Yāsīn, p. 66, 10-ult. / Engl. transl. M. Mahdi,
pp. 26 f.
97 In his Tahāfut al-falāsifa: Cf. F. Griffel, “Al-Ghazālīʾs (d. 1111) Incoherence”, pp. 197–199.
448 chapter 23
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chapter 24
Das Fārābī-Bild des Maimonides

Ideentransfer als hermeneutischer Weg zu Maimonides’ Philosophie
Die philosophischen Traditionen des Fārābī in ihrer Auswirkung auf Maimoni-

des’ enzyklopädisches Werk Moreh Nevukhim, “Führer der Unschlüssigen”, sind
schon verschiedentlich Gegenstand der Forschung gewesen. Hierbei ist Mai-
monides’ ausdrücklicher Rückgriff auf Fārābī, Abhandlung über den Intellekt,
sowie auf drei verlorene Schriften des Fārābī, seinen Kommentar zu Aristoteles’
Physik und Nikomachischer Ethik und seine Abhandlung über Die veränderli-
chen seienden Dinge, diskutiert worden.1 In der Zwischenzeit sind weitere Texte
des Fārābī identifiziert worden, deren Titel Maimonides nicht nennt.2
Für Details eines zentral stehenden Themenkomplexes, nämlich Maimo-
nides’ Diskussion der Prophetie, ist auf Fārābīs Buch über den Musterstaat
verwiesen worden oder auf Ibn Sīnās diesbezügliche und letztlich von Fārābī
inspirierte Erörterungen.3 Maimonides nennt keine der politischen Schriften
des | Fārābī, ebenso keine von Fārābīs zahlreichen logischen Schriften, obgleich 200
er Letztere in einem Brief an den hebräischen Übersetzer seines Moreh Nevuk-
him für unübertroffen hält.4 Wir sind also gut beraten, nochmals das jetzt
1 Vgl. Shlomo Pines in der Einleitung zu seiner Übersetzung von Moses Maimonides, The
Guide of the Perplexed. With an Introductory Essay by Leo Strauss. I–II. Chicago/London
1963, S. lxxviii ff.
2 Vgl. Sarah Stroumsa, “Al-Fārābī and Maimonides on the Christian Philosophical Tradi-
tion: a Re-evaluation”. In Der Islam 68, 1991, S. 263–287: Zu Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim
1.71. – Gad Freudenthal, “Four Implicit Quotations of Philosophical Sources in Maimoni-
des’ Guide of the Perplexed”. In Zutot: Perspectives on Jewish Culture 2, Dordrecht (etc.) 2003
(S. 114–125), S. 123–125: Maimonides, Moreh I 31 benutzt Fārābī, as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya. –
Rémi Brague, “Mise à jour”. In Shlomo Pines, La liberté de philosopher. De Maïmonide à
Spinoza, Paris 1997 (S. 227–233), S. 228–229: Zu Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ǧadal als Quelle von Moreh
II 15, mit Verweis auf Georges Vajda, “À propos d’ une citation non identifiée d’Al-Fārābī
dans le «Guide des Égares»”. In JA 253, 1965, S. 43–50; dazu ergänzend Sarah Stroumsa,
“Al-Fārābī and Maimonides on Medicine as a Science”. In ASP 3, 1993 (S. 235–249), S. 247–
249.
3 Vgl. S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. lvii ff., bes. S. lxxviii ff. – Zu lbn Sīnā vgl. S. Pines, Guide, S.
xciii ff., und Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Maimonides’ Reticence Toward Ibn Sīnā”. In Avicenna
and His Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven/Louvain-La-Neuve, September
8 – September 11, 1999. Ed. Jules L. Janssens and Daniel De Smet. Leuven 2002. = Ancient
and Medieval Philosophy. Series 1/XXVIII, S. 281–296.
4 Mitgeteilt in S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. lx oben.

454 chapter 24
zugängliche Œuvre des Fārābī mit Maimonides zu vergleichen, an einem aus-

gewählten Detail zu prüfen, was Maimonides ausgewählt hat, was er weggelas-
sen hat und warum.
In früheren Vergleichen zwischen Fārābī und Maimonides, die teilweise
auch Maimonides’ Mišneh Torah,5 seine Maqāla fī ṣināʿat al-manṭiq6 und seine
Šemonah peraqim7 einbezogen haben, ist man je nach Einschätzung der fara-
bianischen Gedanken zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen gekommen. Grund-
legend ist hierbei Leo Strauss’ Interpretation geworden, der in drei in den
Jahren 1934, 1935 und 1936 erschienenen Veröffentlichungen die Prophetologie
beider Denker verglichen hat.8 Shlomo Pines hat 1965 in seiner Einleitung
zur englischen Übersetzung von Maimonides’ Moreh Nevukhim weitere Details
zugefügt.9 Maimonides stütze sich auf Fārābīs Lehre von der Vollendung des
Menschen und von seiner Glückseligkeit durch größtmögliche Annäherung
an den göttlichen aktiven Intellekt. Von Fārābī habe er seinen abstrakten und
bewusst Widersprüchlichkeiten in Kauf nehmenden Stil übernommen, um
201 die Ungebildeten abzu|schrecken.10 Doch in den politischen Theorien gebe
es Unterschiede zwischen beiden. So sei Moses der einzige Gesetzgeber, der
5 So Joel L. Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s Opinions of the Virtuous City and Maimonides’ Foun-
dations of the Law”. In Studia Orientalia memoriae D. H. Baneth dedicata. Jerusalem 1979,
S. 107–153.
6 Vgl. Harry A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion. I. Cambridge,
Mass. 1973, S. 551–560: “Note on Maimonides’ Classification of the Sciences”. – Joel L.
Kraemer, “Maimonides on the Philosophic Sciences in his Treatise on the Art of Logic”.
In Perspectives on Maimonides. Philosophical and Historical Studies. Ed. J. L. Kraemer.
Oxford 1991, S. 77–104.
7 Vgl. Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Shemonah Peraqim and Alfarabi’s Fuṣūl al-
Madanī”. In Essays in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy. Selected, and with an Intro-
duction by Arthur Hyman. New York 1977, S. 116–133. – Jeffrey Macy, “The Theologi-
cal-Political Teaching of Shemonah Peraqim: a reappraisal of the text and of its Arabic sour-
ces”. In Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 16–21,
1981. Division C. Jerusalem 1982, S. 31–40.
8 Leo Strauss, “Die philosophische Begründung des Gesetzes. Maimunis Lehre von der
Prophetie und ihre Quellen”. In Leo Strauss, Philosophie und Gesetz. Beiträge zum Ver-
ständnis Maimunis und seiner Vorläufer. Berlin 1935, S. 87–122. Auch erschienen in Monde
Oriental 28, Uppsala 1934, S. 99–139. – Leo Strauss, “Quelques remarques sur la science
politique de Maïmonide et de Fārābī”. In Revue des études juives 100, Paris 1936, S. 1–37. –
Leo Strauss’ Arbeiten verdrängten die, ungefähr gleichzeitig, im Jahr 1935 erschienene
vergleichende Studie von Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, “Maimonides’ Conception of State and
Society”. In Moses Maimonides, 1135–1204. Anglo-Jewish papers in connection with the 8th
centenary of his birth. Ed. Isidore Epstein. London 1935, S. 191–206.
9 S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. lxxviii ff.
10 S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. lxxix.
das fārābī-bild des maimonides 455
eine authentische Offenbarung, nämlich das göttliche Gesetz des Judentums,

empfangen habe, wogegen die anderen Propheten Plagiatoren seien.11 Moses
bedürfe im Unterschied zu den anderen Propheten nicht der vermittelnden
Funktion der Vorstellungskraft, welche prophetische Eingebungen in Form von
Bildern weitervermittle.
Hier wollen wir jetzt anknüpfen und dazu Maimonides selbst zu Worte
kommen lassen. Er schreibt: “Aber Moses vernahm die Stimme, ohne sich der
Vorstellungskraft zu bedienen, vom Deckel der Bundeslade zwischen den bei-
den Cherubim”.12 Moses wird daher in religiösem oder politischem Zusam-
menhang als “Herr der Propheten” (sayyid an-nabiyīn) bezeichnet13 oder in
einem philosophischen Zusammenhang14 als “Herr der Wissenden” (sayyid al-
ʿālimīn), wobei es einen Gradunterschied zu den anderen Propheten gibt.15
Diese verdienen nur dann den Namen eines Propheten, wenn die göttliche
“Vernunftemanation” (al-fayḍ al-ʿaqlī) auf “das Denkvermögen” (al-quwwa n-
nāṭīqa) und “die Vorstellungskraft” (al-quwwa al-mutaḫayyila) in vollkomme-
ner Weise wirkt. Maimonides zufolge16 müsse derjenige, der eine Einwirkung
der Vernunftemanation nur auf das Denkvermögen, nicht oder in mangelhaf-
ter Weise aber auf die Vorstellungskraft erfährt, lediglich zu der Kategorie “der
Gelehrten und Theoretiker” (al-ʿulamāʾ ahl an-naẓar)17 gerechnet werden. Und
wer eine Einwirkung der göttlichen Venunftemanation lediglich auf die Vor-
stellungskraft erfahre, aber von Natur oder wegen mangelnder Übung über zu
wenig Denkvermögen verfüge, gehöre zu den “Staatslenkern, den Gesetzge-
bern, Wahrsagern und Zauberern sowie denjenigen, die wahre Träume haben”
(al-mudabbirūn li-l-mudun wa-wāḍiʿū n-nawāmīs wa-l-kuhhān wa-z-zāǧirūn
wa-arbāb al-aḥlām aṣ-ṣādiqa).18
11 Moreh II 39–40. – Vgl. S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. xc–xci.

12 Moreh II 45, Ende / arab. Text ed. Hüseyin Atay, Ankara 1974. = Ankara Üniversitesi
Ilāhiyat Fakültesi Yayinları 93, S. 447, 9 / engl. Übers. S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. 403. – Vgl.
Altes Testament, Exodus 25:22. – Hier und in den nachfolgenden Verweisen auf Shlomo
Pines’ englische Übersetzung wurde jeweils auch die wertvolle deutsche Übersetzung
von Adolf Weiss, Mose Ben Maimon, Führer der Unschlüssigen (2 Bde., Leipzig 1923 /
Nachdr. Hamburg 1995) herangezogen.
13 Zum Beispiel Moreh II 19 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 336, 19.
14 Zum Beispiel Moreh II 28 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 363, 9.
15 Diese Stufung beschreibt Maimonides auch in der später als Moreh verfassten arabischen
und nur hebräisch erhaltenen “Abhandlung über die Einheit”: Siehe Maamar hajichud.
Ed. Moritz Steinschneider. Berlin 1847, Kapitel 2 (Inhaltsübersicht S. XII).
16 Moreh II 37 / engl. Übers. S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. 373ff.
17 Arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 410, 8.
18 Arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 410, 13–14.
456 chapter 24
202 Diese Differenzierung, die im Grunde genommen Fārābīs Gedanken von der
Unterschiedlichkeit der Menschen weiterführt19 ist von modernen Interpre-
ten in unterschiedlicher Weise missverstanden worden. Abweichend von Leo
Strauss20 sieht Shlomo Pines21 hier einen Widerspruch: Warum entbehre
der Prophet Moses der Vorstellungskraft und erfahre die direkte Einwirkung
der göttlichen Vernunftemanation, nicht aber der Regent, der im Gegenteil
durch die Vorstellungskraft qualifiziert sei? Erwin I. J. Rosenthal geht in
seinen 1957 gehaltenen Franz-Delitzsch-Vorlesungen22 nicht hierauf ein;
ebensowenig Alvin J. Reines in einem 1970 erschienenen Aufsatz über “Mai-
monides’ Concept of Mosaic Prophecy”;23 Lawrence V. Berman konnte in
seinem 1974 erschienenen Aufsatz über “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfā-
rābī”24 hierauf keine Antwort geben und begnügte sich mit dem Hinweis, dass
für Maimonides Moses sowohl “Herr der Propheten” war als auch Herr der
demonstrativen Philosophie, der in Fārābīs System der Stellung des Philosoph-
Regenten entspreche und somit eine Verbindung zwischen vollkommener spe-
kulativer Vernunft und vollkommener praktischer Aktivität forme.25
Die widersprüchliche Auffassung vom Propheten Moses und von den ande-
ren Propheten erscheint bis heute ungeklärt. Auch die umfangreiche, 2001
erschienene Monographie von Howard Kreisel, Prophecy. The history of an
idea in medieval Jewish Philosophy,26 vermag keine Antwort zu geben. Jeffrey
Macy hatte in seinem 1986 veröffentlichen Vergleich zwischen Fārābīs und
Maimonides’ Prophetentum27 die Erkläung vorgeschlagen, dass Maimonides
hier einer Ambiguität bereits bei Fārābī gefolgt sei; dieser habe in seinen Schrif-
19 Vgl. zu dessen Echo bei Maimonides G. Freudenthal, “Four Implicit Quotations” (s.
Anm. 2), S. 124.
20 Vgl. dessen Philosophie und Gesetz (s. Anm. 8), S. 95–96.
21 S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1) S. xci.
22 Veröffentlicht unter dem Titel Griechisches Erbe in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des
Mittelalters. Stuttgart 1960, Kap. 4 (“Sendungsprophetie und Natürliche Prophetie”).
23 In Hebrew Union College Annual 40–41, 1969–1970, S. 325–361.
24 In IOS 4, 1974 (S. 154–178), S. 166 zu Anm. 42.
25 Vgl. auch Lawrence V. Berman, “The Political Interpretation of the Maxim: The Purpose
of Philosophy is the Imitation of God”. In Studia Islamica 15, 1961, S. 53–61, bes. S. 59–60. –
Lawrence V. Berman, “Maimonides on Political Leadership”. In Kinship and Consent.
The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses. Ed. Daniel J. Elazar. Ramat
Gan, Philadelphia (etc.) 1981, S. 113–125.
26 Dordrecht (etc.) 2001. = Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 8, S. 210ff.
27 Jeffrey Macy, “Prophecy in al-Farabi and Maimonides: The Imaginative and Rational
Faculties”. In Maimonides and Philosophy. Papers Presented at the Sixth Jerusalem Phi-
losophical Encounter, May 1985. Ed. Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel. Dordrecht
(etc.) 1986. = Archives Internationales d’ Histoire des Idées 114, S. 185–201.
ten in uneinheitlicher Weise über Offenbarung als Quelle rationaler Erkennt-

nis für | den Philosophen gesprochen, der nicht immer als Prophet dargestellt 203
werde und der die Phantasie, die Vorstellungskraft lediglich benutze, um mit
den Bildern der Religion die nichtphilosophische Masse zu überreden.
Diese Erklärung setzt ein Fārābībild voraus, das nicht dem Textbefund und
der ihm angemessenen Interpretation entspricht. Es ist schon ein fundamenta-
ler Irrtum, anzunehmen, dass bei Fārābī die Verwendung des Begriffes “Offen-
barung” “nicht mehr sei als eine Anpassung an volkstümlichen Glauben” –
“nothing more than an accommodation to popular beliefs”.28
Im Gegenteil, für Fārābī ist die Offenbarung, die Eingebung des göttlichen
aktiven Intellekts, Quelle aller Erkenntnis.29 Wenn Fārābī zufolge die nach-
ahmende Vorstellung auf die gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen “Partikularien”
(al-ǧuzʾiyāt), auf “die getrennten Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt al-mufāriqa) und
auf “alle erhabenen Dinge” gerichtet sei, kurzum auf dasjenige, was vom gött-
lichen Intellekt inspiriert sei, spreche man von “Prophetie” (nubuwwa). Diese
trete dann auf den Plan, wenn die philosophische Erkenntnis dessen, was gut
ist, nicht ausreiche und der Ergänzung bedürfe durch die “Eingebung” (waḥy)
des göttlichen aktiven Intellekts.
Es ist daher kein Wunder, dass für Fārābī der Regent des Musterstaates nicht
nur Philosoph, sondern auch Prophet sein muss. Da den Regenten die göttli-
chen Eingebungen des aktiven Intellekts in der Form von Nachahmungen der
Wahrnehmungen und Intelligibilia erreichen, kann er sie auch in dieser Form
an die Menschen, seine Untertanen, weitergeben. Er hat die Aufgabe, in phi-
losophischen Beweisführungen den philosophisch Gebildeten zu überzeugen
und die Masse, die nur ein “bildhaftes Wissen” habe, durch “Warnungen” und
“Vorschriften” zu überreden. Als Philosoph kann er sich in seiner Instruktion
des Bürgers verschiedener Hilfsmittel der Logik und Beweisführung bedienen,
als Prophet bedient er sich der Metaphern der rhetorisch-poetischen Sprache.
Hierbei entpuppen sich die prophetischen Warnungen nicht als unvoll-
kommenes, der Philosophie unterlegenes Wissen, das auf die Anhänger der
Religion und deren Unzulänglichkeit im Verstehen philosophischer Wahrheit
zugeschnitten ist. Im Gegenteil: Da sie vom göttlichen aktiven Intellekt gespeist
sind, ergänzen sie das philosophische Wissen. Dies geschieht in einer Weise,
die der Ergänzung der theoretischen Erkenntnis dient durch praktische Ori-
entierung, moralische Einsicht und praktische Klugheit. Die Religion und ihre
28 J. Macy, “Prophecy” (s. Anm. 27), S. 192.

29 Vgl. zu den nachfolgenden Ausführungen Hans Daiber, “The Ruler as Philosopher. A new
interpretation of Fārābī’s view”. In MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, pp. 128–149. = H. Daiber, From the
458 chapter 24
Partikularien werden so zu einer “Nachahmung”, zu einem ergänzenden Bild

204 der Philosophie, der Universalien, ohne mit dieser identisch zu sein. Sie | ist
ein “Instrument” der Philosophie und verhilft dieser, zur Wirklichkeit zu wer-
den. Denn Philosophie ist primär praktische Ethik.
Nun muss – wie schon gesagt – ein guter Philosoph-Regent auch ein Pro-
phet sein – dies sowohl im Hinblick auf die Anhänger der Religion, die Masse,
als auch angesichts der Grenzen philosophischen Wissens. Philosophie und die
rhetorisch-poetischen Mittel der Sprache erscheinen als unvollkommene Hil-
fen beziehungsweise Werkzeuge der Religion.
Philosophisches Wissen muss durch den göttlichen intellectus agens, näm-
lich durch prophetische Eingebungen vermittelt und ergänzt werden. Hierbei
kann das Wissen, das der Regent so erhält, in Form von nachahmenden Bil-
dern an den Untertan vermittelt werden. Diese Nachahmungen ersetzen das
Original, das nur in der Form von Abbildem wahrgenommen und weitervermit-
telt werden kann. Diese Abbilder erscheinen orientiert an der Wirklichkeit –
ebenso wie das philosophische Denken in seiner Interdependenz von Theorie
und Praxis.
Diese Analogie zwischen Religion und Philosophie – Fārābī spricht von Reli-
gion als Nachahmung der Philosophie – erlaubt den philosophischen Beweis
für religiöse Wahrheiten sowie die Verwirklichung philosophischer Erkennt-
nis in der Religion. Daher ist der Regent im Musterstaat nicht nur ein Philo-
soph, sondern auch ein Prophet, der Gottes Eingebung erfährt und als Regent
des Staates Gottes Vorschriften an seine Untertanen vermittelt. Diese sollen in
zunehmender “Angleichung” an Gott den Vorschriften der Religion nacheifern.
Gleichzeitig hat Fārābī das Wissen des Philosoph-Regenten und Prophet-
Regenten als Nachahmungen klassifiziert, deren Original die Idee des Mus-
terstaates ist. Hier erscheint die Wirklichkeit des Menschen als “politisches
Wesen” (ζῷον πολιτικόν) mit ethischen Verpflichtungen in der Gemeinschaft
des Staates betont. Philosophie ist nicht mehr ein Privileg der Spezialisten, der
Elite, sondern kann durch den Philosoph-Regenten an den Bürger vermittelt
werden – nämlich in der Gestalt der Religion und der von ihr vorgeschriebenen
Regeln und Gesetze. Als eine Nachahmung der Philosophie erscheint Religion
als eine Verwirklichung der wahren Philosophie, die sich an der Praxis orien-
tiert weiß, als Ethik.
In seiner Diskussion hatte Fārābī in der Nachfolge von Aristoteles’ Nikoma-
chischer Ethik die drei Seelenkräfte Sinneswahrnehmung, Verstand und Stre-
ben eingeführt, die das ethische Handeln des Menschen sowie seine Erkennt-
nis des Richtigen steuern. Fārābī integrierte hier den aristotelischen Begriff
der φρόνησις, der praktischen “Einsicht”: Die Intelligibilien sind nicht nur ein
Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, sondern vermitteln auch sittliche
Einsicht, Erkenntnis des erstrebenswerten Guten und des zu meidenden

Schlechten. Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis und sittliche Einsicht hängen zu-
sammen. Der Mensch kann nicht allgemein tugendhaft sein, sondern nur,
indem er das Gute praktiziert. Theorie und Praxis gehören zusammen, wobei
einerseits die Vernunft, die philosophische Erkenntnis, das tugendhafte Han-
deln bestimmt und | andererseits die vernunftorientierte Einsicht in das erstre- 205
benswerte Gute und das zu meidende Schlechte auf das Handeln des Men-
schen gerichtet ist. Es orientiert sich an der Wirklichkeit und ist nicht rein
theoretisch.
In dieser an der Praxis orientierten Philosophie der Ethik kann Fārābī sich
auf eine aristotelische Lehre stützen, die in der Fārābīforschung bislang über-
sehen worden ist, nämlich auf die Interdependenz von Denken und Wahrneh-
mung. Das allgemein Gute, die Idee des Guten, ist nicht denkbar ohne sinn-
liche Wahrnehmung. Daher haben Aristoteles und in seiner Nachfolge Fārābī
die “Vorstellungskraft” (φαντασία) eingeführt; diese schickt als Vermittler zur
Denkseele die “Sinneswahrnehmungen” (Aristoteles: αἰσθήματα), beziehungs-
weise die “Vorstellungsbilder” (Aristoteles: φαντάσματα) des wahrgenomme-
nen Objektes.30
Diese “Vorstellungsbilder” nennt Fārābī “Nachahmungen” (muḥākāt) – eine
terminologische Neuschöpfung des Fārābī. Alles sinnlich Wahrnehmbare, aber
auch alle “Intelligibilia” (al-maʿqūlāt) werden von der Vorstellungskraft nachge-
ahmt. Denn nicht das Wahrgenommene oder das Gedachte selbst gelangt in die
Denkseele des Menschen, sondern lediglich eine Imitation, ein Bild. Die Seele
denkt in Bildern.
Die hier zugrunde liegende Interdependenz von Denken und Wahrneh-
mung ist für Fārābī eine weitere Rechtfertigung für die aristotelische Kombi-
nation von wissenschaftlicher “Erkenntnis” (ἐπιστήμη) und sittlicher “Einsicht”
(φρόνησις), von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft. Dieses Miteinander
von wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und sittlicher Einsicht kommt in Fārābīs
“Musterstaat” (al-madīna al-fāḍila) und in seiner “Musterreligion” (al-milla al-
fāḍila) zum Ausdruck. Denn “die Partikularien” (al-ǧuzʾiyāt) der Religion ent-
sprechen den “Universalien” (kulliyāt) der Philosophie, die die Partikularien
beweist.31 Insofern erscheint die Musterreligion als Nachahmung der Philoso-
phie. Sie ist ihr “ähnlich” (šabīha).32
30 Vgl. auch Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic
Philosophy. Leiden (etc.) 1990. = IPTS 7, S. 189 ff.
31 Vgl. Fārābī, al-Milla. Ed. Muhsin Mahdi. Beirut 1968, S. 47, 12–17.
32 Vgl. Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 31) S. 46, 22. – H. Daiber, “Ruler” (s. Anm. 29),
S. 11.
460 chapter 24
Diese Ähnlichkeit beruht, wie wir gesehen haben, auf gemeinsamer Struk-
tur. Gleichzeitig aber entpuppt sich die Religion keineswegs als wertloses Ab-
bild der Philosophie. Denn sie allein kann die Bürger des Musterstaates über-
zeugen, das zu glauben und zum Erreichen der höchsten Glückseligkeit das zu
tun, was sich von der Philosophie her beweisen, aber nicht von ihr herleiten
lässt.
Dies bedeutet keineswegs, dass Philosophie eine Dienerin der Religion ist.
Denn die Wirklichkeitsbezogenheit der Philosophie ist Fārābī zufolge nicht
nur erkenntnistheoretisch beweisbar, nämlich mit der aristotelischen Lehre
von der Interdependenz von Denken und Wahmehmung. Die Musterreligion
206 ist auch ein praktisches, durch die Philosophie als gültig erwiesenes Beispiel |
für den Zusammenhang von wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und sittlicher Ein-
sicht, und insofern eine Nachahmung der Philosophie. Mit ihren Vorschriften
und Regeln sorgt sie für die Praxisbezogenheit der Ethik und hat das Ziel, die
sittliche Einsicht der Philosophie zu verwirklichen.
Hier zeigt sich, dass der Zusammenhang von Theorie und Praxis in Philo-
sophie und Religion auch Religion und Philosophie strukturell miteinander
verbindet. Philosophie und Religion sind ebenso aufeinander angewiesen wie
Denken und Wahrnehmung, Theorie und Praxis, wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis
und sittliche Einsicht, religiöser Glaube (“Einsichten”) und Handeln nach den
Vorschriften der Gesetze. Der Nachweis dieser Zusammenhänge ist die origi-
nelle Leistung des Fārābī.
Bei Maimonides ist von diesen Gedanken des Fārābī recht wenig übrig
geblieben. Die erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen des Fārābī vermisst
man, und an die Stelle der farabianischen Religion als Komplex von Vorschrif-
ten und “vorzüglichen Gesetzen” (šarāʾiʿ fāḍila)33 sowie als Abbild der Philoso-
phie ist bei Maimonides34 das wegen einer “gewissen Nützlichkeit”35 univer-
sell gültige und göttliche jüdische Gesetz getreten. Dieses ersetzt seit Moses
die anderen Gesetze, kann aber später durch einen Propheten oder durch die
Versammlung der “Weisen” (ḥakhāmīm) allenfalls vorübergehend suspendiert
oder ergänzt worden sein.36 Es führe den Einzelnen durch “Spekulation” (an-
naẓar) und rationale “Forschung” (al-baḥṯ) zu menschlicher Vollkommenheit,
33 Fārābī, al-Milla, ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 31), S. 47, 2 ff.

34 Vgl. zu Maimonides Jeffrey Macy, “The Rule of Law and the Rule of Wisdom in Plato, al-
Fārābī, and Maimonides”. In Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions. Papers presented at
the Institute for Islamic-Judaic Studies. Ed. William M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks.
Atlanta 1986, S. 205–232.
35 Moreh III 26 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 576, 15ff. / engl. Übers. S. Pines, Guide
(s. Anm. 1), S. 508.
36 Vgl. J. Macy, “Rule” (s. Anm. 34), S. 218.
nämlich zu einer Vollkommenheit in Vernunft und Erkenntnis.37 Diese setze

die “erste Vollkommenheit”, nämlich in materieller Hinsicht, voraus, die nur
in der Gemeinschaft und im Zusammenspiel mit der Gemeinschaft38 erreicht
werden könne.39
Maimonides integriert einzelne Traditionen der farabianischen Philosophie,
hat aber Fārābīs Offenbarung, Quelle der theoretischen Erkenntnis und sittli-
chen Einsicht durch Vermittlung der Vorstellungskraft, ersetzt durch | die Ver- 207
nunftemanation direkt an Moses, den Propheten par excellence, der nicht der
vermittelnden Vorstellungskraft bedarf. Denn die Vorstellungskraft vermittelt
sozusagen nicht die nackte Wahrheit, sondern nur Bilder, die in Maimonides’
Augen wegen der Unterschiedlichkeit einer wörtlichen oder figürlichen Deu-
tung zu Widersprüchlichkeiten führen40 und daher ebenso wenig als gleichran-
gig mit der direkten Vermittlung der Wahrheit an den Propheten Moses gelten
können wie das Hören von Gottes Wort durch Vermittlung eines Engels.41 Hier
ist Aristoteles’ Wechselbezug zwischen Denken und Wahrnehmung und Aris-
toteles’ Konzept von der Vorstellungskraft aufgegeben zugunsten einer Episte-
mologie,42 in der die Vorstellungskraft wegen ihrer bildhaften und deswegen
verfälschenden Darstellung nicht den Rang einer direkten Wahrheitsvermitt-
lung einnimmt und somit nicht mit dem direkten Sprechkontakt zwischen
Gott und Moses vergleichbar ist.
Im Gegensatz hierzu hatte Fārābī in seiner Schrift al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala
fī l-manṭiq43 zu einem bestimmten Grade die bildhafte Darstellung schwie-
riger Dinge, das Ersetzen schwieriger Dinge durch leichter Vorstellbares und
Vergleichbares für möglich gehalten. Hierin sah Maimonides jedoch eine der
37 Moreh III 27 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 580 / engl. Übers. S. Pines, Guide (s.
Anm. 1), S. 511; zitiert bei J. Macy “Rule” (s. Anm. 34), S. 216. – Vgl. Menachem Kellner,
Maimonides on Human Perfection. Atlanta 1990. = Brown Judaic Studies 202.
38 Vgl. auch Moreh II 40 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 419ff. / engl. Übers. S. Pines,
Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. 381 ff., und Aristoteles, Politik I 2.
39 Moreh III 27 / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 579, 18ff. / engl. Übers. S. Pines, Guide
(s. Anm. 1), S. 511.
40 Vgl. Moreh I Vorwort / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 22, 13ff. / engl. Übers. S. Pines,
Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. 17 ff.
41 Vgl. Moreh II 45, Ende / arab. Text ed. H. Atay (s. Anm. 12), S. 445ff. / engl. Übers. S. Pines,
Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. 402–403.
42 Vgl. zu ihr auch Joel L. Kraemer, “Maimonides on Aristotle and the Scientific Method”.
In Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 19, 1989, S. 53–88, bes. S. 62ff. und
80. – Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn
Bajja, and Maimonides”. In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature. Ed. Isadore
Twersky. Cambridge/London 1979 (S. 82–109), S. 89ff.
43 Ed. M. Mahdi (s. Anm. 31), S. 88–91. – Vgl. H. Daiber, “Ruler” (s. Anm. 29), S. 8–9.
462 chapter 24
Ursachen für Widersprüche, die man in Büchern finden kann. Maimonides

diskutiert dies offensichtlich unter dem Eindruck der genannten Fārābīschrift.
Deren These von der Gleichheit von Ding und Abbild und die damit begründete
pädagogische Theorie vom Bild als Hilfsmittel zur Erleichterung des Lernens
wird kritisiert, weil sie zu Widersprüchen führe.
Als Folge dieser Kritik an der Wertigkeit des Vorstellungsbildes können wir
jetzt verstehen, warum Moses in den Augen des Maimonides nicht der Vorstel-
lungskraft bedarf und damit den anderen Propheten überlegen ist, aber auch
den “Staatslenkern und Gesetzgebern”, die Maimonides zufolge zu denen gehö-
ren, “die eine Einwirkung der göttlichen Vernunftemanation lediglich auf die
Vorstellungskraft erfahren, aber von Natur oder wegen mangelnder Übung über
zu wenig Denkvermögen verfügen”.44 Deutlich ist der Unterschied zu Fārābī,
für den der Regent des Musterstaates ein Philosoph und Prophet ist, der durch
208 Vermittlung der Vorstellungskraft, der nachahmenden Vorstellung, die | Ema-
nationen des göttlichen aktiven Intellekts empfängt. Ein Charakteristikum von
Fārābīs Lehre von der Prophetie, nämlich die Nachahmung der Vorstellungs-
kraft, spielt bei dem Propheten par excellence, Moses, keine Rolle mehr und
nimmt bei den im Rang nachfolgenden Empfängern der Emanationen des gött-
lichen aktiven Intellekts lediglich eine vermittelnde Rolle ein.
Auffälligerweise hat diese negative Einschätzung der Vorstellungskraft eine
Parallele bei dem älteren, gleichfalls in Cordoba geborenen Zeitgenossen Abra-
ham Ibn Daud (1110–1180AD). In einer 1990 von Resianne Fontaine veröf-
fentlichten Quellenanalyse45 von Ibn Dauds in Toledo um 1160, also 30 Jahre
vor Maimonides’ Moreh, geschriebenem Werk ha-Emunah ha-ramah,46 ist auf
diese Abweichung von Fārābī hingewiesen worden, ohne allerdings die Paral-
lele bei Maimonides zu notieren. Nun gibt es, worauf R. Fontaine47 hinweist,
in Ibn Dauds Diskussion der Prophetie eine ganze Anzahl von Parallelen zu Ibn
Sīnā. Sie zählt dazu auch Ibn Dauds von Fārābī abweichende Einschätzung der
Vorstellungskraft. Hier sollten wir allerdings darauf hinweisen, dass Ibn Dauds
Einschränkung der Rolle der Vorstellungskraft kein Erbe Ibn Sīnās ist – denn
Ibn Sīnā folgt im Großen und Ganzen Fārābī.48
44 Siehe oben zu Anm. 18.

45 Resianne Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud. Sources and Structures of
Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah. Assen/Maastricht 1990. = Studia Semitica Neerlandica 26, S. 143–
144.
46 Fünfte Grundlehre, Abschnitte I und II. – Vgl. die deutsche Übersetzung von Simon Weil,
Das Buch Emunah Ramah oder: Der erhabene Glaube. Frankfurt a.M. 1852, S. 88ff.
47 In Defence of Judaism (s. Anm. 45), S. 144–145.
48 Vgl. D. L. Black, Logic (s. Anm. 30), S. 210 ff. – Zu Ibn Sīnā vgl. auch John Peter Por-
Angesichts weiterer Parallelen zwischen Ibn Dauds und Maimonides’, aller-

dings wesentlich detaillierterer und teilweise erheblich abweichender Diskus-
sionen der Prophetie,49 aber auch anderer Themen,50 könnte Maimonides in
diesem Punkt von Ibn Daud inspiriert gewesen sein.51 Hierfür spricht manches,
wobei wir uns bewusst bleiben sollten, dass Maimonides auf dieselben Quellen
wie Ibn Daud zurückgegriffen und offensichtlich weitere Texte zur Verfügung
hatte. Die Abhängigkeit des Maimonides von Ibn Daud ist daher nicht eindeu-
tig klärbar. Überdies betont Ibn Daud mehr die Tugendhaftigkeit des Propheten
Moses, nicht aber seine intellektuelle Überlegenheit über die anderen Prophe-
ten. Diese hatte Maimonides mit der Nähe zu Gott begründet, weswegen Moses
nicht der Vermittlung der Vorstellungskraft bedürfe. | Bei dieser Pointierung 209
handelt es sich um eine Neuerung des Maimonides, die wie gesagt seiner Kritik
an Fārābīs Theorie vom Bild als pädagogischem Hilfsmittel entspringt – ferner
seiner Kritik an Fārābīs Übertragung der Abbildtheorie im Rahmen der Lehre
von der Vorstellungskraft auf seine Doktrin von der Prophetie.
Abweichend von Fārābī betont Maimonides hier die direkte Kommunika-
tion zwischen Gott und dem Propheten, nämlich Moses. Die Vorstellungskraft
als vermittelnde und damit mehr oder weniger verfälschende Instanz ist den
übrigen Propheten zu eigen, aber auch in variierender Weise den “Gelehr-
ten und Theoretikern”, den “Staatslenkern, den Gesetzgebern, Wahrsagern und
Zauberern, sowie denjenigen, die wahre Träume haben”.52
Die von uns herausgearbeitete Neubewertung der Vorstellungskraft bei Mai-
monides und die Konsequenz für Maimonides’ Fārābībild lässt Zweifel auf-
kommen an der von Shlomo Pines Fārābī zugeschriebenen inneren Wider-
sprüchlichkeit in ihrer Auswirkung auf Maimonides. Sie lässt auch Zweifel
aufkommen an Pines’ offensichtlich von Leo Strauss53 initiierter These,
dass beide sich eines schwer verständlichen Stils bedienten, um unqualifizierte
Leser nicht zu Fehldeutungen zu verleiten, die für den Autor und die Gesell-
telli, The Concept of Imagination in Aristotle and Avicenna. Diss. Montreal, McGill Uni-
versity 1979, S. 32 ff., bes. S. 57 ff.
49 Vgl. R. Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism (s. Anm. 45), S. 149ff.
50 Vgl. R. Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism (s. Anm. 45), Register s.n. Maimonides.
51 Auf einen solchen Einfluss hat bereits A. Weiss (einer Anregung von Jacob Guttmann
folgend) in der Einleitung zu seiner oben (Anm. 12) genannten deutschen Übersetzung
des Moreh hingewiesen, allerdings mit der Einschränkung, dass beide aus einer gemein-
samen Quellen geschöpft haben könnten (S. CLXXVI–CLXXVII).
52 S. Anm. 18.
53 Vgl. zu diesem hier Georges Tamer, Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne.
Das Verhältnis von Leo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. Leiden (etc.) 2001. =
IPTS 43, bes. S. 244 ff.
464 chapter 24
schaft verhängnisvoll werden könnten.54 Eine solche These lässt sich nicht aus
Fārābīs Werken ableiten. Sie verdankt offensichtlich ihre Entstehung Maimoni-
des’ Diskussion der Ursachen der Widersprüchlickeiten im Vorwort zum Moreh
Nevukhim.55 Eine davon ist Maimonides zufolge der Trugschluss, eine schwie-
rige Sache durch ein für die Vorstellungskraft des Lesers oder Zuhörers leichter
verständliches, aber verfälschendes Bild erklären zu wollen. Diese kritische
Einschätzung des Bildes und der Vorstellungskraft hat Maimonides zu erheb-
lichen Abweichungen von Fārābī veranlasst. Es ist daher falsch, Maimonides
als uneingeschränkten Schüler des Fārābī einzustufen. Ideentransfer erscheint
hier als modifizierte Adaption, die es im vorliegenden Fall verbietet, Fārābī
durch die Brille des Maimonides zu sehen. Die analysierende Beschreibung der
Unterschiedlichkeit und ihrer Ursachen verhilft gleichzeitig zu einem besseren
Verständnis der beiden Denker Maimonides und Fārābī.
Summary
The Jewish philosopher and scholar Maimonides (d. 1204AD) was heavily influ-
enced in his concept of prophecy by the Muslim philosopher Fārābī. However,
he differs from Fārābī in several points. Maimonides assumes a direct commu-
nication between God and the prophet, Moses. Fārābī’s imitating power of ima-
gination merely played a mediating role between God and the other prophets,
the scholars and the rulers. Contrary to Fārābī’s high estimation of imagination
as a correlating bridge between divinely inspired thought and man’s virtuous
acting in the perfect state, and contrary to Fārābī’s high estimation of the image
of reality (→ H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/17, II/18, II/21), Maimo-
nides had a negative view of imagination, as we find it already before him in
his older contemporary Abraham Ibn Daud (1110–1180 AD). According to him,
Moses is intellectually superior to the other prophets and does not require the
imagination because of his nearness to God. Herewith, he is criticizing Fārābī’s
concept of the image as a pedagogic tool for the teaching of philosophy to the
citizen by using imitating pictures. Because of his concerns regarding the role
of imagination, Maimonides in fact cannot be considered as a pupil of Fārābī.
Nor should we look at Fārābī through the eyes of Maimonides, as has been done
by modern interpreters (Leo Strauss, Shlomo Pines).
54 Vgl. S. Pines, Guide (s. Anm. 1), S. lxxix und lxxxvi.

55 Vgl. hierzu Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics,
and Moral Philosophy. Chicago/London 1990, S. 67–90: “Maimonides’ Method of Contra-
dictions”.
Additional Remark
An elaboration of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements of Maimoni-

des’ doctrine of prophecy (based on Fārābī) is Rosalie Helena de Souza
Pereira, A herança greco-árabe na filosofia de Maimônides: profecia e imagi-
nação. In Kriterion. Belo Horizonte 131, 2015, pp. 107–128.
Republished, with some modifications, from The Trias of Maimonides / Die Trias des
Maimonides. Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture of Knowledge / Jüdische, arabi-
sche und antike Wissenskultur. Ed. Georges Tamer. Berlin/New York 2005. = Studia
Judaica XXX, pp. 199–209. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 25
Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī

as-Siǧistānī in der Forschung*
I Einführung 466 – II Forschungsgeschichte 467 – III Die Quellen des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
469 – IV Exzerpte aus dem Ṣiwān al-ḥikma 474 – V Das Verhältnis des Muntaḫab zum
Muḫtaṣar Ṣiwān al-ḥikma 477 – VI Textkritische Anmerkungen zum Muntaḫab Ṣiwān
al-ḥikma 478 – VII Schlussbetrachtung 498 – Summary 499 – Supplementary Remarks
499
I Einführung
Die Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī (gest. ca. 374/985) zugeschriebene

Kompilation Ṣiwān al-ḥikma ist kein originelles Werk. Dennoch kann sie das
Interesse der Wissenschaft beanspruchen, weil sie zahlreiche, z.T. verlorene
Quellen verarbeitet hat. Außerdem gibt sie uns einen Eindruck von Bildungs-
stand und Inhalt der philosophischen Diskussionen in Bagdad und in der ost-
persischen Provinz Siǧistān (Sīstān) im 10. Jh. AD.
Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma bietet in chronologischer Reihenfolge eine Exzerpten-
sammlung aus philosophischen, philosophiegeschichtlichen und vor allem
gnomologischen Schriften. Der Text beginnt mit Thales und endet mit einem
Artikel über Abū Sulaymān al-Maqdisī, einen Zeitgenossen des Abū Sulaymān
al-Manṭiqī. Wie man schon lange weiß1 ist das Werk in mindestens2 zwei kür-
zenden Rezensionen aus dem 12. Jh. AD erhalten, nämlich im anonymen Mun-
taḫab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma3 und im Muḫtaṣar Ṣiwān al-ḥikma des ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān
* Zugleich eine Besprechung von Douglas Morton Dunlop (Hrsg. v.): The Muntakhab
Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah of Abū Sulaimān As-Sijistānī. Arabic Text, Introduction and Indices. The
Hague/Paris/New York 1979. = Near and Middle East Monographs IV. XXXVII + 198 S. – Vgl.
Dimitri Gutas, The Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikma Cycle of Texts. In JAOS 102, 1982, S. 645–650.
1 Auf die Handschriften hat erstmals Martin Plessner, Beiträge zur islamischen Literatur-
geschichte I. In Islamica 4, Lipsiae 1931 (S. 525–561), S. 534–538, hingewiesen.
2 Zu einer möglichen dritten Rezension s. Anm. 50.
3 Hrsg. v. ʿA. R. Badawī (s. Kap. II Nr. 5) und v. D. M. Dunlop (s. Anm.*). – Der Muntaḫab
wird wohl Ende des 12. oder zu Beginn des 13. Jh. AD verfasst worden sein: Vgl. W. Al-
Qāḍī (s. Kap. III Anm. 39), S. 93. – Frank Griffel hat, einer Anregung von Muḥammad
Taqī Dānišpažūh (1959) folgend, als Autor des Muntaḫab Muʿīn ad-Dīn Abū l-ʿAlāʾ Muḥam-

der ṣiwān al-ḥikma und abū sulaymān al-manṭiqī as-siǧistānī 467
as-Sāwī an-Naysābūrī (lebte um 540/1145).4 Ein chronologisch angeordnetes

und hauptsächlich biobibliographisches “Supplement” (Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-
ḥikma) | zum islamischen philosophiegeschichtlichen Teil schrieb der Gelehrte 37
Ẓahīr ad-Dīn al-Bayhaqī (gest. 565/1169 oder 1170).5
II Forschungsgeschichte
Früher erschienene Arbeiten über Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī haben sich zu-
meist ausschließlich auf Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdīs Œuvre6 gestützt:
– Im Jahre 1933 schrieb Muḥammad Khan Qazvīnī eine 46 Seiten umfas-
sende Monographie in Persisch,7 wovon die Seiten 8–31 und 44–46 in den
Dirāsāt al-adabiyya 2, Beirut 1960–1961, S. 249–274 in arabischer Überset-
zung veröffentlicht wurden.
– Aḥmad Amīn verfasste eine kurze Skizze in seinem in Kairo 1940–1962
erschienenen zehnbändigen Werk Fayḍ al-ḫāṭir in Teil 7, S. 329–341.
– Ebenso stützte sich auf Tawḥīdī Fehmi Jadaane, La philosophie de Sijis-
tānī. In Studia Islamica 33, 1971, S. 67–95.
– Doch erst Joel L. Kraemer8 hat in seiner noch nicht ersetzten Disserta-
tion “Abū Sulaymān Al-Sijistānī: a Muslim Philosopher of the Tenth Century”.
Yale University 1967, versucht, ein umfassendes Bild zu geben. Dabei hat
er erstmalig vom Ṣiwān al-ḥikma in der vorhandenen Kurzform sowie von
kleineren, bis dahin bekannt gewordenen Abhandlungen des Abū Sulaymān
Gebrauch gemacht.9
mad Ibn Maḥmūd an-Naysābūrī al-Ġaznāwī (d. 590/1194) wahrscheinlich machen können:
s. Frank Griffel, On the Character, Content, and Authorship of Itmām Tatimmat Ṣiwān
al-ḥikma and the Identity of the Author of Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. In JAOS 133, 2013,
pp. 1–20.
4 Zu diesen vgl. Kap. V.
5 Carl Brockelmann, GAL I, S. 324; S I, S. 557. – Der Text wurde hrsg. v. Muḥammad Shāfiʿ,
Lahore 1935, und von Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Taʾrīḫ ḥukamāʾ al-Islām. Damaskus 1946. –
Eine Auswahl ist mit Kommentar übersetzt worden v. Max Meyerhof, ʿAlī al-Bayhaqīʾs
Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma. In Osiris 8, Brügge 1948, S. 122–217.
6 Dieses ist auch im Ṣiwān herangezogen worden, s. Kap. III.
7 Šarḥ-i ḥāl-i Abū Sulaymān Manṭiqī Siǧistānī. Chalon-sur-Saône. Genannt von D. M. Dunlop,
S. XII.
8 Genannt (aber nicht weiter benutzt) von D. M. Dunlop, S. XII.
9 Vgl. auch Joel L. Kraemer, Three Unpublished Philosophical Treatises of Abū Sulaymān
as-Sijistānī. In Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Orientalists (Ann Arbor 13th–
19th August 1967), Wiesbaden 1971, S. 238–240. Die dort genannten Abhandlungen sind jetzt
von ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī herausgegeben worden (s. Anm. 10). Die genannten Arbeiten
468 chapter 25
– Einige Materialien zu Abū Sulaymāns Biographie und Philosophie findet

man ferner in ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawīs Einleitung zu seiner in Teheran
1974 erschienenen Edition des Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-hikma (arab. Einl. S. 5–71;
gekürzte franz. Einl. S. 3–41).10
38 – Da Abū | Sulaymān und seine “Schule” zu den Schülern des Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī
(gest. 363/974) gehören, hat der Herausgeber von Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdīs Tahḏīb al-
aḫlāq, Nāǧī at-Takrītī seiner 1978 in Beirut/Paris erschienenen Edition ein
Kapitel (S. 38–46) über den Siǧistānīkreis und einige seiner Ideen eingefügt.
Man vergleiche jetzt auch N. at-Takrītī, al-Falsafa l-aḫlāqiyya l-aflāṭūniyya
ʿind mufakkirī l-Islām. Beirut 1979, S. 165–188.
– Die genannten Arbeiten von J. L. Kraemer, ʿA. R. Badawī und N. at-
Takrītī haben zusätzlich ein Werk herangezogen, das unabhängig von
Badawīs Edition (s.o. Nr. 5) 1979 nochmals und viel besser von D. M. Dun-
lop herausgegeben wurde, nämlich die bereits genannte anonyme Kurz-
fassung (Muntaḫab) des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. Hauptsächlich dieser Ausgabe von
Douglas Morton Dunlop ist vorliegende Miszelle gewidmet.
– Der Wert und die Brauchbarkeit des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma für die islamische Phi-
losophiegeschichte wird nicht dadurch geschmälert, dass das Werk wahr-
scheinlich gar nicht von Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī stammt, sondern erst 17
Jahre oder mehr nach Abū Sulaymāns Tod kompiliert worden ist. Daniel
von Joel L. Kraemer sind eingeflossen in seine Monographie Philosophy in the Renais-
sance of Islam. Abū Sulaymān Al-Sijistānī and His Circle. Leiden 1986.
10 Diese Einleitung ist wiederabgedruckt worden in ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Quelques
figures et thèmes de la philosophie islamique. Paris 1979, S. 95–136. – Badawīs Ausgabe
enthält im Anhang folgende drei kleine Abhandlungen (nach der Teheraner Hs. Maǧlis-i
Šūrā-i Millī 94): a) Maqāla fī l-aǧrām al-ʿulwiyya ḏawāt anfus nāṭiqa (S. 367–371); b) Maqāla
fī l-muḥarrik al-awwal (s. 372–376); c) Maqāla fī l-kamāl al-ḫāṣṣ bi-nawʿ al-insān (S. 377–
387). – Alle drei Abhandlungen sind von J. L. Kraemer (s. Anm. 9), S. 278ff., nach den Hss.
Teheran und Rampur (2845) übersetzt worden. Zur letztgenannten Abhandlung vgl. auch
Mübahat Türker, Le traité inédit de Siǧistānī sur la perfection humaine. In Pensamiento
25, Madrid 1969, S. 207–224 (enthält neben dem Text auch eine ausführliche Einleitung). –
Weiteres handschriftliches Material: Die 1. Abhandlung steht auch Patna 2641/8 (Kata-
log II 475); die 3. Abhandlung befindet sich auch in der Hs. Irak Museum (Bagdad) 952,
S. 153 (150) – 166 (163), und in der Hs. Academia das Ciencias de Lisboa V. 292, fol. 32 v–37
v (Anfang abweichend). – Eine weitere Abhandlung ist Abū Sulaymān, Kalām fī mabādiʾ
al-mawǧūdāt wa-marātib quwāhā wa-l-awṣāf allatī tūṣafu ḏ-ḏāt al-ūlā bihā wa-ʿalā ayy
waǧh waṣafathā n-Naṣārā bi-t-tawḥīd wa-l-kaṯra wa-l-ǧawhariyya wa-l-uqnūmiyya: Hrsg. v.
Gérard Troupeau, Un traité sur les principes des êtres attribué à Abū Sulaymān Al-
Siǧistānī. In Pensamiento 25, 1969, S. 259–270. = Gérard Troupeau, Études sur le christia-
nisme arabe au Moyen Âge. Aldershot 1995, Nr. VIII. – Eine bisher nicht beachtete Maqāla
fī l-aǧsām al-uwal al-arbaʿa llatī hiya n-nār wa-l-hawāʾ wa-l-arḍ (etc.) steht in der bereits
erwähnten Lissaboner Hs. auf fol. 51 r–55 r.
Gimaret (1978) und Wadād Al-Qāḍī (1981) haben mit guten Gründen die
Verfasserschaft des Abū Sulaymān für den Ṣiwān al-ḥikma in Zweifel gezo-
gen (s. Kap. III Anm. 38 und 39).
– Als unschätzbare Quelle für die Wiederentdeckung von in Griechisch und
Arabisch verfassten gnomologischen sowie philosophie- und wissenschafts-
geschichtlichen Schriften ist der Ṣiwān häufig (aber noch nicht erschöp-
fend!) herangezogen worden. Zu nennen sind hier außer der Dissertation
von Joel L. Kraemer (s.o. Nr. 4)11 noch Roger Arnaldez,12 Douglas
Morton Dunlop,13 Dimitri Gutas,14 Jörg Kraemer,15 Franz Rosen-
thal,16 | Gotthard Strohmaier17 und Manfred Ullmann18. – Auch 39
als biographische Quelle ist der Ṣiwān immer wieder benutzt worden: Er-
wähnt seien hier George N. Atiyeh,19 Douglas Morton Dunlop,20
Franz Rosenthal21 und Samuel Miklos Stern.22
III Die Quellen des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
Über die Quellen des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma wissen wir noch längst nicht alles. Franz
Rosenthal23 hat für §19–26 Ibn Ḥunayns Taʾrīḫ al-aṭibbāʾ nachgewiesen, wel-
cher seinerseits auf Johannes Philoponus’ verlorenem Geschichtswerk basiere.
Ferner ist Ḥunayns auf griechischen Quellen basierende Sammlung Nawādir
11 Vgl. auch Kap. VI zu Z. 2399 ff.

12 L’ histoire de la pensée grecque vue par les Arabes. In Bulletin de la société française de
philosophie 72, Paris 1978, S. 117–168. – Vgl. Kap. VI zu Z. 67–75; 76ff.; 210ff.
13 Philosophical Discussions in Sijistān in the 10th century A.D. In AAWG.PH. 3. F. Nr. 98,
1976, S. 108–114. – Vgl. Kap. VI zu Z. 2690 ff.; 2927 ff.; 2948ff.; 3262ff.
14 Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation. A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia.
New Haven, Conn. 1975 = American Oriental Series 60. – Vgl. Kap. VI passim.
15 Arabische Homerverse. In ZDMG 106, 1956, S. 259–316; 107, 1957, S. 511–518 (Nachträge). Von
D. M. Dunlop S. IX genannt.
16 Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn’s Taʾrīḫ al-aṭibbāʾ. In Oriens 7, Leiden 1954, S. 55–80. Von D. M. Dunlop S.
XVIII genannt. – Vgl. Kap. VI zu Z. 464–466; 591–592; 801; etc.
17 S. Kap. IV Anm. 57; ferner Kap. VI zu Z. 447–450; 571; 1188–1189; 1492–1494.
18 Die arabische Überlieferung der sogenannten Menandersentenzen. Wiesbaden 1961. = AKM
34/1. Von D. M. Dunlop S. XV genannt. – Vgl. Kap. VI zu Z. 499ff.
19 Al-Kindī: The Philosopher of the Arabs. Rawalpindi 1966 (S. 216–257: Biographie des Kindī).
Genannt D. M. Dunlop S. 113 Anm.
20 Biographical Material from the Ṣiwān al-Ḥikmah. In JRAS 1957, S. 82–89.
21 S. Kap. VI zu Z. 2668–2671; 2692 ff.
22 S. Kap. VI zu Z. 3442.
23 S. den Anm. 16 genannten Aufsatz.
470 chapter 25
(ādāb) al-falāsifa24 für den gnomologischen Teil eine sehr wichtige Vorlage
gewesen.25 Dimitri Gutas denkt darüber hinaus auch an gnomologische
Sammlungen der Ḥunayn-“Schule”. So wird z.B. Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn in der Hs.
Köprülü I 1608 als Übersetzer von Nawādir falsafiyya genannt und zitiert.26 Als
weitere gnomologische Quelle können wir Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqīs Amṯāl al-
Yūnāniyīn hinzufügen.27
Für das griechische philosophiegeschichtliche Material ist Dunlop zufolge
Porphyrius’ verlorene Schrift Philosophus historia eine wichtige Quelle gewe-
40 sen.28 Ferner kann an die im Arabischen Ammonius zuge|schriebenen und im
Griechischen gleichfalls nicht erhaltenen Placita philosophorum gedacht wer-
den, worin Vorsokratikern neuplatonische Lehren zugeschrieben werden.29
Dies scheint jedoch im vorliegenden Fall nur in sehr geringem Maße und wohl
nur indirekt der Fall gewesen zu sein (s.u. Z. 106 ff.).
Als wichtige Quelle für das vorsokratische Material habe ich Pseudo-Plu-
tarch (= Aetius), Placita philosophorum in der arabischen Übersetzung des
Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā nachweisen können.30
24 Nur erhalten in späteren Bearbeitungen und Auszügen (eine wird Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī
al-Anṣārī zugeschrieben: Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Kuweit 1985), sowie in der
hebräischen Übersetzung des Judah Ben Salomon al-Ḥarīzī (hrsg. u. übers. v. Abra-
ham Loewenthal, Berlin 1896; genannt von D. M. Dunlop S. XV). – Vgl. D. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 38 f.; und Kap. VI zu Z. 943.
25 Diese Vermutung D. M. Dunlops (S. XVII) ist von D. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 450 Tabelle,
m.E. mit guten Gründen befestigt worden. Zu weiteren gnomologischen Quellen des
Ṣiwān s. D. Gutas, S. 274 f.; 331; 379 f.; 426 ff.
26 Vgl. D. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 48 ff.
27 S. Kap. IV Nr. 9.
28 Einl. S. XXII; vgl. arab. Text § 14 sowie EI2 II Sp. 949 a (Richard Walzer) und Helmut
Gätje, Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam. Heidelberg 1971.
= Annales Universitatis Saraviensis. Reihe: Philos. Fakultät 11, S. 79.
29 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung. Wiesba-
den 1980. = Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der Ori-
entalischen Kommission 33, S. 2; S. 290 Anm. 15 (lies dort statt Porphyrius “Ammonius”!)
und S. 817. – Ferner Kap. VI zu Z. 106 ff. – Wie man dem Aufsatz von Ilai Alon, Ḥik-
mah and Ḥaqq: Divine Attributes. In Studia Orientalia memoriae D. H. Baneth dedicata (s.
u. Z. 3115), S. 95 f., entnehmen kann, erscheinen in der einzigen Hs. Aya Sofya 2450, wel-
che den Ammonius zugeschriebenen Text auf fol. 107 v–135 v enthält, islamische Namen
wie al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī und Abū Naṣr. Der Text ist also offensichtlich von einem Muslim
(nach meinem Eindruck in geringem Maße) redigiert worden. – Vgl. jetzt die Edition
von Ulrich Rudolph, Die Doxograhie des Pseudo-Ammonios. Ein Beitrag zur neuplato-
nischen Überlieferung im Islam. Stuttgart. = AKM 49/1.
30 H. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 80 f.; vgl. S. 816 f. – Eine falsche Identifikation (Diogenes Laer-
tius) erscheint noch bei Roger Arnaldez (s. Anm. 12), S. 125f.
Außerdem werden arabische Übersetzungen folgender griechischer Texte

zitiert: Menandersentenzen;31 Hippokrates’Aphorismen32 und sein Eid;33 Pytha-
goras’ “Goldene Verse” in der Fassung des Iamblichus;34 Johannnes Philoponus’
Contra Aristotelem (griechisch und arabisch nicht erhalten);35 Galens Kompen-
dium der platonischen Republik (griechisch und arabisch nicht erhalten);36 die
§ 223–231 überlieferte Geschichte zwischen Galen und dem König “Bāz” sowie
dessen Sohn Glaukon lässt sich vorläufig nicht identifizieren.
Damit ist die Reihe der benutzten arabischen Übersetzungen griechischer
Quellen sicherlich noch nicht abgeschlossen. Vgl. z.B. Kap. VI zu Z. 943 und
1518ff.
Außer arabischen Übersetzungen griechischer Texte sind auch eine Anzahl
islamischer Werke exzerpiert worden. Hierbei muss zunächst geklärt werden,
ob die Exzerpte vom Verfasser das Ṣiwān eingefügt worden sind oder vom
späteren Redaktor des Textes. Wenn man | zunächst die allein bei Ẓahīr ad- 41
Dīn al-Bayhaqī37 vorkommende Zuschreibung des Ṣiwān an Abū Sulaymān al-
Manṭiqī akzeptiert, kommt man nicht umhin, zahreiche Exzerpte aus Werken
jüngerer Zeitgenossen des Abū Sulaymān einem späteren Epitomator zuzu-
schreiben, welcher seinerseits als Vorlage für die Redaktoren des Muntaḫab
und Muḫtaṣar gedient haben müsste. Oder Abū Sulaymān müsste im Rah-
men eines regen Gedanken-und Schriftenaustausches zwischen den Gelehr-
ten seiner Generation (vgl. z.B. Kap. VI zu Z. 485 f.) Werke seiner wesentlich
jüngeren Zeitgenossen zitiert haben. Oder man nimmt mit Daniel Gima-
ret38 an, dass der von Bayhaqī genannte Abū Sulaymān Muḥammad Ibn
Ṭāhir Ibn Bahrām as-Siǧistānī verschieden ist von Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī
as-Siǧistānī. Die von Gimaret erhobenen Bedenken gegen die traditionell
angenommene Autorenschaft des Ṣiwān sind jetzt von Wadād Al-Qāḍī ver-
31 Arab. Text § 97–100; zuerst von J. L. Kraemer (s. Anm. 15), S. 307ff., nachgewiesen. Die
arab. Übersetzung der Menandersentenzen ist von M. Ullmann (s. Anm. 18) herausge-
geben worden.
32 Nr. 1, 2, 3 und 5 werden im arab. Text § 110 zitiert. Der arabische Text der Aphorismen (es
gibt mindestens zwei Übersetzungen) ist noch nicht ediert: s. Manfred Ullmann, Die
Medizin im Islam. Leiden/Köln 1970. = Handbuch der Orientalistik I, Erg.bd. VI/1, S. 28. –
Fuat Sezgin, GAS III, 1970, S. 28 f.
33 Arab. Text § 111.
34 Arab. Text § 34–38; vgl. Z. 499 ff.
35 Arab. Text § 235–237; vgl. Kap. VI zu Z. 2400 ff.
36 Im Ṣiwān (Muntaḫab § 16) zitiert nach der Überlieferung von ʿAlī Ibn Yaḥyā Ibn an-Nadīm;
vgl. J. L. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 219 f., und Kap. VI zu Z. 209f.
37 Tatimma (s. Anm. 5). – S. Anm. 38.
38 Sur un passage énigmatique du Tabyīn d’ Ibn ʿAsākir. In SI 47, 1978 (S. 143–163), S. 155.
472 chapter 25
tieft worden.39 Wenn auch die von ihr vorgeschlagene Zuschreibung des Ṣiwān
an den wenig bekannten ʿĀmirīschüler Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib vorläufig nicht
stringent beweisbar ist,40 wird man dennoch auf Grund der von ihr vorgebrach-
ten Argumente annehmen müssen, dass der Ṣiwān nicht von Abū Sulaymān
al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī stammt. Davon ausgehend, dass der Ṣiwān zwischen
1004 und 1029AD geschrieben worden ist (so W. Al-Qāḍī, S. 115), sind die
zahlreichen Exzerpte aus Werken des Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, Miskawayh und
ʿĀmirī auf den Kompilator des Ṣiwān zurückzuführen und müssen nicht – auch
nicht teilweise – einem späteren Epitomator (den Verfassern des Muḫtaṣar
und Muntaḫab) zugeschrieben werden. Das Quellenproblem findet so eine
überraschend einfache, wenn auch nicht alle Fragen beantwortende Lösung.41
42 Wadād Al-Qāḍī hat in einem Anhang (S. 120–|123) alle Stellen aus dem Mun-
taḫab und Muḫtaṣar zusammengestellt, welche auf Abū Ḥayyān at Tawḥīdī (al-
Baṣāʾir wa-ḏ-ḏaḫāʾir; al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa; aṣ-Ṣadāqa wa-ṣ-ṣadīq; al-Muqā-
basāt)42 und auf Miskawayh (Ǧāwīdān ḫirad = al-ḥikma al-ḫālida;43 Taǧārib
al-umam)44 beruhen. Hinzufügen können wir jetzt die Konkordanz einer wei-
teren islamischen Quelle des Ṣiwān, nämlich Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad Ibn
Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī an-Naysābūrī (gest. 381/992), al-Amad ʿalā l-abad: Muntaḫab,
39 Kitāb Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma: Structure, Composition, Authorship and Sources. In Der Islam 58,
1981, S. 87–124.
40 In der auf ʿĀmirīs Name folgenden Eulogie qaddasa llāhu rūḥahū l-ʿazīz (ed. D. M. Dun-
lop, Z. 49) sieht W. Al-Qāḍī, S. 116, einen Hinweis auf ein besonders enges Verhāltnis
zwischen dem Autor des Ṣiwān und ʿĀmirī. Indessen kommt dieselbe Eulogie auch bei
der Erwähnung von Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧazī (= as-Siǧistānī), ed. D. M. Dunlop, Z. 718,
vor. Bewiesen ist mit der Eulogie lediglich, dass die genannten Autoren zum Zeitpunkt
der Kompilation des Ṣiwān nicht mehr am Leben waren.
41 Z.B. würde man gerne erfahren, wie es möglich ist, dass zahlreiche Dicta in Tawḥīdīs
Baṣāʾir einem anonymen faylasūf oder ḥakīm zugeschrieben werden, im Muntaḫab und
Muḫtaṣar die Philosophen aber namentlich genannt werden. Ferner möchte man wis-
sen, aus welcher Schrift die Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī zugeschriebene bibliographische
Notiz im 377/987 vollendeten Fihrist des Ibn an-Nadīm (ed. Riḍā Taǧaddud, Teheran
1971, S. 304, 11 f.) stammt.
42 Die Muqābasāt sind herausgegeben worden von Ḥasan as-Sandūbī (Kairo 1347/1929),
Muḥammad Tawfīq Ḥusayn (Bagdad 1970) und Daniel Watrigant (thèse de 3e
cycle, Paris-Sorbonne 1973). Die Seitenangaben hier beziehen sich auf die Kairener Aus-
gabe. – Bei den Zitaten aus den Muqābasāt, sowie bei der Erwähnung von Tawḥīdīs Buch
al-Hawāmil wa-š-šawāmil denkt D. M. Dunlop (S. XXVI) noch an spätere, vom Epitoma-
tor des Muntaḫab stammende Einfügungen.
43 Anders D. M. Dunlop (S. XXIV) und D. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 450 (Tabelle), wonach
umgekehrt Miskawayh den Ṣiwān benutzt hat. Dies stößt bei Miskawayhs “Vermächtnis”
(Waṣiyya) auf Schwierigkeiten, weswegen D. M. Dunlop (S. XXIV Anm. 107) §297–300
dem späteren Epitomator zuschreiben muss.
44 S. Kap. VI zu Z. 3015 ff.
ed. Douglas Morton Dunlop, Z. 50–87 = al-Amad, ed. Everett K. Row-

son,45 S. 70, 2–75, 2 (Auslassungen: S. 70, 9f.; 74, 3 f. und 13f.) / ed. Samuel Mik-
los Stern,46 S. 333, 1–335, 19 (Auslassungen: S. 333, 8 f.; 335, 5 und 15 f.) / Übers.
S. M. Stern, S. 328–333;47 Muntaḫab Z. 106–115 = al-Amad S. 78, 2–79, 6; Mun-
taḫab Z. 116–176 = al-Amad S. 80, 1–86, 5; Muntaḫab Z. 2806–2823 = al-Amad S.
55, 6–58, 2. – Ein islamisches Werk, welches in ismailitischen Kreisen verbrei-
tet war, wird im Schlusskapitel des Muntaḫab exzerpiert: § 310 enthält ein Stück
aus den Abū Sulaymān al-Maqdisī beigelegten Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (s. Kap. VI
zu Z. 3645ff.). – Ferner sei hier die in islamischen Kreisen entstandene und an
griechische Traditionen anknüpfende Aristoteles-Alexander-Romanlite|ratur 43
(Briefwechsel zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander) genannt: s. Kap. VI zu Z.
943.
Bisher handschriftlich nicht nachweisbare, aber im Muntaḫab ausdrücklich
genannte Quellen sind:
– Abū Isḥāq aṣ-Ṣābiʾ: §295 (al-Fuṣūl al-ʿašara) und Z. 2705 ff.
– Abū Maʿšar, Aḫbār al-umam as-sālifa min al-Maġribiyīn: § 90
– Abū Tammām an-Naysābūrī, Risāla fī l-ḥudūd: § 290
– Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī, Amṯāl al-Yūnāniyīn: § 256; vgl. Kap. IV Nr. 9 Anm. 57
45 Beirut 1979. = Wisdom of Persia Series XXII.

46 In seinem wichtigen Artikel “Ibn Masarra, Follower of Pseudo-Empedocles – an Illusion”.
In Actas do IV Congresso de Arabes e Islamicos (Coimbra-Lisboa 1968), Leiden 1971, S. 325–
337. = Samuel Miklos Stern, Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Thought. Ed. F. W. Zimmer-
mann. London 1983, Nr. 5. S. M. Stern weist dort nach, dass Miguel Asin Palacios’
Studie (s. Kap. VI zu Z. 106 ff.) auf Ṣāʿids irrtümlicher Zuweisung pseudoempedokleischer
Lehren (welche nach dem Referat von ʿĀmirī vorgetragen werden; s. Anm. 47) an Ibn Mas-
arra aufbaut: Vgl. Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, Ṭabaqāt al-umam. Ed. Louis Cheikho. Beirut 1912,
S. 21, 8–10; übernommen von Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ. Ed. August Mül-
ler. Königsberg i.Pr. 1884, I, S. 37, 1 f.; (Nicht wörtlich) übernommen von Ibn al-Qifṭī,
Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ. Ed. Julius Lippert. Leipzig 1903, S. 16, 4f. – S. M. Stern ist dabei ent-
gangen, dass vor ihm bereits A. E. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul
Arabi. Cambridge 1938 / Nachdr. Lahore 1964, S. 179–183, Ṣāʿids Angabe in Zweifel gezogen
hatte.
47 Wie M. S. Stern nachgewiesen hat, ist ʿĀmirī auch Quelle für Ṣāʿid, Ṭabaqāt al-umam,
gewesen (nicht wörtlich). – Diejenigen ʿĀmirīpassagen, die sämtlich auch von Abū Sulay-
mān exzerpiert worden sind und bei Ṣāʿid stehen, hat S. M. Stern mit englischer Über-
setzung und kurzem Kommentar in dem Anm. 46 genannten Artikel herausgegeben. Mit
Ṣāʿid teilt Abū Sulaymān folgende ʿĀmirīpassagen: Muntaḫab Z. 54–59: Vgl. Ṣāʿid, ed. L.
Cheikho (s. Anm. 46), S. 22, 5–9; Muntaḫab Z. 59–62 (min šarrihim): Vgl. Ṣāʿid, ed. L.
Cheikho, S. 23, 1–4; Muntaḫab Z. 63–66: Vgl. Ṣāʿid, ed. L. Cheikho, S. 23, 8–12; Muntaḫab
Z. 77–78: Vgl. Ṣāʿid, ed. L. Cheikho, S. 24, 6; Muntaḫab Z. 107: Vgl. Ṣāʿid, ed. L. Cheikho,
S. 21, ult.
474 chapter 25
– Abū Zakariyāʾ aṣ-Ṣaymarī: §§69, 263 und 285; vgl. Kap. VI Z. 3252 ff.
– Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Yaḥyā: s.u. Z. 176–226
– Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī: §242: Sentenzen von al-Kindī; vgl. Kap. IV
Nr. 9 Anm. 57
– ʿAlī Ibn Yaḥyā an-Nadīm, at-Taʾrīḫ: §16; vgl. Kap. VI Z. 209 f.
– ʿĀmirī, Kitāb an-Nusk al-ʿaqlī: §260
– ʿĪsā Ibn Zurʿa: §§281–282
– Kindī, Fī l-amrāḍ al-balġamiyya: §§243–24448
– Šāhid Ibn al-Ḥusayn,49 Tafḍīl laḏḏāt an-nafs: § 258
– Sinān Ibn Ṯābit: §252.
IV Exzerpte aus dem Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma ist viel benutzt und zitiert worden.
Douglas Morton Dunlop nennt in der Einleitung zu seiner Ausgabe S.

XXIIIf.:
– Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal; vgl. die Stellenkonkordanz bei
Wadād Al-Qāḍī (s. Kap. III Anm. 39), S. 123 f.
– Mubaššir Ibn Fātik, Muḫtār al-ḥikam (vgl. Anm. zu Z. 463f., 492, 556–559,
662, 1488f., 2002ff. und 2061f.).
– Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad: Dieser Autor ist mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit
zu streichen, weil er nach W. Al-Qāḍī (S. 110 ff.) umgekehrt eine Quelle des
Ṣiwān war.
– Anonymus, Šaḏarāt fī ḥikam al-ḥukamāʾ al-aqdamīn (MS Fez 2509).
Dimitri Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 450 Tabelle, fügt noch folgende Werke hinzu:
– Anonymus, Muḫtār min kalām al-ḥukamāʾ al-arbaʿa al-akābir.50
– Ibn Hindū, al-Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya fī l-ḥikam al-yūnāniyya. Nach D. Gutas
hat Ibn Hindū (wie Mubaššir) den Ṣiwān nur benutzt sofern er nicht di-
rekt aus Ḥunayns Nawādir (eine Quelle auch des Ṣiwān) geschöpft habe.
– Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ nach den Exzerpten von Mubaššir.
48 Diese von Douglas Morton Dunlop, Arabic Civilization to A.D.1500. London/Beirut

1971, S. 231–233, übersetzte Risāla ist, wie man der Notiz Z. 2535ff. entnehmen kann, vom
Bearbeiter des Muntaḫab eingefügt worden.
49 Zeitgenosse des Rhazes: s. Ibn an-Nadīm, Fihrist, ed. Riḍā Taǧaddud (s. Anm. 41), S. 357,
10–12.
50 Geschrieben zwischen dem 11. und 14. Jh. AD.; von D. Gutas, (s. Anm. 14), S. 62ff., mit
Außerdem wird der Ṣiwān (Original oder Auszug) in folgenden Texten exzer-
piert:
– Bei Šahrazūrī (13. Jh. | AD), Rawḍat al-afrāḥ wa-nuzhat al-arwāḥ.51 In der 44
Teiledition (Einleitung) von Muḥammad Bahǧa al-Aṯarī52 lassen sich
folgende Passagen (mit Kürzungen und nicht immer wörtlich) auf den Mun-
taḫab zurückführen: Muntaḫab Z. 9–10; 13–16 = Rawḍa 146, 7–13; Muntaḫab
Z. 17–26 = Rawḍa 147, 20–148, 11; Muntaḫab Z. 27–30 = Rawḍa 148, 15–149, 2;
Muntaḫab 30–38 = Rawḍa 149, 8–150, 9; Muntaḫab 39–45 = Rawḍa 150, 11–151,
5; Muntaḫab 49–61 = Rawḍa 151, 7–152, 10; Muntaḫab 63–103 (ohne 94–98)
= Rawḍa 152, 12–155, 3; Muntaḫab 187–239 (ohne 192–196) = Rawḍa 155, 12–
159, ult. – Es folgt in Rawḍa 160–170 ein Exzerpt aus Ibn an-Nadīm, Fihrist.
Ed. Riḍā Taǧaddud (s. Anm. 41), S. 299ff. – Die genannten Rawḍaexzerpte
aus dem Ṣiwān umfassen auch Auszüge aus der arabischen Übersetzung von
Pseudo-Plutarch (= Aetius), Placita philosophorum.53 Hier sei noch darauf
hingewiesen, dass Šahrazūrī neben dem Ṣiwān auch Mubaššir und Bayhaqī
(Tatimma: s. Kap. I Anm. 5) benutzt hat.54 Er hat seinerseits im 15. Jh. AD
dem Perser Mirḫwand55 und im 17. Jh. dem türkischen Gelehrten Ḥusayn
Hezārfenn56 als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle gedient.
– Pseudo-Suyūṭī, Ǧāmiʿ al-kalimāt (MS Berlin 8727 = Petermann II 116): Vgl.
Kap. VI zu Z. 1492–1494. Auf fol. 38 r 3 der genannten Hs. steht ein Passus
über Sokrates, welcher dem Autor zufolge Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī ent-
nommen sei und welchen Abū Sulaymān in Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqīs Über-
setzung der Sokrateslegende gefunden habe.57 Gotthard Strohmaier
englischer Übersetzung herausgegeben. D. Gutas, S. 429ff., hält es für möglich, dass der
Text – der Abschnitt von Pythagoras bis Aristoteles – eine weitere Rezension des Ṣiwān
bietet.
51 Hss. sind z.B. Berlin 10056 und die davon abgeschriebene Kopie Berlin 10065.
52 In Nuṣūṣ falsafiyya muhdāt ilā Duktūr Ibrāhīm Madkūr. Hrsg. v. ʿUṯmān Amīn. Kairo 1976,
S. 135–170. – Das gesamte Werk ist herausgegeben von Syed Khurshid Ahmed, Nuzhat
al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ fī taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ. I–II. Hyderabad 1976.
53 S. H. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 816 f.
54 S. M. Ullmann (s. Anm. 18), S. 10. – Franz Rosenthal, Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik. In
Oriens 13–14, 1960–1961 (S. 132–158), S. 147 f.
55 S. Douglas Morton Dunlop S. XXIII103, und bereits Franz Rosenthal, Arabische
Nachrichten über Zenon den Eleaten. In Orientalia N.S. 6, 1937 (S. 21–67), S. 25.
56 S. F. Rosenthal (s. Anm. 55), S. 63.
57 S. Gotthard Strohmaier, Ethical Sentences and Anecdotes of Greek Philosophers
in Arabic Tradition. In Ve Congrès International d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants (Bruxelles
31 août–6 septembre 1970). Actes. Bruxelles o.J. = Correspondance d’Orient 11 (S. 463–471),
S. 467 / Nachdr. in Gotthard Strohmaier, Von Demokrit bis Dante. Hildesheim/Zürich/
476 chapter 25
zufolge57 habe Abū Sulaymān demnach eine (vielleicht nach einer syrischen
Sammlung angefertigte) Übersetzung des Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī benutzt.
Mit dieser “Übersetzung” sind sicherlich die Muntaḫab § 256 exzerpierten
Amṯāl al-yūnāniyīn gemeint. Da Pseudo-Suyūṭīs Passus über Sokrates nicht
im Sokrateskapitel des Muntaḫab (§§40–41) steht, ist die Möglichkeit gege-
45 ben, dass der Pseudo-Suyūṭītext den ungekürzten Ṣiwān oder eine vom |
Muntaḫab verschiedene Rezension gekannt hat.
– Wahrscheinlich nicht vom Ṣiwān abhängig, aber auf dieselben Quellen zu-
rückgehend, die auch im Ṣiwān benutzt worden sind, ist Abū Sulaymāns
älterer Zeitgenosse Ibn Abī ʿAwn al-Baġdādī (321/933 hingerichtet), Kitāb
al-Aǧwiba al-muskita (Hs. Wien Mixt. 1149 = Loebenstein 2297).58 Der Text
enthält auf fol. 1–8 r einen gnomologischen Teil, welcher in den bisheri-
gen Arbeiten noch nicht berücksichtigt worden ist. Dieser wurde hier nicht
vollständig mit dem Muntaḫab kollationiert (vgl. lediglich Kap. VI zu Z. 410
und 1871). Wie ein Vergleich mit der Berliner Hs. 8317 zeigt, ist das Werk
auch unter dem Titel Lubb al-lubāb fī ǧawābāt ḏawī l-albāb im Umlauf gewe-
sen.59 Die Berliner Hs. beginnt mit dem Abschnitt Min ǧawābāt al-ǧiddiyya
(fol. 3 v–81 v), welcher in der Wiener Hs. fehlt. Die Istanbuler Hs. Beya-
zit Devlet Halk (ehemals Umumi) Kütüphanesi 97 scheint vollständig zu
sein.60
– Ebenso nicht vom Ṣiwān, aber von denselben Quellen abhängig ist die jü-
disch-gnomologische Literatur islamischer Zeit. Dimitri Gutas, S. 40 und
302, nennt Ibn ʿAqnīn. – Weitere, in der islamischen gnomologischen For-
schung bisher nicht beachtete Quellen sind Ibn Gabirol, Iṣlāḥ al-aḫlāq ʿalā
raʾy afāḍil al-ḥukamāʾ al-mutaqaddimīn61 und Joseph Ben Meir Ibn Zabara
(12. Jh. AD), Sefer haš-ša ʿašūʿīm.62 Zum Text des Ibn Gabirol hat der Her-
New York 1966. = Olms Studien 43, S. 44–52. – Wie G. Strohmaier mitteilt, bezweifelt
Pseudo-Suyūṭī die Authentizität der Übersetzung.
58 1324/1906 von einer 630/1233 geschriebenen Hs. kopiert.
59 Es handelt sich also sicherlich und nicht “probably” (so Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿīd
Khan in EI2 III 683a) um ein- und dasselbe Werk.
60 Vgl. die von Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿīd Khan, Ibn Abī ʿAwn, a littérateur of the third
century. In IC 16, 1942, S. 210 f., gegebene Inhaltsübersicht, wonach dem 1. Abschnitt der
Berliner Hs. ein Kapitel über ǧawābāt ḏawī l-ādāb vorausgeht. Zu zwei Editionen s. BIPh
Nr. 4355f.
61 Hrsg. u. übers. v. Stephen S. Wise, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities. New York 1902;
21966.
62 Hrsg. v. Israel Davidson, New York 1914 / Engl. Übers. v. Moses Hadas, The Book of
Delight by Joseph Ben Meir Zabara. With an introduction by Merrian Sherwood. New
York 1932. – Auf das Buch hat mich Gerrit Bos hingewiesen.
ausgeber Stephen S. Wise, S. 108–113, die Parallelen zu Ḥunayns Nawādir

nachgewiesen.
– Dieselben gnomologischen Quellen wie im Ṣiwān werden schließlich
auch benutzt sein in den handschriftlich (Punjab University Library Lahore)
bewahrten und noch nicht herausgegebenen Nawādir al-aḫbār des Šihāb
ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥiǧāzī (gest. 875/
1470 oder 1471). Der von C. Brockelmann (GAL II S. 18) nicht genannte
Text wurde von Abdul Qayyum in IC 18, 1944, S. 254, S. 254–268 beschrie-
ben. | 46
V Das Verhältnis des Muntaḫab zum Muḫtaṣar Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
Von den erhaltenen Rezensionen des Ṣiwān al-ḥikma (s.o. Kap. I) hat Douglas
Morton Dunlop den anonymen Muntaḫab vollständig und vom Muḫtaṣar
des ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī im Appendix III, S. 173, eine Probeseite ediert.
Dem Appendix kann man entnehmen, dass der Muḫtaṣar einerseits sein Ori-
ginal in stärkerem Maße gekürzt hat, andererseits aber Abschnitte besitzt,
welche im Muntaḫab fehlen (z.B. den von D. M. Dunlop mitgeteilten Fārābī-
abschnitt).63 Eine solche Beobachtung findet man in D. Gutas’ Ausgabe des
Muḫtār min kalām al-ḥukamāʾ (s. Anm. 50) bestätigt: Dimitri Gutas hat im
textkritischen Apparat den Muntaḫab und den Muḫtaṣar des Ṣiwān eingear-
beitet und dabei zeigen können, dass der Muḫtaṣar trotz größerer Nähe des
Muntaḫab zum Original (D. Gutas S. 281) zahlreiche Weisheitssprüche (z.B.
von Sokrates und Saraḫsī)64 enthält, welche im Muntaḫab fehlen. Angesichts
der Wichtigkeit des Ṣiwantextes ist daher auch eine Ausgabe des Muḫtaṣar
notwendig.65 Eine solche Ausgabe muss die Überlieferungsgeschichte des Tex-
63 Auch hrsg. v. ʿA. R. Badawī in seiner Muntaḫab-Ausgabe (s. Kap. II Nr. 5), S. 28f.
64 Den Saraḫsīabschnitt hat Franz Rosenthal, From Arabic Books and Manuscripts IV. In
JAOS 76, 1956, S. 29 und 32 übersetzt. – Zu Saraḫsī hat Franz Rosenthal in einer Mono-
graphie (s. Kap. VI, zu Z. 2668) und in zwei weiteren Artikeln in JAOS 71, 1951, S. 135–142,
und 81, 1961, S. 222–224, alle Nachrichten und Fragmente gesammelt. Ergänzend hierzu
können wir das Fragment über die Kategorien in der Hs. Aya Sofya 4855, fol. 71 r, hinzufü-
gen: Hrsg. u. übers. in Hans Daiber, De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica
et islamica. The Category of Relation in Arabic-Islamic Philosophy. In Enrahonar. Supple-
ment Issue. Barcelona 2018, S. 431–490. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/10,
Kap. V.
65 Eine Inhaltsübersicht gibt ʿA. R. Badawī in seiner Muntaḫab-Ausgabe (s. Kap. II Nr. 5)
S. 26–28. – Einen genauen Vergleich des literarischen Aufbaus von Muḫtaṣar und Mun-
taḫab findet man bei W. Al-Qāḍī (s. Kap. II Anm. 39), S. 89ff. und 94ff. – Eine Edition des
Muḫtaṣar besorgte R. Mulyadhi Kartanegara in seiner unveröffentlichten Disserta-
478 chapter 25
tes berücksichtigen. Hier hat D. M. Dunlop in seiner Edition des Muntaḫab

gute Vorarbeit geleistet, aber längst nicht alle Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft. Im
textkritischen Apparat zu D. M. Dunlops Edition findet man in der Regel
die Parallelen bei Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ), Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn
(Taʾrīḫ al-aṭibbāʾ), Miskawayh (Ǧāwīdān ḫirad), Mubaššir (Muḫtār al-ḥikam)
und Tawḥīdī (Muqābasāt) erwähnt. Ferner wird auf die arabische Übersetzung
der Menandersentenzen (hrsg. v. M. Ullmann) und auf Hippokrates’ Apho-
rismen hingewiesen. Eine Stichprobe zeigt indessen, dass auf Varianten der
vergleichbaren und zugänglichen arabischen Texte häufig nicht hingewiesen
worden ist. Außerdem sind einige Quellen des Ṣiwān (s.o.) im textkritischen
Apparat nicht eingearbeitet worden. Dasselbe gilt für die mittelbar oder unmit-
telbar auf dem Ṣiwān basierenden Exzerpte (s.o.). Ferner hätten einige frühere
Arbeiten, welche den Ṣiwān herangezogen haben, nutzbringend herangezo-
47 gen oder zumindest genannt werden können. Diesbezüglich | werden in den
nachfolgenden Anmerkungen zur Ausgabe von D. M. Dunlop einige Litera-
turhinweise gegeben.
VI Textkritische Anmerkungen zum Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
Dunlop hat seiner äußerst verdienstvollen Edition 5 Handschriften zugrunde-

gelegt, wovon die Leidener Hs. Or 1333 (Golius) nur ein Fragment umfasst. Wie
ein Vergleich mit der von Badawī (s. Kap. II Nr. 5) besorgten Ausgabe zeigt,
ist Dunlop hierbei wesentlich sorgfältiger zu Werke gegangen als Badawī.
Letzterer hat nicht die Londoner und die Leidener Handschrift benutzt, aber
zusätzlich die Istanbuler Hs. Fatih 3222 (enthält den Muḫtaṣar Ṣiwān al-ḥikma)
herangezogen. Ist somit zwar ein weiterer Textzeuge zugänglich gemacht wor-
den, muss hier gleichzeitig darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Badawī im text-
48 kritischen Apparat nicht immer ein zuverlässiges | Bild vom handschriftlichen
Befund gibt. Hier hat Dunlop sorgfältigere Arbeit geleistet. Aber auch die End-
form des auf Grund der Handschriften rekonstruierten Textes ist in Dunlops
Ausgabe qualitativ viel besser.
Trotz der geschilderten Vorzüge weist Dunlops Ausgabe einige Mängel auf.
Sie hat zahlreiche Fehler, welche zu Lasten des Druckes gehen. Darüber hin-
aus gibt es eine Anzahl von Stellen, welche anders gelesen werden müssen.
Hier hat Badawī zuweilen das Richtigere. Er bietet ab und zu mögliche Alter-
tion The Mukhtaṣar Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma of ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī. Arabic text and introduc-
tion. PhD University of Chicago 1996.
nativlesungen, deren Richtigkeit am handschriftlichen Material nachgeprüft

werden müsste. Die nachfolgenden Anmerkungen (in der Zeilenzählung des
arabischen Textes von Dunlop) sind das Resultat eines Vergleiches mit Bada-
wīs Edition. Eingearbeitet sind Literaturhinweise, welche die zukünftige Arbeit
mit dem Text etwas erleichtern wollen.
Z. 7 lies Ibn ohne Alif. – Z. 20 naḥfaẓuhū : nach der arab. Placitaübersetzung (s.
Anm. 29) muss es yaḥfaẓuhā heißen. – Z. 24 wayafriḍu : so auch Šahrazūrī; der
Fehler stand wohl bereits im Ṣiwānexemplar, das Šahrazūrī benutzt hat. Dessen
Placitaexzerpte gehen auf den Ṣiwān zurück. Vgl. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 816:
wa-yaʿriḍu arab. Placita, ed. Daiber, S. 5, 7. – Z. 24-26 = Z. 460 f. = arab. Placita,
ed. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 5, 9–11. – Z. 36 ⟨hʾdn⟩ lies ⟨mʾdn⟩. – Z. 41 ⟨ʾsṭʾḫrʾ⟩ lies
⟨ʾstʾǧrʾ⟩. – Z. 43 lies mit den Hss. und den arab. Placita, ed. Daiber (s. Anm. 29),
S. 8, 9 ⟨qyṭs⟩. – Z. 51 lies Luqmān. – Z. 61 lies ruʾasāʾ. – Z. 66 lies bihī. – Z. 67-75
(= Exzerpt aus ʿĀmirī, s. Anm. 45) geht nach Arnaldez (s. Anm. 12), S. 129–131,
auf eine christliche Quelle zurück, worin die auf Eratosthenes zurückführbare
(hier Platon zugeschriebene) Lösung einer mathematischen Frage (Verdoppe-
lung des Würfels) in anekdotenhafter Form vorgetragen wird. Die Ṣiwānstelle
ist Sezgin, GAS V, S. 83 und 79 nachzutragen. Es ist durchaus denkbar, dass die
von Sezgin genannte pseudoplatonische und von Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā übersetzte
Schrift Uṣūl al-handasa (nicht erhalten) Quelle von Abū Sulaymāns Vorlage,
nämlich ʿĀmirī gewesen ist. Diese Vorlage (oder ʿĀmirīs Text) ist nach Stern
(s. Anm. 46), S. 330 Anm. 7, auch von Qazwīnī, Āṯār al-bilād. Ed. Ferdinand
Wüstenfeld. Göttingen 1848, S. 382f., benutzt worden. Sicherlich nicht auf
ʿĀmirī, sondern auf dessen Quelle basiert Mullā Luṭfī Maqtūl (15. Jh. AD), Risāla
fī taḍʿīf al-maḏbaḥ. Auch dort wird Platon als Quelle genannt. Die Risāla ist von
Şerefettin Yaltkaya herausgegeben und von Abdulhak Adnan sowie
Henri Corbin übersetzt worden (Paris 1940. = Études orientales publiées par
l’ Institut français d’Archéologie de Stamboul VI). – Z. 73 mutawāliya : mutawā-
tira ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45). – Z. 76ff. (§5.6) kommentiert Arnaldez (s. Anm. 12) | 49
S. 127f. – Z. 106ff. Mit dem Abschnitt, welcher Empedokles neuplatonische Leh-
ren in den Mund legt und wovon Ṣāʿid (s. Anm. 46) einen Teil übernommen
hat (vgl. Z. 107 mit Ṣāʿid 21, ult.s.), vgl. den Empedoklesabschnitt bei Šahras-
tānī, al-Milal wa-n-niḥal. Ed. William Cureton. Leipzig 1923, S. 260, 9 ff. /
Engl. Übers. in Miguel Asin Palacios, Mystical Philosophy of Ibn Masarra
and his Followers. Leiden 1987 (übers. nach dem span. Original Aben Masarra
y su escuela. Madrid 1914. = Obras escogidas I, Madrid 1946, S. 1–216), S. 49. –
Stern denkt in seinem Artikel Anbaduḳlīs (EI2 I, S. 183f.) an Ammonius’Placita
philosophorum (vgl. dazu Anm. 29) als Vorlage. Allerdings teilt die ʿĀmirīpas-
sage mit dem Empedoklesabschnitt der Istanbuler Ammoniushandschrift Aya
480 chapter 25
Sofya 2450, fol. 109 v, nur den Gedanken und nicht den Wortlaut. – Z. 107 lies wa-
l-qudra. – Lies mit den Hss. ḏū. laysa huwa + Nominativ ist auch in der Überzet-
zungsliteratur nachweisbar. Vgl. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 7. – makān mutamayyiz
(ed. Dunlop und ed. Badawī, S. 87, 4) : makān mutamayyiza liest die ein-
zige Hs. von ʿĀmirī, al-Amad, was der Herausgeber E. K. Rowson (s. Anm. 45),
S. 78, 3, m.E. zu Recht in maʿānin mutamayyiza verbessert. Letzteres haben auch
Ṣāʿid, Ṭabaqāt al-umam, ed. Cheikho (s. Anm. 46), S. 21, 11 (= Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa,
Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ (s. Anm. 46) I, S. 37, 3) und Ibn al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ, ed.
Lippert (s. Anm. 14), S. 16, 17, welche hier ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45) exzerpieren. –
Z. 108 lies mit ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45) und Badawī maʿlūmuhū wa-maqdūruhū wa-
murāduhū. – Z. 115 wuǧūdun : + ʿalayhi ʿĀmirī. – Z. 120 lies nūrāniyan. – Z. 124
mā : + šāʿa ʿĀmirī. – Z. 135 maḥtūban lies maḥtawiyan. – Z. 141 nach lahū lies bi-
fiṭnatin. ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45, S. 82, 11) hat bi-ġibṭatin. – Z. 143 lies al-kaṯīra. – Z. 144
lies kitābi. Badawī und ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45, S. 82, 15) haben kitābihī. – Z. 150 lies
maqṣūdahū. – Z. 155 li-iqāma : li-ifāḍa ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45, S. 84, 4). – Z. 159 inna
: ʿĀmirī (s. Anm. 45, S. 84, 10) hat den besseren Text lan yaʿriḍa. – Z. 176-226 mit
kommentierter Übersetzung auch hrsg. v. Samuel Miklos Stern, Abū ʿĪsā
Ibn Al-Munajjim’s Chronography. In Islamic Philosophy (s. Anm. zu Z. 2193–2199
/ Nachdruck in Samuel Miklos Stern, Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Thought.
London 1983, Nr. 13), S. 451ff. / arab. Text S. 460–463. – Z. 177 aẓalla lies mit
Badawī aṭalla. – Z. 178 lies qubila. – Z. 182 lies (ʾ)mriʾi. – Z. 183ff., Z. 270ff. und
Z. 392ff. Genus und Kasus der Zahlwörter, welche Dunlop in der fehlerhaften
Form der Hss. übernommen hat, hätte man verbessern können. – Z. 188 App.
Dunlop denkt bei Māḫālā an Maleachi (Malachias), wie man nach einigem
Suchen auf S. 191 im Index unter “Mākhālā” entdecken kann. – Z. 189 Nach wa-
fī ist zamān einzufügen (s. Badawī und Šahrastānī). – Z. 198 lies Ardašīr. –
Z. 209 lies aqāwīl. – Z. 209f. Dieser Anfang des Zitats aus Galens Kompen-
dium von Platons Republik steht auch bei Abū l-Fidāʾ, al-Muḫtaṣar fī aḫbār
al-bašar; s. den Abdruck des Fragments in Galeni compendium Timaei Platonis.
50 Ed. Paul Kraus und | Richard Walzer. London 1951. = Plato Arabus I, arab.
Text S. 37. In der dort nachfolgenden mit yaʿnī eingeleiteten Erklärung weichen
beide Texte voneinander ab. – Nebenbei sei darauf hingewiesen, dass das hier
zitierte Galenkompendium von Platons Republik nichts zu tun hat mit der Pla-
ton zugeschriebenen Maqāla fī s-siyāsa, welche einer näheren Untersuchung
bedarf. Die Maqāla ist handschriftlich erhalten in Aya Sofya 2410, fol. 19 r–23 v,
und (ohne Titel) in Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 1419, fol. 79 v–80 v. – Z. 210 ff. vgl.
dazu Arnaldez (s. Anm. 12), S. 132f. – Z. 216 lies ǧamīʿ. – Z. 218 ʿalima : Badawī
hat yaḥkumu gelesen. – Z. 222 Nach yunsab / yansub / yansib hat die Edition von
Badawī noch li-nafsihī hāḏihī l-ālatu / l-ālata. – Z. 235 li-ṯ-ṯawb : von Dunlop
vorgeschlagenes li-n-nuʾab ist m.E. das Richtige. – Z. 235 li-taḏhīb … wa-tašriya :
Badawī hat besseres li-tarhīb … wa-taǧwīh. – Z. 238 u.ö. lies manšaʾuhū (mit
Wāw als Hamzaträger). – Z. 262 lies yaʾti (mit Hamza). – Z. 278 und Z. 279 kann
man mit Z. 280 ʿāliman muʿalliman lesen. – Z. 283 lies ʿuṭṭila. – Z. 289 waladin :
Badawī S. 101, ult. hat besseres waladihī : al-awlādi Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, Taʾrīḫ al-
aṭibbāʾ, ed. Rosenthal (s. Anm. 16), S. 66, -4. – Z. 304 Ende lies aṭ-ṭibb. – Z. 306
Ende lies wa-⟨ʾstfʾ nws⟩. – Z. 323 lies al-ahammu : + wa-l-murādū, ed. Badawī,
S. 105, 1. – Z. 337 ašbāha awlādihī : ašbaha bi-awlādihī Badawī. – Z. 357 lies
al-adwiya. – Z. 376 lies al-kalbi. – Z. 408-410 ( fīhi) vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns
Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 99 r
7–10. – Z. 410 Zur Parallele bei Ibn Durayd (gest. 321/933), Kitāb al-Muǧtanā
(nach denselben Quellen der Ḥunaynschule, die auch im Ṣiwān benutzt wer-
den: Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 273–275, s. Franz Rosenthal, Sayings of the
Ancients from Ibn Durayd’s Kitāb al-Mujtanā. In Orientalia N.S. 27, Roma 1958
(S. 29–54 und 150–183), S. 44 Nr. 43. Dieselbe Quelle ist ferner wörtlich wieder-
gegeben in Ibn Abī ʿAwn (gest. 321/933), al-Aǧwiba (s.o. S. 476), fol. 3 v -5 f. –
Z. 418 wa-bi-mā : Badawī hat wa-mimmā. – Z. 420 lies mit den Hss. Muʾayy-
isun (vgl. Z. 107). – Z. 422 Auffällig ist die Konstruktion yaḥtāǧu an. – Z. 424
ist mit der Mehrzahl der Hss. mubdiʿun zu lesen (vgl. Z. 107). – Z. 432 ist mit
Badawī S. 113, -2 al-lāʾima statt al-aʾimma zu lesen. – Z. 434 lies āsifīn. – Z.
442 Ende lies mit Badawī S. 114, 13 al-ašar. – Z. 443 hat Badawī fa-aḫāfa. – Z.
447-450 vgl. Gotthard Strohmaier, Die arabische Sokrates-Legende und
ihre Ursprünge. In Studia Coptica. Hrsg. v. Peter Nagel. Berlin 1974. = Berliner
Byzantinistische Arbeiten 45 (S. 121–136), S. 128. – Z. 462ff. Zur Quellenlage des
Pythagorasabschnittes vgl. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 274f. – Z. 463-464 (wa-l-baḏl)
= Muḫtār (s. IV, 5), ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 62, 3–6, (Kommentar S. 216–220). –
Z. 463 (wa-ḏukira) – Z. 464 (wa-l-baḏl): Zur Parallele bei Ibn Durayd, | Mubaššir 51
(= Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa) and Ibn Hindū s. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 218. – Z. 464 (wa-
lammā) – Z. 466 (al-mawāḍiʾ) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 80, 10–82, 3.
Zu weiteren Parallelen s. Gutas S. 264–268; Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 40 f. Nr.
30. – Z. 466 (wa-ahdā) – Z. 468 (wa-ftaqara) = Muḫtār (s. IV, 5) ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 62, 7–9, (Kommentar S. 220). – Z. 472 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 473 (abadan)
= Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 64, 6f., (Kommentar S. 225f.). – Z. 472
(wa-kāna) – Z. 475 (al-mawt) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 66, 1–4, (Kom-
mentar S. 227–231). – Z. 475 (wa-arāda) – Z. 476 (daʿwat an-nās) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 66, 5–7, (Kommentar S. 231f.; Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 43
Nr. 37). – Z. 477 (wa-qāla) – Z. 478 (al-kaṯīr) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 66, 8f., (Kommentar S. 233). – Z. 478 (wa-qāla) – Z. 479 (al-ǧahl) = Muḫtār
ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 70, 11 und 72, 1, (Kommentar S. 244–246; Rosen-
thal (s. Z. 410), S. 42f. Nr. 36) – Z. 483 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 484 (al-hamm) = Muḫtār
ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 72, 2f., (Kommentar S. 246). – Z. 485 (wa-qāla) – Z.
482 chapter 25
486 (ʿāqil) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 68, 8 f., (Kommentar S. 236f.);
Gutas zufolge hat Abū Sulaymāns Zeitgenosse ʿĀmirī (as-Saʿāda wa-l-isʿād)
den Passus aus dem Ṣiwān über eine Zwischenbearbeitung übernommen. – Z.
486 (wa-qāla) – Z. 488 (ḥayātika) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 74, 1–
4, (Kommentar S. 247f.). – Z. 489 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 491 (iḫwānihī) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 76, 3–6. – Z. 492 (rāḥa-li-l-mawt) = Mubaššir, Muḫtār
al-ḥikam. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Madrid 1958, S. 43, 7 (Zeno zuge-
schrieben); vgl. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 252, wo die Ṣiwānstelle nachzutragen
ist. – Z. 492 (an-nawm) – Z. 493 (ṭawīl) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 76,
77f., (Kommentar S. 252). Dimitri Gutas zufolge wird derselbe Ausspruch bei
Ibn Hindū und Mubaššir Sokrates zugeschrieben. Dieselbe Zuschreibung fin-
den wir in der gnomologischen Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 57
r -7f. – Z. 493 lies wa-l-mawt. – Z. 494 lies ruʾūs; nach wa-t-talāmīḏu lies mit
Badawī S. 119, 2 yaqillūna. – Z. 495 lies wa-yataʿaḏḏabūna.
Z. 499ff. (§34–38): Die arabische Übersetzung der pseudopythagoräischen

“Goldenen Verse” (Carmina aurea) stammt wohl von einem Zeitgenossen Ḥu-
nayns oder von einem Vorgänger: s. Franz Rosenthal, Some Pythagorean
Documents transmitted in Arabic. In Orientalia N.S. 10, Roma 1941 (S. 104–
115 und 383–395), S. 112 Anm. 1. Wie Manfred Ullmann in seiner Tübin-
ger Dissertation “Griechische Spruchdichtung im Arabischen” aus dem Jahre
1959 zeigt (S. 28f.), ist die im Muntaḫab überlieferte Textfassung besser als die
von Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Kairo 1952,
S. 225–228 wiedergegebene Version. Allerdings wird man entgegen Ullmann
(S. 29) deswegen nicht die von F. Rosenthal angenommene Abhängigkeit
des Miskawayh von Ḥunayns Reproduktion des Textes (in seinen Nawādir al-
falāsifa) bezweifeln dürfen. Die von Ullmann (S. 28 f.) genannten Varianten
52 der Miskawayhtradition lassen sich fast ausnahmslos | aus innerarabischen Ver-
schreibungen oder Änderungen des im Ṣiwān gebotenen Wortlautes erklären.
Ullmann bietet auf den Seiten 33–50 eine textkritische Edition der Carmina
aurea, wobei auch die Nebenüberlieferung (s. Ullmann S. 24 ff.) mitberück-
sichtigt ist. Ein weiterer Textzeuge derselben Übersetzung ist die Hs. Princeton
2950 (ELS 308), fol. 303 v–308 v (Katalog v. Rudolph Mach: fol. 305 v–310 v):
Diese nachfolgend nicht vollständig kollationierte Hs. (1995 v. Hans Daiber
herausgegeben. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/19) enthält gleich-
zeitig eine durch qāla l-mufassir eingeleitete Kommentierung der einzelnen
Verse. Die Hs. umfasst den Text der Carmina aurea bis Z. 545 in der Edition von
Dunlop (usīra bihī) und bricht mitten im Kommentar hierzu ab. Die Über-
schrift dieses Textes lautet: Šarḥ maǧmūʿ min Kitāb ⟨ʾyʾmylḥs⟩ (= Iamblichus)
li-waṣāyā Fūṯāġūras al-faylasūf. Eine Variante dieses Titels bietet der Ṣiwāntext
(Z. 499): (wa-hāḏā) maǧmūʿ min Kitāb Iyāmblīḫus li-tabyīn waṣāyā Fīṯāġūras.
Demnach reproduziert der Ṣiwān die Carmina aurea nach der Fassung des
Kommentators Iamblichus, dessen Kommentar (tabyīn) jedoch fälschlicher-
weise im Titel genannt, aber nicht zitiert wird. Im Griechischen ist von Iambli-
chus kein solcher Kommentar erhalten. Wohl aber haben wir in Iamblichus’
Protreptikus (Buch III) Äußerungen zu folgenden Versen der Carmina erhal-
ten: 45; 46; 49–56; 58–63; 69–71: s. Pieter Cornelis van der Horst in seiner
kommentierten Edition der Carmina (Les vers d’or Pythagoriciens. Diss. Leiden
1932), S. XLf. Zu klären bleibt noch die Frage, ob Text und Kommentar in der
vorliegenden Form unmittelbar von Iamblichus stammen oder von einem spä-
teren Bearbeiter aus Iamblichus’ Œuvre “zusammengestellt” (maǧmūʿ; Franz
Rosenthal in EI2 II, S. 929b, missverständlich: “summary”) wurden. In den
Bearbeitungen von Ḥunayns Nawādir al-falāsifa (vgl. Hs. Escorial 760, fol. 45
v -4, und die hebr. Version des Ḥarīzī, deutsche Übers. v. Albert Loewen-
thal (s. Anm. 24), S. 125) findet sich dieser Titel nicht. Dies gibt Anlass zu
der Vermutung, dass der Ṣiwān die Carmina aurea nicht aus Ḥunayns Nawādir
übernommen haben könnte, sondern eventuell direkten Zugang zum Original
der Übersetzung hatte, welche Text und Kommentar des Iamblichus umfasst.
Als nicht hilfreich erweist sich die Hs. Escorial 888, fol. 91 r–114 r, welche ein
Istiṯmār aš-šayḫ al-fāḍil Abī lʾFaraǧ ʿAbd Allāh Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib li-maqālat Fīṯāġūras
al-maʿrūfa bi-ḏ-ḏahabiyya – tafsīr ⟨brqls⟩ enthält. Dieser ⟨brqls⟩ (Proklos? Hie-
rokles? Vgl. Manfred Ullmann in seiner oben genanten Dissertation, S. 31 f.)
zugeschriebene und in der Redaktion von Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib erhaltene Kommentar
entpuppt sich als eine eigenständige Abhandlung zu einzelnen Gedanken der
pythagoräischen Ethik. Der Titel der Carmina aurea wird mehrmals erwähnt.
Als ihr Autor, d.h. als | derjenige, “welcher die goldenen Worte in Gedichtform 53
gebracht habe” (wāḍiʿ al-alfāẓ aḏ-ḏahabiyya šiʿran), wird mehrmals ein Mann
namens ⟨ʾmyʾdqls⟩ / ⟨ʾmbʾdqls⟩ (Empedokles?) genannt. Der Text beschränkt
sich nicht auf eine paraphrasierende oder kommentierende Neuformulierung
des Inhaltes der Empedokles zugeschriebenen Verse. So wird z.B. die pythago-
räische Spekulation um die Zahl Vier mit der Vierzahl der platonischen Tugen-
den verbunden. Wie in der oben genannten Princetoner Hs. ist hier mit neuem
philosophiegeschichtlichem Material zu rechnen. Vgl. jetzt Edition und Über-
setzung von Neil Linley, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Proclus’ Commentary on the Pytha-
gorean Verses. Buffalo/New York 1984 und die Bespr. v. Hans Daiber in Der
Islam 65, 1988, S. 134–137. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/28. – Z.
507 lies yanbaġī. – Z. 508 Anm. Die dort genannte Variante teilt C mit Mis-
kawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Kairo 1952. Hier wie
häufig auch an anderen Stellen hat Dunlop die auffällige Übereinstimmung
dieser Hs. mit Miskawayh nicht notiert. – Z. 511 Die ursprüngliche Lesart, wel-
484 chapter 25
che in der übrigen arabischen Textüberlieferung der Carmina aurea bewahrt

ist, lautet bi-ǧamīʿi n-nāsi. – Z. 525-528 Eine kürzere, Platon zugeschriebene
Variante steht Z. 610f. – Z. 530 lies tuwaṭṭiʾu. – Z. 532 vgl. die Überlieferung
in der arabischen Placita ed. Daiber (s. Anm. 29), S. 5, ult., und Kommen-
tar Daiber S. 338; ferner Kommentar zu ed. Dunlop Z. 499 ff. – Z. 545 lies
wa-šafayta. – Z. 548 f. steht auch Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil IV. Kairo 1928, S. 101,
1 f. (= I 92, ult.–93, 2 mit der Variante iḏā faʿalta mā qultu laka yā Diyūǧānis
(Diogenes) wa-faraqta statt fa-innahā ʿinda ḏālika iḏa); vgl. ferner Muntaḫab
Ṣiwān Z. 3673–3675 (= Iḫwān IV 120, -8f.; vgl. IV 223, -4 f.). – Z. 554 Badawī
S. 124, 7–12 bringt nach der Hs. Beşir Aga 944 (loses Blatt) ein zusätzliches
Pythagorasdiktum mit neuplatonischer Färbung. Es ist nicht unter den griechi-
schen und in syrischer Übersetzung erhaltenen Pythagorassprüchen zu finden:
s. die Ausgabe von Henry Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus. Cambridge
1959, S. 84–94; vgl. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 30f. Entsprechendes lässt sich weder
im Pythagorasabschnitt des gnomologischen Textes der Hs. Aya Sofya 2456 (s.
Anm. 66), fol. 82 r ult.–83 v, noch in der arabischen Version von Ammonius’
Placita (s. Anm. 29) nachweisen. – Z. 556-559 = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 84, 1–5, (Kommentar S. 276). Dimitri Gutas zufolge beruht das Sokrateska-
pitel des Ṣiwān auf Ḥunayns Nawādir al-falāsifa und auf einer Quelle, welche
auch Vorlage von Kindī (Alfāẓ Suqrāṭ), Ibn Hindū und Mubaššir war und auf
einer griechischen Sokratestradition sowie einer griechischen gnomologischen
Sammlung beruht. Zusätzlich können wir hier mit der Möglichkeit rechnen,
dass Abū Sulaymān hierbei eine nach einer syrischen Sammlung angefertigte
Übersetzung des Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī benutzt haben kann (vgl. Kap. IV Nr.
9). – Z. 559 (wa-kāna) – Z. 561 (wa-l-alam) = (mit einigen Varianten) Ḥunayn,
Nawādir (Bearbeitung von al-Anṣārī), Hs. Escorial 760, fol. 17 v 6–9 / Hebr. Ver-
54 sion von Ḥarīzī, deutsche | Übers. v. Abraham Loewenthal (s. Anm. 24),
S. 91f. Nr. 39. – Z. 562 (wa-qāla) – Z. 563 (an-naǧāt) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas
(s. Anm. 14), S. 86, 1–3, (Kommentar S. 282f.). – Z. 562 (wa-stahīnū) – Z. 563
(tamūtū) : vgl. (nicht wörtlich) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456
(s. Anm. 66), fol. 80 v 5f. – Z. 563 (wa-qīla) – Z. 563 ( faqduhū) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 86, 6f., (Kommentar S. 283–285). Variante: mā bāluka
statt mā laka. – Z. 566 (wa-kataba) – Z. 571 (li-taʾkula) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas
(s. Anm. 14), S. 86, 13–88, 4, (Kommentar S. 287f.). – Z. 571 (wa-innamā … li-
taʾkula): vgl. zur Verbreitung des Spruches im Arabischen Strohmaier (s. Z.
447), S. 127. – Z. 575-579 (wa-l-kiḏb) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 88, 4–10.
Die dortige Variante wa-nasabuhū ilā verdient m.E. den Vorrang vor sprachlich
unmöglichem wa-tušbihu / tušabbahu ilā. – Z. 579 (wa-marra) – Z. 580 (al-
adab) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 92, 10f., (Kommentar S. 293). – Z. 580
(wa-qīla Zeilenende) – Z. 581 (al-hawā) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 92,
12, (Kommentar S. 293f.) – Z. 581 (al-malik) – Z. 582 (šahawātuhū) = Muḫtār

ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 84, 6, (Kommentar S. 276f.) und die gnomologische
Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 57 v 7 f. – Z. 582 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 583
(al-muḫliṣ) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 104, 4, (Kommentar S. 316 f.)
und die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 57 v 8. –
Z. 583 (wa-ʿābahū) – Z. 584 (taqdir ʿalayhi) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 84, 7f., (Kommentar S. 279f.). – Z. 586 (wa-kāna) – Z. 587 (akṯar) = Muḫtār
ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 96, 7, (Kommentar S. 299 f.). Vgl. die beinahe wört-
liche Parallele in der gnomologischen Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66),
fol. 57 v 2–4, und dieselbe Idee, ebenfalls Sokrates zugeschrieben, im anony-
men Fiqar al-ḥukamāʾ (13. Jh. AD). Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī in Rasāʾil
falsafiyya li-l-Kindī wa-l-Fārābī (etc.). Benghazi 1973, S. 219, ult.–220, 2. Der Her-
ausgeber ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī hat seiner Ausgabe die Hs. Paris 5964
zugrundegelgt – in der Meinung, ein Unikum vor sich zu haben. Doch derselbe
Text ist unter dem Titel Kitāb Ḥikam al-ḥukamāʾ wa-nawādir al-qudamāʾ auch
in der Istanbuler Hs. Laleli 3706, fol. 77 r–111 r, enthalten. – Z. 587 (wa-qāla) –
Z. 590 (al-bāqī) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 90, 11–92, 3, (Kommen-
tar S. 291f.). – Z. 590 lies an yakūna. – Z. 591 (wa-naẓara) – Z. 592 (ilayka) =
Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 102, 4f., (Kommentar S. 312 f.; vgl. F. Rosen-
thal (s. Z. 410), S. 50 Nr. 63). Vgl. die anonyme, von einem Christen im 15. Jh.
AD geschriebene gnomologische Sammlung Aqwāl al-ḥukamāʾ Hs. Maktabat
al-Awqāf, Bagdad 9763, fol. 43 r 5–8. – Z. 592 (wa-kāna) – Z. 594 (bi-l-māʾ) :
vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya
2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 98 v 9–1. – Z. 601 (al-mālu … al-ʿāṣiy) = Ḥunayn, Nawādir
(Bearbeitung v. Anṣārī) Hs. Escorial 760, fol. 17 r 5 f. / Hebr. Version des Ḥarīzī,
deutsche Übers. v. Loewenthal (s. Anm. 24), S. 90 Nr. 29. – Z. 603ff. (§ 43–
47): Der Abschnitt über Platon | wurde bereits früher von ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān 55
Badawī, Aflāṭūn fī l-Islām. Teheran 1974, S. 300–305 (nach der Hs. Beşir Aga
494) herausgegeben. Einiges daraus hat Franz Rosenthal, On the Know-
ledge of Plato’s Philosophy in the Islamic World. In IC 14, 1940 (S. 387–422 /
Nachdruck in Franz Rosenthal, Greek Philosophy in the Arab World. Alder-
shot 1990, Nr. II), S. 407f. übersetzt. – Quellen sind nach Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 376–380, Ḥunayns Nawādir und die arabische Übersetzung einer Platonüber-
lieferung. – Z. 604-608 (ẓāhir) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 116, 1–6,
(Kommentar S. 332f.). – Z. 608 (qāla) – Z. 609 (al-ḫayr) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 130, 7f. – Z. 609 wa-ḥaqqahū : Badawī, S. 129, 8, liest wa-ḫafhū. Was
haben die Hss.? – Z. 610f. ist eine kürzere Variante der pseudopythagoräischen
Carmina aurea, Vers 40–42 (= hier Z. 525–528). S. den Hinweis bei Ullmann
(s. Z. 499ff.), S. 50. – Z. 612 (wa-qāla) – Z. 613 (ʿāliman) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 130, 11f., (Kommentar S. 357). – Z. 622 lies fa-l-ʿubūdiyya. – Nach al-
486 chapter 25
ǧawr lies allaḏī. – Z. 625 al-muǧāwara lies al-muǧāwaza. – Z. 630 (wa-qāla) – Z.

631 (nūruhā) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 120, 14–122, 1 (weitere Nach-
weise im App.). – Z. 631 lies zibriǧuhā. – Z. 635 Nach wa-ašadduhum lies mit
Badawī bi-ʿilmihī. – Z. 646 yastanfirka : Badawī, S. 132, 11, hat besseres yastafiz-
zaka. – Z. 649 lies al-murūʾata. – Z. 655-656 (aṯ-ṯamarata) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas
(s. Anm. 14), S. 168, 9f. (Aristoteles zugeschrieben; vgl. Kommentar S. 392 f.). –
Z. 661-663 (al-qūwa) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 172, 9–12, (Platon
zugeschrieben; vgl. Kommentar Gutas S. 402). – Z. 662 tasriqu : Badawī liest
(möglicherweise ursprüngliches) tanzifu / tunzifu. Ebenso Muḫtār ed. Gutas
(s. Anm. 14), S. 172, 11, wo im Apparat die Varianten tasriqu (Muntaḫab; Muḫ-
taṣar) und tastariqu (Mubaššir) genannt sind. – Z. 663 wa-l-quwwatu bi-mā
: Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 172, 11, hat wa-lā qūwatun bihā. Badawī,
S. 133, -5, liest wa-lqū bi-mā und beruft sich auf die Hs. Beşir Aga 494. Dunlop
und Gutas nennen diese Variante nicht, sodass ich annehmen möchte, dass
die Lesart des Muntaḫab (welche hat der Muḫtaṣār?) eine Verschreibung der
ursprünglichen Lesart ist, welche im Muḫtār bewahrt ist. – Z. 675 (wa-qāla) –
676 (ʿanhū) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 134, 1 f. – Z. 677ff. (§ 48–63)
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 426–429, denkt im Abschnitt über Aristoteles an fol-
gende Quellen: Aristotelesbiographie des Ptolemaeus al-Ġarīb (dazu Anton-
Hermann Chroust, Aristotle. I. London 1973, S. 54 ff.); Ḥunayns Nawādir al-
falāsifa (gnomologischer Teil); Aristoteles-Alexander-Romanliteratur (Redak-
tion von Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ; vgl. Z. 943); Kompendium der aristotelischen Ethik;
vgl. auch Gutas in Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. Ed. Jill Kraye, Wil-
liam Francis Ryan and Charles B. Schmitt. London 1986, pp. 20 ff. – Z.
678 lies raǧulin. – Z. 693 lies wa-l-ʿibāra. – Z. 695 lies wa-nūr. – Z. 698 lies
ʿašrata. – Z. 720 (wa-qāla: naṣḥuka … bi-l-bāṭil) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 204, 10f. – Z. 774 lies iddiḫarihī. – Z. 775-776 (šayʾin) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 164, 3f., (Kommentar S. 386). – Z. 775 lies muʿallimuhū. – laysat :
56 Muḫtār hat | richtiges laysa. – Z. 776 Vor šayʾin erwartet man min, das auch
im Muḫtār steht. – Z. 776 (wa-qāla – šurbin) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 164, 5f., (Kommentar S. 386f.). – Z. 777 Statt lawm lies besser mit Badawī,
S. 142, ult., luʾm. – Z. 777 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 778 (as-sukūt) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 168, 4, (Kommentar S. 390f.). – Z. 778 lies as-sukūt und fa-qāla. –
wasuʾila … taḍʿufa = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 168, 11 f., (Kommentar
S. 393–395). – Z. 782 (wa-qāla) – Z. 783 (bahīman) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 170, 1f., (Kommentar S. 395f.). Griechische Quelle ist Gutas (s.
Anm. 14) zufolge die Aristotelesbiographie von Ptolemaeus al-Ġarīb. – Z. 783
(wa-qāla … al-ḥikma) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 170, 5, (Kommen-
tar S. 398f.). – Lies wa-ṭabīʿa. – Z. 785 lies wa-qāla (1. loc.). – Z. 785 (wa-qāla 2.
loc.) – Z. 786 (bāṭilan) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 170, 8 f., (Kommentar
S. 399). – Z. 786 (wa-qāla … al-faqīr) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 170, 12,
(Kommentar S. 400f.). – Nach huwa lies allaḏī. – Z. 791 (wa-qāla … mirʾātahū)
= Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 172, 1f. – Z. 794 lies mit Badawī, S. 144, -7,
li-l-adīb. – Z. 797 (wa-qāla … muḫtār) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 174,
3, (Kommentar 404). – Lies ṣūrati. – Z. 798 lies ḫafiya. – Z. 801 vgl. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 260; Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 46f. Nr. 50. – Z. 802-803 Der Aḫṭal-
vers steht im Dīwān. Ed. Anṭūn Ṣāliḥānī. Beirut 1903, S. 256, 4 (hat tirahin
statt diyyatin). – Z. 805 (wa-qāla … li-ġayrihī) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 174, 7, (Kommentar S. 404f.). – Z. 805 (wa-qāla 2. loc.) – Z. 807 (aṣdiqāʾuhū)
= Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 174, 8–10, (Kommentar S. 405). – Z. 808
(wa-suʾila) – Z. 809 (ǧismika) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 174, 11 ff.,
(Kommentar S. 405–407). – Z. 809 wa-man : wa-bayna man Badawī S. 145, -4.
Vgl. (nicht wörtlich) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66),
fol. 75 v -4f. – Z. 810 (wa-qāla) – Z. 811 (an-naẓar) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 174, 13f. – Z. 811 (wa-raʾā) – Z. 813 ( yaqbalu) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s.
Anm. 14), S. 176, 2–4, (Kommentar S. 407). – Z. 814 allaḏī lies ad-daniyya. – Z.
815 lies wa-qāla. – Z. 817 (wa-qāla) – Z. 818 (wa-fasada) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas
(s. Anm. 14), S. 176, 5–7. – Z. 818 (wa-qāla) – Z. 820 (wāḥidin) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 176, 8–10, (Kommentar S. 407). – Z. 820 Nach yuʿnā bihī
lies wa-mā lā (s. Badawī S. 146, -3 und Gutas, s. Anm. 14). – Z. 822 (wa-suʾila
… ʿaqlin) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 178, 9 f., (Kommentar S. 408). –
Z. 822 u.ö. lies al-Iskandar. – Z. 823 (wa-kāna) – Z. 825 (kawnī) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 178, 11–14, (Kommentar S. 408–410); vgl. Rosenthal
(s. Z. 410), S. 42 Nr. 34. – Z. 825 (wa-saʾalahū) – Z. 826 (ḥurrun) = Muḫtār ed.
Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 180, 3f., (Kommentar S. 410). – Z. 832 (wa-qāla) – Z. 834
(al-ʿiffa) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 180, 5–8, (Kommentar S. 410 f.).
Bei idem nicht identifizierbaren Namen ⟨ʾwmynws⟩ denkt Gutas an Hermip-
pus. – Z. 834 (wa-qāla) – Z. 836 (ilayhim) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 180, 9–12, (Kommentar S. 411). – Z. 836 (wa-qāla) – Z. 839 (lā maʿnā lahū)
= Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 182, 4–7. – Z. 845 ( fa-kataba) – Z. 846 | 57
(wa-s-salm) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 182, 12 f. – Z. 846 (wa-qāla) –
Z. 847 (maḍarra) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 196, 9 f. – Z. 849 (qāla …
aʿdāʾahum) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 184, 10 f. – Z. 850-866 = (worauf
Dunlop hingewiesen hat) Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān
Badawī. Kairo 1952, S. 266, 14–267, -3, aber auch (wohl nach Miskawayh) in
der gnomologischen Sammlung Min kalām al-ḥukamāʾ al-bāliġīn wa-ʿulamāʾ
ar-rāsiḫīn, Hs. Maktabat al-Awqāf (Bagdad) 6629/9, S. 27, 8–20. – Z. 878 (wa-
qāla) – Z. 879 (wa-absaṭ) = Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 200, 4 f. – Z.
897 faḍā lies afḍā. – Z. 908 lies Ardašīr. – Z. 913 lies al-mutaqaddimūn. – Z.
914 ; nach ʿimāra lies wa-lā daʾbun. – Z. 915 lies fī ṭalbihī. – Z. 920 waṣaftuhā :
488 chapter 25
hier ziehe ich mit Badawī S. 154, 3 waḍaʿtuhā vor. – Z. 921 tadbīrihī Badawī,
S. 154, 5. Was haben die Hss.? – Z. 931 Nach ar-raʾy fehlt allaḏī (s. Badawī S. 155,
5). – Z. 943 (wa-qad … wa-tafhama): Diese von Kraemer in seinem Homer-
aufsatz (s. Anm. 15) nicht genannte pseudohomerische Sentenz steht auch in
der Hs. Aya Sofya 4260. Diese enthält einen auf griechischen Quellen basie-
renden apokryphen Briefwechsel zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander in arabi-
scher Bearbeitung, welche Grignaschi dem Sekretär des Hišām Ibn ʿAbd al-
Malik, nämlich Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ zuschreibt. Der genannte Vers steht (mit einer
Variante) abgedruckt bei Mario Grignaschi, Le roman épistolaire classique
conservé dans la version arabe de Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ. In Le Muséon 80, Louvain
1967 (S. 211–264), S. 256. Grignaschi zählt weitere pseudohomerische Verse
auf, welche sich z.T. auch in der gnomologischen Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456
(s. Anm. 66) finden: Vgl. fol. 58 r–7f.; fol. 64 v 3f. mit Grignaschi S. 258 f. Nr.
11 und 13. – Ein näherer Vergleich mit dem apokryphen Briefwechsel (vgl. die
Analyse bei Grignaschi)66 wird vielleicht weitere Parallelen zum Ṣiwāntext
66 Vgl. auch Mario Grignaschi, Les “Rasāʾil Arisṭāṭālīsa ʾilā-l-Iskandar” de Sālim Abū-l-
ʿAlāʾ et l’ activité culturelle à l’ époque omayyade. In Bulletin d’Études Orientales 19, 1965–
1966 (Damas 1967), S. 7–83. – Zu den von M. Grignaschi genannten Hss. des apokry-
phen Briefwechsels zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander ist der bisher völlig übersehene
gnomologische Teil der Hs. Aya Sofya 2456, fol. 52 v–75 r, (enthält einen Auszug aus der
Risālat Arisṭūṭālīs fī s-siyāsa l-ʿāmmiya) hinzuzufügen: Vgl. die Inhaltsangabe (nach der Hs.
Köprülü 1608, fol. 78–110 v) bei Jozéf Bielawski, Lettres d’Aristote à Alexandre le Grand
en version arabe. In Rocznik orientalistyczny 28/1, Warszawa 1964 (S. 7–34), S. 19–25. Dem
Auszug sind Abschnitte über Weisheitssprüche eingefügt (z.B. fol. 57 r–v: Sokrates; fol. 57
v–58 r: Platon), welche wohl den Nawādir al-falāsifa von Ḥunayn entstammen. Auch in
zahlreichen nachfolgenden Abschnitten (fol. 75 v–114 v) wird Ḥunayn wichtige, aber nicht
einzige Quelle gewesen sein. Die Hs. ist ein wichtiger Textzeuge v.a. für Ḥunayns Nawādir
al-falāsifa und für den apokryphen Briefwechsel zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander. Sie
ist nebst der Hs. Kabul 45 (S. 276–296) zu den von Dimitri Gutas genannten Hss. hinzu-
zufügen. Da eine genaue Beschreibung der Hs. den Rahmen der Miszelle sprengen würde,
beschränke ich mich auf den Hinweis, dass neben Auszügen aus philosophischen Schrif-
ten (Aristoteles, Themistius, Pythagoras) zwei Texte vollständig übernommen worden
sind: 1) fol. 84 v–97 v stehen Waṣāyā Falāṭūn, auch al-Waṣāyā al-aflāṭūniyya genannt. Der
Text ist identisch mit den Fiqar iltaqaṭat wa-ǧumiʿat ʿan Aflāṭūn wa-l-aḫlāq al-iḫtiyāriyya.
Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Aflāṭūn fī l-Islām. Teheran 1974, S. 173–192, 6; das Ende
(fol. 97 v 6–16) weicht von ed. ʿA. R. Badawī, S. 192, 6–196, ab. Der Text wurde unter
dem Titel al-Amṯāl al-ḥikmiyya min kalām baʿḍ mašāhir al-falāsifa al-awwalīn bereits im
Jahre 1882 in Istanbul (S. 141–165) herausgegeben. Als Verfasser wird Yūsuf Ibn ʿAbd Allāh
angegeben, welcher den Text im Jahre 893/1488 geschrieben habe. Bereits im 10. Jh. AD
übernimmt Ibn Hindū, al-Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya (ed. Muṣṭafā al-Qabbānī ad-Dimašqī,
Kairo 1900, S. 8–65) den Text mit einigen Umstellungen, aber vollständig. Häufig formt er
den ersten Teil einer 12-teiligen und Aflāṭūniyāt genannten Sammlung, welche zumeist
Fārābī zugeschrieben wird und dann den Titel trägt: al-Alfāẓ al-aflāṭūniyya wa-taqwīm
ergeben. Gutas (s. hier zu Z. 677ff.) nennt ihn unter den Quellen des Ṣiwān. –
Z. 951 wa-ǧaddada lies mit Badawī, S. 156, -4, wa-ḥaddada. – Z. 956 lahū : vor
al-ʿahd besser Badawī, S. 157, 5. – Z. 961 wa-daḫala : wa-udḫila Badawī, S. 157,
-6. – Z. 975 (wa-qāla) – Z. 984 Eine kommentierte engl. Übersetzung steht bei
Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 85ff. – Z. 977 ⟨syb⟩ lies sabab. – Z. 977 riwāya : + qāla
Badawī, S. 159, 3. – Z. 984 Zu al-Andalusī vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 109 f. –
Lies anā qultu. – Z. 986 as-sunan und wa-s-sīra : as-sunna wa-s-siyar Badawī,
S. 159, ult. – Z. 993 lies ʿašrata. – Z. 1009 mulkī : mamlakatī Badawī, S. 161, -3;
vgl. Z. 1007. – Z. 1036 bi-s-sunan : bi-s-sunna Badawī, S. 164, 5. – Z. 1039 wa-š-
šarāb : + aṭ-ṭayyib Badawī, S. 164, 9 (fehlt Badawī zufolge in den Hss. A und
D). – Z. 1040 Anfang lies ilayhā – Z. 1055 li-yaǧmaʿahā Badawī, S. 165, ult. (bes-
ser). – Z. 1066 Nach al-mamlaka lies fa-baynamā. – Z. 1072 lies al-wazīr. – Z.
1080 lies ⟨sʾwy⟩. – Z. 1084 bi-l-qašaf lies mit Badawī, S. 169, 2, bi-t-taqaššuf.
| – Z. 1087 lies mit Badawī, S. 169, 7, fa-tanāwala. – Z. 1089 lies al-yūnānī. – 58
Z. 1090 lies al-ḥikma. – Z. 1096 (wa-atbaṣbaṣu … al-ašrār) vgl. Rosenthal (s.
Z. 410), S. 33f. Nr. 8. – Z. 1106 (wa-marra) – Z. 1108 (tarāhu) vgl. Rosenthal
(s. Z. 410), S. 33 Nr. 6. – Z. 1112 lies al-malik. – Z. 1122-1170 Die Entsprechungen
bei Plotin findet man in der von Geoffrey Lewis angefertigten englischen
Übersetzung dieses Stückes und der Šahrastānīexzerpte in Plotini opera II. Ed.
Paul Henry und Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. Paris 1959, S. 478–485 (= Franz
Rosenthal, Aš-Šayḫ al-yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus Source. In Orientalia
N.S. 22, 1953, S. 385–400). – Z. 1132 lies ḥaraka. – Z. 1133 Nach al-awwal lies al-
ānu (= τὸ ὄν). – Z. 1151 wa-qāla : + ayḍan Badawī, S. 174, -2. – Z. 1164 fī ṯ-ṯaqāfa
lies mit Badawī, S. 175, -7, fī t-taqāna. – Z. 1175-1177 vgl. (nach dem Auszug des
Šahrastānī) Franz Altheim und Ruth Stiehl, New Fragments of Greek Phi-
losophers. In East and West N.S. 12, Roma 1961 (S. 3–18), S. 14b. – Olof Gigon
in Franz Altheim, Geschichte der Hunnen V. Berlin 1962, S. 95. – Ferner Theo-
phrast, Metaphys. I 5 F. – Z. 1178 lies šayʾun. – Z. 1188 (wa-raʾā) – Z. 1189 (šiʾta) :
vgl. Strohmaier (s. Z. 447–450), S. 127f. – Z. 1190 (wa-naẓara) – Z. 1192 (tuḥ-
sinuhā) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 45 Nr. 44. – Z. 1193 al-abāʾil : Badawī,
S. 178, 7, liest al-ayāʾil, vgl. aber Plutarch, Quaest. conv. VII 5. 704 F (Hinweis v. D.
Gutas). – Z. 1197 wa-l-ġarānīb lies wohl wa-l-ġarābīn. – Z. 1216 lies fa-qāla. –
Z. 1227 lies bi-luʾmin. – Z. 1228 lies infāḏihā. – Z. 1230 Franz Rosenthal, Das
Fortleben der Antike im Islam. Zürich/Stuttgart 1965, S. 365 Anm. 16, bezweifelt
as-siyāsa al-mulūkiyya wa-l-aḫlāq (vgl. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 377–379, wo Obiges nachzu-
tragen ist). – 2) Ein neuer Text steht fol. 76 v–80 r: Es ist ein apokrypher Brief des Sokrates
an Platon, worin Hippokrates, Galen, Philon sowie die ägyptischen Astrologen (rwfyws)
und Ptolemaeus genannt werden. Der Brief steht nicht in den Epistolographi graeci. Ed.
Rudolf Hercher. Paris 1873.
490 chapter 25
die Identität mit Aeschylus. – Z. 1237 lies tubdaʿu bihī (vgl. Edward William
Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon. London/Edinburgh 1863–1893 / Nachdr. Beirut
1968, I, S. 166 c) aḥwaǧa. – Z. 1240 lies al-muwāsāt. – Z. 1242 al-ǧirm lies mit
Badawī, S. 182, 7, al-ḥazm. – Z. 1251 Nach wa-lisānahū lies waǧawāriḥahū. –
Z. 1268 lies ruʾūs. – Z. 1275-1276 (ḥayāt) : vgl. Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14),
S. 102, 3, (Kommentar S. 309–311). – Z. 1307 lies aḥadan. – Z. 1309 lies al-maqt. –
Z. 1320 lies at-taẓāhur bihī. – Z. 1357 himta lies hamamta. – Z. 1358 (wa-qāla) –
1359 (nafsahū) : vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gnomologische Samm-
lung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 107 v 9–11. – Z. 1362 ʿanka : ʿindaka Badawī,
S. 192, 9. – Z. 1372 man + huwa Badawī, S. 193, 5. – Z. 1390 Anfang lies fiʿlan. –
Z. 1394 lies ṣadīqan. – Z. 1403 lies bi-sahilin. – Z. 1406 lies aradta. – Z. 1434
lies al-ḫulq. – Z. 1447 (2 mal) lies buʾs. – Z. 1456 lies al-awlād. – Z. 1484 lies
59 waǧadta. – Z. | 1488 (wa-qāla … ǧāhilin) = z.T. wörtlich Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn al-
aḫbār II. Kairo 1963, S. 124, 7 (nach Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 448, wo noch eine
Entsprechung in Ǧāḥiẓ, at-Tarbīʿ, nachgewiesen ist) und Šahrastānī, al-Milal,
ed. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 305, 15f. – Z. 1488 (wa-qāla) – Z. 1489 (muʿānidan)
= Mubaššir, Muḫtār al-ḥikam. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Madrid 1958,
S. 297, 3–5. – Z. 1488 ( fa-qāla) – Z. 1489 (muʿānidan) = Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn II
(s. Z. 1488), S. 124, 8. – Z. 1490 lies ḫayran. – Z. 1490 (wa-qāla) – Z. 1491 (bihī) =
Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 306, 3 f. – Z. 1491 yaqbalu
: + šayʾan Badawī, S. 204, -5. – Z. 1492 (wa-qīla) – Z. 1494 (ʿalayhi) = Šahras-
tānī, al-Milal, ed. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 306, 4 f., und nach Strohmaier
(s. Anm. 57), S. 469 Anm. 34, auch Ibn Hindū und Pseudo-Suyūṭī, Ǧāmiʿ al-
kalimāt, Hs. Berlin 8727, fol. 144 v 1. – Z. 1501-1504 vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns
Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 99
r 1–7. – Z. 1518ff. Möglicherweise ist hier ein Bruchstück aus Euklids Abhand-
lung über Musik, al-Qawl ʿalā l-luḥūn enthalten (Hs. Manisa 1705, fol. 93 v–109
v). Vgl. dazu Eckhard Neubauer in Der Islam 48, 1972, S. 5, wonach der Text
nach einer unvollständigen Hs. als Kindītraktat unter dem Titel Muḫtasar al-
Mūsīqī fī taʾlīf an-naġam von Zakariyāʾ Yūsuf, Muʾallafāt al-Kindī l-mūsīqiyya.
Bagdad 1962, S. 111–120, herausgegeben wurde. Es ist aber auch gut denkbar,
dass hier ein Bruchstück aus Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayns (so die Hs.) Übersetzung einer
Schrift über den Einfluss der Musik vorliegt, die in Ḥunayns Nawādir exzer-
piert wird; s. Loewenthals Übersetzung der hebräischen Version von Ḥarīzī
(s. Anm. 24), S. 76f.: Dieses Stück ist eine verkürzte Wiedergabe einer doxo-
graphischen Schrift über den Einfluss der Musik, welche den Titel trägt Kitāb
ʿUnṣur al-mūsīqā wa-mā ftaraqat ʿalayhi l-falāsifa min tarkībihī wa-māʾiyyatihī.
Der Text ist handschriftlich erhalten in der bereits genannten Hs. Manisa 1705,
fol. 123 v–130 v. Dieser 638/1240 geschriebenen Sammelhandschrift zufolge soll
der Text von einem Mann namens Paulus verfasst und von Isḥāq Ihn Ḥunayn
übersetzt worden sein. Zum Text vgl. Franz Rosenthal, Two Graeco-Arabic
Works on Music. In Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 110, 1966,
S. 261–268. = Franz Rosenthal, Science and Medicine in Islam. London 1991
Nr. VI. – Z. 1537 lies min ḏahabin. fa-qīla lahū. – Z. 1543 (wa-qāla … ḫawfihī)
: vgl. Muḫtār ed. Gutas (s. Anm. 14), S. 104, 1, (Kommentar S. 315). – Z. 1544
lies al-ḥīṭān. – yudāwā : auch möglich ist tadāwā. – Z. 1546 lies iḏā stahdama. –
Z. 1556 lies ṯumma ḏakarahū. – Z. 1563 wa-tašawwaša : + wa-ḫtalafa Badawī,
S. 210, 11 (mit den Hss. C und Fatih 3222). – Z. 1568 ʿalayhā lies mit Badawī,
S. 210, -4, ḫallihā. – Z. 1573 lies yastamriʾu und yastamriʾuhū. – Z. 1589 lies aw
yaqbalu. – Z. 1596 lies ardaʾa. – Z. 1597 lies fa-yabtadiʾa. – Z. 1603 lies ḥasana
l-buḥrān. – Z. 1604 lāzima : mulāʾima Badawī, S. 213, 7 (besser). – Z. 1619 lies
wa-aḥfaẓu. – Z. 1620 lies wa-ṭ-ṭahāra Badawī, S. 214, 5, und Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa,
Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ (s. Anm. 46) I, S. 25, -5. – Z. 1626 lies min az-zamān. – Z. 1630
lies ʿalā tarki. – Z. 1635 lies ġayra muwāfiqin. – Z. 1638 (min ḫāriǧin) – Z. 1639
(muzayyanan): Dies ist eine fehlerhafte Dittographie von Z. 1637f. – Z. 1647 lies
mā yanbaġī. – Z. 1648 bi-ġayrihī : + wa-|yasʾaluhū Badawī, S. 216, 9. – Z. 1650 60
(wa-daʿā) – Z. 1652 ( yastaḥsinuhā) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 45 f. Nr. 46. –
Z. 1658 Dunlop denkt hier an Aristeas, Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 57, an Aris-
tippas. Rosenthal, Sayings (s. Z. 410), S. 38 Nr. 22, zufolge ist der Abschnitt
“derived from Galen, Protrepticus 1. 8f. C. G. Kühn”. – Z. 1663 lies fa-daḫala. –
Z. 1671 lies ka-ǧasadin. – Z. 1672 in : iḏā Badawī, S. 218, 5 (besser). – Z. 1693
Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 57, denkt an Herodot, Dunlop an Aphrodite. – Z.
1701 al-istiʿdād : al-iḥtirāz Badawī, S. 220, 11 (offensichtlich nach den Hss. Fatih
3222 und C). – Z. 1703f. vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 52 f. Nr. 70. – Z. 1704 lies
min qanātin. – Z. 1705 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 57, denkt an Perikles. – Z.
1713 ǧawr lies mit Badawī, S. 221, 12, ǧūd. – Z. 1715-1717 ( fa-hiya l-ġalaba) : vgl.
(wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456
(s. Anm. 59), fol. 98 v 17–19. – Z. 1724 (wa-qāla) – Z. 1725 (waḥša) : vgl. Rosen-
thal (s. Z. 410), S. 44 Nr. 41. – Z. 1727 (qāla … ilā l-māl) : vgl. Rosenthal (s.
Z. 410), S. 37 Nr. 18; Anonymus, Min kalām ḥukamāʾ al-bāliġīn (s. Z. 850–866),
S. 46, -9f. – Z. 1739 wa-yuṣīnu (vgl. Reinhart Pieter Anne Dozy, Supplément
aux dictionnaires arabes. I–II. Paris 21927, s.v.) : wa-yaṣūnu Badawī, S. 223, -6. –
Z. 1743-1746 vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 35f. Nr. 15. – Z. 1750 lies fa-staʿmil. –
Z. 1753-1755 (bi-l-ḥaqīqa) : vgl. die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456
(s. Anm. 66), fol. 110 r 17–20 (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir). – Z. 1757 wa-qāla
: al-mutaḫādiʿ Badawī, S. 225, 2. – Z. 1762 (wa-qāla) – Z. 1763 (al-fiʿl) : vgl. die
gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 110 v 13f. (wohl nach
Ḥunayns Nawādir). – Z. 1767 lies yatalaqqāhu. – Z. 1768 lies bi-an yaḥmulahū. –
Z. 1769 wa-māla lies wa-qāla. – Z. 1772 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, 365 und
365 Anm. 21, (wo auf eine syrische Parallele verwiesen wird) denkt an Psellus. –
492 chapter 25
Z. 1777 wa-lākin : + yasʾalūna Badawī, S. 226, -3. – Z. 1779-1781 vgl. Ibn Hindū, al-
Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya. Kairo 1318/1900, S. 124 = deutsche Übers. Rosenthal (s. Z.
1230), S. 356. Zu den griechischen Parallelen (s. Z. 1779 und 1781) s. Rosenthal
(s. Z. 410), S. 51 Nr. 64. – Z. 1782 vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 365 Anm. 22. – Z.
1783 (qīla … ʿaqlī) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 53 Nr. 73. – Lies tilmīḏan. – Z.
1794 Dunlop und Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 195 Nr. 147, denken an Theognis. –
Z. 1807 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, denkt an Kleostratus. – Z. 1811 Epikurus
(so Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58) oder Nikodorus? – Z. 1817-1819 (al-inqiyād)
: vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya
2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 99 r 10–12. – Z. 1825 Im Register ist der nicht identifizier-
61 bare Name unter Bryson zu finden! – Z. 1834 Anaxinus? – | Z. 1849 identifizieren
Dunlop und Rosenthal (Fortleben (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, und Sayings (s. Z. 410),
S. 36f. Nr. 16) mit Aesop. – Z. 1854 lies fa-aṣʿadūhu. – Z. 1855 lies hāʾulāʾi. – Z.
1857 lies fa-ḍaḥikū. – Z. 1868 lies aǧli. – Z. 1871 (suʾila … ṣāḥibihā) = Ibn Abī ʿAwn
(s.o. S. 476), al-Aǧwiba fol. 6 v -3 (⟨ fwrws⟩ zugeschrieben; eine schlechte Vari-
ante ist yusammā statt yusamminu). – Z. 1874 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58
und S. 365 Anm. 25, identifiziert mit Philistion. – Z. 1882 (allaḏīna) – Z. 1883
(al-azwāǧ) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 44 Nr. 42. – Z. 1888 (maḥabba) –
Z. 1889 (tataʿallaqa bihā) : vgl. die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456
(s. Anm. 66), fol. 109 r -7f. (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir); Rosenthal (s. Z.
410), S. 41 Nr. 33. – Z. 1889 aš-šaraf : as-saraf Badawī, S. 235, -6 (besser). Was
haben die Hss. B und C? – Z. 1893 Der Passus wurde von Franz Rosenthal,
Plotinus in Islam: The Power of Anonymity. In Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Ori-
ente e Occidente. Roma 1974. = Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Anno 371, 1974
(S. 437–446) / Nachdr. Franz Rosenthal, Greek Philosophy in the Arab World.
Aldershot 1990, Nr. IV, S. 429f., auf Plotin, Enn. I 3. 3, in der Rezeption der aristo-
telischen Kommentatoren zurückgeführt. – Z. 1896 Dunlop und Rosenthal
(s. Z. 1230), S. 58 und S. 365 Anm. 26, (wo auf Parallelen in Diogenes Laertius
und Ibn Hindū verwiesen wird) identifizieren mit Isokrates. – Z. 1899 lies fa-lā
yahwā. – Z. 1900 wa-ftaraḍūhu. – Z. 1910 lies tubqū. – Z. 1913 lies iġtimāmī. – Z.
1926 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, (vgl. die griech. Parallelen S. 365 Anm. 27)
denkt an Chairemon. – Z. 1930 qīla : + lahū Badawī, S. 239, 4. – Z. 1932 Dunlop
denkt an Nicaeon (s. Index S. 193), Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, an Nicanor. –
Z. 1940 Der Name ist im Register unter Ostanes zu finden. – Z. 1942 lies li-l-
insān. – Z. 1951 lies fa-qāla. – Z. 1956 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, denkt an
Aesop. – Z. 1965 (suʾila … ǧānib) : vgl. (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gno-
mologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 109 r 5 f. – Z. 1971 lies
fa-mā llaḏī. – Z. 1975 (wa-suʾila) – Z. 1976 (al-ḫamr) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z.
410), S. 35 Nr. 13. – Z. 1977 (2 mal) lies mamlūʾun. – Z. 1981 Im Register ist der
Name unter Deucalion zu finden. – Z. 1985ff. vgl. die griechischen Parallelen
bei Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 366 Anm. 29. – Z. 1991 ff. Dunlop und Rosen-
thal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58, (vgl. die griech. Parallelen S. 366 Anm. 30) denken an
(Demetrius) Lacon. – Z. 1996-1998 Eine englische Übersetzung und den Nach-
weis einer Parallele bei Ibn Hindū (al-Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya) findet man bei Ben
Edwin Perry, Secundus the Silent Philosopher. Ithaca/New York 1964, S. 160
Anm. Eine griechische Parallele findet man in der Textsammlung Leben des
Philosophen Secundus. Ed. Ben Edwin Perry S. 84 § 11. – Z. 1997 lies qāla. –
Z. | 1999 Vor Isḥāq fehlt wa-kāna (Badawī, S. 245, 2). – Z. 2002ff. vgl. (kür- 62
zer) Mubaššir, Muḫtār al-ḥikam. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Madrid 1958,
S. 309, -6f. / Übers. Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 186 Nr. 89. Vgl. F. Rosenthal (s.
Z. 410), S. 46 Nr. 47. – Z. 2018 ⟨ʾfsṭs⟩ ist im Register von Dunlop unter Hephais-
tos zu finden. – Z. 2019 lies yanbaġī. – Z. 2021 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 58,
denkt an Antisthenes. – Z. 2028 (wa-qāla) – Z. 2029 (safahin) = Šahrastānī, al-
Milal, ed. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 302, 1f.; vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 39 Nr.
28. – Z. 2030 (wa-yuḥkā … aṣbaʿan) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 37 Nr. 19. Aus-
führlicher Fiqar al-ḥukamāʾ (s. Z. 586–587) ed. Badawī, S. 222, 11–15. – Z. 2033
lies al-bāb. – Z. 2039–2041 (ǧinsika) : vgl. die gnomologische Sammlung Aya
Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66), fol. 109 v 11–14 (wohl nach Ḥunayns Nawādir). – Z. 2042
lies wa-lā yaftarru. – Z. 2044 lies fa-l-yakṯur. – Z. 2046-2048 vgl. (wohl nach
Ḥunayns Nawādir) die gnomologische Sammlung Aya Sofya 2456 (s. Anm. 66),
fol. 98 v 15–17 (unvollständig). – Z. 2047 lies wa-min. – Z. 2048 lies aṭ ṭabaqa. –
qāʾilan : qābilan Badawī, S. 249, 10. Was haben die Hss.? – Z. 2060 (wa-qīla 1.
loc. – maḥabbatī lahū) : vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 53 Nr. 72. – Z. 2061 (wa-
qīda 2. loc.) – 2062 (as-sunna) = beinahe wörtlich Mubaššir, Muḫtār al-ḥikam.
Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Madrid 1958, S. 298, 12 f. / Übers. Rosenthal
(s. Z. 1230), S. 175 Nr. 15; vgl. S. 366 Anm. 33 und S. 369 Anm. 64. – Z. 2073 lies al-
ʿaql. – Z. 2077 lies at-tawāḍuʿ. – Z. 2088 lies tukāfiʾu. – Z. 2090 Rosenthal (s. Z.
1230), S. 59, denkt an Eumenes. – Z. 2093 lies ṣāḥibuhā und aš-šatīma. – Z. 2097
lies nāwūs. – Z. 2104 lies al-yūnāniyīn. – Z. 2104 ( fa-qīla) – Z. 2105 ( yaqṭaʿu)
: vgl. Ǧāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān. Ed. ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn. I.
Kairo 21965, S. 290, 3f. (Dīsīmūs) = Übers. (nebst griech. Parallelen) Rosen-
thal (s. Z. 1230), S. 355. – Z. 2105-2107 vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 410), S. 44 Nr.
40. – Z. 2106 lies ḥammara waǧhī. – Z. 2109 Im Register von Dunlop ist der
Name unter Aesop zu finden. – Z. 2135-2137 vgl. Rosenthal (s. Z. 2130), S. 366
Anm. 35. – Z. 2149 lies fa-tilka l-ḥarāra. – Z. 2150 yaǧurruhū l-ġummā : takar-
raha l-ḥummā Badawī, S. 258, 1 : lies vielleicht tukrahu l-ġummā. – Z. 2154
Dunlop denkt im Apparat an Cebes, im Register (S. 193) jedoch an Ostanes. –
Z. 2160-2165 vgl. die englische Übersetzung von Perry (s. Z. 1996–1998), S. 20
Anm. 29; S. 257f. bringt Perry eine fast wörtliche Parallele bei Ibn Hindū (al-
Kalim ar-rūḥāniyya). Die Secundussprüche bei Ibn Hindū werden von Perry
494 chapter 25
mit dem Griechischen verglichen. – Z. 2168 fīmā : + yakūnu Badawī, S. 259, -

5. – Z. 2189 lies maslak an-nāqiṣ. – Z. 2190 ṣaddaqahū Badawī, S. 261, -4. – Z.
2193-2199 Franz Rosenthal, A Commentator of Aristotle. In Islamic Philo-
63 sophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays | presented by his friends and pupils
to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday. Ofxord 1972 (S. 337–349), S. 347 f.,
analysiert den Abschnitt. Er denkt bei ⟨ʾllynws⟩ an einen nicht weiter bekann-
ten Aristoteliker namens Apollonius von Alexandrien, welcher in der orienta-
lischen Überlieferung mit dem Namensvetter Apollonius von Tyana verwech-
selt wurde. Nur so erklärt sich nach Franz Rosenthal das Auftauchen eines
aus den apokryphen Briefen des Apllonius von Tyana (ed. Rudolf Hercher,
Epistolographi graeci. Paris 1873, S. 115) stammenden Spruches im Muntaḫab
Z. 2197–2199 innerhalb eines Kapitels über ⟨ʾllynws⟩. Fritz W. Zimmermanns
Erklärung (in seinem Buch al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aris-
totle’s De Interpretatione. London 1981. = Classical and Medieval Logical Texts
III, S. XCVIIf.) des Namens als Titel eines nestorianischen Handbuches über
heidnische griechische Philosophie stößt daher auf Schwierigkeiten. Zudem ist
Bar Bahlūls Erklärung von ⟨ʾlynws⟩ – der Form nach ein Genitiv von Ἕλλην –
als “Graecism and Paganism” (Übersetzung v. F. W. Zimmermann) ungenau.
Bar Bahlūs Deutung entspricht griechischem Ἑλληνισμός oder eventuell Ἑλλη-
νικόν. – Z. 2197 lies wa-aǧdādukum. – Z. 2200 Rosenthal (s. Z. 1230), S. 59,
denkt an Ammonius. – Z. 2218 lies yantafiʿu bihī. – Z. 2223 lies ʿalā nuẓarāʾihī. –
Z. 2235 lies bi-ḥasabi. – Z. 2242 lies mutafarriṭan. – Z. 2244 u.ö. lies Ǧālīnūs. –
Z. 2263 lies nasaʾū (ohne Yāʾ). – Z. 2273 lies wāǧibun. – Z. 2275 ḫazāʾinihī : ist
ḫizāʾinihī : ist ḫizānatihī (so Badawī, S. 267, 12; vgl. Z. 2284) zu lesen? – Z.
2281 lies yubaʿʿiḍu. – Z. 2298 wuqifa : yūqafa Badawī, S. 269, 3. – Z. 2310 lies
hadāyā. – Z. 2312 lies mit Badawī, S. 269, ult., rāma. – Z. 2319 aqbala : aballa
richtig Badawī, S. 270, 9. – Z. 2324 lies yufāriqhumā. – Z. 2326 yuǧaddidu : faǧ-
addada Badawī, S. 270, -3. – Z. 2342 Nach ǧinsuka lies waʿindaka. – Z. 2345 lies
istiqbāḥihim. – Z. 2355 lies mit Badāwī, S. 272, ult., yusallimuhū (vgl. yasʿā). –
Z. 2362 buḏūr al-manṭiq (vgl. Dunlop S. 190 unten, wo dies unzulässigerweise
übersetzt wird mit “the ‘lights’ of logic”) : buḏūr al-manṭiq Badawī, S. 273, -
8, lies wohl bi-nūr al-manṭiq. – Z. 2366 lies qiyās an-nafs. – Z. 2372 minhumā
: fīhimā Badawī, S. 274, 10. – Z. 2377 lies lam takun an taʿtadila (sc. an-nafs).
Zur Konstruktion von kāna + an vgl. Wörterbuch der klassisch-arabischen Spra-
che I. Wiesbaden 1957, Sp. 459 a 18ff. – Eine Änderung von lam takun zu lam
yumkin (so Badawī, S. 274, -6) ist nicht nötig. – Z. 2379 lies an-nabātiyya. –
Z. 2388 lies aṭabbu. – Z. 2399ff. vgl. Joel L. Kraemer, A Lost Passage from
Philoponus’ Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation. In JAOS 85, 1965, S. 318–
327. – Z. 2424 fa-inna fīnā : bi-anna fīnā verbessert Badawī, S. 278, 4. – Z. 2442
lies wa-lā yumkinu. – Z. 2444ff. vgl. Franz Rosenthal, Some Pythagorean
Documents Transmitted in Arabic. In Orientalia N.S. | 10, Roma 1941, S. 395 64

Anm. 3. – Z. 2456 abtadiʾa : + bihī Badawī, S. 281, 10. – Z. 2491 ḥassiyya : die
Varianten der Hss. sprechen mehr für ḫasīsa (so Badawī, S. 284, 9) oder ḫis-
siyya; vgl. jedoch adnās al-ḥiss Z. 2493! – Z. 2493 irtaqat : + minhā Badawī,
S. 284, 12. – Z. 2499 inbiṯāṯihī : inbiṯāqihī Badawī, S. 284, -3. – Z. 2512 lies ʿalā
ʿaqlihī. – Z. 2541 lies nāfiʿa. – Z. 2551 lies li-imātatihā. – Z. 2554 hiya : + ʿadadu
Badawī, S. 288, -4. – Z. 2570 lies muḥāmin (ohne Yāʾ). – Z. 2597 fa-naḥnu :
fa-biḥaqqin Badawī, S. 291, -8. Was haben die Hss.? – Z. 2598 lies allaḏī. – Z.
2605 lies adnaʾu. – Z. 2609 lies yastaṭil (s. Z. 2622). – Z. 2613 lies ⟨ʿṣy⟩. – Z. 2614
dafaʿa lies nafaʿa. – Z. 2616 iddiʿāʾ lies Elativ adʿā. – Z. 2626 ḥāra lies ǧāra. –
Z. 2628 aʿlāqihī lies aḫlāqihī. – Z. 2633 wa-yuǧazziʾ lies mit Badawī, S. 295, 2,
wa-yaǧurrunī. – Z. 2634 lies kamā yatanāwaluhū. – Z. 2644 lies al-bašiʿa. – Z.
2657 milkinā : Badawī zufolge haben die Hss. A und D makāninā. – Z. 2659 lies
wa-l-āḫira. – Z. 2664 wa-ǧaʿalahū Badawī, S. 297, 8. – Z. 2666 mubdaʿūna. – Z.
2668-2671: Eine Übersetzung steht bei Franz Rosenthal, Aḥmad B. Aṭ-Ṭayyib
As-Saraḫsī. New Haven, Conn. 1943. = American Oriental Series 26, S. 58. – Z.
2672 = Abū Muḥārib al-Ḥasan Ibn Sahl Ibn Muḥammad al-Qummī: s. Šahras-
tānī, al-Milal, ed. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 348, 7. – Z. 2675 lies ġalabati und
min ġayri. – Z. 2690ff. vgl. Dunlop, Philosophical Discussions (s. Anm. 13),
S. 110f. – Z. 2692f. Zur negativen Beschreibung von Kindī vgl. Franz Rosen-
thal, in Orientalia N.S. 9, 1940, S. 189. – Z. 2702 lies bi-t-tahniʾa. – Z. 2711 lies
wa-li-ġalabati. – Z. 2713 yanqaṣiya lies mit Badawī, S. 301, 4, nataqaṣṣā. – Z.
2722 lies bi-taqṣīrin. – Z. 2745 maʿa : ʿalā Badawī, S. 303, 2. – Z. 2751 lies mit
Badawī, S. 303, 8, iḏā ṭirta waqaʿta (oder zu lesen taqaʿu?) qarīban. – Z. 2751 lies
uns al-ins. – Z. 2759 lies ḥikmatahū. – Z. 2764 mubattarāt : muntaṯirāt Badawī,
S. 304, -10. – Vgl. zum Abschnitt Kap. IV Nr. 9. – Z. 2765 lies as-sirār. – Z. 2780
lies wa-ddaḫara. – Z. 2782 Anfang lies ṣadaʾa. – Z. 2785 lies ka-l-aryaḥiyyati. –
Z. 2804-2834 und Z. 2842-2848 = Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī in seiner Aus-
gabe von Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Kairo 1952, S. 347 f. Anm. – Z. 2825 lies
ḫabīʾatan. – Z. 2827 wa-l-intiṣāl Badawī, S. 309, 12. – Z. 2829 lies al-ḥikma. –
Z. 2831 li-ʿaqlihī Badawī, S. 309, -7. – Z. 2834 (marātibu) – 2842 (ʿalā l-iṭlāq)
steht wörtlich im ʿĀmirīkapitel des Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Ed. ʿAbd ar-
Raḥmān Badawī. Kairo 1952, S. 372, 13–373, 8. – Z. 2845 lies al-ʿIrāq. – Z.
2848 lies mit Badawī, S. 310, -3f., lā ḫafāʾuhū. – Z. 2849-2926 Übersetzung und
Analyse bietet Kraemer (s. Anm. 9), S. 45–50. – Z. 2864 watuġiḏḏu lies mit
Badawī, S. 312, 1, (vgl. Kraemers Übersetzung) wa-baʿdu. – Z. 2894 lies mit
Badawī, S. 313, 12, hāḏā l-laḥnu wa-tafannana. – Z. 2927-3014 Übersetzung und
Analyse bietet Kraemer (s. Anm. | 8), S. 53ff. Vgl. Dunlop, Philosophical Dis- 65
cussions (s. Anm. 13). – Z. 2930 lies yunšidu. – Z. 2934 lies yakmulu. – Z. 2636
lies wa-kāna yaḥfaẓu. – Z. 2939 (innī) – Z. 2940 (huwa) : dies steht als Zitat des
496 chapter 25
Siǧistānī in einer Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Abhandlung über den Traum ed.

Gätje (s. Anm. 28), S. 135, 24f. – Z. 2940 lies yaḥfaẓu. – Z. 2948 ff. vgl. Dunlop,
Philosophical Discussions (s. Anm. 13), S. 111f. – Statt Asfuzarī (so Dunlop auch
S. 184) is wohl Isfīzārī zu lesen: Vgl. Gimaret (s. Anm. 38), S. 158 f. – Z. 2955
lies an-nafs. – Z. 2978 lies wa-llāhi. – Z. 2991 lies an-nafs. – Z. 2998 lies min
ġayri. – Z. 3005 lies ǧawāmiʿ; nafīs. – Z. 3015-3088 Die hier (mit einigen klei-
neren Auslassungen und Kürzungen) exzerpierte Quelle, nämlich Miskawayh,
Taǧārib al-umam. Ed. Henry Frederick Amedroz. II. Kairo 1333/1915, S. 275,
2–282, 13. = Der Islam 3, 1912, S. 346–351, gibt uns die Möglichkeit, den Mun-
taḫabtext zu ändern (der Einschub Z. 3019f. beweist, dass Miskawayh und der
Kompilator des Ṣiwān sich persönlich gekannt haben). – Z. 3016 ūtiya : udiya
Misk. – yahiru : bahara Misk. – Z. 3017 ʿanhū : + ġayrahū. – Z. 3021 ibnī : abī
Misk. – al-ʿarabiyya : al-ġarība Misk. (vgl. auch Z. 3025). – Z. 3023 lies wa-kāna
yašuqqu ʿalaya ḏālika : fa-kāna ḏālika yašuqqu ʿalaya Misk. – Z. 3028 lies fa-
asquṭu. – Z. 3029 asquṭu : + fī Misk. – Lies yuʾtā. – Z. 3030 (Anfang) ʿalā : –
Misk. – Z. 3031 innahū : fa-innahū Misk. – Z. 3036 arbaʿīna wa ḫamsīna : ṯalāṯīna
wa-arbaʿīna Misk. – Z. 3040 kuntu bi-šarīṭatin : kānat lī šarīṭatan Misk. (vgl.
Muntaḫab Hss. A B). – Z. 3047 wa-l-manṭiq : fa-ammā l-manṭiq (Nachsatz: fa-
mā ǧasara!) Misk. – Z. 3052 lies mutaḫayyira. – Z. 3056 lies wa-nazāha. – Z.
3058 lies wa-sīnūn. – Z. 3060 bāriʿan fī ḏālika l-maʿnā : annahū bāriʿan fī ḏālika
l-fanni wa-l-maʿnā Misk. – Lies al-muʿǧabūna. – Z. 3061 yamsuku : wa-yamsuku
Misk. – yanfuḏa : yunfida Misk. – Z. 3062 fīhi : ʿalayhi Misk. : minhū Muntaḫab
ed. Badawī, S. 323, -2. – Z. 3068 baʿīd : badīʿ Misk. – Z. 3069 bi-tanāwulihī :
yatanāwalu Misk. – ṯiqātuhū : biṯiqātihī Misk. – maʿahā : maǧrāhā Misk. – Z.
3071 yaʾtī : + lahū Misk. – Z. 3073 yunādīhi : yunāwīhi qirnun Misk. – al-ġaraḍi
: al-furaṣi Misk. – Z. 3076 bihā : bihī Misk. – Z. 3081 lies an-naẓar. – Z. 3086
wa-hāḏā : hāḏā Misk. – Z. 3087 wa-ddaʿaynā: aw-i-ddaʿaynā Misk. – Z. 3115
Zum Unterschied zwischen dahr und zamān bei Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī vgl. Shlomo
Pines und Michael Schwarz, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdīʾs Refutation of the Doctrine
of Acquisition (iktisāb). In Studia orientalia memoriae Ḥ. Baneth dedicata. Jeru-
salem 1979 (S. 49–94), S. 61. – Z. 3123ff. vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 116 f. –
Z. 3124 fī : min Badawī, S. 328, 6. Haben die Hss. fī oder folgt Dunlop hier
der lectio difficilior von Tawḥīdī, al-Muqābasat. Ed. Ḥasan as-Sandūbī. Kairo
66 1929, S. 142, 4? – Z. 3128 lies | al-alfāẓ. – Z. 3150 lies mā taqūlu und bi-asrihī. –
Z. 3172ff. vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 111–115. – Z. 3188 lies ʿĪsā Ibn ʿAlī : vgl.
Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed. Cureton (s. Z. 106ff.), S. 348, 9. – Z. 3199ff. vgl. Kra-
emer (s. Anm. 8), S. 126f. – Z. 3205 lies aš-šahawāt. – Z. 3223 ff. vgl. Kraemer
(s. Anm. 8), S. 123–126. – Z. 3228 lies al-muʾṯara. – Z. 3233 lies bi-l-falyi. – Z.
3252ff. Abū Zakariyāʾ aṣ-Ṣaymarī ist Kollege des Abū Sulaymān; vgl. Kraemer
(s. Anm. 8), S. 82ff. und 99ff. – Z. 3262ff. vgl. Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed. Cureton
(s. Z. 106ff.), S. 348, 8, und (s. Z. 3263f.) Dunlop, Philosophical Discussions

(s. Anm. 13), S. 112, sowie Aristoteles, De generatione animalium 784 a 4 ff. – Z.
3264 at-tamṯīl : al-fašal (“Unvermögen”) Badawī, S. 338, 5. – Z. 3267 lies wa-qad
amnā. – Z. 3268 lies kaʾannahū. – Z. 3273 lies ar-Rūmī. – Z. 3277 lies li-l-fanāʾ. – Z.
3282ff. vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 115f., und zu Ġulām Zuḥal Manfred Ull-
mann, Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam. Leiden 1972. = Handbuch
der Orientalistik I, Erg.bd. VI/2, S. 333; Sezgin, GAS VII, S. 168. – Statt Ibn Bīlis
lies mit Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa. Ed. Aḥmad Amīn und
Aḥmad az-Zayn. Kairo 21953, S. 38, 4, Ibn Bakkus (= Ibrāhīm Ibn Bakkūš al-
ʿAššārī, wozu man Ullmann S. 73f. vergleiche). – Z. 3295 = Abū Tammām
Yūsuf Ibn Muḥammad an-Naysābūrī: S. Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed. Cureton (s.
Z. 106ff.), S. 348, 6. – Z. 3301ff. vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 325 f. – Z. 3310
Anfang lies al-ašyāʾ. – Z. 3317ff. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8), S. 105 ff. – Z. 3320 lies
mubāšaratan. – Z. 3328 lies la-ṣuʿūbatan. – Z. 3332 vgl. Kraemer (s. Anm. 8),
S. 108f. – Z. 3345 lies tuṭillu. – Z. 3382 lies li-ltiʾāmihī. – Z. 3391 lies al-ināba. – Z.
3399 li-ḥufratihī lies mit Badawī, S. 346, 11, li-ḥaḍratihī. – Z. 3405-3419 vgl. die
franz. Übers. bei Mohammed Arkoun, Contribution à l’ étude de l’ humanisme
arabe au IVe/Xesiècle: Miskawayh (320/325–421 = 932/936–1030) philosophe et his-
torien. Paris 21982. = Études Musulmanes XII, S. 48 f. – Z. 3420-3524 Auch hrsg. v.
Mohammed Arkoun, Textes inédits de Miskawayh (m. 421). In Annales Isla-
mologiques 5, Le Caire 1963 (S. 818–205), S. 191–195. – Z. 3436 rāʾāhu : hier ist
mit Badawī, S. 348, -5, und Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān
Badawī. Kairo 1952, S. 286, 10, rābahū zu lesen. – Z. 3441 baḏalahū lies mit den
Hss. A B und mit Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad, ed. Badawī (s. Z. 3436), S. 286, -
4, yabḏiluhū. – Z. 3456 Anfang lies ruʾya. – Z. 3480 aṭfaʾahū lies mit Badawī,
S. 351, 3, und Miskawayh, Ǧāwīdān ḫirad (s. Z. 3441), S. 289, 4, aṭġāhu. – Z. 3490
lies ḥattā yuẓfirahā. – Z. 3500 lies al-uṣūl. – Z. 3503 lies al-ʿawīṣa. – Z. 3541 lies
al-waqiḥa. – Z. 3549 lies al-iqtidāʾ. – Z. 3552 yurdīnā : yūdīnā Badawī, S. 355,
-6; m.E. ist die richtige Lesart yuʾḏīnā; s. Tawḥīdī, al-Muqābasāt (s. Anm. 42),
S. 206, -2. – Z. 3563 lies kulla nafʿin. – Z. 3565 lies nanqulu und numayyizu. –
Z. 3594 fa-|quddāma ġašyatihī ḥālun lies mit Badawī, S. 358, 7, faqada am 67
ġašyathū ḥālun. – Z. 3616 wa-yanbaġī : wa-tantafī Badawī, S. 359, -3. – Z.
3624 Anfang lies wa-yaḥfiẓuhū. – Z. 3627 lies naġnā; nastaḥiqqu. – al-mazīda
: al-mazyata besser Badawī, S. 360, -3. – Z. 3628 lies nataḫarraǧu. – Z. 3630
lies tunẓimuhū; tuṣliḥuhū. – Z. 3632 lies šaġafat. – Z. 3641ff. vgl. Kraemer (s.
Anm. 8), S. 117f. – Der Text ist (nach der Hs. Murad 1408) abgedruckt worden
von Samuel Miklos Stern, The Authorship of the Epistles of the Ikhwān-
Aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. In IC 20, 1946 (S. 367–372; Nachtrag in IC 21, 1947, S. 403f.), S. 371 f. –
Z. 3642 wird Abū Sulaymān al-Maqdisī als Autor der Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ hin-
gestellt. Dies modifiziert Bayhaqī, Tatimma, ed. Kurd ʿAlī (s. Anm. 5), S. 36,
498 chapter 25
1: Nur die Formulierung (alfāẓ hāḏā l-kitāb) stamme von Maqdisī; Mitautoren
seien ferner Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn Hārūn az-Zanǧānī, Abū Aḥmad an-Nahraǧūrī,
al-ʿAwfī und Zayd Ibn Rifāʿa. Die Richtigkeit dieser Angabe, welche die Rasāʾil
einem Autorenkollegium in Basra zuschreibt, hat S. Stern nachgewiesen. Er
hat wahrscheinlich gemacht, dass Zanǧānī spiritus rector dieser Gruppe war:
S. den im Kommentar zu Z. 3641ff. genannten Aufsatz von S. M. Stern. Ferner
Samuel Miklos Stern, New Information about the Authors of the “Epistles
of the Sincere Brethren”. In IS 3, 1964, S. 405–428. = Samuel Miklos Stern,
Studies in Early Ismailism. Jerusalem/Leiden 1983, S. 155–176. – Z. 3645-3679 =
(mit einigen kleinen Auslassungen) Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ IV. Kairo 1928, S. 119,
8–120, ult. – Auf die Übereinstimmung wies bereits Rosenthal, Some Pytha-
gorean Documents (s. Z. 499ff.), S. 115 Anm. 1. – Mit einigen Varianten steht
der Text auch Rasāʾil IV S. 222, 7–224, 2. – Z. 3648 lies al-atfālu minkum. – Z.
3650 lies ar-ruʾasāʾ. – Z. 3658 lies nadʿū. – Z. 3660 lies taṣʿadu. – Z. 3661 lies
fa-tušāhidu. – Z. 3671 lies innakum turīdūna und ġadan. – Z. 3674f. vgl. den
Kommentar zu Z. 548f.
VII Schlussbetrachtung
Der Herausgeber des Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, Douglas Morton Dun-

lop, hat dankenswerterweise seiner Ausgabe einen “General Index” beigefügt,
sowie eine Liste von unsicheren oder nicht identifizierbaren Namen, meist
griechischer Provenienz. Hierbei sind zahlreiche Namen aufgenommen, die
auch im “General Index” genannt sind. Dies wäre vermeidbar gewesen, wenn
alle Namen in einem einzigen arabischen Index zusammengefasst und die
erschließbaren griechischen Namen in Klammern beigefügt worden wären. Ein
zusätzlicher analytischer Index wäre selbstverständlich damit nicht überflüs-
sig geworden. Die ersten Ansätze hierzu findet man im “General Index”. In die-
68 sem sind nicht alle Namen | aufgenommen, deren vorläufige oder wahrschein-
liche Identifizierung Dunlop im textkritischen Apparat zum arabischen Text
vorgenommen hat. Nebenbei bemerkt: Dort ist nicht jede im Index genannte
Identifizierung genannt. Dies hat zur Folge, dass man beim Lesen des Namens
⟨ʾfsṭs⟩ (Z. 2018) erst nach längerem Suchen auf den im Index genannten Namen
Hephaistos stößt oder bei dem rasm ⟨ʾswns⟩ (Z. 2109) auf Aesop kommt usw.
Eine Stichprobe ergab überdies, dass in den Indices folgende Namen fehlen:
S. 176: ⟨ʾwfwrs⟩ §211; ⟨bʾnydws⟩ §172; ⟨blwn⟩ §193; S. 178: ⟨ fylʾsṭws⟩ § 141; ⟨ fylsws⟩
§ 123; ⟨ fylmws⟩ §210, ⟨qʾdʾmwnyʾ⟩ §205; ⟨mʾnʾfyls⟩ § 209; S. 181: Abū Saʿīd mit Ver-
weis auf Ibn Baylas / Bīlis; S. 189: Ibn Baylas / Bīlis, Abū Saʿīd (= Ibn Bakkūs / Bak-
kūš; s. zu Z. 3282ff.) § 289. – Einige Namen würde ich anders identifizieren, aber
solange keine Belege auffindbar sind, müsste auch da ein Fragezeichen beige-
fügt werden.
Der Text ist noch längst nicht voll erschlossen. Zahlreiche Schwierigkeiten sind
noch nicht befriedigend gelöst. Um so mehr sind wir dem Herausgeber zu Dank
verpflichtet, dass er uns mit seiner sehr wertvollen Edition für zukünftige wis-
senschaftliche Arbeit eine unersetzliche Ausgangsbasis geschenkt hat.
Summary
The article is a review of Douglas Morton Dunlop (ed.), The Muntakhab

Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah of Abū Sulaimān As-Sijistānī. Arabic Text, Introduction and
Indices. The Hague/Paris/New York 1979. The Arabic text is an anonymous shor-
tening recension from the 12th century AD of the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma by Abū Sulay-
mān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī (d. ca. 374/985AD). The 2nd recension, the Muḫ-
taṣar Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma, written by ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī (around 540/1145),
is much shorter but contains some chapters missing in the Muntaḫab. It is edi-
ted by R. Mulyadhi Kartanegara as a PhD thesis, University of Chicago,
Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, March 1996. – Our review
article gives an overview of the research in the text, in its sources, in its use
by later texts, and adds a long list of corrections and references to the litera-
ture.
On Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī cf. now Encyclopaedia Islamica II. Leiden/Bos-

ton 2009, pp. 585a–595a (Sharafoddin Khorasani, translated from Persian
by Farzin Negahban). – Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy I, Dordrecht
2011, pp. 17–20 (Emily Cottrell). – Emily Cottrell, The Siwan al-Hikma
and its Readers, from Baghdad to Tabriz and Siwas, through Khorasan: Rea-
ding the Classics during the 12th and 13th century. In İslam Medeniyetinde
Bağdat (Medînetü’s Selâm) Uluslararası Sempozyum, 7–8–9- Kasım 2008 [Bagh-
dad (Medinat al-Salam) in Islam International Symposium, 7–8–9- November
2008]. Published by the Waqf of Marmara University Faculty of Theology. Istan-
bul 2011, pp. 47–63. – Philosophy in the Islamic World I: 8th–10th Centuries.
Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson.
English translation by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Hand-
book of Oriental Studies I, vol. 115/1, p. 668 (Dimitri Gutas). – On new Syriac
500 chapter 25
gnomological material cf. Yury Arzhanov, Sayings of Greek Philosophers. A

Study in Syriac Gnomologia with Edition and Translation. Lovani 2018. = CSCO
669. Subsidia 138.
Republished, with some corrections and additions, from Arabica 31, 1984, pp. 36–68. By
courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 26
Miskawayh’s Purity of the Soul

as a Program Leading to Ethicization of Knowledge
I Introduction 501 – II Miskawayh and His Cultural Background 501 – III An Analysis of
Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq 503 – III.1 First Treatise: The Soul, Its Parts and Their Role
504 – III.2 Second Treatise: The Soul as Cornerstone of Character and Education 504 –
III.3 Third Treatise: Virtues and Knowledge 505 – III.4 Fourth Treatise: Practical Virtues
505 – III.5 Fifth Treatise: Love and Friendship 506 – III.6a Sixth Treatise: The Health
of the Soul, Its Preservation 506 – III.6b Sixth Treatise: The Health of the Soul, Its Res-
toration 507 – III.6c Sixth Treatise: Remedy of Fear 508 – III.6d Sixth Treatise: Remedy
of Grief 508 – IV Ethics as Likeness to God. The Way from Plato to Miskawayh 509 – V
What is New in Miskawayh’s Ethics? 511 – VI Miskawayh’s Way from Practical Ethics to
“Spiritual Medicine”. A comparison with Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī and a Rediscovered Galenic
Source 513 – VII Conclusion 514 – VIII Echoes of Miskawayh’s Ethics in the Muslim
World 515 – Abstract 517
I Introduction
Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) called his monograph on ethics “Refinement of Char-

acter and the Purification of Natural Dispositions”, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq wa-taṭhīr
al-aʿrāq.1 An alternative title is “Book on the Purity of the Soul”, Kitāb Ṭahārat
an-nafs. These titles are illuminating. We will try to show that his book is kind of
a program to self-education, to constant endeavour to improve self-discipline
by learning and practicing virtues which, in Miskawayh’s Neoplatonic formula-
tion, leads to “purification of the soul”.
II Miskawayh and His Cultural Background
Miskawayh’s concepts and language reflect the spirit of his time. As secretary
of the Buyids in Baghdad and in Rayy near Tehran, he had contacts with many
1 Miskawayh, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq. Ed. Constantine K. Zurayk. Beirut 1966. – Engl. transl. by C.
K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character (Tahdhib al-Akhlaq). Chicago 2002.

502 chapter 26
scholars. He was librarian of the vizier Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970),
whose letters on meteorological, astronomical and psychological questions,2
sent to the Buyid ruler ʿAḍud ad-Dawla, give an impression of the variety of
his library. Miskawayh was especially interested in philosophy, and his books
betray knowledge of Greek sources like Aristotle, Galen, Alexandrian com-
mentaries of Aristotle, and Neoplatonic adaptations of Aristotelian texts, espe-
cially of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, including a summary of the Nico-
machean Ethics, called in its Arabic-Latin translation by Hermannus Aleman-
nus Summa Alexandrinorum (s. n. 85), doxographical texts like the treatise on
the virtues of the soul, the Maqāla fī iṯbāt faḍāʾil an-nafs attributed to Plato;
his own collections of proverbs attributed to Greek philosophers and pre-
Islamic Persian wise, called Ǧāwīdān-ḫirad = al-Ḥikma al-ḫālida; Neoplatonic
texts like Plotinus in the adaptation of a Theology attributed to Aristotle, or
texts by Porphyry and his pupil Iamblichus. Iamblichus’ commentary, lost in
the Greek original, on the Pseudo-Pythagorean Golden Verses is preserved in
an Arabic translation.3 Another source of Miskawayh is a text on education of
the youth attributed to the Neopythagorean Bryson. Some of the mentioned
Greek sources became known to Miskawayh through Islamic philosophers
like Kindī (ca. 185/801–between 247/861 and 259/873) and Fārābī (258/872–
339/950 or 951), or there were common sources, as for example the ethics of the
encyclopaedia of the Sincere Brethren from the 4th/10th century shares with
Miskawayh similar Neoplatonic concepts and propagate the value of love and
friendship.4
The eclecticism from so many Greek and Arabic sources is a mirror image
of the open-mindedness of a society which shared their texts and ideas, and
was engaged in many discussions organized in learned circles – I mention Abū
Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī and his correspondence with Miskawayh on ethical and
philosophical questions, the Kitāb al-Hawāmil wa-š-šawāmil, which is recently
newly edited with an English translation. In the answers on questions by Abū
2 Ed. and Engl. transl. by Hans Daiber, Naturwissenschaften bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhun-
dert n. Chr. Briefe des Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd (gest. 360/970) an ʿAḍudaddaula. Leiden/New
York/Köln 1993. = IPTS 13.
3 Ed. and Engl. transl. by Hans Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica in arabischem Gewande.
Der Kommentar des Iamblichus zu den Carmina aurea. Ein verlorener griechischer Text in
arabischer Überlieferung. Amsterdam/New York/Oxford/Tokyo 1995. = VNAW.L n.r. 161. = H.
4 A first comparison of Miskawayh and Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ can be found in ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān
Badawī, Miskawaih. In A History of Muslim Philosophy. Ed. Mian Muhammad Sharif. I.
Wiesbaden 1963, pp. 469–479. = ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Quelques figures et thèmes de la
philosophie islamique. Paris 1979, pp. 137–147.
miskawayh’s purity of the soul 503
Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023) we find several topics discussed by Miskawayh,

like knowledge,5 friendship/partnership,6 fear of death,7 justice/injustice,8
health and illness of the soul.9 The answers given by Miskawayh appear to be
preliminary steps of his later written Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq.
All scholars of that time have one tendency in common: The return to the
past, to Greek thinkers and their echo in Islamic thinkers who share one com-
mon and universal value, the value of knowledge in the context of Islamic
religion. This common value shared by all nations is ethics – it is ethicization of
knowledge.10 The Jewish scholar Joel Kraemer gave his book on the “cultural
revival during the Buyid age” the title Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam
(1986; 21992) – because of the return of this period to Greek models, compar-
able with the humanistic movement during the European Renaissance in the
15th and 16th centuries.
This comparison is misleading, as it neglects the background of an Islamic
religion. Ethicization of knowledge means the rediscovery of human dignity in
the context of the Islamic religion.
III An Analysis of Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq
Miskawayh’s ethics can be considered as a program for ethicization of know-

ledge. This assessment requires a clarification. In his historical work Taǧārib
al-umam wa-taʿāqub al-himam, “The Experiences of the Nations and the Con-
sequences of their Ambitions”, Miskawayh considers the experiences of history
as a valuable moral guide of mankind – not religion. History is the achieve-
5 Ed. Bilal Orfali and Maurice A. Pomerantz / Engl. transl. Sophia Vasalou and
James E. Montgomery, The Philosopher Responds. An Intellectual Correspondence from
the Tenth Century. New York 2019, I, pp. 52–57; 80–83 and 206–211.
6 B. Orfali and M. A. Pomerantz / Engl. transl. S. Vasalou and J. E. Montgomery, I,
pp. 98–103 and 198–203. – Cf. Nuha Al-shaar, Ethics in Islam. Friendship in the Political
Thought of al-Tawḥīdī and His Contemporaries. New York/London 2019.
pp. 112–117.
pp. 130–135.
pp. 236 f.
10 In the term “ethicization” I follow Muʿtazz Al-Khatib’s terminology in his article “From
a Fiqhi Approach to an Ethical Approach: Ijtihād and the genome as a Case Study”.
In Journal of Islamic Ethics 3, 2019 (pp. 90–127), p. 116: Ethicization of fiqh / taḫlīq al-
fiqh.
504 chapter 26
ment of a single human being and not primarily the guidance by the saints
and prophets who received divine revelation.11 For this reason, in Miskawayh’s
ethics the prophetic revelation and Fārābī’s concept of the ruler as prophet
and philosopher in the perfect state is pushed into the background. Miskawayh
rediscovered the role of the individual within a society which is shaped by har-
mony, love and friendship.
His ethical work Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq is accordingly structured and in using the
philosophical language of his time it is divided into six “treatises” (maqālāt),
mainly focused on man’s soul:12
III.1 First Treatise: The Soul, Its Parts and Their Role
The first treatise13 discusses the role of the soul and its three Platonic parts,
the rational, the irascible and the appetitive power, for the attainment of the
virtues “knowledge” (ʿilm) and “wisdom” (ḥikma), “temperance” (ʿiffa) and “gen-
erosity” (saḫāʾ), finally “prudence” (ḥilm) and “courage” (šaǧāʿa). The balance
of the mentioned three groups of virtues leads to “justice” (ʿadl).
III.2 Second Treatise: The Soul as Cornerstone of Character and

Education
The second treatise14 explains, that the soul is the cornerstone of human char-
acter and education. The character, a “state” (ḥāl) of the soul, can be trained
through education that is oriented at the “law” (šarīʿa).15 Its perfection is appro-
priate for human beings and it is a combination of knowledge, theoretical
perfection and the realization of knowledge, practical perfection, or perfec-
11 Cf. Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography. Leiden 1952, pp. 141f. –
C. Edmund Bosworth, “MESKAVAYH, ABU ʿALI AḤMAD”. In Encyclopaedia Iran-
ica, online edition, 2002, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/meskavayh
‑abu‑ali‑ahmad. – Gerhard Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions for Islamic Society:
Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh. In Philosophy of the Islamic World. I: 8th–10th Centuries. Ed. by
Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson. English translation
by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook of Oriental Studies I, 115/1
(pp. 304–344), p. 330. – John Peter Radez, Ibn Miskawayh, the Soul, and the Pursuit of
Happiness. Lanham/Boulder/New York/London 2019, ch. 6 (comparison of Miskawayh’s
Taǧārib al-umam and Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq).
12 On Miskawayh’s concept of the soul cf. G. Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11),
pp. 334 ff., and on his Tahḏīb cf. ib., pp. 337–344.
13 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 3–30 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 5–26.
14 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 31–73 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 29–65. – Cf. G. Endress,
Ancient Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11), pp. 323 f. and 338f.
15 Cf. ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 35, 13 ff. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 32f.
tion of the character.16 Miskawayh dedicates a long section, taken from the
Oikonomikos by the Pythagorean Bryson, to the education of the youth:17 This
section stresses such values as love of honour, the observance of religious tradi-
tions and duties, temperance, dissociation from the bad, learning by heart good
traditions, good manners in eating, clothing and behaviour. A perfect charac-
ter leads to happiness and is reserved for the perfect philosopher or for the
prophet who receives divine revelation. Miskawayh does not further elaborate
this idea. Remarkable here is Miskawayhs allusion to Fārābī’s concept of the
ruler as a philosopher and prophet. He expanded this idea with his concept of
education of the individual. Education is a constant process of striving after
knowledge and its realization. It requires the guidance of teachers. In allusion
to Fārābī, Miskawayh speaks of “managers of cities”, who should guide every
person to intellectual happiness and thereupon to “practical arts and sensible
activities”.18 Here, education leads to the improvement of the character and it
leads to happiness.
III.3 Third Treatise: Virtues and Knowledge

The third treatise19 gives, on the basis of late Greek sources,20 an enumeration
of the degrees of happiness and of the virtues leading to happiness. The “spir-
itual virtue” (al-faḍīla ar-rūḥāniyya) that leads to perfect happiness, requires
the highest degree of knowledge, and the highest level of perfection in man’s
actions.
III.4 Fourth Treatise: Practical Virtues

In the fourth treatise21 Miskawayh turns to the practical part that leads to hap-
piness. He dicusses the virtues in man’s actions that lead to justice: Miskawayh
gives a detailed exposition of the practice of virtues, of courage, abstinence,
generosity, and above all justice which is the balance of all virtues and which
includes the duties towards God, towards fellow human beings, towards the
forebears, and towards the duties of worship.
16 Cf. ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 39, 15 ff. / Engl. transl C. K. Zurayk, pp. 36f.
17 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 55–63 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 50–56. – Cf. G. Endress,
Ancient Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11), p. 324.
18 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 72, 10 ff. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 64.
20 Cf. G. Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11), pp. 324f.
506 chapter 26
III.5 Fifth Treatise: Love and Friendship

An expansion of this treatise on virtues is the fifth treatise22 on love and friend-
ship. Because man has the inclination to “companionship” (uns) that keeps
society together and creates solidarity, Miskawayh can propagate religion and
its gatherings for the worhsip of God as something resulting not only from “the
law” (aš-šarīʿa) and from accepted customs. A cornerstone of solidarity is love
and friendship that must be regulated by social rules.
III.6a Sixth Treatise: The Health of the Soul, Its Preservation

In the last treatises of Miskawayh’s book on ethics, in his treatises on the health
of the soul, its preservation and its restoration,23 he takes up and continues the
discussion of the first treatise on the soul. On the basis of his discussion of the
cardinal virtues and Galen’s doctrine of the four temperaments, Miskawayh
gives practical advices for the preservation of the health of the soul24 and
the restoration of its health25. In the foreword he explains the diseases of
the soul in allusion to the Aristotelian26 and Galenic27 doctrine, that man is
composed of his body and the “divine, incorporeal faculty”, his soul. Diseases
might have their origin in the soul when man is thinking evil things or when
he is frightened; or diseases are caused by man’s constitution or his senses.
Miskawayh explains this in many details and with many examples, taken from
daily life, as follows: The health of the soul can be preserved through the associ-
ation of man with good people, through constant reflection and acting accord-
ingly – by observing such virtues as friendliness, truthfulness, moderation and
prudence, diligence, self-control, attentiveness, sincerity, and critical forbear-
ance. Here, we can easily detect Platonic and Aristotelian virtues and explana-
tions taken from Galen’s Ethics. Moreover, in a passage on the examination of
conscience, on man’s rebuke of his soul, attributed to the philosopher Kindī,28
we detect an echo of the Pseudo-Pythagorean Golden Verses (40–42). They
might have reached Kindī through their Arabic translation with Iamblichus’

26 Cf. Aristotle, De anima 403 a 3 ff.
27 Cf. Galen, That the Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body / Arabic trans-
lation ed. by Hans Hinrich Biesterfeld, Galens Traktat, Dass die Kräfte der Seele den
Mischungen des Körpers folgen. Wiesbaden 1972. = G. Fichtner (s. n. 31), no. 28 (Quod
animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur).
28 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 190, 3 ff. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 169.
commentary,29 or – in the present case more likely – from Galen’s Diagnosis

and Cure of the Soul’s Passions,30 which was translated into Syriac and Arabic,31
and which Miskawayh quoted in the preceding page as Man’s Understanding
the Defects of His Soul.32
III.6b Sixth Treatise: The Health of the Soul, Its Restoration

In the following section, Miskawayh discusses the possibilities to restore the
health of a soul. According to him, the health of the soul is missing when the
balance is missing. This balance between two extremes can be reached through
“activity (al-ḥaraka), effort (as-saʿy), and diligence (iǧtihād)”.33 The balance
between two extremes leads to the four cardinal virtues, which Miskawayh
mentions here as “courage” (aš-šaǧāʿa), “temperance” (al-ʿiffa), “wisdom”
(ḥikma), and “justice” (al-ʿadāla).34 In the footsteps of Galen’s Diagnosis and
Treatment of the Soul’s Passions, the main cause for the illness of a soul is
the irascible part of the soul, which can – considering the temperament of
a person – become the seat of “anger”, of an “agitation” “as a result of which
the blood of the heart boils in a passion for vengeance”.35 Miskawayh gives
many examples of bad character traits arising from anger. They can be changed
through moderation, self-control, sincerity and magnanimity.
29 Ed. and Engl. transl. by H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3).

30 De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione. Ed. Wilko de Boer.
Leipzig/Berlin 1937. = Corpus medicorum graecorum V 4, 1, 1, ch. 6 §10 / Engl. transl. by Paul
W. Harkins , Galen on the Passions and Errors of the Soul. Ohio 1963, p. 49. – On examin-
ation of conscience in antiquity cf. Pierre Hadot, Wege zur Weisheit oder Was lehrt uns
die antike Philosophie? Berlin 1999, pp. 231–233. – On the Galenic text cf. P. Hadot, p. 232
n. 103.
31 See Gerhard Fichtner, Corpus Galenicum. Bibliographie der galenischen und pseudo-
galenischen Werke. Berlin 2018, no. 29.
32 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 189, 2 ff. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 168f. (translation wrongly
“Man’s Understanding of His Own Defects”). – On the association with virtuous friends: Cf.
Galen, De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione. Ed. W. de Boer
ch. III / Engl. transl. P. W. Harkins (s. n. 30), Galen on the Passions and Errors of the Soul,
pp. 31–33.
33 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 191, 11 f. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 170 below.
34 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 193, 6–9 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 172.
35 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 193, 17f. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 172. – On the comparison with
the boiling of blood around the heart cf. Aristotle, De anima 403 a 31, and Peter Adam-
son, Abū Bakr Al-Rāzī (d. 925), The Spiritual Medicine. In The Oxford Handbook of Islamic
Philosophy. Ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke, Oxford 2017 (pp. 63–
82), p. 67.
508 chapter 26
III.6c Sixth Treatise: Remedy of Fear

The knowledge of possible misfortunes in the future is a strong remedy against
fear, which arises if the irascible part of the soul has not any “agitation” and if
cowardice and a feeling of faintness prevail.36 Consequently, Miskawayh argues
that fear of death can be abolished through knowledge of the shortcoming of
life before death and knowledge of the immortality of the soul after its separa-
tion from the body.37 In this regard, we quote a crucial passage:
“The intelligent man” (al-ʿāqil), therefore, should shrink from incompletion
and find comfort in being complete. He should seek everything that could make
him complete and perfect, that could ennoble him and raise his rank, and that
could free him in such a way as to make him safe from falling into captivity
rather than tighten his fetters and add to his complexity and entanglement.
He should also trust in the fact that, when the noble and divine substance is
213 delivered from the thick and corporeal one, in purity and clarity | rather than in
mixture and turbidity, that substance attains happiness, returns to its heavenly
abode, gets closer to its creator, wins the proximity of the Lord of the universe,
associates with its kindred and fellows among the good spirits, and escapes
from what is contrary and foreign to it.38
III.6d Sixth Treatise: Remedy of Grief

Miskawayh ends his book with a section on the “remedy of grief” about “the
loss of a dear one or the failure to fulfill a desire”; similar to fear of death grief
can be cured by insight into the transience of the world, contrary to the world
of the intellect. As a corroboration of this, Miskawayh adds a long excerpt from
Kindī’s treatise Dafʿ al-aḥzān “The Repelling of Griefs”: Consolation and rem-
edy from grief about the loss of property is the awareness of a possible loss of
possessions, because God has entrusted them to His creatures.39 The Kindī-text
is transmitted in varying versions which ultimately might go back to a lost Hel-
lenistic treatise with the title Perì alypías “On Freedom of Pain/Grief”, perhaps
written by Themistius or Plutarch.
36 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 205, 11 f. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 182.

37 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 216, 13 ff. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 191. – Cf. G. Endress, Ancient
Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11), pp. 334 and 342.
38 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 212, 18–213, 3 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 188.
39 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 219, 12–222, 19 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 194–196.
IV Ethics as Likeness to God. The Way from Plato to Miskawayh40
Kindī, in the complete version of his treatise On the Method of How to Dis-
pel Sorrow,41 advices the neglect of worldly things and the concentration on
the intelligible world by “imitating God”. This imitation of God is, according to
Kindī, attained through the human virtues, through good behaviour and acting.
This will lead to nearness to God and knowledge of Him.42
The similarity of the Kindītext to our quotation from Miskawayh’s chapter
on the fear of death, its causes and its remedy is obvious. The quotation mir-
rors the transformation of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and its three parts
θυμικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν and λογιστικόν43 into the Neoplatonic concept of the soul
returning to its divine origin. Kindī and after him Miskawayh follow the Neo-
platonic tradition of Plotinus – and also of Iamblichus.44 Kindī in his Discourse
on the Soul had developed a philosophical foundation – possibly following the
Neoplatonic tradition of the Vita pythagorica as shaped by Porphyry and his
student Iamblichus.45 It explains that the soul consists of three parts – as we
found them in Miskawayh’s excerpt of the treatise on The Virtues of the Soul.46
It is eager to release itself from the body through ethical virtues and to return
40 Cf. my article “Ethics as Likeness to God. An overlooked tradition”. = H. Daiber, From the
41 Risāla fī l-ḥīla li-dafʿ al-aḥzān. – Cf. Peter Adamson and Gerhard Endress, Abū
Yūsuf al-Kindī. In Philosophy of the Islamic World. I: 8th–10th Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich
Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson. English translation by
Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook of Oriental Studies I, 115/1
(pp. 143–220), pp. 160 f. and 193f. – According to a recently published article, there was
no direct borrowing from Galen’s recently discovered Περὶ ἀλυπίας, as Kindī and Galen
follow a common Hellenistic tradition: Cf. Antoine Pietrobelli, Arabic Περὶ ἀλυπίας:
Did al-Kindī and al-Rāzī Read Galen? In Galen’s Treatise Περὶ ἀλυπίας (De indolentia) in Con-
text. A Tale of Resilience. Ed. Caroline Petit. Leiden/Boston 2019. = Studies in Ancient
Medicine 52, pp. 265–284.
42 Cf. Hans Daiber, Political Philosophy. In History of Islamic Philosophy. Ed. by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. London/New York 1996. = Routledge History of
World Philosophies I–II (pp. 841–885), p. 844, and on the editions of the Kindītext, p. 843
n. 24. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/8.
43 Cf. the references in Hans Daiber, Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text über
die Tugenden der Seele. In Der Islam 47, 1971 (pp. 25–42), pp. 34f. = H. Daiber, From
the Greeks to the Arabs I/7. – θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν, in addition the “sensible soul”, are
considered to be a source for “imagination”. This is a Neoplatonizing modification of the
Aristotelian discussion about imagination and sensation in De anima III 3.
44 Cf. Hans Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 28f.
45 Cf. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 32f.
46 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 86, 7–90, 21 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 77–81.
510 chapter 26
to its divine origin, the realm of the intelligible world.47 Kindī does not offer
a fully developed ethical doctrine, this remains reserved to Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī
(251/865–313/925), Fārābī, and above all to Miskawayh.
These philosophers have continued the Neoplatonic tradition, insofar as
they share the common concept of happiness, which can be reached by the
release of man’s soul from matter, by man’s virtuous acting and his increas-
ing knowledge.48 According to Miskawayh, this knowledge is most perfect in
the “perfect man” (insān kāmil), who is either a “perfect philosopher” (ḥakīm
tāmm) because of his “inspirations” (al-ilhāmāt) in his philosophical attempts
and through heavenly support in his “intellectual conceptions” (at-taṣawwurāt
al-ʿaqliyya). Or he is a prophet supported by God, because he obtains divine
“revelation” (al-waḥy) in varying grades. He will then become an intermediary
between “the higher world” (al-malaʾ al-aʿlā) and “the lower world” (al-malaʾ al-
asfal).49 This formulation is a clear echo of a specification introduced by Fārābī,
who had added the concept of prophecy as prerequisite of the philosopher.50
According to Fārābī, the ruler in the perfect state is a philosopher and he is a
prophet who rules the city – inspired by God and by emulating God’s rule.51
In addition, Miskawayh and Fārābī mirror an accentuation in Iamblichus, who
combined philosophy with theurgic revelation and herewith had modified his
teacher Porphyry.52
The common Neoplatonic tradition in Miskawayh and Fārābī, appears to be
mixed in the latter mainly with Platonic and Aristotelian ideas.53 This means,
Fārābī is concentrating on epistemology and the concept of knowledge, of
learning and acquiring knowledge.
47 Risāla f-l-qawl fī n-nafs al-muḫtaṣar min Kitāb Arisṭū wa-Falāṭun wa-sāʾir al-falāsifa. Cf. P.
Adamson and G. Endress, Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (s. n. 41), pp. 147, 166 and 194.
48 Cf. Hans Daiber, Fārābī on the Role of Philosophy in Society. In Philosophia Islamica I,
Tehran 2010 (pp. 71–77), pp. 73 f. and 77. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/22.
49 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 70, 15–20 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 62.
50 For more details on parallels between Fārābī and Miskawayh s. Roxanne D. Marcotte,
The Role of Imagination (mutakhayyilah) in Ibn Miskawayh’s Theory of Prophecies
(nubuwāt). In American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73, 1999, pp. 37–72, esp. pp. 56–72.
51 Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view. In
MNAW. L n.r. 49/4 (pp. 128–149), p. 17 nn. 79 and 80. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs II/18.
52 Cf. Gregory Shaw, The Soul’s Innate Gnosis of the Gods. Revelation in Iamblichean The-
urgy. In Revelation, Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity. Ed. by Philippa Town-
send and Moulie Vidas. Tübingen 2011 (pp. 117–129), pp. 122–129.
53 On Fārābī cf. Hans Daiber, Fārābīs Aristoteles. Grundlagen seiner Erkenntnislehre. In O
ye Gentlemen. Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture. In Honor of Remke Kruk.
Leiden 2007. = IPTS 74, pp. 99–112. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/21.
V What is New in Miskawayh’s Ethics?
Miskawayh, however, is more focussed on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,

which he represents combined with Hellenistic, Neoplatonic interpretations.54
These Neoplatonic interpretations gave his ethics a specific shape. Miskawayh’s
Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq is not a book on political thought, containing rules for rulers
and ruled, like Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. On the contrary,
it is a book on virtues of the individual. And his individual – as formulated by
Miskawayh in a passage attributed to Aristotle – is provided with “wisdom” (al-
ḥikma) and “intellect” (al-ʿaql) and should “aim with all his capacities (bi-ǧamīʿ
quwāhu) to live a divine life (ḥayāt ilāhiyya)”.55 This aim requires, as Miskawayh
says in the footsteps of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,56 a “moderate amount
of external goods” (al-qaṣd min al-ḫayrāt al-ḫāriǧiyya).57
Miskawayh’s book Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq is not primarily addressed to the citizen,
to rulers and ruled. It is a guidebook on ethics for the individual, for training
his character and teaching him the right behaviour towards his fellow-being.
Love, friendship58 and justice59 are for the benefit of the individual and are the
only means for attaining happiness and knowledge. Human virtues, however,
are imperfect: Who has knowledge of real happiness and the real good, can
“endeavour” (ǧahd) “to gain His (God’s) favour” ( yataqarrabu ilayhi) and can
try “to obtain” ( yaṭlub) God’s “pleasure” (marḍāt) “as far as he is able” (bi-qadr
ṭāqatihi), so that “he resembles ( yataqayyalu)60 (God’s) acts to the extent of his
54 Cf. G. Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions (s. n. 11), pp. 322–326 and 337–344.
55 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 171, 13–15 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 152. – On the term
“divine life” cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X 7. 1177 b 30f. / Arabic transl. ed. Anna A.
Akasoy and Alexander Fidora, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics. With an
introduction and annotated translation by Douglas Morton Dunlop. Leiden/Boston
2005. = ASL 17, p. 561, 12 / Engl. transl. Douglas Morton Dunlop, p. 560.
56 I 8. 1099 a 31–b 7 / Arabic transl., ed. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora (s. n. 55), p. 143, 7–16 /
Engl. transl. D. M. Dunlop, p. 142.
57 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 172, 1 f. / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 153.
58 Cf. Tahḏīb 5th discourse. – Perhaps, Miskawayh has given some inspiration to his con-
temporary Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), Kitāb aṣ-Ṣadāqa wa-ṣ-ṣadīq. However,
both authors share a common background, which in addition is mirrored in the con-
temporary Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (cf. below n. 79). – On Tawḥīdī’s Kitāb aṣ-Ṣadāqa wa-ṣ-ṣadīq
cf. Nuha A. Alshaar, Ethics in Islam. Friendship in the Political Thought of al-Tawḥīdī and
His Contemporaries. London/New York 2015. = Culture and Civilization in the Middle East
46.
59 Cf. Tahḏīb 4th discourse.
60 Cf. Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. qyḍ. – C. K. Zurayk translates
“imitates”.
512 chapter 26
capacity (istiṭāʿa)”.61 According to Miskawayh, there exists an hierarchy existing

between God, the angels and those “who seek to be like God” (al-mutaʾallihīn).62
This hierarchy reappears in a similar way and, partly with identical ter-
minology, in a commentary on the Pseudo-Pythagorean Golden Verses, written
by the Neoplatonist Iamblichus. Iamblichus distinguishes between God, “the
angels who are close (to the Gods)” (al-malāʾika al-muqarrabūn)63 and “the god-
like” (al-ilāhiyūn) who are souls which “assumed a human shape” (taʾannasat),
abandoned worldly pleasures and are looking for their “good” (maṣāliḥ).64 Iam-
blichus recommends a moderate acquisition of possessions, insofar as it is
necessary and useful for man,65 who is “on the path of virtue” (sabīl al-faḍīla) by
“reflecting” (bi-šuġl al-fikr) on the paths leading to virtues, away from “the body”
(al-badan). Everyone is obliged to tackle difficult situations and to endure trials
as possibilities to learn, to find the right way and to avoid sensual “delights” (laḏ-
ḏāt), in accordance with his capacity.66 Perfect human virtues of man, whose
soul participates in the divine being,67 pave the way to the divine virtue.68 The
reasonable part of the soul urges the disobedient part to keep to the virtues and
to become habituated to them. This is a process of “learning” (dars), leading
to “education” (taḫarruǧ), “experience” (tadarrub, ḫibra) and “patience” (ṣabr),
also in dealing with others.69 Iamblichus understood philosophy as “conform-
61 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 170, 4–7 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 151.

62 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 169, 13 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, p. 151. – Richard Walzer,
Greek into Arabic, Oxford 1962, p. 228, translated al-mutaʾallihīn with “the divine men”, giv-
ing the Greek equivalents θεῖοι ἄνδρες and ἐκθεούμενοι.
63 The term “close (to God)” (al-maqarrabūn) corresponds to Greek συνεχής in Iamblichus’
De mysteriis I 6. 20-2-8, on which cf. Beate Nasemann, Theurgie und Philosophie in Jam-
blichs De mysteriis. Stuttgart 1991. = Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 11, pp. 137f. It describes
the closeness of the δαίμονες to God.
64 Iamblichus, Šarḥ maǧmūʿ min Kitāb Iyāmbliḫus li-waṣāyā Fūṯāġūras al-faylasūf / Ed. and
Engl. transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 40/41, 5–11; cf. H. Daiber’s
introduction, pp. 18 f.
65 Ed. and Engl. transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 54/55, 2–6; cf. H.
Daiber’s introduction, pp. 26–28.
66 Cf. ed. and Engl. transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 58/59, 13–22.
67 Cf. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 20f.
68 Cf. ed. and Engl. transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 88/89, 21-ult.;
cf. H. Daiber’s introduction, pp. 20, 26 and 29 f.
69 Cf. ed. and Engl. transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 62/63, 6–10,
and 86/87, 14–18; cf. H. Daiber’s introduction, pp. 22–25. – Echoes of Iamblichus’ remarks
about the acquisition of experience in dealing with others and the critical reflection about
others and oneself (cf. also ed. and Engl. transl. H. Daiber, pp. 80/81, 10–82/83, 23) appear
in Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 190, 4–191, 4 / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk,
pp. 169 f., in a quotation attributed to Kindī.
ity with the divine” (ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεῖον ὁμολογία) and “knowledge of the gods” as
perfect virtue, wisdom and happiness, making man “similar to gods”.70
Iamblichus’ concept of a similarity between man and God and of the exist-
ence of the divine soul in man is ultimately Platonic. It instigated him in con-
trast to his teacher Porphyry to the assumption of theurgic virtues as a way to
receive theurgic revelations.71
The Alexandrians and Ammonius did not go so far and instead spoke of
assimilation to God through virtues leading to knowledge of God. Herewith,
they deviate from Plotinus and follow the Neoplatonic and Pythagorean tradi-
tion of Iamblichus. We found an echo in Kindī and above all in the ethics of
Miskawayh.
VI Miskawayh’s Way from Practical Ethics to “Spiritual Medicine”
A Comparison with Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī and a Rediscovered Galenic

Source
Miskawayh’s ethics is a guideline for training the character leading to practical
and “spiritual” virtues and leading to knowledge. This deliberates man’s soul
from the deficiencies of the body and let his soul return to its divine origin.
Miskawayh’s book thus became a practical handbook on “Spiritual Medicine”
(aṭ-Ṭibb ar-rūḥānī). Before him, the famous physician Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī had
written a book with this title.72 This book is less extensive and differs in its struc-
ture, and has not always used the same sources: Different from Miskawayh’s
Aristotelianism, mixed up with Neoplatonism and Galenism, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī
keeps to Platonism and the Platonic traditions that he found in Galen’s ethics
70 Cf. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), pp. 30f. – On the concept of assimi-
lation to God in Greek commentaries to the Golden Verses cf. Anna Izdebska, Man, God
and the Apotheosis of Man in Greek and Arabic Commentaries to the Golden Verses. In The
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10, 2016, pp. 40–64. According to A. Izdebs-
ka, pp. 57–60, assimilation to God (apotheosis) does not exist in the Arabic Iamblichus.
She considers the text to be “somewhat inconsistent” (p. 58), and in another passage to be
“a strange mixture of Islamic/Christian theology” (p. 60). With regard to our comparison
with Miskawayh and with Neoplatonic texts and in view of the contextualization of Iam-
blichus’ commentary (s. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica (s. n. 3), introduction) A.
Izdebska’s interpretation is not convincing.
71 Cf. Hans Daiber, Ethics as Likeness to God (s. n. 40), n. 77.
72 On its contents and analysis cf. Hans Daiber, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. In Philosophy of the
Islamic World. I: 8th–10th Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger,
and Peter Adamson. English translation by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston
2017. = Handbook of Oriental Studies I, 115/1 (pp. 381–420), pp. 398–400 and 401–403. = H.
Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/14. – Peter Adamson, Abū Bakr Al-Rāzī (s. n. 35).
514 chapter 26
De moribus,73 mixing up the Platonic doctrine of the assimilation to God with

the Neoplatonic concept of the soul’s liberation from the body through good
actions and increasing intellectual insight, thus, leading to nearness to God.74
This interest in ethics as likeness to God is shared by Miskawayh. And there
is another commonality with Miskawayh: At the end of chapter 4 in his aṭ-Ṭibb
ar-rūḥānī Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī says that he used Galen’s book on “Good Men Can
Profit from their Enemies”,75 and another book by Galen that he epitomized
bears the title “How a Man May Uncover (taʿarruf ) the Vices of His Soul”.76
Both Galenic titles were also mentioned by Miskawayh, in a different sequence.
Both, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī and Miskawayh, here have excerpted only Galen’s “How
a Man May Uncover the Vices of His Soul” – apparently independently from
each other: The excerpts differ in length and are taken from Galen’s The Dia-
gnosis and Cure of the Soul’s Passions.77 Miskawayh adds the remark “that one
cannot be satisfied ( yaqnaʿu) with what Galen said” – perhaps this criticism is
directed against the comprehensibility of the Arabic translation. The original
of the Galentext contains several more thoughts that reappear in different con-
texts in Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī and in Miskawayh. I will mention here: The constant
improving of one’s character that leads to the likeness to God; diligence; self-
sufficiency, moderation and suppression of greediness; association with and
consultation of good people, the friend; the fight against anger, fear and grief,
which are diseases of the soul; constant reflection; and discipline.
VII Conclusion
The qualities mentioned in Galen’s The Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul’s Pas-
sions are expanded in Miskawayh to an elaborate handbook on the educa-
73 Preserved in an Arabic translation only. = G. Fichtner (s. n. 31), no. 412. – By the way,
Galen refers to this text at the beginning of ch. 6 of his De propriorum animi cuiuslibet
affectuum dignotione et curatione.
74 Cf. H. Daiber, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (s. n. 72), pp. 404–405.
75 Lost in the Greek original, but translated into Syriac and Arabic (not preserved): s. G.
Fichtner (s. n. 31), no. 162: Maqāla fī anna l-aḫyār min an-nās qad yantafiʿūna bi-aʿdāʾi-
him.
76 The English translation by Arthur John Arberry, The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes. Lon-
don 1950, p. 37, wrongly has “How a Man May Discover his Own Vices”.
77 De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione (Περὶ διαγνώσεως καὶ
θεραπείας τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑκάστου ψυχῇ ἰδίων παθῶν “The Diagnosis and Cure of the Passions
Peculiar to Each Person’s Soul”), ed. Wilko de Boer, ch. III / Engl. transl. P. W. Harkins
(s. n. 30), pp. 32–36.
tion of man and his soul. It uses key terms of Galen’s ethics in his On Moral
Character (De moribus), and integrates Galen in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
and its discussion of virtues, love, friendship, and justice. The Aristotelian text
is connected with Neoplatonic comments taken from Greek-Hellenistic texts,
partly ascribed to Porphyry and transforming the Platonic doctrine of the soul
and its three parts thymikon, epithymetikon and logistikon into the Neoplatonic
concept of the soul returning to its divine origin.78 Moreover, Miskawayh used
texts on the “Virtues of the Soul”, among them a doxographical treatise on the
“Virtues of the Soul” ascribed to Plato, and possibly a Pythagorean text on the
“Golden Verses”, combined with Iamblichus’ commentary. Finally, Miskawayh
quotes texts by Kindī – not to speak of those texts he might have known without
quoting them and circulating during his lifetime, like Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī’s aṭ-Ṭibb
ar-rūḥānī or the ethical part of the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ.79
VIII Echoes of Miskawayh’s Ethics in the Muslim World
It is not astonishing that Miskawayh’s text with its complexity and its con-
figuration of so many texts attracted the interest of many Muslim scholars.
Remarkable is the tendency to adduce examples from Qurʾān and Hadith as
confirmation of Miskawayh’s philosophical doctrines. Here, I will mention
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502/1108) and his religious ethics aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim
aš-šarīʿa.80 Herewith, Rāġib became a model for Ġazālī’s (450/1058–505/1111)
ethical works and for Ġazālī’s critical reception of Miskawayh’s ethics.81 – An
78 On details cf. H. Daiber, Ethics as Likeness (s. n. 40).

79 Cf. H. Daiber, Ethics as Likeness (s. n. 40), n. 79.
80 Cf. Hans Daiber, Griechische Ethik in islamischem Gewande. Das Beispiel von Rāġib
al-Iṣfahānī (11. Jh.). In Historia philosophiae medii aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philo-
sophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Ed. Burk-
hard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta. I–II. Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1991 [1992], pp. 181–192.
= H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/30. – Yasien Mohamed, The Ethical Philo-
sophy of Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī. In Journal of Islamic Studies 6, 1995, pp. 51–75. – Yasien
Mohamed, Knowledge and Purification of the Soul. In Journal of Islamic Studies 9, 1998,
pp. 11–34, and above all his monograph The Path to Virtue. The Ethical Philosophy of Al-
Raghib Al-Iṣfahānī. Kuala Lumpur 2006, in which his articles, also mentioned in the fol-
lowing note, are integrated.
81 Cf. Muḥammed Abul Quasem, Al-Ghazali’s Rejection of Philosophic Ethics. In Islamic
Studies 13, 1974, pp. 111–127. – On a comparison of Ġazālī’s and Miskawayh’s ethics cf.
Janine Sourdel, Reflexions sur les “facultés” de l’âme chez al-Ghazali. In Mélanges
Farid Jabre, Beirut 1989, pp. 237–240. – Lenn E. Goodman, Islamic Humanism. Oxford
2003, index s.n. Miskawayh. – Yasien Mohamed, The Educational Ethics of Iṣfahānī and
516 chapter 26
echo of Miskawayh’s ethics can be found in scholars like Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī
(597/1201–672/1274), Nasirean Ethics,82 and through his mediation in Iranian
philosophers like Ǧalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawwānī (830/1426 or 1427–908/1502),83 and
in the Syriac bishop and philosopher Gregory Barhebraeus (1226–1286AD)
in his Butyrium sapientiae, the part on practical philosophy.84 Moreover, in
Jewish philosophers like Maimonides (between 1135 and 1138–1204AD) and
Ibn Falaquera (1225–ca. 1295AD),85 in the Shiʿite philosopher and theologian
Muḥammad Mahdī an-Narāqī (1128/1716–1210/1795),86 in the Egyptian writers
and intellectuals of the Egyptian renaissance (nahḍa) Rifāʿa at-Taḥtāwī (1216/
1801–1290/1873),87 Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1265/1849–1323/1905) and his pupil
Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā (1282/1865–1354/1935).88 – We have no clear idea about
Ghazzālī. In Afkar. Journal of ʿAqidah and Islamic Thought 3, Kuala Lumpur 2002, pp. 113–
142. – Yasien Mohamed, Islamic Psychotherapy: Iṣfahānī’s Treatment of Anger, Fear and
Sorrow. In Afkar 4, 2003, 87–102 (compares Miskawayh, Ġazālī and Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī).
82 Cf. Wilferd Madelung, Naṣīr Ad-Dīn Ṭūsī’s Ethics Between Philosophy, Shiʿism, and
Sufism. In Ethics in Islam. Ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Malibu, California 1985, pp. 85–
101.
83 Cf. Bakhtyar Husain Siddiqi, Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī. In A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Ed. Mian Muhammad Sharif. I. Wiesbaden 1963, pp. 883–888.
84 Cf. Mauro Zonta, Structure and Sources of Bar-Hebraeus’ “Practical Philosophy” in the
Cream of Science. In Orientalia Christiana Analecta 256, 1998, pp. 279–292, and the edi-
tion and translation with commentary by Peter N. Joosse, Syriac Encyclopaedia of Aris-
totelian Philosophy. Barhebraeus (13th c.), Butyrum sapientiae, Book of Ethics, Economy and
Politics. Leiden/Boston 2004. = ASL 16.
85 Cf. Steven Harvey, A New Islamic Source and the Guide of the Perplexed. In Mai-
monidean Studies. Ed. Arthur Hyman. II. New York 1991, pp. 31–59. – Bruno Chiesa,
Una fonte sconsciuta dell’Etica di Shem Tob ibn Falaquera: la Summa Alexandrinorum.
In Biblische und judaistische Studien. Festschrift für Paolo Sacchi. Ed. Angelo Vivian.
Frankfurt a.M. 1990, pp. 583–612. According to B. Chiesa, the parallels between Miska-
wayh and Ibn Falaquera are based on a common source, the Summa Alexandrinorum,
which is preserved in the Arabic-Latin translation made in 1240 by Hermannus Aleman-
nus. On this translation cf. the new edition and analysis by Frédérique Woerther, La
summa alexandrinorum, abrege arabo-latin de l’ éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote. Édition
critique, traduction française et introduction. Leiden/Boston 2020. = IPTS 113.
86 Cf. Juan Ricardo I. Cole, Ideology, Ethics and Philosophy. Discourse in Eighteenth Cen-
tury Iran. In Iranian Studies 22, 1989, pp. 7–34.
87 Juan Ricardo I. Cole, Rifāʿa Al-Taḥtāwī and the Revival of Practical Philosophy. In
Muslim World 70, 1980, pp. 29–46. – Cf. also Mutaz al-Khatib, The Emerging Field of
Ethics in the Context of Modern Egypt. In Ways of Knowing Muslim Cultures and Societies.
Studies in Honour of Gudrun Krämer. Ed. by Bettina Gräf, Birgit Krawietz and
Schirin Amir-Moazami. Leiden/Boston 2019. = Social, Economic and Political Studies
of the Middle East and Asia 122 (pp. 157–178), pp. 159–161.
88 Cf. M. al-Khatib, The Emerging Field (s. n. 87), pp. 163f.
the relation of Miskawayh’s ethics to his contemporary Ibn Sīnā (370/980–

428/1037),89 to the ethics of the Christian Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (893–974AD),90 to the
Shafiʿite jurist Māwardī (361/972–450/1058) in his books on political science91
and to the political philosopher Šihāb ad-Dīn Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ, who seems to
belong to the 7th/13th century.92 Māwardī and Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ appear to be
examples of “ethizication” of law – due to Miskawayh’s impact on them. In
his Sulūk al-malik fī tadbīr al-mamālik “Conduct of the Master in the Manage-
ment of the Kingdom” Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ propagates the way of the Prophet as a
way to moral, to “spiritual” reflection and material welfare. Herewith, his book
became an early example for the Islamic ethicization of fiqh in the footsteps
of Miskawayh’s ethics. Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ’s inclusion of ethics in politics has a long
prehistory, starting with Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ in the 2nd/8th century, who wrote a
“mirror of princes” inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.93 This “mirror of
princes” received a philosophical fundament in Miskawayh’s ethics which gave
the individual a new significance by introducing love, friendship and justice as
cornerstones of human dignity.
Abstract
Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) wrote his book Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq wa-taṭhīr al-aʿrāq
“Refinement of Character and the Purification of Natural Dispositions” with the
persuasion that man can improve his character through increasing knowledge.
89 Cf. first observations by Holger Preissler, Ibn Sīnā and Miskawaih. Bemerkungen
zu ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen. In Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā, 980–1036. II. Ed. Burchard
Brentjes. Halle a.d. Saale 1980, pp. 35–42.
90 Cf. Nāǧī at-Takrītī, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī. A critical edition and study of his Tahdhīb Al-Akhlāq.
Beirut/Paris 1978, introduction.
91 Cf. Saʿīd Ben Saʿīd, al-Fiqh wa-s-siyāsa. Dirāsa fī t-tafkīr as-siyāsī ʿind al-Māwardī. Beirut
1982 (comparison with Fārābī, Miskawayh and Ibn Ḫaldūn).
92 On the date of Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ cf. D. M. Dunlop in the introduction to his edition and
translation of Fārābī’s Fuṣūl al-madanī. In Douglas Morton Dunlop, Aphorisms of the
Statesman. Cambridge 1961, p. 6. – Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ wrote a book on Sulūk al-malik fī tadbīr
al-mamālik, on which cf. Nāǧī at-Takrītī, al-Falsafa as-siyāsiyya ʿind Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ maʿa
taḥqīq kitābihī Sulūk al-malik fī tadbīr al-mamālik. 2nd rev. ed. Beirut 1980. N. at-Takrītī
compared Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ with Miskawayh. – Cf. also S. M. Hasanuz Zaman, Shihāb Al-
Dīn Ibn Abī ’l-Rabī, On Management of Personal and Public Wealth. In Islamic Studies 31,
1992, pp. 365–374.
93 Cf. Hans Daiber, Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Ausdruck griechi-
scher Ethik, islamischer Ideologie und iranisch-sassanidischer Hofetikette. In Oriens 63,
1986, pp. 284–302.
518 chapter 26
His handbook on ethics is a guideline for self-education and discipline. As a

librarian of the vizier Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) he knew the main
works on ethical and political philosophy, like Kindī (d. between 247/861 and
259/873), Fārābī (d. 339/950 or 951) and possibly Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. 313/925),
moreover Arabic translations of ethical works by Galen (d. ca. 216 AD), Aristotle
(d. 322AC), Bryson (d. between 100AC and 2nd c. AD), Pseudo-Pythagoras,
Neoplatonic texts like Porphyry (d. ca. 305AD) and Iamblichus (d. ca. 325 AD),
in addition doxographical texts about late Greek ethics. – In his selection of
texts and ideas he developed a unique system of ethics, which combined prac-
tical virtues with theoretical “spiritual” virtues leading to “nearness to God”
and “happiness” of the soul. Using the philosophical language of his time,
Miskawayh explains his educational program as a way to knowledge of the soul
on its return to its divine origin. Therefore, ethics of the individual is increas-
ing “likeness to God.” – Miskawayh’s handbook was used by Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī
(d. 502/1108) and Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) who imbedded Miskawayh’s philosoph-
ical ethics in Koranic ethics and “islamized” it. Miskawayh’s ethics became very
influential until the 13th/19th century (Rifāʿa at-Taḥtāwī a.o.) and paved the
way to the ethicization of fiqh and its application in politics, e.g., in Māwardī
(d. 450/1058) and Šihāb ad-Dīn Ibn Abī r-Rabīʿ (7th/13th c.). The inclusion of
ethics in politics has a long history which started with Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ in the
2nd/8th century and received a philosophical fundament in Miskawayh’s eth-
ics, which gave the individual a new significance by introducing love, friendship
and justice as cornerstones of human dignity.
Unpublished paper.
chapter 27
Ethics as Likeness to God in Miskawayh

An Overlooked Tradition*
Abstract
We have a quite good knowledge of Miskawayh’s ethics and his sources. Still puzzling
is his combination of Platonic, Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts. In some cases
Miskawayh’s use of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics betrays Neoplatonizing interpreta-
tions, perhaps due to Hellenistic commentaries. Why and how these interpretations
are introduced in Miskawayh’s ethics is still unclear. The paper will focus on an over-
looked tradition about the soul, which evolved to be the common base for ethics from
Kindī to Miskawayh. This tradition can be traced back to critical discussions about
the soul by Alexandrian philosophers since the 3rd century AD. Porphyry’s pupil Iam-
blichus (d. ca. 325AD) appeared to have played a remarkable role, also in the ethics of
Miskawayh, as a comparison with Iamblichus’ commentary on the Pseudopythagorean
Golden Verses shows. This commentary is lost in the Greek original, but available in an
Arabic translation from the early 9th century AD.
We have a fairly clear idea of the diversity of Miskawayh’s (ca. 320/932–ca. 421/
1030) sources in his Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq,1 his mainwork on ethics.2 At first sight and
as recently shown by scholars, Miskawayh’s concept is mainly based on a com-
bination of Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. In addition, Neoplatonic com-
mentaries are integrated, as well as central concepts of Fārābī’s Perfect State,
including Fārābī’s epistemological idea of divine revelation to the prophet-
ruler.3
What is Miskawayh’s motive to combine divergent sources and traditions
in his Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq? The answer requires a comparison with Fārābī’s Perfect
* Paper, given at Ethical Instruction as Educational Discourse. Thought and Impact of the Clas-
sical Muslim Thinker Miskawayh (d. 1030) between Reception and Transformation. International
Symposium, Göttingen, May 24–27, 2018.
1 Tahḏīb, ed. Constantine K. Zurayk / Engl. transl. C. K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Char-
acter (Tahdhib al-Akhlaq).
2 Cf. Gerhard Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions.
3 S. nn. 49 and 50.

520 chapter 27
State. Contrary to Miskawayh, Fārābī did not concentrate on ethics. His Perfect
State is more interested in citizenship and rulership and their epistemological
background.
Miskawayh’s ethics appears to be a supplement to Fārābī’s political philo-
sophy and concentrates on the ethics of the individual. He quotes Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics and adds comments taken from Greek-Hellenistic texts,
partly ascribed to Porphyry (“and others”4). Most important is a passage in
Treatise III of Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb, rendering Miskawayh’s opinion on the “spir-
itual virtue” leading to perfect happiness. It is followed by an excerpt on the
“Virtues of the Soul” attributed to “the philosopher”.5
196 | Both sections are preceded by a doxographical report6 about two groups of
philosophers:
– Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato7 “and the like”, who considered the virtues and
happiness as belonging to the soul alone.
4 Cf. G. Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions, pp. 324 f.

5 On this s. n. 18.
6 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 80, 1–7 and 13–17 / Engl. transl., pp. 72f. – The passage reappears
in an anonymous collection of philosophical excerpts from the 11th century AD, MS Oxford,
Marsh 539. – Cf. Elvira Wakelnig, A Philosophy Reader, p. 466 (E. Wakelnig does not
mention Miskawayh’s source, which we discuss below n. 8).
7 On Socrates and Plato cf. also Miskawayh, Maqāla fī n-nafs wa-l-ʿaql / Engl. transl. by Peter
Adamson and Peter E. Pormann, More than Heat and Light, pp. 523f. – On a further
Arabic report about Socrates’ doctrines of the soul, with a Neoplatonizing tint, cf. Ilai Alon,
Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, p. 163. On Socrates’ numerous sayings about virtues cf.
ib. pp. 128–143 and about friendship pp. 153–156. – The Arabic texts about Socrates are collec-
ted and translated into English by I. Alon, Socrates Arabus, index s.n. friendship, soul, virtue.
The passage in Miskawayh, which we quoted, is reproduced pp. 89f. (no. 491) / Engl. transl.
p. 73 (the name of Socrates is missing in the translation). – Here, we can add an apocryphal
letter by Socrates, written to “Plato, the Sage”, the Kitāb Suqrāṭīs al-muwāfiq li-ahl as-samāʾ
fī n-niyya wa-l-muǧāwir li-ahl al-arḍ fī l-ǧuṯṯa ilā l-ḥakīm Falāṭūn (MS Aya Sofya 2456, fol. 76
v 4–80 r 11; ed. I. Alon, Socrates Arabus, pp. 53–60, no. 171 / Engl. transl., pp. 48–53). This
text, which requires further investigation, turns out to be a letter of consolation about the
death of “Afrāb(a)f(a)qūn”, the son of Plato. It shares some stylistic features with the Greek-
Syriac-Arabic translations from the school of Kindī / Ibn al-Biṭrīq (e.g. wa-iḏ kāna ḏālika
ka-ḏālika fa-qad istabāna anna, ed. I. Alon, p. 57, 8, and the similar phraseology described in
G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, pp. 174–176 and 180–183) and has perhaps a (Syriac?) Christian
origin, with a Neoplatonic background. Similar to the Neoplatonic tradition in Miskawayh, it
propagates the virtue of knowledge which is part of the soul and releases it from the body.
Criticizing physicians like Hippocrates and Galen, the text considers “the perfection of the
soul” (istikmāl an-nafs), the sum of “all qualities of good deeds” (ǧamīʿa ḫiṣāli l-ḥasanāt) as
an “evidence of its divine origin” (́šahāda ʿalā annahā min al-lāhūt), ed. I. Alon, p. 57, 12ff. /
Engl. transl., p. 51. – I. Alon in his short comment p. 115 refers to a certain similiarity to Plato,
Rep. 603 B (correct: 603 D–604 B).
ethics as likeness to god in miskawayh 521
– The Stoics “and a group of the Naturalists”, according to whom happiness of

the soul alone is incomplete.
Miskawayh took his doxographical information from a small text on the virtues
of the soul, the Maqāla fī iṯbāt faḍāʾil an-nafs attributed to Plato. It criticizes
those, who prefer asceticism to wealth.8
Miskawayh himself is convinced that happiness only belongs to the soul.
According to him, “bodily things” (al-ašyāʾ al-ǧusmāniyya) have a double func-
tion: Whosoever is still in the lower rank of the “bodily things” is “looking”
( yuṭāliʿ) at the noble things, by “seeking” (bāḥiṯan) them, “desiring” (muštāqan)
them, “being driven to them” (mutaḥarrikan naḥwahā) and “pleased” (muġta-
biṭan) with them.9 And who is in the rank of the “spiritual things” (al-ašyāʾ ar-
rūḥāniyya)10 remains simultaneously “looking” at the “lower things” (al-ašyāʾ
ad-daniyya), “by learning from them (muʿtabiran bihā), by reflecting on the
signs of divine power and the evidences of perfect wisdom, by following the
example of (these signs and evidences) (muqtadiyan bihā), by regulating (nāẓi-
man) them, by pouring out (mufīḍan) goods (ḫayrāt) on them and by leading
them gradually to what is the best in accordance with their readiness (qubūl)
and capacity (istiṭāʿa)”.11
This statement is of crucial importance for a correct understanding of
Miskawayh’s ethics. The starting point is the imperfection of man: “He has an
abundant share of wisdom, and, by virtue of his spirituality, he stays among
the higher beings (al-malaʾ al-aʿlā) from whom he gets the subtleties of wis-
dom and is illuminated ( yastanīru) by the divine light (an-nūr al-ilāhī). And
he seeks to add to his virtues in the measure of the attention (ʿināya) he gives
to them and of the lack of hindrances from them”.12
| The “overflowing ( fayḍ) of the light of the First One (al-awwal)” makes man 197
free from pains and sorrows, of which someone in the first rank is not free.13 He
8 Hans Daiber, Ein pseudoplatonischer Text, § 5. – Fragments of a Syriac version are pre-
served by the Jacobite author Iwannīs of Dārā (9th c. AD): s. Mauro Zonta, Iwānnīs of
Dārā. – On the allusions of the Maqāla fī iṯbāt faḍāʾil an-nafs to the Divisiones Aristoteleae
and on fragments of their Syriac transmission cf. Tiziano Dorandi and Issam Marjani,
La tradizione siriaca, pp. 18 f.
9 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 83, 21 f. / Engl. transl., pp. 75f. – Here and elsewhere we do not always
follow the translation of C. K. Zurayk.
10 On rūḥānī cf. Gerhard Endress, Platonizing Aristotle. – On rūḥānī “spiritual” in the
sense of “immaterial” and its echo in Ibn Bāǧǧa cf. David Wirmer, Vom Denken der Natur,
pp. 504–532.
11 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 84, 1–5 / Engl. transl., p. 76.
12 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 85, 3–6 / Engl. transl., pp. 76f.
522 chapter 27
who belongs to the higher rank and has attained “the final and extreme happi-
ness” (āḫir as-saʿādāt wa-aqṣāhā) is only in need of the necessary things of his
body “to which he is attached and from which he cannot be set free until his
creator so wills”.14
Here, the text adds a most important statement, which is equally crucial for
a better understanding of Miskawayh’s ethics: “(The person in the higher rank)
longs to associate with his kindred and to meet the good spirits (al-arwāḥ aṭ-
ṭayyiba) and the angels who are close to him (al-malāʾika al-muqarrabūn)”.15
Man’s “association with his kindred” (ṣuḥbat aškālihi) includes, as Miska-
wayh elsewhere says,16 the task of teaching those “who are akin or near to him
and wish to learn from him (aḥabba l-iqtibās minhū)”. This is an allusion to the
Farabian-Aristotelian concept of man as political animal, ζῷον πολιτικόν, who
requires his fellow human beings – also in the process of getting knowledge
from the teacher, Fārābī’s prophet and leader.17
Miskawayh’s explanations receive a philosophical foundation in the follow-
ing chapter, which is said to be an excerpt from a work entitled The Virtues of
the Soul, attributed to “the philosopher”18 and translated by Abū ʿUṯmān ad-
Dimašqī. This work cannot be identified.

16 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 85, 11 f. / Engl. transl., p. 77.
17 Cf. also Miskawayh, al-Fawz al-aṣġar, ed. Ṣāliḥ ʿUḍayma, pp. 91, 7–92, 5 / French
transl. ch. 8 / Engl. transl., p. 142. – Cf. G. Endress in Philosophy in the Islamic World I,
p. 314.
18 C. K. Zurayk in his edition and translation identified “the philosopher” (al-ḥakīm) with
Aristotle, and G. Endress in Philosophy in the Islamic World I, p. 337, speaks of Aristotle
as “author of a Pseudo-Platonic-Peripatetic treatise on the ‘virtues of the soul’”. In the
anonymous collection of philosophical excerpts from the 11th century AD, MS Oxford,
Marsh 539, the first sentence of the Faḍāʾil an-nafs can be found, followed by a sentence
from the Nicomachean Ethics, attributed to Plato: s. E. Wakelnig, A Philosophy Reader,
p. 32. – Closer to the truth is Shlomo Pines’ classification of the text as a Neoplatonic
treatise: s. S. Pines, Un texte inconnu, pp. 172–175 and 184–186 (referring to Porphyry,
Plotinus, Iamblichus), pp. 178f. and 196–200 (Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Providence). –
I assume that the text on The Virtues of the Soul is part of the Neoplatonizing comment-
ary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which has been tentatively ascribed to Porphyry
by Richard Walzer. See R. Walzer, Porphyry, pp. 294–296. The Virtues of the Soul
might have been written by Porphyry himself, as it shares with Porphyry the concept of
philosophy as a way to God, contrary to the revelationist concept of Porphyry’s student
Iamblichus (s. n. 77). In favour of this identification is the fact that the translator men-
tioned by Miskawayh, Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī, also has translated Porphyry’s Isagoge (s.
R. Walzer, Porphyry, p. 278).
According to this treatise, the lower rank of virtues is related to body and
soul. Man’s conduct cannot be more than “moderation” (iʿtidāl)19 to an extent
“rather nearer to what ought to be than to what ought not to be” (ilā mā yan-
baġī aqrabu minhū ilā mā lā yanbaġī).20 In the second rank “man directs his
will (irāda) and efforts (muḥāwalāt) to the best improvement (ṣalāḥ) of his soul
and body”, with decreasing affection for worldly things and only insofar as they
are necessary.21 There | are many grades of virtues, as people differ in their 1) 198
“nature” (ṭabāʾiʿ), 2) “habits” (ʿādāt), 3) degrees of “science” (ʿilm), “knowledge”
(maʿrifa) and “understanding” ( fahm), 4) in their “ambitions” (himam) and 5)
in their “desires” (šawq) and “efforts” (muʿānāt), 6) finally possibly also in their
“fortunes” (ǧudūd).22
The highest degree is “the purely divine virtue” (al-faḍīla al-ilāhiyya al-
maḥḍa), a rank “which is not accompanied by any longing” for future or past,
remote or near things, by fear or desire. The “uppermost ranks of virtues” are
determined by the “intellectual part” (al-ǧuzʾ al-ʿaqlī) of man and enable man
“to follow the example of the first cause and to imitate Him and His activities”
(tašabbuhuhū bi-l-ʿilla al-ūlā wa-qtidāʾuhū bihā wa-bi-afʿālihā).23
Herewith man’s activities become “divine” (ilāhiyya) and “absolute good” (al-
ḫayr al-maḫḍ) and as such “proceed from his inner and true self (lubābuhū
wa-ḏātuhū l-ḥaqīqiyya), which is his divine reason (ʿaqluhū l-ilāhī) and his real
essence (ḏātuhū bi-l-ḥaqīqa)”.24
In the final passage the author of the treatise on The Virtues of the Soul
explains his concept of the resemblance of man’s actions to the actions of
“the first principle” (al-mabdaʾ al-awwal), the creator in the final stage: Man’s
and God’s actions are performed only “for this activity itself” (lā yafʿalu mā
yafʿaluhū min aǧli šayʾin ġayri fiʿlihi nafsihi) and for “the divine intellect itself”
(wa-ḏātuhū nafsuhā hiya l-ʿaql al-ilāhī nafsuhū). Herewith, man’s activity be-
comes the “absolute good and absolute wisdom” (ḫayr maḫḍ wa-ḥikma maḫḍa).
Accordingly, God’s activity is only “for the sake of His own Self” (min aǧli
19 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 86, 13 / Engl. transl., p. 78.

23 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 87, 8–88, 3 / Engl. transl., pp. 78f.
24 Cf. Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 88, 4–11 / Engl. transl., p. 79. – A fragment, ed. C. K. Zurayk,
p. 88, 7–8 / Engl. transl., p. 79, can be found as a saying, attributed to Plato, in an anonym-
ous collection of philosophical excerpts from the 11th c. AD, ed. and transl. E. Wakelnig,
A Philosophy Reader, pp. 298/299, (no. 200). Cf. the commentary of E. Wakelnig, pp. 461
and 32.
524 chapter 27
ḏātihi) and God’s care of other things happens only as “a secondary purpose”
(al-qaṣd aṯ-ṯānī).25
Equally, man’s actions for others are for “a secondary purpose”. The primary
purpose is “his own self” (min aǧli ḏātihi) and the “activity itself” (min aǧli l-
fiʿli nafsihi), i.e. “the virtue and the good themselves” (li-nafsi l-faḍīla wa-li-nafs
l-ḫayr). Activity as virtue is not for the sake of benefit, of preventing harm, of
seeking authority or honour. The author of The Virtues of the Soul concludes:
“This is the object of philosophy and the culmination of happiness” ( fa-hāḏā
huwa ġaraḍ al-falsafa wa-muntahā as-saʿāda).26
It is “divine knowledge” (maʿrifa ilāhiyya) and “divine desire” (šawq ilāhī)
which reach man when he is “free” and “purified” (ṣafā, naqiya) from “the phys-
ical” (al-amr aṭ-ṭabīʿī) and when in himself, in “his very essence” (nafs ḏātihi) –
that is his “reason” (al-ʿaql) – “the divine things” (al-umūr al-ilāhiyya) take
place in a manner “which is nobler, finer, more pronounced, more manifest
to (reason) and more evident than (that of) the first propositions (al-qaḍāyā
al-uwal) which are called the primary intellectual sciences (al-ʿulūm al-awāʾil
al-ʿaqliyya)”.27
The passages quoted from The Virtues of the Soul do not speak of divine rev-
elations to man and herein differ from Iamblichus. They look like echoes and
slight specifications of Plotinus’ discussions about virtue (Ennead I 2), happi-
199 ness (Ennead I 5 and 7), and the soul (Ennead IV 8). | According to Plotinus,
who follows here Plato,28 likeness to God is attained by being just and living
in wisdom (Ennead I 2. 1). Man’s soul, its civic virtues, attain likeness to God29
through increasing purification from the passions of the body (Ennead I 2. 2)
and devotion to the absolute Good, the intellectual principle, its knowledge
and its wisdom (Ennead I 2. 4, 6 and 7). The virtue in the Supreme is its act and
its essence, the virtue in man is a civic virtue and if man abandons his human
life, he will have the life of the gods (Ennead I 2. 6). Man’s soul, the individual
soul, has appetite for the divine intellect, his source to which he is ascending
(Enneads IV 8. 4 and 5; VI 9 and 11). It is neither a pneuma nor a body (Ennead
IV 8. 8 C).
25 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 88, 18–89, ult. / Engl. transl., pp. 79f. – On the passage cf.
S. Pines, Un texte inconnu, pp. 170f. and 199, and Angelika Neuwirth, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf,
pp. 188–190.
27 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 90, 14–21 / Engl. transl., pp. 80f. (end of the excerpt).
28 Cf. Theaetetus 176 B, quoted by Lawrence V. Berman, Political Interpretation, pp. 53f.
29 On the history of this concept in Greek philosophy s. Dietrich Roloff, “Angleichung”.
The above-mentioned ambivalence of Plotinus with regard to the soul

results from Plotinus’ criticism of the Stoic concept of pneuma, of κρᾶσις δι’
ὅλων, which became known to the Arabs in the 9th century AD through the
adaptation of the Enneads in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology.30 It paved the
way to the classification of the soul as something spiritual, as we find it in
Miskawayh. It is not detectable in the treatise The Virtues of the Soul, as quoted
by Miskawayh: The quotation only speaks of “two beastly souls” which are
the source of “imagination” (taḫayyul) and of the “sensible soul” (nafsuhū al-
ḥissiyya) of man. Their “vicissitudes” (dawāʿī) will disappear, when man’s activ-
ities – his “real essence” – become “divine” and his “divine reason”.31
This is a transformation of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and its three
parts θυμικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν and λογιστικόν32 into the Neoplatonic concept of the
soul returning to its divine origin. However, the consequent classification of the
soul as something spiritual does not exist – at least in Miskawayh’s excerpt from
the treatise The Virtues of the Soul.33
A forerunner of such a classification of the soul as something spiritual
appears to be Plotinus’ student Porphyry, who introduced the doctrine of the
pneuma in Neoplatonism.34 In his treatise De regressu animae he expresses his
conviction, that only the “spiritual soul” (anima | spiritalis) can be purified and 200
he introduced for the first time the concept of theurgy as a tool for the purifica-
tion of this soul by using rituals.35 Porphyry did not fully develop this concept.
This remained reserved to his student Iamblichus, who in his work De mysteriis
30 Cf. Cristina D’Ancona, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 185–204. – The relevant passages
in Plotinus’ Enneads, esp. IV 7. 2, § 82, and in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology (esp.
ch. III) are available in a critical edition, with translation and extensive commentary by
C. D’Ancona, Plotino. L’immortalità, pp. 136ff. (commentary, pp. 286ff.), and (Theology)
pp. 416 ff. (commentary, pp. 502 ff.).
32 Cf. the references in H. Daiber, Ein pseudoplatonischer Text, pp. 34f. – θυμικόν and ἐπι-
θυμητικόν, in addition the “sensible soul”, are considered to be a source for “imagination”.
This is a Neoplatonizing modification of the Aristotelian discussion about imagination
and sensation in De anima III 3.
33 Nor is this classification mentioned in Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 15, 9–
16, 5 / Engl. transl., pp. 14 f., where the tripartition of the soul is explained: On this cf. also
P. Adamson, Miskawayh’s Psychology, p. 42, and P. Adamson, Miskawayh on Pleasure,
pp. 207–210.
34 Cf. Gérard Verbeke, L’ Évolution, pp. 363–374. – Stephane Toulouse, Les théories,
pp. 268–274. – Michael Chase, “Omne corpus fugiendum?”, pp. 37–58, and the refer-
ences given in these publications.
35 Joseph Bidez, Vie de Porphyre, p. 35*, 15 ff., quoted in Thomas Stäcker, “Theurgie”,
col. 1180 below.
526 chapter 27
considered theurgy as a tool for the purification of the lower soul, of its lead-
ing up to the intelligible and to the divine powers.36 Here, he presupposes an
“affinity” (ἐπιτηδειότης) between the beings and their divine cause.37
This affinity between man and God is the prerequisite for the establish-
ment of a relationship with the gods by exercising virtues, which Iamblichus
called theurgic virtues.38 Ammonius and the Alexandrians instead speak –
echoing Plato (s. n. 28) – of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ “likeness to God” and herein differ
from Plotinus, who considered the human virtues solely as a way to the perfec-
tion of man’s ethical-political life, but not as making man godlike. Ammonius
called philosophy as likeness to God as it is possible for man.39 He explains this
with the additional remark – perhaps with respect to the Christian theologians
in the 6th century AD – that neither the philosopher’s knowledge nor his care
for the lower are comparable with God’s knowledge and providence.40
The sketched positions and the culmination among Alexandrian philosoph-
ers of the 5th and 6th centuries AD turn out to be the starting point for the
development of ethics in Islamic philosophy. Kindī (d. between 247/861 and
259/873) followed the Neoplatonic tradition of Plotinus – and also of Iam-
blichus41 – in his treatise On the Method of How to Dispel Sorrow.42 This is
excerpted by Miskawayh43 and advises man to dedicate himself to the intel-
ligible world, to the absolute Good and to turn away from the transitory world.
Thus, he can release the rational soul from the passions in the world. A philo-
sophical foundation – possibly following the Neoplatonic tradition of the Vita
pythagorica as shaped by Porphyry and his student Iamblichus44 – has been
developed by Kindī in his Discourse on the Soul. It explains, that the soul con-
sists of three parts – as we found them in Miskawayh’s excerpt from the treatise
36 Cf. T. Stäcker, “Theurgie”, col. 1181, nn. 11 and 12. – G. Verbeke, art. Geist II: Pneuma,
col. 161. – John F. Finamore, Iamblichus, p. 4. – Beate Nasemann, Theurgie und Philo-
sophie, pp. 198ff. – S. Toulouse, Les théories, pp. 277–294.
37 T. Stäcker, “Theurgie”, col. 1181, nn. 18 and 19.
38 T. Stäcker, “Theurgie”, col. 1181, n. 23.
39 On this definition cf. L. V. Berman, Political Interpretation. – H. Daiber, Qusṭā Ibn
Lūqā, pp. 118 f., the references given there, and Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie,
pp. 510 f.
40 Cf. Rainer Thiel, Transformation, pp. 408–415.
41 Cf. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 28 f.
42 Risāla fī l-ḥīla li-dafʿ al-aḥzān. Cf. Peter Adamson and Gerhard Endress, Abū Yūsuf
al-Kindī, pp. 160 f. and 193f. – According to a recently published article there was no dir-
ect borrowing from Galen’s recently discovered Περὶ ἀλυπίας, as Kindī and Galen follow a
common Hellenistic tradition: Cf. Antoine Pietrobelli, Arabic Περὶ ἀλυπίας.
43 Ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 219–221 / Engl. transl., pp. 194–196.
on The Virtues of the Soul. It is eager to release itself from the body through
ethical virtues and to return to its divine origin, | the realm of the intelligible 201
world.45 Kindī does not offer a fully developed ethical doctrine – beyond the
“ascetic and intellectualist ethics” that appears in Kindī’s Treatise on the Say-
ings of Socrates.46
This remains reserved to two later philosophers, to Fārābī (d. 339/950 or
951) and to Miskawayh. Both philosophers have continued the Neoplatonic tra-
dition, insofar as they share the common concept of happiness, which can
be reached by the release of man’s soul from matter, by man’s virtuous act-
ing and by his increasing knowledge.47 According to Miskawayh, this know-
ledge is most perfect in the “perfect man” (insān kāmil), who is either a “per-
fect philosopher” (ḥakīm tāmm) because of his “inspirations” (al-ilhāmāt) in
the philosophical attempts made by him and through heavenly support in his
“intellectual conceptions” (at-taṣawwurāt al-ʿaqliyya). Or he is a prophet sup-
ported (by God), who obtained divine “revelation” (al-waḥy) in varying grades,
which exist in comparison with God. He will then become an intermediary
between “the higher world” (al-malaʾ al-aʿlā) and “the lower world” (al-malaʾ al-
asfal).48 This formulation is a clear echo of a specification introduced by Fārābī,
who had added the concept of prophecy as prerequisite of the philosopher.49
According to Fārābī, the ruler in the perfect state is a philosopher and a prophet
who – inspired by God and by his assimilation to God by emulating God’s rule –
leads the city.50 In addition, Miskawayh and Fārābī mirror an accentuation in
Iamblichus, who combined philosophy with theurgic revelation and herewith
modified the approach of his teacher Porphyry.51
The common Neoplatonic tradition in Fārābī and Miskawayh appears to be
mixed in Fārābī mainly with Platonic and Aristotelian ideas.52 Fārābī is concen-
trating on epistemology and the concept of knowledge, of learning and acquir-
ing knowledge.53 We have only a small treatise on virtues attributed to Fārābī
45 Risāla fī l-qawl fī n-nafs al-muḫtaṣar min Kitāb Arisṭū wa-Falāṭun wa-sāʾir al-falāsifa. Cf. P.
Adamson and G. Endress, Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, pp. 147, 166 and 194.
46 Risāla fī alfāẓ Suqrāṭ. Cf. P. Adamson and G. Endress, Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, pp. 164 and
194 below.
47 Cf. H. Daiber, Al-Farabi on the Role, pp. 73 f. and 77.
49 For more details on parallels between Fārābī and Miskawayh s. Roxanne D. Marcotte,
The Role of Imagination, esp. pp. 56–72.
50 H. Daiber, Ruler, p. 17 nn. 79 and 80.
51 S. n. 77.
52 On Fārābī cf. H. Daiber, Fārābīs Aristoteles.
53 Cf. H. Daiber, Ruler.
528 chapter 27
and based on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with some Platonic elements.54

Miskawayh, however, is in fact more focussed on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth-
ics, which he represents combined with Hellenistic, Neoplatonic interpreta-
tions.55
These Neoplatonic interpretations gave Miskawayh’s ethics a specific shape.
His Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq is not a book on political thought, containing rules for
202 rulers and ruled, like Fārābī’s | Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. On the con-
trary, it is a book on virtues of the individual who – as formulated by Miskawayh
in a passage attributed to Aristotle – is provided with “wisdom” (al-ḥikma) and
“intellect” (al-ʿaql) and should “aim with all his capacities (bi-ǧamīʿ quwāhu) to
live a divine life (ḥayāt ilāhiyya)”.56 This aim requires, as Miskawayh says – echo-
ing Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics57 – a “moderate amount of external goods”
(al-qaṣd min al-ḫayrāt al-ḫāriǧiyya).58
Miskawayh’s book Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq is not primarily addressed to the citizen,
to rulers and ruled. It is a guidebook on ethics for the individual, for training
his character and teaching him the right behaviour towards his fellow human
beings. Love, friendship59 and justice60 are for the benefit of the individual
and are only means for attaining happiness and knowledge. Human virtues,
however, are imperfect: He who has knowledge of real happiness and the real
good, can “endeavor” (ǧahd) “to gain His (God’s) favour” ( yataqarrabu ilayhi)
and can try “to obtain” ( yaṭlub) God’s “pleasure” (marḍāt) “as far as he is able”
(bi-qadr ṭāqatihi), so that “he resembles ( yataqayyalu)61 (God’s) acts to the
extent of his capacity (istiṭāʿa)”.62
54 This is the Ǧawāmiʿ as-siyar al-marḍiyya fī qtināʾ al-faḍāʾil al-insiyya. Ed. and transl. by H.
Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik, pp. 741–753.
55 Cf. G. Endress, Ancient Ethical Traditions, pp. 322–326 and 337–344.
56 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 171, 13–15 / Engl. transl., p. 152. – On the term “divine life”
cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X 7. 1177 b 30 f. Arabic transl., ed. Anna A. Akasoy and
Alexander Fidora, The Arabic Version, p. 561, 12 / Engl. transl. Douglas M. Dunlop,
p. 560.
57 I 8. 1099 a 31–b 7 / Arabic transl., ed. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, p. 143, 7–16 / Engl. transl.
D. M. Dunlop, p. 142.
59 Cf. Tahḏīb 5th discourse. – Perhaps, Miskawayh has given some inspiration to his contem-
porary Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), Kitāb aṣ-Ṣadāqa wa-ṣ-ṣadīq, although both
authors share a common background, which in addition is mirrored in the contempor-
ary Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (cf. below n. 79). On Tawḥīdī’s Kitāb aṣ-Ṣadāqa wa-ṣ-ṣadīq cf. Nuha A.
Alshaar, Ethics in Islam.
60 Cf. Tahḏīb 4th discourse.
61 Cf. Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. qyḍ. – C. K. Zurayk translates
this as “imitates”.
Miskawayh has modified Aristotle’s allusions to the “most divine element”

in man,63 who must “strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best
thing” in him,64 with a Neoplatonic tint. He says: “The love of wisdom, the devo-
tion to the intellectual conception (at-taṣawwur al-ʿaqlī), and the use of divine
notions (al-ārāʾ al-ilāhiyya) are characteristic of the divine part in man”.65
Therefore, he who has acquired virtues, has concern for divine virtues, and
herewith he can “join the good spirits (al-arwāḥ aṭ-ṭayyiba) and mingle (iḫtal-
aṭa) with the angels which are close (to God) (al-malāʾika al-muqarrabūn)”.66
Here, Miskawayh adds, in a statement attributed to Aristotle, some informa-
tion about the hierarchy existing between God, angels and those “who seek to
be like God” (al-mutaʾallihīn).67
This hierarchy reappears in a similar way and partly with identical termi-
nology in a commentary on the Pseudopythagorean Golden Verses, written by
the Neoplatonist Iamblichus, we already mentioned earlier. Iamblichus distin-
guishes between God, “the angels who are close (to the gods)” (al-malāʾika al-
muqarrabūn)68 and the “godlike” (al-ilāhiyūn), who are souls | which “assumed 203
a human shape” (taʾannasat), abandoned worldly pleasures and are looking for
their “good” (maṣāliḥ).69 Iamblichus recommends a moderate acquisition of
possessions, insofar as it is necessary and useful for a man70 who is “on the path
of virtue” (sabīl al-faḍīla) by “reflecting” (bi-šuġl al-fikr) on the paths leading to
virtues, away from the “body” (al-badan). Everyone is obliged to tackle difficult
situations and to endure trials as possibilities to learn, to find the right way and
63 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X 7. 1177 a 16 f. / Engl. transl. Jonathan Barnes, The Com-
plete Works of Aristotle, p. 1860 / Arabic transl. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, p. 557, 11 /
Engl. transl. D. M. Dunlop, p. 556.
64 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X 7. 1177 b 34 / Engl. transl. J. Barnes II, p. 1861 / Arabic
transl., ed. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, pp. 561, 14–563, 1 / Engl. transl. D. M. Dunlop,
pp. 560 and 562.
67 Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, p. 169, 13 / Engl. transl., p. 151. – Richard Walzer, Greek into
Arabic, p. 228, translated al-mutaʾallihīn with “the divine men”, giving the Greek equival-
ents θεῖοι ἄνδρες and ἐκθεούμενοι.
68 The term “close (to God)” (al-maqarrabūn) corresponds to Greek συνεχής in Iamblichus’
De mysteriis I 6. 20-2-8, on which cf. B. Nasemann, Theurgie und Philosophie, pp. 137f. It
describes the closeness of the δαίμονες to God.
69 Iamblichus, Šarḥ maǧmūʿ min Kitāb Iyāmbliḫus li-waṣāyā Fūṯāġūras al-faylasūf / Ed. and
transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 40/41, 5–11. Cf. H. Daiber, introduc-
tion, pp. 18 f.
70 Ed. and transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 54/55, 2–6. – Cf. H. Daiber,
introduction, pp. 26–28.
530 chapter 27
to avoid sensual “delights” (laḏḏāt), in accordance with his capacity.71 Perfect

human virtues of man, whose soul participates in the divine being,72 pave the
way to the divine virtue.73 The reasonable part of the soul urges the disobedient
part to keep to the virtues and to become habituated to them. This is a process
of “learning” (dars) leading to “education” (taḫarruǧ), “experience” (tadarrub,
ḫibra) and “patience” (ṣabr), also in dealing with others.74 Iamblichus under-
stood philosophy as “conformity with the divine” (ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεῖον ὁμολογία) and
“knowledge of the gods” as perfect virtue, wisdom and happiness, making man
“similar to gods”.75
Iamblichus’ concept of a similarity between man and God and of the exist-
ence of the divine soul in man is ultimately Platonic. It formulates the precon-
ditions for man’s increasing knowledge of the divine and is a Platonic modifica-
tion of the ancient Greek principle τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον, “like attracts like”.76
This concept led Iamblichus – in contrast to his former teacher Porphyry and
his concept of philosophical contemplation as only path to the gods – to the
assumption of theurgic virtues as a way to receive theurgic revelations.77
The Alexandrians and Ammonius did not go so far and instead spoke of
assimilation to God through virtues leading to knowledge of God. Herein they
deviate from Plotinus and follow the Pythagorean tradition of Iamblichus. We
found an echo in Kindī and above all in the ethics of Miskawayh. With some
probability, Miskawayh knew the Golden Verses and the commentary by Iam-
blichus. This may explain, that an anonymous Arabic philosophy reader from
71 Cf. ed. and transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 58/59, 13–22.
73 Cf. ed. and transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 88/89, 21-ult. – Cf. H.
Daiber, introduction, pp. 20, 26 and 29 f.
74 Cf. ed. and transl. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 62/63, 6–10, and 86/87, 14–
18. – Cf. H. Daiber, introduction, pp. 22–25. – Echoes of Iamblichus’ remarks about the
acquisition of experience in dealing with others and the critical reflection about oth-
ers and oneself (cf. also ed. and transl. H. Daiber, pp. 80/81, 10–82/83, 23) appear in
Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb, ed. C. K. Zurayk, pp. 190, 4–191, 4 / Engl. transl. pp. 169f., in a quota-
tion attributed to Kindī.
75 Cf. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische Pythagorica, pp. 30 f. – On the concept of assimilation to
God in Greek commentaries to the Golden Verses cf. Anna Izdebska, Man, God and the
Apotheosis, pp. 40–64. According to A. Izdebska, pp. 57–60, assimilation to God (apo-
theosis) does not exist in the Arabic Iamblichus. She considers the text to be “somewhat
inconsistent” (p. 58) and in one passage to be “a strange mixture of Islamic/Christian theo-
logy” (p. 60). In view of our comparison with Miskawayh and with Neoplatonic texts and in
view of the contextualization of Iamblichus’ commentary (s. H. Daiber, Neuplatonische
Pythagorica, introduction) A. Izdebska’s interpretation is not convincing.
76 Cf. Carl Werner Müller, Gleiches zu Gleichem, pp. 177–193.
77 Cf. Gregory Shaw, The Soul’s Innate Gnosis, pp. 122–129.
the circle of Miskawayh, compiled in the 11th century AD, contains excerpts
from the Golden Verses (excluding Iamblichus’ commentary).78
It is interesting that the philosophy reader contains an extensive quotation
from the encyclopaedia of the socalled “Sincere Brethren” (Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-
Ṣafāʾ). This encyclopaedia, written during the lifetime of Miskawayh, deserves
our interest, as it shares with Miskawayh the Neoplatonic post-Plotinian and
Iamblichan doctrine, the ascent and return of the soul to its | divine origin 204
through increasing knowledge, purification of the soul and improvement of the
character. This requires friendship for the mutual assistance.79
The parallels and differences between Miskawayh and the Rasāʾil Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ deserve further investigations. Both mirror universalistic concepts of
love, friendship and harmony among people, as they were discussed in the
Buyid age. With good reasons, Joel Kraemer gave his book on the “cultural
revival during the Buyid age” the title Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam
(1986; 21992). Translations from Greek, the philosophical heritage of Kindī and
Fārābī and lively discussions resulted in a humanistic thinking across bor-
ders.80 This open-mindedness can answer our question at the beginning of this
paper: What is Miskawayh’s motive to combine divergent sources and tradi-
tions in his Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq? Simultaneously, Miskawayh set new accents in the
footsteps of Iamblichus: Happiness of man is happiness of his soul and likeness
to God. Fārābī’s concept of a perfect state is pushed into the background and
his concept of its prophetic leader is in the shadow of the individual, exercising
virtues which Iamblichus called theurgic virtues paving the way to theurgic
revelations. In this point Miskawayh dissociates himself from Iamblichus and
prefers the Platonic and Alexandrian concept of likeness to God.
78 Cf. E. Wakelnig, A Philosophy Reader, pp. 37–39.

79 Cf. Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Part IV, Epistle 43 (The Ascent to God) and 45 (Friendship
and Mutual Assistance) in the English translation by Eric van Reijn, The Epistles of the
Sincere Brethren (Rasaʾil Ikhwan al-Safaʾ). (Epistles 43–45 are newly edited with English
translation by Toby Mayer, Ian Richard Netton and Samer F. Traboulsi, On Com-
panionship and Belief. Oxford 2017). – Cf. also part III (on soul and intellect = Epistles
32–41) in the German translation by S. Diwald, Arabische Philosophie. – Epistles 32–36
are newly edited and translated into English by Paul E. Walker, Ismail K. Poonawala,
David Simonowitz and Godefroid de Callataÿ, Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. –
Epistles 39–41 are newly edited and translated into English by Carmela Baffioni and
Ismail K. Poonawala. Foreword by Nader El-Bizri, Epistles of the Brethren of Purity.
Sciences of the Soul and Intellect. II: An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of
Epistles 39–41. Oxford 2017 (rev. by Cristina D’Ancona in SGA 8, 2018, pp. 445–450).
80 Cf. H. Daiber, Humanism, pp. 298 ff.
532 chapter 27
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chapter 28
The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn

Sīnā
Epistemological and Theological Aspects and the Consequences
In his early fifties, around the year 1030AD,1 after decades of a fruitful life
dedicated to philosophy, medicine and science, Ibn Sīnā wrote a letter to his
disciple Bahmanyār Ibn al-Marzubān in Rayy and encouraged him to engage
in philosophical discussions, “because in them lies pleasure and benefit”. He
adds: “Whatever I am able to bring to light I will do so either openly, or from
behind a veil (ḥiǧāb) which acts as a useful kind of stimulus and drill for it.
Whatever I am unable to do so, I will excuse myself and admit it, since what
is known to mankind is limited”.2 This passage has been interpreted as an allu-
sion to Ibn Sīnā’s method of pointers and indications as a didactic way for the
philosopher, whereas the same method is said to have an obfuscatory function
for the non-philosopher, the common people – because the indicative method
should conceal knowledge from the unworthy who only can be addressed by
symbols and allegories.3
This interpretation of the texts, based on the assumption of an influence of
Alexandrian Aristotelianism, is contradictory. How can the indicative method,
according to Ibn Sīnā, be a way to “remove the cover”, “lift the veil” and “indicate
the innermost ideas stored in the depth of books and withheld from expli-
cit mention”, as Ibn Sīnā says in his Treatise on the State of the Soul,4 or being
applied for its didactic function5 and at the same time can have an obfuscatory
function?6 In fact, the alleged obfuscatory method is based on an erroneous
1 Cf. David C. Reisman, The Making of the Avicennan Tradition. Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002. =
IPTS 49, p. 116.
2 Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Arisṭū ʿind al-ʿarab. I. Cairo 1947, p. 246, 4–6 / Ed. Muḥsin
Bīdārfar. Qum 1992, pp. 53, 13–54, 2 / Engl. transl. based on a new collation of the MSS by
Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Leiden/New York/Kobenhavn/Köln
1988. = IPTS 4, p. 59 (cf. p. 307) / 2nd rev. and enlarged edition. Leiden/Boston 2014. = IPTS
89. – The editions do not mention Bahmanyār, but cf. D. C. Reisman, Making (s. n. 1), pp. 116
and 139.
3 D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), pp. 308–310, and on the symbols and the allegories pp. 299ff.
4 Ibn Sīnā, Aḥwāl an-nafs. Ed. Aḥmad Fuʾād al-Ahwānī. Cairo 1952, p. 141, 4f. / Engl. transl.
D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), pp. 32 f. and 308.
5 D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 309.
6 D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 309.

the limitations of knowledge according to ibn sīnā 537
combination of the quoted passage from Ibn Sīnā’s letter to a disciple in Rayy
with a passage in Ibn Sīnā’s On the Nature of Prayer.7 On the contrary, Ibn Sīnā’s
last major work, his Pointers and Reminders, is written as an exposition of “fun-
damental principles and essential elements of philosophy” which can be used
by the philosopher as a basis for the elaboration of “corollary principles” and of
philosophical details.
This, however, is not the whole truth. Leaving aside the possibility, that the
term “pointer” or “indication” might have several meanings and might have
been used even in the sense | of an indicative summary8 – we should now have 26
a look at the prehistory of the term išāra “pointer, indication”.
Before Ibn Sīnā, in the 9th/10th centuries AD, the Iranian Sufi Ǧunayd al-
Hazzāz (d. 298/910) informs us in his treatise on divinity: “What [I have said] is
an indication of what I cannot explain further. Moreover, you can understand
this in accordance with the indication, if you have reached the state of being
(kawn), which precedes my description”.9 To his colleague Abū Bakr al-Kisāʾī he
recommends: “Be careful with what you are saying and what your contempor-
aries know. Tell people only what they can recognize and keep them away from
what they cannot understand”.10 Ǧunayd did not develop his cryptical and eso-
teric seeming language, because he wanted to conceal it from those who do not
understand. On the contrary, he was aware of the difficulty to convey to others
mystical experience with the means of language.11
A look at Ǧunayd inspires us to take into consideration additional aspects of
Ibn Sīnā’s own attitude towards the practice of philosophy, which, according to
him, is the actualization of knowledge, coming from the celestial spheres, in the
human intellect.12 At first sight he might have been impressed by Alexandrian
Aristotelianism: Ibn Sīnā got acquainted with the doctrine of the Alexandrians
through Fārābī’s Prolegomena to the Study of Aristotle’s Philosophy, from which
he learned that Aristotle used “an obscure way of expression”, because only the
suitable student and not the unworthy should learn philosophy; he should be
7 Quoted by D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), l.c.

8 Cf. D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), l.c. (L 81).
9 Ed. Ali Hassan Abdel-Kader, The Life, Personality, and Writings of Al-Junayd. London
1962 / Repr. 1976, p. 45, 8–10 / Engl. transl., p. 168; cf. p. 57.
10 Sarrāǧ, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī t-taṣawwuf. Ed. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson. Leiden 1914 /
Repr. London 1963, p. 241, 1 f. / Engl. transl. A. H. Abdel-Kader, The Life (s. n. 9), p. 57.
11 On this cf. Annemarie Schimmel, “Secrecy in Sufism”. In Secrecy in Religions. Ed. Kees
W. Bolle. Leiden 1987. = Studies in the History of Religions XLIX, pp. 81–102.
12 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī l-kalām ʿalā n-nafs an-nāṭiqa. Ed. A. F. Ahwānī, Aḥwāl an-nafs (s.
n. 4), pp. 197, 17–198, ult. / Engl. transl. D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), pp. 76f. (§10); cf. D.
Gutas, p. 219.
538 chapter 28
tested and trained by this method of obscurity.13 This Alexandrian view might
indeed be echoed in the already quoted saying of Ibn Sīnā: “Whatever I am able
to bring to light I will do so either openly, or from behind a veil, which acts as
a useful kind of stimulus and drill for it”. This, however, does not justify the
interpretation of Ibn Sīnāʾs use of išāra as an obfuscatory way to conceal philo-
sophical knowledge from the unworthy. There is no clear example for this in
Ibn Sīnā.
Here, we propose another interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s use of išāra, “indic-
ation, pointer”, which takes into account epistemological and theological as-
pects. For Ǧunayd the divine truth cannot be further explained; for Ibn Sīnā
primarily the metaphysics of the rational soul can only be discussed by the way
of pointer.14 As the rational soul, the human intellect, is an imperfect mirror of
the divine intellect and strives for its return to its divine origin through increas-
ing knowledge, it must be content with mere indications of the divine truth.
27 This view we must substantiate now by a look at Ibn Sīnā’s treatise On the
Rational Soul, his last philosophical work,15 and by a look at his doctrine of the
divine active intellect, the first cause and prime mover; moreover, by a look at
his demonstrative method.
The rational soul is explained by Ibn Sīnā as something substantial, subsist-
ing in itself and associated with the human body only as long as it is alive.
At the beginning, the rational soul is material intellect only. Subsequently, it
receives the forms of primary intelligibles through syllogism, learning, acquis-
ition. After that, it receives the forms of secondary intelligibles, either through
reflection – that is by finding what results from the primary intelligibles – or
through intuition that is representation of the cause, the “middle term”, which
makes the existence or non-existence of a thing necessary either by search or,
initially, without search. Through the acquired intelligibles the faculty of the
soul is ready to call to presence the intelligibles whenever it wishes. In this state
it is called the actual intellect. And after the presence of the intelligibles in the
faculty of the soul the faculty is called acquired intellect.
After this description of the development of the soul from material intel-
lect to acquired intellect via actual intellect and its classification as a substance
associated with the human body but imperishable after the death of this body,
13 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaġī an yuqaddam qabla taʿallum falsafat Arisṭū. Ed. Friedrich

Dieterici. In Alfarabi’s philosophische Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, p. 54 / Engl. transl.
D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 227, who refers to the Greek parallels in Elias.
14 Cf. D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 309 below and pp. 255ff.
15 Ed. A. F. Ahwānī, Aḥwāl (s. n. 4), pp. 195–199 / Engl. transl. D. Gutas, Avicenna (s. n. 2),
pp. 72–78.
Ibn Sīnā continues to explain the perfection of the soul, of its “bliss” (saʿāda):
It comes about by purification a) through increasing knowledge of God: The
soul is purified through the knowledge of God, when it is ready to call the intel-
ligibles to presence when it wishes, namely in the state of the active intellect.
Ibn Sīnā compares it with “a polished mirror upon which are reflected the forms
of things as they are in themselves”. Perfection of the soul also comes about b)
through acts for God by following reason and religious law and by having an
excellent character. Here, Ibn Sīnā stresses the ethical and religious aspects; to
follow religious laws means the subjugation of the “bodily faculties of the soul,
the appetitive and the irascible” to the rational soul, which is “at peace”. The
necessary predisposition is, according to Ibn Sīnā, the balance of the Galenic
four humours which leads to a balanced temperament.
Man’s involvement in opposites and a not balanced mixture of the four ele-
ments hinders him to “receive the divine effluence” (qubūl al-fayḍ al-ilāhī).16
Ibn Sīnā explains this “divine effluence” as “inspiration (ilhām) coming from
the Lord, occurring all at once and revealing some intellectual truth (ḥaqīqa
min al-ḥaqāʾiq al-ʿaqliyya)”.17 He adds: “As long as the rational soul of man is
associated with the human body, no corporeal entity (ǧirm) can be completely
ready to receive the divine effluence or to have perfectly revealed to it all the
intelligibles”.
Increasing purification of the soul through increasing knowledge creates
increasing propensity for the contact with the divine effluence, i.e. with the
medium of the divine effluence, the intellectual substance, also called “angel”
in the language of revelation and “active intellect” by philosophers. The res-
ult is “a certain similarity to the celestial bodies” | which, different from the 28
human body, are totally devoid of such opposites and therefore are perfectly
receptive to the divine effluences. Therefore, only after its separation from the
body the soul will receive the divine effluence completely and reach “a simil-
arity with the abstract intellects which are the causes of beings” and to which
“all the truths are revealed”.
Ibn Sīnā’s explanations are based on the Neoplatonic doctrine of emana-
tions from the divine One to the first intellect, from which nine intellects sub-
sequently emanate. Those he identifies with the first heaven, followed by the
sphere of the fixed stars Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, and Moon. A
similar system can be found in Ibn Sīnāʾs model Fārābī. Both philosophers were
16 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī l-kalām ʿalā l-nafs an-nāṭiqa (s. n. 4), p. 198, 6 / Engl. transl. D. Gutas,
Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 77.
17 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī l-kalām ʿalā l-nafs an-nāṭiqa (s. n. 4), p. 197, 19 / Engl. transl. D. Gutas,
Avicenna (s. n. 2), p. 76.
540 chapter 28
inspired, as Miklós Maróth has shown,18 by Plotinus’ Enneads, of which

book V was known to the Arabs as Theologia Aristotelis; by Proclus’ Institutio
theologica, which was available to the Arabs in the redaction known as Liber
de causis; by Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book XII, and by Themistius’ Comment-
ary on it (lost in the Greek original and only preserved in an Arabic-Hebrew
translation); finally by Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise On the Principles of
the Universe, which is only preserved in Syriac and Arabic.19
The Greek Neoplatonic texts since Alexander of Aphrodisias assume an
identity of the causing principle in Aristotle, De anima III 5, with the first cause
in Aristotle, Metaphysics XI,20 and stress the role of the intellect as origin of the
things through emanation, as their cause is primarily potentially and later actu-
ally. Because of these effluences, emanations, the intellect remains present as
cause in all things, although they are different from one another.21 This state-
ment means, as Miklós Maróth has worked it out,22 the identity of intellect
and things caused by the things, causes and caused things, because the uni-
versal intellect knows, through his self-knowledge, the plurality in itself, the
universe. At the same time, there is a hierarchy from the knowledge of the
highest genus (substance) – as Ibn Sīnā says in his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, Book on the
Soul, by grasping the separate form independent from the material world23 –
to the lowest species (homo).24
18 Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Leiden/New York/Köln
1994. = IPTS 17, pp. 203 ff.
19 The Arabic text (Fī mabādiʾ al-kull) is edited and translated by Charles Genequand,
Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. Leiden/Boston/Köln 2001. = IPTS 44. – On the
French translation s. H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/21, n. 51.
20 Cf. Victor Kal, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle. Leiden 1988. = Philo-
sophia antiqua 46, ch. 9: On the history of the interpretation of Aristotle, De Anima III 4
and 5, §§ 4 ff.
21 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 210 ff.
22 M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 210 ff.
23 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, aṭ-Ṭabīʿiyyāt, Kitāb an-Nafs, book V 1. Ed. Fazlur Rahman, Avi-
cenna’s ‘De Anima’. London 1959, p. 206, 11 ff. / Ed. Geoges C. Anawati and Saʿīd Zāyid.
Cairo 1975, p. 184, 9 ff. / Latin version in Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu sextus de
naturalibus IV–V. Ed. Simone van Riet. Louvain/Leiden 1968, p. 76, 4ff.: “quae autem
est magis propria ex proprietatibus hominis, haec est scilicet formare intentiones univer-
sales intellegibiles omnino abstractas a materia, sicut iam declaravimus, et procedure ad
sciendum incognita ex cognitis intelligibilibus credendo et formando.” – Cf. Leen Spruit,
Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. I: Classical Roots and Medieval Discus-
sions. Leiden/New York/Köln 1994. = Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 48, pp. 86ff. (the
Latin quotation on p. 86, related to n. 246, is not correct). – As L. Spruit shows, in Ibn
Sīnā the acquisition of knowledge culminating in the reception of an emanated abstract
form, starts from the sensible images which are in fact not a source of cognitive contents,
but occasion the production of intelligible forms or intentions (maʿānī).
24 M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), p. 210.
This hierarchy of being is fundamental for Ibn Sīnā’s concept of causality. 29

As in Proclus’ Institutio theologica prop. 25–30 the effect is to some respect
identical with the cause and to some respect different. The similarity between
cause and effect, between intellect and soul, results in the desire of the soul
to return to its divine cause.25 The beings participate in the divine intellect,
which itself is the first effect of the divine One, the potentiality. This particip-
ation leads to the existence of plurality, coming from the unity through causal
relation.
Therefore, the intellect knows itself, knows what is potentially in it and what
will come.26 Proclus concluded from this causal interdependence of things
the epistemological possibility to recognize things because of their cause. The
cause can be derived from the effect and the effect can be derived from the
cause.27
The causality of cause and effect allows conclusions and is part of the syllo-
gism. Or as Aristotle says in his Analytica posteriora, a book that was highly
influential in medieval Islamic philosophy (78 a 30–b 3):28 “Things can be
grasped by the syllogisms ὅτι and διότι”, on “how” and “why”.29 Aristotle had
explained at the beginning of his Analytica posteriora the investigation as con-
centrated on facts, on the connection of a subject and a predicate, e.g. on “how”
the sun diminishes (τὸ ὅτι) and “why” this is so (τὸ διότι), whereas the questions
εἴ ἐστιν and τί ἐστιν, “whether it is” and “what it is”, are directed to the existence
of a thing and its essence or definition. Every investigation is nothing else than
a search for the middle term, with the aid of which the syllogism can be formu-
lated, the demonstration of the answer by the conclusion.30 For example the
middle term, the μεσόν, “the planets are near” together with the premise “what
is near, the light of that does not flicker” is the cause of what is included in the
conclusion “the light of the planets does not flicker”.
25 Cf. Proclus, Institutio theologica. Ed. Eric Robertson Dodds, The Elements of Theology.
Oxford 21963, prop. 21 / Arabic version (perhaps by Ibn al-Biṭrīq) ed. and transl. by Ger-
hard Endress, Proclus Arabus. Beirut 1973. = BTS 10, pp. 19–21 (text) and pp. 267–270
(transl.).
26 Proclus, Institutio theologica (s. n. 25), prop. 167 / Arabic version ed. and transl. by G.
Endress (s. n. 25), pp. 35 ff. (text) and pp. 289 ff. (transl.).
27 Proclus, Institutio theologica (s. n. 25), prop. 65.
28 Cf. Michael E. Marmura, “The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle
Ages”. In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth
International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Helsinki 24–29 August 1987. Ed. Monika
Asztalos, John E. Murdoch and Ilkka Niiniluoto. I. Helsinki 1990. = Philosophica
Fennica 48, pp. 85–103.
29 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), p. 209.
30 Cf. here and in the following M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 73ff.
542 chapter 28
We will not enter into details and modifications by later commentators and
their impact on the theory of demonstration in Islamic philosophers from
Fārābī to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd. This complex has been investigated by Mik-
lós Maróth, who showed the influence of Aristotle’s method of inquiry as
described in Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora and his Topica and of his Neopla-
tonic commentators as mainly echoed in the “introductions” (εἰσαγωγαί) to
any science on the principles of demonstration and on the hierarchical clas-
sification of sciences (in the footsteps of the Tabula porphyriana)31 in Islamic
culture. M. Maróth also draws our attention to the attempt of Neoplatonic
philosophers to harmonize the Aristotelian syllogism with the Neoplatonic
doctrine of emanationism: According to this doctrine, every caused being ori-
30 ginates from a preceding causing being and similarly from | mediating causes,
the μεσόν. The Neoplatonic causal relation is at the same time a demonstrative
syllogism in the sense of Aristotle’s ὅτι and διότι, of “how” and “why” a thing is.
Here, it is important to notify, that this syllogism appears to be modified accord-
ing to the Neoplatonic hierarchy of major terms, which explain the essence, the
“why” of the minor terms. Because of this hierarchy, the minor term necessarily
leads to the existence of the major term. It does not, however, lead to the cause,
the “why” of the major term.
This hierarchy of definition and argumentation implies an important
change of the Greek commentators of Aristotle, and became decisive for the
Arabic philosophers – including Ibn Sīnā. Different from Aristotle’s interest
in the middle term, the explaining principle, they search for the cause or the
effect. Accordingly, Proclus constructed, on the basis of Aristotle, syllogistic
argumentations, including conclusions from the general cause, the genus to
the particular causes, the species, from that species to the more particular term,
which – compared with that species as genus – forms another species, and so
on.32 Therefore, Ibn Sīnā draw the conclusion that the differences, the fuṣūl,
specialize the genus and create the species.33 The cause can be found in the
differences. The peculiarities can be the causes of additional peculiarities. In
the line of John Philoponus, the causes are identical with the differences, the
differentiae specificae and differentiae divisivae.34
The Aristotelian analytic syllogism appears to be replaced by the syllogism
drawn from the indication, by the συλλογισμὸς τεκμηριώδης, which does not
31 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 92 ff.

32 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 96 f.
33 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān. Ed. Abū l-ʿAlāʾ ʿAfīfī. Cairo 1956, p. 200, 18f. / Ed.
ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Cairo 1954, p. 227, 8–10; incompletely quoted by M. Maróth,
Araber (s. n. 18), p. 109 n. 265.
34 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 113 ff. and 122 f.
allow the recognition of the cause but only of the existence, the being of the
upper things, not their “why”.35 The major terms explain the “why” of the
minor terms, the minor terms, however, explain the existence, not the “why”
of the major ones. Syllogism is purely deductive and based on the hierarchy of
the Neoplatonic Tabula porphyriana.36 The causes as applied in the syllogism
appear in the definition as differentiae specificae.
Our sketch has shown that Ibn Sīnā modified Aristotle’s syllogism by com-
bining it in the tradition of Neoplatonic philosophers with the causes, the
differentiae and definitions.37 Knowledge is based on syllogistic proof, classi-
fication and definition. It has its limits with regard to the συλλογισμὸς τεκμη-
ριώδης, which can only be an indication of the existence, of the being of the
upper things, of the causes, but not of their “why”. This presupposes, as we
have seen, a hierarchical structure which in the Neoplatonic tradition of the
Tabula porphyriana is much more elaborated than in Aristotle’s Analytica pos-
teriora, where the principles are the most general principle, and from which
the increasing special theorems are derived. This was interpreted by the Neo-
platonic commentators within the context of their doctrine of emanations:
From the “One”, the most general being, the cause, the most general term, arises
through emanations the existing, the caused, which in an increasing manner is
specified. | Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā has emphasized that the principles must be 31
“universal” (kullī), “essential” (ḏātī) and “primary” (awwalī).38
Neoplatonism and Ibn Sīnā assume a chain of theorems and concepts which,
via ultimate principles, go back to the first axiom of metaphysics, the “One”, the
first cause, which cannot be proven. From the first principles of metaphysics
the final theorems of the sciences can be derived through an endless chain of
species and genera as described in the Tabula porphyriana. An example is Ibn
Sīnā’s Treatise on the Parts of the Intellectual Sciences (Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm
al-ʿaqliyya).39 It gives a stemma of sciences starting with metaphysics, which
successively is followed by mathematics and physics.40

36 Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), p. 126.
37 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān. Ed. A. ʿA. ʿAfīfī (s. n. 33), pp. 296ff. / Ed. ʿA. R.
Badawī, pp. 225 ff. – Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 116ff.
38 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān. Ed. A. ʿA. ʿAfīfī (s. n. 33), pp. 135ff. / Ed. ʿA. R.
Badawī, pp. 72ff. – Cf. M. Maróth, Araber (s. n. 18), pp. 151ff., who refers to the Neopla-
tonic terms κατὰ παντός, καθ αὑτό und πρώτως.
39 Edition in Tisʿ rasāʾil fī l-ḥikma wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿiyyāt. Istanbul 1881, pp. 71–90. Cf. the short (incom-
plete) analysis (based on the Latin translation by Andreas Alpagus Bellunensis, Venice
1546, fol. 139–146). In Ludwig Baur, Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae.
Münster 1903. = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters IV/2–3, pp. 346–
349.
544 chapter 28
Ibn Sīnā mentions as parts of metaphysics prophecy and inspiration.41 As

he explained in his treatise on the soul already quoted, purification of the soul
through increasing knowledge and assimilation to the “active intellect” enables
it to receive the divine effluence, the “inspiration coming from the Lord”, “or
to have perfectly revealed to it all the intelligibles”. The active intellect has its
cause in the divine “One”, who is uncaused, or in Aristotelian terminology the
“unmoved mover”.
Language cannot define it and demonstration cannot rely on the syllogism
of “how” and “why”. Definition and demonstrative syllogism are confined to the
subordinate subsequent causes and effects.
The human soul has access to the divine “active intellect” only through its
“purification” by increasing knowledge. But because of its association with
the body “no corporeal entity (ǧirm) can be completely ready to receive the
divine effluence or to have a perfect revelation of all the intelligibles”. An excep-
tion – at least to some amount – is the prophet42 or the man who has intu-
ition. The “inspiration coming from the Lord” “reveals” only “some intellectual
truth”.43
The rational soul, the human intellect, will always remain an imperfect mir-
ror of the divine intellect and will remain striving after the return to its divine
origin through increasing knowledge. It must be content with mere indications
of the divine truth. This divine truth, as emanated to the divine intellect, can-
not be object of demonstrative syllogism. The first cause cannot be explained
by another cause. Here, knowledge, which as such is based on syllogistic proof
and which is classification and definition, appears to be limited with regard to
the συλλογισμὸς τεκμηριώδης. This συλλογισμὸς τεκμηριώδης can only be an indic-
ation of the existence, of the being of the highest principle, of the uncaused
cause, but not of its “why”.
32 This highest principle is to some extent, however, conceivable in its effects,
in the caused thing. This conceivability of the cause and its subsequent causes –
I remind you of Ibn Sīnā’s first intellect, from which subsequently nine intel-
lects emanate – in their effects must be interpreted against the background of
the history of the law of causal similarity in Aristotle and Neoplatonism.
41 Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya. In Tisʿ rasāʾil fī l-ḥikma wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿiyyāt (s. n. 39), p. 78,
4 ff.
42 On Ibn Sīnā’s concept of prophecy cf. Michael E. Marmura, “Avicenna’s Theory of
Prophecy in the Light of Ashʿarite Theology”. In The Seed of Wisdom. Essays in Honour of
T. J. Meek. Ed. W. S. McCullough. Toronto 1964, pp. 159–178, esp. pp. 166ff.
43 S. n. 17.
Aristotle defended the similarity between cause and effect. His principle of
“man begets man” (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, Metaph. 1032 a 25)44 remained
the model of Plotinus’ and Proclus’ concept of causality in its tension between
immanence and transcendence.45 Proclus defends the idea, that the effect has
some resemblance to its cause (Institutio theologica, prop. 32; 36, 6 f.: συνδεῖ
δὲ πάντα ἡ ὁμοιότης). The originally Aristotelian idea of similarity led to the
necessity of explaining differences in the universe. However, in the Neoplatonic
doctrine it led to the self-differentiation of the One, of intellect and soul – and
this, as we have already told, in the tradition of the Tabula porphyriana.
The hierarchy of causes and effects as inspired by the Tabula porphyriana
explains, that the first cause does not “precontain” its effects and, on the con-
trary, is identical with the effect in an “ontologically superior, because more
unified form”.46 Consequently, the effects are identical with their causes in an
ontologically inferior, less unified and more differentiated form.47
Here, the Neoplatonic interpretators of Aristotle replaced Aristotle’s “hori-
zontal” explanation of the effect as something similar to the cause and de-
veloped in their emanationist cosmology a “vertical” cause-effect relationship,
which includes both – similarity and dissimilarity.48
This assumption of the difference between cause and effect in a vertical
cause-effect relationship reappears in Ibn Sīnā’s concept of different modes of
existence (esse, wuǧūd), with regard to priority and posteriority, self-sufficiency
and need, necessity and possibility,49 of the superiority of cause over effect with
regard to existence.50
Accordingly, the cause, the Avicennian first cause has more “truth” than the
effect. It gives the existents their existence and truth.51
Here, we detect an echo of Kindī’s Aristotelian-Neoplatonic concept of truth,
which appears to be identified in Ibn Sīnā with existence which has differ-
44 Cf. Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne agens agit sibi simile. A “Repetition” of Scholastic Meta-
physics. Leuven 1996. = Louvain Philosophical Studies 12, ch. I.
45 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens (s. n. 44), ch. II.
46 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens (s. n. 44), p. 101.
49 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics II. Ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, Sulaymān Dunyā,
Saʿīd Zāyid. Arabic and French introduction by Ibrāhīm Madkūr. Cairo 1960, p. 276,
13 ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens (s. n. 44), p. 171 n. 37.
50 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics (s. n. 49) II, p. 278, 3 ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rose-
mann, Omne agens (s. n. 44), p. 172 n. 40.
51 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics (s. n. 49) II, p. 356, 8 ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rose-
mann, Omne agens (s. n. 44), p. 173 n. 44.
546 chapter 28
ent modes. Ibn Sīnā developed his doctrine of incomparability of the divine
primary being, the “only being” (anniyya faqaṭ), with the subsequent causes
33 and their effects on the basis of the Neoplatonic denial | of divine attributes.
According to Ibn Sīnā, properties are predicable of God only in an “ambiguous”
(bi-t-taškīk) or analogous manner.52
Following this Avicennian tradition, the Iranian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā
(d. 1050/1640), too, emphasized that the transcendent unity of God cannot
be known. It can only be known by intuition and remains “ambiguous” (bi-
t-taškīk). The diversity of modes of existence is only a shadow of God’s unity
(waḥda fī l-kaṯra wa-l-kaṯra fī l-waḥda).53
Ibn Sīnā’s awareness of the limitations of human knowledge and of the
superiority of the divine One, who is uncaused and the unmoved prime mover,
led him to the formulation of a new way of demonstration, which in the tradi-
tion of Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora replaced
Aristotle’s συλλογισμὸς ἀναλυτικός by the συλλογισμὸς τεκμηριώδης. This συλλο-
γισμὸς τεκμηριώδης can only be an indication of the existence, of the being of
the highest principle, of the uncaused cause, but not of its “why”. The Aris-
totelian syllogism of “why” remains restricted to the minor terms, the sub-
sequent causes.
Here, Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics reveals – in the hierarchy of being, in the dif-
ferentiation between the True One, “the necessary being” (wāǧib al-wuǧūd)
and his emanations, which in the words of Mullā Ṣadrā are the “shadow” (ẓill)
of God54 – the limitations of knowledge and definition. The effects of causes,
the existing contingent things are – although emanating from the first cause –
ontological inferior to the divine One. Therefore, they cannot in reality com-
pletely mirror the True One, His essence. Because he was convinced of the lim-
52 John P. Rosheger, “A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes”. In The Modern
Schoolman 77, 2000, pp. 169–177, here p. 175. J. P. Rosheger refers to Harry Austryn
Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides”.
In Harvard Theological Review 31, 1938, pp. 151–173. = Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies
in the History of Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Isadore Twersky and George Huntston
Williams. I. Cambridge, Mass. 1973, pp. 455–477, who explained the term bi-t-taškīk from
Greek ἀμφίβολα in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Topics I 5. 106 a 9
und II 3. 110 b 16 f.
53 Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī). Albany 1975,
p. 90.
54 Cf. al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-arbaʿa. Introduced by Muḥammad Riḍā Luṭfī.
I/1. Qum 21378/1958, pp. 312, 12–313, 4. – Cf. Daniel De Smet, “Le Souffle du Miséricordieux
(Nafas ar-Raḥmān) – Un élément pseudo-empédocléen dans la métaphysique de Mullā
Ṣadrā aš-Šīrāzī”. In Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 10, 1999 (pp. 467–
486), p. 479. – F. Rahman, Philosophy (s. n. 53), p. 6.
itations of knowledge, of demonstration and of definition with regard to God’s

transcendence and infiniteness, Ibn Sīnā developed his well-known distinction
between essence and existence. And because of the limitations of knowledge,
the science of metaphysics cannot define the highest principle, the divine One.
Even the philosopher can talk about it only in the way of “pointers”, of “indica-
tions”.
The Jewish philosopher Maimonides (530/1135–600/1204) seems to be in-
spired by Ibn Sīnā’s “agnostic” attitude. He knew Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-
t-tanbīhāt and took over from it the simile of the lightning flashes: “Those who
know”, the ʿārifūn – according to Ibn Sīnā the Sufis and the prophets – perceive
something of the light of truth comparable to the lightning which flashes for a
few moments only.55 With regard to “things separate from | matter” (al-umūr al- 34
mufāraqa), Maimonides speaks of “hidden matters” (al-umūr al-ḫafiyya) which
the mind cannot grasp.56 According to him, they remain “open to speculation
(naẓar) and research (baḥṯ)”. Maimonides continues: “The proofs with regard
to them are well-hidden, though correct; many doubts (šukūk) arise with regard
to them; the critic may well find in them objects for his criticism and the cav-
iller objects for his cavilling”.57 It is not difficult to detect here an echo of Ibn
Sīnā and his concept of pointer and indications, as it should be understood.
Republished, with some corrections, from Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft. Probleme der
Epistemologie in der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Knowledge and Science. Problems of
Epistemology in Medieval Philosophy. Ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander
Fidora and Pia Antolic. Berlin 2004. = Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel
10, pp. 25–34. By courtesy of the publisher.
55 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išhārāt. Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo 21971. III–IV, p. 828, 3ff. / Engl. transl.
Shams Inati, Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism. Remarks and Admonitions. Part Four. London/New
York 1996, p. 86. – On the comparison with Maimonides s. Shlomo Pines, “The Limita-
tions of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides”. In Studies
in Medieval Jewish History and Literature. Ed. Isadore Twersky. Cambridge, Mass./Lon-
don 1979 (pp. 82–109), pp. 89 ff. (Republished in S. Pines, Maimonides. A collection of
essays. Ed. Joseph A. Buijs. Notre Dame, Indiana 1988, pp. 91–121).
56 Maimonides, Dalāʾil al-ḥāʾirīn. Ed. Hüseyin Atay. Ankara 1974, I. 74, p. 224, 3ff. and 9ff.
/ Engl. transl. Shlomo Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed. Chicago 1963, pp. 220f.; cf. S.
Pines, p. 96.
57 Maimonides, Dalāʾil al-ḥāʾirīn, op. cit. I. 72, p. 219, 8–10 and 9ff. / Engl. transl. S. Pines,
Guide (s. n. 56), p. 193.; cf. S. Pines, pp. 96 f. – Shlomo Pines here did not refer to Ibn Sīnā,
whose position however explains Maimonides’ understanding of Fārābī and Ibn Bāǧǧa,
and Maimonides’ use of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise on The Principles of the Uni-
verse – as expounded by Shlomo Pines in his article, cf. above n. 55.
chapter 29
Bahmanyār
Bahmanyār, Kiyā Raʾīs Abū l-Ḥasan Ibn Marz(u)bān Aʿǧamī Āḏarbāyǧānī (d.
ca. 430/1038 or 1039; or 458/1066 or 1067), one of Ibn Sīnāʾs pupils during his
stays in Hamadan (405/1015–415/1024) and Isfahan (415/1024–428/1037). Very
little is known about his life. Originally a Zoroastrian, converted to Islam, his
knowledge of Arabic was not perfect, ġayr māhir fī kalām al-ʿarab (Bayhaqī,
p. 97, end; Ḫwānsārī II, pp. 157, 18f. and 160, 16).
Bahmanyār is mainly known as a commentator and transmitter of Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophy. His main work, the Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl (ed. Murtaḍā al-Muṭah-
harī, Tehran 1349 h.š./1970–1971) was compiled in Isfahan between 415/1024
and 428/1037 for his uncle, the Zoroastrian Abū Manṣūr Ibn Bahrām Ibn Ḫuršīd
Ibn Yazdyār. It offers the quintessence of Ibn Sīnā’s logic, physics, and meta-
physics, according to his Šifāʾ, Naǧāt and Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt. It also contains,
as Bahmanyār informs us (Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl, p. 1, 7), results of his discussions with
Ibn Sīnā. This book, which follows in its structure Ibn Sīnā’s Dāniš-nāma-ī ʿAlāʾī,
is said to have been translated into Persian (Ḫwānsārī II, p. 157, 19f.) and sum-
marized (Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa II, p. 204, 5f.) by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (d. 629/1231).
The preserved manuscripts of the Taḥsīl differ in length: s. G. C. Anawati, p. 19;
further MSS Ragıp Paşa 880, copied 1118/1706, and British Museum Add. 16.659,
fol. 201 r (197 r)–228 v (224 v).
The discussions between Ibn Sīnā and Bahmanyār during the time of ʿAlāʾ-
ad-Dawla (cf. Niẓāmī ʿArūḍī, Čahār maqāla, Engl. transl. E. G. Browne,
pp. 126f.) also resulted in a collection of answers by Ibn Sīnā on questions by his
pupils, mainly by Bahmanyār. In this collection, called Mubāḥaṯāt (W. E. Gohl-
man, pp. 100f.; Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa II, p. 19, 20), Ibn Sīnā comments on difficulties
of his aš-Šifāʾ, his al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt and his al-Inṣāf. The text is transmit-
ted in different versions. The only available edition (s. Bibliography) does not
include all manuscripts and versions, some of which contain answers on ques-
tions by other pupils of Ibn Sīnā, namely Abū Manṣūr Ibn Zayla and Abū Ǧaʿfar
Muḥammad Ibn Ḥusayn Ibn Marz(u)bān (Y. Mahdawī, p. 202). On the varying
manuscripts s. Y. Mahdawī, pp. 202–212; G. C. Anawati, pp. 82–85. – Further
502 a MSS: British Museum 8069 (18th–19th c.), fol. 17 v–21, and | Feyzullah Efendi
2188, fol. 211 r–220 r (starts with no. 5 of Y. Mahdawī, p. 210). Two letters by
Ibn Sīnā, appended to the manuscript preserved in Egypt, are written to a per-
son addressed aš-Šayḫ al-fāḍil, apparently Bahmanyār (Čahār maqāla, ed. Z.
Qazvīnī and M. Moʿīn, p. 446 no. 5).

bahmanyār 549
Akin to the texts as mentioned above is a collection of notes (Taʿlīqāt) on fun-

damental terms of metaphysics, physics and logic, taken by Bahmanyār from
explanations given by Ibn Sīnā. It is not clear whether the Taʿlīqāt are the re-
sult of Bahmanyār’s discussions with Ibn Sīnā in Hamadān (W. E. Gohlman,
pp. 54f.) during the reign of Šams ad-Dawla (thus ʿA. R. Badawī in his edition,
p. 6) or have been compiled later in lsfahan during the reign of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla.
On manuscripts s. Y. Mahdawī, pp. 60–64, and G. C. Anawati, pp. 19–21. An
excerpt of the text appears under the name of Fārābī (s. J. R. Michot. MIDEO
15, 1981, pp. 231–250).
Three more treatises are attributed to Bahmanyār. They, too, follow Ibn Sīnā
and contain short descriptions of metaphysics (Risāla fī mawḍūʿ ʿilm mā baʿd
aṭ-ṭabīʿa); of the degrees of beings (Risāla fī marātib al-mawǧūdāt), and of the
perceiving powers of the soul according to Peripatetic philosophy (Maqāla fī
ārāʾ al-maššāʾīn fī umūr an-nafs wa-quwāhā).
The fact, that Bahmanyār’s books in the first place aim at explicating and
summarizing ideas of his teacher Ibn Sīnā and that they to some extent may be
based on notes taken from his master’s lectures, makes it difficult to differen-
tiate between the writings of Ibn Sīnā and those of his pupils. This explains
why the summary of metaphysics as mentioned above (following Ibn Sīnā’s
aš-Šifāʾ) in manuscripts often has been attributed to Ibn Sīnā (also called Iṯbāt-
al-mabdaʾ al-awwal; cf. Y. Mahdawī, pp. 259f., and G. C. Anawati, pp. 235 f.). In
an analogous manner we can explain why the Risāla fī marātib al-mawǧūdāt as
mentioned above has also been attributed – at least in one passage (MS Berlin
3058) – under the title of Risāla fī iṯbāt al-mufāraqāt to another pupil of Ibn
Sīnā, namely to Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Maʿṣūmī. Two manuscripts have ascribed
the text to Bahmanyār (G. C. Anawati, p. 19) as well as a third, incomplete
manuscript (Köprülü, Istanbul 1604; s. G. C. Anawati, p. 19) which has the title
Faṣl min Kitāb fī iṯbāt al-ʿuqūl al-faʿʿāla wa-d-dalāla ʿalā ʿadadihā wa-iṯbāt an-
nufūs as-samāwiyya. However, to make matters more complicated, the Risāla fī
iṯbāt al-mufāraqāt, which is identical with the Risāla fī marātib al-mawǧūdāt,
is ascribed to Fārābī in numerous manuscripts and publications (Ḥusayn
ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ and Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn, Muʾallafāt al-Fārābī. Baghdad 1395/1975,
p. 309).
An independent treatise appears to be Bahmanyār’s Maqāla fī ārāʾ al-
maššāʾīn fī umūr an-nafs wa-quwāhā in MS Nafiz Paşa, Istanbul 1350, fol. 54
v–57 r. It is a supplementary treatise on what has been said by Ibn Sīnā in his aš-
Šifāʾ, aṭ-Ṭabīʿiyāt: an-Nafs. Ed. Georges C. Anawati and Saʿīd Zāyid. Cairo
1395/1975, pp. 27ff., esp. pp. 50ff. The text mainly deals with the “perception”
(idrāk) of the souls of men and stars.
Further writings by Bahmanyār, which seem to be lost, include:
550 chapter 29
502 b – Kitāb al-Bahǧa fī manṭiq wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿī wa-l-ilāhī | (Baġdādī I, p. 244; Ḫwānsārī

II, p. 157) = (?) Kitāb fī l-manṭiq (Bayhaqī, p. 98, 3) = Kitāb az-Zīna fī l-manṭiq
(Šahrazūri II, p. 38, 11). A fragment of the Kitāb al-Bahǧa on God’s (al-wāǧib)
knowledge of Himself has been preserved by Ḫwānsārī II, p. 158, 15–18.
– Kitāb as-Suʿadāʾ (Ḫwānsārī II, p. 157 end; Baġdādī I, p. 244).
– Kitāb fī l-mūsīqā (Bayhaqī, p. 98, 4 = Šahrazūrī II, p. 38, 11).
– Several gnomological sayings are ascribed to Bahmanyār in Bayhaqī,
pp. 98, 5–99, 2 (taken over, with omissions, by Šahrazūrī II, pp. 38, 12–39,
2, and Ḫwānsārī II, p. 158, 19–21).
Bahmanyār’s extant work gives the impression, that he was very much inter-
ested in Ibn Sīnā’s Neoplatonic teaching of the divine uncaused, self-sufficient
and necessary first cause and the creation caused by it through “emanations”
( fayḍ). Moreover, he paid much attention to the soul of men and stars, its
perceiving powers and afterlife. According to one report (Ḫwānsārī II, p. 158),
Bahmanyār differed from Ibn Sīnā in his teaching of the soul. Contrary to Ibn
Sīnā, he maintains that the soul is not unchanged in its afterlife – as plants and
living beings change in the course of time – but is “similar” (šibh, naẓīr) to what
it has been before. This difference between Bahmanyār and Ibn Sīnā cannot
modify the impression, that Bahmanyār stood in the shadow of his great mas-
ter. He has become known to posterity as a commentator of Ibn Sīnā, but seems
not to have had much influence. We only hear, that Bahmanyār’s pupil Abū l-
ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī has taken care for the propagation of his master’s ideas and
of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy in Khorasan (Bayhaqī, p. 126, 10 f.; Ḫwānsārī VI, p. 314,
12).
Bibliography
Printed Works by Bahmanyār

Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl. Ed. by Murtaḍā al-Muṭahharī. Tehran 1349 š./1970. – Russian transl.
by A. V. Sagadeeva, Kniga pervaya. Perevod s arabskogo, vvodnaya statʿya i kom-
mentarii. I–III. Baku 1983–1986 / Repr. Moscow 2010. – Engl. transl. of some pages
by Everett K. Rowson in An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia. Ed. Seyyed Hos-
sein Nasr, Mehdi Aminrazavi, Mohammad Reza Jozi. I. London/New York
2008, pp. 390–406.
al-Mubāḥaṯāt (with answers by Ibn Sīnā). Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Arisṭū ʿind
al-ʿarab. I. Cairo 1947 / Kuwait 21978, pp. 119–246.
Risāla fī marātib al-mawǧūdāt. Ed. and German transl. by Salomon Poper, Behmenjār
Ben El-Marzubān, der persische Aristoteliker aus Avicenna’s Schule. Zwei metaphy-
sische Abhandlungen von ihm, Arabisch und Deutsch mit Anmerkungen. Leipzig
bahmanyār 551
1851, pp. 17–28 / German transl., pp. 24–47. – Ed. ʿAbd al-Ǧalīl Saʿd, Bahmanyār,
Mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa. Cairo 1329/1911, pp. 12–19.
Risāla fī mawḍūʿ ʿilm mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa. Ed. and German transl. by Salomon Poper,
Behmenjār Ben EL-Marzubān, pp. 2–16 (transl. pp. 1–23). – Ed. ʿAbd al-Ǧalīl Saʿd,
Bahmanyār, pp. 2–11.
Taʿlīqāt (a compilation of Ibn Sīnā’s text, in the recension of ʿAbd ar-Razzāq). Ed. ʿAbd
ar-Raḥmān Badawī. Cairo 1392/1973. – An excerpt of this text (ed. ʿA. R. Badawī,
pp. 17, 2–193, 19) is ascribed to Fārābī and published in Hyderabad 1346/1927.
Primary Sources
Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī, Sīrat aš-Šayḫ ar-Raʾīs. Fihrist kutub Ibn Sīnā. Ed. and transl.
William E. Gohlman: The Life of Ibn Sina. Albany/New York 1974. – The text has
been used by Qifṭī, Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ. Ed. Julius Lippert. Leipzig 1903, pp. 413ff.
Baġdādī, Ismāʿ īl Pāša al-: Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn. I. Istanbul 1951, col. 244.
Bayhaqī, Ẓahīr ad-Dīn al- / known as Ibn Funduq, | Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. = Taʾrīḫ 503 a
ḥukamāʾ al-Islām. Ed. Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī. Damascus 1946, pp. 97–99.
Ḫwānsārī, Muḥammad Bāqir al-: Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt fī aḥwāl al-ʿulamāʾ wa-s-sādāt. II.
Tehran/Qom 1392/1972, pp. 157–161.
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ. Ed. August Müller. Königsberg
i.Pr. 1884 / Repr. 1972.
Ibn Funduq → Bayhaqī
Ǧūzǧānī → Abū ʿUbayd al-Ǧūzǧānī
Niẓāmī ʿArūḍī, Čahār maqāla. Ed. Muḥammad Qazvīnī. Rev. Muḥammad Moʿīn.
Tehran 31333 š./1954. – Text p. 124, notes pp. 444–447 / Engl. transl. Edward Gran-
ville Browne. London 1921 / 21978.
Šahrazūrī, Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Maḥmūd aš-: Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-
afrāḥ. II. Hyderabad 1396/1976, pp. 38f.
Secondary Sources
Afnan, Soheil M.: Avicenna. His Life and Works. London 1958, pp. 233f.
Anawati, Georges C.: Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā. Cairo 1950.
Boer, Tjitze J. de: The History of Philosophy in Islam. Transl. Edward R. Jones. New
York 21967, pp. 146f.
Brockelmann, Carl: GAL I, p. 458 (wrongly mentions an edition of the Kitāb at-
Taḥṣīl in Cairo 1329/1911); S I, p. 828.
Ḥalabī, ʿAlī Aṣġar al-: Taʾrīḫ-i falāsifa-yi īrānī az āġāz-i Islam tā emrūz. Tehran 1351
š./1972, pp. 365–368.
Kaḥḥāle, ʿUmar Riḍā: Muʿǧam al-muʾallifīn. III. Beirut 1376/1957, p. 81.
Mahdawī, Yaḥyā: Fihrist-i nusḫahā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn Sīnā. Tehran 1333 š./1954.
Mammadov, Zakir: Bəhmənyarın fəlsəfəsi. Baku 1983.
552 chapter 29
Michot, Jean R.: Tables de correspondance des ‘Taʿlīqāt’ d’Avicenne et du ‘Liber aph-
orismorum’ d’Andrea Alpago. In MIDEO 15, 1981, pp. 231–250.
Nāʿima, ʿAbd-Allāh: Falāsifat aš-Šīʿa. Ḥayātuhum wa-ārāʾuhum. Beirut ca. 1960,
p. 263.
Rahman, Fazlur: “Abū l-Ḥasan Bahmanyār Ibn al-Marzubān”. In EI2 I, 1960, p. 926.
Ṣafā, Ḏabīḥ Allāh: Tārīḫ-i Adabiyyāt dar Īrān. I. Tehran 1371 š./1992–1993, pp. 318–319.
Sebti, Meryem: Bahmanyar. In Noétique et théorie de la connaissance dans la philo-
sophie arabe du IXe au XIIIe siècle. Des traductions gréco-arabes aux disciples d’Avi-
cenne. Ed. Meryem Sebti & Daniel De Smet. Paris 2019. = Études musulmanes
52, pp. 339–359.
Sultonov, Umarbek: Muosiri Abuali ibni sina. [Muʿāṣirān-i Abū ʿAlī Ibn-i Sīnā].
Dushanbe 1980, pp. 64–66.
Cf. also Morteza Gharaee Garakani, “Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān” (Engl.

transl. Keven Brown). In Encyclopaedia Islamica 4, Leiden/Boston 2013,
pp. 181b–185a. – Jules L. Janssens, Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān: A Faithful Dis-
ciple of Ibn Sīnā? In Before and After Avicenna. Ed. David C. Reisman. Leiden
2003, pp. 177–197. – Mustakim Arici, Ibn Sînâcı Felsefe Taṣavvuru. In Dîvân:
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, cilt 15, sayı 28, 2010, pp. 135–175.
Republished, with some modifications, from Encyclopaedia Iranica III, London/New

York 1989, col. 501 b–503 a. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 30
Griechische Ethik in islamischem Gewande

Das Beispiel von Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5./11. Jh.)
Über den Iṣfahaner Gelehrten Abū l-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-
Mufaḍḍal, auch Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī genannt, wissen wir sehr wenig. Er ist bislang
bekannt geworden als Verfasser einer literarischen Anthologie, der Muḥāḍarāt
al-udabāʾ, eines Koranlexikons, der Mufradāt fī ġarīb al-Qurʾān, und zweier
Bücher über Ethik, des Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa und des Kitāb
Tafṣīl an-našʾatayn wa-taḥṣīl as-saʿādatayn.1 Die Angaben der biobibliographi-
schen Lexika über seine geistige Heimat sind äußerst dürftig und von Wilferd
Madelung gesammelt und kritisch gesichtet worden.2 Demnach dürfte er die
Mitte des 5./11. Jahrhunderts “kaum lange überlebt haben” und – wie man aus
den Angaben in Rāġibs Werken schließen könne – weder Schiite noch Muʿtazi-
lite3 gewesen sein. Er sympathisiere mit der Philosophie, die er mit der Offen-
barungsreligion zu verbinden suche. Im Übrigen sei er als Adīb “Schöngeist”
mehr interessiert gewesen an “Sprache, ästhetischer Formulierung und treffen-
den Zitaten, sei es in Poesie oder Prosa”.4
W. Madelungs genannte Einschätzung von Rāġib ist im Großen und Gan-
zen richtig und wird durch einen Blick in Rāġibs Ethikwerke bestätigt. Hier
verdient besonders Rāġibs Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa5 | das Inter- 182
esse des Philosophiehistorikers, weil es eine selbständige Weiterführung von
Gedanken der griechischen Ethik in islamischem Gewande ist.
Mit griechischer Ethik wird Rāġib in Berührung gekommen sein durch die
Arbeiten seines wesentlich älteren Iṣfahaner Zeitgenossen Miskawayh (gest.
421/1030). Wie dessen Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq6 geht Rāġib in seiner Ethik von der
1 Vgl. Carl Brockelmann, GAL I, S. 289; S I, S. 505.

2 Ar-Rāġib Al-Iṣfahanī und die Ethik Al-Ghazālīs. In Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen.
Fritz Meier zum 60. Geburtstag. Hrsg. v. Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1974 (S. 152–163),
S. 155 ff. – Vgl. auch Abū l-Yazīd al-ʿAǧamī in seiner Edition von Rāġib, Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā
makārim aš-šarīʿa. Kairo 21987, Einleitung S. 20 ff.
3 Vgl. auch Hans Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-
Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, S. 277, und unten Anm. 28.
4 Wilferd Madelung (s. Anm. 2), S. 161.
5 Hrsg. v. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2).
6 Hrsg. v. Constantine K. Zurayk. Beirut 1967, S. 5, 15 ff. – Eine englische Übersetzung (The
Refinement of Character) veröffentlichte C. K. Zurayk 1968 in Beirut. Vgl. die Besprechungen

554 chapter 30
aristotelisch-platonischen Dichotomie Seele-Körper aus,7 sowie von der plato-

nischen (vgl. Plato, Rep. IV) Dreiteilung der Seele in τὸ λογιστικόν,8 τὸ ἐπιθυμητι-
κόν9 und ὁ θυμός,10 welche die vier platonischen Kardinaltugenden11 bewirken:
Plato Miskawayh Rāġib
1) ἡ σοφία al-ʿilm, al-ḥikma al-ḥikma, al-ʿilm “Weisheit”

“Wissen”, “Weisheit” S. 16, 10 “Wissen” S. 100, 612
2) ἡ σωφροσύνη al-ʿiffa “Mäßigkeit”, as-saḫāʾ al-ʿiffa “Mäßigkeit”, al-ǧūd
“Großmut” S. 16, 13 “Großmut” S. 100, 613
3) ἡ ἀνδρεία al-ḥilm “Geduld” oder “Ein- aš-šaǧāʿa “Mut”, al-ḥilm
183 sicht”; | aš-šaǧāʿa “Mut” S. 16, “Geduld” oder “Einsicht” S. 100,
16 714
4) ἡ δικαιοσύνη al-ʿadāla “Gerechtigkeit”, als al-ḥilm “Geduld” S. 100, 715
Resultat des “Gleichgewichts” und al-ʿadāla “Gerechtigkeit”,
(i ʿtidāl)14 und der “Beziehung” als Resultat der “Verbindung”
(nisba) der zuvor genannten drei (iǧtimāʿ) der zuvor genannten
Tugenden zueinander S. 16, 8 Tugenden S. 100, 816
von Josef van Ess in Erasmus 23, Wiesbaden 1971, S. 709–712, und von Hans Daiber in
OLZ 67, 1972, Sp. 370–373. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/50.
7 Vgl. aḏ-Ḏarīʿa, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 75, 1ff.
8 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 100, 5: quwwat al-fikr. – Vgl. Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk
(s. Anm. 6), S. 15, 11 f.: al-quwwatu llatī bihā yakūnu l-fikru wa-tamyīzu wa-n-naẓaru fī ḥaqāʾ
iqi l-umūr.
9 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 100, 6: quwwatu š-šahwa. – Vgl. Miskawayh, ed. C. K.
Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 15, 14–16: al-quwwatu llatī bihā takūnu š-šahwatu wa-ṭalabu l-ġiḏāʾ
…
10 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 100, 7: quwwatu l-ḥamiyya. – Vgl. Miskawayh, ed. C. K.
Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 15, 12–14: al-quwwatu llatī bihā yakūnu l-ġaḍabu wa-n-naǧda …
11 Vgl. Plato, Rep. 435 B ff.
12 Vgl. ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 111, 3 f.: iṣlāḥu l-fikrati bi-t-ta ʿallum …; vgl. S. 128, 11.
13 Vgl. ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 111, 5 f.: iṣlāḥu š-šahwati bi-l-ʿiffati …; vgl. S. 128, 11.
14 Vgl. ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 111, 6–8: iṣlāḥu l-ḥamiyya bi-islāsihā …; vgl. S. 128, 11f.
15 Vgl. zur hier anklingenden aristotelischen Mesoteslehre und zu ihrem Nachleben im Islam
Chistoph Bürgel, Adab und iʿtidāl in ar-Ruhāwīs Adab aṭ-ṭabīb. In ZDMG 117, 1967,
S. 90–102. – H. Daiber, Bespr. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), Sp. 371f.
16 Vgl. ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 111, 9 f.: bi-iṣlāḥi l-quwā ṯ-ṯalāṯi yaḥṣulu li-n-nafsi l-
ʿadālatu wal-iḥsān; vgl. S. 128, 12.
griechische ethik in islamischem gewande 555
Wie diese Liste sowie die Rāġib und Miskawayh gemeinsame Aufzählung der
“Laster” (raḏāʾil)17 bestätigen, hat Rāġibs Ethik Miskawayh benutzt, allerdings
ohne sich sklavisch an dessen Wortlaut zu halten. Einzelne Termini werden
gelegentlich durch andere ersetzt. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich, dass Rāġib selb-
ständig mit Gedanken Miskawayhs umgegangen ist und ihnen zuweilen einen
neuen Kontext gegeben hat, den wir hier etwas beleuchten wollen. Damit soll
gleichzeitig der Nachweis erbracht werden, dass die dadurch bedingte schein-
bar lockere Übereinstimmung zwischen Rāġib und Miskawayh keine ausrei-
chende Basis für die Annahme gemeinsamer Quellen formt. Solche hatte W.
Madelung,18 zumindest teilweise, nicht ganz ausgeschlossen. Vielmehr wird
man Modifikationen von Miskawayhs Gedanken damit erklären dürfen, dass
Rāġib zusätzliche Informationen seiner Zeit herangezogen hat.19 Ferner ist mit
der Möglichkeit zu rechnen, dass Rāġib durch seine gründliche Kenntnis des
Korans, den er häufig zitiert, koranische Nuancen und Assoziationen einbe-
zogen hat, die griechisches Gedankengut zuweilen in neuem Licht erscheinen
lassen.
So wird der neuplatonische Begriff von der Reinheit der Seele,20 den Rāġib 184
dem Werk des Miskawayh entnommen hat,21 mit dem koranischen Gedanken
von der “Stellvertretung Gottes” assoziiert. Rāġib schreibt:
Durch das Tun (iktisāb) des Edlen (al-makrama) verdienen Menschen

eine Klassifikation als Stellvertreter (ḫalīfa) Gottes. Sie ist mit Seiner Aus-
sage Ich werde auf Erden einen Nachfolger einsetzen!22 gemeint; ferner mit
Seiner Aussage: … und euch zu (deren) Nachfolger auf der Erde machen, um
zu sehen, wie ihr (dann) handelt;23 ferner mit Seiner Aussage: Er ist es, der
euch als Nachfolger auf der Erde eingesetzt hat. Und Er hat den einen von
euch einen höheren Rang verliehen als den anderen, um euch mit dem, was
Er euch gegeben hat, auf die Probe zu stellen.24 – Ich habe darauf hingewie-
sen, dass die Stellvertretung Gottes nur mit der Reinheit der Seele (ṭahā-
rat an-nafs) zulässig ist; ebenso darauf, dass die besten (ašraf ) religiösen
17 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 100, 9 ff.! – Vgl. Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6),
S. 17 (ausführlicher).
18 Ar-Rāġib (s. Anm. 2), S. 162.
19 Vgl. unten Anm. 46 ff. zu den Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ.
20 Vgl. etwa Plotin, Enn. I 6.
21 Vgl. ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 91, 18 f.
22 Sure 2:30. – In der Übersetzung der Suren folgen wir Rudi Paret, Der Koran. Übersetzung.
Stuttgart (etc.) 1962.
23 Sure 7:129 (126).
24 Sure 6:165.
556 chapter 30
Pflichten (al-ʿibādāt) nur mit reinem Körper zulässig sind. Ich habe nun
Gott um die richtige Eingebung gebeten und habe über (dieses Thema)
ein Buch verfasst, das ein Mittel (ḏarīʿa) zu edlen Gesetzeshandlungen
(makārim aš-šarīʿa) sein soll. Ich habe erklärt, wie der Mensch die Stufe
der demütigen Verehrung (Gottes) (al-ʿubūdiyya) erreicht, die Gott zur
Ehre (šaraf ) für die Frommen gemacht hat; ferner, wie er (selbst) über sie
hinauskommen (kann), wenn er sie mit der Stufe der Stellvertretung (al-
ḫilāfa) verbindet, die Gott zur Ehre für die Rechtschaffenen (aṣ-ṣiddīqīn)
und Märtyrer (aš-šuhadāʾ) gemacht hat. Denn die Verbindung der Satzun-
gen (aḥkām) und edlen Eigenschaften (makārim) des Gesetzes (aš-šarʿ)
im Wissen (ʿilman) und das Vorzeigen von beidem im Handeln (ʿamalan)
führt zu hohem Rang (al-ʿulā), vollendet die Frömmigkeit (taqwā) und
bringt (die Menschen) zum Garten der Einkehr (Sure 53:15).25
Dieser Passus enthält in nuce das Wesentliche von Rāġibs Ethik. Ihr Ziel ist
185 es, zur “Glückseligkeit” (saʿāda) im Diesseits und vor allem im | Jenseits26 hin-
zuführen. Der Text konzentriert sich auf die Interpretation des bereits genann-
ten neuplatonischen Gedankens von der Reinheit als Vortrefflichsein und als
Tun dessen, was die islamischen Gesetze vorschreiben, was in ihnen “edel”
(makrama) ist. “Religiöse Pflichten” (ʿibādāt) und die Tugenden (vgl. makrama)
der platonisch-aristotelischen Ethik erscheinen verbunden im koranischen
Begriff des “Stellvertreter”-Seins von Gott. Hierbei geht Rāġib27 davon aus,
dass “die absoluten edlen Eigenschaften” (al-makārim al-muṭlaqa) oder “die
Mehrzahl davon”, wie z.B. “Weisheit” (al-ḥikma), “Großmut” (al-ǧūd), “Geduld”
oder “Einsicht” (al-ḥilm), “Wissen” (al-ʿilm) und “Verzeihen” (al-ʿafw), auch der
Beschreibung des “Schöpfers” dienen können.28 Tatsächlich lassen sich die
25 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 59, 1–12.

26 Die “wahre Glückseligkeit” as-saʿādatu l-ḥaqīqiyyatu besteht aus “den jenseitigen Gütern”,
al-ḫayrātu al-uḫrawiyyatu, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 128, 4ff. Rāġib zählt nach
dem Vorbild von Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 80, 13ff., zur Glückselig-
keit auch die “körperlichen Tugenden”: S. ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 128, 13ff.; vgl.
S. 134ff. Beide folgen platonisch-aristotelischer Tradition: Vgl. Hans Daiber, Ein bisher
unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text über die Tugenden der Seele in arabischer Überlie-
ferung. In Der Islam 47, 1971, S. 39 f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/7.
27 Ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 58, 9–11.
28 Diese Möglichkeit schränkt Rāġib in seinem Kitāb fī l-ʿaqāʾid, einer Verteidigung des ortho-
doxen Glaubens – vgl. Hans Daiber, Muʿammar (s. Anm. 3), S. 216 – insofern ein, als Gott
mit den “existierenden Dingen” (al-mawǧūdāt) nur einige Namen “dem Ausdruck nach”
(lafẓan), nicht “der Bedeutung nach” (maʿnan) teilt: Vgl. MS Chester Beatty (Dublin) 5277,
S. 9, 3 ff. / hrsg. v. Šamran al-ʿIǧlī, Das Kitāb fī l-ʿaqāʾid. Beirut 1988.
genannten Eigenschaften, die mit Ausnahme von ʿafw29 nach dem Vorbild
von Miskawayh auch in der oben genannten Umschreibung der platonischen
Tugenden vorkommen, so oder ähnlich als Attribute Gottes im Koran30 oder in
der islamischen Theologie31 nachweisen.
Dies ist kein Zufall. Vielmehr liegt hier eine Weiterführung des koranischen 186
ḫilāfa-Gedankens32 vor, den Rāġib an anderer Stelle33 auch als “Nachahmung
(iqtidāʾ) des Schöpfers im Lenken (as-siyāsa) nach Maßgabe der menschli-
chen Fähigkeit, nämlich in der Verwirklichung der edlen Gesetzeshandlungen”
beschreibt. Der hier durchschimmernde platonisch-neuplatonische Gedanke
von der ὁμοίωσις θεῷ34 klingt bereits bei Miskawayh an. Miskawayh vertritt die
These, dass der Mensch vollkommen werde durch das Wissen um die “Uni-
versalien der seienden Dinge” (kulliyāt al-mawǧūdāt), weil dieses “in gewisser
Weise” (bi-naḥwin mā) auch die Partikularien einbeziehe, die nicht von den
Universalien getrennt seien. Folglich verdiene er durch zunehmendes Wis-
sen um die Universalien und durch “ordnungsgemäßes Handeln” (al-fiʿl al-
manẓūm) “Mikrokosmos” (ʿālam ṣaġīr) genannt zu werden und werde “in ge-
wisser Weise” identisch mit ihnen.35 Miskawayh fährt dann fort:
Daraufhin wirst du (die Formen, ṣuwar, bzw. die Universalien der sei-
enden Dinge) durch deine Handlungen entsprechend deiner Fähigkeit
geordnet haben und so im Hinblick auf sie zu einem Stellvertreter (ḫalīfa)
deines Herrn (mawlā), des Schöpfers aller Dinge werden.36
Diese Gedanken hat Rāġib weiter ausgebaut und hierbei zusätzliche Nuan-
cen ins Spiel gebracht. Er schreibt:
29 Es ist keineswegs eine Verschreibung aus al-ʿiffa “die Mäßigkeit”: Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-
ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 342–344.
30 Vgl. zu ḥikma z.B. Sure 33:34; zu ǧūd vgl. koranisches raḥmān “barmherzig” z.B. Sure 1:1;
zu ḥilm vgl. koranisches ḥalīm ġaffūr “mild und bereit zu vergeben” Sure 2:235 (236); zu
ʿilm vgl. koranisches al-ʿalīm al-ḥakīm “der Bescheid weiß und Weisheit besitzt” z.B. Sure
2:32 (30); zu ʿafw vgl. koranisches ʿafuwwun ġaffūrun “bereit, Nachsicht zu üben und zu
vergeben” z.B. Sure 22:60 (59).
31 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar (s. Anm. 3), Index unter ḥikma, ǧawād und ʿalīm.
32 Vgl. zu diesem Wadad Al-Qadi, The Term “Khalīfa” in Early Exegetical Literature. In
Gegenwart als Geschichte: Islamwissenschaftliche Studien Fritz Steppat zum 65. Geburts-
tag. Leiden 1988, S. 392–411.
33 Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 91, 5 f.; vgl. S. 96, 8f.
34 Vgl. Plato, Theaetet 176 B. – Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus. Wiesbaden 1980, S. 327f. und
dort gegebene Hinweise.
35 Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 41, 7 ff.
36 Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 41, 13 ff.
558 chapter 30
Unter einem anderen Gesichtspunkt (kann man sagen): Insofern Gott

Menschen zu einem Mikrokosmos gemacht hat; seinen Körper zu so
etwas wie eine Stadt (gemacht hat); den Verstand zu so etwas wie ein
in ihr regierender König (gemacht hat); seine Kräfte, nämlich Denken,
Phantasie und die Sinne,37 zu so etwas wie sein Heer und seine Hilfskräfte
(gemacht hat); die (Körper-)Glieder zu so etwas wie seine Untertanen
(gemacht hat); die Begierde zu so etwas wie einen Feind (gemacht hat),
der ihn in seinem Königreich bekämpft und sich darum bemüht, seine
Untertanen zugrunde zu richten – ist sein Körper vergleichbar mit einem
187 Anker (ribāṭ) und einem Hafen | und seine Seele vergleichbar mit einem,
der sich darin aufhält und (dort) angelegt hat.38
Den hier anklingenden platonischen Widerstreit zwischen dem Verstand

und der Begierde hat Rāġib weiterhin mit einem Bild umschrieben, das sich
als abgewandelte Form eines platonischen Textes39 entpuppt. Rāġib schreibt:
Der Verstand ist vergleichbar mit einem Reiter auf der Jagd, seine Be-
gierde ist vergleichbar mit einem Pferd; sein Zorn ist vergleichbar mit
einem Hund. Wenn nun der Reiter geschickt ist, sein Pferd gezähmt und
sein Hund abgerichtet ist (muʿallam “ausgebildet”), dann verdient er, das
zu erlangen, was er begehrt. Wenn er ungeschickt ist, sein Pferd wider-
spenstig oder störrisch und sein Hund bissig, dann lässt sich unter seiner
(Lenkung) sein Pferd nicht folgsam antreiben, sein Hund bleibt nicht
zusammen mit dem Pferd gehorsam und gefügig. Folglich verdient er,
zugrunde zu gehen, abgesehen davon, dass er nicht erreichen wird, was
er wünscht.40
Auch Miskawayh hat dem geschilderten Widerstreit von Verstand und Be-
gierde seine Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, aber andere Bilder verwendet.41
Ebenso fehlt dort der Vergleich von Körper und Verstand mit der Stadt und
ihrem König. Hier werden wir andere Quellen in Betracht ziehen müssen. Der
Vergleich des Körpers mit einer Stadt lässt sich bereits bei dem Philosophen
37 Vgl. zu ihnen auch Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 77ff.
38 Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 103, 6–9; vgl. auch S. 202, 8ff.
39 Plato, Phaedrus 246 A ff.
40 Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 104, 4–8. Vgl. das Bild von Pferd und Reiter
auch S. 102, 10 ff. und zum Widerstreit zwischen dem Verstand und dem animalischen
Teil, wodurch der Mensch zu einem Zwischenwesen zwischen “Tier” (bahīma) und “Engel”
(malʾak wa-rabbānī; vgl. Sure 12:31) wird, S. 86 ff. und 89ff.
41 Ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 52, 5 ff.
Fārābī (gest. 339/950 oder 951) nachweisen.42 Allerdings ist die dort geschil-
derte hierarchische Struktur anders: Die vortreffliche Stadt (oder: der Staat; vgl.
πόλις) gleicht dem vollkommenen Körper, dessen Glieder der Vollendung und
Erhaltung der Lebewesen dienen; sie haben unterschiedliche Funktionen; lei-
tendes Organ ist unter ihnen “das Herz” (al-qalb).43
Eine größere Ähnlichkeit liegt hier vor zu der im 4./10. Jahrhundert ver-
fassten Enzyklopädie der Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (“Lautere Brüder”). Dort wird | die 188
Denkkraft mit dem König und die übrigen, wie bei Miskawayh44 und Rāġib45
sich gegenseitig unterstützenden Kräfte mit den “Truppen, Untertanen, Skla-
ven, Gefolgschaft, Dienern und Vasallen” verglichen.46 – Weitere Parallelen gibt
es im bereits genannten ḫalīfa-Gedanken47 und in der ja auch für Miskawayh
sowie für Rāġib charakteristischen Einstufung des Menschen als Mikrokos-
mos.48
Die genannten, im Einzelnen kürzenden und häufig nicht wörtlichen Paral-
lelen, die sich vermehren ließen,49 zeigen, wie sehr Rāġib von der Enzyklopädie
der Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ inspiriert worden ist. Darüber hinaus ist das Erbe des Fārābī
deutlich geworden, das sowohl bei den Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ als auch bei Miskawayh
nachgewirkt hat. Wir hatten bei Miskawayh gesehen, wie die Einstufung des
Menschen als Mikrokosmos mit seinem Wissen um die Universalien begrün-
det wird. Entsprechend erscheint seine Einstufung als Stellvertreter Gottes als
eine Folge seines Wissens um die Universalien. Hieran anknüpfend konnte
42 Ed. Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi. On the Perfect State. Oxford 1985, S. 230, 12ff. (= IV 15
§ 4); vgl. Kommentar R. Walzer, S. 424 und 435 ff.
43 Vgl. ed. R. Walzer (s. Anm. 42), S. 166, 13 ff. (= IV 10, §3ff.).
44 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 81 f.
45 Vgl. ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 14 f. und 19 f.
46 Vgl. Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. Ed. Ḫayr ad-Dīn az-Ziriklī. Kairo 1928, III, S. 214, 8ff. /
Übers. Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie
Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (III). Wiesbaden 1975, S. 137ff. – Susanne Diwald, Die Seele und
ihre geistigen Kräfte. In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essay presented by
his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday. Ed. Samuel Miklos
Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown. Oxford 1972 (S. 49–61), S. 53.
47 Vgl. Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (s. Anm. 46), I, S. 228, 2 ff.; 236, 1ff. und 262, 17ff.
48 Vgl. Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (s. Anm. 46) sowie zur dortigen Makrokosmos-Mikrokosmos-
Spekulation und zu deren “indo-iranischem” Hintergrund Geo Widengren, Macro-
cosmos-Microcosmos Speculation in the Rasaʾil Ikhwan Al-Safa and Some Hurufi Texts.
In Archivio di filosofia. Padova 1980, S. 297–312. – Zu weiteren Belegen der Makrokosmos-
Mikrokosmos-Spekulation vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar (s. Anm. 3), S. 128, Anm. 3.
49 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 77f., (gekürzt) mit Rasāʾil (s. Anm. 46) II,
S. 339 ff.; Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, S. 79f., (gekürzt) mit Rasāʾil III, S. 237 / Übers. S.
Diwald (s. Anm. 46), S. 191f. – Zu Rāġibs Klassifikation der Seelenkräfte als “geistig” (rūḥā-
niyya) vgl. Rasāʾil II, S. 349 f., und dazu S. Diwald, Die Seele (s. Anm. 46), S. 50f.
560 chapter 30
Rāġib den Begriff des Stellvertreters neuplatonisch als “Nachahmung Gottes”

interpretieren.50 Diese wird bei ihm nach Fārābīs Vorbild als “Lenkung” in der
“Verwirklichung der edlen Gesetzeshandlungen” interpretiert. Die Einbezie-
189 hung der Gesetzeshandlungen in eine letzten Endes aristotelisch | verstandene
Verbindung von Theorie, Wissen einerseits und praktische Ethik andererseits
ist typisch für Fārābīs politische Philosophie51 und klingt bei Miskawayh nur
kurz an.52 Fārābī hatte die Religion als Abbild der Philosophie, der Univer-
salien in der Form von Gesetzesvorschriften verstanden. Der hier vorausge-
setzte Zusammenhang zwischen den Universalien und den Partikularien hat
bei Rāġib im koranischen ḫalīfa-Begriff einen Niederschlag gefunden, der in
platonisch-neuplatonischem Vokabular die Nachahmung Gottes umschreibt
und im Sinne Fārābīs Wissen und Handeln zu einer politischen Philosophie
umgemünzt hat, die ihre Vollendung in den islamischen Gesetzesvorschrif-
ten sowie in der ʿimārat al-arḍ,53 im “Kultivieren der Erde” findet. Gleichzeitig
haben beide Autoren an der Unentbehrlichkeit der Prophetie für die menschli-
che Erkenntnis festgehalten: Für Fārābī muss der Philosophenkönig auch Pro-
phet sein, der vom intellectus agens die göttliche Offenbarung erhält.54 Ebenso
sind für Rāġib “die meisten Leute nicht zur Erkenntnis dessen imstande, was
ihnen im Jenseits nützen und schaden wird, sowohl der Partikularien als auch
von deren Universalien”.55 Sie sind daher auf “Propheten” (anbiyā ʾ) angewie-
sen.
Auffälligerweise spricht Rāġib von den Propheten in der Mehrzahl und
erwähnt nicht ausdrücklich Mohammed. Dieselbe Unklarheit herrscht auch
bei Fārābī. Hierbei scheinen beide von einem universalistischen Religions-
begriff auszugehen: Religiöse Wahrheit ist nicht das Privileg einer einzigen
50 S. Anm. 33.
51 Vgl. zu dieser hier Hans Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (gest. 339/950). In
L’ homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. Ed. Christian Wenin. II. Louvain-la-Neuve 1986.
= Philosophes médiévaux XXVII, S. 729–753. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/17. – Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view.
Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986. In MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, S. 128–149. = H. Daiber, From
52 Vgl. lediglich Miskawayh, ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 35, 13ff.
53 Genannt Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 90, 11, mit einem Verweis auf Sure
11:61 (64): “Und er hat euch auf ihr (sc. der Erde) die Möglichkeit zum Leben gegeben”
(istaʿmarakum) (Übers. Rudi Paret). – Vgl. Rāġib, Kitāb Tafṣīl an našʾatayn wa-taḥṣīl as-
saʿādatayn, Kairo ca. 1920, S. 34, 4 ff. – Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, S. 91, 1ff., (vgl. S. 95, 1ff.)
nennt die ʿimārat al-arḍ als spezifische Tätigkeit des Menschen neben ʿibāda und ḫilāfa.
54 Vgl. Fārābī, ed. R. Walzer (s. Anm. 42), S. 210 ff. (IV 14); dazu H. Daiber, Ruler (s. Anm. 51),
S. 15 f.
55 Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 204, 4 f.
Religionsgemeinschaft. Auch früheren Propheten wurde sie zuteil, ist jedoch

in der Überlieferung verfälscht worden. Diese | typisch ismailitische Einstel- 190
lung hat kurz vor Fārābī im Kitāb Aʿlām an-nubuwwa (geschrieben vor 321/933
oder bereits vor 313/925) des Ismailiten Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī ihren Niederschlag
gefunden. Religionen unterscheiden sich in ihrer “äußeren” (ẓāhir) Form, nicht
aber in ihrem “inneren” (bāṭin) “Sinngehalt” (maʿānī).56 Dieser universalisti-
sche Religionsbegriff wird für Rāġib zur Rechtfertigung dafür, die universelle
philosophische Wahrheit, das Wissen um die Universalien nach dem Vorbild
Fārābīs auch in den “edlen Gesetzeshandlungen” des Islam verwirklicht zu
sehen. Dies wird durch Koranverse auf Schritt und Tritt dokumentiert. Ihr
Inhalt erscheint konform mit den Universalien und wird somit in seiner Allge-
meingültigkeit bestätigt. Gleichzeitig erweist sich die Einsicht in die religiöse
Ethik, die “edle Gesetzeshandlung”, als unmöglich ohne “Verstand” (ʿaql). Seine
“Kenntnis” (maʿrifa) um Gott beginnt bei der Erkenntnis “der seienden Dinge”
(al-mawǧūdāt), worin Gottes “Wirken” (ṣanʿa) seine “Spur” (aṯar) hinterlas-
sen hat.57 Hier folgt Rāġib dem traditionellen kosmologischen Gottesbeweis.58
Dieser entpuppt sich als Bestätigung des Zusammenhangs zwischen dem Men-
schen als Mikrokosmos und den Universalien. Im ständigen Lernprozess mit
Hilfe des Verstandes, der nur das Beste (al-afḍal wa-l-aṣlaḥ) will,59 aber auch
durch ein “göttliches Gnadengeschenk” ( faḍl ilāhī) an die Propheten,60 sowie
in der Erfüllung der “edlen Gesetzesvorschriften” wird der Mensch zunehmend
Gott ähnlich und wird seine Seele “rein”.
Hier klingt neuplatonisches Gedankengut an, das dem frühen Islam nicht
unbekannt geblieben ist, nämlich die Vorstellung von der Rückkehr der Seele
zu ihrem göttlichen Ursprung durch zunehmende Erkenntnis und durch vor-
bildliches Handeln. Eine anschauliche Beschreibung liefert Iamblichus’ Kom-
mentar zu den pseudopythagoräischen Goldenen Versen, der im griechischen
Original verloren, aber in einer aus dem 3./9. | Jahrhundert stammenden ara- 191
bischen Übersetzung erhalten ist.61 Dort anklingende neuplatonische Gedan-
56 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (10th century AD) on the Unity and Diversity of
Religions. In Dialogue and Syncretism. An interdisciplinary approach. Ed. Jerald D. Gort
(et al.). Grand Rapids/Amsterdam 1989, S. 87–104. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs II/15.
57 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 202, 2 f. – Rāġib, al-Mufradāt fī ġarīb al-Qurʾān.
Kairo 1904, III, S. 103, 1 ff. – H. Daiber, Muʿammar (s. Anm. 3), S. 167.
58 Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar (s. Anm. 3), S. 159 f.
59 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 106, 2 ff. – Rāġib knüpft hier an Miskawayh an
(vgl. ed. C. K. Zurayk (s. Anm. 6), S. 31 ff. und 57, 17ff.), aber auch an Fārābī: Vgl. zu diesem
hier H. Daiber, Ruler (s. Anm. 51), S. 6–8.
60 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 124, 5 ff.
61 Eine Edition mit Übersetzung und Kommentar erschien 1995: Hans Daiber, Neuplatoni-
562 chapter 30
ken erscheinen in der Ethik des Rāġib erweitert um die islamischen Bausteine
Koran, Gesetz und Offenbarung. Hierzu ist Rāġib unmittelbar angeregt worden
durch die Sympathisanten der Islamiliten (Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ), durch Fārābī und
Miskawayh. Deren Werke haben Rāġib zu seinem Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim
aš-šarīʿa inspiriert, ein Buch das wenig später von dem ungleich bekannte-
ren Theologen Ġazālī (gest. 505/1111) in seiner Ethik, dem Mīzān al-ʿamal und
danach in seinem theologischen Hauptwerk, den Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn, benutzt
worden ist.62 Bereits vor Ġazālī war Rāġib von der optimistischen Einstellung
ausgegangen, dass der Mensch sich strebend bemühen und durch “Vortreff-
lichkeit” ( faḍl) sich von den anderen unterscheiden kann.63 Es ist denkbar,
dass diese Einstellung auch bedeutsam geworden ist für Ġazālīs Begriff des iǧti-
hād, des strebenden “Sich-Bemühens”, der unvoreingenommenen Suche nach
der religiösen Wahrheit, die sich vom blinden “Autoritätsglauben” (taqlīd) frei-
macht.64 Ġazālī erscheint als Abschluss einer langen Entwicklung, die über
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī bis in die Diskussionen ismailitischer Kreise zurückreicht: Zu
Beginn des 4./10. Jahrhunderts hatte der berühmte Arzt und Philosoph Abū
Zakariyāʾ ar-Rāzī die These vertreten, dass der Mensch von sich aus durch Intui-
tion und selbst aus Fehlern früherer Generationen lernen könne. Dies bezwei-
felte sein Kontrahent, der Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, der auf das Bedürfnis
des Menschen nach Leitung und auf die Unentbehrlichkeit der prophetischen
Offenbarung verwies.65
Hier erscheint der Mensch nicht nur als “einzelnes Subjekt”, “das sich in
192 freiem Handeln verwirklicht” und “in der Spannung von Seelenvermögen | und
Leibhaftigkeit in das Handlungsgefüge der Polisgemeinschaft” eintritt – so ist
sche Pythagorica in arabischem Gewande. Der Kommentar des Iamblichus zu den Car-
mina aurea. Amsterdam/New York/Oxford/Tokyo = VNAW.L n.r. 161. = H. Daiber, From
the Greeks to the Arabs I/19.
62 Vgl. W. Madelung (s. Anm. 2), S. 153 f. – Zu weiteren Quellen von Ġazālī, Mīzān (näm-
lich Ibn Sīnās Aḥwāl an-nafs und Risāla fī l-aḫlāq) vgl. Jules L. Janssens, Al-Ghazālī’s
Mīzān Al-ʿAmal. An ethical Summa based on Ibn Sīnā and Al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahānī. In Isla-
mic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation in Honour of
Hans Daiber. Ed. Wim Raven and Anna Akasoy. Leiden/Boston 2008. = IPTS 75, S. 123–
137.
63 Vgl. Rāġib, ed. A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī (s. Anm. 2), S. 83ff. – A. Y. al-ʿAǧamī, Tafṣīl an-našʾatayn
(s. Anm. 53), S. 39 ff. – Die Überlegenheit des Menschen über die Tiere und die Unter-
schiedlichkeit der Menschen formten zentrale Themen im ismailitischen Schrifttum: Vgl.
H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (s. Anm. 56).
64 Vgl. zum iǧtihād bei Ġazālī Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazzali. Jerusalem 1975,
S. 488 ff.
65 Vgl. H. Daiber, Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (s. Anm. 56).
jüngst der platonische Subjektbegriff umschrieben worden.66 Das platonisch-

neuplatonische Menschenbild wurde bei Rāġib und seinen Vorläufern unter
dem Eindruck der politischen Philosophie des Fārābī modifiziert und ist, ange-
reichert um den aristotelischen Begriff vom Willen und vernunftgemäßen Han-
deln des Individuums,67 der koranischen Offenbarung als Maßstab von allem
Denken und Handeln untergeordnet worden.
Summary
Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī (5th/11th c.) in his ethics Kitāb aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilā makārim aš-šarīʿa
offers a synthesis of Greek-Platonic-Neoplatonic doctrines and Koranic ethics.
It is mainly based on Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq, on the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-
Ṣafāʾ, and Fārābī. The Platonic-Neoplatonic concept of man’s likeness to God is
replaced by the Koranic concept of man as “deputy” (ḫalīfa) of God by keeping
to “the law” (aš-šarīʿa), by fulfilling the ritual obligations and by practicing vir-
tue. Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī inspired Ġazālī’s ethics and apparently shaped Ġazālī’s
concept of iǧtihād.
Cf. the monograph (based on a PhD thesis at the University of Frankfurt a.M.
in 2000) by Yasien Mohamed, The Path to Virtue. The Ethical Philosophy of
Al-Raghib Al-Iṣfahānī. Kuala Lumpur 2006.
Republished, with some modifications and additions, from Historia philosophiae medii
aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch
zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Ed. Burkhard Mojsisch und Olaf Pluta. I–II. Amster-
dam/Philadelphia 1991 [1992], pp. 181–192. By courtesy of the publisher.
66 Christoph Riedel, Subjekt und Individuum. Darmstadt 1989. = Grundzüge 75, S. 32. –
Vgl. zur sokratisch-platonischen Ethik Stephan H. Pfürtner in Ethik in der europäi-
schen Geschichte. I. Hrsg. v. Stephan H. Pfürtner, Dieter Lührmann und Adolf
Martin Ritter. Stuttgart (etc.) 1988, S. 27 ff.
67 Vgl. C. Riedel (s. Anm. 66), S. 39 ff., und S. H. Pfürtner (s. Anm. 66), S. 40ff.
chapter 31
God versus Causality

Ġazālī’s Solution and Its Historical Background
In modern historiography rationalism means scientific knowledge based on

unprejudiced cognition, similar to the ideal of the European Enlightenment
(17th–19th c.), which replaced religion by human rationality.1 Is it possible, in
view of this, to talk about Ġazālī’s impact on the development of rationality in
Islam?
I will present the thesis, that Ġazālī’s concept of causality2 is the result of his
2 philosophical theology, which is based on his Koranic-Ashʿarite | theology and
on his knowledge of Ibn Sīnā, whose Neoplatonism he took as a starting point
for his critique of Ibn Sīnā.3 He modified previous discussions by resuming the
1 Cf. Günter Gawlick, Rationalismus. In HWPh 8, 1992, col. 44–47.

2 Ġazālī’s concept of causality has been the subject of a large number of articles and mono-
graphs which do not consider the Stoic-Neoplatonic background. See the bibliography in
F. Griffel’s monograph. We can add the following publications: Muhammed Yasin El-
Taher Uraibi, Al-Ghazalis Aporien im Zusammenhang mit dem Kausalproblem. Thesis Bonn
1972, pp. 250 ff. – Kwame Gyekye, Al-Ghazālī on Causation. In Second Order 2/1, ILE-IFE,
Nigeria 1973, pp. 31–39. – Carol Lucille Bargeron, The Concept of Causality in Abu Hāmid
Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah. Thesis University of Wisconsin-Madison
1978. – Mohammed Allal Sinaceur, Logique et causalité chez Ghazali. In Un trait d’union
entre l’ orient et l’ occident: Al-Ghazzali et Ibn Maimoun. Rabat 1986. = Academie du Royaume
du Maroc. Publications 12, pp. 173–211. – Luciano Rubio, El “Ocasionalismo” de los teologos
especulativos del Islam. Su posible influencia en Guillermo de Ockham y en los “ocasionalistas” de
la Edad Moderna. El Escorial 1987, pp. 161–198. – Abu Yaarub al-Marzouki, Le concept de
causalité chez Gazali. Tunis (s.d.). – Yusuf Rahman, Causality and Occasionalism. A Study of
the Theories of the Philosophers, Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. In Hamdard Islamicus 21/1, 1998,
pp. 23–31. – Lenn Evan Goodman, Three Enduring Achievements of Islamic Philosophy. In
Mohaghegh Nāma. Collected papers presented to Professor Mehdi Mohaghegh. Supervised
by B. Khorramshāhī and J. Jahānbakhsh. II. Tehran 2001 (pp. 59–89), pp. 79–83 and 86f.
(L. E. Goodman alludes to Neoplatonism, but regretfully did not elaborate this). – Edward
Omar Moad, Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and “Acquisition”. In Philosophy East and West
57, Honolulu 2007, pp. 1–13. – Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazali. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo-
sophy (2007), ch. 7. – Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Appropriation of Ibn Sīnā’s Views on
Causality and the Development of the Science in Islam. In Uluslararası Ibn Sīnā sempozy-
umu bildiriler, 22–24 Mayis 2008. II, pp. 105–115. – Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical
Theology, pp. 147 ff., 175 ff. and 215 ff.
3 Some remarks can be found in Mohammad Noor Nabi, Criticism of Al-Ghazali on the
Theory of Emanation presented by Plotinus and Ibn Sina. In Reason and Tradition in Islamic
Thought. Ed. Mahmudul Haq. Foreword by M. Salim Kidwai. Aligarh 1992, pp. 116–129.

god versus causality 565
Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of causality as formulated by Proclus in Institutio

theologica. Herewith, he dissociated himself from Ibn Sīnā’s Aristotelian view
and contributed to rationality in Islam in a very original manner.
Ġazālī’s reflection on causality turns out to be a reaction on preceding dis-
cussions of those who tried to replace God by another cause. It deserves our
attention, as Ġazālī influenced through his Tahāfut al-falāsifa and its refuta-
tion by Ibn Rušd, the Tahāfut at-Tahāfut,4 the discussion in medieval Europe,
the arguments of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bernard of Arezzo or of
Nicolaus of Autrecourt.5 His originality has even prompted a | comparison with 3
similar ideas of the English philosopher David Hume in the 18th century.6
At first sight Ġazālī gave a clear answer to those who tried to replace God,
Allāh, by another kind of causality, to those people who appear in early Islamic
sources under the name “Dahrites”, “materialists”, and who may be called “athe-
ists”, to use a term which originated in the 16th–17th centuries Europe.7
4 Ed. by Maurice Bouyges. Beirut 1930. = Bibliotheca arabica scholasticorum. Série arabe.
III. (Beirut 31992) / Engl. transl. by Simon van den Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence). I–II. London 1969. – On Ibn Rušd’s concept of causality
and his critique of Ġazālī cf. Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation.
Albany 1985, and the review by Hans Daiber in Der Islam 64, 1987, pp. 310f. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs II/57. – Recently, it has been shown, that Ibn Rušd’s concept of
causality shows traces of the Neoplatonic doctrine of intermediaries: Cf. Cecilia Martini
Bonadeo, Averroes on the Causality of the First Principle: a Model in Reading ‘Metaphysics’
Lambda 7, 1072 b 4–16. In Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter.
Ed. Andreas Speer and Lydia Wegener. Berlin/New York 2006. = Miscellanea Mediaevalia
33, pp. 425–437. – Cf. Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics, pp. 248ff. – Both did not
take into account the role of Proclus’Institutio theologica, whose importance I emphasized in
my review of B. S. Kogan’s monograph in Der Islam 64, 1987, p. 311.
5 Cf. J. E. Heyde, Entwertung, pp. 14 ff. – M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism. – Harry Aus-
tryn Wolfson, Nicolaus of Autrecourt and Ġazālī’s Argument Against Causality. In Spec-
ulum 44, 1969, pp. 234–238. = H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 593–600. – R. E.
Abu Shanab, Ghazali and Aquinas on Causation. In Monist 58, Chicago 1974, pp. 140–150. –
David B. Burrell, Causality and Necessity in Islamic thought. In Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Ed. Edward Craig. II. London/New York 1998. – Kojiro Nakamura, Al-
Ghazali. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy IV, esp. p. 65 col. a. – Dominik Perler and
Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im
europäischen Denken. Göttingen 2000. = AAWG.PH 3. Folge. 235. – Taneli Kukkonen, Cre-
ation and Causation. In Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. Robert Pasnau and
Christina van Dyke. I. Cambridge 2010 (pp. 232–246), pp. 236f. – On the Latin transmission
of Ġazālī’s works compare H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, pp. 132–136.
6 Cf. Abdul Matin, The Ghazalian and the Humian Critiques of Causality: a comparison. In
The Dacca University Studies. A. 29, 1978, pp. 29–434.
7 Cf. Hans-Walter Schütte, Atheismus. In HWPh 1, 1971, col. 595–599. – On the history of
“atheism” s. Georges Minois, Geschichte des Atheismus. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegen-
566 chapter 31
The term “Dahrites” has its origin in the Koranic concept of dahr as we find it
in Sura 45:23 (22) f., in the context of the following remark about the unbeliever.
I quote the translation of Arthur J. Arberry:
Hast thou seen him who has taken his caprice (hawāhu) to be his god, and
God has led him astray out of a knowledge, … They say, ‘There is nothing but
our present life; we die, and we live, and nothing but Time (dahr) destroys
us’.
Here, we detect the divine cause replaced by the inclination of man (hawā-
hu), who orientates himself solely towards his life in this world, who considers
himself as perishable, as a victim of time.8
Remarkable, in the formulation of the Sura quoted, is the assessment of indi-
viduality as causal factor equal to God. According to Mohammed, this is not
4 compatible with his | belief in one God, to whom everyone must surrender. The
same Sura is the starting point of later descriptions of the so-called “Dahrites”
who deny God.9 Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 869), the famous prose writer, in his book
on animals demonstrates that even animals hint at God’s existence.10 His cos-
mological and teleological proof of God contradicts the denial of God by the
Dahrites who, moreover, replace God by the unchangeable movement of the
stars.11 Ǧāḥiẓ refers to discussions of agnostic circles from the 8th/9th centur-
wart. Translated from French [Histoire de l’ athéisme. Les incroyants dans le monde occi-
dental à nos jours] by Eva Moldenhauer. Weimar 2000. The book includes a short
chapter on “the Arabic-Muslim contribution to unbelief” (pp. 68–76). This can be supple-
mented by a collection of articles ed. by Friedrich Niewöhner and Olaf Pluta, Athe-
ismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance. Wiesbaden 1999. = Wolfenbütteler Mittelalter-
Studien 12: On “atheism” in Islam s. the contributions by Hans Daiber, Rebellion gegen
Gott (pp. 23–44); Sarah Stroumsa, The Religion of the Freethinkers of Medieval Islam
(pp. 45–59); Muhammad Abu Al-Fadl Badran, “… denn die Vernunft ist ein Prophet” –
Zweifel bei Abū ʾl-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (pp. 61–84); Dominique Urvoy, La démystification de
la religion dans les textes attribués à Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (pp. 85–94); Mohammad Moham-
madian, Der oblique Blick. Zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Religion in den Robāʿiyāt
von Omar Khayyām (pp. 95–114).
8 On the concept of dahr cf. here Georges Tamer, Zeit und Gott: Hellenistische Zeitvorstel-
lungen in der altarabischen Dichtung und im Koran. Berlin/New York 2008, pp. 193ff. and
107 ff.
9 On the term cf. Daniel Gimaret, Dahrī II (in the Islamic Period). In Encyclopaedia Iran-
ica VI, Costa Mesa, California 1993, p. 588 b–590 a.
10 Ǧāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿA. S. Hārūn II, p. 109, 5f.
11 Cf. Ǧāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿA. S. Hārūn VII, p. 12, 11ff. – Cf. in addition H. Daiber,
Rebellion, p. 25.
ies AD who, in the tradition of old sceptic-materialistic traditions of the Sas-

sanians from the 6th century AD, acknowledge the influence of the stars on
the sublunar world.12 According to Ǧāḥiẓ, the assumption of any astrological
influence on creation means the denial of God. He, who asserts the eternal
uniformity of the celestial bodies, cannot anymore assume generation and cor-
ruption, or the “distinction between Creator and created”, but solely “eternal
matter” (aṭ-ṭīna al-qadīma).13
This conclusion by Ǧāḥiẓ is not new. It takes up an alleged discussion be-
tween the theologian Abū Ḥanīfa and a Dahrite, which is summarized in the
10th century AD by Abū l-Layth as-Samarqandī in his commentary on the old-
est Islamic credo, on Abū Ḥanīfa’s al-Fiqh al-absaṭ.14
Although the report seems to be late,15 we can nevertheless detect old ideas
in it. The thesis of the Dahrite and the refutation, attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, with
the argument, that contrary qualities like humidity, dryness, cold and heat can
only be combined by a superior factor, by God, is among others16 also found
in the theologian Māturīdī (d. 333/944). In his “Book on the unity of God”, his
Kitāb at-Tawḥīd,17 he informs us, that he based his information on the Dahrites
on their critic Ibn Šabīb, a pupil of the Muʿtazilite Naẓẓām (d. before 232/847).18
Apparently, | Ibn Šabīb was a source for Māturīdī’s own counter-arguments and 5
his thesis of the prevailing divine cause.
We know that Ibn Šabīb, like Māturīdī, follows Naẓẓām, whose critical de-
scription of the Dahrite principles is preserved.19 Naẓẓām had – contrary to
the Dahrites and dualists – developed the doctrine that all things, even con-
trary things, are “mixed” by the intervention of God.20 Here, God did not
become a complete transcendent being, but can be conceived in the reason-
able order of creation. Moreover, God imposed on all things created by Him a
nature that determines their causality. God acts indirectly, through nature cre-
12 For further details s. H. Daiber, Rebellion, pp. 26 f.

13 Ǧāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿA. S. Hārūn VII, p. 12, 11ff.
14 Ed. (with commentary) by Hans Daiber, The Islamic Concept of Belief in the 4th/10th
Century. Abū l-Laiṯ as-Samarqandī’s Commentary on Abū Ḥanīfa (died 150/767), al-Fiqh
al-absaṭ. Tokyo 1995. = Studia culturae islamicae 52, l. 771–784. – Cf. for further details H.
Daiber, Rebellion, pp. 28–30.
15 Cf. H. Daiber, Rebellion, pp. 29 f.
16 For further references see H. Daiber, Rebellion, p. 30 n. 27.
17 Ed. Fathallah Kholeif. Beirut 1970, pp. 141 ff.
18 On his doctrine cf. J. van Ess, Theologie III, p. 367.
19 Ǧāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿA. S. Hārūn V, Cairo 21966, p. 40, 5ff. / German transl. J. van
Ess, Theologie VI, p. 66.
20 Cf. J. van Ess, Theologie III, pp. 366 f.
568 chapter 31
ated by Him in the things. Naẓẓām adduced the example, that “God provided
the stone with such a nature, that it rolls, if someone pushes it”.21
Naẓẓām’s thesis, that contrary things are forceably put together through the
intervention of a superior divine cause, is not new. He himself might have
been inspired by Christian circles of his time, who themselves ultimately follow
the doctrine of the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De mundo, described there in
the chapters 5 and 6.22 Consequently, causality in Naẓẓām remains something
determined by God. Herewith, Naẓẓām continues discussions before and dur-
ing his time: The Islamic theologian Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmr (ca. 111/730–184/800)
opposed the so-called “naturalists” by denying the independent “nature” of
things and assuming a connection of things, of “parts”, by God. Even man’s
action is determined by God: Man “acquires” what God has created. 23
A contemporary of Ḍirār, the Shiʿite Hišām Ibn al-Ḥakam, introduced a new
concept, namely the “cause” created by God. This “cause”, sabab, “necessarily”
“calls forth” the acts of man, provided that man wants them24 and under the
condition that he has the capacity.25
This deterministic component appears somewhat later in a different man-
6 ner in Naẓẓām’s theology. Naẓẓām replaces the term “cause” | with the terms
“nature” (ḫilqa, ṭabīʿa) and “coercion” (īǧāb): According to him, God has cre-
ated in things and imposed on them their “nature” or “coercion”. Man has only
the potentiality to give the impulse to a causality, which as such is determined
by God and is therefore unavoidable.26
His contemporary Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulamī differed from this.
According to him, nature is not something created by God, but a key term
for causality that is inherent in things. God determines this causality only
indirectly: Here, Muʿammar offers a unique solution: According to him, the
21 Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, p. 404, 7 f. – Cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, pp. 403f.
22 Cf. H. A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 150 f. – J. van Ess, Theologie III, p. 367. – Cf. Hans Daiber,
Possible Echoes of De mundo in the Arabic-Islamic World: Christian, Islamic and Jewish
Thinkers. In Cosmic Order and Divine Power. Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos. Introduc-
tion, Text, Translation and Interpretative Essays by Johan C. Thom, Renate Burri,
Clive Chandler, Hans Daiber, Jill Kraye, Andrew Smith, Hidemi Takahashi,
and Anna Tzvetkova-Glaser. Ed. by Johan C. Thom. Tübingen 2014. = SAPERE
XXIII, pp. 169–180. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/17.
23 Cf. J. van Ess, Theologie III, pp. 38, 41 f. and 44 ff.
24 Cf. al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, p. 40, 12 ff. – H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam,
pp. 672 f. – J. van Ess, Theologie I, pp. 369 f.
25 Cf. Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, p. 42, 12 ff. / Engl. transl. W. Montgomery Watt, Free
Will and Predestination in Early Islam. London 1948, p. 116. – Cf. J. van Ess, Theologie I,
pp. 370 f.
26 Cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, pp. 403 f. – J. van Ess, Theologie III, pp. 378f.
determinant cause for its part is determined indirectly by God, namely via an
endless chain of causes, of maʿānī, of determinant factors.27
This solution, which reminds us of the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanations
as intermediary causes, appears to be a promising step in the direction of
the revolutionary thesis of John Philoponus in the 6th century AD. Based on
the Christian axiom, that God created the whole world, John Philoponus had
refused the heathen thesis of the immanence of gods in the world as well as
in the stars. He defended the doctrine of a transcendent God, who created the
universe from nothing28 and who thereupon leaves the universe to its imman-
ent laws.29
Here, in John Philoponus, we detect the first beginnings of a separation
between natural sciences and theology.30
This separation could not yet gain a foothold in Islam and was confined
primarily to the deprivation of stars and matter of their divinity. God remains
active in creation through nature. His activity exists indirectly and its final
effect has no more the identity of cause and effect in the Aristotelian sense.
God remains a transcendent creator of substances. Nature which is cre-
ated by God in these substances determines the causality of things coming
into being, the causality of “accidents”. Nature has become a causal principle,
related to the first, divine effective cause, Aristotle’s unmoved prime mover,
solely via an endless chain of determinant factors, the maʿānī.
Muʿammar’s doctrine reminds us of Ġazālī’s assumption of a series of inter- 7
mediate causes and their effects determined by God. This appears, as we have
seen, to be a refutation of the ancient Greek thesis of the eternity of matter, and
of astrologers who replaced the divine Creator by the influence of the stars.
Now, we must give some explanations on the concept of intermediary causes
mediating between the first cause, namely God, and the final effect: Ġazālī
adopted it in a very specific way, which – as I try to show – betrays his thorough
knowledge of Neoplatonic theology and its concept of causality. In the gener-
ation before Ġazālī, the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (384/994–456/1064) in
his critique of Kindīʾs metaphysics31 already had developed a doctrine, which
27 Cf. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, pp. 222ff. – H. Daiber, Muʿammar. In EI2 VIII 1993. = H.
Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III A/6. – J. van Ess, Theologie III, pp. 67ff.
28 Cf. on this and its afterlife in Islamic and Jewish thinkers H. A. Davidson, Proofs, pp. 86ff.
29 Cf. Walter Böhm, Johannes Philoponus, Grammatikos von Alexandrien (6. Jahrhundert
n. Chr.). Ausgewählte Schriften übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert. München/Pader-
born/Wien 1957, pp. 300 ff.
30 Cf. on this S. Sambursky, Physical World, pp. 154 ff.
31 His Risālat ar-Radd ʿalā l-Kindī al-faylasūf, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās in Ibn Ḥazm, ar-Radd
ʿalā Ibn an-Naghrīla al-Yahūdī wa-rasāʾil uḫrā. Cairo 1960, pp. 187–235. – Cf. the analysis
570 chapter 31
in some details anticipated Ġazālī’s explanation of causality and its Neopla-

tonic background. Ibn Ḥazm had criticized the philosopher Kindī from the 9th
century AD, who in his metaphysics, his al-Falsafa al-ūlā, is said to have been
inconsequent with regard to God’s transcendence. God cannot be called ʿilla
“cause”, as this is not compatible with the concept of God’s tawḥīd “unity”. Ibn
Ḥazm argues – in the footsteps of Proclus’ Institutio theologica or its Arabic
adaptation, the al-Ḫayr al-maḥḍ, known in the Middle Ages as Liber de causis –
that God acts through the mediation of causes, of “natures” whose “name” (ism)
and “state” (ḥāl) depend on the “decree” (taqdīr) of the “almighty and knowing”
(al-ʿazīz al-ʿalīm) God.32 God is not comparable with anything, neither with the
cause nor with the effect.33 Similar to Naẓẓām, God provided nature with some
coercion which necessitates the effect.34 Because of God’s willing and acting,
God’s will and action start to exist.35
Of course, Ibn Ḥazm could hardly have had any direct influence on Ġazālī.
More likely is the assumption, that both follow common Neoplatonic sources,
8 which we shall examine now as immediate background of Ġazālī’s | doctrine
of causality. Plotinus’ Enneads, at least the Arabic transmission, does not give
a clear picture of causality. The Arabic Plotinus, as Ibn Sīnā understood, con-
siders creation as something mediated by a series of intellects between the
necessary being and the sublunar world.36 Moreover, the Arabic Plotinus con-
tains an echo of Ennead VI 8 “On the Free Will and the Will of the One”,37 a
chapter which intends to explain the compatibility of God’s free will, the pure
cause and the necessity of His emanations, the caused things. John Michael
by H. Daiber, Kritik. – Here, we should be aware, that al-Kindī’s concept of Neopla-

tonic causality found some echo in Kindī’s text De radiis, which is lost in its Arabic ori-
ginal and which reminds us of Plotinus’ metaphor of the sun (s. below). – Cf. Pinella
Travaglia, Magic, Causality and Intentionality. The doctrine of rays in al-Kindī. Turnhout
1999, esp. pp. 20 ff. – Hans Daiber, Magie und Kausalität im Islam. In Die Geheimnisse
der oberen und der unteren Welt. Magie im Islam zwischen Glauben und Wissenschaft. Ed.
Sebastian Günther and Dorothee Pielow. Leiden/Boston 2019. = Islamic History
and Civilization 158 (pp. 155–177), pp. 167–169. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/32.
32 Cf. H. Daiber, Kritik, pp. 294 f.
33 Cf. H. Daiber, Kritik, p. 293 n. 109.
36 Cf. P. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, pp. 137ff. – A forerunner of Ibn Sīnā in his emphasis
of the divine intellect as creative first cause, based on Proclus and the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-
ḫayr, is Fārābī. – Cf. Damien Janos, The Greek and Arabic Proclus and al-Fārābī’s Theory
of Celestial Intellection and Its Relation to Creation. In Documenti e studi sulla tradizione
filosofica medievale 21, 2010, pp. 19–44.
37 See P. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, pp. 145 ff.
Rist in his monograph on Plotinus,38 in the chapter on “Emanation and Neces-

sity”,39 gave the following explanation: “Emanation is necessary because the
One wills it to be so”; “the products of the One, as well as the One itself, are
the products of will”.40 In the footsteps of Plato’s comparison of the Good
with the sun and with the light of the intelligible world, Plotinus41 explained
the emanation from the One with the light of the sun42 or the heat of the
fire.43 He might44 have been inspired by | the Stoic concept of the sun45 as 9
ἡγεμονικόν, as governing part, as the heat that permeates in a dynamic pro-
cess of interacting46 causes the organism of the cosmos. The Stoic Cleanthes
described it as τόνος, as strength-producing “tension”47 and the Stoic Chrysip-
pus as πνεῦμα.48 It reappears under Stoic influence in Alexander of Aphrodisias’
38 Cambridge 1967.
39 J. M. Rist, Plotinus, pp. 66–83.
40 J. M. Rist, Plotinus, p. 82.
41 Ennead V 1. 6. – Cf. the echo in the Arabic “Dicta sapientis graeci” I, translated by Geof-
frey Lewis in Plotini opera, II: Enneads IV–V, ediderunt Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf
Schwyzer. Paris/Bruxelles 1959, p. 275. – Regrettably, this Stoic-Neoplatonic tradition is
not taken into consideration in the monograph by Klaus Hedwig, Sphaera lucis. Studien
zur Intelligibilität des Seienden im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation. Mün-
ster 1980. = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. N.F. 18,
pp. 93 ff.
42 In Ennead IV 6 f. explained as ἐνέργεια of the shining. – Proclus took this up: Cf. L. Sior-
vanes, Proclus, pp. 241 ff.
43 Cf. J. M. Rist, Plotinus, p. 68.
44 According to the opinion of A. C. Lloyd, Anatomy, p. 99, Plotinian emanation does not
have a Stoic source but “takes over Aristotle’s model of physical causation, transposing it,
of course, to non-physical causation”. Different from Aristotle, the effect has a lower degree
than the cause: Cf. A. C. Lloyd, Anatomy, p. 100, and here the following discussion.
45 According to S. Sambursky, Physical World, p. 112, Plotinus’ discourse on light was “obvi-
ously” influenced by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander, De fato, is, moreover, our source
for the Stoic view on causality. Cause and effect presuppose the same circumstances, or –
as Ġazālī formulated – the same conditions. – On the Stoic postulate of causality, which
“comes remarkably near to our present notion of causality”, cf. Shmuel Sambursky,
Physics of the Stoics. Princeton 1959, pp. 54 f.
46 Cf., for example, the references in Johannes Hübner, “Ursache/Wirkung”. In HWPh 11,
2001 (col. 377–384), col. 379 f.
47 The term appears, by the way, in Proclus’ Institutio theologica, proposition 23, in the verb
ἀνατείνονται: The participated substances “are linked by an upward tension to existences
not participated”.
48 Cf. J. M. Rist, Plotinus, p. 70. – On the Stoic doctrines cf. David E. Halm, The Origins
of Stoic Cosmology. Ohio 1977, pp. 150 ff. – Maximilian Forschner, Die Philosophie der
Stoa. Logik, Physik und Ethik. Darmstadt 2018, pp. 117–122. – Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Göt-
tingen 41970, pp. 101 ff. – On the interaction between the parts of the cosmos, the συμπάθεια
in Posidonius, cf. M. Pohlenz, p. 217ff., and M. Forschner, p. 122. – Karl Reinhardt,
572 chapter 31
treatises On Providence and On the Principles of the Universe, which both were
translated into Arabic and which both with their assessment of the planets as
medium between the divine providence and the sublunar world contributed to
what has been called “astrologization of the Aristotelian cosmos”.49 The Stoic
immanence of the divine dynamic medium, the πνεῦμα, is replaced in Neo-
platonism by a concept of the divine One. This divine One as divine intellect
is both immanent and transcendent, and through subsequent causes creates
in a secondary causality or activity, and under the condition that there is no
hindrance,50 the multiplicity of things on an ontologically inferior level.51 The
difference of degree in unity led Proclus in his Institutio theologica to the more
10 systematized conclusion, that there is merely ὁμοιότης “similarity” | between
cause and effect, and that the effect is only an image of the cause.52 This
concept of causal similarity, which replaces the Aristotelian53 equality of cause
and effect in favour of an ontological hierarchy, reappears in Ibn Sīnā, who –
in addition to the Aristotelian concept of material and formal causality54 – dis-
tinguished three different modes of “existence” (wuǧūd) of cause and effect,
that is to say “priority” respectively “posteriority”, “self-sufficiency” respectively
“need”, “necessity” respectively “possibility”.55 Here, Ibn Sīnā appears to follow
Kosmos und Sympathie. Munich 1926; p. 254 n. 1 mentions a parallel with Stoic συμπάθεια
in Plotin, Ennead IV 1. 4, 32. – L. Siorvanes, Proclus, pp. 64f.
49 See Gad Freudenthal, The Medieval Astrologization of the Aristotelian Cosmos: From
Alexander of Aphrodisias to Averroes. In MUSJ 59, 2006, pp. 29–68, esp. pp. 37ff. – G.
Freudenthal refers to the Stoic background of Alexander and to echoes in Islamic
philosophy. We can add Ġazālī as an additional example of “astrologization of the cos-
mos”, here inspired by Neoplatonic sources.
50 Cf. A. C. Lloyd, Anatomy, pp. 100 f.
51 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, pp. 67 ff. – A. C. Lloyd, Anatomy, pp. 102ff.
52 On the details cf. the differentiating description in P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, pp. 92ff.,
esp. pp. 97 ff. – A. C. Lloyd, Anatomy, pp. 107 ff. – L. Siorvanes, Proclus, pp. 86ff.
53 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, pp. 33 ff.
54 Cf. Amos Bertolacci, The Doctrine of Material and Formal Causality in the “Ilāhiyyāt”
of Avicenna’s “Kitāb al-Šifāʾ”. In Quaestio 2, 2002, pp. 125–154. – On Ibn Sīnā’s echo in Mullā
Ṣadrā’s concept of causality cf. the remarks by Rüdiger Arnzen, The Structure of Mullā
Ṣadrā’s al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-ʿAqliyya al-arbaʿa and his Concepts of First
Philosophy and Divine Science. An essay. In Medioevo 32, 2007 (pp. 199–239), pp. 220f.,
and above all David B. Burrell, Mulla Sadra on “Substantial Motion”: A Clarification
and a Comparison with Thomas Aquinas. In Journal of Shiʿa Islamic Studies II/4, 2009
(pp. 369–386), pp. 379ff. D. B. Burrell correctly mentions as background the Neopla-
tonic emanation from the first cause, which can explain similarity and difference between
creator and creation.
55 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, pp. 161 ff. and 171ff. – On “causal self-sufficiency vs.
causal productivity” in Ibn Sīnā cf. Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Con-
text. Ithaca/New York 2003, pp. 181 ff. – On Ibn Sīnā’s concept of the two modes of exist-
Proclus’ Institutio theologica, which explains in proposition 5 the posteriority

of the manifold to the One; in proposition 7 the superiority of the product-
ive cause to the product; in proposition 956 the self-sufficiency, which is “in
some way akin to the One, the Good”, which however Proclus considers to be
inferior to the “unqualified Good”; proposition 77 ff. describes the dependence
of potentiality and of its proceeding to actuality on the superior perfect and
infinite potency. In addition, Proclus assumes different grades of reality (prop.
14ff. and 25ff.), and accordingly a gradation of causes and their potency (prop.
56ff.) according to their remoteness | from the first, the primal cause.57 In addi- 11
tion, all things participate in the unparticipated Being, Life and Intelligence
(prop. 101).
A comparison with Ġazālī immediately shows common features, which urge
us to reflect Ġazālī’s causality against the background of Neoplatonic concepts.
We start with Ġazālī’s concept of God as it is described in his al-Maqṣad al-
asnā fī šarḥ maʿānī asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā: Besides the Koranic-Ashʿarite divine
attributes, sometimes shaped by Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics,58 we find the follow-
ing description of God: God is “an existent necessarily existing in Himself”
(al-mawǧūd al-wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihī)59 and has “no need for a cause or an
agent” (istiġnāʾ ʿan-i-l-ʿilla wa-l-fāʿil);60 He is the “cause of causes” (musabbib
al-asbāb), which is “above the effect” ( fawqa l-musabbab);61 there is a “differ-
ence” (tafāwut) between “cause and effect” (al-ʿilla wa-l-maʿlūl), “perfect and
imperfect” (al-kāmil wa-n-nāqiṣ).62 God’s “decree and predestination” (qaḍāʾ
wa-qadar) and His “will” (mašīʾa, murāduhū) are explained as His “ruling”
ence, the possible and the necessary, in their application to the proof of God’s existence
from contingence cf. Michael E. Marmura, Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for
God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ. In Medieval Studies 42, 1980, pp. 337–352.
56 Cf. also propositions 40 ff. the discussion of the “self-constituted” and the Arabic Liber de
causis, proposition 20, ed. and transl. R. C. Taylor, The Liber de causis, p. 317 (transl.). – On
“self-sufficiency” in Proclus cf. L. Siorvanes, Proclus, pp. 82ff. – L. Siorvanes discusses,
in addition, the hierarchy of cause and effect, pp. 86ff. (causes are greater than effects),
pp. 92 ff. (causes are prior to effects).
57 Cf. also the Arabic Liber de causis, ed. and Engl. transl. R. C. Taylor, propositions 1 and 19.
58 Cf. Ġazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād. Ed. Agah Çubukçu and Hüseyin Atay. Ankara 1962,
p. 79, 10 ff. – ʿAbdu-r-Raḥmān Abū Zayd, al-Ghazali on Divine Predicates and their Prop-
erties. Lahore 1970 (repr. 1974), introduction, pp. VII ff.
59 Ġazālī, al-Maqṣad al-asnā, ed. F. Shehadi, p. 47, 12 / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N.
Daher, p. 35.
60 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 50, 7 / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 38.
61 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 116, 11 ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 103.
62 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 115, 19ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 102. – Cf. ed. F.
Shehadi, p. 158, 16 ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 146.
574 chapter 31
(taqdīr), His “arranging the causes” (tartīb al-asbāb), His “setting up universal
causes” (waḍʿ al-asbāb al-kulliyya) and His application of them to their effects,
“the movement of the sun, moon, and stars flowing out to effect events on
earth”.63 The effects, what “enters into existence enters into it by necessity, will
be necessary by the eternal decree which is irresistible”.64 “Things depend on
one another, while everything depends on the power (qudra) of God”.65 God
“creates the action and the place, to receive it, the conditions pertaining to its
12 reception” (ḫāliq al-fiʿl wa-ḫāliq al-maḥall al-qābil wa-ḫāliq | šarāʾiṭ qubūlihī).66
In his Miškāt al-anwār Ġazālī concentrates on the Koranic equation of God
with the light in Sura 24:35 and correlates it with the Plotinian equation of the
divine cause with the light of the sun. He assumes a hierarchy of lights between
the heavenly lights and earthly lights and the existence of angels as mediators
between the “Lordly Presence” (ḥaḍrat ar-rubūbiyya) and the light on earth.67
The given examples sufficiently prove the Neoplatonic background of
Ġazālī’s doctrine of attributes with regard to his description of God as cause
and with regard to his concept of causality as a descending chain of causes.
The gradation of causes within a cosmology inspired by Neoplatonism and the
63 Ed. F. Shehadi, pp. 98 ff., esp. p. 101 / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, pp. 86ff.,
esp. p. 89. – Cf. ed. F. Shehadi, p. 101, 11 ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher,
p. 89. – Cf. also R. M. Frank, Creation, pp. 16 ff.
64 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 103, 4 ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 90. – Cf. also
Ġazālī, Maqāṣid al-falāsifa II (Fī l-ilāhiyāt). Cairo 1936, p. 64, 10ff.
65 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 124, 14 f. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 111.
66 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 125, 9 f. / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 111. – The
term “condition” in the context of causality (cf. also F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosoph-
ical Theology, pp. 222ff. and 231ff.) might be inspired by Ibn Sīnā: Cf. his Dāniš-nāma-ī
ʿAlāʾī, translated by Parviz Morewedge, The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). A crit-
ical translation, commentary and analysis of the fundamental arguments in Avicenna’s
Metaphysica in the Dāniš-nāma-ī ʿAlāʾī (The Book of Scientific Knowledge). London 1973,
pp. 43 ff., 83 ff. and 90 ff. – In the generation after Ġazālī we find in Muʿtazilite circles some
reflexions on causation under the condition that no hindrance prevents this. The context
is an occasionalistic view of God and not natural philosophy: Cf. Jan Thiele, Kausalität
in der muʿtazilitischen Kosmologie. Das Kitāb al-Muʾaṯṯirāt wa-miftāḥ al-muškilāt des Zay-
diten al-Ḥasan ar-Raṣṣāṣ (d. 584/1188). Leiden/Boston 2011. = IPTS 84, index p. 151, šarṭ.
67 See Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights. A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced,
and annotated by David Buchman. Provo, Utah 1998, pp. 10 and 13f. – On the Neopla-
tonic background of Ġazālīʾs symbolism of light cf. H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies,
pp. 264ff. – The Neoplatonic background is not taken into account in F. Griffel, al-
Ghazālīʾs Philosophical Theology, pp. 245 ff. – Contrary to F. Griffel, pp. 260ff., it seems
to me quite possible, that Ġazālī – although or because he was a critic of the Ismailites – in
his Miškāt followed some Ismailite adaptations of Neoplatonic cosmology: Cf. Hermann
Landolt, Ghazālī and “Religionswissenschaft”. In Asiatische Studien 45/1, Bern (etc.) 1991,
pp. 19–72, and the publications mentioned by Frank Griffel.
Sufism of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī68 led Ġazālī to the assumption, that | God does 13
not only create the subsequent causes through the intermediary causes includ-
ing angels and using the metaphor of the light of the sun. God also creates the
conditions69 and “He puts all the existing causes at the service of man’s power”
(hayyaʾa lahū ǧamīʿ asbāb al-wuǧūd li-maqdūrihī).70
Now, we shall enter into the details of Ġazālī’s concept of causality and
extract those key terms whose previous history and echo in Ġazālī’s theology
as described throw new light on Ġazālī’s thought. The starting point for Ġazālī
is his concept of God as the determining factor contrary to the Aristotelian-
Avicennian thesis of the eternity and perpetuity of the world. God created
the world from nothing.71 Consequently, as Ġazālī criticizes in the 16th ques-
tion of his Tahāfut al-falāsifa,72 the Neoplatonic-Avicennian reduction of the
movements of the heavens and the effects of nature to “separate intelligences”
through the mediation of celestial causes ascribes a determining power to
things – and not to God. Ġazālī here criticizes the conclusion, that every effect
68 On the Sufism of Ġazālī cf. here H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, pp. 503ff. – Kojiro Naka-
mura, Imām Ghazālī’s cosmology reconsidered with special reference to the concept of
jabarūt. In Studia Islamica 80, 1994, pp. 29–46. – Kojiro Nakamura, Al-Ghazali, Abu
Hamid. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy IV, London/New York 1998 (pp. 61–68),
p. 66. – The Neoplatonism of Ġazālī’s cosmology is doubted by F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s
Philosophical Theology, p. 283. – Cf., however, Ġazālī’s ar-Risāla al-laduniyya, translated
by Che Zarrina Saʾari, Al-Ghazālī and Intuition. An Analysis, Translation and Text of
al-Risāla al-Laduniyya. Kuala Lumpur 2007, introduction ch. 3 (cosmology). – The Neo-
platonic background of Ġazālī’s cosmology is confirmed by his Maḍnūn corpus, on which
cf. M. Afifi al-Akiti, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Falsafa: Al-Ghazālī’s Maḍ-
nūn, Tahāfut, and Maqāṣid, with Particular Attention to their Falsafī Treatments of God’s
Knowledge of Temporal Events. In Avicenna and His Legacy. A Golden Age of Science and
Philosophy. Ed. by Y. Tzvi Langermann. Turnhout 2009, pp. 51–100, the table of contents
on pp. 96 ff., esp. pp. 97 and 98 f. – Here, I refer to the facsimile edition of the text (with the
title al-Masāʾil al-maḍnūn bihā ʿan ġayr ahlihā) by N. Pourjavady, Majmūʿah-ye Falsafī-
e Marāghah, the chapter on celestial bodies, p. 72, 17ff. = medieval Hebrew translation ed.
and transl. by H. Malter, Abhandlung, pp. 20 ff. – On the Hebrew text cf. Y. Tzvi Langer-
mann, The “Hebrew Ajwiba” Ascribed to al-Ghazālī: Corpus, Conspectus and Context. In
MW 101/4, 2011, pp. 680–697.
69 Cf. also al-Maḍnūn, facsimile edition by N. Pourjavady (s. n. 68), p. 73, 2ff. / medieval
Hebrew translation, German version by H. Malter, pp. 21f.
70 Ed. F. Shehadi, p. 145, 11 / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher, p. 132. – On the
Ashʿarite doctrine of God’s determining power and man’s free will to meet his duties cf. D.
Gimaret, La doctrine, pp. 441 ff.
71 See Ġazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 12ff., esp. pp. 31ff. –
Cf. the analysis of Michael E. Marmura, The Conflict over the World’s Pre-eternity in the
Tahāfuts of Al-Ghazāli and Ibn Rushd. Thesis Michigan 1959, pp. 39ff.
72 Ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 156 ff.
576 chapter 31
is, via a series of intermediary causes, ultimately caused by the “eternal heav-
14 enly movement”.73 According to Ġazālī, then, God is | denied as the determining
factor and is replaced by the causality of nature, the laws of generation and
corruption, which is ultimately determined by the movement of the heavenly
bodies and the volition of the “celestial souls”.74 There would be no place for
divine miracles.75
Here, the notion of necessity implied in this kind of causality76 is criticized
by Ġazālī as something purely based on the observation, that the effect “occurs
with the cause, but not (necessarily) by it” (ʿindahū lā bihī).77 Although, act-
ing factors of nature (e.g. fire) might possess specific qualities which lead to
identical effects, it might happen, for example, that through the intervention
of God’s Will, of a free and omnipotent Agent78 or His angels fire does not lead
73 Cf. Ġazālī, Tahāfut, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 157ff. – F. Griffel, Ghazālī’s Philo-
sophical Theology, pp. 147 ff. – Ġazālī refers to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine as e.g. described in his
Kitāb an-Naǧāt, ed. M. Fakhry, pp. 175ff. – On Ibn Sīnā’s Neoplatonic doctrine of eman-
ation cf. Louis Gardet, La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne. Paris 1951, pp. 45ff. – Osman E.
Chahine, Ontologie et théologie chez Avicenne. Paris 1962, pp. 121ff. – Mohammed Noor
Nabi, Theory of Emanation in the Philosophical System of Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā. In IC 56,
1982, pp. 233–238. – Jules L. Janssens, Avicenna: tussen neoplatonisme en Islam. Thesis
Leuven 1984, I, pp. 75ff. – Jules L. Janssens, Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sīnā. In
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 8, 1997, pp. 455–477 / Reprint in J.
L. Janssens, Ibn Sīnā and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World. Aldershot/Hamp-
shire 2006. = Variorum Collected Studies Series IV. – Olga Lizzini, Fluxus ( fayḍ). Indagine
sui fondamenti della metafisica e della fisica di Avicenna. Bari 2011, pp. 553f., with some
remarks on the terminology of “emanation” in Ġazālī. – Damien Janos, Moving the Orbs:
Astronomy, Physics, and Metaphysics, and the Problem of Celestial Motion According to
Ibn Sīnā. In ASP 21, 2011, pp. 165–214, not convincingly doubts the influence of Fārābī’s
Neoplatonic theory of ten separate intellects, although he acknowledges the adoption of
the common source of both philosophers, namely, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Principles of
the Cosmos, the Mabādiʾ al-kull (s. D. Janos, p. 179 n. 42). Moreover, the Neoplatonic tra-
dition of Ibn Sīnā is mirrored in the terminology of “emanation” (s. D. Janos, pp. 207ff.).
Because “emanation” is, according to our explanation, in Neoplatonism a dynamic pro-
cess, and it deserves more attention also in connection with Ibn Sīnā’s celestial kinematics.
74 Cf. M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, pp. 58 ff.
75 Cf. Ġazālī, Tahāfut, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 168f.
76 Cf. also Blake D. Dutton, Al-Ghazālī on Possibility and the Critique of Causality. In
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10, 2001, pp. 23–46.
77 Ġazālī, Tahāfut, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 171. – Cf. M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasion-
alism, pp. 61 and 63f. – H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 543ff. – Michael E.
Marmura, Ghazali and Demonstrative Science. In Journal of the History of Philosophy 3,
1965, pp. 183–204.
78 Ġazālī, Tahāfut, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 77, 15ff. – Cf. M. Fakhry, Islamic Occa-
sionalism, p. 66. – On the Ashʿarite equation of God’s will and acting s. D. Gimaret, La
doctrine, ch. IV ff.
to combustion.79 Causes are mere conditions of the conditioned and do not

necessarily imply any effect relatable to it. As in Ashʿarite theology80 God is the
sole agent with unlimited activity.
Ġazālī’s assumption of God as sole agent and real cause does not exclude 15
Ġazālī’s critique of necessitarianism, of the necessary causal connection be-
tween cause and effect. As has already been shown by Michael E. Mar-
mura,81 Ġazālī’s critique has a background in the writing of the Ashʿarite Bāqil-
lānī (d. 403/1013). Bāqillānī’s theology already found some echo in Ibn Sīnā who,
however, did not abandon his concept of necessitarianism.
Ġazālī has modified the Ashʿarite concept of God’s all determining will,
which, according to the Ashʿarites, is God’s act82 that does not proceed from
God’s essence. In contrast to the Ashʿarites, who denied natural causes and
kept to the doctrine that God is the only real cause,83 and in contrast to Ibn
Sīnā, Ġazālī combined the necessity of God’s causing the effects84 with the
non-necessity (contingency) of natural causality: He introduced his differenti-
ating doctrine of causality. He assumes intermediary causes between the divine
first cause, its “primary planning” (at-tadbīr al-awwal) and “ruling” (al-ḥukm)
and the final effects and ascribes to God’s “decree” (qaḍāʾ) and “predestina-
tion” (qadar)85 the arrangement and application of causes to their “numbered
and defined effects” (musabbabātuhā al-maʿdūda al-maḥdūda) “according to
a determined measure which neither increases nor decreases”. The causes are
described as “universal, primary, fixed and stable causes (asbāb), which remain
and do not change, like the earth, the seven heavens, the stars and celestial
bodies, with their harmonious and constant movements, which neither change
nor end”.86
79 Cf. Ġazālī, Tahāfut 17th discussion, ed. and transl. M. E. Marmura, pp. 170ff. – Cf. M.
Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, p. 69.
80 Cf. F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, pp. 126ff.
81 Cf. Michael E. Marmura, The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina).
In Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani. Ed. by Michael
E. Marmura. New York 1984 (pp. 172–187), pp. 183 ff.
82 Cf. Ašʿarī, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ. Ed. Richard Joseph McCarthy, The Theology of Al-Ashʿarī.
Beyrouth 1953, pp. 24 ff. (§§ 49 ff.) / Engl. transl., pp. 33ff. – Cf. above n. 76.
83 Cf. Richard M. Frank, The Structure of Created Causality according to Al-Ašʿarī. An
Analysis of the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, §§ 82–164. In Studia Islamica 25, 1966, pp. 13–75.
84 Cf. R. M. Frank, Creation, pp. 63 ff.
85 Cf. R. M. Frank, Creation, pp. 47 ff.: “God’s “Determination” of what must be”.
86 Cf. al-Maqṣad al-asnā, ed. F. Shehadi, p. 98, 7 ff., esp. p. 98, 10ff. / Engl. transl. D. B. Bur-
rell and N. Daher, p. 86. – The text is quoted in Ġazālī’s Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl ad-dīn
(Cairo, undated), p. 13, 6 ff. – On the interpretation of the text cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-
Ghazālī’s Theory, pp. 80–84. – F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, pp. 242ff. –
578 chapter 31
16 This description of the causes clearly shows traces of the Aristotelian87 and
Avicennian88 doctrine of eternal moving celestial spheres and their unmoved
prime mover. Ġazālī illustrates it with a water clock, in which a hollow vessel
swims on water in a hollow cylinder with a small hole in its bottom. If the water
flows out of this hole little by little, the hollow vessel swimming on it sinks and
draws through the string connected with it a ball in such a manner that the ball
falls after every hour into a bowl and tinkles.89
The analogy of the water clock exemplifies the interaction of divine and
natural causality leading to one and the same effect. This cooperation, which
reminds us of a similar explanation of causality in Thomas Aquinas,90 presup-
poses a chain of causes between the divine first cause and the effect of causes
which derive from God’s action, from His spontaneous will and from the nature
of the intermediary causes, the necessity of their essence.
In connection with this theory of intermediary causes between God and
the final effect, Ġazālī explicitly warns of the assumption that a thing does not
17 come into being through God’s power.91 Here, he gives the explanation, that |
On God’s creation of the secondary causes in Ġazālī cf. R. M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī, pp. 36ff. –
On celestial causes in Ġazālī cf. R. M. Frank, Creation, pp. 38ff.
87 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII 8.
88 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb an-Naǧāt, ed. M. Fakhry, p. 300, 15ff.
89 al-Maqṣad al-asnā, ed. F. Shehadi, p. 99 / Engl. transl. D. B. Burrell and N. Daher,
pp. 86 f. = Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn (s. n. 86), pp. 14 f. – Cf. F. Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical
Theology, pp. 236ff. – This type of water clock is described in Eilhard Wiedemann,
Aufsätze zur arabischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Ed. Wolfdietrich Fischer. I. Hildes-
heim/New York 1970, p. 366. – Cf. E. Wiedemann, Gesammelte Schriften zur arabisch-
islamischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Gesammelt, bearbeitet und mit Indices versehen v.
Dorothea Girke und Dieter Bischoff. III. Frankfurt a.M. 1984. = Veröffentlichungen
des Institutes für Geschichte der Arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften. Ed. by Fuat Sezgin.
B, 1/3, pp. 1234f.
90 Summa contra gentiles, ch. 70, 3rd book. – Cf. M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, pp. 148ff.
91 Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ, ed. ʿA. A. al-Ḫālidī IV, p. 334, 1 ff. / German transl. H. Wehr, Al-Ġazzālī’s
Buch vom Gottvertrauen, p. 31. – Cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-Ghazālī’s Theory, pp. 89f. – On
the concept of causality in the Iḥyāʾ cf. F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology,
pp. 215 ff. – For this reason, Ġazālī cannot be interpreted as maintaining that beings, unlike
God, have real causal efficacy – a thesis which is elaborated by R. M. Frank, Creation, and
which with good reason is criticized by Michael E. Marmura, Ghazālian Causes and
Intermediaries. In JAOS 115, 1995, pp. 89–100. – Here, in the accentuation of God as being
the real cause acting through intermediaries, Ġazālī appears to be an Ashʿarite and not a
philosopher following Ibn Sīnā. This observation does of course not exclude the amalgam-
ation of Avicennian rudiments, e.g., the Aristotelian-Avicennian notion of God as prime
mover. – On the problem of classifying Ġazālī as Ashʿarite cf. Kojiro Nakamura, Was
Ghazālī an Ashʿarite? In Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 51, Tokyo
1993, pp. 1–24. – F. Griffel, al-Ghazālīʾs Philosophical Theology, pp. 284f.
each one of the intermediary causes derives from the other “in the same way
as a conditioned thing (mašrūṭ) derives from another condition”.92 At the same
time, God’s power remains present in the things. This is exemplified by Ġazālī
with the example of an impure person submerged up to his neck in water: His
impurity will only be removed under the condition, that he also washes his
face. God’s eternal power surrounds the determined things in the same way as
the water surrounds a man’s body.93 His power is actualized under the condi-
tion, that the man also washes his face; but the real cause remains God’s eternal
power which is actualized under certain conditions. The series of causes or
conditions constitute a rule or law, called sunna or ʿāda.94 This rule or law, the
connection of effects with conditioning causes, which through God’s power can
be violated in the case of miracles,95 reveals God’s wisdom.96
The same rule or law of the connection of divine and secondary causality is
also valid for the action of man and his free will. Ġazālī modifies the | Ashʿarite 18
doctrine and develops a differentiating view,97 in which three kinds of man’s
92 Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ, ed. ʿA. A. al-Ḫālidī IV, p. 334, 9 / German transl. H. Wehr, Al-Ġazzālī’s Buch
vom Gottvertrauen, p. 31. – The translation by H. Wehr and B. Abrahamov, Al-Ghazālī’s
Theory, p. 90, “some of the determined things … derive from others” is misleading; this has
seduced B. Abrahamov to the assumption that “Al-Ghazālī contradicts himself. Above
he says, that some determined things derive from others, whereas here he says that all
that happens in the world comes about through a necessary derivation”. The Arabic word
baʿḍ here does not mean “some”, but rather “one”, “the other”. Consequently, the following
discussion by B. Abrahamov, pp. 90 f. is superfluous.
93 Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ, ed. ʿA. A. al-Ḫālidī IV, p. 334, 23ff. / German transl. H. Wehr, Al-Ġazzālī’s
Buch vom Gottvertrauen, pp. 32 f. – Cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-Ghazālī’s Theory, pp. 91f.
94 This is clarified by H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 544f. – On Ibn Rušd’s
critique cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 551ff. – Contrary to B. Abra-
hamov’s claim (Al-Ghazālī’s Theory, p. 95), there is no difference between sunna (as used
in Ġazālī’s Iḥyāʾ) and ʿāda (as used in Ġazālī’s Tahāfut). This is confirmed by Ġazālī’s state-
ment, that miracles occur through God’s power ( fī maqdūrāt Allāh): s. Ġazālī, Tahāfut, ed.
and transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 176, 1 ff. If “in the habitual course of nature” (bi-ḥukm al-
ʿāda) e.g. the change of earth and other elements into a plant does not occur as usual
over a long space of time, but “in a time shorter than has been known” (Tahāfut, ed.
and transl. M. E. Marmura, p. 176, 4 ff.). – On Ġazālī’s concept of miracles cf. Barry S.
Kogan, The Philosophers Al-Ġazālī and Averroes on Necessary Connection and the Prob-
lem of the Miraculous. In Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism. Ed. Parviz Morewedge.
New York 1981, pp. 113–132; Edward H. Madden, Averroes and the Case of the Fiery Fur-
nace, ib., pp. 133–150; Jalāl al-Ḥaqq, Al-Ghazālī on Causality, Induction, and Miracles.
In Al-Tawḥīd III/3, Tehran 1986, pp. 55–62; R. M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī, pp. 20f.
95 S. n. 94.
96 Cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-Ghazālī’s Theory, pp. 80 and 95.
97 For more details cf. R. M. Frank, al-Ghazālī, pp. 42 ff. – F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosoph-
ical Theology, pp. 217 ff.
580 chapter 31
actions are distinguished:98 1) “Action according to his nature” ( fiʿl ṭabīʿī), e.g.
when someone stands on water, he submerges. 2) “Action based on” his instinct,
“his volition” ( fiʿl irādī), e.g. when someone breathes. 3) “Action based on his
choice” ( fiʿl iḫtiyārī), e.g. writing.
The kinds of action mentioned remain exposed to necessity, compulsion,
i.e. the rule or law imposed by God. Like every effect, the kinds of man’s action
mentioned are also the result of conditioning causes. The submerging in water
is conditioned by man’s weight, the motion of the throat for breathing is con-
ditioned by man’s instinct, the volitional action and man’s choice or motiva-
tion are conditioned by his judgement and knowledge. Finally, man’s motiva-
tion, his motives, which with good reason have been compared with Naẓzām’s
“inspirative force” (ḫāṭir),99 are the condition of man’s “power” (qudra) to act.
All the mentioned conditions of man’s action are ultimately conditioned by the
existence of man as living being, by his life.
Ġazālī’s doctrine of man’s will and action follows the same scheme of con-
ditioning causes and conditioned effects. Even man’s choice is compulsory and
ultimately determined by God, insofar as it is conditioned by his life, his know-
ledge of the necessity of causal connections as repeated connection of two
events100 and his creation by God.101
My short description so far has revealed the following elements as corner-
stones of Ġazālī’s doctrine of causality:
– God as the all determining cause.
– Nature implanted by God in the substances, God’s creatures. It is the rule
of things or their law, according to which a chain of causes leads to effects
which appear to be conditioned by a series of causes conditioning one
19 another. |
– Man’s choice and action as a result of conditioning power and cognition.
– The establishment of primary and unchangeable causes, namely the
earth, the seven heavens, the stars, the celestial sphere and their propor-
tional perpetual motions, which are created by God’s “decree” (qaḍāʾ) and
98 Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ, ed. ʿA. A. al-Ḫālidī IV, p. 332, 5 ff. / German transl. H. Wehr, Al-Ġazzālī’s
Buch vom Gottvertrauen, pp. 27 f. – Cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-Ġazālī’s Theory, pp. 86f.
99 H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 624–644 (“The Ḥāṭirāni in the Kalam and
Ghazālī as Inner Motive Powers of Human Actions”), esp. pp. 639ff.
100 Cf. F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, pp. 162ff., 175ff. and 211ff.
101 Cf. B. Abrahamov, Al-Ghazālī’s Theory, pp. 88–90. – Thérèse-Anne Druart, Al-
Ghazālī’s concept of the Agent in the Tahāfut and in the Iqtiṣād: Are people really agents?
In Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration
of Richard M. Frank. Ed. by James E. Montgomery. Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA 2006. =
Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 152, pp. 425–440.
which through their proportioned and measured motions were directed by

God to their final effects.102
This explanation forms the basis of Ġazālī’s doctrine of causality: Ġazālī uses
the terms ṭabīʿī, sunna or ʿāda103 to describe causality, and he specifies this by
introducing a series of conditioning causes between God and the final effect:
A cause becomes a condition for the caused, the conditioned, the effect. This
doctrine continues preceding discussions by Hišām Ibn al-Ḥakam, Naẓẓām and
Muʿammar in the spirit of Neoplatonic emanationism. According to Ġazālī,
God’s ruling power remains present in the hierarchy of intermediate causes
between God and the final effect. God determines whether a cause becomes
a condition for the effect or not, and God determines whether the chain of
causes can be shortened and thus can lead to a miracle.104 Even man’s choice
and action are subjected to God’s power, which determines their conditions,
namely, man’s cognition and capacity.
Ġazālī’s statement about the cognition of man as a condition of his choice
preceding his action implies the assumption, that man’s action causes some-
thing if the conditions do not prevent it. Moreover, it implies the assumption,
that man can recognize causalities, effects following their causes, if the con-
ditions are fulfilled and if there is no hindrance. This reminds us of modern
discussions in the 20th century: A monograph on causality, published in 1957
by the German philosopher Johannes Erich Heyde, declares, that causality
means “the being condition for change”.105 It is not dependent on “regularity”
or “necessity”.106 Moreover, he explains, that man perceives and reflects caus-
ality as he perceives himself, his will and acting as “causes” of changes which
he desires.107 Contrary to the “positivists”, this reflection on causality, on the
relation | between cause and effect, forms the basis for a true understanding of 20
“reality” (“Wirklichkeit”).108
Ġazālī has contributed to this reflection on causality, not only in classical
Islam109 and in European philosophy110. He continues to contribute to this
102 Cf. n. 86.

103 Cf. nn. 94 and 98.
104 Cf. nn. 75 and 95.
105 J. E. Heyde, Entwertung, p. 132: “bei ʿKausalitätʾ handelt es sich … um das ‘Bedingung sein
für Veränderung’ selbst”.
106 J. E. Heyde, Entwertung, pp. 133 ff.
107 J. E. Heyde, Entwertung, p. 145.
108 J. E. Heyde, Entwertung, p. 146.
109 Ġazālī was criticized by Ibn Rušd in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, whose Latin translation was
available since the 14th century AD: s. H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, p. 134 and cf. p. 179.
110 Cf. nn. 5 and 6.
582 chapter 31
reflection in our age. Our short description of the background of Ġazālī’s doc-
trine of causality reveals the correlation of Islam and rationalism. It confirms,
that religion as stimulus of science was shaping the history of sciences in Islam
in a specific manner. This contradicts the statement by Ǧamāl ad-Dīn al-Afġānī:
In his reaction on Ernest Renan’s paper, delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris on
29 March 1884 about the hostility of Islam to science, Afġānī described Islamic
religion merely as a moral force and as an inspirer of human phantasy, which
enabled the Muslims to contribute to science.111
Islam, however, was not only a moral force and not only an inspirer of human
phantasy. We have seen, that the comparison of the “atheistic” replacement
of God by matter as the only causality with Ġazālī’s doctrine of causality has
shown us the real starting point of Ġazālī’s doctrine. He formulated it in the
context of contemporary Ashʿarite theology, maintaining a critical attitude
towards Ibn Sīnā’s mainly Aristotle-orientated philosophy. Finally, Ġazālī’s doc-
trine must be understood as a development within the framework of a theo-
cratic religion and as a result of discussions in agnostic and Muʿtazilite circles
before Ġazālī, moreover, as a reaction on Neoplatonic ideas circulating since
the philosopher Kindī in the 9th century AD. Ġazālī’s concept of a dynamic
causality, whose first cause, because of its descending chain of intermediary
causes, is only similar to and not identical with the final effect, gives an ori-
ginal answer to the problem of the necessity of created beings, as discussed
since Ashʿarī: According to Ibn Sīnā,112 they are necessarily existing with respect
21 to their cause; according to Ġazālī, | divine determinism appears to be restric-
ted to the “best of all possible worlds”.113 The intermediary causes save God’s
transcendence from the involvement in the visible world, the final effect and
their conditions. Nevertheless, God appears to be an all permeating power,
a causal energy or δύναμις which is not identical with its effect.114 This has
111 See H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, ch. 1. – Hans Daiber, Science and Technology versus
Islam. A Controversy from Renan and Afghānī to Nasr and Needham and its Histor-
ical Background. In Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 8, 1993, pp. 169–
187. Also in Journal of the History of Arabic Science 10/1–2, Aleppo 1992–1994, pp. 119–
153.
112 Cf. F. Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, pp. 141ff.
113 Cf. Eric M. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought. The Dispute over al-Ghazālī’s “Best of
all Possible Worlds”. Princeton 1984. – Cf. F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology,
pp. 225 ff.
114 After completing the article, I found that Eduard von Hartmann intuitively came to
a similar conclusion in his Geschichte der Metaphysik from the year 1899, vol. I. Leipzig
/ Repr. Darmstadt 1969, p. 222: “Eine Notwendigkeit der Verknüpfung zwischen Ursache
und Wirkung, zwischen einem Dinge und einem anderen soll schlechthin ausgeschlossen
sein … Diese ganze Auffassung der Kausalität weist auf die Plotinische eines organischen
been misunderstood among scholars as criticism of causality by Ġazālī. In

fact, Ġazālī’s concept of a hierarchical chain of causes ending in the first, the
divine, transcendent cause can already be found in Ibn Sīnā and before him
in Kindī,115 in Fārābī116 and to some extent in the early Muʿtazilite Muʿammar
Ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulamī.117 It is a consequent conclusion from Neoplatonic eman-
ationism and its doctrine of cause and effect. In contrast to Ibn Sīnā and after
him to Mullā Ṣadrā, who both emphasized the transcendence of God who
can only be known in an “ambiguous manner” (bi-t-taškīk),118 Ġazālī kept to
the Ashʿarite theology of divine attributes, modified by Neoplatonic concepts,
and added a concept of causality, which is dual causality, a combination of
divine dynamism and causal conditions, divine cause and secondary causal-
ity.119 As in Neoplatonism, every effect results from a concurrence (Proclus: συν-
δρομή) of several contributing causes, which in Neoplatonism act on a | suitable 22
entity at the appropriate time and the allotted place.120 For this reason, Ġazālī
could combine contingent causality and occasionalism.121 He was no scepti-
Zusammenhanges lebendiger Kräfte zurück im Gegensatz zu dem unlebendigen Mecha-

nismus einer rein passiven Gesetzmäßigkeit”.
115 S. nn. 31 ff.
116 Cf. F. Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, pp. 136ff.
117 S. nn. 27 ff.
118 Cf. Hans Daiber, The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sīnā. Epistemological
and theological aspects and the consequences. In Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft. Probleme
der Epistemologie in der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann,
Alexander Fidora and Pia Antolic. Berlin 2004, pp. 25–34. = H. Daiber, From the
119 Regarding the echoes of this double-agency in creation, the reader is referred to the stimu-
lating collection of articles in Creation and the God of Abraham. Ed. by David B. Burrell,
Carlo Cogliati, Janet M. Soskice and William R. Stoeger. Cambridge 2010, esp.
the contributions by David B. Burrell (pp. 40–52), Rahim Acar (pp. 77–90: “Creation:
Avicenna’s metaphysical account”), Ibrahim Kalin (pp. 107–132: “Will, necessity and
creation as monistic theophany in the Islamic philosophical tradition”; also in Ishraq.
Islamic philosophy yearbook 1, Moscow 2010, pp. 345–367), Simon Oliver (pp. 133–151),
and James R. Pambrun (pp. 192–220: “Creatio ex nihilo and dual causality”).
120 Cf. L. Siorvanes, Proclus, pp. 129 ff.
121 On Ġazālī’s combination of causality and occasionalism cf. Michael E. Marmura, al-
Ghazālī. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Ed. by Peter Adamson and
Richard Charles Taylor. Cambridge 2005 (pp. 137–154), pp. 145ff. – Jon McGinnis,
Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghazālī. In Arabic Theology, Arabic
Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank. Ed.
by James E. Montgomery. Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA 2006. = Orientalia Lovaniensia
Analecta 152, pp. 441–463. – Frank Griffel, al-Ghazali. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo-
sophy (2007), ch. 7.4: “The Cum-possibility of Occasionalism and Secondary Causality”. All
explanations suffer from the neglect of the Stoic-Neoplatonic doctrine of causality.
584 chapter 31
cist.122 His concept of causality reveals several aspects which are alluded to in
medieval and modern theories. We can mention the modern debates about
the criteria of causal relatedness, about necessary and sufficient conditions of
causality, about probability and regularity, and about causality as a transfer of
energy.123
This actuality of Ġazālī’s reflections cannot hide the fact, that Ġazālī devel-
oped his concept of causality against a religious background and in the con-
text of Ashʿarite theology. God is the first cause. God’s creation, however, can
produce causalities on its own, and has conditioned effects. This is possible,
because God remains transcendent and at the same time He is present every-
where, comparable to the ubiquity of the sun’s rays and their all-pervading
energy.
Bibliography
Frequently quoted publications
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1988, pp. 75–98.
Adamson, Peter: The Arabic Plotinus. A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aris-
totle. London 2002.
Ašʿarī, al-: Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn wa-ḫtilāf al-muṣallīn. Ed. Hellmut Ritter. Wies-
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Burrell, David B. and Nazih Daher → Ġazālī, al-Maqṣad al-asnā, English transla-
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Daiber, Muʿammar → Daiber, Hans: Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿ-
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Daiber, Hans: Rebellion gegen Gott. Formen atheistischen Denkens im frühen Islam.
In Atheismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance. Ed. by Friedrich Niewöhner
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123 Cf. John Losee, Theories of Causality. From Antiquity to the Present. New Brunswick
(U.S.A.) and London (U.K.) 2011, and the conclusion on pp. 197ff.
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Davidson, Herbert Alan: Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in
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Berlin/New York 1991, 1992, 1995.
Fakhry, Majid: Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas. Lon-
don 1958.
Frank, Richard M.: Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School. Durham/London 1994.
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Ġazālī, al-: al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿan ghayr ahlihī → al-Masāʾil al-maḍnūn bihā ʿan ġayr ahlihā.
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A Philosophical Anthology from Maraghah. Tehran 2002, pp. 63–99.
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586 chapter 31
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chapter 32
Magie und Kausalität im Islam
1. Zwei jemenitische Texte zur “Beschwörung des Diebes” 587 – 2. Die magische Wir-
kung von “Knoten” und “Blasen” – Griechische Parallelen 595 – 3. Magie und neupla-
tonische “Sympathie” 597 – 4. Eine Philosophie der Magie 599 – Kindī, De radiis – 5.
Anhang: Drei weitere jemenitische Texte zur Beschwörung des Diebes 602 – Bibliogra-
phie 605 – Summary 608 – Handschriften 609
Magie im mittelalterlichen Islam ist verschiedene Male Gegenstand von Unter-

suchungen gewesen.1 Die unterschiedlichen Gestaltungen scheinen erschöp-
fend beschrieben. Dennoch – der beherrschende ideologische Hintergrund
magischer Praktiken hat nur wenig Beachtung gefunden. So ist nicht geklärt,
wie der bisweilen deterministische Charakter islamischer Religiosität mit
menschlicher Einflussnahme auf göttliches Wirken, nämlich durch magische
Praktiken, vereinbar ist.
1 Zwei jemenitische Texte zur “Beschwörung des Diebes”
Um hier mehr Licht in das Dunkel zu bringen, um die Philosophie der Magie zu
verstehen, greifen wir auf handschriftlich erhaltene Texte aus dem 11./17. Jahr-
hundert und aus dem 12./18. oder 13./19. Jahrhundert zurück, die die “Beschwö-
rung”, die ʿazīma2 eines Diebes zum Thema haben. Hierzu werden drei unter-
schiedliche Texte zur Vertreibung des Diebes, d.h. also aus dem Bereich der
apotropäischen Magie3 und in dieser Funktion mit den Amuletten bzw. Talis-
manen4 vergleichbar, vorgestellt. Der erste Text lautet:5
1 Vgl. die Bibliographie von G. C. Anawati, Études, S. 411–432. – M. Ullmann, Natur- und
Geheimwissenschaften, S. 359–426. – Die Sammlung von Artikeln in Magic and Divination. –
B.-C. Otto, Magie, geht nur kurz auf die Magie im Islam ein und beschränkt sich inner-
halb eines Kapitels über Marsilio Ficino und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (S. 413–504) in
dem Abschnitt S. 442–451 auf eine kurze Diskussion von Kindī, De radiis (s. Anm. 73ff.) und
Pseudo-Maǧrīṭī, Picatrix.
2 Zum Begriff vgl. den grundlegenden Aufsatz von I. Goldziher, Zauberelemente, S. 306–314
/ Gesammelte Schriften V, 1970, S. 35–43.
3 Vgl. zu den unterschiedlichen Formen der Magie K. Goldammer, Magie, Sp. 632.
4 Vgl. zu diesen den grundlegenden Aufsatz von T. Canaan, Decipherment. – M. Wirkus,
Magie, S. 30–33.
5 Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127 (11./17. Jh.), fol. 98 r 10–22, zitiert 10–13.

588 chapter 32
Ein Abschnitt über das Beschwören (ʿazīma) eines Diebes
Du schreibst Folgendes auf ein Papier und legst (dieses) in ein dunkles Haus,
156 worin sich niemand befindet. (Dann) legst Du auf (das Geschrie|bene)6 einen
schweren Stein, wobei die auf (dem Papier)7 befindlichen (geschriebenen
Dinge) knotenartig verbunden erscheinen (wa-yuʿqadu).8 Hierauf wird dem
Dieb der Platz trotz seiner Weite zur Beklemmung, er ist nicht mehr Herr sei-
ner selbst (lā yatamālaku), sodass er das Stehlen aufgibt. Das (auf dem Papier
Aufgeschriebene) ist Folgendes – es ist erprobt und verbreitet:
MKSLMYNAAMLY
ḤAYAAMRYḤA
w a – l l ā h h u w a9
WYLWḤMḤWWṬAḤ
R W Ṭ M A Y A Ḥ W Ṭ allāhumma
innaka taʿlamu!10 wa-iḏan11 ʿalima Ibn ḍālla
fulān Ibn fulāna. Wa-innaka qādirun12
naruddahā13 fa-raddadahā wa-raddadnāka ilā ummika
kay taqirra ʿaynuhā wa-lā yaḥzanu14 wa-rǧiʿ il-baṣara15
wa-innahū ḏāt ar-raǧʿ16
(auf dem Kopf stehend:)

DWDWANSAKWS
Qurʾān Muḥammad
6 ʿAlayhā, das Suffix kann sich nur auf das Geschriebene (hāḏihī) beziehen.
7 Gemeint ist wohl das Papier und nicht der Stein.
8 Hs. wa-yuʿqalu, was keinen Sinn gibt; der Abschreiber hat den Schlussbuchstaben D als L
verlesen bzw. verschrieben.
9 Huwa scheint an koranischem huwa llāhu llaḏī lā ilāha illa huwa (Koran 59:22–23) orien-
tiert zu sein; es taucht auch als Hāʾ und Wāw als letzte Zeichen unter den sieben Siegeln
(dazu unten S. 162) auf, wozu man H. A. Winkler, Siegel und Charaktere, S. 143, vergleiche.
10 Vgl. Koran 14:38 (41): “Herr! Du weißt, was wir geheimhalten!”
11 Hs. ‘d’.
12 Vgl. Koran 6:37 “Gott hat (jederzeit) die Macht (qādirun), ein Zeichen herabzusenden.”
13 Vgl. Koran 4:47 (50) fa-naruddahā ʿalā adbārihā “damit wir nicht (etwa gewisse) Gesich-
ter (von Leuten, die unsere Mahnung nicht befolgen) verschwinden lassen und (von vorn)
nach hinten versetzen.”
14 Vgl. Koran 28:13 (12): “Und so gaben wir ihn (sc. den Mosesknaben) seiner Mutter zurück,
damit sie frohen Mutes und nicht traurig sei.”
15 Vgl. Koran 67:3 “Sieh Dich noch einmal um! Kannst Du (irgend) einen Defekt feststellen?”
16 Vgl. Koran 86 11: “Beim Himmel mit seiner (regelmäßigen) Wiederkehr (der Gestirne?)!”
magie und kausalität im islam 589
links vom Quadrat steht:

RYRWNRS
ṢṬWS
rechts vom Quadrat steht:

DṢKMWṬM
. YR
In diesem Text ist die apotropäische Wirkung des Wortes und der unverbun- 157
den stehenden Buchstaben17 zentral. Den Buchstaben, die man auch “magi-
sche Formeln” nennen kann,18 werden magische Kräfte zugesprochen. Entspre-
chend einer alten bereits vorislamischen Tradition,19 der zufolge in islamischer
Zeit auf die Buchstaben, aus denen der Koran besteht, geschworen wird.20 Vor
allem den sog. “geheimnisvollen” Buchstaben des Korans, d.h. den Buchsta-
ben, die am Anfang von 29 Suren stehen,21 wird – wie uns die Enzyklopädie
der Lauteren Brüder aus dem 4./10. Jahrhundert informiert (s. Anm. 19) – diese
Funktion zugeschrieben. In den magischen Werken des Būnī (gest. 622/1225 in
Kairo) erscheinen sie als Bezeichnungen der Namen und Eigenschaften Gottes
und es wird ihnen eine magische Wirkung beigelegt.22 In unserem Text erschei-
nen genau diese “geheimnisvollen Buchstaben”, mit Ausnahme von Hāʾ, ʿAyn
und Qāf.23 Stattdessen finden wir unter den Buchstaben zusätzlich das Dāl
und das Wāw. Wenn wir zu diesen beiden das Bāʾ hinzufügen (das hier fehlt,
aber in unserem Text zu Dāl oder Rāʾ verschrieben sein könnte), ferner das
auch als “geheimnisvoller Buchstabe” existierende und hier vorhandene Ḥāʾ,
erhalten wir das Zauberwort Budūḥ, das sich aus den Bestandteilen eines drei-
17 Vgl. hierzu T. Canaan, Decipherment, S. 152–166 (die von uns nachfolgend genannten
“geheimnisvollen” Buchstaben des Korans werden nicht erwähnt).
18 So R. Kriss und H. Kriss-Heinrich, Volksglaube II, S. 127.
19 Vgl. S. Diwald, Arabische Philosophie, S. 499–501 und dort gegebene Hinweise. – Wie H.
A. Winkler in seinem grundlegenden Werk Siegel und Charaktere, S. 14, andeutet, gelten
die heiligen Schriften (nicht nur der Koran) den Zauberern als “Zusammenfassung aller
Kräfte – sie sind ja wesentlich Emanationen Gottes”. H. A. Winkler hat diesen Emanati-
onsgedanken nicht weiter ausgeführt, was wir hier nachholen wollen.
20 Vgl. I. Goldziher, Kitāb Maʿānī al-nafs, S. 25–28.
21 Vgl. die Aufzählung in Alford T. Welch, “al-Ḳurʾān”, Sp. 413–414.
22 Vgl. M. M. El-Gawhary, Gottesnamen, S. 135–137, und D. A. M. Pielow, Quellen, S. 77–
83. – Vgl. auch R. Kriss und H. Kriss-Heinrich, Volksglaube II, S. 96.
23 Eine Identifizierung der Buchstaben mit den Anfangsbuchstaben der 99 Gottesnamen,
wie wir dies in Schriftamuletten finden (vgl. R. Kriss und H. Kriss-Heinrich, Volks-
glaube II, S. 68–70), ist hier nicht wahrscheinlich, bzw. allenfalls nur teilweise mög-
lich.
590 chapter 32
teiligen magischen Quadrats zusammensetzt und in der islamischen Magie in

der Gestalt von Talismanen als Schutzmittel dient.24
Zusätzlich zur Macht des Buchstabens veranschaulicht unser Text mit dem
Quadrat die Macht des Wortes: Die rechte und die linke Linie des Quadrats
symbolisieren in kalligraphischer Weise jeweils die Namen Muḥammad und
Qurʾān. Die obere Linie gibt in Dehnbuchstaben wa-llāhu wieder und auf der
158 unteren | Linie wird auf den Ecken links das Wort Qurʾān wiederholt und rechts
der Name Muḥammad. Alle Seiten sind außen jeweils von zwei Zeilen mit
unverbundenen Buchstaben flankiert, die obere Seite fügt nach innen zwei
weitere Zeilen mit Buchstaben hinzu. Dann folgt als Kernstück des Innenfel-
des eine unzusammenhängende Aneinanderreihung von Satzteilen aus dem
Koran, aus den Suren 14:38 (41); 6:37; 4:47 (50); 28:13 (12); 67:3 und 86:11. Gemein-
sam ist diesen Surenteilen der Hinweis auf Gottes Wissen (taʿlamu) und Macht
(qādir), das dreimalige Vorkommen des Verbums radda bzw. raddada mit der
Grundbedeutung “zurückweisen” und das zweimalige Vorkommen der Wurzel
raǧaʿa “zurückkehren”. Zweifelsohne sollen die auf Papier geschriebenen, aus
dem Koran stammenden (d.h. besonders wirkungsvollen) und durch Wieder-
holung verstärkten Worte das tun, was die Wurzeln dieser Wörter bedeuten,
nämlich die Vertreibung des Diebes, bzw. die Abkehr von seinem Vorhaben
bewirken.
Die apotropäischen Worte sind ein Ausdruck von Gottes Macht, die durch
die Namen Allāh, Muḥammad und Qurʾān symbolisiert erscheinen, die, wie
bereits gesagt, das magische Quadrat flankieren.
Darüber hinaus werden sie zu einem Zauber, wie die Notiz über den Knoten
und den Stein zeigt. In beiden Details knüpft der Text an eine alte Tradition
an, die im 3./9. Jahrhundert Ibn Saʿd in seinem biographischen Lexikon, dem
Kitāb aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kabīr25 festgehalten hat. Dort wird der Prophet von Labīd
Ibn al-Aʿṣam und seinen Töchtern auf Veranlassung der Juden von Medina ver-
hext, sodass er den Verstand verliert und abmagert. Labīd tue dies “aus Liebe
zum Geld” (ḥubb ad-danānīr),26 bediene sich hierzu der Knoten, die er aus
dem Haupthaar des Propheten gemacht habe und die er unter einem “Brun-
24 Vgl. D. B. MacDonald, “Budūḥ”, Sp. 153–154 / ursprüngliche deutsche Version (1913), Sp.
802–803. – Vgl. auch E. Graefe, D. B. MacDonald und M. Plessner, “Djadwal”, Sp. 370,
und T. Canaan, Decipherment, S. 147–148 und 156–164. – V. Porter, Islamic Seals, S. 187–
188.
25 Ibn Saʿd, Kitāb aṭ-Ṭabaqāt, ed. F. Z. Schwally II, S. 4, 5–6 und 17; deutsche Inhaltsangabe
ebd. Einleitung, S. I–II; gekürzte Wiedergabe bei I. Goldziher, Richtungen, S. 140–141. –
Vgl. R. Kriss und H. Kriss-Heinrich, Volksglaube II, S. 91–92.
26 Ibn Saʿd, Kitāb aṭ-Ṭabaqāt, ed. F. Z. Schwally II, S. 5, 7.
nenstein” (urʿūfat al-biʾr) versteckt habe.27 Mohammed wird von dem Zauber
befreit, indem die Zauberknoten “gelöst werden” (inḥallat).28 Dies geschieht
durch Rezitation der Suren 113 und 114, die auch al-Muʿawwiḏatān29 genannt | 159
werden. In Sure 113 werden die sogenannten “Knotenanbläserinnen” erwähnt,
die naffāṯāt al-ʿuqad, die auch Böses verursachen können.30 Anhangsweise sei
hier darauf hingewiesen, dass die magische Wirkung der Knoten, die der Koran
erwähnt und die in der von Ibn Saʿd festgehaltenen Überlieferung mit den
Juden Medinas in Beziehung gesetzt wird, tatsächlich einen wichtigen Hin-
weis impliziert, nämlich im vorliegenden Fall einen möglicherweise jüdischen
Ursprung:31 Im Alten Testament, im aramäischen Teil des Buchs Daniel, in
Kap. 5, Vers 12 und 16 wird Daniel von König Nebukadnezar zu sich gerufen,
wegen seiner Fähigkeit, “Knoten zu lösen” (mešāre qiṭrīn), was die Lutherbibel
unscharf mit “Geheimnisse offenbaren” übersetzt. Zudem gibt es im rabbini-
schen Schrifttum eine Überlieferung, wonach eine mit drei Knoten versehene
Schnur eine Krankheit zum Stillstand bringe; eine mit fünf sei heilsam; und
eine mit sieben helfe gegen Zauberei (sic!).32 Der kulturhistorische Hinter-
grund des Knotens und seiner magischen Wirkung scheint indessen weite-
rer Klärung zu bedürfen. Er spielt eine Rolle im apotropäischen Amulett der
Griechen,33 ebenso in russischen Volkszaubersprüchen34. Bereits bei den alten
Ägyptern gibt es Knotenamulette, wobei die Darstellung des Knotens – zu einer
Hieroglyphe mit der Bedeutung “vereinigen” stilisiert – einem V gleicht, dessen
Spitze in einem Kreis und dessen beide obere Enden in einem geschlossenen
27 Ibn Saʿd, Kitāb aṭ-Ṭabaqāt, ed. F. Z. Schwally II, S. 5, 2. – Vgl. die Bedeutungsangabe bei E.
W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon I/3, S. 1107, Sp. b: “A piece of rock that is left in the bottom
of a well, being there when it is dug, in order that the cleanser of the well may sit upon it
in cleansing it: or a stone that is at the head of the well, upon which the drawer of water
stands”. – Das Knüpfen von Knoten in den Bart soll den bösen Blick fernhalten, was aber
in Form eines Hadith verboten worden ist: Vgl. I. Goldziher, Ausrufe und Formeln, S. 142
/ Gesammelte Schriften V (1970), S. 356.
29 Dazu EI2 VII, 1993, Sp. 269–270. – T. Nöldeke, Geschichte des Qorāns I, S. 108–110.
30 R. Paret übersetzt naffāṯāt al-ʿuqad allerdings mit der alternativen Bedeutung: “Von
(bösen) Weibern, die (Zauber)knoten bespucken”. Vgl. aber I. Goldziher, Richtungen,
S. 140. Man beachte hier, dass der koranische Ausdruck min šarr an-naffāṯāt fī l-ʿuqad nicht
unbedingt die Schädlichkeit des “Knotenanblasens” unterstellt.
31 Dies wird bereits angedeutet in J. Trachtenberg, Jewish Magic, worin auf S. 127 auf Sure
113 und die Daniel-Stelle hingewiesen wird.
32 Vgl. G. Veltri, Magie und Halakha, S. 134, mit Verweis auf weitere Belege in L. P. Hogan,
Healing in the Second Tempel Period, S. 113 Anm. 15.
33 Vgl. P. Wolters, Faden und Knoten.
34 Vgl. F. von Andrian, Russische Volkszaubersprüche, Beilage, S. 132–139.
592 chapter 32
Haken enden.35 Hier sei darauf hingewiesen, dass dieses Zeichen auch in grie-
chischen Zauberpapyri des 4./5. Jahrhunderts AD aus Ägypten vorkommt und
unter den sogenannten Brillenbuchstaben arabischer Amulette wieder auf-
taucht.36
160 Unser jemenitischer Text erwähnt die genannten Suren 113 und 114 nicht.
Ihm geht es lediglich um die Wirksamkeit der apotropäischen Surenteile, die
er im magischen Quadrat nennt und deren Wirksamkeit durch die Zauberkno-
ten gewährleistet ist. Seine Erwähnung des schweren Steines und der Knoten
greift auf die genannte alte und von Ibn Saʿd festgehaltene Tradition zurück.
Auch seine Beschreibung des Zustandes, in den der potentielle Dieb aufgrund
der Knoten gerät und wodurch er vom Stehlen abgehalten wird, nämlich der
Verlust der “Selbstbeherrschung” (lā yatamālaku) angesichts des beengenden
Zustands, in den er gerät, erinnert an die Beschreibung des verhexten Prophe-
ten, der “den Verstand verliert” ( yaḏhabu ʿaqluhū)37 und keine Kontrolle mehr
über seine Sinne hat.38
Auf den bislang diskutierten Text folgt eine weitere Beschwörung eines Die-
bes, die sich gleichfalls auf die Zauberwirkung des Knotens bezieht. Sie lautet
folgendermaßen:39
Ein Abschnitt über das Beschwören mit einem Pergament (ʿazīmat ar-riqq / ar-
raqq)
Es ist gleichermaßen richtig und erprobt. Es wird ein schwarzes Zicklein
ohne weiße Farbe genommen. Sein Fell wird abgezogen. Dann nimmt man ein
Stück weiße Haut (salaba), um damit das Pergament zu verbinden. Dies soll
geschehen, nachdem man einen dünnen (ʿazl “schwach”) und weißen Faden
genommen und hiermit 7 Knoten geknüpft hat.
35 Vgl. F. W. von Bissing, Ägyptische Knotenamulette, S. 24. – Das Amulett und seine magi-
sche Wirkung spielten eine zentrale Rolle bei den alten Ägyptern. Vgl. z.B. R. Brier,
Zauber, S. 161–183 und 265–281. – R. S. Bianchi, Images of Isis, S. 470–505, bes. S. 494, in
Verbindung mit der Göttin Isis (Hinweis v. Frau Prof. Heike Behlmer, Göttingen). Doch
erscheint es in hellenistischer Zeit zunehmend mit der stoischen und neuplatonischen
Ideologie von der sympathetischen Wirkung der Dinge verbunden, wie wir sie nachfol-
gend beschreiben werden.
36 S. Anm. 107.
38 Ḥattā yuḫayyala ilayhi annahū yafʿalu s̆-s̆ayʾa wa-lā yafʿaluhū wa-ankara baṣaruhū, ebd. II,
S. 5, 3; vgl. S. 4, 16 und S. 5, 10–11.
39 Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127, fol. 98 r 13–98 v 16.
Währenddessen rezitierst Du beim ersten Knoten: “Oder es ist, wie (wenn)

ein Gewitterregen vom Himmel (niedergeht), voller Finsternis, Donner und
Blitz. (fol. 98 v) Sie stecken sich vor den Donnerschlägen in Todesfurcht die
Finger in die Ohren. Und Gott hat die Ungläubigen (allesamt) in seiner Ge-
walt.”40
Beim zweiten (Knoten rezitierst Du): “Was meinst Du wohl von einem, der
seine (persönliche) Neigung sich zu seinem Gott gemacht hat, und den Gott
mit Bedacht irregeführt, und dem er das Gehör und das Herz versiegelt, und
über dessen Gesicht er eine Hülle gelegt hat?”41
Beim dritten (Knoten rezitierst Du): “… machen wir42 zwischen Dir und 161
denen, die nicht an das Jenseits glauben, eine unsichtbare (?) Scheidewand.”43
Beim vierten (Knoten rezitierst Du): “Und wir haben (gleichsam) vor ihnen
einen Wall errichtet, und ebenso hinter ihnen, und sie (damit von vorne und
von hinten) zugedeckt, so dass sie nichts sehen.”44
Beim fünften (Knoten rezitierst Du): “Bringt mir die Eisenstücke! Als er
schließlich (den Wall) zwischen den beiden Berghängen (?) gleichmäßig hoch
(?) gemacht hatte, sagte er: ‘Blast (das Feuer an)!’ Als er es schließlich zum Glü-
hen gebracht hatte, sagte er: ‘Bringt mir (flüssiges) Metall (qiṭr), damit ich es
darüber gieße!’ (97/96) Nun konnten sie nicht über ihn (herüber)kommen und
ihn (auch) nicht durchbrechen.”45
Beim sechsten (Knoten rezitierst Du): “Oder (die Handlungen der Ungläubi-
gen sind) wie Finsternis in einem abgrundtiefen Meer, das von einer Woge
bedeckt wird, über der eine (weitere) Woge liegt, und über der (auch noch)
eine Wolke liegt – eine Finsternis über der anderen: Wenn man seine Hand
ausstreckt, kann man sie (vor Dunkelheit) kaum sehen. Wem Gott kein Licht
verschafft, der hat (überhaupt) keines.”46
Beim siebten (Knoten rezitierst Du): “Sie haben ein Herz, mit dem sie nicht
verstehen,47 Augen, mit denen sie nicht sehen, und Ohren, mit denen sie nicht
hören. Sie sind (stumpfsinnig) wie Vieh. Nein, sie irren noch eher (vom Weg)
ab und geben (überhaupt) nicht acht.”48
40 Koran 2:19 (18), Übersetzung nach R. Paret.

41 Koran 45:23 (22), Übersetzung nach R. Paret.
42 Ǧaʿalnā (so der Koran); Hs. faǧʿlna.
43 Koran 17:45 (47). Übersetzung nach R. Paret.
45 Koran 18:96 (95)–97 (96). Übersetzung nach R. Paret.
47 Yafqahūna; Hs. yaʿqilūna.
48 Koran 7:179 (178).
594 chapter 32
Hierauf macht er die Knoten am Pergament fest (barama). Da beginnen

Kräfte (quwan) zu blasen (wa-yanfuḫū), bis dass es (das Pergament) glatt ist
und sich in der Weise mit der Haut (des Zickleins) zu verbinden sucht (munā-
fasatan), dass es an keiner Stelle mehr Luft einholen kann. Hierauf sagt er: “Ich
habe jemanden beschworen wegen des Hab und Guts (matāʿ) des X, Sohn der
Y”.49 So wird der Dieb (entweder) in seinem Inneren zerrissen ( yaftaṭiru min
162 baṭnihī) oder er gibt den Diebstahl auf und | bleibt in Armut.50 Solange nun
der Dieb das Stehlen nicht ablehnt, wird er unaufhörlich aufgeblasen. Dies ist
vergleichbar mit der Eigenschaft des Pergaments: Wenn (der Dieb) die Armut
ablehnt, erhält das Pergament Öffnungen51 und kommen aus ihm die Kno-
ten zum Vorschein, sodass es atmen kann. Es ist wirklich erprobt. Zu Ende ist
dies.
Der Schwerpunkt dieses Textes liegt auf der magischen Wirkung der sieben
Knoten, wobei die Zahl Sieben interessant ist, da sie in einer oben genannten
(s. Anm. 31) jüdischen Tradition gerade das Gegenteil bewirken soll, nämlich
Zauberei aufheben. Bemerkenswerterweise besteht die am häufigsten gebetete
Koransure, die Fātiḥa, ebenfalls aus sieben Versen (vgl. auch die sogenann-
ten “Sieben Siegel Salomos”). Die Anfertigung der sieben Knoten erscheint in
dem jemenitischen Text mit der Rezitation von sieben Koranteilen verbunden.
Grundtenor der rezitierten Surenteile ist die mahnende Beschreibung desjeni-
gen, “der seine (persönliche) Neigung sich zu seinem Gott gemacht hat”, des
von Gott Getrennten und Ungläubigen, als jemand, der in Todesfurcht ist; sich
in der Finsternis befindet; weder verstehen, sehen noch hören kann und sich
auf dem Irrweg befindet. Hier wird also ein Dieb beschrieben. Doch wie soll
der Dieb an seinem Vorhaben gehindert werden?
49 Auffällig ist die Formulierung “X, Sohn der Y” ( fulān Ibn fulāna) statt des üblichen “X,
Sohn des Y”. Ignaz Goldziher, unter Berufung auf Theodor Nöldeke, weist in einem
1894 veröffentlichten kurzen Aufsatz über “Hebräische Elemente in muhammedanischen
Zaubersprüchen” darauf hin, dass diese Formulierung eine Eigentümlichkeit auch in jüdi-
schen Beschwörungsformeln sei.
50 Wa-taʿallaqa fī mawḍiʿ aḍ-ḍāʾiʿa; letzteres Wort fehlt in den Lexika; ḍāʾiʿ bedeutet “arm”;
ḍaiʿa bedeutet “Verlust”.
51 Hs. futiḥat statt futiḥa.
2 Die magische Wirkung von “Knoten” und “Blasen” – Griechische

Parallelen
Der jemenitische Text bietet hier eine eigenartige Konstruktion: Es wird ein
Pergament mit einem Stück weißer Haut eines Zickleins verbunden, dessen
schwarzes Fell man abgezogen hat. Dann werden sieben Knoten in einen dün-
nen, weißen Faden geknüpft und mit dem Pergament verbunden. Nachdem
dies geschehen ist, so sagt der Text, “beginnen Kräfte (quwan) zu blasen” und
als Folge davon wird das Pergament glatt und verbindet sich gleichmäßig mit
der weißen Ziegenhaut, “sodass es (das Pergament oder die Ziegenhaut) an kei-
ner Stelle mehr Luft einholen kann”.
Demnach geht von den Knoten, die durch die koranische Rezitation geprägt
worden sind, eine magische Wirkung aus, die mit dem jetzt erfolgenden Aus-
spruch qualifiziert wird: “Ich habe jemanden beschworen wegen des Hab und
Guts des X, Sohn der Y”.
Diese an den potentiellen Dieb gerichtete Aussage aktiviert folgende zaube- 163
rische Wirkungen:
– Wenn der Dieb zur Tat schreitet, wird der Dieb aufgeblasen und “in seinem
Inneren zerrissen”, parallel zur aufblasenden Wirkung der “Kräfte” zwischen
der weißen Haut des Zickleins und dem damit verbundenen Pergament.
– Wenn der Dieb von seinem Vorhaben Abstand nimmt, d.h., wenn er “den
Diebstahl aufgibt und in Armut bleibt”, dann regen sich nicht mehr die
blasenden “Kräfte” zwischen Ziegenhaut und Pergament, das Pergament
bekommt keine Öffnungen und die Knoten können nicht aus dem Perga-
ment heraustreten.
Demnach sind die Knoten des weißen Fadens auf der Innenseite des Per-
gaments, d.h. zwischen Pergament und Ziegenhaut. Wird der Dieb aktiv, führt
die dann einsetzende Blasbewegung zwischen Ziegenhaut und Pergament zur
Entstehung von Öffnungen im Pergament, wodurch die Knoten zum Vorschein
kommen.
Als Schlüsselbegriff entpuppt sich hier das Phänomen des “Blasens”, das
sowohl zwischen Ziegenhaut und Pergament stattfindet als auch im Inneren
des Diebes. Zwischen Ziegenhaut und Pergament führt das Blasen zunächst
lediglich zur Glättung des Pergaments. Beabsichtigt aber der Dieb zu stehlen,
dann setzt die Blasbewegung in einem solchen Ausmaß ein, dass das Perga-
ment Öffnungen bekommt, aus denen die Knoten heraustreten, aber auch die
Luft entweichen kann. Gleichzeitig entsteht die Blasbewegung im Dieb, der “in
seinem Inneren zerrissen wird”.
Dieses Resultat ist in mehrfacher Hinsicht aufschlussreich, sowohl was die
Kausalität betrifft, als auch die Tradition, die dieser Gestaltung zugrunde liegt.
596 chapter 32
Zunächst erinnert die Verbindung von Blasen und magischen Knoten an den
von uns bereits erwähnten koranischen Begriff naffāṯāt al-ʿuqad, die “Knoten-
bläserinnen”. Zweifelsohne knüpft der Autor unseres Textes an diese korani-
sche Überlieferung aus Sure 113 und an spätere Echos an, die etwa Ibn Saʿd
festgehalten hat. Doch neu ist in unserem Text die sympathetische Wirkung,
die vom Blasen zwischen Pergament und Ziegenhaut ausgeht. Sie wirkt gleich-
zeitig im Inneren des Diebes.
Wie muss man sich dies erklären? Hier hilft uns ein Blick auf die Antike
weiter. In den Papyri graecae magicae, einem aus Ägypten stammenden Text-
korpus aus dem 2. bis 5. Jahrhundert AD,52 finden wir einen Magiebegriff,
der in manchen Details dem islamischen gleicht. So finden wir hier wie dort
164 Abwehr- und | Schutzrituale,53 sogar Rituale zum Aufspüren eines Diebes.54
Wie den Koransuren wird auch antiken Zaubersprüchen, “Formulierungen des
wirkmächtigen Sprechens”,55 eine magische Kraft zugesprochen. Sie ist heilig
bzw. göttlich und erscheint als eine rituell durch den Magier hervorrufbare
“Kraft” (dynamis),56 auch “göttliche Kraft” (theia energeia) genannt.57 Interes-
sant ist hier die Terminologie der griechischen Papyri, in denen der Begriff
Zauber unterschiedlich bezeichnet wird, z.B. mit energeia (“Energie”, “Kraft”)58
oder mit dynamis (“Kraft”, “Bewegung”)59 und pneuma (“Wind”, “Luft”),60 eine
Begrifflichkeit, die wir auch in unserem jemenitischen Text wiederfinden, näm-
lich in dem Begriff quwan und in den Verben nafaḫa / tanaffaḫa bzw. tanaf-
fasa – dem können wir auch das koranische naffāṯāt hinzufügen.
Zu diesen begrifflichen Parallelen zwischen antiker und islamischer Magie
tritt hier eine weitere inhaltliche Übereinstimmung, nämlich die sympathe-
tische Wirkung der Luft. In unserem arabischen Text exemplifiziert mit der
Gleichzeitigkeit vom aufgeblasenen Zwischenraum zwischen Ziegenhaut und
52 Hrsg. v. K. Preisendanz.
53 Vgl. B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 382–385.
54 Vgl. B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 390 (mit Verweis auf Papyri graecae magicae V, 70 = K. Prei-
sendanz I, S. 184–185).
55 B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 404.
56 Vgl. B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 388 (mit Verweis auf Papyri graecae magicae IV, 3172 = K. Prei-
sendanz I, S. 176–177).
57 Vgl. B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 398 (mit Verweis auf Papyri graecae magicae I, 263–275 = K.
Preisendanz I, S. 14–17).
58 Vgl. B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 385 (mit Verweis auf Papyri graecae magicae III, 290 und 412 =
K. Preisendanz I, S. 50–51).
sendanz I, S. 176–177).
sendanz I, S. 144–145).
Pergament und dem Aufblasen des Diebes. Ein solches Anschwellen eines
menschlichen Körpers, im vorliegenden Fall bis hin zu seiner Spaltung, erin-
nert an das Anschwellen des Körpers als Zeichen göttlichen Wirkens, das
Iamblichus aus dem 3./4. Jahrhundert AD in seiner Schrift De mysteriis berich-
tet,61 gleichfalls ausgehend von der stoisch-neuplatonischen Sympathie des
gesamten Kosmos.62
3 Magie und neuplatonische “Sympathie”
Entscheidender als diese entfernte Ähnlichkeit ist aber für uns der hier anklin-
gende stoische Gedanke der Sympathie, der in der neuplatonischen Kausali-
tätstheorie aufgegriffen und hierdurch in einer für das islamische Denken | 165
maßgebenden Weise, etwa in Ġazālīs Kausalitätstheorie,63 weiterentwickelt
worden ist. Das im arabischen Text genannte “Blasen”, ebenso wie der Begriff
des pneuma in den griechischen Magie-Papyri erlauben mit gutem Grund
einen Vergleich mit stoischem pneuma, das göttliche hegemonikon, das mit der
Sonne verglichen wird, die als Hitze in einem dynamischen Prozess der Inter-
aktion von Zwischenursachen den gesamten Kosmos durchdringt. Zu diesen
Zwischenursachen zählen die Planeten, die entsprechend der Beschreibung
des Alexander von Aphrodisias in seinen auf Arabisch überlieferten Abhand-
lungen Über die Vorsehung und Über die Prinzipien des Universums zwischen
der göttlichen Vorsehung und der sublunaren Welt vermitteln und somit zur
“Astrologisierung” des aristotelischen Kosmos führen.64 Das hier durchschim-
mernde Bestreben, Gottes Transzendenz mit seiner Allgegenwärtigkeit zu ver-
einbaren, haben die Neuplatoniker weitergeführt und so die “Philosophie” der
Magie im Islam maßgeblich geprägt.65 Hierzu ersetzten sie die stoische Inter-
aktion zwischen den Teilen des Kosmos, die sympatheía, durch die neuplato-
nische Lehre vom göttlichen Einen, der als göttlicher Intellekt durch die nach-
geordneten und daher sekundären Ursachen die Vielzahl der Dinge erschuf,
die ontologisch ihm unterlegen sind.66 Das stoische pneuma ist im Neupla-
tonismus ersetzt durch die neuplatonische Auffassung vom göttlichen Einen,
61 De mysteriis III 5. 112; erwähnt B.-C. Otto, Magie, S. 364.

62 Vgl. C. Zintzen, Wertung, S. 415.
63 Vgl. H. Daiber, God versus Causality, S. 7–12.
64 Vgl. G. Freudenthal, Medieval Astrologization, S. 37–54. – Genannt bei H. Daiber, God
versus Causality.
65 Das ist ansatzweise herausgearbeitet worden von D. A. M. Pielow, Quellen, S. 49–54 und
138–143.
66 Vgl. hierzu und zu weiteren Details H. Daiber, God versus Causality.
598 chapter 32
der als göttlicher Intellekt sowohl transzendent als auch immanent ist und der
durch die nachgeordneten Ursachen in sekundärer Kausalität oder Aktivität
sowie – unter der Voraussetzung, dass es keine Hindernisse gibt – die Viel-
heit der Dinge erschafft. Wie die Stoiker gebrauchen die Neuplatoniker das
Bild von der Sonne, die mit ihren Strahlen allgegenwärtig ist. Für Plotin sind
die Emanationen vom göttlichen Einen, die sekundären Ursachen, mit dem
Licht der Sonne vergleichbar und begründen die Anteilnahme von sekundären
Ursachen und Verursachtem an der vollkommenen und endlichen göttlichen
Macht. Gleichzeitig spricht Plotin in seiner Enneade IV 4 [28] 4167 von der “Sym-
pathie” und “Harmonie des Alls” (to pãn) das eine “Einheit” (hén) forme wie ein
“Lebewesen” (zõon).68 Dies ermögliche magische “Wirkungen” (goeteíai) in der
Nähe und Ferne – vergleichbar einer Saite auf der Leier, die durch eine andere
in Mitschwingung versetzt wird.
166 Die Sympathie und Harmonie des Weltalls schließt hierbei nicht die onto-
logische Unterlegenheit der Gott nachgeordneten verursachten Dinge aus. Es
gibt lediglich eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Ursache und Verursachtem. So kann
die göttliche erste Ursache in ihrer Autarkie nur dann wirksam werden, wenn
die Bedingungen der nachfolgenden Kausalitäten bzw. Zwischenursachen
erfüllt sind. So ist hier eine Interaktion zwischen göttlicher und naturgegebe-
ner Kausalität möglich. Wir finden dies auch bei Ġazālī im 5./11.–6./12. Jahrhun-
dert, der unter neuplatonischer Anregung und zusätzlich im Rückgriff auf aris-
totelische und avicennianische Lehren eine Kausalitätstheorie entwickelt, die
die aschʿaritische Lehre von Gottes alles bestimmendem Willen bzw. Handeln
mit der Nichtnotwendigkeit bzw. mit der Bedingtheit der Naturkausalität zu
verbinden vermag. Jedes Naturwirken ist an bestimmte Voraussetzungen bzw.
Bedingungen gebunden, wogegen die göttliche Primärursache autark bleibt
und sich auf ihr “Planen” (tadbīr), “Dirigieren” (ḥukm) und “Bestimmen” (qaḍāʾ,
qadar) beschränkt. Eine solche Allgegenwärtigkeit von Gottes Macht und Wir-
ken, die sich durch untergeordnete Zwischenursachen und Naturen manifes-
tiert, erlaubt Ġazālī die Kombination von aschʿaritisch geprägter göttlicher
Determination und muʿtazilitisch bzw. letztlich an Naẓẓām (gest. vor 232/847)
orientiertem eigenständigem Naturwirken (bzw. Kausalität), das bestimmten
Bedingungen unterworfen ist. Ġazālī hat hier Ansätze weiterentwickelt, die vor
ihm bereits bei dem andalusischen Gelehrten Ibn Ḥazm (384/994–456/1064)
anklingen. Dieser greift zurück auf die Institutio theologica des Neuplatoni-
67 Text und deutsche Übersetzung von R. Harder, Plotins Schriften II, S. 22–29 der chrono-
logischen Reihenfolge; Text und Übersetzung S. 344/345. – Vgl. dazu C. Zintzen, Wertung,
S. 405–406.
68 Plotin, Enneade IV 4 [28] 32, 13; Text und Übersetzung R. Harder (s. Anm. 67), S. 322/323.
kers Proclus (412–485AD) oder auf die im lateinischen Mittelalter als Liber de
causis bekannt gewordene arabische Bearbeitung al-Ḫayr al-maḥḍ und vertritt
die These, dass Gott durch Vermittlung von Zwischenursachen, von “Naturen”
wirke, die von Gottes “Bestimmung” (taqdīr) abhängig seien.69 Ibn Ḥazm ent-
wickelt seine These in einer Kritik an Kindī (ca. 185/801–247/861 oder 252/
866),70 dem er vorwirft, dass er in seiner Metaphysik, seiner al-Falsafa l-ūlā,
Gottes Transzendenz beeinträchtigt habe, wenn er ihn als “Ursache” (ʿilla)
bezeichne. Dieser Begriff setze einen direkten Bezug zu “Verursachtem”
(maʿlūl) voraus, und dies sei mit Gottes tawḥīd, seiner Transzendenz, unver-
einbar. Ibn Ḥazms Kritik ist nicht ganz unberechtigt – zumindest was Kindīs
Begrifflichkeit betrifft. Denn in aristotelischem Sinne spiegelt sich die Ursache
im Verursachten wieder – anthropos anthropon genna (Metaph. 1032 a 25),71
wogegen es Proclus zufolge nur eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit gibt.72 | 167
4 Eine Philosophie der Magie – Kindī, De radiis
Gleichwohl ist Kindī in seinen Kausalitätsvorstellungen ein Neuplatoniker, der

im Rahmen seiner Emanationskosmologie eine vertikale Beziehung zwischen
Ursache und Wirkung postuliert und somit Ähnlichkeit und Verschiedenheit
zwischen göttlicher Ursache und Verursachtem verbinden kann.
Dies gelingt ihm mit der bereits genannten stoisch-neuplatonischen Lehre
von der sympatheia, einer Hierarchie von einer Ursache – nach dem Vorbild
von stoischem hegemonikon (s. o.) auch unitas regitiva genannt73 – und nachfol-
genden interaktiv74 bzw. in reziproker Weise75 tätigen Zwischenursachen. Hier-
bei wird die Allgegenwärtigkeit der göttlichen ersten Ursache mit den Strahlen
der Sonne, aber auch aller anderen Gestirne exemplifiziert. Kindī hat dies in
seiner nur auf Lateinisch erhaltenen Schrift “Über die Strahlen” (De radiis) the-
matisiert. Diese Schrift ist nichts anderes als eine theoretische Einführung in
69 Zu Ibn Ḥazm vgl. H. Daiber, Kritik, S. 294–295.

70 Gemeint ist Ibn Ḥazm, Risālat ar-Radd ʿalā l-Kindī l-faylasūf.
71 Vgl. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, ch. I.
72 Vgl. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, ch. II.
73 Al-Kindī, De radiis, S. 228, 11 / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann, The Philo-
sophical Works of Al-Kindī, S. 229. – Den Vergleich mit stoischem hegemonikon bringen
M.-T. d’Alverny und F. Hudry in ihrer Einleitung, S. 161–162, und danach P. Travaglia,
Magic, S. 34.
74 Vgl. P. Travaglia, Magic, S. 24–31.
75 Vgl. P. Travaglia, Magic, S. 23–24.
600 chapter 32
die Magie und ihre Philosophie. Ihr zufolge gingen nicht nur von der Sonne,76
den Gestirnen, sondern von allen Körpern,77 sogar vom gesprochenen Wort
Strahlen aus. Diese seien die virtutes der Körper und könnten ein kausales
Wirken verursachen, das letztlich ein Ausfluss der göttlichen Allgegenwärtig-
keit sei. Kindī78 spricht von mundus elementaris, von allen Dingen in ihr, die
ein “Abbild” (exemplum) der “Gestirnenwelt” (mundus sidereus) bzw. der “gött-
lichen Harmonie” (celestis harmonia)79 seien und “gleichzeitig” (concomitan-
tia)80 selbst Strahlen aussendeten.
Diese Strahlen ließen sich nun von einem Individuum, einem Magier beein-
flussen. Er könne in ihnen, den kosmischen Gesetzen von Sympathie und Anti-
pathie81 entsprechend, “Unterschiedlichkeiten” (differentia) bewirken, abhän-
gig von der Intensität82 seines “Wunsches” (desiderium), seiner “Hoffnung”
(spes) und seiner “Furcht” (timor). Er kann sie außerdem in “andere nahe
168 oder ferne Dinge” | (super res alias propinquas vel remotas) übergehen lassen.83
Hierzu bediene sich der Magier des “Wortes” (verbum, vox) in unterschiedli-
cher Gestaltung, sei es als bloße “Aussage” (indicativa), “Befehl” (imperativa),
“Wunsch” (optativa), “Fürbitte” (deprecativa), als “Beschwören” (obsecrativa)
oder “Verwünschung” (exsecrativa).84 Das Wort könne mit seinen Strahlen
auf Feuer, Luft, Wasser oder Erde einwirken,85 abhängig von der “Intensität”
des hiermit ausgedrückten “Wunsches” (intensum alicuius desiderium).86 Kindī
fügt weitere Faktoren hinzu, die Strahlen beeinflussen und damit “Bewegun-
gen” (motus) bewirken könnten: Er nennt “Figuren” ( figurae) und “Zeichen”
76 Vgl. auch P. Travaglia, Magic, S. 42.

77 Vgl. Kindī, De radiis, S. 224–226 (Kap. 3) / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann,
The Philosophical Works of Al-Kindī, S. 226–228.
78 Kindī, De radiis, S. 224, 2–6 / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann, The Philoso-
phical Works of Al-Kindī, S. 226.
79 Kindī, De radiis, S. 227, 1 / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann, The Philosophical
Works of Al-Kindī, S. 229. – Vgl. dazu P. Travaglia, Magic, S. 31 und 40. – J.-P. Boudet,
L’ harmonie du monde.
80 Kindī, De radiis, S. 229, 1 / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann, The Philosophical
Works of Al-Kindī, S. 230.
81 Vgl. P. Travaglia, Magic, S. 37–40. – Zu sympatheia und antipatheia vgl. auch den Neu-
platoniker Proclus, De sacrificio, S. 109–110 (griech.) / S. 103–105 / Lat. Übersetzung des
Marsilio Ficino, S. 106–108: compassio – repugnantia (zitiert nach B. Copenhaver, Her-
mes Trismegistus).
82 Vgl. auch Kindī, De radiis, S. 243, 19–20.
83 Kindī, De radiis, S. 228, 10–13 / Engl. Übers. P. Adamson und P. E. Pormann, The Philoso-
phical Works of Al-Kindī, S. 229 f.
84 Kindī, De radiis, S. 238, ult.s.; 244, 6; 248.
85 Kindī, De radiis, S. 234, 11–12.
86 Kindī, De radiis, S. 243, 26; vgl. S. 245, 20.
bzw. “Buchstaben” (caracteres),87 wobei hier zurecht auf die bereits genannten
Papyri graecae magicae sowie auf die islamischen Talismane, Zauberformeln
und Beschwörungen hingewiesen worden ist.88 Ferner nennt Kindī “Bilder” von
Menschen und Tieren,89 und schließlich noch das “Opfer” (Plur. sacrificia).90
Ich kehre zu den jemenitischen Texten zurück. Es ist deutlich geworden,
dass hier an die stoisch-neuplatonische Allgegenwärtigkeit göttlicher Wirk-
samkeit in Form von nachgeordneten Zwischenursachen angeknüpft wird. Ent-
sprechend dem Bild der alles durchdringenden Sonnenstrahlen gehen auch
von Dingen Strahlen aus, die Veränderungen verursachen könnten. Die Texte
nennen die koranischen Knoten, die durch die Rezitation von Koransuren bei
ihrer Knüpfung Veränderungen verursachen könnten und in diesem Fall einen
Dieb von seiner Handlung abhalten. Die Kraft der gottgesandten Suren bewirke
in unsichtbarer Weise – Kindī sprach von Strahlen – in der Nähe oder Ferne
und zu gegebener Zeit, was das Individuum – hier der Rezitator der Suren –
will. Die Intensität von Gottes Willen erscheint vergleichbar mit der Intensität
der Strahlen der Gestirne, der Dinge und der Worte, welche jeweils Erschei-
nungsformen göttlicher Wirksamkeit seien. Gottes Wille sei allgegenwärtig,
vergleichbar dem stoischen pneuma oder bestimmenden hegemonikon, wofür
der Neuplatonismus gleichfalls nach stoischem Vorbild das Beispiel von den
Strahlen der Sonne nimmt. Kindī hat dieses Bild von den Strahlen auf alle
Gestirne und alle Dinge übertragen. Die Strahlen seien eine alles verbindende
Energie und durch Interaktion ständigem Wandel unterworfen und vom inten-
siven Willen des Individuums beeinflussbar. Dies | setzt voraus, dass Gott eine 169
transzendente Größe bleibt, die sich im Neuplatonismus durch Emanationen
der ontologisch inferioren Zwischenursachen, bzw. bei Kindī durch Strahlen,
dem Kosmos mitteilt. Der Magier kann sich ihrer bedienen, indem er durch
seine Beschwörungen hier wie dort – nämlich infolge der kosmischen Har-
monie – dieselbe Wirkung verursachen kann. Das Aufblasen des Ziegenfell-
Pergament-Behältnisses hat dank der magischen Wirkung der koranischen
Knoten, der rezitierten Suren und des magischen Einflusses von Koranbuch-
staben, hier der sogenannten geheimnisvollen Buchstaben, eine apotropäische
Wirkung zur Folge, indem in sympathetischer Weise auch im Inneren des Die-
bes ein Aufblasen erfolgt, das ihn zerreißen und somit vom Diebstahl abhalten
soll.
87 Kindī, De radiis, S. 250–252 (Kap. 7).

88 Vgl. die bei M.-T. d’Alverny und F. Hudry S. 250–251 genannten Hinweise.
602 chapter 32
Hier zeigt sich exemplarisch, wie vorislamische Elemente in ein Verständnis

von islamischer Frömmigkeit integriert werden und auf diese Weise “islami-
siert” erscheinen. Magie und Religion sind untrennbar verbunden. Auch des-
wegen sind wir berechtigt, von islamischer Magie zu sprechen – auch wenn
diese mit vorislamischer, speziell spätantiker und mit mittelalterlicher Magie
manche Merkmale teilt.
5 Anhang
Drei weitere jemenitische Texte zur Beschwörung des Diebes
Im Anhang sind zwei weitere arabische Texte aufgeführt, die im Licht der vor-
angehenden Ausführungen interpretiert werden können:91
Ein Abschnitt über die Beschwörung des Diebes

genannt “Beschwörung mit einem Siegel” (ʿazīmat al-ḫātam)
Du schreibst folgende Namen auf ein Gefäß, in eine einzige Zeile und Du
schreibst die Namen der Verdächtigen (al-muttahamīn) darüber, jeden Ver-
dächtigen für sich, “X, Sohn der Y”.92 (Dann) befestigst Du ein Silbersiegel an
einem weißen, seidenen Faden. Das hält derjenige fest, der die Fātiḥa93 drei-
170 mal rezitiert (fol. 99 r), (sowie) den Thronvers94 bis ʿalīm,95 | dann šahida llāhu
bis ḥakīm,96 dann quli llahumma mālika l-mulk bis bi-ġayri ḥisāb,97 dann law
anzalnā hāḏā l-Qurʾān bis zu ihrem Ende.98 Die Namen, die Du auf dem Gefäß
in einer Zeile aufschreiben sollst, sind folgende:
91 Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127, fol. 98 v 17–99 v 8.

92 Vgl. dazu Anm. 49.
93 Koran, Sure 1.
94 Koran 2:255 (256).
95 Das Ende von Koran 2:255 (256): “Sein Thron reicht weit über Himmel und Erde. Und es
fällt ihm nicht schwer, sie (vor Schaden) zu bewahren. Er ist der Erhabene und Gewaltige.
2:256 (257): In der Religion gibt es keinen Zwang. Der rechte Weg (des Glaubens) ist (durch
die Verkündigung des Islam) klar geworden, (so dass er sich) von der Verirrung (des heid-
nischen Unglaubens deutlich abhebt). Wer nun an die Götzen (aṭ-ṭāġūt) nicht glaubt, an
Gott aber glaubt, der hält sich (damit) an der festesten Handhabe (fest), bei der es kein
Reißen gibt. Und Gott hört und weiß (alles)”.
96 Koran 3:18 (16) (vollständig).
97 Koran 3:26 (25) – 27 (26).
98 Koran 59:21.
MHMH WA D W R L D M N W S A S A D A R A R M W Y H A W A L L L H M Ḥ
R Ḥ M A K D N M D K R M W N W W L D (oder N) A A Ṣ R D W H R B ʿ Ṭ H A
K D A LK Y Ḥ Y A R D H A L H W R A W Y R Y K M A Y A R H R 699 L K M R 9
W L W N MHMH .100
Dann tust Du (taǧʿal) Wasser in das Gefäß, bis es fast den Abschluss (as-sukr
oder as-sakar)101 erreicht; (so) ist es ein Siegel (zusammen) mit (den genann-
ten Namen), wenn das Wasser (sie) erreicht. Dann hört das Wasser nicht auf,
sich (nach verschiedenen Richtungen) zu wenden ( yatawaǧǧahu) und neigt
sich (schließlich) zu dem Namen des Diebes, so dass Du ihn erkennst, so Gott
will. (Das ist) richtig und erprobt. Jenes ist zu Ende.
In der Handschrift Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127, fol. 99 r 8–14, heißt es:
Ein Abschnitt über die Beschwörung des Diebes
Du schreibst diese (oben genannten) Siegel (ḫātamāt) und Zeichen (dalālāt)

in eine einzige Zeile und der Talisman (soll) eine Zeile sein in einem schma-
len Streifen (sawṭ).102 Du sollst ferner in einem schmalen | Streifen folgende 171
Verse schreiben: Und wenn Ihr das Gebet beendet habt,103 dann geht Eurer Wege
(intaširū) und strebt danach, dass Gott Euch Gunst erweist! Und gedenket unab-
lässig Gottes! Vielleicht wird es Euch (dann) wohl ergehen.104 Und Du sollst
folgenden Vers rezitieren: Ihr Gläubigen! Seid nicht wie diejenigen, die (seiner-
zeit) dem Mose Ungemach zugefügt haben, worauf Gott ihn von den Verdächti-
gungen (?), die sie über ihn äußerten, freisprach! Bei Gott stand er (immer) in
hohem Ansehen (Sure 33:69), ohne dass es dem Gleiches auf dem schmalen
99 Die Zahl 6 und die nachfolgende Zahl 9 entstammen möglicherweise dem Zauberwort
budūḥ (siehe dazu oben), das im magischen Quadrat entweder Zahlen (darunter 6 und 9)
oder die entsprechenden Zahlenbuchstaben enthält.
100 Die aufgezählten Buchstaben enthalten die koranischen “geheimnisvollen” Buchstaben
(vgl. Anm. 21) A (17×), R (13×), L (9×), M (8×), H (7×), Y (5×), N (4×), Ḥ (2×), S (1×), Ṣ (1×), ʿ
(1×), Ṭ (1×); ferner die Buchstaben B (1×), D (9×) und W (14×); fügt man diesen den Buch-
staben Ḥ hinzu, der Teil der koranischen “geheimnisvollen” Buchstaben ist, so haben wir
hier wie oben (Anm. 24) das Zauberwort budūḥ.
101 E. W. Lane I/4, 1391 b “a dam, a thing with which a river, or rivulet is stopped up”.
102 In der Hs. stand ursprünglich wasaṭ, was durchgestrichen ist. – Zu dem Substantiv sawṭ,
das nachfolgend nochmals belegt ist, vgl. E. W. Lane I/4, 1467 b “remaining portion of
water, a road or track of little width between two elevations”.
103 Im Koran steht “das Gebet zu Ende ist” (quḍiyat).
104 Koran 62:10, Übersetzung nach R. Paret.
604 chapter 32
Streifen gibt.105 Du sollst sagen: Beschwörung! Zeige die Freude auf dem
Rücken des Diebes, der Hab und Gut des X, des Sohnes von Y gestohlen hat!
(Die Beschwörung) trifft (den Dieb) in voller Länge und Breite. Die Wirkung
hiervon an ihm (dem Dieb) ist somit erklärt. (Es ist) richtig und sehr erprobt.
Sowie schließlich Daiber Collection III, Hs. 24 (12./18. oder 13./19. Jh.), fol. 52 v 1–
7:
Abschnitt über einen Dieb
Du nimmst reinen Staub und rezitierst über ihm 10mal: “Wenn (über kurz oder
lang) die Hilfe Gottes kommt und der (von Ihm verheißene) Erfolg ( fatḥ) (sich
einstellt).”106 10mal. (Dann) schreibst Du nachfolgende Namen (Zeichen) auf
Papier und verbindest das Papier mit einem schwarzen Lumpen (ḫirqa sawdāʾ)
und hängst es auf. (Dann) bläst sich der Bauch des Diebes auf, sodass er zurück-
lässt, was er gestohlen hatte, so Gott will (bi-ḏni llāh) – erhaben ist Er. Dies sind
die Namen (Zeichen):
(Es folgen 5 “Brillenbuchstaben”).107
105 Bi-lā bazwatin ʿalā s-sawṭ. Zu bazwun “equal, equivalent, or like”. – Ich bin in der Lesung
der Hs. nicht ganz sicher.
106 Koran 110:1.
107 Die sog. “Brillenbuchstaben” werden in unterschiedlichen Formen überliefert und haben
sich bislang einer sicheren Deutung entzogen; vgl. R. Kriss und H. Kriss-Heinrich,
Volksglaube II, S. 81; D. A. M. Pielow, Quellen S. 156–158 und T. Canaan, Decipherment,
S. 167–170; H. A. Winkler, Siegel und Charaktere, S. 163–164 weist auf ihr Vorkommen
in der Antike hin und denkt (wenig überzeugend) an die Keilschrift als Inspirations-
quelle. – Was in unserer Hs. wie die überdimensional großgeschriebene arabische Zahl V
in drei Variationen erscheint, ist bei T. Canaan S. 167 belegt und soll die Zahl 70 bedeu-
ten. – Indessen erscheinen die Brillenbuchstaben unserer jemenitischen Handschrift ins-
gesamt – mit der Ausnahme eines Brillenbuchstabens, in dem ein waagerechter Strich mit
geschlossenem Haken rechts und links mittig von zwei parallel stehenden senkrechten
Strichen mit Haken oben und unten geschnitten wird – auch auf griechischen Zauberpa-
pyri des 4./5. Jahrhunderts AD aus Ägypten: s. K. Preisendanz (Hrsg.), Papyri graecae
magicae II, S. 53 (Pgm X, Zeile 25–35: Mittel gegen Feinde, Ankläger, Räuber, Schreck-
geister, Traumgespenster) mit der Tafel I Abb. 5, sowie Pgm XVIIc = K. Preisendanz II,
S. 140. – K. Preisendanz, Zur synkretistischen Magie, S. 115, weist auf “unerklärliche Zei-
chen oft in buchstabenähnlichen Formen, die ‘Charaktere’” hin, die seit dem 1. Jh. AD
vorkommen und deren Linien “meist” “mit einem kleinen Kreis” enden, der “wohl hier
wie auf vielen Zauberbildern das Entweichen der magischen Energie verhindern soll”.
Zu einem altägyptischen Vorbild siehe Anm. 35. Alternative Erklärungen nennt W. M.
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Summary
Magic and Causality in Islam
The article is devoted to the ideological, Graeco-Hellenistic background of apo-

tropaic magic, i.e., the form of magical practices that make use of amulets and
talismans. Starting point are two Yemenite manuscripts from the 11th/17th and
12th/18th or 13th/19th centuries, which are published here in the original, with
commented translation.
Fundamental is the idea of the power of the Koranic letters and words which
have an apotropaic effect. It appears associated with ancient, pre-Islamic tradi-
tions of the magical effect of knots and stones. The authoritative background is
the notion of a ubiquitous God whose power can be activated by the magician.
Kindī has addressed this in a treatise only preserved in a medieval Latin
translation with the title De radiis, “About the rays”. This text is nothing else
than a theoretical introduction to magic and its philosophy. According to it, the
sun and the stars, but also all the bodies, even the spoken word, emit rays which
ultimately emanate from the divine ubiquity. This concept and the doctrine
of the sympathetic effect of the air ultimately built on the Stoic-Neoplatonic
doctrine of the sympathy of the entire cosmos. There, the immanence and
transcendence of God appear compatible with the assumption of an allperva-
ding basic force – which Kindī calls “rays” – and of a hierarchy of Neoplatonic
intermediate causes which give the omnipresence of Stoic pneuma or hegemo-
nikon a new form. Thus, God remains the distant and unapproachable almighty
God, as manifested in the Qurʾān. At the same time, he is the omnipresent God
who can be conjured up by using amulets and talismans, with letters and words.
Republished, with some modifications, from Die Geheimnisse der oberen und der unte-
ren Welt. Magie im Islam zwischen Glauben und Wissenschaft. Ed. Sebastian Gün-
ther and Dorothee Pielow. Leiden/Boston 2019. = IHC 158, pp. 155–177. By courtesy
of the publisher.
175
Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127 (11./17. Jh.), fol. 97 v–98 r
176
Daiber Collection III, Hs. 127 (11./17. Jh.), fol. 99 v–100 r

610 chapter 32
177
Daiber Collection III, Hs. 24 (12./18. oder 13./19. Jh.), fol. 52 v 1–7
chapter 33
Ibn Rušd, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh
Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Rušd (6th/12th–7th/13th c.) was one of the
sons of the famous philosopher Ibn Rušd (520/1126–595/1198), known in the
West as Averroes. According to the meagre Arabic biographical literature avail-
able, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Rušd worked as a physician of the Almohad caliph
Muḥammad an-Nāṣir (regn. 595/1199–610/1213) in Marrakech (C. S. F. Bur-
nett, pp. 281ff.). The report by Giles of Rome (d. 1316AD) that Muḥammad Ibn
Rušd’s sons “were with the Emperor Frederick [II]” (Egidius Romanus, Quod-
libeta II, quaestio 20) can be taken seriously, although we do not have further
proof of this (C. S. F. Burnett).
ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Rušd wrote two treatises:
– “On the therapeutic method,” which can be identified as an epitome of
Galen’s Methodus medendi, possibly preserved in MS Escorial 884, fol. 76–
78, but attributed there to ʿAbd Allāh’s father, Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rušd.
– “On the intellect”, specifically “On whether the active intellect unites with
the material intellect whilst it is clothed with the body” (Hal yattaṣil | bi-l- 181 b
ʿaql al-hayūlānī al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl wa-huwa multabis bi-l-ǧism).
This philosophical text was translated into Hebrew by Samuel Ibn Tibbon
(d. 1230AD), together with two short treatises by his father Abū l-Walīd Ibn
Rušd (H. Daiber, BIPh I, p. 406) on conjunction of the material intellect with
the active intellect. This translation, together with an Arabic-Latin translation
by an anonymous translator done some time before 1240 AD, testifies to the
interest in the nature of the intellect that existed in the 7th/13th century. The
text, available in its Arabic original together with the Hebrew and Latin ver-
sions (C. S. F. Burnett and M. Zonta), discusses the question whether the
active intellect unites with the material, i.e., the potential intellect with the
body.
ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Rušd attributes to the active intellect the ability to actual-
ize the intellect in habitu, which he explains as “the potential thoughts” (al-
maʿqūlāt bi-l-quwwa). The active intellect “is connected with man, being like
his form (aṣ-ṣūra)”, and as such is the actualization of the intellect in habitu
(al-ʿaql allaḏī bi-l-malaka), which are the potential thoughts. Potentiality for
thinking necessarily turns into actuality of thinking | in the separate, act- 182 a
ive, acquired intellect, which is the perfection and actuality of the first mat-
ter, the potential intellect. This perfection, this form, at the same time is a
potentiality for another form, for another perfection, finally leading to per-

612 chapter 33
fection no longer with potentiality. This increasing perfection is the increas-

ing knowledge in a human being who is “obedient to God and approaches
Him”.
ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Rušd quotes Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, and
presupposes the concept of a human material intellect as something common
to all human beings. Herein, he follows the later position of his father who, in
a growing dissociation from Aristotle and by modifying Ibn Bāǧǧa’s (d. 532/1138
or 533/1139) teaching, had developed this doctrine in his own late treatises (M.
Grignaschi; H. A. Davidson, pp. 258ff. and 295 ff.; K. P. Bland, pp. 1 ff.).
According to this position, the human being is a link between the created world
and the eternal world of the separate intelligences. Therefore, conjunction with
the active intellect means self-apprehension, that is, perception of the mind
(M. Fakhry, pp. 201f.).
Bibliography
Bland, Kalman P.: The Epistle of the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect
by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni. New York 1982.
On Ibn Rušd’s doctrine of the intellect and its influence in the Middle Ages see ref-
erences to literature in H. Daiber, BIPh II, pp. 250f.
Burnett, Charles S. F.: The “Sons of Averroes with the Emperor Frederick” and
the transmission of the philosophical works by Ibn Rušd. In Averroes and the Aris-
totelian Tradition. Sources, constitution and reception of the philosophy of Ibn
Rushd (520/1126–595/1198). Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum,
Cologne 1996. Ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan Aertsen. Leiden/Boston/Cologne
1999, pp. 259–299.
Burnett, Charles S. F. and Mauro Zonta, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ibn Rushd
(Averroes junior), On whether the active intellect unites with the material intellect
whilst it is clothed with the body. A critical edition of the three extant medieval
versions, together with an English translation. In Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et
Littéraire du Moyen Âge 67, 2000, pp. 295–335.
On previous editions see H. Daiber, BIPh II, p. 11.
Daiber, Hans: BIPh
Davidson, Herbert Alan: Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their cos-
mologies, theories of the active intellect, and theories of human intellect. New
York/Oxford 1992.
182 b Fakhry, Majid: Three | varieties of mysticism in Islam. In International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 2, 1971, pp. 193–207.
Grignaschi, Mario: Il miraggio dell’immortalità dell’anima nell’aristotelismo arabo.
ibn rušd, abū muḥammad ʿabd allāh 613
In Yād-nāma in memoria di Alessandro Bausani. Ed. Bianca Maria Scarcia

Amoretti and Lucia Rostagno. I. Rome 1991, pp. 205–217.
Republished, with some modifications, from Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, I, 2009,

pp. 181 a–182 b. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 34
Ṭūsī, Naṣīr ad-Dīn
Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, also
called Muḥaqqiq-i Ṭūsī, Ḫwāǧa-i Ṭūsī or Ḫwāǧa Naṣīr ad-Dīn, the most import-
ant and influential Shiʿite scholar in the fields of mathematics, geometry, astro-
nomy, philosophy and theology, styled in later times al-muʿallim aṯ-ṯāliṯ “the
third teacher” (i.e. after Aristotle and Fārābī).
1 Life
He was born on 11 Ǧumādā I 597 / 17 February 1201 in Ṭūs, in the neighbourhood

of Mashhad, into a family who, according to Ḫwānsārī (Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt. VI,
p. 300, 11), originated from Ǧahrūd Sāwa near Qum(m). He received his imam-
education in Ṭūs and died in Baghdad on 18 Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 672 / 25 June 1274.
746 b Under the guidance of his father Waǧīh ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan
aṭ-Ṭūsī, a respected jurist, Ṭūsī enjoyed his first education in Arabic, Qurʾān,
Hadith, and above all, in jurisprudence following the doctrine of the Shiʿite
ʿAlam al-Hudā aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā (355/965–436/1044), an adversary of the
Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār. His father’s wide range of interests stimulated Ṭūsī
to study the various sciences and doctrines, including philosophy and the
Ismailite doctrine. He continued his studies first at Nīšāpūr, between 610/1213
and 618/1221. Here, Quṭb ad-Dīn al-Miṣrī and Farīd Dāmād, both pupils of Faḫr
ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, were his teachers in mathematics, natural sciences, Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophy and medicine. Leaving Nīšāpūr, Ṭūsī went to Irak, where he stud-
ied jurisprudence with the Shiʿite scholar Muʿīn ad-Dīn Sālim Ibn Badrān al-
Māzinī. Later he studied at Mosul with the mathematician and astronomer
Kamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (551/1156–639/1242; GAL S I, p. 859), who himself had
been a pupil of the scholar Bābā Afḍal.
In 630/1233, after finishing his studies, Ṭūsī found in Sartaḫt, in the province
of Qūhistān, a patron in the Ismailite governor Muḥtašam Nāṣir ad-Dīn ʿAbd
ar-Raḥīm Ibn Abī Manṣūr. Ṭūsī had been studying the Fuṣūl-i muqaddas of the
Nizārī Ismailite imam Ḥasan ʿAlā Ḏikrihī as-Salām (d. 561/1166) and then con-
verted to the Ismailite faith. During this period, he wrote the Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī (s.
below), a work on ethics named after the governor Nāṣir ad-Dīn. The first ver-
sion was finished in 633/1235. Shortly after, about 644/1246, he published his
spiritual autobiography Sayr wa-sulūk, wherein he describes how he came to

ṭūsī, naṣīr ad-dīn 615
turn away from exoteric kalām and to turn to Ismailite esoteric philosophy. In
about 644/1246 we find Ṭūsī in Alamūt, the fortress of the Assassins. It is unclear
whether he travelled there only as a companion of Nāṣir ad-Dīn (thus S. J. H.
Badakhchānī, Naṣīr, p. 5; cf. H. Dabashi, The Philosopher), or whether he
had incurred the disgrace of Nāṣir ad-Dīn and had been banned to Alamūt.
It may have been this, considering the uncertain political situation, and per-
haps also because of his dissatisfaction with the Ismailite surroundings, he had
the ambition of getting admission to the court of the last Abbasid caliph al-
Mustaʿṣim bi-llāh (regn. 640/1243–656/1258) in Baghdad. Anyhow, Ṭūsī stayed
for about twenty years in Alamūt and Maymūndiz. During these long years, he
was able to use the rich library there for his scientific works. In 653/1255 the
Ismailites sent him as a negotiator to Hülegü, the Ḫān of the Mongols, who was
preparing his conquest of Persia. In the face of the hopeless situation of the
Ismailites vis-à-vis the Mongol superiority, Ṭūsī tried to convince the Ismailite
ruler Rukn ad-Dīn Ḫuršāh to submit to the Mongols. In 654/1256 Alamūt fell
into their hands anyway. The shattering of the Ismailite movement was fol-
lowed by the conquest of Baghdad, which Ṭūsī could not prevent (the accounts
about his role are ambiguous, cf. A. Hairi, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī), and was followed
by the fall of the caliphate, detested by the Shiʿites. Ṭūsī accompanied Hülegü
on his conquests in the West, and had to witness both, the fall of Baghdad on
3 Ṣafar 656 / 10 February 1258 and the murder of the caliph. Owing to Ṭūsī and
probably also to Ibn al-ʿAlqamī, the Shiʿite vizier of the last Abbasid caliph, after
their occupation of Mesopotamia the Mongols spared the Shiʿite sanctuaries to
a large extent.
It is possible that Hülegü, already before the conquest of Baghdad, entrusted
Ṭūsī with important duties, such as the administration of all religious founda-
tions (waqf ) and the finances. In 657/1259, almost sixty years old, Ṭūsī | began 747 a
in Marāġa, near Tabrīz, the construction of an observatory whose director he
became. He also prepared the astronomical tables (az-Zīǧ al-Īlḫānī), which
he finished at the age of about seventy under Hülegü’s successor, the Īlḫānid
Abaqa (663/1265–680/1282) (s. F. J. Ragep, EI2 X, 2002, pp. 750–752). During
this period, Ṭūsī was in contact with a great number of scholars who came to
Marāġa, not least because of the rich library which was being built there since
Hülegü had begun to pick up the stores of libraries in Mesopotamia, Bagh-
dad and Syria. In some biographies, the following names of scholars are men-
tioned, who among others are said to have been in Marāġa: Barhebraeus (Abū
l-Faraǧ Ibn al-ʿIbrī), Faḫr ad-Dīn al-Ḫilāṭī / Ḫalāṭī from Tiflis, Faḫr ad-Dīn al-
Marāġī al-Mawṣilī, Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (ʿAbd ar-Razzāq Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad
aš-Šaybānī), Muʾayyad ad-Dīn al-ʿUrḍī ad-Dimašqī, Muḥyī ad-Dīn al-Maġribī
(Ibn Abī š-Šukr), and Naǧm ad-Dīn Dabīrān al-Qazwīnī al-Kātibī (who held a
616 chapter 34
scholarly discussion with Ṭūsī on metaphysical questions, on wāǧib al-wuǧūd

and on logic; → Muṭāraḥāt, the list of Ṭūsī’s works). Missing is here the name
of Quṭb ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī, the most important commentator of the Taḏkira fī
ʿilm al-hayʾa (ed. and transl. F. Jamil Ragep, New York 1993), Ṭūsī’s astronom-
ical work, perhaps because he had criticized aṭ-Ṭūsī’s work, in particular in the
field of philosophy, and because he is said to have denounced him to Hülegü (E.
Wiedemann, Aufsätze, p. 711). For an unknown reason Ṭūsī, shortly before his
death, left Marāġa “with many of his pupils and followers” and went to Baghdad,
where he died some months later (Kutubī, III, p. 251, 12–13). He is said to have
been buried there, according to his testament, near the tomb of Mūsā al-Kāẓim.
2 Ṭūsī as Theologian and Philosopher
Ṭūsī was an extraordinarily prolific scholar. The list of his extensive œuvre
shows titles on astronomy, astrology, geomancy, mathematics, physics, min-
eralogy, medicine, jurisprudence, philosophy including logic, mysticism, and
theology (E. Wiedemann, Aufsätze, pp. 707–727; GAL I; M. Z. Mudarrisī,
Sarguḏašt; M. T. M. Raḍawī, Aḥwāl; M. Muʿīn, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī).
Ṭūsī wrote the greater part of his philosophical works in an Ismailite envir-
onment. His first patron, the above-mentioned Ismailite governor Muḥtašam
Nāṣir ad-Dīn ʿAbd ar-Raḥīm, was particularly interested in ethics. On his behalf,
Ṭūsī translated into Persian al-Adab al-waǧīz li-l-walad aṣ-ṣaġīr of Ibn al-Muqaf-
faʿ, a small treatise on the correct behaviour of children, of which the authen-
ticity is doubtful. Cf. GAL S I, p. 236 no. 6; M. T. Dānišpažūh in his edition of the
Aḫlāq-i Muḥtašamī; the table of contents in H. Dabashi, Khwājah, pp. 561–562.
Muḥtašam also requested Ṭūsī to finish a draft of practical ethics, which he had
conceived and begun. This Aḫlāq-i Muḥtašamī, based on Muḥtašam’s concept
and notes, composed around 630/1233 and published under Ṭūsī’s name, exists
in an Arabic version (ed. Beirut 1981), to which in the original a Persian trans-
lation is attached, published by M. T. Dānišpažūh, Tehran 1960 and 1982. It
consists of forty chapters, dealing first with the knowledge of God, with proph-
ecy and the imamate, then mainly with the virtues of the pious and the Sufi,
described in each chapter one after the other with references from Qurʾān,
Hadith and Sunna, from poetry and the sayings of “wise people/philosophers
and Ismailite propagandists” (al-ḥukamāʾ wa-d-duʿāt) (cf. H. Dabashi, Khwā-
jah, pp. 559–561). It has been surmised that the work was composed as a guide
for preachers and teachers (S. J. H. Badakhchānī, Naṣīr, pp. 57–58).
747 b Ṭūsī’s ethical work Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī, written two years later for Muḥtašam |
Nāṣir ad-Dīn, has a more philosophical character. Two decades later, after
the rupture with the Ismailites, Ṭūsī published it once more with a different
beginning and different conclusions, and without the dedication to Muḥtašam
Nāṣir ad-Dīn (cf. S. J. H. Badakhchānī, Naṣīr, p. 61 n. 30). Just like the little-
known Gušāyiš-nāma, which deals with the esoterical aspects of ethical vir-
tues, the Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī is written in the spirit of Ismailite ideology. Its first
part is based on Miskawayh’s ethical work Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq, which in turn is
marked by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but also by Platonic and Neopla-
tonic teachings (M. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, pp. 107–130). The first part is
followed by two sections on domestic economy (tadbīr al-manzil) and polit-
ics (siyāsat al-mudun), in which Ṭūsī mainly used Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb as-Siyāsa,
Bryson’s Oikonomikos, Fārābī’s as-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, the latter’s Fuṣūl al-
madanī, and Miskawayh’s al-Ḥikma al-ḫālida (cf. W. Madelung, Naṣīr al-Dīn;
the analytical table of contents in D. M. Donaldson, Studies, pp. 169–182;
M. Fakhry, Ethical Theories, pp. 131–142; H. Dabashi, Khwājah, pp. 562–568).
Because of its practical orientation, his work has had a lasting influence and
has increasingly been popularized: Cf. 1) Daw(w)ānī, Aḫlāq-i Ǧalālī (= Lawāmīʿ
al-išrāq fī makārim al-aḫlāq). – 2) Īǧī, Risālat al-Aḫlāq (unpublished; Encyclo-
paedia Iranica I/2, 1985, pp. 722–723). – 3) Kāšifī, Aḫlāq-i Muḥsinī. – 4) Aḥmad
Ibn Muḥammad Mahdī an-Narāqī, Miʿrāǧ as-saʿāda (lithogr. Tehran 1883, new
ed. 1993): On the contents of this work, which is a slightly revised Persian trans-
lation of his father’s Ǧāmiʿ as-saʿādāt. Ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Kalantar.
I–III. Beirut 1985 → D. M. Donaldson, Studies, pp. 190–192. Cf. the article by
Jalal ad-Din Mojtabavi – who translated the Ǧāmiʿ as-saʿādāt into Per-
sian – on “Religious ethics and Naraqi’s innovations in his moral book, Jāmiʿ
al-Saʿādāt (The collection of felicities)”. In Contacts Between Cultures. Selec-
ted papers from the 33rd International Congress of Asian and North African
Studies, Toronto, August 15–25, 1990. Ed. Amir Harrak. Lewiston/Queen-
ston/Lampeter 1992, pp. 351–352; J. R. I. Cole, Ideology, pp. 7 ff. – 5) ʿUbayd
az-Zākānī, Aḫlāq al-ašrāf, composed in 740/1340–1341; cf. Encyclopaedia Iran-
ica I/2, 1985, p. 723.
Probably, the most important testimony to Ṭūsī’s Ismailite-oriented philo-
sophy is his Rawḍat at-taslīm yā taṣawwurāt, an ethico-eschatological guide
for travelling from the physical to the spiritual world. Following the Neopla-
tonic doctrine of emanation, the work contains a description of Ismailite
cosmology. The will of the unknowable Divinity, His “command” (amr) and
“word” (kalima), embodied in the imam or in the latter’s prototype ʿAlī Ibn
Abī Ṭālib, communicate themselves through “emanation” ( fayḍ) to the first
intellect, to the ʿaql al-faʿʿāl or to the ḥuǧǧa, whose prototype is Salmān al-
Fārisī; from this emanates the “universal soul” (nafs-i kullī), the dāʿī, i.e. Prophet
Mohammed, followed by the human soul. Linked to this cosmology appears
618 chapter 34
the Ismailite theory of the imamate, the doctrine of satr, the period of conceal-
ment of ḥaqīqa in the bāṭin and qiyāma, the period of the qāʾim who possesses
truth (cf. F. Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs, pp. 409ff.). The fact, that the imam neces-
sarily possesses complete knowledge, makes compulsory both his existence
and the total self-surrender to him. A prerequisite is the observation of the reli-
gious duties, not only by following the Sharia, but also in an esoteric way and
in the ascent of the soul from the position of potentiality to “the perfection of
the ascertainment of the reasoned knowledge” (kamāl-i ṭaḥqīq ʿilm-i ʿaqlī) (cf.
Rawḍat at-taslīm, taṣawwuf no. XXVI).
In about 664/1264 Ṭūsī expressed his views on the theme of ethics for the last
time, now in the spirit of the Sufis, whose movement became popular in the
period of the Mongols. At the request of the vizier Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad
748 a Ǧuwaynī, he composed | the treatise Awṣāf al-ašrāf, a guide for the Sufi on
his path from “faith” (īmān) to “union” (waḥda) and “extinction” ( fanāʾ) of the
self into God (W. Madelung, Naṣīr al-Dīn, pp. 98–101; H. Dabashi, Khwājah,
pp. 568–569; R. Strothmann, Die Zwölfer-Schīʿa, pp. 68–77). The approach to
God here results from the behaviour of the Sufi, whereas the “correspondence”
(murāsalāt) between Ṣadr ad-Dīn al-Qūnawī and Ṭūsī (ed. G. Schubert) deals
with the relation between philosophical and mystical knowledge of God.
In this correspondence, which perhaps took place during Ṭūsī’s stay in
Marāġa and was criticized by the Hanbalite theologian Ibn Taymiyya (→ T.
Michel, Ibn Taymiyya’s Critique, p. 12), Ṭūsī, among other things, responds to
Ṣadr ad-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s question about how it is possible that many things can
emerge out of one thing, although from one thing only one thing can emerge
(G. Schubert, Annäherungen, pp. 31–32; W. C. Chittick, Mysticism; N. L.
Heer, Al-Rāzī and Al-Ṭūsī). Ṭūsī’s arguments are based on the Neoplatonic doc-
trine of emanation, according to which plurality is the result of many causes
which presuppose one another, but which in the end go back to only one cause.
This problem, which Ṭūsī during his lifetime treated in different ways (cf. B. H.
Siddiqi, Naṣīr, pp. 577–578), is already found in his commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s
al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt, in which he defends Ibn Sīnā against Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-
Rāzī, that is to say in his Ḥall muškilāt al-Išārāt (III, pp. 244–245; cf. N. L. Heer,
Al-Rāzī and Al-Ṭūsī), composed around 644/1246 at the request of Muḥtašam
Šihāb ad-Dīn. It is also found in his Risāla fī l-ʿilal wa-l-maʿlūlāt, and again
extensively in a letter written in Ḏu l-Qaʿdā 666 / July 1268 and addressed to the
judge of Herat (ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh, Sih guftār, pp. 6–13), and finally in his
Maṣārīʿ al-Muṣāriʿ, a refutation of Šahrastānī’s al-Muṣāraʿa, in which Šahrastānī
had criticized Ibn Sīnā’s notion of God and his ontology. Among other things,
he had attacked Ibn Sīnā’s thesis according to which only one being can emerge
from the absolute unique One (cf. W. Madelung, Aš-Šahrastānīs Streitschrift,
esp. pp. 254–255; W. Madelung, Aspects; A. Hartmann, Ismāʿīlitische Theo-

logie, pp. 199–200).
Ṭūsī must have written this refutation of Šahrastānī’s Ismailite doctrine at
a later stage of his life, when he had turned away from the Ismāʿīliyya, that
is to say after 254/1256, when Alamūt fell into the hands of the Mongols. Ibn
Sīnā’s metaphysics come to the fore, taking the place of the Ismailite norm
of the prophets. It forms the basis of Ṭūsī’s theology (cf. H. Dabashi, Khwā-
jah, pp. 555–557), namely of the Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid, and of the Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād.
The latter work has become authoritative in Twelver Shiʿa circles and has been
commented upon several times (s. below the list of works). In this context, it
is important to note, that Ṭūsī, notwithstanding his growing sympathy for the
Twelver Shiʿa (cf. also his Iʿtiqādiyya, a summary of undisputed Shiʿite doctrines
→ H. Dabashi, Khwājah, p. 557), remained faithful to many Ismailite doctrines.
This is shown e.g. by the Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid, partly a rendering into Arabic of
what he had said earlier in his Ismailite-influenced autobiography Sayr wa-
sulūk.
Yet, even Ṭūsī’s last work, the Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal written in 669/1271, an epi-
tomizing commentary on Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqad-
dimīn wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn, still
defends the Ismailite doctrine of taʿlīm and rejects the Shiʿite doctrine accord-
ing to which the naṣṣ (designation) of the imam can be cancelled by badāʾ
(changeability of God’s will). The Ismailite and Shiʿite inheritance does not
obscure the fact, that Ṭūsī has become an important pioneer for Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophy; modifications in details can be detected here (cf. ʿA. Q. Qārāʾī and
M. Qārāʾī, Post-Ibn Rushd, pp. 29–30, where Ṭūsī’s sympathies for the Šayḫ
al-Išrāq as-Suhrawardī are mentioned). As witnesses of Ibn Sīnā’s | influence 748 b
may be mentioned his Maṣārīʿ al-Muṣāriʿ, Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād, Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid
and, above all, Ḥall muškilāt al-Išārāt; furthermore, Ṭūsī’s Persian representa-
tion of Porphyry’s Isagoge and of Aristotle’s logic, the Asās al-iqtibās (for the
concept of substance in this work → P. Morewedge, Analysis of “Substance”).
Fourteen years later, Ṭūsī composed in Arabic a considerably shortened version
under the title Taǧrīd al-manṭiq. It is therefore not surprising, that the Hanbal-
ite theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya followed the criticism of his teacher Ibn
Taymiyya (s. above) and that he, in his Iġāṯat al-lahfān min maṣāyid aš-šayṭān,
considered Ṭūsī as the most pernicious hidden atheist, for whom the Qurʾān
is said to have been “the scripture of the masses”, Qurʾān al-ʿawāmm, but Ibn
Sīnā’s works “the scripture of the elite”, Qurʾān al-ḫawāṣṣ (M. Perlmann, Ibn
Qayyim, p. 334; cf. W. Madelung, Aš-Šahrastānīs Streitschrift, p. 258 n. 8).
620 chapter 34
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622 chapter 34
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Contains the answer on questions about logic, posed by Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī.
an-Nafs lā tafsudu bi-fasād al-badan. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 524, 1–10.
an-Nafs taṣīru ʿālaman ʿaqliyyan. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 524, 11–16.
[an-Nufūs al-arḍiyya]. Qawl fī n-nufūs wa-quwāhā min kalāmihi: an-nufūs al-arḍiyya
nabātiyya ḥayawāniyya wa-nāṭiqa. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 497–500.
Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 434–468.
Rabṭ al-ḥādiṯ bi-l-qadīm. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 482–484.

Also in → M. Z. Mudarrisī, Sarguḏašt, pp. 179–181.
Radd ʿalā munāqašāt al-Kātibī → Muṭāraḥāt falsafiyya
Rawḍat at-taslīm yā taṣawwurāt. Persian text, ed. and transl. by Vladimir A. Ivanow.
Leiden 1950.
New ed. and transl. by Seyyed Jalal Hosseini Badakhchani, The Paradise of
Submission. London 1999. – Originally a thesis in Oxford 1989.
French transl. by Christian Jambet, La convocation d’Alamut. Lagrasse 1996.
ar-Risāla an-|Naṣīriyya → Fuṣūl-i Ḫwāǧa-i Ṭūsī 749 b
Risāla andar qismat-i mawǧūdāt. In → Maǧmūʿa-i rasāʾil (ed.) → P. Morewedge, Meta-
physics (ed. with Engl. transl.)
Risāla fī l-ʿilal wa-l-maʿlūlāt. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 509–515. → Sih guftār, pp. 13–
20.
Risāla fī l-ʿilm al-ladunī wa-l-kasbī. In Mullā Ṣadrā, Kitāb al-Mašāʿir. Ed. Muḥammad
Bāqir Qāšānī. Lithogr. ed. Tehran 1880. = Risāla fī l-ʿilm al-iktisābī wa-l-ladunī (=
Risāla fī l-ʿilm wa-l-ʿālim wa-l-maʿlūm). In → M. Z. Mudarrisī, Sarguḏašt, pp. 172–174.
Risāla fī l-ʿilm bi-l-ǧuzʾiyāt. In → Sih guftār, pp. 10–13.
Risāla fī taḥqīq baqāʾ an-nafs al-insānī baʿd ḫarāb al-badan → Risālat Baqāʾ an-nafs
Risāla-i ǧabr wa-qadar → Maǧmūʿa-i rasāʾil (ed.) → P. Morewedge, Metaphysics (ed.
with Engl. transl.)
Risāla-i iṯbāt-i wāǧib → Maǧmūʿa-i rasāʾil → P. Morewedge, Metaphysics (ed. with Engl.
transl.)
Risāla-i mūsīqī-i Ḫwāǧa Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī. Ed. Dāwūd Iṣfahāniyān. In Farhang-i Irān-
zamīn 26, 1986, pp. 245–252.
Arabic version: Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, Risāla fī ʿilm al-mūsīqī. Ed. Zakariyāʾ Yūsuf.
Cairo 1964.
Risāla-i rusūm-i pāǧāhān-i qadīm wa-ṭarz-i guftan-i māliyāt → Maǧmūʿa-i rasāʾil, pp. 28–
35.
Risāla muḫtaṣara fī l-ʿaqāʾid → Aqall mā yaǧibu iʿtiqāduhū
Risālat al-Imāma. Ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh. Tehran 1956.
Also ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nūrānī. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 423–433.
Cf. Bianca Maria Scarcia Amoretti, La “Risālat al-Imāma”; Seyyed Jalal
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Risālat Baqāʾ an-nafs baʿd al-mawt / fanāʾ al-ǧasad, with commentary by ʿAbd Allāh
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1342/1923–1924.
Also ed. Tehran 1894.
Ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nūrānī. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 485–490, also entitled Baqāʾ
an-nafs baʿd bawār al-badan and Risāla fī taḥqīq baqāʾ an-nafs al-insānī baʿd ḫarāb
al-badan.
624 chapter 34
Šarḥ al-išārāt → Ḥall muškilāt

Šarḥ masʾalat al-ʿilm. Ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nūrānī. Mashhad 1965.
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Šarḥ Risālat Ibn Sīnā fī anna li-kull ḥayawān wa-nabāt aṣlan ṯābitan. In → Talḫīṣ al-
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Sayr wa-sulūk → Maǧmūʿa-i rasāʾil (ed.) → S. J. H. Badakhchani, Naṣīr al-Dīn
Ṭūsī
Sih guftār dar bāra-i čigūnagī-i padīd āmadan-i čand čīz az yakī wa-sāziš-i ān bā qāʿida-
i “āfarīda na-šudan-i bisyār az yakī” yā “al-wāḥid lā yaṣdur ʿanhū illā al-wāḥid” – “Ex
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Ṣudūr al-kaṯra → Kayfiyyat ṣudūr al-kaṯra
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taʿdīl al-asrār, on logic.
Tafsīr Sūrat al-ʿAṣr. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 520, 18–24.
Also in → M. Z. Mudarrisī, Sarguḏašt, p. 131, 14–19.
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Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād / al-kalām, with commentary by ʿAbd ar-Razzāq al-Lāhīǧī, Šawāriq al-
ilhām fī šarḥ Taǧrīd al-kalām. 2 vols. Repr. of the lithogr. ed. Tehran/Isfahan n.d.
GAL S I, p. 927, mentions four lithographic editions, published in Tehran 1267, 1280,
1299, 1311.
On Lāhīǧī → GAL S II, p. 590.
Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād / al-kalām, with commentary by Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Kašf al-
murād fī šarḥ Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād. Qum n.d.
Also ed. and transl. into Persian by Abū l-Ḥasan aš-Šaʿrānī. Tehran 1398/1977.
Printed Beirut 1988.
Ed. ʿAbbās Muḥammad Ḥasan. Alexandria 1994.
On previous eds. and commentaries → GAL S I, pp. 925–927.
Taǧrīd al-manṭiq. Beirut 1988.
Talfīq fī n-nafy wa-l-iṯbāt. Ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh, Guftārī az Ḫwāǧa-i Ṭūsī
dar bāra-i nabūd wa-būd. In Maǧalla-i Dāniškāda-i adabiyyāt 3/4, Tehran 1957, pp. 11–
42.
Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, together with thirty philosophical and theological treatises. Ed.
750 a ʿAbd Allāh Nūrānī. | Tehran 1980.
Also ed. in the margins of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-
l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn. Cairo 1905.
Also ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd ar-Raʾūf Saʿd. Cairo 1979.

On a German paraphrase and shortened translation of Rāzī’s Muḥaṣṣal and Ṭūsī’s
Talḫīṣ → M. Horten, Die philosophischen Ansichten → M. Horten, Die spekulative
und positive Theologie
Taʿlīqa ʿalā Risālat Ibn Maymūn fī radd Ǧālīnūs. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, pp. 507–508.
Taʿlīqāt aṭ-Ṭūsī ʿalā mabāḥiṯ Risālat al-Kātibī → Muṭāraḥāt falsafiyya
Ṯanāʾ al-mawǧūdāt bi-wuǧūdihim ʿalā llāh subḥānahū. Fāʾida. In → Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal,
p. 520, 1–6.
Tawallā wa-tabarrā. Tehran 1960.
Also in → Aḫlāq-i Muḥtašamī, 1960, pp. 562–570.
Also in → S. J. H. Badakhchani, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, pp. 17–18.
Treatise, titleless, in Arabic, on the necessity of death. In → M. Z. Mudarrisī, Sargu-
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chapter 35
Ibn Khaldūn
Leben und Werk
ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσοντα τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόν-

των ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι,
ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμα τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνι-
σμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.
Thukydides, Der Peloponnesische Krieg, I.22.41
∵
I Ibn Khaldūns Leben als Spiegelbild seiner Zeit 629 – II Ibn Khaldūns Geschichtswerk
und Weltbild 636 – II.1 Ibn Khaldūns “Prolegomenon” zur Weltgeschichte 637 – II.2 Ibn
Khaldūns Geschichtsphilosophie 639 – II.3 Islam und Religion als prägender Faktor
oder Werkzeug der Geschichte? 642 – III Der Einfluss des Ibn Khaldūn 647 – IV Kon-
kordanz 653 – V Die Weltkarte des Ibn Khaldūn 656 – Summary 657 – Supplementary
Remarks 657
I Ibn Khaldūns Leben als Spiegelbild seiner Zeit
In der Muqaddima,2 einer theoretischen “Einleitung” zu seinem Geschichts-

werk mit dem Titel Lehrbuch und Sammlung über die Anfänge und (nach-
1 Wer aber den Willen haben wird, sich ein truglos klares Bild vor Augen zu führen von dem, was
gewesen ist und von dem, was – gemäß der menschlichen Natur – wieder einmal so oder ähnlich
sein wird – wenn dieser mein Werk für nützlich erachtet, wird mir das genügen. Als Besitz-
tum für immer, eher denn als Bravourstück für sofortiges Zuhören, ist es geschaffen. – Diese
Übersetzung des Thukydides (zw. 460 und 454–nach 403AC) folgt, leicht verändert, der zwei-
sprachigen Ausgabe v. Michael Weißenberger. Berlin/Boston 2017. Mit einer Einleitung
v. Antonios Rengakos. – Der Satz des Thukydides könnte, so oder ähnlich, auch von Ibn
Khaldūn stammen. Er hat allerdings den Begriff “gemäß der menschlichen Natur” (κατὰ τὸ
ἀνθρώπινον) in unvergleichlicher Weise, ebenfalls im Rahmen einer zyklischen Geschichts-
theorie, weiter ausgearbeitet.
2 Wir benutzen hier zusätzlich zur Faksimile-Teiledition, die dem Sammelband über Ibn Khal-

630 chapter 35
folgende) Geschichte der Araber, Nichtaraber, Berber und der zeitgenössischen

mächtigsten Herrscher hat Ibn Khaldūn / Ḫaldūn zahlreiche Reflexionen über
Staat und Gesellschaft niedergelegt, die noch heute unsere Aufmerksamkeit
verdienen. Einen ersten Entwurf hat er im Jahre 1377, in seinem 45. Lebens-
jahr abgeschlossen, während eines vierjährigen Aufenthaltes in dem einsam
gelegenen Schloss Qalʿat Ibn Salāma in der Provinz Oran, wohin er sich zur
Niederschrift seiner Weltgeschichte zurückgezogen hatte.
Seine eigenen Schicksalsschläge, die nicht zuletzt eine Folge der politischen
Unstabilität seiner Zeit waren, veranlassten ihn zu theoretischen Überlegun-
gen über die Grundlagen eines Staates. Ibn Khaldūn erscheint nicht wesentlich
beeinflusst von den politischen Theorien der Griechen, weder von Aristoteles’
Politik, noch von Platons Politik und Gesetze oder Averroes’ Bearbeitung von
Platons Republik, noch von der Kreislauftheorie eines Thukydides oder Poly-
bios.
Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken sind nicht von der Geschichte seiner Zeit zu tren-
nen. Da er politisch aktiv gewesen ist und seine Beziehungen zu den Herr-
schern seiner Zeit ebenso wechselten wie die Machtstellung dieser Herrscher,
bietet seine Biographie eine unmittelbare Einsicht in den historischen Hinter-
grund, aus dem heraus er seine Einsichten in die Zusammenhänge von Staat
und Wirtschaft entwickelt hat. Sie lässt sich relativ gut rekonstruieren aus
34 seiner Autobiographie,3 aus der Muqaddima, | und aus der späteren biogra-
phischen Literatur.4 Ibn Khaldūn, dessen vollständiger Name Abū Zayd ʿAbd
dun in der Sammlung Klassiker der Nationalökonomie beigefügt ist und dem dieser Bei-
trag entnommen ist, die Ausgabe von Étienne Marc Quatremère, Prolégomènes d’Ebn-
Khaldoun. Texte arabe, publié d’ après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale. I–III. Paris
1858 / Nachdr. Beirut 1970. Dazu werden folgende deutsche Auswahlübersetzungen herange-
zogen: Annemarie Schimmel, Ibn Chaldun, Ausgewählte Abschnitte aus der muqaddima.
Tübingen 1951. = Civitas gentium 8. – Mathias Pätzold, Ibn Khaldūn. Buch der Beispiele.
Die Einführung – al-Muqaddima. Leipzig 1992. = Reclam-Bibliothek 1440. Für die Textteile,
die dort nicht übersetzt sind, wird auf die vollständige Übersetzung von Franz Rosen-
thal (s.u.) verwiesen. – Zu weiteren Editionen und Übersetzungen in westliche Sprachen s.
Hans Daiber, BIPh I, S. 446 f. – Ältere (Teil-)Übersetzungen und (Teil-)Editionen zählen auf:
Nathaniel Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist and Philosopher. New York 1930 /
21967 / Nachdr. Lahore 1978, S. 54–56 und 57–60, und Franz Rosenthal (Übers.), Ibn Khal-
dūn. The Muqaddimah. I–III. London/New York 1958. = Bollingen Series XLIII, Bd. I, S. C ff.
3 at-Taʿrīf bi-Ibn Ḫaldūn wa-riḥlatuhū ġarban wa-šarqan. Hrsg. v. Tawit at-Tanǧi. Kairo 1951
/ Franz. Übers. v. Abdesselam Cheddadi, Le voyage d’occident et d’orient: autobiographie.
Paris 21995.
4 Vgl. die Hinweise bei F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. XXIX–XXXIII. – Franz
Rosenthal, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Biography Revisited”. In Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund
Bosworth. Hrsg. v. Ian Netton. I. Leiden/Boston/Köln 2000, S. 40–63.
ibn khaldūn 631
ar-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn Walī ad-Dīn at-Tūnisī al-Ḥaḍramī

al-Išbīlī al-Mālikī lautet, wurde am 27. Mai 1332 in Tunis geboren. Wie der
Namensteil al-Ḥaḍramī anzeigt, stammten seine Vorfahren aus Südarabien, aus
dem Hadramaut. Sie emigrierten im 8. Jahrhundert AD nach Spanien, wo sie
sich schließlich in Sevilla niederließen. Die meisten von Ibn Khaldūns Vorfah-
ren waren gebildete Leute, die leitende Funktionen innehatten. Doch im Zuge
der Reconquista kamen die muslimischen Eroberer Spaniens zunehmend in
Bedrängnis. Die Familie Khaldūns verließ bereits vor der Eroberung durch die
Christen (1248AD) Sevilla und emigrierte nach Nordwestafrika, wo sie fami-
liäre Bande zu dem Gründer der Hafsidendynastie Abū Zakariyāʾ Yaḥyā (reg.
1228–1249AD) hatte. Die meiste Zeit weilte sie in Tunis. Ibn Khaldūns Vater
genoss dort großes Ansehen als Kenner des Korans, des islamischen Rechts,
der Grammatik und der Poesie. Sein Interesse an einer gründlichen Ausbildung
seiner Kinder und seine Beziehungen zur Hafsidendynastie legten die Grund-
lage für Ibn Khaldūns Kombination von Gelehrsamkeit und staatsmännischer
Einsicht. Ibn Khaldūn erlernte bei seinem Vater das Arabische, folgte einer tra-
ditionellen Ausbildung in den Koran- und Traditionswissenschaften sowie in
Jurisprudenz und Poesie.
Einen tiefen Eindruck macht auf Ibn Khaldūns zyklisches Geschichtsden-
ken wohl das wechselhafte Schicksal der Hafsidendynastie in Tunis. Ihre Geg-
ner sind die merinidischen Herrscher von Fez, die wiederholt Tunesien angrei-
fen. Im Zuge der Eroberung von Tunis im Jahre 1347AD durch den merinidi-
schen Herrscher Abū l-Ḥasan kommen zahlreiche Gelehrte nach Tunis, die zu
Lehrern des damals 15jährigen Ibn Khaldūn werden. Viele dieser Lehrer wer-
den Opfer der Pestepidemie, die in den Jahren 1348/49AD Tunis heimsucht,
und der auch seine Eltren zum Opfer fallen. Dennoch und trotz der damali-
gen politischen Instabilität – die hafsidischen Regenten von Tunis stehen unter
der Kontrolle des Almohaden Abū Muḥammad Ibn Tāfrāgīn5 – gelingt es Ibn
Khaldūn, eine wichtige Position am Hofe in Tunis zu bekommen, nämlich als
Unterschriftsberechtigter (Ṣāḥib al-ʿAlāma), wodurch er zumindest in beraten-
der Funktion in alle Regierungsgeschäfte eingeweiht ist.
Trotz dieser guten Aussichten auf eine politische Karriere in Tunis nutzt er
die Beziehungen seiner Familie zu den merinidischen Herrschern in Fez. Im
Jahre 1354AD folgt er einer Einladung des dortigen merinidischen Herrschers
Abū ʿInān, der die Wissenschaften fördert und um sich einen Kreis von Gelehr-
ten versammelt. Dies versetzt Ibn Khaldūn in die Lage, im Kontakt mit zahl-
reichen Gelehrten seine Ausbildung zu vervollkommnen. Ibn Khaldūn bleibt
5 Vgl. F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. XLI, und III, S. 427ff.
632 chapter 35
neun Jahre am merinidischen Hofe in Fez, wo er für kurze Zeit als Sekretär in
35 der Verwaltung tätig ist. Doch seine | damals entstehende Freundschaft zu dem
Hafsiden Abū ʿAbd Allāh wird zum großen Ärgernis für Abū ʿInān. Dieser wirft
ihn am 10. Februar 1357 ins Gefängnis und schickt sich kurz danach an, Tune-
sien zu erobern. Ibn Khaldūn muss 21 Monate im Gefängnis verbringen, erst
Abū ʿInāns Tod am 27. November 1358 beschert ihm die Freiheit. In den folgen-
den Streitigkeiten um die Nachfolge beteiligt sich Ibn Khaldūn an den zahlrei-
chen Hofintrigen. Er unterstützt Abū ʿInāns Bruder Abū Sālim, der im Juli 1359
zum Herrscher Marokkos wird. Dieser macht Ibn Khaldūn zum Dank für seine
Unterstützung zum Staatssekretär und beauftragt ihn später mit der Rechtspre-
chung in Fällen, die nicht durch das muslimische Gesetz geregelt sind.
Nach dem Tode Abū Sālims, während einer Revolte ziviler und militärischer
Beamter im Herbst 1361, fühlt sich Ibn Khaldūn nicht mehr sicher. Er verlässt
Fez und reist nach Granada, wo er am 26. Dezember 1362 ankommt. Dort wird
er als ehemaliger Staatssekretär des Abū Sālim von dem nasridischen Herr-
scher Muḥammad V. freundlich empfangen. Dies als Belohnung für frühere
Dienste, die ihm Ibn Khaldūn in Fez erwiesen hatte und die ihm geholfen hat-
ten, seine Herrschaft in Granada zu erneuern. Muḥammad V. beauftragt ihn
mit der Ratifizierung eines Friedensvertrages zwischen Kastilien und den Mus-
limen. Der christliche Herrscher, Pedro der Grausame, bietet ihm bei dieser
Gelegenheit an, in seine Dienste zu treten und ihm sodann die Besitztümer
der Khaldūnfamilie in Sevilla zurückzugeben. Ibn Khaldūn lehnt ab und kehrt
nach Granada zurück, wo er sich zunächst sicher fühlt.
Doch nach kurzer Zeit entsteht zwischen ihm und seinem Freund, dem
Wezir Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb, eine Rivalität, die schließlich zum Bruch des Kontaktes zwi-
schen beiden führt. Ibn Khaldūn nimmt die Einladung seines alten Freundes,
des Hafsiden Abū ʿAbd Allāh an, der im Juni 1364 die Kontrolle über Bougie
zurückgewonnen hatte. Im März 1365 kommt Ibn Khaldūn in Bougie an, wo er
den Posten eines “Kämmerers” (ḥāǧib) übernimmt und nebenher juristische
Vorlesungen hält. Doch nach der militärischen Niederlage Abū ʿAbd Allāhs, der
sich nicht gegen seinen Vetter Abū l-ʿAbbās, den Herrscher von Constantine,
durchsetzen kann und im Mai 1366 umkommt, wechselt Ibn Khaldūn zu Abū
l-ʿAbbās, in der Hoffnung, seine Position behalten zu dürfen. Da sich jedoch
kein richtiges Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen beiden entwickelt, entschließt
sich Ibn Khaldūn, seine alten im Jahre 1352 erstmals geknüpften Kontakte mit
dem arabischen Stamm der Riyāḥ-Dawāwida zu erneuern und lässt sich in Bis-
kra nieder. Zunehmend enttäuscht vom “Sumpf der Politik”6 lehnt er eine Ein-
6 at-Taʿrīf, ed. T. at-Tanǧī (s. Anm. 3), S. 143. – Zit. F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S.
LI.
ibn khaldūn 633
ladung von Abū Ḥammū, des Herrschers von Tlemcen ab und nimmt zunächst
eine abwartende Haltung ein. Wie richtig seine Entscheidung war, wird durch
den siegreichen Vormarsch des merinidischen Herrschers von Fez | ʿAbd al- 36
ʿAzīz (reg. 1366–1372AD) auf Tlemcen im Jahre 1370 bestätigt. Doch da Ibn Khal-
dūn seit Abū Sālims Tod (1361AD) ein gespanntes Verhältnis zu den Meriniden
hat, beschließt er, nach Spanien zu gehen. Er wird durch ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz daran
gehindert, der ihn zum Kontaktmann zu den arabischen Stämmen macht. Als
er nach zweijähriger Tätigkeit am 11. September 1372 mit seiner Familie Bis-
kra verlässt, um, einer Aufforderung des ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz folgend, nach Fez zu
wechseln, erreicht ihn die Nachricht vom Tod des ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Er setzt seine
Reise dennoch fort, beschließt aber nach seiner Ankunft in Fez angesichts
des dortigen politischen Chaos nach Spanien auszuweichen. Mit viel Mühe
gelingt es ihm schließlich im Herbst des Jahres 1374, gegen den Widerstand
der Herrscher in Fez, nach Granada zu reisen, wird aber von dort auf Anwei-
sung der Regierung in Fez zurückgeschickt. Auf dem Rückweg kommt er mit
Abū Ḥammū in Kontakt, der die Kontrolle über Tlemcen wiedererlangt hat und
ihm anbietet, eine politische Mission zu den Dawāwida-Arabern auszuführen.
Doch Ibn Khaldūn, der Politik überdrüssig, ergreift die Gelegenheit, sich unter
den Schutz eines Nomadenstammes zu stellen und sich ganz vom öffentlichen
Leben abzuwenden. Er geht mit seiner Familie in die einsam gelegene Burg
Qalʿat Ibn Salāma in der Provinz Oran. Dort hält er sich über drei Jahre auf
und beginnt, seine Weltgeschichte niederzuschreiben. Zunächst vollendet er
die “Einleitung” zu diesem Werk (November 1377), hat aber dann Mühe, das
eigentliche Werk, seine Geschichtsdarstellung zu schreiben, da er keine Biblio-
thek zur Verfügung hat. Im Winter 1378 verlässt er Qalʿat Ibn Salāma und kommt
im November oder Dezember 1378 in Tunis an, wo er sich viel von den dortigen
Bibliotheken verspricht. Zuvor hat er mit dem dortigen hafsidischen Regenten
Abū l-ʿAbbās Kontakt aufgenommen. Dieser erlaubt ihm, in seine Geburts-
stadt Tunis zurückzukehren und dort juristische Vorlesungen zu halten. Dort
erfährt der brillante Ibn Khaldūn zunehmenden Widerstand von Seiten ande-
rer Gelehrter am Hofe, vor allem von dem malikitischen Rechtsgelehrten Ibn
ʿArafa, der seinem jüngeren und erfolgreicheren Kollegen missgünstig gesinnt
ist.
Klug genug, holt sich Ibn Khaldūn im Oktober 1382 von Abū l-ʿAbbās die
Erlaubnis ein, die Pilgerfahrt nach Mekka machen zu dürfen. So kann er sich
unter diesem Vorwand vom öffentlichen Leben in Tunis zurückziehen. Am 8.
Dezember 1382 erreicht er auf dem Seeweg Alexandrien. Er setzt seine Reise
nach Mekka nicht fort, sondern lässt sich in Ägypten nieder, wo er abgese-
hen von einigen wenigen Reisen in den Osten für den Rest seines Lebens
bleibt. Am 6. Januar 1383 kommt er nach Kairo, das zu dieser Zeit unter den
634 chapter 35
Mamluken eine blühende und, politisch gesehen, vergleichsweise sichere Stadt

ist. Kurz zuvor ist al-Malik aẓ-Ẓāhir Barqūq Regent von Ägypten geworden.
Durch Vermittlung eines einflussreichen türkischen Beamten, Alṭunbuġā al-
Ǧūbānī, gewinnt Ibn Khaldūn Barqūqs Vertrauen, das bis zu dessen Tode im
Jahre 1399 ungetrübt bleibt. Diesem widmet Ibn Khaldūn später seine Weltge-
37 schichte, indem er sie unter Heranziehung von Barqūqs königlichem | Titel “aẓ-
Ẓāhirī” nennt. Ibn Khaldūns profunde Kenntnisse, übrigens auch in Poesie und
“Literatur” (adab), bescheren ihm Lehrbefugnisse an der Azhar-Universität
und an den Lehranstalten Qamḥiyya, Ẓāhiriyya und Ṣurġatmišiyya, hauptsäch-
lich in Jurisprudenz (v.a. malikitisches Recht) und Überlieferungswissenschaft.
Vereinzelt gibt er Veranstaltungen über historische Themen, darunter über
seine Weltgeschichte und die “Einleitung” (Muqaddima) dazu, die beide wäh-
rend seines Aufenthaltes in Ägypten von ihm ständig überarbeitet werden. Er
hat großen Zulauf während seiner ägyptischen Zeit und immer mehr seiner
Anhänger legen großen Wert darauf, ihn unter ihren Lehrautoritäten aufzufüh-
ren oder von ihm eine “Lehrbefugnis” (iǧāza) zu erhalten.7
Am 8. August 1384 wird Ibn Khaldūn von Barqūq zum malikitischen Ober-
richter Ägyptens ernannt. Diese Position beschert ihm zusätzlich zum Ansehen
seiner Professur noch mehr Einflussnahme und Macht. Er geht gegen Korrup-
tion und Bestechungen vor und ersetzt unfähige Muftis und unfähige juristi-
sche Ratgeber. Damit schafft Ibn Khaldūn sich viele Feinde und bleibt deswe-
gen weniger als ein Jahr im Amt. Er kämpft nicht gegen seine Absetzung, denn
in dieser Zeit verliert er durch ein Schiffsunglück, im Oktober/November des
Jahres 1384, seine gesamte Familie, die ihm aus Tunis an seinen neuen Wohnsitz
nachfolgen sollte.
Nach der Absetzung von seinem Richterposten übernimmt Ibn Khaldūn
eine Professur für malikitisches Recht. Er hat damit eine sichere Stelle, von der
aus er von September 1387 bis Mai 1388 seine Pilgerfahrt nach Mekka nachho-
len kann. Im Januar 1389 wird er zum Professor für Traditionswissenschaft an
der Ṣurġatmišiyya und im April desselben Jahres zusätzlich (allerdings nicht
für lange Zeit) zum Direktor des Baibars-Institutes ernannt. Einen Monat vor
Barqūqs Tod, im Juni 1399, erhält Ibn Khaldūn seine Stelle als malikitischer
Richter zurück. Er behält seine Position auch unter Barqūqs Nachfolger Faraǧ,
dem zehnjährigen Sohn Barqūqs. Doch nach seiner Rückkehr von einer Reise
nach Damaskus und zu den heiligen Stätten in Palästina in der Gesellschaft
von Faraǧ sieht er sich ein weiteres Mal als Opfer von Intrigen seiner Stelle als
malikitischer Richter beraubt.8 Hierbei mag auch die Unzufriedenheit man-
7 Vgl. F. Rosenthal, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Biography” (s. Anm. 4), S. 53ff.

8 Vgl. F. Rosenthal, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Biography” (s. Anm. 4), S. 51–53.
ibn khaldūn 635
cher Leute über Ibn Khaldūns zuweilen willkürlich erscheinendes Handeln

eine Rolle gespielt haben.
Einige Zeit später, im November des Jahres 1400, begleitet Ibn Khaldūn den
neuen Herrscher Faraǧ auf einer Expedition nach Damaskus, das von den Mon-
golen unter Timur belagert wird. Wegen einer drohenden Revolte in Ägypten
muss Faraǧ im Januar 1401 vorzeitig zurückkehren. Doch Ibn Khaldūn bleibt
in Damaskus und rät zu einem Waffenstillstand mit den Mongolen. Es kommt
am 10. Januar 1401 zu einer Begegnung zwischen Ibn Khaldūn und Timur, die
sich über 35 Tage | hinziehen wird. Als Eroberer interessiert sich Timur für 38
Ibn Khaldūns Kenntnisse des Westens und seiner Geographie, und umgekehrt
nutzt Ibn Khaldūn die Gelegenheit, um aus erster Hand Informationen über die
Mongolen und ihren Herrscher Timur zu erlangen und an den merinidischen
Herrscher von Fez weiterzugeben.
Im März 1401 kehrt Ibn Khaldūn nach Kairo zurück. Im April 1401 wird er ein
drittes Mal zum Richter ernannt, um danach, bis zu seinem plötzlichen Tode
am 17. März 1406, noch drei weitere Male abgesetzt bzw. wieder eingesetzt zu
werden. Über die letzten fünf Jahre seines Lebens ist uns nur wenig überliefert.
Die Tatsache, dass Ibn Khaldūn als Richter wiederholt abgesetzt wurde,
sollte von der damaligen unsicheren politischen Lage her erklärt werden, aber
auch von Ibn Khaldūns strikter Abneigung gegen Personen, die ihr Richteramt
durch Bestechung zu erlangen suchten.9 Seine Unbestechlichkeit, aber auch
sein Wissen und seine Erfahrung verschafften Ibn Khaldūn höchstes Ansehen
bei den Herrschern, gleichgültig welchem Lager sie angehörten – aber auch
Feindschaft und Missgunst bei denen, die weniger erfolgreich waren. Darüber
hinaus war Ibn Khaldūn, wie seine Biographie zeigt, realistisch genug, um sich
das politische Lager auszusuchen, das am meisten Sicherheit auch für seine
persönlichen Belange versprach. Er strebte nach Macht und Ansehen, aber
auch nach Anerkennung als Lehrer und Gelehrter. Sein Blick für politische
Situationen, seine Beobachtungsgabe und sein Abstraktionsvermögen haben
ihn zu theoretischen Einsichten befähigt, die weit über seine Zeit und die Gren-
zen der arabischen Welt hinaus gewirkt haben.10 Hier ist es angebracht, Ibn
Khaldūns einflussreichstes Werk näher zu betrachten, die “Einleitung” zu sei-
ner Weltgeschichte, die weniger als Kompilation aus älteren Quellen ins Auge
sticht – Ibn Khaldūn kannte keine politischen Schriften der Antike, die ihn
angeregt hätten – sondern primär als Summe von Erfahrungen eines in der
9 Vgl. F. Rosenthal, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Biography” (s. Anm. 4), S. 45ff.

10 Vgl. F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. IXVI. – Vgl. auch die nachfolgenden Bei-
träge.
636 chapter 35
Gesellschaft engagierten Gelehrten, der Aufstieg und Niedergang verschiede-

ner Dynastien erlebt hatte.
II Ibn Khaldūns Geschichtswerk und Weltbild
Bevor wir Ibn Khaldūns wichtigstes Werk, die Muqaddima (“Einleitung”) einer
näheren Betrachtung unterziehen, seien zuvor weitere Werke genannt, die
uns einen Eindruck vermitteln von seinem Weltbild, aus dem heraus er unter
Einbeziehung persönlicher politischer Erfahrungen seine neuen Einsichten
in die Geschichte entwickelte. Dieses Weltbild ist wesentlich geprägt vom
Islam, von seiner Religiosität und von seiner in der Zeit von Fārābī (gest.
950 oder 951AD) bis Ibn Rušd / Averroes (gest. 1198 AD) entwickelten poli-
tischen Philosophie über die prophetische Führung eines am Gesetz orien-
39 tierten Gemeinwesens.11 Ibn Khaldūn hatte bei Ābilī (gest. | 1356AD) Philoso-
phie und Theologie, sowie Logik und Mathematik studiert und ist auf diesen
Gebieten schriftstellerisch tätig geworden, ohne allerdings die Originalität sei-
ner großartigen, und ihn bis ins hohe Alter beschäftigenden “Einleitung” und
seiner Weltgeschichte zu erreichen. Sein 1351 abgeschlossenes und uns erhal-
tenes Jugendwerk Lubāb al-Muḥaṣṣal fī uṣūl ad-dīn12 ist nichts anderes als eine
Zusammenfassung von Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn
wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn, einem Kom-
pendium der Wissenschaften der früheren Gelehrten bis zu seiner Zeit. Ibn
Khaldūn übernimmt hierbei die Kritik des schiitischen Philosophen Naṣīr ad-
Dīn aṭ-Ṭusī (gest. 1274AD) an diesem Werk, das seinerseits die Philosophen,
insbesonders Ibn Sīnā kritisiert.13 Ferner soll Ibn Khaldūn, einer Angabe sei-
nes Freundes Lisān ad-Dīn Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb zufolge, eine Zusammenfassung von
Abhandlungen des Philosophen Ibn Rušd, eine für den Sohn Muḥammads V.
von Granada geschriebene Abhandlung über Logik sowie eine Abhandlung
11 Vgl. Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn’s Philosophy of History. London 1957 / Chicago 21971,
S. 84ff. – Hans Daiber, “Die Autonomie der Philosophie im Islam”. In Knowlege and the
Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the 8th International Congress of Medi-
eval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.). I. Ed. Monika Asztalos, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Nii-
niluoto. Helsinki 1990. = Acta philosophica fennica 48 (S. 228–249), S. 248 / Ergänzte eng-
lische Version in Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures. Leiden/Bos-
ton 2012, S. 86 f.
12 Hrsg. v. Luciano Rubio. Tetuan 1951.
13 Diese Kritik an Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī hat Ṭūsī niedergelegt in seinem Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal,
gedruckt am Rande von Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal (etc.). Kairo 1905 / Neuedition von
ʿAbd Allāh Nūrānī. Teheran 1980. = Wisdom of Persia XXIV.
ibn khaldūn 637
über Arithmetik14 geschrieben haben.15 Zur Liste von Ibn Khaldūns Werken
fügt Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb noch einen Kommentar zu al-Būṣīrī (gest. 1294 oder 1297 AD),
al-Burda, ein Lobgedicht auf den Propheten Mohammed, ferner einen Kom-
mentar zu einem juristischen Lehrgedicht des Ibn al-H̱ aṭīb hinzu. Ebenso
wenig originell ist das uns erhaltene Werk Ibn Khaldūns über das Studium der
Mystik, das Šifāʾ as-sāʾil li-tahḏīb al-masāʾil,16 das sich mit der am Ende des 14.
Jahrhunderts in Spanien diskutierten Frage beschäftigt, ob der Novize eines
“Führers” (muršid) bedarf oder durch Studium der Bücher den mystischen Pfad
finden könne.
II.1 Ibn Khaldūns “Prolegomenon” zur Weltgeschichte

Ibn Khaldūns Hauptwerk, das ihn bis an sein Lebensende beschäftigt hat und
ihn vor allem in seiner Nachwelt berühmt gemacht hat, ist sein “Prolegome-
non”, die “Einleitung” (Muqaddima) zu seiner Weltgeschichte, dem “Buch der
Beispiele (etc.)” (Kitāb al-ʿIbar etc.)17 Diese Weltgeschichte beginnt in Band II:
Er behandelt die Geschichte der Araber und des muslimischen Ostens; er geht
auf die Babylonier, Assyrer, Kopten, Israeliten (inkl. Jesus, die Apostel, die vier
Evangelisten), Perser, Griechen und Römer ein, ferner auf die Goten in Spanien,
die Portugiesen, Spanier, Basken, Franzosen, Türken, Tataren und Mongolen.
Band III diskutiert hauptsächlich die Geschichte | der Berber und Nordafrikas 40
und ist für uns eine außerordentlich wichtige Quelle für die Geschichte Nord-
afrikas.
Viel interessanter als Buch II und III ist die “Einleitung”, die Ibn Khaldūns
Geschichtsphilosophie enthält und ihn berühmt gemacht hat. Sie beginnt mit
einem Vorwort, worin der Plan des Gesamtwerkes vorgestellt wird. Diesem folgt
eine Vorrede, die von der Vortrefflichkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft spricht,
von ihren Prinzipien sowie auf Irrtümer der Historiker hinweist: Man müsse
14 Ein Echo von Ibn Khaldūns Beschäftigung mit Arithmetik finden wir in seiner Muqad-
dima, ed. É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes III, S. 93ff. / Übers. F. Rosenthal, Ibn
Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) III, S. 118 ff. – Vgl. dazu Sonja Brentjes, “Die Arithmetik bei Ibn
H̱ aldun”. In Ibn H̱ aldun und seine Zeit. Hrsg. v. Dieter Sturm. Halle a.d.S. 1983. = Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge 1983/1984, I 19, S. 25–39.
15 Vgl. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn’s Philosophy (s. Anm. 11), S. 35f. Anm. 5. – Heinrich Simon,
Ibn Khaldūns Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Kultur. Leipzig 1959. = Beiträge zur Orien-
talistik II, S. 29.
16 Neueste Edition v. Abū Yaʿrub al-Marzūqī. Tunis 1991 / Franz. Übers. v. René Pérez,
Ibn Khaldūn, La voie et la loi ou le maître et le jurist. Paris 1991. – Frühere Editionen: s. H.
Daiber, BIPh I, S. 447 f.
17 Der vollständige Titel lautet: Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa-dīwān al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-ḫabar fī taʾrīḫ al-
ʿArab wa-l-Barbar wa-man ʿāsarahum min ḏawī s-sulṭān al-akbar. – Die deutsche Ü berset-
zung ist zu Beginn dieses Beitrages genannt.
638 chapter 35
zu den Ursachen der sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Erscheinungen vordringen, um

zwischen wahren und falschen Überlieferungen unterscheiden zu können. Die
Ursache der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen erkenne derjenige, der den Zusam-
menhang zwischen historischem Geschehen und menschlicher Kultur, ʿumrān,
erkannt habe.
Nach dieser Vorrede beginnt Buch I des Kitāb al-ʿIbar, die “Einleitung” (Muq-
addima). Es behandelt in Ibn Khaldūns eigenen Worten
… das Wesen der menschlichen Kultur und was darin vorkommt an Land-
leben und Seßhaftigkeit, Vormachtstellung, Erwerb und Lebensunterhalt,
an Wissenschaften, Künsten und dergleichen. Die Gründe und Ursachen
hierfür.18
Ibn Khaldūn behandelt Sinn, Zweck und Aufbau der theoretischen Einlei-
tung seines Geschichtswerkes und diskutiert dann im ersten der sechs Teile
der Muqaddima “die menschliche Kultur im Allgemeinen”.19 Dieser erste Teil
besteht aus folgenden sechs “Vorreden”: 1) Über die Notwendigkeit des Zusam-
menschlusses der Menschen; 2) Über den Anteil des bewohnten Landes an der
Erde. Hinweis auf die Meere, Flüsse und Klimata (ein geographischer Abriss); 3)
Über den Einfluss des Klimas auf die Farbe und die Lebensumstände der Men-
schen; 4) Über den Einfluss des Klimas auf den Charakter der Menschen; 5)
Über die Verschiedenheit der Kulturzustände infolge von Überfluss und Hun-
ger und welche Wirkungen auf die Körper und Charaktere der Menschen dar-
aus resultieren; 6) Über Inspirationen und Träume, über Menschen, die das
Verborgene kraft ihrer Natur oder durch religiöse Übungen erfassen können.
Der zweite Teil der Muqaddima behandelt die erste Stufe der menschlichen
Kultur, die ländliche Kultur, das Nomadenleben, das auf Ackerbau und Vieh-
zucht beruht.
Der dritte Teil diskutiert die Grundlagen politischer Macht, wobei das Kalifat
als besondere Herrschaftsform im Islam viel Aufmerksamkeit erfährt. Ibn Khal-
dūn diskutiert die Ursachen, die zur Entstehung von Dynastien und Reichen
führen, d.h. von der niederen zur höher entwickelten, sesshaft-städtischen
Lebensweise.
Der vierte Teil beschreibt die sesshaft-städtische Lebensweise, die primär
auf Handel und Gewerbe beruht.
41 Der fünfte Teil beschreibt die zahlreichen Gewerbe der damaligen Zeit.
18 Ed. É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes I, S. 6 / Übers. A. Schimmel, Ibn Chaldun (s.

Anm. 2), S. 3.
19 Übers. A. Schimmel, Ibn Chaldun (s. Anm. 2), S. 18.
ibn khaldūn 639
Der sechste Teil diskutiert die verschiedenen Wissenschaften und Künste,

die städtischer Kultur entspringen.
II.2 Ibn Khaldūns Geschichtsphilosophie

Doch nun zu den Kernpunkten von Ibn Khaldūns Geschichtsphilosophie.20
Für Ibn Khaldūn ist Geschichte primär Kulturgeschichte. Historisches Gesche-
hen hängt ihm zufolge mit menschlicher Kultur zusammen, mit ʿumrān.
ʿUmrān bezeichnet bei Ibn Khaldūn primär das diesseitige Leben des Men-
schen, sein schöpferisches Handeln, das im Unterschied zu den übrigen Lebe-
wesen auf die Verbesserung der menschlichen Existenz abzielt. Hier erscheint
menschliche Kultur als ein neuer Faktor. Wer diesen erkenne, der sei auch
in der Lage, das Wesen der Geschichte richtig zu erfassen. Nicht der chrono-
logische Ablauf der Ereignisse, sondern die menschliche Kultur, ʿumrān, mit
ihren gesellschafts- und wirtschaftsbezogenen Kausalitäten ist Gegenstand der
Geschichte. Geschichtsschreibung wird zu einer Wissenschaft, die sich mit den
Kausalitäten historischer Abläufe beschäftigt, wobei Gesellschaft und Wirt-
schaft in einem engen Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Dieser Komplex hat
daher in der Vergangenheit zunehmend das Interesse von Wirtschaftswissen-
schaftlern gefunden.21
20 Von den zahlreichen Darstellungen (vgl. H. Daiber, BIPh II, S. 223–230 genannte Literatur
und Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship. A Study in Orientalism. Lon-
don 1981) sei hier genannt die jüngst erschienene Monographie von Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn
Khaldūn. An Essay in Reinterpretation. London 1982 / Repr. 1990. Rez. v. Fadlou Shehadi
in JAOS 107, 1984, S. 532 f.
21 Zur Literatur vgl. A. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship (s. Anm. 20), S. 286–
288. – Yassine Essid, “Ibn Khaldūn und die wirtschaftlichen Vorstellungen im Islam”.
In Ibn Khaldūn. Ökonomie aus der “Muqaddima”. Textauswahl von Hans Daiber. Hrsg.
v. Bertram Schefold. [Und] Vademecum zu dem Klassiker des arabischen Wirtschafts-
denkens. Düsseldorf 2000, S. 55–90, Anm. 14, 15, 21, 24. – Fuad Baali, Social Institutions.
Ibn Khaldūn’s Social Thought. London 1992, S. 51–71. – Abdalla M. Battah, Ibn Khal-
dūn’s Principles of Political Economy: Rudiments of a new science. Diss. Washington 1988,
bes. S. 69–114. – Fabián Estapé, Ibn Jaldun o el precursor. Discurso leído el día 28 octubre
de 1993 en el acto de recepción de Fabián Estapé en la Real Academia de Buenas Letras
de Barcelona y respuesta por el Académico numerario Juan Vernet. Barcelona 1993. –
George S. Firzly, Ibn Khaldūn: A Socio Economic Study. Diss. Utah 1973, S. 169–265,
bes. S. 213ff. – Bashar Gusau and Muhammad Lawal Ahmad (Hrsg.), Readings in
Islamic Economics. I. Sokoto, Nigeria 1993. Enthält zwei Artikel, die auf Ibn Khaldūn ein-
gehen: S. 40–54: Abubakar Abdullahi, “Theory of Profit in Secular Economic Litera-
ture and its Islamic Formulations”; S. 143–155: Chika Umar Aliyu, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Views
on Stages of Economic Development”. – Sule Ahmed Gusau, “Economic Thoughts of
Ibn Khaldūn”. In Journal of Islamic Economics 3, 1993, S. 61–80. – K. V. Nagarajan, “Ibn
Khaldūn and ‘Supply-Side Economics’: a note”. In Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics
640 chapter 35
Wie im 10. Jahrhundert bereits Fārābī und kurz danach die Enyzklopädie
der sog. “Lauteren Brüder” und Miskawayh, beruft sich Ibn Khaldūn auf die
42 antike Tradition | von der Notwendigkeit des Zusammenschlusses der Men-
schen.22 Die Menschen schließen sich, abhängig von der Art und Weise der
Erwerbung des Lebensunterhaltes, auf unterschiedliche Weise zusammen, ent-
weder nach Art der Nomaden (badāwa) oder nach Art der sesshaften Stadtbe-
völkerung (ḥaḍāra). Kennzeichen der badāwa sind Ackerbau, Viehzucht, Wei-
dewirtschaft, wobei keine Zwischenformen unterschieden werden – vielleicht,
weil die Grenzen fließend sind und die genannten Tätigkeiten allen Gruppen
gemeinsam sind.
Für Ibn Khaldūn stehen Ackerbau und Viehzucht als Lebensnotwendig-
keiten am Anfang der Menschheitsgeschichte und sind Voraussetzungen für
alle nachfolgenden Entwicklungsstadien. In dieser Epoche bilden sich sittlich-
moralische Eigenschaften aus, etwa Tapferkeit, Geduld und Aufrichtigkeit und
solche, die für die Nomaden typisch sind.
Je mehr die Bevölkerung zunimmt und sesshaft wird, desto mehr und desto
unterschiedlicher werden die Tätigkeiten – was schließlich über das Maß des
notwendigerweise zu Erwerbenden hinausgehe und zu Luxus führe.23 Charak-
teristisch für diese Kulturstufe sind Sesshaftigkeit und weitgehend städtische
Zivilisation. In dieser als ḥaḍāra bezeichneten letzten Stufe der menschlichen
Kultur werden Gewerbe und Handel bestimmend, die den Luxus hervorbrin-
gen. Auf dieser Grundlage entstehen die Künste und Wissenchaften. Hand in
Hand hiermit ist ein sittlich-moralischer Verfall zu beobachten, von dem die
Nomaden im Gegensatz zur sesshaft-städtischen Bevölkerung verschont blie-
ben.
5/1, 1982, S. 117–119, enthält eine Kritik an Präsident Ronald Reagans Vergleich [Okt. 1981]
von “supply-side tax cuts” mit Ibn Khaldūn. – Ibrahim M. Oweiss, “Ibn Khaldūn, the
Father of Economics”. In Arab Civilization. Challenges and Responses. Studies in Honor of
Constantine K. Zurayk. Ed. George N. Atiyeh and Ibrahim M. Oweiss. Albany 1988,
S. 112–127. – Erwin Isak Jakob Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken über den Staat.
München/Berlin 1932, S. 71–92. – H. Simon, Ibn Khaldūns Wissenschaft (s. Anm. 15), S. 78–
98. – Abdol Soofi, “Economics of Ibn Khaldūn Revisited”. In History of Political Economy
27, 1995, S. 387–404. – Dieter Weiß, “Ibn Khaldūn on Economic Transformation”. In Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies 27, 1995, S. 29–37. – Dieter Weiß, “Ibn Khaldoun
on Economic Polity”. In Les Cahiers de Tunisie 41/42, 1990, S. 281–291.
22 Aristoteles, Politik I 1. 1253 a 2 ff. – Vgl. Hans Daiber, “Political Philosophy”. In History of
Islamic Philosophy. Ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman. London/New York
1996. = Routledge History of World Philosophies I, S. 849–852. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks
to the Arabs II/8.
23 Muqaddima, Kap. 4 ff.
ibn khaldūn 641
Dennoch steht die ḥaḍāra über der Kulturform der badāwa. Auch die ba-
dāwa sei in ihrem einfachen Leben auf die städtischen gewerblichen Pro-
dukte angewiesen. Daher gebe es einen permanenten Konflikt zwischen den
Bewohnern der Wüste, des Gebirges und des flachen Landes einerseits und
denen der Städte andererseits. Der in den Städten vorhandene Reichtum ver-
anlasse gewaltsame Eroberungen und Inbesitznahmen der politischen Macht.
Die Kluft zwischen beiden Kulturformen ist unüberbrückbar.
Die Basis beider Kulturformen ist, wie bereits gesagt, das Zusammenleben
der Menschen. Voraussetzungen sind der gesellschaftliche Zusammenschluss
und die Zusammenarbeit. Außerdem sei für eine “Zügelung”, wāziʿ, des Men-
schen ein starker Regent erforderlich, da der Mensch in seiner Entwicklungs-
stufe, die unmittelbar auf das Tierreich folgt, noch einen angeborenen Trieb zur
Aggression habe. Diese zügelnde Macht müsse, notfalls mit Gewalt, die Men-
schen lenken und sie vor gegenseitiger Vernichtung bewahren.
Hier unterscheidet sich Ibn Khaldūn von den islamischen Philosophen, da
er | eine religiöse Orientierung des Herrschers für nicht in jedem Fall erforder- 43
lich hält und da seiner Ansicht nach eine rein weltliche Form der Herrschaft
ausreichend ist. Prophetie und Offenbarung des religiösen Gesetzes seien zwar
für den Islam bindend, aber im Allgemeinen und auf die Menschheit bezogen
nicht mehr conditio sine qua non. Hierauf weise bereits die Tatsache, dass es
genügend Völker außerhalb des Islam, der umma, gebe, die ohne islamisches
Gesetz und Offenbarung existierten.
Ibn Khaldūn zufolge beruht die Herrschaft in der badāwa primär auf der
Autorität des Oberhauptes. Außerdem gebe es in der badāwa in unverfälschter
Weise Verhaltensweisen wie verwandtschaftliches Mitgefühl und Solidarität,
die der menschlichen Natur entspringen und sowohl auf Blutsbindung beru-
hen als auch auf Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen. Ibn Khaldūn hat für diese Art
von Gemeinschaftsgefühl, das auf Familie oder Stamm bezogen ist, den Begriff
ʿaṣabiyya24 geprägt.
Diese im Menschen ursprünglich vorhandene ʿaṣabiyya sorge für die Unter-
stützung der eigenen Gruppe und für den Kampf gegen die anderen. Diese in
der Natur des Menschen liegende ʿaṣabiyya unterscheidet Ibn Khaldūn von der
heidnischen ʿaṣabiyya, die damals zu ständigen Rivalitäten zwischen den Stäm-
men geführt hatte und von dem Propheten Mohammed durch die einigende
Kraft des Islam ersetzt worden war.
24 Vgl. zu diesem Begriff H. Simon, Ibn Khaldūns Wissenschaft (s. Anm. 15), S. 48–62. –
Peter von Sivers, Khalifat, Königtum und Verfall. Die politische Theorie Ibn Khaldūns.
München 1968, S. 81–109. – Muhammad Mahmoud Rabīʾ, The Political Theory of Ibn
Khaldūn. Leiden 1967, S. 48–69.
642 chapter 35
Ibn Khaldūn rechtfertigt mit diesem Hinweis auf die Geschichte seinen eige-
nen Versuch, die Bedeutung der ʿaṣabiyya zu objektivieren und hiermit die
Entwicklung menschlicher Kultur, nicht nur der islamischen, von badāwa zu
ḥaḍāra zu erklären.
Derjenige, der über die stärkste ʿaṣabiyya verfügt, strebe nach Vorrang. Der
wāziʿ, die zügelnde Macht, strebt seine Vorrangstellung zu festigen und ihr Kon-
tinuität zu verleihen. Dies führt zur Etablierung einer erblichen Dynastie, einer
dawla, in Form einer Autokratie, die Ibn Khaldūn mulk “Monarchie” nennt.
Dynastie und Staat werden von ihm nicht unterschieden.25 Die Entwicklung
der Dynastie führt zum Ende der nomadischen Lebensform. Sie führt aber
auch zum Verfall der Dynastie selbst, weswegen ihr die Macht durch einen
noch im Nomadentum sich befindenden Stamm entrissen wird. Doch sobald
die nomadischen Machthaber sich in der von ihnen eroberten Stadt niederge-
lassen haben, passen sie sich zunehmend den vorhandenen Verhältnissen an,
ohne deren Strukturen zu verändern. Es bleibt schließlich nur beim Personen-
wechsel, beim Wechsel von alten zu neuen Machthabern.
Somit hat für Ibn Khaldūn jede Dynastie, vergleichbar dem natürlichen
Organismus, eine begrenzte Lebensdauer. Es gibt Blüte, Stagnation, Verfall,
Untergang, wobei dies Hand in Hand geht mit der zunehmenden Isolierung des
44 neuen Machthabers | und seiner Dynastie von der ʿaṣabiyya, vom Stamm, dem
er sich anfänglich verbunden fühlte. Dies findet seinen Ausdruck im zuneh-
menden Engagement von fremden Gefolgsleuten statt solchen aus dem eige-
nen Stamm, von Söldnern und fremden Beamten.
Der Ausbau der Herrschaft verstärkt das Bedürfnis nach Repräsentation. Die
damit verbundenen zunehmenden Kosten führen zu erhöhten Steuern, die
zunehmend das wirtschaftliche Wachstum lähmen. Es wird weniger Reichtum
produziert, weswegen die Dynastie zu unrechtmäßigen Mitteln greifen muss.
Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch ist vorprogrammiert, zumal die städti-
sche Bevölkerung in passivem Luxusleben verharrt und sich deswegen nicht
gegen Angriffe von außen, der Nomaden, der badāwa, wehren kann.
II.3 Islam und Religion als prägender Faktor oder Werkzeug der
Geschichte?
Ibn Khaldūn vertritt eine zyklische Geschichtstheorie, wonach es ständigen
Aufstieg und Niedergang gibt. Es gibt den Übergang von der zivilisationslo-
sen Vorstufe der badāwa zur badāwa und von der badāwa zur ḥaḍāra. Was ist
die treibende Kraft, die zur Änderung, zu einer höheren Stufe führt, wenn man
davon ausgeht, dass die ʿasabiyya sich an der Gesellschaft orientiert?
25 Vgl. Muqaddima, Kap. III.

ibn khaldūn 643
Hier scheint Ibn Khaldūns Erkenntnis dominierend gewesen zu sein, dass

politische Macht keiner übergeordneten und ins Transzendente weisenden
Orientierung bedarf. Überdies vermittelte die zeitgenössische Geschichte der
entstehenden und vergehenden Dynastien den Eindruck, dass Geschichte
zyklisches Entstehen und Vergehen ist. Ein Fortschritt ist nicht sichtbar.
Somit strebt Ibn Khaldūn nach einer auf empirischer Beobachtung beruhen-
den rationalen Erklärung der Geschichte. Andererseits hat er ausschließlich für
den Islam die Religion als prägende Kraft anerkannt. In der Gestalt des Prophe-
ten und durch die ihm offenbarte göttliche Wahrheit hat Gott in die Geschichte
eingegriffen. Ibn Khaldūn diskutiert daher vor allem in den Kapiteln 3 und 6
die Religion, um zu zeigen, wie Gott durch die Verkündigung des Propheten
die Handlungen der ersten Muslime bestimmte. Der frühislamische Staat ist
primär durch göttliche Einflussnahme und nicht im Entwicklungsprozess von
der ʿaṣabiyya, der Stammessolidarität, zum mulk, zur “Monarchie”, entstanden.
Dies habe noch in der Zeit der vier ersten rechtgeleiteten Kalifen nachgewirkt.
Im Übrigen deutet Ibn Khaldūn an, dass für ihn der dīn, die “Religion”, auch
einen in der menschlichen Gesellschaft wirkenden Faktor darstellt, der Ver-
änderungen unterworfen ist. Eine stärkere Triebkraft ist jedoch die ʿaṣabiyya.
Dies zeigt die frühislamische Geschichte: So unterliegt ʿAlī, der vierte Kalif, dem
Omayyaden Muʿāwiya (reg. 661–680AD), weil dessen ʿaṣabiyya stärker war und
nicht, weil seine religiöse Überzeugung mangelhaft war.
Der Zusammenhalt, der auf Blutsbindung, auf Solidarität mit Familie,
Stamm und Nachbarschaft beruht, ist stärker als das Band der Religion – wie-
wohl in der Prophetengeschichte eine Wechselwirkung zwischen Religion und
ʿaṣabiyya da sei und die ʿaṣabiyya in der Frühzeit des Islam die Weisheit Got-
tes erkennen lasse. Doch in | der darauf folgenden Phase sei die Religion zum 45
Werkzeug für die Legitimierung der politischen Macht geworden.
Mit seiner zeitlichen Beschränkung der göttlichen Intervention auf die Früh-
zeit des Islam vermochte Ibn Khaldūn, seine rationale Erklärung des Ge-
schichtsablaufes als zyklisches Auf und Ab mit der islamischen Auffassung vom
göttlichen Eingriff in die Geschichte in Einklang zu bringen. Somit vermeidet
er den Konflikt mit der islamischen Orthodoxie und hebt sich gleichzeitig von
der Tradition ab.
Hier erscheint es in methodischer Hinsicht unerlässlich, Ibn Khaldūns Welt-
bild von seinen Voraussetzungen her zu interpretieren26 und die Interpretation
26 Vgl. Bruce B. Lawrence, “The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn’s Political Theory”. In
Ibn Khaldūn and Islamic Ideology. Ed. B. B. Lawrence. Leiden 1984. = International Stu-
dies in Sociology and Social Anthropology XL, S. 7, Kommentar zu S. 14–26: F. Rosenthal,
“Ibn Khaldūn in his Time [May 27, 1332 – March 17, 1406]”.
644 chapter 35
nicht modernen, von außen herangetragenen Intentionen zu unterstellen. Wer

daher auf Ibn Khaldūns Kontext des damaligen Islam achtet, wird die schein-
bar ambivalente Haltung Ibn Khaldūns zur Religion besser verstehen. Die Geis-
ter scheiden sich an der Frage, ob Ibn Khaldūn den Islam als die absolute Wahr-
heit betrachtet oder nicht. Ihm unorthodoxe oder gar nichtreligiöse Anschau-
ungen zuzuschreiben, ist ein Missverständnis der komplexen Situation, die
sein Verhältnis zum Islam prägte. Gleichzeitig ist für ihn der Islam vielschich-
tig. Insofern kann man in Ibn Khaldūns Auffassung vom Islam vier Schichten
unterscheiden:27 Die Geschichte des Islam, die Erscheinung des Islam, Kultur
und Glaube des Islam. Unter diesen prägt die Geschichte die Erscheinungsform
(behaviour), die Kultur und den Glauben des Islam.
Da somit der islamische Glaube ständig bezogen erscheint auf andere Berei-
che der islamischen Weltanschauung, erscheint Ibn Khaldūn in den Augen
eines muslimischen oder nichtmuslimischen theologischen Positivisten als
agnostischer Relativist, der den Islam als eine von mehreren historischen
Modalitäten innerhalb eines zyklischen Musters von wiederkehrendem Wech-
sel betrachtet.
Je nachdem, wie sehr bei Ibn Khaldūn die Geschichte zum prägenden Faktor
gemacht wird oder die Religion, die Offenbarung, hat sich eine gegensätzliche
Einschätzung von Ibn Khaldūn entwickelt: Der englische Orientalist Hamil-
ton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb verteidigte in seinem 1933 erschienenen
Aufsatz “The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn’s Political Theory”28 des-
sen islamische Orthodoxie. Ein muslimischer Gelehrter jedoch, M. K. Ayad,
hält ihn in seiner 1930 publizierten Monographie Die Geschichts- und Gesell-
schaftslehre Ibn Khaldūns29 für einen Vorläufer des marxistischen Materialis-
mus. Indessen lässt H. A. R. Gibbs Erklärung Ibn Khaldūn und dem Maghrib
des 14. Jahrhunderts mehr Gerechtigkeit widerfahren als Ayads These.30 Ent-
46 gegen | A. Al-Azmeh31 kann man Ibn Khaldūn nicht aus dem idelogischen
Hintergund herausreißen, den er von seinen Vorfahren ererbte, dem er ver-
pflichtet blieb und den er weiter entwickelte.
So tun wir gut daran, hier auf Ibn Khaldūns Verhältnis zum Islam und über-
haupt zur Religion näher einzugehen. Für Ibn Khaldūn war die Religion Islam
27 Vgl. Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or historicism?
Berkeley 1967. – B. B. Lawrence, “The Islamic Background” (s. Anm. 26), S. 8.
28 Nachdruck in Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of
Islam. Boston 1967, S. 166–175.
29 Stuttgart/Berlin 1930.
30 Vgl. H. Simon, Ibn Khaldūns Wissenschaft (s. Anm. 15), S. 110–118.
31 A. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn. An Essay in Reinterpretation (s. Anm. 20). – Vgl. A. Al-
Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship (s. Anm. 20).
ibn khaldūn 645
und der Islam Religion. Islam war für ihn die historische Artikulation eines
göttlichen Plans, der rational erscheint und daher von denen interpretiert und
verstanden werden kann, die ein Auge für die Offenbarung haben. Man könnte
Ibn Khaldūn auch als Neo-Muʿtaziliten oder als Krypto-Aristoteliker einord-
nen, doch dann würde das Wesentliche in seiner Weltanschauung verkannt.
Ibn Khaldūn war überzeugt, dass es in der Geschichte einen göttlichen Vorsatz
gibt, und dass Islam und Araber überlegene Vehikel für seine Verwirklichung
sind. In diesem Rahmen ist die Verwirklichung des göttlichen Plans eine Ver-
antwortlichkeit der Menschen. Kurzum: Die Mängel muslimischer Herrscher,
etwa der späten Omayyaden und Abbasiden, spiegelt ihr Scheitern bei der
Anwendung islamischer Richtlinien wider, nicht so sehr das Scheitern dieser
Richtlinien.
Der Islam bietet für Ibn Khaldūn den perfekten Rahmen für die menschli-
che Gesellschaft, aber Allāh bleibt transzendent. Seine Macht wird nicht ein-
geschränkt durch das Scheitern der Muslime, durch ihre Weigerung, Gottes
Willen zu akzeptieren. Dieser göttliche Wille wurde auch von Nichtmuslimen
akzeptiert.
Hierbei überrascht, dass Ibn Khaldūn nahezu völlig das Eindringen der Mon-
golen in das islamische Reich, den Dār al-Islām, ignoriert, auch ihren Eindruck
auf das abbasidische Kalifat. Denn die Muqaddima enthält nur eine Anspie-
lung auf Hulagus Plünderung von Baghdad. Die Bekehrung der Mongolen zum
Islam, die während Ibn Khaldūns Leben begann, wird nicht als Beispiel für Ibn
Khaldūns These benutzt.
Vielleicht ist dies der Grund, weswegen ein Historiker des 15. Jahrhunderts,
Saḫāwī,32 Ibn Khaldūns ungenaue Kenntnis historischer Ereignisse, besonders
im Osten, beklagt. Diese Kritik gilt nur mit Einschränkung. Denn im fünften
Band des Kitāb al-ʿIbar gibt Ibn Khaldūn eine recht genaue Beschreibung der
Mongolen und Tataren, des Aufstiegs Dschingis-Khans, seiner Eroberungen in
Ost und West und der Geschichte der Nachkommen bis zu Hulagu und Timur.
Besonders Dschingis-Khans Nachfolger Timur (Timurlang / Tamerlan) wird
ausführlich beschrieben, hierbei auch sein Aufenthalt in Damaskus im Jahre
1401. Man hat vermutet,33 dass Ibn Khaldūn in Timur die Person sah, die genug
ʿaṣabiyya besaß, um die islamische Welt zu vereinigen und ihr eine neue Rich-
tung in der Geschichte zu geben.
In jedem Fall scheint Ibn Khaldūn vom islamischen Glauben getrieben 47
gewesen zu sein, nicht vom Gegenteil. Er war der Ansicht, dass Allāh auch über
32 aḍ-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn at-tāsiʿ. IV. Kairo 1935, S. 148, 8.

33 Vgl. Mohamed Talbi, Ibn Ḫaldūn et l’ histoire. Tunis 1973, S. 116.
646 chapter 35
das arabische Reich hinaus wirke, um die Wahrheit muslimischer Offenbarung

auch durch nichtarabische, vermutlich muslimische nomadische Krieger zu
bestätigen.
In diesem Zusammenhang ist es gut, nochmals auf Ibn Khaldūns Verhältnis
zur Religion34 einzugehen. Zunächst sei wiederholt, dass Ibn Khaldūn aus sei-
ner Zeit, aus dem islamischen Kontext seiner Zeit zu verstehen ist. Dennoch
bleibt die Frage, ob das von ihm entworfene Geschichtsbild noch islamisch ist.
Betrachten wir das Problem des Verhältnisses von Glauben und Wissen.
Ibn Khaldūn beschränkt das Wissen auf den irdischen Bereich, es ist empi-
risches Wissen, und dieser allein kann Gegenstand einer Untersuchung sein.
Hier unterscheidet er sich von Ġazālī (1058–1111 AD), der Glauben und Wis-
sen trennt, um das Wissen auf den zweiten Rang nach dem Glauben zu set-
zen. Für Ibn Khaldūn jedoch ist die Metaphysik ein getrennter Bereich, der
der Religion vorbehalten und vom empirischen Bereich abgeschieden ist. For-
mal hält er am islamischen Dogma fest, aber es ist für ihn kein Gegenstand
empirischer Forschung. Daher hält Ibn Khaldūn Philosophie, die er als Meta-
physik versteht, für nutzlos und eine Beschäftigung mit ihr für schädlich.35
Man kann ihm zufolge nicht vom sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren auf das Übersinn-
liche schließen und die religiösen Dogmen nicht mit dem Verstand beweisen.
Beide Bereiche, der Glaube und die irdische Welt, sind voneinander getrennt.
Was nicht irdisch, im Bereich des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren ist, bleibt für ihn
uniteressant. Religion ist nur als Teil der Kultur beachtenswert. Gott als Ursa-
che hat keinen direkten Bezug zur Welt, sondern hat als erste Ursache nur
über eine unendliche Kette von Zwischenursachen einen Bezug zu den Din-
gen.36
Im Gegensatz zu Ġazālī, für den Wissenschaft einen geringeren Stellenwert
besitzt, ist für Ibn Khaldūn eine Trennung von Religion und Wissenschaft die
Voraussetzung für empirische Forschung. Aber er scheut sich dennoch, seine
34 Vgl. F. Baali, Social Institutions (s. Anm. 21), S. 27–37. – H. Simon, Ibn Khaldūns Wissen-
schaft (s. Anm. 15), S. 110–119. – Erwin Isak Jakob Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken
über den Staat. München/Berlin 1932, S. 50–60.
35 Muqaddima, ed. É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes III, S. 209ff. / Übers. F. Rosenthal,
Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) III, S. 246 ff. – Zu Ibn Khaldūns Verhältnis zur Philosophie vgl.
A. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship (s. Anm. 20), S. 82–107. – Erwin Isak
Jakob Rosenthal, “Ibn Jaldūn’s Attitude to the Falāsifa”. In al-Andalus 20, 1955, S. 75–
85. – H. Simon, Ibn Khaldūns Wissenschaft (s. Anm. 15), S. 39–47. – M. Mahdi, Philosophy
of History (s. Anm. 11), bes. S. 63–132.
36 Ed. É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes III, S. 27, 8 ff. / Übers. F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn
(s. Anm. 2) III, S. 34 f.
ibn khaldūn 647
Erkenntnis von Gesetzmäßigkeiten in der Gesellschaft zu verallgemeinern. So

müssen wir jetzt nochmals versuchen, Farbe zu bekennen in der Frage, ob Ibn
Khaldūn primär von religiösen Vorstellungen des Islam geprägt ist (H. A. R.
Gibb) oder doch strikt Religion an die zweite Stelle rückt (M. K. Ayad,37 E. I. J.
Rosenthal38).
Nun können wir beobachten, dass Ibn Khaldūn die Religion funktionali-
siert, sie | zu einem Instrument der Gesellschaft macht. Religion ist göttliches 48
Gesetz, das die Gesellschaft erhält. Die Religion intensiviert die ʿaṣabiyya. Sie
unterstützt den theokratischen Staat und ist nicht primär für die Erbauung des
Einzelnen da. Religion ist göttliches Gesetz mit gesellschaftlicher Funktion.
Somit erscheint Ibn Khaldūns Kreislauftheorie, der Wechsel zwischen
Nomaden und Städtern, nicht eingeschränkt durch die religiöse Offenbarung.
Beide Bereiche sind voneinander getrennt. Im anderen Fall gäbe es einen
unüberbrückbaren Widerspruch zwischen der These der ewigen Wiederkehr
des Gleichen, d.h. der aristotelischen und averroistischen These von der Ewig-
keit der Welt einerseits und islamischer Schöpfungstheologie andererseits. Da
für Ibn Khaldūn die Geschichte vom Glauben getrennt ist, gibt es kein “Heils-
geschehen”, keinen Endpunkt der Geschichte. Geschichte hat keine Jenseits-
bezogenheit. Sie lässt sich nicht aus außerirdischen Prinzipien erklären, son-
dern aus dem Menschen, seinem Trieb und aus den gesellschaftlichen Zwän-
gen.
III Der Einfluss des Ibn Khaldūn
Ibn Khaldūns Einfluss ist noch immer nicht ausreichend erforscht. Was die
arabische biographische Literatur über Ibn Khaldūn berichtet, ist noch nicht
erschöpfend herangezogen worden.39 Wenig bekannt ist auch das Echo sei-
nes Geschichtswerks und seiner Theorien bei anderen damaligen Geschichts-
schreibern, wie Qalqašandī (gest. 1418AD),40 Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn
Muḥammad Ibn az-Zamlakānī (schrieb um 1425 AD),41 Taqī ad-Dīn al-Fāsī
37 Geschichts- und Gesellschaftslehre, (s. Anm. 29).

38 Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken (s. Anm. 34), S. 50–60.
39 Vgl. lediglich Dieter Sturm, “Die Wertung Ibn Ḫaldūn’s bei Ibn Ḥaǧar Al-ʿAsqalānī und
As-Saḫāwī”. In Ibn Ḫaldun und seine Zeit. Hrsg. v. D. Sturm. Halle a.d.S. 1983. = Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge 1983/1984, I 19, S. 77–85. –
F. Rosenthal, “Ibn Khaldūn’s Biography” (s. Anm. 4).
40 Hinweis bei F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. LXVI, Anm. 80.
648 chapter 35
(gest. 1429AD),42 Maqrīzī (gest. 1442AD),43 Abū l-Maḥāsin Ibn Taġribirdī (gest.
1470AD),44 Suyūṭī (gest. 1505AD)45 oder Maqqarī (gest. 1632 AD). Darüber hin-
aus hat Ibn Khaldūn die Fürstenethik des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts geprägt, wie
ein Vergleich mit seinem Zeitgenossen Abū l-Qāsim Ibn Riḍwān al-Malaqī, aš-
Šuhub al-lāmiʿa fī s-siyāsa an-nāfiʿa,46 oder mit dem im 15. Jahrhundert verfass-
49 ten Werk Badāʾiʿ as-silk fi ṭabaʾiʿ al-mulk des Ibn al-Azraq47 zeigt. Doch | mit Ibn
Khaldūns staatspolitischen Ideen haben sich erst seit dem 17. Jahrhundert die
Osmanen beschäftigt, die als neue Großmacht an Ibn Khaldūns Theorien von
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Dynastien interessiert waren.48 Es erstaunt daher
nicht, dass unter den Handschriften von Ibn Khaldūns Weltgeschichte und sei-
ner Muqaddima49 zahlreiche Exemplare in türkischen Bibliotheken erhalten
sind, darunter mehrere aus Ibn Khaldūns Zeit.50
Unter diesen sticht die Handschrift Atif Efendi 1936 hervor, die 804 Hiǧri /
1401–1402, also vier bis fünf Jahre vor Ibn Khaldūns Tod von einem unbekann-
ten Schreiber abgeschrieben wurde und heute in der Süleymaniye Kütüpha-
43 Vgl. Mohammed Abdullah Enan, Ibn Khaldūn, His Life and Work. Lahore 1941 / Nachdr.
1975, S. 98 ff. – Dazu A. Abdesselem, Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs (s. Anm. 47), S. 14.
44 Hinweis bei M. A. Enan, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 43), S. 102.
45 Hinweis bei F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. LXVI Anm. 80.
46 Vgl. Mohamed Saleh Bishari, Aš-Šuhub Al-Lāmiʿa fī As-Siyāsa An-Nāfiʿa. Mit einer
einführenden Darstellung der Ausführungen Ibn Khaldūns zum Begriff der Geschichts-
wissenchaft. Diss. Bonn 1980, bes. S. 158–164. Auf den Seiten 189–231 ist die Einleitung von
aš-Šuhub al-lāmiʿa herausgegeben worden. Eine Edition des vollständigen Textes (von ʿAlī
Sāmī an-Naššār) erschien 1984 in Casablanca.
47 Ed. ʿAlī Sāmī an-Naššār. I–II. Bagdad 1977. – Ed. Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm. I–
II. Tunis 1977. – Erste Beobachtungen findet man bei Ahmed Abdesselem, Ibn Khaldūn
et ses lecteurs. Paris 1983, S. 17–37. – Eine englische Übersetzung (nicht fehlerfrei) der Aus-
gabe ʿA. S. an-Naššār I, S. 33–156, findet man bei J. C. Buitendijk, Views on Civilization
and Education by Ibn Al-Azraq. Doctoraalscriptie Freie Universität Amsterdam (undatiert,
ca. 1987). – Eine vergleichende Studie von Ibn Khaldūn und Ibn al-Azraq (nebst Textaus-
wahl) erschien 1993 in Beirut: ʿAlī Zayʿūr, al-Falsafa al-ʿamaliyya ʿind Ibn Ḫaldūn wa-Ibn
al-Azraq fī t-tayyār al-iǧtimāʿī at-taʾrīḫī (“Die praktische Philosophie bei Ibn Khaldūn und
Ibn al-Azraq in der geistigen Strömung von Soziologie und Geschichtsschreibung”). – Eine
weitere vergleichende Studie zu Ibn al-Azraq und Ibn Ḫaldūn ist Aldila (binti) Isahak,
Ibn al-Azraq’s Political Thought. A study of Badāʾiʿ al-silk fī ṭabāʾiʿ al-mulk. Saarbrücken
2010.
48 Vgl. Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and ‘Ibn Khaldunism’ in
Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters”. In Ibn Khaldūn and Islamic Ideology (s. Anm. 26),
S. 46–68.
49 Vgl. N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun (s. Anm. 2), S. 47–53. – ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Muʿalla-
fāt Ibn Ḫaldūn. Libyen/Tunis 21979.
50 Siehe F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. LXXXVIIIff.
ibn khaldūn 649
nesi, Istanbul, aufbewahrt wird. Diese Handschrift, die in der jetzigen Gestalt
zwischen Fol. 129 v und 130 r eine Lücke hat und dort durch eine spätere Hand
um 6 Folios ergänzt worden ist,51 wurde vermutlich von Ibn Khaldūns Pri-
vatexemplar abgeschrieben, dem auch die Zufügungen und Verbesserungen
entnommen sind. Einer von Ibn Khaldūn selbst stammenden, in der oberen lin-
ken Ecke des Titelblattes angebrachten und mit Goldumrahmung versehenen
Bemerkung in maghribinischer Schrift zufolge ist diese Abschrift von Ibn Khal-
dūn selbst kollationiert und verbessert worden. Sie sei die beste aller Kopien:
Dies ist ein Exemplar52 der Muqaddima des “Buchs der Beispiele über
die Geschichte der Araber, Nichtaraber und Berber”. Es ist ganz und gar
wissenschaftlich, eine Art Vorrede (dībāǧa) zu dem Geschichtsbuch. Ich
habe es, soweit ich es vermochte, kollationiert und verbessert. Keine von
den Abschriften ist korrekter als diese. Geschrieben vom Autor (des Wer-
kes) ʿAbdarraḥman Ibn Khaldūn – Gott (erhaben ist Er) möge ihm Erfolg
verleihen und ihm mit Seiner Gnade verzeihen.
51 Vgl. die Beschreibung bei F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. XCIII–XCVII, der
wir die nachfolgenden Angaben entnommen haben.
52 musawwada bedeutet hier nicht “Entwurf” (so F. Rosenthal, Übers. (s. Anm. 2) I, S.
XCIV: “draft”). – Vgl. Reinhart Dozy, Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes. Leiden/Paris
31967, I, S. 700a.
650 chapter 35
Diese Notiz muss vor April 1402 geschrieben sein, denn eine von ihrem wohl
ersten Besitzer, Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Muḥammad al-Isfiǧābī, geschrie-
bene Notiz, die auf dem ersten Vorsatzblatt die Vortrefflichkeit des Buches
bescheinigt, ist auf den 29. April 1402 datiert.
Das beschriebene Interesse des Osmanischen Reiches an Handschriften von
Ibn Khaldūns Muqaddima und seiner Weltgeschichte führte noch nicht zu
50 einer Renaissance | von Ibn Khaldūns Denken. Daran konnte auch die (nicht
ganz vollständige) türkische Übersetzung durch Pirizade Efendi aus dem Jahre
1730AD53 nichts ändern. Erst mit der Expedition Napoleons nach Ägypten
(1798AD) beginnt sich die Situation zu ändern.54 Im Orient empfindet man
zunehmend eine schmerzliche Diskrepanz zwischen europäischer und isla-
mischer Zivilisation. Man besinnt sich auf das eigene Erbe und rückt, beson-
ders in Nordafrika, Ibn Khaldūn zunehmend in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses.
Dies führt im 19. Jahrhundert in der arabischen Welt zu einem umfassenden
Studium der Muqaddima des Ibn Khaldūn. Die erste gedruckte Ausgabe der
Muqaddima erscheint im Jahre 1857 in Kairo. Ihr folgt 10 Jahre später das eigent-
liche Geschichtswerk. Auf dieser Edition, die auf mancherlei Kritik gestoßen
ist, basieren zahlreiche spätere Editionen in arabischen Ländern. Im Erschei-
nungsjahr der ägyptischen Ausgabe veröffentlichte der französische Orienta-
list Étienne Marc Quatremère (1782–1857) eine Ausgabe, die zwar Mängel
aufweist, aber heute noch als Standardausgabe gilt.55 Dieser Ausgabe folgte –
auch aus praktischen Gründen, nämlich wegen des Bedarfs an Informatio-
nen über die Geschichte Nordafrikas im Zuge der Kolonialisierung Algeriens
durch die Franzosen – eine französische Übersetzung (Paris 1862–1868) durch
Baron William Mac-Guckin De Slane (1801–1879), Dolmetscher der fran-
zösischen Armee.
Eine neue französische Übersetzung hat 1967 Vincent Monteil veröffent-
licht. Am besten ist die 1958 erschienene englische Übersetzung von Franz
Rosenthal. Dieser benutzte eine große Anzahl von Handschriften, darun-
ter auch die aus dem Jahre 1402, woraus hier eine Auswahl im Faksimile-
druck vorgelegt wird. Weitere Übersetzungen gibt es ins Urdu (1924), Türkische
(1954), Portugiesische (1958), Hindi (1961), Persische (1966) und Hebräische
(1966). Eine vollständige deutsche Übersetzung gibt es bislang nicht, aber drei
Auswahlübersetzungen, nämlich von Erich Isak Jakob Rosenthal (1932),
53 Erschien 1859 in Kairo. Vgl. dazu F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. CVIIf.
54 Vgl. hierzu A. Abdesselem, Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs (s. Anm. 47), S. 39 ff., und die Über-
sicht bei M. Pätzold, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2), S. 23–28.
55 Vgl. zu ihr F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I, S. CIf.
ibn khaldūn 651
Annemarie Schimmel (1951) und von Mathias Pätzold (1992),56 welche

für die hier abgedruckte Übersetzung herangezogen wurden.
Wie schon gesagt, wurde Ibn Khaldūn im 19. Jahrhundert bei Arabern und
Europäern gleichzeitig entdeckt, nämlich im Zuge der Expedition Napoleons
nach Ägypten. Handschriften kamen aus dem Orient nach Europa, und die
Kolonialisierung Algeriens durch die Franzosen steigerte den Wunsch nach
Informationen über die Geschichte Nordafrikas. Daher begann man, sich für
die Muqaddima und Ibn Khaldūns Geschichte Nordafrikas zu interessieren.
Ferner hat man versucht, die ideengeschichtliche Bedeutung Ibn Khaldūns
zu unterstreichen und für die europäische Geistesgeschichte zugänglich zu
machen, indem man in nicht immer gerechtfertigter Weise auf Parallelen zu
Denkern | des Westens hingewiesen hat. Man weist in oft ahistorischer Aktua- 51
lisierung auf Parallelen zu Machiavelli (1469–1527),57 zu Montesquieu (1689–
1755)58 hin und sieht in Ibn Khaldūn einen geistigen Vater der sich etablieren-
den Soziologie,59 einen Vorgänger von Auguste Comte (1798–1857)60 oder Her-
bert Spencer (1820–1903).61 Auch Ibn Khaldūns zyklisches Geschichtsden-
ken findet großen Anklang, weswegen der britische Historiker und Geschichts-
philosoph Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975) die Muqaddima als “zweifelsohne
größtes Werk seiner Art” bezeichnet, “das jemals geschaffen wurde”.62
Die Khaldūn-Rezeption63 ist in der modernen arabischen und westlichen
Welt unterschiedlich.64 Die westliche Wissenschaft betrachtet Ibn Khaldūns
Werk als Beitrag zur Universalgeschichte, der überdies eine gewisse Verwandt-
56 Siehe die bibliographischen Angaben in Anm. 2.

57 Vgl. M. A. Enan, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 43), S. 168 ff.
58 Vgl. Fuad Baali, Society, State und Urbanism: Ibn Khaldūn’s Sociological Thought. New
York 1988, Reg. s.n.
59 Vgl. N. Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun (s. Anm. 2), S. 27–33. – F. Baali, Society (s. Anm. 58), S. 69–
106.
60 Vgl. F. Baali, Society (s. Anm. 58), bes. S. 21 ff.
61 Vgl. F. Baali, Society (s. Anm. 58), Reg. s.n.
62 Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History. Oxford/London/New York/Toronto 61955, III,
S. 322: “… undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created …”.
Zu A. Toynbee vgl. F. Baali, Society (s. Anm. 58), Reg. s.n.
63 Vgl. die bei H. Daiber, BIPh II, S. 223–230, diesbezüglich und unter modernen Autoren
verzeichnete Literatur.
64 Vgl. im Einzelnen A. Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship (s. Anm. 20). – A.
Abdesselem, Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs (s. Anm. 47), S. 57ff. – Bruce B. Lawrence,
“Ibn Khaldūn and Islamic Reform”. In Ibn Khaldūn and Islamic Ideology (s. Anm. 26), S. 69–
88. – Die Übersicht bei M. Pätzold, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2), S. 26–28. – Ferner zur Ibn
Khaldūn-Renaissance in der arabischen Welt die Kongressakten Ibn Ḫaldūn wa-l-fikr al-
muʿāṣir. Tunis 1980.
652 chapter 35
schaft zu moderner Soziologie und Anthropologie aufweise,65 wogegen die

Muslime Ibn Khaldūn zur Findung ihrer eigenen Identität benutzen. Er
erscheint als Gewährsmann für soziologische und geschichtsphilosophische
Fragen zur Erhellung gegenwärtiger gesellschaftlicher Phänomene.
So berufen sich Vertreter der arabischen bürgerlichen Aufklärung und der
islamischen Reformbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts auf Ibn Khaldūns ge-
schichtsphilosophische Theorien vom Entstehen und Vergehen von Dynastien
und Reichen. Ebenso wie das Islamische Reich untergegangen sei, werde auch
das mächtige Europa ein Ende haben. Hierbei sind die islamischen Reformer
beeindruckt von Ibn Khaldūns gesellschaftspolitischen Interessen sowie von
seiner Rücksichtnahme auf islamische Tradition und Religion.
Der islamische Reformer Ǧamāl ad-Dīn al-Afġānī (1839–1897) zieht aus
Ibn Khaldūns Lehren vom Werden und Vergehen der Staaten den Schluss, dass
entsprechend auch der europäische Kolonialismus ein Ende haben müsse und
den gleichen universalen Gesetzen unterworfen sei.
Auch Ibn Khaldūns Lehren vom Kalifat tauchen in politischen Diskussionen
des 20. Jahrhunderts auf.66 So benutzt der muslimische Reformer Rašīd Riḍā
52 (1865–1935) | die Muqaddima, um das Kalifat zu verteidigen und die panisla-
mische Kalifatsidee dem europäischen Kolonialismus sowie aufkommenden
nationalistischen Bewegungen in der arabischen Welt entgegenzusetzen.
Sein Gegner, ʿAlī ʿAbd ar-Rāziq (1888–1966), interpretiert Ibn Khaldūns
Beschreibung der Entwicklung des Kalifats zu einer weltlichen Herrschaft mit
mehr oder weniger islamischen Vorzeichen als Hinweis auf die Unvereinbar-
keit von Herrschaft und Religion. Daher trat er für die Trennung von Staat und
Religion ein.67
In der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts ist im Zuge der nationalen Ver-
selbständigung der arabischen Länder das Erbe islamischer Kultur in den Mit-
telpunkt arabischer Intellektueller gerückt. Man interessiert sich für rationale
Bewegungen der glorreichen islamischen Geschichte, für die großen Denker
des islamischen Mittelalters, insbesondere für Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd und Ibn Khal-
dūn und widmet ihnen Konferenzen mit internationaler Beteiligung.
Diese Rückwendung zur eigenen großen Vergangenheit dient schließlich
auch dem Aufspüren der Ursachen bestehender gesellschaftlicher und wirt-
65 Vgl. John W. Anderson, “Conjuring with Ibn Khaldūn: From an Anthropological Point
of View”. In Ibn Khaldūn and Islamic Ideology (s. Anm. 26), S. 111–121.
66 Vgl. B. B. Lawrence, “The Islamic Background” (s. Anm. 26), S. 81f. – M. Pätzold, Ibn
Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2), S. 27.
67 Vgl. die ausführliche Diskussion bei A. M. Battah, Ibn Khaldūn’s Principles of Political
Economy (s. Anm. 21), S. 177–207.
ibn khaldūn 653
schaftlicher Verhältnisse. Man zieht Ibn Khaldūn zur Lösung der eigenen, aktu-
ellen Probleme heran.68
IV Konkordanz
Nachfolgend eine Konkordanz der Textabschnitte über Ökonomie in Ibn Khal-

dūns Muqaddima. Sie sind als Beilage zu dem Sammelband über Ibn Khaldūn
in der Sammlung Klassiker der Nationalökonomie (dem dieser Beitrag entnom-
men ist) im Faksimiledruck nach der 1401–1402AD geschriebenen Handschrift
Atif Efendi 1936 (Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Istanbul) veröffentlicht.
Die Konkordanz enthält die Seitenzählung des Faksimilebandes, die Ent-
sprechungen in der Edition von Étienne Marc Quatremère (I–III. Paris
1858), in der französischen Übersetzung von Georges-Henri Bousquet
(Ibn Khaldoun: Les textes sociologiques et économiques de la Mouqaddima 1375–
1379. Paris 1965, §§32–65: Über Ökonomie) und in den deutschen Überset-
zungen von Erwin Isak Jakob Rosenthal (Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken über
den Staat. München/Berlin 1932), Annemarie Schimmel (Ausgewählte Ab-
schnitte aus der muqaddima. Tübingen 1951) und Mathias Pätzold (Ibn Khal-
dūn, Buch der Beispiele. Die Einführung – al-Muqaddima. Leipzig 1992). | 53
68 Hier hat, worauf M. Pätzold, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) auf S. 28 hinweist, das 1966 in Paris,
41978, erschienene Buch von Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldoun. Naissance de l’histoire passé
du tiers monde, eine gewisse Rolle gespielt. Es ist 1971 in spanischer, 1982 in arabischer und
1984 in englischer Übersetzung erschienen: s. H. Daiber, BIPh I, S. 559f.
654 chapter 35
MS69 É. M. G.-H. E. I. J. A. M.
Quatremère Bousquet Rosenthal Schimmel Pätzold
170
3–8 I. 1–6 29–35
9–18 I. 56–72 §§32, 33, 34 39–53
19–2071
22 I. 220–221 §47 65–66
23–24 I. 223–225 §47 68–70
25–26 I. 235–236 §33 78–79
28 I. 257–258 §64 91–92
30–39 II. 79–81 §58 73–75 154–156
II. 82–83 §59 76–77 128–129
II. 83–87 §60 77–79 129–132
II. 87–92 §61 75–76 132–136
II. 92–93 §62 72–73 136–137 157
II. 93–100 §6372 83–85 137–142 158–160*73
42–46 II. 108–113 86–87 144–149 162–167
47–48 II. 124–126 §56 87–88 155–157
50–69 II. 234–239 §52 82–83* 168–170* 183–188
II. 239–242 §49 80–82 170–173
II. 243–244 §50 173–174
II. 244–247 §53 174* 188–191
II. 247–249 §45 175–176
II. 249–250 176–177 191–192
II. 250–255 §54* 90* 177–179* 192–193
II. 255–261 §§55, 56* 179–185 197–202
II. 261–265 §57* 185–188
II. 265–266 §51 188–189
69 Die angegebene Seitenzählung bezieht sich auf die durchlaufende Paginierung im Faksi-
mileband, wobei Leerseiten nicht mitgezählt sind. Die ursprüngliche Foliozählung der Hs.
ist aus dem Faksimileband ersichtlich.
70 Titelblatt der Hs. mit der autographischen Notiz.
71 Weltkarte, gezeichnet nach dem Vorbild der Weltkarte, die von dem Kalifen Maʾmūn (reg.
813–833 AD) beauftragt wurde.70
72 Mit einer kleinen Umstellung: S. 99 der Ausgabe É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes (s.
Anm. 2) II erscheint in der Übersetzung von G.-H. Bousquet als §60.
73 * = gekürzt oder Zusammenfassung.
ibn khaldūn 655
( fortges.)
MS É. M. G.-H. E. I. J. A. M.
Quatremère Bousquet Rosenthal Schimmel Pätzold
71–75 II. 272–276 §§36, 48* 192–195* 209–213

II. 276–278 §37 195–197* 213–215
II. 278–280 §38 197* 215–217
78–85 II. 287–288 §40 198–199 217–218
II. 289–295 §§33, 34* 199–205
II. 295–296 §41 205–206 218–220
II. 297–300 §42 206–208* 221*74
II. 301–302 §43 208–209
II. 302–303 §44 209–210*
87–88 II. 309–310 §54 212* 221–222
89 II. 311–312 213
II. 312–313 §48 214 224
II. 315 §35 214*
90–92 II. 316–317 §46 215 226–227
93–95 II. 383–384 §48 218–219 240–242
97 III. 433–434 §65 274
74 Nur ed. É. M. Quatremère, Prolégomènes (s. Anm. 2) II, S. 297–298.

656 chapter 35
54 V Die Weltkarte des Ibn Khaldūn75
1 = Süden / 2 = Westen / 3 = Norden / 4 = Osten / 5 = südlich des Äquators unbe-

wohntes Land wegen der Hitze / 6 = Äquator / 7 = das Land Lamlam / 8 = das Land
Maġzāwa / 9 = Kanem / 10 = Bartū / 11 = Gawgaw / 12 = Zaġāy / 13 = at-Tāǧuwīn / 14
= Nubien / 15 = Abessinien / 16 = Ghana / 17 = Lamṭa / 18 = as-Sūs / 19 = Marokko
/ 20 = Tanger / 21 = Ṣinhāǧah / 22 = Darʿa / 23 = Ifrīqiyya / 24 = Fezzan / 25 = Ǧerid
/ 26 = Kawār / 27 = Wüste von Berenike / 28 = Innere Oasen / 29 = Oberägypten
/ 30 = Ägypten / 31 = Béja / 32 = Ḥigāz / 33 = Syrien / 34 = Yemen / 35 = Yamāmah
/ 36 = Basra / 37 = Irak / 38 = aš-Šiḥr / 39 = Oman / 40 = aṣ-Ṣind (Westindien) /
41 = Mokrān / 42 = Kermān / 43 = Fārs / 44 = al-Bahlūs / 45 = Aserbaidschan / 46
= Wüste / 47 = Ḫorāsān / 48 = Ḫwārizm / 49 = al-Hind (Ostindien) / 50 = aš-Šāš
(Taschkent) / 51 = aṣ-Ṣugd (Sogdiana) / 52 = China / 53 = at-Tuġuzġuz / 54 = Gas-
cogne / 55 = Britannien / 56 = Kalabrien / 57 = Frankreich / 58 = Venedig / 59 =
Deutschland / 60 = Mazedonien / 61 = Böhmen / 62 = Ǧaṯūliyya / 63 = Ǧarmāniyya
/ 64 = al-Baylaqān / 65 = Armenien / 66 = Ṭabaristān / 67 = al-Lān (Alanen) / 68 =
Baškīr / 69 = Bulġār / 70 = Baǧnākiyya (= Pečenga?) / 71 = “Stinkendes Land” / 72 =
“Ödes Land” / 73 = Magog / 74 = Ġazna / 75 = Turkiyya / 76 = Aḏkiš / 77 = Ḫalluḫiya
/ 78 = Gog / 79 = Kīmāk / 80 = im Norden unbewohntes Land wegen der Kälte
75 Die Karte erscheint bei F. Rosenthal, Ibn Khaldūn (s. Anm. 2) I zwischen den Seiten 110
ibn khaldūn 657
Summary
This chapter on the life, work and thoughts of the famous historian Ibn Khal-
dūn / Ḫaldūn (d. 808/1406) is part of a publication on Ibn Ḫaldūn as a classic of
Arabic-Islamic economic thinking. The publication includes in addition chap-
ters concentrating on Ibn Ḫaldūn’s socio-economic synthesis and on economic
concepts in Islam. It adds a selection of texts on economy in a facsimile edition
based on an autograph of Ibn Ḫaldūn’s Muqaddima from the year 804/1401–
1402 and with German translation (based on Erich Isak Jakob Rosenthal,
Annemarie Schimmel and Mathias Pätzold). The Muqaddima is a pro-
legomenon, a theoretical “introduction” to Ibn Ḫaldūn’s world history. It is ana-
lyzed in our chapter against the background of his life and concentrates on key
concepts of Ibn Ḫaldūn’s philosophy of history and their afterlife, on “human
culture” (ʿumr), its development from “nomadism” (badāwa) to a sedentary life-
style (ḥaḍāra), on “solidarity” (ʿaṣabiyya) of the community through the “curb”
(wāziʿ) of man’s innate tendencies of aggression. History is a constant cycle of
becoming and passing and is the result of many causalities. Although belief
and this world are separate entities, religion and revelation play a key role in
strengthening solidarity in the service of theocracy.
Latest publications: Osman Bakar, Towards a New Science of Civilization. A

synthetic study of the philosophical views of al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, Arnold
Toynbee, and Samuel Huntington. In Synthesis philosophica 31, no. 62, 2016,
pp. 313–333. – Stephen Frederic Dale, The Orange Trees of Marrakesh. Ibn
Khaldun and the Science of Man. Cambridge, MA 2015.
Republished, with some additions and modifications, from Ibn Khaldūn. Ökonomie
aus der “Muqaddima”. Textauswahl von Hans Daiber. Hrsg. v. Bertram Schefold.
[Und] Vademecum zu dem Klassiker des arabischen Wirtschaftsdenkens. Düsseldorf
2000, pp. 33–54. By courtesy of the publisher.
und 111 nachgezeichnet. Die in der Karte genannten Länder und Ortschaften sind ebenda
identifiziert worden. – Vgl. hierzu GAS X: Mathematische Geographie und Kartographie im
Islam und ihr Fortleben im Abendland. Historische Darstellung. Teil 1. Frankfurt a.M. 2000.
= Veröffentlichungen des Institutes für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften,
S. 92 ff. und 471. – Eine farbige Reproduktion von Ibn Khaldūns Weltkarte findet man auch
in GAS XII: Kartenband. Frankfurt a.M. 2000, S. 30 (Nr. 9). Dort erscheint sie auf den Kopf
gestellt, um sie für den modernen Leser erkennbar zu machen.
chapter 36
Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad
Ibn Khaldūn / Ḫaldūn (geb. am 27. Mai 1332AD in Tunis, gest. am 17. März 1406
in Kairo) trat nach einer klassischen Ausbildung in Koran, Traditionswissen-
schaft und Recht zunächst in den Dienst der in Ifriqiyya (heutiges Tunesien
und Ostalgerien) herrschenden Dynastie der Hafsiden. Die Rivalität zwischen
dieser Dynastie und den Mariniden in Marokko sowie den Abdalwadiden im
heutigen Westalgerien im Kampf um die Nachfolge des in der Mitte des 13. Jahr-
hunderts zusammengebrochenen Almohadenreiches, aber auch persönliche
Beweggründe führten dazu, dass Ibn Khaldūn bei Herrschern unterschiedli-
cher Dynastien in Fez, Bougie und Kairo tätig war – als Verwalter, Gelehrter,
Diplomat und Richter. Der Auf- und Niedergang der herrschenden Dynastien
und die daraus resultierende Instabilität der Wirtschaft, der Landwirtschaft,
des Handwerks und des Handels, auch mit Europa (Südfrankreich, Spanien)
und dem muslimischen Osten, veranlassten Ibn Khaldūn, seine Erfahrungen
und Eindrücke in einem groß angelegten Geschichtswerk, in seiner Universal-
geschichte “Lehrbuch und Sammlung über die Anfänge und (nachfolgende)
Geschichte der Araber, Nichtaraber, Berber und der zeitgenössischen mäch-
tigsten Herrscher” zusammenzustellen. Die geschichtsphilosophische Quint-
essenz hat er in einzigartiger Weise in den Prolegomena (muqaddima) zu die-
sem hauptsächlich auf die Geschichte Nordafrikas konzentrierten Werk schrift-
lich niedergelegt.
Muqaddima “Vorwort”
Erstentwurf 1377AD. – Erstausgabe Būlāq, Ägypten 1857. – Neuausgaben v.

ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Wāfī, 1–4. Kairo 1957–1962 / Beirut 1994. Zusammen mit
dem Geschichtswerk und der Autobiographie (at-Taʿrīf ) in 14 Bänden hrsg.
v. Ibrāhīm Šabbūḥ. Tunis 2006–2013. – Übersetzungen (Auswahl): Franz
Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History. London/New York
1958. – Annemarie Schimmel, Ibn Chaldun. Ausgewählte Abschnitte aus der
Muqaddima. Tübingen 1951. – Mathias Pätzold, Ibn Khaldun, Buch der Bei-
spiele: Die Einführung al-Muqaddima. Leipzig 1992. – Bertram Schefold
(Hrsg.): Ökonomie aus »Muqaddima«. [Und] Vademecum zu dem Klassiker des
arabischen Wirtschaftsdenkens. Düsseldorf 2000.

ibn khaldūn, ʿabd ar-raḥmān ibn muḥammad 659
Jeglicher unkritischen Übernahme geschichtlicher Überlieferungen abhold

und an der Kausalität von Gesellschaft und Kultur in ihrer politischen und
wirtschaftlichen Verflechtung interessiert, enwickelt Ibn Khaldūn in seiner Mu-
qaddima erstmals eine zyklische Geschichtstheorie vom Entstehen der als sol-
chen schöpferischen menschlichen “Kultur” (ʿumrān) im Zusammenschluss
der Menschen und in der Entwicklung des Nomadentums zur Sesshaftigkeit
(mit Ackerbau, Viehzucht und Weidewirtschaft), zur städtischen Zivilisation.
Da diese als ḥadāra bezeichnete Stufe auf Arbeitsteilung, Gewerbe und Han-
del beruht, die mehr als | das Notwendige produziere und zu Luxus führe, 215 b
schwindet das anfänglich bestimmende, von Loyalität zu Familie und Stam-
mesgemeinschaft und weniger von Religion geprägte Gemeinschaftsgefühl.
Dieses bezeichnet Ibn Khaldūn als ʿaṣabiyya, als Einsatz der Menschen für die
Gemeinschaft, als sozialen Zusammenhalt.
Hand in Hand mit dem Schwinden der ʿaṣabiyya sei ein moralisch-sittlicher
Verfall zu beobachten. Auch die Herrschenden, deren Aufgabe die Zügelung
des den Menschen angeborenen Aggressionstriebes gewesen sei, versuchen
nach der Periode des Nomadentums (mit solidarischer Kooperation zwischen
Regenten und Untertanen) in der Phase der Sesshaftigkeit ihre Herrschaft zu
etablieren und zu einer erblichen Dynastie zu machen, zu einer Autokratie.
Dieser Ausbau der Herrschaft ist mit zunehmenden Kosten verbunden. Dies
führt zu erhöhten Steuern und damit zu Preissteigerungen, die das wirtschaftli-
che Wachstum lähmen. Abnehmender Reichtum veranlasst die Dynastie bzw.
den Staat (Ibn Khaldūn unterscheidet hier nicht), zu unlauteren Mitteln zu
greifen, etwa zu Enteignung und Zwangsarbeit. Der wirtschaftliche Zusam-
menbruch ist programmiert, zumal die städtische Bevölkerung, in passivem
Luxusleben verharrend, sich gegen Angriffe von außen, durch die Nomaden,
nicht wehren kann.
Da die Landwirtschaft der Nomaden und der Handel bzw. das Gewerbe
städtischer Zivilisation aufeinander angewiesen sind und die Folgen des Nie-
dergangs wirtschaftlicher Art sind, hat Ibn Khaldūn der Ökonomie viel Auf-
merksamkeit geschenkt, ohne sie jedoch zum Hauptgegenstand eines einzi-
gen Kapitels zu machen. Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft gehören zusammen. Die
wachsende Bevölkerung in den Städten und die abnehmende Notwendigkeit
von Arbeit für den Lebensunterhalt führen zu größerer Nachfrage und damit
zu Preissteigerungen.
Ibn Khaldūn diskutiert daher den Bevölkerungszuwachs; den Komplex An-
gebot-Nachfrage-Preisentwicklung; die Rolle des durch Landwirtschaft, Hand-
werk und Handel erzielten angemessenen, rechtmäßig erwirtschafteten und
investierten Gewinns für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und den Handelsüber-
schuss, um Luxusgüter einzuführen oder Kapital aufzubauen. Hierbei sei das
660 chapter 36
Unterlassen angemessener Investitionen ebenso wirtschaftsschädlich wie die

Verringerung des Geldumlaufs durch überhöhte Besteuerung. Ibn Khaldūn
geht hierbei von dem Grundsatz aus, dass “Einkommen und Ausgaben in jeder
Stadt sich die Waage halten sollten”.
Ibn Khaldūns Gedanken hatten weder Vorläufer noch nennenswerte Nach-
folger – allenfalls Bewunderer. Daran konnten weder die türkische Teilüberset-
zung aus dem Jahre 1730, noch die im 19. Jh. erscheinenden Editionen etwas
ändern. Doch erlebte Ibn Khaldūn im 20. Jh. eine Renaissance durch Über-
setzungen ins Deutsche (Teile), Englische, Französische, Hebräische, Portugie-
216 a sische und Spanische, sowie durch zahlreiche Publika|tionen in Europa und
im Orient, in denen er als “Vater der Ökonomie” (Ibrahim M. Oweiss 1988)
bezeichnet wird und in denen auf Parallelen zu Keynes, Malthus, Marshall,
Marx, Ricardo, Adam Smith, sowie auf immer noch gültige Aussagen zu den
Komponenten ökonomischer Entwicklung hingewiesen wird.
Literatur: Abdalla M. Battah, Ibn Khaldun’s Principles of Political Economy.

Rudiments of a New Science. Diss. The American University Washington 1988
(Bibliographie, S. 177ff.). – Fabián Estapé, Ibn Jaldun o el precursor. Barcelona
1993. – Sule Ahmad Gusau, Economic Thoughts of Ibn Khaldun. In Journal
of Islamic Economics 3/1, 1993, S. 61–80. – Chika Umar Aliyu, Ibn Khaldun’s
Views on Stages of Economic Development. In Muhammad Lawal Ahmad
Bashar und Sule Ahmad Gusau (Hrsg.), Readings in Islamic Economic I.
Sokoto, Nigeria 1993, S. 145–155. – Abdol Soofi, Economics of Ibn Khaldun
Revisited. In History of Political Economy 27, 1995, S. 387–404. – Dieter Weiß,
Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation. In International Journal of Middle
East Studies 27, 1995, S. 29–37. – Bertram Schefold (Hrsg.), Vademecum
zu dem Klassiker des arabischen Wirtschaftsdenkens. Düsseldorf 2000 (mit ver-
schiedenen Beiträgen). – Ibrahim M. Oweiss, Ibn Khaldun. The Father of
Economics. In George N. Atiyeh und Ibrahim M. Oweiss (Hrsg.), Arab Civi-
lization. Challenges and Responses. Studies in Honor of Constantine K. Zurayk.
Albany/New York 1988, S. 112–127.
Nachtrag: Vgl. den Index s.v. “economics” in Hans Daiber, BIPh.
Republished, with some modifications and additions, from Lexikon ökonomischer

Werke. 650 wegweisende Schriften von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Ed. by Diet-
mar Herz and Veronika Weinberger. In cooperation with Andreas Blätte,
Torsten Budäus, Shakuntala Banerjee and Wibke Reger. Stuttgart/Düsseldorf
2006, pp. 215a–216a. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 37
Mullā Ṣadrā on the Problem of Creation and the

Role of Greek Philosophers
New light on Mullā Ṣadrā as a Historian of Greek Philosophers*
Mullā Ṣadrā is one of those philosophers who did not refer to Greek philosoph-
ers as a warning example.1 On the contrary, he adduced them as confirmation of
his own doctrines. He had a high opinion especially of Presocratic philosophers
and considered them as a supplementary source of knowledge in addition to
knowledge based on intellectual intuition.
Mullā Ṣadrā’s work therefore becomes an important source for the afterlife
of Greek philosophers whose transmissions in Arabic often mirror texts which
are lost in the Greek original, and some reveal late Hellenistic interpretations.
More important for us, however, is the fact, that a correct understanding of
Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought requires a thorough | source analysis, including Mullā 8
Ṣadrā’s Greek sources. Their comparison with Mullā Ṣadrā will contribute to a
better understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy.
Mullā Ṣadrā preferred Presocratic philosophers to the teaching of the Aris-
totelian school and of the Illuminationists, because he considered them as
heirs of Hebrew prophetic wisdom, which was distorted by later Greeks. For
him, true Greek philosophy started with the Presocratics and ended with Aris-
totle.
This quite unusual position requires a clarification. The answer to the ques-
tion as to why Mullā Ṣadrā preferred the Presocratics is related to Mullā Ṣadrā’s
discussion of creation. We shall therefore give a short description of his theory
of creation.2 Creation starts with the “emanation” (ṣudūr) of “simple beings”
* The article is based on a paper presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May, 1999,
Tehran), and appeared in print in Mulla Sadra and Comparative Studies. Islam-West Philo-
sophical Dialogue. III. Tehran 2002, pp. 3–18.
1 Cf. Hans Daiber, Hellenistisch-kaiserzeitliche Doxographie und philosophischer Synkre-
tismus in islamischer Zeit. In ANRW II, 36/7, 1994 (pp. 4974–4992), p. 4976. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs I/3. – First remarks on the sources of Mullā Ṣadrā can be found
in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Studies. Beirut 1967, pp. 127–133 (ch. 11: Mulla Sadra as
a source for the history of Muslim Philosophy) and in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ṣadr al-dīn
Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy. Tehran 1978 / Repr. Chicago 1998 as Transcendent
Theosophy of Sadruddin Shirazi, ch. 4.
2 Cf. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ṣadr Al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mulla Sadra). In A History of Muslim Philo-

662 chapter 37
(basāʾiṭ) from God, namely intellect, soul, nature, and finally the prime mat-
ter. This kind of “creation”, called ibdāʿ, is followed by the “formation”, takwīn,
of “composed beings” (murakkabāt), which are composed from matter and
form, namely natural bodies, plants, animals and human beings. The subtle
beings are imperishable, whereas the things composed of matter and form have
opposites and can change and decay.
Here, Mullā Ṣadrā follows the so-called Theology attributed to Aristotle.3
Moreover, he keeps to a Neoplatonic scheme of emanation via intermediate
causes. It starts with the divine intellect and ends with the prime matter. As in
Neoplatonism the soul descends in the first process of “creation”, the ibdāʿ, from
God to matter. In the second process of “formation”, the takwīn, it rises from
matter again to intellect in the human being. Creation appears as a movement
from ontological subtlety to solidity of matter, from subtle being to being of
matter, which cannot be seen and is hidden under many possible forms. From
God, from unity to multiplicity of the forms, to quiddity, to possibility. Mul-
tiplicity of forms has its highest rank in the human being and his intellect –
9 although | this does not possess the rank of divine intellect, the first emana-
tion from God. In sum, ibdāʿ “creation” is a transition from unity to multiplicity
(takṯīr al-wāḥid), whereas takwīn “formation” is a movement from multiplicity
to unity (tawḥīd al-kaṯīr).
Evidently, Mullā Ṣadrā follows the traditional Neoplatonic theory of inter-
mediate causes: God is the first cause. Between Him, the highest being, and
the sublunary world, the matter, exist many intermediaries. This Neoplatonic
scheme is similar to that in the corpus of Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān4 and especially
in the 4th/10th-century encyclopaedia of Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ.5 It is followed
with modifications by Islamic philosophers like Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Naṣīr
ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī.6 Their predecessor Kindī in the 3rd/9th century modified his
sophy. Ed. Mian Muhammad Sharif. II. Wiesbaden 1966, pp. 932–961, esp. pp. 942ff. –
Muhammad Abdul Haq, An Aspect of the Metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā I. In IS 9, 1970,
pp. 331–353. – Muhammad Abdul Haq, Metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā. In IS 10, 1971, pp. 291–
317, esp. pp. 298 ff.
3 Cf. below.
4 Cf. Paul Kraus, Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān. Contribution à l’ histoire des idées scientifiques dans
l’ Islam. Paris 1986 / Repr. of the edition Cairo 1942. = Mémoires présentés à l’Institut d’Égypte
45, pp. 136 ff.
5 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. Revised edition.
London 1993, pp. 51 ff. – Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists. An Introduction to
the Thought of the Brethren of Purity (Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ). London 1982 / Repr. Edinburgh 1991. =
Islamic surveys 19, pp. 33 ff.
6 On Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, and their sources – Aristotle, Plotin, Ptolemy,
Themistius, and above all Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise On the Principles of the Universe,
mullā ṣadrā on the problem of creation 663
sources Plotinus and Proclus and did not assume an intermediating causal-
ity between the One and the multiplicity of creation. Through emanation the
intellect in actu (the forma formarum), the immaterial and intelligible forms,
species and genus, and finally the material single things of nature receive their
“reality” (ḥaqīqa) from the first cause of all beings, “the True One” (al-wāḥid al-
ḥaqq).7
Why have Islamic philosophers, including Mullā Ṣadrā, been attracted so 10
much to Neoplatonism and its system of emanationism? The answer is given by
the example of Kindī: He found a corroboration of the Koranic concept of God
as an almighty and transcendent being in the Muʿtazilite doctrine of tawḥīd,
of the unity and undescribability of God, whose infinity cannot be defined. A
confirmation of the Islamic doctrine of God’s transcendence in his eyes was the
Neoplatonic doctrine of God, which he took over with some modifications and
omissions from Plotin’s Enneads in the paraphrase of the Pseudo-Aristotelian
Theology and from Proclus’Institutio theologica. These philosophers were at the
same time confronted with the problem: How can a transcendent God be the
creator of a visible world? Or, as Plotin formulated this question:8 How does
multiplicity emerge from the One, how does contingent existence arise from
divine essence, which necessarily exists?9
which is lost in its Greek original (Arabic version with translation is edited by Charles
Genequand, Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. Leiden/Boston/Köln 2001. = IPTS
44) – cf. Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Leiden/New
York/Köln 1994. = IPTS 17, pp. 196ff., esp. pp. 203ff. – On Fārābī cf. Ian Richard Netton,
Allāh Transcendent. Studies in the structure and semiotics of Islamic philosophy, theology
and cosmology. London/New York 1989 / Repr. London 1994, pp. 114ff.
7 Cf. Michael E. Marmura and John Michael Rist, Al-Kindī’s Discussion of Divine Exist-
ence and Oneness. In Medieval Studies 25, 1963 (pp. 338–354), p. 354. – Alfred L. Ivry,
Al-Kindī’s Metaphysics. Albany 1974, p. 19. – Gerhard Endress, review of Alfred. L. Ivry.
In OLZ 76, 1981, pp. 159 f. – I. R. Netton, Allāh Transcendent (s. n. 6), pp. 58ff., esp. pp. 63f. –
S. below n. 63.
8 Ennead V 1. 6 (attributed to aš-Šayḫ al-yūnānī: s. ed. Franz Rosenthal, aš-Šaiẖ al-Yūnānī
and the Arabic Plotinus Source. In Orientalia N.S. 21, 1952, pp. 461–492; 22, 1953, pp. 370–400;
24, 1955, pp. 42–66, esp. pp. 476f.). – The echo in the Arabic text of Pseudo-Aristotle, Theo-
logy. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici, Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles. Leipzig 1882 / Repr.
Hildesheim 1969. = Die Philosophie bei den Arabern im X. Jahrhundert n. Chr. XI, p. 111, 3ff. –
Both texts can be found in English translation, together with the Greek original in Plotini
opera II: Enneads IV–V. Ediderunt Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. Plotiniana
arabica ad codicum fidem anglice vertit Geoffrey Lewis. Paris/Bruxelles 1959, pp. 272–275.
9 Some remarks on its history in Jewish and Islamic philosophy can be found in Arthur
Hyman, “From What is One and Simple only What is One and Simple Can Come to Be”. In Neo-
platonism and Jewish Thought. Ed. Lenn Evan Goodman. Albany 1992, pp. 111–135. – Cf. also
Alexander Altmann, Creation and Emanation in Isaac Israeli: a reappraisal. In Studies in
664 chapter 37
The answer offered by philosophers from Kindī onwards is not completely

satisfactory. God’s transcendence appears to be undermined by intermediar-
ies. Kindī, however, omitted them apparently as something incompatible with
the Koranic and Muʿtazilite conception of divine transcendence. On the other
hand, the assumption of some relation between God and the visible world
11 was unavoidable: God in Islam is the creator of | the world, therefore, some
relation between God and the world must be assumed, either through some
unspecified emanation (Kindī) or through some intermediaries in a hierarch-
ical order.
Let us now have a look at Mullā Ṣadrā. His quotation of Greek philosoph-
ers and his predilection for Presocratic philosophers will enable us to get a
clearer view of Mullā Ṣadrā’s position concerning this problem. In his main
work, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-ʿaqliyya al-arbaʿa, the second safar on
natural philosophy, the section on substances, 5th chapter, 3rd paragraph, we
find a chapter “About the agreement of prophets and philosophers on com-
ing into being (ḥudūṯ) of the world”. In this chapter, nearly identical with his
earlier Risāla fī l-ḥudūṯ,10 Mullā Ṣadrā adduces Greek philosophers as testimon-
ies for his own doctrine of creation, of ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam, the alternative title of his
work.
Firstly, Mullā Ṣadrā stresses, that philosophers and prophets agree, that
the world and its “simple” (basāʾiṭ) and “composed” (murakkabāt) things are
Medieval Jewish History and Literature. Ed. by Isadore Twersky. Cambridge, Mass./Lon-
don 1979, pp. 1–15 / Repr. in Alexander Altmann, Essays in Jewish Intellectual History.
Hannover/New Hampshire/London 1981, pp. 17–34.
10 We use the edition in Rasāʾil Āḫūnd Mullā Ṣadrā. Tehran 1302/1884, pp. 2–109. – The dox-
ographical section can be found as appendix (ḫātima) on pp. 67, 16–105, 16. Mostly, it
contains the same doxographical passages as al-Ḥikma. Additional informations in Ḥudūṯ
go back to two sources: 1) ʿĀmirī, al-Amad ʿalā l-abad: Cf. Ḥudūṯ, pp. 68, 13–69, 2, with ʿĀmirī
/ Ed. and transl. Everett K. Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and Its Fate. New
Haven, Conn. = American Oriental Series 70, pp. 70–75. 2) Aetius, Placita philosophorum:
Cf. Ḥudūṯ, p. 68, 8 f., with Aetius I 3. 7 ed. H. Daiber (s. n. 20), p. 5, 9f., and Ḥudūṯ, p. 68,
11 f., with Aetius I 3. 8 ed. H. Daiber, p. 5, 12 f. – In one case Mullā Ṣadrā added in his later
work al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya an excerpt from Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology, which is not in
al-Ḥudūṯ (s. n. 39). Apparently, Mullā Ṣadrā did not simply take over the text of Ḥudūṯ and
in some cases consulted his sources again. – The text of the Risāla fī l-ḥudūṯ is separately
edited, together with a Persian translation by Muḥammad Ḫōǧawī. Tehran 21419/1998–
1999. – Simultaneously, an edition by Sayyid Husayn Musaviyan appeared in Tehran:
Risāla fī ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam. – A commented German translation is published by Sayed M.
Bagher Talgharizadeh, Die Risāla fī l-ḥudūṯ. Die Abhandlung über die Entstehung von
Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm aš-Šīrāzī (1572–1640): mit Übersetzung und Erläute-
rung. Berlin 2000. = Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 229.
created.11 He mentions Thales, Anaximenes, Agathodaemon,12 | Empedocles, 12

Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as real philosophers, who were ascet-
ics and “godlike persons” (ʿibād mutaʾallihūn), who took care of the spread of
wisdom and “theological sciences” (ʿulūm ar-rubūbiyya).13 People belonging
to the following generations, like Hippocrates, the poet Homer, the geometer
Archimedes, the scientist Democritus and the astronomer Yūḏāsif (?) were
merely technicians ( yunsabu ilā ṣināʿa min aṣ-ṣināʿāt).14 We leave aside some
anachronisms in the enumeration of these names and we should be aware, that
Mullā Ṣadrā considers the thinkers from Thales to Aristotle as wise men who
were in accordance with their own doctrines and who possessed the “light of
wisdom” (nūr al-ḥikma) and the “niche of prophecy” (miškāt an-nubuwwa).15
After this short introduction of veritable Greek philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā
gives a summary of their common main ideas, which were concentrated on
“the unity (waḥdāniyya) of the Creator”, on His “knowledge of the things”, “the
way, how the existing things emanate from Him and the world comes into being
through Him”, on the first elements, the hereafter, and on the immortality of the
soul. It is expressively stated, that the doctrine of the eternity of the world is a
later invention and based on “distortion of wisdom” (taḥrīf al-ḥikma).16
After this general introduction Mullā Ṣadrā inserts a passage on | Thales,17 13
which is an excerpt from Šahrastānī, al-Milal wa-n-niḥal.18 Šahrastānī himself
11 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya V, p. 206, 11 f. The text in Ḥudūṯ, pp. 67f., differs here. – We use
the 2nd edition of al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya. – A German paraphrase of parts can be found
in Max Horten, Das philosophische System von Schirazi. Strassburg 1913. = Studien zur
Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients II and in Max Horten, Die Gottesbeweise
bei Schirazi (gest. 1640). Bonn 1912.
12 Classified as people from Milet: Cf. al-Ḥikma V, p. 206 below / not in Ḥudūṯ. – Agatho-
daemon is in Arabic tradition one of the ancient Egyptian sages or prophets. – Martin
Plessner, “Aghāthūdhīmūn”. In EI2 I, 1960.
13 al-Ḥikma V, p. 206, 22–207, 1 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 69, 2–5.
14 al-Ḥikma V, p. 207, 3–5 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 69, 5–9. – The following lines in al-Ḥudūṯ were
repeated in al-Ḥikma V, p. 207, 6 ff.
15 al-Ḥikma V, p. 207, 10 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 69, 13. – The expression miškāt an-nubuwwa is an allu-
sion to Sura 24:35 and is attributed to all prophets by Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal.
Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects. Ed. William Cureton. London 1846 / Repr.
Leipzig 1923, p. 202, 7. – Cf. Šahrastānī, Livre des religions et des sectes. Traduction avec
introduction et notes par Jean Jolivet et Guy Monnot. I–II. Louvain 1986; 1993, II, esp.
p. 92 n. 14.
16 al-Ḥikma V, p. 207, 15 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 69, 17.
17 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 207, 16–208, below = (with some deviations) al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 69, 18–70, 19.
18 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 207, 16–208, 3 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 69, 18–70, 5 = Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
p. 254, 3–12; al-Ḥikma V, p. 208, 3–6 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 70, 5–9 = Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
pp. 254, 18–255, 2; al-Ḥikma V, p. 208, 17f. = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 70, 17f. = al-Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cure-
666 chapter 37
here had combined two sources: Aetius’ doxography called Placita philoso-
phorum “the opinions of the philosophers”19 which he used in the Arabic trans-
lation by Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā,20 and Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography which con-
tains a neoplatonizing survey of Presocratic philosophers.21 This doxography
attributed to Ammonius seems to have been compiled in the 9th century AD.
It is based on Greek sources and betrays Islamic influence. Its neoplatonizing
view of the Presocratics impressed Mullā Ṣadrā so much, that he took over its
terminology and essential ideas and that he considered the philosophers dis-
cussed by Pseudo-Ammonius as forerunners of his own doctrine of God, His
emanation and creation.
As well as Šahrastānī’s excerpt on Thales from Pseudo-Ammonius, Mullā
Ṣadrā’s excerpt is longer than the preserved text of Pseudo-Ammonius trans-
mitted only in one MS. From this longer text we get a clear picture of Thales’
ideas which attracted Mullā Ṣadrā so much: God is first without any form, He
“created” (abdaʿa) the things which did not exist before Him in a kind of cre-
atio ex nihilo. From Him “emanated” (inbaʿaṯa) every “form” (ṣūra) in the world.
“The prime matter” (al-ʿunṣur al-awwal) is its “substrate” (maḥall). Water, the
14 principle of all beings, becomes the receiver of all forms. | Mullā Ṣadrā adds: It
is “the expanding being” (al-wuǧūd al-inbisāṭī), which in Sufi terms is explained
as an-nafas ar-raḥmānī “the breath of compassion”.22
This addition is remarkable, as it hints at Mullā Ṣadrā’s distinction between
the “creation”, the ibdāʿ of subtle things and the “formation”, the takwīn of “com-
pound things”, the murakkabāt. Thales’ water is a kind of an allpermeating
medium (s. below), the prime matter, from which in the process of takwīn the
compound things are “formed”.
ton, p. 255, 4–6. – On Šahrastānī’s Thales-article s. Roger Arnaldez, L’histoire de la

pensée grecque vue par les Arabes. In Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 72/3,
1978 (pp. 117–168), pp. 133–135.
19 al-Ḥikma V, p. 207, 16 f. = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 68, 3–5 and 69, 18f. = Aetius (s. n. 20), Placita I 3. 1
(beginning), taken from the quotation in Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 290, 15f.
20 Edited by Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung.
Wiesbaden 1980. = Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der
Orientalischen Kommission XXXIII.
21 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 207, 20–208, 2 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 69, ult.–70, 5 = Pseudo-Ammonius, Ārāʾ. Ed.
and transl. Ulrich Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios. Wiesbaden/Stut-
tgart 1989. = AKM XLIX/1, ch. II.
22 al-Ḥikma V, p. 208, 17–19. Mullā Ṣadrā – as Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 256, 12f. – refers
p. 208, 19f. to Sura 11:7 (9): li-qawlihī taʿālā: wa-kāna ʿaršuhū ʿalā l-māʾ. – On an-nafas ar-
raḥmānī s. n. 56. – In al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 70, 18 f. Mullā Ṣadrā has instead aqūlu: wa-ka-annahū
arāda bihī (sc. al-māʾ) al-mādda al-ǧusmāniyya.
Mullā Ṣadrā assumes the same doctrine in Anaxagoras’ thought which is

described after Thales,23 although – Mullā Ṣadrā admits – Anaxagoras speaks
in “symbols” (rumūz).24 The transmitted text of Pseudo-Ammonius is defect-
ive and has a different arrangement,25 therefore, we should compare Mullā
Ṣadrā’s direct source, Šahrastānī’s report on Anaxagoras. This report appears
shortened, with an additional excerpt on Anaxagoras from Porphyry26 and
with confirming comments by Mullā Ṣadrā, who at the end remarks, that the
alleged “rest” of the things which afterwards were arranged by the intellect
means an “intellectual being” (kaynūna ʿaqliyya) of the things preceding “the
natural existent beings” (al-akwān aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya).27 Here, Mullā Ṣadrā alludes to
his distinction between the ibdāʿ of “subtle” beings, followed by the takwīn of
compound things.
In the following section28 Anaximenes is introduced as a representative of 15
the doctrine, that God, “the One in his oneness” (al-wāḥid bi-waḥdāniyyatihī)
“created” (abdaʿa) “the form of matter” (ṣūrat al-ʿunṣur), then the intellect, from
which “emanate” (inbaʿaṯa) many forms differing in their “colours” (alwān),
“light” (anwār) and (divine) “influence” (āṯār). The further away emanated
forms are from their origin, the more darkness replaces light in a world which
perishes. Whereas God’s knowledge of the forms is eternal.
The printed text of Mullā Ṣadrā’s al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya in some passages is
corrupt, but it is possible to deduce from the excerpt from Šahrastānī’s extract
of Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography the Neoplatonic scheme of emanationism,
the effluence of forms from the divine intellect, and the hierarchy of these
forms which differ in their “light” and “colour”.
We should be aware, however, that the text of Ammonius’ doxography as
excerpted by Šahrastānī is sometimes not identical with the preserved manu-
23 al-Ḥikma V, p. 209, 1–20 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 70, 19–71, 13, without the final sentence al-Ḥikma
V, p. 209, 19 f.
24 al-Ḥikma V, p. 209, 2. = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 70, 20.
25 On movement and rest of the Creator cf. Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph
(s. n. 21), ch. X.
26 al-Ḥikma V, p. 209, 7 f. = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 71, 3 f.: wa-ḥakā ʿanhū Furfūriyūs annahū qāla: aṣlu
l-ašyāʾi ǧismun wāḥidun mawḍūʿun li-l-kulli lā nihāyata lahū wa-minhū yaḫruǧu ǧamīʿu l-
aǧsāmi wa-l-quwā l-ǧusmāniyya.
27 al-Ḥikma V, p. 209, 19 f. / not in al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 71, 13.
28 al-Ḥikma V, p. 209, 21–210, 14 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 71, 13–72, 9, with an additional passage taken
from Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, pp. 259, 12–260, 5 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 72, 9–16. – al-Ḥudūṯ,
pp. 72, 16–73, 2, contains a comment by Mullā Ṣadrā explaining Anaximenes’ al-ʿunṣur
al-awwal as wuǧūd muṭlaq emanating from God as al-muṭlaq al-inbisāṭī and as an-nafas
ar-raḥmānī (on which s. n. 56). – Cf. Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s.
n. 21), ch. XI.
668 chapter 37
script of Ammonius and has additional text, which at least in part is based on
a more complete version of Ammonius’ doxography.
This appears to be the case with the report on Empedocles.29 Mullā Ṣadrā’s
excerpt from Šahrastānī confirms and supplements the Neoplatonic trends
which he found so interesting in Thales, Anaxagoras and Anaximenes. Mullā
Ṣadrā refers to his own Risālat Iṯbāt al-ḥudūṯ,30 which is available in print. He
16 declares, that the universal souls implore | the intellect to beseech “the creator”
(al-bāriʾ) to give them light, which is emanated to the individual souls and this
world. “The earth posesses life and a soul”, as Mullā Ṣadrā finds it confirmed in
the Theology ascribed to Aristotle. And he adds, that the individual soul returns
to its divine origin.
This remark is crucial for Mullā Ṣadrā’s own doctrine of creation, as it clearly
shows the Neoplatonic coexistence of two contradictory concepts, God’s tran-
scendence and God’s immanence through the particular souls which strive for
the return to their divine origin. They need the help of the intellect who asks
God to give his light to the souls.
Mullā Ṣadrā continues his commented excerpts from Šahrastānī, concen-
trating on those Neoplatonic trends which he found in Šahrastānī’s reports
on Pythagoras,31 Socrates,32 and Plato.33 We do not find any significant new
information with regard to Mullā Ṣadrā’s doctrine of God and His creation.
Remarkably, he now adds a new source:34 ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-Amad ʿalā l-abad.
It is available in print and allows some corrections of the printed text of Mullā
Ṣadrā’s al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya, and itself can profit from a comparison with
29 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 210, 15–211, 20 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 73, 3–75, 5, with an additional passage, pp. 73,
15–74, 14, including excerpts from Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 264, 3–6 = al-Ḥudūṯ,
p. 73, 15–18, and ed. W. Cureton, pp. 264, 16–265, 3 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 74, 7–14. – Cf. Pseudo-
Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21), ch. XXII. – R. Arnaldez’s analysis of
Šahrastānī’s article on Empedocles (s. n. 18), p. 135.
30 al-Ḥikma V, p. 210, 20; Mullā Ṣadrā refers to al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 73, 8f.
31 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 211, 21–213, 3 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 75, 5–76, 9. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
pp. 265, 12–278, 18, and his source Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21),
ch. XV and XVI.
32 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 213, 4–214, 7 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 76, 9–77, 12. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
pp. 278, 19–279, 4; 279, 12–20. – Mullā Ṣadrā adds his comments al-Ḥikma V, pp. 213, 21–214,
7 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 77, 4–12. – Pseudo-Ammonius does not have a chapter on Socrates.
33 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 214, 8–219, 17 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 77, 12–82, 11: The text adds, p. 82, 11–19, a quo-
tation from Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd, with short commentary, lines 15–17; this passage is in
al-Ḥikma in the following chapter, p. 224, 6–17. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, pp. 283–
288. – Pseudo-Ammonius does not dedicate a chapter to Plato.
34 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 219, 19–221, 1 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 82, 21–84, 5.
the excerpt in Mullā Ṣadrā.35 This excerpt is not based on Pseudo-Ammonius,

the common source of Šahrastānī | and ʿĀmirī. It tries to explain, that the 17
contradictory sayings by Plato and his pupil Aristotle on creation and etern-
ity of the world should be understood as creatio ex nihilo and as a turning
the world from disorder to “order” (niẓām). Mullā Ṣadrā adds a critical com-
ment,36 clarifying again that Plato’s and Aristotle’s sayings lead to the doc-
trine of creation and perishability of the world. Mullā Ṣadrā ends his report
on Plato with an excerpt from the letters by Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd to ʿAḍud
ad-Dawla on the createdness of the stars derived from their being provided
with soul and life, including a doxographical report on Plato and Aristotle.37
He adds, that there is no “inconsistency” (munāfāt) between Plato and Aris-
totle.38
Mullā Ṣadrā finds a confirmation of this statement in the Theology attrib-
uted to Aristotle, which he quotes and comments on several times39 in the
following section on Aristotle.40 The world and its forms perish, but their crea-
tor (al-muḥdiṯ, mubdiʿ al-ḥaqq) is eternal and has no “beginning” (badʾ). This is
again illustrated with Šahrastānī’s report on a dispute between Aristotle and a
materialist,41 on which Mullā Ṣadrā | comments with the final remark: 18
35 Ed. and transl. E. K. Rowson, pp. 84–87 (ch. 12–15). – Cf. E. K. Rowson’s commentary on
the Greek sources, pp. 251–262. Rowson mentions the fact that ʿĀmirī’s al-Amad was used
by Mullā Ṣadrā (pp. 29 and 204), but he did not compare the texts and does not give an
enumeration of all excerpts.
36 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 221, 2–224, 17 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 84, 5–87, 8, without the section al-Ḥikma V,
p. 224, 3–17, (which includes lines 6–14 an excerpt from Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd; s. n. 37),
of which we find the excerpt from Ibn al-ʿAmīd in al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 82, 11–19.
37 Cf. Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Ḥikma V, p. 224, 6–14 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 82, 11–19, with Ibn al-ʿAmīd, ed.
and transl. Hans Daiber, Naturwissenschaft bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr.
Leiden/New York/Köln 1993. = IPTS 13, letter no. III, p. 46, line 264–p. 48, line 276 (com-
mentary pp. 134–136).
38 al-Ḥikma V, p. 224, 15–17 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 82, 19–21.
39 Cf. al-Ḥikma V, pp. 224, 24–225, 5 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 87, 13–18 with Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology,
ed. F. Dieterici (s. n. 8), p. 12, 7–11; al-Ḥikma V, p. 225, 6–10 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 87, 18–88,
2, with Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 12, 12–18; al-Ḥikma V, p. 225, 11f.
= al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 88, 2–4, with Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 13, 11–13; al-
Ḥikma V, p. 225, 14–18 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 88, 4–10 (both texts add Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentary:
al-Ḥikma V, pp. 225, 19–226, 11 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 88, 10–89, 4) with Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology,
ed. F. Dieterici, p. 79, 13–18; al-Ḥikma V, pp. 226, 12–227, 1 (not in al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 89, 4) with
Pseudo-Aristotle, Theology, ed. F. Dieterici, pp. 137, 14–138, 9.
40 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 224, 18–229, 1 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 87, 8–90, 11.
41 Cf. al-Ḥikma V, p. 228, 13–21 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 89, 20–90, 7, with Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
p. 327, 11–18.
670 chapter 37
Consider people with indisputable knowledge and understanding, the

wisdom and religion (of Aristotle)! Did after him come a philosopher or
theologian with such firm and solid words on coming into being of the
world, on its connection with the true creator who does not change in
His essence, in His will and in His relation (to the world)?
aqūlu: unẓurū maʿāšira ahli l-yaqīni wa-ūlī l-baṣīrati fī l-ḥikmati wa-d-dīn!

hal ǧāʾa aḥadun baʿdahū min-a-l-ḥukamāʾi wa-l-mutakallimīna bi-miṯli
hāḏa l-kalāmi l-muḥkami l-matīni fī bābi ḥudūṯi l-ʿālami wa-rtibāṭihī bi-l-
mubdiʿi l-ḥaqqi min ġayri taġyīrin lā fī ḏātihī wa-lā fī irādatihī wa-iḍāfatihī?
The remaining part of Mullā Ṣadrā’s chapter about “the agreement of proph-
ets and philosophers on coming into being (ḥudūṯ) of the world” is an annex42
containing additional remarks and answers on possible objections with regard
to Aristotle’s doctrine as described in Šahrastānī and above all in Pseudo-
Aristotle’s Theology. Here, Mullā Ṣadrā again aimed at the proof that the world
is created ex nihilo, that “the creator” (al-bāriʾ) is the “mover of the spheres, the
leader and regent of the heaven, acting, wise, having his will in his acting and
doing”.43 The subsistence of the world is based on movement, which is “the
form” (ṣūra) of the created things, of “what came to be” (al-mukawwanāt).44
“The ascription of the eternity of the world (qidam al-ʿālam) to Aristotle by
19 the multitude” (al-ǧumhūr) should be understood as eternity of the “world of |
intellect” (al-ʿālam al-ʿaqlī), “the world of divinity” (ʿālam al-ālihiyya).45
In the shadow of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology Mullā Ṣadrā as-
sumes intermediate causes between God and the visible world. This Neo-
platonic hierarchy of emanations enabled him to save God’s transcendency
and almightiness. The validity of this specific interpretation is confirmed in
his eyes through the harmony between the Presocratic philosophers. He dis-
cusses Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles and Pythagoras, who were followed
by Plato and Aristotle. In a separate chapter, which follows the chapter about
“the agreement of prophets and philosophers on coming into being (ḥudūṯ) of
the world”, Mullā Ṣadrā adds “Zenon the older” (Zīnūn al-akbar),46 Democri-
42 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 229–234 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 90, 11–95, 17. The sections have the title tafsīr wa-
taḏkira (pp. 229–231), wahm wa-taḥṣīl (pp. 231–232) and tasǧīl (pp. 232–234).
43 al-Ḥikma V, p. 231, 3 f. = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 92, 5 f.
45 al-Ḥikma V, p. 232, 14 ff. = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 93, 10 ff.
46 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 235–236, 11 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 95, 17–96, 19, interspersed with comments by
Mullā Ṣadrā. Cf. pp. 235–236, 4 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 95, 17–96, 13 with Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cure-
tus,47 the adherents of the Academy (of Plato),48 Heraclitus (Harqal al-ḥa-
kīm),49 Epicurus,50 aš-Šayḫ al-yūnānī (Plotinus),51 Porphyry,52 and | Proclus.53 20
Here, too, he excerpted Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal54 and added his
comments, which confirm their agreement on the coming into being of the
world, although they do not belong to the “outstanding original (thinkers)” (al-
uṣūl al-aʿlawna).55
Mullā Ṣadrā was convinced that Greek philosophers from the Presocratics
up to Aristotle, and in addition the Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus (aš-Šayḫ
al-yūnānī), Porphyry and Proclus kept to the doctrine that the world is the cre-
ation of a transcendent God via a chain of causes, of emanations. Moreover,
creation begins with ibdāʿ of intellect, soul, nature and finally prime matter by
God and is continued by the takwīn “formation” of things which are composed
from matter and form, namely natural bodies, plants, animals and human
beings. This Neoplatonic view of Presocratic and Aristotelian philosophy is ulti-
mately inspired by a doxography attributed to Ammonius. Its conformity with
Aristotle is – in the eyes of Mullā Ṣadrā – established by the so-called Theo-
logy attributed to Aristotle. And the conformity of Aristotle with Plato in the
doctrine of creation is proven by a quotation from ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-Amad ʿalā
ton, pp. 292, 7–17 (based on Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21),
ch. VI).
47 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 236, 12–238, 4 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 96, 19–98, 3, without the final sentence in
al-Ḥikma, pp. 238, 3 f., with interspersed comments by Mullā Ṣadrā. – Cf. pp. 236, 22–237,
8 with Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 294, 12–20 (based on Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and
transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21), ch. VIII).
48 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 238, 5–239, 1 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 98, 4–20. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
pp. 295, 16–296, 5 (based on Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21),
ch. XIX, lines 22–31) with al-Ḥikma V, p. 238, 5–15.
49 al-Ḥikma V, p. 239, 2–5 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 98, 21–99, 3. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 296,
11–15, and his source Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21), ch. XX, on
which see Daniel De Smet, Héraclite, philosophe de la guerre, dans la tradition arabe.
In Acta orientalia belgica 9, 1994, pp. 131–140, esp. pp. 136ff.
50 al-Ḥikma V, p. 239, 16–19 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 99, 11–14. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 297,
10–12, and his source Pseudo-Ammonius, ed. and transl. U. Rudolph (s. n. 21), ch. XVIII.
51 al-Ḥikma V, p. 240, 12–16 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 100, 6–10. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, pp. 234,
5–9; 240, 20–241, 8 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 100, 13–101, 6. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton, p. 335,
8–19.
52 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 242, 11–243, 1 = al-Ḥudūṯ, p. 102, 1–12. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cureton,
pp. 345, 7 and 346, 2–7.
53 al-Ḥikma V, pp. 243, 9–245, 3 = al-Ḥudūṯ, pp. 102, 17–104, 12. – Cf. Šahrastānī, ed. W. Cure-
ton, pp. 338, 15 ff. esp. pp. 340, 14–342, 7.
54 See the preceding notes.
672 chapter 37
l-abad and from a letter by Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd to ʿAḍud ad-Dawla on the
stars which are animated and have life.
Mullā Ṣadrā accepted the Neoplatonic coexistence of two contradictory con-
cepts, of God’s transcendence through His being “one in His oneness” and of
God’s immanence through His emanations, of divine unity and formal multipli-
city. The bridge between God and the world is, as Mullā Ṣadrā explains Thales’
concept of water, or the concept of light in his reports on Anaximenes and
Empedocles, an “expanding being” (al-wuǧūd al-inbisāṭī) which in Sufi terms
is explained as an-nafas ar-raḥmānī “the breath of compassion”. Here, Mullā
Ṣadrā follows Ibn ʿArabī, who quoted two prophetic sayings on nafas ar-raḥmān
and explains the world as “Breath of the Compassionate”.56 According to Ibn
21 ʿArabī, | the breath is the vehicle for God’s words, the creatures, and creation
is in the school of Ibn ʿArabī “the effusion of being upon the heavenly arche-
types”,57 the breath of “existentiating Compassion”.58
This concept and in addition Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of return of all things to
God59 appear to be the starting point of Mullā Ṣadrā’s assumption of his doc-
trine of creation as something common to Greek philosophers from Thales up
to Proclus and the “prophets”. In contrast to Ibn ʿArabī,60 however, he does not
speak of creation as manifestation of the hidden divine being in the forms
of beings. Contrary to Ibn ʿArabī, creation is creation from nothing, ex nihilo,
through a hierarchy of intermediate causes, of emanations which share the
“breath of compassion”. Nevertheless, creation is not Ibn ʿArabī’s theophany
and on the contrary presupposes the Neoplatonic transcendence of God. A
sign of God’s presence in the world is the particular soul that strives to return
to its divine origin. Moreover, the “breath of compassion” which can be com-
pared with the Plotinian picture of heat which emanates from fire or cold which
emanates from snow.61 In Mullā Ṣadrā this “breath of compassion” has the func-
tion of an allpermeating medium which proceeds from God’s unity through the
mediation of intermediate causes. This system of intermediate causes allows
56 Cf. William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge. Albany 1989, p. 127 and pp. 19 and
35. – Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill 1975, p. 268. –
And above all Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of Ibn ʿArabī. Princeton
21980, pp. 115 ff. and 297 ff.
57 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages. New York 21969, p. 111.
58 H. Corbin, Creative Imagination (s. n. 56), pp. 184 ff.
59 Cf. on this doctrine W. C. Chittick The Sufi Path (s. n. 56), pp. 19f.
60 Cf. H. Corbin, Creative Imagination (s. n. 56), pp. 200ff.
61 S. above n. 8 and the references given there. – On Plotinus’ explanation of his simile of
fire-heat cf. A. Altmann, Creation (s. n. 9), pp. 6 ff.
the procession of inferior multiplicity from the One. God is transcendent and
at the same time creator of multiplicity.
The concept of God as highest reality with subsequent stages Mullā Ṣadra
shares with the 3rd/9th-century philosopher Kindī, whom he | quotes several 22
times in his al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya.62 Kindī assumed within an Aristotelian
and Neoplatonic framework the identity of truth and being and considered
“the True One” (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq, al-ḥaqq al-awwal) as cause of the “exist-
ence” (wuǧūd) of “everything” (kullu šayʾin), which receives from that cause
its “being” (anniyya / inniyya), its “reality” (ḥaqīqa).63 In the footsteps of Kindī
Mullā Ṣadrā’s doctrine ultimately mirrors, with Neoplatonic colouring and
adaptation of Suhrawardī’s concept of reality as “one single continuum of
light”,64 the Aristotelian idea, that “everything through which a common qual-
ity communicated to other things is itself of all those things in the highest
degree possessed of that quality … that is most true what causes all subsequent
things to be true”.65
Mullā Ṣadrā, like Kindī, gave this Aristotelian notion an ontological ori-
entation under the influence of Plotinus and its adaptation in the Pseudo-
Aristotelian Theology. Truth is existence and existence is the only reality. Nev-
ertheless, modes of existence / being following the first and highest truth, mul-
tiplicity emanating from the unity of the True One, continue to share existence.
Mullā Ṣadrā, however, attributed “ambiguity” (taškīk)66 to this kind of second-
ary existence.
We do not want go into details. We conclude our paper with the final remark:
Mullā Ṣadrā found a confirmation for his doctrine of creation as emanation in
the thoughts of Greek philosophers. According to him, they share one universal
truth, which he described as the basis of his own Islamic doctrine of creation.
Here, Mullā Ṣadrā became a model in practising the dialogue between two
cultures, Greek and Islamic, which both can learn from each other and which
both possess a common universal and prophetic truth.
62 Cf. M. Horten, Das philosophische System (s. n. 11), Index.

63 Kindī, Kitāb fī l-falsafa al-ūlā. Ed. and transl. Roshdi Rashed and Jean Jolivet, Œuvres
philosophiques et scientifiques d’Al-Kindī. II: Métaphysique et cosmologie. Leiden/Boston/
Köln 1998. = IPTS 29, p. 9, 2 ff. – Cf. A. L. Ivry, Al-Kindī’s Metaphysics (s. n. 7), p. 55, and
commentary, p. 119.
64 Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī). Albany 1975,
pp. 10 ff.; cf. pp. 31 ff.
65 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics II 1. 6 (993 b 24–28).
66 Cf. F. Rahman, Philosophy (s. n. 64), pp. 11 and 34 ff.
674 chapter 37
Frequently Quoted Works
Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-ʿaqliyya al-arbaʿa. Introduced by Mu-

ḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar. Ed. by Riḍā Luṭfī and (VI–VII) by Ibrāhīm al-
Amīnī and Fatḥ Allāh al-Ummīd. I–IX. Qum 21378/1958–1383/1963.
Mullā Ṣadrā, Risāla fī l-ḥudūṯ. In Rasāʾil Āḫūnd Mullā Ṣadrā. Tehran 1302/1884, pp. 2–
109.
Šahrastānī, aš-: Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal. Ed. William Cureton. London 1846 / Repr.
Leipzig 1923.
Republished, with corrections and additions, from Spektrum Iran 13, Bonn 2000, pp. 7–
chapter 38
Ambiguity (taškīk) of Being in Mullā Ṣadrā

A Common Philosophical Problem between Cordoba and Iṣfahān*
Mullā Ṣadrā developed his concept of “being” / “existence” (wuǧūd)1 under the
impression of Ibn Sīnā, Peripatetic forerunners, Neoplatonism, and the Sufism
of Suhrawardī from the school of Ibn ʿArabī. Their diversity of ideas made him
aware of inconsistencies and problems. He tried to solve them by proposing
a new concept, dissociating himself from his teacher Mīr Dāmād, who con-
sidered “being” as a mere accident2 and preferred the primacy of “quiddity”
(māhiya).3
Mulla Ṣadrā felt a great inconsistency in the simultaneousness of a tran-
scendent and autarkic God who has no causal relation to the world and an
immanent God whose wisdom is revealed in His created world. Kindī, whose
ideas were well known to Mullā Ṣadrā,4 did not realize the incompatibility of
the concept of God as ʿilla “cause” and of God’s tawḥīd “unity”, and for this
he was critized by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ḥazm (384/994–456/1064).
According to Ibn Ḥazm, Kindī’s classification of God as “cause” implies division,
although he denies any “multiplicity” (kaṯra) in God. God is not “cause”, as any
cause is related to a multiplicity of caused effects – and this relation would | des- 184
troy the unity of God.5 Moreover, causes and effects are “correlativa” (muḍāf )
which are “similar to each other”.6 From the One cannot emanate many things;
they are created – as Ibn Ḥazm postulated, they are the result of God’s creatio
ex nihilo.7
Herewith, we have reached a conclusion often debated by later Islamic and
medieval Latin philosophers. Mullā Ṣadrā offers a new proposal by introducing
his concept of “existence” or “being” (wuǧūd), even an “expanding being” (al-
* The article is based on a paper presented at the International Colloquium on Cordoba and
Isfahan: Two Schools of Islamic Philosophy. Isfahan, 27–29 April 2002.
1 S. H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, esp. p. 147 n. 31, prefers the term “being”.
2 M. A. Haq, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Being, p. 268.
3 Cf. M. Moris, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Doctrine, p. 123. – S. H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 48.
4 Cf. H. Daiber, Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 22 f.
6 H. Daiber, Kritik, p. 290.
7 H. Daiber, Kritik, pp. 287 f.

676 chapter 38
wuǧūd al-inbisāṭī),8 which appears as a bridge between God and the world and
which by a Sufi term from the school of Ibn ʿArabī is explained as an-nafas ar-
raḥmānī “the breath of compassion”, a vehicle for God’s words – the creatures.
Creation, in the school of Ibn ʿArabī, is “the effusion of being upon the heavenly
archetypes”,9 the breath of “existentiating compassion”.10
Here, “being” or “existence” appears as something congruent with the eman-
ation from God, with intermediate causes which make the emanation of in-
ferior multiplicity from the superior One possible. Kindī, Mullā Ṣadrā’s model,
considered the superior One, “the True One” (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq), “the first truth”
(al-ḥaqq al-awwal) as the cause of “existence” (wuǧūd) of “everything” (kullu
šayʾin), which receives from that cause its “being” (anniyya / inniyya), its “real-
ity” (ḥaqīqa).11
This concept of causal similarity, of “reality”, being shared between the caus-
ing “True One” and the caused “existence”, which receives from its cause its
“being”, its “reality”, stimulated Mullā Ṣadrā to new ideas. He found confirm-
ation in Suhrawardī’s concept of reality as “one single continuum of light”,12
185 and | he attributed “ambiguity” (taškīk) to existence which follows the primary,
the causing existence.13
Mullā Ṣadrā did not defend his doctrine of the “primacy of existence” (aṣālat
al-wuǧūd)14 from the very beginning, but he developed his position in a crit-
ical discussion about Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between essence and existence in
contingent things. In the West, this distinction was rejected by Ibn Rušd, who
defined substance as something that existed by itself. In the East, Mullā Ṣadrā
formed the culmination of a radical transformation of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine. He
did not accept Suhrawardī’s criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine and he refuted
Suhrawardī’s classification of existence as something purely mental. For Mullā
Ṣadrā the reality of existence is not the object of mental conception, it is the
object of “intuition”, of mušāhada or ḥuḍūr.15
8 This term results from Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of being as flow, as process. – Cf. S. H. Rizvi,
Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 103.
9 S. H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 111.
10 H. Corbin, Creative Imagination, pp. 115 ff., 297 ff. – Cf. D. De Smet, Le Souffle. – S. H.
Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 128.
11 See H. Daiber, Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 22.
12 F. Rahman, Philosophy, pp. 10 ff.; cf. pp. 31 ff.
13 On the complex term taškīk cf. S. H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 38ff. (Rizvi translates “mod-
ulation”).
14 See F. Rahman, The God-World Relationship, p. 250. – On “primacy of existence” s. the
article by M. Moris, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Doctrine. – S. H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 61.
15 F. Rahman, God-World Relationship, pp. 242 f. – On Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of mental being
cf. S. H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 77–101, and on the reality of being pp. 102ff.
ambiguity (taškīk) of being in mullā ṣadrā 677
In the mind there are essences and there is not existence – that exists only
as a general idea. Esssences are “mental things” (umūr ḏihniyya). Existence,
however, is the only real thing and not accessible for the mind. In the mind
existence has “ambiguity” (taškīk), as each application of the concept to reality
differs in its meaning, this concept itself however – as essence – is shared by all
the individuals.16
As Fazlur Rahman has shown,17 this doctrine is based on a combina-
tion of ideas of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī. According to Ibn Sīnā, the existence
of the necessary being is self-sufficient and uncaused, whereas the existence
of the contingent is caused and due to the necessary being.18 According to
Suhrawardī, objectively real is not the existence, but the essence, the “essence
of light” (māhiyat an-nūr), | which in its absoluteness is pure light, the light of 186
lights – God. When this light is spread in the contingent world, it has different
grades and loses intensity. Mullā Ṣadrā takes over this doctrine by replacing
Suhrawardī’s essence of light by existence and declares, that the most perfect
existence is existence in itself and existence by itself – in contrast to the less
perfect existence of the contingent world.19
At the same time, Mullā Ṣadrā used the concept of taškīk “ambiguity”, with
the purpose to defend on the one side the common nature of all beings, the
common existence shared by all reality, and to explain on the other side the
simultaneousness of differences in all beings. Existence is something wherein
things are at the same time the same and different. The classification “perfect”
and “less perfect” in a doctrine of essentialism, Mullā Ṣadrā felt as insufficient
for a clear distinction between God’s being and e.g. man’s being.20
Only existence can be the One and many things. Existence is common to all
existing things, and at the same time every existing thing is unique. This does
not mean, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, that existence is one single reality – i.e.
God – and that the multiplicity of contingents is due to the existential rela-
tion of essences to this unique reality. How can the principle of existence be
something unifying and differentiating at the same time?
Again Mullā Ṣadrā repeats, that the mind cannot combine unity and differ-
ence and considers this as mutually excluding. But this conception, created
mentally, is a deception. Existence as a concept created mentally excludes
existential existence, because the mind transforms the existential fact of exist-
16 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, pp. 35 f.; I/3, pp. 18, 6–21, end.
17 F. Rahman, God-World Relationship, pp. 243 f.
18 Ibn Sīnā, Taʿlīqāt as quoted in Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, p. 46, 9ff.
19 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya III/1, pp. 19, 10–23, 3.
20 Cf. F. Rahman, Philosophy, pp. 84 f. – F. Rahman, God-World Relationship, p. 244.
678 chapter 38
ence into an essence which is universal – whereas existence is particular and

unique.21 However, essence is something indefinite, indeterminate (mubham)
and unreal, whereas existence is concrete, determinate, luminous and real.22
It makes essences distinguishable from one another. Essences can only be con-
ceived in the mind and can be known with their names, whereas existences are
unnamed and unknown (maǧhūlat al-asāmī),23 and they are not object of the
mind.
Mullā Ṣadrā explains this with the interesting idea that, in contrast to fixed
187 and unchangeable essences, the existence, the reality, is in | perpetual move-
ment.24 The mind can only regard the continuous movement of reality by
cutting it into individual segments. A single segment mentally perceived is
something fixed, an essence. The permanent movement of existence can only
be intuited and cannot be conceived mentally.25
Against this background, Mullā Ṣadrā concluded, contrary to the Avicennian
school, that things are no more composed of essence and existence. The mind
can easier deduce from the existence an essence, which is a segmentary picture
from the endless changing reality. Essence is something only conceived men-
tally, a single issue of the innumerable possibilities of existence. Here, Mullā
Ṣadrā has developed a thesis based on his modification of Suhrawardī’s criti-
cism about Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between essence and existence. Suhrawardī
considered existence as something existing only mentally and he kept to the
objectivity of essences. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, reversed Suhrawardī’s position
by defending the objectivity of existence and considering essences as some-
thing existing only mentally.26
This doctrine results in Mullā Ṣadrā’s conclusion that, contrary to existence,
essences are not created but instead are something in the mind.
With regard to existence, Mullā Ṣadrā distinguishes, as already said, between
the self-sufficient divine existence and the contingent existence created by
God. The proof of God’s existence therefore is based on the assumption of a
gradation of being – of existence. God, the necessary being, is ontologically
prior to other “ranks of existence” (marātib al-wuǧūd). God is the absolute real-
ity and as such does not require any proof. Mullā Ṣadrā here sees himself in
21 Cf. F. Rahman, God-World Relationship, p. 245.

22 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, pp. 63, 15–64, 12; 68 f. and 87.
23 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, pp. 49, 10 ff.; 56, 3 ff. and 61, 1ff.
24 Cf. also A. Açikgenç, Being and Existence, pp. 104 ff.
25 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, p. 87, 11 f.
26 Cf. S. H. Rizvi, Roots of an Aporia, pp. 102 ff.
harmony with Suhrawardī’s concept of light or absolute light. Consequently,

God cannot be proved by contingents.
In contrast to Suhrawardī’s thesis of a divine exterior cause of all contingents
which form a unit, Mullā Ṣadrā uses his thesis of the identity of the One and
the existence, of the real One and the real existence. The unity of the whole in
contrast to the multiplicity of the real existent individuals exists only mentally.
Mullā Ṣadrā concludes from this observation that there is no real unity of all
contingents and therefore still exists a multiplicity of individual | contingents 188
and their causes. Consequently, this argument of the contingent would lead to
an infinite regress – with God as final cause.27
Instead of this regressus ad infinitum, ending with God as final cause, Mullā
Ṣadrā developed the doctrine of the multiplicity of things in the unity of exist-
ence, which in its most perfect form is the existence of the real One. Contrary
to the Sufi doctrine of the “unity in the multiplicity” (waḥda fī l-kaṯra), Mullā
Ṣadrā defends the multiplicity in the unity of existence, in which God is the
most perfect existence.28
Consequently, “differences” (tafāwut) in the “reality of existence” (ḥaqīqat
al-wuǧūd), are not caused by something coming from outside (lā bi-amr zāʾidin
ʿalayhā ʿāriḍin lahā), but due to “that reality (of existence) itself” (bi-nafs tilka
al-ḥaqīqa) and can be categorized as “priority” (at-taqaddum) and “posterior-
ity” (at-taʾaḫḫur), “necessity” (al-wuǧūb) and “contingency” (al-imkān), “sub-
stantiality” (al-ǧawhariyya) and “accidentality” (al-ʿaraḍiyya), “perfection” (at-
tamām) and “imperfection” (an-naqṣ).29
Multiplicity of existence can be described with these terms. The unity of
existence can only be described as multiplicity. Or as Mullā Ṣadrā formulates:
“The simple reality (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) is all the things” (kull al-ašyāʾ).30 The
simple reality of God is all the things; you cannot, however, say that any con-
crete mode of existence is God, – as less as a “body capable of growth” and
understood as a concrete existing species, e.g., as a plant, can be identified with
an animal.31 God is the most simple and the mulitplicity of all concrete things,
but the single concrete thing is not a predication of God.
27 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya III/1, pp. 30 ff. – Cf. F. Rahman, God-World Relationship, p. 249.
28 Cf. al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, p. 108, 15 ff. – M. A. Haq, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Being,
pp. 273 f.
29 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, pp. 120, 19–121, 1 / Engl. transl. F. Rahman, God-World Relation-
ship, p. 251.
30 al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya III/1, pp. 110 ff.
31 Cf. al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya III/1, p. 115, 1 ff. / Engl. transl. F. Rahman, God-World Relation-
ship, p. 252.
680 chapter 38
This means, that the most simple reality of God received a new mode in the
concrete existing being. This new mode of God’s reality is not identical with
God’s existence. The multiplicity of all levels of beings, however, is identical
with God as existence. A single concrete mode of existence is an imperfect
189 rendering of the multiplicity of God’s | existence. Therefore, this existence of
concrete modes is a “doubtful” rendering of God’s existence and characterized
by ambiguity. The totality of modes of existence in this world is identical with
God’s existence – as well as the divine existence, “the simple reality” (basīṭ al-
ašyāʾ) is identical with “all the things” – however, a concrete mode of existence
cannot claim to be a mirror of God’s existence qua an endless chain of modes.
“Ambiguity” (taškīk) appears to be a term related to the discovery, that the
concrete, individual mode of existence is an ambiguous insight in the endless
wealth of God’s existence.32 God’s existence is understood no more as infinite
dynamis, but as energeia in the Aristotelian sense. God is the sum of innumer-
able modes of the concrete, visible world. Infinity of divine power is trans-
formed into infinity of divine acting, His existence, which is “all the things”.
This appears, as Fazlur Rahman has shown, to be a synthesis of the Neo-
platonic theory of emanations and Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of the “descents” (tanazzu-
lāt) of the divine absolute being.33 Therefore, there is no cause-effect relation
applicable to God. The first “effect” is “the self-unfolding existence” (al-wuǧūd
al-munbasiṭ), through which every being has its existence.34
The transcendent unity of God cannot be known, and the being, his exist-
ence, can only be known by intuition and remains “ambiguous”, because it is in
the things, with them and it is their basis. It is the “shadow” (ẓill) of God,35 of
the multiplicity included in Him. Thus, God’s unity remains diversity, and the
diversity of modes of existence is only a shadow of God’s unity (waḥda fī l-kaṯra
wa-l-kaṯra fī l-waḥda).36
This central point of Mullā Ṣadrā’s doctrine can better be understood as part
of the history of the law of causal similarity in the Middle Ages and its pre-
history in Aristotle and Neoplatonism. Aristotle’s doctrine of the equality of
cause and effect (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ “man begets man”, Metaph. 1032 a
25)37 became the starting point of Plotinus’ and Proclus’ concepts of causality
32 Here, we differ from the explanation given by A. Açikgenç, Being and Existence, pp. 130ff.
33 F. Rahman, Philosophy, p. 82.
34 F. Rahman, Philosophy, pp. 83 f.
35 Cf. al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya I/1, pp. 312, 12–313, 4 and 333, 16f. – Cf. D. De Smet, Le Souffle,
p. 479. – F. Rahman, Philosophy, p. 86.
36 F. Rahman, Philosophy, p. 90.
37 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, ch. I.
in its tension | between immanence and transcendence.38 Proclus defends the 190
idea, that the effect has some resemblance to its cause (Institutio theologica,
prop. 32; 36, 6f.: συνδεῖ δε πάντα ἡ ὁμοιότης). This originally Neaplatonic idea of
similarity led to the necessity of explaining differences in the universe. In the
Neoplatonic doctrine it led to the self-differentiation of the One, of intellect
and soul.
Nevertheless, the cause does not anticipate its effects and, on the contrary,
it is only identical with the effect in an “ontologically superior, because more
unified, form”.39 Consequently, the effects are identical with their causes in an
ontologically inferior, less unified and more differentiated form.40
Here, the Neoplatonic successors of Aristotle’s concept of causal equality
developed in their emanationist cosmology a “vertical” cause-effect relation-
ship, which includes both similiarity and dissimilarity.41
This assumption of difference between cause and effect in a vertical cause-
effect relationship reappears in Ibn Sīnā’s concept of different modes of “exist-
ence” (esse, wuǧūd), with regard to priority and posteriority, self-sufficiency and
need, necessity and possibility,42 of the superiority of cause over effect with
regard to existence.43
Accordingly, the cause, the Avicennian first cause has more “truth” than the
effect. It gives the existent beings their existence and truth.44
Here, we detect an echo on Kindī’s Aristotelian-Neoplatonic concept of
truth, which appears to be identified in Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā with exist-
ence, which has different modes. The Neoplatonic orientation and Ibn Sīnā’s
concept of the active intellect of the Dator formarum is not shared by the
Islamic West, by the Andalusian | philosopher Ibn Rušd who favoured Aris- 191
totle’s “horizontal” explanation of the effect as something identical with the
cause. Ibn Rušd however, applied Aristotle’s principle of the identity of cause
and effect to the concept of the first mover, whose “form is in some way all
38 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, ch. II.

39 P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, p. 101.
42 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, II, p. 276, 13ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rosemann,
Omne agens, p. 171 n. 37.
43 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, II, p. 278, 3 ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rosemann,
Omne agens, p. 172 n. 40. – On Ibn Sīnā’s concept of causality, its Neoplatonic background
and its repercussion in Ġazālī cf. H. Daiber, God versus Causality, pp. 1–22.
44 Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, II, p. 356, 8 ff. / Latin transl. quoted in P. W. Rosemann,
Omne agens, p. 173 n. 44.
682 chapter 38
forms”.45 Moreover, Ibn Rušd clearly stated in his critique about Ġazālī’s occa-
sionalism, in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut: If “(a thing) had a special act, then there
would indeed exist special acts resulting from special natures, but if it had no
single special act, then the One would not be one” – or with Aristotle’s words: If
“a man did not beget a man” – being is reduced to nothingness.46 Consequently,
if their would not exist an identity between cause and effect, no effect, no being
could be distinguished from another one and would be nothing. The effect,
the existent being, receives its identity from its shaping cause and at the same
time, the hidden essential being does not remain opaque, but can be recog-
nized through its acts.47
This last mentioned conclusion is not shared by Mullā Ṣadrā, who mod-
ified the Aristotelian identity of cause and effect by adapting the Neopla-
tonic assumption of a hierarchy of being, by distinguishing between perfect
and imperfect being. The imperfect being is a shadow of the perfect being,
an incomplete and opaque rendering of the divine truth, which is accessible
to intuition only. This incomplete and opaque picture of the divine truth, as
given by the secondary existence, is characterized by Mullā Ṣadrā as something
“unclear” (mubham), which implies “ambiguity” (taškīk). The more God’s divine
being is something unaccessible, the more the existence, His shadow, is
something “unclear” and full of ambiguity.
This conclusion is drawn by Mullā Ṣadrā on the basis of a philosophical
discussion, which in the figures of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd had developed two
contradictory positions either on the basis of Aristotle or in the line of the
Neoplatonic doctrine, or by combining both positions. Mullā Ṣadrā more often
followed Neoplatonism and found this structurally congruent with the Sufism
of Ibn ʿArabī and Suhrawardī. In this way, he was decisively stimulated by Kindī
192 and above all by | Ibn Sīnā, who developed his doctrine of the incomparability
of the divine primary being, the “only being” (anniyya faqaṭ), with the rest of
reality on the basis of the Neoplatonic denial of divine attributes. According
to Ibn Sīnā, properties of God are predicable only “in an ambiguous manner”
(bi-t-taškīk), or in an analogous manner.48
45 Ibn Rushd, Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa, ed. M. Bouyges III, p. 1529, 8f. – Cf. P. W. Rosemann,
Omne agens, pp. 179 f.
46 Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ed. M. Bouyges, p. 520, 9ff., esp. p. 521, 1ff. / Engl. transl. S.
v. d. Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut I, pp. 318 f. – Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens,
pp. 184 f.
47 Cf. P. W. Rosemann, Omne agens, pp. 185 f.
48 J. P. Rosheger, A Note, p. 175. Rosheger refers to H. A. Wolfson, The Amphibolous
Terms in Aristotle, wo explained the term bi-t-taškīk from Greek ἀμφίβολα in Alexander of
Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Topics I 5. 106 a 9; II 3. 110 b 16f.
Now we understand that Mullā Ṣadrā’s Neoplatonism in his doctrine of

being, of taškīk al-wuǧūd,49 is the starting point of his epistemology. This
fact has so far not been taken into account by scholars working on Mullā
Ṣadrā. They interpreted taškīk al-wuǧūd as “gradation” or “modulation” of exist-
ence. However, the Neoplatonic doctrine of the hierarchical structure of being
reappears in fact in an epistemological reorientation. Taškīk is, epistemologic-
ally, ambiguity because of the gradation of being. This is the result of God’s tran-
scendence and almightiness as the creator: Because God is the many things –
single existent beings appear only as a shadow of the One, the Almighty, of His
unlimited power.
Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of God is shared by Albertus Magnus, who formulated
it as follows: Creator creando demonstrat suum posse: posse autem magis demon-
stratur in multa creando quam in creando unum: et sic videtur, quod causa mul-
titudinis creatorum debeat esse ex parte creationis.50 Herewith, Albertus Mag-
nus contradicted the Averroistic dictum “ex uno non sit nisi unum” – a dictum
already condemned in 1277 by the bishop of Paris, Stephan Tempier.
Abstracts 193
The article tries to show, that the Shiʿite philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā (979/1571 or
980/1572–1050/1640) developed his concept of existence or being and its “ambi-
guity” (taškīk) under the impression of Ibn Sīnā’s Neoplatonism, combined
with Suhrawardī’s concept of essence as light permeating the contingent world.
God’s unity is present in the multiplicity of the existent beings, which, because
of their hierarchical causality, can only be a shadow of God. The more God’s
transcendent divine being is something unaccessible the more His shadow of
the existence is something “unclear” and full of ambiguity. Here, Mullā Ṣadrā
has modified the Aristotelian concept of causality in favour of the Neoplatonic
idea of intermediate emanations, which result in a mere similarity between
divine cause and its effect, the created world. Epistemologically, God’s being
or existence remains because of its innumerable modes and grades something
ambiguous. Every statement about God’s unlimited dynamis and His innumer-
able acts of energeia must be “doubted”.
∵
49 Cf. I. Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy, pp. 51, 66, 101, 113, esp. p. 184 n. 57.
50 Quoted from Albertus’ In contrarium by M. Grabmann, Die Lehre des heiligen Albertus
Magnus, p. 305.
684 chapter 38
Cet article se propose de montrer que le philosophe chiite Mullā Ṣadrā (979/
1571 or 980/1572–1050/1640) a développé son concept d’ existence ou d’ être
et son “ambiguïté” (taškīk) sous l’influence du néo-platonisme avicennien,
combiné avec le concept sohrawardien d’essence comme lumière pénétrant
le monde contingent. L’unité de Dieu est présentée dans la multiplicité des
choses qui sont comme une ombre de Dieu en raison de leur causalité hiér-
archique. Plus l’être divin transcendant de Dieu est quelque chose d’ inacces-
sible, plus l’existence de son ombre est quelque chose de “pas clair” et plein
d’ambiguïtés. Ici Mullā Ṣadrā change le concept aristotélicien de causalité en
faveur de l’idée d’émanations intermédiaires néoplatoniciennes qui aboutit à
une seule similitude entre la cause divine, ses effets et le monde créé. Du point
de vue épistémologique, l’être ou l’existence de Dieu, à cause de ses nombreux
états et degrés, reste quelque chose d’ambigu. Chaque déclaration sur la dyna-
mis illimitée de Dieu et ses actes innombrables d’ energeia doit être “mise en
doute”.
∵
Il presente articolo cerca di dimostrare che il filosofo shiita Mullā Ṣadrā (979/
1571 or 980/1572–1050/1640) sviluppò il suo concetto di esistenza, o di essere
e la sua “ambiguità” (taškīk), sotto l’influenza del neoplatonismo avicenniano,
associato al concetto sohrawardiano di essenza come luce permeante il mondo
contingente. L’unità di Dio è presente nella molteplicità delle cose che, a causa
della loro causalità di ordine gerarchico, possono essere solo un’ombra di Dio.
Quanto più l’essere divino trascendente di Dio è qualcosa di inaccessibile, tanto
più la sua ombra dell’esistenza è qualcosa di “poco chiaro” e pieno di ambi-
194 guità. Qui Mullā Ṣadrā modifica il concetto aristotelico di causalità | in favore
dell’idea neoplatonica di emanazioni intermedie che si risolvono in una mera
similitudine fra la causa divina, i suoi effetti e il mondo creato. Dal punto di
vista epistemologico, l’essere o l’esistenza di Dio, a causa dei suoi molti stati e
gradi, resta qualcosa di ambiguo. Qualunque affermazione sulla dynamis illim-
itata di Dio e suoi innumerevoli atti di energeia deve essere “messa in dub-
bio”.
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686 chapter 38
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chapter 39
The Reception of Islamic Philosophy at Oxford in

the 17th Century
The Pocock(e)s’ (Father and Son) Contribution to the Understanding of
Islamic Philosophy in Europe
I Historical Background 687 – II Edward Pocock’s Edition and Study of Barhebraeus’

Compendious History – A Milestone in European Histories of Islamic Philosophy 690 –
III The Pococks’ Edition and Translation of Ibn Tufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān 697 – IV
Edward Pocock as Humanist 702
I Historical Background
The importance of Islamic philosophy was for the first time recognized by the
Latinists of medieval Europe. Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1114–1187AD) e.g.,
conceived its role as a transmitter and interpreter of Greek philosophy. He
rendered many Greek-Arabic translations into Latin. And by 1180 AD several
translators and interpreters had finished their work on Avicenna’s philosophi-
cal encyclopaedia aš-Šifāʾ,1 which in its Latin version had an enormous influ-
ence on philosophy and science in the Middle Ages.2
However, simultaneously with the search for a world-wide universal cul-
ture in the age of humanism, the interest in oriental cultures did focus on the
systematic study of Islam. By this time collections of Arabic manuscripts had
been acquired in European libraries. In 1588 the Cardinal and Grand Duke of
Tuscany Ferdinando de Medici already had at his disposal an Arabic print-
ing press. During the Renaissance professorships for Arabic were established in
Paris, then in Leiden, Rome, and Oxford. Missionary interest in Islamic religion
was increasingly replaced by an ideological and intellectual demand for more
knowledge that led to the publication of encyclopaedias.
1 A critical edition, taking the Arabic original into consideration, is being prepared by Simone
van Riet a.o., Louvain-la-Neuve 1977 ff. – Cf. Hans Daiber, BIPh.
2 See, e.g., the references given by Maxime Rodinson, “The Western Image and Western
Studies of Islam”. In The Legacy of Islam. Ed. Joseph Schacht and Clifford Edmund
Bosworth, Oxford 21979, p. 18.

688 chapter 39
66 As early as 1697 a forerunner of the modern Encyclopaedia | of Islam,3 the

Bibliothèque orientale by Barthélemy d’Herbelot (1625–1695), was pub-
lished in Paris.4 Yet Barthélemy d’Herbelot used no other primary sources
than biobibliographical texts. The same shortcoming we find in his forerun-
ner, the Swiss reformist theologian Johann-Heinrich Hottinger (1620–
1667), whose Analecta historico-theologica (Zurich 1652) contains a chapter
on the “Usefulness of Arabic in theology, medicine, jurisprudence, philosophy
and philology”.5 The material Hottinger collected was, however, restricted
to short notes on authors and works. These notes were rarely based on the
works themselves and shed no light on their contents. Hottinger took his
information mostly from two biobibliographical sources: Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa
(d. 668/1270),6 Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ,7 and Ibn an-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist (com-
piled 377/987). Even an Arabic quotation ascribed to Abū Sulaymān al-
Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī (d. ca. 374/985) describing the Banū Munaǧǧim can
be traced back to Ibn an-Nadīm.8 Furthermore, Hottinger’s classification
of the theologian Ašʿarī (d. 324/935 or 936) as “the greatest Aristotelian philo-
sopher”9 is an uncritical adoption of a source that can be identified as Leo
Africanus’ biography of scholars, De viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes
from the year 1527.10 This small book was freely used by Hottinger in his Bib-
3 Leiden/Leipzig 1913–1938 (4 vols.) / New edition, in English and French. Leiden/London

1960–2005 (12 vols.). / Third edition since 2003.
4 Repr. Maastricht 1776.
5 See pp. 233–316.
6 When two sets of dates are given, as in the case in question, the first refers to those of the
Anno Hegirae and the second to those of the Christian Era.
7 For example the information on Kindī in Johann-Heinrich Hottinger, Promptuar-
ium sive bibliotheca orientalis, Heidelberg 1658, p. 217, 17–20, is based on Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa,
Ṭabaqāt. Ed. August Müller. Königsberg i.Pr. 1884 / Repr. Westmead 1972, I, p. 209, 7.
8 Cf. J.-H. Hottinger, Promptuarium (s. n. 7), p. 217, 1–4, with Ibn an-Nadīm, Fihrist.
Ed. Gustav Flügel. Leipzig 1871–1872 / Repr. Beirut 1964, p. 243, 18–20 / Ed. Riḍā
Taǧaddud. Tehran 1971, p. 304, 11 ff. – The information cannot be found in the preserved
summary (Muntaḫab) of Abū Sulaymān’s Ṣiwān al-ḥikma; see the editions of ʿAbd ar-
Raḥmān Badawī, Tehran 1974, and Douglas Morton Dunlop, The Hague/Paris/New
York 1979. For this latter work see Hans Daiber, “Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān
al-Manṭiqī as-Siğistānī in der Forschung”. In Arabica 31, 1984, pp. 36–68. = H. Daiber, From
9 Johann-Heinrich Hottinger, Bibliothecarius quadripartitus. Tiguri 1664, p. 249;
quoted by Felix Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike in der Tradition des Islam. Darm-
stadt 1980, p. 66.
10 On Leo Africanus (i.e. al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad al-Wazzān az-Zayyātī) and his
book see Carl Brockelmann, GAL S II, p. 710.
the reception of islamic philosophy at oxford 689
liothecarius quadripartitus11 and by Johannes Albertus Fabricius (1668–

1736) in his Bibliotheca | graeca.12 In addition to the works of Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa 67
and Ibn an-Nadīm, it was for orientalists a main source for the history of philo-
sophy and science in Islam. And it remains important, because Leo Afric-
anus cited several Arabic sources which have not yet been identified, including
a “biography of philosophers” (Philosophorum vita) ascribed to Ibn Ǧulǧul
(“Ibnu Giulgiul”): This work, not identical with the well-known Ṭabaqāt al-
aṭibbāʾ wa al-ḥukamāʾ composed by Ibn Ǧulǧul in 377/987,13 contains new
information.14
The critical evaluation of this information calls for a comparison with the
primary sources on Arabic-Islamic history and doxography as well as with the
original texts of the Islamic thinkers themselves. Making available both cat-
egories of texts, as well as studying them, have been the main tasks of oriental-
ists in Europe.
Holding an eminent place in this work is Edward Pocock (1604–1691),
who has been called “the greatest of seventeenth-century English Arabists”.15
Pocock was a pupil of Matthias Pasor (1599–1658), a philosopher from
Heidelberg who taught Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, and Arabic at Oxford, and,
above all, Pocock was a pupil of the English Arabist William Bedwell
(1563–1632).16 From 1630 until 1636, Pocock served as a preacher in Aleppo,
Syria. While there, he continued his Arabic studies and used the opportunity to
collect Arabic manuscripts on behalf of William Laud, Chancellor of Oxford
University and from 1633 until 1641 Archbishop of Canterbury.17 However, the
income from the chair, Laud had established for Pocock at Oxford, became
insecure after Laud was removed from his position as archbishop in 1641.
Two powerful friends of Pocock – John Greaves (1602–1652), holder of the
11 See J.-H. Hottinger, Bibliothecarius quadripartitus (s. n. 9), pp. 246–291.

12 See Christophorus Carolus Fabricius, Bibliotheca graeca. Hamburg 1726, vol. 13,
pp. 259–298, esp. the article on Ašʿarī, pp. 262 ff.
13 Ed. by Fuʾād Sayyid. Cairo 1955.
14 See, e.g., the article on Fārābī in C. C. Fabricius, Bibliotheca graeca (s. n. 12), pp. 265ff. –
The quotations from Ibn Ǧulǧul in Johann Jakob Brucker (see F. Klein-Franke,
Die klassische Antike (s. n. 9), p. 105) are based on Leo Africanus.
15 Samuel C. Chew, The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance.
New York 1937, p. 407. – A detailed, well documented article on Edward Pocock, writ-
ten by Stanley Lane-Poole, can be found in Dictionary of National Biography 46, New
York/London 1885, pp. 7–12.
16 See Peter Malcolm Holt, Studies in the History of the Near East. London 1973, pp. 3ff.,
and Alastair Hamilton, William Bedwell the Arabist, 1563–1632. Leiden 1985, p. 53.
17 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), pp. 5 ff.
690 chapter 39
68 Chair of Geometry at Gresham College in London since 1630,18 and John |

Selden (1584–1654), jurist, orientalist, and member of the parliamentary com-
mission19 – did their utmost to guarantee his income, which was sporadic-
ally blocked after 1645. During this time of financial uncertainty, Edward
Pocock was working on two books which became eminently important for the
blossoming scientific study of Islamic philosophy in Europe: His edition and
translation into Latin of Barhebraeus’ (1226–1286AD) compendious history,
the Muḫtaṣar fī d-duwal, and his edition and translation into English of Ibn
Ṭufayl’s (ca. 498/1105–581/1185) philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān.
II Edward Pocock’s Edition and Study of Barhebraeus’ Compendious

History – A Milestone in European Histories of Islamic Philosophy
Pocock’s edition and Latin translation of Barhebraeus’ history Historia

compendiosa dynastiarum was published in 1663 at Oxford. In 1650, he had
already published a small chapter on the history of the Arabs before Islam,
together with a comprehensive commentary.20 This book, Specimen historiae
Arabum, has been called “a cornerstone of Arabic scholarship in England”,21
and it influenced the historiography on Islamic philosophy until as late as the
19th century. A rich source for the historian of pre-Islamic Arabia, it is less reli-
able on Mohammed who is criticized for his moral behaviour.22 Secondly, it is
a rich collection of material on Islamic sects, especially on the Muʿtazilites.23
Pocock mentions, e.g., “Nodhamus” (i.e. Naẓẓām)24 and his adherents,25 as
well as “Wasel Ebn Ata” (i.e. Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾ)26 and his teacher Ḥasan al-
Baṣrī.27 His information is primarily based on the heresiography of Šahra-
18 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 7. – Cf. Johann Fück, Die arabischen Studien in Europa
bis in die Anfänge des 20. Jahrhunderts. Leipzig 1955, p. 86.
19 P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 10.
20 In the edition by Joseph White, Oxford 1806, the Arabic text and Latin translation are on
pp. 1–30 and the notes on pp. 31–411. J. White added an annex on Abū l-Fidāʾ, Historia
veterum Arabum, text and Latin translation by Antoine-Isaac Silvestre de Sacy. We
quote from the edition of J. White.
21 S. C. Chew, The Crescent and the Rose (s. n. 15), p. 408 n. 6.
22 Cf. the summary of the content by P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), pp. 34ff., and the critical
evaluation by J. Fück, Die arabischen Studien (s. n. 18), pp. 88ff.
23 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 199–269.
24 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 192, 224 and 241.
26 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 199, 214, 215, 256, 259 and 369.
27 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 214–216 and 370.
stānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal.28 Furthermore, he refers to Ibn | Ḫallikān, 69

Kitāb Wafayāt al-Aʿyān;29 Ibn al-Aṯīr, al-Kāmil fī t-taʾrīḫ;30 Iǧī, Kitāb al-Ma-
wāqif with commentary (Šarḥ);31 Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim;32 and a text
by “Ebno l-Kassai”.33 The reference is most likely to Ibn Ḥakmūn al-Quḍāʿī
(d. 454/1062) and his as yet unpublished world-history, Kitāb al-Inbāʾ ʿalā al-
anbiyāʾ wa-tawārīḫ al-ḫulafāʾ.34 This author is also cited as “Al-Kassaius”,
“Al-Kodaius”,35 “Al-Kossaius”, and apparently also as “Ahmed Ebn Yusef”.
Finally, we find among Pocock’s sources Ġazālī’s Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn,36 in-
cluding a complete version of Ġazālī’s “Creed” (ʿAqīda) in Arabic text with
Latin translation.37 It should be noted that many explanations of single terms
are taken from the old Arabic lexica by Ǧawharī (d. 393/1002 or 1003 or later)
and Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1415)38 who both had been main sources for Jacobus
Golius (1596–1667), Lexicon Arabico-Latinum.39
A comparison of these sources, which Pocock quoted from Arabic manu-
scripts then available to him, with the modern editions reminds us that Po-
cock had at his disposal texts which were sometimes incomplete and full
of mistakes. Sometimes, he himself doubted the correctness of the transmis-
sion.40 In spite of these difficulties, Pocock offers a valuable collection of
28 For example Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 199. – S. n. 40.

29 For example Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 215. This information is based on Ibn Ḫallikān, Kitāb
Wafayāt al-Aʿyān. Ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut 1972, VI, pp. 8ff. – Concerning the incorrect
explanation of the name Muʿtazila see Hans Daiber, Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾ als Prediger und Theo-
loge. Leiden 1988. = IPTS 2, pp. 18 ff. – J. van Ess (s. n. 48), Index.
30 For example Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 210.
31 Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 214.
32 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 202 and 228.
33 Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 214.
34 See C. Brockelmann, GAL I, p. 343, and S I, p. 584.
35 Such a reference also occurs in Edward Pocock’s Praefatio to his son’s edition and Latin
translation of Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān. – See below, pp. 74–75.
36 Specimen (s. n. 20), Index s.n. “Gazali”. – According to P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 36,
Pocock used a late redaction on the Iḥyāʾ-text by “Arbaī” (perhaps Irbilī?). I have not
been able to confirm this suggestion.
37 See Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 269–286, and Ġazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. Cairo 1346/1927, I,
pp. 79, 13–83, 4.
38 See Specimen (s. n. 20), Index s.n. “Firauzabadius” and “Jauharius”.
39 On Jacobus Golius’ Lexicon see J. Fück, Die arabischen Studien (s. n. 18), pp. 82–84.
40 Cf., e.g., Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 199, with Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa al-Niḥal. Ed.
Muḥammad Ibn Fatḥ Allāh Badrān. Cairo n.d. I, pp. 35, 19ff. and 36, 6ff. Here,
Pocock suggests changing the term al-kalām (ed. M. I. F. A. Badrān I, p. 36, 7) to al-
Islām. We find on the margin: “Forsan imo (sic) certe S. [i.e. A.-I. S. de Sacy!] legendum
al-Islām ‘cum viis’ Islamismi”.
692 chapter 39
material which until today is of some help. It would be even more helpful if
70 he had added details about the | sources cited and their pagination. However,
we should not expect a critical evaluation of the information provided by the
Arabic sources. Pocock was unable to compare doxographical reports with
the original texts, a problem which remains until today a frequent obstacle to
our study of early Islam. Nevertheless, he was able to sketch a picture of early
Islam and its intellectual history which testifies to his vivid interest in the philo-
sophical ideas of the Arabs.
Barhebraeus’ note that God had not given pre-Islamic Arabs the gift of
philosophizing41 induced Pocock to write a long comment on the beginnings
of philosophy among the Arabs.42 Therein, he attenuates Barhebraeus’ state-
ment. Admitting that philosophy was unknown to the Arabs before the appear-
ance of the Abbasid caliphate, he insists that they were very successful when
they became concerned with it. He argues, however, that in the beginning
they were hindered by the material circumstances of their lives.43 Moreover,
philosophy was originally considered to be both incompatible with and super-
fluous to the Qurʾān. However, the second Abbasid caliph Abū Ǧaʿfar al-
Manṣūr (regn. 136/754–158/775)44 was, according to Pocock, an expert in law
and “engaged in philosophy and, above all, in astronomy”.45 Pocock gives no
source for this remark, which can be specified as follows: During Manṣūr’s
reign there were three important scholars pursuing astrology at his court,
namely, the Jew Māšāʾallāh, the Persians Nawbaḫtī and ʿUmar Ibn Far-
ruḫān aṭ-Ṭabarī. In their work, they betray astronomical knowledge going
back to Iranian sources.46 Pocock’s remark about the “study of philosophy”
(philosophiae … studium) during the reign of Manṣūr is possibly an echo of
41 For the Arabic see Barhebraeus, Historia compendiosa dynastiarum. Ed. Edward Po-
cock. Oxford 1663, p. 6, 6 ff. Barhebraeus’ text has also been edited by Anṭūn Ṣāli-
ḥānī, Beirut 1958; for this passage s. p. 94, 10 ff.
42 See Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 170, 9 ff.
43 This remark inspired a long digression by Johann Gottfried Lakemacher in his small
book, Dissertatio inauguralis historico-litteraria de fatis studiorum apud Arabes. Helmstadt
1719. A German translation can be found in F. Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike (s.
n. 9), p. 91.
44 See Hugh Kennedy, “al-Manṣūr”. In EI2 VI, 1988, pp. 427ff.
45 See Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 171, 17 ff.
46 See Paul Kunitzsch, “Über das Frühstadium der arabischen Aneignung antiken Gutes”.
In Saeculum 26, 1975 (pp. 268–282), p. 275. – Cf. Dimitri Gutas, “The Rebirth of Philo-
sophy and the Translations into Arabic”. In Philosophy in the Islamic World. I: 8th–10th
Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson.
English translation by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook of Ori-
ental Studies. I: The Near and Middle East. 115/1 (pp. 94–142), pp. 99f.
early adaptations of Greek ethics and Aristotelian logic in the work of Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ.47 Finally, in the meantime we have sufficient information about the
inclusion of Greek | Hellenistic ideas in the theology of Muʿtazilites and Shiʿites. 71
One might mention Hišām Ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795 or 796)48 or Ḍirār Ibn
ʿAmr (ca. 111/730–ca. 184/800).49
Correct but not exhaustive is Pocock’s statement that during the reign
of Maʾmūn (198/813–218/833) Greek books were collected and translated into
Arabic.50 He suggested, surely incorrectly,51 that a problem arose because of
Islam “commanding belief in many clearly ridiculous things” (tot plane ridicula
credere iubens) and tried to substantiate this with a quotation from “Takid-
din” by referring to Ṣafadī’s commentary on a poem (poema) by “Tograi”.
Here, Pocock used Ṣafadī’s (d. 764/1363) al-Ġayṯ al-Musaǧǧam, which is a
commentary on Tuġrāʾī’s (d. 515/1121) Lāmiyyat al-ʿAǧam.52 If we compare the
quotation as presented by Pocock in Latin translation with the Arabic ori-
ginal,53 we can identify Takiddin with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328).
Pocock’s version of the passage in question is very inaccurate. According
to Ibn Taymiyya, it was inevitable that God punished Maʾmūn for introdu-
cing the philosophical sciences (al-ʿulūm al-falsafiyya) into the Islamic com-
munity:
47 Cf. Hans Daiber, “Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Ausdruck griechi-
scher Ethik, islamischer Ideologie und iranisch-sassanidischer Hofetikette”. In Oriens 43,
2015, pp. 273–293. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/11. – Hans Daiber, “De
praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica. The Category of Relation in
Arabic-Islamic Philosophy”. In Enrahonar. Supplement Issue. Barcelona 2018 (pp. 431–
490), ch. III. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/10.
48 Cf. Wilferd Madelung, “Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam”. In EI2 III, 1971, pp. 496–498. – Hans
Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbdād as-Sulamī (gest.
830 n. Chr.). Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, Index. – Michele Angela Margherita
Deangelis, The Collected Fragments of Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam, Imamate “Mutakallim” of
the 2nd Century of the Hegira. Together with a Discussion of the Sources for and an Intro-
duction to his Teaching. PhD New York University 1974. – J. van Ess, Theology (s. n. 49).
49 See Josef van Ess, “Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmr”. In EI2, Suppl. 3–4, 1981, pp. 225–227. – An impression
of the infiltration of Greek concepts in early Islamic theology gives Josef van Ess, Theo-
logy and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra. Translated from German by
John O’Kane (I) and Gwendolin Goldbloom (II). Leiden/Boston 2017ff. = Handbook
of Oriental Studies I, 116/1 ff.
50 See Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 171. – Cf. Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cul-
tures. Leiden/Boston 2012, ch. 1–3.
51 See Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 171.
52 See C. Brockelmann, GAL I, p. 247; S I, p. 439.
53 See al-Ġayṯ al-Musaǧǧam fī Šarḥ Lāmiyyat al-ʿAǧam. Beirut 1395/1975, I, p. 79, 6–8.
694 chapter 39
Mā aẓunnu Allāha yaġfalu ʿan al-Maʾmūn wa lā budda an yuqābila ʿalā mā

iʿtamada maʿa hāḏihi l-umma min idḫāl hāḏihi l-ʿulūm al-falsafiyya bayna
ahlihā.
I do not believe that God would forgive Maʾmūn and instead he inevit-
ably requited the introduction of these philosophical sciences into the
community, which in the company of him relied on them.
This was “translated” by Pocock as follows:
72 Fieri non posse quin Deus certas de AlManone (sic) poenas sumeret, quot
scientiis philosophicis introductis Mohammedanorum pietatem interpel-
laverit.54
According to this “translation”, God must punish Maʾmūn, because the philo-
sophical sciences introduced by him have “disturbed” (interpellaverit) the piety
of the Muslims. No such explanation is to be found in the Arabic text. It appears
to be Pocock’s own interpretation and he added, moreover, that
no one will be astonished at this sentiment who has heard petty creatures
amongst us boldly asserting that all human letters and sciences are hostile
to religion and should be entirely rooted out from Christian common-
wealths, that everyone’s vernacular tongue is enough for him, and that
whatever time is spent on others is wasted.55
Here, the general trends within Pocock’s own time seem to have induced him
to interpret the Arabic text in a specific manner. We have already mentioned
his difficulties to hold his academic position after the removal of his patron
William Laud. Laud was removed not only because of enmity against him,
but also because of growing antipathy in politics and religion to the study
of foreign languages generally,56 and the study of Islamic culture especially.
Thus, Pocock could compare the conflict he faced at Oxford with the tension
between religion and the “philosophical sciences” in early Islam. Although this
tension cannot be found in the text of Ṣafadī quoted above, it is discussed in
later Arabic texts.57
54 See Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 172, 8–10.

55 Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 172, 10–16. – For the English translation see P. M. Holt, Studies (s.
n. 16), p. 11.
56 See Joseph Dolch, Lehrplan des Abendlandes. Darmstadt 1982, pp. 274ff.
57 See Ignaz Goldziher‚ “Die Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken
Now we can discern why Pocock in his Specimen historiae Arabum paid so
much attention to the philosophical ideas of the Muʿtazilites. He mentioned,
moreover, all the Islamic philosophers of importance, as there are Kindī,58
Fārābī,59 the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ,60 Avicenna,61 Ġazālī,62 Ibn Bāǧǧa,63
Averroes,64 Naṣīr ad-Dīn | aṭ-Ṭūsī,65 and Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī.66 How- 73
ever, the information he provides is restricted to very short biobibliographical
notes taken from Arabic historians, biographers, and doxographers.
Despite these shortcomings, Pocock’s Specimen is a remarkable collection
of material for the history of Islamic philosophy. It influenced many books
written from the 18th till to the 19th centuries: We find echoes in Johann
Gottfried Lakemacher’s Dissertatio inauguralis historico-litteraria de fatis
studiorum apud Arabes;67 in Christophorus Carolus Fabricius’ Speci-
men academicum de studio philosophiae graecae inter Arabes;68 and, above all,
in the Historia critica philosophiae69 of Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770),
the founder of philosophical historiography in Europe. As Brucker had no
knowledge of Arabic, he used exclusively European sources.70 One of his main
sources was Pocock’s Specimen, and he used it in addition to Pocock’s edi-
tion and Latin translation of Barhebraeus’ Historia compendiosa dynasti-
Wissenschaften”. In I. Goldziher, Gesammelte Schriften. Hildesheim 1970, V, pp. 357–400

/ English version in I. Goldziher, Studies on Islam / Engl. transl. Merlin L. Swartz.
Oxford 1981.
58 See Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 42 and 350.
60 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 210 and 369; identified here as “Echwanosafa”.
62 Specimen (s. n. 20), Index s.n. “Gazali”.
63 Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 370.
65 Specimen (s. n. 20), p. 200.
67 S. n. 43. – Cf. here and in the following also the survey in H. Daiber, BIPh, introduction,
pp. XVI ff., or in Hans Daiber, “What is the Meaning of and to What End Do We Study
the History of Islamic Philosophy?” In The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Pro-
ceedings 7, no. 5, Jerusalem 1998 (pp. 177–199), pp. 181ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to
the Arabs II/1.
68 Altdorf 1745.
69 Leipzig 1742–1744, 5 vols.
70 With regard to this see F. Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike (s. n. 9), p. 105. The Latin
translation of Ibn Ǧulǧul’s biographies of scholars that is mentioned by F. Klein-
Franke, citing J. J. Brucker, never existed. Brucker’s misleading note is apparently
based on Leo Africanus who, in his De viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes, often
cited Ibn Ǧulǧul’s Philosophorum vita (s. n. 14).
696 chapter 39
arum, Oxford 1663. But in Brucker’s description we miss the sober judge-
ments found in Pocock’s compilation. Because the Platonic-Neoplatonic ele-
ment of Islamic philosophy was scarcely known to Pocock and his generation,
and because Brucker was a critic of Aristotle, Brucker also condemned
Islamic philosophers for being commentators of Aristotle.71
Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae did not remain in vogue for a long
time. Scholars of the 19th century gradually improved their assessment of
Islamic philosophy by consulting newly available texts.72 As a result, Brucker
was scarcely cited by such 19th-century historians of philosophy as Heinrich
74 Ritter,73 Albert Stöckl,74 or | Barthélemy Hauréau.75 These authors
made use of new texts, translations, and studies76 which increasingly replaced
Pocock’s compilation. The German scholar Heinrich Ritter seems to have
been the last historian of philosophy to use Pocock. He cited Pocock’s Spe-
cimen in his Geschichte der Philosophie as well as in a lecture given at the
Academy of Göttingen in 1844. This lecture, entitled “Über unsere Kenntnis
der arabischen Philosophie und besonders über die Philosophie der orthodoxen
arabischen Dogmatiker”, is a critical review of August Schmölders and his
contempt for Islamic philosophy.
71 See F. Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike (s. n. 9), pp. 107ff.

72 See F. Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike (s. n. 9), pp. 109ff.
73 See his Geschichte der Philosophie. Hamburg 1844, vol. 7 and 8; this corresponds to his
Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie. Hamburg 1845, vol. 3 and 4.
74 See Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Mainz 1865, vol. 2, pp. 13ff. An extract was
published in Mainz in 1894, and a third edition, revised and edited by Georg Weingärt-
ner, appeared in Mainz in 1919 under the title Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie;
see the chapter on “arabische Philosophie”, pp. 149–157.
75 See Histoire de la philosophie scolastique. Paris 1880 / Repr. Frankfurt 1966.
76 See F. Klein-Franke, Die klassische Antike (s. n. 9), pp. 119ff. – We should add Franz
Delitzsch, Anekdota zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik unter Juden und
Moslemen. Leipzig 1841. It is, for that time, a rich collection of material on the Muʿtazilites,
their Jewish sympathizers, and kalām. Besides the Hebrew text ʿEṣ Ḥayyim by the Karaite
Ahron Ben Elia and a long German summary of it, the book contains Arabic excerpts
from Īǧī’s (d. 756/1355) Kitāb al-Mawāqif, al-Kāfī al-Āqḥiṣārī’s (d. 1025/1616) Nūr al-
yaqīn fī uṣūl ad-dīn (on manuscripts see C. Brockelmann, GAL S I, p. 294), and Taf-
tāzānī’s (d. 793/1390) Šarḥ ʿalā al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya. Moreover, Delitzsch had added
an extensive list of names and words (pp. 301–327) containing references to Pocock’s
Specimen and the edition of Barhebraeus.
III The Pococks’ Edition and Translation of Ibn Tufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn
Yaqẓān
The edition of Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān by the two
Pococks, father Edward and his son Richard, was an equally successful
work as the Specimen. By means of their edition and Latin translation of this
work, published in 1671, they hoped to contribute to a better understanding
of Islamic philosophy. As Edward Pocock declared,77 the barbarous transla-
tions of Islamic philosophy from the Middle Ages had caused Christians of his
time to get a bad impression of it. By 1645, he was already working on an English
translation of the work.78 In 1671, his son, Richard Pocock (1648–1727), pub-
lished the Arabic text with Latin translation and a dedication to Archbishop
Gilbert of Canterbury.
His father, Edward Pocock, added a short introduction about Ibn Ṭufayl
and the novel. For this he used Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa’s Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, Moses | 75
Narboni’s (1300–1362) still unpublished Hebrew commentary on the anonym-
ous Hebrew translation,79 and Ibn Ḫallikān’s Wafayāt al-Aʿyān. Moreover, he
mentions a quotation from an anonymous commentary on Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy
Ibn Yaqẓān in Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī’s (d. 749/1349) Masālik al-abṣār fī
mamālik al-amṣār.80 He gave equally detailed information about each of the
authors Ibn Ṭufayl had cited in the preface to his tale, namely, Fārābī, Ibn
Sīnā, Ġazālī, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Ibn Rušd, and Ǧunayd. For his comments he had
77 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 17.

78 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 14. – Michael Nahas, “A Translation of Ḥayy B. Yaqẓān
by the elder Edward Pococke (1604–1691)”. In Journal of Arabic literature 16, 1985, pp. 88–
90.
79 The anonymous Hebrew translation was composed in 1349AD. On the text see Salomon
Munk, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe. Paris 1955 / Repr. of the 1859 edition, p. 417
and p. 504 n. 1. – Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelal-
ters und die Juden als Dolmetscher. Graz 1956 / Repr. of the edition Berlin 1893, pp. 209ff. –
Léon Gauthier, Ibn Thofail, sa vie, ses œuvres. Paris 1909, pp. 48ff. – On Pocock’s notes
see S. Munk, Mélanges, pp. 412 ff. – This Hebrew translation is different from the Hebrew
version of Avicenna’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān by Ibn ʿEzra. For the latter text see Hermann
Greive, Studien zum jüdischen Neuplatonismus. Berlin/New York 1973, pp. 114ff. – Gott-
hard Strohmaier, “Chaj ben Mekitz – die unbekannte Quelle der Divina Commedia”.
In Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch 55/56, 1980–1981, pp. 191–207 / Repr. in G. Strohmaier, Von
Demokrit bis Dante. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1996. = Olms Studien 43, pp. 449–465.
80 See on this not completely edited geographical work C. Brockelmann, GAL II, p. 141; S
II, pp. 175ff. – A facsimile edition in 27 parts appeared in the Institute of Arabic-Islamic
Sciences in Frankfurt a.M. in 1988–1989.
698 chapter 39
recourse to Ibn Ḫallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān; Yāfiʿī, Mirʾāt al-ǧanān; Barhe-

braeus, al-Muḫtaṣar fī d-duwal; Abū l-Fidāʾ, Muḫtaṣar Taʾrīḫ al-bašar; and
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ.
The edition and translation were republished in 1700 without any changes81
and served as the basis for subsequent translations into English, Dutch, and
German during the 17th and 18th centuries.82 The Arabic text became well-
known in Europe, for the most part through the English translation by the
Cambridge orientalist Simon Ockley (1678–1720), published in 1708.83 Until
the 19th century this was the only Arabic philosophical text available in a pub-
lished edition. Afterwards, several new editions appeared in the Middle East
and in Europe.84
76 The contents of the text85 can be summarized as follows: The hero of the
philosophical novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān grows up on an island, having no con-
tact with human society. Gradually, he gains knowledge of the world. His intel-
lectual development enables him to discover simple scientific truths and finally
to recognize abstract philosophical truth. Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philo-
sophies are combined in a mystical view of the world, the highest aim of which
is beatific vision. Later, Ḥayy meets a representative of traditional religion,
Asal, and realizes that this religion is the symbolic reproduction of the same
philosophical truth he had discovered for himself without any external help.
Ḥayy does not require religion and keeps to his contemplative manner of look-
ing at things, far away from human society.
Through the translation of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, the theme of the
individual who develops alone on an island, without foreign help or intellec-
81 See Christianus Fridericus Schnurrer, Bibliotheca Arabica. Halle a.d.S. 1811,

pp. 470 ff., with a list of errata occurring in the 1671 and 1700 editions.
82 See Remke Kruk, “An 18th-Century Descendant of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and Robinson Cru-
soe: Don Antonio de Trezzanio”. In Arabica 34, 1987, pp. 364–365.
83 Republished in 1711 and, in an abridged form, again in 1731. The original publication
was reprinted, with slight changes, by Edward A. van Dyck. Cairo 1905 and London
1983. – On Simon Ockley see Arthur John Arberry, The Cambridge School of Arabic.
Cambridge 1948, pp. 13ff., and Arthur John Arberry, Oriental Essays. London 1960,
pp. 13 ff. – On Simon Ockley as an historian see P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), pp. 5ff.
84 Later editions and translations are mentioned in C. Brockelmann, GAL I, p. 460; S I,
p. 831 and S III, p. 1237. – See also Amélie-Marie Goichon, “Ḥayy Ibn Yakẓān” and
Bernard Carra de Vaux, “Ibn Ṭufayl”. In EI2. – Mian Mohammad Sharif, A History
of Muslim Philosophy. Wiesbaden 1963, I, pp. 526 ff. – For further literature s. H. Daiber,
BIPh.
85 See the modern English translation and commentary by Lenn Evan Goodman, Ibn
Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān. Los Angeles 1983. – Cf. the review by Helmut Gätje in Die
Welt des Orients 7, 1974, pp. 309–312.
tual inspiration, became widely spread in the literature of the 18th century.
However, the theme of the solitary soul living on an island was not new and
was in fact already a topic of the Spanish author Balthasar Gracián in his
El Criticón published in 1651.86 Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe from the year
1719 became well-known throughout Europe. Though some aspects of Defoe’s
tale resemble Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, it is apparently an independ-
ent adaptation of the theme.87 Stories similar to Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and
published after 1719 appear to be a mixture of narrative elements taken from
Robinson Crusoe and ideas from Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, often com-
bined with imaginative embellishments and modifications.88
Typical themes from Islamic philosophy can be found scattered throughout 77
these stories. The mystical theme of the retirement from the world and the sub-
sequent knowledge of God in the 18th century becomes an instructive example
of the disciplined behaviour of man in a state of necessity. The anonymous
imitation in 1761, entitled The Life and Surprizing Adventures of Don Antonio
de Trezzanio, no longer emphasizes the philosophic-mystical aspect of ascent
to pure knowledge of God. Instead, it focuses on the material aspects of empiri-
cism and practical domination of the world. Here, we find analogies to contem-
porary empirical philosophy and to the idea of the fundamental philosophical
identity of religions as developed during the Enlightenment. The original inten-
tion of Ibn Ṭufayl’s novel Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān is not fully recognized. Nor is
any attention paid to Ibn Ṭufayl’s criticism of his forerunners Fārābī and
Ibn Bāǧǧa, neither of whom advocated the abandonment of the world. On
the contrary, they considered participation in human society to be the only
way to true philosophy: Fārābī, for example, spoke of religion as imitation of
philosophy,89 whereas, according to Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophy, contemplation
in solitude makes religion superfluous – it is merely a tool needed by unlearned
people.
86 See García Gómez, “Un cuento árabe, fuente común de Abentofáil y de Gracían”. In Re-
vista de archives, bibliotecas y museos 30, 1926, pp. 1–67 and 241–269.
87 See Remke Kruk, transl., Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Ṭufayl: Wat geen oog heeft gezien.
Amsterdam 1985, p. 25.
88 See Nawal Muhammad Hasan, “A Study in Eighteenth Century Plagiarism”. In The
Islamic Quarterly 27, 1983, pp. 31–48. This article summarizes the book Hayy Bin Yaqzan
and Robinson Crusoe: A Study of an Early Arabic Impact on English Literature. Baghdad
1980. – On the anonymous English plagiarism, The Life and Surprizing Adventures of
Don Antonio de Trezzanio, London 1761, see N. M. Hasan, pp. 32–37; R. Kruk, Abū Bakr
Muḥammad Ibn Ṭufayl (s. n. 87), pp. 25 ff., and R. Kruk, “An 18th Century Descendant” (s.
n. 82).
89 For more details see Hans Daiber, “The Ruler as Philosopher: A New Interpretation of
al-Fārābī’s View”. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986. In MNAW.L n.r. 49/4 (pp. 128–149),
pp. 17 ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18.
700 chapter 39
This originally Farabian idea of religion as symbolic representation of philo-

sophical truth apparently appealed to representatives of the Enlightenment in
the 17th/18th centuries. It was compatible with their understanding of true reli-
gion as a symbiosis of science and piety, as a universal religion which takes on
different forms.90 At the same time, they found that it corresponded with their
aspiration to refuse adherence to particular religious forms: They could refer to
the decision of Ḥayy not to commit himself to traditional religion, but to return
instead to his island along with Asal and to devote himself to philosophical
contemplation – a higher form of religion. Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical novel
thus became a historical example for those during the Enlightenment who pre-
78 ferred reason | to the dogmatism of religion, refused puritanism, pedantry, and
bigotry, and strove to elevate human society to a higher, universal religiousness.
Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān appears to representatives of the Enlightenment as a proto-
type of the autonomous human being who, free of traditional religious commit-
ments, develops tolerance and humanity, and by his own reason gains a deeper
knowledge of God and the world. In his preface to the edition, Pocock sum-
marizes the aim of his book as that of showing how “unlimited reason” (ratio
illibata) can achieve “cognition (cognitio) of the sublime things (rerum sublimi-
corum)”, and how philosophers can obtain knowledge “of God and the higher
world” (Dei mundique superioris). Interestingly, Pocock added the statement
that the philosopher is ultimately unable to dispense with “divine revelation”
(divina revelatio).91 Here, Pocock keeps to trends which deeply influenced the
curriculum of schools at that time: We may refer to Johann Amos Comenius
(1592–1670) who spoke of the “gradual” (gradatim) education of man Deo duce,
ratione luce, sensu teste.92
The parallels between ideas of the Enlightenment and ideological elements
of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān may also have been stimulating leitmotivs for Edward
Pocock when he started to translate Ibn Ṭufayl’s book into English. Surely,
he was reminded of an ideal typical for the Enlightenment, namely, the ideal
of natural religion independent of clerical institutions.93 As we know, he trans-
lated into Arabic a masterpiece of natural and rationalist theology, the De veri-
tate religionis christianae by the Dutch statesman and scholar Hugo Grotius
90 See the article “Aufklärung” in HWPh 1, 1971, col. 620–635.

91 Therefore, he equates the guidance and leadership of God with the light of reason; see ed.
1700, praefatio, p. A 2.
92 See J. Dolch (s. n. 56), Lehrplan, pp. 285 ff. – Not available to me was Gul A. Russell,
“The role of Ibn Ṭufayl, a Moorish physician, in the discovery of Childhood in Seventeenth-
century England”. In Child Care through the Centuries; A Historical Survey from Papers given
at the Tenth British Congress on the History of Medicine. Cardiff 1986, pp. 166–177.
93 See the remark by P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 17), p. 14.
(1583–1645). We shall refer to this book later.94 Here, we can point to a cer-
tain parallel between this text and Pocock’s engagement in translating Ibn
Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, namely, the harmony of religion and philosophy,
whereby God, man, and fellowman form a community. Humanistic thinking
also appears to have spurred Pocock to undertake his task, especially because
the ideas of fear of God and reason occasionally flow together in the text.
Finally, we should try to integrate Pocock’s work on Ibn Ṭufayl into the 79
historical circumstances of his time, that is, into the context of his age. After
the death of his patron, the Archbishop of Canterbury and former Chancellor
of Oxford University William Laud (1645), Pocock’s chair was repeatedly
threatened as Laud’s policy had found no approval. In spite of the prevail-
ing critical attitude against Laud, which negatively affected his own security,
Pocock kept Laud in high regard.95 This is perhaps not only an expression
of his personal gratefulness to William Laud and his reforms at the Uni-
versity and Colleges of Oxford. Apparently, Pocock did not agree with his
Presbyterian countrymen who condemned Laud’s clerical policy – the forceful
introduction of a universally valid Anglican prayer-book and the establishment
of a uniform High Church – and, persecuted by Laud, he emigrated to North
America.96 Given the disunity within England, caused by numerous sectarian
movements and by the civil war between the adherents of monarchy (rep-
resentatives of the Anglican prayer-book), Parliament (representatives of the
common law), and the army (defender of religious tolerance), it is possible that
Pocock considered the universalist tendencies of William Laud a better
way to peace and unity.97 However, Laud’s policy did not conform with the idea
of tolerance and natural religion that Pocock favoured and that was propa-
gated by the Enlightenment. Thus, it seems understandable that Pocock did
not continue his work on an Arabic philosophical text that would appeal to re-
presentatives of religious tolerance and inevitably become a thorn in the sides
of their enemies. It is not surprising that, kept out of politics and of everything
that could disturb peace and was irreconcilable with his conscience, he writes
in a letter to Horn of Gueldres, dated November 30, 1650:
I have learnt, and made it the unalterable principle of my soul, to keep peace,
as far as in me lies, with all men; to pay due reverence and obedience to the
94 S. nn. 106 ff.

95 The praefatio by Edward Pocock to the edition of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān mentions the muni-
ficentia Reverendissimi Praesulis Gulielmi Laud Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, s. p. 8.
96 See H. A. L. Fisher, Die Geschichte Europas. Stuttgart 1951, II, pp. 18ff.
97 See H. A. L. Fisher, Geschichte (s. n. 96) II, p. 25.
702 chapter 39
higher powers, and to avoid all things that are foreign to my profession or
studies; but to do anything that may ever so little molest the quiet of my con-
science would be more grievous than the loss, not only of my fortunes, but
even of my life.98
80 There is little reason for wonder then that during such a time of tensions and
troubles the general mood, especially in Puritan circles, was often against the
study of Arabic and Islam. Pocock was challenged to point to the import-
ance of his field. He therefore added to the treatise on Arabic metrics, Tractatus
de prosodia arabica, Oxford 1661, by his pupil Samuel Clark (1625–1669), an
introduction that informs the reader about the role of Arabic in the universi-
ties, especially as relates to the study of philosophy.99 However, the intellectual
mood in England at that time, and perhaps also his lack of time, continued to
hold him back from his translation of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, begun in 1645.100
As already mentioned, Richard Pocock finished the edition and the Latin
translation and met with a lively response from Enlightenment thinkers dur-
ing the end of the 17th and in the 18th centuries. Within three years the Quaker
George Keith published an English paraphrase of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, and in
1686 a Platonist from Cambridge, George Ashwell, was moved to produce
a new English translation following the Latin version.101 George Ashwell
was apparently attracted to Neoplatonic reminiscences in Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
and may have found in them a welcome counterpart to the empirical and
nominalistic philosophy of men like Francis Bacon (1561–1626) or Thomas
Hobbes (1588–1679).
IV Edward Pocock as Humanist
Summing up, it may be said that during the period of the Enlightenment there
was a strong philosophical interest in Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and even a
scientific desire to become familiar with new themes. Philosophic-ideological
interests facilitated the spread of Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical novel, and sci-
entific points of view stimulated Pocock’s collection of material in his Speci-
men historiae Arabum. The latter remained a standard work of European his-
toriography on Islamic philosophy until the beginning of the 19th century. Even
98 See S. Lane-Pole, “Edward Pococke” (s. n. 15), p. 9b.

99 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), pp. 16 ff. and 29.
100 See M. Nahas (s. n. 78), “A Translation”, p. 90.
101 See A. J. Arberry (s. n. 83), The Cambridge School, pp. 21ff.
though Pocock may be for us “an archaic figure, the representative of a dead
scholarly tradition”,102 he did not lose his importance as the first European ori-
entalist who called | our attention to the importance of the collections of Arabic 81
material and to the eminent role of philology for the study and appraisal of
Islamic philosophy.
It is also unwarranted to class Pocock among those orientalists who estab-
lished oriental studies by unduly emphasizing grammar and lexicography.103
No doubt, “the preparation of lexicons and grammars was characteristic of
the earlier seventeenth century”.104 At the same time, however, we can see
a remarkable change in the European field of oriental studies starting with
Edward Pocock and that continues to be important: Pocock went ahead
with a principle formulated a generation later by the Dutch orientalist Adri-
aan Reland (1676–1718) in his book De religione Mohammedica (Utrecht
1705) – namely, that the authority for facts about Islam must be of Muslim ori-
gin.105
Strictly speaking, Pocock continues in a tradition of humanists like Eras-
mus of Rotterdam who, with their literary-philological interests, expected
to discover a new ideal of life in the study of classical sources. Correspond-
ingly, Pocock found it necessary to support information on Islam by docu-
mentary evidence, that is, by Islamic texts. Pocock’s serious commitment to
this principle becomes evident from the fact that he was not afraid to criti-
cize his famous contemporary, the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius: Edward
Pocock shows in his Specimen that a reference by Grotius in his treatise
De veritate religionis christianae concerning an alleged conversation between
Mohammed and a dove cannot be proven by the texts.106 Nevertheless,
Pocock continued to have a high opinion of Hugo Grotius. In 1660, he
published his Arabic translation of Grotius’ treatise, a standard work on nat-
ural, reason-oriented theology, first published in Paris in 1627.107 This defense
of Christianity, which has been republished several times and translated into
several languages, was written as an aid for Christian sailors who during their
travels came into contact with Jews, Moslems, heathens, and atheists. Accord-
ing to Grotius, the truth of Christian belief, the | resurrection of Christ, is 82
102 See P. M. Holt, Studies (s. n. 16), p. 22.

103 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism. New York 1978, p. 77.
104 See Norman Daniel, Islam and the West. Edinburgh 1960, p. 385 n. 16.
105 This is pointed out by N. Daniel, Islam and the West (s. n. 104), p. 295, who refers to
Popock’s edition of Barhebraeus’ Historia compendiosa.
106 Specimen (s. n. 20), pp. 191 ff. – N. Daniel, Islam and the West (s. n. 104), p. 385 n. 16.
107 See N. Daniel, Islam and the West (s. n. 104), p. 298.
704 chapter 39
substantiated by sources which are based on eyewitnesses.108 This principle

of a source, a text as an eyewitness report that guarantees the correctness
of transmitted information, apparently made deep impression on Pocock
and induced him to a similar estimation of Arabic primary sources as reli-
able records on Islam. However, Pocock did not manage to develop a critical
method for the evaluation of traditions and their tendencies.
Despite this shortcoming and despite the lack of published Arabic texts,
Pocock has added a major contribution to our knowledge of the Islamic his-
tory of ideas. He cites texts which remain partially unpublished.109 Now it is our
task to continue Pocock’s work, while at the same time correctly classifying
Islamic texts by means of the critical interpretation and comparative analysis
of their sources and contents in the context of Islamic literature and Islamic
intellectual history.110
Republished, with corrections, from The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe.
Ed. by Charles E. Butterworth and Blake Andrée Kessel. Leiden/New York/
Köln 1994. = Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters XXXIX, pp. 65–82.
By courtesy of the publisher.
108 See G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes, “Grotius als theoloog”. In Het Delfts Orakel: Hugo de
Groot, 1583–1645, Delft 1983, p. 115.
109 S. nn. 34, 79 and 80.
110 On these methodological questions see H. Daiber, Muʿammar (s. n. 48), pp. 1ff. and 12ff.
chapter 40
The Humanism of Syed Muhammad Naquib

Al-Attas
An Evaluation of His Concept of Education in View of Classical Islamic
Sources*
I Introduction 705 – II The Concept of Humanism 706 – III Al-Attas’ Concept of Edu-
cation 706 – IV Al-Attas’ on Arabic Language and Meaning 708 – V The Way from
“Meaning” to “Knowledge”, “Truth” and Adab 710 – VI The Way from Truth to Proper
Behaviour 712 – VII The Way from Adab to Emulation of the Prophet 713 – VIII The
Way from Education to Islamic Humanism 717 – Bibliography 719 – Summary 722
I Introduction
It is an honour for me to present a paper on a great scholar and unique thinker.

Besides, he is an ingenious architect of buildings – the old and the new ISTAC.
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas combined his “knowledge” ʿilm and
his “activity” ʿamal, when he built ISTAC, meant as an institution for academic
training, leading to education. He combines Islamic thought and teaching lead-
ing to educated people as cornerstones of an Islamic state.
And this is remarkable in so far as he bases his educational program on his
knowledge of the Qurʾān, on Muslim thinkers, and on the requirements of a
generation of Muslims who want to know the concepts of their forefathers, the
shining examples.
* This is a paper delivered at the 1st International Symposium on Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-
Attas: Intellectual and Practical Dimensions, 15th February 2020, UTM Kuala Lumpur. The text
is an expanded and modified version of a paper given in 2011 at a Conference on Knowledge
and Education in Classical Islam: Historical foundations – contemporary impact, University of
Göttingen, with the title “The Malaysian Scholar Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (*1931) on
Islamic Education. An evaluation in view of classical Islamic sources”.

706 chapter 40
II The Concept of Humanism
Here, we detect a striking similarity to “Humanism”. We use the term “human-

ism” in its original meaning as a description of an educational program for
human beings, a program orientated towards Ancient Greek and Roman literat-
ure. This concept of humanism reached its first climax during the Renaissance
in the 15th and 16th centuries AD, when the study of classical Greek and Latin
authors was a way to develop the concept of a universal man independent
of theological and philosophical restrictions. Already before the Renaissance,
the Catalan theologian and philosopher Ramon Llull in the 13th/14th centur-
ies AD developed a concept of education based on the idea of the universality
of knowledge and its origin in ancient sciences, the authorities of antiquity.
Knowledge of the Artes liberales, of logic and rhetoric with Latin as a gate to the
knowledge of all other sciences, of geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy,
as well as the concept of man’s freedom and responsibilty for his personal dig-
nity and social obligation within the society constitute a humanistic concept
of man on the basis of practical ethics.1
Ramon Llull and after him great Renaissance thinkers like Pico della Mir-
andola are testimonies of a new emerging ideal of an educated man and his
ethical behaviour. A comparison with Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas’
concept of education immediately shows their common interest in the educa-
tion of man – on the one side within a Christian humanism, on the other side:
Within an Islamic humanism.
III Al-Attas’ Concept of Education
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas developed his concept of man’s edu-

cation by referring to classical Islamic authors – and he modified them. In the
revival of Islamic concepts of the past he did the same as humanists in Europe
did in their orientation at Greek and Latin authors from the past as shining
examples for the development of a concept of the diginity of man and his eth-
ical virtues.
Therefore, we will have to look at the classical Islamic literary sources and
at the inspirative sources of Naquib Al-Attas. We will analyse his ideas on
knowledge and education in the light of Islamic thinkers since the time of
Ibn Qutayba (213/828–276/889). We will discuss the sources mentioned by Al-
Attas, the peculiarities of his concept of education and possible parallels in
1 Cf. H. Daiber, Humanism, pp. 293 f.

the humanism of syed muhammad naquib al-attas 707
early Islamic thought. Al-Attas’ work is a very important contribution to the

ideal of “Islamic education” which became the curriculum of the ‘International
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization’ (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur, foun-
ded by him in 1987 and being its director until 2002.
When we study Al-Attas’ ideas of education in his monograph The Concept
of Education in Islam, we find similarities to the “Western” concept of educa-
tion, and we find differences. Both concepts are dominated by the concern for
the ethical aspect of education, the shaping of man, that is not restricted to
mere knowledge, but includes his role in a good society. This common ground
might be due to universal aims of education which we find in different cultures,
each containing different details that are determined by the specific times and
places of a culture.
Here, we will concentrate on peculiarities of the Islamic concept of edu-
cation. These peculiarities arise from what we call “Islam” in its complexity,
or they give a special accentuation to universal trends of man’s education, of
“Bildung”, explained by German dictionaries as the totality of cognition, know-
ledge and experiences, combined with sound judgement and good taste.
Our starting point will be Al-Attas’ description of the concept of educa-
tion,2 which he has discussed on several occasions since 1977.3 His monograph
The Concept of Education in Islam (1980) was translated into Arabic in 1998
and forms a chapter in his book on Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the
Future (1985).4 His Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam from 1995 bears wit-
ness to the “Bildung” of a Muslim and to the Islamic concept of education.
I shall focus my paper on the earlier Islamic traditions in Al-Attas’ concept
of education and his new assertions. The Islamic texts Al-Attas mentions as
his sources, such as the Qurʾān, old Arabic dictionaries like the Lisān al-ʿarab
by Ibn Manẓūr (630/1233–710/1311 or 1312),5 the books of definitions of tech-
2 On Al-Attas’ concept of education see the description in W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational

Philosophy, pp. 121 ff. – On the Malayan context of Al-Attas’ concept of education cf. A. F.
Abdul Hamid, Islamic Education in Malaysia; F. Ahmed, An Exploration of Naquib al-Attas’
Theory of Islamic Education. – On the echo of Al-Attas’ concept of education in Malaysia
see K. Hiroko, Problems of Islamic Education.
3 His book The Concept of Education in Islam is an enlarged commentary on his paper “Pre-
liminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education”,
presented at the First World Conference on Muslim Education, Mecca, March 31 – April 8 in
1977. The paper is published in Jeddah 1978 in the collection of selected articles edited by S.
M. N. Al-Attas, Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, pp. 19–47. Worth reading is Al-
Attas’ introduction to this volume, pp. 1–15.
4 Ch. VI. – The text was already published in 1978 in Kuala Lumpur, in Al-Attas’ book Islam
and Secularism (especially in the chapter “The Dewesternization of Knowledge”, pp. 127–160).
5 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, p. 135.
708 chapter 40
nical terms written by ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad al-Ǧurǧānī (739/1339–817/1414) and

Tahānawī (12th/18th c.),6 and works on theology, like Taftāzānī’s (722/1322–
792/1390) commentary on the Creed by Naǧm ad-Dīn an-Nasafī7 (459/1067–
537/1142), or Ġazālī’s (450/1058–505/1111) works8 give a basic idea of the Islamic
background of Al-Attas’ concept of education.
IV Al-Attas on Arabic Language and Meaning
At the beginning of his discussion Al-Attas reminds the reader of the sci-
entific structure of the Arabic language, which in his eyes is corroborated by
the Qurʾān and the Hadith, as well as by the numerous dictionaries and lists
of technical terms used by the Arabs in early Islamic times.9 Their explana-
tions, as well as the explanations by commentators on the Qurʾān, are con-
sidered to be correct and exclude any semantic changes during the centuries
to come. The meaning of ambiguous expressions, according to Al-Attas, can
be explained by tafsīr, and their “ultimate” meaning can be explained by taʾwīl.
The Qurʾān and the prophetic tradition appear as archetypes of knowledge and
exclude historical developments – they do not require a historical contextual-
ization.
This starting point can refer to a classical Islamic philological exegesis of
the Qurʾān, which, e.g., in the commentary by al-Ḥākim al-Ǧušamī / Ǧišumī
(d. 493/1101) combined the analysis of grammar (qirāʾa, luġa, iʿrāb, naẓm) of the
Qurʾān with a description of its “meaning” (maʿnā) and the deduction of “legal
rules” (aḥkām).10
Al-Attas does not give a detailed introduction to the principles of an inter-
pretation of the Qurʾān, nor does he explicitly refer to the ẓāhir-bāṭin distinc-
tion, e.g., in the request of the Ismailite Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (d. 322/934) to search
for the universal “meaning” (maʿnā) of the pictures (amṯāl) used in the divine
revelation of the Qurʾān.11
6 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 100, 104, 139, 328 and 342.
7 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 84 and 115.
8 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 115–116, 163, 174–175, 177–178, 228,
232 ff., 240 ff., 283, 365 and 368.
9 On Al-Attas’ concept of the Arabic language and its scientific nature see W. M. N.
Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 330 ff. – S. B. Ahmad, Al-Attas on Language and
Thought.
10 Cf. Daiber Collection III, the description of MS 4.
11 Cf. H. Daiber, Islamic Thought, p. 73.
In a linguistic-semantic turn Al-Attas postulates the existence of an “Is-

lamic vocabulary” orientated towards the language of the Qurʾān, which “islam-
ized” both the Arabic language after the ǧāhilī period and the non-Arabic lan-
guages of Muslim peoples.12 In his opinion the result of this “Islamization” are
“Islamic languages” which share the same “meanings” (maʿnā). Here, Al-Attas
criticizes the “modernist movement” which lacks “intellectual and spiritual
leadership”, and which, under the influence of non-Islamic world views, created
semantic confusion leading to the “Deislamization” of the Arabic language.
This he considers as a loss of adab.13 Adab is more than tarbiya “education”,
more than the “process of instilling something and turning them into human
beings, into rational and at the same time spiritual beings who are able to judge,
discriminate, and clarify”.14 This capacity includes the ability of the educated
to understand formulations and their “meanings” (maʿnā), i.e., “the recognition
of the place of anything in a system, and its relation to other things”.15
This reminds us of Ġazālī’s complaint about the loss of the original mean-
ings of terms among scholars of his time,16 and of Ġazālī’s increasing tendency
to replace philosophical terminology with concepts of kalām.17 Moreover, it
reminds us of the interesting discussion in Ibn Qutayba’s Adab al-kātib. This is
a handbook written by a historian and scholar in the 3rd/9th century for secret-
aries at the caliphal court entrusted with administrative tasks. In the introduc-
tion Ibn Qutayba criticizes those people who are “scholars” (ʿulamāʾ) without
knowledge who want to be progressive and use terms and concepts without,
in fact, knowing their real “meaning” (maʿnā).18 Ibn Qutayba mentions their
allusion to Aristotle’s books and to logical terms taken from Aristotle,19 and he
refers to Muḥammad Ibn al-Ǧahm al-Barmakī’s boast of the saying awwal al-
fikr nihāyatu al-ʿamal, “the first in thought is the last in action”. In Ibn Qutayba’s
view none of this reaches the level of “wisdom” (ḥikma) and “eloquence” (al-
ḫiṭāb) of the Arabs in religion, law, law of inheritance, and grammar, or in the
12 See S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, pp. 8ff.

13 See S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, pp. 10–12.
15 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 15. – Cf. W. M. N. Wan Daud, Al-Attas. A
Real Reformer, pp. 46 ff.
16 See S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 11.
17 See F. Griffel, Apostasie und Toleranz, p. 264, n. 20.
18 See Ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib. Ed. M. Grünert, pp. 1, 7ff., and 2, 9ff.
19 Ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib. Ed. M. Grünert, pp. 3 and 11ff. / French transl. G. Lecomte,
L’ introduction du Kitāb adab al-kātib d’ Ibn Qutayba, pp. 53–54. – Also in B. Soravia, Ibn
Qutayba en Al-Andalus, pp. 552–553.
710 chapter 40
sayings of their Prophet and companions.20 Ibn Qutayba praises “knowledge”

(ʿilm) and “speculation” (naẓar) and gives an idea of his concept of adab, com-
bining knowledge with ethics.21
V The Way from “Meaning” to “Knowledge”, “Truth” and Adab
To a similar concept of adab Al-Attas adds his emphasis on the process

of getting knowledge and on its recipient, “the rational being” (al-ḥayawān
al-nāṭiq),22 who – as ḫalīfa “vicegerent” of God and created in God’s “own
image”23 – is able to articulate with his audible speech and articulation of
the “meaning” (maʿnā) the “inner, unseen reality” (ʿaql or qalb).24 Al-Attas
explains “meaning” as the recognition of the place of anything in a “system”.
This implies the clarification and understanding of the relation a thing has with
other things, its order.25 Here, Al-Attas refers to Ǧurǧānī’s and Tahānawī’s
books on definitions and their, ultimately Avicennian, distinction between
essence and existence. “Essential relation” and “specific difference” are con-
sidered as something immutable, otherwise there would be constant change,
which would make the recognition of things impossible.
This reminds us of the criticism of the sophists by the Islamic philosopher
Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951) and of Fārābī’s own view about the reality
of existing things, as he developed it in his monograph on the perfect state,
his Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila.26 These things are identical with the
“meaning” (mafhūm) of their terms, and in their essence and meaning they
are created by an external divine Creator. According to Fārābī, knowledge of
what derives from the divine first cause, through mediation of the prophet
and ruler, is philosophical truth. This philosophical truth is imitated by reli-
20 Ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib, ed. M. Grünert, pp. 5, 7–6, 2. – Cf. the translation in S. M.
Stern, The First in Thought is the Last in Action, pp. 240–241. – The interpretation in J.
van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft III, p. 206 is not correct.
21 See Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn al-aḫbār. Ed. Aḥmad Zakī al-ʿAdwī, I, pp. 117–130 / Paraphrase
by F. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, pp. 254–266. – On naẓar as a source of know-
ledge see Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl muḫtalif al-ḥadīṯ. Ed. M. Z. an-Najjār, pp. 87ff. / French
transl. G. Lecomte, Le traité des divergences, pp. 99 ff. – Cf. G. Lecomte, L’introduction,
pp. XX ff.
22 Cf. S. M. N. Al-Attas, On Justice and the Nature of Man, pp. 31–47.
23 Cf. e.g. S. M. N. Al-Attas, Prolegomena, pp. 56 and 58.
24 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 14.
26 See on the following H. Daiber, Al-Fārābī on the Role of Philosophy. – H. Daiber, Al-
Fārābīs Aristoteles. – H. Daiber, Ruler.
gion, and this imitation is not only an easily comprehensive picture of what in
philosophy is based on philosophical proofs – it is also the reality of philosoph-
ical truth, the ethical realization of the theory of philosophy and its universals.
Philosophy, that is scientific cognition, becomes moral insight. It becomes real-
ity in the shape of the imitation of religion and its laws, the rules that regulate
man’s actions.
Here, we detect a common interest of Al-Attas and Fārābī concerning
epistemology and its indebtedness to divine inspiration. Al-Attas does not
mention Fārābī and merely speaks of the “concerted agreement that all know-
ledge comes from God”.27 And whereas Fārābī inserts – in the footsteps of Plato,
Aristotle, and Alexander of Aphrodisias – a long discussion of the soul and its
faculties, Al-Attas confines himself, in the footsteps of Ǧurǧānī, to the men-
tion of the soul as interpreter and as something which “arrives … at the meaning
of a thing or an object of knowledge”.28 He adds the role of tafsīr and taʾwīl
(“an intensive form of tafsīr”)29 as “methods of approach to knowledge and sci-
entific methodology”.30 Here, the Qurʾān is considered to be the “final authority
that confirms the truth in our rational and empirical investigations”. It conveys
knowledge to man – i.e. “recognition of the proper places of things in the order
of creation such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of God in the
order of being and existence”.31 Knowledge is knowledge of God the Creator, as
He is revealed in the Qurʾān. The concept of God’s “secret” (ġayb) and Ibn Sīnā’s
concept of God, who can be known from His creation only in a “doubtful man-
ner” (bi-taškīk),32 here is purposely not discussed. Instead, Al-Attas adds to
the “recognition” the “acknowledgement of the proper (that is real and true)
places of things in the order of creation such that it leads to the recognition of
the proper place of God in the order of being and existence”.33 Al-Attas here
has in mind the necessary “action” (ʿamal) by man in the world of empirical
things, including religious and ethical aspects of human existence.34

30 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 18. – Cf. W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational
Philosophy, pp. 343 ff.
31 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 18. On the concept of the “proper place”
which Al-Attas based on Ḥuǧwirī’s definition of ʿadl (see S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept
of Education, p. VIII n. 4) see W. M. N. Wan Daud, review of S. M. N. Al-Attas, Islam and
the Philosophy of Science, p. 121.
32 See H. Daiber, The Limitations of Knowledge, pp. 32f.
34 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 19, bottom.
712 chapter 40
VI The Way from Truth to Proper Behaviour
Al-Attas’ evaluation of the recognition of truth as the recognition of proper

behaviour, of man’s duty and obligation, of his conduct that conforms with
truth is remarkable. This truth means consonance with the requirements of
“wisdom” (ḥikma) and “justice” (ʿadl).35 Wisdom is understood as knowledge
given by God, which enables man to have “correct judgement” with regard “to
the proper places of things”. The assessment of knowledge as ability to judge,
bestowed on man by God, followed by right action, i.e., the conduct of man who
keeps to his obligation, has its roots in Islamic theology and in the definition
of belief as “knowledge” (ʿilm) and “action” (ʿamal) – as Al-Attas acknow-
ledges36 with references to the later sources ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad al-Ǧurǧānī’s
Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt,37 and to Taftāzānī, an older contemporary of Ǧurǧānī, and the
commentary on the Creed (ʿAqāʾid) by Naǧm ad-Dīn an-Nasafī (d. 536/1142).38
In fact, the correlation of knowledge and action already exists in the Koranic
equation of ʿilm “knowledge” and īmān “belief”39 and in the discussions on the
significance of ʿamal “work” for “belief”.40
Moreover, we can add – with regard to the combination of knowledge and
moral action as part of religion – the famous and already mentioned forerunner
Fārābī. He developed an epistemology on the basis of Neoplatonism, Aristotle,
as well as Aristotle’s commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. According to this
epistemology, theoretical insight is divine inspiration coming from God to the
prophet-philosopher as emanations of the divine active intellect. It becomes
reality in the form of rules and laws prescribed by religion. These laws and rules
describe God’s will in the shape of symbols and pictures also understandable
to not philosophically minded people. These laws and rules of religion determ-
ine the conduct of man and they are the fulfilment of theoretical insight,
the actualization of philosophy. Fārābī alignes this with Aristotle’s episte-
mology, according to which man can only think in pictures. The symbols of
35 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 20. – On man’s justice, orientated at God’s

justice and its realization in ethics as part of religion cf. S. M. N. Al-Attas, On Justice and
the nature of man, pp. 1–23.
36 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, pp. 19–20.
37 See Ǧurǧānī, Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt, ed. G. Flügel, p. 96, 10ff. and 14ff.
38 See Taftāzānī, Šarḥ ʿalā l-ʿAqāʾid, pp. 15–16 / Engl. transl. Earl Edgar Elder, A comment-
ary, pp. 10–11.
39 See F. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, pp. 29–30 and 97ff.
40 See the chapter on “Belief and Work” in T. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief, pp. 159ff. – F.
Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, pp. 240 ff., neglected this aspect. – See my remarks
in ZDMG 123 (1973), pp. 413 ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/41.
religion, the pictures of human thinking, the laws and rules – they shape man’s
conduct and his moral actions.41
VII The Way from Adab to Emulation of the Prophet
Fārābī offers a combination of the knowledge bestowed by God on man and the
moral actions of man, comparable with what we find in Al-Attas’ statements.
Al-Attas continues his discussion with the introduction of the term adab,
instead of tarbiya, as a key term for the description of the “discipline of body,
mind, and soul”, which has the task to “assure the recognition and acknow-
ledgement of one’s proper place in relation to one’s physical, intellectual, and
spiritual capacities and potentials”.42 Adab is knowledge of the purpose of seek-
ing knowledge, namely, knowledge of the purpose of inculcating goodness in
man. This goodness of man is based on knowledge and action. It is the result
of man’s lower animal self, recognizing and acknowledging its proper place in
relation to the higher rational self that constitutes the adab of the lower self.
Adab, or the process of taʾdīb “education” leading to adab,43 appears in a
proper place in Al-Attas’ doctrine as the shaping of the lower capacities of
man, i.e., the shaping of man’s “animal soul” (an-nafs al-ḥayawāniyya) by his
“rational soul” (an-nafs an-nāṭiqa).44 This term, which should replace the term
tarbiya, makes man a good man in terms of his relation to his family, to people,
his community, and to society.45 In a comparable manner Fārābī emphasized
the role of the individual and his soul and its capacities which, in the struggle
between the rational soul and its lower parts, strive for happiness in this world
and in the hereafter.46 Fārābī gives a differentiated pictures of the role of the
individual in a hierarchically structured society, in which the lower serves the
higher. Society consists of the “leader” and the “led”, imām and maʾmūm. The
41 See the references given in n. 26.

42 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 22. – See S. M. N. Al-Attas’ “accept-
ance speech” on occasion of his appointment as the first holder of the Al-Ghazali Chair
of Islamic Thought at the ‘International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization’
(ISTAC) in 1994, published under the title “Islam, Science and Knowledge”, pp. 116–118.
44 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, p. 23. – On Al-Attas’ psychology see W. M.
N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 49 ff.
46 See Fārābī, Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. Ed. and transl. by R. Walzer, section IV,
ch. 10 (on the faculties of the soul) and ch. 13, 4–7. – H. Daiber, Prophetie und Ethik,
pp. 730 ff.
714 chapter 40
highest position an imām could reach is to be a philosopher-ruler who receives

his inspiration from the divine active intellect. Fārābī does not use the term
adab in his monograph on the perfect state (al-madīna al-fāḍila),47 apparently,
because he did not intend to offer a handbook on morals and behaviour for
the members of a society, as the “mirrors for princes” did, composed by Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ and his epigones.48 On the contrary, he offered a kind of epistemology
with the intention to emphasize the necessity of self-education by constant
reflection in an endless process of assimilation to God.49
Al-Attas has differing accentuations, but with Fārābī he shares the evalu-
ation of man as a human being striving for knowledge that comes from God,
and for good action and conduct in society, in accordance with his know-
ledge. Accordingly, adab is “recognition and acknowledgement of the reality
that knowledge and being are ordered hierarchically, according to their various
grades and degrees of rank, and of one’s proper place in relation to that real-
ity and to one’s physical, intellectual and spiritual capacities and potentials”.50
Fārābī would not have opposed this. However, he would have avoided the term
adab as a concept in its narrow sense.51
Fārābī stressed the necessity of constant reflection in combination with
divine inspiration – par excellence in the person of the prophet-ruler who
transmits his knowledge and experiences to the ruled. Moreover, Fārābī invites
the reader of his monograph on the “Principles of the insights52 of the citizens
of the best state”, to be critical towards any political system. He is doing this by
ending his book with a long chapter on “ignorant” and “erring” cities, partly in
the footsteps of Plato’s Republic. His ideas about the perfect state are restricted
to general remarks on the intellectual qualities of the just ruler. In Fārābī divine
inspiration stimulates the creative phantasy of man’s constantly critical reflec-
tion on the correlation of scientific cognition and moral insight that is practical
prudence within the perfect state. This is a universal world state, made up of a
ruler and the ruled, and consisting of smaller units of nations and communities
which serve one another.
47 On taʾdīb in Fārābī see F. S. Haddad, An early Arab Theory of Instruction, pp. 242–243.
(quoted in W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, p. 140). – F. S. Haddad, Alfarabi’s
Theory of Communication, p. 127.
48 See G. Richter, Studien zur Geschichte der älteren arabischen Fürstenspiegel. – A. K. S.
Lambton, Islamic Mirrors for Princes. – H. Daiber, Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ.
49 See H. Daiber, Ruler, p. 17.
51 On the development and changing use of adab see F. Gabrieli, “Adab”.
52 On this translation of ārāʾ see H. Daiber, Philosophy and Law.
Fārābī is not as idealistic as Al-Attas, who speaks of the possibility of “edu-

cation”, taʾdīb, in the sense of “inculcation” of knowledge53 in a process that
“makes man recognize and acknowledge his position in relation to God, his
true possessor, and that makes him act in accordance with this recognition and
acknowledgement”.54
In the view of Al-Attas adab should be understood in its original and
early meaning as something related to man’s emulation of the Sunna of the
Holy Prophet as an “embodiment of excellence in conduct”,55 and as something
fused together with ʿilm and ʿamal, “knowledge” and “action”.56 The loss of adab
is considered by Al-Attas to be the reason for the loss of justice and for
the “error in knowledge of Islam and the Islamic vision of reality and truth”
among Muslims today,57 including their leaders “who are not qualified for valid
leadership” and “who do not possess the high moral, intellectual and spiritual
standards required for Islamic leadership”.58 Here, Al-Attas stresses the indis-
pensability of a “constant guidance by the learned and the wise within it (sc. the
society) so as to ensure its salvation”.59 According to Al-Attas, the learned and
wise are those who “exercise constant vigilance in detecting erroneous usage
in language”. By doing this, they can avoid semantic change leading to “general
confusion and error in the understanding of Islam and of its world view”.60
Fārābī did not discuss such confusions stemming from semantic changes
and the erroneous use of terms. For him, existing things are identical with the
“meaning” (mafhūm) of their terms, and in their essence and meaning they are
created by an external divine Creator. Here, Al-Attas in the same way pre-
supposes an original meaning of terms, which is the truth and which should
be preserved. Comparable with Fārābī, who keeps to the necessity of the guid-
ance by a ruler and wise man with prophetic qualities, Al-Attas postulates an
“Islamic leadership” with “high moral, intellectual and spiritual standards”. In
addition, he considers education to be the task of the individual and not of the
state61 – specifying this view in other places with references to the good action
and conduct of man in society. Finally, he considers Prophet Mohammed to
be the universal and perfect man, who can become a “model to emulate in

55 S. M. N. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education, pp. 34–35.
716 chapter 40
life”.62 Here too, Al-Attas has modified the view of Fārābī, who did not
identify the prophet-ruler with Prophet Mohammed, but instead speaks of the
emulation of God by man under the guidance of a prophet-ruler.
Consequently, Al-Attas talks about the duty of men and women in the
Islamic university63 to reflect the Holy Prophet in terms of knowledge and right
action, so that they might resemble the Prophet in quality as nearly as pos-
sible.64 For this reason, and in view of the fact that all knowledge comes from
God, the religious sciences, in a wider sense the “Islamic thought”, are neces-
sary for all Muslims ( farḍ al-ʿayn).65 “Rational, intellectual and philosophical
sciences”, including human sciences, natural sciences, applied sciences, and
technological sciences are obligatory for some Muslims only.
The prevalence of the religious sciences is based on the fact that the Qurʾān,
the revelation of God’s wisdom to Prophet Mohammed, is the starting point
of the Islamic concept of education. For this reason, the study of the Arabic
language of the Qurʾān, its explanation, and the acquisition of its ultimate
meaning by tafsīr and taʾwīl, are central in religious studies, in addition to the
study of sunna, šarīʿa, tawḥīd (theology), and taṣawwuf (Islamic metaphysics,
including psychology, cosmology, ontology, and “legitimate elements of Islamic
philosophy”).
On the basis of the cited preconditions and on the basis of the Islamic doc-
trine of the Qurʾān and its language as ultimate and archetypical realities,66 as
“the Sublime Exemplar of al-bayān”,67 Al-Attas’ concept of an Islamic philo-
sophy of education appears to be consistent. Consequently, errors and confu-
sions in human knowledge are due to wrong interpretations of the Qurʾān, its
meaning, and its Arabic language. The Qurʾān is not considered to be a liter-
ary document with its own history and prehistory, and any developments of
the Koranic language are not caused by historical developments, they are the
result of human error and confusion.

63 On Al-Attas’ concept of an Islamic university see W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational
Philosophy, pp. 169 ff.
65 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 197ff. and 243ff.
66 On the concepts of “knowledge” (ʿilm) and “meaning” (maʿnā), who both are intrinsically
connected and are something pre-existent – in accordance with Al-Attas’ elaboration
of the Sufi concept of mīṯāq (“Covenant”) – see the study of S. Ahmad, The Doctrine of
Al-Mithaq.
67 S. M. N. Al-Attas, On Justice and the Nature of Man, p. 29. – Al-Attas (pp. 28f.) explains
ʿilm al-bayān as something not restricted to rhetoric, the ʿilm al-balāġa. ʿilm al-bayān
VIII The Way from Education to Islamic Humanism
Education is emulation of the Prophet and his Sunna through increasing know-
ledge, which ultimately comes from God and results in the good. This explan-
ation implies the characterization of education, formulated by Al-Attas as
taʾdīb leading to adab, as an ongoing process of increasing knowledge and
improving action. A comparison with the European concept of “education”,
in German “Bildung” in contrast to “Ausbildung” (“instruction”), shows com-
mon features and significant differences. Both concepts share the concept of
education as a shaping of man through an increase of knowledge and through
reflection on the ethical behaviour of man in society. They differ in so far as
the creative phantasy of man is replaced in the Islamic concept by a kind of
intuition68 which is nourished by the inspirational power of the divine revela-
tion to the Prophet, that is the Qurʾān whose archetypical value is undoubted.
This could eventually restrict the possibility of man’s critical reflection, i.e., his
openmindedness to a multiplicity of interests that make his life meaningful
and give him orientation and self-identity, also in the confrontation with other
cultures. An illustrative example is the history of Islamic culture, which in the
view of orientalists is the result of an encounter between Greek-Sassanian, Jew-
ish, and Christian cultures that has led to the development of a religion which
shaped its achievements. Al-Attas calls this shaping “Islamization”69 which,
according to him, pertains to language, thought and reason, and which does
not allow foreign influences, “the infusion of alien concepts”.
In Al-Attas’ view, the other, the alien, the different that is not Islam, is
not inspiring and enriching, but leads to deislamization and finally to seculari-
zation.70 Islam is primarily the unfolding of God’s wisdom as revealed in the
Qurʾān. Here, Al-Attas’ concept of Islamic education differs from the
European humanistic concept of education which focuses on shaping man and
includes balāġa and maʿānī, involving “logic” (manṭiq) with all its methods of disputation,
classification and definition, syllogism, demonstration and persuit of truth.
68 On its role in Al-Attas’ concept of education see W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philo-
sophy, pp. 46 ff. and 271 ff.
69 On Al-Attas’ concept of Islamization see W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy,
pp. 291 ff. and 371 ff. – In the meantime, several studies appeared, mainly in Malaysia, on
Al-Attas’ concept of the Islamization of knowledge and a comparison with Ismaʿil
Ragi Faruqi, Fazlur Rahman and Kamal Hassan. I mention here a recent article
by A. F. Abdul Hamid, Shifting Trends of Islamism, pp. 376f. – Still informative is the
article by S. F. Alatas, The Sacralization of the Social Sciences, esp. pp. 95–97.
718 chapter 40
his identity in the dialogue with the other, the alien. Thus, the shadow of the
Qurʾān does not allow the rise of “Arabic humanism”.71
We conclude: In view of Al-Attas’ interest in foreign cultures, including
Western cultures, which he criticizes as secular civilizations, and at the same
time whose knowledge he considers to be “core knowledge” ( farḍ ʿayn),72 and
in view of his ideal of education understood as an ongoing process of increasing
knowledge coming from God and improving the action of man in his emula-
tion of the Prophet, Al-Attas turns out to be an Islamic humanist.73 Similar
to the European humanism and similar to the return of the Renaissance to the
Greek and Latin originals of shining models – the principle of humanists like
Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536AD) and Philipp Melanchton (1497–1560) to
rely on the original sources – Al-Attas rediscovered the importance of the
single word in its true meaning. Different from the European humanism, the
archetypical meaning of the single word in Islam is shaped by the Qurʾān –
considered to have universal validity.
Al-Attas’ concept of education deserves due attention in contemporary
discussions by European and non-European Muslims on “Islamic education”.74
He makes us aware, that Islamic education has Islamic purposes that create an
Islamic identity and an Islamic authenticity, based on the knowledge of Islam,
on Islamic adab, and on God’s divine inspiration.75
In Europe the concept of education has been heavily debated since the
turn of the millennium. The introduction of a new university curriculum,
shared by all members of the European Union and leading to Bachelor’s and
Master’s degrees, tends to reduce universities to mere schools for specialists,
mainly serving economical interests. Critical voices emphasize the necessity of
a concept of education which shapes man, gives him orientation, opens him to
a multiplicity of interests, and makes his life and his role in society meaning-
ful. These voices refer to movements of humanism in Europe existing since the
12th century AD, or to what is labeled cultural and communicative memory.76
They refer to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and his concept of responsibility
71 On this concept and on examples of “Arabic humanism” in the 19th and 20th centuries see
M. Kreutz, Arabischer Humanismus in der Neuzeit.
72 See W. M. N. Wan Daud, Educational Philosophy, pp. 198ff.
73 We are aware of the fact that “Islamic humanism” has many facets: Cf. L. E. Goodman’s
historical monograph “Islamic Humanism”. – On this concept see M. Schöller, Zum
Begriff des “islamischen Humanismus”. – Cf. H. Daiber, Humanism.
74 See the collection of articles (partly including remarks on the historical background) in E.
Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung.
75 Cf. F. Ahmed, An Exploration of Naquib al-Attas’ Theory of Islamic Education, esp. p. 793.
76 See J. Assmann, Communicative and Cultural Memory.
(“Mündigkeit”), which is understood as a constant ethical reflection on man’s

behaviour and his position in society. This deserves due attention in an equal
manner as Naquib Al-Attas’ concept of education in its aspects different
from and common with European humanism.
In Al-Attas’ doctrine the humanistic concept of the diginity of man is de-
scribed as follows: “All souls have the same status in relation to their Lord: that
of being subject, possessed, owned, ruled, governed, enslaved, created, cher-
ished and sustained.” “They were akin to one another in yonder place and here
they are brethren who love one another for God’s sake. Though one be in the
East and the other in the West, yet they feel joy and comfort in each other’s
talk, and one who lives in a later generation than the other is instructed and
consoled by the words of his brother”. Al-Attas assumes a common destiny
of all men “long before they appeared as earthly brothers, and they were true
kith and kin before they were born in earthly kinship”.77 Here, Al-Attas refers
to the Koranic-Sufi concept of the “Covenant” (mīṯāq) between the soul and
God – the basis of Islamic brotherhood.78
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Summary
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas based his educational program on his

knowledge of the Qurʾān and on Muslim thinkers.
In the revival of Islamic concepts of the past he did the same as the European
humanists in the 15th and 16th centuries did in their orientation at Greek and
Latin authors from the past as shining examples for the development of a
concept of the diginity of man and his ethical virtues.
We will have to look at the classical Islamic literary sources and at the
inspirative sources of Naquib Al-Attas. We will analyse his ideas on know-
ledge and education in the light of Islamic thinkers since the time of Ibn
Qutayba (213/828–276/889). We will discuss the sources mentioned by Naquib
Al-Attas, the peculiarities of his concept of education and possible parallels
in early Islamic thought.
The Qurʾān and the prophetic tradition are archetypes of knowledge and
exclude historical developments – and they do not require a historical contex-
tualization.
We will discuss some similarities in Ġazālī (450/1058–505/1111), Ibn Qutayba,
and the Islamic philosopher Fārābī (258/872–339/950 or 951). However, Al-
Attas has differing accentuations: In his view adab should be understood as
something related to man’s emulation of the Sunna of the Holy Prophet as an
“embodiment of excellence in conduct”, and as something fused together with
ʿilm and ʿamal, “knowledge” and “action”.
In view of Al-Attas’ interest in foreign cultures, in view of his ideal of edu-
cation understood as an ongoing process of increasing knowledge coming from
God and the improving action of man in his emulation of the Prophet, finally,
in view of his concept of the equality of all men before God and their brother-
hood, Al-Attas turns out to be an Islamic humanist.
Similar to European humanism, Al-Attas rediscovered the importance of
the individual word in its true meaning. Different from European humanism,
the archetypical meaning of the individual word in Islam is shaped by the
Qurʾān – considered to have universal validity.
Slightly different, also published as “The Malaysian Scholar Syed Muhammad Naquib
Al-Attas (b. 1931) on Islamic Education: An Evaluation in View of Classical Islamic
Sources”. In Knowledge and Education in Classical Islam. Religious Learning between
Continuity and Change. i. Ed. Sebastian Günther. Leiden/Boston 2010. = IHC 172,
pp. 1001–1013.
Reviews
∵
chapter 41
Franz Rosenthal
Knowledge Triumphant (1970)
Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant. The Concept of Knowledge in

Medieval Islam. Leiden: Brill 1970. IX, 356 S.
Im vorliegenden Buch zeigt Franz Rosenthal, der sich schon verschiedent-

lich als ein hervorragender Kenner der islamischen Geistesgeschichte her-
vorgetan hat, auf recht eindrucksvolle Weise, welche zentrale Rolle der Wis-
sensbegriff in der islamischen Kultur eingenommen hat. Rosenthal bedient
sich hierbei einer ungeheuren Fülle von Material auch aus der Spätantike,
um den islamischen Wissensbegriff von der ältesten Zeit an, in Poesie und
Prosa, im Koran, in der Theologie der Orthodoxie und Häresie, in Mystik, Phi-
losophie und Adab zu beleuchten. Vor allem im letzten Kapitel (Knowledge
is Society) wird anhand der Adab-Literatur auch die gesellschaftsbezogene
Rolle beleuchtet: Man bekommt einen Eindruck davon, wie sehr das Wissen
nicht nur idealistischer Gegenstand philosophisch-theologischer Spekulation
ist, sondern auch soziales Produkt der islamischen Gesellschaft. Dabei zeigt
sich allerdings der stark konservative Charakter des islamischen Wissensbegrif-
fes. Wissen ist das Ergebnis einer ständigen, v.a. durch die umgebenden nichtis-
lamischen Kulturen angeregten Auseinandersetzung zwischen Tradition und
Neuerung und ist von Anfang an durch eine stark religiöse Komponente cha-
rakterisiert, indem stets von Neuem das Verhältnis Gott – Mensch reflektiert
wird.
Ro. S. 26f. vertritt als mögliche Annahme, dass es christliche Kreise gewe-
sen sind, die das bereits bei Mohammed nachweisbare lebhafte Interesse an
ʿilm und maʿrifa bewirkten. Rosenthal spricht von jüdischem Gnostizismus
und dessen Einfluss auf Mohammed. Zweifelsohne wird es nicht das nor-
mative Judentum gewesen sein, sondern es waren Nachfahren von Kreisen
des häretischen Judentums hellenistischer Prägung, welche altorientalische
Weisheitsspekulation mit hellenistischer Philosophie verbanden. Altorientali-
sche Weisheit und philosophisch-gnostische Spekulation dürften maßgebend
an der Entwicklung des islamischen Wissensbegriffes beteiligt gewesen sein,
wobei Erstere im lebhaften Interesse des islamischen Kulturkreises an ethi-
schen Fragen des praktischen Lebens fortwirkte. Man denke an die in Koran
und Hadith enthaltenen religiösen Vorschriften, die zunehmend unter helle-

728 chapter 41
nistischem Einfluss entwickelte reiche gnomologische Literatur und philoso-

phische Ethik und an die Fürstenspiegelliteratur. Den ersten Höhepunkt ratio-
naler Spekulation erlebte die islamische Kultur in der theologischen Bewegung
der Muʿtazila (ausgehendes 8.–10. Jh. n. Chr.), welche ihrerseits einen maßgeb-
lichen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung und Gestaltung der islamischen Glaubens-
lehre ausübte. Die Muʿtazila hat sich dabei der Hilfsmittel hellenistischer Logik
bedient, was das bereits frühe Interesse der Muslime an aristotelischer Logik
(worauf Rosenthal, S. 195 hinweist) erklärt. Man greift auf Termini der aris-
411 totelischen Kategorienlehre zurück, deren logisch-onto|logische Relevanz z.B.
von Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. Muḥsin Mahdī, Beirut 1969, beleuchtet wird.
Vgl. noch H. Daiber in Gnomon 42, 1970, S. 539ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks
to the Arabs I/24; vgl. zu Ro. S. 109f.
Im Einzelnen seien noch folgende Ergänzungen und Bemerkungen gestat-
tet, die als Anregung für weitere Detailarbeiten dienen mögen:
Ro. S. 52 Nr. A 2: Vgl. auch Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I, S. 274, 28 f. (als
Definition Ašʿarīs).
Ro. S. 52 Nr. A 10: Vgl. auch Ṣaffār (GAL I, S. 427), Kitāb Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit.
Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11 v -2ff. und Ro. S. 62, E 13.
Ro. S. 53, -4: Nach Āmidī füge ein: Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I, S. 274, -
9 f. und Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī, Šarḥ al-ʿumda, MS Berlin
1991, fol. 4 r 1ff. – Eine kurze Anspielung auf die B 2 genannte Wissensdefinition
steht auch Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11 v 8, als Variante zu
der Ro. S. 58, D 1 angeführten Definition – mit der Begründung, dass die Termini
tabayyun wie maʿrifa mit ʿilm identisch seien.
Ro. S. 54 oben: Der Gebrauch von ʿalayhi statt bihī in der Wendung ʿalā mā
huwa bihī (“so wie es (eben) ist”) ist kein Versehen, sondern durchaus legi-
tim. Die Präposition bi- mit Suffix wird zuweilen in affirmativen Sätzen (vgl. W.
Wright und M. J. de Goeje, Grammar II, S. 159 A; H. Reckendorf, Arabische
Syntax, §129 c), zur Bezeichnung der Identität einer Sache mit einer anderen
gebraucht. Hier gibt sie die Übereinstimmung einer Sache mit sich selbst an.
Dafür kann aber auch die Präposition ʿalā mit Suffix (“entsprechend”, “gemäß”)
gebraucht werden, so im kalām des 9./10. Jh. Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter,
S. 212, 10f., überliefert als anonyme Lehre: “Der Schöpfer ist an keinem Ort, son-
dern so, wie er nicht aufgehört hat zu sein (bal huwa ʿalā mā lam yazal ʿalayhi)”.
Nach Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 157, 6, ist dieselbe Definition Lehre von
Hišām al-Fuwaṭī, ʿAbbād Ibn Sulaymān und Abū Zufar, allerdings ohne
ʿalayhi (was Ritter ergänzt hat). Ein weiterer Beleg für ʿalā mā huwa ʿalayhi
steht Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 371, 4.
Ro. S. 56: Die Übersetzung idrāk für κατάληψις ist auch vorausgesetzt in der
arab. Übersetzung der Placita philosophorum IV 8. 1, ed. H. Daiber, Aetius Ara-
franz rosenthal, knowledge triumphant (1970) 729
bus, S. 196, 5 (καταληπτικόν). Hingegen ed. H. Daiber, S. 196, 4, steht inṭibāʿ,

wobei diesem Wort idrāk für ἀντίληψις (H. Diels, Doxographi graeci 393 a 17f.)
vorausgeht.
Ro. S. 58, die Definition D 1 steht auch als anonyme Lehre Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ
al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11 v 8. Nach Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I,
S. 274, -3, und Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī, Šarḥ al-ʿumda, MS
Berlin 1991, fol. 4 r 4f., vertritt sie Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾinī (bei Faḫr ad-Dīn
ar-Rāzī an der genannten Stelle allerdings ohne den Zusatz ʿalā mā huwa bihī,
der an anderem Ort, Mafātīḥ I, S. 275, 1, erscheint). Mafātīḥ I, S. 274, -3 f., gibt
als Variante hierzu die Definition istibānat al-ḥaqāʾiq an. Nach Mafātīḥ I, S. 274,
-2, habe sich Isfarāʾinī bei der Definition von ʿilm auch mit dem Terminus at-
tabyīn “begnügt”. Die Lesart tabyīn statt tabayyun ist keineswegs ein Fehler (so
Ro. S. 58, Anm. 3). Infinitive des 2. und 5. Stammes können ohne Bedeutungs-
unterschied gebraucht werden (man vergleiche z.B. auch den abwechselnden
Gebrauch von taḫyīl und taḫayyul).
Ro. S. 58 Definition D 3: Als Gewährsmann hierfür nennt Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-
adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1557, fol. 11 v 4, und Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I, S. 275,
3, nennt Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl aš-Šāšī (zu diesem vgl. GAS I, S. 497 f.).
Ro. S. 59 Definition D 6–9: Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11
v 12f., bringt als Definition eines Aschʿariten (und wider|legt sie anschließend): 412
“Wissen ist das, wodurch der Wissende zwischen dem Übereinstimmenden
und Unterschiedlichen, dem Sein und dem Nichtsein sowie zwischen Jung und
Alt unterscheidet”.
Ro. S. 60 Definition E 4 Anm. 6: Vgl. Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I,
S. 275, 20f., als Lehre der Philosophen: al-ʿilm ṣūra ḥāṣila fī n-nafs muṭābiqa li-
l-maʿlūm.
Ro. S. 62 Anm. 4: Als anonyme Definition auch Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī,
Mafātīḥ I, S. 275, 3f.: al-ʿilm taṣawwur al-maʿlūm ʿalā mā huwa bihī.
Ro. S. 63: iʿtiqād ist nicht “belief”, sondern “Überzeugung”; vgl. J. van Ess,
Erkenntnislehre, S. 71f.
Ro. S. 63 Anm. 5: Auch Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11
v 17f., nennt al-Kaʿbī (= Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balḫī?) als Urheber
der F 2 gegebenen Definition, welche übrigens noch Muṭahhar Ibn Ṭāhir
al-Maqdisī (s. GAL S I, S. 222) in seinem Geschichtswerk Kitāb Badʾ al-ḫalq
wa-t-taʾrīḫ, ed. Clément Huart I, Nachdr. Teheran 1962, S. 19, 2 f., vertritt
und damit seine muʿtazilitische Herkunft verrät. Ṣaffār folgt in der oben
genannten Stelle offensichtlich ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Uṣūl ad-dīn, S. 5,
10f. Zu Ṣaffārs Abhängigkeit von ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī vgl. zu Ro.
S. 66 Anm. 4. Ṣaffār hat allerdings wie Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-
Nasafī, Šarḥ al-ʿumda, MS Berlin 1991, fol. 4 r 10, aš-šayʾ statt al-maʿlūm. – Der
730 chapter 41
Wissende ist von dem Gewussten überzeugt, ohne dass das Wissen Vorausset-
zung hierfür sei: Vgl. Ṣaffār, fol. 12 r ult.s. Auch Ṣaffār neigt im Grunde zu
dieser Lehre, weil er – davon ausgehend, dass der Mensch vergessen kann, was
er weiß – der Meinung ist, dass der Mensch nicht “wesenhaft” (li-ḏātihi), son-
dern wegen einer vorübergehenden “Eigenschaft” (maʿnan!) wissend sei (fol. 12
r 15ff.).
Ro. S. 63 Anm. 7: Nach ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Uṣūl ad-dīn, S. 5, 11 ff.,
füge ein: Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11 v 18 f. Vgl. auch Faḫr
ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb I, S. 275, 4ff. und 16 f., und Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn
Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī, Šarḥ al ʿumda, MS Berlin 1991, fol. 4 r 10 f.
Ro. S. 64 Anm. 1: Vgl. ferner Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī,
Šarḥ al-ʿumda, MS Berlin 1991, fol. 3 r paenult.ss., und Josef van Ess, Erkennt-
nislehre, S. 73.
Ro. S. 66 Anm. 4: Die Naẓẓāmsche Definition von ʿilm bringt nach ʿAbd al-
Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Uṣūl ad-dīn, S. 6, 2–3, auch Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al adilla, Brit.
Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 11 v -5f. In der Handschrift ist sie z.T. am Rande nachgetra-
gen worden, mit dem Zusatz: li-annahū (sc. Naẓẓām) qāla: al-irāda ḥaraka min
ḥarakāt al-qalb. Ṣaffār bemerkt hierzu kritisch: “Alle sind sich über die Unter-
scheidung von Wissen und Willen einig”. Er fügt hinzu (fol. 11 v 4 f.): wa-qāla
(sc. Naẓẓām) fī baʿḍ kutubihī inna maʿdina l-ʿilmi d-dimāġu. Wie hier deut-
lich wird, bringt Ṣaffār in seinem Auszug aus ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī,
Uṣūl ad-dīn einige selbständige Zusätze, Ergänzungen und Kommentierungen.
Sein Bericht stellt insofern eine selbständige Bearbeitung dar, die im Einzelnen
sogar zusätzliches Material enthält. – Ṣaffār selbst bekennt sich zur Defini-
tion seines Vaters von ʿilm als “Fortfall der Verborgenheit” (intifāʾ al-ḫafāʾ): S.
fol. 12 r 1 und 12f.
Ro. S. 67 Anm. 3: Als “Gründlichkeit und Genauigkeit des Handelns” (iḥkām
al-fiʿl wa-itqānuhū) definiert nach Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I, S. 275, 2,
Ibn Fūrak das Wissen.
Ro. S. 94 Anm. 1: Eine jüngere, leichter zugängliche Ausgabe von Kulīnī
gibt es unter dem Titel al-Uṣūl min al-Kāfi, Teheran 1334 h.š./1375 h.q./1955. Bd.
I, S. 10ff., handelt über Wissen und Verwandtes, was in der späten schiitischen
Enzyklopädie des Maǧlisī, Biḥār al-anwār I, S. 81 ff., aufgegriffen und ausführ-
licher wiederholt wird.
Ro. S. 99, paenult.: Für Ġaylāns Lehre, dass das menschliche “Wissen”
(maʿrifa) über Gott von Gott erschaffen sei, ist es völlig konsequent, dass das
Wissen mit Notwendigkeit eintritt: Vgl. Anonymus, Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal,
413 MS Maktabat | al-Awqāf Bagdad 6819 – die Handschrift ist 1309/1891–1892 abge-
schrieben worden von MS Atif Efendi 1373 in Istanbul, welche von Fuat Sez-
gin in Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi 6, 1955, S. 142 f., beschrieben wird – S. 93, 8
(al-ʿilmu yuḥdiṯu l-ašyāʾa ḍarūratan) und ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb
an-Nāsiḫ wa-l-mansūḫ, MS Berlin 478, fol. 23 v 3f. (al-maʿārif kulluhā ḍarūriyya)

als Lehre des Ġaylān, Ṯumāma und Ǧāḥiẓ (zu Letzterem vgl. die hier zu Ro.
S. 148 Anm. 6 und zu Ṯumāma die hier zu Ro. S. 149 Anm. 1 angegebenen Stel-
len), welche sich damit von der Lehre unterscheiden, dass “das Wissen etwas
(vom Menschen) Erworbenes ist” (al-maʿārif kasbiyya). Vgl. zum Wissensbegriff
des Ṯumāma und Ǧāḥiẓ auch Josef van Ess in Der Islam 42, 1966, S. 169–
178.
Ro. S. 100 Anm. 1: Ebenso ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq, ed.
M. M. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, S. 206, 16f. (der Abschnitt fehlt in der von A. N. Nader
unter dem Titel Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal edierten kürzeren Rezension dieses
Werkes). Danach Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton, S. 108, 8 f., wel-
chem Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 283 r, folgt. Īǧī, welcher in sei-
nem theologischen Hauptwerk Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 376ff., im Abschnitt
über islamische Sekten sich ganz auf Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741,
fol. 276 r–285, stützt, jedoch in seinem fast wörtlichen Plagiat einiges weglässt,
hat den Passus nicht in seinen Bericht aufgenommen. – Ähnlich wie Ġay-
lān definierte der Murǧiʾite Yūnus an-Numayrī: S. die unten angegebenen
Stellen und Anonymus, Kitāb al-Milal, MS Maktabat al-Awqāf Bagdad 6819,
S. 94, 16f. – In diesem Zusammenhang noch ein kurzes Wort zu Āmidīs Werk
Abkār al-afkār und dessen Verhältnis zur benutzten Vorlage, nämlich Šahras-
tānīs Kitāb al-Milal und ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādīs Kitāb al-Milal, wel-
ches, neben dem Kitāb al-Farq des ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, seinerseits
Vorlage des Šahrastānī gewesen ist. Zur Quellenlage von Letzterem vgl. im
Einzelnen H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 28ff. – ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādīs
Kitāb al-Milal ist vor dem Kitāb al-Farq verfasst, wie das Zitat al-Farq, S. 271,
ult. bis 272, 2 aus al-Milal, ed. A. N. Nader, Beirut 1970, S. 117, 3, beweist. Es
ist eine kürzere, teilweise erheblich abweichende Version. Āmidī folgt in sei-
nem Abschnitt über islamische Sekten im Wesentlichen Šahrastānīs Kitāb
al-Milal, ohne sich ganz mit ihm zu decken. Es gibt bei ihm Sätze, zu denen
ein Pendant bei Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal fehlt, aber bei ʿAbd al-Qāhir
al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Milal vorhanden ist, nicht jedoch in ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-
Baġdādīs Kitāb al-Farq. Z.B. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed.
A. N. Nader, S. 121, 8–10, steht ähnlich Āmidī, fol. 277 v 10 f., fehlt aber in ʿAbd
al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq, S. 155, und in Šahrastānī. Keineswegs
kann man, wie ein Vergleich weiterer Stellen zeigt, daraus den Schluss zie-
hen, Āmidī habe von Šahrastānīs Kitāb al-Milal eine vollständigere Version
besessen. – Bei einer quellenkundlichen Verwertung der genannten Berichte
genügt es in den meisten Fällen, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq
und Kitāb al-Milal und Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal heranzuziehen. Auf die
späteren Exzerpte, wie Āmidī und danach Īǧī, wird man in der Regel verzich-
732 chapter 41
ten können. – Bei inhaltlichen Abweichungen in den späteren Exzerpten muss

zunächst geklärt werden, ob sie nicht auf nachlässiger Lektüre und ungenauer
Kürzung der Vorlage beruhen oder aber bereits auf einer fehlerhaften Vorlage.
Eine dritte Möglichkeit ist, dass es bereits von Anfang an zwei verschiedene
Berichte gegeben hat, von denen bald der eine, bald der andere bei den spä-
teren Häresiographen auftaucht. In solchen Fällen wird man manchmal nicht
entscheiden können, welche Überlieferung “richtiger” ist: Z.B die Definitionen
von īmān der beiden Murǧiʾiten Yūnus Ibn ʿAwn (an-Numayrī) und Abū
Šamr / Šimr stimmen nach Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 134, 1–11, über-
ein. Nach Maqālāt, S. 134, 14–135, 4, haben der Naẓẓāmschüler Muḥammad
414 Ibn Šabīb und ʿAbbād Ibn Sulaymān dem Abū | Šamr / Šimr eine davon
abweichende Glaubensdefinition zugeschrieben. Beide Varianten tauchen in
den nachfolgenden Berichten auf:
– Nach Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 134, 1–11, referieren als Definition aus-
schließlich des Yūnus Ibn ʿAwn (mehr oder weniger wörtlich und voll-
ständig): ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. M. M. ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd, S. 202, ult.ss.; vgl. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed.
A. N. Nader, S. 139, 15ff.; Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton,
S. 104, 7ff.; nach Letzterem gekürzt Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741,
fol. 282 v 18–20 (exzerpiert von Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 397, 1–3);
Maqrīzī, Ḫiṭaṭ IV, S. 171, 11f., und Murtaḍā Ibn ad-Dāʿī ar-Rāzī, Kitāb
Tabṣirat al-ʿawāmm (vgl. GAL S I, S. 711; ib. S. 757 wird das Werk fälschlich
nochmals aufgeführt mit der Angabe, der Autor sei Zeitgenosse Ġazālīs!
GAL S I, S. 769, wird derselbe Titel als anonymes Werk ausgegeben!), S. 59, 4–
8 (dort fälschlich die Namensform Yūnus aš-Šimrī). – Ašʿarīs Maqālāt, ed.
H. Ritter, S. 134, 2 und 10, ist die Vorlage von ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ǧīl(ān)ī,
Kitāb al-Ġunya I, S. 102, 23f. (anschließend die Definition des Abū Šamr /
Šimr, s.u.).
– Auf denselben Text (Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 134, 1–11) zurückgehend
wird als Definition des Abū Šamr / Šimr bei folgenden Autoren referiert:
Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton, S. 107, ult.ss.; danach Āmidī,
Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 283 r 22f. (fehlt im Āmidī-Exzerpt des
Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 397f.); ferner – ebenfalls in den Fußspuren
von Šahrastānī folgende Autoren: 1) Ibn al-Aṯīr, al-Lubāb fī tahḏīb al-
ansāb, II, S. 28, 10–14. – 2) Murtaḍā Ibn ad-Dāʿī ar-Rāzī, Kitāb Tabṣirat
al-ʿawāmm, S. 60, paenult.–61, 3; dort anschließend die Variante nach Ibn
Šabīb, s.u.; Namensform bei Murtaḍā Ibn ad-Dāʿī ar-Rāzī, S. 59, 11, ist
wie bei Ibn al-Aṯīr und Murtaḍā az-Zabīdī, Tāǧ al-ʿArūs III, S. 316, 6–7,
Abū Šimr! – 3) Samʿānī, Kitāb al-Ansāb, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, fol. 338 r
13–17; außerdem (nach Šahrastānī?) Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn
Aḥmad al-Kirmānī (schrieb vor 525/1131), Maqāla fī šarḥ qawl rasūl Allāh,
ed. S. Dedering, S. 39, 8f. (die Edition des kurzen Textes ist GAL S I, S. 7576c
nachzutragen); direkt nach Ašʿarīs Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 134, 2–3 und
67, 12–13, referiert ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ǧīl(ān)ī, Kitāb al-Ġunya I, S. 102, 25-
ult.
– Vom vorausgehenden Abschnitt abweichend wird nach Ašʿarī, Maqālāt,
ed. H. Ritter, S. 134, 14–135, 4, (mehr oder weniger genau und teilweise
gekürzt) als Definition des Abū Šamr / Šimr bei folgenden Autoren vor-
getragen: ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. M. M. ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd, S. 206, 1ff., und ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. A.
N. Nader, S. 140, 3f.; dort wird Z. 2f. ein Bericht als fehlerhaft abgelehnt, der
Abū Šamr / Šimr dieselbe Glaubensdefinition beilegt wie der Yūnusiyya.
Als Begründung wird angegeben, Abū Šamr / Šimr sei im Unterschied zu
Yūnus Qadarite (Vertreter der Lehre von der menschlichen Willensfreiheit)
gewesen. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī erinnert an eine echte Variante in
der Definition von īmān nach Abū Šamr / Šimr, die (z.B. A. S. Tritton,
Muslim Theology, S. 44) neben der anderen, mit Yūnus Ibn ʿAwn gemeinsa-
men Definition angeführt werden müsste. Er dürfte sich dabei auf Ašʿarīs
Maqālāt gestützt haben. Dieser Text wird auch Quelle von Murtaḍā Ibn
ad-Dāʿī ar-Rāzī, Kitāb Tabṣirat al-ʿawāmm, S. 61, 3–6 (dort als Bericht des
Ibn Šabīb) gewesen sein.
Ro. S. 100 Anm. 6: Vgl. auch den Bericht des Hanbaliten Abū Bakr al-Ḫal-
lāl, Kitāb al-Ǧāmiʿ li-ʿulūm (oder al-Musnad min masāʾil) Aḥmad Ibn Ḥan-
bal (GAS I, S. 511f.), Brit. Mus. Or. 2675, fol. 96 r 1 f., über die Ǧahmiyya: iḏ
ʿarafa r-raǧulu rabbahū bi-qalbihī fa-huwa muʾmin (vgl. noch fol. 153 v 11); fer-
ner die Berichte bei Abū Layṯ as-Samarqandī, Bustān al-ʿārifīn, S. 78, 16;
ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, Šarḥ al-uṣūl al-ḫamsa, ed. ʿA. ʿUṯmān, S. 708, ult., wo noch
die Naǧǧāriyya genannt ist; Ibn Taymiyya, al-Īmān, ed. Z. ʿA. Yūsuf, | S. 230, 415
1f.; Ibn Taymiyya, aṣ-Ṣārim al-maslūl, S. 518, 11 f.; Abū l-Qāsim Isḥāq Ibn
Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, as-Sawād al-aʿẓam, vgl. A. S. Tritton, An Early
Work, S. 97; Tāǧ ad-Dīn as-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt aš-Šāfiʿiyya I, S. 45, 7 f. (Glauben
ist Wissen des Herzens ohne “Aussprechen” (lafẓ) des Glaubensbekenntnisses);
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ǧīl(ān)ī, Kitāb al-Ġunya I, S. 102, 14 f. und 19; Ṣābūnī,
al-Kifāya fī l-hidāya, MS Yale University Library 849, fol. 244 r 5 f., und Ṣaf-
fār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 112 r 6 f. (beide nennen neben
der Ǧahmiyya noch Abū l-Ḥusayn aṣ-Ṣāliḥī und dessen Schüler); Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, Kitāb Ġāyāt al-afkār (vgl. GAL S II, S. 245, und Josef van Ess in Der
Orient in der Forschung, Festschrift Otto Spies, Wiesbaden 1967, S. 170f.) I, MS
Berlin 4908, fol. 49 v -4; Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī, Šarḥ al-
ʿumda, MS Berlin 1991, fol. 81 r -4; Nasafī al-Makḥūlī, at-Tamhīd, MS Chester
734 chapter 41
Beatty (Dublin) 4554, fol. 31 r 8; Nasafī al-Makḥūlī, Kitāb Baḥr al-kalām,

MS Heidelberg A/T 423, fol. 118 r 2f. (al-maʿrifa bi-l-qalb dūna l-iqrār bi-l-lisān);
Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 272 v 8 f. = Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII,
S. 323, 3. – Anonymus, Kitāb al-Milal, MS Maktabat al-Awqāf Bagdad 6819,
S. 91, 6f.; vgl. S. 14f. – Ibn Taymiyya, Risālat al-Furqān, S. 35, 5 (vgl. S. 41, -4),
gebraucht statt maʿrifa den Terminus taṣdīq und schreibt Ǧahm die Definition
des Glaubens als “Fürwahrhalten des Herzens” (taṣdīq al-qalb) zu. Hier wird
ein in der späteren muslimischen Theologie allgemein gebräuchlicher (s. Ro.
S. 102f.) aschʿaritischer Terminus in die Berichterstattung über Ǧahm einge-
führt: Ašʿarī hatte – wie übrigens vor ihm bereits Bišr al-Marīsī (s. Ašʿarī,
Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 140, 13ff.; vgl. Ro. S. 102) und der Mystiker al-Ḥāriṯ
al-Muḥāsibī, Risālat al-Mustaršidin, ed. ʿA. Abū Ġudda, S. 30, 2; vgl. S. 89,
5 f. und J. van Ess, Gedankenwelt, S. 160f., ferner Nāšiʾ al-Akbar (s. J. van
Ess, Häresiographie, S. 13 und 139f.) – den Begriff maʿrifa durch taṣdīq ersetzt
und den Glauben als taṣdīq bi-l-qalb definiert: Vgl. Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed.
W. Cureton, S. 73, 2ff.; Taftāzānī, Šarḥ ʿalā l-ʿaqāʾid an-Nasafiyya, S. 118, 8;
vgl. S. 124, ult.ss.; Ṣaffār, Talḫis al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 112 r 12 ff.;
L. Gardet, Dieu, S. 361ff. – Ašʿarī grenzt damit deutlich maʿrifa und taṣdīq
voneinander ab und unterscheidet sich hierin von der Muʿtazila. Nach dem
Bericht des Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 157, 12 f., lehrten “Abū l-Huḏayl
und die meisten Muʿtaziliten: Wir sehen (narā) Gott mit unseren Herzen in
dem Sinn, dass wir um Ihn in unserem Herzen wissen (naʿlamu bi-qulūbina)”. –
Dieser muʿtazilitischen Lehre folgt Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī insofern, als
er “die (Gottes)schau” (ar-ruʾya) als “Sehen des Herzens” (ruʾyat al-qalb) und als
“Wissen” (al-ʿilm) interpretiert und sie mit gewissen Modifikationen (s.u.) zum
Inhalt des Glaubens macht. Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed.
F. Kholeif, S. 80, 1ff., beruft sich auf eine “Nachricht” (ḫabar) vom Prophe-
ten, die uns in der islamischen Traditionsliteratur erhalten ist: Vgl. Buḫārī,
Kitāb al-Ǧāmiʿ aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ, Kitāb Mawāqīt 16, ed. L. Krehl I, S. 148, 10, und v.a.
Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. L. Krehl IV, S. 460, -4f.; ferner die A. J. Wensinck, Concor-
dance II, S. 202 a/b und 200 b genannten Stellen. – In Buḫārī, al-Ǧāmiʿ, Kitāb
al-Īmān 13 = ed. L. Krehl I, S. 13, 4, wird vom Propheten der Ausspruch über-
liefert: al-maʿrifa fiʿl al-qalb (mit Verweis auf Sure 2:225). Es scheint, als ob der
nur hier belegte und Mohammed zugeschriebene Lehrsatz seine Existenz einer
416 Anregung der Muʿtazila | verdankt; Tustarī (vgl. hier zu Ro. S. 316 Anm. 3) hat
sich seiner bedient, wenn er das Herz als “Werkzeug des Denkens und Wissens
(ālat al-fikra wa-l-maʿrifa)” bezeichnet: Vgl. Tustarī, Kitāb al-Muʿāraḍa, ed. C.
Tunç, S. 47, 9. – Auch durch Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī wird die Klassifi-
kation des Herzens als Sitz des Wissens eine weitere Verbreitung in der isla-
mischen Orthodoxie gewonnen haben. Taftāzānī, Maqāṣid aṭ-ṭālibīn I, S. 173,
-14ff., bringt ein eigenes Kapitel darüber, dass “das Herz (al-qalb) der Ort des
Wissens (maḥall al-ʿilm) ist”. – Man glaubt an Gott, indem man um ihn im Her-
zen weiß. Hierbei wird abgesehen von einer terminologischen Unterscheidung
zwischen Glauben und Wissen – die spätere islamische Theologie spricht von
“Fürwahrhalten” (taṣdīq) und Wissen (vgl. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Īmān, S. 235, 9 ff.).
Vgl. noch Taftāzānī, Šarḥ al-ʿaqāʾid, S. 129, 13f. (Glauben ist Wissen, maʿrifa,
als Lehre einiger Qadariten) oder die Glaubensdefinition des Naǧǧār (s. Ro.
S. 102 Anm. 1). – Nach Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 108 v -7 ff.
(cf. auch fol. 7 r 1ff.) scheint auch Abū Ḥanīfa nicht scharf zwischen taṣdīq
und maʿrifa getrennt zu haben: Der Glaube sei “des Fürwahrhalten des Her-
zens”, in anderer Formulierung auch “Wissen des Herzens und Bekenntnis mit
der Zunge”. – Vgl. noch Abū l-Layṯ as-Samarqandī, Bustān al-ʿārifīn, S. 78,
17; Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 271 v 13f.: al-īmān huwa l-iqrār bi-
l-lisān wa-l-maʿrifatu (als Lehre der Ġaylāniyya, des Abū Ḥanīfa und ʿAbdal-
lāh Ibn Saʿīd Ibn Kullāb). Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 323, 5, verändert
in seinem Exzerpt hieraus den Wortlaut und gibt als Glaubensbekenntnis Abū
Ḥanīfas an (genauer gesagt: “Es werde von Abū Ḥanīfa berichtet ( yurwā)”):
at-taṣdīq maʿa l-kalimatayni (sc. die beiden Aussagen der šahāda, nämlich lā
ilāha illā llāh und Muḥammad rasūl Allāh). Nimmt man diese Aussagen zusam-
men, bestätigt sich die bei Ro. S. 104 angedeutete hanafitische Kombination
von taṣdīq und iqrār. Entsprechend definiert der Schiite Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-
Ṭūsī, Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād, S. 339, 10, den Glauben als taṣdīq bi-l-qalb wa-l-lisān. Vgl.
den Kommentar des Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Kašf al-murād, S. 339, 12 ff. – Die
aschʿaritische Distinktion zwischen maʿrifa und taṣdīq scheint sich nicht völlig
durchgesetzt zu haben. Noch ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ǧīl(ān)ī: Kitāb al-Ġunya I,
S. 70, 4, definiert den Glauben, das Fürwahrhalten des Herzens als “das Wis-
sen um Gott und seine Attribute” (al-ʿilm bi-llāh wa-ṣifātihī). – Der Aschʿarite
Bāqillānī folgt z.B. al-Inṣāf fī mā yaǧibu ʿtiqāduhū, ed. M. Kawṯarī, S. 22,
10ff.; 54, -2ff. und 56, 11ff., der aschʿaritischen Glaubensdefinition: īmān = taṣdīq
al-qalb bzw. ʿaqd (“Überzeugung”; vgl. Josef van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, S. 72)
bi-l-qalb und iqrār bi-l-lisān wa-ʿamal bi-l-arkān. Jedoch nach dem Bericht des
Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Yūsuf Ibn ʿUmar as-Sanūsī, ʿUmdat ahl at-tawfīq =
al-ʿAqīda al-kubrā nebst Selbstkommentar, S. 39, 8–10, scheint er der aschʿariti-
schen Linie nicht immer treu geblieben zu sein: Vgl. auch Bāqillānī, Kitāb at-
Tamhīd, ed. R. J. McCarthy, S. 346, 5f. Schuld daran ist vielleicht der Umstand,
dass bereits Ašʿarī selbst seine Vorstellungen über taṣdīq im Laufe seines
Lebens, d.h. vor und nach seiner Abwendung von der Muʿtazila geändert haben
wird: Man vergleiche die Aufzählungen der Bedeutungen von taṣdīq nach
Ašʿarī bei Šahrastānī, Nihāyat al-iqdām, ed. A. Guillaume, S. 472, 2 ff., und
danach Abū ʿUḏba, ar-Rawḍa al-bahiyya, S. 24, 7 ff. Nach der oben angeführten
736 chapter 41
Stelle des Sanūsī soll Bāqillānī den Glauben auch als “Fürwahrhalten, das
dem Wissen (al-maʿrifa) folgt” definiert haben, wobei er ausdrücklich dem Ter-
minus al-maʿrifa die Termini al-iʿtiqād at-taqlīdī, aẓ-ẓann oder aš-šakk vorgezo-
417 gen hat. Vgl. dazu Louis Gardet, Art. | Īmān, EI2 III, 1971, S. 1173, Sp. b unten.
Bāqillānī berührt sich hier offensichtlich mit der Muʿtazila und mit Abū
Manṣūr al-Māturīdī: Bāqillānī und Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī las-
sen den Glauben nicht von der “Offenbarung” (aš-šarʿ; so Ašʿarī), sondern von
der “Vernunft” (al-ʿaql) bestimmt sein. Vgl. zum unterschiedlichen Standpunkt
von Ašʿarī und Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī hier noch Abū ʿUḏba, ar-Rawḍa
al-bahiyya, S. 34, 13ff. – Die zweite große theologische Richtung neben der
aschʿaritischen, die maturiditische Bewegung, scheint einen Kompromiss zwi-
schen der muʿtazilitischen und der aschʿaritischen Glaubensdefinition gesucht
zu haben. Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. F. Kholeif, S. 381,
8 f., zufolge “fordert das Wissen (al-maʿrifa) zum Fürwahrhalten auf”. Oder ed.
F. Kholeif, S. 373, 9f.: “Der Glaube ist vornehmlich im Herzen durch das
Hören (as-samʿ) und Begreifen (al-ʿaql) insgesamt”. Vgl. auch Abū Manṣūr
al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt ahl as-sunna I, ed. I. ʿAwḍīn und S. ʿAwḍīn, S. 290,
6 f. (al-īmān huwa t-taṣdīq wa-t-taṣdīq bi-l-qalb yataǧaddadu fī kulli waqtin); vgl.
S. 44, 6ff. (dazu unten) und M. Götz, Māturīdī, S. 57ff.; ferner den Bericht des
Nasafī al-Makḥūlī, Kitāb Baḥr al-kalām, MS Heidelberg A/T 423, fol. 114
v 9 und 12–14 (mit Verweis auf Sure 12:17); Taftāzānī, Šarḥ ʿala l-ʿaqaʾid an-
Nasafiyya, S. 126, -2f.; Ḥāfiẓ ad-Dīn Abū l-Barakāt an-Nasafī, ʿUmdat
ʿaqīdat as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa, ed. W. Cureton, S. 23, 10 f., und im Einzelnen
noch die Ausführungen von T. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief, S. 109 ff. und 207 ff.,
wo die Unterschiede des aschʿaritischen und des maturiditischen Glaubens-
begriffes behandelt werden. Im Art. Imān von Louis Gardet, EI2 III, 1971,
S. 1170f., kommen sie zu kurz. – Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī grenzt sich damit
von der Definition des Glaubens ausschließlich als “Bekenntnis mit der Zunge”
ab. Dies ist nicht ganz richtig, zumindest für Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī
selbst, vgl. Louis Gardet, Īmān, EI2 III, 1971, S. 1171a: “In the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī
tendencies the stress moves from iʿtiḳād to ḳawl”. Letztere Definition soll bereits
Ġaylān ad-Dimašqī vertreten haben – wenn man dem Bericht des Isḥāq
Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ǧʿman (= Ǧuʿmān?) Zabīdī, Maǧmūʿ al-firaq aṯ-ṯalāṯ
wa-s-sabʿīn, MS India Office Library London 469, fol. 36 v 1, Glauben schen-
ken darf. Zabīdī scheint ein später Autor zu sein. Er nennt am Schluss seines
Werkes den 768/1367 verstorbenen Yāfiʿī (GAL S II, S. 227) und dessen Werk
Marham al-ʿilal al-muʿaṭṭila, auf das er für weitere Einzelheiten verweist. Zum
größten Teil ist Zabīdīs Bericht ein Exzerpt aus dem bereits oben (vgl. hier
zu Ro. S. 99, paenult.) genannten anonymen Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal (MS
Maktabat al-Awqāf Bagdad 6819), welches zwischen 530/1136 und 555/1160 ver-
fasst wurde: Zabīdīs Kapitel über die Muʿtazila steht Anonymus, S. 107–114,
ist allerdings leicht gekürzt und ohne Kommentar und Widerlegung der ein-
zelnen muʿtazilitischen Lehren. – Die Definition des Glaubens als “Bekennt-
nis mit der Zunge” ist v.a. von der Karrāmiyya (und danach auch von dem
jüdischen Theologen Maimūnī: Vgl. D. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributen-
lehre, S. 369ff.) vertreten worden: Vgl. T. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief, S. 151 ff. –
Šahrastānī, al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton, S. 84, paenult.s. (vgl. Ašʿarī, Maqālāt,
ed. H. Ritter, S. 141, 6f.). – Maqrīzī, Ḫiṭaṭ IV, S. 170, 4 f. – Ibn Taymiyya, aṣ-
Ṣārim al-maslūl, S. 518, 11. – Ibn Taymiyya, al-Īmān, ed. Z. ʿA. Yūsuf, S. 230, 2. –
Tāǧ ad-Dīn as-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt aš-Šāfiʿiyya I, S. 45, 16 f. und 46, ult.s. – ʿAbd
al-Qādir al-Ǧīl(ān)ī, Kitāb al-Ġunya I, S. 103, 15 f. – Taftāzānī, Šarḥ ʿala l-
ʿaqaʾid an-Nasafiyya, S. 128, 1f. – Ǧuwaynī, Kitāb al-Iršād, S. 396, 11. – Ṣābūnī,
al-Kifāya fī-l-hidāya, MS Yale University Library 849, fol. 244 r 4 f. – Zabīdī,
Maǧmūʿ al-firaq, fol. 36 r 5. – Nasafī al-Makḥūlī, at-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid ( fī
ʿilm) at-tawḥīd, MS Chester Beatty (Dublin |) 4554, fol. 30 v 14; Nasafī al- 418
Makḥūlī, Kitāb Baḥr al-kalām, MS Heidelberg A/T 423, fol. 114 v 7 f. – Āmidī,
Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 271 v 10f. (danach Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII,
S. 323, 4f.). – Anonymus, Kitāb al-Milal, MS Maktabat al-Awqāf Bagdad 6819,
S. 91, 14ff. – Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī lehnt die karramitische Glaubens-
definition (qawlun bi-l-lisāni dūna t-taṣdīqi) ausdrücklich ab: Vgl. Taʾwīlāt ahl
as-sunna, ed. I. ʿAwḍīn und S. ʿAwḍīn I, S. 44, 6 ff. – Abū l-Qāsim Isḥāq Ibn
Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, as-Sawād al-aʿẓam, Brit. Mus. Or. 12781, fol. 52 v 1;
vgl. A. S. Tritton in JRAS 1966, S. 97. Dort wird neben der Karrāmiyya noch
die Murǧiʾa genannt: Zu deren Glaubensdefinition vgl. den Bericht des Abū
Bakr al-Ḫallāl, Kitāb al-Ǧāmiʿ li-ʿulūm Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, Brit. Mus. Or.
2675, fol. 95 v -4ff.: al-īmānu qawlun bi-l-lisāni wa-ʿamalu l-ǧāriḥa; ähnlich Ibn
Ḥanbal selbst: al-īmānu qawlun wa-ʿamalun; s. dessen ʿAqīdat ahl as-sunna, ed.
M. Ḥ. Fiqī, S. 81, 10. – Abweichend hiervon referiert Ibn Taymiyya, aṣ-Ṣārim
al-maslūl, S. 518, 10, als murǧiʾitische Lehre: Der Glaube ist die “Glaubensüber-
zeugung (al-iʿtiqād) und das Bekennen (al-qawl)”. Vgl. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Īmān,
S. 230, 1: “Das Bekennen mit der Zunge und das Fürwahrhalten im Herzen”.
Ibn Taymiyya vertritt dieselbe Definition, nur dass er hinzufügt: “… und das
Handeln mit den Gliedmaßen” (al-Īmān, S. 230, 12 f.). Damit grenzt er sich,
wie er selbst schreibt (al-Amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-n-nahy ʿan-i-l-munkar = Šaḏarat
al-Balātin I, ed. M. Ḥ. Fiqī, S. 390, 13ff.), von den Murǧiʾiten ab – wir können hin-
zufügen: Von den Murǧiʾiten der Schule Abū Ḥanīfas, welche die praktische
Frömmigkeit nicht zum Teil des Glaubens machen. – Bereits Abū ʿUbayd hat
in seiner sunnitischen Glaubensdefinition diesen Ausschluss der praktischen
Frömmigkeit abgelehnt: Vgl. W. Madelung, Early Sunni Doctrine, S. 233 ff.,
bes. S. 235ff. – Ibn Taymiyyas Glaubensdefinition (vgl. zu ihr im Einzelnen
738 chapter 41
noch T. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief, S. 166ff.) entspricht nach dem Bericht des
Tāǧ ad-Dīn as-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt aš-Šāfiʿiyya I, S. 46, 12 f., derjenigen der Mehr-
zahl der “Traditionarier” (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīṯ) und bewegt sich auf der Linie der
(auch aschʿaritischen) “Orthodoxie”. Man vergleiche das “orthodoxe” Glaubens-
bekenntnis des Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb fī l-ʿaqāʾid, MS Chester Beatty (Dub-
lin) 5277, S. 11, 1; Anonymus, Kitāb al-Milal, MS Maktabat al-Awqāf Bagdad
6819, S. 102, 5f. (Lehre der ahl as-sunna wa-l-ǧamāʿa); der Aschʿarite Bāqillānī
(s.o.), ähnlich aber auch der Mystiker Ḥakīm at-Tirmiḏī (3./9. Jh.), Bayān al-
farq, ed. N. Heer, S. 43, 3ff., allerdings als Definition von islām. Dieser Terminus
ist dort (wie bei dem Mystiker Muḥāsibī: Vgl. J. van Ess, Gedankenwelt, S. 60 f.)
von īmān verschieden (vgl. ed. N. Heer, S. 44, -4 ff.). Er ist ein umfassenderer
Begriff für das Befolgen der Wahrheit aus dem “Glauben” (īmān) heraus und
erstreckt sich (wie die “orthodoxe” Vorstellung von īmān) auch auf die prak-
tische Frömmigkeit (ʿamal bi-l-arkān, wozu man A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim
Creed, S. 17ff. vergleiche).
Ro. S. 109f.: Mit Recht weist Rosenthal auf die auffällige Erscheinung
hin, dass die muslimische Theologie sich schon seit den frühesten Zeiten mit
den Gottesattributen beschäftigte. Es ist speziell ein Anliegen der Muʿtazila
gewesen, deren Gottesbegriff sehr stark transzendente Züge aufweist – etwa in
der Unerkennbarkeit Gottes, in der via negationis der Gotteserkenntnis und in
der Verleugnung jeglichen Anthropomorphismus. Freilich sind die Vorstellun-
gen einer Transzendenz Gottes nicht konsequent zu einer mystischen Theo-
419 logie von der Unendlichkeit Gottes weiterentwickelt worden (vgl. etwa E. |
Hoffmann, Platonismus und Mystik im Altertum, S. 127ff.). Die Transzendenz
Gottes wird in der muʿtazilitischen Theologie in der Weise gleichsam “durch-
löchert”, dass ähnlich wie im Neuplatonismus (vgl. F. Heinemann, Plotin,
S. 250ff.) in sie bestimmte Termini hineinprojiziert werden: Man überträgt auf
Gott eine ganze Reihe von Attributen – auch via negationis – die eine Brü-
cke zwischen der Unendlichkeit Gottes und dem endlichen Sein herzustellen
suchen. Eine solche gleichsam begrenzende Definition Gottes und seines Wir-
kens wird zu einem allerdings unvollkommenen Beweis für die Existenz Gottes
(vgl. Ro. S. 110). Von hier erklärt sich auch das ausgeprägte Interesse der musli-
mischen Theologie an der Attributenlehre. Der speziell für die muʿtazilitische
Theologie charakteristische Gottesbeweis aus der Seinsstufung begegnet uns
auch bei Aristoteles: Vgl. B. Effe, Studien zur Kosmologie, S. 104 ff. Im Mit-
telalter ist er besonders geläufig gewesen: Vgl. G. Grunwald, Geschichte der
Gottesbeweise, S. 30f., 83f., 100 und 153ff. – Der islamisch-muʿtazilitische Got-
tesbeweis aus der Seinsstufung weist somit Spuren des im Mittelalter durch
Anselm von Canterbury klassisch gewordenen ontologischen Gottesbe-
weises auf. Die mit diesem gegebene Möglichkeit einer Begriffsbestimmung
Gottes und Konzipierung im Verstande wird jedoch damit relativiert, dass Attri-
bute Gottes nur via negationis möglich sind und keineswegs die Unendlichkeit
Gottes erfassen können.
Ro. S. 113 unten: Es sei hier darauf hingewiesen, dass auch der berühmte Phi-
losoph Kindī (ca. 185/801–zw. 247/861 und 259/873), auf dessen Berührungen
zur Muʿtazila R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, S. 176ff., hingewiesen hat, der Bag-
dader Schule von der Leugnung der Gottesattribute (via negationis) gefolgt zu
sein scheint: Vgl. den Bericht des Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577,
fol. 12 v 6–8: anna l-ʿālima man yaʿlamu šayʾan yaǧūzu an yaḫfā ʿalayhī ḏālika
š-šayʾu wa-li-hāḏā ankara huwa (sc. Kindī) waǧamāʿatun min-a-l-falāsifati an
yakūna ṣāniʿu l-ʿālami ʿāliman li-mtināʿi an yaḫfā ʿalayhi šayʾun. Man vergleiche
damit die muʿtazilitische Lehre, wonach über Gott nur in der Weise Eigenschaf-
ten ausgesagt werden können, als damit die gegenteilige Aussage ausgeschlos-
sen wird. Vgl. z.B. Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmr nach Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 166,
14f.: Dass Gott wissend ist, bedeutet: Er ist nicht unwissend. Vgl. im Einzelnen
J. van Ess, Ḍirār b. ʿAmr, S. 277–279.
Die Ro. S. 119 Anm. 7 gegebenen Hinweise auf Muʿammar sind nicht ganz
korrekt, weil Muʿammar die Lehre vom göttlichen Wissen mit seiner Theorie
von den unendlichen maʿānī verknüpft. Das göttliche Wissen gründet in einer
unendlichen Kette von maʿānī des Wissens, in welcher jedes Wissen durch ein
weiteres wesenhaft bestimmt ist. Von der Lehre, dass Gott sich selbst wisse (Ro.
S. 120 oben), hat Muʿammar sich ausdrücklich distanziert: Im unendlichen
Wissen Gottes ist die Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung, die Unterscheidung zwischen
Wissendem und dem als solchem begrenzten Gewussten (wozu auch das Wis-
sen um sich selbst gehört) aufgehoben (ähnlich etwa auch bei dem Mystiker
Ibn ʿArabī, s. Ro. S. 188). Vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 179 ff.
Zu der Ro. S. 120 unten besprochenen muʿtazilitischen Leugnung von Got-
tes Wissen vgl. die Begründung bei Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit. Mus. Or. 1577,
fol. 12 v 14ff.: Würde Gott ein Wissen haben, würde er damit nur “einen | einzi- 420
gen Wissensinhalt” (maʿlūm wāḥid) wissen, ebenso wie wir “mit einem Wissen
(bi-ʿilm wāḥid)” nur “einen einzigen Wissensinhalt” wissen. Das heißt: Wissen
ist etwas Begrenztes. Nach Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ I, S. 177, 7, formu-
lieren Kaʿbī (al-Balḫī) und Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī: “Das Wissen folgt dem
Gewussten”. Begrenztes Wissen ist mit der Unendlichkeit Gottes unvereinbar.
Ro. S. 121 Anm. 2: Die Lehre der Ǧahmiyya von der Erschaffung des Wissens
Gottes bringt als anonyme muʿtazilitische Lehre Ṣaffār, Talḫīṣ al-adilla, Brit.
Mus. Or. 1577, fol. 12 v 18f.
Ro. S. 122 Anm. 9: Die Identifizierung von Gottes Wissen mit Gott lehrt Abū
l-Huḏayl: Vgl. Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 165, 5 f.; Maqālāt, ed. H. Rit-
ter, S. 485, 7–10, zufolge habe Abū l-Huḏayl dies den Philosophen, und
740 chapter 41
zwar Aristoteles entnommen. Man könnte hier auf Aristoteles, Meta-

physik XII 7. 1072 b 26–29 hinweisen, wonach Gott seinem Wesen nach, nicht
durch das Attribut Wissen wissend ist. Von hier ist es kein weiter Schritt mehr
zur Gleichsetzung von Wissen und Gott, wie sie vor Aristoteles bei Xeno-
phanes begegnet, welcher sich damit gegen jeglichen Anthropomorphismus
wandte: Vgl. W. Jaeger, Theologie, S. 55ff. und 57ff., sowie R. M. Grant, Early
Christianity, S. 376ff.; dazu H. Daiber, Muʿammar, S. 200 f.
In der Ro. S. 123 Anm. 5 angeführten Belegstelle Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Rit-
ter, S. 213 (sie beginnt Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 212, 16 ff.) scheint mir ein frü-
hes schiitisches Zeugnis vorzuliegen: Ašʿarī nennt die Muǧassima (Anthropo-
morphisten) als Vertreter der beschriebenen Lehren. Zu der Muǧassima zählt
Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 209, 13ff. und 210, 15 f., die Schiiten Hišām
Ibn al-Ḥakam und Hišām Ibn Sālim al-Ǧawālīqī. Tatsächlich vertreten
beide nach Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 515, 10f., für den Willen Gottes eine
ähnlich lautende Lehre, wie sie Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 212, 16 ff., für das
Wissen Gottes angeführt wird. Die Lehre, dass Gottes Wissen kein “Ding” (šayʾ)
und nicht etwas anderes sei, ist gegen die Ǧahmiyya gerichtet (vgl. Maqālāt,
ed. H. Ritter, S. 298, 7 und 494, 10), weswegen die von Rosenthal erwo-
gene Identifizierung der Muǧassima mit der Ǧahmiyya hinfällig wird. Die Lehre
berührt sich vielmehr mit derjenigen der Kullābiyya: S. Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter,
S. 298, 6f. und 9. – Die Bezeichnung von Gottes Wissen als maʿnā scheint der
Muʿammarschen Theologie entnommen zu sein (vgl. H. Daiber, Muʿammar,
S. 186ff.) und ist gegen die Kullābiyya (vgl. Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 546, 10 f.)
und gegen Nāšiʾ (vgl. Maqālāt, ed. H. Ritter, S. 185, 2 f.) gerichtet. Wie man
sieht, kreuzen sich in diesem Zeugnis die verschiedensten theologischen Strö-
mungen der Muʿtazila. Es zeigt, wie sehr die ältere schiitische Theologie der
Muʿtazila verpflichtet ist.
Ro. S. 134 Anm. 1: Es liegt die letztlich platonische Unterscheidung zwi-
schen Gottes Sein und Wirken zugrunde. Wir finden sie auch in der christlich-
hellenistischen Theologie – etwa bei Gregor von Nyssa: Vgl. W. Völker,
Gregor von Nyssa, S. 30ff. – sowie in der muslimischen Attributenlehre, in der
Unterscheidung zwischen ṣifāt aḏ-ḏāt “Attribute des Wesens” und ṣifāt al-fiʿl
“Attribute des Wirkens”. Vgl. z.B. Bayhaqī, al-Iʿtiqād ʿalā maḏhab as-salaf, ed.
A. M. Mursī, o.O. 1961, S. 21, -8ff.
Ro. S. 140 Anm. 1: Der Prophetengenosse ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Masʿūd wird
auch von Ibn Mubārak, Kitāb az-Zuhd, ed. Ḥ. R. Aʿẓamī, S. 15, -3, als Vertreter
421 des Ausspruchs genannt: kafā bi-ḫašyati llāhi ʿilman wa-kafā bi-ġtirārin ǧahlan. |
Ro. S. 148 Anm. 5: Zu Naẓẓāms Wissensbegriff vgl. Ǧāḥiẓ, Min Kitāb al-
Masāʾil, ed. C. Pellat, S. 318, 16ff. und 319, 18ff.
Ro. S. 148 Anm. 6: Vgl. zu Ǧāḥiẓ’ Wissensbegriff die eben genannte Schrift
des Ǧāḥiẓ, ed. C. Pellat, S. 315ff.; Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741,
fol. 277 v -6. = Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 383, -5 f.; fol. 277 v ult.s. = Īǧī, Kitāb
al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 384, 5 (fehlt ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq,
ed. M. M. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, S. 175, -5. = ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-
Milal, ed. A. N. Nader, S. 124, 3). Vgl. ferner zu Ro. S. 99, paenult.
Ro. 149 Anm. 1: Zu Ṯumāmas Äußerungen über das Wissen vgl. auch zu Ro.
S. 99, paenult.; ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. M. M. ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd, S. 172, 6ff.; ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. A. N.
Nader, S. 122, 4f.; danach Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, MS Berlin 1741, fol. 277 v 12 ff.
= Īǧī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif VIII, S. 383, 9ff. Bei Āmidī (fol. 277 v 12 = 277 v 16)
steht noch der zusätzliche Passus: wa-anna-l-maʿrifa mutawallida ʿani-n-naẓar.
Er entstammt Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal, ed. W. Cureton, S. 50, 1 (Āmidī
hat neben ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baġdādī auch Šahrastānīs Angaben für sei-
nen häresiographischen Bericht verwertet).
Ro. S. 167: Es wäre von Interesse, in diesem Zusammenhang Suhrawardī,
Risāla fī l-maʿrifa wa-t-tawḥīd heranzuziehen. Der Titel ist erst jüngst nach einer
Wiener Handschrift (Nr. 2258 = Mixt. 947, 4, fol. 131 v–143 r) bekannt geworden
und fehlt in GAL. Die Handschrift ist genannt in H. Loebenstein, Katalog der
arabischen Handschriften, S. 122f.
Ro. S. 210 Anm. 1 und Ro. S. 215 Anm. 2: Der Text von Abū Manṣūr al-
Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd ist nach dem Cambridger Unikum (Add. 3651) von
F. Kholeif herausgegeben worden; vgl. dazu H. Daiber, Zur Erstausgabe. –
Neuausgabe von B. Topaloğlu und M. Aruçi, Ankara 2003.
Ro. S. 211f.: Zum Wissensbegriff des ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār vgl. G. F. Hourani,
Islamic Rationalism, S. 17f.
Ro. S. 214 Mitte lies Abū Isḥāq Ibn Nawbaḫt.
Ro. S. 316 Anm. 3: Vgl. auch Ibn Mubārak, Kitāb az-Zuhd, S. 15 ff. (ṭalab
al-ʿilm li-ʿaraḍin fī d-dunyā) und S. 281ff. (bāb mā ǧāʾa fī qabḍ al-ʿilm). Die Fröm-
migkeit des Ibn Mubārak zeigt einen stark asketischen Zug. Doch trotz seiner
mystischen Neigungen zu Weltentsagung und Gottergebenheit (tawakkul; zu
seiner Rolle in der Sufik vgl. B. Reinert, Die Lehre vom tawakkul) kann man –
wie auch Ro. S. 174 Anm. 1 feststellt – ihn noch nicht zum Sufi deklarieren. Ibn
Mubārak verherrlicht in dem genannten Werk, das auf jegliche theologische
Dialektik verzichtet, die praktische Frömmigkeit des Einzelnen. Adab ist besser
als ʿilm (wozu man Ro. S. 293 vergleiche). Einen ähnlichen Standpunkt nimmt
der Mystiker und Theologe Tustarī (gest. 283/896; s. GAS I, S. 647), der Begrün-
der der Sālimiyya ein: Vgl. dessen Kitāb al-Muʿāraḍa wa-r-radd ʿalā ahl al-firaq
wa-ahl ad-daʿāwa fī l-aḥwāl min kalām Sahl, ed. C. Tunç, Sahl B. ʿAbdallāh at-
Tustarī, S. 37, 10. – Zu Tustarīs Begriff des Wissens, welches am frommen Han-
deln des Einzelnen orientiert ist (s. ed. C. Tunç, S. 41, 2 ff.), vgl. C. Tunç, S. 34 ff.
742 chapter 41
Man kann Franz Rosenthals äußerst inhaltsreiches und anregendes

Werk wärmstens zur Lektüre empfehlen. Es gibt einen tiefen Einblick in das
islamische Wissenschaftsbild klassischer Zeit. Schade nur, dass neben dem Per-
sonenregister (lies dort ‘Daiber’ statt ‘Daiberg’) kein Sach- und Stellenindex
beigefügt ist.
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Summary
Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant (1970), is a collection of material

on the concept of knowledge, taken from all Islamic fields of knowledge. The
review is concentrating on theological and philosophical aspects, adds more
references taken from printed books and manuscripts, some observations and
conclusions. Main points are definitions of “knowledge” (ʿilm, maʿrifa); its seat
in “the heart” (al-qalb); its differentiations and its relation to “belief” (īmān,
taṣdīq); the relation of belief to revelation or reason; knowledge as divine attri-
bute; the differences between the theologians and the reason thereof. Special
attention is given to some Muʿtazilites and the theologians Ašʿarī and Abū
Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, their forerunners, their Greek-Christian inspirations
and their epigones, among them some Sufis and Ibn Taymiyya. The review
includes several observations on the affiliation between the quoted doxogra-
phical sources, which is extensively discussed in H. Daiber, Muʿammar.
Reprinted, with some modifications and additions, from ZDMG 123, 1973, pp. 410–421.
chapter 42
Oliver Leaman
An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy
(1985)
Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge

University Press 1985 (23cm., XII, 208 S.), ISBN 0521 24 707 1 (hardcover),
£ 20.00; 0521 28 911 4 (paperback), £6.95.
238 Diese Einführung möchte über die Anlässe islamischen Philosophierens infor-
mieren und dem Leser eine Vorstellung von Problemen und Gedankenkomple-
xen islamischer Philosophen vermitteln. Hierbei wird der von ihnen inspirierte
jüdische Philosoph Maimonides miteinbezogen. Das Buch beschäftigt sich
hauptsächlich mit Ġazālīs vom orthodoxen Glaubensbegriff her begründeten
Kritik an den Philosophen (Aristoteles, Fārābī, Avicenna). Diese lehrten,
dass die Welt ewig sei, Gott nicht die Particularia wisse und dass es keine Aufer-
stehung des Leibes gebe. Im Gegenangriff habe Averroes versucht, Religion
mit aristotelischer Metaphysik zu verbinden. Der zweite Haupteil des Buches
geht auf den Konflikt Vernunft-Offenbarung ein, der auch das Gebiet der isla-
mischen Moralphilosophie durchziehe: Ist etwas gut, weil es von Gott vorge-
schrieben ist (Ġazālī) oder weil es objektiv gesehen gut ist (Muʿtaziliten)?
Leaman (S. 165) bezweifelt die Nützlichkeit einer solchen Fragestellung und
betont in diesem Zusammenhang die Rolle der politischen Ethik als Ergänzung
der kontemplativen Funktion der Philosophen.
Das Buch enthält zahlreiche interessante und wichtige Beobachtungen, ist
aber vielleicht mehr ein Spiegelbild einer Reflexion der Frage, wie islami-
sche Philosophie in Form, Inhalt und Bedeutung beschrieben werden sollte.
Es macht den Leser darauf aufmerksam, dass islamische Philosophie nicht
nur als Fortsetzung der griechischen angesehen oder nur durch die Brille der
mittelalterlichen scholastischen Philosophie betrachtet werden sollte, sondern
den islamischen Kontext beachten muss. Leaman hält aber im Übrigen isla-
mische Philosophie für “philosophically not very creative” (S. 20). Diese, aber
auch andere Äußerungen sind problematisch. Dem Leser wird Oliver Lea-
mans Kritik an Interpretationen moderner Islamwissenschaftler, v.a. an Leo
Strauss’ “esoterischer” Interpretation der Philosophie nicht völlig einsich-
tig. Der “esoterischen” Interpretation zufolge haben islamische Philosophen
versucht, ihre Lehren als konform mit der islamischen Religion darzustellen
oder ihre wahren Meinungen verschleiert. Leaman räumt ein, dass dies nicht

oliver leaman, an introduction to medieval philosophy (1985) 747
ganz auszuschließen sei (S. 187: “There is a good deal to be said for such a para-
digm”), aber er plädiert im Übrigen für eine Interpretation der Philosophen
nicht lediglich unter dem Blickwinkel des Gegensatzes zwischen Offenbarung
und Philosophie – vielmehr müssten die philosophischen Argumente, so wie
sie in den Texten vorgelegt werden, studiert werden. Deren stilistische Gestal-
tung, bzw. ihr nur für den philosophisch Gebildeten zugänglicher Inhalt recht-
fertige nicht die Annahme, die Philosophen hätten eine esoterische Haltung
eingenommen.
Leamans Ausgangspunkt ist Fārābī und dessen These von der Religion als
Spiegelbild der Philosophie (S. 191), das der ungebildeten Masse philosophische
Wahrheit vermitteln kann. Allerdings wird der Leser hier wie auch in vielen
anderen Fällen über den genauen Befund im Unklaren gelassen und erfährt
keine Belege. Verweise auf Primär- und Sekundärliteratur fehlen häufig (vgl.
dazu die Rez. v. Charles E. Butterworth in JAOS 106, 1986, S. 725–732,
und Michael E. Marmura in MW 76, 1986, S. 43–45). Immerhin regt die
Kritik an Leo Strauss zum Nachdenken an, zumindest was dessen Fārābī-
Interpretation betrifft (vgl. Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new
interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view. In MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, 1986 (S. 128–149), S. 17 f.
= H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18). Es ist auch richtig, zunächst
zu versuchen, einem Text, so wie er uns vorliegt, die philosophischen Argu-
mente zu entnehmen und den Gedankengang nachzuvollziehen und zu ana-
lysieren – aber nicht von vornherein von der Annahme auszugehen, dass der | 239
Autor beabsichtige, etwas mit Rücksicht auf den orthodoxen Glauben und die
ungebildete Masse zu verbergen. Eine sinnvolle Analyse islamischer Philoso-
phie “without asking these autobiographical and historical questions” (S. 201)
scheint mir aber sehr problematisch. Islamische Philosophie, auch in ihrer
Originalität, erschließt sich erst dann voll und ganz, wenn alle Philosophen
und ihre griechisch-arabischen Quellen miteinbezogen sind (beides ist hier
nur unvollständig geschehen), der historische Kontext eines einzelnen Philo-
sophen und seiner Gedanken berücksichtigt ist und seine Wirkung im islami-
schen Kulturbereich beleuchtet wird. Hierbei mag auch ein Vergleich mit dem
mittelalterlichen Weltbild in seiner Integration von Gedanken der islamischen
Philosophie nützlich sein und uns bewusst machen, dass der Gegensatz von
Philosophie und Religion grundsätzlich nicht am Anfang der islamischen Phi-
losophiegeschichte gestanden hat und nicht ihr Hauptmerkmal gewesen ist.
Oliver Leamans Buch regt dazu an, diese und andere Fragen neu zu durch-
denken. Wie ein Blick in die islamische Philosophiegeschichte zeigt, reicht die
Korrelation zwischen einem angenommenen permanenten Gegensatz Philo-
sophie – Offenbarung und dem Verbergen philosophischer Wahrheit in einer
für die Masse unzugänglichen Sprache nicht aus, um eine “esoterische” Inter-
748 chapter 42
pretation der Philosophie zu rechtfertigen oder abzulehnen. Die Geschichte

der Koranexegese, ihre Unterscheidung zwischen “innerem” (bāṭin) und “äuße-
rem” (ẓāhir) Wortsinn in ismailitischen Kreisen des 9./10. Jh., sowie zuvor schon
die muʿtazilitischen Diskussionen über die göttlichen Attribute machen zu
Genüge deutlich, wie sehr man sich des Problems einer sprachlichen Wie-
dergabe des Gemeinten bewusst war. Angesichts der jeweils besonderen his-
torischen Umstände, die eine Vielfalt von Anregungen voraussetzen, ist das
Bild der islamischen Philosophie alles andere als einheitlich. Diese Tatsache
sollte uns vor einer einseitigen Interpretation im Sinne der “Esoteriker” oder
der Anhänger des äußeren Wortsinns warnen: Wenn Fārābī das Denken am
Wahrnehmbaren orientiert sein lässt, sowie von der Unterschiedlichkeit der
Menschen und von ihrem Bedürfnis nach einem prophetischen Führer aus-
geht, so zeigt er sich von griechischen Quellen und von ismailitischen Dis-
kussionen inspiriert, wonach die Erkenntnis philosophischer Wahrheit durch
allegorische Interpretation der “äußeren” Wortform für möglich gehalten wird:
Vgl. Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures. Leiden/Boston
2012, S. 73f. Hierbei ist für die Ismailiten das Symbol, das Bild – Fārābī sprach
von “Religion” als “Nachahmung” der Philosophie – mit dem Gemeinten, der
Philosophie identisch. Oliver Leamans Übernahme der Farabianischen Ein-
heit von Wort bzw. Bild und Gedanke berechtigt nicht zu einer Interpretation,
die sich nur an den äußeren Wortsinn hält und nicht mit der Möglichkeit des
esoterischen “Verbergens” rechnet. Letztere hat es in islamischen (wie auch in
griechischen) Kreisen gegeben: Vgl. Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristo-
telian Tradition. 2nd rev. ed. Leiden/Boston 2014. = IPTS 89, S. 255 ff. und 339 f.
Alles in allem haben wir hier ein anregendes Buch, auch wenn manches wei-
terer Diskussion bedarf.
Republished, with a few corrections, from BiOr 47/1–2, col. 237–239. By courtesy of the
publisher.
chapter 43
Farhad Daftary (ed.)

Mediaeval Ismaʿili History and Thought (1996)
Mediaeval Ismaʿili History and Thought. Ed. by Farhad Daftary. Cambridge

University Press 1996. XVIII, 331 S. 8o. Hartbd. £40,00. ISBN 0 512-45140-X.
Als Ergänzung zu seiner umfangreichen Monographie The Ismailis: their his-

tory and doctrines (Cambridge: University Press 1990 / Nachdruck 1992) hat
Farhad Daftary mit dem hier zu besprechenden Buch eine Sammlung von
Aufsätzen vorgelegt, die einzelne Aspekte aus der Geschichte der Ismailiten
auf der Basis neuer oder bislang unzugänglicher Texte näher beleuchten. Ein
solches Buch bedarf kaum der Rechtfertigung, frühere und aus der mittelalter-
lichen sunnitischen Polemik gespeiste Vorurteile gegenüber der schiitischen
Gruppe der Ismailiten widerlegen zu wollen. Aus einer frühen schiitischen
Bewegung gegen die Abbasiden ist eine im Rahmen ihrer Missionstätigkeit kul-
turgeschichtlich bedeutsame Richtung geworden, deren Ideologie zur Grund-
lage der Fatimiden in Nordafrika und der mit ihnen zu Ende des 3./9. und
im 4./10. Jahrhundert rivalisierenden Qarmaten in Baḥrain, d.h. der gesamten
Golfregion geworden ist.
Nach einem Übersichtsartikel von Farhad Daftary über “Ismaʿilis and
Ismaʿili studies”, S. 1–20, enthält der Band folgende Aufsätze: S. 21–73: Wil-
ferd Madelung, “The Fatimids and the Qarmaṭīs of Baḥrayn”, eine leicht
revidierte Übersetzung des in Der Islam 34, 1959, S. 34–88, erschienenen Arti-
kels, der erstmals die wirkliche Beziehung der Qarmaten in Baḥrain zu den
Fatimiden klarstellt und eine kritische Sichtung und Auswertung der Berichte
später islamischer Historiker bietet. – S. 75–83: Heinz Halm, “The Cosmo-
logy of the Pre-Fatimid Ismāʿīliyya”, eine Zusammenfassung von Resultaten
seiner 1978 in Wiesbaden erschienenen Kosmologie und Heilslehre der frühen
Ismāʿīlīya. = AKM XLIV/1, worin frühe Formen ismailitischer Kosmologie unter
Einbeziehung spätantiker Gnosis beschrieben werden. – S. 85–89: Wilferd
Madelung, “Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī and the Seven Faculties of the Intellect”,
gibt eine Analyse von Abū Yāʿqūb as-Siǧistānī, Kitāb al-Yanābīʿ, 16. Kap,
und weist auf den neuplatonischen Hintergrund der Intellektenlehre. – S. 91–
115: Heinz Halm, “The Ismaʿili Oath of Allegiance (ʿahd) and the Sessions
of Wisdom (maǧālis al-ḥikma) in Fatimid Times”, beleuchtet die Initiation
von Konvertiten, die sich mit einem “Eid” (ʿahd) zur ismailitischen Lehre ver-

750 chapter 43
pflichteten und in fatimidischer Zeit in sog. “Sitzungen der Weisheit” (maǧālis

al-ḥikma) unterrichtet wurden. Heinz Halm gibt eine nützliche Übersicht
über die noch nicht vollständig in Editionen zugängliche Maǧālis-Literatur,
eine noch längst nicht erschöpfte Fundgrube für ismailitische Lehren. – S. 117–
143: Ismail K. Poonawala, “Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān and Ismaʿili Jurisprudence”,
bietet eine Übersicht über Entwicklung und Hauptzüge ismailitischen Rechts,
das sich primär auf Koran, Sunna und die Autorität des unfehlbaren Imams
stützte. Zum anerkannten Gesetzescodex der Fatimiden wurde al-Qāḍī an-
56 Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), Daʿāʾim Islām, wovon | hier eine Analyse vorgelegt wird. –
S. 145–152: Abbas Hamdani, “A critique of Paul Casanova’s Dating of the Rasāʾil
Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ”, bringt Argumente für eine frühe Datierung der Rasāʾil Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, nämlich in die Zeit kurz vor der Errichtung des fatimidischen Kali-
fats (297/909). Ausgehend vom ismailitischen Charakter der Rasāʾil interpre-
tiert Hamdani die dritte Risāla über Astronomie nicht als Vorberechnung der
am 19. November 1047 AD stattfindenden Konjunktion von Saturn und Jupi-
ter mit dem Steinbock, welche die Triplizität der Erde darstelle und woraus
Paul Casanova in einem 1915 veröffentlichten Aufsatz eine Datierung der
Rasāʾil kurz vor 1047AD abgeleitet hatte. Zusätzlich ausgehend von der 48.
Risāla fī kayfiyyat ad-daʿwa ilā Allāh, “the most explicitly Shiʿi or Ismaʿili Risāla
of the work” (S. 146), interpretiert Hamdani die dortigen Aussagen über den
erwarteten Imam, der jedoch bereits anwesend sei, aber von den Leuten noch
geleugnet werde, als Hinweise auf die unmittelbar bevorstehende Errichtung
des fatimidischen Kalifats im Jahre 297/909. Die Argumente klingen einleuch-
tend, obgleich der Leser sich fragt, ob diese astronomische Berechnung von
den Rasāʾil (Hamdani weist S. 150 noch auf die tatsächlich im Jahr 296/908
stattgefundene Konjunktion von Jupiter und Saturn hin) nicht als nachträg-
liche Konstruktion für eine Untermauerung des fatimidischen Anspruchs auf
das Kalifat eingefügt worden sein könnte. Ferner spricht einiges dafür, dass
die Rasāʾil über einen längeren, in das 4./10. Jh. hineinreichenden Zeitraum
“gewachsen” sind. Hier können nur detaillierte Textvergleiche weiterhelfen,
z.B. mit den Quellen und den inhaltlichen Parallelen zu anderen Texten des
3./9. und 4./10. Jahrhunderts. Vgl. die Forschungsgeschichte in Inka Nokso-
Koivisto, Microcosm – Macrocosm. Analogy in Rasāʾil Ikhwān Aṣ-Ṣafāʾ and
Certain Related Texts, Diss. Helsinki 2014, S. 46 f., und Carmela Baffioni,
“Ikhwān Al-Ṣafāʾ”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008, rev. 2016). –
S. 153–160: Azim A. Nanji, “Portraits of Self and Others: Ismaʿili perspectives on
the history of religions”, diskutiert Passagen in den Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ und in
Abū Ḥatim ar-Rāzī, Aʿlām an-nubuwwa, die ein Bewusstsein von den histori-
schen und sozialen Ursachen der Unterschiedlichkeilt von Religionen andeu-
ten und Wege zu einem gemeinsamen Verständnis über diese Unterschiedlich-
farhad daftary, mediaeval ismaʿili history and thought (1996) 751
keiten hinweg aufzeigen wollen, nämlich durch allegorische Schriftinterpreta-

tion. – S. 161–177: Paul E. Walker, “An Ismaʿili Version of the Heresiography of
the Seventy-Two Erring Sects”, enthält eine Analyse des Sektenkapitels in Abū
Tammām, Kitāb aš-Šaǧara, Teil I (noch nicht ediert); Teil II hatte ʿĀrif Tāmir
in zwei verschiedenen Versionen veröffentlicht (als Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ in Beirut 1965
und als Šaǧarat al-yaqīn in Beirut 1982) und jeweils Abū Firās Šihāb ad-
Dīn al-Maynaqī (4./10. Jh.) und ʿAbdān (3./9. Jh.) zugeschrieben. – S. 178–
204: Farhad Daftary, “Ḥasan-Ṣabbāḥ and the Origins of the Nizārī Ismaʿili
Movement”, skizziert die frühe Geschichte der Ismailiten im Persien des 5./11.
Jahrhunderts und die komplexe Rolle des Führers der Niẓārī-Ismailiten Ḥasan-
i Ṣabbāḥ (d. 518/1124) bis hin zur Revolte der persischen Ismaʿiliten gegen die
Seldschuken. – S. 205–220: Carole Hillenbrand, “The Power Struggle be-
tween the Saljuqs and the Ismaʿilis of | Alamūt, 487–518/1094–1124: The Saljuq 57
perspective”. Der Artikel ergänzt nach Primärquellen den vorangehenden Auf-
satz von Farhad Daftary, sowie frühere Darstellungen des Kampfes der Seld-
schuken gegen die Ismailiten von Alamūt. – S. 221–229: Clifford Edmund
Bosworth, “The Ismaʿilis of Quhistān and the Maliks of Nīmrūz or Sīstān”,
skizziert die politische Geschichte der Ismailiten in Quhistān und Sīstān an
der Grenze zu Afghanistan vom 5./11. Jahrhundert bis zur Zerstörung ihrer
Zentren durch die Befehlshaber von Ilḫān Hülegü in den Jahren 651/1253 und
654/1256. – S. 231–245: Hamid Dabashi, “The philosopher/vizier: Khwāja Naṣīr
al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Ismaʿilis”, beleuchtet die Biographie von Naṣīr ad-Dīn
aṭ-Ṭūsī (597/1201–672/1274) und den Einfluss der Ismailiten auf seine schrift-
stellerische Tätigkeit, insbesonders auf seine ethischen Werke Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī
und Aḫlāq-i Muḥtašamī, worin die platonische Auffassung vom Philosophen-
König eine interessante persische Färbung erhalten hat. – S. 247–263: Charles
Melville, “‘Sometimes by the Sword, Sometimes by the Dagger’. The role
of the Ismaʿilis in Mamlūk-Mongol relations in the 8th/14th century”, bietet
einen kritischen Bericht über die Rolle der Ismailiten als fidāwīs bzw. fidāʾīs
(“assassins”) im Auftrag der Mamluken. In den Geschichtsquellen erscheint
der Terminus fidāʾī zunehmend als eine Umschreibung für “Mörder” und nicht
mehr für einen ismalilitischen fidāʾī im ursprünglichen niẓāritischen Sinn. –
S. 265–280: Ali S. Asani, “The Ismaʿili gināns: Reflections on authority and
authorship”, weist auf die Komplexität der Autorenschaft der sog. Gināns, von
urprünglich mündlich überlieferten erbaulichen Gedichten, die Missionaren
oder sog. Pīrs der Niẓārī-ismailitischen Khodja-Gemeinde in Indien bereits seit
dem 5./11. Jahrhundert zugeschrieben werden. Es müsse zwischen wirklicher
Autorenschaft und Zuschreibung an eine Autorität unterschieden werden. –
S. 281–297: Abbas Amanat, “The Nuqṭawī movement of Maḥmūd Pisīkhānī
and his Persian cycle of mystical-materialism”, behandelt esoterische Sekten
752 chapter 43
aus postmongolischer Zeit (8./14. und 9./15. Jh.), deren Lehren zwar ismailiti-
schen Einfluss verraten (z.B. zyklische Geschichtsauffassung und esoterische
Exegese), aber in der materialistischen Auffassung von der Seelenwanderung,
in Maḥmūd Pisīḫānīs Anspruch auf das Prophetentum und in der Ablehnung
der schiitischen Lehre des Imamats eigene Wege gegangen sind.
Eine Bibliographie (S. 299–313) und ein Index (S. 314–331) erhöhen den Wert
des Buches, das Einblicke in neue Forschungsresultate bietet und ergänzende
Übersichtsartikel zu Teilaspekten einer für Kultur und Geschichte des Islam
bedeutsamen Bewegung.
Republished, with some modifications, from OLZ 93, 1998, col. 55–57. By courtesy of
the publisher.
chapter 44
George F. Hourani
Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (1985)
George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics. Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press 1985. XVI, 282 S. £27,50.
Vorliegender Sammelband enthält, mit einer Ausnahme, folgende 16 früher

erschienenen und teilweise revidierten Beiträge hauptsächlich zur islamischen
Ethik:
– Islamic Theology and Muslim Philosophy. Ein mit Erfahrung geschriebener
Überblick, der allerdings Verallgemeinerungen nicht ganz vermeiden konn-
te.
– Ethics in Classical Islam: a conspectus. Hourani gibt folgende Aufteilung:
– “Normative religious ethics” (Koran, Tradition).
– “Normative specular ethics” (Fürstenspiegel, Weisheitsliteratur, platoni-
sche Popularphilosophie).
– “Ethical analysis in religious tradition” (Juristen, Theologen, Muʿtazili-
ten). Hierbei folgen die Muʿtaziliten weniger der Offenbarung, als viel-
mehr der philosophischen Methode, wobei griechischer Einfluss zurecht
als “indirect and diffuse way” (S. 21) eingeschränkt wird.
– “Ethical | analysis by philosophers” (aḫlāq-Literatur, welche hellenisti- 300
scher Philosophie folgt).
– Ethical Presuppositions of the Qurʾān. Der Koran enthält ethische Aussagen,
die großenteils von der Offenbarung her, aber teils auch vom menschlichen
Verstand her begründet werden und objektive Werte darstellen.
– ‘Injuring Oneself’ in the Qurʾān, in the Light of Aristotle. Zu ẓulm im Sinne von
“schädigen”, im Ausdruck ẓulm an-nafs “ruining oneself, injuring oneself”.
– Two Theories of Value in Early Islam. Hourani stellt die muʿtazilitische
Theorie der Werte als objektive Größen der aschʿaritischen Einstufung als
etwas von Gottes Willen Bestimmtes gegenüber (“theistic subjectivism”).
– Islamic and Non-Islamic Origins of Muʿtazilite Ethical Rationalism. Parallelen
zwischen Muʿtaziliten und Zoroastriern deuten Hourani zufolge nicht auf
spezifische Beziehungen zwischen beiden Bewegungen hin. Die Möglich-
keit eines islamisch-muʿtazilitischen Einflusses auf die Zoroastrier hat Hou-
rani nicht erwogen. Dagegen schließt Hourani aus der Polemik gegen die
Manichäer, dass Muʿtaziliten von Manichäern außer vielleicht einigen Ter-

754 chapter 44
mini nichts übernommen hätten. – Christlicher Einfluss wird über nicht

näher bestimmbare mündliche und schriftliche Kanäle stattgefunden ha-
ben. Doch der Einfluss etwa des Johannes Damascenus auf frühe muʿta-
zilitische Ethik sei nicht erwiesen. Eher könne man an Theodor Abū
Qurra (ca. 123/740–ca. 204/820) denken. Doch hier müsse, wie Hourani
zu Recht feststellt, erst eine Antwort auf die Frage gesucht werden, “to what
extent is there a necessary logic leading from the Qurʾān to Muʿtazilism as
one side of an Islamic dialectic”? (S. 89). Etwas übertrieben scheint mir
Houranis These, dass die Muʿtaziliten sich kühl verhalten hätten gegen-
über der Philosophie, “which they passed by almost unnoticed, although it
was certainly known to them” (S. 97).
– The Rationalistic Ethics of ʿAbd Al-Jabbār. Hourani gibt eine Zusammenfas-
sung von Resultaten in seinem Buch Islamic Rationalism. The Ethics of ʿAbd
Al-Jabbār. Oxford 1971.
– Deliberation in Aristotle and ʿAbd Al-Jabbār. Im Gegensatz zu Aristote-
les’ teleologischer Auffassung ist nach ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār das Denken auf
wāǧib und qabīḥ gerichtet, wie es von der islamischen Tradition festgelegt
war.
– Ashʿarī. Ein lesenwerter Artikel über Ašʿarīs Theologie und ihre Quellen.
– Juwayni’s Criticisms of Muʿtazilite Ethics. Die muʿtazilitische Lehre, dass ethi-
sches Wissen sich notwendigerweise durch Intuition sowie durch rationale
Einsicht einstellt und dass ethische Werte absolute gegebene Größen sind,
wird von dem Aschʿariten Ǧuwaynī u.a. mit dem Hinweis auf Widersprüche
zwischen muʿtazilitischer und orthodoxer Lehre sowie mit der Erkenntnis
kritisiert, dass die Klassifikation von Gut und Böse sich nach den Umstän-
den von guten und bösen Handlungen richtet.
– Ghazālī on the Ethics of Action. Ähnlich der aschʿaritischen Lehre vom ethi-
schen Voluntarismus (oder ethistischen Subjektivismus) ist ethisches Han-
deln “notwendig” (wāǧib), weil Gott es in der Offenbarung befohlen hat und
weil es entsprechend Ġazālīs teleologischer Ethiktheorie die Menschen,
welche zur unvoreingenommenen Suche nach der authentischen Wahrheit
der Schrift, der Überlieferung verpflichtet sind, zur Glückseligkeit führt –
nicht weil etwas an sich und aus Verstandesgründen (Muʿtaziliten) gut ist.
Gottes “Gnade” (lutf ) ist es überlassen, wie er die Menschen belohnt. Ent-
gegen der deontologischen Ethiktheorie der Muʿtaziliten betont Ġazālī
die Nichtnotwendigkeit dessen, was für die Menschen “am besten” ist (al-
aṣlaḥ).
– Reason and Revelation in Ibn Ḥazm’s Ethical Thought. Der Schafiite und spä-
tere Zahirite Ibn Ḥazm folgt in seiner Ethik der zeitgenössischen Lehre vom
301 ethistischen Subjektivismus. Gut und Böse existieren | nur als Beschreibung
george f. hourani, reason and tradition in islamic ethics (1985) 755
dessen, was dem menschlichen Verstand in der Form von Gottes Wort offen-
bart wird; taʿlīl und qiyās werden daher abgelehnt. In diesem Sinne sieht Ibn
Ḥazm – m.E. in Anlehnung an Fārābī – keinen Unterschied zwischen Phi-
losophie und Scharia (S. 177).
– The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam. Hourani bietet einen
differenzierenden Überblick von aš-Šāfiʿī bis heute. Am sich wandelnden
Bild vom consensus in der islamischen Geschichte weist er darauf hin, dass
ein Muslim heute den consensus nicht als unfehlbares, sondern als korrigier-
bares Prinzip islamischen Rechts verstehen sollte.
– Ibn Sīnā’s Essay on the Secret of Destiny. Hourani bietet eine Übersetzung
und Interpretation von Ibn Sīnās Risāla fī sirr al-qadar. Der kleine Trak-
tat unterstreicht – entgegen den Muʿtaziliten – die göttliche Determination
und widmet sich hauptsächlich dem Theodizeeproblem. Ibn Sīnā erklärt
Böses als etwas von Gott nicht essentiell (eine Aristoteles zugeschrie-
bene Lehre), sondern akzidentiell (eine Plato zugeschriebene Lehre) “Be-
absichtigtes” (maqṣūd). Dies erinnert nebenbei bemerkt an die stoischen
“Nebenwirkungen” (συναπτόμενα) bzw. “Nebenerzeugnisse” (ἐπιγεννήματα),
die nicht von Gott, sondern von der Natur verursacht seien (vgl. H. Dai-
ber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-
Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, S. 275). – Anlass
des Traktates ist eine an Ibn Sīnā gerichtete Frage nach dem Sinn des
Sufi-Spruchs “Wer das Geheimnis der göttlichen Vorherbestimmung (qadar)
kennt, ist ein Ketzer (alḫada)”. Ibn Sīnā äußert anschließend, dass dies
nur in Form von Symbolen oder “Rätseln” (marmūza) und in “verhüllen-
der Weise” (maknūna) gelehrt werden könne, da ihre offene “Darlegung”
(iẓhār) eine schlechte Wirkung auf die breite Masse ausüben würde. Dies
interpretiert Hourani im Anschluss an Leo Strauss folgendermaßen: Ibn
Sīnā habe in Rätseln über qadar gesprochen, damit die breite Masse nicht
hiervon verwirrt werde und ketzerische Gedanken über Religion entwickle.
Doch solle damit die Neugier des Novizen geweckt werden, damit sein Ver-
stand angeregt werde, sich mit den implizierten Problemen zu beschäftigen.
Diese Interpretation findet m.E. keine Stütze in den Texten und widerspricht
im Gegenteil der von Hourani (S. 241) angeführten Äußerung des Ibn Sīnā,
wonach es die Pflicht der Propheten sei, “to acquaint them (sc. ordinary
people) with the Majesty and Might of God the Exalted by means of symbols
(rumūz) and images (amṯila)”; “it is not good for a man to appear openly to
possess knowledge of a truth he is concealing from the public”. Soweit Ibn
Sīnā. Er verwendet hier deutlich rumūz im Sinne von “Symbolen” und nicht
von “Rätseln”. Die breite Masse kann nur in Symbolen über qadar unterricht
werden; diese würden theoretisch Begabte nicht hindern, sie philosophisch
756 chapter 44
zu untersuchen (Hourani, S. 241 Anm. 38; vgl. S. 244). Hier greift m.E. Ibn
Sīnā auf eine Lehre des Fārābī zurück, wonach philosophische Wahrheit
den Bürgern des Musterstaates nur in Form von Bildern, “Nachahmungen”
philosophischer Wahrheit, in Form von Religion vermittelt werden kann; vgl.
H. Daiber, “The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s
view”. In MNAW.L n.r. 49/4 (S. 128–149) 1986, bes. S. 17 f. = H. Daiber, From
the Greeks to the Arabs II/18). – Wenn Ibn Sīnā feststellt, dass die offene
Darlegung des Geheimnisses göttlicher Determination die breite Masse in
verkehrter Weise beeinflussen würde, besagt dies demnach lediglich, dass
der Verzicht auf Symbole beim philosophisch Ungeschulten falsche Vorstel-
lungen wecke. Von esoterischem Verbergen göttlicher Wahrheit, von “some
conscious reserve in the manner of writing it” kann hier keine Rede sein.
302 – Averroes on Good and Evil. Averroes geht von Gut und Böse als objektive |
Werte aus, polemisiert gegen aschʿaritischen Voluntarismus und bringt in
der Rückführung des Bösen auf die Materie eine platonische Komponente
ins Spiel. Lohn und Strafe des Individuums im Jenseits werden ersetzt durch
Eigenverantwortlichkeit des Menschen für seine Glückseligkeit im Diesseits
in Form von theoretischer und praktischer Vollkommenheit, die an Aris-
toteles orientiert erscheint. Dieses scheinbar muʿtazilitische Bekennt-
nis zur Willensfreiheit des Menschen wird eingeschränkt mit der mittel-
baren, auf sekundären Ursachen beruhenden Determination allen Gesche-
hens durch Gott. Hierbei existiert das Gute nur deswegen, weil es auch das
Böse gibt. Gott hat die Menschen als eine “Verbindung” (tarkīb) von ver-
schiedenen Naturelementen geschaffen. Als solche bedarf der Mensch der
Leitung durch den von Gott instruierten Philosophen-König und kann sich
nicht auf das Erwerben von Wissen, auf Lernen beschränken oder sich aus-
schließlich auf seinen Verstand verlassen. Auch hier klingen Gedanken von
Fārābī an.
– Combinations of Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics. Hourani unter-
scheidet im klassischen Islam 5 verschiedene Positionen im Verhältnis der
Vernunft zur Offenbarung:
– Offenbarung und unabhängige Vernunft.
– Offenbarung, die von der abhängigen Vernunft ergänzt wird.
– Offenbarung unter Ausschluss der Vernunft.
– Offenbarung in der Person des Imam.
– Vernunft geht von der Offenbarung aus (Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd).
Die zweite Form von ethischem Voluntarismus hat durch Schafiiten und
Aschʿariten die weiteste Verbreitung gefunden.
Das Kapitel endet mit einem Ausblick auf die muslimische Gegenwart, de-
ren Liberalismus keine feste theoretische Grundlage im islamischen Denken
george f. hourani, reason and tradition in islamic ethics (1985) 757
habe. Hourani empfiehlt, dort anzuknüpfen, wo die frühen Juristen und

Muʿtaziliten begonnen haben “and work to develop a system of Islamic law
which would openly make use of judgements of equity and public interest,
and a system of ethical theology which would encourage judgements of right
and wrong by the human mind, without having to look to scripture at every
step”. Hier sieht Hourani die Muʿtaziliten auf dem richtigen Weg zu objek-
tiven Werturteilen. Ihre Korrektur durch moderne Ethik-Philosophen und
Theologen sei der beste Weg für Muslime, den Islam zu neuem Leben zu
erwecken.
Mit diesem pro-muʿtazilitischen Bekenntnis endet diese Aufsatzsammlung zur
Geschichte der islamischen Ethik, die uns einen Einblick gibt in die Vielschich-
tigkeit und in den historischen Kontext zeitlosen ethischen Denkens. Das Buch
ist informierend, auch für Theologen und Philosophen außerhalb des Fachge-
bietes. In Details sind Korrekturen möglich oder es kann anders interpretiert
werden. Doch das durch Indices gut erschlossene Werk ist ein wichtiger Bei-
trag zu der noch zu schreibenden Geschichte der Ethik im Islam.
In 1991 Majid Fakhry published his monograph Ethical Theories in Islam. Lei-
den/New York (etc.). 2nd revised edition 1994. = IPTS 8.
Republished, with some modifications, from Der Islam 64, 1987, pp. 299–302. By cour-
chapter 45
Edward Booth
Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and
Christian Thinkers (1983)
Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thin-

kers. Cambridge 1983. Cambridge University Press. XXVI, 314 S. Preis £ 35,–.
(Cambridge studies in medieval life and thought. Third series, vol. 20).
Das hier anzuzeigende Buch ist eine problemgeschichtliche Arbeit und behan-
delt ein Thema, das die Philosophen seit Sokrates beschäftigt, nämlich das
Verhältnis des Allgemeinen zum Besonderen (vgl. HWPh 1, 1971, Sp. 164ff.).
Über dieses Thema hat der Baseler Philosophiehistoriker Heinrich Barth
im Jahre 1947 (21966) eine zweibändige Monographie mit dem Titel Philoso-
phie der Erscheinung verfasst. Sie behandelt die Diskussion der Philosophen
vom Altertum bis in die Neuzeit und geht im ersten Band (S. 342–359) kurz
auch auf die islamischen Philosophen ein. Booth scheint diese Arbeit nicht
gekannt zu haben. Bei ihm sind die Akzente etwas anders gesetzt. Häufig
lässt er die Texte selbst sprechen, berücksichtigt die Aristoteleskommen-
tare und zieht neben Plotin noch weitere Neuplatoniker (Porphyrius, Pro-
clus) heran. Ferner behandelt seine Arbeit ausführlich die Überlieferungen
der christlichen Philosophen (Johannes Philoponus, syrische Peripateti-
ker, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius) und der islamischen Philosophen
(Kindī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd) sowie deren Quellen (neben Aris-
toteles auch neuplatonische Schriften, wie die ps.-aristotelische Theologie
und Proclus’ Institutio Theologica). Die islamischen Diskussionen haben die
jüdischen Philosophen (Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides) geprägt sowie
die Scholastiker des lateinischen Mittelalters, von denen Booth ausführlich
Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin behandelt. So ist das Buch,
das eine immense Literatur, darunter auch lateinische, hebräische und arabi-
sche Handschriften verarbeitet hat, eine willkommene Ergänzung des bisher
Bekannten geworden. Es ist eine glücklicherweise durch einen Index erschlos-
sene Fundgrube zu einem zentralen Thema, das nicht nur das Interesse des
Philosophiehistorikers verdient. Booth ist zu einer differenzierenden Schau
des bekannten Materials gekommen.
Es ist typisch für Aristoteles gewesen, dass er seine Untersuchungen
methodisch mit der Aporie, mit dem Hinweis auf die Gleichheit konträrer

edward booth, aristotelian aporetic ontology (1983) 759
Argumente beginnt. Eine seiner Aporien ist die Identifikation der Universa-
lien/des Allgemeinen mit den Partikularien/dem Besonderen auf der einen
Seite und die | These von der Unabhängigkeit der Partikularien auf der ande- 144
ren Seite: Das Besondere des Allgemeinen muss im Besonderen sowohl aner-
kannt als auch geleugnet werden. Booth geht nicht auf den sokratischen
Ursprung der aristotelischen Aporie ein. Die Aporie ist für die Diskussionen
nach Aristoteles nicht mehr essentiell gewesen. Man betont – vereinfacht
ausgedrückt – entweder stärker das Besondere (Aristoteles) oder das All-
gemeine (Platon). Oder man kommt in der Abwägung beider Aspekte und
unter Einbeziehung neuplatonischer Elemente zur Unterscheidung zwischen
göttlich verursachter essentia auf der einen Seite und existentia auf der ande-
ren, wobei der aristotelische Gedanke vom Vorhandensein des Allgemeinen
durch das Vorhandensein des Besonderen dominiert (Fārābī). Das plotinisch-
proklische Element sieht Booth bei Ibn Sīnā und bei Ibn Rušd zuguns-
ten einer modifizierten aristotelisch-peripatetischen Position zurückgedrängt,
während es ähnlich der christlich-hellenistischen Philosophie bei Albertus
Magnus und Thomas von Aquin überwiegt.
Booths Klassifikationen sind sicherlich hilfreich für eine mehr system-
orientierte Betrachtungsweise. Man sollte sich jedoch bewusst bleiben, dass
der Befund bei ein- und demselben Philosophen nicht immer widerspruchs-
frei ist. Dies mag durch die benützten Quellen verursacht sein. So verdankt Ibn
Sīnā einem Fārābī entscheidende Anregungen. Es ist denkbar, dass Fārābīs
im Sinne des Neuplatonismus modifizierter Aristotelismus auch Ibn Sīnā
geprägt hat: Man vergleiche Booths Äußerungen auf S. 125 f., wo m.E. die Rolle
des intellectus agens bei Ibn Sīnā unterschätzt wird (“the role of the agent
intellect could only be that of instrumental cause”). Hier wird die Analyse der
Texte, ihrer Quellen und ihres philosophiegeschichtlichen Standortes zu teil-
weise anderen Resultaten kommen können. Z.B. die von Booth (S. 99 Anm. 23
nach Mohammed-Hassan Sahebozzamani) genannte Beschreibung der
Religion als “philosophy simplified for the masses by analogy and allegory” ist
nicht richtig. Für Fārābī ist die Religion die nachahmende Verwirklichung der
Philosophie, der Universalia. In einer originellen Weise und unter Einbezie-
hung des aristotelischen erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunktes von der Inter-
dependenz von Wahrnehmung und Denken (welche generell bei Booth zu
kurz kommt), sowie des aristotelischen Wechselverhältnisses von Theorie und
Praxis, wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und sittlicher Einsicht, lässt Fārābī die
Universalia verwirklicht sein durch die Partikularia. Das Allgemeine wird durch
das Besondere realisiert und das Besondere ist eine “Nachahmung” des Allge-
meinen: Vgl. Hans Daiber, “The Problem of Teaching Philosophy to the Citi-
zen: al-Fārābī’s Solution”, Vortrag, gehalten während der “Vth International Phi-
760 chapter 45
losophy Conference on Philosophy & Mass-Man”, Cairo 12–15 November 1983,

und während der “Philosophy Conference in honour of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī”,
Tehran 13–17 November 1983. = Persische Übersetzung in H. Daiber, From the
Greeks to the Arabs II/19. = H. Daiber, “The Ruler as Philosopher. A new inter-
pretation of al-Fārābī’s view”. MNAW.L n.r. 49/4, 1986, S. 128–149. = H. Daiber,
Abschließend noch einige Bemerkungen und Ergänzungen:

In Booth S. 62 unten: Die Definition des genus durch Michel der Inter-
pret (Baḏōqā Michael) entspricht der ersten der drei Arten des genus nach
Porphyrius, Isagoge, ed. Adolfus Busse, Berlin 1887. = CAG IV/1, S. 1, 18 ff. –
Zu den syrischen Quellen wäre auch ein Vergleich mit Johannes Damasce-
nus’ Dialectica und mit Gerhard Richter, Die Dialektik des Johannes von
Damaskus. Ettal 1964. = Studia Patristica et Byzantina 10, nützlich gewesen.
Booth S. 82: Den Nestorianer Theodor Bar Konī würde ich nicht als “Phi-
losophen” bezeichnen.
Booth S. 100: “Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle” ist ein von Muhsin
Mahdi gewählter Titel einer Sammlung von Fārābī-Texten in englischer
145 Übersetzung (Ithaca/New York | 21969) und nicht der zweite Teil von Fārābīs
Buch “The Attainment of Happiness”, welches im arabischen Original von
Ǧaʿfar Āl Yāsīn 1981 in Beirut neu herausgegeben worden ist.
Booth S. 106: Zur Unterscheidung von essentia und existentia bei Fārābī,
Ibn Sīnā und Suhrawardī vgl. Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality
of Existence, Tokyo 1971. = Studies in the Humanities and Social Relations XIII,
S. 86ff.
Booth S. 122: Die Erklärung von inniyya als Lehnübersetzung von syri-
schem aynāyūṯā scheint mir nicht so sicher; hiermit lassen sich m.E. schwer-
lich Fārābīs Erklärungen des Terminus in seinem Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. Muhsin
Mahdi, Beirut 1970, S. 61, 8ff., vereinbaren.
Booth S. 127 und ff. zu Ġazālī: Vgl. auch Muhammad Yasin El-Taher
Uraibi, Al-Ghazalis Aporien im Zusammenhang mit dem Kausalproblem. Diss.
Bonn 1972.
Booth S. 278: Kindīs “Treatise on Definitions” ist mit Kommentar und Über-
setzung neu herausgegeben worden von Felix Klein-Franke in Le Muséon
95, 1982, S. 191–216; Kindīs Abhandlungen “On First Philosophy” und “On the
True, First and Perfect Agent (etc.)” ist von Abū Rīda 1978 in Kairo neu heraus-
gegeben worden.
Booth S. 279: Die arabische Bearbeitung von Aristoteles’ Physik ist von
ʿAbd Ar-Raḥmān Badawī 1964–1965 in Kairo herausgegeben worden.
Booth S. 281: Averroes’ Talḫīṣ Kitāb al-Maqūlāt ist 1980 in Kairo von
Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim, Charles Butterworth und Aḥmad
edward booth, aristotelian aporetic ontology (1983) 761
ʿAbd al-Magīd Harīdī herausgegeben worden. Dieselben haben 1981 Aver-

roes’ Talḫīṣ Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿibāra publiziert. Beide Texte wurden 1982 in
Beirut von Ǧīrār Ǧihāmī (in Talḫīṣ manṭiq Arisṭū) herausgegeben. Letztere
Ausgaben enthalten alle “mittleren Kommentare” zu Aristoteles’ Logik.
Booth S. 283: Averroes’ Treatise on the Union of the Agent Intellect with
Man ist mit dem Kommentar des Narboni nebst englischer Übersetzung von
Kalman P. Bland herausgegeben worden: The Epistle of the Possibility of Con-
junction with the Active Intellect. New York 1982.
Booth S. 286: Die pseud-aristotelische Theologie ist zu Beginn des 16. Jh.
von Moses Rovas nicht ins Lateinische, sondern ins Italienische übersetzt
worden. Die lateinische Version ist eine von Petrus Nicolaus Castellani
stammende Bearbeitung, welche die nach dem Arabischen angefertigte italie-
nische Übersetzung des Moses Rovas herangezogen hat: s. Salomon Munk,
Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe. Paris 1859, S. 248; Moritz Stein-
schneider, Die europäischen Übersetzungen aus dem Arabischen bis Mitte des
17. Jahrhunderts. Graz 1956, S. 59 Nr. 92; Bernd Roling, Aristotelische Natur-
philosophie und christliche Kabbalah im Werk des Paulus Ritus. Tübingen 2007,
S. 380 Anm. 15 und dort gegebene Hinweise. – Man vermisst den von ʿabd ar-
Raḥmān Badawī in Aflūṭīn ʿind al-ʿArab, Kairo 1955, Kuweit 31977, sowie von
Friederich Dieterici nebst Übersetzung in Leipzig 1882–1883 / Nachdr. Hil-
desheim 1969 herausgegebenen Text der pseud-aristotelischen Theologie.
Booth S. 289 oben: Der zuerst genannte Aufsatz von Georges C. Ana-
wati ist in dessen Études de philosophie musulmane, Paris 1974, S. 229–262,
wiederabgedruckt worden.
Booth S. 296, -3: Der Aufsatz von Isaac Husik ist fortgesetzt worden in
Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut. Ed. S. W. Baron and Alexander
Marx. New York 1935, S. 370–378.
Booth S. 297, 13 lies Rashed.
Booth S. 303: Die genannten Aufsätze von Harry Austryn Wolfson
sind in dessen Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion I, Cambridge,
Mass. 1973, wieder abgedruckt worden.
Republished from Der Islam 62, 1985, S. 143–145. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 46
Toshihiko Izutsu
The Concept and Reality of Existence (1971)
Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence. Tokyo 1971: The Keio
Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies. II, 167 S. (Studies in the Humanities
and Social Relations Vol. XIII).
Das Buch enthält vier Beiträge zur Geschichte des Begriffes wuǧūd “Existenz”
mit besonderem Schwergewicht auf der späteren persischen Philosophie. Der
Hauptteil des Werkes (S. 57–149) befasst sich mit dem Existenzbegriff des per-
sischen Mystikers und Philosophen Sabzawārī (gest. 1289/1873) nach dessen
Abhandlung Šarṭ-i manẓūme und dessen Vorgängers Mullā Ṣadrā (ca. 979/
1571 oder 980/1572–1050/1640). Izutsu strebt eine Darstellung der “Struktur”
von Sabzawārīs Metaphysik an. Er geht von dem bei Sabzawārī zentralen
Existenzbegriff aus, wobei er strukurelle Übereinstimmungen zwischen Phi-
177 losophien von Orient – des islamisch|-iranischen Kulturkreises, sowie (S. 39–
41) von Advaita Vedanta, Taoismus und Mahayana Buddhismus – und Okzi-
dent, d.h. Heidegger und Sartre, aufzuzeigen sucht. Sein Buch soll ein
Beitrag zur “metaphilosophy” (S. 36) sein. Izutsu hält trotz der von ihm aus-
drücklich betonten Unterschiedlichkeit des westlichen Existentialismus und
des islamisch-iranischen Existenzbegriffes – Izutsu spricht missverständlich
von “Iranian existentialism” – einen Vergleich beider Philosophien für möglich.
Obzwar die islamisch-iranische Philosophie nicht das Problem der persönli-
chen Existenz des Menschen behandelt, so besteht die Ähnlichkeit der Struktur
beider darin, dass – v.a. in Sabzawārīs Metaphysik – “die Realität der Exis-
tenz” (aṣālat al-wuǧūd) in den Blickpunkt des Interesses rückt und im Gegen-
satz zur aristotelischen Ontologie nicht das Seiende, sondern allein “das Sein”
(al-wuǧūd) für etwas Wirkliches gilt. Sabzawārīs Vorläufer Mullā Ṣadrā
zeigt sich hier von den Mystikern Šihāb ad-Dīn as-Suhrawardī, welcher
die Existenz als ein metaphysisches “Licht” (nūr) betrachtet, und Ibn ʿArabī
beeinflusst (S. 129f. und 137f.; vgl. S. 38 und 63f.). Unter dem Einfluss der Mys-
tik hat Sabzawārī die Lehre entwickelt, dass die “Realität der Existenz” dem
menschlichen Verstand verborgen bleibt und nur in einer Art unio mystica “at
the level of supra consciousness” (S. 85) erfassbar ist. Die bei Sabzawārī nach-
weisbare Unterscheidung zwischen essentia (māhiyya / quidditas) und existen-
tia klingt unter aristotelischem Einfluss bereits bei Fārābī an (vgl. S. 86 ff.)

toshihiko izutsu, the concept and reality of existence (1971) 763
und wurde von Ibn Sīnā übernommen, welcher sie aber für eine begriffliche
Unterscheidung hält (S. 95–99; vgl. S. 70–72) und die Existenz als ein speziel-
les, notwendiges Akzidens des Existierenden betrachtet (vgl. S. 38 und 118 f.).
Ibn Sīnās genannte These einer begrifflichen Unterscheidung modifizieren
Mullā Ṣadrā und danach Sabzawārī in der Weise, dass nur “die Existenz”
(al-wuǧūd) als etwas “Reales” (aṣīl) und die quidditas (al-māhiyya) als etwas “im
Verstand Gegebenes” (iʿtibārī) gilt (S. 100 und 103ff.) – im Gegensatz zu Šihāb
ad-Dīn as-Suhrawardī, für welchen umgekehrt die quidditas etwas Reales
ist. – Existenz und Existierendes sind für beide trotz der Vielheit eine einzige
einheitliche Realität in einer Art coincidentia oppositorum.
Toshihiko Izutsus anregendes und instruktives Buch hat einige Grundli-
nien aus der verwirrenden Vielfalt der vorhandenen Gedanken herausgearbei-
tet, die sich einer schwierigen Terminologie bedienen. Da die Untersuchung
ihr Schwergewicht auf das Erfassen von Strukturen legt, kommt bedauerlicher-
weise die Vorgeschichte des Existenzbegriffes im islamischen Bereich im Gan-
zen doch zu kurz. Hier wird man manches in Detailarbeit genauer herausarbei-
ten, ergänzen und modifizieren können. So nützlich methodisch gesehen eine
Strukturanalyse ist, weil sie ein besseres Verständnis ermöglicht und einem
alten Vorurteil entgegentritt, aus Ähnlichkeiten voreilig auf eine Deszendenz
schließen zu müssen, anstatt die Möglichkeit einer Konvergenz ins Auge zu
fassen – so gefährlich ist es auch, nur gleichsam Überzeitliches, Gemeinsames
zu sehen und nicht in der Herausarbeitung spezieller Nuancen und Akzentver-
schiebungen auch die Wirkungsgeschichte bestimmter Ideen in ihrer Komple-
xität innerhalb eines begrenzten Kulturbereiches zu verfolgen.
Zum Schluss noch einige Anmerkungen:

– Man vermisst einen Hinweis auf den Terminus inniyya / anniyya “entitas”
(bezeichnet wie der Terminus wuǧūd ursprünglich den Gegensatz zu mā-
hiyya “quidditas”).
– Ferner vermisst man einen Hinweis auf den Gedanken der analogia entis
in der islamischen Mystik (z.B. Ibn ʿArabī, aber auch Ġazālī), der – als
solcher aber nicht erkannt – S. 45 nur kurz angedeutet ist. Er zeigt, dass
bei den islamischen Mystikern die Realität der Existenz der Realität Gottes
entspricht. Für Ġazālī z.B. ist daher Gott “die Existenz (al|-wuǧūd) ohne 178
quidditas (māhiyya)”, welche nicht mit dem Verstand erfasst werden könne
(Ġazālī, Muqaddimat Tahāfut al-falāsifa al-musammāt Maqāṣid al-falāsifa.
Ed. Sulaymān Dunyā. Kairo 1961, S. 251, -7f. und 251, 12 f.).
– S. 6 Anm. 3 lies naqd (statt nadq).
– S. 39f.: Zum Advaita vgl. hier auch die vergleichende Studie von J. Frits
Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism. Madras 1961. = Madras University Philo-
sophical Series 10.
764 chapter 46
– Der S. 65 erwähnte Gedanke der Einheit von ʿāqil, maʿqūl und ʿaql in Gott –
leider ist, wie öfters, hierfür keine Belegstelle aus Mullā Ṣadrā angege-
ben! – begegnet auch bei Ibn Sīnā, an-Naǧāt. Kairo 21357/1938, S. 243 und
245; ferner Louis Gardet, La connaissance mystique chez Ibn Sīnā et ses
présupposés philosophiques. Le Caire 1952. = Mémorial Avicenne II, S. 29 f.,
und ist ursprünglich aristotelisch: Vgl. Aristoteles, Metaphysik XII 7 und
9, bes. 1074 b 34–35.
– Zu S. 92 Anm. 65: Streiche “ed. Sulaymân Dunyâ [etc.]”: Die genannte Stel-
lenangabe Bd. II, S. 80, bezieht sich auf Simon van den Berghs engl. Über-
setzung von Averroes’ Tahāfut at-tahāfut.
– Zu S. 92 Anm. 65: Zu Fārābīs Terminologie huwiyya = wuǧūd vgl. auch
Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf. Ed. Muḥsin Mahdī. Beirut 1969. = Recherches
publiées sous la direction de l’Institut des Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, sér. I,
t. 46, S. 112, 17ff. und 113, 6f.
Toshihiko Izutsus Buch ist dankenswerterweise mit Indices versehen und

zur Erstorientierung auch einem weiteren Leserkreis zu empfehlen.
Republished from Der Islam 50, 1973, pp. 176–178. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 47
Richard Walzer (ed. and transl.)

Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (1985)
Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ
ārā ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila. A revised text with introduction, translation and
commentary by Richard Walzer. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985. 569 S.
Der islamische Philosoph Fārābī (gest. 339/950 oder 951) ist ein origineller
Denker gewesen. Bis heute sind von ihm zahlreiche Texte noch nicht oder
nur unzureichend herausgegeben und übersetzt worden. Lediglich ein Text
wurde mehrmals ediert und ins Deutsche, Türkische, Französische1 und Spa-
nische (s. R. Walzer S. 33)2 sowie ins Russische (in Filosofskii traky, übers.
v. Šachmardan Esenovič, Alma Ata 1970) und Persische (Andīšahā-i ahl-i
madīna-i fāḍila, bearb. v. Sayyid Ǧaʿfar Saǧǧādī, Teheran 1975) übersetzt.
Mit Richard Walzers posthum von Gerhard Endress herausgegebener
Übersetzung wird Fārābīs Lehre zum ersten Mal dem englischen Leserkreis
zugänglich gemacht. Außerdem werden wir mit einer zuverlässigen textkriti-
schen Ausgabe beschenkt.
Richard Walzer hat sich auf 11 Hss. gestützt, die er in drei Gruppen ein-
teilen kann und die aus dem 11., 13., 15., 17., 18. und 20. Jh. stammen. Zwei von
Walzer nicht herangezogene Hss. in Leningrad und Taschkent sind Walzer,
S. 29 genannt; 9 weitere Hss. werden von Ḥusayn ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ und Ǧaʿfar
Āl Yāsīn, Muʾallafāt al-Fārābī, Bagdad 1975, S. 340 aufgezählt; hinzuzufügen
ist noch Andhra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (früher:
Āṣafīya), Falsafa 63 | (= Arab. 371; geschr. 1023/1614), fol. 93 v–120 v. Diese Hss. 210
dürften wohl kaum das von Walzer erzielte Resultat essentiell modifizieren.
Gegenüber den früheren Ausgaben (Friedrich Heinrich Dieterici 1895;
Kairo 1905, 1906, 1948, 1961; R. P. Jaussen, Youssef W. Karam und J. Chlala
1949; Albert Nasri Nader 1959) kann Walzer verbesserte Lesarten bie-
ten und Zweifel über die Richtigkeit des Befundes aus dem Wege räumen. Wir
haben jetzt eine solide Basis für ein sehr komprimiert geschriebenes und nicht
immer leicht zu verstehendes Alterswerk Fārābīs über politische Philosophie.
1 S. Nicholas Rescher, Al-Fārābī. An Annotated Bibliography. Pittsburgh 1962, S. 47.

2 Manuel Alonso Alonsos spanische Übersetzung wurde mit zusätzlicher Einleitung neu
hrsg. v. Miguel Cruz Hernandez, Madrid 1985.

766 chapter 47
Schwierigkeiten der Interpretation, aber auch die Bedeutung des Textes für
die islamische und außerislamische Philosophiegeschichte rechtfertigen daher
voll und ganz den ausführlichen Kommentar, den Walzer Text und Überset-
zung folgen lässt (S. 337–503). Dort wird in meistens erschöpfender Weise auf
vergleichbares Material in Antike, Hellenismus und Islam verwiesen, freilich
ohne immer die Frage nach dem direkten historischen Zusammenhang zu stel-
len. In einzelnen Fällen der Übersetzung und Interpretation sind abweichende
Lösungen möglich: z.B. S. 246, 2f. ṯumma an yakūna maʿa ḏālika lahū qudra-
tun bi-lisānihī ʿalā ǧūdati t-taḫyīli bi-l-qawli li-kulli mā yaʿlamuhū heißt nicht
“moreover, he should be a good orator and able to rouse (other’s people’s)
imagination by well-chosen words”, sondern “außerdem soll er sprachlich in
der Lage sein, all sein Wissen auf vortreffliche Weise in Worten wiederzuge-
ben”; taḫyīl bedeutet hier dasselbe wie taṣwīr / taṣawwur. – Auch in der Inter-
pretation des Inhaltes ist es möglich, zu anderen Ergebnissen zu kommen.
Richard Walzer neigt dazu, Gedanken, die nicht in den bekannten grie-
chischen Quellen belegbar sind, auf verlorene hellenistische Texte zurückzu-
führen. Er unterschätzt hierbei den eigenen Beitrag eines Philosophen vom
Formate Fārābīs, der nicht nur ein guter Kenner platonischer, aristotelischer
und neuplatonischer Lehren gewesen ist, sondern auch selbständig weiterge-
dacht und kombiniert hat. Ein zentrales Beispiel scheint mir Fārābīs Lehre
von der Nachahmung zu sein, worin unter Heranziehung von Alexander
von Aphrodisias’ Kommentar zu Aristoteles’De anima Gedankensplitter
aus Aristoteles’ De anima, Nikomachische Ethik und Parva naturalia sowie
aus Galen kombiniert erscheinen. Vgl. hierzu Hans Daiber, Prophetie und
Ethik bei Fārābī (gest. 339/950). In L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. Actes
du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale (30 août–4 sep-
tembre 1982). Ed. par Christian Wenin. Louvain-la-Neuve II, 1986. = Philo-
sophes médiévaux XXVII (S. 729–753), S. 729ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks
to the Arabs II/17. – H. Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpreta-
tion of al-Fārābī’s view”. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York 1986. In MNAW.L n.r.
49/4, S. 128–149. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/18. – H. Dai-
ber, Semitische Sprachen als Kulturvermittler zwischen Antike und Mittel-
alter. In ZDMG 136, 1986, S. 311f. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
I/1.
Mit diesen Hinweisen sei keineswegs das Verdienst von Richard Walzers
letztem opus magnum geschmälert. Sie möchten lediglich den Leser darauf auf-
merksam machen, dass die Schwierigkeiten des Textes und die Komplexität
der Gedanken den Rückgriff auf das Original nicht überflüssig machen. Wer
hier weiterkommen will, hat im vorliegenden Buch ein vorzügliches und durch
Indices gut erschlossenes Nachschlagewerk.
richard walzer, al-farabi on the perfect state (1985) 767
An Kleinigkeiten habe ich noch notiert: S. 22 Anm. 27: Die arabische Über-
setzung von Theophrastus’ Metaphysik hat Ilai Alon mit engl. Übersetzung
hrsg. in JSAI 6, 1985, S. 163–217. Sie ist jetzt ersetzt durch die Neuausgabe von
Dimitri Gutas, Theophrastus On First Principles (Known as his Metaphysics).
Leiden 2010. = PhAnt 119. – In Richard Walzers Kommentar zu Fārābīs
Erörterungen über die erste Ursache hätte man noch auf Proclus’ Institu-
tio theologica bzw. auf die pseud-aristotelische Theologie verweisen können,
die Fārābī gekannt hat: s. Fritz W. Zimmermann in Pseudo-Aristotle in the
Middle Ages: The Theology and other Texts. London 1986. = Warburg Institute
Surveys and Texts XI, S. 128ff. und 177ff. – S. 371 Anm. 221: Zu hayūlā für ὕλη
vgl. Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus. Wiesbaden 1980, S. 44. – | S. 506 und 513: 211
Lies H(endrik) J(oan) Drossaart Lulofs. – S. 512: Eine überarbeitete und
erweiterte Version meiner dort genannten Dissertation erschien unter dem
Titel Aetius Arabus (s.o.). – S. 540: Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Plurality
of Immovable Movers in Aristotle, Averroes and St. Thomas (so ist zu lesen) ist
wieder abgedruckt worden in Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies in the His-
tory of Philosophy and Religion I. Cambridge 1973, S. 1–21.
A reprint appeared Chicago 1998. – On the translations of Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ s.

Hans Daiber, BIPh I, pp. 292f., and on studies s. BIPh II and Supplement s.n.
Fārābī, Mabādiʾ. – A new German translation, with commentary and analysis,
is published by Cleophea Ferrari, Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī – Die Prinzipien der
Ansichten der Bewohner der vortrefflichen Stadt. Stuttgart 2009.
Republished, with some corrections, from Die Welt des Islams XXIX, 1989, pp. 209–211.
chapter 48
Shukri B. Abed
Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in
Alfārābī (1991)
Shukri B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Alfārābī. Al-
bany: State University of New York Press 1991. XVI, 201 S.
Als Schüler des Grammatikers Abū Bakr as-Sarrāǧ und unter dem Eindruck
zeitgenössischer Diskussionen, v.a zwischen dem Grammatiker Abū Saʿīd as-
Sīrāfi und dem christlichen Übersetzer Abū Bišr Mattā im Jahre 320/932, über
das Verhältnis von Logik und Sprache, hat Fārābī zum ersten Male die Sprach-
philosophie in das Arabische eingeführt und ist damit wegweisend für spätere
Grammatiker geworden. Fārābī folgt einerseits Sīrāfīs These vom Zusammen-
hang von Sprache und (nicht universeller) Logik, andererseits lässt er sich von
Abū Bišrs Annahme einer universellen Logik leiten, die Abū Bišr zufolge aller-
dings nicht der Sprache bedarf. Fārābī geht von “Prototypen” (miṯāl awwal)
der Sprache aus, von universellen Intelligibilia, die sich in jeder Sprache, auch
im Arabischen, widerspiegeln, am vollkommensten in der philosophisch-
383 logischen Sprache, die der | Rhetorik und Poetik überlegen sei. Fārābī ist v.a. in
seinem Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq und in seinem Kitāb al-Ḥurūf
darum bemüht, aristotelische Logik und arabische Sprache als harmonische
Verbindung zu präsentieren, indem er aristotelische Logikterminologie in ara-
bischem Kontext bietet. Diese hat Shukri Abed in einer sorgfältigen Beschrei-
bung zusammengestellt und analysiert: Kap. 1–5 bieten eine Zusammenfas-
sung von Fārābīs Logik-Lexikon. Das dann folgende Schlusskapitel beschreibt
Fārābīs Sprachphilosophie, angewandt auf die arabische Grammatik. Fārābī
geht hier von aristotelischen Begriffen (bes. vom Begriff der Zeit) aus und kri-
tisiert Grammatiker seiner Zeit, besonders die Schule von Kufa und ihren Ver-
treter Sīrāfī. Trotz unterschiedlicher grammatischer Strukturen einzelner Spra-
chen gibt es Fārābī zufolge eine allen Sprachen gemeinsame logische Denk-
struktur. Sie findet ihren vollkommensten Ausdruck in der Definition, in der
Identifikation von Dingen unter Rückgriff auf Universalien. Diese entwickelt
Fārābī nach dem Vorbild von Aristoteles’ Kategorien und Porphyrius’ Isagoge,
wobei in der Diskussion des Verhältnisses der Partikularien zu den Univer-
salien Abed zusätzliche Anleihen aus Aristoteles’ Analytica priora, Analytica
posteriora, De interpretatione, Topica, Physica und Metaphysica nachgewiesen

shukri b. abed, aristotelian logic and the arabic language (1991) 769
hat. Diskutiert werden die aristotelisch-porphyrianischen Prädikamente ḥadd,

rasm, “Wesen” und mawǧūd sowie die Rolle der vier aristotelischen Ursachen,
die syllogistische Beweisführung, Einteilung und Klassifikation in der Defini-
tion. Interessant ist der Nachweis, dass für Fārābī nur das realiter “Existie-
rende” (mawǧūd) essentia (māhiyya) hat und wahr ist; māhiyya ist nicht nur
ein gedanklicher Begriff, sondern impliziert die Frage nach der aristotelischen
μορφή und ihrem Träger, der ὕλη (Abed, S. 79). Gerne hätte man mehr zu
Abeds Erklärung S. 72 “It is only by imitation that God is the subject of pre-
dication of anything” erfahren. Wie können gleichzeitig alle als solche defi-
nierbaren seienden Dinge aus Gottes nicht in Kategorien fassbarer ǧawhar
(Substanz) emanieren? Übrigens ist es entgegen Abed, S. 113, nicht überra-
schend, dass Fārābī den Begriff des “Vakuums” (ḫalāʾ) als Beispiel für seine
Definition von “falsch” verwendet. Fārābī geht wie Aristoteles von der Nicht-
existenz des Vakuums aus und hat dies zum Thema einer kleinen Abhand-
lung gemacht: s. Hans Daiber, Fārābīs Abhandlung über das Vakuum. In
Der Islam 60, 1983, S. 37–47. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs III
B/7.
Shukri Abeds anregende Studie, die mit einem Index ausgestattet ist, wird
sich als nützlich erweisen für jeden, der sich mit Fārābīs Logik beschäftigt. Wei-
tere, hiermit zusammenhängende Fragen, sowie die Bedeutung von Fārābīs
Sprachphilosophie für seine Metaphysik und politische Philosophie sind aus-
geklammert. Leider hat Shukri Abed nicht Deborah L. Black, Logic and
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy. Leiden 1990. =
IPTS 7 heranziehen können. – Manche Überschneidungen gibt es mit Salim
Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna. Leiden/New York (etc.) 1991. =
IPTS 9. – Auf S. 140 vermisst man die nur arabisch erhaltene Abhandlung des
Alexander von Aphrodisias, veröffentlicht von Albert Dietrich, Die arabi-
sche Version einer unbekannten Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die
Differentia specifica. = NAWG, Philol.-hist. KI. 1964, Nr. 2. – In diesem Zusam-
menhang hätte die im Arabischen nachwirkende alexandrinische Dihairesis-
literatur Berücksichtigung finden müssen. Diese beschäftigte sich mit dem
Problem der Definition und unterschied, wie Fārābī (Abed hat hierauf nicht
hingewiesen), zwischen Definition und Beschreibung, sowie zwischen voll-
ständiger und unvollständiger Definition: s. Christel Hein, Definition und
Einteilung der Philosophie. Von der spätantiken Einleitungsliteratur zur arabi-
schen Enzyklopädie. Frankfurt/Bern/New York 1985, S. 72ff. – In der von Shukri
Abed herangezogenen Literatur ist mir schließlich aufgefallen, dass Nicho-
las | Reschers Veröffentlichungen, nämlich Al-Fārābī’s Short Commentary 384
on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics und Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (beide
Pittsburgh, Pa. 1963), nicht erwähnt sind. Zu Nicholas Rescher und seinen
770 chapter 48
Resultaten zu Fārābī s. Seymour Feldmann, Rescher on Arabic Logic. In The

Journal of Philosophy 61, 1964 (S. 711–734), S. 726ff.
Republished, with some changes, from ZDMG 142, 1992, pp. 382–384. By courtesy of the
publisher.
chapter 49
Joel L. Kraemer
Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam (1986)
Joel L. Kraemer, Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam. Abū Sulaymān al-

Sijistānī and his Circle. Leiden 1986: E. J. Brill. XVI, 354 S. – (The Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies: The Shiloah Institute, Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, Bd. VIII). – hfl. 140.–
Das Tolerieren einer Vielzahl von Minderheiten und ihrer Lehren ist Teil der
Politik ismailitischer Kreise Irans zu Beginn des 10. Jahrhunderts AD. Ein bered-
tes Dokument hierfür ist Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzīs Protokoll seines Streitgesprächs
mit dem Arzt und Philosophen Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī zwischen 930 und 932AD,
sein Aʿlām an-nubuwwa, das Salah Al-Sawy, Teheran 1977 und zusammen
mit einer engl. Übersetzung Tarif Khalidi 2011 in Provo, Utah veröffentlichte.
Diese Politik der Offenheit findet einen ruhmvollen Abschluss unter den Buy-
iden (945–1055AD). Joel L. Kraemer hat sie in seinem Buch Humanism in the
Renaissance of Islam, Leiden 1986 (vgl. Rez. Berthold Spuler in Der Islam 46,
1987, S. 330f.) ausführlich und mit vielen neuen Details beschrieben.
Für die Philosophiegeschichte besonders ergiebig ist die Überlieferung über
Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī und seine “Schule”. Ihr hat Kraemer das hier zu
besprechende Buch gewidmet und damit den Inhalt seiner 1967 an der Yale
University, New Haven, abgeschlossenen Dissertation Abū Sulaymān as-Sijista-
ni. A Muslim Philosopher of the Tenth Century in überarbeiteter und erweiterter
Form einem größeren Leserkreis zugänglich gemacht. In minutiöser Kleinar-
beit werden über Abū Sulaymān und seinen Kreis alle Angaben aus den ein-
schlägigen biobibliographischen Quellen gesammelt, interpretiert und für die
Geistesgeschichte jener Zeit ausgewertet. Hauptquelle ist der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma,
auch wenn er uns nur in späteren Bearbeitungen erhalten ist und in der vor-
liegenden Form nicht von Abū Sulaymān selbst stammt, sondern in späteren
Schülerkreisen kompiliert worden sein mag: Vgl. Joel L. Kraemer, S. 119 ff.;
Hans Daiber, Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī
in der Forschung. In Arabica 31, 1984 (S. 36–68), S. 40 f. = H. Daiber, From the
Für Abū Sulaymāns Lehren und Themen seiner Diskussionen sind die Muqā-
basāt und das Kitāb al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa seines Lehrers Abū Ḥayyān at-
Tawḥīdī maßgebend; ferner die erhaltenen und von J. L. Kraemer (S. 274–

772 chapter 49
312) in kommentierter englischer Übersetzung vorgelegten Abhandlungen Fī

l-muḥarrik al-awwal; Fī anna l-aǧrām al-ʿulwiyya ṭabīʿatuhā ṭabīʿa ḫāmisa; Fī l-
kamāl al-ḫāṣṣ bi-nawʿ al-insān. Von der Abhandlung Fī mabādiʾ al-mawǧūdāt
wird eine ausführliche Inhaltsübersicht gegeben (S. 306–310). Hier sei noch
eine bislang unberücksichtigt gebliebene fünfte Abhandlung genannt, die in
einer Lissaboner Hs. (Academia das Ciencias de Lisboa v. 292, fol. 51 r–55 r)
erhalten ist, nämlich die Maqāla fī l-aǧsām al-uwal al-arbaʿa llatī hiya n-nār wa-
l-hawāʾ wa-l-māʾ wa-l-arḍ. – Mit dieser Textgrundlage kann Kraemer (S. 136–
273) ein Bild von Abū Sulaymāns Philosophie und ihrem Hintergrund geben.
Als Schüler des Christen Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī ist Abū Sulaymān ein guter Kenner
aristotelischer und neuplatonischer Schriften. In der Diskussion zwischen Abū
Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus und Sīrāfī über Logik und Grammatik folgt er Abū Bišr
375 und Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī und schreibt den Griechen logisches Talent zu, das | phi-
lologische Talent jedoch den Arabern, deren Sprache ideal für philosophische
Spekulation sei.
In seiner Naturphilosphie bietet Abū Sulaymān im Wesentlichen das aristo-
telisch-ptolemäische Weltbild, wobei allerdings unaristotelische Elemente ein-
bezogen werden. Kraemer (S. 194f.) erwähnt Abū Sulaymāns Prinzip des
Magnetismus, wodurch die Sterne um die Sonne bewegt würden. Dieser Beleg,
der älteste bekannte seiner Art, dürfte auch für die Diskussion über die Erfin-
dung des Kompasses von Bedeutung sein. Vgl. zu Letzterem Edmund Oskar
von Lippmann, Geschichte der Magnetnadel bis zur Erfindung des Kompas-
ses (gegen 1300). In Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften
und der Medizin III/1, Berlin 1933, S. 1–49, bes. S. 15 ff.; Joseph Needham, Sci-
ence and Civilization in China IV/1. Cambridge 1962, S. 245 ff., und die in Lynn
White, Medieval Religion and Technology. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1978,
S. 8, Anm. 30, gegebenen Hinweise.
Das neuplatonische Erbe zeigt sich vor allem in Abū Sulaymāns Gotteslehre,
die den Einfluss der Terminologie arabischer Plotinschriften verrät. – Beach-
tenswert ist schließlich Abū Sulaymāns Behandlung des Verhältnisses der Phi-
losophie zur Religion, die von Fārābī angeregt gewesen sein wird und dessen
These von der Abhängigkeit des menschlichen Verstandes von der göttlichen
Offenbarung folgt (vgl. Kraemer, S. 230ff. und 241 ff.). – Joel L. Kraemers
Buch wird eine Fundgrube für den bleiben, der sich mit islamischer Geistesge-
schichte des 10. Jahrhunderts AD beschäftigt.
Nachfolgend einige Ergänzungen:

Kraemer, S. 179: Die Notiz, dass Abū Sulaymān mit dem Wezir Abū l-Faḍl
Ibn al-ʿAmīd über Fragen der aristotelischen Physik diskutiert habe, erklärt
die Vertrautheit Ibn al-ʿAmīds mit der aristotelischen Physik auch in seinem
Briefwechsel mit ʿAḍud ad-Dawla: Vgl. Hans Daiber, Naturwissenschaft bei
joel l. kraemer, philosophy in the renaissance of islam (1986) 773
den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Leiden/New York/Köln 1993. = IPTS 13,
S. 126f. (anknüpfend an Aristoteles, Physics IV 8. 215 a 25 ff.).
S. 208 Anm. 163: Die Angabe, dass der Muʿtazilite ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār sich mit
Alchemie beschäftigt habe, beruht vermutlich auf einer Verwechslung: Vgl.
Manfred Ullmann, Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam. Leiden
1972, S. 222.
S. 271 Anm. 294: Die Identität der von ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī herausge-
gebenen Abhandlung Fī l-istiṭāʿa mit Alexander von Aphrodisias’ Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ᾽
ἡμίν haben bereits Fritz W. Zimmermann und H. Vivian Brown, Neue ara-
bische Übersetzungstexte der spätantiken Philosophie. In Der Islam 50, 1973
(S. 313–324), S. 321, nachgewiesen.
S. 313: Die Abhandlungen des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Fī l-ʿināya, Fī l-
istiṭāʿa, Fī t-tadbīrāt al-falakiyya sind herausgegeben worden von Hans-
Jochen Ruland, Die arabischen Fassungen von zwei Schriften des Alexander
von Aphrodisias über die Vorsehung und über das liberum arbitrium. Diss. Saar-
brücken 1976.
S. 313: ʿĀmirī, al-Amad ʿalā l-abad ist von Everett K. Rowson 1979 in Beirut
ediert worden.
S. 314: Fārābi’s Mabādiʾ ārā ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila ist mit engl. Übersetzung
und ausführlichem Kommentar von Richard Walzer, Oxford 1985, neu hrsg.
worden.
S. 315: Ḥunayns Nawādir al-falāsifa, in der Redaktion des Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī
Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, sind von ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān
Badawī, Kuweit 1985, hrsg. worden.
S. 318: Die arabischen Übersetzungen von Aristoteles’ De mundo sind von
David Alan Brafman hrsg. worden: The Arabic De mundo: An edition with
translation and commentary. PhD Duke University 1985.
S. 319: Šahrazūrīs Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ erschien 1976 in Hyde-
rabad. – Weitere Editionen erschienen 1988 in Ṭarābulūs (ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm
ʿUmar Abū Šuwayrib) und 1993 in Alexandrien (ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Abū
Rayyān).
S. 320: Eine weitere Edition der Muqābasāt Tawḥīdīs besorgte ʿAlī Šalaq
1986 in Beirut.
S. 321: Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdīs Maqāla fī l-mawǧūdāt ist von Mübahat Türker hrsg.
worden in Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi 17, 1959,
S. 145–157. Sie ist identisch mit der von Kraemer fälschlich gesondert genann-
ten Maqāla fīmā intazaʿahū min Kitāb as-samāʿ aṭ-ṭabīʿī.
Republished, with some supplements, from Der Islam 66, 1989, pp. 374–375. By courtesy
of the publisher.
chapter 50
Constantine K. Zurayk
The Refinement of Character – A Translation from
the Arabic of Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad Miskawayh’s
Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (1968)
Constantine K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character. A translation from

the Arabic of Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq.
Beirut: American University of Beirut 1968. XXIII, 221 S. gr. 80 = Centennial
Publications, ed. by Fuʾād Sarrūf. $6.50; Lw. $ 8.
Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Miskawayh verfolgt mit seinem Werk Tahḏīb
al-aḫlāq, dessen englische Übersetzung Constantine K. Zurayk hier vor-
legt, einen didaktischen Zweck: Durch zunehmende Kenntnis der Seele den
Menschen so zu formen, dass alle seine Handlungen gut sind.
– Die angemessenen menschlichen Handlungen, durch welche man Glück-
seligkeit erlangt, stimmen mit der “Urteilskraft” und “Überlegung” überein
(bi-ḥasab tamyīzihī wa-rawiyyatihī. Ed. C. K. Zurayk. Beirut 1966, S. 14,
7). Daher hat die quwwa an-nāṭiqa (ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 16, 2), eine der
drei platonischen Seelenteile, den Vorrang – nämlich τὸ λογιστικόν neben
ὁ θυμός und τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; dazu Hermann Siebeck, Geschichte der Psy-
chologie I/1. Gotha 1880, p. 201ff. Die drei Vermögen der Seele bewirken
die vier platonischen Kardinaltugenden (vgl. Platon, Rep. IV 435 B ff.; Her-
371 mann Siebeck, | I/1, p. 237ff., und Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic.
Oxford 1962, S. 222) “Weisheit” (al-ḥikma = ἡ σοφία), “Mäßigkeit” (al-ʿiffa =
ἡ σωφροσύνη), “Mut” (aš-šaǧāʿa = ἡ ἀνδρεία) und “Gerechtigkeit” (al-ʿadāla =
ἡ δικαιοσύνη) (ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 16, 19) mit ihren jeweiligen Unterteilun-
gen (Übers. S. 17ff.) und ihrem Gegenteil. Um diese Tugenden zu erreichen,
braucht man die Hilfe der Mitmenschen (vgl. zu ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 29,
8, inna l-insān madanī bi-ṭ-ṭabʿ, Aristoteles Pol. I 1. 1253 a 2 ff.: ζῷον πολιτι-
κόν).
– Der Charakter des Menschen, d.h. sein Seelenzustand, ist nicht nur fertig
vorgeformt (ṭabīʿiyyan min aṣl al-mizāǧ), sondern kann durch “Gewohnheit”
und “Übung” gewonnen werden (mustafād bi-l-ʿāda wa-t-tadarrub, ed. C. K.
Zurayk, S. 31, 8). Das Ziel sind Wissen und damit Seelenruhe (ed. C. K.
Zurayk, S. 40, 5) und “charakterliche Vollkommenheit” (al-kamāl al-ḫulqī,

constantine k. zurayk, the refinement of character (1968) 775
ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 40, 9). Dass Tugend Wissen ist, hat in der Antike kei-
ner so sehr betont wie Sokrates: Vgl. Max Wundt, Der Intellektualismus
in der griechischen Ethik. Leipzig 1907, S. 47 ff. – Interessant ist die Notiz
(Übers. S. 45f.), dass Miskawayh in seiner Jugend ein verschwenderisches
Leben geführt habe. – Die höchste Stufe in der Glückseligkeit ist “die Stufe
der Engel” (ufq al-malāʾika, ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 69, 13).
– “Glückseligkeit” (as-saʿāda) ist das Ziel, das der Mensch durch Erwerb des
“Guten” (al-ḫayr) anstrebt. Miskawayh zählt verschiedene, aus der Antike
überlieferte Einteilungen auf (Übers. S. 70ff.; dazu Richard Walzer, S.
223f.). Wahre Glückseligkeit ist, in Übereinstimmung mit dem Neuplato-
nismus, nicht die Glückseligkeit des Körpers, sondern das Aufgehen in “die
Stufe der geistigen Dinge” (ar-rutbat al-ašyāʾ ar-rūḥāniyya, ed. C. K. Zurayk,
S. 83, ult.), wo der Mensch das überfließende “Licht” des Einen empfängt
(wa-yakūnu masrūran abadan … bi-mā yuḥaṣṣilu lahū dāʾiman min fayḍ nūr
al-awwal, ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 85, 8f.). Durch “Weisheit” (al-ḥikma) wird die
Seele erzogen und von “den physischen Dingen” und “Begierden der Kör-
per” (al-umūr aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya, šahawāt al-abdān, ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 91, 18 f.)
gereinigt. Daher bezeichnet Miskawayh (Übers. S. 81 ff.) sein Buch als Kitāb
aṭ-Ṭahāra “Das Buch der Reinigung (sc. der Seele)”. Vgl. Plotin, Enneade I 6:
Das Hässliche in der Seele ist eine Verunreinigung; zum Schönen gelangt
man durch “Reinigung”.
– Da die Tugenden die “Mitte” (wasaṭ) zwischen zwei Extremen sind (Übers.
S. 22ff. und 110f. wird Platon als Gewährsmann genannt), spielt die Tugend
der “Gerechtigkeit” (al-ʿadl), nämlich gegenüber Gott, den Mitmenschen
und Vorfahren (Übers. S. 106) eine große Rolle (vgl. Übers. S. 95 ff.). Wirk-
liche Gerechtigkeit besteht durch das vom Gesetz geregelte Erhalten “der
Gleichheit” (al-musāwāt, ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 113, 3). Hier ist, wie bereits
im Keim in der pythagoräischen Ethik und dann besonders bei Aristote-
les, die Tugend als die richtige “Mitte” (μεσότης) zwischen zwei Extremen
bestimmt. Die aristotelische Mesoteslehre ist durch Platon vorbereitet (vgl.
Hermann Siebeck, I/2, Gotha 1884, S. 109f. und S. 477 Anm. 1; aus|führlich 372
Hans Meyer, Platon und die aristotelische Ethik, München 1919, S. 76ff.). Ein
längerer, in dieser Gestalt im Griechischen (vgl. Aristoteles, Magna Moralia
und Eudemische Ethik) nicht erhaltener Mesotesabschnitt steht in der pseu-
doaristotelischen Schrift De virtutibus et vitiis, arab. Übers. des Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib.
Ed. Mechthild Kellermann, Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die
Tugend. Diss. Erlangen 1965, S. 59, 18–58, ult. (Übers. S. 77–79); vgl. Übers.
des Abū Qurra ebd., S. 39, 14–22 (Übers. S. 106 f.). – Zur Tugend der μεσότης
in der islamischen philosophischen Ethik vgl. noch Christoph Bürgel,
Adab und iʿtidāl in ar-Ruhāwīs Adab aṭ-ṭabīb. In ZDMG 117, 1967, S. 101. Wie
776 chapter 50
sie in besonderer Weise das an der klassisch-griechischen Paideia orientierte

ärztliche Bildungsideal des Isḥāq Ibn ʿAlī ar-Ruhāwī (9. Jh. AD) und dessen
adab- Verständnis bestimmte, zeigt der genannte Aufsatz.
– Die Harmonie der Menschen untereinander ist gewährleistet durch “Liebe”
und “Freundschaft” (al-maḥabba, aṣ-ṣadāqa; Übers. S. 123ff.), wovon ver-
schiedene Arten aufgezählt werden.
– Der letzte Abschnitt (Übers. S. 157ff.) bringt als Ausklang eine Anleitung
zur Erhaltung einer gesunden Seele. Geprägt von griechisch-hellenistischer
Ethik gibt Miskawayh einen Abriss der Tugendlehre. Miskawayh befolgt hier-
bei einen philosophischen Eklektizismus, indem er Platon und Aristoteles
in gleicher Weise wie Schulströmungen des späten Peripatos und der Aka-
demie, vor allem aber des Neuplatonismus verbindet.
Zu einzelnen Stellen sei noch Folgendes angemerkt:

– Die Einl. S. XI Anm. 2 genannte Edition des Miskawayhtextes durch Con-
stantine K. Zurayk basiert auf sechs Hss. Weitere Hss. existieren in Nad-
schaf, Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Ḥakīm 1279, und in der Privatbibliothek des
Dr. Ḥusayn Maḥfūẓ, al-Kāẓimiyya bei Bagdad, Nr. 12 (von Letzterer befin-
det sich ein Mikrofilm in der Maktaba al-Markaziyya der Universität Bag-
dad).
– Zu der Einl. S. XIV genannten Ausgabe von Miskawayhtexten durch Mo-
hammed Arkoun vgl. den Hinweis von Gerhard Endress bei Josef van
Ess in Der Islam 42, 1966, S. 168, wonach diese Texte Auszüge aus der Institu-
tio theologica des Proclus (nämlich Propositionen 15, 17, 21 und 54) enthalten.
– Der Vergleich der Sonnengröße mit der eines Fußes, S. 8 unten, findet sich
in den Placita philosophorum von Pseudo-Plutarch / Aetius. Ed. Herman-
nus Diels, Doxographi Graeci. Berlin 1879, S. 351, 11 f., und wird dort Heraklit
zugeschrieben. – Übers. S. 9 oben (ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 8, 1 f.) = Miskawayh,
al-Fawz al-aṣġar. Kairo 1319/1901, S. 40, 10.
– Zur Einteilung der “Güter” (al-ḫayrāt = τὰ ἀγαθά) in “edle” (aš-šarīfa = τίμια),
“lobenswerte” (mamdūḥa = ἐπαινετά), “nützliche” (nāfiʿa = ὠφέλιμα) und sol-
che “mit Wirkvermögen” (bi-l-quwwa vgl. δυνάμεις) S. 12 (ed. C. K. Zurayk,
S. 11, ult.; vgl. auch S. 70 = ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 76, 18–20) vgl. Stobaeus,
Eclogae VI 1, 13, 287, ed. August Meineke II, S. 81, 26, und Alexander von
Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria. Ed. Max Wal-
lies in CAG II/2, Berlin 1891, S. 242, 1ff., und dazu Hermannus Mutsch-
mann (Hrsg.), Divisiones quae vulgo dicuntur Aristoteleae. Lipsiae 1907, Einl.
S. XXIVf. – Fehmi Jadaane, L’influence du stoicisme sur la pensée musul-
mane. Beyrouth 1968. = Rech.ILO, nouv. sér. I 41, S. 191, sieht in der Aufzählung
stoischen Einfluss, was jedoch nicht überzeugt.
constantine k. zurayk, the refinement of character (1968) 777
– Zu S. 16: Zur Definition von ḥikma als “Wissen der göttlichen und mensch-
lichen Dinge” vgl. Aetius, Placita philosophorum I, Prooem. 2 (Hermann
Diels, Doxographi Graeci, S. 273, 11–13) und | dazu Hans Daiber, Aetius 373
Arabus. Wiesbaden 1980, S. 327f.
– S. 22, -11 ist für unverständliches “once” wohl “after” (baʿd) zu lesen.
– S. 24, -18 befremdet die Übersetzung “when it comes to courage” für wa-
ammā š-šaǧāʿa.
– Zu S. 30: Als Lehre der Stoiker wird erwähnt, dass der Mensch von Natur aus
gut sei, nur die Gemeinschaft mit den Bösen mache ihn schlecht. Hierzu vgl.
Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa I. Göttingen 31964, S. 124 ff.
– S. 72f. (= ed. C. K. Zurayk, S. 80, 1–7 und 13–17) enthält einen Auszug aus
einer im griechischen Original nicht mehr erhaltenen pseudoplatonischen
Schrift über die Tugenden der Seele. Die arabische Übersetzung findet sich
in einer Hs. in Mosul, al-Madrasa al-Aḥmadiyya 152, fol. 88 a: Maqāla fī iṯbāt
faḍāʾil an-nafs li-Aflāṭūn allatī sammāhā ʿādāt an-nafs “Abhandlung des Pla-
ton über den Nachweis der Seelentugenden, welche er ‘Gewohnheiten der
Seele’ nannte”. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar bringt Rezensent in Der
Islam 47, 1971, S. 25–42; 49, 1972, S. 122–123 (Nachtrag). = H. Daiber, From the
Greeks to the Arabs I/7.
– In dem S. 211–217 gegebenen sehr knappen arab.-engl. Glossar vermisst man
die Angaben der wichtigen Stellen.
Constantine Zurayk weist in seiner Einleitung S. XI darauf hin, dass seine

mit Anmerkungen versehene Übersetzung nicht die noch ausstehende umfas-
sende Analyse der Quellen, des Inhaltes und seines Einflusses ersetzt. Mit sei-
ner gut lesbaren Übersetzung hat der Verfasser hierfür eine gute Ausgangsbasis
geschaffen. Der Namens- und Sachindex am Schluss des Buches und die über-
sichtliche Aufteilung des Textes in Abschnitte (am Rande der Übersetzung sind
dankenswerterweise jeweils Seiten- und Zeilenzählung der Edition verzeich-
net) erhöhen die Brauchbarkeit des Werkes.
Nachtrag: In der Zwischenzeit hat Mohammed Arkoun eine französische

Übersetzung des Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq veröffentlicht: Traité d’éthique. Traduction
française avec introduction et notes. Damas 1969.
778 chapter 50
On the sources of Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq cf. H. Daiber, Ethics as Likeness

to God in Miskawayh. An overlooked tradition. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to
the Arabs II/27.
Republished from OLZ 67, 1972, col. 370–373. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 51
Susanne Diwald
Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der
Enzyklopädie Kitāb Ihwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (III) (1975)
Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopä-

die Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt. Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz 1975. XII, 641 S. gr. 80. = Akademie der Wissenschaften und der
Literatur Mainz. DM 198.
Das wohl in Gelehrtenkreisen des Irak entstandene und vielleicht von dem
nicht näher bekannten Abū Sulaymān Muḥammad Ibn Maʿšar / Musʿir / Naṣr
al-Bustī al-Maqdisī / Muqaddasī vor 959/960AD schriftlich niedergelegte enzy-
klopädische Werk Kitāb / Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (= RIṢ) “das Buch / die Abhand-
lungen der lauteren Brüder” hat – wie schon einige typische Termini verraten1 –
einen ausgesprochen didaktischen Zweck: Durch Kenntnis des gesamten phi-
losophisch religiösen und naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens (“der intellektuel-
len Dinge” = al-umūr al-ʿaqliyya, Diwald S. 203) “die Seele zu läutern und den
Charakter zu bessern”. Dasselbe Ziel und zum Teil mit denselben Mitteln ver-
folgt ein Werk, das im selben Jahrhundert entstanden ist, nämlich Miskawayhs
Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq (vgl. zu diesem Rez. in OLZ 67, 1972, Sp. 370–373. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs II/50), mit dem es das Streben des Neuplatonismus
teilt, die Seele auf die Stufe der geistigen Dinge zu heben. Im Corpus der Iḫwān
aṣ-Ṣafāʾ ist jedoch keine Tugendlehre enthalten, die das Leben der Menschen
im Diesseits durch einen Katalog von Vorschriften für das menschliche Zusam-
menleben regeln würde. Die Intention der Iḫwān ist ganz auf die vollkommene
Stufe im Jenseits gerichtet. Diese zu erreichen setzt Wissen voraus: Wis|sen 47
ist Erlösung, die Beschäftigung mit der Wissenschaft “das wahre Leben”. Das
RIṢ verbindet neuplatonische Lehren und neupythagoräische Zahlenspekula-
tionen sowie gnostisch-dualistische Vorstellungen zu einem Weltsystem, das
eine philosophisch-naturwissenschaftliche Begründung für das Sufitum geben
möchte. Eine Gesamtdarstellung, die allerdings nicht in allen Punkten und
Thesen befriedigt, ist von Yves Marquet unter dem Titel La philosophie des
Iḫwān Al-Ṣafāʾ, Algier um 1965/66, herausgebracht worden.
1 Vgl. Abdul-Latif Tibawi, Some Educational Terms in Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ. In Abdul-
Latif Tibawi, Arabic and Islamic Themes, London 1974, S. 181–186.

780 chapter 51
Das zu besprechende Buch von Susanne Diwald enthält eine kommen-

tierte Übersetzung von Buch III des RIṢ (“Seele und Intellekt”). Für die Über-
setzung wurden hauptsächlich 5 Hss. (davon die älteste in Istanbul aus dem
Jahre 578/1182) und die gedruckte Version Beirut 1957 herangezogen. Die arab.
Varianten sind im Apparat zur Übersetzung vermerkt. In der Einleitung bringt
Diwald einen Überblick über Entstehungszeit, Verfasserschaft, Intention, ide-
engeschichtlichen Hintergrund und Nachwirken des RIṢ. Zu Recht weist Di-
wald auf Berührungen mit schiitischen und mystischen Lehren und auf aus-
gesprochen unismailitische Tendenzen hin (Diwald S. 27f.). Die These vom
ismailitischen Ursprung lehnt sie (zu Recht) ab. Eine ausführliche Diskussion
sollte in einem Einleitungsband erscheinen.
Die Bearbeitung eines so eminent wichtigen Textes wie der des RIṢ bedarf
keiner besonderen Rechtfertigung. Die oftmals paraphrasierende Übertragung
Friedrich Dietericis (1858–1891) genügt wissenschaftlichen Ansprüchen
nicht. Susanne Diwald vermag in vielen Fällen ihrer Übersetzung einen
nach den Hss. verbesserten und vervollständigten Text zugrundezulegen. Man
ist gespannt auf Diwalds Kriterien in ihrer Entscheidung für die eine oder
andere Lesart; eine Darstellung war für den Einleitungsband in Aussicht ge-
stellt. Bei manchen Varianten hat man den Eindruck, dass sie nicht im Zuge
der handschriftlichen Überlieferung entstanden sind, sondern darauf hinwei-
sen, dass verschiedene Versionen (um das Wort “Redaktion” zu vermeiden) im
Umlauf gewesen sind. – Die Übersetzung ist in den meisten Fällen gelungen.
In einem Kommentar zu einem so vielschichtigen Werk kann natürlich nicht
alles erschöpfend behandelt werden.
Gewünscht hätte man sich auch für den Nichtorientalisten mehr Hinweise
auf Carl Brockelmann, GAL; Fuat Sezgin, GAS; Eduard Zeller, Die
Philosophie der Griechen / Nachdr. Darmstadt 1963; (das Werk wird z.B. Diwald
S. 110 erwähnt, fehlt aber im Literaturverzeichnis). Ergänzend zu E. Zeller
s. William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, I ff.
Cambridge 1967ff. Die Literaturverweise (bes. auf altphilologische Literatur)
sind nicht immer auf dem neuesten Stand.
Nachfolgend einige Bemerkungen zu Kommentar und Übersetzung, die Rez.

zum größten Teil mit der von Ḫayr ad-Dīn az-Ziriklī, Kairo 1347/1928 (hier
abgekürzt mit K) besorgten Ausgabe (Bd. III, S. 182–372) durchverglichen hat:
Diwald S. 6 Anm. 19: Dem dort genannten Aufsatz v. Martin Schreiner
(ZDMG 53, 1899, S. 63) kann man entgegen Diwald nicht entnehmen, dass
ʿUmar Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḫalīl at-Tūnisī (nicht: Tūnusī) eine Widerlegung
des RIṢ geschrieben habe. Woher hat Diwald diese Angabe? – Diwald S. 9,
10 ist der Satz nicht in Ordnung; der Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ gehört natürlich nicht zu
susanne diwald, arabische philosophie und wissenschaft (1975) 781
dem bei Diwald vorher genannten Aloys Sprenger, sondern zu Šahrazūrī,

dessen Name hier ausgefallen ist. – Diwald S. 12: Die Angabe, dass Bayḫaqī,
Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ von dem RIṢ “ganz | so” spreche, “als habe es ein einziger 48
Autor verfaßt” ist nicht präzise. Taʾrīḫ, ed. Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Damaskus
1946, S. 36, 1f., heißt es nach der Aufzählung der Namen Abū Sulaymān Muḥam-
mad Ibn Musʿir al-Bustī al-Maqdisī / Muqaddasī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn Zahrūn
ar-Rayḥānī, Abū Aḥmad an-Nahraǧūrī, al-ʿAwqī (sic statt al-ʿAwfī), Zayd Ibn
Rifāʿa: fa-hun ḥukamāʾu ǧtamaʿū wa-ṣannafū rasāʾila iḫwāni ṣ-ṣafāʾi wa-alfāẓu
hāḏā l-kitābi li-l-Maqdisī / Muqaddasī. Demnach hat Maqdisī / Muqaddasī die
Rasāʾil nicht verfasst, sondern formuliert. – Diwald S. 16 f.: Die Argumenta-
tion, dass der Titel ursprünglich Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ und nicht Rasāʾil etc.
gelautet habe, überzeugt nicht. Immerhin besteht das Buch aus zahlreichen
rasāʾil. Bayhaqī spricht gleichfalls von rasāʾil. – Diwald S. 22 Anm. 88 lies al-
maḥǧūb. – Diwald S. 22, -4: Der Zusammenhang ist unklar. – Diwald S. 22
Anm. 111: Man hätte der Einfachheit halber und besser auf Francis E. Peters,
Aristoteles Arabus (s. Diwald Literaturverz.) S. 72–74, und Josef van Ess, Jün-
gere orientalistische Literatur zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Bereich
des Islam, in Parusia, Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, Frankfurt a.M. 1965
(S. 333–350), S. 334–339, verweisen können. – Diwald S. 25: Zum Zusammen-
hang Gnosis-Hermetismus-Astrologie-Mystik vgl. den Sammelband Gnosis und
Gnostizismus, hrsg. v. Kurt Rudolph, Darmstadt 1975. = Wege der Forschung
262, Index s.n. – Diwald S. 27f. spricht Diwald von ausgesprochen unismai-
litischen Textstellen im RIṢ, wie die Ablehnung des Autoritätsglaubens und die
Aufforderung, sich bei Fehlen einer Autorität des Analogieschlusses (qiyās) zu
bedienen. Dies ist typisch muʿtazilitisch: Vgl. Josef van Ess, Die Erkenntnis-
lehre des ʿAḍudaddīn al-Īcī, Wiesbaden 1966, S. 45 ff. (zu taqlīd) und Joseph
Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Oxford 1950, S. 128 ff.
(zu qiyās). Mit den Schiiten (und dem RIṢ) teilen die Muʿtaziliten das Interesse
an der Imamatsfrage. Trotz weiterer Berührungen mit den Muʿtaziliten (s. Rez.
zu Diwald S. 297, 342f. und 393) darf man freilich den Autor des RIṢ deswe-
gen noch nicht zu einem Muʿtaziliten machen, wie es nach Ibn Qifṭī, Taʾriḫ al-
ḥukamāʾ, ed. Julius Lippert, Leipzig 1903, S. 82, 11 f., schon früh getan worden
ist. Es gibt auch antimuʿtazilitische Textstellen (s. Rez. zu Diwald, S. 180 f. und
457), und vieles deutet eher auf eine Herkunft aus schiitischen Kreisen (s. außer
Diwald auch Rez. zu Diwald, S. 435, 6f. und 457). – Diwald S. 33 oben:
Zum arab. Original der Turba philosophorum vgl. Martin Plessner, Vorso-
kratische Philosophie und griechische Alchemie. Wiesbaden 1975. = Boethius 4. –
Diwald S. 33 unten: Zu Nikomachos, Euklid und Theon von Smyrna in arab.
Überlieferung vgl. Fuat Sezgin, GAS V 1974, S. 164f. und 83ff. – Diwald S. 35:
Zur arab. Übersetzung der aristotelischen Metaphysik hätte man besser Fran-
782 chapter 51
cis Edward Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, S. 49–52, nennen können. – Diwald

S. 35, 15 lies: “Denn (wa-ḏālika) da der Schöpfer …”. – Diwald S. 36, 10: “Das
Helle und Dunkle”: inv. ord. K (= Ed. Kairo) S. 183, 11. – Diwald S. 36, 19:
“Zukunft und Gegenwart”: inv. ord. K S. 183, 18. – Diwald S. 37 Mitte: Zu
den Wissenschaftseinteilungen bei den Arabern vgl. auch Simon van den
Bergh, Umriß der muhammedanischen Wissenschaften nach Ibn Ḫaldūn, Lei-
den 1912, S. 7ff. – Diwald S. 38, 19: Nach “findet man” füge ein: “bei näherer
Betrachtung” (iḏā ʿtabarta K S. 184, 3). – Diwald S. 40 oben: Vgl. Hans Dai-
ber, Aetius Arabus, Wiesbaden 1980, S. 81 (zu Plac. I 3. 8). – Diwald S. 40, 27:
Statt “Zählbarem” lies “Existierendem”. – Diwald S. 41 oben: Zu den Dualisten
und ihrer Widerlegung in islamischer Zeit vgl. Guy Monnot, Penseurs musul-
manes et religions iraniennes. Paris 1974. = Études musulmanes 16. – Diwald
S. 41 Anm. 4: Zu den Ḫurramiten vgl. Berthold Spuler, Iran in frühislami-
scher Zeit, Wiesbaden 1952, S. 200ff.; Henri Laoust, Les schismes dans l’ islam,
Paris 1965, S. 95–98; bes. S. 75. – Diwald S. 41, 26: “gehören dazu” steht nicht
in K S. 184, 10. – Diwald S. 42, 3: Anm. b: ḥīna “wenn” (sie sagen) ist nicht
übersetzt. – Diwald S. 42, 8: “großen und kleinen”: inv. ord. K S. 184, 15 f. –
Diwald S. 43, ult.: “erhaben ist er”: “groß ist sein Lob” (ǧalla ṯanāʾuhū) K
S. 184, 18f. – Diwald S. 44, 5: “groß ist sein Lob” K S. 184, 20. – Diwald S. 47,
28: “Denn (wa-ḏālika) aus dem Schöpfer” K S. 185, -4. – Diwald S. 49 Mitte:
Zum aristotelischen Substanzbegriff hätte man statt Cencillo besser Heinz
Happ, Hyle, Berlin/New York 1971, in das Literaturverzeichnis aufnehmen kön-
nen. – Diwald S. 50, 6: “denn (li-anna) die Baumwolle” K S. 186, 14. – Diwald
S. 52 oben: Man vermisst einen Hinweis auf B. Haneberg (s. Lit. verz.). –
Diwald S. 67, 11: Die Seitenzahl zu Dimašqīs Kosmographie muss statt 3 (=
Übers. v. August Ferdinand Michael Mehren, Manuel de la cosmogra-
phie du Moyen Âge, Kopenhagen 1874 / Nachdr. Amsterdam 1964) S. 9, 8 lauten. –
Diwalds Angabe, dass der bei den arabischen Geographen oft wiederholte
Vergleich der in der Luft stehenden Erde mit dem Dotter im Eiklar auf das RIṢ
49 zurückgehe, trifft nicht zu. Quelle dürfte der ältere, um 844AD schreibende |
Ibn Ḫorradāḏbeh (al-Masālik, ed. Michael Jan de Goeje, S. 4, 5 f.) gewesen
sein. Zur Stelle vgl. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40), S. 433, Kommen-
tar zu Plac. III 11. 1. – Zu Sermo IV der Turba philosophorum vgl. M. Plessner,
Vorsokratische Philosophie, (s. Diwald zu S. 33) S. 55 f. – Diwald S. 69, 8 lies
“sprießt”. – Diwald S. 69, letzter Abschnitt: Man vermisst einen Literatur-
hinweis und (im Lit. verz.) die bibliographischen Angaben der hier zitierten
Fragmentensammlung von Hermann Diels und Walter Kranz, Die Frag-
mente der Vorsokratiker. I–III. Berlin 81956. Ein Hinweis auf W. K. C. Guthrie
(s.o.) I, S. 459ff. und/oder E. Zeller (s.o.) I/2, S. 882ff., wäre nützlich gewesen. –
Diwald S. 76, 15 lies “jenes Individuum”. – Diwald S. 77, 1: iḫlāṭ und mizāǧ:
ḫalṭ und mazǧ, K S. 193, 16. – Diwald S. 78, -5: “macht sie stets”, K S. 193, 22. –
Diwald S. 87, 7 und 132, 6 lies Kitāb Ḏaḫīrat al-Iskandar. – Diwald S. 90,
4: Statt “Wurzeln” lies “Stämme” (wie S. 89, ult.). – Diwald S. 92, 13f. lies “zu
sich nimmt, um sich davon zu ernähren und wenn jenes …”. – Diwald S. 93,
Anm. b kann mit der Mehrzahl der Hss. und mit K ʿalā beibehalten werden. –
Diwald S. 103: Zu Harran vgl. den ergänzenden Überblick v. Samuel Miklos
Stern, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Account of How Christ’s Religion was Falsified by the
Adoption of Roman Customs, in Journal of Theological Studies N. S. 19, 1968,
S. 159–164. – Diwald S. 105, 11: Statt “Bekämpfung” lies “Sieg” (ġalaba). Das
Wort entstammt der griech.-arab. Übersetzungsliteratur und geht auf griech.
νῖκος zurück, womit infolge des spätgriech. Itazismus empedokleisches νεῖκος
verwechselt wurde; vgl. Rez., Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40) S. 42 f. – Diwald
S. 106, 4 lies “nämlich all das”. – Diwald S. 108: Zum Einfluss der Nous-Lehre
des Alexander von Aphrodisias auf die arab. jüdische Philosophie vgl. auch
Aron Günsz, Die Abhandlung Alexanders von Aphrodisias über den Intellekt,
Diss. Berlin 1886 (enthält als Anhang die von Samuel Bar Yehuda angefertigte
hebr. Übersetzung von Isḥāqs Übertragung). – Diwald S. 109, 20 f. lies “wie die
Vier der Drei nachgeordnet ist”. – Diwald S. 112, 15–17 steht K S. 204, 15 f. nach
Diwald S. 112, 20. – Diwald S. 113, 10: “Gegenwart und Zukunft” K S. 204, -
2. – Diwald S. 113, 24: “Hitze” steht vor “die vier Mischungen” K S. 205, 8. –
Diwald S. 114, 1: “Trockenheit und Feuchtigkeit” K S. 205, 8. – Diwald S. 118,
4 f.: Die “durch Übereinkunft festgelegten (Dinge)” erinnern an die stoische
Lehre von der Gegebenheit der Namen durch den menschlichen Willensakt
(θέσει) und vom gleichzeitigen natürlichen Ursprung (φύσει) der Namen, weil
sie der Natur der benannten Dinge entsprechen: Vgl. Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa,
I, Göttingen 41970, S. 41; Heinrich und Marie Simon, Die alte Stoa und ihr
Naturbegriff, Berlin 1956, S. 127–129. – Diwald S. 118, 5–7: Interessant ist der
Gedanke, dass Gott “die natürlichen Dinge” (al-umūr aṭ-ṭabīʿiyya K S. 206, -
8) geschaffen hat. Er erinnert an Naẓẓām (vgl. zu Diwald S. 180 f.) und an
die etwa von Philoponus vertretene Auffassung von Gott. Vgl. Samuel Sam-
bursky, Das physikalische Weltbild der Antike, Zürich/Stuttgart 1965, S. 587ff.
Ein Buch, das Diwald auch sonst öfters in ihrem Kommentar hätte mit Nut-
zen heranziehen können. – Diwald S. 118, 23–25: Die genannte Kindīschrift
steht in den Rasāʾil al-Kindī, ed. Abū Rida II, Kairo 1953, S. 40–46; nochmals
hrsg. u. übers. v. Nicholas Rescher und Haig Khatchadourian in IS 4,
1965, S. 45–54. – Diwald S. 119, 4: “Blätter”: nach “Adern” K S. 207, 4. – Diwald
S. 119, 6: Dem Terminus “Feuerform” (šakl nārī) liegt die in der hellenistischen
Lehrtradition und unter ihrem Einfluss in der griechisch-arabischen Überset-
zungsliteratur geläufige entsprechende Interpretation von πυραμίς zugrunde:
s. Rez., Aetius Arabus, (s. zu Diwald S. 40) S. 60. – Diwald S. 124, 6: Nach
784 chapter 51
“aber” füge ein “porös (mutaḫalḫila), da sie” K S. 209, 3. – Diwald S. 124,

9 f.: Anaxagoras hat nicht die Auffassung abgelehnt, dass die Gestirne feuri-
ger Natur seien. Für ihn sind die Sterne “entflammte Steine”: Vgl. Aetius, Plac.
philos. II 13. 3 und W. K. C. Guthrie, History (s.o.) II, S. 302ff. – Diwald
S. 126, 4: tadāwir K S. 209, -8. – Diwald S. 126, 24: “Meer, Berge” K S. 210,
1. – Diwald S. 127: Die Erklärung der Entstehung des Regens und der Meere
ist aristotelisch: Vgl. Meteor. I 9–11 und II 1–3 (dazu Hans Daiber, Ein Kom-
pendium der aristotelischen Meteorologie in der Fassung des Hunayn Ibn Isḥāq.
Amsterdam/Oxford 1975. = VNAW.L n.r. 89. Amsterdam/Oxford 1975. = ASL.
Prolegomena et parerga 1, S. 71f. und 73ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to
the Arabs I/10). – Diwald S. 139: Wo steht die Risālat Hermes? – Diwald
S. 143, 10 lies: “Ebenso wird von dem Propheten … überliefert” K S. 216, -3. –
Diwald S. 148, 2. Abschn.: Man hätte einen Hinweis auf Eilhard Wiede-
mann, Aufsätze (s. Diwald Lit. verz.) geben können. – Diwald S. 150, 8 lies
“Erdoberfläche” (basīṭ al-arḍ K S. 219, -2). – Diwald S. 153, 9–11: “maßlosen
Eiseskälte (al-bard al-mufriṭ) … das überfließende Wasser (al-māʾ al-mufriṭ), die
Feuchtigkeit. Unter der überhandnehmenden Erde (al-arḍ al-mufriṭa) die Tro-
ckenheit” K S. 221, -6f. – Diwald S. 153, 25 vermisst man einen Beleg aus der
Antike. – Diwald S. 155, 19 lies “Denn diese Art”. – Diwald S. 156, 13 füge
nach “Tieren” ein: “Zur Erklärung dessen sei gesagt” K S. 222, 17. – Diwald
50 S. 159, 2 lies “jener Röhre” K S. 224, 6. – Diwald S. | 160, ult. folgt K S. 225, 19–
21: wa-iḏ qad faraġnā min ḏikri marātibi l-ḥayawāniyyati mimmā yalā rutbata
l-insāniyyati fa-yanbaġī an naḏkura awwala martabati l-insāniyyati mimmā yalā
l-ḥayawāniyyata. – Diwald S. 161, 2 (“Die tiefste Stufe”) und öfters: Voraus
geht iʿlam yā aḫī “wisse mein Bruder” K S. 225, 23 und öfters. – Diwald S. 164
Mitte: Vgl. weiteres bei Geo Widengren, Gnostic Technical Language in the
Rasāʾil Iḫwān Al-Ṣafāʾ, in Actas do IV Congreso de estudios arabes e islamicos
Coimbra-Lisboa 1968, Leiden 1971, S. 181–203. – Diwald S. 165, 18–22 lies “Mit
der einen (Bedeutung) weisen die Philosophen darauf hin, dass … Mit der
anderen Bedeutung weist die Allgemeinheit darauf hin, dass …”. – Diwald
S. 167, 6: Es fehlen im Literaturverzeichnis die bibliographischen Daten von
Alexander Pfänder, Logik, Halle 21929. – Diwald S. 167, 19: fikra K S. 228,
17. – Diwald S. 168, 10 lies: “Es ist edler und höher als all diese (drei Wege).
Denn man sagt …” K S. 228, ult. – Diwald S. 169: Zu huwiyya vgl. Hans
Daiber, Das theologisch- philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-
Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut 1975. = BTS 19, S. 158. – Diwald S. 170, 2:
“Gott … hat über sie gesagt”: “Entsprechend wie Er (Gott) sie beschrieben hat;
denn Er hat in seiner vollkommenen Offenbarung gesagt” kamā waṣafahum
fa-qāla fī muḥkam tanzīlihī K S. 229, 10. – Diwald S. 170, 13f.: “Miteinander
verbunden = maqrūn”: “Die Summe von beiden” ǧumlatuhumā K S. 229, 15. –
Diwald S. 171, 8: “Die Formen”: “Jene Form” K S. 229, 23. – Diwald S. 171,
21: “All diese Worte” und öfters: Voraus geht ṯumma ʿlam “fernerhin wisse” K
S. 230, 6 und öfters. – Diwald S. 172, 1–4 lies “bald – bald” (9 mal). – Diwald
S. 173, 10: “Dürfte dir” K S. 230, -3. – Diwald S. 180, 22: “Nur (laysat illā … ḥasb)
aus folgenden” K S. 234, 2f. – Diwald S. 180, 24 lies “die ihm inhärieren”. –
Diwald S. 180 und 181: Was hier als Meinung der “meisten Gelehrten” refe-
riert und widerlegt wird, ist muʿtazilitisch: 1) Die Unterscheidung zwischen
den Handlungen, die durch den “freien Willen” (iḫtiyār) des Menschen ver-
ursacht werden und den “natürlichen Wirkungen” (afʿāl ṭabīʿiyya) der Tiere;
2) Die Bezeichnung dieser Handlungen und Wirkungen als Akzidentien, von
denen “Leben”, “Macht” und “Wissen” namentlich erwähnt werden. Vgl. Rez.,
Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 283ff. und 360 ff.; 3) die Beziehung der
“natürlichen Wirkungen” auf Gott (vgl. auch hier zu Diwald S. 118, 5–7) erin-
nert an Naẓẓāms These von der Erschaffenheit der Natur durch Gott, wobei
gleichzeitig die Wirkungen durch den Zwang der Natur erzeugt werden: Vgl.
Rez., Muʿammar, S. 403ff. – Diwald S. 196, ult.: + fal-yuṭlab hunāka “es soll
dort studiert werden” K S. 239, 4. – Diwald S. 198, 7: Nach “bringt”: + wa-
ḏakarnā ayḍan “wir haben ferner erwähnt” K S. 239, 17. – Diwald S. 209: Der
textkritische Apparat ist nicht in Ordnung: Zu e-f muss die Textvariante von
B (= K S. 243, 6–9) bei fī l-ʿaqli l-munfaʿili enden; das nachfolgende wa-kunnā
qad bayyannā qabla ḏālika ist als Variante von B unter g anzugeben und das
dann folgende fī risālat māhiyyat aṭ-ṭabīʿa gehört unter i-j als Variante von B
mit dem Vermerk, dass dieses Stück umgestellt ist und vor ḏikr kayfiyyat taʾṯīrāt
steht. – Diwald S. 214: Zu Fazārī vgl. Fuat Sezgin, GAS V, S. 199f. und 216 f. –
Diwald S. 232, 20 lies “jenes (sphärische) Individuum”. – Diwald S. 266, 19
lies “wir müssen” (naḥtāǧu). – Diwald S. 275, 26 f. lautet wörtlich: “Denn du
findest einen Menschen oder ein Tier, wie es eine Speise … genießt”. – Diwald
S. 276, 1f. lautet wörtlich: “Ebenso findest du ein- und denselben Menschen, wie
er zu irgendeiner Zeit etwas genießt und für schön hält”. – Diwald S. 278, -2
und S. 279, 11.19.24 lies: “Das ist gleichermaßen” K S. 268 f. – Diwald S. 288,
10f. lies: “Jene begehrten und geliebten Zeichnungen und Formen”. – Diwald
S. 297: Die Definition der “Kenntnis” (maʿrifa) als “Ruhe für die Herzen” (rāḥa
li-l-qulūb) fern vom “Autoritätsglauben” (taqlīd) knüpft an muʿtazilitische Tra-
dition an: Vgl. zu Letzterer Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, Leiden
1970, S. 63 zu Anm. 7, und dazu Rez. in ZDMG 123, 1973, S. 412 = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs II/41. – Zu muʿtazilitischem sukūn an-nafs vgl.
Josef van Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s.o. zu S. 27), S. 75ff. – Diwald S. 298, 9 und
öfters: Der Abschnitt wird eingeleitet durch übliches wa-ʿlam yā aḫī ayyadaka
llāhu wa-iyyānā bi-rūḥin minhū “wisse, mein Bruder – Gott möge dich und uns
unterstützen mit Geist von Ihm” K S. 276, 10 und öfters. – Diwald S. 301, 1:
786 chapter 51
Voraus geht fa-naqūlu ʿlam yā aḫī ayyadaka etc. “Wir sagen: Wisse, mein Bru-
der (etc. wie S. 298, 9)” K S. 277, 16. – Diwald S. 301, 15: “Denn das ganze
Streben” K S. 277, 22. – Diwald S. 304 Mitte fehlt ein Hinweis auf S. 336. –
Diwald S. 308, App. a: K S. 280, 3 hat iʿlam ayyadaka llāhu wa-iyyānā bi-rūḥin
minhū. – Diwald S. 309: Man vermisst einen Beleg zur geschilderten mysti-
schen Konzeption des Wissens, wozu man F. Rosenthal, Knowledge (s.o. zu
S. 297) S. 155ff. vergleiche. – Diwald S. 312, 15: Zu den Wissensdefinitionen
im RIṢ s. F. Rosenthal, Knowledge (s.o. zu S. 297), S. 60, 62 und 105–108. –
Diwald S. 313, 1 lies “für wahr halten”. – Diwald S. 329: Zum Vergleich der
Form des Herzens mit einem Pinienzapfen (vgl. auch Diwald S. 336), der im
51 Islam weit | verbreitet ist, vgl. Hans H. Lauer, Das Herz in der Medizin des
arabischen Mittelalters, in Heidelberger Jahrbücher 13, 1969 (S. 103–115), S. 107́f.
Eine Begründung dafür, warum das Herz als Sitz des inneren Feuers mit einem
Pinienzapfen verglichen wird, vermag auch Lauer nicht zu geben. Sie ist darin
zu suchen, dass nach antiker Tradition das Feuer die Gestalt einer Pyramide hat
(deren Form hier mit der Gestalt eines Pinienzapfens verglichen wird), weswe-
gen übrigens umgekehrt πυραμίς im Arabischen fast regelmäßig mit šakl narī
“feurige Gestalt” wiedergegeben wird: Vgl. Rez., Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40),
S. 60 und S. 314 Anm. 507 mit einem Beleg aus Hiob von Edessa. – Diwald
S. 334, 3 lies “Stütze” (qiwām / qawām). – Diwald S. 335, 4 f. lies “des Erha-
benen und Edlen”. – Diwald S. 336 Mitte: Vgl. S. 304. – Diwald S. 342, 5 f.:
Zu kumūn-ẓuhūr, ein bei dem Muʿtaziliten Naẓẓām zentraler Beriff, vgl. Rez.,
Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 110f. – Diwald S. 343: Das “Sehen des Her-
zens” (als einzige Möglichkeit der Gottesschau) und die Gleichsetzung mit dem
Wissen ist muʿtazilitisch: Vgl. Rez., Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 143 ff. –
Diwald S. 353, 5: “Gott möge Dir helfen” K S. 296, 17. – Diwald S. 376, 12:
“O frommer … helfen” fehlt K S. 305, -7. – Die geschilderten gegensätzlichen
Standpunkte über die Realität von Bewegung und Ruhe finden wir bei den
frühen Muʿtaziliten: Vgl. Rez., Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 294 ff. –
Diwald S. 380, 2 und öfters geht voraus: fa-naqūlu “wir sagen” K S. 306, 17
und öfters. – “O mein Bruder … helfen” fehlt K S. 306, 18. – Diwald S. 383: Zur
geschilderten aristotelischen Anschauung über die Entstehung der Sterne und
zum Fortleben in islamischer Zeit vgl. Rez., Kompendium (s. zu Diwald S. 127),
S. 92f. – Diwald S. 384: Zur geschilderten nichtaristotelischen Definition des
Windes als “Wogen der Luft” vgl. Rez., Kompendium (s. zu Diwald S. 127),
S. 76. – Diwald S. 386: Zur Erdbebentheorie (aristotelisch) vgl. Rez., Kompen-
dium (s. zu Diwald S. 127), S. 81ff. – Diwald S. 393, 3 lies besser “natürliche”
(ṭabīʿiyya) und “willentliche” (irādiyya); diese Unterscheidung knüpft an das
muʿtazilitische Gegensatzpaar ṭabʿ – iḫtiyār an: Vgl. dazu Rez., Muʿammar (s. zu
Diwald S. 169), S. 283ff. – Diwald S. 398: Die Widerlegung der Lehre von der
Ewigkeit der Welt durch das RIṢ (vgl. auch Diwald S. 402ff.) ist gegen Aristo-
teles gerichtet, der in nicht widerspruchsfreier Weise von Gott, der Ursache der
Schöpfung, als dem ersten unbewegten Beweger spricht; vgl. Rez., Muʿammar
(s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 252f. und dort gegebene Verweise. – Zur gleichfalls
widerlegten These vom Ruhen der Erde (aristotelisch) vgl. Pierre Duhem,
Système (s. Diwald Lit. verz.) I, S. 215ff. Sie war in der Antike weit verbreitet:
Vgl. S. Sambursky, Das physikalische Weltbild (s. zu Diwald S. 118, 5–7), S. 336 ff.,
und ist vor allem durch Ptolemaeus (vgl. P. Duhem, Système I, S. 480) in islami-
scher Zeit bekannt geworden (vgl. Rez., Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40), Kommen-
tar zu Plac. III 11. 1 und 13. 1). – Diwald S. 401, 5 geht voraus “Ebenso gilt” (wa-
hakāḏā) K S. 315, 14. – Diwald S. 405, 15 und öfters geht voraus fa-naqūlu ʿlam
“Wir sagen: Wisse!” K S. 317, 17 (es fehlt “O mein Bruder”) und öfters. – Diwald
S. 406 Anm. d: kāna fehlt (male) K S. 317, 21. – Diwald S. 419, 6: “O mein Bru-
der … helfen” fehlt K S. 322, 14. – Diwald S. 428, Tabelle: Die Frage “Warum ist
es?” folgt K S. 325, 15 auf die Frage “Was ist es?”. – Diwald S. 433, 1: “Gott möge
Dir helfen” fehlt K S. 327, 7. – Diwald S. 435, 6 f. (vgl. S. 357, 16 und S. 437):
Auch schiitische Kreise vertraten in ähnlicher Formulierung die These vom
Vorherwissen Gottes um die Dinge vor ihrer Erschaffung: s. Rez., Muʿammar
(s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 195 Anm. 2. Ebenso in der Mystik des Ibn ʿArabī: s.
Rez., Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 57 Anm. 5. – Diwald S. 451: (Stelle
fehlt im Index s.n. “Zeit, Definition”): Der Hinweis auf die pythagoräische Lehre
trifft nicht ganz zu. Vgl. zur Zeitdefinition des RIṢ Aristoteles, Physics IV 14.
223 b 21–23. Weiteres s. Rez., Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40), Kommentar zu Plac.
I 21. 2a. – Diwald S. 455 Anm. k-l: ṯumma ʿlam K S. 336, 10. – Diwald S. 457
oben: Hier liegt ein Stück antimuʿtazilitischer Polemik vor, mit deutlich schii-
tischer Tendenz. Im Gegensatz zu schiitischen Kreisen betonten die Muʿtazi-
liten die Unvereinbarkeit der Gegensätze auch durch Gottes Allmacht. Vgl.
Rez., Muʿammar (s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 117ff., bes. S. 123ff. – Diwald S. 458,
Tabelle: K S. 337, 2–5 bietet die Spalten 1–4 in umgekehrter Reihenfolge (K Nr.
1 steht bei Diwald rechts). – Diwald S. 463, 2. Abschn. (vgl. auch Diwald
S. 474 oben): Der hier ausgesprochene Gedanke, dass Gott notwendigerweise
entsprechend seiner Weisheit erschafft, knüpft an die ursprünglich muʿtaziliti-
sche Lehre von Gottes “Absicht” an, das Nützliche zu tun: Vgl. Rez., Muʿammar
(s. zu Diwald S. 169), S. 220f. und 232–235. – Diwald S. 512, 12 f.: “Gott … hel-
fen” fehlt K S. 357, -3. – Diwald S. 520, 11 lies “Hervorbringung” (takwīn). –
Diwald S. 528: Die Erklärungen von Blitz und Donner sind aristotelisch: Vgl.
Rez., Kompendium (s. zu Diwald S. 127), S. 84f.; ebenso die Erklärungen der
anderen meteorologischen Erscheinungen. – Peter Steinmetz, Die Physik
des Theophrast von Eresos. Bad Homburg/Berlin/Zürich 1964. = Palingenesia
1 (vgl. Rez. v. Hans Benedikt Gottschalk in Gnomon 39, 1967, S. 17–26)
788 chapter 51
52 hat versucht, in den meteorolo|gischen Erklärungen des RIṢ. theophrastisches

Gedankengut wiederzufinden. Vgl. dazu Hans Daiber, The Meteorology of
Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation. In Theophrastus. His Psycholo-
gical, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings. Ed. by William Wall Forten-
baugh and Dimitri Gutas. New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.) 1992.
= RUSCH V (S. 166–293), S. 222–225. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
I/12. – Diwald S. 532: Zur These vom Stehen der Erde in der Luft, die den ara-
bischen Kosmographen wohl bekannt ist und antike Vorbilder hat, vgl. Rez.,
Aetius Arabus (s.o. zu S. 40), Kommentar zu Plac. III 11. 1 (S. 433). – Diwald
S. 547, 13f.: “konvex – konkav”: Inv. ord. K S. 369, 9. – Diwald S. 555, 14 f.: “Gott
… helfen” fehlt K S. 372,7. – Diwald S. 556, 1f. lies “Dann wird er Dir Deine
Rechnung begleichen”. – Zum Literaturverzeichnis S. 557 ff.: Statt Abū Ibn Roste
muss es heißen Ibn Roste, Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad Ibn ʿUmar. – Diwald S. 563, -15
lies Albert Hourani. – Diwald S. 567, 6 hätte man besser die deutsche
Neubearbeitung aufnehmen können: Hamilton A. R. Gibb und Jacob M.
Landau, Arabische Literaturgeschichte. Zürich/Stuttgart 1968. – Die Diwald
S. 567 genannten Aufsätze von Ignaz Goldziher sind wiederabgedruckt in
Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. v. Joseph Desomogyi, 5 Bde. Hildesheim 1967–
1970. – Diwald S. 568: Es fehlt Gustav Edmund von Grunebaum, Kritik
und Dichtkunst. Wiesbaden 1955 (von Diwald zitiert S. 259). – Diwald S. 568:
Hachimi steht ein 2. Mal im Literaturverzeichnis unter Hāšimī. – Diwald
S. 568, paenult.: Von Ḥallāǧ, Kitāb aṭ-Ṭawāsīn gibt es eine Neuedition v. Paul
Nwyia. Beirut 1972. = MUSJ 47. – Diwald S. 569: al-Ḫatīb al-Baġdādī ist falsch
vor Hasse eingeordnet. – Diwald S. 575, 1 lies Lesky. – Diwald S. 577, -11
fehlt der Erscheinungsort (Madrid). – Diwald S. 585, 5 ist zu steichen, da der
Titel richtig unter ar-Risāla al-djāmiʿa bereits S. 582 aufgeführt wird. – Diwald
S. 585, -4 lies 53 statt 83. – Diwald S. 586: Der Verfasser des unter as-Sīmāwī
genannten Werkes ist Ibn Sīnā; es muss daher S. 572 eingeordnet werden. Zu
as-Sīmāwī gehört der Titel Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-muktasab fī zirāʿat aḏ-ḏahab. The
Arabic text ed. with a transl. and introd. by Eric John Holmyard. Paris 1923. –
Die Diwald S. 591 genannten Aufsätze v. Harry Austryn Wolfson und
der S. 592 oben an 2. Stelle genannte Titel sind der Reihe nach wiederabge-
druckt in Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and
Religion I. Cambridge/Mass. 1973, S. 455–477; 493–545; 250–314; 344–370; 478–
492. – Diwald S. 595, Sp. a -4. lies Mustanṣir.
Namens- und Sachindices erleichtern die Benutzung eines so wichtigen
Buches erheblich. Vielleicht könnte bei den nächsten Bänden, die hoffentlich
bald erscheinen, die arabische Fachterminologie öfters im Text in Klammern
beigefügt und durch einen Index erschlossen werden. Für die weitere Bearbei-
tung des arabischen Textes sei dringend die Mitbenutzung der Kairener Edition
empfohlen. Diese weicht entgegen Diwalds Angabe (S. 30) in vielen Fällen
von der Beiruter Ausgabe ab.2
A new edition with English translation is published by Paul E. Walker,

Ismail K. Poonawala, David Simonowitz, and Godefroid de Calla-
taÿ, Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. Sciences of the Soul and Intellect. Part I: An
Arabic critical edition and English translation of Epistles 32–36. Oxford 2016.
This edition is the 9th publication in a project of the Institute of Ismaili Studies
in London.
On the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, its partial and complete editions and translati-
ons (including medieval translations), its authorship, date, doctrine and impact
cf. Daniel De Smet in Philosophy in the Islamic World I: 8th–10th Centuries.
Ed. by Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson.
English translation by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Hand-
book of Oriental Studies I, 115/1, pp. 748–759 and 780–786.
Republished, with some corrections and modifications, from OLZ 76, 1981, col. 46–52.
2 Eine Seitenkonkordanz zu den drei existierenden Drucken Kairo, Beirut und Bombay bringt
David R. Blumenthal in Arabica 21, 1974, S. 186–203.
chapter 52
Ian Richard Netton

Muslim Neoplatonists (1982)
Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists. An Introdution to the Thought of

the Brethren of purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ). London 1982. George Allen & Unwin.
146 S.
Gegenstand der hier anzuzeigenden Einführung sind die wichtigsten Lehren

der vor 959/960AD von einem Autorenkollektiv im lrak verfassten und von
Abū Sulaymān al-Maqdisī / Muqaddasī redigierten1 Enzyklopädie der “Lau-
teren Brüder” (Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ). Netton beschränkt sich auf die nicht natur-
wissenschaftlichen Teile und informiert uns zunächst über die vermutliche
Entstehungsgeschichte der Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (= RIṢ). Dann geht er auf
die griechischen und christlich-jüdischen Quellen ein, ferner auf literarische
Anleihen aus der persischen (Waṣiyyat Ardašīr) und indischen Literatur (Bar-
laam und Josaphat: Kalila wa-Dimma).2 Wir werden zu Recht darauf hinge-
wiesen, dass die Zitate und Anleihen aus nichtislamischer Literatur mit einer
Fülle von Koranzitaten und koranischen Anspielungen verbunden erscheinen.
Richtig, wenn auch nicht neu,3 ist die nichtismailitische Herkunft der RIṢ.
Netton möchte sie nun als “Muslim neoplatonists” klassifizieren. Bei der Lek-
türe der Kapitel über die Quellen der RIṢ – wobei als besonders instruktiv die
Abschnitte (Netton S. 53–77) über die christlichen und jüdischen Quellen
hervorgehoben seien – bekommt man allerdings zunehmend den Eindruck,
dass diese Klassifizierung weniger “accurate” (Netton S. 108) ist als ihre Ein-
ordnung als Sympathisanten der Ismailiten. Strikt genommen ist nur ein einzi-
ges Kapitel (Netton S. 33–52) dem neuplatonischen Einfluss gewidmet. Die
dort (Netton S. 46f.) genannte Isagoge des Porphyrius kann nicht als eine
spezifisch neuplatonische Quelle bezeichnet werden. In diesem Zusammen-
1 Vgl. Hans Daiber in OLZ 76, 1981, Sp. 46. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/51. –
Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī, Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. Ed. Douglas Morton Dunlop. The
Hague/Paris/New York 1979, Z. 3442.
2 Hierbei hätte der Aufsatz von Martin Plessner, Beiträge zur islamischen Literaturgeschich-
te IV. In IOS 2, 1972, S. 353–361, gewinnbringend herangezogen werden können.
3 Vgl. das auch bei Netton im Lit. verz. genannte Buch von Susanne Diwald, Arabische Phi-
losophie, S. 27 f.

ian richard netton, muslim neoplatonists (1982) 791
hang wäre es interessant gewesen, zu erfahren, ob die RIṢ eine der bekannten
arabischen Übersetzungen benutzt haben4 oder eventuell eine Textsammlung,
in welcher zusätzliche, nicht-porphyrianische Interpretamente aufgenommen
worden sind. Denn die von Netton S. 47 als “most important contribution”
der RIṢ ausgegebene Zufügung einer sechsten Kategorie (neben species, genus,
differentia, proprietas und accidens), nämlich das Individuum (šaḫṣ), geht letzt-
lich auf spätgriechische Kommentare zum aristotelischen Organon zurück, die
in Johannes Damascenus’ Dialectica (Patrologia Graeca 94, Sp. 573 AB) sowie
in der syrischen Dihairesis-Literatur (z.B. Bar Zoʿbī)5 nachgewirkt haben und
offensichtlich auch von Kindī, Rasāʾil I, ed. M. ʿA. Abū Rīda, Kairo 1950, S. 123f.,
benutzt worden sind. Von einer Zufügung “for the sake of symmetry and com-
pleteness” (Netton S. 48) kann also keine Rede sein. – Eine stärkere Einbe-
ziehung der hellenistisch-byzantinischen Kommentarli|teratur zum aristoteli- 377
schen Organon hätte manche Irrtümer und voreilige Einstufungen als “neupla-
tonisch” verhindern können. So entstammt z.B. der Terminus ṣifāt ḏātiya (RIṢ.
Ed. Ḫayr ad-Dīn az-Ziriklī. I. Kairo 1928, S. 396) Ammonius’ Kommentar zu
Porphyrius’Isagoge.6 Auch die in den RIṢ belegbare (Netton S. 11) Vierteilung
der Mathematik in Arithmetik, Geometrie, Astronomie und Musik findet man
im genannten Ammoniuskommentar (ed. Adolf Busse, S. 13, 10 f.) und in der
syrischen Dihairesis-Literatur (Bar Zoʿbi; s.o.): Sie hat historisch gesehen nichts
mit der pythagoräischen Spekulation um die Zahl Vier7 zu tun – was natür-
lich nicht ausschließt, dass sie in pythagoräischem Sinne adaptiert worden ist.
Die pythagoräischen Lehren sind wohl häufig durch Aristoteles den Iḫwān aṣ
Ṣafāʾ bekannt geworden: Man vergleiche die von Netton S. 12 genannte aris-
totelische Unterscheidung zwischen Zahl und Gezähltem, welche wir auch in
den RIṢ finden. Darüber hinaus ist der Einfluss von Aristoteles und seinen
Kommentatoren größer, als von Netton angenommen worden ist: Ein peri-
patetisches Erbe ist die von Netton S. 17f. genannte Terminologie ʿallāma bi-l-
quwwa und ʿallāma bi-l-fiʿl, welche auf die Unterscheidung νοῦς παθητικός und
4 Die Übersetzung des Abū ʿUṯmān ad-Dimašqī ist in zwei Editionen zugänglich: Ed. ʿAbd
ar-Raḥmān Badawī, Manṭiq Arisṭū III. Kairo 1952, S. 1019–1068, und Ed. Aḥmad Fuʾād
al-Ahwānī. Kairo 1952. – Vgl. Kwame Gyekye, Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s
Eisagoge. Beirut 1975.
5 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Ein vergessener syrischer Text. Bar Zoʿbī, Über die Teile der Philosophie. In
OrChr 69, 1985, S. 73–80. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs I/13.
6 Hrsg. v. Adolf Busse. In CAG IV/3, Berlin 1891, S. 92. – Vgl. Miklós Maróth, Termini der
Logik bei den Arabern. In Actes de la XLLe conférence internationale d’études classiques Eirene
(Cluj-Napoca 2–7 octobre 1972), Bucureṣti/Amsterdam 1975 (S. 51–54), S. 52.
7 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Aetius Arabus. Wiesbaden 1980, S. 337f.
792 chapter 52
νοῦς ποιητικός8 zurückgeht. Ebenso ist die Lehre der RIṢ (vgl. Netton S. 18)
aristotelisch, dass das Denken von den wahrgenommenen Dingen affiziert wird
(vgl. Aristoteles, De anima III 4 und 5). Praktisch bedeutungslos sind Anlei-
hen aus Plato: Vgl. Netton S. 16–19, aber bereits Franz Rosenthal, On the
Knowledge of Plato’s Philosophy in the Islamic World. In IC 14, 1940 (S. 387–
422. = F. Rosenthal, Greek Philosophy in the Arab World, Aldershot 1990, nr.
II), S. 388ff., 397 und 420, wo in den RIṢ eine zusätzliche Stelle aus Platos Phae-
drus nachgewiesen ist. – Der neuplatonische Einfluss in den RIṢ beschränkt
sich im Wesentlichen auf Bruchstücke der Lehren von der Emanation und der
Hierarchie der Hypostasen, sowie auf die auch mystische Lehre von der Eins-
werdung mit Gott in der Reinigung der Seele durch Wissen. Hierzu gehört auch
das Wissen um unterschiedliche Lehrmeinungen und Religionen (vgl. Netton
S. 95). – Interessant sind die von Netton nicht genannten Gemeinsamkeiten
und Unterschiede zu Miskawayh (vgl. Rez. in OLZ 76, 1981, Sp. 46 f. = H. Daiber,
From the Greeks to the Arabs II/51)9 und zu Fārābī. Mit beiden teilen die RIṢ
(vgl. Netton S. 4f.) den Begriff taʿāwun.10 Auf eine weitere Parallele zwischen
den RIṢ und Fārābī, nämlich in der Lehre von den Seelenkräften, hat Susanne
Diwald hingewiesen.11 Leider ist Ian Netton auf diese Berührungen nicht
eingegangen. Sein Buch ist ein einseitiger Versuch geworden, die Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ
zu Neuplatonikern abzustempeln.
On the complexity of sources and traditions in RIṢ cf. the survey of Daniel De
Smet in Philosophy in the Islamic World I: 8th–10th Centuries. Ed. by Ulrich
Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson. English transla-
8 Vgl. Aristoteles, De anima III 5. 430 a 12. – William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A His-
tory of Greek Philosophy VI. Cambridge 1981, S. 215 ff.
9 Vgl. auch Hans Daiber, Ethics as Likeness to God. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs II/27, Anm. 79.
10 Vgl. Fārābī, al-Madīna l-fāḍila. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici. Leiden 1964, S. 53f., und Mis-
kawayh, Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq. Ed. Constantine K. Zurayk. Beirut 1967, S. 15, 4. – Dazu Aris-
toteles, Politics I 1. 1253 a 2 ff., und Shlomo Pines, Aristotle’s Politics in Arabic Philosophy.
In IOS 5, 1975, S. 150–160. Auch in Shlomo Pines, Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts
and in Mediaeval Science. Jerusalem/Leiden 1996. = The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines II,
S. 146–156, und in Shlomo Pines, Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy. Ed. Sarah
Stroumsa. Jerusalem/Leiden 1996. = The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines III, S. 251–261.
11 In der Festschrift für Richard Walzer, Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition,
London 1972, S. 49–61, bes. S. 53.
ian richard netton, muslim neoplatonists (1982) 793
tion by Rotraud Hansberger. Leiden/Boston 2017. = Handbook of Oriental

Studies I, 115/1, pp. 755–758.
chapter 53
Douglas Morton Dunlop (ed.)

The Muntakhab Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah of Abū Sulaimān
As-Sijistānī (1979)
Douglas Morton Dunlop (Hrsg.), The Muntakhab Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah of Abū

Sulaimān As-Sijistānī. Arabic text, Introduction and Indices. The Hague/Paris/
New York: Mouton Publishers 1979. = Near and Middle East Monographs IV.
XXXVII + 198 S.
Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma ist ein philosophiegeschichtliches Kompendium mit zahl-

reichen Exzerpten aus zum Teil verlorenen griechischen und islamischen Quel-
len. Es enthält auch wichtiges biographisches und gnomologisches Material.
Kein Wunder, dass der Text in der erhaltenen handschriftlichen Form von den
Orientalisten häufig benutzt worden ist. Obwohl auf die erhaltenen Kurzfor-
men aus dem 6./12. Jahrhundert, nämlich den anonymen Muntaḫab und den
Muḫtaṣar des ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī an-Naysābūrī bereits im Jahre 1931 von
Martin Plessner hingewiesen worden ist (in Islamica 4, S. 534–538), hat die
mehrmals geforderte Edition lange auf sich warten lassen: Im Jahre 1974 gab
ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī in Teheran den Text des Muntaḫab nebst folgenden
drei kleineren Abhandlungen des Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī heraus: 1) Maqāla
322 fī l-aǧram al-ʿulwiyya ḏawāt anfus nāṭiqa; 2) Maqāla fī l-|muḥarrik al-awwal; 3)
Maqāla fī l-kamāl al-ḫāṣṣ bi-nawʿ al-insān.
Der Text des Muntaḫab erschien 1979 ein zweites Mal, nämlich in der hier
anzuzeigenden Ausgabe von Douglas Morton Dunlop. Wie ein Vergleich
beider Editionen zeigt, ist Dunlop wesentlich sorgfältiger verfahren. Außer-
dem hat Dunlop zusätzlich die Londoner Hs. und das Leidener Fragment
benutzt. Demgegenüber hat Badawī zusätzlich die Istanbuler Hs. Fatih 3222
herangezogen. Wenn man von den Druckfehlern in Dunlops Edition einmal
absieht, bleibt dennoch eine Anzahl von Stellen übrig, wo Badawī eine bessere
Lesart bietet oder wo an Hand von Badawīs Angaben die vermutlich rich-
tige Lesart rekonstruiert werden kann. Obwohl beide Editionen nicht immer
das Richtige bieten, verdient die Ausgabe von Dunlop den Vorzug. Diese
sollte man benutzen und im Zweifelsfalle die Edition von Badawī daneben
legen. Im Unterschied zu Badawī hat Dunlop auch die Nebenüberlieferung
(Quellen und spätere Exzerpte aus dem Ṣiwān) berücksichtigt. Allerdings sind
zahlreiche Varianten der Nebenüberlieferung nicht im textkritischen Apparat

douglas m. dunlop (ed.), the muntakhab ṣiwān al-ḥikmah (1979) 795
genannt. Außerdem sind eine Anzahl von Quellen nicht erkannt worden. Hier
hätte etwas mehr getan werden können, wobei die Nennung aller Quellen und
späteren Exzerpte in einem zweiten Apparat hilfreich gewesen wäre.
Die Bedeutung des Ṣiwān wird nicht dadurch geschmälert, dass der Text
wahrscheinlich gar nicht von Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī stammt, sondern min-
destens 17 Jahre nach dessen Tode, nämlich zwischen 394/1004 und 420/1029
kompiliert sein wird: Wadād Al-Qādī denkt in ihrem sehr ausführlichen Bei-
trag in Der Islam 58, 1981, S. 87–124, an den wenig bekannten ʿĀmirīschüler Abū
l-Qāsim al-Kātib. Wer auch immer der Verfasser des Ṣiwān gewesen sein mag,
der Text enthält wichtiges Material, welches uns einen Einblick gibt in den
philosophischen Bildungsstand der “Schule” des Abū Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī.
Dieser bildet Gegenstand einer 1967 von Joel L. Kraemer verfassten Disser-
tation an der Yale Universität in New Haven: Abū Sulaymān as-Sijistānī: a Mus-
lim Philosopher of the Tenth Century. Sie ist eingeflossen in Joel L. Kraemers
Monographie Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam. Abū Sulaymān Al-Sijistānī
and His Circle. Leiden 1986. In der Einzelanalyse des Ṣiwān-Textes in den erhal-
tenen Kurzfassungen ist noch längst nicht alles getan. Der Muḫtaṣar ist zwar
kürzer, enthält jedoch einiges zusätzliches Material. Er liegt in einer unver-
öffentlichten Dissertation vor: R. Mulyadhi Kartanegara, The Mukhtaṣar
Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma of ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī. Arabic text and introduction. PhD
University of Chicago 1996.
Wer den Text des Ṣiwān in irgendeinem Zusammenhang benutzt, sollte nicht
vergessen, dass zu zahlreichen Passagen bereits Analysen vorliegen. Dunlop
hätte dem Benutzer seiner Edition einen großen Dienst erwiesen, wenn er z.B.
in seinem – leider nicht immer vollständigen – Index auf solche Analysen in
der orientalistischen Literatur verwiesen hätte.1
Trotz mancher Kritik kann die Wichtigkeit von Dunlops Textausgabe nicht
genug unterstrichen werden. Die dahinter steckende editorische Leistung ver-
dient unsere Anerkennung.
Republished, with some modifications, from Der Islam 60, 1983, pp. 321–322. By cour-
1 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī in der For-
schung. In Arabica 31, 1984, S. 36–68. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/25.
chapter 54
Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and Admonitions, part one:

Logic. Translated from the Original Arabic with an
Introduction and Notes by Shams Constantine
Inati (1984)
Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and Admonitions, part one: Logic. Translated from the Ori-
ginal Arabic with an Introduction and Notes by Shams Constantine Inati.
Toronto, Ontario, Canada 1984. Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies XIV, 165
S. (Mediaeval Sources in Translation 28). – $9.50.
Ibn Sīnā bietet in seinem häufig schwer verständlichen und daher viel kom-
mentierten Alterswerk al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt eine zusammenfassende Dar-
stellung von Logik, Physik, Metaphysik und Mystik. Was wir hier finden, ist Ibn
Sīnās eigener Standpunkt. Auch aus diesem Grunde ist es sicherlich eine gute
Idee gewesen, eine englische Übersetzung von dem Kapitel über Logik zu ver-
öffentlichen; ihr sollen weitere Kapitel folgen.
Shams Constantine Inati schickt seiner Übersetzung eine ausführliche
Analyse des Textes voraus, welche uns gleichzeitig über die Bedeutung der
Logik, einem Teil und Hilfsmittel der Philosophie, informiert. In diesem Zusam-
menhang erscheinen Ibn Sīnās Thesen interessant, dass Wissen zu “Glückse-
ligkeit” (saʿāda) führe und dass man praktisches und theoretisches Wissen ver-
binden müsse. Erstere Wissensart umfasse das Wissen um das, was für Gesell-
schaft, Familie und Individuum das Beste sei. Dieses sei die Voraussetzung
für das theoretische Wissen, durch welches die metaphysische Vollendung
des Individuums erreicht werde. Inati weist in diesem Falle auf seine unge-
druckte Dissertation An Examination of Ibn Sīnā’s Solution for the Problem of
Evil, State University of New York at Buffalo 1979. Zweifelsohne ist Ibn Sīnā
hier von Gedanken des Fārābī inspiriert gewesen, welcher in seiner Madīna l-
fāḍila in ähnlicher Weise Gedankenkomplexe aus Aristoteles’ Erkenntnislehre
und Ethik (Nikomachische Ethik) verbunden hatte. Leider erfahren wir in Ina-
tis Buch fast nichts über die aristotelischen Ausgangspunkte. Ein Blick auf die
Apodeiktik des Aristoteles, seine Lehre von Urteil, Begriff und Syllogismus z.B.
an Hand der Materialversammlung von Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im
Abendlande I. Darmstadt 1865, S. 104ff., wäre hier in Einzelfragen sowohl der
Analyse als auch der Übersetzung nützlich gewesen. So wird man für den aris-

shams constantine inati – ibn sīnā, remarks (1984) 797
totelischen Ausgangspunkt von Ibn Sīnā weiterhin auf die französische Über-
setzung von Amélie-Marie Goichon aus dem Jahre 1951 angewiesen sein.
Zusätzlich sollte man dabei der Frage nachgehen, ob Ibn Sīnā auch Fārābīs
Logikkommentare herangezogen hat.
Ausdrücklich sei hier der Versuch des Übersetzers gewürdigt, die Logik der
Išārāt im Kontext der übrigen Werke des Ibn Sīnā zu sehen und zu interpre-
tieren. Zu Avi|cennas Lehre von den Urteilen vgl. auch das von Inati nicht 339
genannte Werk von Nabil Shehaby, The Propositional Logic of Avicenna. A
translation from ash-Shifāʾ: al-Qiyās. Dordrecht 1973. Die kontextbezogene In-
terpretation ist ebenso unerlässlich wie die von Inati vernachlässigte Quellen-
analyse.
Wie Stichproben zeigen, ist die Übersetzung mit wünschenswerter Sorg-
falt angefertigt worden. In Einzelfällen ist sie über die oben genannte franzö-
sische Übersetzung von Amélie-Marie Goichon hinausgekommen. Den-
noch sollte man in Zweifelsfällen auf die französische Version zurückgreifen.
Neben der Edition von Sulaymān Dunyā (Kairo 21971) sind diejenigen von
Jacques Forget (Leiden 1892) und Nabil Shehaby (Teheran 1960) herange-
zogen worden. Von der Nützlichkeit dieses Vergleiches zeugen die Anmerkun-
gen zur Übersetzung. Diese enthalten überdies Erklärungen schwieriger Passa-
gen und Termini technici. Letztere hätte man gerne in einem Index erschlossen
gesehen, der auch die arabischen Äquivalente umfasst. Doch dies soll nicht
unsere Anerkennung vorliegender Übersetzungsleistung schmälern.
Part 4 of the Išārāt is translated by Shams Constantine Inati under the title
Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism. London/New York 1996. – On editions, translations and
studies cf. Hans Daiber, BIPh, Index.
chapter 55
Qāsim, Butterworth and Harīdī (eds.)

Averrois Cordubensis in Librum Aristotelis De
interpretatione (1981)
Charles E. Butterworth (transl.)
Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s
Categories and De interpretatione (1983)
Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim, Charles E. Butterworth (und) Aḥmad

ʿAbd al-Magīd Harīdī (Hrsg.), Averrois Cordubensis in Librum Aristotelis De
interpretatione (Talḫīṣ Kitāb al-ʿIbāra). Cairo 1981. The General Egyptian Book
Organization. 16 S. und 131 S. arab. Text. = Corpus commentariorum Averrois in
Aristotelem. Versionum Arabicarum volumen 1, a (3).
Charles E. Butterworth (Übers.), Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aris-

totle’s Categories and De interpretatione. Princeton 1983: Princeton University
Press. XX, 193 S., Preis $29, 50.
Im Jahre 1931 hat Harry Austryn Wolfson die Herausgabe der arabischen,
hebräischen und lateinischen Übersetzungen von Averroes’ Aristoteleskom-
mentaren angeregt (s. Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies in the History of
Philosophy and Religion I. Cambridge/Mass. 1973, S. 430–454). Seit 1978 ist die
Leitung des Gesamtunternehmens, ein Projekt der Union Académique lnterna-
tionale, am Thomas-lnstitut in Köln (vgl. Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 20,
1978, S. 58–64). Aus welchen Gründen auch immer, die Koordination einzelner
Projekte in verschiedenen Ländern ist ein schwieriges Unterfangen geworden.
So konnte es geschehen, dass die arabische Version beider hier anzuzeigender
Texte in einem Zeitraum von wenigen Jahren mehrmals herausgegeben wor-
den ist: Averroes’ “Mittlerer Kommentar” zu Aristoteles’ Hermeneutik (Talḫīṣ
Kitāb al-ʿIbāra) wurde (nach drei Hss.) von Muḥammad Salīm Sālim 1978 in
Kairo herausgegeben; ferner wurde Averroes’ “Mittlerer Kommentar” zu Aris-
toteles’ Kategorien und Hermeneutik (gleichfalls nach drei Hss.) 1982 in Bei-
rut von Ǧīrār Ǧihāmī ediert in dem Sammelband Ibn Rušd, Talḫīṣ manṭiq
Arisṭū. = Manšūrāt al-ǧamiʿa al-lubnāniyya. Qism ad-dirāsāt al-falsafiyya wa-
l-iǧtimāʿiyya 12. Diese Ausgabe hat zwar den Vorteil, dass alle Logiktexte in

qāsim, butterworth and harīdī, averroes (1981, 1983) 799
einem Band vereinigt sind und dass ein Glossar beigefügt ist. Aber die von
Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim, Charles E. Butterworth und Aḥmad
ʿAbd al-Magīd Harīdī vorgelegte Ausgabe des Kategorienkommentars mit
dem Titel Averrois Cordubensis commentarium medium in Aristotelis Categorias
(Kairo 1980. = Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versionum
Arabicarum volumen 1, a 2) sowie des hier anzuzeigenden Hermeneutikkom-
mentars machen einen sorgfältigeren Eindruck. Die Herausgeber stützen sich
auf sechs Hss. und ziehen (im Falle des Kategorienkommentars) auch die Erst-
ausgabe von Maurice Bouyges, Beirut 1932, heran. In der Einleitung zu einer
englischen Übersetzung gibt Butterworth eine Beschreibung der sechs Hss.
und rechtfertigt seine Neuedition. Leider erfährt man nichts über das Verhält-
nis des arabischen Textes zur hebräischen Übersetzung, die von Herbert A.
Davidson 1969 in Cambridge, Mass. herausgegeben und ins Englische über-
tragen worden ist (= Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versio-
num Hebraicarum volume l, a und Versio Anglica voluminis l, a 1–2). Auch der
sehr detaillierte Kommentar von Davidson ist äußerst informativ und nütz-
lich und sollte beim Studium der von Butterworth angefertigten englischen
Übersetzung herangezogen werden.
In seinem Kategorien-Kommentar hält sich Averroes in der Regel recht ge-
nau an den Text des Aristoteles. Zusammenhängende Abschnitte leitet er mit
einer lnhaltsübersicht ein, um dann den Text (teilweise mit qāla eingeleitet)
im Einzelnen zu kommentieren. Hierbei äußert sich Averroes zuweilen kri-
tisch oder zustimmend zu Fārābī: Vgl. außer Butterworth, S. 36 und 70,
auch Davidson in seiner oben genannten englischen | Übersetzung, Index s.n. 147
Alfarabi. Averroes greift nicht auf die griechische Kommentarliteratur zurück.
Einige Male zieht er andere Werke des Aristoteles heran (z.B. Physik: s. S. 46).
Häufig ersetzt er die bei Aristoteles genannten Beispiele durch andere, dem
islamischen Leser geläufigere Beispiele oder er erwähnt zusätzliches Anschau-
ungsmaterial. Sein Kommentar beleuchtet Nuancen, die bei Aristoteles nicht
ausdrücklich zur Sprache kommen. So mag er vielleicht tatsächlich dem bes-
seren Verständnis des Aristotelestextes dienen.
In seinem Kommentar zur Hermeneutik hält sich Averroes weniger strikt an
den Aristotelestext. Auffällig sind zahlreiche Verweise nach Grenzen und Mög-
lichkeiten der arabischen Sprache. Manche Gedanken und Klassifikationen
kommen bei Aristoteles nicht vor. Informierend ist hier die Analyse von But-
terworth in seiner Einleitung S. 91–117. Butterworth äußert sich nicht
zu Averroes’ nichtaristotelischen Quellen (vgl. lediglich S. 128). Es ist denk-
bar, dass Averroes wie im Kategorien-Kommentar auch Fārābī herangezogen
hat: Dessen Kitāb Bārī Armīniyās (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας) ist mehrmals herausgegeben
worden (1976, 1986, 1987), ebenso dessen Kommentar Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs
800 chapter 55
fī l-ʿibāra (1971, 1988). Beide Texte sind von Fritz W. Zimmermann ins Engli-
sche übersetzt worden: Al-Fārābī’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s
De Interpretatione. London 1981. Vgl. H. Daiber, BIPh I Nr. 2871–2875 und 2954–
2956.
Wie Stichproben zeigen, ist die Übersetzung lesbar und korrekt. Im Zwei-
felsfall sollte man Davidsons englische Übertragung der hebräischen Überset-
zung des Kategorienkommentars heranziehen; ferner die aristotelischen Texte
und deren arabische Übersetzungen, über die uns Butterworth leider an
keiner Stelle informiert.
Insgesamt sind Text und Übersetzung, die beide am Rand auf die entspre-
chenden Aristotelespassagen verweisen, ein nützliches Hilfsmittel für das Stu-
dium von Averroes’ Aristotelesexegese.
Republished, with some modifications, from Der Islam 62, 1985, pp. 146–147. By courtesy
of the publisher.
chapter 56
Charles E. Butterworth
Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics
Translated, with Introduction and Notes (1986)
Charles E. Butterworth, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poe-

tics. Translated, with introduction and notes. Princeton University Press (1986),
XVI, 162 S.
Ein Blick auf die Rezeptionsgeschichte von Aristoteles’ Poetik seit dem Mittel-
alter und auf die Beschäftigung heutiger Gelehrter mit ihr1 macht uns bewusst,
dass über die Textgrundlage noch nicht in allen Details Klarheit herrscht. Hier-
auf hat Ingram Bywater mehrfach hingewiesen in seiner englischen Über-
setzung in The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. II. Prin-
ceton 1984, S. 2316–2340. Der syrisch-arabischen Übersetzung kommt daher
eine besondere Bedeutung zu: Trotz Jaroslaus Tkatschs ausführlichem Ver-
gleich der orientalischen Überlieferung mit dem Griechischen in seiner 1928
in Wien und Leipzig erschienenen Monographie Die arabische Übersetzung
der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes
müssen im Einzelfall textkritische Probleme des Griechischen unter Heran-
ziehung der syrisch-arabischen Überlieferung neu durchdacht werden. Wie
nützlich dies sein kann, zeigt eine 1984 erschienene Studie von Carlo Gal-
lavotti, La versione araba di Arist. Poet. 15, 7. In Studi in onore di Francesco
Gabrieli nel suo ottantesimo compleano. A cura di Renato Traini I, Roma 1984,
S. 341–347. Freilich ist ein Vergleich mit der syrisch-arabischen Überlieferung
dadurch erschwert, dass die syrische Vorlage, die im 10. Jh. AD Abū Bišr Mattā in
eine häufig kaum verständliche arabische Version übertragen hat, noch nicht
in einer zuverlässigen Textausgabe vorliegt. David Samuel Margoliouth
hat den syrischen Text nach Barhebraeus’ Butyrum sapientiae veröffentlicht in
seinen Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam. Londini 1887, S. 114–139.
Allerdings hat er nicht alle Hss. des Butyrum herangezogen. Ferner könnten
1 Vgl. Omert J. Schrier in Forum der Letteren 29, Amsterdam 1988, S. 69–73. – Omert J.
Schrier, The Poetics of Aristotle and the Tractatus Coislinianus. A Bibliography from about
900 till 1996. Leiden 1996 (22018). = Mnemosyne. Supplements 184. – Zur Wirkungsgeschichte
Arbogast Schmitt, “Aristoteles – Poetik”. In Der Neue Pauly. Supplemente 7: Die Rezeption
der antiken Literatur, Darmstadt 2010.

802 chapter 56
für die Textgeschichte die Alexander von Aphrodisias zugeschriebenen und

von Ḥunayn übersetzen “Poetischen Lehren des Philosophen Aristoteles” (al-
Fawāʾid aš-šiʿriyya li-Arisṭūṭālīs al-ḥakīm) in der Istanbuler Hs. Carullah 1279,
fol. 69 v–70 v (s. Franz Rosenthal in JAOS 75, 1955, Sp. 18 a) interessant sein.
Und schließlich bleibt das Desiderat eines genauen Vergleiches mit der Text-
grundlage, die arabische Kommentatoren in ihren Kommentaren zu Aristote-
les’ Poetik benutzt haben: Einen wichtigen Platz nimmt hier neben Avicenna
und Fārābī der “Mittlere Kommentar” des Averroes ein, den Butterworth
und Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Magīd Harīdī 1987 in Kairo neu herausgegeben haben
und den Butterworth in seiner hier zu besprechenden kommentierten
englischen Übersetzung einem größeren Leserkreis zugänglich gemacht hat.
Butterworth, der 1975 auch Averroes’ Kurzkommentar zur Poetik mit eng-
lischer Übersetzung herausgegeben hatte (Averroes’ Three Short Commentaries
on Aristotle’s “Topics”, “Rhetorics”, and “Poetics”. Albany 1975), hat seiner verläss-
lichen englischen Übersetzung in einer Einleitung einen sorgfältigen Vergleich
des aristotelischen Textes mit Averroes’ Kommentar vorausgeschickt und ist
zu dem Ergebnis gekommen, dass Averroes wohl Abū Bišrs syrisch-arabische
Übersetzung benutzt hat “or at least” “one closely resembling it”. Vermutlich hat
Averroes versucht, Abū Bišrs Version, die ihm häufig unverständlich gewesen
sein wird, zu “modernisieren”. Ob er (noch) eine andere Übersetzung benutzt
hat, lässt sich nicht beweisen.
Averroes’ Kommentar ist trotz aller Missverständnisse sicherlich ein wich-
tiger Beitrag zur Interpretation der aristotelischen Poetik, auch wenn er häufig
eigene Wege gegangen ist und den Kern der aristotelischen Lehre verfehlt hat.
377 Hierbei hat Aver|roes die Problematik seiner Kommentierung wohl geahnt:
So ist er einerseits bemüht, eine universalistische, für alle Nationen geltende
Lehre der Poetik zu entwickeln. Deren Ziel sei “setting forth the correctness
of beliefs as part of urging people to do or to avoid certain actions” (Butter-
worth, S. 21). Andererseits war er sich bewusst, dass es Unterschiede gibt, die
eine Übertragung von Begriffen und deren Inhalt von der einen in die andere
Kultur erschweren. So ersetzt er in nicht immer nachvollziehbarer Weise “Tra-
gödie” durch “Eulogie” und “Erzählung” oder “Komödie” durch “epische Poesie”
und “Satire”. Averroes hält die arabische Poesie für unterlegen, da die Araber
in ihrer Poesie mehr zu Parabeln, Fabeln und “anderen falschen Erfindun-
gen” neigen und ihre Poesie somit der Philosophie weniger nahestehe. Eine
Schlüsselposition nimmt hier §38 ein (Kommentar zu Poetik 1451 a 36–1451
b 14). Hiernach habe die wahre Poesie (der Griechen) “existierenden” (ašyāʾ
mawǧūda), aber nicht den erfundenen, “überhaupt nicht existierenden” (laysa
lahā wuǧūdun aṣlan) “Dingen” einen Namen gegeben (ed. Butterworth /
Harīdī, S. 77, 8ff.). Sie sei “gleichsam etwas Natürliches für die natürlichen Völ-
charles e. butterworth, averroes’ middle commentary (1986) 803
ker”. Butterworth, S. 44f., vermutet hinter dem Ausdruck “natürliche Völ-

ker” (die Griechen und die Andalusier, nicht aber die Araber) die sesshaften
Völker im Unterschied zu den nomadisierenden Arabern. Doch angesichts des
oben genannten Textzusammenhangs sei hier der Vorschlag geäußert, dass der
Terminus assoziativ zu der Vorstellung entwickelt sein könnte, dass die wahren
Dichter eine “naturgemäße” (φύσει) Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Bezeich-
netem voraussetzen. Averroes hat gegenüber der arabischen Poesie eine kriti-
sche Haltung eingenommen, vielleicht weil er in ihr die von ihm immer wie-
der betonte Aufgabe nicht verwirklicht sah, zu guten Handlungen aufzufor-
dern und von bösen abzuschrecken. Hier greift Averroes einen aristotelischen
Ansatz auf (vgl. Butterworth, S. 14f.), wenn er dem Dichter pädagogische
Pflichten auferlegt. Aristoteles’ Ausführungen (z.B. Poetik 1448 a 1 ff.) erhalten
hier eine neue Pointierung, wenn offensichtlich im Anschluss an platonisch-
farabianische Lehren vom Musterstaat, der ja auch Gegenstand von Averroes’
Kommentar zu Platons Republik gewesen ist, die Poesie die Menschen zur rich-
tigen Glaubensüberzeugung, zum Tun des Guten führen will. Poetik erscheint
als eine Art Rhetorik (vgl. Butterworth, S. 14). Letztere hatte bei Fārābī die
Aufgabe, die Massen zu überzeugen. Vergleichbar mit Averroes’ Kritik an der
Benutzung von Parabeln und Fabeln durch die arabischen Dichter (s.o.) hatte
Fārābī alles abgelehnt, was ein verfälschendes Bild für das eigentlich Gemeinte
ist. Vgl. hierzu und zum aristotelischen Ausgangspunkt Hans Daiber, The
Ruler as Philosopher. A new interpretation of al-Fārābī’s view. In MNAW.L
n.r. 49/4, 1986, (S. 128–149), bes. S. 137. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs
II/18. Somit ist Averroes’ Akzentuierung der moralischen Aufgabe von Poesie
eine Weiterentwicklung älterer philosophischer Tradition, die sich auf Fārābī
zurückführen lässt und auf verschiedenen Wegen von Aristoteles angeregt wor-
den ist.
Zum Schluss noch einige bibliographische Ergänzungen: Von der hebräi-
schen Überlieferung, die Charles E. Butterworth nicht herangezogen hat
und in der es zwei Übersetzungen gab (s. Moritz Steinschneider, Die
hebraeischen Übersetzer des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher. Graz
1956, §21) ist diejenige des Todros Todrosi aus dem Jahre 1337 AD in der latei-
nischen Übersetzung des Jakob Mantinus (gest. 1550) zugänglich. Friedrich
Heidenhein hat sie nach der Venediger Aristoteles-Averroes-Ausgabe aus
dem Jahre 1562 in Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik, Suppl. 17, Leip-
zig 1890, S. 351–382, veröffentlicht. Jaroslaus Tkatsch (Tkač) hat hiernach
den Beginn des Textes mit dem arabischen Original (ed. Fausto Lasinio)
und mit dem griechi|schen Text Wort für Wort verglichen (Über den arabi- 378
schen Kommentar des Averroes zur Poetik des Aristoteles. In Wiener Studien 24,
1902, S. 70–98). – Eine Neuedition der arabisch-lateinischen Übersetzung von
804 chapter 56
Hermannus Alemannus gibt es von Larry Lawrence Bronson, An Edition

of Averroes’ Commentaria media on Aristotle’s Poetics. Translated by Herman-
nus Alemannus. PhD Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey,
New Brunswick 1970. – Eine vergleichende Studie bietet Salim Kemal, Ara-
bic Poetics and Aristotle’s Poetics. In British Journal of Aesthetics 26, Oxford
1986, S. 112–123. Der Aufsatz ist Teil der Monographie von Salim Kemal, The
Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna. Leiden/New York/Kobenhavn 1991. = IPTS
9. – Zur Geschichte der aristotelischen Poetik bei den Syrern und Arabern
seien dem interessierten Leser die folgenden Bücher anbefohlen: Wolfhart
Heinrichs, Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik. Beirut 1969. = BTS 8. –
Gregor Schoeler, Einige Grundprobleme der autochthonen und der aristote-
lischen arabischen Literaturthorie. Wiesbaden 1979. = AKM 41/4, nebst Nachtrag
in ZDMG 126, 1976, S. 78x–81x.
The Syriac-Arabic tradition is collated with the Greek text in a new edition of
Aristotle’s Poetics by Leonardo Tarán and Dimitri Gutas, Aristotle Poetics.
Editio major of the Greek text with historical introductions and philological
commentaries. Leiden/Boston 2012. = Mnemosyne, Supplements 338. The Greek
text will benefit from critical editions and comparisons of the Syriac, Arabic,
Hebrew and Latin material, which is planned in the “Einstein-Project 2016–
2019” of the Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies: “Die Poetik
des Aristoteles zwischen Europa und Islam”.
Republished, with some modifications and additions, from Der Islam 66, 1989, S. 376–
chapter 57
Barry S. Kogan
Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (1985)
Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation. Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press 1985. XI, 348 S.
Averroes’ Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, eine Widerlegung von Ġazālīs Kritik der Philoso-
phen (Tahāfut al-falāsifa) möchte eine Einleitung in das Studium der Beweis-
führung sein. Der Text gibt uns einen Einblick in wissenschaftliche Methodik
islamischer Philosophie, in das Nebeneinander von axiomatischen und deduk-
tiven Denkmethoden. Diesen Aspekt hat Kogan nicht näher ausgeführt. Ihm
ging es hauptsächlich um das Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen Kausalität
und göttlichem Schöpferhandeln.
Averroes hat hier einen Mittelweg eingeschlagen zwischen “Philosophen”,
die Kausalität nach einem neuplatonischen Emanationsmodell (“plenitude/
overflow model”) interpretieren und Ġazālī, der die Kausalwirkungen einem
Agens zuschreibt, der Leben, Wissen und Willen habe, ex nihilo schaffe, wobei
von Gott geschaffene Ursachen und deren Verursachtes nur akzidentell mit-
einander verbunden seien. Im Gegensatz zu Ġazālī wirkt für Averroes jede
Ursache nur in Bezug auf Verursachtes (vgl. Aristoteles, Metaph. X 3; Pro-
clus, Instit. theol., prop. 28) entweder vorsätzlich oder von Natur. Hierbei geht
er nach einem aristotelischen Modell (vgl. Hans Daiber, Das theologisch-
philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.).
Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, S. 92ff.) von der Gleichzeitigkeit von Wirk-
ursache und Bewirktem aus. Ferner impliziert er eine Stufung der Ursachen:
Die Ursache, welche die meiste Kontinuität und die geringste Veränderlich-
keit besitzt, | ist der göttliche Agens. Die Welt kann nur insofern von diesem 311
bewirkt sein, als sie in der kontinuierlichen Kreisbewegung der Himmelssphä-
ren eine kontinuierliche Kreisbewegung hat bzw. ewig ist. Mit den Kreisbe-
wegungen dieser Himmelssphären und mit der Unvergänglichkeit der physi-
kalischen Beschaffenheit werden die kontinuierlichen sublunaren Änderun-
gen in Verbindung gebracht, wohingegen veränderliche Planetenstellungen
ihr Pendant in der Vergänglichkeit und Veränderlichkeit der sublunaren Welt
haben. Die Himmelssphären ihrerseits werden von den himmlischen Intellek-
ten bestimmt. Sie verhalten sich zueinander wie die Form, die Substanz zu den
konkreten Partikularien, wobei allerdings die himmlischen Formen von der

806 chapter 57
Materie getrennt bleiben, um ewig aktiv sein zu können. Im Anschluss an Aris-

toteles ist die Welt – alles, was bewegt ist – von einem höchsten Agens in
Bewegung gesetzt, ohne zeitlichen Beginn und sie ist keine creatio ex nihilo.
Aus dem Prozess der Bewegung resultieren vorher nicht dagewesene Partiku-
larien. Averroes vermag so die ewige Himmelssphäre gleichzeitig als Schöpfung
Gottes, als separaten Intellekt einstufen. Das Problem, dass ein separater Intel-
lekt als Wirkursache physikalischer Zustände betrachtet werden kann, löst er
mit der Einführung des göttlichen Kausalwirkens. Gott schafft, indem er kon-
tinuierlich die Formen der Dinge denkt, mit denen er im Denken identisch ist
(Kogan, S. 237). Hier erscheint die von Averroes anfänglich vertretene und im
Tahāfut at-Tahāfut sowie im Großen Kommentar zur Metaphysik aufgegebene
Emanationstheorie von Fārābī und Avicenna ersetzt durch ein mehr aristoteli-
sches Modell – dies auffälligerweise unter dem Einfluss seines Gegners Ġazālī.
Kausale Notwendigkeit ist für Averroes ein Modus der Wirksamkeit von Parti-
kularien, die in der Konstellation von aktiver Ursache und passiv Verursachtem,
Form und Materie, Änderungen hervorrufen. Dies setzt ausreichende Poten-
tialität voraus, so dass die Verwirklichung ohne Verzögerung eintreten kann.
Hier erscheint Potentialität in aristotelischem Sinne als Realmöglichkeit. Was
in Wirklichkeit sein kann, i s t. Auf diese Weise vermag Averroes Verursachtes
einerseits als etwas notwendigerweise von der Ursache Bewirktes (vgl. Aristo-
teles, aber auch Proclus) und andererseits als akzidentelle Qualität ohne onto-
logische Beziehung zur Ursache (Ġazālī) zu klassifizieren.
Barry S. Kogans Studie konzentriert sich auf die philosophische Ana-
lyse und zieht hierbei die übrigen einschlägigen Schriften des Averroes und
seine griechischen Quellen (v.a. Aristoteles) heran. Unser Verständnis von Aver-
roes’ Tahāfut at-Tahāfut ist damit erheblich vertieft worden. Bei der Interpre-
tation hätte vielleicht der islamische Hintergrund einzelner Diskussionsele-
mente sowie ein Buch einbezogen werden können, das die islamischen Erörte-
rungen über das Verhältnis der Naturkausalität zur göttlichen Ursache erheb-
lich beeinflusst hat, nämlich Proclus’ Institutio theologica. Vgl. Hans Daiber,
Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an Kindīs Metaphysik. In Der Islam 63, 1986 (S. 284–
302), S. 284ff. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/12.
Republished from Der Islam 64, 1987, S. 310–311. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 58
Fathallah Kholeif
A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His
Controversies in Transoxiana (1966)
Fathallah Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in

Transoxiana. Beyrouth: Dar El-Machreq Éditeurs 1966. XVI, 226 S., 71 arab. S. gr.
80 = Recherches publiées sous la direction de l’Institut de Lettres Orientales de
Beyrouth. Serie I, tome XXXI.
Der viel bewunderte – aber auch angefeindete – Dogmatiker und Philosoph

Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (gest. 607/1210) berichtet in seinem Werk Munāẓarāt fī
bilād mā warāʾ an-nahr,1 in einer Art Autobiographie, über Streitgespräche
theologischen, philosophischen und juristischen Inhaltes mit hanafitischen
und maturidischen “Gelehrten” (ʿulamāʾ) in Transoxanien. Rāzī ist ein Gegner
der Muʿtazila, obwohl er oft muʿtazilitische Argumente und Lehren gebraucht.
Er ist in der Theologie Aschʿarite, im Recht Schafiite, ohne sich mit den beiden
Richtungen völlig zu identifizieren. Wie der oft mit den Waffen griechisch-
aristotelischer Logik geführte Streit mit seinen Gegnern zeigt, besitzt Rāzī
ein erstaunliches Maß an Wissen und Scharfsinn. Nach der von Kholeif
S. 190–203 aufgestellten Liste seiner Werke zu schließen, hat Rāzī im Laufe
seines Lebens eine rege literarische Produktivität entfaltet. Einen guten Ein-
blick in seine Gedankenwelt ermöglichen die Munāẓarāt, die uns Kholeif
durch seine Ausgabe2 und kommentierte Übersetzung erst richtig erschlossen
hat.
S. 29–85 bringt Kholeif eine Übersetzung der insgesamt 16 Themen (=
arab. Text S. 7–63), um dann in einem letzten Hauptteil (S. 87–188) in der Form
eines Kommentars zunächst die Lehre und Stellung des Rāzī in Philosophie
und Theologie (= Kommentar zu Streitfrage Nr. 3–5; 14; 2; 13; 16; 10; 9), dann
seine Anschauungen über die Prinzipien des islamischen Rechts (= Kommen-
tar zu Streitfrage Nr. 6–8; 11; 12) und schließlich über Einzelprobleme des ange-
wandten Rechts (= Kommentar zu Streitfrage Nr. 1 und 15) darzustellen.
1 Der Titel stammt von einem späteren Kopisten; vielleicht lautete er ursprünglich Aǧwibat al-
masāʾil al-Buḫāriyya.
2 Sie ersetzt die Ausgabe Ḥaydarābād 1355/1936.

808 chapter 58
Die Streitfragen Nr. 3 und 4 widmen sich dem Problem der Gottesattribute:
Man ist sich einig über die Anerkennung der sieben Attribute ʿilm, qudra, irāda,
ḥayāt, samʿ, baṣar und kalām.3 Diese werden in der Form der Negation – remotio
oder negatio für ἀφαίρεσις in der hellenistischen Theologie4 – als weder iden-
tisch mit der Substanz Gottes noch als etwas anderes als Substanz bezeichnet.
Man ist sich aber uneinig über weitere Attribute wie z.B. takwīn “Erschaffung”,
welches die Gegner von Rāzī, die Hanafiten und Maturiditen anerkennen als
ein zusätzliches Attribut der “Tätigkeit” ( fiʿl), nicht der Substanz.5
379 Gottesattribute der Tätigkeit (ἐνέργεια) kennen bereits die griechischen Kirchenvä-
ter.6 Im Grunde genommen steht dahinter die bereits platonische Unterscheidung von
Gottes Sein und Wirkungen, in deren Folge das Begriffspaar οὐσία – δύναμις eine zen-
trale Rolle in der hellenistischen Theologie spielt. In der pseudoaristotelischen Schrift
De mundo wird mit Hilfe des δύναμις-Begriffes das Wirken Gottes unter Ablehnung der
stoischen Immanenzlehre erklärt.7
Rāzī hält takwīn für ein Attribut der Zeit (ḥādiṯ) und der Relation (ṣifa nis-
biyya), wodurch die Relation zwischen dem Schöpfer bzw. Seiner Allmacht
(qudra) und der Schöpfung (mukawwan) wahrnehmbar wird.
Damit ist eine weitere Möglichkeit der Gottesaussage ausgenutzt. Wie bei den grie-
chischen Kirchenvätern8 kennt man die Möglichkeit, über Gott zu reden, nicht nur in
der Form der Negation, sondern auch durch die Darstellung der bestehenden kausa-
len Beziehung Gottes zur Schöpfung, indem er sie durch seine Handlungen (ἐνεργείαι)
ins Leben ruft.9 Wenn hierbei in der Formulierung der Gotteslehren die aristotelische
Katogorienlehre Anwendung findet – vgl. zum Attribut der Zeit aristotelisches πότε, zu
3 Vgl. dazu J. Windrow Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology II/2. London 1967, S. 104ff.
4 Vgl. dazu Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine
Attributes in the Kalam. In JAOS 79, 1959 (Sp. 73–80), Sp. 74 b ff. = H. A. Wolfson, The Phi-
losophy of the Kalam. Cambridge, Mass./London 1976, S. 217ff.
5 Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Attributen der Substanz und solchen der Tätigkeit in der
muʿtazilitischen Gotteslehre vgl. Otto Pretzl, Die frühislamische Attributenlehre. In Sit-
zungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in München, Phil.-hist. Abt., Jg.
1940, H. 4, S. 9 ff.
6 Vgl. H. A. Wolfson (s. Anm. 4).
7 Vgl. Hans Strohm, Studien zur Schrift von der Welt. In Mus Helv 9, Basel 1952 (S. 137–175),
S. 160 ff. – Johan C. Thom, The Cosmotheology of De mundo. In Cosmic Order and Divine
Power. Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos. Ed. Johan C. Thom. Tübingen 2014 (S. 107–120),
S. 113ff. – Zur Unterscheidung von Wesen und Wirken Gottes in der christlich-hellenistischen
Theologie vgl. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs
als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie. In ZKG 70, 4. F. 8, 1959 (S. 1–45),
S. 35 ff.
8 Vgl. H. A. Wolfson (s. Anm. 4).
9 Z.B. bei Albinus und Plotinus, s. Harry Austryn Wolfson, Albinus and Plotinus on Divine
Attributes. In The Harvard Theological Review 45, Cambridge 1952 (S. 115–130), S. 122f.
fathallah kholeif, a study on fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī (1966) 809
dem der Relation aristotelisches πρὸς τί, stoisches πρὸς τί πως έχοντα10 – so folgt Rāzī
wie übrigens bereits die frühe Muʿtazila11 einer Tradition der christlich-hellenistischen
Theologie.12
Wenn Gott will, kann er durch seine Allmacht (qudra) die der Möglichkeit
nach (vgl. unten zu Streitfrage Nr. 2) ewig existierende Schöpfung ins Leben
rufen. Somit bezeichnet das durch die qudra Gottes bestimmte Attribut tak-
wīn: 1. Die Beziehung zu der der Möglichkeit nach bestehenden Existenz der
Schöpfung, welche ewig ist; 2. Die Beziehung zur Verwirklichung der Schöp-
fung in der Zeit (taʿalluq tanǧīzī ḥādiṯ). – Gegen die Maturiditen (vgl. Kholeif,
S. 97ff.) und in Einklang mit der Karrāmiyya und Muʿtazila vertritt Rāzī die
Zeitlichkeit von takwīn. Denn seiner Meinung nach würde die Ewigkeit von tak-
wīn die Untrennbarkeit dieses Attributes von der Substanz Gottes implizieren.
Dadurch aber würde diese die Schöpfung notwendigerweise erschaffen, womit
Gott nicht mehr frei, sondern unter Zwang handeln würde. Letzteres ist Gegen-
stand des 4. Streitgesprächs.
In der 5. Streitfrage wendet sich Rāzī (mit Ǧuwaynī) gegen diejenigen, wel-
che mit den Aschʿariten unter die zusätzlichen Gottesattribute auch das Attri-
but des “Bleibens” | (baqāʾ) rechnen. Denn Gott bleibe durch seine Substanz, 380
nicht durch ein zusätzliches Attribut des “Bleibens”: Das “Bleiben” ist abhängig
von der Substanz, nicht umgekehrt.
14. Streitfrage: Gottes kalām (“Wort”) ist nach Rāzī ein ewiges Attribut der
Substanz Gottes (kalām qadīm qāʾim bi-ḏā-tihī).13 Es wird von der theologi-
schen Bewegung der Ǧahmiyya infolge der Verneinung jeglicher anthropomor-
pher Aussagemöglichkeit über Gott abgelehnt. Vgl. die Darstellung von Dārimī
(gest. 282/895, s. GAL S I, S. 342) in seinem Kitāb ar-Radd ʿalā l-Ǧahmiyya. Hrsg.
von Gösta Vitestam. Lund/Leiden 1960 (s. Einleitung, S. 22ff.). Wie im Falle
der Sichtbarkeit Gottes (s.u. zu Streitfrage 2) anerkennt Rāzī die Möglichkeit,
Gottes Wort zu hören.
Wie das im Einzelnen zu verstehen ist, zeigt die 2. Streitfrage zwischen dem
Maturiditen Nūr ad-Dīn aṣ-Ṣābūnī (gest. 580/1184, s. GAL² I, S. 464, und S I,
S. 643) und Rāzī über das Problem der Gottesschau. Rāzī verknüpft dieses mit
10 Zur griechischen Kategorienlehre vgl. z.B. Innocenty M. Bochenski, Formale Logik.

Freiburg/München 1962, §§ 11. 13. 15. 19.
11 Vgl. Hans Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād as-
Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.). Beirut/Wiesbaden 1975. = BTS 19, S. 57ff. und 166ff.
12 Zur Aufnahme der Kategorienlehre in der christlichen Theologie vgl. Carl Prantl,
Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande II. Graz 1955 (Nachdr.), S. 4f. und 7.
13 Vgl. Ignaz Goldziher, Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. In Der Islam 3,
1912 (S. 213–247), S. 245 / Nachdr. I. Goldziher, Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Joseph
Desomogyi. V. Hildesheim 1970, S. 237–271.
810 chapter 58
der von Abū Hāšim eingeführten Modus-(ḥāl-)Theorie.14 Es kann eine Quali-

tät zwar “nicht existierend” (lā mawǧūd), aber keineswegs “nicht seiend” (lā
maʿdūm)15 sein.16 Vielmehr muss zwischen dem lā maʿdūm und lā mawǧūd ein
vermittelnder Zwischenzustand (wāsiṭa bayn al-mawǧūd wa-l-maʿdūm) ange-
nommen werden, welcher als ḥāl bezeichnet wird. Daher impliziert nach Rāzī,
der in seiner Argumentation der Muʿtazila folgt, der ḥāl, d.h. der Zwischenzu-
stand zwischen dem aktualisierbaren Nichtseienden (dem ens in potentia) und
dem aktualisierten Seienden, die Möglichkeit der Gottesschau.
13. Streitfrage: Rāzī glaubt an die Möglichkeit einer “Verpflichtung zu etwas
Undurchführbarem” (at-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq).17 Er nimmt seinen Ausgangs-
punkt von der Lehre, dass “die Fähigkeit gleichzeitig mit der Verwirklichung,
nicht vor ihr ist” (al-istiṭāʿa maʿa l-fiʿl lā qablahū, arab. Text S. 51, -2).18 Von
hier ist es kein weiter Schritt mehr zur muʿtazilitischen Lehre von der Wil-
lensfreiheit. Dadurch, dass Gott die Menschen nicht zu etwas “Undurchführba-
rem” (mā lā yaqdiru ʿalayhi; Ašʿari, Maqālāt, ed. Hellmut Ritter, S. 230, 14)
“verpflichtet” ( yukallif ), impliziert taklīf die “Fähigkeit” (qudra oder istiṭāʿa)19
dazu.20
16. Streitfrage über die Weltschöpfung: Mit Ibn Sīnā vertritt Rāzī die aristo-
381 telische Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt. Vgl. dazu Moses Worms, |
Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt bei den mittelalterlichen arabischen
Philosophen des Orients und ihre Bekämpfung durch die arabischen Theologen
(Mutakallimūn). Münster 1900. = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters 3/4.
Die 10. Streitfrage enthält interessante Ausführungen über Šahrastānīs
Kitāb al-Milal wa-n-niḥal und dessen Quellen, nämlich das Kitāb al-Farq bayn
al-firaq des ʿAbd al-Qāhir Ibn Ṭāhir al-Baġdādī, den Ṣiwān al-ḥikma des Abū
14 Dazu Josef van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddin al-Īci. Wiesbaden 1966. = Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommis-
sion, XXII, S. 206 ff., und Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert
Hidschra I–VI. Berlin/New York 1991–1997, Index s.n. Abū Hāšim.
15 Dazu J. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s. Anm. 14), S. 192.
16 Von F. Kholeif, S. 129, 3. Abschnitt, falsch interpretiert.
17 Dazu J. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s. Anm. 14), S. 316 und 269f.
18 Rāzī nennt Abū Ḥanīfa (79/699–150/767) als Vertreter der Lehre – Ašʿarī, Maqālāt al-
islāmiyīn. Ed. Hellmut Ritter. Istanbul-Leipzig 1929/30, S. 230, 15, jedoch die späteren
Muʿtaziliten.
19 Beide Termini können unterschiedslos gebraucht werden. Vgl. William Montgomery
Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam. London 1948, S. 90 Anm. 37.
20 Vgl. W. M. Watt, Free Will (s. Anm. 19), S. 69 ff.
Sulaymān as-Siǧistānī,21 das Kitāb Adyān al-ʿarab von Ǧāḥiẓ22 und ein persi-
sches Fragment aus der Schrift Čahār faṣl des berühmten Schiiten Ḥasan Ibn
aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ. Letzteres handelt darüber, dass die “Belehrung” (taʿlīm) durch den
Imam vor die reine Verstandeserkenntnis geht.23 Nach Rāzī (ebenso Bāqillānī,
Ǧuwaynī und Ġazālī; s. Kholeif, S. 146) jedoch ist der Verstand unabhängig
von der Lehre des unfehlbaren Imam.
Wie die 9. Streitfrage zeigt, teilt Rāzī mit vielen muslimischen Philoso-
phen und Theologen die Abneigung gegen die Astrologie (aḥkām an-nuǧūm).24
Nach Rāzī ist der Glaube an die Astrologie identisch mit einem Glauben an
den Wechsel und die Zusammensetzung der himmlischen Körper. – Einige
Abschnitte in Rāzīs Munāẓarāt sind juristischen Themen gewidmet.
In der 6. Streitfrage sucht Rāzī zu beweisen, dass beim Vergleich einer Sache
mit einer anderen die qualitative Rechtfertigung (at-taʿlīl bi-l-maṣāliḥ wa-l-
mafāsid) vor die utiliaristische (at-taʿlīl bi-l-waṣf ) gehe. Denn die qualitative
Rechtfertigung impliziere ja die utilitaristische.
Die Streitfragen 7, 8, 11 und 12 handeln vor allem über die auf den vier Ele-
menten al-aṣl, al-farʿ, al-ʿilla und al-ḥukm25 aufgebaute “Analogie” (qiyās), eines
der vier islamischen “Rechtsprinzipien” (uṣūl al-fiqh, nämlich Qurʾān, sunna,
iǧmāʿ und qiyās).
Aus dem Bereich des angewandten Rechts wird in Streitfrage 1 die Verkaufs-
kommission, bzw. das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Kommissionär und Kom-
mittent behandelt. Es wird bewiesen, dass im Gegensatz zur hanafitischen
Lehre, welche dem Kommissionär mehr Handelsfreiheit zugesteht, ein Verkauf
mit Verlust (ġabn fāḥiš) nicht mit den Kommissionsbedingungen vereinbar
ist.
Rāzī unterscheidet hier zwischen der “Bezeichnung” (lafẓ) und dem “Gemeinten”
(maʿnan) des Wortes bayʿ (“Verkauf”). In gleicher Weise unterschieden die Stoiker zwi-
schen φωνή und σημαινόμενον. Das σημαινόμενον, auch λεκτόν genannt, ist für sie τὸ
21 Davon sind zwei Auszüge erhalten: Vgl. Manfred Ullmann, Griechische Spruchdichtung
im Arabischen. Diss. Tübingen 1959, S. 15–17. – Hans Daiber, Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū
Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī in der Forschung. In Arabica 31, 1984, S. 36–68. = H. Dai-
ber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/25.
22 Das Original scheint nicht erhalten zu sein, s. GAL S I, S. 946245.
23 Vgl. Josef van Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s. Anm. 14), S. 281ff., bes. S. 284.
24 Vgl. Ignaz Goldziher, Die Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken
Wissenschaften. In Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten. Phil.-hist. Kl. 1915/8, Berlin 1915, S. 20 ff., zu Rāzī S. 22 / Nachdr. in I. Goldziher,
Gesammelte Schriften (s. Anm. 13), S. 357–400 / engl. Version v. Merlin L. Swartz in Stu-
dies in Islam, New York/Oxford 1981, S. 185–215.
25 F. Kholeif, S. 150, und J. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s. Anm. 14), S. 382ff.
812 chapter 58
382 πρᾱγμα τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς δηλούμενον.26 Damit ist ein weiterer Be|leg für die Entspre-
chung von λεκτόν = maʿnan gewonnen, die Simon van den Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut
Al-Tahafut II. London 1954, S. 188 (zu 334. 3), anführt.
Streitfrage 15 handelt über Freiheit und Verpflichtung der einzelnen Partner
beim Abschluss eines Kaufvertrages.
In Rāzīs Munāẓarāt wird eine Fülle von zentralen Themen angeschnitten,
und man wird dem Herausgeber dankbar sein, dass er durch seinen Kom-
mentar das Verständnis des recht vielschichtigen und manchmal schwer ver-
ständlichen Gedankensystems erleichtert hat. Viele Probleme, besonders theo-
logischer und philosophischer Art, werden durch zukünftige Forschung noch
näher zu klären sein, wobei auch frühere Quellen stärker herangezogen und
ausgewertet werden müssten, da sie Licht werfen auf ihre Vorgeschichte und
historische Entwicklung. Hierbei wird nicht zuletzt ein Blick auf den antik-
hellenistischen Hintergrund eine Interpretationshilfe sein.
Zum Schluss seien noch einige wenige (ausgewählte) Bemerkungen und
Ergänzungen gebracht: Es wirkt etwas störend, dass z.T. verschiedene Abkür-
zungen für ein- und dasselbe Werk verwendet werden: z.B. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿas
ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ wird S. XVI unten mit ʿUyūn, S. 189 aber
mit “ANB” abgekürzt. – Das S. 10 Anm. 4 genannte Werk al-Ḫayrāt al-ḥisān des
Hayṯamī (GAL II, S. 38922) fehlt in der Bibliographie; ebenso das S. 19 Anm. 3
genannte Werk. – Die S. 21, 2–4 gegebene Beschreibung der äußeren Erschei-
nung von Rāzī nach Ṣafadī und Ibn al-ʿImād, die auch Georges C. Anawati
in seinem Artikel über Rāzī in EI2 II, 1965, Sp. 752, bringt, steht – wie schon
Kholeif bemerkt – nicht in Einklang mit den sonst bekannten Nachrich-
ten über die Persönlichkeit Rāzīs. Mir scheint, hier haben sich nichts ande-
res als “Denk- und Ausdrucksschemata”27 niedergeschlagen, welche orientiert
sind an der aus der Antike übernommenen physiognomischen Literatur. Die
Schilderung ähnelt in frappanter Weise der Beschreibung, die Polemon von
“einem die Wissenschaft liebenden Mann” (ar-raǧul al-muḥibb li-l-ʿilm)28 gibt.
Es wäre reizvoll, einmal zu untersuchen, inwieweit sich literarische Topoi sol-
26 Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Ed. Hans von Arnim. II. Lipsiae 1905, S. 48, 23. – Zur stoi-
schen Unterscheidung von λεκτόν und φωνή entsprechend der höheren (διάνοια) und nie-
deren Seelentätigkeit (φαντασία) vgl. Heymann Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwis-
senschaft bei den Griechen und Römern I. Berlin 1890 / Nachdr. Hildesheim 1961, S. 296ff.,
bes. S. 289 ff.
27 Terminologie nach Wolfgang Kayser, Das sprachliche Kunstwerk, München 91963, S. 72.
Vgl. ebda zur Übernahme antiker literarischer Topoi in das lateinische Mittelalter, deren
Erforschung durch Ernst Robert Curtius eingeleitet wurde.
28 Arabische Übersetzung des griechischen Textes in Scriptores physiognomonici graeci et
latini, recensuit Richardus Foerster. I. Lipsiae 1893, S. 273, 2ff. / Lat. Übers. S. 272.
cher Art in der biographischen Literatur der Araber niedergeschlagen haben. –

Die S. 31 Anm. 1 gegebene Definition von al-istiṣḥāb als eine juristische Regel
“where there is no prescription ordained | by God” ist nicht exakt. Der Terminus 383
bezeichnnet das Anknüpfen an Fiqh-Regeln, die für gewisse Umstände gelten
und weiterhin in Kraft bleiben, wenn nachgewiesen ist, dass diese Umstände
gleich geblieben sind. Vgl. Ignaz Goldziher, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
des Morgenlandes 1, 1887, S. 228–236 / Nachdr. in Ignaz Goldziher, Gesam-
melte Schriften. Hrsg. von Joseph Desomogyi. II. Hildesheim 1968, S. 182–
190. – S. 39, -7f.: Zum Begriffspaar taṣdīq “Urteil” und taṣawwur “Vorstellung”
(arab. Text S. 18, 1; Kholeif unscharf “conception” und “assertion”) vgl. J. van
Ess, Erkenntnislehre (s. Anm. 14), S. 95ff. – Zu S. 56 Anm. 1: Fārābīs Äußerungen
für und wider die Astrologie finden sich in seiner Schrift Risālat Taḏākīr fīmā
yaṣiḥḥu wa-mā lam yaṣiḥḥa min aḥkām an-nuǧūm. Ed. Friedrich Dieterici,
Alfārābīs philosophische Abhandlungen. Leiden 1890, S. 104–114. – S. 206, -4 lies
Ibn Malkā (nicht b. Malakā). – S. 211, 6 lies al-Murtaḍā (nicht al-Murtaḍī). –
S. 223 gehören die unter “astrology” nach der Zahl 147 genannten Seitenzahlen
zum Stichwort “analogy”. – Arab. Text S. 11, -8 erwartet man nach klass.-arab.
Sprachgebrauch hinter fa-ammā ein fa-lā. – Arab. Text S. 17, 8 lies wa-in statt
wa-an; streiche das Tašdīd über fī. – Arab. Text S. 18, 1 und S. 31, 6 streiche das
Yāʾ am Ende von ṭarafa. – Arab. Text S. 21, 9 fehlt die Angabe der Kapitelnum-
mer 43; ebenso S. 24, -3 (Nr. 54); 43, 1 (Nr. 109); 44, 5 (Nr. 113); 57, -8 (Nr. 154). –
Arab. Text S. 23, 10 nach az-zamān lies al-awwal (Übers. richtig “first”) statt aṯ-
ṯānī.
Die englische Übersetzung ist korrekt, aber nicht immer mit der wünschens-
werten Flüssigkeit und Klarheit geschrieben (vgl. z.B. S. 53 Mitte!).
Wir sind dem Autor dankbar, dass er durch seine mit Übersetzung, Kom-
mentar und Indices versehene Edition einen Text zugänglich gemacht hat, der
für die Kenntnis von Rāzīs theologischen, philosophischen und juristischen
Anschauungen unentbehrlich ist.
Republished from OLZ 66, 1971, col. 378–383. By courtesy of the publisher.
chapter 59
Imām Rāzī’s ʿIlm Al-Ak̲h̲lāq

English Translation of His Kitāb Al-Nafs Wa’l-Rūḥ
Wa S̲h̲arḥ Quwāhumā with Introduction and
Commentary by M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Maʿṣūmī
(1969)
[Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī,] Imām Rāzī’s ʿIlm Al-Ak̲h̲lāq. English Translation of

his Kitāb Al-Nafs Waʾl-Rūḥ Wa S̲h̲arḥ Quwāhumā with Introduction and Com-
mentary by M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Maʿṣūmī. Islamabad (1969): Islamic Research
Institute. XI. 334 S.
Ein Jahr nach Erscheinen seiner Edition von Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (gest.
607/1210), Kitāb an-Nafs wa-r-rūḥ wa-šarḥ quwāhumā (Islamabad 1968) hat M.
Ṣagīr Ḥasan al-Maʿṣūmī eine englische Übersetzung dieses Werkes über
philosophische Ethik geliefert. Sie ist versehen mit einer knappen Einleitung
(S. 1–34), sowie mit kommentierenden Anmerkungen und einem Index. Rāzī
(S. 37) hatte seine Abhandlung als “ein Buch über die Ethik” (Kitāb fī ʿilm al-
aḫlāq) bezeichnet. Er ging davon aus, dass “die Seele” (an-nafs) das Wesen des
Menschen ausmache. Der Mensch ist nicht mit dem konkreten Körper iden-
tisch (vgl. S. 107ff.), sondern etwas Unkörperliches (vgl. S. 96 und 115) und durch
das von Gott dem Menschen eingegebene “Pneuma” (rūḥ) mit höheren geisti-
gen Fähigkeiten versehen. Der Körper ist das Werkzeug der Seele (vgl. S. 156,
159 und 192), deren einziges Streben es ist, weg von den körperlichen Freu-
den, von Reichtum und heuchlerischem Ansehen (vgl. S. 267ff.) auf dieser Welt
(vgl. S. 242 und 244), allein durch das Denken und im geistigen Streben wei-
terzukommen (vgl. S. 101), “Wissen” (ʿilm) um “die geistige Übung” (ar-riyāḍa
ar-rūḥāniyya) und damit Wissen um richtiges ethisches Verhalten zu erwer-
ben (vgl. S. 83). Die Seele, welche mit Hilfe der Werkzeuge des Körpers Wissen
und Erkenntnis erworben hat, atmet mit der “Seele der himmlischen Region”
(nafs al-malakūt) und besitzt (S. 159) “das Licht der Gottheit” (nūr al-lāhūt).
Dieses teilt sich mit – wie im Neuplatonismus (man vermisst einen entspre-
chenden Hinweis bei Maʿṣūmī S. 72f. Anm. 9) – durch Emanationen der Welt
“der geistigen Wesen” (al-arwāḥ) und Seelen, welche eine Zwischenstufe zwi-
schen dem “Notwendig-Seienden” (wāǧib al-wuǧūd) und der passiven Welt der
Materie bildet (vgl. S. 63ff.). Durch die Teilhabe am göttlichen Licht (vgl. auch

imām rāzī’s ʿilm al-akhlāq (1969) 815
S. 181) erreicht der Mensch in der Angleichung an Gott die vollkommenste Stufe
(vgl. S. 173, 233ff. und 246). Rāzī zeigt sich – wie vor ihm bereits Miskawayh: Vgl.
dessen Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq und dazu H. Daiber in OLZ 67, 1972, Sp. 370–373 = H.
Daiber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/50 – vom Neuplatonismus beeinflusst:
Die Vervollkommnung des Menschen ist nicht eine Angelegenheit des Körpers,
sondern der Seele, wenn sie auf der Stufe der geistigen Wesen – Miskawayh
sprach von den ašyāʾ ar-rūḥāniyya – das Licht des Einen empfängt. Aber im
Unterschied zu Miskawayh, dessen Werk zusätzlich der philosophischen Ethik
des Peripatos viel verdankt, dominiert in Rāzīs Werk die neuplatonische Kom-
ponente: In einer Art ὁμοίωσις θεῷ erreicht der Mensch durch die Teilnahme
am Licht Gottes, welcher alles weiß (vgl. S. 227), die vollkommenste Stufe. Rāzī
verdankt hier viel dem Mystiker Ġazālī, auf dessen Werk Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn er
häufig zurückgegriffen hat.
Die Übersetzung ist flüssig und mit Verständnis für die Sache geschrieben. 175
Manche philosophischen Fachtermini hätte man etwas anders nuancieren und
präzisieren können. Ohne weiter auf diesen Punkt einzugehen, seien anbei
noch einige ausgewählte Anmerkungen gestattet (wobei von leicht erkennba-
ren Druckfehlern abgesehen sei): 1) Zu S. 32 Anm. 29: Von den Munāẓarāt des
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī gibt es eine neue, kritische Textedition mit engl. Über-
setzung und Kommentar von Fathallah Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr Al-Din
Al-Rāzī and his Controversies in Transoxiana. Beyrouth 1966. Cf. Rez. H. Dai-
ber, From the Greeks to the Arabs II/58. – 2). Zu S. 88 f. und 159: Dort wird die
Einheit der Seele trotz ihrer drei Funktionen, nämlich idrāk (“Wahrnehmung”),
ġaḍab (“Zorn”) und šahwa (“Begierde”), betont. Zu dieser platonischen Dreitei-
lung der Seele und zur Betonung der Einheit der Seele vgl. H. Daiber, in Der
Islam 47, 1971, S. 35f. und Bd. 49, 1972, S. 123. = H. Daiber, From the Greeks to the
Arabs I/7. – 3) Die Seiten 128–141 (arab. T. S. 60–74) enthalten als solche (von
Maʿṣūmī nicht erkannte) umfangreiche Auszüge aus Galen, De placitis Hippo-
cratis et Platonis, und zwar aus einem Abschnitt, in dem Galen sich nach einem
Zitat aus Aristoteles, De partibus animalium III 4. 666 b 13ff. mit der aristote-
lischen These vom Herzen als Ursprung der Nerven auseinandersetzt und zu
beweisen sucht, dass das Gehirn der Ursprung der Nerven und das Herz der
Ursprung der Arterien sei: S. die griech. Ausgabe von Iwanus Müller, Lip-
siae 1874, S. 157–167. Zu der uns nicht erhaltenen Übersetzung dieses Galenbu-
ches ins Arabische (Kitāb Ārāʾ Abūqrāṭ wa-Aflāṭūn) durch den Ḥunaynschüler
Ḥubayš (gest. 277/890) vgl. Fuat Sezgin, GAS III 1970, S. 105 f., und Manfred
Ullmann, Die Medizin im Islam. Leiden/Köln 1970. = Handbuch der Orienta-
listik, I, Erg.bd. VI/1, S. 40.
Republished, with some modifications, from Der Islam 50, 1973, pp. 174–175. By courtesy
of the publisher.
chapter 60
Braulio Justel Calabozo (ed. and transl.)

La Hidāya de Al-Raȳrāȳī (un Espejo de Principes
Medieval) (1983)
Braulio Justel Calabozo (Hrsg.), La Hidāya de Al-Raȳrāȳī (un Espejo de

Principes Medieval). Edición crítica, traducción y estudio. Madrid, Instituto
Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1983 (24cm., 228, 116 S.). ISBN 84 7472 050 8.
Der nordafrikanische Mystiker Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar Ibn Mūsā Ibn Muḥammad
ar-Raǧrāǧī (gest. 868/1464), ein Schüler des Ibn ʿAbbād ar-Rondī (733/1333–
792/1390) und Anhänger der Šāḏiliyya, hat vorliegenden Fürstenspiegel als
Richtschnur sowohl für den Herrscher als auch für seine Untertanen verfasst.
Der Titel Hidāyat man tawallā ġayra r-Rabb al-Mawlā “die Rechtleitung dessen,
dem außer an Gott dem Herrn die Herrschaft übertragen wurde” (Calabozo
nicht korrekt: “Guía del que ha tomado por soberano a quien no es el Señor,
el Soberano”) deutet bereits an, dass das Buch zum gottgefälligen Leben in
Religion und Politik anleiten möchte und nicht nur die in der früheren Fürsten-
spiegelliteratur üblichen praktisch-moralischen Ratschläge gibt. Es überrascht
daher nicht, dass Raǧrāǧī neben zahlreichen Zitaten aus Koran, Hadith und
Mystik sowohl Passagen aus Māwardīs al-Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya, als auch u.a. aus
Ġazālīs Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn und dessen Naṣīḥat al-mulūk bringt. Der “Herrscher”
(sulṭān) ist “Nachfolger” (ẖalīfa) des Propheten und gehört zu den “Zeichen”
(āyāt), die auf Gottes “Einheit” (tawḥīd) weisen. Denn im Grunde genommen
ist, wie im letzten Buch (IV) ausgeführt wird, Gott allein “Herr” (mawlā) und
“Herrscher” (mālik). Seine Untertanen befinden sich in unterschiedlichen mys-
tischen Stadien (aḥwāl, maqāmāt; vgl. fol. 79 v ff.). In zahlreichen Abschnitten
werden in den vorangehenden Büchern die Rechte und Pflichten des Herr-
schers und seiner Untertanen behandelt, wobei deutlich wird, dass der Gehor-
sam gegenüber dem Herrscher stellvertretend steht für den Gehorsam gegen-
über Gott.
Der Herausgeber dieses Mystik und Moral, Religion und Politik verbinden-
den und in seiner Art interessanten Textes hat in seiner Edition und in der
spanischen Übersetzung auf vorbildliche Weise auf die Quellen verwiesen und
in seiner Einleitung das Nötige zum Autor und zu seinem Werk zusammenge-
stellt. Beachtenswert ist auch der Vergleich mit der christlichen Fürstenspie-
gelliteratur des 13.–15. Jahrhunderts, den der Herausgeber in seiner Einleitung

braulio justel calabozo, la hidāya de al-raȳrāȳī (1983) 817
bringt. Der Text des Raǧrāǧī ist für uns überdies wichtig wegen seiner zahl-
reichen Zitate aus Werken hauptsächlich der islamischen Mystik. Dies zeigt
ein Blick in den dankenswerterweise vom Herausgeber beigefügten Index der
Eigennamen (S. 215–223) und der Termini technici (S. 255–257).
Republished from BiOr 44, 1987, col. 555. By courtesy of the publisher.

From The Greeks To The Arabs and Beyond

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1 What Is the Meaning of and to What End Do We Study the History of

2 Die Fortsetzung der philosophischen Tradition bei den syrischen

6 Fārābī – Kindī – Arabisch-islamische Theologie und Philosophie –

9 Essential Features of Islamic Political Philosophy 146

10 De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica

11 Das Kitāb al-Ādāb al-kabīr des Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ als Ausdruck

12 Die Kritik des Ibn Ḥazm an Kindīs Metaphysik 243

14 Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī 271

15 Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī (4th/10th c.) on the Unity and Diversity of

16 The Ismailite Background of Fārābī’s Political Philosophy

17 Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī (258/872–339/950 oder 951) 347

18 The Ruler as Philosopher

19 The Problem of Teaching Philosophy to the Citizen

22 Fārābī on the Role of Philosophy in Society 423

23 Philosophy and Law in the Context of Fārābī’s Epistemology and

24 Das Fārābī-Bild des Maimonides

25 Der Ṣiwān al-ḥikma und Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī in der

26 Miskawayh’s Purity of the Soul as a Program Leading to Ethicization of

27 Ethics as Likeness to God in Miskawayh

28 The Limitations of Knowledge According to Ibn Sīnā

30 Griechische Ethik in islamischem Gewande

31 God versus Causality

32 Magie und Kausalität im Islam 587

33 Ibn Rušd, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh 611

34 Ṭūsī, Naṣīr ad-Dīn 614

36 Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad 658

37 Mullā Ṣadrā on the Problem of Creation and the Role of Greek

38 Ambiguity (taškīk) of Being in Mullā Ṣadrā

39 The Reception of Islamic Philosophy at Oxford in the 17th Century

40 The Humanism of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas

41 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant (1970) 727

42 Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy

43 Farhad Daftary (ed.), Mediaeval Ismaʿili History and Thought

44 George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics

45 Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and

46 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (1971) 762

47 Richard Walzer (ed. and transl.), Al-Farabi on the Perfect State

48 Shukri B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in

49 Joel L. Kraemer, Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam (1986) 771

50 Constantine K. Zurayk, The Refinement of Character – A

51 Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der

52 Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists (1982) 790

53 Douglas Morton Dunlop (ed.), The Muntakhab Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikmah

55 Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim, Charles E. Butterworth,

56 Charles E. Butterworth, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on

57 Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation

58 Fathallah Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His

59 Imām Rāzī’s ʿIlm Al-Ak̲h̲lāq. English Translation of His Kitāb al-Nafs

60 Braulio Justel Calabozo (ed. and transl.), La Hidāya de

OLZ Orientalistische Literaturzeitung. Berlin (etc.)

The transliteration follows the rules of the German Oriental Society.

What Is the Meaning of and to What End

1 Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe, XVII (Historische Schriften), part 1. Ed. by Karl-Heinz

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789

1911),4 to consider its role in the universal historical development of philo-

Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Manichaeism. Therefore, it is no coincidence

10 Cf. F. van Steenberghen, Philosophie (s. n. 9), pp. 343ff.

25 S. nn. 26 and 36. – Cf. H. Daiber, “Reception” (s. n. 23), ch. 3.

[52], 1997 [53: 243–245]) – ausgenommen der an monophysitischer Theo-