Nuclear Weapons Testing

Summary: Should we have a total ban on the explosion of nuclear devices for testing purposes?

Efforts to stop the testing of nuclear weapons have been going on for nearly as long as nuclear technology has existed. The
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty only banned tests in certain environments such as the atmosphere, outer space and beneath the
sea. While the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty included a statement of intent to work towards the total ending of
nuclear testing, it was not until the competition of the Cold War effectively ended and after the START Treaties between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. were signed that a total moratorium became feasible. President Gorbachev in 1991 and
President Bush Sr. in 1992 declared unilateral moratoriums on testing and were followed by other nuclear powers. In the
1990s debate has focused on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 which rules out any nuclear tests in any
environment indefinitely for its signatories. This was opened for signatures in 1996 but has not been ratified by the 44 listed
Appendix 2 nations who must commit before the treaty comes in to force. Non-ratifiers include the U.S.A, China and India
although major nuclear powers like Russia and the United Kingdom have committed. As such the situation is finely balanced
and it is possible in a debate fairly to propose either the abandoning or the enforcing of the Treaty.

The CTBT works with the Non- The CTBT is indeed an attempt to
Proliferation Treaty and is the freeze the current nuclear power
best way to stop the development balance (one reason it is so
and proliferation of more, and distrusted by new global powers) but
more complex, nuclear weapons it is a misguided one. It is only likely
amongst established powers and to curtail those nations who present
to new States. It not only holds no real threat to global stability. In
back the technical development fact, by limiting those states it can
of weapons but also reduces the make the reality of Mutually Assured
extent to which they can be Destruction less clear and actually
shown off, therefore reducing encourage recklessness by less
their value as a bargaining chip stable nuclear powers. Most nuclear
and a symbol of power. The proliferation now comes not from
CTBT means fewer weapons in costly development programmes but
fewer states and is therefore a from the purchase of ready made
valuable way of reducing nuclear nuclear materials and expertise from
tensions. the ex-Communist Bloc. If we have
nuclear weapons their effect must be
clear to all so they are stabilising and
not the opposite.

Nuclear explosions have a huge Overt testing by nuclear powers

environmental impact and cause happens in only the most deserted
huge harms. Large areas are and environmentally stable areas
irradiated by the blasts and the such as Siberia and the deserts of
long term effects of radioactive
materials thrown into the
atmosphere by the explosions are
uncertain. Tests often involve
moving people off their own lands
as with the French tests in
Polynesia in 1995 and involve the
destruction of habitats.
Underground tests are suspected
to have caused earthquakes in
China although information is
limited.
The CTBT can be effective in
stopping the testing of nuclear
weapons. It includes redress
measures in the treaty, both
specified and scope for wider
action. Moreover, voluntary
commitments to curtail nuclear
testing do hold moral force. The
French government waited for the
end of a one-year moratorium
before resuming testing in 1995.
Verification of the Test Ban is
now possible; the Comprehensive
Test Ban Organisation in Vienna
is in charge of the International
Monitoring system comprising a
network of stations throughout
the world which can take seismic,
hydro-acoustic and infrasound
measurements in all
environments and which measure
radionuclide levels. There is also
a right of inspection between
signatories in line with those
included in the US-USSR
weapons reduction treaties.
There is no danger to the
competence of existing nuclear
arsenals from the CTBT. Other
aspects of nuclear weapons like
guidance systems and missiles
Western Australia and Nevada. As
such its environmental impact is not
just minimal but much less than that
of secret tests which might take
place to circumvent the Treaty. In the
end the environmental damage is not
significant enough to decide this
debate.
The CTBT is toothless. Its only
specific measure is expulsion from
the treaty rights and obligations. It is
unenforceable and its only effect is
likely to be on those states who
threaten least by their nuclear
armouries. Affectively it puts the tool
of nuclear testing in the hands of the
least stable and least scrupulous of
the nuclear powers.
Verification can never be perfect and
there will always be uncertainty and
mistrust. If nations perform covert
tests it not only means they are more
likely to be in more vulnerable
environments but also that they are
more likely to raise tensions because
of the greater uncertainty about the
source and import of the test.
Further, the environments in which
testing was banned in the Limited
Test Ban Treaty are more likely to be
used if there is no legal difference
and a greater secrecy.
Computer modelling can only work
so long as it is based on data from
real explosions. The less real data,
the less effective it is; as time goes
by and new technologies develop
can still be tested and computer modelling will become increasingly
modelling does much of the work unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is exactly
for testing explosions anyway. the unexpected effects that are
Russia and Britain have both important in the tests. They not only
ratified the CTBT and neither allow us to ensure the weapons are
have any intention of working but also yield data which has
relinquishing their status as been found highly useful in the
nuclear powers. peaceful nuclear industries which are
specifically protected in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Voters in the United States, for Computer modelling can only work
example, overwhelmingly favour so long as it is based on data from
the CTBT. 73% to 16% say that real explosions. The less real data,
the United States should ratify the the less effective it is; as time goes
treaty. World opinion in all but a by and new technologies develop
few rogue states strongly favours modelling will become increasingly
banning nuclear testing creating a unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is exactly
significant political impetus. the unexpected effects that are
important in the tests. They not only
allow us to ensure the weapons are
working but also yield data which has
been found highly useful in the
peaceful nuclear industries which are
specifically protected in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.