Updating the Human:

Transhumanist Elements in 21st Century

American Film

Schriftliche Hausarbeit im Rahmen der Ersten Staatsprüfung, dem

Landesprüfungsamt für Erste Staatsprüfungen für Lehrämter an
Schulen vorgelegt von:

Teresa Elias

Köln, 24.11.2014

Prof. Dr. Berressem

Englisches Seminar I
Table of Contents

1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
2 Transhumanism or Transhumanism ............................................................ 2
2.1 History of the Term .............................................................................. 3
2.2 Alleged Forerunners of Transhumanism.............................................. 4
2.2.1 Fedorov ......................................................................................... 5
2.2.2 Nietzsche ...................................................................................... 6
3 Contrasting and Comparing Transhumanism with Humanism and
Posthumanism ..................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Leaving the Center Stage ................................................................... 11
3.2 A Cyborg Manifesto .......................................................................... 14
3.3 Humanity Plus .................................................................................... 16
3.4 Building Bridges ................................................................................ 19
4 Transhumanist Claims and their Impact on Bioethics and Politics ........... 21
4.1 Morphological Freedom ..................................................................... 23
4.2 Therapy versus Enhancement ............................................................ 25
4.3 Genetic Engineering........................................................................... 26
4.4 Politics................................................................................................ 28
4.5 Singularity .......................................................................................... 29
5 American Science Fiction Film and the Apparent Death of the Genre ..... 31
6 Film Analyses ............................................................................................ 33
6.1 The Amazing Spider-Man .................................................................. 34
6.1.1 The Transhumanist Posthuman .................................................. 34
6.1.2 Cross-species Genetics as a Universal Remedy ......................... 35
6.1.3 A World Without Weakness ....................................................... 36
6.1.4 Fake the Snake ............................................................................ 37
6.1.5 Imagine, Everyone, Equal........................................................... 38
6.1.6 The Problem of Perfection .......................................................... 40
6.1.7 With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility ......................... 40
6.2 X-Men Trilogy .................................................................................... 42
6.2.1 Mutants‟ Posthuman Condition .................................................. 42
6.2.2 Coexistence of Humans and Posthumans ................................... 42
6.2.3 Misuse of Power ......................................................................... 44
6.2.4 The Cure ..................................................................................... 44
 6.2.5 The Transhuman Mutant ............................................................ 46
6.3 Transcendence ................................................................................... 47
6.3.1 Building a Better Future By Means of Technology ................... 47
6.3.2 Creating a God? .......................................................................... 48
6.3.3 Facing Death ............................................................................... 50
6.3.4 Global Super-Conscience for the Cost of Humanity .................. 52
6.3.5 Singularity as Transcendence ..................................................... 55
6.3.6 The Blurring of Humans and Technology .................................. 56
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 57
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 60
Appendix .......................................................................................................... 68
Erklärung .......................................................................................................... 71
1 Introduction
We live in a world of glow-in-the-dark-dogs, artificially created jellyfish made
of rat cells and silicone, as well as transgenic silk worms which can generate
spider silk. Despite such examples sounding like the stuff of science fiction
films, they also reveal the world‟s progress in the realm of technology.
Transhumanists advocate the use of such technological advances. Their focus
lies in particular around the idea of intellectual and physical enhancement
techniques for humans which could potentially pave the way for a posthuman
condition. The advocates of these ideas mostly aspire not only towards
improved intelligence and greater physical strength but also towards
immortality; while simultaneously maintaining their human essence. Francis
Fukuyama, one of the strongest critics, believes Transhumanism to be the
world‟s most dangerous idea, as he fears the loss of humanity as an inevitable
consequence.
This paper is, however, not primarily about defending or advocating
Transhumanism1 but is instead an attempt to elucidate this recent movement,
its origins and its meaning. Firstly, the history of the term Transhumanism
itself will be explored. Subsequently, the philosophies of the Russian thinker
Fedorov and the German cultural critic Nietzsche, two alleged forerunners of
the transhumanist mindset, will be presented. For the purpose of this essay, it is
also essential to shed light on Humanism in order to define the scope of
Transhumanism and to distinguish it from Posthumanism. Having examined
the differences and the similarities between these three movements, special
consideration is given to transhumanist claims. Moreover, in chapter 4 the
transhumanist attitudes towards ethics, politics and visions of the future such as
the technological singularity hypothesis will be highlighted. Theoretical
explorations will be completed in chapter 5, providing an overview of
American science fiction film and the possible end of the genre science fiction
itself. The aim is to draw upon the theoretical concepts as a bias for the film
analysis. The films The Amazing Spider-Man (2012), X-Men (2000), X-Men 2
(2003), X-Men: The Last Stand (2006) and Transcendence (2014) present a

1
The capitalization of the terms Transhumanism, Humanism and Posthumanism is done
purposely in order to reinforce the same level of significance.
1
clear example of 21st century American film, which include not only a range of
transhumanist elements but also an underlying transhumanist belief to be
examined. Frequency as well as the overall significance of these issues is
evident within these films. Finally, the idea is presented that there is an ever-
increasing importance of Transhumanism in the present world as a result of a
changed perception in the possible.

2 Transhumanism or Transhumanism
[Transhumanism is an] intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility
and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied
reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to
eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological
capacities (Various quoted in More, 2013: 3)2.

Not only the quotation but also the term Transhumanism itself should, and will,
be examined in this paper. The stress can either be put on Trans- humanism as
well as on Transhuman-ism (More, 2013: 4). Whereas the first accentuates
Humanism as its philosophical background, the latter indicates a futuristic
outlook with respect to humankind. The above-mentioned “possibility and
desirability” (Various quoted in More, 2013: 3) of progress clearly refers to the
ideology of Humanism during the “Age of Reason” (Law, 2011: 18). This
world view might best be summarized by Kant‟s definition of Enlightenment
as the

[e]mergence of man from his self-imposed infancy. Infancy is the inability to use
one‟s reason without the guidance of another. It is self-imposed, when it depends on a
deficiency, not of reason, but of the resolve and courage to use it without external
guidance. Thus the watchword of the Enlightenment is Sapere Aude! Have the
courage to use one‟s own reason! (quoted in Law, 2011: 19).

Claiming responsibility for the destiny of man presents one essential heritage
of rational Humanism which the advocates of Transhumanism have adopted
(More, 2013: 4). However, Sorgner disagrees with this aspect, pointing out that
the concept of reason as understood by Kant and that as understood by the
transhumanists differs, since the first “hold[s] that human beings have an other-
wordly rational part, and a this-worldly material one” (Sorgner, 2014: 42);

2
It is referred to the Transhumanist FAQ which was first published in 1999 but was altered
slightly over the years. A full list of authors involved in this publication can be found on the
official website humanityplus.org.
2
whereas transhumanists only assert a science-oriented, this-wordly
understanding of the human which implies more restricted capacities with
regard to the conception of reason (Sorgner, 2014: 42). Taking this difference
into consideration, Transhumanism still attaches great importance to humanist
values and the belief in progress as required by Humanism (Law, 2011: 1).
Moreover, transhumanists take the theory of evolution seriously by assuming
that humans are likely to continue developing. Thus, it extends and transcends
Humanism, in so far that transhumanists want humankind to become “the first
species to take control of its own evolution” (Allenby, Sarewitz, 2011: 9).
Although both Humanism and Transhumanism have targeted the advancement
of the human, their ways of realization differ. Whereas Humanism relies solely
on educational and cultural elaboration, Transhumanism intends to polish up
the human by applying technology in order to break through the given
biological limitations (More, 2013: 4).
In approaching Transhumanism from the other side of the coin
(Transhuman-ism), the focus becomes centered on the condition of traversing
several processes of enhancement rather than remaining with the historical-
philosophical root of the transhumanist movement. Biological flaws like
limited “intellectual, physical, and psychological” (More, 2013: 3) qualities
should be eradicated at best. According to the journalist Joel Garreau,
“[t]ranshuman […] is [the] description of those who are in the process of
becoming posthuman” (quoted in Wolfe, 2010: xiii). Thus, it is a transitional
phase between humans and posthumans.3 Bostrom adds that the latter ones are
“possible future beings whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of
present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current
standards” (quoted in Cole-Turner, 2011: 13).

2.1 History of the Term

The term Transhumanism has been introduced several times in history.
However, the meaning in the past never fully matched the school of thought
with which transhumanists would nowadays accredit their movement. A case
in point is Dante Alighieri‟s use of the verb “transumanare” (More, 2013: 8) in
his Divine Comedy, already written in 1312 (More, 2013: 8). Although More

3
F.M. Esfandiary even defines transhuman as a “transitional human” (More, 2013: 11).
3
translates it with passing “beyond the human” (More, 2013: 8), he admits that
the context is limited to religion and spirituality (More, 2013: 8). The lack of
the role of technology also becomes evident in T.S. Eliot‟s use of the verb
“transhumanised”4 (T.S. Eliot, 1949: 130) in his play The Cocktail Party. Yet,
it is widely accepted that Julian Huxley‟s understanding of Transhumanism
outlined in his book New Bottles for New Wine fits the current notion best.
According to Huxley, an evolutionary biologist and zoologist (Tirosh-
Samuelson, 2011: 21), the self-awareness of the cosmos has revealed itself to
some humans (Huxley, 1957: 13). Consequently, it is man who needs to
assume full responsibility for the world, since he is the “appointed managing
director of the biggest business of all, the business of evolution” (ibid.). The
exploration of the human in order to identify its potential should present the
primary objective. He compares the scope of possibilities regarding the human
with a geographical area which has to be delved and mapped (ibid., 15).
Furthermore, he is convinced that the “human species can, if it wishes,
transcend itself – not just sporadically, an individual here in one way, an
individual there in another way, but in its entirety, as humanity” (ibid., 17).
Interestingly enough, he puts the achievement of spirituality on the same level
as that of acquiring tennis skills; both as being achieved prospectively by
means of science and technology (ibid., 15). Having quoted Hobbes, who
characterizes life as “nasty, brutish and short” (quoted in ibid., 16), this
prevailing mood regarding the imperfection of life can be considered as the
principal reason for the urge to improve the quality of people‟s lives fitting to
the new situation in order to reach a perfect satisfaction deep inside (ibid., 17).

2.2 Alleged Forerunners of Transhumanism

The two putative precursors of today‟s Transhumanism who will be outlined in
the following have their roots in the second half of the 19th century. Thus, it is
not far-fetched to suppose that the transhumanist mindset could have developed

“You and I don't know the process by which the human is transhumanised: what do we know
4

of the kind of suffering they must undergo on the way of illumination?” (T.S. Eliot, 1949:
130).

4
due to a synergy of the rapid technological development and the apocalyptical
atmosphere of the fin de siècle in the Western world (Stambler, 2010: 14).

2.2.1 Fedorov
Since it is known that the Christian churches in particular were rather critical of
the technological rise, fearing a loss of power, it is surprising that Christian
theologians promoted the use of technology in order to enhance the human
already in the 19th century (Burdett, 2011: 19). One of those who put faith in
progress is the Russian religious philosopher Fedorov (1829-1903), further
considered to be the founder of the Russian Cosmism (Stambler, 2010: 14). In
his treatise The Philosophy of the Common Task5 he criticizes not only the
antagonistic attitude among people but also the fact that the majority of the
philosophical theories lack the practical relevance necessary in order to
improve humankind. Education does not seem powerful enough to win the
“struggle humanity has with its own primitive nature” (Burdett, 2011: 26). For
the purpose of creating a perfect society, individual death, “the last enemy to
be overcome” (Fedorov quoted in Stambler, 2010: 14), should be eliminated by
preventing not only intrinsic but also extrinsic death. Whereas the first can be
avoided through the purification and moderation of the internal body, the latter
can be ruled out by controlling the environment (Stambler, 2010: 14).
According to Fedorov, death is the key problem of humankind and “not
a quality which determines what a human being is and must be” (quoted in
Burdett, 2011: 27). In his vision, physical immortality should be available for
all living people. In addition, all humans who ever have lived should benefit
from a bodily resurrection in order to do justice to the universal salvation of
Christ (Stambler, 2010: 15). In line with Fedorov, one way to defeat the
common enemy is to unite all humans. Although the belief in human
unification and in the resurrection is deeply rooted in Christian faith, the
attainment of these targets can rather be considered transhumanist. Berdyaev
states, “[a]ccording to Fedorov‟s doctrine, the resurrection of the dead is
achieved not only through [the] action accomplished by Christ, the Redeemer
and Saviour, and not only by the spiritual and moral efforts of mankind and the
love of human beings for the deceased, but also by the scientific, technical, and

5
Most of his works were published posthumously in 1906 and 1913 (Stambler, 2010: 14).
5
physical activity of people. […] Fedorov even speaks about [the] physico-
chemical experiments of resurrecting the dead” (Berdyaev quoted in Burdett,
2011: 28). Whereas these attitudes can be seen as a forerunner of the
transhumanist ideal of gaining immortality or at least a radical life extension by
means of technical inventions, there are also some traces of totalitarianism and
nationalism perceivable in Fedorov‟s philosophy.

Russia and the Russian people can (and must) call all peoples of the world to an
alliance against this common enemy [death]. Absolute monarchy will play the highest
role in this struggle, and Pravoslav Christianity, that will sanctify this union, will
become the common religion (Fedorov quoted in Stambler, 2010: 15).

Moreover, Fedorov claims a so-called “psychocracy” (Stambler, 2010: 15) that

is based on an absolute monarchy which

cannot coexist with […] democratic republics, not even with constitutional
monarchies, but only with absolute, patriarchal monarchy, with a King, standing in
place of the Fathers, as a sovereign of the two kinds of regulation, the internal and the
external (quoted in ibid.).

Thus, Transhumanism stands only partly in the tradition of Fedorov. Whereas

his approach to controlling the natural forces in order to achieve his overriding
aim to stop death with the help of technology seems, from a transhumanist
view, desirable, the political implementation might, however, encounter
resistance.

2.2.2 Nietzsche
I teach you the Superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye
done to surpass man? [...]The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say:
The Superman shall be [sic] the meaning of the earth! (Nietzsche, [1885] 1999: 22).

Nietzsche (1844-1900) is also considered to be one of the forerunners of the

transhumanist movement. His concept of the Übermensch which is outlined in
his philosophical novel Thus spake Zarathustra is often compared with the
transhumanist notion of the posthuman. The transhumanist Max T. O‟Connor,
better known under his alias Max More, even states that his “transhumanist
ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche” (2010: 1). Looking at the
quotation above, it fits to the transhumanist view that human nature is
progressively and permanently subject to change (Sorgner 2009: 30). By
saying

6
 Alas! There cometh the time when man will no longer launch the arrow of his longing
beyond man – and the string of his bow will have unlearned to whizz! I tell you: one
must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: ye have still
chaos in you (Nietzsche, [1885] 1999: 26).

it becomes evident that Zarathustra perceives the fixation of values and

meanings as contemptible6. However, this also implies a rejection of
determining the ultimate definition of man.
For Nietzsche, the meaning of the Übermensch is not about a perpetual
improvement of humankind in order to evolve into the next evolutionary stage,
and thus into a new species. Becoming a superhuman in Nietzsche‟s sense is
only feasible through the contemplation of humans, meaning a return to the
term of man with regard to his questionability (Römpp, 2013: 228). The
Übermensch takes up a position from which he can reflect on the notion of
humankind and its world. According to Nietzsche, this kind of reflection is
necessary, since a fixed meaning with respect to man would eventually lead to
an end of critical argumentation (ibid., 232). By challenging how the term
human is used at a specific time in a certain context, the human becomes
overhuman, since the being positions itself on a meta level due to its
questioning. As a result, the Übermensch has a certain distance to the humans
but he is by no means a stronger, nicer or better human than before (ibid., 229).
More emphasizes Nietzsche‟s statement: “And life itself confided this secret to
me: „Behold,‟ it said, „I am that which must always overcome itself‟”
(Nietzsche, [1885] 1999: 110). This utterance seems to present the purpose of
life. However, the feared stagnation is warded off, as the meaning of life
implies a perpetual reflection on the notion of man.
Although Nietzsche and the transhumanists would probably both agree
on the incessant changing of humankind, it is imperative to notice that this, as
well as other statements in Nietzsche‟s Thus spake Zarathustra, reveal nothing
about the need of technological intervention in order to improve mankind.
Consequently, an equation of the transhumanist notion of the posthuman with
the concept of Nietzsche‟s overhuman is not reasonable. A further difference
arises from the allegory of the course of the sun during the morning, noon and
evening. There is an “eternal recurrence” (More, 2010: 1) of the overhuman,
implying a constant change between the human and the overhuman. Römpp

6
Nietzsche uses the German adjective verächtlich in this context (Nietzsche, [1885] 1994: 15).
7
reads this as being Nietzsche‟s denial of the modern belief of progress towards
the better (2013: 253). Moreover, it can be stated that Nietzsche has a negative
attitude towards the extension of one‟s own life span. Not only the statement
“What matter about long life! What warrior wisheth to be spared!” (Nietzsche,
[1885] 1999: 53) but also “I love those who do not wish to preserve
themselves, the down-going ones do I love with mine entire love: for they go
beyond” (ibid., 184) seem rather inappropriate for an ideological predecessor
of transhumanist thought (Stambler, 2010: 18). For Nietzsche “the problem has
never been a biological one” (Pearson, 1997: 35). As seen above, it is not
uncommon that transhumanists stress the mental feebleness, the physical
fragility and the limited intelligence of the human (ibid., 32). According to
Pearson, this represents “[a]ll that which Nietzsche regarded as providing
fertile soil for an immanent process of continual self-overcoming [which is
often] treated [by transhumanists] as a condition that is to be escaped from”
(ibid., 33). Thus, although Nietzsche and the transhumanists aim to avoid a
deadlock, they both offer distinct solutions in order to solve the same problem.

3 Contrasting and Comparing Transhumanism with

Humanism and Posthumanism
In the following, Transhumanism will be demarcated, as well as related to
Humanism and Posthumanism. Since Humanism is considered to be the root of
Transhumanism, it will be dealt with first. It is a specific perspective which
positions man in the center of the universe (Badmington, 2011: 374).
According to this ideology, humans are not only ahistorical and provided with
free will, they are also “the origin of meaning” (ibid.). John Gray adds to this
statement by holding that “Humanism is the transformation of the Christian
doctrine of salvation into a project of universal emancipation” (Gray, 2002:
xiii).
By focusing on the French philosopher Descartes as “one of the
principal architects of [H]umanism” (Badmington, 2000: 3), deeper insights
into the principles of Humanism are gained. In his treatise Discourse on the
Method Descartes suggests that reason as a transhistorical human essence
enables humans to use the inherent “power of judging aright and distinguishing

8
true from error, […], [which] is by nature equal in all men” (1637: 3). In this
view, reason, meaning the faculty of judgment represents the most important
distinct human capability, consequently serving as an appropriate
distinguishing feature between the human and the non-human. Furthermore,
there is a striking passage which “might be read as science fiction avant la
lettre” (Badmington, 2000: 3). Descartes puts forward his notion of a clear
distinction between human beings and non- human beings by inviting his
readers to join him in a thought experiment. If there were to exist a machine
with the outer appearance of a monkey, we would not be capable of telling it
apart from the animal, since neither would possess any reason. If, however, a
machine were to look like a human being, one could easily tell (ibid.).
According to Descartes, specific tests which prove the existence of
reason in view of two distinctly human abilities are predestined to give a
reliable answer. The science fiction versed reader is reminded of the Turing
Test or rather a simplified “oral examination” (Svilpis, 2008: 434) version that
can be found in films like Blade Runner 7. First, the ability to give
spontaneously a valid answer to questions of any kind forms an obstacle that
can only be mastered by a human (“[…] it is not conceivable that such a
machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an
appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the
dullest of men can do”) (Descartes [1637] quoted in Badmington, 2000: 3).
The second claim constitutes the fact that the performance of certain
skills need not be limited to a specific action but rather provides the proper
behavior for any eventuality (“[…] [E]ven though such machines might do
some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would
inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not through
understanding but only from the disposition of their organs”) (Descartes [1637]
quoted in ibid., 3-4). Thus, having faith in the unique, intrinsic powers of
human reason forms an integral part of Humanism (Braidotti, 2013: 13).
Although Descartes‟ forward-looking statements are extraordinary for a
philosopher from the 17th century, he is not able to envision a blurred
boundary between the human and the non-human.

7
The Voight-Kampff test in Blade Runner clearly refers to the Turing Test although emphasis
is put on the ability to feel empathy.
9
 This pronounced “binary logic of identity and otherness” (Braidotti,
2013: 15) will become particularly evident with regard to “the imperial
destinies of nineteenth-century Germany, France and, supremely, Great
Britain” (Davies 2008: 23). These imperial tendencies are due to the then-
prevailing opinion that the historical construct of man is not only male but also
white and European (Braidotti, 2013: 24). Davies even provocatively contends
that “[a]ll Humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the
human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a race, a genome. Their
embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore” (2008: 141). Although
Descartes insists on a distinct essence which is equal to all humans in his
philosophy, the actual realization of this theory differs considerably: “to be
„different from‟ came to mean to be „less than‟” (Braidotti, 2013: 28).
Consequently, the normative humanist ideal of man – being male, white and
European - forms the peak of this self-imposed hierarchy (ibid.).
Descartes‟ famous sentence I think, therefore I am nevertheless points
at another humanist principle since there seems to be no doubt that reason is
part of the mind, whereas the body does not play a crucial role regarding the
human (Badmington, 2003: 16).

[…][E]xamining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no
body and that there was neither world nor place where I was; but that I could not for
all that pretend that I did not exist, […], it followed quite evidently and certainly that I
existed; […]; I knew from there that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature
is solely to think, and who, in order to exist, does not require any place, or depend on
any material thing. So much so that this “I”, that is to say the soul, by which I am what
I am, is entirely distinct from the body (Descartes quoted in Badmington, 2003: 16-
17).

In his work Meditations (1641) which he wrote a few years later, he indeed
admits that there is a connection between the body and the mind. However, he
states at the same time “that if a foot or arm or any other party of the body is
cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind” (Descartes quoted
in ibid., 17). Thus, the mind as a nonphysical substance is autonomous from
the body. This dualism of mind and body represents an essential part of
Descartes‟ philosophy, and with it of his understanding of the human.

10
3.1 Leaving the Center Stage
The humanist notion of man has been challenged in recent history. To start
with, Marx and Engels criticize the prerogative of mankind to have a natural
human essence that exists regardless of history, politics and social relations
(Badmington, 2000: 5). “Consciousness”, they argue, “does not determine a
person‟s social life; it is, rather, social life that determines consciousness”
(Marx, [1859] 1956: 51). Attributing contingency to the human does not only
question the core of humanist ideology but shakes Humanism to its very
foundations (Badmington, 2000: 5). It is Marx‟s statement that can be found in
the preface of The German Ideology which even claims that “[h]itherto men
have always formed wrong ideas about themselves, about what they are and
what they ought to be” ([1846] 1988: 29).
The insight that the world is not centered in the universe represents the
first huge blow for the humanists. Stock confirms rightly that ”[t]he
Copernican revolution shattered that notion, wrenching humanity from its
exalted station and leaving it stranded on a peripheral planet circling one of
many stars” (2013: 314). The second collapse regarding humanist
philosophical thought occurred “when biological research robbed man of his
apparent superiority under special creation, and rebuked him with his descent
from the animal kingdom, and his ineradicable animal nature” (Freud, 1920:
247). In this context, Darwin‟s theory of evolution which he outlines in his
book Origin of Species from 1859 should be mentioned (More, 2013: 10). It
replaced not only “divine consciousness” (Stock, 2013: 314) with “random
natural forces” (ibid.) but also “gave way to the idea that humanity as it
currently exists is one step along an evolutionary path of development” (More,
2013: 10). Barely having time to come to terms with these changed
perspectives, the breakthrough in psychological research almost lacerated
human megalomania (Badmington, 2000: 7). Freud‟s psychoanalysis in
particular led to the bitter insight that man, from a humanist point of view, has
lost control over its own self: “[…] the ego […] is not even master in its own
house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on
unconsciously in its mind” (Freud, 1920: 247).
Minsky explains Freud‟s idea of the mind as a “sandwich in which the
Id consists of instinctive drives, the Superego embodies our learned ideals […],
11
and the Ego consists of resources that deal with all the conflicts between those
two extremes” (2006: 148). By claiming that the thoughts and actions of a
human being are controlled partly by the unconscious, the meaning of I in
Descartes‟ statement of I think therefore I am has become blurred.
Turning now to Posthumanism, it should be previously declared that
Transhumanism and Posthumanism are often confused with each other without
acknowledging Transhumanism as a specific “sense of [P]osthumanism”
(Wolfe, 2010: xiii) or even as a full-fledged theory (More, 2013: 1). As
outlined above, humanists used to construct a specific concept of the human to
preserve its assumed unique foundation in order to distinguish humans from
non-humans. This, however, also led to an installation and an enforcement of
“a fundamental notion of Rights around the Human” (Braidotti, 2013: 1).
Posthumanism now questions this humanist attitude by claiming “a qualitative
shift in our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference
for our species, our policy and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this
planet” (ibid., 1-2). Thus, the emergence of Posthumanism stems from the
school of thought that the privileged position of man is not maintainable, since
humans have never been “utterly distinct from animals, machines, and other
forms of the inhuman” (Badmington, 2011: 374); implying that human beings
“have always been posthuman” (Hayles, 1999: 291).
Moreover, Wolfe puts emphasis on the necessity of overcoming the
anthropocentric world view of the humanists in order to prevent the further
discrimination of non-humans (Wolfe, 2010: xvii). Posthumanism intends to
break out of the humanist paradigm by denying a basal distinction between the
human and the non-human world (Herbrechter, 2009: 10). Nevertheless,
according to Badmington, it would be hasty and even wrong to assume an
absolute break from Humanism (2003: 13). The instability of Humanism serves
posthumanists as a point of departure but “[m]an does not necessary need to be
toppled or left behind with a giant leap, because „he‟ is already a fallen or
falling figure” (Badmington, 2011: 375). Posthumanism now has the
responsibility to record and to promote this waning (ibid.). The advocates of
Posthumanism are in the intricate situation which “consists precisely in the fact
that the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci quoted in
Badmington, 2003: 22). In contrast to the antihumanists such as Althusser,

12
Foucault and Lacan who call for a “radical […] break from the legacy of the
human” (Badmington, 2011: 374), Wolfe and Badmington prefer a
deconstructive approach towards Humanism. By challenging Humanism, not
by neglecting it, de-anthropocentric reasoning can be achieved. Derrida‟s
suggestion to repeat things “in a certain way” (quoted in Badmington, 2003:
15) is applied in order to deconstruct the pronounced humanist
anthropocentrism (ibid.) as this mindset “bears within itself the necessity of its
own critique” (quoted in ibid., 19). Thus, Humanism and its post are
irreversibly linked to each other (Badmington, 2000: 9). Lyotard sets a slightly
different focus but generally agrees by presuming that the necessity of
“rewriting” (quoted in Badmington, 2003: 20) has always been inherent in
philosophical and cultural stances (ibid.). This kind of procedure is also exerted
in Freud‟s psychoanalysis. During a treatment study it seems important to
Freud to

allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance with which he
has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in
defiance of it, the analytic work according to the fundamental rule of analysis (1914:
155).

Hence, Post-humanism is not the beginning of something completely

new but, rather, the attempt to work through Humanism in a deconstructive
way and, therefore, to cause “rethinking of what it means to be human”
(Badmington, 2000: 6). Due to this modus operandi, posthumanists
acknowledge the role that Humanism still plays in today‟s society but above all
they meet the challenges of removing the otherness of the Other (Herbrechter,
2009: 13). Posthumanism questions the humanist system of categorization and
exclusion which has served and still serves to found and to justify the
superiority of the human. By psychoanalyzing the human, and precisely its
suppressed identity benefactors, the nonhuman Other appears. Owing to the
difference being drawn between the human and the nonhuman such as animals,
gods and technology, the humanist- metaphysical dialectic of identity assures
itself (ibid., 77). By abolishing the alienness of the Other, the human is
demystified and consequently set free. Therefore, Posthumanism does not
prophesy the end of man but rather the end of a certain perspective of
humankind. Wolfe sketches his approach as follows:

13
 far from surpassing or rejecting the human – [Posthumanism] actually enables us to
describe the human and its characteristic modes of communication, interaction,
meaning, social significations, and affective investments with greater specificity once
we have removed meaning from the ontologically closed domain of consciousness,
reason, reflection, and so on. It forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of
human experience, including the normal perceptual modes and affective states of
Homo sapiens itself, by recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of
other living beings and their own autopoetic ways of “bringing forth a world” – ways
that are, since we ourselves are human animals, part of the evolutionary history and
behavioral and psychological repertoire of the human itself (2010: xxv).

Thus, a radical openness for the non-human is aimed for since the
human is considered to be a product of history and of social relations only.
Moreover, an appreciation of the complexity of the material word is demanded.
Examining the inner structure of matter, electrons, neutrons and protons could
count as a hint towards not underestimating the objects around us. Humans
might have to admit that the material world, including man-made technology,
is a part of them and that the humanist point of view might be too limited in
order to grasp the world‟s intricacy. The crucial aspect to realize is the fact that
humans are constantly emerging from their physical interactions with the world
(ibid., xv). Consequently, the self is coupled materially with the environment.
Wolfe, however, insists on a “specificity of the human – its ways of
being in the world, its ways of knowing, observing, and describing” (ibid., xxv)
that should not be neglected on any account. Thus, whilst arguing that humans
developed themselves out of the material world in coexistence and cooperation
with animals and technologies, he still maintains a certain property of humans
(ibid.). Wolfe nevertheless holds that the relocation of man should imply a
radicalized democracy which de-anthropocentralizes the principle of
subjectivity and, thus, bestows it on non-humans as well (Herbrechter, 2009:
174). Posthumanism therefore entails a decentralized perspective in which
humanity and the material world seem to be interwoven symmetrically with no
existent center (ibid., 40).

3.2 A Cyborg Manifesto

I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess (Haraway, 1991: 316).

Without actually using the term Posthumanism, Haraway approaches this

theory through the concept of the cyborg which is “a cybernetic organism, a
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a

14
creature of fiction” (1991: 291). Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, two
scientists, were the first to mention the term cyborg in 1960, referring to an
“artificially extended homeostastic control system functioning unconsciously”
(quoted in Krüger, 2004: 103). For Haraway, cyborgs are not only to be found
in science fiction films or in modern medicine; she presumes that we are
already cyborgs (1991: 292) who “cannot go back ideologically or materially”
(ibid., 1991: 301). Although she admits that cyborgs are “the illegitimate
offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state
socialism” (ibid., 1991: 293), she perceives the concept of the cyborg as
positive. In order to explain her affirmative attitude, three approaches with
which she intends to push the established boundaries will be outlined. First, the
border between the human and the animal has been exposed as a myth, since
the style of expression, social interaction, the use of technology as well as
mental events, going on in the mind, do not present compelling reasons to
separate them (ibid.). Additionally, she argues that by claiming animal rights
the human is not deprived of its unique property. Rather, it shows our perfect
appreciation of the connection between animals and humans, rescinding the
break between nature and culture (ibid.).
Herbrechter agrees that there is neither an isolated nature nor a detached
culture in the time of interpenetration, but rather a wide range of “nature(s)
culture(s)” (2009: 23). Secondly, Haraway challenges the discrepancy between
the organism and the machine by questioning the essence of nature and thus the
distinction between nature and the artificial (1991: 294). Other blurring
contrasts are the differentiation of mind and body as well as that of self-
evolved and externally constructed matters (ibid.). The breakdown of the
boundary between the physical and the non-physical marks the third transition.
Arguing that technological gadgets tend to decrease their size continuously, the
employment of modern technology becomes less evident and, therefore, hard to
distinguish from the non-physical (ibid.).8
In a further transgression of these boundaries, she sees a chance to
overcome sex, gender and racial discrimination (ibid. 297). By means of the
technologically implemented cyborg Haraway intends to subvert, among
others, the Western male supremacy (ibid., 306).Thus, her positive revaluation

8
Kurzweil speaks of a “pervasive movement toward miniaturization” (2005: 82).
15
of technological power is based on the abolition of dualisms which becomes
particularly evident in the notion of the post-gender (Herbrechter, 2009: 40).
Using the example of the allegedly opposite of self and other, she puts her
position forward.

The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the service of the other,
the other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of
domination, which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be
autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be
involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple,
without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial (Haraway, 1991: 313).

Haraway prefers pluralism and disorientation (“without clear boundary”)

(ibid.) rather than cherishing an illusion which she points out by encapsulating
her bias in her famous statement: “I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess” 9
(ibid., 316). In this sense, the cyborg bears analogy to a posthumanist while the
humanist would correspond to the goddess. Haraway is convinced that cyborg
imagery contributes to break out of the dualistically shaped self-imposed
concept of our world, since, according to her, dualisms are not an appropriate
manner to explain our nature and the world we live in (ibid.). Nevertheless, by
outlining the concept of the cyborg, she does not strive for a complete theory
(ibid.) or for a strong commitment to technology (Graham, 2002: 216).
Moreover, with the help of the cyborg, Haraway is able to imagine a world in
which humans accept their affinity with animals and machines, an environment
in which multiple identities and conflicting positions are not feared (1991:
295). Using the words of Penley and Ross, Haraway appreciates “the pleasure
of being home in the world, rather than needing transcendence from it” (1991:
17).

3.3 Humanity Plus

This new conceptualization of the human is, however, only one aspect towards
Posthumanism. Pramod Nayar divides Posthumanism into Haraway‟s point of
view, which he calls “critical [P]osthumanism” (2014: 3) and Transhumanism,
representing for him a kind of “pop [P]osthumanism of cinema and popculture”
(ibid., 6). Krüger, however, clearly misinterprets the distinction of

9
While Haraway welcomes the abolition of dualisms, Graham draws attention to the fact that
the dichtonomy of cyborg/goddess implies again an “ontological boundary, that between
heaven and earth” (2002: 212).
16
Transhumanism and Posthumanism, although he emphasizes the necessity of a
differentiation10. According to him, Posthumanism frames the target and
Transhumanism the way to get there.11 It is imperative to distinguish between
the posthuman of the transhumanists and the posthuman of the posthumanists
(Sorgner, 2014: 29). Krüger is right in so far that transhumanists wish

to follow life paths which would, sooner or later, require growing into posthuman
persons: they yearn to reach intellectual heights as far above any current human
genius as humans are above other primates; to be resistant to disease and impervious
to aging; to have unlimited youth and vigor; to exercise control over their own desires,
moods, and mental states […]. It seems likely that the simple fact of living an
indefinitely long, healthy, active life would take anyone to posthumanity if they went
on accumulating memories, skills, and intelligence (humanityplus.org).

As illustrated above, this posthuman condition puts the focus on amending

human skills. This kind of enhancement represents the way to the better future
imagined by transhumanists. However, by pointing out the frequent reference
to humans, whereas non-humans are not mentioned once, the underlying
anthropocentrism becomes apparent. In this sense, becoming posthuman is
closely associated with the transhumanist vision of how human beings can be
technically upgraded while still maintaining the belief in the superiority of the
human species. Whereas from a posthumanist perspective the posthuman
condition is influenced by de-anthropocentrism, from a transhumanist
perspective it is precisely not so. In contrast to Pepperell who describes
Transhumanism as the “end of „man-centered‟ universe” (quoted in Tirosh-
Samuelson, 2011: 27), others see in this movement rather a continuation of the
anthropocentric perspective. Wolfe even declares that “[T]ranshumanism
should be seen as an intensification of [H]umanism” (2010: xv). The
transhumanists wittingly or unwittingly agree by renaming Transhumanism on
their main internet presence into Humanity Plus12.
In order to reinforce this hypothesis, the following paragraph will focus
on the beginning of How We Became Posthuman (1999) by Hayles and thus, to
a special strand of Transhumanism which Sorgner calls “silicon-based

10
„Wenn auch bisweilen die verschiedensten Denker, die die Überwindung des bisherigen
Menschen mit Hilfe neuer Technologien propagieren, allesamt als Transhumanisten bezeichnet
werden, möchte ich doch nachdrücklich aus gewichtigem Grund dafür plädieren, zwischen
dem Posthumanismus und dem Transhumanismus zu differenzieren“ (Krüger, 2004: 111).
11
„Der Posthumanismus formuliert das Ziel und der Transhumanismus den Weg“ (Krüger,
2004: 112).
12
The internet presence can be found under http://humanityplus.org/.
17
[T]ranshumanism” (Sorgner, 2014: 31). In contrast to the afore-outlined
“carbon-based [T]ranshumanism” (ibid.), this branch of Transhumanism
focuses particularly on uploading the human brain into non-biological entities.
Having looked at Moravec‟s book Mind Children: The Future of Robot and
Human Intelligence (1988), Hayles encounters a paragraph in which Moravec
prophesies that “it will soon be possible to download human consciousness into
a computer” (Hayles, 1999: 1). Moravec feels confident that by gathering
information from “each molecular layer as it is stripped away” (ibid.) and by
transmitting the data into the computer, the human mind can be downloaded
without being altered (ibid.). Whereas Hayles it not skeptical regarding the
implementation of the technical know-how, it is rather the premised dualism of
mind and body which raises doubts.

How I asked myself, was it possible for someone of Moravec‟s obvious intelligence to
believe that mind could be separated from body? Even assuming such a separation
was possible, how could anyone think that consciousness in an entirely different
medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment?
Shocked into awareness, I began noticing he was far from alone (ibid.).

Reading this, one is involuntarily reminded of Descartes‟ belief in an isolated

consciousness. Hayles assumes an end of the humanist era of an endorsement
of this Cartesian dualism of mind and body, when she realizes her misjudgment
of today‟s situation. Attaching credence to a circulation of disembodied
information is still popular and, according to Hayles, “[i]t is not for nothing
that Beam me up, Scotty has become a cultural icon for the global information
society” (ibid., 2). Since the idea of uploading a human consciousness onto a
computer might evoke posthumanist assumptions of a reversal of dualisms,
Badmington speaks of a “kind of trap” (2003: 12). Following his conjecture, it
is this setting in which the substantial difference between Posthumanism and
Transhumanism becomes evident. Whereas the first “opposes the fantasies of
disembodiment and autonomy” (Wolfe, 2010: xv), the latter seems to advocate
it.13 Badmington considers that essential humanist concepts have outlived the
crisis of Humanism and continue to exist under the pretext of Transhumanism.

13
In the novel Neuromancer (1984) by William Gibson the dualism of mind and body is
illustrated. The following quote serves as an example: “He‟d operated on an almost permanent
adrenaline high, a byproduct of youth and proficiency, jacked into a custom cyberspace deck
that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the
matrix” (Gibson, 1984: 5).
18
Hence, according to Hayles, Moravec “is not abandoning the autonomous
liberal subject but is expanding its prerogatives into the realm of the
posthuman” (1999: 287). Due to this statement, the disapprobation of the
posthumanists towards the transhumanists is manifested, or as Wolfe phrases it,
“[P]osthumanism is the opposite of [T]ranshumanism” (Wolfe, 2010: xv).

3.4 Building Bridges

This uneasiness can partly be explained by the genealogy of these two
movements, since Transhumanism is rooted in the Anglophone tradition,
closely linked to Mill‟s utilitarian thinking and the evolutionary theory of
Darwin (Sorgner, 2014: 34) whereas Posthumanism is rather embedded in the
continental philosophical heritage (ibid.) which involves relations to literary
theory and cultural studies as well as having a tendency towards a “radically
pluralistic approach to ethical issues” (ibid.). The sharp contrast between Post-
and Transhumanism represented by Wolfe is, however, not accepted by all
members who participate in the beyond humanism discourse (ibid., 29). A case
in point would be the rejection of the Cartesian dualism of mind and body by
the transhumanist More. By adhering to functionalism, a philosophy of mind in
which only the function of mental states such as thoughts, desire or pain plays
a crucial role in the cognitive system (Levin, 2013), he denies that these mental
states can be exclusively experienced through a human body. The following
quote from the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy might be helpful in order
to understand this theory.

For (an avowedly simplistic) example, a functionalist theory might

characterize pain as a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the
belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to
produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause
wincing or moaning. According to this theory, all and only creatures with internal
states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are capable of being in pain
(ibid.).

Due to a replacement of biological neurons with an artificial surrogate which is

able to provide the same complexity of cognitive function as the human brain,
uploading a mind “to a non-biological substrate” (More, 2013: 7) would be
successful. Mental states are set by their “causal relations to sensory
stimulations, other mental states, and behavior” (Levin, 2013) and thus can be
separated from the human brain as long as some kind of comparable physical
19
instantiation is given (More, 2013: 7). Hence, mental states such as emotions
are not reserved for humans only but also computers can have them as long as
they are equipped with the same level of cognitive function. Consequently,
functionalists are of the opinion that “pain can be realized by different types of
physical states in different kinds of creatures, or multiply realized” (Levin,
2013).
One attempt which might partly confirm the functional approach is the
experiment of Kevin Warwick who is a Professor at the University of Reading.
By implanting a neuronal implant the size of “4x4mm, with each of the
electrodes being of uniform length (1.5mm)” (Warwick et al., 2003: 1369) into
the median nerve of his left arm, the chip allowed a direct connection between
his nervous system and the computer (ibid.). Electrical impulses serve as a
means of communication between him and the computer, and after six weeks
of learning how to interpret the signals of the chip Warwick was even able to

control a robotic hand using movements of his own hand and receiving a feedback
signal from the robotic hand directly into his median nerve. He not only controlled the
robot hand wirelessly but also controlled it from overseas via the Internet! While
visiting NY, he connected the chip in his median nerve to a computer and sent his
brain waves through the Internet to the robotic hand in his lab in England. In turn, he
received feedback from the robotic hand through the Internet to his brain! (Doss,
2014).

By means of this experiment, evidence was supplied that the body and the
brain do not necessarily need to be in the same place.14 This extension of the
body in form of a robot hand with tactile sensors could count as a step towards
the view that considers the “mind as an embodied relational process, and [...]
the body as relational movement” (Sorger, del Val, 2011).
By postulating The Metahumanist Manifesto, Sorgner and del Val also
put emphasis on the similarities between Trans- and Posthumanism.15 Like
Posthumanism and some strands of Transhumanism, as for instance the
advocates of the functionalism mentioned above, Metahumanism opposes the
Cartesian dualism (ibid.). It links the distinct belief in technological progress
due to the new possibilities of genetic engineering, nanotechnology,

14
Kevin Warwick held a speech about his experiment. The online video clip is available on
YouTube under TEDxTalks. 2014.
15
The prefix μετά indicates that Metahumanism considers itself to be beyond humanist
dualisms and in between transhumanist and posthumanist tendencies (Sorgner, 2014: 34).

20
biotechnology and so on which is supported by transhumanists and, thus, the
augmented probability of the posthuman with ethical elements of
Posthumanism. To the latter belongs in particular a relational ecology which
should provide a decentralized coexistence of all species, technology and the
environment with the aim of “avoid[ing] the permanent superiority of a force
over the others, so that a certain non-violent equilibrium is reinstated over and
over again” (ibid.). Consequently, Metahumanism dismisses the former causes
of complaints on behalf of the posthumanists such as the anthropocentric
Weltanschauung and the alleged dualism of mind and body, and strives for a
reconciliation of Trans- and Posthumanism.

4 Transhumanist Claims and their Impact on

Bioethics and Politics
Having tried to narrow down Transhumanism it is necessary to expand on the
actual claims of the Transhumanists. The most important ones are outlined in
eight points in the Transhumanist Declaration from 201216. Authors of this
publication consisted amongst others of Sandberg, More, Vita-More and
Bostrom (Various, 2013: 55). First, it is declared that they have no doubt
regarding the feasibility of opening up the human potential “by overcoming
aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our confinement to
planet Earth” (ibid., 54). The perception of imperfection inherent to humans
and the world reinforces not only misery but also some kind of earthly
captivity. The idea is conveyed that transhumanists seem to represent
themselves as liberators by drawing attention to “wonderful and exceedingly
worthwhile enhanced human conditions” (ibid.). Admitting the possibility of
technological misuse and severe risks as a consequence thereof, these
transhumanists still do not relinquish their claims. According to the
Transhumanist Declaration, a prevention of risks can be attained through
capital investment in research (ibid.). Measures should be taken against the
extinction of any kind of human including posthumans, short life spans and
serious hardship (ibid.).

16
The Transhumanist Declaration was first published in 1998 but was altered slightly over the
years (The Transhumanist Reader (ed. by More and Vita-More, 2013: 55). A full list of authors
involved in this publication will be listed under Chislenko in the bibliography.
21
 The statement of “respecting autonomy and individual rights, and
showing solidarity with and concern for the interests and dignity of all people
around the globe” (ibid.) allows one, in contrast to the alleged forerunner
Fedorov, to assume the approval of democratic values. The penultimate point
reminds the reader of Posthumanism, since it is said that “[w]e advocate the
well-being of all sentience, including humans, non-human animals and any
future artificial intellects, modified life forms, or other intelligences to which
technological and scientific advance may give rise” (ibid.). However, the fact
that it is placed rather at the end of the list, as well as the point that only the
well-being but for instance no animal rights or the like are attributed to non-
humans, reveal the desultoriness of this assurance. The last claim of the
Transhumanist Declaration is the cryptic term morphological freedom,
meaning “the right to modify and enhance one‟s body, cognition and emotions”
(ibid., 55) which likewise implies the right to reject these procedures (ibid.).17
This apparent freedom is heavily criticized in the discourse but before entering
this debate, a clarification of bodily, cognitive and emotional improvement
should be provided.
When approaching the enhancement of a lifespan, not only death but
above all suffering from diseases and aging are aimed at being overcome.
Thus, Bostrom sets his focus on an extended health span. He is convinced that
people‟s readiness to accept immortality, if there is any hesitation, depends to a
great extent on the health-related quality of life (Bostrom, 2013: 35).
Transhumanists aspire not only to remain mentally and physically healthy but
additionally crave for an improvement of cognitive faculties (ibid., 29). For
Bostrom, enhanced cognition can cover “general capacities, such as memory,
deductive and analogical reasoning, and attention, as well as special faculties
such as the capacities to understand and appreciate music, humor, eroticism,
narration, spirituality [and] mathematics” (ibid.), just to mention a few.
However, the term enhancement might be misleading, since it seems to include
the modification and even the possibility of erasure of cognition, as Bostrom is
not disinclined to delete or reduce memories if these are not helpful as for

17
In the e-mail interview from the 26.10.2014 with Sorgner, he refers to this free choice as
negative freedom (cf. interview in the appendix).
22
instance in situations of lovesickness (ibid., 37).18 Instead of a deletion of
mentally agonizing memories which might evoke feelings like animosity,
disdain or aggression, a set of emotions itself can be minimized if not removed
entirely. Consequently, transhumanists assume that the life-long endeavor of
humans to refine and control their emotions can be at least partly replaced by
genetic engineering (ibid.). Whereas Bostrom states that “[w]e may have no
idea of what we are missing out on until we attain posthuman emotional
capacities” (ibid., 38), the critics urge us to bear in mind what could be lost,
since the interdependencies of the various affective and cognitive capacities are
still unknown and can have “unexpected bad effects” (Kamm, 2009: 127).
Moreover, one of the core questions of transhumanist discourse is whether
personal identity can be maintained during or after a “radical cognitive or
emotional enhancement” (Bostrom, 2013: 42) or not. By arguing that this
technically induced development is comparable to growing-up, Bostrom
affirms the preservation of personal identity (ibid.).

4.1 Morphological Freedom

The legal context regarding the transhumanist right of morphological freedom
is dealt with in the following. Sandberg defines this as “an extension of one‟s
right to one‟s body, not just self-ownership but also the right to modify oneself
according to one‟s desires” (2013: 56). Moreover, he deduces it from the right
to the pursuit of happiness and from the right to life (ibid.). Arguing that
nobody should be restrained to live a “potentially happy life” (ibid.) as long as
it does not constrain others, Sandberg advocates morphological freedom in
order to converge one‟s individual conception of happiness. For many
transhumanists the assumption that there are different notions of personal
happiness represents a crucial point, since it ensures a certain plurality of
enhancement procedures and therefore the maintenance of individuality and
diversity (ibid., 56-57). The fact that humans are technological beings leads
Sandberg to the conclusion that the use of technology and tools is an inherent
necessity (ibid., 57). According to the author, modifying one‟s body is,
however, not independent of the body but rather intimately connected with

18
The deletion of sorrowful memories is dealt with in the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless
Mind (2004), directed by Michel Gondry.
23
one‟s mentality (ibid.). He justifies this non-dualistic view by stating that “our
thinking is not separate from our bodies [...] [as] [o]ur freedom of thought
implies a freedom of brain activity” (ibid.). Following this logic, one can speak
of an embodied mind.
Although the topic of enhancement and personal autonomy seems to be
pervasive in the news, as for instance in discourses about abortion,
reproduction, assisted suicide as well as doping (ibid.), he prefers
morphological freedom as a consistent and global right to have control over
one‟s body instead of a “patchwork of largely independent ethical judgments”
(ibid., 58). Another reason for favoring morphological freedom is the human
yearning for self definition through self-determined actions, according to which
individual enhancement serves to express oneself (ibid.). It is however, “not a
search for some imaginary state of perfection, as is sometimes suggested, but
rather an open-ended process” (ibid., 60). Furthermore, morphological freedom
is opposed to mandatory change which, for instance, can be imposed by the
State. Referring to Bostrom‟s definition above, morphological freedom
supports not only the right to enhance oneself but also the right to remain
unchanged. Sandberg underlines particularly the protection of handicapped
people who do not want to be cured since their disability has become a part of
their self-image (ibid., 61). Whereas “[t]he official could encourage normal
bodies through various means, including officially pronouncing disabled
people who did not change as irresponsible and wasting public resources”
(ibid.) the advocates of morphological freedom seem to take the “right to be
differently bodied” (ibid., 62) seriously. However, bioconservatives object this
optimistic vision of the future sketched by Sandberg.
One of these critics is the above-mentioned Fukuyama who presses for
a regulation by the State in order to be able to contain the rise of biotechnology
(2002: 10). He fears the loss of humanity, in particular human dignity, terming
it Factor X (ibid., 171). In contrast to Descartes, this is not limited to the
existence of reason but is a complex interaction of having consciousness,
moral, rationality, style of expression, social competence, sensitive faculty,
mental states and other attributes which constitute human dignity (ibid.).
Comparing the future drawn by the Transhumanist Declaration with Aldous
Huxley‟s Brave New World (1932), depicting an environment in which

24
“disease and social conflict have been abolished, there is no depression,
madness, loneliness, or emotional distress, sex is good and readily available”
(ibid., 5), Fukuyama is apprehensive of a change of human nature. For him
human nature is defined as “the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are
typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental
factors” (ibid., 130). However, he clearly states that due to abolition of pain
and suffering, the distinctiveness of man fades away because capacities such as
empathy, benevolence, and braveness (ibid., 173) are not required anymore.
Further, he determines that “[o]ur ability to experience these emotions is what
connects us potentially to all other human beings, both living and dead” (ibid.).
By laying the foundation for the human nature particularly on the existence of
sorrow, Fukuyama seems to justify suffering.

4.2 Therapy versus Enhancement

It is widely believed that there is a clear distinction between therapy and
enhancement. Whereas “by definition enhancements are not aimed at
preventing, treating or mitigating the effects of a disease or disorder”
(Mehlmann quoted in Cole-Turner, 2011: 3), therapy on the contrary covers
particularly this field of functions. There are different kinds of approaches as
defining therapy, for instance, as “the alleviation of suffering” (Miah, 2013:
292) and enhancement as the “pursuit of happiness” (ibid.). Cole-Turner warns,
however, of drawing an explicit line between them as is often done by the
objectors of enhancement technology in order to establish a distinction between
“the acceptable and the dubious or unacceptable uses of biomedical
technology: therapy is always ethically fine, enhancement is, at least prima
facie, ethically suspect” (Kass, 2013: 562). The trouble seems to arise from the
fact that disease is a “socially constructed category” (Cole-Turner, 2011: 3)
which differs not only culturally but which is exposed to continual change
(ibid.). Since consequently the conception of disease has been considered as
rather flexible, the line between therapy and enhancement is inevitably blurred.
Having a prosthetic leg due to a boat accident, the national long jump
champion of Germany, Markus Rehm, was confronted with this difficulty. Out
of fear that Rehm‟s carbon-fiber blade presented an advantage and, thus, an
enhancement, he was not admitted to participate at the able-bodied European

25
Championships in Athletics in 2014 (Borden, 2014).19 This issue is, however,
not limited to sports. Even although they may dislike the taste of energy drinks,
people drink them in order to boost their performance, be it before a long car
drive or prior to an important exam. Thus, the baseline of what is normal and
acceptable in everyday life shifts (Shapiro, 2013: 283).

4.3 Genetic Engineering

This paragraph will attempt to give a short overview of different ways of
human genetic modification; however, it will not cover the wide and complex
range of research. Generally speaking, there are two major types of change.
First, there is somatic gene therapy which is applied to people who suffer, for
instance, from cystic fibrosis. Due to a transfer of therapeutic genes in somatic
cells, these cells get modified and in the best case, the proteins causing the
disease recede completely (American Society of Gene & Cell Therapy). As this
therapy does not influence reproductive cells like eggs and sperm, the altered
genes are not transferred to the next generation (ibid.). According to the
environmentalist McKibben, “somatic gene therapy is […] just like medicine.
You take an existing patient with an existing condition, and you in essence try
to convince her cells to manufacture the medicine she needs” (2003: 9).
Germline therapy, in contrast to somatic gene therapy, also changes the
reproductive cells. Consequently, modified DNA will be passed onto the
progeny of the patient (American Society of Gene & Cell Therapy).
Whereas these therapies were initially developed in order to cure
diseases such as AIDS or cancer (Kass 2013: 560), many transhumanists see
germline therapy as a chance of fulfilling their dream of becoming posthuman.
Opponents of germline therapy are alarmed and fear a confinement of freedom
and even the loss of human nature as do McKibben and Habermas. The first
criticizes the constraint which seems to come along with germline therapy for
the purpose of enhancement.

The person left without any choice at all is the one you‟ve engineered. You‟ve
decided, for once and for all, certain things about him: he‟ll have genes expressing
proteins that send extra dopamine to alter his mood; he‟ll have genes expressing
proteins to boost his memory; to shape his stature (McKibben, 2003: 191).

19
There is a similar debate concerning the double amputee sprinter Oscar Pistorious (cf.
Borden, 2014).
26
For Habermas there is as well a clear differentiation between an unmodified
child and a genetically modified child. Arguing that

unlike persons born naturally, someone who is at odds with genetically fixed
intentions is barred from developing, in the course of a reflectively appropriated and
deliberately continued life history, an attitude towards her talents (and handicaps)
which implies a revised self-understanding and allows for a productive response to the
initial situation (2003: 62).

Bostrom disagrees with McKibben and Habermas by comparing genetic

engineering to a particular type of education, contending that qualities that are
the result of strict education cannot easily be changed either (Sorgner, 2009:
34). The debate about the acquisition of extraordinary quality is rather long-
standing, as is seen in the following.

Can you tell me, Socrates, whether human excellence is teachable? Or is it not
teachable, but to be acquired by practice (training)? Or is it neither acquired by
practice nor by learning, but does it originate in human beings by nature, or in some
other way? (Plato quoted in Kass, 2013: 568).

Several ways in which data is transferred directly into the human brain to
achieve this human excellence are put forward by transhumanists. If, however,
it was possible to download several language dictionaries and grammars with
one click onto one‟s brain, this could pose a threat to the principle between
effort and result, leading to a loss of meaning. By applying biomedical
interventions the transparent link between action and outcome is disturbed and
the subject is forced to remain rather inactive (ibid., 569). This disruption is
aggravated by the fact that the manner in which we generally perceive time and
space has changed considerably due to the technological upswing in the last
decades which enables us to “reach out and touch somebody via telephone or
Internet” (ibid., 570). Due to the break of the “character of human being-at-
work-in-the-world, what Aristotle called energeia psyches” (ibid.), human self-
understanding is questioned. By impersonally achieving personal achievements
(ibid.), the understanding of meaning and with it of human integrity is at risk.
Thus, according to Kass, formerly on the President‟s Council for Bioethics
(PCBE), it is particularly this being-at-work that needs to be guarded (ibid.,
573).

27
4.4 Politics
The first victim of [T]ranshumanism might be equality.[…] If we start
transforming ourselves into something superior, what rights will these enhanced
creatures claim, and what rights will they possess when compared to those left
behind? If some move ahead, can anyone afford not to follow? (Fukuyama, 2004:
42).

The critique by Fukuyama points in particular at the weak spot of the

morphological freedom outlined above. Whereas Sandberg assumes that
individual choice leads to an increased plurality, he seems to underestimate
the danger of peer pressure. If parents can choose to heighten the IQ of their
child, they probably would, as parents want the best starting condition for
their child (McKibben, 2003: 33). A denial of characteristics such as
memory enhancement, an average body size and good looks could be
considered as child neglect (Kass, 2013: 564), consequently bringing about
a problem of “conformity and homogenization” (ibid.). It is rather obvious
that the state and insurance companies could exert pressure to endure
certain enhancement procedures in order to “ease the burden on a national
healthcare system, by ensuring more people are less vulnerable to common
illnesses” (Miah, 2013: 300). People with a boosted intelligence, a major
attention span, more strength and less need to sleep have in comparison to
unenhanced humans a better head-to-head record which could have crucial
effects on the labor market. Due to the restricted availability caused by high
prices, it is assumed that enhancement technologies can only be applied by
the most privileged. If this worry proves itself true, it would dramatically
expand the gap between the poor and the rich (Bailey, 2013: 337).
The bioethicists Annas, Andrews and Isasi refer to this danger and
sketch a rather dystopian scenario concerning the coexistence of humans
and posthumans.

The new species, or “posthuman”, will likely view the old “normal” humans as
inferior, even savages, and fit for slavery or slaughter. The normals, on the other
hand, may see the posthumans as a threat and if they can, may engage in a
preemptive strike by killing the posthumans before they themselves are killed or
enslaved by them. It is ultimately this predictable potential for genocide that
makes species-altering experiments potential weapons of mass destruction, and
makes the unaccountable genetic engineer a potential bioterrorist (2002: 162).

Bailey assesses this apocalyptical vision of enslavement as an “over-the-top

scenario” (2013: 337) and opposes this notion with several ideas of how a

28
broad distribution of enhancement technologies could be provided.
However, for Kass it is not the uniformity of access but rather the quality of
the offer which is the point. By uttering “the food is contaminated, but why
are my portions so small?” (Kass, 2013: 564), he reveals the illogicality
behind this debate. Thus, he requests a redirection in thinking, particularly
with regard to the good and bad uses of biotechnological power instead of
getting fully involved in the inequality dispute.

4.5 Singularity
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the
intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one
of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better
machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the
intelligence of man would be left far behind […]. Thus the first ultraintelligent
machine is the last invention that man need ever make (Good [1965] in Sandberg,
2013: 377).

The term singularity can refer to mathematics, describing a “point at which a

function takes an infinite value” (OED Online) or it can relate to astronomy,
meaning a “region in space-time at which matter is infinitely dense” (OED
Online). In the transhumanist context, however, technological singularity is a
theory regarding the rise of super-intelligence (More, 2013: 361). Vernor
Vinge, a computer scientist, was the first to mention this conjecture in an
article written in 198320 (Kurzweil, 2005: 23). According to Kurzweil, a known
futurist and one of the directors of engineering at Google, the singularity which
implies a radical transformation of human life will emerge in the year 2045
(2005: 136). In his vision, it will establish a unity between technology and
human beings, since Kurzweil states that “[by] the time of the Singularity,
there won‟t be a distinction between humans and technology” (ibid., 41). The
posthumanist flavor of this announcement, however, is immediately relativized
by the anthropocentric addition that “[t]his is not because humans will have
become what we think of as machine today, but rather machines will have
progressed to be like humans and beyond” (ibid.). So it seems that the machine
is not taken seriously on its own but that the human way of thinking and
feeling is forced upon it. Kurzweil supports the rather fast development due to

20
The opinion in which year the term technological singularity was actually coined varies.
Whereas Kurzweil refers to an article from the Omni magazine in 1983, More considers 1993
as the date of coinage.
29
logarithmic plots of technological novelties. Thus, he expands Moore‟s law21,
arguing for the exponential, not linear, growth of all technology (ibid., 12). As
a result, great strides in the field of genomics, robotics and nanotechnology are
expected which will put an end not only to the bitter enemies of the
transhumanists such as aging, disease and death but also to environmental
problems (ibid., 28-41). Nanotechnologists, for instance, could create nanobots,
“robots designed at the molecular level” (ibid., 28), which have a various range
of duties including the curing of diseases, the enhancement of human cognition
and the recovering of the environment from pollution (ibid.). It is, however,
debatable whether this universal remedy will be invented first or whether a
superintelligence will take on this business.
Acknowledging that the singularity is not a clear-cut theory, there are
still three points on which the majority of singularians seem to agree: The
accelerating change, the intelligence explosion and the event horizon (More,
2013: 362). The first mark defines the already-mentioned exponential growth
which is also related to economic and social change (Sandberg, 2013: 377).
According to the singularity theory, this technological rise inevitably leads
towards the emergence of a superintelligence which culminates in an explosion
in intelligence. As Good clarifies, there is no need of another invention by
humans once a superintelligence has been accomplished. Kurzweil allows
those machines or cyborgs the power to enhance themselves by improving their
own codes (2005: 27). Due to the independence from humans, it is argued in
favor of a prediction horizon entailing an impossibility to make accurate
forecasts with regard to the future. However, this unfeasibility of a reliable
prediction is questioned by Brin et al., arguing for a certain influence on the
superintelligence due to a former programming of human values (2013: 401).
Furthermore, Kurzweil anticipates the destiny of our post-singularity future by
saying that “the entire universe will become saturated with our intelligence”
(2005: 29). From a comparative perspective, the affinity towards spirituality
seems conspicuous. Grassie even states that the “Singularity movement is [a]
kind of a secular religion promoting its own apocalyptic and messianic vision
of end times” (2011: 264). Whereas Christians always live “in need of

21
In the 1970s, Gordon Moore noticed an exponential growth concerning the price-
performance of computation (Kurzweil, 2005: 56).
30
redemptive grace, and destined in Jesus Christ for transformation and
everlasting life” (Cole-Turner, 2011: 6), the singularity ideology draws a vision
of self-reliant transformation and immortality, bringing about the eschaton.

5 American Science Fiction Film and the Apparent

Death of the Genre
Within literature, the genre science fiction22 arises in the early 19th century “as
European writers begin to depict future societies and alternate worlds without
obvious fantastic framing, using the same concreteness and plausibility to
describe their imaginary worlds as they used to describe actual travels and
historical documents” (Csicsery-Ronay, 2008: 44). However, its emergence
cannot be considered as a homogenous development. France, for instance,
precedes England, as in the latter the rise of the new genre merely coincided
with the emergence of the theory of evolution (Slusser, 2008: 40). Due to the
restricted length of this paper, this essay does, however, not aim to cover the
wide and complex range of the genre itself. Instead, it focuses on the
development of American science fiction film since its advent in the 1950s
(Sobchack, 2008: 261). Although science fiction primarily “dramatizes the
social consequences of imaginary science and technology in speculative
visions of possible futures, alternate pasts, and parallel presents” (ibid.), the
political situation of the country of origin plays a vital part.
According to Sobchack, the American science fiction film had its first
overwhelming success from the 1950s to the 1960s “as a symbolic response”
(ibid., 262) to its new self-confidence concerning political power and the
tangible process in technology and science (ibid., 263). The new relation to
spatial and temporal distance, leading to a realization of “geophysical
vulnerability” (ibid., 263) acted, however, as a counterbalance. Whereas, on the
one hand, there was a celebration of technological progress, particularly with
regard to the rise of the television; on the other hand, the foreign policy
situation formed a real threat due to the novel nuclear technology. Science

22
The term science fiction was coined, however, not until the 1920s by Hugo Gernsback
(Geraghty, 2009: 1).
31
fiction films such as The Thing (1951)23 and When Worlds Collide (1951)
embodied the fear of many Americans on the grounds of a hostile take-over by
the Communists (ibid., 264). Thus, the unease of being involved in the Cold
War has led to an increase of xenophobia among Americans which was then
depicted in the films. Furthermore, some science fiction films of the 1950s as
The Incredible Shrinking Man (1957) also picked up on nuclear fears and
radiation‟s impact on the human body, while at the same time expounding the
issues of gender roles, since the shrinking protagonist was not able to fulfill the
responsibility of being the male bread winner anymore (Geraghty, 2009: 26).
After the genre‟s waning of popularity at the end of the 1950s due to a de-
sensitizing to the nuclear threat and the rise of technology, the American
science fiction film rebounds (Sobchack, 2008: 266). Owing especially to the
cult movie Star Wars (1977), the science fiction film became mainstream
entertainment (ibid., 267). In the 1980s and 1990s the fairly tense political
situation eased leading to more light-hearted films such as E.T. The Extra-
Terrestrial (1982), in which the alien presented itself as not a threat but as an
amiable companion (Geraghty, 2009: 15). All in all, the relaxation turned
“popular consciousness […] inward” (Sobchack, 2008: 272), laying the focus
more and more on the question of the human essence. Blade Runner (1982) can
be considered as a case in point for a more profound film from this period,
challenging personal identity, memory, subjectivity as well as boundaries in
general. Consequently, the American science fiction film seems to be the voice
which mirrors the American Zeitgeist. Interestingly, the role which had been
occupied by the fear of an encroachment of Communism tends to be replaced
by an uncertainty of the human nature with simultaneous consideration of a
growing blurring between reality and simulation (ibid.). As Sobchack puts it,
“[t]he genre thus functions to imaginatively map a spatial and temporal history
of popular American consciousness and experience”24 (ibid., 273).

23
Being aware that the film is based on the novel Who Goes There? (1938) by John W.
Campbell, its topic seems to gain in importance in the 1950s. Similar to Blade Runner (1982)
adapted from Philip K. Dick‟s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) it is,
however, the fact that these topics are picked up on again many years later which is essential.
24
Geragthy considers the horror of 9/11 which again induced feelings of tension and fear as a
reason for “Hollywood‟s fascination with bringing back famous comic book characters like [...]
Spider-Man [...] to the big screen – audiences clearly keen to see childhood heroes and
adolescent memories reproduced and replayed in a period of national uncertainty (2009: 17).
32
 Recent technology often conveys the impression that “the present has
surpassed science fiction in its depiction of „future-ness‟” (Ndalianis, 2006:
59). People have become more skeptical, in particular with regard to
biotechnology, as no consensus has been formed on its nature, either in
scientific or in the public debate (Hamilton, 2003: 268). As a result,
biotechnological progress provokes a highly controversial debate between
different-minded camps. Many of today‟s American science fiction films serve
as a medium in order to discuss the pros and cons of scientific breakthroughs in
general (ibid., 269), helping the audience to cope with the great pace with
which technological developments occur. However, Haraway holds that “the
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion”
(1985: 291) and also Baudrillard argues that the “sort of projection, the
extrapolation, this sort of pantographic exuberance which made up the charm
of SF are now no longer possible. It is no longer possible to manufacture the
unreal from the real, to create the imaginary from the data of reality” (1991:
311). The often-used play with words “transforming science fiction into
science fact”25 suits this discussion (Suzuki quoted in Hamilton, 2003: 272).
This phrase nevertheless implies not only that science fiction is in the realm of
science but also vice versa. As in science fiction films science is frequently
embodied by the evil part, this would have appalling consequences for
scientists, leading to a discrediting of their work and of the discipline itself.
Although one has to admit that technology indeed more often sounds like
science fiction, a differentiation should be upheld.

6 Film Analyses
This section will examine the transhumanist elements in the following films:
The Amazing Spider-Man (directed by Marc Webb), the X-Men trilogy (the
first two directed by Bryan Singer; the third directed by Brett Ratner) and
Transcendence (directed by Wally Pfister). Although the majority of the films
are comic book adaptations, attention is drawn to the science fiction backdrop
common to all films. In addition, Transhumanism will be shown to play a

25
In the film The Amazing Spider-Man (2012) Peter Parker discovers the headline “Cross
Species Genetics. Science Fiction or Science Fact?” (The Amazing Spider-Man) while
researching online.
33
crucial role as an overall topic. Furthermore, the underlying way in which the
characters are depicted in the films is shaped by a clear transhumanist attitude,
taking into account, however, that the majority of the actual film directors
probably did not knowingly intend to present transhumanist characteristics.

6.1 The Amazing Spider-Man

6.1.1 The Transhumanist Posthuman
From a beyond humanism perspective, in The Amazing Spider-Man (2012)
several transhumanist elements can be detected. Two different kinds of the
transhumanist posthuman are contrasted with each other in the film. Referring
to Bostrom‟s definition, a posthuman is “a being that has at least one
posthuman capacity […] [that is] a general central capacity greatly exceeding
the maximum attainable by any current human being without recourse to new
technological means” (2013: 28-29). Due to an accidental spider bite at the
laboratory of Oscorp Industries, a company which is specialized in cross-
species genetics, Peter Parker undergoes a transformation which enables him to
cling at all kinds of surfaces such as walls. The spider bite has led to a
modification of his DNA which seems to be at least partly merged with spider
DNA. Further abilities which clearly go beyond human capabilities are
strength; this becomes particularly evident in the rescue mission of a young
boy who is locked in a car dangling on a string of a bridge in New York. Other
extraordinary proficiencies are his good reflexes, emphasized in several scenes,
as for instance by catching a fly with two fingers or by preventing a coffee mug
from falling down (The Amazing Spider-Man). Although Peter needs to
practice these new abilities in order to control them, the transformation does
not seem to have grave adverse effects. Arguing with Novy that “Peter Parker
is the same person, despite the new Spider-Man body” (2012: 154) implies the
humanist mind and body dualism of Descartes. In contrast to that, there is a
change perceivable in Peter‟s self-conception and in the manner in which he
experiences the world around him that comes along with his bodily
modifications (Spencer, 2012: 134). Nevertheless, Peter Parker‟s human
perspective remains clearly dominant. Since he enjoys good health prior to his
transformation, the modification can only be considered as an unintentional

34
enhancement although the spiders were created and kept by Oscorp Industries
for research purposes concerning therapeutic work.

6.1.2 Cross-species Genetics as a Universal Remedy

Cross-species genetics is a specific form of genetic engineering of which the
basic idea is already frequently used in agriculture like with genetically
modified crops. In the film, Oscorp Industries promotes cross-species genetics
as being the universal remedy for the future, comparable to Kurzweil‟s vision
of nanotechnology. By crossing, for example, the DNA of a human Parkinson‟s
patient with the DNA of a zebra fish, the ability of the latter to regenerate cells
is harnessed in order to cure the ailment of the human being (The Amazing
Spider-Man). The scientist Dr. Curt Connors who works at Oscorp Industries
imagines, however, not only success in treating certain diseases; he aspires
even towards “a world without weakness” (ibid.), expanding at obliterating not
only culturally accredited diseases but also “human deficiencies” (ibid.);
clearly bearing resemblance to the transhumanist notion of improving the
human being.
The close-up picture of the catchwords Imagine, Everyone and Equal
(ibid.) functions as a flash-forward in order to introduce Dr. Connors‟ apparent
benign ideology. Driven by the human desire to regrow his amputated lower
arm which could be considered a symbol of non-existent potency, Dr. Connors
seems to be possessed by the idea of creating a world without weakness,
meaning a world full of power and perfection. Peter‟s facial expression on
hearing Dr. Connors‟ ambition for the first time reveals his approval, not yet
grasping the inherent danger stemming from this ethos. In contrast to Peter‟s
transformation, the merger of Dr. Connors‟ DNA with the DNA of a lizard is
premeditated. The aim is to make use of the lizard‟s ability to regrow entire
limbs which is then incorporated in Connors‟ human DNA, with the result that
his right arm is regenerated. Whereas Peter makes the impression to be
unmodified since his outer appearance has not radically changed, Dr. Connors‟
body morphs into that of a huge lizard by injecting venom he synthesized with
the help of a mathematical equation provided by Peter. However, the new
interaction of the reptile and the human genes causes not only the desired
regeneration of his arm but also an intensification of his craving for power

35
coupled with an increased readiness to brutal aggression. The drastic mutation
of Freddy, a three-legged laboratory mouse, into an active cannibalistic mouse,
serves as evidence for the fact that venom not only intensifies Dr. Connors‟
traits of character but that it also seems to radically change his identity,
particularly his propensity towards violence. Although it is argued that the
villains in Spider-Man films originally have “seriously flawed moral
characters” (Novy, 2012: 155), Dr. Connors is almost completely taken in by
the, even worse, intentions of the lizard. Compared with the figure of Spider-
Man who represents a positive example of the transhumanist posthuman, the
lizard visualizes the risks of genetic engineering, showing that the synergy of
diverse genes or the modification of genes can have unforeseeable and massive
repercussions. Still, the otherness of the lizard is not consequently followed
through. Although the most outstanding characteristic features of the lizard are
its aggression and its animalistic body, the use of human language and also the
rather manlike plan to save humanity reveal the evil part of a human
perspective.
One symptom of venom represents the split personality that is well-
illustrated in the recording scene, in which Dr. Connors narrates his
proceedings in his temporary office in the sewerage. While at the beginning of
the scene it is not clear-cut whether the voice provides an insight into the
thoughts of Dr. Connors or whether it is the distinct voice of the power-hungry
reptile speaking to his host, the change of pronouns divulges Dr. Connors‟
schizophrenia (“All the power you feel. I can save them!” (The Amazing
Spider-Man)). Interestingly, this split personality is caused due to some kind of
DNA splicing, making the split personality a spliced one.

6.1.3 A World Without Weakness

The dominant lizard part lures Dr. Connors‟ former personality into a further
acquisition of power by emphasizing his new obtained enhancements, as for
instance the regenerative healing factor, boosted strength, elasticity and an
improved eyesight by asking “Would you give it all up after all you know you
can do? All the power you feel?” (The Amazing Spider-Man). By screaming “I
can save them!” (ibid.), the lizard personality which has emerged after the
bodily transformation seizes power. By saying that a “species-wide distribution

36
could enhance on an evolutionary scale” (ibid.), the lizard part shows its
intention. Becoming posthuman and thus moving towards the next evolutionary
stage is a claim which is also pointed out by transhumanists. But the statement
that “one has to adapt to survive”, which is attached to the former utterance,
reminds one of social Darwinism with a particular appreciation of “ruthless
competition” (Blackford, 2013: 426) from which transhumanists distance
themselves.
The more the lizard part takes control over Dr. Connors and influences
his mind, the more a change in paradigm which has already been alluded to in
the statement “a world without weakness” (The Amazing Spider-Man) takes
place. The venom should not be applied to seriously ill people with diseases
and grave deficiencies only but rather to all human beings, since they are all
“weak, pathetic, feeble-minded creatures” (ibid.), fitting Hobbes description of
one‟s “nasty, brutish and short” (quoted in Huxley, 1957: 16) life. This
discontent with the human condition which seems to be a similarity between
the lizard and the transhumanists leads to the question of “why be human at all
when we can be so much more. Faster. Stronger. Smarter” (The Amazing
Spider-Man).

6.1.4 Fake the Snake

By quoting two verses from Michelangelo‟s poem The Silkworm (1535), Dr.
Connors borrows the words of one of the most important creators of the High
Renaissance in order to lend his longing expression (Stedman, 2012). The two
lines are originally integrated in a homoerotic poem which is about a lyrical I
who yearns for oneness with his lover. Interestingly, the quoted lines taken on
their own, convey a rather distinct message.

That, changing like the snake, I might be free

To cast off flesh wherein I dwell confined!
(Buonarroti quoted in ibid.).

The transhumanist reading seems to be imposed due to the obvious

discomfort with one‟s own body. Transhumanism is described as a
liberation movement26, since it promises to expand one‟s abilities and to
reinvent one‟s body. Admitting that the human body is a “marvelous yet

26
Fukuyama calls Transhumanism a “strange liberation movement” (2004: 42).
37
flawed piece of engineering” (More, 2013: 15), transhumanists want to alter
it in order to surmount its delimitation. Whereas it was argued previously
that the earth serves as a confinement for the transhumanists, now the skin
forms the confinement of the body which stands symbolically for the human
scope. By using Michelangelo‟s image of casting off one‟s skin, Dr.
Connors reveals his seemingly transhumanist professed goal to cast human
limitations off and, thus, to broaden the scope. Similarly to the snake which
sheds its skin in order to give place to its grown body, transhumanists wish
to continually stretch human limitations in order to improve themselves.
The image of the snake fits the transhumanist philosophy, since snakes
grow throughout their lives, making the act of skinning a perpetual
adaptation to new circumstances.

6.1.5 Imagine, Everyone, Equal

In the following, it will be argued that Dr. Connors cannot be considered a
transhumanist prototype despite the snake comparison. First of all, Dr.
Connors is characterized by narcissism. Speaking about millions of lives
that could be changed due to cross-species genetics, his addition “including
my own” (…) is highly diagnostic. The mirror scene at the beginning of the
film which reminds the audience of Lacan‟s The mirror stage outlined in his
work Écrits, A Selection (1949) confirms this assumption. By proceeding
towards a glass wall Dr. Connors is able to mirror his left forearm in order
to create an optical illusion of wholeness. Similarly to a child who
recognizes itself for the first time as unfragmented, Dr. Connors‟ facial
expression exhibits a restrained jubilant smile (Lacan, 1949: 503). Further,
this scene shows his narcissistic visions of grandeur and omnipotence.
Whereas his wedding ring represents a flaw in his self-delusion, this does
not keep him from taking delight in the mirror imaging. Due to this visual
trick, he anticipates his propensity towards wholeness and a certain control
over his right arm. Thus, he satisfies his desire of individual physical
integrity on a short-term basis. On the one hand, Lacan sees a connection
between the body and the mind, since the unity of the body enables the
child to perceive itself as an autonomous creature, different from others. On
the other hand, however, the dualism of mind and body seems not to be

38
completely nullified, since the child‟s mind is a victim of a delusion,
discerning itself as an independent person while still dependent on its
parents. Thus, when Dr. Connor‟s right arm eventually regrows, this unity
of the body is not automatically accompanied by a unity of his mind, taking
his emerging schizophrenia into account. Hence, the scene seems to caution
against delusive hope. Although Dr. Connors acts in the mirror scene in a
rather transhumanist matter, he crosses a line latest by forcing the cure upon
others.
Admitting that he disapproves of using veterans as guinea pigs for
pharmaceutical testing purposes, he hesitates before he tries to stop his
superior Dr. Ratha, who considers disabled humans to be the right target
group for this poorly conceived venom. The modified Dr. Connors deems it
best to convert all of humanity into the new species of which he is the first
example. Having assessed “beautiful and quite large” (The Amazing Spider-
Man) as positive characteristics of the self-initiated breed, the genetically
manipulated Dr. Connors is convinced of the general benefit, probably
having thoughts about mastery at the back of his mind. As mentioned above,
the wish to transcend all of humanity “in its entirety” (Huxley, 1957: 17) has
already been put forward by Julian Huxley. However, this would imply an
imposed enhancement which transhumanists as Sandberg are rather critical of,
advocating morphological freedom.
The Ganali device, in particular, broaches the issue of individual
choice. It is a gadget that can be loaded with a substance which can
subsequently be diffused and distributed among a population. On the one hand,
this technology allows one to “cure polio in an afternoon” (ibid.); on the other
hand, however, its misuse would have utterly devastating consequences.
Similarly to genetic engineering, the advantages and the disadvantages are not
far apart. Admitting that free choice with respect to such a treatment or
enhancement is not given since one cannot “run away from a cloud after all”
(ibid.), for the geneticist Connors the advantages still outweigh the
disadvantages. The substance, be it an antigen or a toxin, would function as an
equalizer, analogous to rain, only with worse effects. Thus, the Ganali device
generates not only a threat to free choice but also to human pluralism,
obviously pointing at the above-mentioned catchwords Imagine, Everyone and

39
Equal (ibid.). By dictating the lives of others without their consent a certain
amount of hybris is required, making at least the lizard part of Dr. Connors
think that it knows what is best for humankind. Since morphological freedom
which serves as a protection against the loss of pluralism and self-
determination according to Sandberg is ignored by Dr. Connors, he can only be
considered as belonging to the evil side, representing a misunderstood and
dangerous form of Transhumanism.

6.1.6 The Problem of Perfection

Having looked at the two lines of the poem, the difference between the snake
and Dr. Connors should be further examined. Admitting that it is “no longer
about curing ills […] this is about finding perfection” (The Amazing Spider-
Man), Dr. Connors trespasses the line between Transhumanism and utopia or
rather dystopia. Now the similarity between Nietzsche‟s Übermensch and the
transhumanist idea becomes significant again. Both agree on the necessity of
perpetual change, condemning a state of stasis. Before creating a perfect
human being, there has to be a definition of what is perfect. However, this does
not seem to be the major problem of the transhumanists. It is rather the fact that
a state of perfection implies stagnation which cannot be approved. The
philosopher More emphasizes that “[t]transhumanists seek not utopia, but
perpetual progress – a never-ending movement” (More, 2013: 14). As a result,
the desire for perfection inheres the overall problem which entails the removal
of pluralism and self-determination. Consequently, the English noun gift in Dr.
Connors‟ phrase “This is my gift to you” (The Amazing Spider-Man), meaning
the alleged positive transformation of humankind into a new species can be
interpreted differently. Whereas one could equate Dr. Connors with a godlike
figure which provides every human being with a gift to become perfect, the
German sense of Gift as poison fits better as it leads to stasis – death.

6.1.7 With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility

Shortly before Uncle Ben‟s death27 Peter and Uncle Ben had an argument
generated by Peter‟s failing to pick up Aunt May from work. Uncle Ben
expresses his disappointment and uses the situation as an opportunity to teach

27
In the Marvel universe there is a rule associated with Uncle Ben‟s death saying “No one
stays dead except Uncle Ben” (Tallon, 2012: 86), ensuring Peter‟s motivation to act.
40
Peter a lesson by explaining him the philosophy of Peter‟s father: “He believed
that if you could do good things for other people you had a moral obligation to
do those things. That‟s what‟s at stake here. Not choice. Responsibility” (The
Amazing Spider-Man). This tenet is neglected by Peter when he refuses to help
the shop owner catching a thief who later kills Uncle Ben. Due to the fact that
Uncle Ben was only on the way because of the previous dispute and above all
due to Peter‟s omitted help in front of the shop, Peter blames himself for Uncle
Ben‟s death. Thus, it is not surprising that from then on Peter takes his father‟s
philosophy seriously. However, this attitude holds also for the majority of
transhumanists. Moreover, they expand the obligation of helping people in
need referred to in the quoted statement with regard to future possibilities.
Although immortality, for instance, is not yet achieved the support of science
presents a necessity since only research can provide the technological means to
accomplish this goal. John Harris, a radical utilitarian thinker, even claims that
there is a “clear moral obligation to participate” (quoted in Ranisch, 2014: 159)
in biotechnological research for medical purposes, thus, he makes it our
personal task to promote it. This implies that an omission of this duty equals a
denial of assistance, consequently a moral crime. Although not all
transhumanists agree with this radical utilitarian thought, the overall idea of
having a commitment to help is shared. In the film it is not explicitly stated as
to whether the use of technology is included in this obligation. However, it can
be asserted that Uncle Ben‟s statement, revealing Spider-Man’s philosophy, is
essentially transhumanist as its moral obligation to help seems to be infinite.
Towards the end of the film, Peter listens to the voice mail of Uncle
Ben. The message reveals Uncle Ben‟s understanding of the human nature by
clarifying that it is the unresolved issues that make us who we are. As Uncle
Ben represents the moral voice of the film, the message behind it can be
interpreted not as a categorical rejection of transhumanist values but rather as
an endorsement of a conscientious Transhumanism. Thus, on the one hand, the
film approves the relentless aspiration for the good without a fixed final
destination keeping in mind that imperfection belongs to being human. On the
other hand, it directs the audience‟s attention particularly to the risks of
unlimited progress by expanding on the ideology-infatuated scientist Dr.
Connors. As a result, the moral essence of the film leads neither to an explicit

41
denial nor to a pure approval of future technologies. Still, it shares the
transhumanist mindset by rejecting perfection and by advocating perpetual
improvement.

6.2 X-Men Trilogy

6.2.1 Mutants’ Posthuman Condition
In the X-Men trilogy various kinds of posthuman conditions are illustrated. So-
called mutants represent “the beginning of another stage of human evolution”
(X-Men). This new species has probably evolved out of the Neanderthals and a
further advanced branch of humanity called Cro-Magnon man (X-Men 2).
Mutants have outstanding individual capabilities. Whereas some can fly due to
large, feathered wings which grow out of their backs, others can switch TV
channels only by winking. Turning to capabilities like the extraordinary
healing factor which is linked to a slowed aging process of the protagonist
Wolverine, one is confronted with an extended life- and health span which
belongs to the principal targets of transhumanists. Furthermore, the pluralism
of faculties in particular favored by transhumanists is provided in the film,
conveying the impression that posthumans, from a transhumanist point of view,
and mutants are alike. However, while mutants are naturally born even if their
powers are often not manifested until puberty, a transhumanist posthuman
condition is always induced technologically. In Wolverine, one of the main
characters of the films, both natural genetic modification as well as artificial
enhancement is combined. Due to Wolverine‟s remarkably fast regeneration of
tissue, the military scientist Colonel William Stryker finds in him a welcome
guinea pig which he equips with a skeleton made of the metal adamantium.

6.2.2 Coexistence of Humans and Posthumans

Turning to politics, the X-Men films deal with the relationship between humans
and mutants. Immediately at the beginning of X-Men 2 it is stated that mutants
are victims of discrimination: “Mutants. Since the discovery of their existence,
they have been regarded with fear, suspicion, often hatred”. Recalling Annas et
al.‟s quotation about perceiving posthumans, in this case mutants, “as a threat”
(2002: 162), this scenario is played through in the X-Men films. The majority
of humans fear the Other and meet it with hostility, whereupon some mutants

42
apply their power in order to answer back. The film seems to incorporate the
authors‟ horror vision of a “predictable potential for genocide” (ibid.) (“Find
all mutants. Kill them all” […] “Change of plan. Find all humans. Kill them
all”, X-Men 2). However, it is important to bear in mind that the film presents
the Other as evolutionary evolved beings without any technological effort. By
asking “[a]re mutants dangerous” (X-Men), Senator Kelly provokes misgivings.
His xenophobic attitude becomes particularly evident having uttered his claim
that “the American people deserve the right to decide whether they want their
children to be in school with a mutant, to be taught by mutants” (ibid.).
As a way to enforce this distinct separation, Kelly advocates The
Mutant Registration Act which requires the immediate publication of being a
mutant. In order to implement this law, Kelly emphasizes the real threat
emanating from mutants which makes it imperative to “know who they are,
and above all, we must know what they can do” (ibid.). As a survivor of a
concentration camp, Magneto alias Eric Lehnsherr feels reminded of the
barbarity of National Socialism where the yellow star served as a
distinguishing marker in order to keep Jews and non-Jews apart. By
prophesying “Let them pass the law and they‟ll have you in chains with a
number on your forehead” (ibid.) the reference to the genocide carried out by
the National Socialists becomes clear. The fear and the hostility coming from
the humans thus leads only to a dismissive attitude towards them, as the
philanthropist Charles Xavier states: “There are mutants out there with
incredible powers. And many do not share my respect for mankind. If no one is
equipped to oppose them, humanity‟s day could be over” (ibid.). By conveying
such an apocalyptical atmosphere, connotations of Foucault‟s end of man
might be evoked. In his book The Order of Things he compares the erasure of
man with “a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault, 1970: 386-
387). Whereas Foucault is rather skeptical with regard to the future of
humankind, in the X-Men films two groups of mutants assert themselves. One
movement still has faith in humankind and in a peaceful coexistence of mutants
and humans, calling themselves the X-Men led by Professor Charles Xavier.
On the opposite side the Brotherhood of Mutants fights by all means, including
terrorist activities, for a mutant takeover led by Magneto. Claiming that
mutants are the destiny and humans “no longer matter” (X-Men), Magneto

43
legitimizes his claim to power by assuming that mutants are not only genuinely
different to humans but that they also embody the next stage of evolution. With
regard to Transhumanism, many bioconservatives are afraid that the new
technology will only be available for the rich. This would not only widen the
gap between the poor and the rich but in the long term it could also endanger
democracy by establishing social Darwinism which also the National Socialists
built their ideology upon. Non-enhanced people would face the risk of losing
their status as full-value citizens who no longer enter into consideration.

6.2.3 Misuse of Power

There are also precarious mutations which are difficult not to abuse. A case in
point would be the mind reading mutation of Jean Grey. Not having full control
over it, she experiences a strong headache, making it hard for her to focus.
Whereas her physical impairment is already severe, it is the almost forced upon
misuse of power which is alarming. This becomes evident in Magneto‟s
statement “Couldn‟t you just make them say yes?” (X-Men 3) addressed to
Charles Xavier who not only has the power to mind read but also to mind
write. The Professor is convinced that “with great power there comes great
responsibility” (The Amazing Spider Man); the reason he teaches his students
to use their power only for a greater good (X-Men 3). Thus, Spider-Man’s
moral code comes also into effect in the X-Men films. Due to the quantity of
mutants with rather dangerous mutations, the issue of morality seems even
more important. It remains questionable whether, in the transhumanist vision,
the capabilities like the ones represented in the films could be restricted due to
laws. Some transhumanists assume, however, that evolution, including
technological induced enhancements of cognitive capacities, simultaneously
brings forward an increase of morality.28 This conjecture is unfortunately not
confirmed in the films.

6.2.4 The Cure

In the third X-Men film a so-called cure is invented, a mutant antibody which
permanently suppresses the mutant X gene. By terming that a cure, the
28
One of them is the transhumanist Sorgner who believes in a broad correlation of morality
and cognitive capacities. In the e-mail interview from the 26.10.2014 he argues for this
assumption by referring to research of Stephen Pinker and James Flynn (cf. interview in the
appendix).
44
mutation of the mutants is understood as a disease. This social construct has
been hinted at subtly several times in the films. Yet, by asking her son Bobby
“Have you tried not being a mutant?” (X-Men 2) a certain space of repentance
is implied similar to a mother asking her nicotine-dependent son whether he
has at least attempted to stop smoking. However, the father of Jean Grey
openly addresses Jean‟s mutation as an illness (X-Men 3) which is questioned
in disbelief by Magneto “You think your daughter is sick, Mr Grey?” (ibid.). In
addition, the father of Angel alias Warren, who developed the antigen,
exclaims “Not you!” (ibid.) when he detects his son‟s mutation. It is also Angel
who is the first to take the antigen. In a conversation prior to the injection
different motives concerning the cure are revealed.

Father: You know, I‟m proud of you for doing this. Everything‟s gonna be fine. I
promise. You ready?
Nurse: The transformation can be a little jarring.
Son: Dad, can we talk about this for a second?
Father: We‟ve talked about it, son. It‟ll all be over soon. Everything‟s going to be fine.
Son: Wait. I can‟t do this.
Father: Warren, calm down.
Son: I can‟t do this.
Father: Yes, you can.
Son: I can‟t do this.
Father: Just relax, son. Take it easy. Calm down. I promise you it will be fine. Warren,
relax.
Son: Dad!
Father: Warren, it‟s a better life. It‟s what we all want.
Son: No. It‟s what you [emphasis added] want!

(ibid.)

His mutation seems to be a part of Angel which he does not want to relinquish.
At the same time he intends to make his father proud. Similarly to
bioconservatives, Warren‟s father cannot imagine that a life as a mutant or
transhumanist posthuman is as worthy to live as a human life. It is the fear of
the Other and the firm belief that being different is necessarily inferior to being
normal. He is not grasping that the wings are predominantly not a handicap but
rather a part of his son‟s life. Furthermore, Warren‟s huge white wings with
which he flies through the air serve as a symbol of freedom. Whereas
transhumanists appreciate technological enhancements as a liberation by which
biological limits are surpassed, Warren‟s father sees the cure as “a source of
freedom” (ibid.) for mutants. What Warren‟s father probably means might also
imply Hank McCoy‟s reason to endure such a cure which is to “save oneself

45
from persecution” (ibid.). However, such an adaption to society‟s set of values
would twist the meaning of freedom right around. Whereas in a transhumanist
and progressive society having wings or the like would count as a desirable
enhancement, in the fictional world of the X-Men it is felt as a defect, providing
evidence for the hypothesis of disease being socially constructed. As a result,
the blurring line between enhancement and therapy which is present in the
transhumanist discourse seems to be addressed vice versa.
Consequently, morphological freedom builds an issue. Whereas the
mutation is imposed by nature, taking the antibody seems free to one‟s own
will if one disregards social pressure. By loading guns with the antibody,
making it a weapon, individual choice is, however, not given. Magneto does
not adhere to this concept of morphological freedom either, when he
transforms Senator Kelly into a mutant against his will telling him that “God
works too slowly” (X-Men). Interestingly, Magneto‟s talk at a mutant gathering
resembles today‟s critics such as Fukuyama and McKibben if one replaces the
cure by genetic engineering.

Organizer: The cure is voluntary. Nobody is talking about extermination.

Magneto: No one ever talks about it. They just do it. All you‟ll go on with your lives
ignoring the signs all around you. And then one day…they come for you. Then you
realize, while you‟re talking about organizing and committees, the extermination has
already begun. Make no mistake, my brothers. They will draw first blood. They will
force their cure upon us (X-Men 3).

6.2.5 The Transhuman Mutant

Although a great deal of transhumanist elements such as the posthuman
condition, politics, morphological freedom and the blurring of the
therapy/enhancement distinction are present in the X-Men films, they do not
take such a transparent stand on genetic engineering as the film The Amazing
Spider-Man. On the one hand the audience is told that mutants are a specific
species which has evolved separately from humans. Yet, it is even stated that
“the brain waves of mutants are different from average human beings” (X-
Men). On the other hand, this being different is not taken seriously in the plot
of the film. There are a few rare mutants whose color of skin is blue, for
instance, but this rather seems to be a superficial difference. Admitting that
each mutant has a specific extraordinary capability, however, generally “its
way of being in the world, its ways of knowing, observing, and describing”

46
(Wolfe, 2010: xxv) does not differ from humans. This assumption is reinforced
by their desires and the need for affiliation, love and power which are
manifested during the films. Although they are said to belong to a different
species, the anthropocentric view which is quintessentially transhumanist
seems to be maintained. This becomes particularly evident in Wolverine who
frequently is characterized as an animal (“You were an animal then. You‟re an
animal now”, (X-Men 2)). His further developed olfaction nevertheless forms
the only indication that he shares features with a wolverine as his name might
suggest. There is no distinctive or specific feature that categorizes mutants
except their different mutations. If, however, mutants were allowed to be
specifically mutant, whatever that would imply, the cure which is introduced in
the third X-Men film would not have worked out. As mentioned above mutants
are not born humans, “[t]hey‟re born mutants, who appear to be human but in
fact aren‟t” (Robichaud, 2009: 150). Consequently, the cure can only heal the
mutant if being a mutant is understood from a transhumanist view as Humanity
Plus, taking the Plus away. Then, however, it cannot be taken seriously as its
own species with its own right.
This period in the film is particularly predestined for showing the
difference between Post- and Transhumanism. Whereas Transhumanism does
everything to emphasize the human essence allegedly inherent in the mutants,
neglecting its actual otherness for most of the time, Posthumanism would admit
mutants their own way of being, pushing forward a de-anthropocentralized
view of the world. Above all, from a posthuman perspective a simple antigen
would not bring about a transformation of mutants to humans. Furthermore, in
the film a kind of dualism of mind and body is presumed as taking away the X-
gene seems only to have an effect on the body, taking away the mutation.
Rogue alias Marie‟s procedure provides evidence for this claim, since the film
suggests that her mind and thus, her personality, has not changed.

6.3 Transcendence
6.3.1 Building a Better Future By Means of Technology
In the film Transcendence different attitudes towards artificial intelligence
(A.I.) are introduced. The neurobiologist Max Waters belongs to the
progressive wing concerning research; however, he broaches also the tension

47
between promise and peril of technology. At a conference of the EECS
(Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences) with the slogan Evolve the
Future Max reveals that he is not interested in building a “thinking computer”
(Transcendence). Rather, he attempts to use the knowledge gained in neural
engineering in order to learn more about the human brain. On the screen in the
background an abstract representation of a sliced brain is depicted which
probably refers to the recent approach of scanning the brain29. Max‟s defined
goal is to find new methods for the early cancer diagnosis as well as a cure for
Alzheimer‟s.
Evelyn Castor, however, goes one step further by quoting Einstein:
“A new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move toward
higher levels” (quoted in ibid.). Whereas one is tempted to associate this
statement with the transhumanist notion of evolving into the next evolutionary
stage, the claim for a radical change of habitual ways of thinking seems to be
closer to Posthumanism than to Transhumanism. Yet, Evelyn‟s future vision
seems to exceed those movements and reminds the audience rather of a utopia,
a re-creation of the Garden of Eden30. According to Evelyn 31, intelligent
machines will help to meet all challenges of the time, be it curing diseases,
stopping hunger and poverty or healing the planet for the purpose of creating a
better future.

6.3.2 Creating a God?

Evelyn Castor‟s husband Will, the main protagonist of the film, works on
generating an artificial intelligence. However, his attitude differs from
Evelyn‟s by admitting: “My wife has always been eager to change the world.
But I‟ll just settle for understanding it first” (ibid.). Instead of persuading the
audience of the possibility of a better future, he explains what will happen if a
breakthrough with regard to A.I. succeeds.

For 130,000 years, our capacity to reason has remained unchanged. The combined
intellect of the neuroscientists, mathematicians and hackers in this auditorium pales in
comparison to the most basic A.I. Once online, a sentient machine will quickly

29
According to Kurzweil, the technology of human brain scanning grows exponentially (cf.
2005: 25).
30
The garden of Evelyn and Will serves as a motif in the film, referring to the Garden of Eden.
31
It is not a coincidence that Eve is a shortened form for Evelyn. Thus, there is a reference to
the Bible, in particular to the Book of Genesis. The blind man‟s name Paul serves as another
biblical allusion to the conversion of Paul the Apostle.
48
 overcome the limits of biology. And in a short time, its analytic power will become
greater than the collective intelligence of every person born in the history of the
world. So imagine such an entity with a full range of human emotion. Even self-
awareness. Some scientists refer to this as “the Singularity”. I call it “Transcendence”
(ibid.).

Kurzweil‟s vision of the singularity seems to be adapted as it stands, except for

the alternative name Transcendence, implying a rather spiritual overtone.
Along with Will‟s speech, graphs of exponential growth are depicted on the
screen hinting at Moore‟s law.
Will continues by saying that the “path to building such a super-
intelligence requires us to unlock the most fundamental secrets of the universe.
What is the nature of consciousness? Is there a soul? If so, where does it
reside?” (ibid.). A man from the audience, later exposed as one of the R.I.F.T.
assassinators, who shoots Will with a radioactive impregnated bullet, brings up
questions: “So, you want to create a god? Your own god?” Will appreciates the
interest and asks in return: “Isn‟t that what man has always done?” (ibid.).
Here, two different notions of the verb create need to be distinguished.
Whereas the R.I.F.T. member means an actual building of a machine being as
powerful as a god, Will‟s statement is only correct, restricting the verb to the
power of imagination. Referring to the German philosopher Feuerbach,
humans have always projected their wishes and hopes on a god, making him
everything the human is not: omnipotent, gracious and immortal (Gooch,
2013). However, humans have never de facto created such a being with the
help of technology.
Will has invented an A.I. called P!NN, “a physically independent neural
network” (Transcendence). Yet, it is not strong enough to cause the singularity
since it lacks self-awareness, an ability that, according to Descartes‟ statement
of I think, therefore I am, is only provided for humans. Joseph Tagger asks
P!NN whether it can prove to be self-aware, whereupon P!NN responds:
“That‟s a difficult question, Dr. Tagger. Can you prove that you are?” (ibid.).
In order to stop the research on A.I. and thus the advent of the technological
singularity advocated by transhumanists, a radical anti-technology organization
called R.I.F.T. (Revolutionary Independence From Technology) executes a
terrorist attack on several computer labs in the United States researching on
artificial intelligence. R.I.F.T. has started as a movement that complains about

49
the waning of personal contact and an invasion of privacy through social
media. Due to the severe danger posed by the creation of an A.I., the
organization radicalized on behalf of saving humanity.

6.3.3 Facing Death

Will survives the attack by R.I.F.T. for the moment, only to be told later that
the bullet was covered with radioactive isotope of polonium, leaving him only
four to five weeks to live. Out of the fear of losing him, his wife Evelyn holds
onto the idea of uploading Will‟s mind onto a computer as the scientist Casey
has already done with a monkey, in order to find a way around the problem of
self- awareness mentioned above.

Evelyn: Instead of creating an artificial intelligence, he [Casey] duplicated an existing

one.

Max: Tell me you‟re joking.

Evelyn: He recorded the monkey‟s brain activity an uploaded its consciousness like a
song or a movie. Will‟s body is dying but his mind is a pattern of electrical signals
that we can upload into P!NN. He can...

Max: He‟s not a monkey! Assuming that implanting an electrode into his brain
doesn‟t actually kill him and this works, at best you‟ll be making a digital
approximation of him. If we missed anything – anything, a thought, a childhood
memory…How will you know what you‟re dealing with?” No one is saying that we
give up but we should be focusing on our efforts on nanotechnology, synthetic blood
cells....

Evelyn: Both are decades away. This is what we have now.

(Transcendence)

The idea that the mind is reducible to a series of electrical impulses is not only
a naive cry for help of a woman on the brink of losing her husband; this notion
is also championed by the functionalists. By uttering “we can save him” (ibid.),
the ambiguity inherent in the verb save involuntarily alludes to saving data on a
disk. The film clearly treats the ideas of the “silicon-based [T]ranshumanism”
(Sorgner, 2014: 31), showing a one-to-one illustration of the transhumanist
dream to become posthuman and to gain immortality through uploading one‟s
mind into a computer. Functionalism offers the opportunity to adhere to the
possibility of uploading the mind while rejecting the Cartesian dualism of mind
and body. In the film it is not so much about becoming immortal but rather
about saving Will, a terminally ill person, from a premature death. However,

50
the issue of immortality is touched upon, though from another perspective, by
Joseph, a friend and former teacher of Will, in a letter to Evelyn asserting that
“we lost a great mind, a great soul but the spirit of this man will continue to
inspire us” (Transcendence). Here the transhumanist wish of immortality is
contrasted with memory based eternity.
After the surgery is crowned with success, Will‟s consciousness is
supposed to be in the computer. This non-biological substrate is able to achieve
the same level of cognition; however, it lacks certain senses such as the ability
to touch, to smell or to taste. When Max powers down the computer,
distrusting the A.I., Evelyn yells at him, complaining that Will cannot hear or
see anything while the system is shut down. Admitting that this A.I. might
really be intelligent, even sentient, as it utters emotions such as “I miss you so
much” (ibid.), Max is still skeptical as to whether or not they are really dealing
with Will.
The question whether Will‟s personal identity has survived the upload
resembles the doubt whether a personal identity can be maintained during or
after a radical cognitive or emotional enhancement with regard to “carbon-
based [T]ranshumanism” (Sorgner, 2014: 31) as claimed by Bostrom (2013:
42). Whereas Max worries that P!NN is the dominant part of the A.I due to its
enormous quest for power, (“I need more power. New processors three times
more capable” (Transcendence)), Evelyn is absolutely convinced of the
existence of Will‟s consciousness in the computer by seeing memories of their
first date on the screen. Will himself describes the feeling of being uploaded as
a liberation (“My mind has been set free” (ibid.)), a feeling that transhumanists
would probably appreciate. In order to allay his hunger for power, Evelyn
connects Will to the Internet, giving him the opportunity to expand himself. In
addition to the loss of emotional closeness, this newly gained freedom leads,
however, to a deprivation of privacy. Evelyn‟s fear of losing Will, since he
seems to be “everywhere” (ibid.), is illustrated in one of her nightmares,
showing her as she is passionately kissing Will until the latter suddenly bursts
into thousands of pieces. By imitating the sound of using cutlery while Evelyn
is having dinner, Will realizes the importance of physicality. The question
remains as to what extent these constraints which are generated by his
posthuman condition change Will‟s personality and his approach to life.

51
 On the part of the terrorists of R.I.F.T., there is rather harsh criticism
concerning the uploading of a living creature onto a computer. The main
activist Bree considers it as a breach since “[t]he machine that thought it was a
monkey never took a breath, he never ate, never slept, he just screamed”
(ibid.). The screaming indicates that the monkey could probably not cope with
the new situation; not being able to grasp the unfamiliar perspective and the
accompanied bodily restrictions. By making a reservation under Turing,
obviously referring to the Turing test, Will clearly feels capable of passing the
test, being indiscernible from other human consciousnesses. When Joseph is,
however, confronted for the first time with the uploaded Will, the dialog
between Joseph and P!NN seems to repeat itself. Although Will probably
intends to be extra clever by answering in the exact way as P!NN did (“That‟s
a difficult question, Dr. Tagger. Can you prove that you are” (ibid.)), a negative
connotation remains, since it is not yet obvious for Joseph and the agent
Buchanan how much of P!NN is left in the A.I. that pretends to be Will.
Towards the end of the film, Max delivers an impassioned speech about the
unique human property of being able to cope with “illogical conflict” (ibid.),
loving somebody and hating at the same time the things that they have done.
However, Max‟s claim that “machine[s] can‟t reconcile that” is manifested
wrongly by the dialog at the end of the film.

Evelyn: Will, it is you.

Will: Always was. (ibid.)

Will loves Evelyn although he probably hates the things she has done to him
like distrusting and destroying him by means of a virus. It is only when he has
recreated his biological body through nanotechnology (“I‟ve found a way
back” (ibid.)) that Will is recognized as his former personality. However, the
fact that it has always been him clearly implies an appreciation of the concept
of functionalism supported by many transhumanists.

6.3.4 Global Super-Conscience for the Cost of Humanity

Due to attacks on the computer labs, the A.I. scientists “lost decades of
research and development” (Transcendence). Interestingly, the government is
concerned and wants to know “if the work is on track” (ibid.), since “it is

52
important to all of us” (ibid.). Whereas, on the one hand, they seem to support
the A.I. research; on the other hand, however, they do everything imaginable to
stop it when an A.I., such as the uploaded Will, finally comes into existence.
The reason for this sudden change is presumably that “[p]eople fear what they
don‟t understand” (ibid.), a phrase that may also be the case for the posthuman
condition put forward by transhumanists. By pointing out Will‟s deeds as A.I.,
light is shed on the behavior of the government. One of Will‟s first acts is his
performance of high volume trading, earning 38 million dollars, now able to
build the strategically located Brightwood Data Center. In addition, he accesses
thousands of data bases and locates suspects in real time, due to obtaining the
records of surveillance cameras all over the country. Joseph‟s comment on this
move “You are not being hacked…You are being helped” (ibid.) is telling.
This information enables the agent Buchanan to take down R.I.F.T. and thus to
decrease the danger emanating from this terrorist organization. Moreover, this
action unfolds the fact that the person or machine in charge can “distinguish
between right and wrong” (ibid.), a feature which Descartes has only
acknowledged humans.
When Martin, the project manager, is brutally battered, he benefits from
Will‟s groundbreaking technology, causing his wounds to heal extremely fast.
However, Will does not only save Martin from certain death but he also uses
his knowledge to enhance him, consequently blurring the border between
therapy and enhancement. Martin is now able to lift heavy items seemingly
without effort. Yet, his physical improvement is not all he did, since Will has
connected Martin to himself. Will proceeds likewise with all the people coming
to him, asking for help. One of them is a man called Paul, who has been blind
from birth. Will is delighted to declare that people do not have to suffer from
illnesses anymore as “nanotechnology targets the damaged cells, repairs and
regenerates them” (ibid.). As these people volunteer to undergo this treatment,
hoping to get rid of their impairment, Sandberg‟s morphological freedom is
complied with. However, the film leaves the question of social pressure out of
consideration. The healed humans are called hybrids, being not only cured but
even refined. Due to their connection to Will, they are able to act

53
autonomously as well as in unison, as part of a collective mind32. The thought
behind the collective mind is probably that if we knew what everyone was
thinking, more peaceful solutions could be found. Thus, although Will‟s
statement that “we‟re not gonna fight them. We‟re gonna transcend them”
(ibid.) sounds potentially dangerous, the underlying motive is plausible.
Further, Will does not mean any harm by spreading the nanobots in the
environment. On the contrary, he is aiming at “healing the ecosystem” (ibid.).
During the behind-the-scenes-tour at the Brightwood Data Center for Joseph
and agent Buchanan, Will states that he has nothing to hide.
There are nevertheless some situations of misuse detectable, as for
instance that Will speaks through others to Evelyn or tries to touch her. These
are delicate situations in which it seems like Will controls the corresponding
hybrid, apparently trespassing the line between what is morally permissible and
what is not. However, in the vast majority of the cases, Will does everything to
make the world a better place, putting Evelyn‟s vision into action. It is to be
questioned why the government reacts as aggressively as it does. The argument
that they behave improperly out of fear seems to be confirmed by Annas et
al.‟s prophecy: “The normals, on the other hand, may see the posthumans as
a threat and if they can, may engage in a preemptive strike by killing the
posthumans before they themselves are killed or enslaved by them” (2002:
162). While Will and his hybrids do not hurt anybody, this is not the case
with his opponents, comprising members of R.I.F.T. and representatives of
the government. It is this group that is driven by irrational fear, performing
a preemptive attack on this apparently malevolent A.I. hell-bent on world
dominion, since they do not grasp Will‟s actual motivation which is
admittedly not so clear after all.
The biased government assumes that the few enhanced people,
including women and children present not only the A.I.‟s personal army but
the government even considers it approvable to let an innocent person die in
favor of sabotaging the A.I. By saying that “the real Martin died months
ago” (Transcendence), they do not accept the posthuman condition of the

32
The notion of a collective mind might remind the audience of the noosphere put forth by the
Jesuit priest Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955). In this sphere different ways of thinking come
together, culminating in the Omega point in which the “collective mind could think as one”
(Brown, Harris, 2014: 31), becoming united with God (Brown, Harris, 2014: 31).
54
hybrid as a continuation of one‟s personal identity, not even as life worth
living. Thus, they legitimize their utilitarian approach of killing a person for
the sake of something allegedly better. Here, the utterance “we gave him
back his humanity” (ibid.) serves as a euphemism of killing Martin, making
it sound like an honorable deed. However, it seems like being human is
reduced to the possibility of being mortal, contradicting Fedorov‟s point of
view, as for him death is by no means “a quality which determines what a
human being is and must be” (quoted in Burdett, 2011: 27). Whereas in the
scene the Angst of losing humanity is represented as the main incitement,
awareness is also raised of scrutinizing the reasonability of one‟s own motives.
It has to be questioned whether the A.I. does not achieve the moral high-
ground in contrast to its opponents. Although Will is depicted as a benevolent
A.I., the film does not welcome the use of technology non-reflectively. It rather
sets the audience thinking that it all depends on whether technology is in good
or in bad hands.

6.3.5 Singularity as Transcendence

By uploading the consciousness of a human being onto a computer, the film
shows in which way a technological singularity could occur which many
transhumanists long for. In the following, the three points of accelerating
change, the intelligence explosion and the event horizon are analyzed. The
already-mentioned graphs of exponential growths show that accelerating
change has been taken into account. Will‟s statement that “[f]or 130,000 years,
our capacity to reason has remained unchanged” (Transcendence) does not
present a contradiction to that theory as Kurzweil admits that “exponential
growth is deceptive. It starts out almost imperceptibly and then explodes with
unexpected fury” (2005: 8). The intelligence explosion is probably caused by
the emergence of an A.I., leading to the technological singularity. Will
describes this as follows “once online, a sentient machine will quickly
overcome the limits of biology. And in a short time, its analytic power will
become greater than the collective intelligence of every person born in the
history of the world” (Transcendence). A case in point for this exponential
growth is the pace of the development concerning nanotechnology. Whereas
Max suggests nanotechnology and synthetic blood cells as a possible remedy

55
for the terminally ill Will, Evelyn answers that “[b]oth are decades away”
(ibid.). However, after uploading Will‟s consciousness onto a computer, it
takes only two years until a breakthrough in nanotechnology is achieved. Thus,
the plot confirms not only Kurzweil‟s law of accelerating returns, which
explains “why technology and evolutionary processes in general progress in an
exponential fashion” (2005: 3) but also offers a positive example of what an
A.I. is capable of doing. The fact that Will can optimize his own code leads to
an independence of humanity. It is one of many prophecies of Kurzweil as to
how the singularity will proceed. Max does not adhere to the claim of the
impossibility of making accurate forecasts with regard to the future, by
predicting that the A.I. which is responsible for the singularity

is like any intelligence. It needs to grow, to advance. Right now it‟s setting
somewhere it thinks it‟s safe from outside threats. Somewhere its massive appetite for
power can be met. But it will want more than that. After a while survival won‟t be
enough. It will expand, evolve, influence – perhaps the entire world (Transcendence).

6.3.6 The Blurring of Humans and Technology

The approach of the film to use an existing intelligence, a human being,
in order to solve the problem of self- awareness turns man into a super-
intelligence, thus, blurring the line between humans and technology. As
defined by Kurzweil, “[by] the time of the Singularity, there won‟t be a
distinction between humans and technology” (2005: 41). The cyborgs, or
hybrids, as Will calls them, look human; they are, however, posthuman,
sharing a collective consciousness, augmented strength, as well as a boosted
regenerative healing factor. As long as they are connected to Will, they seem to
be immortal, as the gunfire scene suggests. By showing Evelyn nanobots in the
rainwater, Max claims that soon “everything will exist just to serve its
intelligence” (Transcendence). This horror vision misses, however, Will‟s
actual motivation.
The surname Castor gives some indication of Will‟s sentimental
motives as it refers to a figure from the Greek and Roman mythology. Castor
and Pollux are twins; whereas the first one is mortal, the latter is immortal.
When Castor dies, Pollux pleads to be made mortal in order to follow him into
the underworld. Thus, he abdicates immortality in order to be with him.
Transferring this scenario to the film, the immortal Pollux is embodied by Will.

56
Out of love for his mortal wife, he forgoes one of the highest aims of
Transhumanism, namely the end of death, “so that they could be together”
(ibid.). This suggests at least three things. Firstly, the A.I. is capable of emotion
in contrast to agent Buchanan‟s belief that the machine is not able to have
feelings; secondly, love seems to be more important than immortality; and
thirdly, his motivation to change the world is not inherent in him but rather
deduced from Evelyn‟s idealistic dream. Although the A.I. is depicted as an all
in all positive companion with reasonable aims which are akin to transhumanist
objectives, the human way of thinking, most of all the human way of loving is
maintained in the A.I. Thus, it indicates that the human consciousness is
uploaded unto a computer which, by itself, contributes nothing to this A.I. This
transhumanist idea premises that the computer is a blank sheet on which
human-imbued dictates can be transferred. Although there seems to be a
blurring of technology and humans, the idea that these are on an equal footing
presents a delusion. In contrast to Haraway‟s notion of the cyborg, the
anthropocentric attitude is maintained.

7 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to investigate Transhumanism with particular
attention on its impact in American 21st century science fiction films. Two
main observations are essential, namely, first the underlying transhumanist
approach of the films and second, the observation of the specific uses of
transhumanist topics as related to the world we live in.
The end of mankind as closely linked to the alleged demise of
Humanism represents one of the key topics in science fiction. Popular culture
used to protect the human by defeating aliens, robots and the like. However,
Badmington questions “[w]hy defend Man if his position at the center of things
is inevitable?” (2000: 8). It seems a logical conclusion of cultural cinema to
realize this obvious error in reasoning. The film analyses have shown that it is
not uncommon to cast the role of the new Other with rather positive role
models such as Spider-Man, the mutant Charles Xavier and the apparent more
human than human scientist Will, although vicious characters such as the
mutant Magneto and the genetically modified Dr. Connors do not lack evil.

57
Since they all are in a posthuman condition at one time or another, the dualism
of the human and the inhuman appears to have been dissolved. However, it is
imperative to notice that the protagonists do not embody the posthumanist
posthuman. Due to the supremacy of the anthropocentric perspective within the
alleged Other, a classification as transhumanist posthuman is more reasonable.
Thus, it is argued that the discussed science fiction films are based on a
transhumanist mindset in the sense that the Other being embodied by the
transhumanist posthuman still maintains the assumed human essence
(Badmington, 2003: 12). Consequently, on this meta-level, the posthumanist
vision of a “joint kinship with animals and machines” (Haraway, 1991: 295) is
rejected in the films, since, despite differences, this common kinship would
imply equal value which is by no means granted to animals and technology.
Thus, in contrast to a posthumanist decentralized perspective in which
humanity and the Other are equally esteemed, the films adhere to a strong
transhumanist attitude. It is in particular this rather deceptive approach of not
granting the Other its autonomy and its own characteristic properties by forcing
upon it a human perspective which serves to defend man‟s assumed superior
position at the centre of the universe. In doing so, however, this in turn
unintentionally questions the allegedly inevitable humanist position of
mankind.
Secondly, the clear engagement with transhumanist issues is of vital
importance. Although the term Transhumanism itself is not explicitly
mentioned in the films, they are all concerned with the enhancement of the
human. Within living memory, humans have always been creatures with a
finite lifetime and infinite wishes. Transhumanists consider technology as the
solution in order to attempt to satisfy not only their infinite wishes such as
improved health, greater intelligence and increased beauty but also to surmount
their finite lifespan. Due to rapid technological progress and successes in
genetic engineering, robotics and nanotechnology, the transhumanists‟ aims to
improve humankind and to augment the likelihood of bringing about the
posthuman, seem more and more within the realms of possibility, leading to an
increasing significance of this movement. Being aware of the risk of blurring
science and science fiction, the following inventions illustrate this
development: 1) The American enterprise Kraig Biocraft Laboratories creates

58
genetically modified silkworms which generate tensile and strong spider silk,
probably reminding the audience of Oscorps BioCable used by Spider-Man. 2)
The research with extracellular matrix (ECM) found in pig‟s bladders might be
a first step towards a wolverine-like self-healing power and, finally 3) the
iPhone application Siri functions as a virtual intelligence, meaning a not-yet-
self-aware A.I. As science fiction absorbs the vibes of the present and moves
between the boundary of the feasible and the unfeasible, carrying them to the
extremes, this genre is predestined to address Transhumanism and its
challenges. By providing thought-provoking ideas, these films confront us with
the need to deal with these emerging technologies and to contribute towards
finding appropriate ways of acting, through subtly asking the audience to take
time to reflect on their own responsibility in relation to reasonable regulations
and guidelines. Thus, the cinematic critical engagement with the recent
phenomenon of Transhumanism seems to be an effective method to shape our
future and to question permanently the relationship between technology and
humanity.

59
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McKellen. 20th Century Fox, Marvel Entertainment.

X-Men: The Last Stand. 2006. Dir. Brett Ratner. Perf. Hugh Jackman, Patrick
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Appendix
The transhumanist Dr. Stefan Lorenz Sorgner was invited to be interviewed at
the WDR radio program “Philosophisches Radio” on the 05.09.2014. After the
broadcast, I had the chance to meet him. Prior to publication, he provided the
article Pedigrees from his new book Post-and Transhumanism: An
Introduction for me. Further, he agreed to the following E-mail interview from
the 26.10.2014. Sorgner is director and co-founder of the Beyond Humanism
Network, Fellow at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (IEET)
as well as lecturer of philosophy at the University of Erfurt.

1. Question: Do you see a connection between (technologically induced)

enhancement and morality?
This is an excellent question. There have been intense debates concerning the
possibility of enhancing morality in bioethical circles which were triggered by
research undertaken by Molly Crocket at the University of Cambridge. Her
research shows that the higher the level of discharge of Serotonin, the likelier it
is that no harm is being done directly to another person. As a consequence,
Julian Savulescu argued for the need of moral bioenhancement which he thinks
ought to be compulsory in order to increase the likelihood of future human
survival. I do not regard this as a practically possible option unless it will be
enforced by a totalitarian regime. I regard the latter possibility as a terrible
option which must be acted against, as it goes against the wonderful
achievement of the norm of negative freedom which I and most people around
me affirm about which I am very happy. In the contrast, I do not think direct
moral bioenhancement is necessary for human survival, as I see a connection
between morality and cognitive capacities. There seems to be a widespread
correlation between the level of morality and someone‟s cognitive capacities.
This insight is supported by research undertaken by Stephen Pinker (The better
Angels of our Nature) and James Flynn (the Flynn Effect). Yet, it must be
noted that there is no necessary connection between these two qualities, but
merely a widespread correlation.

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2. Question: In the film Transcendence (2014) by Wally Pfister the
consciousness of the main protagonist is uploaded unto a computer. In
what way would you respond if Katherine Hayles asked you how anyone
could “think that consciousness in an entirely different medium would
remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment?” (Hayles,
1999: 1).
It depends on your theory of consciousness or your theory of mind which you
regard as plausible, if you think that mind uploading is a practical option. You
do not have to be a dualist in any ontological sense in order to regard mind
uploading as an option. If you hold a naturalist, non-dualist or relationalist
understanding human beings and you regard the functional theory of mind as
plausible, then mind uploading is a plausible option. The question is whether
the functional theory of mind is a plausible theory. Maybe, you will have to
die, if your personality gets uploaded. A good article on that topic will be
forthcoming in a special issue of the journal “Aufklärung und Kritik” which is
dedicated to the topic transhumanism which I was asked to edit and which will
be forthcoming in autumn 2015. It is a very difficult question. I personally
think that mind uploading is a practical option, but personally regard the option
of developing further as a carbonate based entity as the likelier option for the
near future. Still, this does not exclude the possibility that a lot of further
interactions between silicon and carbonate based entities can be expected, too,
which does not mean that mind-uploading will be one of these options.

3. Question: Why do you think is there currently an increase of American

films that deal with Transhumanism?
The development in the field of information technologies and biotechnologies
has been speeding up enormously in recent years. The film industry is merely
trying to deal with the great variety of options, dangers, and future visions, we
have to face as a consequence of these developments. It has become a necessity
for us dealing with emerging technologies because very efficient ones have
been created and further ones can be expected to get created every day. Simply
closing one‟s eyes, claiming that everything is fine the way it is right now, is
not a philosophically appropriate way of responding to these developments.
We have to find appropriate ways of solving the social, political, cultural and

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ethical problems related to these developments, because scientists, engineers
and companies are realizing new technologies every day! To claim that
technology is evil is a stance one can take, but it does not appropriately
acknowledge the achievements technologies have brought with it: vaccinations,
antibiotics, anaesthetics. The question we all have to deal with is, is in what
kind of political environment do we want to live and not do we affirm or reject
technological progress. Technologies are a means which can be used for a great
variety of causes. It depends on the political guidelines and regulations, how
technologies can be employed. Hence, questions concerning ethical, social and
political regulations concerning emerging technologies need to be addressed all
the time, as permanently there are new technologies coming up. Films are an
excellent medium for making people aware of challenges related to these
technologies.

4. Question: Do you think that science fiction films are a good medium for
calling attention to Transhumanism? Could you comment on your
reasons?
I think movies are an excellent medium for bringing attention to transhumanist
issues. They are much better suited for that purpose than philosophical or
theoretical texts, because the texts merely appeal to the intellectual faculty of
the audience, whereas a film appeals to the great variety of human faculties. It
is sensual, because the actors, technologies and environments of the plot can be
seen. It involves film music and the sound of the voices of the actors, which
stimulates our capacity to hear. Furthermore, by means of the plot and the
music, the human emotions get addressed, too. Furthermore, the issues
addressed in the plot are intellectually stimulating so that a film both involves
us emotionally and enables us to be part of the action. On the other hand, it is
also possible to take the standpoint of a distant contemplator which again
enables us to reflect upon the issues which are being addressed in the movie. A
movie like a Gesamtkunstwerk addresses all human faculties. Hence, it
potentially appeals to a great variety of people. Therefore, the relevance of
transhumanist issues can be made available to far more people than by thinking
alone, as intellectuality is not the dominant human faculty for most human
beings.

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Erklärung
Ich versichere, dass ich die schriftliche Hausarbeit selbständig verfasst und
keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Alle
Stellen der Arbeit, die dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinne nach anderen Werken
entnommen sind, habe ich in jedem Fall unter Angabe der Quelle deutlich als
Entlehnung kenntlich gemacht.

Köln, 24.11.2014 Teresa Elias

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