i.

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

Published by

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM !?. RICHARDSON Commandant

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT Ft. FORMAN Deputy Commandant
I

MILITARY REVIEW STAFF

Colonel Edward M. Bradford, Ed!tor m Chfet

EDITORIAL STAFF: Lieutenant Colonel Ernest L, Webb, Man

agw Editor, Major Arthur F Torres, Latin Arf?er) can Ed!tor
,.
..-,
wi00ucn0t4 STAFF. w. o,me R D.mI.gu.z,, P,o... f,o. Emmr Mr chases IvLe
A,, an. De,,gn hi, .4rno, W Galla. ay, P,m,,nq 01,,,,,

CIRCULATION Seccmo 1w!ena.t Mmnael A sham A$somale ~d,zot Sergeant

F,,s, Class Fe!, ” A Ag.,l, a,. Adm In>sfraf,,e S.msrv>sor

MR ADVISORY BOARD

EX OFFICIO General Don. A Starry C.ammantier Jrammq ,.0 Drxtr,ne Command

L,e.!e”a”t Ge,eral W,il,an R f+cherdso”, Commander COnib<ned Am, C,”
[W Ma,., General 0,, ” E DeHaven Comma, we,, Log,$!,cs Center, Ma].,
General W,llrarr R Berkmm Ch,ef US Army Rese,.e Lleute.anl Genera!
LaVern E WeQ.r Ch<el fiat,..., Guard Bye... Ma,.r General Jack A Wake,,
DW.W commander Combmeti Awns combat De.elwmenf Acr,ucty ..0 Com
0,..0 Arms Tram,.g Develocmk. fs Actwtty yap, General Smckw Lewis
M@ner c.mm..dc? Aom(.rwafmn center, Bngad, er Genera! J J Brophy,
As3>s1.”! DePu1y Com”.a”der Cmnb!neci Arms Comb,, Deve,wmen, ,!,,(.,,”
ana Comb, neu Arms Tr.!.q Deve!ocmen!9 Ac1!.,Iv
1
ACTIVE’ Colonel H E Chapman, Department of Command, Colonel warn. D
Mesa D,rec forate of Ee.cafm. 2.U C.mc.l.m Affa!rs, Lw.tens.t Colonel 1P)
d E L Roberts Dep.rlment of Reswrce M.nagemenl, colonel ewe Tat.,
Department 0: Tact,cs, Lwtena.t Colonel J C Johnson, DeLwlment of u.,
(,.0 .“0 Comb,ned DPe,at,ons L,eute”.”t Colonel (P) W,il,arn A StOfIt, Con)
bat .$ f.tims Inwl.fe, Dr k. D Gr.her, John F MorrKoo Chw of MW.W
H!story, colonel Carl Acme, N.won.l Guard BuT..., Mr Lw Brodsky, Oltrce
of me Cmef. Armv Reserve Colonel W S Bayer, Combmed Arms Combar
Devefommenc Acwtv ..0 Commneo Arms rrammg DeveloDment$ Acfwzty.
Lw!ena.t colonel Joseoh E B.rlas, US Army, J.Dan and IX COWS. Ma!or
Gerry A Magee, Aamm!slralto. Cenler, Malor ROSS E Markle, LowstIcs
Center, Colonel Patrick D Ctmolm, Forces Command
Military Review

VOLUME LX FEBRUARY 1980 NO 2

CONTENTS

PAGE 2 FAREWELL TO ARMS: A PERSPECTIVLON RETIREMENT

by Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vough!, US A/my, Ret/red

13 CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION

by ,Colonel Phihp D.” Coleman, US Army Reserve

19 AIR ASSAULT DIVISION: MISSIONS ,

by Ma/or Br//ey W, Howe// Jr., US Army

30 “AKS THE MAN IF I BE GOIN’ ““ ROOTS OF BLACK ENGLISH

by Major Lynn L. Srms, US Army Reserve

33 CROSSING THE MAIN RIVER

by L/eutenarf;Co/one/ Dennis K. Gulp. US Army

43 FIELD ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT IN THE ACTIVE DEFENSE

by Ma/or F/oyd !/. Churchd/, US Army

51 STRATEGY AND THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL. PART II

by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P O ‘Meara Jr., US Army

64 HOW FAR BACK IS THE REAR?

by Captain Karen L. Frey, US Army

0 67 IRAN THE AOVISERS’ VIEW

by Major Arley H McCorm/ck; US Army

75 REVIEWS the best from other journals

79 LETTERS

81 NEWS

88 STUDIES

90 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional

MILITARY REVIEW IS publlshed monthly m Enghsh and Spamsh and quarterly in Portuguese Use
of funds for printing th!s publication approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 Feb.
ruary 1979. Controlled circulation postage ps!d at Leavenworth, KS 66046 and Topeka, KS 66606.
Subscription. $t2.00 per year US and APO/FPO $14.00 fore]gn. Single copies $1.50 US and
APOIFPO $1.75 foreign Address all mail to Mddary Review, USACGSG FOrt LeavenwOrfh, KS
66027. Telephone (91 3) 684.5642 or AUTOVON 552.5642. Unless otherwise stated, the wews here!n
are those of the authors and are not necessary those of the Department of Defense or any ele­
ment thereof. Basw of of flclal distribution IS one per general of freer and one per fwe field grade
officers

MILITARY REVIEW (USPS t 23.830) US ISSN 0026.4148

.— --- --=— ---- ---- ____ ____ ___q

111111
I
NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAl LED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY CARD ~

FIRST CLASS PER,VIT ho 4 FT LEAVENWORTH KS

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEi

Military

Review

US Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

!
.-——— -——— -— -- ---— ———- -——- -.. ;

‘111111
I
NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILE,D
IN THE
uNITEO STATES

BLJSINESS REPLY G4R13 ~

FIRST CLASS PERMIT No 4 FT LEAVENWORTH KS

I —

WSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

Military =
Review _
US Army Command and General Staff College —­
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

.- —— - [- —--.— ---—— -— —-- ----- --­

 Things to do today:
3
1. Subscribe to Militaqy Review
r’”-—.— —--- —-.= -——= —--- —--- ---,

‘l!!/ Military
Review
FOFW LEAVENWOF3TH, KS 66027
� Please Ien!ec! [renew) rnv ~.bwr,pt,o. !. The M,!tlary Rev,ew for

one vear 1S12 CO US and APO FPOI !S14 @3 fore,gnl

= Army � USN uSAF

� B,,, me
~ ARNG uSMC uSCG
@ AcIwe ~ Rer,red � uSAR Z Cwl, a.
J.L(&f n
� Cheik Hece for A.tomatc R-enewaI � Plea=+ change mv address !. [hat shown below

1:

RANK T,lif FIRST NAMC INITIAL L4S1 NAME

1%; ‘

~1
STREET

Cln STATE COUNTRY ZIP COOE

;
Th:s pmtess, onal mtl,rary Iournal ,s tax dpducf!ble
T ~u
---- -——- —.—- .—-— .. —- ———. ___

FOFiT LEAVENWOF3TH, KS 66027

~ Please lpn!?rplre.ewl m? 5.b5cr,D1,0n 10 the fvll!la~y Re.reti for

one vest 1$12 CO US and APO FPOI IS14 CO Iore, gnl

~ Army : uSN uSAF

� B,ll me ~ ARNG uSMC USCG
~ AC[We C RW,. M ~ uSAR [ ‘ Clv, tmn

~ Check Here tor Aulomal,c Re.ewal � Please ctIa”ge my address 10 !ha, shown below

RANK T,TLF F,Rs T UAh,6E l&lTIAL LAST NAME

Clw STATE COUNTRY ZIP CODE

u 7hM
prtiless,onal rn,ltfary journal M tax deducf,ble
 Army Leadership for the 1980s

A continual topic of conversation in the military is

leadership. What is it? Who uses it? Does the “system”
help or hinder it? Is it the same as management? What is
right— and wrong— with the current leadership climate?
How can we improve it? And how do I apply the theory to
make myself a better leader? This perhaps is the most diffi­
cult aspect of all.
The editors at Military Review wish to explore this
area in depth, and the July 1980 issue will be devoted
entirely to the subject of Army leadership for the 1980s. To
do this adequately, we need the response of you, our
readers. Send us your thoughts on leadership, anything
from one paragraph up to a full article of 2,000 words; any­
thing from a specific point to a general philosophy. Send
them to us prior to 30 March 1980. Help us help each other,
and our— yours and mine—Army.
 I

!{
.-—,
-< ---­

“ u

Looking back upon it now, I cannot conceive that God has granted any man
, a n’cher, fu her, more satisfying life than mine, for it was spent in seroice ....
6g~HEY alone of aIl the citizens are
& forbidden to touch and handle
silver or gold. ” Plato, while outlining his
Ideal society in the Republic (circa 360
f3.C.), so separates the guardians of
society from the debilitating effects of
commercial enterprke. His intent was to
produce a “pure” defender, one not
swayed by promises of material reward
nor distracted from his duties by pursuit
of same.
In the 1970e, we see the came vision
emerging from the writin s of such keen
observers of the US nrifita as Professor
Charles Moskos who, wit a gradually
growing chorus of stude i s of the mil­
itary, have cautionsd that shifting the
mifitary from a calling to an occufiation
carries with it the surety of self-inter­
est replacing self-sacrifice as the institu­
tional norm. History suggests the ob­
vious —that is, given comparability of
arms and training, the highly motivated
soldier will invariably outperform the
hireling.
Nowhere is this axiom of military force
generation more flagrantly disregarded
than in the US military of the 1970s
where managerialism has turned the
parade ground into the showroom and
the soldier has become ancillary to the
quarterly review and analysis.
Personnel problems constitute one of
the major defense issues of the decade
and are exacerbated by being approached
piecemeal. As “hot” iseues arise, our mil­
itary managers “manage” the issue.
.
RETIREMENT
General Mattnew Ridgway, 1956
Such A la carte treatment rarely solves
problems; it “manages” them— a reorga­
nization or change of terminology and
the problem disappears only to reappear
under a new manager who repeats the
cycle.
One such “hot” personnel policy issue
which requires examination is military
retirement. It is not possible to solve the
problem of retirement cost in uacuo —no
matter how managerially tidy or polit­
ically desirable a “quick fix” may seem.
A BwinssslikeMilitary
Dbes America want its mifitary to be
more ‘%vsinesslike”? Superficially, the
impression is affirmative, based upon the
implicit opprobrium in “done in a busi­
nesslike manner. ” American business
has nurtured an image of productivity,
efficiency and response to popular need
—all “good” descriptive. There is, how­
ever, another side to the image, and it is
this underside which carries the most
potential danger when applied to soci­
ety’s guardians.
A century and a half ago, ‘de Tocque­
ville warned that democracy fosters
individualism which, in turn, results in
pure selfishness. An economic system
which refies totally upon man’s basest
instincts —that is, crass personal mate­
rial acquisitiveness —will produce char­
acteristic behaviors which are dangerous
3
MILITARY REVIEW
when app’lied to society’s guardians.
Would we intentionally piece our
guardians in an environment which has
been characterized as “a cesspool of re­
sentment, frustration, anguish and
hete”?l Are we ~ng ~ haveCIWineti.
tutions of ultimate survival nurtured by
a “ecience” which is accused by its own
practitioners of @cing emphasis on:
techniques mther than 072 deci­
sions, on tools rather than on results,
and ahove all, on efficiency of the part
rather than on the performance of the
whole.’
Can we afford to maintain a defense
establishment which engages in, ‘ ‘exces­
sive and meaningless effort of mountain­
ous labors that produce mice”?’
Recent studies have reconfirmed tbe
validity of the work accomplished by
such pioneers as Janowitz, and others, in
showing the role of deep-rooted percep
tions, ideology and social mission as
major personal motivating factors for
both entering and remaining in military
service.” Yet we continue to treat mil­
‘itary personnel problems as if they were
simply questions of hiring enough day
laborers to reach authorized strength
levels.
Service in our mifitary need not be­
come an “either or” situation. Institu­
tional motivation— that is, service, tradi­
tional military ethics, and so forth– and
occupational motivation— that ie, pay,
mobility, security, and so forth— are not
mutually exclusive. US society can have
a highly motivated effective’ military at
acceptable fiscal costs, but not if we suc­
cumb to the “bottom-line” mentality of
the accountant. The bottom fine in na­
tional defense matters is not merely a
number of dollars, but a condition of
alignment between etrategic policy,
threats to that poficy and militmy capa­
bility.
4 February
!
A Youthful and ‘Vigorous Mifitary
“Youth and vigor” are terms which
appear repeatedly in the literature of mil­
itary sociology and congressional hear­
ings of the last three decades. Never de­
fined, society has accephsd the termre ae
being nearly synonymous and intrin­
sicaIly “good.” The acceptance of youth
and vigor as a military manpower im­
perative ie largely attributable to our
cultural biases.
In 1949, the irrationality of 20-year
retirement was identified in hearings by
the House Committee on Armed Serv­
ices. A subcommittee report stated:
We think it unreasonable that (a 42­
year-old officer) should be granted retire~
rnent. at such an age when during the
next 10 to 15 years he should be in his
prime in conti”buting to his Government
the results of years of training and expe­
n“ence.’
Twenty years later, a etudy by the
Army adjutant general identified the
period between 23 and 30 years of service
ae the “major professionrd contribution
period.”6
Service response to these a, ‘ eimilar
well-founded findings has been nil.
Today, the requirements of WL m at
least the high-technology conilict to
which the US defense establishment is
committed, have changed. The foot
eoldier is etill the key, but axxanci him
has evolved a tecfmologicef environment
in which mental prowess, not physical
stamina, is the dominant characteristic.
In the 1979 Brookings study, Youth or
Experience?: Manning the Modem Mil- ‘
itary, Martin Binkin and Irene Kyrieko­
poulos identified 60 percent of enlisted
positions as being noncombatant roles in
which age is not a major factor. Corn-’
plaints by the services rega+ng train-

ability and retention ratee for the all­
vohmteer force would tend to add cre­
dence to the increasing need for ekilf
rather than youth and vigof. Contempo­
rary service officers average 44.4 years of
age at retirement; enlisted personnel
average 41.3.7 Clearly, no one can com­
plain of a lack of youth.
Whether the employment of military
forces is an art or a science remains a
moot point. The world notables of both
communities, artistic and scientific, are
the older more experienced practitioners,
yet Amencane blithely assume that
witbin their rnifitsry force, the laws of
human development are inverted. The
young are wise and experienced, deteri­
orating rapidly as they practice. their
profession to the point where they are
incompetent by age 45 to 50.
It appears we have overlooked some of
the truisms of military history. He who
knows what he is about generaIly conquers
the energetic novice. With a few excep­
tions, such as Alexander of Macedonia,
military l~aders peek in their 40e to 60s.
A contemporary and, in some ways,
painful example of our youth fixation in
action can be found in navaf annals.
Admiral Gorsbkov had been the USSR’s
naval chief for 16 years and was 68 years
old when US Admiral Hofloway retired
in 197s at the age of 56 after .oNy four
years as chief of naval operations. When
Gorshkov assumed his post, his Amer­
ican counterpart was commending a sub­
,rnarine tender. The question for US
poficymakers is: Which career pattern is
the more fikely to produce expert direc­
tion at minimum cost, kaleidoscopic
youth or seasoned maturity?
The United States has always had dif­
ficulties with its military. It appears
that the basic cause of this ongoing
social mafady is cultural rejection—that
ie, we resent having mifitary forces.
1980
. . .
RETIREMENT
With the exception of those brief periods
—such as World War II —when crusad.
ing zeal makes military se~ice socially
acceptable, we do not allocate social re­
sources to the armed forces.
Superpower status has compelfed na­
tional attention to be directed to the mil-
i%, but the cultural conditioning of
abhomence has not changed. The estab­
lishment of ail-volunteer armed forces in
the early 1970s can be viewed as the
most recent attempt to free oureelvee of
the annoyance of military service. By
bringing the pay into alignment with the
reet of eociety, we hoped to maintain
armed forces which would attract those
‘who probably would not contribute to
society in any other capacity, thue free­
ing most citizens to pursue their for­
tunes in the marketplace.
The transition to a smafl, *olunteer,
professional military from a mass force
based on short periods of service by citi­
zen-soldiers was never completed in the
sense that personnel poficies were not B
modified to accommodate the fundamen­
tal change in the nature of the armed
forces. Nowhere is this oversight more
apparent than in military retirement.
When 55 percent of the defense budget
for 1976 was needed to meet personnel
costs, both Congress and the administra­
tion began reviewing the compensation
question with retirement assuming a
prominent position.
The existing retirement poficy is self-
defeating in that it has characteristics
which, when viewed in the context of, the
personnel system, virtuaIly guarantee a
low return on the personnel dollar. In
essenee, retirement policy and the person­
nel system’s philosophy work at cross-
purposes, with the former miIdIy errcour­
aging retention and the latter compelling
retirement at the point where it costs the
mosL The data in Table 1 on nondisabifity
*
5 “
MILITARY REVIEW

retirement clarifies the increasing cost
aspect.
Ignoring, for the moment, Af other
motivational factors, the cost-generating
calculus of the current system can be
simply demonstrated. Our 40-yem-oId
guardian kno;ing that be cannot con-
tinue in his chosen csreer beyond about
age 50 (28 or 30 yesrs of service) sur-
mises that his opportunities to begin.
another career are better if he is younger
and retires as early as he can. The ex-
guardian joins the growing number of his
former colleagues, becoming a longterm
rmblic financial Iiabfitv. The General
‘Accounting Office estimates that under
the current system, military retirement
will cost $13.8 billion for 1.4 miilion
retirees by 1983.’
The greatest single contributor to the
burgeoning retirement costs for the Army
is the pergonnel system itsetf. In a series
of interviews with recent and potential
military retirees conducted during the
period 197[-79, I was impressed with the
frequency of terms such as “dead,”
“finished, “ “end of the line, ” “no place
to go,‘‘ and so forth used to describe

!londisability Retirement Data

Selected Average Age Average Years of

Grades at Retirement Service at Ratwemant

06 495 292
05 449 237
04 421 226
E9 447 263
E8 41 6 237
E7 403 222

Average Years of Retired Ldettme

Expectancy
RetIre at Years of Age officers Enhsted M@n

41 346 309
42 337 299
43 328 , 291
44 319 281
45 31 27.3
46 302 264
,,,
55. 19
56 21 7 183
57 21 17.5
.*,

60 188 154
61 179 14.8
62 17.2 141

Tabla 1

6 February

motives for retirement. For over 85 per­
cent of those interviewed to describe
their status in the only profession most
of them have ever know as “dead” at the
18 to 24-year point indicates a major sys­
temic weakness.’
The pereonnel system was not de
signed to produce apathy at the 20-year’
point, but that is what has evolved. In
its efforts to identify and reward the
extraordinary and to keep upward mobil­
ity as a prime motivation for
performance, the eystem has overlooked
85 percent of its membere, and the over­
sight costs dearly.
There is no niche for the man or
woman who is not going to be promoted
any further. There is no reward for excel­
lence or experience. At the time when
most professions begin to grant status to
their members, the Army renders its
members obsolescent (approximately 35
years of ag+. At 40, when most people
are just beginning to contribute to their
business or profession, the Army labels
its professionals obsolete and virtually
forces them into retirement.
The effects of this telescopic career are
largely dysfunctional and can be viewed
from two perspectives. First is retire­
ment cost which we have already ex­
amined. Hidden costs are more impre­
cise. Personnel acquisition costs are
elevated by tbe shortened career period.
Since members determine their status
and career potential early in the process
(about the 10 to 15-year point), they
begin preparing for what is for them the
inevitable second coreer. This prepara­
tion frequently takes the form of educa­
tion and trair.ing acquired with govern­
ment funding or partial funding.
Another preparatory tectmique is one
which affects the second area of cost—
operational efficacy. The service member
facing a career transition will, quite pre­
1980
RETIREMENT
dictably. attempt to gain experience.
which wifl help his civilian marketability.
The resulting assigrunent manipulation
is not necessarily in the best interests of
the service.
The effects of career acceleration on
mifitary preparedness are disquieting be­
cause certain behavior patterns emerge.
To become and remain identified as a
“bright young comer: the service member
must mov- so rapidly that he becomes
superficial in knowledge, oblivious of the
long-term effects of hb actions (which he
never gets to see) and unaware of the con­
sequences of error. The “comem” cannot
stay in a job long enough to grasp all of
the intricacies, or they fall from grace and
are no longer “comers.”
The result is an environment where
form outweighs substance as everyone
scrambles to look good at whatever
happens to have high visibility at that
time. From this “Madison Avenue” ap
preach to a military career, “ticket­
punching” is inevitable. In ticket-punch­
ing’e extreme form, credit for the act
outweighs the act itself in the eyes of the
military careerist.
The career game is, in itseff, dysfunc­
tional since, in their haste to compress a
40-year career into 20 years, the con­
stantly moving careerist finds himself
being new at his job 15 of the 20 yeare.
The public investment in experienced lead­
ership frequently buys experience at the
career game and not functional expe­
rience.
Marketable Skills
An argument could be made that so­
ciety need not take on the burden of pay­
ing pensions to young rnifitery retirees
who, in fact, enter the job market and
7
MfLITARY REVIEW
can sustain themselves “just like the
ree~ of us.” OB the face of it, the corubi- ‘
nation of rcda~ive youth {40 to 45 years
old } and miIitary drifls which are increas­
ingly similar to *hose in the economy
would suppor~ this position. The expe­
riences of miIitary retirees and survey
data, however, do not support this view.
Currently, military retirees are being
discouraged from government work.
Horror stories of double-dipping flag
officers getting impressive combined
incomas enrages the public and sours
hiring bureaucrats. This hae trickled
down to state and local levels as well,
with retirees becoming the objects of an
unusual form of discrimination. Being a
military retiree and having an income
(which popular imagination has fre­
quently overvalued), the retiree is re­
jected before qualifications are even an
issue. The public is thereby denied an
opporiufity to get the full value from
their investment in human resources. .
Another job area which is morally re­
stricted is defense contract work. ‘O.Here,
as in government, the accumulated skills
and knowledge can be readily trans­
ferred. To deny these areas to retirees is
illogical. The stigma attached to gover­
nment and defenee-related employment
forces retirees more and more into the
marketplace.
A recent Department of the Army sur­
vey points out the fact that 63 percent of
the officersand 75 percent of the enlisted
retirees are gainfully employed. It also
chows that in the first job, enlisted men
are making 20 to 32 percent less than
their civilian counterparts doing the
same job, and officers average 15 to 32
percent less. ” What that survey and
previous efforts fail to mention is that
the retiree has little choice but to become
“gainfully” employed.
Gainful employment is dictated by a
8 Febr,uary
simple fact of contemporary life. At 40 to
50 years of age, the military retiree faces
his or her period of greatest family ex.
penee. In a 1978 survey of the US Army.
Command and Generzd Staff College
{USACGSC} class, a 25-percent sample
showed that only H percent perceived
their retirement income as being ade­
quate to live on, wkile 43 percent felt it
was inadequate to live on and M percent
felt it was inadequate without a signifi­
cant change in life style.
Entering the employment merket­
plau, the middle-aged military retiree
does so at a marked disadvantage. We
have previously referred to popular re­
sentment arieing from miIitery personnel
being retired so young and havipg a
handsome income for which no discerni­
ble work is being performed. Addition­
ally, there are prejudices stemming from
two widely held stereotypes of the, ex-
military man or woman. Th& fact that
the two etereotypicsl images are dia­
metrically opposed does not detract from
their discriminatory impact.
Firet is the view that long-term (over
10 years) exposure to military life
renders the retiree incapable of thought
and self-generated action. Harkening
back to the society’s vague feeling that
given a choice decent people would not
be in the military, this stereotype
prompts job interview questions like:
“Can you function in a loosely etrnctured
environment?” and’ ‘Can you work?”
The second and more dangerous
stereotype from the hirer’e viewpoint ie
that of the dynamic leader. The image
here is one of an accomplished “doer”
accustomed to a highly competitive envi­
ronment. Will he disrupt the organiza­
tion? Might he possibly get my job in a
year or so? The latter quest on normally
assures rejection although !khe reasons
given will generally run to such bland

Renerafities as: “You ru’obablv would not
~t into our organisa~on”, aid that old
claseic “You are overquafified for the
position,”
Stereotypes aside, there rre valid mana­
gerial considerations workhg against the
40 to 50-year-old military retiree in his
career transition eff orte. Mifitary officers,
to a grea~r extent than nonco&mis­
sioned officere, are generafly exposed to
higher managerial experiences in their
15th through 20th or 25th year of serv­
ice. However, few business organisations
are willing to recruit for higher manage­
ment poeitione from what is to them an
unproven and nonspecifically exper­
ienced reeource. %nilru-ly, there is justi­
fiable hesitancy to induct highly edu­
cated, widely traveled, mature 45-year­
olds into the bottom of the organiza­
tional pyramid, an area normally in­
habited by 20 to 30-yeer-olds.
With top and bottom effectively
blocked, the retiree muet. compete for
jobs in the rniddlp of the organizational
structure. His competition runs five to
15 years younger and generally has more
directly relatable experience. The reeult
is fairly predictable. Given hie age, ex­
tensive but not specific experience and
the stereotypes, the ex-guerdian is not in
great demand.
For come years, it has been increas­
ingly evident that those skille which are
most marketable for the military retiree
are those most clearly relatable to
business fimctions (comptroller, auto­
matic data processing, and so forth).
Combat skills, while essential for mil­
itary efficacy, are far less marketable in
a second career.’2
Summarizing, the position our rniddle­
aged warrior finds himself in under cur­
rent conditions is that he knows he is
more marketable at 40 to 45 than he is at
45 to 50. He knowe that his retirement at,
1980
RETIREMENT
either the 20 or 28 (30) year point ie not
adequate to maintain fde life style, thue
he muet be “gainfully” employed. He
knows that civil service and defense
industry are being graduolly denied to
him as second career options. He knows
that bueiress-related skifle sell better
than combat skills. Finally, he knows
that the syetem as it is structured today
hae no place for him after the age of 40
unless he is among the tiny group
destined for elevation into the highest
enlisted or commissioned ranks. Even
then, he must retire-by about age 55.
Thus, the ‘“dead end’ which at first
blush seems so incongruous is quite real.
The intrinsic values which motivate
most career milita~ personnel to enter
the services wither under the combined
pressures sketched,above. Socie~ hae, in
effect, produced conditions leading to the
embourgeoisment of our guardians. The
1978 USACGSC survey showed that
while only 26 percent planned to get out
at 20 years at the time of commissioning,
by their 12th to 16th year of service, this
figure had grown to 56 percent.
When asked to rank order eeven fac­
tors affecting their retirement decision,
tbe following reflects the percentages of
respondents who indicated a I or 2 for
that factor.
a Lose of job satisfaction—41 percent.
e Promotion opportunitiee—32 per­
cent.
e Family considerations—40 percent.
e Desire for a new csreer—18 percent.
e Desire to make more money—15 per­
cent.
e Tired of the military—13 percent.
e Marketability in eecond career—29
percent.
In the confirming interview for the
USACGSC survey, I wae struck by the
frequency of the came terms heard in the
retiree interviews— that ie, “dead,”
9
MILITARY REVIEW
“finished,” and so forth. When pushed, ,
both groups painted a picture of despera­
tion in their service cereere. In the cur­
rent philosophy, there is simply no place
to utifize 45-year-old officere and non­
commissioned officers who are not going
any bigher in the rank structure. Upon
not being selected for promotion at the
earliest opportunity, their competence is
suspect. With each succeeding occur- .
rence, it is assumed that their utility
diminishes until they are hard-pressed to
gain acceptance in positione which they
had held yeara before.
A review of both 1978 surveys in fight
of the ‘interview findinge suggests a
queetion”: Is it the reduced promotion
Opportufitiee which is encouraging early
retirement, or is it the environment which
stigmatizes as useless he who is not, pro­
moted every few years? In the Depart­
ment of Defense retiree survey, promo­
tion—either “failed to be promoted” or
“poor possibilities”— was listed as a
major influence to retire hy 46.3 percent
of the officers and 63.6 percent of the
enlisted respondents.
The USACGSC survey showed 32 per­
cent of midcareer active duty officers
considering promotion opportunities as
major factors in their retirement de­
cisions. Impressive as these figures are,
given the near unanimity of interview
comment, they are low. There is little
doubt that some of the motivation
bebind these responses can be attributed
to becoming an “unperson” at age 45.
Answering the question previously
poeed– there is significant evidence that
the issue of promotion is not so clear-cut
as surveys iruiic&e. In the exieting envi­
ronment, promotion is the sine qua non
of acceptance —if one cannot go up, one
must get out. Thue, we have the circular
logic of the defense managers. Aelr about
promotion knowing that the responses
10
will be affected by tbe’ ‘up-or-out” eyner­ ,
gism, then use the findings to convince
Congress and the services that, “up or
out” is not only necessary as a manage­
ment tool, hut it is desired by the eervice
personnel.
In the American culturaI context “You
are what you do.’’” By creating conditions
where tkey cannot “do,” we have taken
people who are generally motivated
toward a national service role and com­
pelled them to “use” the system for per­
sonal gain at great cost in defense dollars.
At the time of this writing, retirement
proposals and counterproposals are issu­
ing “from the servicee, Department of
Defenee, Congress and the White House
staff. Motivated more by the need to re­
duce fiscal cost than human resource
mobilixation, many of these proposals
will be shailow. They wiff be aimed at
removing the political albatross that bil­
lions in retirement payments to tens of
thousands of 45-year-olds constitutes.
Hopefully, some effort wilf he made to
modify the personnel philosophy which
has fostered tbe albatross.
Table 2 provides gener~l considera­
tions which would both reduce the fiscal
burden and improve our defense I
manpower posture.
Considerations 1 and 2 will reduce fis­
cal cost by encouraging longer service.
Such an extension would also bring mili­
tary retirement more closely into align­
ment with prevailing civikan retirement
ages. In the 1978 USACGSC survey,
when asked at what point should Army
retirement be optional, 58 percent re­
sponded affirmatively to either 30 or 40
years of service. Another three percent,
whife calling for the 20-year option,
wrote in that extension of service beyond
the “current 28 or 30 years should be cod­
tingent upon continued productivity. ,
Consideration 3 provides for self-elfmi­
February
 . .

RETIREMENT

General Considswations

1.Optional reti~ement at 55 years of age or 35 years of service whichever is later with 65

percent of pay m pension.
2.Compulsory retirement at 60 years of age (wltfl two-year incremental w$wers at the dis­
cretionof the service secretary) with 80 percent of pay in pension.
3 Optional separation at any po,rrft after 10 years of serwce with a vesting formula and lump-
sum payment
4 Dlscontmue accelerated promotions and “up-or-out” pohcy
5. Establish a special category tor expert personnel wdh 25 years of service who WIII not be
promoted so that they may be retained and their talents used without blocking promotions
6 Encourage clwl-serwce transfers for mlhtary retirees.

Tabre 2

nation by the disenchanted. This would
reduce the numbers of those who are
eimply “putting in 20 years” eo that
their previous investment ie not waeted,
but would not saddle the defense budget
with supporting these people for life.
Consideration 4 is more a personnel phi­
losophy shift than purely a retirement
factor. Accelerated promotions– that is,
being promoted in advance of the normal
time in grade-contribute to the frantic
activity so characteristic of t+e post-
Korekn, War US militery. This poficy
fostere activity simply to appear active
since one could hardly expect to be
tagged as a 4‘real comer” without con­
spicuous displays of energy. Twenty
yeare of struggling to appear hyper­
active frequently results in’ ‘burnout. ” If
we experience “burnout” in peace, what
do we have in reserve for war? The serv­
,ice could reward the gifted with prestig­
ious positions rather than promotion,
thus helping to curb grade escsdstion.
Up or tkt means be promoted or be
eliminated. The philosophy is prodfgsl in
that it does not allow for the exietence of
anything but candidates to be chief of
staff or eergeant major of the Army.
Some 800,000 people working toward
two positions is a scenario more suited to
opera buffs than sustaining military
power.
By encouraging profeeeional corporals,
sergeants and captaine to continue func­
tioning at levels where they have already
proven themselves, training costs wofdd
be reduced, and organizations might
begin to assume an air of stsbllity with a
few faces which remain in pface. Since no
one in or out of the sr&ed forces has sug­
gested that service to one’s country in
the military should be a privilege open
only to the upwardly mobile, “up or out”
can be discontinued by simple adminis­
trative action.
Consideration 5 is so logical that its
chances of implementation are nil. By
this simple measure, we would be able to
rnifk experienced and committed gusrd­
iane with no cost but the granting of a
niche.
Consideration 6 would permit thoee
still vigorous enough to work beyond
retirement to contnbuta their talents to
civif government.
In sum, Plato would be appalled at the
United States in 1980. We have tried to
mariage our guardians as one might a
fast-food chain. By trying to make the

.$

1980 11
MILITARY REVIEW

military function in a businesslike man- Fighting, at whatever level of inten­

ner, we have awakened ethos of I?ith­ ‘ sity, with forces in being means that our
century condottiere — that is, soldiers guardians must be totally dedicated. If :
more concerned with their remuneration our military responses are delayed while
than with fighting. The contemporary the guardians ascertain “what’s in it for
American guardian must keep one eye on me, ” we may find ourselves living that
his future career, leaving only one for the rhetorical question of the Vietnam
nation’s enemies. Tht cost of this is in- era— what if they gave a war and n~body
calculabie, (from the United States) ea,me?

NOTES

I 4.,.. Uris rhe Fr”slrated r, f.” Emasc.l,,,o” of ,.. 9 oepa,tmenl .1 me Army Pamphlet 360845. OPhts stat., %
Execu(,.e. V.., No,tranO Rer”hom CO N V 1972 P ,6 POIf Department of the Army. Washm910n. D C, Mav 1’379 R..
2 Quoted ,“ S,, D... C,emenl and Do””. A,,,, Mon.g,,bh wt. of . . Amoyw,oe s.rwy Wmwea mat percemion. ala not
N.rn Der 8 Lea2w,h?. Mo”og,.Dh Serse, US Arm, Adm, n,sira mat,. lhe m.”agem.”1 theory .“d 10! .Wd r..,.” SPecll!caliy,
,?0” Center For, Be.,amm H.,,,,.. ,.d ,$376 ~ 55 oYerce. !ralz3!I.. m 32). the fr..l!c .,.0 mwlak
es-only
...
3 u.,, OD crt I) 23 ,..3”,, t. make ,, ,,”aronle @ zn ,esu,t<ng from accelerated

. .ler., a B.+.tmw” .“0 JO”. B,.,, C,t,Ze” Force o, Career Promotions, and .l, eke! L).”ch, ”g (DP 15 19) were Commen!ed

F.rceq Irnol&catl O” for Iaeology ,“ tlm All VO!unteer Force The “DO” b, ,e5P.”ae”t, a, be,, e,”g the ttleory
Soc,m P,,chology 01 Mmlary Ser,)ce ed$ted by N Golum?.” ,“0 ?0 The aefense ‘ontrad Droiwbvt,o” has, on .,,.s ,0., Pm
D SeQa, Sag. P“WCWO”, ,“, Beverly H>I,,, Ca,,f .1978 !J244 d“ceo ab,.rd, t,e, 1“ the Ret,red Army P,,,..”,! B.]lel,”, AP,, I
5 tlearmgs H R 2553 US CoPgres., %“s, of Retmesen!a 1959 ret, rem were C..t#Uned mat the comptroller general had
I>,,, S. Dcomm,ttee 01 the Comrm! tee 0“ Acmeo SerVICeS. Wash d,t., m,”ed that DOCWI comb. and $Oft Or#”k, w,ere lnd.tied (.
1“(110” 0 C .1949, P t.440 [he v.,.,, ,v@(.?. of ,+., ,7).1,,,,1s

6 U.mo!an.. m 15025 0,,,, ? Career Me”ageme”l “S Arm, 7I w,,.+ ,%0,.. su*ev Reoort. Department 01 Defense,
A,,. t.i-t G,ne, al S.t OOl Fort Be”,.,” “ . ..!.50” 1“0 J.!, 1,!69 WaSh,”@” D C Ma, 1978, $,P 12
63 12 L..,, SharP ma ALt,ert S,.2erm.3n, The EmPfoyme”f Of R,
7 7,,.”,.., ReD”” N.mber PI TR 370 M,l)t,ry Retirement ,,,,0 M,,,,,,” P,,.. ””,, B.,,,. of SoC,al S,,. ”., Research
T“, s70,, Q, “0.,. ,“,5 V,@, Presearch ,“, Ar,,”gto” V, Feb Wa,hI. @on D C 7966, 0 x,,, The placement D,ob, em 10, non
r“ary 1978, volume II, D 49 prepared !Or the Pre,,, en, , Cornm, s b.s”e$sl,ke ,k&ll, ,s ongo, ”g The 1978 DeDarlment 01 0,?,.s,
s,.. on M,l,ta,y Compensation The essence of me study *.s that survey refwc!ed “o r,!.,,.. t,e, xee” roll,tary SK,lls and ,!”,1,.” ,,
tn. terms ha,. ..1 bee. defined and no one .,3s show. a clea! Pm, 8“ 46 Derce”t of the ,ample and very 4,f,,e ,“ ,4 percent
corsela,, o. uet*een youth and v,gor ..0 rr,litary eff,cacv 13 work ,. 4m.rIca ReDort.1 a .pec!a! lash force m me secre
8 J,.. 0,!,,”, Fe.,,., Pen,,.”, The S,.,,, N.,,. ”., OeM. (w, 01 hea,lh, educ?.t,cn arc .,,1,,,, The MIT Press Cam b,,dge,
Cfir, sf,a” S,(,”,, MO.?1O, 16 May !979 P 12 M.., 1973, D6

I.[PUtenant Colonel Donald B Vough t, LIS

Army, Rettred, currently a ~n[,atc cons.ltanr,

WCPIwd a B A from h’uru Ich Unl~,crsl O. un

bf. A [n polttzcal scrence from the LJmwrstry of

LOUIsud!@. an hf A II? tnternattonal relat~ons

from Boston Urn L en, i? and zs a graduate of the

L’SACG.SC He has wrvt’d uwth che Mih cary

Assstance Adtilsow Group m Vwtnam. wth

Headquarters, Central Arm.v Group, Europe,

and with the Departmevzt of Umfzt-d and Com.

b!ned Operations, USA CGSC

12 February
 . .

The Total Armg concepl is not a one-zoattstreet. If me are to derive

the maximum benefit from this closer association between Actiue
and Reserue anits, we must use the capabilities of both. l%e author
informs as of a unique condition where the expertise of the Re­
serve components is formallg shared with members of the Ach”ue
Armg.

1980 13
 MILtTABY REVIEW
For it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that,
.
an’ “C%uck him out,’ the brute!”
Bff t it’s “.% vior @ ‘is comb-y”
when & guns begin to shoot.
– Tommy by Rudyard Kipling
1 N HIS epic poem Tommy, Rudyard
KipIing summarized tbe public inter­
est in the srddier when he spoke of the
soldier being ignored in peacetime but
adored in time of war. A sirnilex asser­
tion might zdso be made of the soldier
who gives scant attention to the civilian
problems of deafing with the wartime
devastation of families and communities
except during war itself. Civilian atten­
tion to the rnifitary problems and mil­
itary attention to the civilian problems
both vacillate according to the etate of
peace or wa~
For example, World War II and the
postwar period provide examples of the
high esteem that civil-military opera­
tions (CMO ) enjoyed although, in those
days, it was calIed military government.
During Korea, it was the G5 who focused
on the problems of the noncombatant
civilians. In Vietnam, the formalization
of CiViO is less apparent, although no
more appreciated, consciously. There,
many of the problems and concerns of
the CMO specialist were disguised in
such exotic terms as “rural pacifica­
tion, ” ‘‘ civic action” or “internal devel­
opment. ”
As the Army struggled with its con­
science during its emergence from the
negativism of the Vietnam period, the
notion of CMO slipped quietly to the
back burner. While the Active Army has
,virtually stripped itself of the capability
for dealing with CMO, the military has
relegated greater and greater responsi­
bility to the few civil affairs units in the
Army Reserve for that function.
14
As CMO shifted away from the Active
‘ force and to the Reseme, there seemed t.o
be a simifar dirnkmtion of effort to retain
at. least a working knowledge of the pro­
gram in even the military academic- com­
nmnity.
During the same period, the Army
fmzmch that is the principaI proponent
for CMU– the civil at%ire branch–Iost
some of its stature within the Ar~y
etructure. As a reealt, there have been
few opportunities to remind the Army of
its own doctrine: that the responsibility
and authority for CMO are veetsd in the
eenior mifitaW commander in the area of
operation.
This lack of attention to CMO doctrine
hae caused thd newer group of corn.
manders to concentrate primarily on the
tactical requirements neceseery to fight
a battle and ignore some of the other sig­
nificant concerns —the affected civilians
and the civilian resources —that can help
or hinder the tacticaI mission.
-
A f’tesd for Training
The current force structure includes
provisions for the addition of a Ch10
officer on the commander’s staff whose
job it is to help the commander address
the political, economic, social and psy­
chological aspects of military operations.
But, other than instruction at the US
Army Institute for Military Assistance
( USAIMA) at Fort Bragg, North Caro­
lina, which lasts just two weeks, no other
program directs the commander’s atten­
tion to this critical area. And, with the
limited numbers going to tbe USAIMA
course, there appears to be limited capa­
bility’ to meet the exacerbated require­
ments in an expanding force situation.
A review of the Army military educa-
February

tion tmogram revealed that the most
likeIy-pk& for instruction to the great:
eet number of tactically oriented officers
would be the US Army Commend and
General Staff College (USACGSC) at
Fort Leavenworth, Kaneae. The nature
of instruction and the caliber of officers
attending the courees at the USACGSC
further enhanced the poeeibifitiee. More­
over, the USACGSC program in 1976
. . . the resymnsibilitg and authoritg for C.O are vested in the
senior military commander in the area of operations.
revealed a deficiency in this area of mil­
itary instruction. Ths logic was estab­
lished; what was now required were the
detaile and the necessary approvals.
USACGSCInvolvement
I In 1976, informal discue~ions were
held with repreeentativee of the
USACGSC. The discussions culminated
in a request to the commander of the US
Army Training and Doctrine.. Command
(TRADOC) that the 352d Civil Affairs
Command, a civil affairs Reserwe unit
located iu the Washington, D. C.,
vicinity, be authorised to support the
USACGSC in ite CMO instruction.
TRADOC approved the request, and
detailed planning begen.
Since the Active Army possesses only
about one percent of the total civil
affairs assets and the Reserve forces
have the other 99 percent, it was appro­
priate that a major civil affairs Reserve
commend be given this assignment for
the college. Selected members of the
1980
.
GIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
. .
352d Civil Affaire Commend spent their
Reeerve annual training periode at the
USACGSC to determine the type of civil
affairs eupport that might be offered to
the college.
A concept was developed whereby the
352d Civil Affairs Command would act
as a “corporate” consulting faculty
member and collectively write and teach ,
an elective course on CMO, focusing
heavily on the “force multiplier” effects
of the G5 operation at divisional level.
It was agreed that the pro~am of in­
struction and rdl the leeson plans would
be prepared by the 352d Civil Affairs
Command, but they would be subject to
the same standards that would be ex­
pected of any eIective course of instruc­
tion produced at the college.
A Memorandum of Understanding be+
tween the USACGSC and the 352d Civil
Affairs Command was written. .This
memorandum addressed the tasks that
would be performed by the 352d Civil
Affairs Command and indicated they
would include the foflowing:
e Preparing a 30-hour elective course
of instruction to be offered during both
Terms II and 111of the 1978-79 academic
year.
e Furnishing members of the 352d
Civil Affairs Command to be instructors
for this 30-hour elective course of in­
struction referenced above.
e Utilizing the members of th~ 352d
Civil Affairs Command to act ae the G5
controller in the tactical control and
coordination exercise being conductkd by
15
MILITARY REVIEW
the colIege during both Terms H and HI .
of the 19’T8-79academic year.
Tlte Menmrandurn rJf Understanding,
wLick was signed in Wweznher 1978,
went on tO deIineate other duties and
responsibilities of the two organirxkions
in the conduct of this rrmtwd support
agreement..
l= anticipation of the simimz of ~he
ilfemorand~m of Unders&nc&g and
carrying out its provisions, the 352d
C“ivilAffairs Command organized a small
team of officers for this project. Consid­
ering the amount of work that had to ire
done in only a thres-month period in
writinq this 30-hour block of instruction
{broken down as 10 three-hour blocks of
instruction), and coordinating each of
‘ these blocks of instruction into a unified
CMO instructional program, a small
group of experienced officers was consid­
ered the most manageable way of ac­
complishing the mission.
To make sure that all items required
for this mission would be properly time-
phased and understood by all personnel
of the committee, two very important
documents were produced. The firsi OF
these documents wae a program outline
of the 10 three-hour blocke of instmc­
tion, delineating what each block of in­
struction would encompass and identi&­
ing the specific individual who would
have responsibility for writing and later
teaching that biock of instruction at the
college.
The second of these two documents
was a LLSACGSC Project PERT (Pro­
gram Evaluation and Review Technique)
Chart (as shown) outlining all items that
had to be accomplished, and thefi time-
16
phasing over the sext few mork.hs. These
two documents served as the blueprint
for thie project,
Each of the individuals chosen to wri~’
and teach a specific bIcck of instruction
had particular civil affairs expertise in
that subject, a factor for the success of
the project.
The key to elf this prepsration lay in
the availability of the project’s partici­
pants to *@ech their specific biocks. This
meant a fairly radical depertwe from the
usual way that Reserve malts take their
anmmf training. Present. rniIitsry Re­
serve funding requirements dictate that
active reservists can take only two weeks
of active training per year.
In keeping with these requirements,
the 352d Civil Affairs Command fur­
nished the necesmry inetructiomd per­
sonnel to the USACGSC by having the
USACGSC project team officers take
one or two-week tours of active duty in a
“back-to-back” fashion to cover the time
period from January to June 1979. Tius
departure from normal annuaf training
tours also meant that the individuals
assigned to the uSACGSC project would
not be able to be at annual training with
the unit during its normal summer train­
ing period in July,
It was felt that the changing of in­
structors on a weekly or biweekly basis
Udgilt produce a certain amount of
discontinuity in the minds of the
USACGSC students taking the course.
In actual fact, this turned out to be one
of the prime benefits of this course. The
weekly or biweekly change of instruc­
tional personnel from the 352d Civil
Affairs Command has afforded the
USACGSC student an opportunity to
have an expert in a specific civif affairs
field teach a course specifically related to
his area of professional expertise. Prior
to each lesson, instructors furnished each
February ‘
 USACGSC Project PERT Chart
(7110/781
1978 ..
1979
Items Aug Sep Ott Nov Oec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

1 Dec,s,on on uSACGSC support by w

352d CIVII Alta,rs Command
a letter to Br,gadmr Gw?ral Artet _­
b IPtter Ior mandayspacestosup _~

port Iotal ellort

i’” Prepardhon and prese”twon of 30

hour block ot ,nstrucbon to uSACGSC
a Make necessary coan~es on sub v
blocks o! m~truct,on

b Asxgn subblo~k ,n’,lructo!s and v

rdenhly pr, nczpal ,nshuctor

c PreDare t,nal d,att ot 313ho”r

Vw
block cow’? CiIntPnl tar 197879 USA ‘ --- .
CGSC Cdtdkl~Ue
d Prepdre t,nald fattot Wach,nkoo _~.-.Y

)Wt,vm and Iearnmg Ob,ecbv?$ tor

each Ihree hour Ie%son

e Subbloch mstructor~ Rrep.xe Ies ‘—

son LdaflS for each three IIour Ies$on” I

aw~ned

t ~, ‘

Subm,t lesson plans for 352d CIV

!
.,
II At fa, rs Command auproval

‘.

g Subm4 lesson ~lanstor USACGSC tlessons 1

b = (lessons 6 through 10 I

------
approval through 5)
1

h 352d CIVII Atlw Command re (lessons 1 Y_--- V (lessons 6 through 10)

hears;l 01 le;som thrwgh 5) .

Term II
Term Ill
Presenta!mn ot ,n~t!uct,on aI uSA
CGSC fl I23[45[67I89[1O[ [~ ~’

3 Preuarat,on 01 G5 type probl?ms tor

the lact,ral conhol and coord,ndt,on mer
Clw
~ Assign 352d CIVII Alta, rs Com v

mand pwwn(s) to plecare Dmblem5

b Coo!d, nat? Commumty Automat,c v

[xchange ltelPpbone) (CAX)tvoeprob

lem~ that could be W+

c Select 12 [o ?0 ~,obl?ms t~, G5 v

controller use m exwc Ise

d Preva!e pnw$ble soluhon[sl ana w

majm teaching Domt% ior each Dlob t

Iem
:
e Subm,t orI@naI 17 to 20 plob +; .

Iems to uSACGSC

I Ident,ty and wbmd add,hoiwl a

problems to lJSACG C ,s5 bme aim

wa,labhiy perm,ts Ierm II Term Ill

k Use oi vrobl?m~ by G5 con!rolk?r
,
al USACGSC -E

1980 17
 MILITARY REVIEW

student with a biographical summary , What is clear from this experience is

showing his professional background in
thak area of instruction,
As the adage says, “The proof of the
pudding is in the eating.” And so with
the USACGSC project, the proof of the
project was in the acceptance by the stu­
denks at the USACGSC. In Term II, the
firet elective term of the 1978-79 aca­
demic year, 19 students elected to take.
the CMO course. In Term III of this aca­
demic year, 43 students elected to take
this course, an increase of over 125 per­
cent. In the words of one of the colonels,
“the students voted with their feet. ”
The critique sheets of the students
who took the course have been most re­
vealing. One American officer said, “The
courses at the School overlook the
* civilian problems that will be encoun­
tered during combat. ” Or as an allied of­
ficer said:
The Pakistan Army does not have
such an organization because of man­
power constraints, and the functions
must be performed by staff officers. We
do not eueri have G-5, etc. I feel we need
such instruction to perform our task.
Or, finally, a US officer offered the
comment, “The idea of using a series of
instructors who are experts within their
areas was refreshing and highly effec­
tive. ”
that the One-Army concept is a viable,
workable one. In this instance, the
Active force and the Resenes joined ~
together to share the expertjse that is
necessary to teach the subject of CMO
effectively. This complementary dialogue
has had its effect in more fully preparing
both of these elements of the Total Army
to perform their vital combat missions.
This experience in working together to
attain a mutual goal has rewarded both
units. Each now enjoys a greater under­
standing of the other’s capabilities arsd ‘
limitations. Indeed, thk action repre­
sents a big step forward for both
USACGSC ‘and civil affairs. It is an
example of a muturd communication and
a joint exchange of knowledge and capa­
bility that has been the objective of the
Total Army idea since its inception.
This may be the first time that the
One-Army concept has worked in such a
manner that a Reserve orgsnixation has
written a program of instruction, pre­
pared lesson plans and taught a course of
instruction at the USACGSC. We of the
352d Civil Affairs Command hope it will
not be the last time. We believe that this
experiment has been very successful and
are looking forward to a continued asso­
ciation with the USACGSC in future
years. ~

Colonel Phdip D Coleman, US Army Re­

serue, is the Ikztmrlal accounts manager (fed.
wal) ,11 II computt.~ u.ord pmcessmg and text
management company He recezued a B S from
thp USMA,m M.I.E from Stanford Unwersity .
and IS a graduate of the USACGSC.HN
present Reserue component assignment is as I

chzef, Economics and Commerce Dluiszon. 3S2d

Ctuil Affairs Command He has served m the
Uruted States, Germany and Korea, holdzng e
number of command, staff and mstructlonal
p0sLti0n5

18
 NA TO’s inferiority of men and materiel uis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact
demands that NATO ptanners maximize the potential of eoer~
fighting ekment. The air assault dimkion possesses the spee~ tire-
power and flexibility to effect rapid change in a combat situation.
lhe author offers suggestions on possible uses.

A MAJOR confrontation between

Soviet and NATO forces in West­
ern Europe will quite possibly lead to an
forces possess sufficient

saw Pact divisions for long.’

mass and
firepower to delay the estimated 58 War- ‘

initial lees of terrain by NATO. The pit­
falls of a forward defense dependent on
mobilization and movement of in-place
forces and on reinforcement by foraes
located on another continent are obvious.
It is doubtful whether present covering
Assuming NATO forcee eventually are
able to stop a Soviet advance into West­
ern Enrope, they will then face the prob­
lem of restoring the international border.
%ce most of our armored and mecha­
nized divisions wilf be required to amass

. Air Assault Division:

iBsion8

.&s ‘­ ‘
K“

Major Briley W. Howell tJ.r.,

US Army
 MILITARY REVIEW
sufficient combat Bower to ibreak
through the enemy defenses, other re­
sources nmst be sought for accomplish­
ment of rear area and fkmk protection,
antiairborne and Iuobii$y operations,
and to cover gaps along the forward edge
of the battle ar% left by the units
assigned t.o the penetration force.z
The’ rapid rnobtity and antiarmor
capabilities of the air assault division
make it idealIy suited for the per­
formanw of theee reserve and support
missions. The utility of tbe air assault
division during the conduct of a penetra­
tion ii enhanced by an understanding of
the enemy’s probable reaction to this
type of offensive action.
The penetration is a form of maneuver
designed to break through and quickly
rupture prepsred enemy positions at a
critical time when the enemy is over­
extended and in the absence of either an
exposed flank or week spot in the enemy
defense. 3 The penetration is character­
ized by speed of exscution, concentration
of overwhelming combat power on a nar­
row front, maintenance of the attacking
momentum, unrestricted lateral move­
ment, mutually supporting fires and
security-of-the-s houlderahvideningof- the­
gap by follow and support forces.
Of the above referenced chm-acter-
P istics, concentration of overwhelming
combat power on a narrow front is crit­
icaf to our success and the focal point
upon which the Soviets will concentrate
in order to prevent our accomplishment
of the miseion.
Soviet Response
Although the Soviets emphasize the
offensive, certain defensive scenarios are
considered acceptable while preparing to
20
\
resume the offensive. These defensive
scenarios include the consolidation df
gains by advancing eIements, halt to
awai$ additional resources, protection of
a flank, expuIsion of an enemy counter­
thrust, to regroup after suffering severe
losses (normally nuclear}, to free re­
sources for other elements on the offen­
sive and to await logistics support.”
Soviet defensive doctrine stresees
defense in dep~h with the forward edge
being occupied by motorized rifle forcee
and the eecond-echelon and reserve
forces consisting of highly mobde tank-
heavy counterattack forces (Figure 1).
Under current defensive doctrine, the
reserve and second echelon may make up
over half of the force. Whife second-
echelon divisions of the army will occupy
defensive positions, their major task will
be to counterattack and deetroy enemy
forces penetrating the forward defense.’
First-echelon divisions are responsible
for occupying the forward battle posi­
tions gsnsrally organized in a series of
battalion and company strongpoint.s. If a
penetration occurs, the commander at
tb,at level will attempt to contain the
penetration forward of the second eche­
lon and counterattack with combined
tank/antitank forces.
If it appears that the penetration
cannot be contained, the counterattack
forces will normally be used to thicken
the second-echelon defenses or to
conduct spoifing attacks into the nose of
the penetration to block or contain the
advance within the first echelon of the
next higher level of command. Sines, in
the opposing force (OPFOR ) ech/Jon­
ment, the first and eecond echelons of
one lSVS1of command comprise the first
echelon of the next higher level, the
initial levsl will attempt to contain the
penetration and counterattack with ite
forces, As each level of command at bat­
February
 DEFENSIVE BELTS OF THE COMBINED
&
+--’4’’”’’’’’
: Malh Defense
Figure 1
taEorr and above retains tanfdantitank
forces, this procedure wifl be similar for
each (Figure 2).
The Soviets aleo have studied the
American Army’s use of helicopters in
South Vietnam and have adopted certain
techniques for their own use. Missions
wilf normafly be fimited to cloee-in eup
port of ground operations ( 1 to IO kilome­
ters ), including containment of enemy
counterattacks .’
The capability doee exist, however, to
insert assault battafione (motorized rifle)
into the rear of the opposition up to a
distance of 50 kilometers.’ Such action
against the logistic and command and
control elemente could severely hamper a
NATO counterattack. Unite seleeted to
conduct heliborne operations will
normally be taken from second-echelon
forces at either division or combined
arms army level. Given the foregoing
1980
ARMS ARMY
!/
Belt
enemv doctrine and caDabNitv. bow can
the a-k assault divisio~ be employed to
limit their effectiveness?
Air Assault Dwision
The typical air aesault division (Table
of Organization and Equipment 67H)
consists of a divieion base and nine
maneuver battalions (Figure 3[. Heli­
copter assets of the division include 90
attack helicopters (AHISS, AHIGs),
122 observation helicopters (0H58s ), 207
assault helicopters (UHLYS) and 48
assault support helicopters (CH47S).8
They do have limitations in the Western
European environment.’ ,
First, weather extremes such as tor­
nadoes, thunderstorms and other situa­
tions which limit visibility and ceilings
21
 COUNTERATTACK VERSUS CONTAINMENT
Contained

Hn
. Ntwt hq+her reserve

Second echelon

Frste&~\
m
,
&
n Penetration

Not Contained
Next higher reserve

HBl Thicken second echelon (reserve)

Figure 2

to less than one-fourth rnilezmd 100 feet,
respectively, can preclude or delay air-
mobile operations. Second, weight and
size will restrict the type of support
weapons and equipment that can be car-
ned by the air assault forces into the
objective area. In a tactical environment
characterized by massive emillery prepa­
rations from OPFOR regimental and
division artillery groups, the density of

1
.
22 February

—.-.—.—
 AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

I ~, I 11, I 1
P.
ayyj
I

~;q
Combat ‘-’-’’ ----- 1 AI! Defense
Signal Battallon l’lrt,llan! R.+t,l,nrl

DIvIsIon Aftdlery
Headquarters Company

. .

l=ivl-4-
di ‘+!!’
J

Cavalry
Squadron

Figure 3

tube artillery fire available to the air
assault forcee will be considerably dis­
advantaged.
Third, if the air assault force is in­
eerted to neutralize deep targets, it can
be sustained only by cir lines of com­
munication. This limitation reducee the
duration of such operation and dictates
the requirement for timely extraction or
Iinkup by a mechanized ground force.
Fourth, an air aseault force is vulnerable
to enemy tactical air, air-to-air helicop­
tixs and ground-mounted air defense sys­
tems. Vulnerability of an air aseasdt
operation will be especially high d~~g.
landing and pickup at the objective area.
Finally, once the air assault force ie
Sanded on or near the objective and
departs the aircraft, it assumes the pos­
ture of a foot-mobde tactical unit.
The air aseault division has some
unique capabilities. ‘0 The nature of its
transportation enables the unit to attack
from any direction, strike objectives in
otherwiee inaccessible areae, overfly or
bypaes obstacles and cauee the enemy to
dilute his combat power by forcing him
to fight in more than one direction. Addi­
tionally, it poseeeses the capability to
concentrate, dieperse and redeploy

1980 23
MILITARY REVIEW

rapidly over extended areas in order to A dramatisation of a US corps con­

develop the tactical situation, decrease “ ducting a deliberate attack will illustrai!e
its vulnerability to attack or extend its these mfesions. For pnrpoees of graphite,
influence. aeeume that the 10th US Corps is corn­
Although tactical air, artillery (ob­ poeed of two mechanised divisions, the
eerved firee) and attack helicopter eup 52d and 53d; an armored division, the
port may be less effective, adverse 23d; and the 102d Air Assault Divieion.
weather and night will also reduce the The scenario: At 0500, 5 March 19_,
capability of enemy tactical air and air the Popular Eastern Front Forcee
defense forcee to react against air aseault launched an attack against NATO forces
operations. When air aeeault operations in the Federal Repubfic of Germany. Due ­
are conducted during marginal weather ta the creation of saliente north and
or at night, they wifl also acquire the south of the IOth Corps sector, Central
benefit of deception and surprise. Army Group, Central Europe, ordered
the corps to delay back to and establish
defensive positions west of line Apple
Scenario 1: The Flank Counterattack (Figure 4).
It is now 14 March 19_, and the corpe
has been ordered to conduct an attack to
The combinati& of Sow-et defensive/
restore the intsmational border. The
US offensive doctrine and the capabili­ corps commander has decided to divide
ties/limitations of the air aesault divi­ the operation into two phaees: penetra­
sion dictats three primay missions for
tion of the main and second defensive
the air assault division: protection of the
belts and an exploitation to the interna­
counterattackhg NATO force flank,
tional border. ” The commander feels
countering a Soviet airmobile assault
that the third defensive belt will be
into the NATO rear and conducting an
lightly defended. However, epeed of exe­
assault of a deep objective.
cution wiff be critical. The graphic por-

IOTH CORPS DEFENSIVE POSTURE

-“’”e
x
,’‘ r

‘ti~i~. Figure 4
\ Apple
~
24 February

trayal of the corps scheme of maneuver
is depicted at Figure 5.
Due to the limited number of forcee
with which to conduct the penetration,
the corps commander hae decided to
leave the 52d Mechanised Divieion (-),
coneieting of two brigadee, in contact
along the corpe front. The 52d Mecha­
nized Divieion, 3d Brigade, wilE follow
end eupport the 23d Armored Divieion;
the corpe main attack. In the south, the
53d Mechanized Division will conduct a
supporting attack. The 102d Air Aeeault
Divieion will be the corpe reserve.
At 0400, 15 March 19_, the corps con­
ducte the attack to secure the interna­
tional border. The eouthern attack con­
fronts little enemy preseure. However,
the main attack ie elowed by etubbom
resistance. Adding to the difficulty, the
3d German (GE) Corps @ the north hae
been stopped, exposing the 10th Corps
north flank. Side-looking airborne radar
and Standoff Target Acquisition Syetem
reports indicate that a large enemy ar­
mored force is approaching the corps sec-
IOTH CORPS OFFENSIVE
r--’’i”j
EwL \,
1$)80
.
AIRASSAULTDIVISION
tor ikom the northeast. Graphically, this
eituation is depicted in Figure 6.
In accordance with their doctrine, the
OPFOR combined arms army hae corn-,
~t~sd ite Counterattack forces (probabl~”
elemente of a medium tank division)
against the salient existing between the
IOth Corps northern flank and the 3d GE
Corps. Recognizing that speed of execu­
tion is necessary to prevent the counter­
attack from penetrating the 23d
Armored Divieion north flank, the 102d
Air Aesault Division ie committed.
Figure 7 depicts the graphical echeme of
maneuver for the 102d Air Aeeault Divi­
eion.
After ‘coordination with the 3d GE
Corps, the 102d Air Assault Divieion will
move combat elements of one brigade (-)
to dominating terrain close to the path of
the OPFOR counterattack force. Ae the
OPFOR counterattack approached the
23d Division flank, it will be exposed to
flank firee from the infantry and attack
helicopter-s of the air aseault force. The
success of this operation to protect the
SCHEME OF MANEUVER
Go
3( GE)
,, [
12( NATO)
GO (Explolt)
25
 COMBINED ARMS ARMY COUNTERATTACK
-%
23d Division’s flauk and stop the enemy
counterattack will depend upon several
factore.
First, speed of execution and surprise
is an absolute necessity since the opera­
tion will be conducted on the hostile side
of the line of contact within the 3d GE
sector. Second, coordination of execution
between the ground and attack helicop­
ter forces (quite probably in a situation
requiring radio silence ) will be necessary
to maximize the surprise effect of a flank
engagement. Finally, a maximum
amount of corps and division air defense
assets must be used in eupport of the
operation.
As previously discussed, the Hind-D
helicopter retains the capability for both
air-to-air and air-to-surface engagements.
According to doctrine, these aircraft will
lead the Soviet counterattack. Air Force
tactical fighters must be available to
conduct local suppression of enemy air
defense.
26
Scenario 2: Rear Area Protection
Aeeumingtbe 102d Division has beeq
able to stop the Soviet counterattack,
other situations can develop which are
ideally euited for resolution by the air
assault force. Soviet doctrine calls for
the conduct of airbome/airmobde coun­
terattack operations 10 to ~5 kilometer
behind friendly lines to disrupt forward
command and control and Iogietics facili­
ties (Figure 8). A number of probleme
must be derdt with to defeat this situa­
tion.
In the Soviet view, every unit and sub­
unit must be capable of combating hos­
tile aircraft under all conditions regard­
less of their location with respect to the
senior commander’s air defense zone~iz
Helibome forces are certain to be
equipped with a number of SA 7 surface­
to-air missiles and could, depending upon
February
 102D AIR ASSAULT
-)
-)
Figure 7
the force size and composition, possess
14.5mm or ZSU23/4 antiaircraft ma­
chineguns. Moreover, the troops in the
assault force are instructed to make fulf
use of their small arms to provide group
fires against airborne targets. The major
air defense effort will be to protect land­
ing and departing helicopters and com­
mand posts.”
To defeat the situation outlined in Fig­
ure 8, the 102d Air Assault Division
muet approach the objective with epeed
and from multiple approaches using ter­
rain flying techniques.’” A local suppres­
sion of enemy air defense campaign must
be conductia during approaches to the
objective area. Since the enemy wifl not
have heavy armor weapone in his forma­
1980
DIVISION ATTACK “
tion, antiarmor weapon systems will be
less critical to success. However, the
Mi-6 Hook helicopter does retain the cap­
ability to transport armored personnel
carriers such ae the BMP. ”
Scenario 3: Deep Objective
The last and most dangerous operative
mode of the air assault division during
the : heavy corps penetration ie the
assault of targete deep in the enemy’s
rear. Suitable air assault targets may be
key bridges crossing an unfoldable river
witbin the corps zone of action (Figure
9).
.­
 OPFOR ASSAULT INTO 10TH CORPS REAR /

3 (GE)

..
12( NATO)

Figure 8

The danger of this operation is evi-
dented by the fact that the assault force
wiff have to cnoss the line of contact, the
most actively defended entieir sector,
and thereafter bypass the entire array of
OPFOR surface-to-air missiles protect-
ing command and logistics facilities.
Additionally, the sir-to-air threat of the
Hind-D helicopter wifl present a highly
mobile platform which may be encoun-
tered en route to and from the objective
area. After the assault force is on the ‘
ground, their mobility and fireuower will
be extremely limited, making- them de-
pendent upon a timely Iinkup by corps ~
ground forces.
There are a number of advantages
associated with the attack of deep objec-
tives by the air assault division. First,
the corps commander can use economy-
of-force to accomplish the mission since
the air assault force can land on or near

ASSAULT OF DEEP OBJECTIVES

Figure 9

28 Fsbruary
 .
I AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
.

the objective area. Second, the element
of surprise will be greater than with an
airborne assault because air assault units
will land ae integrrd unite, requiring less
time to assemble. Third, although the air
assault unit will have a light firepower
capability, the availability of attack,
reconnaissance and aerial mine-laying
helicopters wilt provide significant &om-
bat power multipliers for the force.
This article has dkplayed those mis-
sions which may be executed by the air
assault division as a part of a heavy
corps conducting a penetration. Those
missions are: corps flank protection,
corps rear area protection and, finally, as
an assault force to secure objectives deep
in the enemy rear. The features that
make the air assault division ideaily
suited for these missions include mobil- w
ity, diversity, eurprise and shock action.
The division’s diversity is exhibited by
its capab+ty to conduct reconnaissance
missione, reinforce with infantry,
provide aerial and ground-mounted fire
support for troops in contact, conduct
economy-of-force operations such as
raids and to maxirniz e the effects of all
assigned missions through a high tempo
of operations. It can provide the ultimate
in surprise and shock action. The air
assault division can add a valuable
dimension to ths battlefield of the 1980s.
We must use it wisely. ‘

NOTES

1 Senators Sam Nun. ..5 Dewey Sarllell, NATO ..6 the
New Sov,et Threat, NA 10, F,fteq N.!(o.s APrtl May 1977 044
2 General Dorm A Starfv, 0. Army Av!atlon,’ A.mt,on D,
ge,t, November 1978 P 4
3 ,Lesson 1—Introauctton and Funoament.is,, fntroa.cl,on
to Offens,.e Sowet Army ODeraf,QnS, US Army COmrrmnd and .
Gener81 S1,!1 College wSACGSC1 Fort LI?aventio!ln K.” 19?8
0,3
4 ,Defe”s,ve 0$).,.1,.”s, SOv,et Army Operatmns US Army
I.telhgence and Threat A“alyss Center, Am.gto. Hal S!.1,..,
V.. Am! 1978, D 3
5 Programea Text 1003, So.!et Tact$cs ,“ the
Defense, u 13 10)0
USACGSC. Fort LeavenwOrIh, Kan volume 5, 1’378.P 3
6 L,eutena.t Colonel Jonn D Baker Jr, where me Sowels
Am Vulner.b{ e,, Army, August 1978, PP 2327
T A!rbor”e Assault Operatm. s,, sower Army Opemhons. 09
C,t, pz
8 F,eta M.n.cd 101.10 , S!s11 01?1..,s F,eld Manual Org.nr
.?.imn.1, Tecim!cal, 8.0 Logs t,cel Dar. Un.1.w,l!ea D. t.,Deparl
II?.”, of the Army>wash$n@.n, D C July 1976, P 2206
9 Programed Text 67.?, FunaEmenlalS of Alfmobrle Opera
f,ons. USACGSC, Fort Leav.nwmth, Km, August 1978, P 25 ,%
10 10,0, 022
11 S,”ce mm WNCWS scow wall be l$m,ted m ut, hzatto”.1 the
au as.$aull 6wIs!0. d.ring me conduct 01 a Pene!rat! on,PrIase 11,
t., emlolt.t, on, vi,!) not be .Odremed
12 L,e”tenan, C.,..,, Lynn W Ha”,.”, S.,,. ! Combat Hel,
COPter O!xrat,.”s,,. lnfem>t,onal De<ense !?..(... Volume 7~,
Number 8, 1978, P ?,245
14 Tn. cows $. PD.11Commano rear area qeratmns .e.ter
w.% ..1 m!ew.mxi r. mm rea! area !mo!ectlo. ouerat ion because
we a.a capabtl!ty of t.e assaulting enemy force exceeds the
capan, itty of e.tstr.g org..,. combat serwce s.poort .n,ls wtn
w,.,., !0 cond.. ! rear W,, Wotec!!o” m,ss,o.s
15 H,.,,”, Op C>( D i 243

f’-- MajorBnk-y W Howe-ii Jr. is zrxth the 4th

\

Infantry Division (hfechanized), Fort Carson,

Colorado. He receiued a B.A m poll tical scLence
from The fitadel, an MA z. management SC,­
ence from the Uruuerstty of Alabama and LS a ,ew,
n
1979 graduate of the USACGSC.Pre.ious ,.,; .
assignmentsincludeservicewiththe 173d AIP” =X
borne Brigade, Republic of Vietnam: the IOlst + =
Amborne L)iuision. Fort Campbell, Kentucky; ~. )
‘ and the Computer Operations DtUZSLOII, Data /
Process, ng Field $Office, Fort I.eauen worth.
\/’ .:
Kansas

1980 29
“Aks the Man

if I Be Gtiin9”:

Roots d Black English

Major Lynn L. Sims,

US Army Reserve

Communication in all its forms and man- w; 2

infestations has been recognized as a valu­ ~H&d,
able tc ol of leadership. The following ;--­
article addresses an area of communi­ + ~’ /“>” ‘“”5%-’1. Y:
cation which has long needed clarifica­ (
tion: the roots and use of Black English. ‘$+--.%.. 1

w HEN a Southern blat

especially impromptu,
use Black English dialect rather than
standard English. To those of us who
have learned standard English, hie
speech will be abrasive and will mark the
speaker in our minds as uneducated. We
might discount what he ie eaying or not
comprehend the information related be­
cause we’ are concentrating too much on
the Englieh epoken, or misspoken.
Consider, then, as I have had to re­
cently, a few ideas that may put you in a
more tolerant attitude the next time you
hear Black English spoken. An under­
standing of the other person always’
helps communication.
- :7.<. -* LF
[,;$~.?~:>:
$
L=
Black English is used by those whose
ancestors lived in slave communities, ~ ‘
end, more recently, their families, and I
perhaps themselves, grew up in a segre­ I
gated community. Black language has
been used in America for over 300 years ;
and, during that time, hae gained a cer­
tain legitimacy in-the black community.

30

In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries,
blacks were brought to the Western
Hemisphere by Spanish and Portuguese
slavers. In Africa, it wae the practice to
encourage coastal tribea to raid the inte­
rior and capture people from distant
communities. The prisoners would be
marched to the coast where they, were
kept in slave pens ‘until ships came to
take them t.a America. Slaves from dif­
ferent tribes were purposefully mixed to
discourage communication and thereby
lessen the poesibllities of an uprising.
According to records, a slave could
stay confined on the African coast for
many months. In that time, no matter
the length, there was a need for daily
communication, so slaves were taught to
understand and speak a new language,
‘pidgin Spanieh or Portuguese. This
pidgin language was reinforced by sail­
ors and elave dealere.
After being transported to America,
those who stayed in the Caribbean de­
veloped and continue to maintain that
pidgin language. Today, Papiamento, an
Afro-Iberian language in the Caribbean
spoken by 200,000 descendants of slaves,
is an example of the result of mixing an
Iberien language (Spanish or Portu­
gueee) with the American experience.
The Papiamenta language is close to. the
fenguage blacks ueed when they first
came to North America.*
Those blacks sold to Engfish colonies
were taught English words which they
used to replace pidgin Portuguese words.
But, in some cases, they kept the lan­
guage form.
There then developed a dialect– Black
English– that used the words but rear­
ranged their order, violated standard
.The ,. formation about Paplamento ..5 Darallels m Black
Engl,sh were f.rnrshea by Prote$$or John c B,rmmgha,m Jr of
me V,rgrnm Commonwealth Uh,vers,ty Language Department
1980
ROOTS OF”BLACK ENGLISH
Englieh rules of grammar and often ab­
breviated words–efl wrong according to
standard English, but understandable
when seen in the historical development.
Then, because blacks were usually sold
intQ an isolated rural Southern setting,
they often did not have a chance to hear
usuef English. The Black English dielsct
was reinforced year after year.
It is irrteresting to see that today’s
Black English dialect has similar char­
acteristics to Papiemento. For instance,
the process of marking nouns as plural
by prefacing a noun with a number re­
sulte in “two boy” or a “basket of
peach. ”
Another feature common to Black
English is the double negative. Ibenan
languages demand a double negative. Its
uee in Black Engfish likely comes from
these same roots. The use of “no” abnost
exclusively as the negative form, ‘‘ 1‘m
not carrying no boxes, ” is parallel in
Papiemento and Black English.
Aleo, a Papiamento verb does not
change from one person to another, end
the subject is always expressed. There is
a strong tendency in Black Engfish to
use one verb form, usually the third per­
son singular. “I is, ” “you is” and “we
is” are afl perfectly good usages in
Papiamento, and the infinitive “to be” is
used instead of the traditional person of ­
@ verb such as “I be going to town. ”
There is a tendency to maintain a
statement word order wbife asking a
question, and the difference is only in the
speaker’s intonation. Ibenan languages
end Englieh normally require inverted
word order for a question. Black English
and Papiamento do not. For example,
“What time it is?” and “Where you be?”
There is also a tendency to drop pre­
fixes or sounds such as “vorce” for
“divorce, “ “have” for “behave” and
“ales” for “desk.” There also has been an
31
MILITARY REVIEW

opposite tendency to “fancify” words
with “-rnent.” on the end such as “di-
vorcement, ” ‘‘ worry rnent” or “divide-
rnent.”
The moving around of sounds within a
word is common itr Papiamento. Black
English has “aks” for “ask.”
Historically, the rnifitary has been one
of the chief avetmes for minorities to
integrate into Atnerican society. Many
Germans who came to America joined
the Army to get free transportation west
and assurance of room and board while
they saved money for a farm, learned the
language and became “American.” For
eimiler reasons, aft,er the Citi War
blacks joined the military by the thou-
sands for security and upward mobiIity.
The Army has constantly dealt with
people who have learned Engfieh as a
second language. From Baron von Steu-
ben, who drilled Washington’s army at
Vafley Forge, and the Indian scouts, who
kept many a cavalryman alive, to Fili-
pino, Korean and Vietnamese aflies, the
Army has recognized these non-English
backgrounds. Meanwhile, it overlooks
the background of a group closer to
home– black Americans.
Today, the Army and the Reserve
programs offer an opportunity for people
from vaetly different walks of life and
social standing to work together. In
almost every location in Amefica, many
dialects and accents are mingIed in the
course of a workday. The next time you,
who have Iearned standard English, have
a chance to listen to one who speaks
Black English, remember his back-
ground. No matter what you may think,
there is a dialect called Black English
spoken in the South, and it has a histor­ 1
ical rationale.
Most bIacks today reaEr,e that stand-
ard English, not Black Engfish dialect, is
the language of society, government,
power and opportunity. Minority groups ,
in America have worked to learn stand-
ard English. Black Englieh, as any other
fanguage or dialect, tends to eegregate
the speaker from the mainstream of
American life and from importance. As
Americans move about, which is
frequent in our mobile society, blacks
wilf probably lose distinguishing parts of
their speech patterns in favor of
standard English. As the process is
working, however, it is helpful to under­
stand the background. The next time
you hear Black English spoken, realize
that you are hearing a language rooted in
over 300 years of usage.
Be conscious of “what” is being said
and filter out the negative effects in your
mind of how it is said. And, even more
important, realize that if you speak
Black Englieh, you are, in fact, segre­
gating yourself. ~

Major Lynn L Sims, US Army Reserue, is

the executive director of the Richmond Inde­

pendence Bicentennial Commission in Virginia

and a member of the Consulting Faculty, USA­

CGSC. His mobilization assignment is with the

Historical Division, US Army Training and

Doctrine Command. He received a B.A. from

Wheat.. College and av M.A. and Ph.D. from

New York University. He was professor of his­

tory at The King’s Colkge and the US military

historian at the USACGSC.

32
 ..

,to be successf@. The riyer-~rossing plan,

%sigiiect-ifi move quickly nmj’or ele­

%eits of the let Armored Division eout.h

of the Main River, had toiwork.

. . . . ,.
$.
, , ”________
.. The Attack ­

At 0215, 30’ Janu& 1979, the three

e@ern brigades attempted, uneuecees-.

. -i4&’ to seise bridges in sector: T&e 4&

Canadian Brigade (operational control to’

 Initial Deployments
1st ArmoredDivision, IFHorger 79
conducted a demonstrati&z in sector.
These two actions, central to the de­
ception plan, were intended to convince
blue forcee that the main attack was
coming in the western sector. Electronic
means were used to portray units
moving into and within the western
sector.
The diversion attack and the dem­
onstration were allowed to develop for
about 12 hours. At dusk on the 30th, the
main attack kicked off with a deliberate
river crossing’in the 3d Brigade sector.
The Crossing Ma Command
Key to the success of the crossing was
the establishment and operation of a
rather unique crossing area control
34
group (CACG ) manned by divisional and
corps personnel.
The Organization
The crossing area command was pro­
visionally organiaed, ae shown in Figure
2, one month before the exercise. Work­
ing for the crossing area con@ol head­
quarters initially were a company(- )of
military police (MPs ), two batteriee of
air defense artillery, two engineer com­
panies (elements of seven engineer com­
panies would eventually work for the
CACG ), one bridge’ company reinforced,
one smoke generator company, as well as
a provisional safety organization of pla­
toon strength.
The missions of these units were
February
 Reforger 79

assigned by the crossing area head­

Crossing Area Control Headquarters

quarters. Each element ‘&d a senior

Non itm,m were all reprewnled m III, Wm. mm each me
officer phyeicelly located at the crossing

Conmwm<amn$.,th the r elements

area headquartera to coordinate its ac­
tivities. Also at the croseing area head­
quarter, each croeeing uni} established
a control cell, responsible for setting its
own movement priorities and iesuing
movement instructions as appropriate

( Fkgnre 3). An aeeistant division com- t

Reforger 79

Crossing Area Command Task Organlzatron

control
Uemnt
R$,,s!,nl 0,,,$,0. commander151Ar”mr,o D)ww”

Comrmnd,mOfl,cer 565th inet.eer %ttal,o. 0,0.1, C,ownz 4wa lam

mmd,, )­
ixewtlw 01<,cer52d am 30 BW6BS Oor m.runo and CWWOI01br,eaoe
,,,.,,,, pa,,,. g throughthe Ucss”g ,,,,,

bw.em .
565!b [ne new Cwa!o? 10wat,c.a Conlro! 1$1kmorm D,v\sro.1
– Platoon 930 E“WW C.onw”, lM,btlQ Assault 0r(d8e (MASIC
(H-24) iBachvPMAa,)
- 8141, E.ww Cmnm.y (Awx ! 61D81artowi L-I ,Pmnw R,bbw
As,,,!, B,,8,,,

Irdfkc Control

1 Aw$,mt D,,t,mcnP<o,mt M,r,h81 ;Ir,t,c CcItrol 0$1.,, )

— rmmny (. I 79M M $(!w PDl,reIM?I Ba!!al,w bll CO,DS1?9 Ian. a,,

10 31?400 1,..,,, )
— 501,, MP C,m,t., I I 1s1A,-o, m 0,, ,,,,’ (010001 leb,.,) , 1,

Smoke C,ordm,!oG
Drw,<onCh,nwal 0!1,,,,
— 85314 S“Ok?C,.?, alorC,T’PA”,

- 8532d ,- Wake Ge.ecalor b“”,”,

Frgure 2 Figure 3

35
MILITARY REVIEW
mander was given the responsibility for.
~he CACG by the commanding genert+
lst. Armored Dkision.
There were three eignificad. points
concerning this arrangement. First, *he
resources required to staff this organiza­
tion came principally fi-om VII Corps
assets given to the division for %e cross­
ing itself. The engineers [to include a
bridge battafkm staff which provided the
Mrastructure for the crossing area com­
mand headqmwters }, the MPs, smoke
generator units and most of the fre­
quency-modulated (FM } communications
equipment came from corps resources.
This permitted division resources to con­
centrate on the battle acroes the river. In
effect, the main attack was reinforced, iq
a unique way, by the allocation of an
additional command and control head­
quarters to handle the river crossing.
Second, the ‘organization became oper­
ational 24 hours before the start of the
main attack. The CACG remained in
place throughout the crossing of the
main elements of the division and sup
port element? and constituted a “mat”
laid down to expedite the crossing by the
maneuver brigades. Brigade command­
ers were relieved of responsibilityy for the
crossing administration and had to be
concerned only with the tactical aspects
of the battle.
The third feature of this organization
involved its physical location. Alf ele­
ments of the crossing area control head­
quarters were collocated in the same com­
mand post. For Reforger 79, a large
schoolroom in a remote German town
was used. This arrangement facilitated,
for example, the continuous coordination
between the movements control coordi­
nator and the M Ps for traffic problems
and between movements control and the
engineer for roacVbridge repair problems.
‘It also increased the flexibility of the
36
organisation to divert units quickIy from
one bridge site to enother in the case of
Tlrs Crossing Plan
The plan, based on an analysia of the
terrain, cslfi+d for two bridge sites,to SIZp­
port the main attack. Each bridge had
its own primary route through the cross­
ing area to ekninate the possibility of
traffic interference. fhce the primary
routes were established, a series of aker­
nate routes were identified so that choke
points on each primary route cotdd be
easily bypassed and so that traffic could
be easily diverted horn one primary
rou]e to the other in the event of damage
to a bridge.
Traffic control points were estab&hed
at each primary route entry point into
the crossing area as welf as at critical
intersections where congestion or rerout­
ing might occur. Furthermore, each pri­
mary and each alternate route was
marked with color-coded signs to ensure
that the crossing traffic remained on tbe
route designated. Figure 4 identifies
these critical aspects of the crossing plan
to include the primary route for north­
bound, returning traffic.
Considering the width of ‘the river and,
the enemy situation, bridgin~ was
planned immediately rather than start­
ing with rafting operations. A difficult
aspect of the crossing plan concerned tbe
location of the bridging assets. Since this
was a deliberate river crossing, it was
essential that the location of the
bridging assets remain unknown to the
enemy. Therefore, bridge assembly areae
were located 15 kilometers to the rear,
outside the crossing area. In fact, the
initial bridge assembly areas were in the
February
 1st Armored ,Division Crossing Area White
‘A \

a. Schwnt”d
‘- ‘%,” ~“e,

Route,

Pr,nlary

Aller.,te,

M“,. Ir,ff,c
----

Figure 4

weetern sector of the division to eupport
the deception plan. # called forward, under MP escort to elimi­
The night before the main attack, the
bridging wae moved juet to the rear of
the croeeing area boundary and bidden in
towns. This helped deceive the enemy as
to the location of the bridge sitee and the
direction of the main attack. Hiding the
bridge in towne was the preferred alter­
native because of the difficult off-road
conditions during the winter. The closely
spaced, multistory buildings of the
typical German town provided excellent
concealment,
The Crossing Operation
At 1600 on 30 January 1979, the main
attack commenced. Initially, two mecha­
nized infantry battelione ewam across
the Main River, one at each of the two
croesing sites. Upon securing the far
chore from direct fire, the bridge wae
nate the poesibllity of congestion, and
emplaced.
At this time, the remainder of the
attacking brigade crossed according to
the brigade commander’e plan, facili­
tated by the movement control element
located at the crossing area command
headquarters. The crossing was designed
to allow each of the battalions in the
attacking brigade to use either of the
two bridges emplaced. Upon completion
of the 3d Brigade crossing against rela­
tively light resistance, a movements con­
trol element from the follow-on brigade
arrived at the croesing area command to
aseume reeponsibility for the crossing of
the 2d Brigade.
The 2d Brigade, having finished its
demonstration in sector, withdrew north
of the river, moved laterally across the
front to staging areas bebind the 3d Bri­
gade and poised iteelf to follow tbe new

1980 37
MILITARY REVIEW

attack. Becauee of the initial succeeees,
enjoyed by the 3d Brigade, the follow-on
brigade’s crossing time was moved up
several hours. By nightfall on 31
January, some 21 hours after the main
attack started, two brigades had crossed
the Main River aIong with their sup­
porting artillery and combat trains.
Crossing Procedures
THAI
This gave the crossing area control head­
quarters positive control over unite as
they moved into, and through, the croes­
ing are (Figure 5). To avoid stopping,
each convoy commander was required to
ar:ive at the TCP five minutes ahead of
time.
Irafhc Cmrfrol Point (TCp)
(Instructions and Briefing list)
Wt !.[ $OtlfJ%,{tUC
INSTRUCIIOWTOE4CHWIT REPRfSftil&Wf
RIPoRl~ 10 VO”R w

With the crossing area organization

and the deception plan adequately re-
sourced to support the tactical concept
of operation, afl the ingredients for a srsc­
cessful river croseing were present. How­
ever, as with any specialized operation, a
new eet of procedures were developed to
ensure that things flowed smoothly and
that there was sufficient. flexibility to ,,,,..,0 Wwlg .3!,,,
(P(l))??<1”1 lHISt MU C\ THESIR$P&\&?)
adjust priorities and to adjuet routes as
required.
1ss addition to the doctrinal MP re­
quirements for traffic control, there were
several additional peculiarities to this
river crossing that involved the M Ps.
0 Two stationary traffic control points
(TCPS) were eetabliehed on the boundary
of the croeeing area (about 6 kilometers
north of each crossing site) and manned
by M Ps. This was considered the opti­
mum number of entry points given the Fwure 5
number of MPe available and the road
net in the area. These TCPS had the miss­
ion of providing each convoy leader e In addition to tbe stationary TCPe
with a strip map of his route through the mentioned above, several roving MP
crossing area. Strip maps were made up patrols were tacked to return any-stray
for each primary route and all the alter­ columns to the priority route they were,
nate routes that were serviced by a par­ given and to reinforce the stationary
ticular boundary TCP. TCPS when problems developed. They
Additionally, the MPs at the boundary also were used as escorts . for high-
TCPS were required to give each unit priority convoys cor+sg through the
entering the crossing area a crossing crossing area.
area command frequency and cell sign. e The MPs, the night before the etart

38 February

of the main attack, also placed route
marker signs on alf routes being used to
ensure that convoys knew where, for
example, the red route went. These
markers, bowever, were not placed on
the road net between the engineer regu­
lating pointe (ERPs) and the river untif
after the main attack commenced to pre­
clude any compromise of the area where
the main crossing would occur.
The engineers, in addition to their doc­
trinal function of operating the ERPs,
bad the following requirements:
o Engineer officers acted as bridge site
commanders. The bridge site com­
mander, in conjunction with the repre­
sentative from the crossing unit, was
responsible for the effective, efficient
movement of traffic across the bridge
end out of the bridge site itself. This
bridge site commander worked directly
for the crossing area commaqder. For
this arrangement to work, these bridge
site commanders must be experienced
and be given sufficient noncommissioned
officers and radio operators to:
– Adjust traffic when ordered to
change, say, from bridging to rafting.
–Assist tbe crossing unit representa­
tive in the efficient movement of traffic
across the bridge.
– Relocate the MP support located at
the bridge site for traffic control
purposes.
– Execute the smoke mission on divi­
sion order (divisiou commanding general
option ).
–Act as a point of contact for local
security matters.
e The engineers also provided the
infrastructure for the crossing area com­
mand headquarters. This engineer bat­
talion staff was responsible for the opera­
tion of six FM radio nets, one for traffic
t980 ) 39
* ,
CROSSING THE MAIN
control purposes, one for engineer regu­
lating purposes, a safety net, a move­
ments control net in contact with the
crossing brigades, a crossing area com­
mand net and a security net. Addition­
ally, the engineer headquarters provided
the administration and logistics support
for this provisional unit. The engineers
also coordinated the early arrival of fol­
low-on bridging to reduce the vulnerabil­
ityy of having only two bridge sites for
the main attack.
e While the ERP was used in the tra­
ditional manner, additional instructions
were provided to the crosshg unit by the
ERP personnel ( Figure 6}.
e As mentioned previously, the loca­
tion of the bridging became an important
feature of thk crossing operation. Once
the bridge was taken to the-river and em-
placed, the backup bridging Ithere was
enough extra bridging to build two rafte
at each site if the bridges were totally
destroyed} was located about 2
kilometers from the river in the nearest
town. This gave immediate reaction
capability in the event of a bridge being
damaged or destroyed, yet it was far
enough away and concealed to minimize
discovery and damage.
Another unique aspect of this crossing
operation concerned the location and
utilization of the movements control cell.
This element, staffed by the brigade
executive officer from the organization
being crossed, was physically located at
the crossing area control headquarters
rather than the headquarters of the cross­
ing urut. His responsibilities included
establishing priorities for the crossing of
his elements and giving instructions to o
those units as to when they should reach
the boundary traffic control point within
the crossing area.
The brigade executive officer, who led
this movements control element, was
,,
MILITARY REVIEW

Engineer Regulating Point s,1,,$locatedat _ S+loreYoucrms,there we several!h(.w you

mu,! know ,“d do
(Instructions and Briefing list)
(Staging Area) 2 lm current coutem the crossingsot IS
General Instructions “ 3 imerge.cv U$$wmalareas beiween here and the cmssng sw are
Iom!ea al coordl”,le$
A, m ww!reer IV charge at e $tag,ngarea mwmeecrewlat,.g 00,.!
[R?] W, “r.: the Io)tow,,g c“Si,”,t,,”, 4 w,th,n me U?P vehtcle SDamg (s 50 reelers (30 rf oveOoade61

a Youare e,Do”s>ble!0, W’W,”E Ibat veh,de, ,,, PrOOeWc!rewred 5 [To,0,,0, mnml,nd,,) ?0, are 1, se”o your dowry to the Cros$mes,te
or br,dge0, mft cmmmg ma 10!br,el,neall crew and om$eneerson wI, no. m cratr m Cwrdmaw the Crms,ng0! your unit
,“6 P,OD,, cm,,I”c oroced.r,,
6 On orderof tbe cmsmg sie commanderI .,11,eleaseeachmarchunl!
b Youme rewovslotefor m!easmgCOIIVOW
to the budgeme ha. Io,d Your Ilalsm Omce!.3!the Cross,.gs,%shouldreceweW6WS!0 moveal me
o do w Dy lb, cm,,,ne st, ccmmande, %,m, 1,.,

c You take w.r or6er3 Wrougl yodr than of commandfrom me 1 1!Wtf,c becomesb!ockedabe to dti$aoledverudesor otherObstmcbons,
,0$s w s te commander!ocateoat !he crowne s,!e Reportall ,mwta.t tran$r%rID,, ,,710rmat0nto me Croww area commandmmd$ate!y
,Cl,,>b,, ,,, 0,”1, and ,10,, ,,8”,1,,,,1 e,e”t, to lb, c,,,s,”E sfle
Ommander 8 II the ,,,,, “g .,,”s ,, , br,@ or a r,!! E,,, ,,fely br,e!I”E 10,1$
Or>ver,mo oasserws
d vowate to m!or. the cwss,rts te comma.der01the arr,kal al your
‘RP ,1 ,a<h cr,s$ “g umt a 70 mwre 8 safe cross“g of me bwdge these qu,a!,o.s and
mceou,es ..4 be Iollo.eo
a Enwre YOUa.a my other vww.ne! ,. the ERPare edwualery
,r,leclea !rmn cola !math,, l“,ury 01 Al veh,cle door%.,11 be unlockeaand a,l W!JOW$ano hatches
00,,,0
1 You ,I,o,ld b, ,.,,, of b,,,, ground g“de m.mands ,“0 n,8tA
.0,,.,”! Orocwures [21 You .,!! obw grwd gu,des upon enier,ng, .h,le on and when
1,,, Pg t,, br,o&
g ins.!. You knon tat wl,ms !0 take >, US? commbnlcwc? wtth
Ire crc,,,ng ,,!, ,s ,,,[ 13) 111al n ei%l YOU.,11 me blackout Ilght, d the crmww w

7 You must n,”, the 8,,.,,, t, ,0, !, o.,,g q.e,l,cm [4 Y,. m,,t dr,,e “0 la,,.r than 10 m 1, 0,s ha”, 0“ the br,dge

, R,”,,,,,!, ,,,,”, 151 ?0. must keep a 30 meter rmtervalo. !he bnage

Ill k we crow.g s te a l,xeo w,cge a ‘hamu br,oce0, one or more 161 m. ..,1 “01 S,ODb!ake acceleratem changegearsm the br,dge
,Mr,,f
,7) $,, arm,,d vebdm ,11c,,. member, ttc,$t the dr,vw m“$l
1?1 What ,, w m,l,!arv load clam 0, tte brtoge 0, rams], 5,s.0.4 v,nr to crowng hrtate

131 II mflwg .tm thee ard wwrh of ,080sca” the ralt(s] carrY7 W Once we! the bnoge do P:: stopto remountthe m. ml,! 5[
.,,,.$ m,! IF, O!,og,
,4) Whal ,, 1,, c“rr,nt be’,tr!wt, t, !1, UO,$?E , te~
191 D,mwnled Daswwm,.US1be Care!tilnot to WDonthebr,dw 10
[51 i+ba[,,, lb, O\,wrW am,, o. t+af ,,.!, Ior use .hw Iralt(c?S em txhwros 0, to be b 1k? ems w othezmm o+the C$OSWWvehcles
m,,rr, Bted7
b 1, ,“%,,, a ,,,, ,,,s, “E o! ,te ,,1, the,, r,~”at,o”, ,“<
b YPhIdeD1eDaratlcn D,0<,6Lrw .“,1 be !o,’o.?d

(11 Arethe vehdes currentlyentew, tte LRPareaorcwrlyG,smrxo ill 41 veo,.e dom . a be .nlockea ma a:l . ndo.s ma hdche
16e5,
red Cm,wcebet.ee~ ?eh,ces50 meter%mm... 30 .eter,l> OPewo

121 1s l-e LRP WCO.,W Cver!caaed,If w .!,,. WI( crassng vw 1:1 Y,, .,11obey w,.*4 K, c,, .00” ente,,,g a“o tit,, 1,,,,,8 th,
,ol.mande, ,mimedfai,l, ,,,!

131 B,, al’ “e,, CIP . tht. lb? ,1,, ,.J $,,2 ,,,,, .<,,(,,.,,, ,, ,,?, 1?1 I’I at .’g,II ~ob .‘ use blackout lIKhlSat SWcro$$,,g SI!e
cm,s ng mmcs’
(4I O,:t wrmm om.nmowd .,11 cross 0“ a rati
,4, 0., a ,eh,c,,, onw,,ty loaO,d ,,6 Pr,D,wd +m ,,0s,”67
151 m. most removemmer book ano web war

16) All oaswger, .$! Ohmounl

31V[ lHC ~OL1OW!NG
INSTRUCTIDVS
TO[lCH UNITRWRLSENT
ITWETHIT
?iPORIS 10 YOURtR? (7) A,,er w., ,,P,c,, ,, c, III, ,a!t the drwe, WI 6,s.,.”1

1 v,. .,11 be ,mss.ne a ,,,s 60_ br W, (or ra,t) Thecm,,mc [E, 0“ tP, <,!1 al “,t$,l,, w I b, ChOCWO

FlgL,re rj

,
40 February
 I CROSSING THE MAIN
required to be at the cro / ing area con­
trol headquarter two houre before his
first unit planned to enter the croseing
area. This gave bim sufficient time to
contact the unit being crossed if there
were any changee to the plan.
An additional feature of the movement
control headquarters was the require­
ment that once the lead element of the
battalion reached the engineer regulating
point, the battalion executive officer
reported to the bridge site commander to
assiet him in moving that particular bat­
talion across the float bridge. This gave
the crossing headquarters positive con­
trol over the units moving through the
croesing area. At the critical point of the
bridge site, control was exercised by
individuals known to the crossing unit’s
chain of command.
e Becauss river-crossing operations are
so complex aud, in this instance, in­
volved elements outside the division,
there was an obvious need for training,
detailed planning and rehearsal to
ensure that the deliberate river crossing
went smoothly. In addition to a
command post exercise to validate the
procedures, organization and crossing
plan, a wafk-through rehearsal of the
crossing plan was held. This rehearsal,
held in a gymnaeium with the floor laid
out as a map of the croeeing area, was
attended by all croseing unit
commanders down to and including
company commanders.
During this one-day gymnasium exer­
cise (GYME X ), the crossing units were
walked through the crossing area and
given an example of the instructions
they would receive during the actual
operation. They etarted at the boundary-
TCP, walked the primary route expected
to be used, stopped at the ERP where
they received a briefing on what was to
happen there, then proceeded to walk to
1980
the river fine where they were given a
eafety briefing and a briefing by the
bridge site commander.
Finally, they left on the primmy route
through the far shore TCP and out of the
crossing area. As a “ result of the
command post exercise and thie
GYMEX, all unit commanders were
familiar with the crossing plan and with
the procedure established ta adjuet
priorities and change routes as required
by the tactical eituation.
At 1600 on 30 January 1979, the 1st
Armored Division started its main
attack. At this time, the tactical plan,
the crossing plan and the croseing orga­
nization were put to the test. In over 21
hours of bridge operation on two bridges,
the results were impressive. Over 3,200
vehicles paesed through the crossing
area on a tactical schedule established by
the brigade commanders.
In 42 hours of bridge croeeing time
(two bridges, 21 hours each), there was,
cumulatively, only five hours of any type
backup at both bridge sites even though
enemy activity accounted for a total of
seven hours of lost bridge time and traf­
fic had to be diverted to keep the flow of
unite on schedule crossing the river. The
results: Two-thirds of an armored divi­
sion with ite eupportfng corps units
moved south to continue with the attack
ahead of schedule.
The Iessons learned from this expe­
rience are many. What follows is a sum­
mary of the most important ones.
e More extensive use of nondivieional
assets is an effective way to manage a
deliberate river crossing because it works
and because it allowe the ditision to con­
41
centrate its attention on the battle
across the river.
a The es%ablishznerttof a crossing rea
control headquarters specifically to Eup-
port ihe main attack is another way to
weight the main attack to heip ensure its
success.
o The estabIisiuxrmt of crossing site
control elements is necessary to move
the traffic across the river expeditiously.
This might be viewed as somewhat akin
to the Navy’s “beachmast=er” concept
ussd during over-the-shore operations. In
essence, there must be one man in charge
at the river fine.
e The physical collocation of the cross-
ing unit movements headquarters with
the crossing area control headquarters is
essential to ensure cIose, continuous co­
ordination among the key command and
control elsments.
e The establishment of at least six
operational FM nets is reauired to toor­
dinate engineer, MP, ~actical unit,
safety, opera~ionaf and security require-
ments.
o The use of ‘a similar organization to
control the river area during retrograde
operations {not exercised on 13eforger 79) ~
warr@.s t%rther study. Such an organi­
zation could allow a withdrawing
division to concentrate on fighting the
retrograde action and preparing
defensive positions on the friendly side
of the river obstacle without being pre-
occupied with the administrative and
engineering aspects of crossing the river.
If we are to @n while fighting out­ ‘
numbered, we must use all available
assets. The 1st Armored Division river­
crossing operation is one example of how ‘
this can be done. The coordination and
cooperation between corps and division
personnel reeulted in an efficient opera-
tion which placed maximum c~mbat
power at the right place at the right
time. It was an examde of icombat readi­
ness in action. ~

L@tt??tQnt Colonel Dennis K Culp IS com­

mander of the 565th Engineer Battalion, 7th
Enguwer Brigade, VII Corps, Germany. He
received a B S from the USMA, an M.S in czud
engmeenng from the Massachusetts Znstztute
of Technology, an M.A, in international rela­
tions from the Untuersi ty of Kansas and is a
graduate of the USACGSC. He has served as an
instructor m the Department of Unified and
Combmed Operations, USA CGSC, and as
operations officer, 18th Engineer Bn’gade.

42
 Through the smoke, haze and fog of battle, the enemg armared
force continues its relentkss advance. As the enemg closes on
friendtq pasitiotw, the fire support team cak’s for their destruction
with massive, lethal US artilleW. When the smoke ctkars, the
friendlq pasitiona have been averrun, aad the enemg armored force
hoe effected a breakthrough. The author conteno% that Shiet doc­
trine and equipment demand a change in the US Armg doctrine for
emplagment of field artille~.

F IELD Artillery is the greatest killer

on the battlefield.
In this age of ‘mec&ized warfare the
Field Artillery is no longer one of the cen­
tral actors.
Which is true?, or is either?
This article will explore the validity of
these contrasting propositions in an
aWempt to answer a question of fimda­
mentel importance to alf the combat
arms: Given the current capabiIitiee and
li~tetions of US artillery units, what
role should the field artiflery (FA) per­
form as pert of the active defense in the
European environment?
Current conditions end those projected
in Europe through the mid-1980s make it

Field Artjllery
Employment in the

MILITARY REWEW
vitally important that the FA corrumr- .
nity step back from long-held dictums
end examine what it. can and cannot
“do” on a fast-moving, armor-dominated
battlefield. This is not to imply that the
srtiflery is no longer a key element on
the battlefield or that it is less important
to the success of the combined arms
team than in the past.
The role of FA in the active defense
will be at least as critical as it was to
previous defensive concepts. However,
as presently organized and oriented, the
FA is tasked to execute missions that are
beyond its physicaI and logistical capa­
bilities. Many missions apparently were
established without regard to the reati­
ties of European battlefield dynamics.
The decision of how and where to em­
ploy FA assets in the active defense
must be based on a thorough analysis of
the battlefield array by two comple­
mentary analytical technique. The first
requirement is a detailed graphic por­
trayal of relative locations of all the com­
bat and combat support systems in the
Soviet first-echelon divisions. Once this
has been accomplished, the product of
this graphic analysis then becomes the
basis for determining optimal employ­
ment of available artille~ assets based
on:
o An evaluation of a type target’s rela­
tive vulnerability to available artillery
munitions.
a The importance of that target to the
Soviets’ ability to continue to control the
tempo and direction of the battle.
e The relative effectiveness of that
target against our forward deployed
elements.
The end result of this analysis is to
determine the parameters within which
FA as a system can most effectively con­
tribute to the successful conduct of the
active defense.
44
AvailebIe evidence indicates that such
an ansfyeis would demonstrate that with
the possibIe exception of the direct sup­
port artillexy batteIion, there is an ‘
immediate requirement to rethink targe&
ing criteria and priorities. Further, this
process should cause a reorientation of
available target acquisition and com­
munications means. This will faditate
the rapid identification, bxstion and
attack of the desired targets. Desired
targets are those which are most readily
vulnerable to artillery fires and which
impact significantly on the Soviete’
ability to control the tempo and momen­
tum of the battle.
Field Manuaf (FM) 6-20, Fire Support
in Combined Arms Operations, argues
this same point when it states: “It is
imperative that commanders understand
the capabilities and limitations of the fire
support system and how those factors
affect combat operations.”’ We must
develop procedures which more ade­
quately match the missions assigned FA
with its demonstrable capabilities.
The fundamental FA mission is well-
stated in FM 6-20: “The mission of the
fire support system is to suppress, neu­
tralize, or destroy surface targets with
indirect fires. . . .“2 This clarity of
thought and direction rapidly dissipates,
however, as the student of the active
defense transitions from broad generali­
ties to the specific tasks identified to
accomplish these mission requirements.
Taking but two of the new family of field
manuals, it is possible to identify some
21 tasks which the FA is expecte~ to
accomplish.’
While it is understood that not all of
these tasks will be accomplished simul­
taneously, a great many of them, in fact,
will be competing for extremely scarce
assets during the most intense momsnts
of battle. If one considers that while

doing these multiple tasks, units are
called upon to reposition and conduct
ammunition resupply operations, what
initially strikes the casual reader as very
demanding may for the practitioner
border on the impossible.
To appreciate the difficulties confront­
ing the FA community, two additional
considerations must be added. Tlie first
of these ie the nature of the environment
in which these taske are to be accom­
plished.
It is generally agreed that the Euro­
pean battlefield wifl be characterised by
a number of factors currently outeide the
experience of the American field artil­
lerymen. The most profound of these is
that for the first time in the collective
experience of our Arruy, we will be the
“have not” force.
While it ie historically true that our
Armed Forces have started each war at a
manpower and materiel disadvantage,
the institutional leesons leerned have
tended to come almost exclusively from
the later periods during which we
enjoyed significant force advantage. Ae
a consequence, much of the conventional
wiedom and historical “leeeons” of our
recent pact experiences are not only
inappropriate, but could be potentially
dangerous as gnidee to future action.
The operational technique and tactics
of the Soviete aleo pose additional prob­
lems. Three characteristics, in particular,
of the Scwiet ground forces compel alter­
ations in the role and method of opera­
tion of American artillery in the active
defense.
Firet is the nature of the target;
Soviet-firet ecAelon forcee wilf be self-
contained armored formation moving
rapidly. Second, theee forcee will have
large quantities of reliable, long-range
artillery available to eupport the attack
and conduct count.erbattery operations.
1980
.
.
FIELD ARTILLERY
Finally, they will field an exteneive elec­
tronic warfare array with considerable
potential for degrading all radio-
dependent operations.
The factors mentioned combine and
interact with each other to create a
battle that is likely to be characterized
by poor communications, fntenee coun­
terbatte~ strikes, forced and frequent
changes of position, limited air eupport,
limited ammunition and extensive use of
emoke. Together, theee factore will
result in ehort engagement ranges and
violent, confused battlee.
If this scenario can be accepted as
reasonably accurak, it becomee immedi­
ately apparent that under current con­
cepts, the FA would be expected to join
the battle in several capacities. A pre­
ponderance of its available fire eupport
would be given to close support missione
for the committed maneuver elements.
While at first glance this appears rea­
sonable and appropriate, a more rigorous
analysie identifies eigniffcsnt disadvan­
tages in such an employment pattern.
The problem surfaces clearly when a
graphic analysis of Soviet attack forma­
tions is made. The analyeis shown in
simplified form in Figure 1 indicates the
type array in types and disposition of
forces at the leading edge of the first
echelon.
In this array, the types of targets viei­
ble to the fire eupport teams, even under
the beet of conditions, are almost exclu­
sively moving tanks and infantry fight­
ing vehiclee. These are precisely the type
targets which the ertfllety itself admits
it is least effective at engaging.4 Further,
following normal Soviet procedure, the “
Soviet vehicles will be buttoned up and
emoking themeelvee. Thus, the impact of
available artillery ordnance will be
limited against this portion of the
attacking Soviet forces. Copperhead, the
45
MILITARY REVIEW

Motorized Rifle Battalion in Attack Formation*

fnemy foward edge
at the battle area When mla.lry ,jwmu.t fb,s ,S

r,du,ed m 100 m,,e,, rf 00,,, D,, b.,

1 k,lmmter
may ,eacb 300,.500 met,,$)
I lank

Orm,reapmo”.e,
,ar,,r

1,., k

Ow’

Assault Ime

-+ 4

.Baslc dlap,rdm trom %ecial Text 30401, The Threat US Armor School, fort Knox Kentucky p z ]7

Figure 1

family of scatterable mines and the dual- successful Soviet detection and countor­
purpose improved conventional munition fires. Just as importantly, the incr~sed
would be more effective. However, only consumption rates required to support
Iirnited quantities can be expected avail- these programs would generate an
able at deployed battery level. almost intolerable stress on an aLready
As a consequence, the ability of the fragile logistics syetem.
FA to influence the outcome of the battle If, however, the graphic representation
significantly at the critical point and preeented above were extended to a
time using “current targeting procedures depth of some 8 kilometers into the lead
is open to question. Additionally, the divieion’s first echelon, the number and
volume and duration of fires necessary to type of elemente which are both suscep­ f
have a reasonable chance of success in tible to effective field artillery fire and
these miesione would create significant critical to the successful execution of the
problems of their own. First, it would Soviei attack increases dramatically.’ As
dramatically increase the probabtity of can be seen in Figore 2, the Soviets
,.

,
46 February
 .

FIELD ARTILLERY
. ..
habitually locate a preponderance of divisional artillery groups are towed, and
their artillery, counterbattery radars, ths mobile command posts, radars, jam-
tactical command and control end elec- mers and radio direction-finding vehicles
tronic warfare assets in a “bend” are soft-skinned. This portion of the
between 2 and 8 kilometers behind the attacking force then constitute a more
lead elements. profitable target for attack by indir@
The majority of Soviet ~egimental and fires. Additionally, because of the nature

[Motorized Regiment in the Attack*

EU6W FORW.4RDEDGE

01 lH1 BATTLE

8REA

I!s,,ult 1,”,

? to 4 kttomelw$ 1 k,!mnete, 500 me{ers

I -1— I 1, ,m,m

IE&2
)
Battahon
tmrmd, ate )
obp?ct,ve @Resew,­
>

&!& 1~ -m
~\)atlal!On )
pylta~,::bl,”h

‘1
)

T
katmn
I&i-) ~Mobtl,zed obw{,a!,on
detachment

1.
— “ .,“’’”-II

o
II
“v
)
Bartal(on )

I*P
I
mimed,ate

ob]ecttne ) a 60
. Baltal,m
‘b

>

<
[
I
Ea

‘\>BattalIon

“Basic d!agram trom Mdddry Operdhons of the Sowet Army, US Army Intelligence Threat Analyss Detachment
Report Number 14 U 76, P 139

Figure 2

1980
MILITARY REVIEW
of the target; significan12y fewer rounds ,
are required to accomplish the suppres­
sikmor neutralization mission.
At, least as important as the poterttiaf
physical datuage expected from attack­
ing this band is the probrible psycho­
logicsf dislocation that would follow. The
Soviets anticipate violent artiflery strikes
against their lead elements. As a conse­
quence, they are weti-prepared, both in “
doctrine and in training, to cope with
present US artiflery eruployment con­
cepts and priorities. However, should
these priontiee change, the situation is
altered from the Soviet perspective. The
scope and impact of this change is sig­
nificantly greater than just the sum total
of increaeed losses of materiel and man­
power alone.
The recent and extended Soviet debate
over the role and timction of the various
combat arms came to the general conclu­
sion that the success of the ground-
gaining arms in attacking NATO defen­
sive positions waa directly dependent on
the availability and viability of large
quantities of artillery to suppress NATO
antitank eystems. It was the “opinion of
several of the debats’s participants that
should they not enjoy an overwhelming
advantage in artillery firepower, the
attack could not succeed.’ Thus, it
appears a strong case can be made that
attacking those elements of the lead
echelon most vulnerable to artilfery fires
will both physically and psychologically
dislocate the command and control
process. The anticipated result of this
action will be to limit the ability of the
Soviets to main~ in their momentum.
From the foregoing analyais, it ia pos­
sible to identify some conclusions in de­
termining the optimal employment of the
FA system on the NATO battlefield. The
more significant of these are:
e FA today is not the most effective
48
means for engaging targets in the for­
ward edge of Soviet lead echelons unfess
the attacking infantry have been forced ‘~
to dismount.
o The fire support team, became of its
location on the battlefield, is not capable
of assisting in the attack of a majority of
the types of targets most effectively
engaged by the FA.
e The limited amount of ammunition
and artillery avaiiable makes it
impossible to conduct afl assigned mis­
sions. Therefore, the prioritizing and
elimination of urrreafiatic missions has
become a necessity.
e The targets currently moat suitable
to artillery attack are located predomi.
nantly in a band 2 to 8 kilometers behind
the forward edge of the lead Soviet el~
ments. By the nature of these targets
and their rple in the Soviet attack pro- ,
cedures, the effect that FA would expect
to have on the NATO battlefield would ,
be cumulative and indirect as opposed to
the immediate results expen”enced in
previous wars. 6
e The current acquisition system is (or
wilf shortly be) equipped, but not orga­
niz ed or oriented, to facilitate
sufficiently rapid identification, location
and targeting of those segments of the
leading Sovist echelon most susceptible
to artillery attack.
e Dedication of more than direct sup­
port battalions to the support of
maneuver elements would be a question­
able role given the limited number @f bat­
talions available, probable targets :0 be
engaged by these elements and the low
probability of successful engagement.
e Artillery assets are going to be
critical to the successful conduct of the
defense. Consequently, few missions
should be fired at such a rate or for such
duration as to ensure detection and
attack, The artillery must survive to
l~!
Fsb;uary
 ..
FIELD ARTILLERY

fight the second and subsequent battles. successfully attacked. Information pas­
Considering the conclusions above, the sage procedures and priorities will have
foflowing recommendation are eub­ to be reorganized. They muet facilitate
rnitted as a meane to addrees these prob­ the rapid coordination and correlation of
lems: information from alf intelligence meane.
e There needs to be a rethinking by the They must provide near real-time target- .
doctrine community of how FA cart most ing data to the appropriate artillery
effectively be employed if it is to provide age~y.
its full potential to the overall defensive In eummary, it would appear that cur­
effort. Thie process ehould take ad­ rent artillery employment procedure
vantage of computer end war-gaming and priorities contain two major flaws.
tecbniquee. It ehould develop an objec­ First, the preeent concepte wilI likely
tive data baee which can be ueed to pro­ cause inordinately fsrge amounts of
pose viable employment criteria. The fimited artillery weapons and ammuni­
analyeie must include: tion reeonrces to be expended against the
– How the Soviet divieion attacke. wrong target. Currently, we target that
– What will be in range at the segment of the enemy lead echelon which
point/time of attack. ie only marginally susceptible to ee,rioue
– What portione of the Soviet divieion damage by the munitione available.
“eyeteme” are meet suitable for attack Second, current concepts ensure that
by FA. inadequate artillery resources will
– Of these targets, which have the remain available to engage effectively
greateet i pact on the Soviets’ ability to the segment in the lead divisions most
T
conduct a .succeeeful attack and are most euitable for attack. As a consequence, it
dangeroue to NATO defenders. wilf be impossible to provide efficient
—What new artillery targeting pro­ volume and duration of fires to facilitate
cedures are needed to attack these ele­ wresting control of the tempo and direc­
mente. tion of the battle from the attacking
e FA priontiee in the active defense force.
should be normally weighted toward: The implication of the propoeed pri­
– Soviet artillery.
oritizing system are particularly pro­
–Target acquisition equipment.
found for the ground-gaining &ns. With .
–Command and control facilities.
the exception of the support available
—Electronic warfare elements.
from the direct eupport artillery bat­
– Air defense units.
talion, the tank-infantry team is going to
—Mounted maneuver unite.
have to pfen to fight and survive as an
However, ehould enemy infantry die-
effective combat element based primarily
mount, the priority of maneuver units on firepower organic or attached to that
changes considerably. Quick fire chan­ organization.
nels would be established for the epecific It is important that ,we articulate and
purpose of facilitating rapid attack of clarify the actuaf operating environment
tbie now highly vulnerable top-priority of the battlefield. Once tbie environment
element. is understood end analyzed, then and
e Significant changes in the target only then will it be possible to determine
acquisition process are neceeeary if the the optirnaf employment of field ertifiery
priority targete identified above are to be in the active defense.

49
MILITARY REVIEW

NOTES

1 flew Manual {FM) 6.20, F,re Suw.rt m Combmeo Arms op. armored pwsonnel c.rrler. Ada!tio.at mfomwtmn ,S WW.tAE, m
.,.1<0”s, Dt?Partrnen, cd lfw Army, Wash, n@n, D C , May 1977, @ FM 6.141.7, Fletd Ari,/lew Target Anal)ws and WC+.9P0.SEm@oy.
.
,. menf, N..n.ck.r. DepMment of lhs Army, Wash ln@on, DC,
2 /.5,0 ,01.1 FeQruaIv 1978, *P 5.7 and511
3 FM 620, Fl,e SIJPP.rt ,“ Co,nb,ned ,4r,ns 0/weoons, q) 5 C N Donnelly, .%ct+cd Problems Faccng the So,,d Amy
.,1, p 5.38, aod FM 1005, Opwafkxx. Department of the Army, Recent Debates m the S.,,,1 Mt[,tary Press; in!er,iat<ond De
Washington, D C , July 1976, P 54 Ienm Rew.w, Volume ?3, N.m&ar 9, 1979, p 1,407 IReprtntd In
4 De{,n,t,,e slaitsttcal Wi?porl for m!. C.ml.lu%mn “ntortu MIJlfavy Rew8ew,June and July ?979, PP !6.26 and pp 60@2 resee.
na!,ly CS”not be mc,”fl,a 1“ m?. WIlcte because of !1s Classll!ca tl”ely )
t,.” However, those {“,.,..,.* may ,.,., to VIe JO,., Mun,t,on% 6 See comments of Brlgaaler General A, Sar.r?wld, tom.
Effects TablelSS (S.rf.cs.m+,.rtacs) {classmed CO. ftdenita)) for mwder of Ismell WU!tery, m F!erd Amllery Journal, M.ay.J.ns
convent lonal t 55m m howlizer f lkes agal nsl moving ta.ks and, 1979, P 16

Major Floyd V. Churchill t3 currently

assigned to the artillery team at Readiness
Group Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, He
receiued a B.A. from The Citadel, an M,A. from
the Collpge of William and May and en
M. MA.S. from the USACGSC. He hat serut=d
m Germany on a V Corpt exercise pkmntng
stafj and participated in numerous Allied
Mobde Force operations to various NATO
cozm trws as either commander or liaison officer
for the US artdlwy contingent. Major Churchill
won the 1978 Military Review Aumrd for E.zct+
lence m Tactzcal Wn”ting for hzs article “TO Win .!

the First Battle” which appeared in the Nouem­

.\ ber 1978 ,.ssz...
/

Britain Making Major Effort in Night Vision. The United King­

dom has announced a major new effort to develop military
forward-looking infrarerl radar (FLIR} thermal-imaging
systems. Called the Thermal-lmaging Pro­
Common Modules
gram, this effort closely parallele a similar US program begun
in 1972. The British program has been initiated due to the
reluctance of the Department of Defense to pass FLIR tech­
nology on to other countries. While agreements have been
reached to provide FLIR common modules to other countries,
notably West Germany, for use in thermal-imaging devices of
their own design, there is some fear that technology transfer
will speed acquisition of such systems by the Soviet Union.
There has been some development of FLIR systems in Europe
already, but the main drawback of all these systems has been
their very h:gh development costs.[l The United States has
found that the only practical approaqh to the cost problem is
to develop a range of component~, which would be inter­
‘ changeable in a wide variety of land-based or airborne FLIR
systems. The availability of such components dramatically
reduces the development and production, costs of the new
system. The British program will be the first real challenge to
the US common module program and could eventually affect
sates to NATO.—DMS Intelligence on Aerospace, @1979.

50 February
 Strategy-making is a unique reflection of the power-sharing
inherent in a given political s~stern. Ta this end the segments of
societg which determine a nation ‘e strategg differ with the natare
of the societg. The author contsnak that a nation% militarg leaders
participate in the devebpment of strategg on~ in a totalitarian as
state. Thus, the milita~ leaders of the United States have no part
in the making of strategy, ontg in executing it Part 0, presented
here, discusses the particutnr constraints which prohibit senior US
militarg leaders from participating in the development of strategu.

s trat6tiy
and the
Military Professional
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P. O’Meara Jr., US Army

E I JVE in turbulent and fasci­ tirnes, the explosion in learning is seldom

nating times. Unfortunately, the recognized for ite actual worth. A cen­
w
obvious often goes unobeemed in rapidly tury from now, the contribution of our
changing eocieties. In our turbulent democracy may be meaeured in the out-

Psrt I of this article appeared In the January 1980 Milifary Rewew.

tipyrlght@1980 by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P. O’Meara Jr., US Army.

1980 ,’ 51
MILITARY REVIEW
pouring of our philosophy and not.
measured in the productivity of our rna­
cbines and technology.
Once the academic world relied upon
the works of the European scholars who
paced the rapid growth of learning.
Those days have passed. Today, the
learned m,ust consume the works of the
pbfloeophers of Harvard, Princeton, CO-,
Iumbia, Stanford, the Massachusetts In­
stitute of Technology and a host of other
US academic institutions before they can
be said to have mastered their disci­
plines.
A few decades ago, the American po­
litical scientists studied German in order
to master the works of the German polit­
ical scientists. Today, it is the German
student who studies the foreign wor%s of
the American political scientists in order
to understand the vast torrent of philo­
sophical thought that has inundated the
academic world from our universities.
This expansion in kerning applies to
many disciplines in which the massive
American contribution presents a unique
challenge to the academic world.
Within the US military community,
we share the dilemma of the European
scholar. We have been awed and over­
whelmed by the outpouring of philosoph­
ical thought from our universities. Much
of $their work is relevant to our profes­
sion. However, we have often been-in­
suceessful in digesting this mass of con­
stantly expanding thought in order to
draw appropriate conclusions concerning
its meaning for our society and its impli­
cations for our profession.
Unlike the philosopher of the univer­
sity, the military professional is largely
an operator. Hie function is to orches­
trate men and machines effectively.
Despite his primary role as operator, the
military professional is both challer ged
and at times threatened by the philo­
52
sophical challenge of the universities. ~ ,
The functions of the operator demand
that he understand the changing bo~y of
learning and apply it w his profession
lest he become ueeless to his rapidly
evoking society.
Despite the handicap posed by the
chalfenge of our scholars and the evolu­
tion of our society, the eoldier as ope~ ~
ator possesses unique insights that
should serve to chaflenge and contribute
to what is without question the greatest
explosion of learning in the history of
man. We have been there— in the revolu­
tion, the social change. We have advised
and fought, built and destroyed, bled
and buried. Our observations are not
always in synchronization with those of
the academician. Let us chalfenge.
Before we challenge, however, we must
acknowledge our enormous debt. To un­
derstand the dynamics of contemporary
political and social change and their im­
pact upon the role of the military, one
muet first understand the contributions
of Samuel Huntington, Charles Moskos,
Carl Friedrich, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Morris Janowitz, Lucien Pye, Gabriel
Amend and a host of others.
These authorities on the sociolo~ and
politics of change have produced a revo­
lution in academic inquiry that has
swept away earlier and inadequate
methods by which political change was
perceived and evaluated. Their contribu­
tions made possible our exploration into
one element of social change in moderni­
zingsocieties. Their contributions provide
the conceptual framework which we util­
ize as the foundation of our analysis.
Among the contributions to contempo­
rary thought, those of Samuel Hunting.
ton have provided the broadest concep­
tualization of the military role in devel­
oping societies. In his analysis of the
polities of change, Huntington addresses
February

the role of the military in modernizing
societies. 1 Within those societies char­
acterized by a low levef of political ineti­
tutionalisation, which he terms praeto­
rian eocieties, Huntington sses the mili­
tary acting in three rolee: that of re­
former, guardian of the constitutional
status quo and as institution builder.
Depending upon the level of political
development of the eociety, the role
changes from reformer in leeeer devel­
oped societies, to guardian and, finally,
to the role of institution builder in ad­
vanced praetonan societies. In those so­
cietiee in which the military role as insti­
tution builder is successful, such as in
Turkey, the society emerges from praeto­
rian dieorder into civic order. Hunting
ton’s analyeis provides us with a broad
conceptualization with which to view the
role of the military in essentially un­
stable, modernizing societies.
Unfortunately, Huntington’s analysis
does not provide us with a concepturd
framework that allows us to perceive the
military role in both the unstable praeto­
rian eociety and the civic society, the
ordered eociety composed of highly insti­
tutionalized political structures. More­
over, Huntington’s analysis does not dis­
tinguish between the military roles in
societiee that opt for the stable Western
democratic model of civic order as
opposed to the stable, totalitarian model
of civic order.
Huntington’s analysis does point out
the advantage of the concrete organiza­
tional model that is the major attraction
of Leninism, offering a proven path from
praetorian instability to an ordered
society. Our queetions are what is the
trade-off of the choice between the two
societies and what are the military roles
in the two predominant stable societies:
the Western democratic etate and the
Communist etate?
1980
.
STRATEGY
The decision to reject or employ coer­
cion ie a key dwisi~ in the modernisa­
tion process. Huntington fails to address
this decision. Charles Moskos does
address the question of the use of coer­
cive force in the contemporary world.’
His analysis suggests that underetend­
ing of the use of violence and coercive
force is key to comprehension of armed
forcee and eociety.
Our analyeis builds upon the Hunting­
ton amadysisand eeptures the insights of
Moskoe to graft the explanation of coer­
cive force upon Huntington’s conceptu­
alization of civic order in order to pro­
duce a conceptual framework that chu-i­
fies the military role in modern, con­
temporary societiee.
The Tyranny of Resources
on the Road to Paradise
The baeis for the choice of the coercive
model of development is both philosoph­
ical and practical. Marxist-Leninist doc­
trine provides an attractive ehortcut to
modernization. Moreover, it answere
many of tbe pragmatic and immediate
questions confronting the radical re­
former. in the face of potentiaf threats to
the society and in the absence of avail­
able resources, the Leninist model b~
comes highly attractive.. The coercive,
Leninist model provides social mobiliza­
tion to augment ecerce capital invest­
ment opportunities in the building of tbe
modem society. .
To the radical reformer confronted
with an immense chaflenge, the choice
becomee one of rejecting the less radical
approach of tbe democratic revolution.
ary, who electively employe violence in
order to remove a temporary obstacle on
the road to modernisation, and drives
53
MIL!TARY REVIEW
him toward endemic ‘tioIsncs, socisf <
rnobiliaation and the institutionalization
of military m psramifitary coercion ‘
internal to the society. The social price of
this choice is high since it ultimately re-
jects the democratic consensus and
creates a manipulated conssnsus. An
additional price rnus~ aiso be paid in the
srea of human rights which may or may,
not be balanced by future gains in eco-
nomic development.
At some point in the drive toward
modernization, the choice of power-shsr-
ing elites must. be made regarding the
role of coercion in the modernization
process. This decision ultimately shapes
the character of the state, and it defines
a role for the military and internal secu.
rity forces in the internal political
processes of the political system.
Although the actual decision may be
more apparent than real, since the histor-
ical character of the state may gravely
fimit actual choices and estabfish a de-
cided propensity for or against coercive
patterns of bshavior, the fact that the
Literature of many premodern societies
reflects an awareness of this decision and
its great importance indicates that such
a decision by power-eharing elites should
be treated as a reality. Moreover, the
decision appfiee to both the Leninist
model and the Fascist model which also
utilizes coercion and social mobilization
in the quest for modernization.
The decision can be considered as one
in favor of either coercive sociological or
free enterprise, economic developmental
patterne. At the point of dscieion, the
choice is made to favor social mobiliza-
tion of the population in order to con-
stmct a new socisf order and thereby
obtain the capacity to construct a vanieh once modernization is achieved,
modem state, or the decision ie made to
favor capitef investment and long-%rm
economic development within the frame-
work of an environment of free enter­
prise.
This decision determines the role of
,. the military in the developing society. A
totalitarian state such as the German
.Third Reich uses rnifitary forcee and
L fice power to achieve the coercive force
necessary to resh-ape the socisf order and
to mobilise the body politic, and the mil-
itary tend to share power in the pofiticsf
process of such societies.’
A constitutional democracy such as
rhe United States or the Federal Repub­
lic of Germany opts in favor of long-term
capital investment in a society charactsr­
izsd by fres enterprise. In the latter
choice, the rnifitary play no role in shap
ing the social order. Thus, the role of the
military, the use of cosrcion and the ulti­
mate character of the stats are inti-
mately related to the developmental
decision of the state. I
Figure 1 shows a hypothetical curve
for each of the two devsfopmentsli pat­
tsrne or models. Begirming at the deci­
sioc point (origin), the line O-A-C! depicte
the developmental course of the stats
attempting to achieve moderrdzation
through social mobilization. The line O-
B-C depicts the developmental course of
the state that attempts modernization
through capital investment and rejects
the social mobilization of the totafitanan
state. Figure 1 does not show the devel­
opmental process as a function of time,
but contrasts two alternative approaches
toward modernization.
Both states strive to attain a utopian
level of development. The totalitarian
leadership eacrfficss the individual in
order to modemiae in the hope that the
vast coercive machinery of the stats wif.f
leaving a utopian, modem and ordered
society. The ideal of the constitutional
democracy sacrifices efficiency to indi:
 Development
Y
A

Y’ ­ ------- !- —— -----­
+---i ---------­

Economic development’
,
Quadrants I
Variables
I II Ill i Iv
Socloeconomtc Disc! phned, Dlsciplmed, Undeveloped Llbertarlan,
Charactenst!cs ordered, eco. mobilized, and and Immo economically
nomlcally premodern bd!zed advanced
advanced society society society
society

Type Utopian Totahtanan Undeveloped Modern

Pohhcal socioeconomic dictatorship socioeconomic conshtutional
System {deal of the right system democracw
or left

Historical None Soviet Umon, Nahons of Federal Republic

Examoles German Third the Thwd of Germany,
Reich World Umted States,
England

Thjs table contrasts the characteristics of the developmental models by Quadrants termed by
the Constructmn ot verhcal and horizontal Imes al x’ and y’ respectively, which are located at
arbdrary points designated as the transd$on point from premodem to modern [eCIImJmLC
development) and hom rmmobrbzed to mobd!zed soc[ebes (sociologmal development) The four
quadrants are ubhzed to md!cate Oevetopment stages m thejr most reduced conceptuabzatmn as
Opposed to ut+flz{ng multcPle stagesm thedevelwmental
process,which we reject for the sake of
Slmphcliy of the model

Figure 1
 MILITARY REVIEW
vidual liberties in the belief that through ,
private ownership and ae!f-motivation,
man can develop a prosperous and
ordered society.
The price of totalitarian modernization
is meaeured in great human sacrifice for
a utopian goal that may not be attain­
able given the mean utilized-that ie, the
police state controls show little eign of
withering away as Marx predicted. The
. price of democratic, libertarian modemi­
zation, on ths other hand, is the inability
to conduct efficient Ion&range centrali­
zed planning because of the reliance
upon the uncertain mechanics of popular
conseneus formation end dependence
upon individual initiative. The point to
be made here is that once the choice has
been made and the military and coercion
are joined and utilized as a tQol in the
developmental process, the foundation of
*
a totalitarian dictatorship is laid.
Synthesisofthe Conceptual
Modsls
Huntington’s analysis of the role of
the military in praetorian eocieties pro­
videe us with an invaluable assessment
of the vaet range of activities of the mil­
itary in modernizing unstable societies.
Unfortunately, his assessment fails to
define for us the roles of the military and
the role of coercion in the civic order or
politically stable societies.
BuiIding upon Huntington’s assess­
ment and incorporating Moskos’ expla­
nation of the employment of coercive
force, we hypothesize that two additional
models of development are found in the
civic order: one that rejects endemic
coercion and establishes a democratic
political system; the other that employs
endemic coercion in order to create a
totalitarian political system.
56
The former system denies the miIitery
a role in power-sharing, while the latter .
allows the military to ehare power with
the political leadership in return for their .
support of the autocratic regime. Thus,
the Red Guarde, the Gestapo, the SS,
the Clseka, the Factory Comrnitteee and
the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) ail
hold privileged positions in the social or­
der and play a major role in mobilizing
the etracture of the new social order.
Violence and coercion in the totalitarian
political syetem is not a temporary phe­
nomena; it is syetemic.
Since the military may hold power or
participate in power-eharing in both the
praetorian society (military dictator) and
the totalitarian dictatorship, the eoldier
does make strategy. In both forms of dic­
tatorship, the military play a significant
roIe in the management of national re­
sources, the leadership of the body poli­
tic and the designation of national gords.
In the dictatorship of the proletariat, the
military share in the internal governing
process with the political leaderekip
(Communist Party) in which the military
leadership simultaneously holds member­
ship.
However, the extent to which the
soldier shares in the etrat.egy-making in
the various Communist states differs sig­
nificantly. In the People’s Republic of
China, the soldier plays a major role in
the govemir.~ process, including ad­
rninietrat.ion of come of the provinces
and assistance in management of in&e­
try. In the Soviet Union, only one
marshal now sits on the Politburo, and
the military and state eecnrity forces
play a lesser role in the management of 1,
the state.
In the case of the People’e Republic of
China, the association of military and
party is particularly C1OSS.This associa­
tion has its origin in the revolution where
February

the party and the Red army were virtu­
ally one during intense periods of revolu­
tionary etruggle. Following the power
seizure, the army has played a role in the
management of the state which has
increased following the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution. At the Ninth Party
Congrees of the Chinese Communist
Party held in 1969, the members of the
Politburo elected at the congress in­
cluded 11 soldiers, or military profes­
sionals, and over 50 percent of the Cen­
tral C&nrnittee wae made up of members
of the army.
Although the etrncture of the two gov­
ernments are in no way simikm and,
consequently, comparisons are at best
difficult, an analogous situation in the
United States would be for a Congrese to
be elected, 50 percent of which consisted
of general officere on active duty in the
US Armed Forces.
The Triad of Strategic Partnerships
Through the examination of the evolu­
tion of strategy, we noted that strategy-
making ie a unique reflection of the
power-sharing inherent in a particular
political system. The coalition of power
holders reflects the character of the
state. A ehift in major power holdere in
the etrateg-making procese results in a
change in the character of the state. A
major change in power holders is revolu­
tionary in nature, causing
revolutionary change in the political
character of the state.
The major political systems tend tn be
partnerships between the major power
holders in the society. The constitutional
democracy is a partnership between the
people and their political leadership. The
totalitarian Communist political syst8m
1980
.
STRATEGY
,,,
is a partnership between the party and
military, internal security forcee. The
military dictatorship is a partnership
between the people and the military lead­
erehip of the eociety.
Consequently; etrategy-meking ii an
exercise in ehsred . power among the
dominant power holders in the society.
The power holders normally consist of a
partnership between two of the foflowing
three groups or sectors in the society:
political leadership, body pofitic and mil­
itary Ieaderehip.’
The substitution of any one of the
above groups by another causes a revolu­
tionary change in the character of the
political eyetem. The two dominant
groups or sectors that together form the
strategy-making partnership dominate
and use the efforts of the third w.ior in
the execution of strategy.
Thus, the combination of military and
politicians determine strategy, and they
manipulate and direct the masses in the
totalitarian dictatorship; the combina­
tion of military authority and body
politic form the military dictatorship
which dominates the political sector;
and the combination of political leader­
ship and body politic unite to form the
constitutional democracy, and together
they determine strategy that is then
executed by the military establishment.
Thus, the role of the military in strategy
formulation is a function of the social
and political order.
The nature of the s~ategy-making
a pertnerehip is related to the nature of
the consensus formed in the body politic.
The consensus of the constitutional
democracy ie known as a popular con­
sensus. The consensus of the military
dictatorship is normally referred to as a
traditional value-oriented consensus. The
conseneue formed in the. Cormminiet
state ie formulated through controlled
57
 MILITARY REVIEW

,- information fed to the society and is thus ,
known as a manipulated consensus.’
The triad of strategic partnerships
illustrated in Figure 2 chows the three
possible partnerships of the three strat­
egy-making sectors in society, the type
government normally produced by the
pertnerehip and the type consensus
created through the strategy-making
partnership.* Although the illustration
shows but three combinations of power­
ebaring and a st@ic eituatikm, we must
remind ourselves that the strate~
making process tends to be a dynamic
process reflecting shifts in power hold-
ere, changes in social forces end techno­
logical change.
Thus, it is a changing picture with an

Manipulated Consensus
Figure 2

58 February

ahnost infinite number of poeeible com­
bination of power holdere. Shifts in
power holdere are at times accompanied
by shifte in the character of the gover­
nment—that is, a dictatorship is over­
thrown and replaced by a form of consti­
tutional democracy. Moreover, a type
government may lean toward one of the
other two type governments in actual
practice.
This phenomenon is well-iflustrated by
‘ ‘people’s democracy.” Many shades of
people’s democracy or Communist dic­
tatorship exist. We have examples of
people’e democracies that have leaned
toward the constitutional democracy”
such as that exieting in Czechoslovakia
during the liberalization move ent
which wae crushed by the Soviet U .on
3
in Auguet 1968. The Dub&k regime at
the time appeared to be making a grad­
ual transition toward a constitutional
democracy under the pressure of an
emerging popular coneeneus. On the
other hand, other examples of the
people’s democracy appear to be not far
removed from a military dictatorship.
Power-Sharing Models
Figore 3 shows a graphic representa­
tion of four pow r-sharing situations.
Each model repre et nts a specific power-
sharing relationship based upon values
assigned to three variables. The varia­
blee include the size and identity of each
of the two partners and the extent of
ehared power (ehaded area). In theory,
the variation of these vanablee would
present an almost infinite number of pos­
sible combinations although, in practice,
restrictions on the size of both of the
partners and the extent of power-sharing -
limit the combinations. Suffice it to say
1980
.
STRATEGY
that many examples of different power­
eharing situations exist, each of which
reflects the unique character of the indi­
vidual state concerned.
In order to illustrate significant pat­
terns of power-ehming, we wilf examine
several examples of power-eharing part­
nerships. Pattern A on Figure 3 repre­
sents a situation in which power ie
equally shered by equal partners that are
contermiuous.
An example of such a power-sharing
eituation was found in Germany during
World War I. The military end the body
politic were essentially one. The exieting
restriction on the eize of the body
politic and the effect of universal mil­
itary tmitig were t 3 create a situation
in which the bddy pofitic end the mil­
itary leadership became essentially the
same group, thereby allowing the part­
ners tQ dominate the political process
and create what amounted to a military
dictatorship witbin the framework of a
constitutional monarchy.
Pattern B represent a power-sharing
situation in which the partners are ap
proximately equsf in strength and exten­
sive power-sharing exiets in the political
process. Such a situation existed in the
People’s Republic of China following the
llth, Party Congress in 1969, with the
People’s Liberation Army and the
party approximately equal partners in
governing the state, a dictatorship of the
proletariat.
Pattern C represents a power-sharing
situation in which one of the partners ie
considerably stronger then the other and
a situation in which limited power-
sharing exiete. Such a situation exists in
the USSR where the (%mmmiet Party
dominatee the military (plue internal
security forces) and a limited role in
etrategy-roeking is pIayed by the lesser
partner.
99
MiLITAflY REVIEW
Pflwa?r-sharing
c D
Figure 3
Although the military plays a limited
role in the allocation of resources in the
sewse that they participate to a limited
degree in key decisionrnaking (Politburo)
and centrefized planning, the power­
shering between the partners is real. The
party ie dependent upon the military and
the internal eecurity forcee for the main­
tenance of internal order, and the leader­
ship of the military and the security
forces share in party membership. In
return for its loyal support of the party
Ieaderebip, the Ieaderehip of military and
eecunty forces enjoy a priviiegea poei-
60
Nkxk?ls
/’--’
tion in the state. Thus, the partnership is
a marriage of convenience.
Acting together, the party and roil­
itery security forces manipulate the body
politic in the dictatorebip of the prole­
tariat. This is a form of power-sharing
that bears a strong similarity to thd
archaic partnerebip between monarch’
and military found in the French mon­
archy prior to the French Revolution. If
we substitute nobility and clergy for the
Communist Party in Pattern C, the rela­
tionship of the eocial structures in the
two statee is essentially unchanged.’
February

Pattern D represents a power-sharing
situation in w~ch the p~”tners are no~
equal and both parties exist simulta­
neously within the dominate member of
the partnership. Such a situation ie
found in the United States where the
political leadership exists within the
body politic and the conetiixttional
powers of the body politic dominate the
political process. In thie caee, the popu­
lar consensus of the body politic both
makes and breaks pofitical leaders, thus
permitting the body politic’ to dominate
the partnership.
Figure 4 shows a graphic representa­
tion of power-sharing in two dictator­
ships and is intended to demonstrate
examples of the relationehlp of the
power-sharing partners to the body poli­
tic in situations wherein the body politic
does not participate in the governing
process. In the first case (E), power-shar­
ing between political leadership ( 1) and
Power-Sharing in the Dictatorship
E“
Figure 4
1980
.
STRATEGY
military (2) occurs within the body poli­
tic (3), creating a dictatorship of the
proletariat within the framework of a
nation-state such as that found in the
People’s Republic of China. In the
second case (F), the political Ieaderiddp
(1) and military {2) exist largely extend
to the body politic(3).
Such a situation existed in France
prior to the .French Revolution. The
French political leadership of the Mth
century was composed of nobility and
clergy and was supranational in chsr­
acter, existing largely externaf to the
prerevolutionery society. The military
leadership, composed mainly of nobility,
aleo reflected the supranational condition
of the French nobihty and was also sub­
stantially divorced from the national
eociety.
The power-sharing between the polit­
ical leadership and milhry was limited.
The power-sharing was a marriage of
61
 MILITARY REVIEW ,
convenience that saw the king sanction
privileges for his army in return for “
loyalty to the crown, maintenance of
intemrd order and defense of the mon­
archy. The power-sharing between polit­
ical and military sectors of the society
reflected the autocratic character of the
French Bourbon monarchy.
In this case, the national society (3) is
represented by a broken line to show
that the French nation had not yet
emerged as the body politic. The final
birth of the French national body politic
was announced to the world in a social
explosion that unleashed powerful social
forces which altered both the nature of
power-sharing in the society and the
nature of strategy-making.
Building upon the tbeoreticel founda­
tions laid by Huntington and Moskos,
we have constructed a theoretical frame­
work that provides us with an explana­
tion of the role of the milkery in both the
civic order and the praetorian society.
We have integrated this framework into
our definition of strategy.
The resulting model we refer to as the
triad of strategic relationships which
provides us with a theoretical foundation
with which to contrast the role of the
, military in our society with that of the
military in other contemporary societies.
It serves to clarify the lack of power
characteristic of the military in demo­
cratic societies which is the sign of a
heaIthy democratic political system.
Moreover, it ilhstrates the shallowness
of the contemporary concept of the roil-
itary-industrial complex.
A correct appreciation of strategic
power-sharing demonstrates that the
totafitanan dictatorship is the true home
of the military-industrial complex, not
the constitutional democracy. The com­
bination of military elites in power-
sharing positions able to allocate re­
62
somces, direct the output of induetry
and shape foreign policy is a combination
of roles and functione often perceived to
exist in our society. But, in reality, one
finds such unique circumstances existing
rather in the people’s democracy and in
autocratic, praetonan, politicaf systems.
The significance of the above analysis
is that it provides us with theory that
explains the roles of the mifitary in
modern societies that more closely
approximates the reality of the world
around us. The theory of the militav­
industrial compiex has been utilized too
long within the acedernic community to
explain the role of the mifitary pr~fes­
sional in our society.
The mifitary-industrial complex theory
is an explanation that aeeumes a major
strate~ and policymaking role for the
military which does not exist within our
society. Moreover, it became a vehiclb
for virulent attacks upon our political
system throughout the Vietnam conffict.
Careful analysis of the mifitary-indus­
trial complex theory demonstrates that
it is inappropriately applied to the con­
stitutional democracy. If the miM.ary­
. industrial complex theory is to play h
role in contemporary political analysis, it
must be applied to the totalitarian dic­
tatorship, the dictatorship of the prole­
tariat.
When political power comes out of the
barrel of a gun, those that bear arme are
elevated to a privileged status in the
society. When political power comee
from the ballot box, those that bear arms
are entitled to no privilege beyond that
extended to the individual citisen. The I
contrast between theee two appro~ches
to political power spelle a vital difference
between totafitarianism and constitu­
tional democracy that determines the
role of the military in their respective
political systems.
,8
February
 STRATEGY’
.

NOTES

1 Samuel P H.ntlngto., Pofft#cal Oroef #n Chengmg some.
t,es, Yale U.wrwty Press, New Haven, con. , 1969.
2 Charles C Moskos Jr, ,The MllIWy,,< Ann.ai Rewew of
Soc!ology, volume 2, 1976, w 55.77
3 The Germ.. Thlra Retch IS mcl.dea Wm. me GIWOW of
PreM.dOm . . . ..!1.S for the P.tPos. of this anah’sts sm.. the de.
c,smn$ .mx!fo.ttng the .atto.al leadership upon their ass.mptton
of POW, ,e,emb!ed the nard chcdces Co”frO”tlOg the e!!!., 01 .
P,em.aer. society 1. the wake .f the economic collaPse of ma
Germ.. economy a.rmg the perloo of the Welmar Republic, Nazi
leader.h,D iv,, co”tmllted wth the task of mbu,!dlng SW “atlonal
economy, ana It was facea with the CIZSS!Coec!slons OYa pm.
modern SOCI.W co”cemmg the struct.rma of society for the
w.sf Of md.mlzat!on
a Hunt, ”gto” argue, that e c..1!11o” between at least two of
three grows m necessary for political stablity The three glows
are laentif ted by H.ntln@On as the mtelllge.tsr% the mtlitarv a.a
tn. Lwas.a”toj m,s assesslle”t closely m.enlble, the nypothea,s
we lo,rnu, ate ,“ � ., a“a,y s,, See bf.”t, ngto”, OP ,,1, P 241
5 RoberI S Sharlet, WwmeDt Form.latlon m Political S.l . . . .
and Communist St.dies Can.wt.allz!ng Pom!cti Particptlon,,,
Comm.nlst St.o(es and rhe .Soclef Sciences, edltsd by Frederic J
Fleron Jr, Rand M. Nally 8 Cm, Chicago, Ill 1S69, F@2d4.53
6 Flg.re 2 dmno”.tr.te% the major Contemporary form of the
t.talrtana. Orctatorsh!p, the .mctat.mhlp of the proletariat
7 For a further ,disc.ssmn of the soviet U“lo” as a “ew SP..
cles of autocracy, see Carl J Fned(lch . ..3 2blg.lew K, Srz.zl.
Skl, Tota!tf.rran Dlctat.r5h!P ano Autocracy, Praeger P.bl [shers,
UY,19S6

Lieutenant Colond Andrew P. O ‘Meara Jr.. is

with the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera­
tions and Plans, Headquarters, Department of
the Army. He receiued a B.S. fmm the USMA, .
an M.S. from the Uniuerstty of Wisconsm-
Milwaukee, an M.M.A.S from the USAC’GSC
and IS a graduate of the Army War Colkge. He
has serued in command and staff assignments
in the United States, Germany and Vietnam
with the lst. 2d, 3d and 4tk Armored Divisions.
the Iltk and 14th Armored Cavalry Regtments
and as an adumor with the Ist Army of the
Republic of Vietnax Caualy Regiment. He is
the author of Infrastmcture and ths Marxist
Power Selzw’e: An Analysis of the Communist
Models of Revolution published in 1973.

/’
New Name for Rocket System. The Army has renamed its new
free-flight artillery rocket currently under development at the
US Army Missile Command the Multiple Launch Rocket Sys­
tem. Formerly called the General Support Rocket System
(Ml?, Sep 1979, P 78), the new name conforms with the name
already established by NATO allies.
The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and
France signed a memorandum of understanding last year
calling for the cooperative development of a standard NATO
rocket. The system is known internationally as the MLRS.
The Army plans to field the system in the early 1980s.
Under the memorandum of understanding, the MLRS will be.
deveioped and coproduced in both the United States and
Europe. The joint program and the new weapon will
strengthen the NATO Alliance, reduce development costs
through the cooperative effort and enable the four countries
-to share production benefits.
The MLRS will feature a 12-round launcher mounted on a
highly mobile, fully tracked vehicle that can be emplaced
quickly and deliver massive firepower. Hardware will be
standard except for communications and perhaps the
ammunition resupply vehicle.

I 980 63
 Most discussions concernirrg rear area securi@ concentrate on the
use of combat’ service support anits at corps and lower levels. A
void in the discussiorr is the tack of consideration for multinational
cooperation at the theater level The author proposes some solu­
tions.
-)

R ECENTLY, there has been consid­

erabledebate on the doctrine of rear
area protection (RAP). The debate has
focused, however, on corps and lower. It
is time to extend this discussion to in­
clude other critical areas.
Lieutenant Colonei Moorad Moora­
dian, US Army, used the European
scenario as an example in his article
“Rem Area Security With an ‘Elastic
FEBA’ “ (Military Review, September
1978). He described the very real threat
posed by the emergence of a S-wiet
strategy and technology aimed at plac­
ing sisable, mobile combat forces in the
rear of US divisions and corps to create a

64 February

second combat front.’
Taking this one step further, it is not
unlikely to suppose that the threat to the
theater army area command (TAACOM )
would be equally critical. The combat
eesential logistic support provided by
the TAACOM from within a relatively
large unprotected geographic area be­
hind the corps rear bound~ makes
TAACOM storage and maintenance
facilities easy and obvious targets for
early neutralization or destruction by the
enemy. Yet appropriate provision for the
security of the TAACOM is seriously
lacking in current US Army doctrine.
A failure to distinguish between the
cows and TAACOM rear areas is at the
root of the problem. Current doctrine
merely defines the rear area as the geo­
graphic epace to the rear of the combat
zone where the majority of the combat
support and combat service support
fqnctions are performed.z
However, once again using the Euro­
pean theater as an example, the
TAACOM, which equates to the 21st
Support Command, encompasses an area
roughly five times as large as the corps
rear area, thereby establishing a distinct
security vulnerabilityy by virtue of size
alone. Additionally, it is important to
note that the 21st Support Command
region crosees the national territorial
boundaries of five countries (the Netber­
lande, Belgium, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany) and that there are associated
host nation considerations which have a
very pronounced impact on TAACOM
security.
Urdike the corpe, which is essentially
responsible for its own RAP, as pointed
out by Major Calvin C. Seybold, US
Army Reserve, in his article “But Who
Ie Guarding the Rear?” (Military Re­
view, January 1979),’ Me TAACQM
1980
.
HOW FAR BACK?
must coordinate for security with the
host nation authorities ;oncerned.
NATO countries retain sovereignty in
their national territories and have overall
responsibility for RAP behind the corps.
rear boundtuy.’
In other words, protection of the
TAACOM is a coalition effort dependent
upon integration of US security require­
ments into a host nation RAP operation
plan. However, basic RAP doctrine es­
pouses a unilateral approach focusing
onlY on tbe capability of combat support
and combat service support forces to
defend themselves.’ Expanded doctrinal
guidance to include the concept of coali­
tion RAP remains obscure.
Additionally, current RAP doctrine
assumes that there is sufficient organic
combat support and combat service sup­
port assets available to perform the RAP
mission. Again, the extent of the coali­
tion effort is not recognized. The
growing trend in the US Army to draw
upon host nation resources in the field of
logistic eupport’ is quite apparent in the
21st Support Command. For example,
civilian local national employees com­
pnae 64 percent of the total 21st Support
Command work force.’
Furthermore, many of the command’s
eupport services, to include security
guard protection of mission essential
facilities, are procured by commercial
contract. Ultimately, this translates into
a reduced number of combat support and
combat service eupport assigned per3ion­
nel and an even greater reliance on host
nation cooperation and coordination for
TAACOM eecurity.
Although not clearly delineated in any
present doctrine, presumably, this neces­
sary host nation coordination would be
included in the RAP mission assigned to
the TAACOM conuhander.’ The problem
iii that the doctrinal element established
65
MILITARY REVIEW

to serve as the TAACOM commander’s,
command/control and planning mecha-
nism, the rear area operations center
(RAOC), is unilaterally orgadized to
function independently witbin an area of
operation.g
RAOC/host nation coordination in a
“shared” area of operation is not ad-
&essed. Compounding this conceptual
omission is the fact that there are no
RAOC units in the Active Army inven-
tory. Rather, these units are a part of the
Reserve and National Guard components
which would he deployed to the theater
of operations in the event of war.
What this means, then, is that there
are serious deficiencies in providing for
the security of the TAACOM. The sokl-
tion is obvious. Peacetime coordination
and liaison with host nation authorities
must be implemented immediately to
begin the work of developing a compre­
hensive multinational RAP plan. This
should be accomplished either by orga­
nizing on-the-ground RAOC units or
transfeming the RAOC functions to
some existing, active duty command and
control element.
Failure to resolve the issue of coalition
rear area protection will seriously ljeopar­
dize the TAACOM’e ability to accomp-
lish its mission. Just as boundaries,afe
always sought out by the enemy as weak
points, it can be expected that the enemy
will also recognize the vulnerability of
the theater army area command created
by a void in host nation/US planning.
%

NOTES

I L,e.tenant cot...) Moozao uooraa ran Rear 4ss. secur, t, DC 1 J.1,1’176, P *36
LV,tn an E!astm FEBA Wl(lary R,.<,*, September 1978, PD 5 FM 3185 Rear Area Protecf>on [RAP) 0,9eralr0”s 00 ,81
4349 6 FM ,005, ODer.t)o”s, oP c,, P 139
2 F,ela Manual ,F%413185 Rear Area P!olecoo” ,RAP, 0,9era 1 Comma.a B,, ef, ”g 21,, S“DDDCI comm, ”o 21,1 S“pp.rl
t<on$ Department .1 the Army Wasm.gtcm, D C, 17 July 1970 P Cc TmWId APO N.* Yak 09325 May 7979 D 1
23 8 FM 547. 711e.ler Armv Logr$f <c,, DeDar[me.1 of III. Arm?,
3 MaIOr Cal.,. C $ey!mlo But Who 1s G.w3,.Q the Rear, Wa.hmglon D C 20 November 1976, 038
MIl,farY %new Ja. u.rY 1979 DD2328 9 FM 31 85 Rear Area Pro,ect,o” ,17APJOnerabo”S OQ CI1
4 FM 1005, O.eraf,.ns, Depml men! CAme Army Was.z. g$o. 0D4 3 through 46

Captain Karen L, Frey M preuost marshal. 21st

Support Command, Kawerslautern, Federal Re­
public of Germany. She recetued a B.A m history
from the Uruuer.ity of Colorado She has served as
physical security officer, 21st Support Command,
and deputy prouost marshal, Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, U’ashington, D. C., and has com­
manded basic training companies at Fort
McClellan, Alabama, and Fort Jackson, South
C’aroiimz.

66 February
IRAN:

Major Arley H. McCormick, US Army. J’

Last gear’s tormoil in Iran caused anxietg at the highest levels of

US government. It atko caused aaxie~ at the level of the US mil­
itarg adviser living in Iran. The author describes this onxieQt and
offers suggestions to future aduisers.

T HE RAN, Iran, 13 February 1979.

The night wae deathly black and>
cool, end the constant echo of the local
reeidents shouting AIZah A Mar (God is
Great) from the rooftops in retort to
more dietant chanting was disrupting.
At 0500, less than 30 yards away from
the advisere’ beds, automatic weapon fire
and a garbled, crackling bull horn inter-
rupted the predawm silence. The Amer-
icans molded themselves to the floor as
tracer rounds streaked up and down the
etreet and zinged over the villa. The odor
of gunpowder filtered through open
windows ae the unarmed foreigners ,,
waited for the aeeauk. to rush over the
wane of their quarters.
Challenges shouted from the Khomeini
revolutionary guard post at the entrance
to the vilkI were answered by West
German automatic weapons in the bends
of Afghans. The American advisers,

1980 67
MILITARY REVIEW
caught on the sidelines of the firefight, .
were “prisoners” of the New Islamic
Repubfic.
Martial law was declared in September
1978. FoIlowing that, important sectors
of the economy (that is, petroleum and
trucking businesses and govemmenc ad­
ministration) deliberately slowed down
pro~tion. Custom inspections became
more thorough and less responsive to”
foreign demands. Lawyers, journalists
and teachers struck. The bazaar —a
major marketplace—and the universi­
ties closed. Foreign labor and businesses
from Japan, Italy and the Western coun­
tries began to leave. The local merchants
struggled as more pictures of Khomeini
appeared in their store windows.
In early December 1978, it was appar­
ent that the government could not sur­
vive. The shah would have to leave. On 6.
December, the Teheran American School
was closed for the safety and security of
the dependents. It was never reopened.
New rumors spread throughout the com­
munity daily. Speculation about the
future, safety and security dominated
most conversations.
Fear that 10 and 11 December, the
Shiite Muslim holy days called Muhar­
ram, would be bloody and that Amer­
icans would be targets for terrorist acts
prompted many to contact anyone who
could influence an evacuation. Depend­
ents were never ordered to leave, but,
on 8 and 9 December, an exodus of sev­
eral thousand American dependents was
completed. They were airlifted from Iran
to havens in the United States and
Europe. Tbe 10th and 1Ith were quiet
days for the Americans. Critical strikes
began in January, and the remaining de­
pendents departed.
The people of Teheran were a refresh­
ing contrast to the upheavaf that gripped
the country. Individually, they were
68
.
warm and genuinely friendly toward
Americans. For the most part, they
seemed to differentiate between a person
who happens to be American and the US
government.
As a group, Americans sometimes
were considered instruments of foreign ,
poIicy, but, individually, relationships
could easily be established even with
strong Khomeini supporters. Stifl, some
Iranians had some alarming precon­
ceived ideas about Americans and Amer­
ican foreign policy. They believed ithat
Americans were agents for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), present in
the country ordy to cheat the Iranian
people, preferring freedom for Amer­
icans, but not for the rest of the world.
At social gatherings or even while bar­
tering in the 10CS1stores, it was not
unusual for totaf strangers to inquire
about CIA activities or related Boints’
regarding foreign policy. It was apparent
that John F. Kennedy was very popular
with Iranians and Jimmy Carter hardly
rated at all.
Iranians shared many American atti­
tudes regarding big business. They pre­
ferred the products provided by Western
corporations, but resented the fact that
tiany got rich supplying their demands.
Some hostility was generated because
of internal corruption. To start a busi­
ness in Iran, an enormous initiating fee
(a bribe) had to be paid to the govern­
ment. To ensure that a company had con­
tracts, a “partner” (a member of the
parliament or the cabinet) was included.
This practice influenced the thought that
American businessmen pay large bribes”
to acquire government and commercial
contracts. Salary inequities between
Americans and Iranians similarly quali­
fied also created animosity.
Despite the contempt local business­
men had for their corrupt government,
February
,,

they had learned to cope. The business­
men among the Khomeini s?upportere
wanted the freedom that was being
promised, but they also realised that
without the shah, no experienced govern­
ment leader existed. They” were waiting
in hopee that times would be as profita­
ble under a compromise or a Khomeini­
led government. It was obvious that
those people who did not actively sup
port Khomeini did not oppose him.
As Khomeini’s etrength grew, more
horror stories regarding the SA VAK, the
ehah’s secret police, fueled the flame of
revolution. It was reported that political
activiste caught by the SA VAK were im­
prisoned, brutally beaten, tortured and
often murdered. Such reports produced
local martyrs and heroes who strength­
ened defiance. A repulsive report regard­
ing SA VAK agente eurfaced. Re­
portedly, the SA VAK agents would raid
a home, and, while interrogating the
men, each agent, in turn, would rape the
women and then leave.
Any support the government could
generate from the people was more out of
fear that Khomeini could not lead the
nation than out of love for the regime. In
spite of alf the indicator of change
approacfdng, the Iranians were as
confused about the evente as were the
Americane. Iranians quoted the Koran
and waited; Americans celled their con.
greeemen. The epecter of change haunted
everyone.
Meanwhile, the American military ad­
visers worked with a population of farm­
ers and nomads who were trying to learn
military skilfs and catch up with techn­
ology. The advisere’ mission was clear:
Through alf adversity, advice the im­
perial Iranian kIitaIY regarding the use,
repair and support of the modem weapon
eyetems, such as the Improved HA WK.
This became increasingly difficult in
1980 =4
.
IRAN
‘ the final months as their Iranian coun­
terpart were preoccupied with pofitics.
Many Iraniane programed themselves to
attend the longest military coureee avail­
able fn Weetem countries. They were
concerned about their famifies, homes
and future. Some Iranian mifitary offi­
cere became very vocaf and negative
about the efficiency of the American- .
contracted instructor and advisers. The
situation strained the progress of US
adviso~ teams. In Teheran; the head­
qnartere. for the Imperiaf Iranian Air
Force Air Defense Command, advising
was practically nonexistent.
Bueiness as usuaf became a face
eavbig, but meaningless, daily exerciee
of grouping advisers on Mercedes 16 and
20-paesenger buses and parading them
from their residences in the north of
Teheran to Doshan Tappeh (see eket.ch
~P) iII the eoutheast and back again.
The lack of meaningful and timely
information regarding the political situ­
ation wae frustrating. The Pubfic Affairs
Office of the US Military Mis~ion With
the Iranian Army/Military Assistance
Advisory Group (ARM ISH/MAAG )
published an Info-Gram that explained
political activities end confirmed inci­
dente involving Americans. The embassy
eetabfiehed a miseion information center
to provide upto-the-minute news. In
spite of the efforts to establish effective
fines of communication, rumors became
the primary source of information.
Although Americans were seldom
physically assaulted, the constant threat
was unnerving. Generally, violence wae
directed against things, hot people. Cars
were painted and windows were smashed.
Telephonic and letter threats abounded,
and verbal abuses were shouted on the
street. The presence of the American was
en extension of American policy and a
morale booster for the government. On
69
 Sketch map of crdrcal Iocatlons m Teheran Ihe gull d]stnct was the heart of the Amer(can commumty It contained a
theater athlebc fac!llhes, m!l!tary clubs and the othces 01 the commander of troops and staff of the US MMary
M6slon twth Iraman ArmylM!ltary Ass[stance Adwsory Group The ma)orlty of American mddary and dependents
hved nearby

the other side, Khomeini used the pres- cumstances— was morale-shattering.
ence of Americans to keep the people In addition to the constant threat of
incited for revolution. For many possible physical harm, the difficulty of
advisers, an awareness of the definition acquiring the necessities of life-perticu-
Of “instrumentalit y of the United lerly food and petroleum products–was
States’’-political pawns under the cir- distressing. Infrequent mail service, poor

70 February

tdeuhone communications and reliance
On a chain of command that did not poe­
sees adequate resources combined to dis­
tort the actual danger facing the Amer­
icana.
Khomeini called for general strikee on
1 January. Petroleum shortagee affected
the Americans meet. Gas lines became
three days long. At leaet one American
waited for gae only to be beaten and
turned away at the pumps. Fuel oil for
homes, normally 3 cente a liter (over 1
quart), was available ordy on the black
market at a cost of 63 cente a liter. Many
ran out of gasoline, heating oif and
natural gae for cooking.
As the situation woreened in January,
the ehah left the country. Khomeini
arrived on 1 February.
The finef attempt to conduct bueiness
ae ueuaf occurred on 7 February. A con­
frontation between progovernment
troops and Khomeini supporter took
place at Doehan Tappeh on the evening
of 9 February. By morning, there was
eporadic fighting, so only the divieion
chiefs were directed to report. However,
they were evacuated by helicopter the
afternoon of the 10th.
On 10 February, the rooftops came
afive with shoute and chanting re-s­
cent of the holy daye of December. SpW­
adic weapon fire wae heard throughout
the night. The following morning, the
streets were clogged with burned-out
automobiles, buses, mangled metal and
charred wood. Gangs of juvenilee carry­
ing Molotov cocktaile, clubs and bricks
lingered at intersections. Many advisers
consolidated in villas or apartments for
their pereonal safety. Isolated, they
waited!
Newe reporte indicated that police sta­
tions around the city were under siege
end falling one by one. Armories were
broken into by the revolutionaries, and
1980
.
IRAN
thousends of people became armed
rebels. B’y midaftemoon on 11 February,
the motor pool belonging to the
ARMISH/MAAG was occupied by Kh­
meini revolutionaries and burned.
Shortly after the motor pool was
seised, government troope retreated to
their berracke. It was the first indication
that the government had changed hands.
Later, the Iranian radio station con­
firmed that the ehah’s government had
fallen. The revolution was over! The
streete were filled with citizens display­
ing their exhilaration and their recently
acquired military clothing, web gear and
erme.
The commissary was also taken by
Khomeini revolutionaries the afternoon
of the 1lth. A very disturbing fact to
many Americans was that many crates
of household goods were stored there
awaiting shipment to the United States.
A fake report that the commissary was
being burned urdeashed considerable bit­
terness. That evening, negotiations
began between the Khomeini Committee
and the American Embassy.
About 1300 on 12 February, the com­
mander of troops for the ARMISH/
MAAG addressed idle personnel who
gathered waiting in the gulf district for
news. He assured them that negotiations
were in progress and that it appeared the
Americans would” remain in control of
the district. Less than 45 minutes later,
he advised them to leave the best way
they could. ,A scramble toward avenuee
of escape ensued. Thoee scafing the walls
were met by Khomeini soldiers.
In retreat and desperation, they gath­
ered in the compound. While actions
were being taken to bum several million
doflare worth of riyale ( Iranian currency)
and dollare and to secure finance and
personnel records and valuable property,
the main gate became. congested with
71
,,
 -,
soldiers coming in and the Americans
attempting to flee. Many fled on foot
through a gathering mob while others
drove out in cars. Communication within
the chain of command stopped, and
everyone appeared to be left on his own.
The Army communications center was
destroyed by American milita~ person­
nel and abandoned before it was occupied
by the revolutionaries. Except for the
embassy facilities, communication with
the outside world was nil. By the evening
of 12 February, all the facilities desig­
nated to accommodate the American
population were controlled by revolution­
aries. The Evin Hotel and the embassy
were exceptions.
On the evening of the 12th, the resi­
dents of the Evin received a telephonic
threat to leave the hotel or be kifled.
They remained in the hotel. By the
following morning, the hotel was sur­
rounded by approximately 2,oOO armed
and rowdy Iranian revolutionaries. They
began to fire at the third-floor windows;
after a time, they lowered their fiie to
the second floor. The Americans crawled
down halls and stairways to the first
floor where they were met by a female
.. ”.-. ..
PI!,,,,,, <..?,, \ >,, .,,,,),,,
Bunkers, idle during the day. became fart!fmd ch&kpomts
at mght
representative and leader of the revolu­
tionaries.
Three black American military - men
with the aid of an African, an employee
of the hotel, walked out the front door
and into the affectiomte embrace of a
ll\
Khomeini soldier who- escorted them
through 2 miles of hostile crowds. The
soldier commandeered a civifian vehicle
and headed for the residence of the
African.
The Americans remaining in the hotel
were escorted to Khomeini Committee
headquarters near the center of Teheran.
While they were away, their personal
belongings were pilfered. At the head­
quarters, they were asked their names,
positions in the military and other duty-,’
related questions. They were also asked
to identify Iranian general officers and to
relate any knowledge they had regarding
the generals’ conduct of their duty.
The Americans were treated with
courtesy and dignity, offered tea and ­
meals and, when +.heywere fzee to leave,
each wae given an unconditional pass.
The pace was confiscated when they
reached the Hyatt Hotel. They could no
longe~ live at the Evin. Frequent threats ,
February

were received while at the Hvatt. and en
attack by Afghans reqnir~d that an
armed guard of Khomeini troops occupy
the premiees.
At one point, some groups of advisers
began phmning their own evacuation.
One I&oup contacted the Russian and
Turkish Embaesiee and requested assist­
ance. Others began planning convoys to
the nearest border.
Many Americans had to go out on the
streets to acquire suppfies to feed the
unexpected adviser visitore in their
homes. Most of the population’s jubila­
tion had waned, and security on the
etreet had tightened. From the con­
firmed end of the eheh’s regime, Kh&
meini had urged the citizens b turn in
their weapons. Weapon collecting pointe
were established all over the city. But.
many groupe that supported Khomeini
now refused t.a dieerm. Afghan and local
Cornmuniet groups were especially vocal
in their opposition. Consequently, there
were bottlenecks where revolutionary
troops were checking for weapons.
, After dark, the streets were deserted.
Vehicles would often be stopped four
times in three blocks. Haetily erected
bunkere on street comere would be occu­
pied by six to 10 teenagers, including
girls, who waved automatic weapons and
searched carefully. Although the curfew
had been lifted after the change in gov­
ernment, movement after dark wae prac­
tically impossible. Amencane found on
the streets at night would be escorted to
the nearest controlling headquarters for
questioning and then released and
advised to stay home after dark.
The morning of 14 February was fike
any other in the seemingly endlese wait
for good news. By now, afl the facilities
used” by the Americsne were totally con­
trolled by Khomeini’s revolutionaries.
The days paeeed slowly. On the 16th,
1980
.
IRAN
the first evacuees were directed to group
at the American Embassy or the Hilton s
Hotel by 1600. Two suitcases were
authorized— one for the hold and one for
cm-on. Much to the dismay of Depart­
ment of Defense personnel, many civil­
ians, who had ample opportunity to leave
Iran prior to Febmary but chose to stay
and equeeze out the laet riyal, brought
as much luggage as they could pay some­
one to carry.
Those who assembled at the embasey
under the watchfnf eye of revolutionary
guarde were requeeted to turn in alf
weapone, liquor, pictures of the shah and
any other items that could be considered
inflammatory. Approximately 450 people
crowded into the embassy restaurant
and the room above ta wait. There was
fittle food and extremely cloee sleeping
arrangement. Television tapes blared aff
night as emotionally drained advisers
pondered their Iossee and tried optirnie­
tically to look to the future. The guards
intruded occasionally. While locsf con­
versations continued, everyone seemed
to feel their presence and tragk their
movement around the room. There was
no doubt that the Americans were pri­
soners.
At 0430, those not already awake were
awakened. At 0500, baggage was col­
lected,. and lines were formed to board
large buses for the trip to the airport.
The buses left the embassy under guard
during the morning rush hour. Some
Iranians were obviously jubilant while
others remained expressionless as the
captors paraded their captives.
Arriving at Mebrabad Airport, the
evacuees waited, most standing , for
nearly six hours, as the revolutionary
cnetom inspectors rummaged through
the baggage, confiscating items that
caught their fancy. After repeated pass­
port and identification checks, all
73
MILiTARY lV3fiEW

boarded the Pan American 747. A short,
tinte after 1600, t,he ordeal was over, and
the losses would be counted in dollars,
not lives.
‘f’he foregoing is an overview of the
perceptions acquired during the last
days in Iran from the lowest level of the
American organizational structure there.
It may not conform to the official rec­
ords being prepsred and promulgated by
responsible organisations. Obviously,
advisers at the lowest levels do not have
the benefits of information, justification
and responsibility to make the tough
decisions necessary to carry on an Amer­
ican presence in a country in revolution.
There are lessons to be learned from
this experience that could soothe the
attitudes of future advisers caught in
similar situations. Among those lessons
are:
e After martial law is declared, depend­
ents and household goods should
remain in the United States,
o Actions should %e taken to
determine the worst-case possibilities
facing Department of Defense personnel
in the host country— that is, packing and
crating materiaf should ?ae acquired and ~
stockpiled, dependents should be rel~­
cated by exp+ting routine commercial
air flights and mail and commercial pack­
ing firms should be contracted to
expedite shipment of hold goods.
e Nonessential advisers should be &.
reeted to a haven through the
expeditious use of leave and temporary
duty.
e The maximum possible alternatives.
for individual security should be pro­
vided— that is, flak jackets and plans to
consolidate living quarters.
e Neceseary life-eupport systems—
food, petroleum products and so forth–
should be stockpiled.
e A responsive communication link
between the lowest and the highest
levels of an organization should be estab­
lished with frequent commander’s calls.
%

Major Ar&y B M. Cormick is with the Cam-

went Army De.,ot Actiwty, Greenham Com­

mon, Newbuy, England He received a B, G S,

~­
in business admims trailon from the Uniut-rsity

of Nebraska. He served wzth the 40th Ordnance

Ammunatioa Company in Vzetnam, zuzth the : Q*”+% i

52.ith Ordnance Missik and Nuclear Mainte­
nance Company, Fort Richardson, Alaska, and
$%
as a missil+= maintenance officer uxth the ~~:g$j

[mproued HAWK Technical Assistance Field

Team, Teheran, Iran HIS article “A C’oncepr for

rb . .

Countering Smoke” appeared .in the December

1978 Militsry Rewew.

\ /

Leavenworth Papers. The Combat Studies Institute of the US

Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansae, hae issued the first of the Leavenworth Papers. The
subject is “The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine,
I
1946 -76.” Interested government agencies may requeet
copies through A4illtary Review or the Director, Combat
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
e

74 February
 The United States and Micronesia in.
the Spanish, Germans, Japanese and the
Fret+Association: A Chanca to Do Better?
Americans who have occupied this area
By Ambassador Philip W. Manhard
Nat!onal Security Affairs Mon.qraph Series,
national security reasons— to deny the
June 1979
area to other foreign powers who could
National Defense Unwerslty,
use it to interdict our sea and air lines of
Washington, D.C,
communication to Asia or to use its
In 1947, the United States assumed
total responsibility for Micronesia under
a unique strategic trusteeship from the
United Nations. Since that time, indiffer­
ence, mismanagement and changing
interests have created a situation
whereby Micronesia is now the last and
only remaining UN trusteeship. This
monograph describes the history of this
troubled relationship between the United
States and the Micronesia people and
offers some suggestions on how the
United States can best fulfill its respon­
sibilities and terminate the UN trustee­
ship.
For many people, Micronesia is best re­
membered from the historic World War
11 battles of Guam, Saipan, the Truk
Ielande and the Marshall Islands.
Actually, Micronesia is not a nation nor
a geographically homogeneous area, but
an anthropological term applied to the
Mariana, Caroline and Marshall IsIands
in the Western Pacific. It is composed of
over 2,oOOislands scattered over some 3
million square miles of ocean and
inhabited by 120,000 people of various
subcultures. These people have never
been politically or economically cohesive
nor socially integrated. Instead, they
have been grouped together for various
economic and administrative reasons by
1980
for the past 400 years.
The United States accepted the trust­
eeship for Micronesia primarily for
islands as stepping stones for bases to
attack the United Ststee. Since 1947, the
United States has also used it for other
military activities such ae for forward
basing for Strategic Air Command air­
craft and as an area for nuclear testing.
As part of the trusteeship agreement,
the United States is responsible for pro­
moting the economic and social develop­
ment of the area and to foster the de­
velopment of the people “toward self-
government or independence. ” The
United States has been heavily criticized
because it has taken these responsi­
bilities too fightly. However, within the
past 10 years, negotiations have taken
place that will resolve the political status
of the area. Three options are being con-
s~dered: US commonwealth, free associa­
tion and independence. The first two are
the ones that are receiving major consid­
eration.
One major reason for the delay in re­
solving the political statue situation has
been the internal disagreements among
the Micronesia people as they try to
decide what is best for them. Their het­
erogeneous cultural nature and the
inequitable division” of income between
the various political subdivisions-dis­
tricts— has created many dissensions. As
a rew-dt, the northern Mariana Islands
negotiated their own future with the
United States, with the US Congress
75

MILITARY REYIEW
aPProv~g: a co-onwedth StatUS for ,
them. The %ernainder of the districts are
discussing their status and whether they
shotdd stay together as a unit or eub­
dzvide into eepamte pofitical entities.
The author ie optimistic about the out­
come of the political status negotiations
and is confident that the final decision
will see a new relationship of “free asso­
ciation” between the remaining districts
and the United States. Thk, he believes,
wiff offer both parties a healthier and
more constructive relationship. “Free
association” is the best hope of serving
each other’e intereste .ae effectively and
as fairly as possible.
Col Earl E Perry
LTl$ce of the S%n;or AovIsef, US Army Auwsory Group
The Defense Mapping Agency and the
Digital Domain
Lleutehant General Abner B Martin, USAF
The LMfary .@rreer, January-February 1979
%What earthly good is a paper map any­
way? Think about it. Invariably, it is out
of date or completely lacke certain infor­
mation which ycm would have found very
useful or even ,critical in completing a
mission. The paper map which we have
used in this country since Generai Waeh­
tigton’s time has come eerious short.
commgs. But theee shortcoming, when
coupled with the total mapping responsi­
bilities of the Defense Mapping Agency
(DMA ), make it necessary that we, the
military users of maps, have a general
knowledge of the DMA efforts which are
involved in the production of an effective
product whether it is a paper map or
digitized topographic data.
Lieutenant General Martin, the DMA
director at that time, gives us a brief
overview of the DMA efforts to make
76
!
!
digitized topographic data avdable to
the mflit.my user. These efforts’ are both
production- end experimental in nature.
Programs described include the D&td
‘anbss‘-ktor‘DLMS}’‘e%%
Contour Matching (TERCOM} and
finder.
The DLMS is a digital topographic
data base used primarily to improve the
training and proficiency of &crews. The
future wifl probably provide other users
for this data base. TERCOM is a digit­
ized terrain program used in the cruise
missile in the form of a stored informa­
~ion mat~wded by the DMA.,Dur­
mg the nus e’a fight, the inertial guid­
ance system has overall reeponsibfity
for guiding the mieeile. The TERCOM
subeyetem eamplee altimeter readings
along the flight track and compares the
samples with the stored matrix. Using
the best match, TERCOM then
computes the navigation position error,
updates the inertial navigation system
and then repeate the process at the next
fixpoint until the target ie reached.
The Firefirzder weapons location sys­
tem ie ueed by the field artillery and is
comprised of the AN/TPQ36 and
AN/TPQ37 radars which are designed to
protect against a range of threats from
mortars to rockets. The system takes
multiple fixes on a projectile and, from
that information, computes the formula
for the projected trajectory back to its
source: These locations are then immedi­
ately known for counterfire. Multiple
projectile can be processed eimulte­
neously.
The future for digitized topographic
data is vast, and a growing part of the
DMA mission is to provide this data in
the form of cost-effective products to the
user. Approximately heff of DMA’e
~products are various kinds of digitized
data files.
To answer the initial question– What
earthly good is the paper map anyway?
– the paper map is very good for certain
uses, but no longer is it the best way to
February

present information for all point location
or navigation uses. The uses to which
digitized topographic data products are
put are growing.
Today’s Army exiets in a period of his­
tory in which we are not always allowed
the luxury of time for a human to read a
paper map and then make his best esti­
mate.
This is a good article and worth
reading by audiences other than the mili­
tary engineer community.
John L Grjffm,
CombmeO Arms COmbdt Development Actfwry
Modern Soviet Artillery Doctrine and Practice
By Christopher Donnelly
NATO’S Fifteen Nabofrs, June-July 1979
The inability to break with tradition,
the unwillingness to consider or experi­
ment with new ideas and the tendency to
prevent subordinates from exercising
initiative are problems with the long-
standing features of Soviet artillery prac­
tice, There is a distinct Soviet “style” to
the conduct of war, states Donnelly, and
it is a style of gunnery which bae shown
a remarkable degree of consistency over
the Iaet century despik the innovations
of technology during that period.
Donnelly discusses several character­
istics of Soviet artillery doctrine. The
characteristics include the overafl fire
plan, mace and weight, centrrdized con­
trol, rigid calculations and logietics. The
discussion of these characteristics, which
were typical of czarist artillery from the
days of fighting Napoleon through WorId
War II, shows that not too much has
changed since.
Conventional artillery concepts have
shaped the way Rueeiane regard alf de­
livery means– whether ground artillew,
1980
.
REVIEWS
fized and rotary-winged aircraft or nu­
clear weapons. All are employed to vary­
ing degrees in the three distinct phases
of contemporary doctrine: the prepara- ‘
tion, the close support and the accom­
p-ent. Afl are subordinated to the
ground commander. This concept of
unity is of the greatest importance. be­
cause it emphseizes the second feature,
concentration.
The Soviet army has never abandoned “
its doctrine of mass, says Donnelly, nor
has it lost its abifity to deliver it. The
Soviets went through great pains in the
1950s and 1960s to develop a doctrine on
how ta fight a war using tactical nuclear
weapons as heavy artillery. They have
now shnost developed their capacity to
fight a war with or without nuclear
weapons. An interesting point is brought
out by Donnelly:
In modem terms, the Soviet artillery
consider it essential for the success of an
operation that, on the vital sectors (but
not necessan”ly over all the front), there
be a ratio of artille~ weapons of about
8:1 in their favour. Such a ratio will
enable them to engage every enemy bat­
tery in a counter-battery duel with a
rati”o 0f3:l. .
To achieve the concentration men­
tioned above, a high level of centralized
control is necessiny, and a Soviet com­
mander must accept as normaI the fact
that he might at one time lose alf his
guns to an adjacent unit. However, at
other times, he will have several times
more artillery than normal. On the mod­
ern battlefield, nonetheless, the time
available for such maes movements wilI
almost surely be minimal. The Soviet
practice of linear deployment is also a
disadvantage as it makes the batteries
extremely vulnerable to accurate coun­
terbattery fires. In his favor is the fact
that much of the Soviet gunnery is con­
ducted by direct fire. This allows them to
use special shaped-charges and sights
against enemy armor formations.
77
MILITARY REVIEW Ip

Their reliance on rigid and complex ,
calculation in planning a battle allows
the Soviets to determine the volume and
type of fire required for any specific task
regardless of the level at which it is
planned. Donnelly says:
A significant consideration, in itself a
feature of Soviet artillery practice, is
that all these figures are assessed on the
assumption that no immediate pn”or reg.
istration of the target and no direct ob-
servation of the fall of the shot will be
possible. Whether
Such fires can be particularly devas-
tating as Israeli defenders found out dur-
ing the October 1973 Middle East War
when they were fired upon by Sbviet-
trained Arab armies.
The final feature, logistics, was a
peculiar one in that it points out the lack
of a supply corps, as such, in the Soviet
system. In virtually all cases, the user is
responsible for tbe supply and mainte~
nance of both weapons and ammunition.
The divisional chief of ~artillery must
negotiate for the allocation of transport
space. However, due to the enormous
numbers of transports available and the
masses of ammunition, it is unlikely,Jhat
other than 10CSIshortages will occur.
These five major features give a dis­
tinct style to Soviet artillery practice.
recent debates in the Soviet
military press will have any impact
cannot be determined. However, as Don­
nelly states, “In all human affairs tbe
habits of long practice do sometimes
become blinkers.” Perhaps we should be
checking ourselves for the beginnings of
the same type phenomenon.—AFT.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers Zvery effort IS made to ensure accw
I
rate translation and summarizatmn However, for more detaded accounts, readers should refer
to the original articles No of flclal endorsement of the vie-s. opinions or factual statements in
these items IS intended or should be referred — Editor.

“The Seven Dwarfs”

Reference the article “Whatever Became of the Seven
Dwarfs?: A Modern Fable” by Colonel A. J. Sajo, US Army,
Retired (Mi/itary Rewew, January 1980).
We have received comments questioning the intent of this
article. This article wae intended as an open plea for a
stronger national defense by strengthening all elements of
the Total Army. In no way was it intended as a condemnation
of any elements of our Total Army. The history of our country
shows only too clearly the indispensable value of citizen-
soldiers and their contribution to readiness. In retrospect,
because of the interpretations which can be drawn from the
dwarfs article, it was a bad article and certainly our thousands
of Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers deserve
an apology. To the Reserve Components, we wish to state
unequivocally that this professional journal proudly supports
their enormous strength and dedication, esprit and contribu­
tion to our Total Army’s readiness goaIs.—Editor.
!

78 February
1
Defending Soizhenitsyn
Professor Hajda’s critical book review
of Sofzhenitsyn’s Harvard address, A
World Split Apart (Military Review,
September 1979), enumerates the leading
ideas well but neglects the fufler dimen­
sion and context of this profound
cuftursl critique.
~ Besides providing remarkable insights
about the politicaland social dissrray of
the West, Sofshenitsyn’s address gossto
the core of the spiritual crisie of the
epoch which he believes to afflict the
East only in a more advanced form than
it does the West. Sofxhenitsyn contsnds
that the materialistic view of the world
which developed since the Renaissance
–denying the existence of intrinsic evil
in man and proclaiming his autonomy
from any higher force–has reached its
logical end-station, a morally gutted
humanism and boundless materialism
emancipated from our earlier heritage
with its “great reserves of mercy and
sacrifice. ” Solzhenitsyn’s pro~osis is ar­
resting:
[We have} reached a major watershed in
history, equal in importance to the turn
from the Middle Ages to the Renais­
sance. The fight, physical and spin’tual,
forourpfanet, afightof cosmic propor­
tions, is not a vague matter of the
future: it has already stizrted.
Hajda’s review has also seemed to con­
fuse morality with “moralizing.” The
American novelist John Gardner
recently wrote that great art always has
been and should always bean art based
on the search, for and delineation of
values. A political’ prisoner in the Grdug
land where values exist as self-mock­
eries, Solaheniteyn developed an acute
sense of the existence of absolute and un­
1980
shakable values and a conviction that
these needed delineation snd affirmation
in every forum. This he has done in the
monumental Gulag A rchipeZago, one of
history’s great moral statements–a
work arguably beyond the capacity of a
man dismissible as a moralixer to exe­
cute.
John Romjue,
US Army Training and Doctrins Command
s The alert reader wilf note that accord­
ing to Webster’s New World Dictionary,
the meaning of “moralixe” is “to think,
write, or speak about matters “of right
and wrong” or “to interpret end explain
in terms of right and wrong.” And th$t’s
what A World Split Apart has attempted
to do.
Joseph Hajda,
Kansas State University
Danish Treat
I read the article “A Chalfenge to the
System: Leadership Selection” by Major
James Talley (Military Reuiew, January
1979) with the greatest pleasure. The
reason it gave me special pleasure is that
I myself dealt with the subject as early
as November 1977 in an article in the
Danish professional journal, The Engi­
neer. Its contents correspond to conolb­
sions in Taffey’s article and would only
be of little interest to Military Reuiew
readers. However, you might be inter­
ested in learning how random sekction
worked in reality although the example
mentioned below was only a parlor game.
I celebrated our 35th officers’ jubilee
with 26 of my contemporaries. All of us
are married, and we were accompanied
79
MILITARY REVIEW
by our wives fonfy two of which had been ,
replaced by rrew ones which tends to
prove the high anorel standards of Dan­
ish officers! ). AS a certain point during
the dinner, I coflectad all 26 narnetags,
having previously asked each officer if he
was satiefied with his rank and present
poeition. One general, three major gen­
erals, five coIonek3, eight lieutenant
colonels and nine majors were present,
and ordy seven answered in the negative.
The 26 narnetags were placed in a hat,
picked out and handed to the officers in
the order thqt they were seated at the
tabIe. Thus, some received their present
rank while others received a higher or
Iower one. They were then asked to con­
sider their new positions and inform all
present of their approval or disapproval.
Now, only six were diesatisfied.
What this proves is naturally uncer­
taih, but why not try the system at your
next mess party?
Col Gunnar M. H. Langberg, Daniah Army
A Code of Ethics
The following is in response to the
article “Military Code of Ethics: A Pro­
posal” by Lieutenant Colonel Jack F.
Lane Jr. (Military Review, October
1979).
We do not ‘need a military Code of
Ethics.
Since the time of George Washington,
devotion to duty and respect for honor
have been the watchwords of American
military professionals. No lesser code is
acceptable, and I doubt there has been a
greater consciousness of duty and-honor
than today. Our people have not become
more liberal and less ethical. Rather,
they have become more realistic in see­
ing the world as it is.
Americane, military and civilian,
expect their public eervants t.a hold to
tbe highest standards of ethics and
80
integrity. I befiave, however, that good
conduct and common sense cannot be
Iegkdated. Ethicef behavior is a result of
a lifetime of education, experience end,
exposure to values and principles that’
are honorabIe and have stood the %se of
time. Everyone in the rnili@ry under­
stands t~ high personal standarde ex­
pected of them, both in their, official
duties and in their personrd concerns, in
ac~iom seen and known by the world and
in the deepsst privacies of the mind.
There is no checklist, no approved solu­
tion for each individual’s every situation.
The fiviug reefity of the expected high
ethicrd standards of the mifitsry simply
cannot be captured in their entirety in ~1
the narrow lifelessness of the printed
word.
We all know right from wrong, and a
code would not make any difference to
one who doesn’t. Punish— swiftly and
pubficly– the wrongdoers. (Don’t retain
them at present rank because they only
have orie year to go until retirement.
Don’t give them a lateral promotion. )
Make individuela responsible for their
actions. (How can a person who super­
vises a project that results in a rnilfion­ 1
dollar cost overrun be promoted?) We
live DOWN to every expectation of a
flourishing bureaucracy, including alf tbe
violations, when we fail to hold indi­
viduals responsible.
We must reward those who display
high ethical standards and encourage our
people to establish even higher stand­
ards. Conversely, we need to expose
those who do not measure up to our
desired goals and then eliminate them.
Based on our history, the military pro­
fessional has good reason to be proud.
Our people stand tall. Continue to rein­
force an awareness of ethical conduct at ~
all levels, and don’t give me another
printed code.
My address is: oJcs/J-5/FD&sP,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301.
Capt Steven E. Cady, USAF
February
 .

UNITED STATES

XV75 TILT. ROTOR AIRCRAFT

The XV75 tilt-rotor research aircraft, being developed by Bell for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the US Army
Research and Technology Laboratories, is shown in its first in-flight con­
version from helicopter to airplane mode. The flight, lasting approximately
40 minutes, included forward speeds of up to 160 knots at altitudes of up
to 3,500 feet above ground level.
Climbs an d scents, acc~erations and decelerations, and turns were
performed durin
7 the fligh}and demonstrated the XV75’S potential as a
multipurpose aircjraft. The NASA/Army XW5 project pilots said the aircraft
handled like a fix -wing transport during the airplane flight mode with no
o noticeable vibratio‘% .

The Mi//taryReview, the Department of the Army and the US Army Cemmand and General
Staff College assume no responaibiiity for accuracy of information contained in the NEWS
section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorse­
ment of the wews, opinions or factual statements is intended.—Edltor.

1980 81
MILITARY REVIEW

SATELLITE SIGNALS TO GUIDE MISSILES

A weapon guidance system that Sep 1979, pp 52-58) are a high

uses radio signals from satellites
orbiting 11,000 miles above the
earth to guide tactical missiles
accurately to land and seabased
targets is under development by
Hughes Aircraft Company for the
US Air Force Armament Labora.
tory, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
The on-board system would deter­
mine a missile’s precise latitude,
degree of flexibility, simplicity,
stealth and the ability to avoid
detection.
Using signals from satellites, a
GPS-guided tactical missile could
be launched anytime and any­
where with the same high
accuracy. In addition to its night­
time capability, the system would
also function in any type weather

longitude and altitude while in and over any distance the weapon”
flight by calculating with extreme can operate.
accuracy (within billionths of a Because the GPS is dependent
second)” the time it takes signals only upon the satellite signals i
from four satellites to reach the on;e it is launched, it inherently is’
weapon. suited for standoff launch-and-
The technique under study has Ieave tactics, with the launching
a number of potential advantages aircraft able to withdraw as soon
over other guidance methods in as the missile is fired. The spread-
use or being considered for spectrum GPS wave form signal
medium-range tactical weapons transmitted from the satellites
such as air or sea-launched cruise also provides the guidance system
missiles, antiship missiles or glide with a high level of built-in resis­
bombs. Among the more tance to electronic counter­
important of these attributes measures so it considerably
derived from using the Global- reduces the need for supporting
Positioning System (GPS) (Fvff?, anticountermeasure equipment.

82 February
 .

NEWS

ON TARGET

Anew liquid crystal reticle fora

gunner’s telescopic sight is sig­
nificantly smaller and less expen­
sive than the mechanical devices
currently used in vehicle fire con­
trol systems. The comput6r­
generated cross hairs can move
on two axes to provide an accu­
rate aim point for the gunner. The
all-digital liquid crystal device has
no moving parts, does not fade in
bright sunlight and has a flexible
format for numerical displays.
Hughes Aircraft Company’s elec­
tro-optical and data systems group
IS developing the reticle under
contracts to the US Army Night
Vision and Electro-Optics Labora­
tories and the US Army Armament
Research and Development Com­
mand.

ISRAEL
SAGGER
The large quantdles of So­
viet Sagger antitank mis.
siles captured by the
Israelis during the last two
Middle East wars have
been subjected to a
number of modifications to
their guidance systems to
Improve their accuracy over
long ranges. This will
enable Israel to Ilne up
another valid antitank
missile alongs!de its stand­
ard m!ss!le system which
IS based on the TOW.—
Ground Defence /nterna.
f/ona/, 1979.

1980 , 83
I
MILITARY REVIEW

The Japanese Air Self-Defense vanced radar processing system,

Force (JASDF) will purchase four the F/awkeye automatically de­
tfawkeyes in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 tects, identifies and tracks enemy
and plan for an additional four in aircraft over both land and water
FY 1983. First delivery is expected at ranges approaching 300 miles.
in May 1982. In addition, Japan It also monitors movement of
may contract for ground support enemy ships and land vehicles.
equipment and also for training of Passively, it detects enemy radar
JASDF flight and maintenance emissions to the maximum lineof­
personnel. sight ranges.
Topped by a 24-foot-diameter Japan’s E2CS will be identical
rotating radome and carrying to those built for-the US Navy. The
10,000 pounds of sophisticated JASDF will use the /-faw/reye in
electronic equipment, the E2C can conjunction with their existing
monitor 3 million cubic miles ground-based early warning
of air space. With its APS725 ad­ system.

FRANCE

FLOATING BRI;GES AND PONTOONS

The French Castor system can to 32 men if used’ individually as

be used for building both floating assault craft.
bridges and pontoons. In either Floating bridges capable of
case, the bridge or ferry structure spanning distances of up to 14.46
is carried on a number of fiber­ meters can be built by using six
glass caissons which can carry up caissons together with a
[

84 February

maximum of four bridging spans,
twO hinge units and two access
ramps. The system can be set up
in less than 40 minutes without
using special equipment.
The bridge is launched by driv­
ing one vehicle at a time to the
water’s edge where the unit is un­
folded and slid into the water.
Once afloat, It is positioned by
two outboard motors. Additional
units are then launched until the
1980
.
.
NEWS
required length is reached. The
bridge is dismantled by reversing
the process.
If a sufficient number of pon­
toons are available, a bridge 100
meters long can be built by 45
men in about an hour, and a raft
can be put together by 15 men in
15 to 40 minutes. Both are capable
of supporting the weight of a 50­
ton vehicle.—Ground Deferrce /rr­
tematior7a/,@1979.
85
MILITARY REVIEW

USSR

AIRBORNE RESUPPLY CAPABILITIES

Figure 3 is a drawing of a heavy
vehicle being extracted from the
Soviet Arr-12 transport aircraft. An
interesting Soviet technique, per­
haps worth adopting, is the use of
braking retrorockets when drop­
ping heavy—and generally also
fragile—vehicles and equipment.
The rockets are ignited by two
feelers mounted diagonally on the
pallet. On touching the ground,
these sensors trigger the rocket­
firii?g circuit, enabling virtually
zero descent speeds to be
achieved at the moment of impact.

tlgure 1

Figures 1 and 2 show the Soviet

PDMM47 system used for light air­
drops. Figure 1 emphasizes how
densely the containers can be
packed. The auxiliary parachute
opens before the main chute,
allowing accurate area drops to be
made, particularity at low altitudes.
The shape of the container and
the use of rails permit the system
to be carried externally by smaller
aircraft for pinpoint drops to en­
circled units. Figure
2

86 February
 .
NEWS

Figure3 ...!
v[gure4

The PGS500 series 2 airdrop construction is that before being

system (Figure 4) can be used for unfolded for use, it takes up very
loads up to 1,100 pounds. The pal- little space. The descent speed of
let is assembled beforehand, its 15 meters per second is high to
exact composition depending on increase drop accuracy and de-
the weight of the load—that is, the crease the likelihood of the con-
descent speed. H consists of two tainer being hit by enemy fire.
plates which enclose a number of However, the design of the PGS-
layers of honeycombed paper 500 enables the payload to survive
(three in the photo). A significant the impact undamaged.—/nterna­
advantage of this type sandwich tior7a/ Defense Rewew, @ 1979.

SOVIETS BUILDING TITANIUM SUBMARINE?

The Soviet Union has been holding back on exports of titanium sponge in
recent months, an action attributed to the increasing use of the material in
military projects. It has been reported that the Russians are developing an
all-titanium submarine that will be able to move faster and dive deeper than
current underwater craft. Efforts of US firms to engage the Soviets in long-
term titanium sponge contracts have been unsuccessful, and only a trickle
of the material is leaving the USSR. In addition, ‘a sharp increase in
European purchases of sponge has further reduced the availability of the
material .—DMS Intelligence Qn AerwJace, @ 1979.

1980 87
,.
 .Wthough this is no longer a study, ~e felt it would be of signigcant interest
to oar officer audieace.—Edizor.

Defense Offieer PersomreI Management Act. The Defense Officer Personnel

Management Act (DOPMA ) is the culmination of a number of efforts by the
Department of Defense {DOD} and the Congress over the past 15 years to
update laws pertaining to commissioned officers.
DOPMA basicelfy attempts to clean up some inefficiencies; cure certain
inequities in officer treatment; provide nev tooki to control the force during
expansion and contraction; and eetablish more uniform permanent promo­
tion, separation and retirement laws for each service. To be successful, a sat­
isfactory baIance between management inh eet of the Department of
Defense and personal rights of the individual officer must ba achieved. The
DOPM A proposal submitted by DOD achieves such a baIance.
DOPMA was passed by the House in both the 94th and 95th Congress, but
was not considered by the fufl S nate. In the spring of 1979, DOPMA was
introduced into the Senate by S h a or Nunn (Senate Bilf S1 186). Hearings
were held on 17 July before his subcommittee (Manpower and Personnel,
Senate Armed Servicee Committee (SASC!)) and reported out of the sub­
committee in August. Since then, the fulf SASC has had numerous closed
sessions to mark up and vote on the legislation. The DOPMA bill, completely
reformatted and renumbered S 1918, was voted out of full committee in mid-
October. Action by the full Senate will probably foflow before the end of
1979. Major provisions of the Senate legislation are:
. 0 Single Promotion System. The committee recommendation provides each
military service a single, permanent promotion system under a single appli­
cable statutory grade table and under laws that would be the same for each
service. +
o Uniform Tenure Provisions. Retains the up-or-out promotion concept
madified with discretionary secretary authority to convene selection boards
to recommend twice-failed Regular 03s and 04s for continued active duty in
order to meet mission requirements. Maximum service for captains and
majors is 20 years and 24 years, respectively (if continued), lieutenant
colonels to 28 years and colonels to 30 years. The DOD version dld not apply
continuation authority to captain.
o AR-Regular Officer Career Force. S1918 does not include provision for
mandatory all-Regular career force by the 1Ith year of commissioned service
as submitted by DOD. Instead, the SASC raised the Regular Army size to
63,000 allowing, if desired, an all-Regular force through management actions.
It does provide ,secretarial authority for convening special selection boards
for the purpose of recommending deferment of mandatory retirement for up
to five years or age 62, whichever occurs first. Brigadier generals and major
generals are retired after five years in grade or 30 years of service and five
years in grade or 35 years of service, respectively, whichever occurs later.
Discretionary continuation authority appfies.
Mandatory retirement age is generally set at age 62 with extension to age
64 in certain categories.
e Grade Limitations. The Senate establishes grade tables that would limit
the number of majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels on a sliding scale. The
06 through 04 grade tables are based on total commissioned officers that ,

88 February
 would lead to a reduction of 30 percent in colonels, 25 percent in lieutenant
dolonels and 20 percent in majors. Transition wouId take place over 10 years
(‘‘major” reduction occurs in the first five years). M eete general officer
strength in relation to total strength: 344 at 700,000 and 352 at. 800,000. It
also authorize the eecretery of defense to allocate an additional 177 general
officere among the services.
� Mobilized Reserves. The Senate rejected the DOD provision of excluding
mobilized Reeerves from the active duty grade limitation and promotion
eystem. It authorities the preeident to suspend theee provisions during
\
national emergency.
e Retirement. S1918 provides provisions for early retirement of lieutenant
colonels who twice failed promotion to colonel and colonels who would have
had four years in grade, No more than 30 percent of those considered would
be recommended for retirement. It emphasizes that the early retirement
provieion ehould be used sparingly and primarily as a means of reducing
numbers in grade during a reduction in force. The bill also increases
D

mi’timum time to be served in senior grade to retire in that grade from six
monthe to three years. Current Army policy requires two years in grade.
e Separation Pay. The Senate Bill revises the payment for those involun­
tarily separated to be equrd to 10 percent of annual basic pay for eaqh year of
service up to a maximum of $30,000. Officers with less than 10 years’ service
receive lees than under current law and those with over 10 years, more.
e Uniform Constructive Service Credit. Specifies those professional cate­
gories that would be entitled to credit and the credit authorized. The DOD
bill would have allowed more discretionary authority to determine the officer
skill categories for credit, as well as the amount of such credk. ln part, the
bill sets constructive credit at three years (first lieutenant) for Chaplain,
Veterinary Corps, Judge Advocate General’s Corps and Medical Service
Corps. Physicians and dentists remain at four years (captain). It also pro­
vides a provision to permit the eecretary of defense to grant additional credit
neceesary to assure entry grade of captain to attract sufficient numbers of
qualified judge advocates when required.
s Competitive Categories for Promotion. Deletes the current categories
specified in law and, instead, authorizes the eervice secretaries to prescribe
and abolieh categories.
a Deputy Judge Advocate General Positions. Provides a uniform provision to
authorize the position of judge advocate general and deputy judge advocate
general in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The secret+uy of defense will
determine a uniform term of office and grade for each position. The bill
requires presidential appointment of these offices by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
e Uniform Treatment of Men and Wdmen Officers. Equalization of treatment
t
of men and women officere with reepect to the laws governing appointment,
promotion, separation and retirement.
o Commodore AdmiraI. S1918 eetabliehes a commodore admiral (one star)
grade in the Navy.
Once Senate action of the DOPMA legislation is complete, the House of
Representatives will take up the Iegielation, probably after the first of the
year. It is anticipated that the House will pass, ae they have twice done in
the past, a bill similar to the DOD version. Differences between the two bills
wilf be compromised in a joint committee of the Congress.

Reprinted from Army Personnel Letter, November 1979

1980 894
I

Arms: Nudmli-’‘aE’d conventional

NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE THIRD WORLO U S. POIICY Dilemma t)y Ernest W Lefever 154 Pages Brookmgs instituhon Washlpg.

ton, D C 1973 $995 clothbound $395 paperbound

While intema}ional affairs are replete with intricate problems and poficy dilemmas,
few problems share the complexity of nuclear proliferation. The consummate scholar of
nuclezw spread—horizontal proliferation in the parlance-must employ a knowledge of
history, politics, physics, physical security, law, psychology, contemporary affairs and,
finally, a high level of analytical skills. Frankly then, it ie not surprising that only the
rare author has managed to tie together the disparate intellectual threads to produce
really outstandhg works on the subject.
More typically, we find books such as Ernest Lefever’s Nuc[ear Arms in the Third
World. At their best, they are informative, descriptive and interesting. Yet they lack the
depth of analysis, insight and investigation which would so enhance their value (and
longevity) as well as the reader’s understanding of the problem. 1
Nuclear Arms in the Third World, while of the lesser breed, is a brief, readable and
competent book which surveys nuclear weapons development through March 1978 in
several of the states which are approaching (or even have crossed) the nuclear weapons
threshold. Lefever includes reasonably complete treatments of India, Pakistan, Iran,
Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina.
He finds that only a small number of technically advanced states (especially Israel and
India, but also South Korea and Taiwan) might develop small nuclear forces by 1985.
He estimates about 10 by the year 2000. He muses that Iran and Egypt might detonate
a weapon by 1985 Brazil and Argentina might attain a small force by the year 2000,
iven as they are by their continental rivalry. Pakistan might deploy a token force by
1 5.
%3
There are a number of interesting tidbits in the book. Several of the near-nuclear states
(for example, Argentina and Iran,-South Africa and Iran and Argentina and India) are
cooperating in various fields of nuclear endeavor.
Lefever concludes with a discussion of prospective nonproliferation policy measuree.
The material is espscialfy noteworthy for the author’s,, recognition of the relationship
between the levels of security assistance and the incentives to pursue nuclear weapons
development. All too often, commentators and policymakers have ignored the fact that
genuine fears (vis-a-vis the incentivs of prestige) motivate the nuclear weapons programs
of Third World states. In one of the seminal works in the field, the late Leonard Beaton
asked: “Must the bomb spread?” Lefever’s conclusion would seem to be: No. If the
United States and other world powers pursue an intelligent and timely policy, nuclear

90 February
 .
BOOKS ‘

abstinence can be the result rather than the danger engendered in the prospect of living
in a nuclear armed crowd. According to Lefever, this means:
More U.S. security commitments in the Third World not fewer. Amen”ca must turn
outward and become involved selectively in the security of significant states that will
otherwise be inclined to go nuclear.

Maj Augustus R Norton,

AFSC

ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPONS by Slockholm Internahonal Peace Research Insntute 299 Pages Crane, Russax & Co N Y 1979
$2650

The book describes the development, ployment and effects of conventional anti­
personnel weapons such as rifles, machin f“guns, bombs, shells, mines and grenades, The
first chapter covers the period from antiquity to 1900. The remaining eight chapters
stress the time frame from World War I through Vietnam. v
The author reinforces attempts to prohibit or restrict the employment of the more
inhumane uee of such weapons. As a means of substantiating his thesis, the author has
managed to compile a red storehouse of information. From the standpoint of in-depth
historical research and the accumulation of statistical data, this is a valuable work. Of
course, the reader should be prepared to wade through the bias of an idealist imbued
with a noble sense of humanism for mankind.
The work has a tendency to overtarget the Unit,ed SLates as the main culprit in the
inhumane use of antipersonnel weapons. Scholarly studies should be objective, but this
book falls short of the mark. From the aspect of providing detailed information pertain­
ing to antipersonnel weapons, the book is worthwhile reading.

Co! Jerome J Haggerty, !JSA8

changing e-lobs

HOW TO MARKET YOURSELF YOURSELF! The Executive Job Changing Guide Book by Bruce E Moses. 208 Pages. Pro-

Search Inc Olympla F!elds, 111 1979 $i4 95

This is a new hook for first termers or retirees who are changing careers and entering
the civilian job market. It is an easy to read employment guide. A professional national
executive search director for the past 15 yeare, Moses goes the gauntlet in how to land
that job. He has placed many Armed Forces graduates, and his book is a worthwhile
addition to the’ ‘how to do it” so necessary to the successfd career changer.—EMB.

1980 91
 MILITARY REVIEW

YOUTH OR EXPERIENCE? Manning the ModErfl Military by Marbo Blnkm and Irene KyriakoDoulos 84 Pa9eS 8rookmgs lnSlltUtlOn,,
Washington, D C 1979 $295 ~

At a time when personnel costs routinely account for over 50 percent of the annual mil­
itary budget and the declining enlistment pool forces the armed services to compete even
more fiercely for’ ‘labor, ” Binkin and Kyriakopoulos offer a provocative alternative.
The military, they propose, should reassess its refiance on “youth and vigor” as the
primary qualification for service. The authors suggest revising pay, retirement and
grade structure to encourage significantly higher retention rates among senior enlisted
personnel. The insistence on youthfulness is a carry-over from the days when most ­
enfisted personnel performed duties directly involving physical combat. But, as early as
World War I, fewer than 50 percent of all enlisted personnel served in combat jobs. By
the end of World War II, about 75 percent of all military jobs were noncombat.
The emphasis on a youthful force (60 percent of the Armed Forces enlisted personnel
were under the age of 25 in 1977) means that if separation rates remain as high as they
are currently, the cost of recruiting and training replacements for soldiers, sailors and
airmen skilled in the technology of modern warfare will continue to be an increasingly
expensive burden for the Armed Forces. A modest increase in retention of experienced
enlisted personnel, the authors argue, would result in reduced recruiting, training and
support costs for essentially nonproductive first-year enlistees.
This savings would more than offset the increased longevity, retirement and support
costs for older but more experienced service members. Furthermore, they point out,
highs retention rates would permit greater selectivity of recruits. The net result would
be a more experienced and, presumably, a more combat-effective force as w@l as lower
personnel and individual training costs.
This Brookings Institution study in defense policy offers a tantalizing solution to sev- i
eral of the vexing problems that confront the modern volunteer force. It deserves the
careful consideration of Department of Defense and Department of the Army leaders
who deal with manpower procurement and retention policies and all others who are con­
cerned with the euccess of the volunteer system.

Mat Robert u Grltl!lh,e

Combal .SW.Ies lnshtufe, uSACGSG

CHAN81NG AMERICAN FAMILY 207 Pages Congressional Quarterly. Wash@On. D C 1979 $625

This research report is fmother in a series of reports published for journalists, scholars
and the generai public. There are 10 reports included in this book, covering such topics
as the changing American family, violence in the family, single-parent families, women in
the work force and youth unemployment, among others. Each report is approximately 20
pages long, dating from 1976 through 1979.
While some of the reports maybe a little old, they sti~ provide a wealth of information
which members of the military can use. MS. Sandra StenceL in her foreword, recognizes
the transition the American family is undergoing. She uses the term transition rather
&

.’92 February
 .
BOOKS

than decline to suggest that the family will prevaiL quoting Kenne~h Kenniston, “Fami­
lies are changing, but it is a mistake to confuse change with collapse.”
The reports provide data concerning the eociaf and economic forces which affect family
fife. The report on single-parent families may have the greatest value to the mifitary
which, at this point, is struggling to derd with this issue. The report on women in the
work force provides insight into the increase of women in the job market during wartime
and how laws have banned discrimination in employment. The charts depicting the earn­
ing gap and women’s labor force can aid the military supervisor at all Ievels to ensure
that squal opportunity is a way of life. and not mere words.
. The reports reflect the general society of America and as such would have more than
passing relevance for the military family. They are not to be read in a eingle sitting.
They should be available for reference. WhfIe the reports are full of statistical informa­
tion, they are easy ta read. They can be a benefit to the military member who wants to
understand the sociaf and psychological forces that impact on military family membere ‘
and could ultimately affect mission accomplishment.

Lt Col J A Kochenour, USA, Retred

B

Amwnd the world

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, .1978-79 .1,256 Pages Gale Research Co Oetrolt, Mlch 1978 $6900

Published annuaUy, Africa South of the Sahara, 1978-79, is a superb, up-to-date refer­
ence providing a comprehensive survey of the Sub-Saheran continent. Background on
African history, development, economics. geomaphy, lanmages Vd reIigions i?
condensed into 10 well-chosen articles authored by such rotable Afncamsts as Basal
Davidson and David Dalby.
A detailed listing, including addresses in various African cities, of regional organiza­
tions offers a brief explanation of the organization’s functions and a list of current
officials. For the student of Sub-Sahara Africa, this section Provides an excellent and
rapid summary of the important regional organizations and, for the experienced African­
ist, a comprehensive review. One salient example is a neat, concise, five-page summation
of the Organization of African UnitY with principal events. history, and goals, inclu~lng
an explanation of the charter, a great aid for the’ ‘Africa watcher. ”
The third and most lengthy section presents a country-by-country update covering
geography, recent historical events, economic factors and a detailed etatisticaf survey,
with such diverse information as livestock estimates to country diplomatic represent­
atives.
The final section contains these handy references: abbreviations, a ‘~who’s who” sec­
tion, primary commodities, research institutes and a selected bibfio=aphy of perio~lcals.

Lt Col Grmdley C Curren,

Depdrlmenf of Und!ed and Combined Operatm?s, USACGSC

1980 93
MILITARY REVIEW

EUROPEAN SECURITY: Prospsa!s tar thff 1980s Dy Derek Leeb~rl 302 Pages Lexington Books. LexlnglOn, Mass 1979

This book contains articles and analysee by a group of facuky and fellows of
Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs. The defense considerations,
poIitics and economics of Europe in association with the United States were discdssed
againet the threat of the Soviet Union and its satellites, and this book is the result. It
updatee many of the problems ~esetting Europe with provocative comment and opinion.
The contributors are eminent researchers and politicaI anaIysts, while the editor,
Derek Leebaert, has been a research feliow of the Center for Science and International
Affairs since 1975. The eubjects range from the probleme of energy and the Hellenic/
Turkish dispute to Eurocommunism and Soviet perception. It should be essentiaI read­
ing for students of Europe and the NATO Alliance since it gives an impartial view of the
results of 30 years of peace under the NATO AK1ance and provides an ineight into the
problems and prospects for the future.
9
Col J;hn S Fowles, Brdish Army,
MA TO Mddary Commlllee, OI!ernahonal MIldary Staff, Brussels

THE PRICE OF GLORY. Verdun 1916 by AIIslaIr Home 364 Pages Pengu,n Books, N Y 1979 $295

This book first appeared in 1962. If you haven’t read it over the ensuing 17 years, you

must not be a “World War I-ophile. ”

C. P. Snow acclaimed Alietair Home “one of the best writers of history in the Znglish­
speaking world.” If that is true, he did nothing to tarnish his reputation with this jewel.

I twice visited Verdun without having read this book. I hope to go back some day
having read it, ”and I estimate my enjoyment of the visit. will increase 50 percent. Home
sets the etage for the battle in a manner that puts the reader in the ruom where decisions
were made. His quotes from soldiers under fire put the reader in the trench or forest with
the besieged.
He is equally at ease and interesting whether telling the story from the French or
German side. His range is from entire armies on the move to individuals locked in one-
on-one combat. Regardless of whether he is discussing a marshal or a poiiu or a gefreiter,
that person becomes alive (again) to us readers. We suffer his sufferings and rejoice with
him in his exultations.
Home’s skillful command of the language, colorful descriptions and touch of humor ‘
throughout make this book a pleasu”re rather than a chore to read. When he describes a
situation in the French army, he also mentions how a similar circumstance would be
handled in the British or German rirmy. The interested reader thus doesn’t have to do
outside in-depth research to satisfy his curiosity. “
The book is as interesting as a historical novel. Si ce his facts about the battle are
correct, his novel-like style appem-s due more to pai&staking research than to a vivid
imaginatiofi.
I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in World War 1.

Ma) John Re!chley

Oeparlment o! Tactics. uSACGSC

94 February
 BOOKS

Learn to Fight/Fight to Learn

NEITHER ATHENS NOR SPARTA?. The Amerman Service Academies m Transmon by Jonn P Lovell, 362 Pages Ind!ana Unlversty

Press, Bloommgton. Ind 1979 $1750

John Lovell is well-qualified to write on the service academies. A graduate of West

Point, he served eix years as an ,4rmy officer, wote his Ph.D. dissertation on attitude
changes of cadets at the US Military Academy and has taught not only at Indiana IJni­
versity, but also at the US Navsf Academy and the US Army War College. His book
lives up to his impressive credentials. It is a solid piece of research, for Lovell has not
only mined the traditior@ sources, but also has conducted a great numfrer of valuable
interviews.
Neither Athens Nor Sparta? deals with the four Defense Department academies and
especially focuses on the enormous changes that have transformed them from the late
1950s to the mid- 1970s. He gets into many issues but remains true to the title by zeroing
in on the constant tension between the contrary demands of the military and academic.
The book is particularly effective in dealing with both the background of each of the four
academies and how each changed during the reform years of the 1960s and 1970s.
Lovell takes other cuts at the subject besides a straight chronological-historical
approach, but with less success. He does make the point, and quite convincingly, that
much reform takes place through the efforts of individuals. Specifically mentioned are
McDermott at Colorado Springs, Davidson at West Point, Leamy at New London, and
Calvert at Annapolis and, of course, Admiral Rickover. The impact of external bodies,
Lovell finds, is secondary.
Another effective portion of the book is the conclusion. Lovell discusses the various
options considered for the future of the service academies. He beheves that the most
probable course over the next 5 to 10 years will be incremental change. Nevertheless, he
does see the possibility that such change may take either a bold or cautious path.
But for all its merit, the book will probably leave many readers unsatisfied. Neither
those four-square friends or foes of the academies will be happy with Lovell’s presenta­
tion, for it is objective, telling both the pros and ‘cons. Likewise, the book may not
eatisfy those in between, for it does not probe deeply such topical and important issues
affecting the academies as the honor code, the impact of women and the present purpose
of the academiee.
Overall, t~e book is well worth reading. First, it will be of interest for those who were
involved at the academies during these years of reform and modernization. Second, the
book will be of interest for any and all interested in the role of the academies in the
formulation of the officer corps. Clearly, Lovell raises the paramount question How well
do the academies serve the needs of their parent services and the defense,of the country?
Lovell does a good job of laying out much information, but be leaves it to the reader to
answer that question.
Kenneth P Weuell,
Raaforo College

1980 95
MILITARY REVIEW

WILDCATTED: The Story of M!chael T. Halbotdy and the BITTER GLORY: Pnland and Its Fate, 191 S-19S9 by R!:hard
Search for Oil W Jack Donahue 268 Paoes McGraw-Hm M Watt 511 Pages. SiMOr! & Shuatef, N Y 1979 $1695
Book CO N Y 1979 $1095 8LITZ A Nnvaf of London Under %aga by Dawd Frazer 899
WORLO AIRCRAFT: 1918-1935 DY Enzo Anaelucc! and Paoto Pages Doubleday &Co N Y 1279,$12,95,
Malrlcardl 319 Pages Rand MiNally & ~o Ch!cago. Ill THE 80MBER IN WORLO WAR U by Altred Price 150 Pages
1979 $795 Scr!bner’s. N Y f976 $1095
WORLO AIRCRAF7. Origins-World War I by Enzo Angeluccl THE BRIOGE AT KILOME7ER 5T5 by Nolan J Argyle 192
and Pacdo Malrlcardl 320 Pages Rand McNally & Co Pages Manor Books. N V 1979 $1 75
Chicago, 10 1979 $795 BUILOING THE HOUSE YOU CAN AFFORO A Ste~by-Stap
WORLO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1979 and Beyond by Consbuctmn Guidn by Stu Campbell t 47 Pages” Garden
Herman Kahn 519 Paoes WWam Morrow & Co We’s! Way Publtshmg Co Charlotte, Vt 1979 $1495 dO!h.
Caldwell, N J 1979 $7”95 bound $995 paperbound
TOKYO ROSE: OrDhan of th8 Pacific bv Masavo Duus Trans CANARIS: Hitler’s Master Spy by Heinz Home Translated
Iated trom the Japanese by Petar Du~s 24S’ Pages. Kodan­ by J Maxwell BrownJohn 703 Pages Ooubleday & Co
sha International, N Y 1979 $12.95 N Y 1979 $1595
THE JAPANESE AIR FORCES IN WORLO WAR 0: The Organi­ THE CAVALRY MANUAL OF HORSE MANAGEMENT. Edited
zation of the JapanOSe Army and Naval Ah Forcos, 1945. and revised by Fredertck L Oevereux Jr 236 Pages A, S
170 Pages Hippocrene Books, N Y 1979 $1495 Barnes &Co Cranbury, N J 1979 $1450
AIR WAR-VIETNAIA, lrItrOduCbOn by Drew khddleton 361 CHARLES E. WILSON ANO CONTROVERSY AT THE PENTA­
PageS Bobbs. Merrdl, N V 197S $1500 GON, 1953 to 195T by E Bruce Geelhoea 216 Pages )
THE APACHES: Eagles of the Southwast bv Oonald E Wor. Wayne State Unwerslfv Press. Detroit. M1ch 1979 $f4 95
tester 3S9 Pages Unwersdy of Oklahoma Press, Norman, THE COMPLETE BOO~ OF ROLLER SKATING by Arm. Vtctoria <
Okla 1979 $1595 Phdllps 268 Pages Workman, N Y 1979 $6.95
ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARYfPOLITICAL RELATIONS: Arab Per­ A CONTINENT ASTRAY: Eurnpe, 1970-197S by WaNar
cepffons and the Politics of Escalation by John W Amos II Laqueur 293 Pages Oxford Umversity Press, N Y 1979
3B2 Paoes Peroamon Press. N Y 1979 53250 115 no
AhABl~: A Jotirnny Through the Laby;iih by Jonathan tUiIi=NT AFFAIRs ATLAS. 19791s0. Edded bv Oonald
SfabaO 344 Pages SIrnOn & SCIIuSfer, N Y 1979 $1195 Paneth 1S2 Pages Facts on Fde, N Y 1979 $19 ~5
ARMS TRANSFERS ANO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Crisis in World Communism. Edited and
Edded bv Andrew J Pierre 331 Paaes New York Unlverstv–, mlroductmn by Vojlech Mastny 392 Pages Facfs on Foe,
P(ess, N’ Y 1979 $2250 ­ NY 1972 $1500
ARMIES OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA by Otto von Plvka 272 OAS OEUTSCHE REICH UNO OER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG: Band
Pages Taplmger Publlahlng Co N Y t979 $1495 f: Ursacherr und Voraussetzungrm dar deutschan Kriags-
AlTACK WARNING REO by Oerek Wood 357 Pages Hrppo­ DoVdik bv Wdhelm Oetst. Manhed Messerschm!dt Hans­
crene Books, N Y, 1976 $1795 krlch VO~Kmann and Woliram Wette 764 Pages. ‘Omd;che
BATTLES WITH MOOEL TANKS bv Donald Featherstone and VedagsAnstalt, Stuttgart, FRG. 1979 OM S2
Kedh Robinson t50 Pages Hlppicrane Books, N Y 1979 THE DEPARTMENT OF OEFENSE Oocumerds nn Establish- ~
$1295. Maflt and OrgaRlzaffOfl, 1944.1978. Edded by Alice C Cole, 2
BE YOUR OWN CHIMNEY SWEEP by Chrlatopher Curbs and Alfred GoldDerg, Samuel A Tucker and Rudfllph A Wln Z
Oonald Post 101 Pages Garden Way Publlshmg Co Char­ nacker 332 Panes US Government Prlntlno Otf[ce, Wash. ~
lotte, Vt 1979 $495 mgton, O C 1979
THE BEAR AT THE BACK 000R: The Sowet Threat to tha THE EGGNOG RIOT Th8 Cbriatmas Mefbrv at Wast Pnlnt bv ~,
West’s LNalfrre m Africa by General S!r Walter Walker 255 James B Agnew 2t 1 Pages Presldlo Press, San Rafaei, ~
Pages Vailant Publishers, Sandton, Republ!c of South Calif 1979 $1295
Africa 1978 ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE FORMS OF CANNON ANO ;
BEHINO JAPANESE LINES: VAth the 0SS in Burma by Rich VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY by N Persy 44 Pages ;
ard Dunlop 448 Pages Rand McNally & Co Chicago, Ill Museum Restorallon Service, 8100mfleld, Ont Can 1979 .:
1979.$1295 $595 7
THE BEST OF FRAGMENTS FROM FRANCE by Captain Bruce ENOGAME; Tha Inside Story 01 SALT II by Strobe TaIbotL ~
Balrnsfather. Compded and edded by Torue and Valmal Hell 319 Pages Harper & Row, N.Y 1979.$1500
160 Paaes Phm Publlshmg, Cheltenham, Eng 1978 f3.25 ENGLISH WEAPONS ANO WARFARE, 449-1660 by A V, B ~
GROUNO ATTACK AIRCRAF7 by Christopher Shores t91 Norman and Don Potdnger 224 Pages Prent!ce-Hall, Engle- ;
Pagea Hippocrene Books, N Y 1977 $995 wood Cliffs, N J 1979 $1295

96