Principles of Subjective Anthropology Concepts and The Knowledge System

Binggong Chen
Principles
of Subjective
Anthropology
Concepts and the Knowledge System
Principles of Subjective Anthropology
Binggong Chen
Principles of Subjective
Anthropology
Concepts and the Knowledge System
Binggong Chen
School of Marxism
Jilin University
Changchun, Jilin, China
Translated by
Xianming Liu A. Blair Stonechild
Jilin University First Nations University of Canada
Changchun, China Regina, Canada
This work was supported by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences
(19WKSB002).
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction
of the Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . 11
1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object
of Anthropology and the Resultant Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1 The Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research
Object of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 The Excursion of the Research Object and Discipline
System of Anthropology and the Harm Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea for the Reconstruction
of the Discipline System of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1 The Historic Mission of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 An Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System
of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . 30
3.1 The Concept of Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 The Concept of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 The Research Objects of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . 37
4.1 Providing Rational Frameworks and Methods for Man’s
Knowledge About Himself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Furnishing Humanity with Rational Knowledge He Can
Use to Be Master of His Destiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Laying the Foundation of Anthropology’s Transition
from the Borderline Discipline to the Mainstream One . . . . . . . . 40
v
vi Contents
4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences

with Original Premises on Which to Fathom the Mysteries
of Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5 Providing a Theoretical Basis for the Discipline in Order
for Chinese Anthropology to Rank Among Its Global Peers . . . 43
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Theoretical Foundation and Mode of Thinking of Subjective
Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.1 World Outlooks of Dialectical Materialism and Historical
Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.2 Marx’s Theory of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.3 Marxist Theory of Human Beings (or Marxist Human
Theory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.4 Marx’s Thoughts on Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2 Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.1 How Modes of Thinking Hitherto Known to Humankind
Hamper Pioneering Efforts to Unravel the Noumenon
of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 The “Triple Transcendence” and “Three Levels”
of Human Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 The Essence of Human Life: Practical Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1 Man’s Practical Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.1 The Conception of Practice as the Essence of Human Life . . . . . 84
1.2 Practice Furnishes the Key to Helping Us Understand
the Great Complexity of Human Life and Unravel
the Essence of Human Life Shrouded in Mystery . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1.3 Marx’s Practical Theory Provides the Fundamental
Principle for Our Understanding of the Noumenon
of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2 Man’s Real Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.1 The Basic Implications of the Marxist Theory About
“The Actual or Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.2 The Essence of “Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.3 Deeper Understanding and Further Exploration
of the Theory on “Real Man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3 The Human Subject’s Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.1 Definition and Category of the Human Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2 Man’s Subjectivity and Its Manifold Manifestations . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3 Definite Values Appropriate to Definite Kinds of Human
Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4 Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.1 The Implications of Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Contents vii
4.2 The Multiple Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

4.3 The Unity of Man’s “Dual Life” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . 157
1 The Noumenon of Human Life: From “Dualism” to “Duality” . . . . . . 158
2 Chinese and Foreign Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon
of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
2.1 Ancient Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of
Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.2 Modern Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of
Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3 Several Theoretical Patterns About the Ontology of Human Life . . . . 180
3.1 “Man Is Created by God” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.2 “Man Is a Living Creature” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
3.3 “Man Is a Rational Creature—That Is, Man Is Endowed
with Reason” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
3.4 “Man as a Creature of Culture” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4 The Synchronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human
Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.1 The Static Existence of the Noumenon of Human
Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.2 The Dynamic Existence of the Noumenon of Human
5 The Diachronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human
Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5.1 The Formative Process of the Noumenon of Human
5.2 The Developmental Stages of the Noumenon of Individual
Human Life—An Individual Human Being’s “Structure
and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
6 The Dualistic Unity of Man’s “Structure and Choice” in a State
of Mutual Dependence—The Noumenon of Human Life . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7 The Unique Human Characteristics and Functions
of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . 219
7.1 The Unique Human Characteristics of the Noumenon
of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.2 The Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s
“Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
8 Comments on Two Types of Ontology of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
8.1 A Critical Commentary on Sartre’s Existentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.2 A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice”
Preparing Certain Theoretical Prerequisites for Human Studies . . . . . 250
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
viii Contents
6 Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

1 The Concept of Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
1.1 The Origin and History of the Term “Personality” . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
1.2 An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Concept of
Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
1.3 A Description of Personality Based on the Theory
of “Structure and Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
2 A Critical Commentary on Classical Theories of Personality . . . . . . . 283
2.1 The Ancient Chinese and Western Theories of Personality . . . . . 284
2.2 The Freudian Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
2.3 Karen Horney’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
2.4 Maslow’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
2.5 Kurt Lewin’s Theory of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
3 Personality Structure: The Concept, Characteristics and Functions . . 317
3.1 The Concept of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
3.2 The Characteristics of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
3.3 The Functions of Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
4 The Basic Structure of Human Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
4.1 The Basic Structure of Human Personality—“The Three
Levels of Personality Structure” and “Eight Kinds of
Powers” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
4.2 Carrying Forward and Drawing Upon Various Theoretical
Traditions of Personality Structure in an Integrated Fashion . . . 344
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
7 Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
1 The Total Absence of the General (or Universal) Concept
of “Group” and the Negative Effects Resulting Therefrom . . . . . . . . . 372
2 The Concept of “Group” and the Categorization of “Groups” . . . . . . . 378
2.1 The Concept of “Group” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
2.2 The Categories of “Group” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
3 Several Theoretical Patterns of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
3.1 Radcliffe–Brown’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
3.2 Émile Durkheim’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
3.3 Max Weber’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
3.4 Bruno Latour’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
3.5 Arnold Toynbee’s Theory of “Group Structure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
4 The Concept, Characteristics and Functions of “Group Structure” . . . 449
4.1 The Concept of Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
4.2 The Basic Hierarchy of Group Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
4.3 The Characteristics of Group Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
4.4 The Functions of Group Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction

of the Discipline System of Anthropology
“The questions,” as Karl Marx pointed out, “are the frank, uncompromising voices
of the time embracing all individuals; they are its mottoes, they are the supremely
practical utterances proclaiming the state of its soul.”1 The revolutionary thesis Marx
set forth as to how man achieves historical progress and social development cannot
fail to awaken us to the fact that “anthropology remains marginal as a category,”
by which is meant that “anthropology is virtually absent in the minds and hearts of
students, student leaders, parents, administrators, alumni, trustees, legislators, and
donors,”2 and that it is abundantly clear that the discipline of anthropology has been
placed in a position of considerable difficulty. With the above situation in view, we
are under the imperative necessity of reflecting deeply and seriously on the long-
term implications of an anthropology that is virtually marginalized, now and ever,
in the academy or in society. It follows justly that within a broader sociohistorical
frame of globalization the problem of how to fathom the various causes underlying
the long-term marginalization of anthropology and of how to come up with more
inclusive strategies to cope with the awkward situation rightly asserts itself as “the
slogan of the times,” to wit, “the most practical voice reflecting the spirit of the
times.” To put it more specifically, the immense and glorious task anthropology has
set itself is to establish the discipline of subjective anthropology, to reconstruct the
discipline system of anthropology, and to bring about a gradual but steady transi-
tion from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. We are fairly justified in
asserting that the colossal effort on the part of anthropology is, in a certain sense, a
1 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 40. Beijing: People’s
Publishing House, pp. 289–290.
2 Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997): 9–17.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128.
© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 1

B. Chen, Principles of Subjective Anthropology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_1
2 1 Introduction
dynamic reflection of “the frank, uncompromising voices of the time embracing all
individuals.” Anthropology, in consonance with the etymology of its name, “study
of humanity,” richly merits the still-unrivalled distinction of being the most compre-
hensive of the academic disciplines dealing with mankind, which can perhaps be
explained in terms of its topical interest, which, on the one hand, tends to be displayed
in its concern with human societies as well as with human cultures, and which, on the
other, tends to embrace such diverse areas as human goals and values and humanity’s
final destination, whereby it stands to reason that anthropology, in relation to other
academic disciplines, rightly asserts itself as one of the mainstream disciplines that
tend to dominate the sphere of academic learning. However, anthropology has been
subjected to relentless marginalization over long periods of time. Peacock, president
of the American Anthropological Association between 1993 and 1995, remarked that
“despite the yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large number of
students, anthropology is still marginal as a category” and that “the discipline is not
a category within the wider culture’s plan, memory, or consciousness”—or, to put it
another way, “anthropology is still the invisible discipline.”3 It can thus be seen that
anthropology’s marginalization has become an indisputable fact when viewed from a
global perspective. To make matters worse, anthropology seems totally undisturbed
by its long-term marginalization and simply fails to exercise any initiative in solving
the problem once and for all. In view of the above situation, we’ll have to note with
regret that this exactly reverses what we might expect.
There is no denying the fact that anthropology’s marginalization would be preg-
nant with grave consequences. In actual fact, the relationship between anthropology
and humanity, in the proper sense, can be reduced to that of the discipline in itself
to its research object. In this world no discipline other than anthropology is inextri-
cably linked with humanity to such an extent that the relationship between any other
discipline and humanity cannot be simply put on a par with that of anthropology to
human beings. In general, the mysteries of anthropology lie in man, and the secrets of
man consist in anthropology. People have been suffering from a serious deficiency in
knowledge on man as a direct consequence of anthropology’s marginalization. Over
a long period of time, people have been complaining that there has been a serious
deficiency in knowledge about man and that the knowledge about man has been
in the grip of poverty. “Man has become,” as philosophical anthropologist Scheler
pointed out, “problematic as never before; he no longer knows what he is.”4 Another
philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann argued that the traditional image of
man has been demolished, whereas modern man lacks such a valid self-image. After
all, culture, art, and social order should have been built on such a self-image.5 From
what has been discussed above, it would be logical for us to argue that how man exists
tends to be predicated upon what he is. Man’s serious deficiency in knowledge about
himself, or rather, the poverty of human knowledge about himself, must of necessity
3 Ibid.
4 Landmann, M. (2006). Philosophical Anthropology (Yan, Jia., Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou
People’s Publishing House, p. 4.
5 Ibid.
1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction of the Discipline … 3
lead the majority of humanities and social sciences to make arbitrary assumptions
about human nature, which, consequently, would make a rational knowledge of
human existence woefully incomplete,6 rest upon an insecure foundation, go from
one extreme to the other, or possess an antagonistic character,7 whereby the resultant
crisis would be most likely to threaten the very existence of human beings. Thus it
would be logical for us to theorize that how to meet the mounting crisis of human
existence necessarily requires as an antecedent in logic the perspicuous but sound
reflections on the question of “what man is,” which, in its turn, must presuppose that
we should carefully study and discuss the problem of anthropology’s marginalization
in all its fundamental bearings.
In the strict sense of the term, anthropology’s marginalization is in essence the
self-marginalization, which, in its turn, constitutes the cause underlying the marginal-
ization of anthropology. As James L. Peacock put it, “it is not society that is to blame
for anthropology’s marginalization, but anthropology itself. …We have a zeal that is
sometimes evangelical. Its roots often are the field experience. This is a rite of passage,
and we do dwell obsessively within it, rather as the religious convert dwells within
the conversion experience; we refer to it as our special source of understanding, thus
disdaining the nonconvert. We think we’re special; so we preach instead of listen,
or we stand aloof. …Whether it survives, flourishes, or becomes extinct depends on
anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become integral and significant to our culture
and society without becoming subservient.”8 The obvious discrepancy between the
existing object of anthropological study widely accepted in anthropological circles
and the one in the proper sense of the term poses a serious problem by which the
discipline of anthropology has been confronted for long periods of time, which holds
true for the discipline system of anthropology. When subjected to rigorous analysis
and thorough examination, the concept of anthropology rightly asserts itself as “the
science of humanity,” or more specifically, “the scientific study of human beings
and of their cultures.” Following this line of thought, we cannot fail to perceive the
slightest discrepancy between this way of framing the idea of anthropology and the
technical conception of the discipline in the proper sense of the term,9 whereby we
may seem justified in asserting that the concept of anthropology we are trying to
understand in this way allows little deviation from the proper definition of the disci-
pline and can thus be considered scientific in the truest sense of the word. However,
we’ll have to note with regret that during the historical development of anthropology
the research object and discipline system of anthropology failed to follow closely this
line of thought that tends not to allow the slightest deviation from a proper, genuine
understanding of anthropology—that is, “the scientific study of human beings and
6 Smith, Steven B., ed. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, p. 135.
7 James, David. (2021). Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. New
York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 86.

8 Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997): 9–17.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128.
9 Miguens, Sofia., ed. (2020). The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, p. 510.

4 1 Introduction
their cultures.”10 In the midst of a transition from theological through biological to

cultural anthropology, rather than being directed towards the study of man himself,
the conscious efforts on the part of anthropologists of different generations were
focused on the description and analysis of various cultural phenomena and their
evolutionary changes, thereby leading to a wide discrepancy between the existing
research object of anthropology generally accepted within anthropological circles
and the normal one that is to be understood in a proper sense, which holds true for
the discipline system of anthropology. To put it more specifically, these discrepancies
tend to manifest themselves in various aspects of anthropology. An example or two
will suffice to make this clear. There has been a fundamental shift in what is the
focus of anthropological research. Anthropology is concerned primarily with “cul-
ture” rather than with “man himself,” which is to say, it is “culture” rather than “man
himself” that rightly asserts itself as the central field of anthropological study. The
research object of anthropology undergoes a fundamental displacement alongside
the shift of the central focus of anthropology to culture. With very few exceptions,
anthropologists almost invariably inveigh most bitterly against the study of man,
that is to say, they either deliberately neglect the study of man or voluntarily abstain
from studying him. Rather, they dwell obsessively within the field of culture. There
is an obvious discrepancy between the existing discipline system of anthropology
widely accepted in anthropological circles and the one in the proper sense of the term,
whereby human beings are deprived of the only academic discipline that tends to
devote itself exclusively to the study of man himself. The subject has been woefully
neglected even by some of the most distinguished names of the academic world
that either disdain to study it or categorically reject it. French anthropologist Claude
Lévi-Strauss, who was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism, attached little
importance to the role of human agency, or rather the function of subjective initia-
tive, but rather laid undue emphasis upon the function of objective structures. He
was emphatic in his assertion that the subject of society as well as of history is the a
priori structure rather than man and that social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in
such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even
declared the position on “melting man,” asserting that “such a detestable favorite as
the human subject must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the
philosophical territory for too long.”11 Alfred Louis Kroeber, an influential American
anthropologist, who served as President of the American Anthropological Associa-
tion, was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
and was acclaimed as one of the greatest anthropologists of the twentieth century.
He treated culture as a super organism and propounded the “superorganic theory of
culture.” For Kroeber, culture has the inherent law of change and development to
itself, anthropologists simply confine themselves to the description and explanation
10 Wulf, Christoph. (2013). Anthropology: A Continental Perspective (Winter, Deirdre., Hamilton,

Elizabeth., Rouse, Margitta., & Rouse, Richard J., Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
press, p. 116. cf. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 778.
11 Li, Qing-Yi. (1986). Althusser and Structural Marxism. Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s

of cultural phenomena, and there is no necessity for them to study man himself. In
1925 he published the “Eighteen Statements,” asserting with emphasis that an indi-
vidual, whose value is embodied in his or her being treated as proof or evidence of
civilization, cannot prove of any historical value. It would strain the keenest imagi-
nation to understand why these anthropologists, whose brilliant achievements earned
them the huge acclaim of the entire anthropological community, had conceived so
profound a contempt for “man himself,” why they had so bitterly inveighed against
the study of man, and why they so deliberately neglected the subject! By the logic
of events, it is bound to follow that anthropology dismisses man’s existence as a
matter of no consequence, whereas, by contrast, man manifests little interest in
anthropology. Herein lies the underlying cause of anthropology’s marginalization.
The transition of anthropology from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one
must be predicated upon a reversion to normal on the part of the research object
and discipline system of anthropology, which, in its turn, necessarily requires as an
antecedent in logic the perspicuous but sound reflections on the question of “what
man is.” In this seminal work, on the one hand the author introduces the concept of
“subjective anthropology” and formulates the knowledge system which will enable
“subjective anthropology” to qualify as an emergent academic discipline in its own
right, and on the other, he endeavors to elaborate on the idea for the reconstruction
of the discipline system of anthropology, so that the pioneering and laudable efforts
on the part of the author may bring about a gradual but steady transition from the
borderline discipline to the mainstream one, whereby this opus can blaze a new path
along which cultured and forward-looking people will be able to acquire new knowl-
edge of man which may provide abundant food for perspicuous but sound reflections
on a long-run solution to the problem of how to meet the impending crisis of human
existence.
The book entitled Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the
Knowledge System, which will reflect a high credit upon its author’s copious learning
and historical perspective, embodies the results of a very large amount of original
research by the author—or to put it the other way round, this opus rightly asserts
itself as the fruit of more than twenty years of resolute pursuit and arduous explo-
ration, whereby the latest frontiers of anthropological research are being pushed
farther onwards as time goes on. His brilliant talent is manifested in this seminal
work, where it is by the exercise of creative talent as well as through the expendi-
ture of creative effort that the author filled two distinct gaps in the knowledge and
understanding of modern man12 and formulated seven basic principles of “subjective
anthropology.”
First, the book filled two distinct gaps in the knowledge and understanding of
modern man. To put it more specifically, it filled the gap in the knowledge and
understanding of the concrete “whole man” and developed the general (or universal)
concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein.
12Mandelbaum, David G., Lasker, Gabriel W., & Albert, Ethel M., eds. (1963). The Teaching of
Anthropology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 597.
6 1 Introduction
Second, the author established seven fundamental principles of “subjective

anthropology.”
(1) He presented the concept of “subjective anthropology” and framed the theo-
retical system that will enable “subjective anthropology” to qualify as a new
academic discipline in its own right.
(2) In the book he conceived and expanded the creative idea for the reconstruction of
the discipline system of Chinese anthropology. According to him, anthropology
should include three major branches, viz. subjective anthropology, cultural
anthropology, and biological (or physical) anthropology, which can be further
divided into smaller branches of knowledge or subfields of study respectively.
To put it differently, the new discipline system of anthropology can be referred to
as the one endowed with Chinese characteristics, Chinese visions and Chinese
styles.
(3) In advancing the theory of “structure and choice,” the author claimed that, more
often than not, such explanations systematically related to the aforementioned
theory are given by formulating some fundamental ontology that posits human
life.
(4) The author gave a graphic description of personality based on the theory of
“structure and choice,” which is to say he propounded and expounded “the
theory of personality structure and choice” which can be represented in the
form of a diagram.
(5) The author provided a graphic description of group based on the theory of
“structure and choice,” that is to say, he postulated and elaborated “the theory
of group structure and choice” that can be represented in the form of a diagram.
(6) The book is the only adequate exposition of the two subjects, namely, the top-
down construction of the value system of group and the construction of sound
personality, which tend to throw new light on our rational knowledge of human
existence.
(7) In methodological terms, subjective analysis has been introduced into the study
of subjective anthropology and thereby asserts itself as the most approved
method for the study of subjective anthropology.
In addition, of all the concepts and theses the author presented and developed in the
crowning work of his long career, some have been widely accepted in anthropological
circles, though this book has added a new light to them, while others originated with
the author himself. It thus comes as no surprise that this book gives the fullest
expression to his systematic creativity which tends to combine logic and reasoning
with unbounded and vigorous imagination and to make him strive in a systematic
way for creative solutions to problems. It therefore naturally follows that when he
attempts to present her arguments in a logical way, it often happens that there are not
enough concepts or categories adequate for the purpose and that since it is difficult
to frame a definition that is both comprehensive and accurate, some concepts or
categories generally accepted within anthropological circles are necessarily endowed
with inherent flaws and their definitions are far from admirably clear and accurate.
With the above situation in view, the author takes the initiative in introducing some
basic concepts and categories that may prove of supreme importance to the discipline
of subjective anthropology, and meanwhile tries to ensure that a lavish expenditure of
creative effort will eventually enable these new concepts and categories to come into
full play in qualifying subjective anthropology as an emergent academic discipline
in its own right, whereby he will be able to carry on his anthropological research in
real earnest.
In the end, however, it must be pointed out that Chinese anthropological circles are
now faced with the triple task of advancing and developing the theoretical system of
subjective anthropology, reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology, and
establishing the discipline system of Chinese anthropology with Chinese character-
istics, Chinese visions and Chinese styles and that the triple task rightly asserts itself
as a theoretical project of tremendous magnitude that has far-reaching implications
for the way we think about the future of anthropology. Just as the research project can
be likened to a huge iceberg, so a wealth of theoretical knowledge the book places
at our disposal may be compared to the tip of the iceberg above the ocean surface.
Like the portion of the iceberg below the water surface,13 the remaining part of the
research project represents a vast reservoir of theoretical knowledge, more abundant,
more mysterious, and more significant. The author suggests that at least the theories
about the following three main subdisciplines of anthropology as well as the rational
knowledge of human existence deserve serious and enthusiastic study so that the
research project could be brought to completion.
(1) Anthropologists should devote themselves most conscientiously to the study
of philosophical anthropology. Of the various sub-branches of philosophical
anthropology, cultural philosophical anthropology becomes immensely popular
with whoever is trying to open up a new frontier for anthropological exploration.
According to cultural philosophical anthropology, the essence of man lies in the
fact that he is a creature of culture. If the fundamental conception of the essence
of man is far from ideal, it follows justly that philosophical anthropology may
provide a fascinating new perspective on the nature of man—or to put it the other
way round, the light thrown upon the essence or nature of man by philosophical
anthropology tends to reveal “what man is” in a new light. Hence anthropologists
should reconstruct the discipline system of philosophical anthropology and form
new theories about it.
(2) According to the academic views widely accepted among Chinese anthropolo-
gists, the discipline system of anthropology can be roughly divided into two
representative schools: the American school and the Continental school. In
general, the discipline of anthropology in the United States can be seen as
comprised of the two branches of physical anthropology and cultural anthro-
pology, while, by contrast, the discipline of anthropology in Continental Europe
is traditionally divided into four subfields, namely, anthropology, archaeology,
13Raab, Jennifer. (2015). Frederic Church: The Art and Science of Detail. New Haven, CT: Yale
8 1 Introduction
ethnology and linguistics.14 The discipline system of modern anthropology is

actually founded on the aforementioned division of the branches of anthro-
pology in the United States and Continental Europe. Based on a brief sum-
up of the existing discipline system of anthropology, the author conceived the
idea for the reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology—that is,
anthropology should encompass the three major branches, to wit subjective
anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological (or physical) anthropology.
If anthropology is referred to as general anthropology, “the study of humankind
at the most comprehensive and holistic level,”15 then, by the logic of events, a
holistic anthropological theory should be accepted as the framework through
which to make sense of general anthropology. If so, in holistic terms, what is
it that general anthropology requires as an antecedent in logic? According to
this conception, in constructing the knowledge system of general anthropology,
how ill anthropologists address themselves to epistemological, methodological,
and ontological questions hitherto much-debated within the anthropological
discourse?
(3) In terms of primary objects of anthropological study, cultural anthropology
remains today the discipline that primarily studies the emergence and divergence
of languages over time, the survivals of ancient cultures, and some traditional
peoples (or primitive tribal groups),16 as well as modern cities and mediums
of film, radio and television, in particular, ethnographic films. Moreover, the
academic discipline is mainly devoted to the study of the origin and development
of the material and spiritual cultures created by human beings as well as of the
laws of human cultural evolution. From what has been discussed above, the
questions naturally arise as to what field of study may rightly assert itself as
the central focus of cultural anthropology as well as about how to develop the
discipline’s theoretical system.
(4) If anthropology can place the question of “what man is” in the clearest light, then,
as often as not, a scientific exposition of “what man is” will be able to serve as a
logical prerequisite for a rational knowledge of human existence and to provide a
sound basis for an objective understanding of human life, whereby anthropology
can supply us with a theoretical foothold for thinking about a long-run solution
to the problem of how to meet the impending crisis of human existence and will
enable us to approach the problem in a scientific and objective spirit. In vying
with other academic disciplines for the only adequate exposition of “what man
is,” more often than not, anthropology will enable us to elicit rational faculties
latent within us, to look back upon the long history of five thousand years in
a scientific spirit, and to turn our thoughts with more earnestness towards the
14 Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin
University Press, pp. 2–3.
15 Valsiner, Jaan., ed. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, p. 96.

16 Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications, p. 1833.
References 9
future. Given the clash of civilizations and resultant confusion and turmoil, it
will come as no surprise that anthropology would be in a position to stimulate
us to cast our minds back on the past and review the historical development in
a scientific spirit, or rather, to bring to light the laws governing human cultural
construction and evolution and to view the clash and merging of civilizations in
their proper historical perspective. Moreover, in throwing considerable further
light upon the rational knowledge of human existence, anthropology will be able
to provide a scientific explanation of certain fundamental values such as love,
justice, democracy, education, and so forth, whereby it would be in a position
to make a lasting contribution toward a long-run solution to the problem of how
human beings are able to achieve some fundamental goals such as existence,
development, well-being, and sustainability. The author has never entertained
the least doubt that anthropology must undergo an inevitable transition from the
borderline discipline to the mainstream one. It is Chinese scholars that start to
think about embarking upon the immense and glorious task and it is incumbent
upon them to push the task through to completion!
References
1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 40. Beijing: People’s
2. Peacock, James L. “The Future of Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 99(1) (1997):
9–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/682128.
3. Landmann, M. (2006). Philosophical Anthropology (Yan, Jia., Trans.). Guiyang, China:
Guizhou People‘s Publishing House, p. 4.
4. Smith, Steven B., ed. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss. New York, NY:
5. James, David. (2021). Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. New
York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 86.
6. Miguens, Sofia., ed. (2020). The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, p. 510.
7. Wulf, Christoph. (2013). Anthropology: A Continental Perspective (Winter, Deirdre., Hamilton,
Elizabeth., Rouse, Margitta., & Rouse, Richard J., Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago press, p. 116. cf. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume
1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 778.
8. Li, Qing-Yi. (1986). Althusser and Structural Marxism. Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s
9. Mandelbaum, David G., Lasker, Gabriel W., & Albert, Ethel M., eds. (1963). The Teaching of
Anthropology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 597.
10. Raab, Jennifer. (2015). Frederic Church: The Art and Science of Detail. New Haven, CT: Yale
11. Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin
12. Valsiner, Jaan., ed. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. New York, NY:
13. Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume 1. Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications, p. 1833.
Chapter 2
Concept and Research Object
of Subjective Anthropology
With the evolution of human civilization spanning over five thousand years, modern
science and technology has attained an advanced stage, in which mankind can reach
the deepest earth and the highest heaven, control the forces of nature, and gain insight
into minute particles. Although he has made tremendous progress and development
in the prolonged process of human civilization, mankind has been neglectful of the
study of himself. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau ever argued two centuries ago, “Of all
human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be that of
mankind.”1 To date, the problem has not been really resolved. As a general rule,
the manner in which man knows himself determines how he acts. The very fact that
mankind has been neglecting to know himself eventually leads to a grave crisis which
may endanger his own existence. In essence, it may well be admitted that the grave
crisis which affects human beings’ own existence can be more or less equivalent to
the great difficulty with which man endeavors to know himself.
There is a close identity between “anthropology” and “knowing thyself’: in
general, “the mysteries of anthropology lie in man, while the secrets of man consist
in anthropology.” However, it is regrettable that a long course of time has witnessed
the study of anthropology not focused upon “man himself” but concentrated on
the human “physique,” “culture” and “society,” which results in the excursion of
the research objects and discipline systems of anthropology. In this sense, anthro-
pology cannot evade responsibility for the grave crisis of “knowing thyself.” This
work in which the author advanced the knowledge system and concepts of subjec-
tive anthropology is intended to orient the discipline system and research objects of
anthropology towards a rational and scientific realm so that anthropology may be
really charged with the arduous task of unlocking the mysteries of man himself and
thus man when confronted with the grave crisis of “knowing thyself” can overcome
the overwhelming odds of survival.
1Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1982). Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men.
Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 62.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_2
12 2 Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology
1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research

Object of Anthropology and the Resultant Impacts
1.1 The Discipline System of Anthropology
According to the academic views widely accepted among Chinese anthropologists,

the discipline system of anthropology can be roughly divided into two representative
schools: the American school and the Continental school. In general, the discipline
of anthropology in the United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields
of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology which can be further divided
into several branches respectively. As a subfield of anthropology, physical anthro-
pology, also known as biological anthropology, includes such academic disciplines
as paleoanthropology, anthropometry, and ethnology, while cultural anthropology
encompasses such scientific subfields as ethnography, linguistic anthropology, and
archaeology.2 By contrast, the scientific discipline of anthropology in Continental
Europe can be divided into such four independent subfields as anthropology, archae-
ology, ethnology, and linguistics. Whether in the United States or in Continental
Europe, each subfield of anthropology can be further divided into smaller branches
of knowledge or fields of study.3 Admittedly, the discipline system of modern anthro-
pology is actually founded on the above-mentioned division of the subfields (or
branches) of anthropology in the United States and Continental Europe.
1.2 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research

Object of Anthropology
In general, the concepts of anthropology endowed with interdisciplinary character-

istics are wide in range and hence abundant in connotations, while the definition of
anthropology as the science that treats of man, in broad terms, determines how the
concepts at the service of anthropology are developed and elucidated. The conception
of anthropology subjected to rigorous analysis and thorough examination requires
that anthropology should lay claim to “man himself as well as his culture” as its
object of study and the learning concerned with “man himself as well as his culture”
as its main body of knowledge. When we endeavor to apprehend the nature of anthro-
pology, this line of thought is subjected to no excursion, to wit, the conception of
2 Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin Univer-
sity Press, pp. 2–3; Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2006). An Introduction to Anthropology. Beijing:
China Renmin University Press, p. 11.
3 Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin

1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research Object … 13
anthropology is scientific and correct and subjected to no excursion.4 However, in the

history of anthropology, its “object of study” and “discipline system” failed to follow
closely this line of thought. During the development of anthropology, there occurred
a shift in focus of study from the biological perspective to the cultural one. As a
subfield of anthropology, biological anthropology (also known as physical anthro-
pology) is a scientific discipline concerned with the biological aspects of human
beings and hence provides a biological perspective to the systematic study of human
beings, while cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology focused on the study
of cultural variation among humans. Scholars engaged in anthropological research
neglected and even chose not to make an exhaustive study of “man himself”. More-
over, they attempted to substitute “cultural anthropology” for “anthropology” in the
hope of making “anthropology” hidden from view, as a result of which the “research
object” and “discipline system” of the scientific discipline of “anthropology” were
subjected to universal deviation (or excursion) from their scientific and correct paths.
This sort of deviation (or excursion) marked by tendency and universality can be seen
everywhere and is primarily incarnated in the following aspects.
(1) The Excursion (or Deviation) of the Principal Focus of Anthropology
The term “anthropology” made its appearance roughly in the sixteenth century. Otto
Casmann (1562–1607) was a German humanist who converted from Catholicism to
Protestantism as a young man. He is important to the history of anthropology and
psychology, because in 1596 he produced a work entitled Psychologia Anthropo-
logica as one of the first scholars to make a study of anthropology. Thenceforward,
the term “anthropology” came to be widely used in German universities. Roughly
speaking, anthropology went through the following shifts in focus of study: “theolog-
ical anthropology”—“biological anthropology”—“cultural anthropology.” During
the development of anthropology, theological anthropology made an earlier appear-
ance. In the nineteenth century, “scientific anthropology” made its debut with the
advent of Darwin’s theory of evolution and its central focus of study was oriented
towards the biological aspects of human beings. From the perspective of “scientific
anthropology,” man is treated as a kind of living organism evolving from nature,
and human traits can be defined by making a comparison between human beings and
4 “In terms of its etymology, anthropology is the science that treats of man. In actual fact, among
multitudes of sciences at the service of mankind, anthropology asserts itself as merely one of them.”
(Encyclopaedia Britannica).
“As a science for the good of human learning, anthropology is the study of human nature and
culture.” (Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). ‘Preface.’ In A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan,
China: Shanxi Education Press, pp. 268–269.)
“The discipline of anthropology is concerned with ‘the learning on humans’.” (Wang, Ming-
Ming. (2002). What is Anthropology? Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 2.)
“As two combining forms of the term “anthropology”, ‘anthropos (human being)’ and ‘logos
(theory or science)’ may owe their origins to Greek beginnings in terms of their respective etymolo-
gies. The two component parts are combined to mean ‘the science (or study) of man (or human
beings)’.” (See also Song, Yuan-Fang., ed. A Concise Dictionary of Social Sciences. Shanghai:
Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1982.)
animals and a study of human beings’ physiological phenomena as well as their evolu-
tionary changes. In terms of the range of study, there is a considerable overlap between
“biological (or physical) anthropology” and “scientific anthropology.” However, the
foregoing discipline encountered various criticisms on the grounds that this academic
approach cannot be used to explain what a “rational person” is. Hence, with the shift
of the central focus of anthropology to culture, “cultural anthropology” marked by
numerous schools and various viewpoints came to assert itself as the main discipline
of anthropology, which was even put on a par with anthropology itself. Cultural
anthropology, which treats humans as a kind of cultural beings, is a branch of anthro-
pology focused on the description and analysis of a variety of cultural (or social)
phenomena as well as their evolutionary changes, by means of which man can be
explained and represented. By submitting the study on human beings to greater
dimensions, cultural anthropology attained a vigorous development during which
multitudes of illustrious masters fruitful in their academic achievements took center
stage in the field of study. However, with the development of cultural anthropology, a
grievous outgrowth attracted widespread attention. Scholars engaged in the research
of cultural anthropology attempted to equate “culture” with “man himself”, holding
that the study of “culture” was more or less equivalent to that of “man himself”, to
such an extent that they attempted to make “man” lie under the shadow of “culture”,
substitute “culture” for “man”, and even turn the study of “culture” against the study
“man”, as a result of which the discipline system and research objects of “anthropol-
ogy” were submitted to grievous excursions. Moreover, this sort of “excursion (or
deviation)” arising from the increasingly widened gap between “cultural anthropol-
ogy” and “anthropology” in terms of their respective research objects and discipline
systems made either “culturology” or “sociology” almost become the version of
“anthropology.” Anthropology was neglectful of the study of “man himself” and this
led to the deficiency in or even emptiness of knowledge on human beings. A grave
consequence followed. “Anthropology” was disinterested in “man himself,” and vice
versa. The science of anthropology was subjected to relentless marginalization (or
peripherization). Until now, this situation has been continuing. As a scientific disci-
pline concerned with the study of human beings and their cultures, anthropology
should have asserted itself as the hot topic of concern and the main focus of atten-
tion. The marginalization (or peripherization) of anthropology is considered to be an
abnormal phenomenon, whose fundamental cause lies in the excursion (or deviation)
of the research object and discipline system of anthropology.
(2) The Excursion of the Research Objects of Anthropology
It is “culture” rather than “man himself” that has long since been the basic object of
study for anthropology. A vast body of anthropological literature treats “culture” as
the object of study and takes it as the key concept of anthropology, on the basis of
which all of the knowledge systems of anthropology are to be formulated and devel-
oped. Not only are the foregoing viewpoints anchored in some works or textbooks,
but also the fundamental viewpoints are shared in different versions of encyclopedia
and famous anthropological literature or course books of the modern world. About the
excursion of the objective of anthropology, German philosophical anthropologist Dr.
M. Landmann argued: “…in England and France, and to some extent in America,
anthropology is equated with ethnology, of which prehistory is also considered a
part. …Even in Germany this use of the term is not completely unknown. Wilhelm
Mühlmann’s Geschichte der Anthropologie (1948) is mainly, if not exclusively, a
history of ethnology.” So far the viewpoint that anthropology takes “culture” rather
than “man himself” as the object of study has been ensconced and even enshrined in
the minds of Chinese scholars and foreign ones alike, and it is regrettable that such
an abnormal phenomenon has been going on up till now. There is no necessity at all
for us to furnish any example in justification of the argument, but pointing out the
following universal fact will suffice to prove the argument. Invariably, the theory that
anthropology takes “culture” as the fundamental object of study neglecting and even
rejecting the study of “man himself” has been widely accepted in various versions
of anthropological works and textbooks. Anthropology was neglectful of or even
abstained from the study of “man himself” and merely focused on the study of
“culture”, and hence in the field of anthropological study this led to not only the
deficiency in knowledge on human beings but also the distortion of the nature and
image of man. Some scholars even hold that the nature of man is equivalent to the
combination of “animals and cultures”! All of the foregoing statements have shown
that at present there exists a prevailing tendency in anthropological circles that the
fundamental object of study for anthropology is treated as the study of “culture”
created by mankind rather than the study of “man himself”, and that anthropology
has long since been staying away from the study of “man himself” that should have
been ensconced as its fundamental object of study and thus how many misappre-
hensions and excursions have been caused when scholars engaged in the study of
anthropology attempted to gain knowledge on human beings!
(3) The Excursion of the Discipline System of Anthropology
In terms of the discipline system of anthropology, modern anthropology is neglectful
of and even abstains from the study of “man himself.” How the discipline system of
anthropology is treated in the United States is as follows. In general, the discipline
of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology, which can be further divided
into several branches respectively. As a subfield of anthropology, physical anthro-
pology, also known as biological anthropology, includes such academic disciplines
as paleoanthropology, anthropometry, and ethnology, while cultural anthropology
encompasses such scientific subfields as ethnography, linguistic anthropology, and
archaeology. Each foregoing subfield of anthropology can be further divided into
smaller branches of knowledge or fields of study. How American anthropologists
divide the discipline system of anthropology and put their own interpretation on
various branches of anthropology also demonstrates clearly that the discipline system
and research objects of anthropology have been subjected to grievous excursions.
“Physical anthropology, also known as biological anthropology, is concerned with
not only the biological bases of human survival in the past and present but also
the nature of the transformation to human anatomy and behavior in the course of
evolution from early hominines to modern people. Of particular concern to physical
anthropologists are the course that human evolution has taken and the processes that
have brought about human biological variation. Much light has been thrown upon
human physical traits as well as relations between human biological physique and
culture.” “Cultural anthropology is a scientific discipline focused on the study of
human society and culture, as distinguished from human biological characteristics.
Cultural phenomena of concern to cultural anthropologists are oriented to the descrip-
tion, analysis, and explanation of modes of human thought and behavior as well as
similarities and diversities among societies or cultures, which are embodied in such
manifold spheres of human life as customs and habits, matrimony, kinship and family
structure, economic and political system, religion, and primitive art.” “Archaeology
(also spelled archeology) takes as its object of study all past human societies. Archae-
ologists examine specifically all aspects of tangible and intangible cultural heritage
of past human life and activities, and as other anthropologists do in their respective
fields of study, so they endeavor to gain a deep understanding of the truth about man
himself across time and space.” “Linguistic anthropologists argue that language is
a social instrument through which people engage themselves in cultural practice.
As a subdiscipline of anthropology, linguistic anthropology is focused on the explo-
ration of how cultural diversity is related to linguistic usages around the world.”
Cai Yuanpei, China’s democratic revolutionary, educator, and thinker, published an
article entitled On Ethnography in the journal of Yiban in December 1926, which
gave a full exposition of the implications of ethnography. He stated briefly, “As a
branch of learning, ethnography, whose methods involve recording or comparing
collected materials, is intended to explore the cultures of various peoples.” To date,
this concept still plays an important role in anthropology. Two conclusions can be
drawn from the implications of the discipline system of anthropology which by
now the anthropological circles have gained a common understanding of. First, as
a major division of anthropology, cultural anthropology as well as its subdivisions
such as archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and ethnography deals with the study of
culture or society, which has been inextricably bound up with human activities since
it was created by man, rather than man himself. Second, biological anthropology,
also known as physical anthropology, has man himself as the object of study, and yet
it never deals with a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness, but
is basically concerned with the biological bases of human beings, which provides a
biological perspective to the systematic study of human beings. A living individual
in his or her wholeness and concreteness, who is not only bursting with vim and
vigor but also endowed with distinctive characteristics, is able to establish himself
among his or her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social
practice. Thus, it may well be admitted that the discipline system of anthropology
fails to treat a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness as the object
of study, a system of theoretical knowledge with regard to a living individual in his or
her wholeness and concreteness has been hitherto unavailable, and even such a wish,
pursuit or intention has not manifested itself. What a regrettable thing! Admittedly,
in the garden of human knowledge, as well as philosophy concerned with the essence
of man as a whole, anthropology can be recognized as the only science of humanity
which studies human beings as a whole. If anthropology evades the study of man
as a whole, which subject would like the study of man as a whole consigned to its
rightful realm?
(4) Classic Authors in Anthropology Neglecting the Study of Man Himself
The basic theories advanced by some prominent anthropologists have shown that they
were not only neglectful of the study of man himself, but also showed contempt for
the study of man himself, and even categorically rejected the study of man himself.
As one of the central figures in the structural school of thought, French anthropol-
ogist Claude Lévi-Strauss was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism who laid
emphasis on the function of objective structures, but warranted little attention to the
role of human agency. He believed that the nature and change of a social phenomenon
is determined by the a priori preexisting structures, human beings’ statements and
actions which are governed by the universal structures can only be treated as their
manifestations, and they never change the structures. Hence, the subject of society
as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be
ruthlessly melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and
facelessness. He even declared the position on “melting man”, asserting that “such a
detestable favorite as the human subject must be expelled from structuralism, since
it has ruled over the philosophical territory for too long.”5 Alfred Louis Kroeber
was an influential American anthropologist, served as President of the American
Anthropological Association, was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute, and was acclaimed as one of the greatest anthropologists
of the twentieth century. He treated culture as a super organism and propounded the
“superorganic theory of culture”, according to which the whole world is made of
such four phenomena as mass or force, life, consciousness, and social life or culture,
culture treated as a super organism is scarcely subject to the influence of a lower
organism, and nor is it influenced by human psychology or inheritance. He held that
culture is endowed with its rightful law of development and change, that anthropol-
ogists confine their attention only to culture, and that there is no necessity for them
to study man himself. In 1925 he published the “Eighteen Statements”, under this
title of which are mainly included the following contents. “Second, in terms of its
research materials, what history studies is not man but his creations, that is, the results
of human action. Third, civilization, which finds expression in human creations and
whose existence is dependent upon human beings, is in essence an entity, a sort of
order deriving its origins from life. …History is not concerned with man who created
civilization but merely with civilization itself. Sixth, an individual, whose value is
embodied in his or her being treated as proof or evidence of civilization, lays no
claim to his or her historical value.” He believed that an individual is of so little
consequence that culture endowed with the characteristics of a super organism can
exist independently of human beings and take its course without any individual’s
influence. Kroeber despised and even denied man’s subjective initiative and histor-
ical value, treated man merely as a supplement to and a proof of culture viewed as a
super organism, and thus there did not seem to be any necessity for anthropologists
5 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.
to study man himself. What a ridiculous argument it is. Man is the product of culture
and vice versa. In the final analysis, culture is the product of man. Without man, how
can there exist the super organism conception of culture? The theories expounded
by the two foregoing anthropologists have shown that the “research objects” and
“discipline systems” of the scientific discipline of “anthropology” were subjected
to universal deviation (or excursion) from their scientific and correct paths. More
specifically, anthropology treated culture as well as society as the object of study,
and neglected or even rejected the study of man himself. Admittedly, there existed
a necessity for the “research object” and “discipline system” of anthropology to be
subjected to universal excursion (or deviation) from their scientific and correct paths.
When we seek to anatomize the universal excursion (or deviation)of the “research
object” and “discipline system” of anthropology from an epistemological angle, it
is not hard to see that the world outlook and methodology derived from dialectical
materialism and historical materialism respectively will play a significant role in
our analysis. If we fail to grasp the advanced world outlook and methodology in an
effort to acquire a deep and complete understanding of man himself, we will not
unravel the mysteries of man, and nor will we comprehend the dialectical relations
between man and culture, which is inevitable to land the discipline of anthropology in
a predicament where anthropologists may encounter enormous troubles in knowing
man himself. Ultimately, they cannot but abandon the study of man himself and turn
their attention to culture, which leads to the universal excursion (or deviation) of the
“research objects” and “discipline systems” of anthropology.
1.3 The Excursion of the Research Object and Discipline

System of Anthropology and the Harm Done
(1) The Imposition of Cultural Repressiveness upon Man’s Subjectivity
There exist deep causes for the excursion of the discipline system and research
object of anthropology, which is attributable to nothing more than scorn or even
contempt for man himself as well as the neglect of the study of man himself. The
fundamental causes reside in its disregarding the relationship of the dialectical unity
between man and culture, having man and culture stand in contradiction to each
other, using culture to screen man, repress man, and supersede man, and negating
man’s subjective status as well as his subjective role. Grave consequences followed
from the foregoing causes. In the territory of anthropology, while culture came out
into the open and expanded far and wide, man’s endowments such as his subjectivity,
independence, initiative, and creativity were obviously treated with disregard. The
realm of anthropology also bore witness to the emergence of such opposite tendencies
as cultural nuclealization versus man’s marginalization, and the constant presence
of culture versus the constant absence of man. Man possesses no historical value
and thus the human subject should be expelled from the territory of anthropology.
Culture is not created by man, but it is treated as an organism, which runs its course.
Culture becomes inextricably bound up with human activities, only because it was
born with no feet and has been dependent on man for its transport. Considering man
is regarded as subservient to culture, there is no necessity for man to be master of his
fate, as a matter of fact man is unable to grasp his destiny in his hands, and thus man
should be at the mercy of culture. Some areas of anthropological study seemed to
bear witness to the resurrection of the God-oriented Middle Ages, though this deity
was culture rather than God. Admittedly, such foregoing tendencies are abnormal.
Anthropology must recognize the subjective status of man as well as the relationship
of the dialectical unity between man and culture, have the subjective status of man
returned to normal, and treat man himself as well as his culture as the object of study.
The reasons are as follows.
First, the human subject exists as a fundamental part of the world, in the sense that
there can be no world without a subject, nor the subject without world. In contrast
with culture, man, who promotes the cultural introspection and transcendence, who
puts them into practice, and who furthers the cultural development far and wide
attributable to human praxis in the final analysis, is widely acknowledged as the goal
of culture, the standard of culture, the dynamics of culture, the source of culture, and
the principle of culture. Without man, there will exist no culture, nor will the renewal
and development of culture.
Second, the relationship between man and culture is not unidirectional but bidi-
rectional and dialectal. Culture creates man, and man is also the maker of culture. In
the final analysis, culture is the product of human practice for survival.
Third, it is only through the human subject that the functions of culture can be
brought into play, and without human agency, any function of culture cannot be
fulfilled. However, whenever a culture claims superiority over the others, whether
or not it can give play to its functions as well as what functions it can fulfill is not
completely dependent on the culture itself, but is still contingent upon the human
subject’s attitude, quality and situation.
Fourth, the being of man is characterized not only by his cultural existence, but
also by his historical existence. In the macroscopic perspective of human civilization,
the path of cultural and social progress is closely linked with the process of human
development, which is characterized by mutual penetration, mutual support, mutual
restriction, and mutual causality, and they work together to manifest themselves in a
course of evolution marked by simultaneity and complexity.
Fifth, man is able to grasp his destiny in his hands. While culture can fulfill a
restrictive function of considerable importance, man is endowed with the creative
capacity for choice. Their respective functions are roughly as follows. While culture
determines the possibility of choice, man decides the reality of choice. Through
continual introspection, transcendence, and choice, man can determine his success
or failure, and thus become master of his fate.
Sixth, the manner in which man knows himself is the way that he behaves and lives.
Man as well as his life is always in an unfinished state. As man himself is endowed
with multifarious potentialities, so human life is full of a multitude of possibilities.
To ensure a bright future for mankind, we must study culture and, particularly, man
himself. More specifically, we must have our study start with such problems as “what
is the human being?” and “what should the human being be?” so as to unravel the
mysteries of man.
(2) Leading to a Serious Deficiency in Knowledge on Man
The object of anthropological study should have been man himself as well as his
culture, and anthropologists should have elucidated the knowledge and theories about
man himself as well as his culture, which should have been the mission of the
discipline. However, the excursions of the discipline system and research objects
of anthropology have shown that anthropologists did not treat man himself as the
object of study, but had culture and society as the object of study. Two grave problems
arose from the foregoing abnormal situation. First, anthropology laid exclusive claim
to the specialized knowledge about culture and society, which made anthropology
almost become another version of culturology or sociology. Second, the foregoing
abnormal situation made the discipline of anthropology deficient in and even empty
of knowledge on man. In the knowledge system of anthropology, apart from the
knowledge about the biological and behavioral aspects of human beings—that is,
the biological bases of human behavior, there rarely exists the knowledge on man
himself. At the present time, in contrast with the anthropological knowledge on
man, philosophy encompasses a more genuine and extensive body of knowledge
about man, and in the pursuit of knowledge about man people would rather turn to
philosophy (the science of man) and psychology for knowledge about man than go
to anthropology for it, although the two subjects are merely devoted to the study
of some aspects of man: one is concerned with the human essence and the other
deals with the human psychology. Over a long period of time, people have been
complaining that there has been a serious deficiency in knowledge about man and
that the knowledge about man has been in the grip of poverty. As the Chinese saying
goes, his own land lies waste while he tills others’ fields. Likewise, when they seek
to pursue knowledge about man, people will always find themselves in an awkward
predicament. Won’t anthropology, which treats man himself as well as his culture as
the object of study, be to blame for the foregoing regrettable situation?!
As a branch of learning, anthropology studies human beings as well as human
cultures, and there exists an inherent identity between the science of humanity and
the knowledge about man. The mysteries of humanity consist in anthropology, and
vice versa. The hope of anthropology resides in the fact that anthropologists should
devote deep study to human beings as well as human cultures so as to unravel and
elucidate the mysteries of man. Nowadays the tasks to be shouldered by the discipline
of anthropology are fairly arduous, and the problems to be addressed are quite grave
and complex. The following problems are likely to pose a variety of formidable
challenges to the science of anthropology. How will anthropologists carry forward
and develop the methodology of anthropology so that they can make a deep study of
human beings as well as human cultures, gain an insight into some intricate problems,
and find proper ways of unraveling the mysteries of man? How will anthropologists
reveal the essence and ontology of “structure and choice” of man’s unique life? How
will anthropologists expound the unique life ontology of “structure and choice” of
a living individual characterized by concreteness and wholeness as well as its rich
theories and regularities? How will anthropologists elucidate the unique life ontology
of “structure and choice” of a group as well as its rich theories and regularities? How
will anthropologists develop the value system of human existence and reveal the
logic of human existence based on the essence and ontology of man’s unique life so
that they can help people face up to the paradoxes inherent in themselves, overcome
a variety of survival crises, inspire confidence in themselves and live a better life in
the future? Generally speaking, anthropology today will have to shoulder theoretical
tasks of tremendous magnitude. More specifically, how will anthropologists address
the following two theoretical problems of considerable magnitude? First, what is the
human being? In other words, anthropologists will have to elucidate the essence and
ontology of man’s unique life, and expound the concrete mode of human existence.
Second, how does the human being exist? That is to say, anthropologists will have to
explore and establish the value system of human existence, and elaborate the concrete
mode of human existence. Knowledge about the former problem is the indispensible
prerequisite to the scientific consideration of the latter one, and only if we have gained
sufficient knowledge about the latter problem, can we achieve a better understanding
of the former one. Knowledge about both of the two problems can provide a solid
foundation of knowledge for human beings’ pursuit of such lofty ideals as sustainable
development and eternal happiness. Such anthropological knowledge is essential and
indispensible for both the survival of personality and the existence of a group as well
as that of a species.
(3) Anthropology’s Marginalization
The excursion or deviation of the discipline system and research object of anthro-
pology lands itself in a trying situation where the science of anthropology is disinter-
ested in man, and vice versa. In more than a century, the discipline of anthropology
has been subjected to relentless marginalization. In the twenty-first century, if the
discipline fails to solve such a problem as the excursion or deviation of the discipline
systems and research objects, anthropology still cannot escape being marginalized,
and cannot even provide core theories for the society. This kind of view is not at
all exceptional. To elaborate the problem, we may as well make reference to the
article entitled The Future of Anthropology which James L. Peacock, president of
the American Anthropological Association between 1993 and 1995, published in
the March issue of American Anthropologist for 1997 and which was translated
in Chinese in the second issue of Study of Nationalities in Guangxi for 2001. The
article showed that American anthropology today has been subjected to marginaliza-
tion and standing in a serious predicament while he sought to analyze the inner causes
and come up with strategies to cope with the awkward situation. James L. Peacock
remarked, “…despite the yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large
number of students, anthropology is still marginal as a category. Anthropology is
virtually absent in the minds and hearts of students, student leaders, parents, admin-
istrators, alumni, trustees, legislators, and donors. …anthropology remains marginal
as a category. We are ‘outside the envelope,’ as they say.”
For this, he further noted that anthropology in the twenty-first century would be
faced with such three possible scenarios as extinction, standing aloof, and developing
and applying the core ideas that are part of our great tradition. “So what is the future
of anthropology? Let’s look at three scenarios: The first is extinction. Götterdäm-
merung; we go up in flames. In this period of downsizing, universities and institutions
see small, vulnerable programs such as anthropology as likely candidates for hit lists.
Unfortunately, this is more than a distant; it is a viable possibility. A second scenario,
perhaps likely, is that we do not die but seek refuge in our enclave, hanging on as
living dead. Anthropology in the twenty-first century, in this vision, consists of disor-
ganized, quaintly intriguing, and slightly amusing naysaying eccentrics who relish
vaguely recalled avant-garde ideas from the fin de siècle 20th-century but who are
merely a curiosity in the 21st. The third alternative, as viable as extinction, is a flour-
ishing redirection of our field into a prominent position in society. Anthropology
would remain intriguing and creatively diverse, iconoclastic and breathtaking in its
sweep and perception, profound in its scholarship, but would become integral and
even leading in addressing the complex challenges of a transnational, yet grounded,
humanity.”
Moreover, he pointed out, “What are liabilities of the discipline and its prac-
titioners? One argument is that it is not society that is to blame for anthro-
pology’s marginalization, but anthropology itself. …Whether it survives, flourishes,
or becomes extinct depends on anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become
integral and significant to our culture and society without becoming subservient.”
Obviously, James L. Peacock is an honest scholar. His article hit the nail on the
head, laying bare the vulnerable points of anthropology, and was keen enough to
awaken the muddle-headed. In essence, anthropology’s marginalization is the self-
marginalization. Anthropology has its own object of study—the human being himself
subjected to deviation, fails to formulate the knowledge system about the human
being himself, and thus people tend to show little concern about the discipline and
even devote scant attention to it. It is not that people do not need anthropology, but that
anthropology fails to meet human needs, and does not even show much concern about
them. It is certain to follow that anthropology cold-shoulders man, and vice versa. To
be more specific, anthropology’s marginalization is attributable to the following two
flaws inherent in the discipline of anthropology. First, anthropology treats culture or
society rather than man himself as the object of study, showing contempt or scorn for
the human being, and even neglecting the study of man himself. Second, anthropology
attaches importance to ancient times while it places little value upon modern times.
Nowadays the anthropological study of “the country and the past” takes priority over
that of “the city and the present”, which was true of the anthropological study in the
past, and even divorces itself from the modern development of human beings. Alfred
Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, a prominent English anthropologist, revealed the second
flaw in the discipline of anthropology long ago and proposed the strategy for making
a synchronic study of anthropological problems, which showed remarkable insight
at that time. It is regrettable that hitherto the two problems mentioned-above have not
been completely solved. Anthropology abandoned human beings, modern people in
particular, and it is small wonder that anthropology has been subjected to marginal-
ization. To ensure a transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one,
anthropology must take resolute measures to solve the two foregoing problems so
that it may have its discipline system and research objects returned to normal, treating
man himself as well as his culture as the objects of study and reconstructing the disci-
pline system of anthropology. Fundamentally speaking, anthropology, “the science
of humanity,” studies human beings as well as human cultures, and in this world no
discipline other than anthropology is so inextricably linked with the fate of mankind.
Considering anthropology’s marginalization is abnormal, it is bound to follow that
anthropology should contribute core theories to society. Given that nowadays the
crisis of human existence has become more acute, mankind is faced with the urgent
task of knowing himself and being master of his own fate. Hence it is incumbent
upon anthropology to help humanity with the task. People earnestly hope that anthro-
pology will treat human beings as well as human cultures as the objects of study and
contribute knowledge about concrete modes of human existence or survival so that it
can help humanity extricate himself from the awkward predicament and see a bright
future before him.
(4) The Arbitrariness of Assumptions about Human Nature Inherent in the
Humanities and Social Sciences
In general, the manner in which man knows himself is the way that he lives. As far as
some humanities and social sciences are concerned, they seek to formulate knowl-
edge systems concerning their respective disciplines based on the way in which man
knows himself. Some humanities and social sciences invariably rest their respec-
tive logical premises upon the assumptions about human nature, and the well-knit
knowledge systems of the disciplines tend to start off on a variety of logical premises
to what man is. Whether complete or partial, more often than not the assumptions
about human nature will determine a priori whether or not the knowledge systems of
the disciplines are correct. Regretfully, anthropology fails to contribute its rightful
assumptions about human nature of man in his wholeness and concreteness to the
humanities and social sciences. Scientism, which has been sweeping through the
world for hundreds of years, has shattered the image of man in his wholeness and
concreteness and cut him into broken pieces. Moreover, scientism merely illuminated
some portions of man at most while it abandoned his other parts, which led man in his
incompleteness into the world. Based upon such assumed premises of human nature,
how can the humanities and social sciences formulate complete knowledge systems
for their respective disciplines? A multitude of long-standing mistaken theories have
been advanced based upon the incomplete knowledge on man. The following two
examples will suffice to illustrate the above situation. Human psychology is rashly
equated with man himself, and the assumptions about man himself can be substituted
by those about human psychology, which has been habitually accepted as self-evident
truths in the realm of management. However, this is not scientific, because human
psychology can only be treated as a part of man in his wholeness and concrete-
ness, and on no account can the former be identified with the latter. Instead of those
assumptions about a living individual in his or her wholeness and concreteness, such
branches of learning as psychology, economics, politics, and ethics vie with one
another in postulating their respective theories on human nature so that they will
be capable of establishing a firm foothold for the theoretical systems within their
respective territories of study. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the truthfulness of

their theoretical postulations on human nature may be derived from those logical
premises which fall far short of scientificalness. In terms of research objects of the
humanities and social sciences, only the discipline of anthropology devotes itself
truly and exclusively to the study of man in his wholeness and concreteness. Hence
it is incumbent upon anthropology to propound the logical premises to man in his
wholeness and concreteness for the humanities and social sciences. Considering the
survival crisis of human existence has become more acute in the twenty-first century,
the study and development of anthropology will have implications for those of some
disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, and also affect the fate and future
of mankind.
(5) The Contorted Discipline System of Anthropology
Any well-knit discipline must make its concepts, objects of study and discipline
system agree with one another, which is true of the discipline of anthropology. In
other words, anthropology’s concepts, objects of study and discipline system must
also agree with one another. However, if anthropology’s concepts, objects of study
and discipline system disagree with one another, many problems will be bound to
arise. Generally speaking, a vast majority of anthropologists may define the term
anthropology as “the science of humanity,” “the science of humans,” or “the scien-
tific study of human beings as well as human cultures.” Despite this fact above-
mentioned, the majority of anthropologists tend to treat culture or society as the
research object of anthropology while the minority may take culture and man as
the object of study. In terms of anthropology’s research objects as well as its main
body of knowledge, the vast majority of anthropologists pursue their studies which
mainly revolve around culture or society, and basically contribute knowledge about
culture or society to human civilization. As for the discipline systems of anthro-
pology, they can be roughly divided into two representative schools: the American
school and the Continental school. In general, the discipline of anthropology in the
United States can be seen as composed of the two subfields of physical anthro-
pology and cultural anthropology while the discipline of anthropology in the Conti-
nental Europe can be divided into such four independent subfields as anthropology,
archaeology, ethnology, and linguistics. Fundamentally, the great majority of anthro-
pologists pursue their studies in accordance with the foregoing discipline systems
of anthropology. The basic contents contained in the foregoing discipline systems
fail to cover knowledge about man himself and they are obviously incomplete. The
above-mentioned theoretical expositions have shown that the discipline of anthro-
pology itself brought about the disagreements and contortions between the concepts,
the research objects and the discipline systems as well as the incomplete knowl-
edge about man himself. Anthropology is the scientific discipline concerned with
human beings as well as human cultures. However, culture or society is ensconced
in the realm of anthropology and treated as the research object and discipline system
while man himself is expelled from the territory of anthropology, which leads to
the excursion and incompleteness of the research objects and discipline systems, but
also the logical contradiction and confusion of the discipline systems. The following
example will suffice to illustrate this regrettable situation. In general, the discipline
of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology which can be further divided
into several branches respectively. However, on no account will the two branches of
anthropology cover all of the disciplines of anthropology, from which are excluded
such branches of anthropology as personality or psychological anthropology, the
anthropology of the family, anthropology of organizations, national anthropology
(ethnography or ethnology) and the anthropology of the state. The foregoing disci-
plines of anthropology neither fall under the category of biological or physical anthro-
pology nor come into the category of cultural anthropology. As scientific disciplines
of anthropology, they deal with man himself, and ought to come under the category
of subjective anthropology formulated in this very work. Whether they fall under
the category of biological anthropology or come into the category of cultural anthro-
pology, such categorization may sound not only illogical but ridiculous. Professor
Jiang Bingzhao at Xianmeng University devoted a thought-provoking discussion to
the foregoing problem in its fundamental bearings. In 1983, Professor Jiang Bingzhao
published an article entitled Cultural Anthropology is not Equated with Ethnology at
the Second (1983) Annual Meeting of Chinese Anthropological Society. He argued
that cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology in which sociality is the central
concept and which focuses on the study of social statuses and roles, groups, institu-
tions, and the relations among them while ethnology is the branch of anthropology
that compares and analyzes the characteristics of different peoples and the relation-
ships between them. He added that the concepts of the peoples came into existence
only after humans made their appearance on the earth, and that the research contents
of cultural anthropology failed to overlap with those of ethnology, and vice versa.
As the chief compiler of Ethnology in the Broad Sense of the Term, Professor Shi
Zhengyi at Minzu University of China holds that ethnology and anthropology cannot
be subsumed under one and the same discipline, and that they cannot substitute for
each other. Moreover, some Chinese scholars maintain that the subject who was
constructed and confined in the past should revert to his selfhood and autonomy. It is
thus clear or evident that the excursion or even deviation of the research objects and
discipline systems of anthropology causes the discipline systems to be faced with
how many serious problems and confusions. If the research object of anthropology
is confined merely to the study of culture or society, and the discipline system of
anthropology is kept within the limits of culture or society, then, whether it is man as
the subject, personality as the subject, or group as the subject, any branch of anthro-
pology which treats any or all of the foregoing three sorts of subjects as the object of
study will come outside the category of anthropology! There is an only way to solve
this serious logical problem, that is to say, anthropology ought to have the research
object and discipline system revert to man himself as well as his culture, and seek
to reconstruct or reestablish the discipline system based on the object of study–man
himself as well as his culture. Hence, it is incumbent upon Chinese anthropologists
to accomplish this historical task.
2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea

for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System
of Anthropology
2.1 The Historic Mission of Anthropology
Anthropology is faced with two tasks of historical importance in the twenty-first

century, that is to say, it must accomplish two fundamental changes.
First, Anthropology must have the research object and the discipline system
respectively revert from excursion to normal. This transformation entails a double
change. First, anthropology must have the object of study revert from excursion to
normal. Considering anthropology gave up the study of man himself and treated
purely culture or society as the research object in the past, on the one hand the
tendency must be corrected, but on the other, anthropology must be given enormous
impetus so that it may treat man himself as well as his culture as the object of study
and make the research object return to normal. Second, anthropology must accom-
plish the task of making the discipline system return from excursion to normal. That
anthropology failed to make a direct study of man himself in the past caused few
branches of anthropology to devote direct study to man himself and thus led to the
excursion of the discipline system. To be more specific, while some disciplines were
absorbed in the exploration of culture or society and others were buried in the study
of human physique, few branches were devoted to the study of man himself. Culture
or society cannot be equated with man himself, and human physique which is merely
concerned with the biological bases of human beings cannot be identified with man
himself either. In view of the abnormal situation mentioned-above, anthropology in
the twenty-first century will have to shoulder another task of historical importance.
Specifically speaking, anthropology ought to establish the subdivisions devoted to the
study of man himself, reconstruct the discipline system of anthropology, and fulfill
the task of making the discipline system revert from excursion to normal. When it
has accomplished the foregoing double change, anthropology will be able to make
itself directly devoted to the study of man himself as well as his culture, make a deep
study of human beings as well as human cultures, and concerned about the survival
and development of humanity so that it can make due contributions to the better fate
of humanity—that is, personality, group or species.
Second, anthropology must ensure a transition from the borderline discipline to the
mainstream one. As it is concerned about the survival and development of humanity
(personality, group or species) and devoted to the task of improving the destiny of
humanity (personality, group or species), anthropology will certainly arouse people’s
enthusiasm and win their support as well as respect for itself, bring about a radical
change in the passive situation where anthropology shows little concern for man
himself and man himself cold-shoulders anthropology, make anthropology, which
2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea for the Reconstruction … 27
is concerned with man himself, and man himself, who is also solicitous for anthro-
pology, produce a good influence on each other, and ultimately expedite its transition
from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one.
Anthropology will have to accomplish the task of making the research object and
the discipline system respectively revert from excursion to normal. Meanwhile, it will
also lend an impetus to the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream
one. Between the foregoing two fundamental changes there exists an inherent iden-
tity. The reversion from excursion to normal on the part of anthropology’s research
object and discipline system provides the presupposition and basis for the foregoing
two fundamental changes while anthropology’s transition from the borderline disci-
pline to the mainstream one constitutes the inevitable outcome of the foregoing two
fundamental changes. Only if it has accomplished the task of making the research
object and the discipline system respectively revert from excursion to normal, can
anthropology give an impetus to the transition from the borderline discipline to the
mainstream one. Only if it strives for the success in transition from the borderline
discipline to the mainstream one, can anthropology lend more powerful impetus to
the reversion from excursion to normal on the part of anthropology’s research object
and discipline system. Only if the foregoing two fundamental changes have been
accomplished, can the prospects of anthropology and the destiny of humanity be
inextricably linked with each other and improved mutually.
A long time ago Chinese anthropologists came to realize the urgent necessity of
bringing about a change in the research objects and discipline systems of anthro-
pology. Fei Xiaotong or Fei Hsiao-tung (November 2, 1910-April 24, 2005), one
of the foremost Chinese social anthropologists, was a pioneering researcher and
professor of sociology and anthropology, and was also noted for his studies of China’s
ethnic groups as well as of village life in China. One of China’s finest sociologists
and anthropologists, his works on these subjects were instrumental in laying a solid
foundation for the development of sociological and anthropological studies in China,
as well as in introducing social and cultural phenomena of China to the international
community.6 He pointed out, “The history of science as well as the development of
science inspires humanity to make a study of himself, and anthropology, ‘the science
of humanity’, which is the scientific study of human beings as well as their cultures
and societies, is viewed as a pioneering work of the nineteenth century. After they
devoted a long period of time to the exploration of anthropology, by the early nine-
teenth century anthropologists had established a set of methods which marked a new
development and a new breakthrough in the humanities’ world. However, anthro-
pologists may have encountered far more difficulties in developing the discipline of
anthropology than they have done in establishing other sciences, not only because
the humanities’ world encompasses a wide range of problems, but because how we
make a study of humans is distinguished from the way that we conduct research on
animals. Researchers must have a new point of view and a new realm of thought.
That is to say, not only must researchers treat objects of study as external things, but
6 Boorman, Howard L. (1968). “Fei Hsiao-tung.” In Biographical Dictionary of Republican China.

II. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17–19.
they must make use of the human traits with which they are endowed to understand
objects of study by placing themselves in the shoes of research objects.”7 The fore-
going ideas spurred Mr. Fei Xiaotong to turn out a multitude of famous works such
as Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley in which
he advanced such well-known thoughts as cross-cultural dialogue and cultural self-
consciousness. By making the authoritative statements mentioned-above, Mr. Fei
Xiaotong held that anthropology, which by the early twentieth century had already
developed a set of scientific methods, ought to conduct a study of man himself.
However, researchers must have a new point of view and a new realm of thought in
order to establish the science of anthropology. Mr. Fei Xiaotong had already real-
ized the necessity of making a new breakthrough and change in the discipline of
anthropology. Regretfully, when he came to realize the serious problem by which
anthropology was confronted, Mr. Fei Xiaotong had reached an advanced age. He
passed away in 2005. His long cherished hope that anthropology ought to have a
new breakthrough, a new point of view and a new realm of thought has been clearly
shown in his thoughts and works.
The foregoing two historic missions, to wit the above-mentioned two funda-
mental changes, ought to be accomplished in the twenty-first century, and thus the
Chinese anthropological circles are confronted with opportunities and challenges.
As far as opportunities are concerned, Chinese anthropologists including scholars
or researchers first become aware of the two tasks of historical importance, first
take them upon themselves, and first advance and formulate a set of original theo-
ries —Principles of Subjective Anthropology, and thus they are faced with excellent
opportunities and broad prospects. As far as challenges are concerned, the two tasks
of historical importance are quite arduous, and they surely involve many complex
problems ranging from theory to practice. The two arduous tasks will require anthro-
pology to incorporate and transcend anthropological theories of the past, which may
take several generations of Chinese scholars to persevere in their concerted efforts.
2.2 An Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System

of Anthropology
(1) A Basic Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System of Anthro-
pology
Based on the foregoing analyses, an idea for the reconstruction of the discipline
system of anthropology is as follows. Anthropology should include three major
branches, to wit subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological (or
physical) anthropology, which can be further divided into smaller branches of knowl-
edge or subfields of study respectively. Anthropology, also referred to as general
7Fei, Xiao-Tong. (1996). Personal Ideas and Reflections on Scholarship. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint
Publishing, p. 328.
2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea for the Reconstruction … 29
anthropology, is the comprehensive study of human beings as well as of human

cultures. The discipline encompasses three major branches, to wit subjective anthro-
pology, cultural anthropology and biological (or physical) anthropology. Subjective
anthropology is mainly concerned with the study of man himself which includes
the concrete mode of human existence—that is, the essence and ontology of man’s
unique life, as well as the concrete mode of human survival. As a primary branch
of anthropology, the science or discipline can be further divided into personality
(or psychological) anthropology, the anthropology of the family, anthropology of
organizations, national anthropology (ethnography or ethnology) and the anthro-
pology of the state. As a major division of anthropology, cultural anthropology is
focused on the study of culture in its many aspects which encompasses knowl-
edge, belief, science and technology, education, art and institution as well as their
respective regularities of production, development and change. As a subfield of
anthropology, biological anthropology, also referred to as physical anthropology,
is primarily concerned with the biological aspects of human beings and provides a
biological perspective to the systematic study of human beings, which includes the
synchronic and diachronic study of the biological bases of human beings. Physical
anthropology includes such academic disciplines as paleoanthropology, anthropom-
etry and ethnology, while cultural anthropology encompasses such scientific subfields
as knowledge anthropology, linguistic anthropology and archaeology. The foregoing
three major branches or divisions of anthropology can be further divided into smaller
branches of knowledge or fields of study.
(2) The Place of Subjective Anthropology in the Discipline System of Anthro-
pology
First, the relationship between anthropology and subjective anthropology constitutes
that between discipline and branch. Subjective anthropology ensconced in the disci-
pline system of anthropology is treated as one of the three primary branches of anthro-
pology. Subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and physical anthropology
together constitute the three major branches of anthropology, which can be further
divided into smaller branches respectively. The three major branches characterized
by mutual connection, mutual support, mutual penetration and mutual permeation
together form the tree of anthropology. As one major branch of the tree of anthro-
pology, subjective anthropology is mainly concerned with the study and explanation
of the knowledge on man himself within the knowledge system of anthropology.
Second, we seem to feel the necessity of some slight explanation on the idea
for the branches of anthropology. The following branches of anthropology such as
personality (or psychological) anthropology, the anthropology of the family, anthro-
pology of organizations, national anthropology (ethnography or ethnology) and the
anthropology of the state can be put under the designation of subjective anthropology.
In order to attempt the reversion from excursion to normal on the part of the research
objects and discipline systems of anthropology as well as the reconstruction of disci-
pline systems of anthropology, we must muster courage and make painstaking efforts
to achieve a breakthrough in the formulation of relevant theories as well as the recon-

struction of discipline systems of anthropology. Here we might as well elucidate the
vital life-force of humanity—“the intellectual power.”
“The intellectual power” constitutes the vital life force indispensible for the
survival and development of humanity. Although it is incapable of being seen or
touched, yet we cannot negate its existence, nor even can we weaken its enormous
power! “The intellectual power” is the influence exercised upon the course of social
development in which in order to hold his destiny in his hands, humanity will have
to grasp how things stand and what the future holds, make a judicious choice of the
way ahead, and take the initiative in utilizing his theoretical and rational thinking
abilities.8 From ancient times to the present, the Chinese nation has been in the habit
of reflection and exploration, and endowed with the power of deep thinking and
the power of indomitable will. The author himself set about the task of discovering
and exploring the problem, to wit the excursion of the research objects and disci-
pline systems of anthropology until he advanced and developed the tentative but
pioneering theoretical system intended to solve the foregoing problem—“the prin-
ciples of subjective anthropology,” which has taken him 25 years of resolute pursuit
and arduous exploration from 1985 through 2010. As the Chinese saying goes, it
takes twenty five years to sharpen a sword. The author cherishes an ardent hope that
Chinese anthropologists will make collective efforts to study or explore the prob-
lems by which anthropology is confronted in the twenty-first century. We cherish the
fervent conviction that Chinese scholars not only must but also can create the new
discipline system of Chinese anthropology with Chinese characteristics, Chinese
visions and Chinese styles in the twenty-first century!
3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective

Anthropology
3.1 The Concept of Anthropology
The term “anthropology” made its appearance roughly in the sixteenth century, and
thenceforth came into existence various definitions of the term anthropology which
were characterized by relative concentration and stability of meanings. In general,
different versions of encyclopedia and famous anthropological literature or course
books of the modern world share the view that anthropology is concerned with the
study of man, that is to say the science that treats of man. Although anthropology
encounters such a grave problem as the excursion of the research objects and disci-
pline systems of anthropology, the understandings of the term anthropology are
nevertheless characterized by relative concentration and stability of meanings, and
8Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Humans’ Gattungswesen Life and Their
Gattungswesen Philosophy. Changchun: Jilin Publishing Group, p. 453.
3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective Anthropology 31
they are roughly scientific. The following examples will suffice to illustrate the fore-
going argument. Anthropology is a scientific discipline which studies not only the
origin and development of humanity himself but also those of material culture and
spiritual culture created by humanity as well as their respective laws of development.9
In terms of its etymology, anthropology is the science that treats of man. In actual
fact, among multitudes of sciences at the service of mankind, anthropology asserts
itself as merely one of them.10 Anthropology studies human beings from biological
and cultural perspectives. That part of anthropology which treats man as an animal is
termed physical anthropology while that part which deals with modes of life created
by people living in societies is referred to as cultural anthropology.11 Anthropology is
a branch of learning concerned with the study of man as well as related non-human
primates. As two combining forms of the term anthropology, “anthropos (human
being, humankind or humanity)” and “logos (study, theory or science)” may owe
their origins to Greek beginnings in terms of their respective etymologies. The two
component parts are combined to mean “the science (or study) of man (or human
beings).”12 As a science for the good of human learning, anthropology is the study
of human nature and culture.13 The discipline of anthropology is concerned with the
learning on humans.14
After a summation of the foregoing definitions of the term anthropology, we may
admit that anthropology is a branch of learning concerned with the study of man as
well as man himself and his cultures. The basic contents contained in the concept of
anthropology may be viewed from two aspects. On the one hand it may be perceived
as one branch of learning concerned with the study of man himself, but on the other
it may be treated as the scientific study dealing with human cultures or societies.
The study of man himself and that of human cultures or societies exist in organic
unity with each other within the discipline of anthropology. “Man himself” and
“culture (or society)” constitute the two principal elements of the concept of anthro-
pology. The connection and unity and development of the two principal elements
form anthropology’s system of core concepts and holistic knowledge system.
9 Yuan, Shi-Quan., & Feng, Tao., eds. (1990). Encylopaedia of China. Beijing: China Press, p. 971.
10 “Anthropology.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 28 Feb.
2022 < https://www.encyclopedia.com > .
11 Ibid.
12 Zhou, Da-Ming. (2007). An Introduction to Anthropology. Kunming, China: Yunnan University
Press, pp. 1–2.

13 Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan, China: Shanxi
Education Press, pp. 268–269.

14 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2002). What is Anthropology? Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 2.
3.2 The Concept of Subjective Anthropology
Subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man as the subject, to wit his basic
mode of existence and that of survival as well as their respective laws of change and
development. That is to say, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man’s
basic mode of existence, to wit the essence and ontology of man’s unique life as well
as their respective laws of change and development, and his basic mode of survival,
to wit the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as
their respective laws of change and development.
The concept of subjective anthropology is endowed with the following properties.
First, as a branch of learning, subjective anthropology is the concrete study of man
himself, to wit man as the subject. Second, subjective anthropology is the concrete
study of man’s basic mode of existence, to wit the essence and ontology of man’s
unique life as well as their respective laws of change and development. Third, subjec-
tive anthropology is the concrete study of man’s basic mode of survival, to wit the
construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as their respec-
tive laws of change and development. Fourth, what subjective anthropology studies
and reveals is the totality of man as the subject, including “personality” (individual)
in his concreteness and wholeness, “group” (community) in their concreteness and
wholeness, and “species” (kind or Gattungswesen) in his or its concreteness and
wholeness.
3.3 The Research Objects of Subjective Anthropology
The discipline of anthropology made its appearance over 200 years ago, and thence-
forth the research objects and discipline systems of the scientific discipline of anthro-
pology were subjected to universal deviation from their scientific and correct paths,
namely, the excursion from the study of man himself as well as his culture to that of
culture or society. Anthropology was neglectful of and even abstained from the study
of “man himself,” which made the discipline deficient in and even empty of knowl-
edge on man—anthropology’s main body of knowledge. Subjective anthropology is
advanced and developed to study and address the following grave problems treated
as the historic tasks which subjective anthropology will have to accomplish in the
twenty-first century, that is to say anthropology’s excursion of the research objects
and discipline systems and failure to illuminate man himself in his concreteness and
totality. Therefore, it is incumbent upon subjective anthropology to accomplish such
fundamental tasks as the concrete study of man himself as a whole and the concrete
illumination of man himself as a whole.
As a major branch of anthropology, subjective anthropology treats man himself in
his concreteness and wholeness as the object of study. More specifically, the research
object of subjective anthropology is man himself, to wit the basic mode of human
existence and that of human survival as well as their respective laws of change
and development. Subjective anthropology is the concrete study and illumination of

the basic mode of human existence—the unique life ontology of man—“structure
and choice”. Meanwhile, it also studies the basic mode of human survival, to wit
the construction of human values and that of holistic personality as well as their
respective laws of change and development.
The illuminating explanations on the research object of anthropology are as
follows:
(1) Subjective Anthropology is the Concrete Study of Man Himself as a Whole,
Which Can Be Demonstrated in the Following Three Aspects
First, “man himself” refers to the total number of people as subjects, rather than a
certain kind of man as the subject. Three kinds of subject are embodied in man as the
subject. More specifically, in this very work, the individual is called “personality,”
the community is referred to as “group,” including all the organizations marked
by inherent self-integration and communities of human survival characterized by
subjective independence and practice which are created by man, such as family,
organization, nationality, state and international organization, and “species” is also
known as kind (Gattungswesen). The contents of this work are mainly concerned
with personality (individual) and group (community) as well as species (kind or
Gattungswesen).
Second, “man himself” denotes every kind of subject in his totality, rather than
a part of every kind of subject. Whether it is concerned with personality, group or
species, this work is invariably concerned with personality as a whole, group as
a whole or species as a whole, rather than a certain part of the respective kinds of
personality, group or species. As the part constitutes a formative element of the whole,
this work is bound to deal with a certain part of the respective kinds of personality,
group or species, but this is merely intended to meet the purpose of elucidating
personality as a whole, group as a whole or species as a whole.
Third, much heed ought to be paid to the distinction between the research objects
of subjective anthropology and those of the philosophical “study of man.” In terms of
their respective branches of learning, subjective anthropology and the philosophical
“study of man” may fall under two different categories which lay claim to clearly
different ways of dealing with their respective objects of study. Although they both
take “man as a whole (or in his totality)” as their respective objects of study, subjec-
tive anthropology and the philosophical “study of man” may adopt vastly different
ways of dealing with “man as a whole (or in his totality).” While the philosophical
study of “man as a whole (or in his totality)” is aimed specifically at revealing the
essence of “man as a whole (or in his totality),” subjective anthropology seeks to
expound theoretical presuppositions concerning “man as a whole (or in his totality)”
by bringing to light the essence or nature of “man as a whole (or in his totality).”
To wit, the fundamental task of subjective anthropology is to reveal and elaborate
“man as a whole (or in his totality)” as well as his essence or nature. What subjective
anthropology treats as the object of study is “man in his concreteness and whole-
ness”, to be more specific, the concrete mode of human survival—that is, “structure
and choice”, in which “man in his concreteness and wholeness” exists, such as the
diagrammatical theory on “the structure of personality and choice”. Meanwhile, it

also studies the basic mode of human survival in which “man in his concreteness and
wholeness” survives—the construction of human values and that of holistic person-
ality as well as the laws of human survival and development and change which “man
in his concreteness and wholeness” has to obey in life. That subjective anthropology
studies “man in his concreteness and wholeness” does not mean that it merely reveals
the essence of “man as a whole (or in his totality).”
(2) Subjective Anthropology Studies and Reveals the Essence or Nature of
“Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness.”
As the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness” constitutes the
logical premise on which we can bring to light and gain a deeper insight into the mode
of human existence (the noumenon of human life) and that of human survival which
man himself is endowed with, priority must be given to the study and revelation of
the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness.” In general, the way
that we apprehend the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness”
will determine how we understand and reveal the mode of human existence (the
noumenon of human life) and that of human survival as well as their inherent laws of
change and development. In the history of anthropology, such branches of learning as
religious anthropology, rational anthropology, biological anthropology and cultural
anthropology took the anthropological stage successively and vied with one another
in advancing their respective theories so as to gain a solid foothold in the territory of
anthropology, and it was bound to follow that there came into existence a considerable
variety of theories on anthropology which stemmed from their respective logical
premises marked by substantial differences among themselves. If we perceive the
essence or nature of man as the creation of god, we will be bound to grasp and interpret
the mode of human existence and that of human survival by making use of the will
of god, and religious anthropology was sure to be established based on the foregoing
theories of anthropology. If we attribute the essence or nature of man to human reason,
we will be most likely to elucidate the mode of human existence and that of human
survival by turning to rational principles, and such an anthropological perspective was
certain to contribute immensely to the construction of rational anthropology. If the
essence or nature of man is ascribed to the biological bases of human beings, the mode
of human existence and that of human survival are certain to be explicated based upon
the natural or biological phenomena, and the above theory was essential to spurring
the appearance of biological anthropology. If we owe the essence or nature of man
to culture, we will strive to understand and explain the mode of human existence and
that of human survival from a cultural perspective, and the above-mentioned theory of
anthropology brought about the construction of cultural anthropology. If we perceive
the essence or nature of man as “subject of practice,” it is bound to follow that we
will seek to expound the mode of human existence and that of human survival from
the perspective of “subject of practice,” and the foregoing theory of anthropology
will lend an enormous impetus to the construction of subjective anthropology. In
summary, the logical premise of subjective anthropology consists in the study and
revelation of the essence or nature of “man in his concreteness and wholeness”, and
therefore it constitutes an important object of study for subjective anthropology.
(3) Subjective Anthropology Studies and Reveals the Concrete Mode of Human
Existence Which Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness is Endowed
with, to wit the Study and Revelation of the Noumenon of Man in His
Concreteness and Wholeness
The study of the concrete mode of human existence (the noumenon of human life)
which man in his concreteness and wholeness is endowed with constitutes the answer
to the question of “what man is”. In this work the author holds that man’s concrete
mode of existence (the noumenon of human life) can be equated with man’s “structure
and choice”. Man exists in the concrete mode of “structure and choice”, personality
exists in the mode of “structure of personality and choice”, and group exists in the
mode of “structure of group and choice”. Only if the life ontology of “structure
and choice” of man or group is expounded, can “man himself” be really and truly
elucidated.
Moreover, it should be noted that the study and revelation of what man himself is
implies deeper implications. What “man himself” is constitutes the basis and premise
of “what man should be or should not be and “what man should do or should not
do”. Only if “man himself”, to wit the mode of human existence, is formulated, can
the mode of human survival—the construction of human values and that of sound
personality be elucidated.
Meanwhile, there exists another necessity for us to notice that the study and reve-
lation of what “man himself” in his concreteness and wholeness is will produce
an influence on various schools of thought as well as their theories in terms of
their respective premises. More often than not, different answers to the question of
what “man himself” is constitute the indispensible prerequisites to the emergence of
different schools of anthropology. The following two examples will suffice to illus-
trate the above argument. French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was arguably
a leading exponent of structuralism who laid emphasis on the function of objec-
tive structures, but warranted little attention to the role of human agency (or man’s
subjective initiative). In his view man’s subjectivity as well as choice does not mean
anything. He believed that man’s existence is endowed with a set of a priori preex-
isting structures inherent in the depth of human subconsciousness, human beings
cannot but obey these structures, and they can never change them. He also held that
the nature and change of a social phenomenon is determined by the a priori preex-
isting structures, and human beings’ statements and actions governed by the universal
structures can only be treated as their manifestations. Hence, the subject of society
as well as of history is the a priori structure rather than man. Based on Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ foregoing theories, structural anthropology came into existence. Subjective
anthropology maintains that structural theories are one-sided. Man’s existence can be
identified with “structure and choice.” Man’s existence is endowed with both struc-
ture and choice, to wit the unity of structure and choice. Subjective anthropology
strives to explain “man himself” as well as his behavior by shedding light on the
“structure and choice” of man characterized by complexity and mutability, hopes
to ameliorate the prospects and destiny of humanity by improving the “structure

and choice” of man, and then constructs the theoretical systems of subjective anthro-
pology. In short, subjective anthropology shoulders the task of studying and revealing
the concrete mode of human existence—“structure and choice,” in which man in his
concreteness and wholeness exists, as well as its laws of change and development,
which constitutes one of the fundamental contents of subjective anthropology.
(4) As Well as the Laws of Destiny which He Strives to Grasp, Subjective
Anthropology Studies and Reveals “Man Himself”—the Concrete Mode of
Human Existence in which Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness Exists
The mode of human survival which “man himself” is endowed with is different from
that of human existence in which “man himself” exists. While the mode of human
existence in which “man himself” exists is a kind of objective existence and falls
within the scope of “what man is”, the mode of human survival which “man himself”
is endowed with is the combination of subjectivity and objectivity, comes not only
within the scope of “what man is” but within the realm of “what man should be”
or “what man should become of”, and in essence, it is most likely to fall within
the realm of “what man should be” or “what man should become of”. It should be
pointed out that man in his concreteness and wholeness cherishes the good hopes
and enthusiastic aspirations for the future which are embodied in the mode of human
existence inherent in “man himself”. To be more specific, by studying and revealing
the mode of human existence in which “man himself” exists, subjective anthropology
ought to sum up the basic experience of human survival and draw the valuable lessons
therefrom which man as the subject (personality, group and species) has learned since
the dawn of civilization, particularly in the long history of 5000 years. It ought to
explore the laws of human survival which man as the subject (personality, group and
species) cannot but obey, reveal and address the fundamental Angst which man as
the subject (personality, group and species) is confronted with in his actual existence.
It ought to help man as the subject (personality, group and species) extricate himself
from the survival predicament, constantly engage in self-reflection and transcend
himself. Subjective anthropology must realize the foregoing ideals and aspirations
so that it would find a reasonable road which man as the subject (personality, group
and species) can take to march ahead. The mode of human existence inherent in
“man himself” which subjective anthropology seeks to elucidate is characterized by
open-endedness, to wit the unity of opposites of result and process, and never reaches
a finished stated once and for all. Let’s make an apt analogy to illustrate the above
point. Even though doctors can succeed in curing a multitude of diseases, they can
never eradiate all diseases from the earth once and for all. Likewise, even if antivirus
softwares can be successful in killing a myriad of viruses, they can never wipe out all
viruses from networks of the world once and for all. Subjective anthropology cannot
but follow in the wake of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species) and
keep close track of the progress or development of his survival practice, cannot afford
to relax in its assiduous efforts for a moment, and devote itself to the arduous study
and exploration so that it would keep pace with him and keep abreast of all the
most recent developments of his survival practice, reveal the inherent laws which he
4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective Anthropology 37
cannot but obey in his survival practice, and help humanity attain the goal of survival,
development and eternal happiness—in the service of mankind forever.
Since it boasts unique research objects and perspectives, subjective anthropology
maintains that it occupies an unsubstitutable place among different groups of sciences
or disciplines and possesses incalculable value to the study and exploration of the
survival practice in which “man himself”—“man as the subject” (personality, group
and species) cannot but engage himself. People will come to like and even cherish a
deep affection for subjective anthropology in same way as they show an interest in
and even have a passion for human anatomy and medical science as well as doctors.
People cannot imagine how humans would survive if there were no human anatomy,
medical science or doctors in the world. Likewise, in the twenty-first century people
will not be able to imagine how humans would survive if there were no subjective
anthropology or subjective anthropologists in the world!
4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective

Anthropology
4.1 Providing Rational Frameworks and Methods for Man’s

Knowledge About Himself
In general, the way that man knows himself will determine how he creates himself
and chooses to act. Self-knowledge constitutes the premise on which man creates
himself and chooses to act. Over a long period of time, on the one hand scientism
has resulted in the fragmentariness of man’s image, but on the other anthropology
had its perspectives transferred to culture and society, which caused anthropology to
be divorced from its rightful object of study—“man himself.” Humanity is plunged
into confusion and crisis in which he meets with tremendous difficulties in knowing
himself. Philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann thought, “Even though
people have made tremendous efforts to solve the question of what man is to which
they furnished innumerable solutions, the question is nonetheless far from being
really settled. In our age, all of the past images of man as a form of self-understanding
have been broken”. He heartily subscribed to the following ideas entertained by Max
Scheler who stated in the essay, “On the Idea of Man”: “In a certain sense all central
problems of philosophy can be traced back to the question of what man is. If there is
a philosophical task whose solution our age needs with singular desperation it is that
of a philosophical anthropology.” Man has become, as Scheler says, problematic as
never before; he no longer knows what he is, and he knows that he does not know
it. Unsure of his way, questionable to himself, he therefore studies with unparalleled
concern his own significance and reality, where he came from and what his destination
is. But when he struggles for a new self-understanding, he is also struggling for his
future form. The quest for an anthropology determines our reality. Everyone realizes
vaguely that the question of man is the question of that decides our fate.15 While
anthropology is the scientific study of “man himself as well as his cultures”, subjective
anthropology is a branch of anthropology focused on the study of “man himself”, to
wit the concrete mode of existence and that of survival of “man as the subject” as
well as their respective laws of development. Hence, it is incumbent on subjective
anthropology to explain and expound man and remove man’s confusion about self-
knowledge. The relationship between “man himself” and subjective anthropology
can be described this way: the mysteries of subjective anthropology consist in “man
himself” while those of “man himself” lie in subjective anthropology. The four ideas
about man which subjective anthropology seeks to advance and expound are as
follows: (1) the idea on the premise of human nature (practical subject); (2) the idea.
on the mode of human existence (the life ontology of “structure and choice”—the
diagrammatical theory on “the structure of personality and choice” and the diagram-
matical theory on “the structure of group and choice”); (3) the idea on the mode
of human existence (“construction of the value system of group” and “construction
of holistic personality”); (4) the idea on the reconstruction of the discipline system
of anthropology. This includes two reforms. The first is to advance the original
concept of “subjective anthropology” and construct the theoretical system of “sub-
jective anthropology.” The second is to advance and expound the original idea on the
reconstruction of the discipline system of anthropology. Anthropology ought not to
cling to the present discipline system which encompasses such two major branches
of learning as “biological anthropology” and “cultural anthropology,” but rather
construct such three primary branches of learning as “subjective anthropology,” “cul-
tural anthropology” and “biological anthropology,” which can be further divided into
several smaller branches respectively. Subjective anthropology not only reveals and
expounds the two main questions of ontology (epistemology) and axiology (ethics),
“What is man?” “What should man do? (How should man live?),” but brings to light
and elucidates the ways of knowing and explaining man, so that it can furnish theo-
retical frameworks and scientific methods which man may avail himself of to gain a
deeper insight into himself.
4.2 Furnishing Humanity with Rational Knowledge He Can

Use to Be Master of His Destiny
What determines the destiny of “man as the subject” (personality, group and species)?
How is the destiny determined? What is the relationship between “man as the subject”
and his destiny? Fundamentally speaking, these problems are vitally concerned with
the survival of human beings. Subjective anthropology has made a scientific answer
15Landmann, M. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s

to the foregoing question by offering original theories and methods that humanity
can avail himself of to be master of his own fate. The above-mentioned theories and
methods can be mostly summed up in the following three fundamental principles
which are closely linked with the existence of “man as the subject” (personality,
group and species).
(1) Theory of “Structure and Choice”
Subjective anthropology advances and expounds the proposition of “structure and
choice”, holding that the theory of “structure and choice” constitutes not only the
life ontology of man, but the methodology of man’s knowledge of human life, and
the existentialism guiding man into the future. It furnishes a profound exposition
of the significance and implications that “structure and choice” will hold for the
human destiny. The above significance and implications are mainly embodied in the
following two points. First, subjective anthropology argues that the destiny of “man
as the subject” (personality, group and species) is mainly determined by “structure
and choice”, to wit by the choice he has made based on the structure. “Structure”
furnishes him with the basis and possibility of “choice” while “choice” determines his
reality. Man’s connected curves in real life constitute his destiny. Second, subjective
anthropology also maintains that “structure” of “man as the subject” (personality,
group and species) is not only inheritable, preexistent and fixed, but also creative,
selective and open-ended, and choice can affect “structure” and even reconstruct
“structure”. Therefore, the destiny of “man as the subject” (personality, group and
species) will be determined by the choice he has made based on the particular premise
of “structure”. The life ontology of “structure and choice” of man is marked by the
following definitive properties. Structure is the basis of life, choice is the creativity of
life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life basis and life creativity. Structure is
what has been in life, choice is what is to be in life, and “structure and choice” is the
unity of what has been in life and what is to be in life. Structure is the regulation of life,
choice is the freedom of life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life regulation
and life freedom. Structure is the tradition of life, choice is the transcendence of
life, and “structure and choice” is the unity of life tradition and life transcendence.
Structure is the finitude of life, choice is the infinity of life, and “structure and
choice” is the unity of life finitude and life infinity. Structure determines choice,
and vice versa. Between structure and choice there exists the unity of opposites on
the basis of mutual penetration and regulation, mutual support and limitation, and
mutual connection and transformation. “Structure and choice” is the basic way in
which under the pressure of the external environment man as the subject responds
to environmental challenges as well as pressures and takes control of his destiny, to
wit, the basic way in which man as the subject remolds the subjective world while
changing the objective world, and gains mastery of the present and the future while
stepping towards freedom. Whether for personality or for group as well as for all
humanity, the significance and implications that “structure and choice” will hold for
the human destiny will be universal.
(2) Top-down Construction of the Value System of Group

Subjective anthropology, which advances and expounds the top-down construction
of the value system of group, holds that, whether in the past or at present, the top-
down construction of the value system of group is of vital importance. Especially in
the era of economic and information globalization, whether the construction of the
value system of group is top-down or not will play a decisive role in the destiny of
group as well as in its ups and downs, and the same is true of family, organization,
nationality, state or international organization. Whichever group has succeeded in
constructing the top-down value system is bound to travel the path of prosperity and
progress and make people live a happy life while whichever group fails to construct
the top-down value system is sure to follow the road of poverty and backwardness and
make people live a miserable life. This has been proved not only by what happened
in the long history of 5000 years, but by the grim realities of the contemporary era.
(3) Construction of “Sound Personality”
Subjective anthropology, which advances and expounds the construction of “sound
personality,” maintains that the human evolution of 1.7 million years constituted a
witness to the perfection of the potentialities of the structure of personality, to wit “the
tertiary structure and eight drives (or powers)” which can be genetically transmitted
through generations. People throughout the world are endowed with pretty much
the same potentialities, regardless of race (white, yellow or black, to name but a
few), gender or age. The differences in their respective potentialities among people
can be mostly attributed to their distinct results of nurture. Therefore, subjective
anthropology maintains that we ought to allow full play to human potentialities and
construct holistic personality, which is of fundamental importance to the destiny
and future of all people throughout the world, regardless of personality, group or all
humanity.
4.3 Laying the Foundation of Anthropology’s Transition

from the Borderline Discipline to the Mainstream One
Anthropology’s marginalization has become an indisputable fact when viewed from

a global perspective. At the present time anthropology’s marginalization from the
borderline discipline to the mainstream one constitutes a historic task in anthro-
pological circles. In order to accomplish a substantial change in the discipline of
anthropology, anthropological circles must strive to discover the fundamental causes
of humanity’s marginalization. After a careful analysis of the development of anthro-
pology in the past 200 years, it is not difficult to find that anthropology’s marginal-
ization can be attributed to the result of anthropology’s self- marginalization. The
excursion (or deviation) of anthropology’s research objects and discipline systems
leads to anthropology’s marginalization. As a branch of learning, anthropology is the
scientific study of human beings as well as human cultures. However, after culture
anthropology came on the anthropological stage, anthropology changed from the

study of man himself as well as his cultures to that of culture and society. Anthro-
pology had its rightful object of study—“man himself” subjected to excursion (or
deviation), and thus sowed the seeds of self-marginalization. The seeds bore flowers
and fruits—anthropology’s marginalization, which can be embodied in the vivid
description of how anthropology that cold-shoulders man himself is treated coolly
by man himself. The foregoing facts may warrant the only conclusion that anthro-
pology which seeks to inaugurate the historic change from the borderline discipline
to the mainstream one cannot but start off having anthropology’s research objects
and discipline systems return to normal. The construction of subjective anthropology
may serve as a decisive step towards anthropology’s transition from the borderline
discipline to the mainstream one. However, if anthropology seeks to initiate the
genuine transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, anthropol-
ogists cannot but carry out overall reforms in the discipline system of anthropology,
which will lay the solid foundation of anthropology’s transition from the borderline
discipline to the mainstream one. To this end, this work maintains that anthropology
will be faced with the following three important tasks of constructing discipline
systems in order to bring about the transition from the borderline discipline to the
mainstream one. First, anthropology ought to make the object of study revert to
normal. To wit, it ought to strive for the reversion from the basic study of culture
or society to that of man himself as well as his cultures. Second, subjective anthro-
pology ought to be constructed so that it can be exclusively devoted to the study of
man himself, to wit the study of the essence or nature of “man as the subject” (person-
ality, group and species), his basic mode of existence and that of survival as well as
their respective laws of development. Third, anthropology ought to carry out overall
reforms in the present discipline system of anthropology and institute the original
discipline system of anthropology which encompasses such three primary branches
as subjective anthropology, cultural anthropology and biological anthropology. Only
in this way can anthropology lay the solid foundation of the transition from the
borderline discipline to the mainstream one and enter into a virtuous circle in which
anthropology is interested in man himself and man himself is also concerned with
anthropology so that it can succeed in bringing about the historic transition from
the borderline discipline to the mainstream one. The author is deeply convinced
that this historical change of anthropology is sure to be inaugurated by Chinese
anthropologists and accomplished by them.
4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences

with Original Premises on Which to Fathom
the Mysteries of Man in His Concreteness and Wholeness
In general, the majority of humanities and social sciences can be viewed as the science
of humanity respectively, and “what is man?” may constitute one premise of these
sciences. Whether or not it is profound or whether or not it is wrong, knowledge

on “what man is” will be directly concerned with the scientificity and valuableness
of humanities and social sciences. However, the question of “what man is” has
been far from being really solved up to now. The assumptions on human nature
which the humanities and social sciences seek to provide are more often than not
incomplete and fragmentary. A couple of examples will suffice to illustrate the above
point. “Philosophy traces “the assumption on human nature” back to the essence or
nature of man; ethics, to man’s morality; psychology, to the human psychology;
jurisprudence, to citizens’ (or civic) rights and obligations before the law. However,
their respective assumptions on human nature cannot be equated with the concrete
and whole man, but can only represent different parts of man in his concreteness
and wholeness. After all, man exists and acts the way that man in his concreteness
and wholeness does, and whatever part of him is subjected to external stimuli, he
is bound to respond the way that man in his concreteness and wholeness is sure
to do so. It is also necessary to point out that numerous disciplines advance the
assumptions on human nature only universal to their respective fields, which they
would more often than not use as the premises to construct the theories and knowledge
systems of their respective disciplines. The following examples will suffice to justify
the point. The science of economics will more often than not construct economic
theories and knowledge systems purely on the assumptions of “economic man”.
Likewise, the discipline of management will also build up management theories
and knowledge systems completely on the assumptions of “psychological man”.
However, the foregoing assumptions on human nature are impossible, nonexistent,
and thus unscientific. It is hard to imagine whether or not there does exist any universal
truthfulness in their respective theories and knowledge systems. Since the turn of the
twenty-first century, the paradox of human existence has been increasingly manifest,
and against this backdrop the incomplete and faulty “assumptions on human nature”
will surely make various sciences fall into their respective areas of mistaken theories.
Just as German philosophical anthropologist M. Landmann stated, “Even though
modern people possess multifaceted knowledge on the human world, such cognition
nevertheless blurs the image of man, and thus our age lacks exactly the clear and well-
defined image of man.” Subjective anthropology seeks to furnish various sciences
with the assumptions and premises on man in his concreteness and wholeness by
trying to reveal and explain him, which will surely help humanities and social sciences
conform to the realities of man in his concreteness and wholeness in a more scientific,
more perfect and more efficient way.
References 43
4.5 Providing a Theoretical Basis for the Discipline in Order

for Chinese Anthropology to Rank Among Its Global
Peers
Marx held that the problem is the slogan of the times and the most practical voice
reflecting the spirit of the times. Making anthropology’s research objects and disci-
pline systems return to normal, establishing subjective anthropology and recon-
structing the discipline system of anthropology may be thought of as being in some
way analogous to the slogan of the times and the most practical voice reflecting the
spirit of the times. The slogan of the times as well as the most practical voice reflecting
the spirit of the times is not only what is expected of anthropology itself but of the
Chinese nation. The twenty-first century will surely bear witness to the rapid rise of
the Chinese nation, and with the rise of the Chinese nation, the spirit of the Chinese
nation is certain to be flourishing and leading the world. China may be the starting
place for these historic tasks of anthropology such as making anthropology’s research
objects and discipline systems revert to normal, establishing subjective anthropology
and reconstructing the discipline system of anthropology which will surely provide
the theoretical basis for China’s anthropology with the Chinese characteristics, the
Chinese spirit and the Chinese style, inaugurate Chinese anthropology’s transition
from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one, and rank among its global peers
in the end. Chinese anthropology will not only contribute the theoretical knowledge
on “man himself as well as his cultures” to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as
well as to the existence and development of all mankind, but contribute wisdom to
the survival, development and happiness of China and all humanity.
References
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Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 62.
2. Hu, Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin
University Press, pp. 2–3; Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2006). An Introduction to Anthropology.
Beijing: China Renmin University Press, p.11.
3. Hu Hong-Bao, ed. (2006). The History of Chinese Anthropology. Beijing: China Renmin
4. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.
5. Boorman, Howard L. (1968). “Fei Hsiao-tung.” In Biographical Dictionary of Republican
China. II. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17–19.
6. Fei, Xiao-Tong. (1996). Personal Ideas and Reflections on Scholarship. Shanghai: Shanghai
Joint Publishing, p. 328.
7. Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Humans’ Gattungswesen Life and Their
Gattungswesen Philosophy. Changchun: Jilin Publishing Group, p. 453.
8. Yuan, Shi-Quan., & Feng, Tao., eds. (1990). Encylopaedia of China. Beijing: China Press,
p. 971.
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2022 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.
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Press, pp. 1–2.
11. Zhuang, Kong-Shao, ed. (2002). A General Survey of Anthropology. Taiyuan, China: Shanxi
Education Press, pp. 268-269.
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13. Landmann, M. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s
Chapter 3
Theoretical Foundation and Mode
of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology
Advancing “the theory of structure and choice” cannot be divorced from the road to
human civilization. Marxist theory constitutes the theoretical basis of “structure and
choice,” and anthropology as well as other related humanities and social sciences
affords the knowlsedge base for “the theory of structure and choice.” It is worth noting
that theories of Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Marxist
theory on humanity in particular, provides theoretical basis, guiding ideology and
scientific methods for the construction of “structure and choice.”
1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology
1.1 World Outlooks of Dialectical Materialism and Historical

Materialism
As a well-knit and well organized theoretical system, Marxist dialectical and histor-
ical materialism is a theory on the universal laws of natural, social and thought
development, which provides the scientific world outlook and methodology for the
proletariat as well as for all mankind. Marxist theories, such as “the world is by its
very nature material,” the unity of matter and consciousness, the relationship between
practice and the world where human beings exist, the basic laws of universal connec-
tion and development of the world, the basic contradictions of society as well as their
laws of development, the driving force for social development, human beings’ cogni-
tive activities as well as their laws, truth and value, and mankind’s emancipation and
human beings’ free and all-round development, provide the scientific and specific
guide for the construction of “the theory of structure and choice” and lay the solid
foundation of “the theory of structure and choice.”

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_3
46 3 Theoretical Foundation and Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology
As a core category of “the theory of structure and choice,” Marxist historical

materialism constitutes the soul of “the theory of structure and choice.” Engels held
that historical materialism is the new world outlook founded by Marx. In the Foreword
to Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy written in 1888,
Frederick Engels rendered an authoritative judgment on Theses on Feuerbach by
Karl Marx in the spring of 1845, holding that the brilliant germ of Marx’s new
world outlook was deposited in the first invaluable document.1 In 1859 Marx offered
an authoritative exposition of his new outlook on the world in the Preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. “The general conclusion at which
I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies,
can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of
production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The
mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual
life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society
come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal
expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have
been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the
change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or
less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should
always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions
of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and
the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms
in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion
of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge
of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this
consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life,
from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of
production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which
there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never
appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb
of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it
can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the
tasks itself arises only when the material conditions of its solution already exist or
are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal,
1 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Ludwig
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House,
p. 213.
1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology 47
and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs

in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the
last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the
sense of individual antagonisms, but of one arising from the social conditions of life
of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of
bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism.
This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of society to a close.”2
The foregoing lucid and in-depth exposition by Marx not only expounds the
structure of human society, the formative elements of society, the fundamental driving
force of social development, the mechanism and mode of social development, but
also reveals the course, phase and prospects of social development, and sheds lights
on the basic laws governing the development of human society. Marxist thoughts
mentioned above constitute not only the core of all historical materialism but also
the basis and soul of the whole theory of “structure and choice.”
In the meantime, Marx and Engels incisively expounded man’s subjective initia-
tive, subjectivity and creativity. From the viewpoint of Marx, in actual production
the subject is man while the object is nature,3 and man as the subject must be the
point of departure,4 which illustrates that in this world only man can act as subject
and claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the
other natural objects can only be treated as objects. Engels sought to make the above
point more explicit by holding that in the socialist society man becomes master of his
social combinations at last, thereby becoming lord of the natural world. “Then, for
the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal
kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human
ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have
hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the
first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become
master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto
standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him,
will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man’s own social
organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history,
now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that
have, hitherto, governed history, pass under the control of man himself. Only from
that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history—only
from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and
in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of
man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.”5 In the thoughts
2 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 82–83.
3 Ibid., p. 88.
4 Marx, K.,& Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 121.

5 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Marx & Engels:
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 760.

of Marx and Engels, man as the concrete and historical subject whose fundamental
mode of existence can be identified with human practice is able to enter into free
and conscious activities in specific social relations and, in Engels’ view, claim to be
master of three types, to wit lord of nature, society and himself respectively. Marx
offered an authoritative exposition of the above point. “Man is a species-being,6 not
only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those
of other things) as his object, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also
because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a
universal and therefore a free being. The whole character of a species, its species—
character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity
is man’s species-character. Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal
is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is
its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he
directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal
life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because
he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for
him. Only because of that is his activity free activity.”7 Marx and Engels’ brilliant
exposition of man’s subjectivity, initiative (subjective activity or dynamic role) and
free and conscious life activity not only lays the foundation of “the theory of structure
and choice, but enables man to determine his fate by making a creative choice based
on “structure”.
1.2 Marx’s Theory of Practice
Historical materialism (also materialist conception of history) constructed by Marx

and Engels is articulated as their new world outlook which is mainly concerned
with the scientific theory of practice. Practice is man’s unique mode of existence as
well as of survival in which man can actively know and reform the world so as to
respond to the pressure of the external environment by solving survival problems.
Practice perceived as the essence of human life is the fundamental mode in which
human beings exist and survive, and constitutes the basis of differentiation and unity
of man’s natural life and supernatural life, objective world and subjective world,
and world-in-itself and human world. As the basic mode of human existence and
that of human survival, practice aroused considerable concern and discussion of
philosophers long ago. However, neither eastern scholars nor western ones failed to
furnish a scientific exposition of the essence and meaning of practice before Marx
and Engels addressed themselves to the conception of practice. For the first time
6 The term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy where
it is applied to man and mankind as a whole.
7 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p.95.

in the history of human thought Marx and Engels furnished a scientific exposition
of practice, holding that practice can be defined as the human activities that human
beings are actively engaged in to know and reform the world so that they would be
able to arouse strong hopes of survival, address themselves to the pressure of the
external environment, and travel the path of development.
In the struggle against old materialism, Marx incisively elaborated on the theory
of practice characterized by man’s initiative (man’s active or dynamic role, man’s
subjective activity). At the very beginning of Theses on Feuerbach, Marx offered
trenchant criticism of the old materialism. “The chief defect of all hitherto existing
materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is
conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous
human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism,
the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not
know real, sensuous activity as such.”8 Marx’s theory of practice sought to have the
active side of man as the subject developed abstractly by idealism reestablished on
the base of materialism.
For the first time in the history of learning, Marx treated material production as
the foremost form of practice, and raised practice up to the level of man’s unique
mode of existence as well as of survival. Marx’s conception of practice constitutes
the theoretical foothold and cornerstone of the theory of “structure and choice.”
An in-depth exposition of “the foremost form of practice” offered by Marx is as
follows. “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion
or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is
conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence
men are indirectly producing their actual material life. The way in which men produce
their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of
subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production
must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the
individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form
of expressing their life, a definite form of life on their part. As individuals express
their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both
with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus
depends on the material conditions determining their production. This production
only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes
the intercourse [Verkehr] of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse
is again determined by production.”9 As man’s unique mode of existence as well as
of survival, practice which treats material production as its foremost manifestation
constitutes not only the fundamental distinction between human beings and animals
but also one of the basic causes of interpersonal difference. This is because practice
8 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on
Feuerbach. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 54.
9 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The
German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 67 – 68.

is the basis of man’s existence, the basis of man’s social relations and the basis of
man’s conscious activities.
The essence of practice consists in the social activities which human beings are
actively engaged in to know and reform the world. Practice is the objective, sensuous
activity characterized by the immediate reality. Practice is man’s active, conscious
activity. Animals adjust themselves to the environment by following their respec-
tive patterns of gene expression and submitting to a wide variety of environmental
restraints. In contradistinction to animals’ instinctive adaptability of their surround-
ings, human practical activity is endowed with human consciousness and purpose.
At the very beginning, the purpose in the form of concepts or ideas exists in the mind
of the practitioner, who is aware that the purpose in the role of a law determines the
means and ways of his activity.10 Practice abundantly demonstrates man’s initiative
and conscious activity. As Mao Zedong pointed out, “ideas, etc. are subjective, while
deeds or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the
dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role ‘man’s
conscious dynamic role,’ and it is a characteristic that distinguishes man from all other
beings.”11 It goes without saying that practice is certain to be man’s social practice
and human beings’ practical activities cannot but be conditioned by certain social
and historical circumstances. Different social conditions will lead to distinct prac-
tical activities. In The German Ideology written from the fall of 1845 to mid-1846,
Marx offered an incisive exposition of the relationship between practice and history.
Moreover, in 1852 Marx furnished a trenchant exposition of the above point in The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. “Men make their own history, but they
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brain of the living.”12
Particular emphasis should also be given to the following point. Practice forms not
only the basis of man’s “dual life” such as “natural life and supernatural life,” “objec-
tive world and subjective world,” “world-in-itself and human world,” and “humanized
nature and human society,” but also the basis of the unity of man’s “dual life” such
as “objective world and subjective world,” “world-in-itself and human world,” and
“humanized nature and human society,” as well as the basis of man’s change from
alienation to humanization and freedom. Marx’s theory of practice constitutes an
important theoretical basis of the theory of “structure and choice.”
10 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 23: Marx & Engels:
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 202.
11 Mao, Ze-Dong. (1991). Mao Zedong Selected Works, Volume 2: On Protracted War. Beijing:

12 Shapiro, Fred R., ed. (2021). The New Yale Book of Quotations. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, p. 530.
1.3 Marxist Theory of Human Beings (or Marxist Human

Theory)
Marxist theory of human beings boasts abundant and profound thoughts, and hence
constitutes an important theoretical basis of the theory of “structure and choice.” It
mainly includes the following contents. “Real man” is conceived as the foothold
of Marxist theory of human beings. The course that human self-knowledge has
taken can be roughly divided into three historical stages, to wit the stage of intuitive
understanding, that of reflective abstraction and that of dialectical all-dimensional
understanding. In the first stage, people can acquire a grasp of man mainly by virtue
of intuitive understanding. In the second stage, people may put an abstract definition
on man by reflecting on human reason. In the third stage, people can achieve a
realistic, historical and concrete understanding of man. These are Marx’s important
thoughts upon “real man,” and they constitute the cornerstone of Marx’s theory of
human beings. The materialist conception of history (or the historical materialism)
founded by Marx uncovers not only the historical mystery of the evolution of human
society but also “Sphinx’s riddle” of man’s development. Marx believes that human
change and development can be attributed to the fact that humans are social beings
and subjects of social practical activities, which affords the key to an understanding
of the mystery of man as well as his evolution, treats man as a process of dialectical
development and views the essence of man as well as his mode of existence as a
process, that is to say, a river rolling on incessantly. This demonstrates that man
is endowed with boundless development and infinite richness, and constitutes the
fundamental reason that before Marx addressed himself to the question of man, a
multitude of theorists failed to achieve an understanding of man. While conducting
a systematic and profound examination of Marx’s thoughts upon “real man,” we can
also find out that Marxist theory of human beings (or Marxist human theory) boasts
abundant and profound thoughts, and Marxism is never devoid of the “empty field”
of human study.
Marx profoundly revealed the essence or nature of man, which is reflected in
the following principal points. First, Marx holds that humans are social beings
and endowed with sociability. Humans are endowed by nature with the following
four characteristics, to wit interdependence, sociability, morality and corporation in
labor.13 Marx believes that man is the most veritable social animal, that is to say, he
is not only a sociable (or gregarious) animal, but an independent animal merely in
society. Engels also thinks that man is the most social of all animals.14 Society consti-
tutes the living conditions under which people depend on one another. The essence
of man is not immutable, but evolves with the change of social practice, social rela-
tions and historical conditions. Second, Marx once elaborated on the nature of man.
The species-essence of man is the free, conscious activity, to wit the active, prac-
tical activity or labor. In Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx once
13 Yuan, Gui-Ren. (1988). Man’s Philosophy. Beijing: Workers’ Publishing House, pp. 44–53.
14 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Dialectics
of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 512.
pointed out, “For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first
place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical exis-
tence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life.
The whole character of a species, its species—character, is contained in the char-
acter of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Life
itself appears only as a means to life.” “The animal is immediately one with its life
activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his
life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious
life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life
activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because
of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he
is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that
is his activity free activity. Estranged labor reverses the relationship, so that it is just
because man is a conscious being that he makes life activity, his essential being, a
mere means to his existence.” “In creating a world of objects by his personal activity,
in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being,
i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself
as a species-being. …An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and
the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in
accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere
the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance
with the laws of beauty.” “It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore,
that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active
species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The
object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates
himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and
therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man
the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-
life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage
over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature is taken from him.
Similarly, in degrading spontaneous, free activity to a means, estranged labor makes
man’s species-life a means to his physical existence. The consciousness which man
has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a way that species-life
becomes for him a means.” “Estranged labor turns thus: Man’s species-being, both
nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him, into a means of
his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external
nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect. An immediate consequence of
the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity,
form his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts
himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work,
to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other
man, and to the man’s labor and object of labor. In fact, the proposition that man’s
species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other,
as each of them is from man’s essential nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact
every relationship in which man stands to himself, is realized and expressed only in
the relationship in which a man stands to other men. Hence within the relationship
of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the
relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.”15 Engels wrote in Dialectics of
Nature, “And what do we find once more as the characteristic difference between
the troupe of monkeys and human society? Labor. …Labor begins with the making
of tools.” Then he added, “In short, the animal merely uses its environment, and
brings about changes in it simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it
serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and
other animals, and once again it is labor that brings about this distinction.”16 Marx
also pointed out, “But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”17 What Marx
meant by “the ensemble of the social relations” can be interpreted as a multilevel
and multifaceted structure. The nature of man is not unchangeable but evolves. As
far as an individual is concerned, the essence of man also evolves, that is to say, the
nature or essence of man also changes or evolves, which is true of or universal to any
individual case. Even though living conditions are roughly the same, the difference
in human nature may also arise. How does this difference come about? It ought to be
admitted that the main reason lies in the influence of social relations, that is to say, his
social experiences and concrete relations will determine his nature. Failure to accept
the foregoing proposition will constitute a departure from materialism. However,
we cannot but admit that an individual’s subjective effort and choice will play an
important, sometimes even a decisive, role in the formation of his nature. Failure to
recognize the above point will be conceived as a departure from dialectics.
Marx profoundly expounded on the theory of the whole man. In The German
Ideology Marx formally produced the scientific conception of separate individuals’
all-round development and thenceforward furnished a systematic exposition of the
concept in many important works. Marx emphasized that intellectual and physical
strength of all members of society should achieve their full and free and harmonious
development in many ways in the course of production. In Principles of Communism
Engels also pointed out, “Industry controlled by society as a whole, and operated
according to a plan, presupposes well-rounded human beings, their faculties devel-
oped in balanced fashion, able to see the system of production in its entirety.”18 Marx
gave special emphasis to the proposition that men should be “whole individuals,” to
wit well-rounded human beings. As a whole individual, man should be possessed of
all his nature or essence in an all-round manner. Marxist theory profoundly unveiled
the cause of man’s one-sided development—the division of labor. Private owner-
ship and class exploitation, meanwhile, aggravated this one-sidedness. Marx held
15 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 96.
16 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 3:
Engels: Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 513, 517.
17 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Complete Works, Volume 3: Marx: Theses on

18 Marx, K., Engels, F. (1958). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Principles of
Communism. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 370.

that the true division of labor begins with the separation between material labor and
mental labor. The division of labor which occurs in the production of a commodity
under capitalism completely destroys the independence of workers and makes them
become the parts of social institutions under the command of capital.19 Engels made
several similar points in Anti-Dühring, “As labor is divided into several parts, so man
himself is divided into several parts. To secure training in a single activity makes
it highly necessary that all other physical and mental faculties should be sacrificed.
This deformity of human development and the division of labor go hand in hand.”20
Therefore, to change the abnormal development of human beings must of necessity
presuppose the transformation of this old social division of labor based on capitalist
exploitation.
Marx thinks that human development is a dialectical process of development.
Man is a historical being and human life is a process of constant introspection and
transcendence. Marx pointed out that the process of human growth must of necessity
go through three basic stages and three historical forms in chronological order. First,
the form of human dependency came into existence when man was at the mercy of
his environment. At that time, although they were already out of the animal kingdom,
human beings were still unable to rid themselves of the dependence on nature, and
so they could not but form a community, which severely impeded or hindered the
development of individual autonomy and creativity. Second, human independence is
based on the dependence on money existing in the form of a special commodity and
generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In the further development of human
beings, their social connections gradually replaced those with nature, which not only
promoted the germination and development of individual autonomy, but helped the
individual come into existence, who entertained the individual-oriented conception
and attached much value to independent personality. Human success in ascending
this step of development lies in the development of commodity market economy and
the material exchange between people. This development boasts a dual character. On
the one hand, individual independence promotes human liberation and development,
but on the other, while he is liberated from the bondage of his relations with nature,
man is again bound up in fetters of money existing in the form of a special commodity
and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. Third, free individuality is based
upon the all-round development of separate individuals and their common powers of
social production which constitute their social wealth. This is the free and conscious
form of human development. These three basic stages and three historical forms
constitute the process which human growth must of necessity go through one after
another, to wit the course of spiral escalation which must of necessity follow the law
of negation of negation.
Marx profoundly elaborated on the theory of human value. First, in order for
us to acquire a good grasp of the conception of human value, it will become a
Manuscripts of 1861–63. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 309.
20 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Anti-
Dühring. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 316.

foremost necessity to elucidate Marx’s thoughts on the two standards of human

labor, to wit “the standard of the species” and “the inherent standard of man.” In
Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx wrote, “An animal forms only
in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst
man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and
knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore
also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”21 What Marx meant here
by “the inherent standard” refers to “the standard of human beings,” that is to say “the
standard of human value.” Second, it is imperative to achieve an objective and correct
understanding of the concept of value as well as that of human value. Marx believed
that the universal concept of value emerges from human beings’ relationships with
objects that satisfy their needs. The subject is the human being and the human society
while the object is the objective reality. Value represents the function and significance
of objective things for the existence and development of human beings and human
society. To put it simply, value is the objective attribute of things to meet people’s
certain needs. In general, human value is different from objective things. Human value
boasts its uniqueness. In addition to the social value that people acquire possession
of while meeting the needs of society, the satisfaction of human existence and needs
also constitutes a kind of value. The following examples will suffice to illustrate this
point. Either a person who is terminally ill and hence deprived of all ability to work
or a person who is physically handicapped and has never been able to do any work
really cannot do any more for society. However, he is the subject, and the satisfaction
of his own existence and needs is the value. He is also entitled to survive, to attain
material and spiritual satisfaction, and to have his personality respected. Man is the
unity of subject and object. Man as the object must contribute to society in order
to gain possession of value while man as the subject is entitled to the respect and
satisfaction which also constitute a kind of value. The so-called human value is the
unity of the respect and satisfaction which the individual receives from the society
and the individual’s duty and contribution to the society. Under socialism, human
value devoid of either of these two aspects will be incomplete. Marxist theory on
the two standards of human labor (“the standard of the species” and “the inherent
standard of man”) as well as the theory on human value provides a theoretical basis
for examining the principle of reasonable existence of man as the subject.
1.4 Marx’s Thoughts on Anthropology
Although he failed to produce any anthropological work in his whole life, Marx did
have abundant thoughts on anthropology in a multitude of works. Marx was much
concerned over anthropology. Marx never stopped studying anthropological mate-
rials and theories since he set out to establish historical materialism and the theory
21Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic
of surplus value. After the first volume of Das Kapital came out, Marx devoted
much of his energy and time to the study of anthropology till the end of his life.
During the period of his life, he made voluminous notes on anthropology such as The
Conspectus (Précis) of Lewis H. Morgan’s “Ancient History,” Notes to (on) Maksim
M. Kovalevsky’s Books—“Communal Landownership” and “Historic-Comparative
Method,” Notes to (on) Mayne’s Work, Notes on John Lubbock’s Works in The Natural
History Review and Notes on Phil’s Work. Moreover, he read and studied many
anthropological notes made by such scholars as Moni, Mauler and Huxter Hausenin
their works. Marx had a lot of research pieces and letters that also contained brilliant
ideas on anthropology. Marx wrote a lot of research pieces on the Asiatic mode of
production. Letters to the editorial board of the Chronicle of the Motherland as well as
those to Zasulich all contained important thoughts on anthropology. Engels carried on
Marx’s unfinished work, developed his anthropological theories and fulfilled his will
by completing and publishing the anthropological monograph entitled The Origin of
the Family, Private Property and the State. The anthropological thoughts of Marx
and Engels were primarily concerned with philosophical anthropology and cultural
anthropology (or social anthropology). Admittedly, anthropology has always been a
theme of Marx’s theoretical activities. Besides the consistent themes of philosophy,
political economy and scientific socialism, there is also a constant theme of anthro-
pology in Marx’s theoretical activities. Marx’s anthropological thoughts were not
only engraved in the minds of his day, but also are treasured up in the memory of
modern people. The influence of Marx’s anthropological thoughts is mainly shown
as follows.
Marx paid much attention to the study of human history and interpreted the abun-
dant fruits of many years’ study on social history as the research results of human
history. In The German Ideology he wrote, “History can be examined in two ways
or from two aspects, that is to say, history can be divided into natural history and
human history. But these two aspects are indivisible, and as long as there exist men,
natural history and human history will be mutually conditioned. Natural history, the
so-called natural science, we shall not discuss here; what we should make an in-depth
study of is human history, because the entire ideology either distorts human history
or ignores it altogether.”22 In fact, Marx’s theory of human or social history not
only constitutes one of the core contents of all Marxist theories, but also produces
a tremendous influence on the socialist movement throughout the world and the
modernization of the contemporary Third World. In the Preface of A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy published in 1859, Marx held that “in broad
outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can
be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.” The
five modes of production or forms of society progress in chronological order like
characters come on the stage one after another. This clearly has the implications of
the unilineal evolution (also referred to as “classical social evolution”) of human
22Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The
German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 66.
society. After studying anthropology in his later years, Marx achieved great theo-
retical transcendence. He believed that history progresses in regular succession and
the course of history is the unity of continuity and discontinuity. In the history of
social development, the factors leading to stability and those bringing about change
are contradictory to one another, so that some societies may have followed unique
courses of history. In particular, the fundamental differences between eastern soci-
eties and western ones may make it possible for some eastern societies to develop
in a non-European way. Under certain historical conditions, it is possible for some
eastern societies to march through the Caudine Forks of capitalism. Marx thought that
internal conflicts differ essentially in different societies, which makes separate soci-
eties gradually possess unique characteristics in their respective courses of history.
This has included the idea of the multilinear evolution of human history. When he
found out that some people attempted to mechanically generalize his theory of the
historical evolution of human society (that is the five-stage theory of human devel-
opment), Marx pointed out indignantly that if one attempted to turn his historical
theory of the origins of capitalism in Western Europe into the theory of historical
philosophy on the path of general development, holding that all nations, whatever
their historical circumstances, are destined to follow the same path, in doing so, he
would bestow too much honor on me, but in the meantime he would heap too many
insults upon me. Marx’s anthropological thought not only provides a theoretical basis
for the establishment and development of socialism in China as well as in other Asian
countries, but also blazes new paths to modernization for the Third World countries
different from those followed by the European countries, and moreover, it provides
theoretical guidance for the countries with the Asiatic mode of production as the
dominant economic system so that they may abandon the closed-door policy (that
is the policy of closing the country to international communication), formulate and
execute the reform and opening up policy. Nowadays Marx’s anthropological thought
still can furnish a scientific and authoritative explanation of a multitude of intricacies
arising in real life and render immense service to the development of every nation
by offering workable solutions to intricate problems arising threrefrom.
There are many other outstanding anthropological thoughts in the works of Marx
and Engels. Engels maintained that anthropology is the bridge from morphology
and physiology of man as well as of race to history.23 This very definition of anthro-
pology is also quite profound and thought-provoking even today. By entering upon an
incisive criticism of Feuerbach’s worship of “the abstract individual,” Marx demon-
strates convincingly that the study of social history must treat the sensuous, prac-
tical and realistic individual as the object of study. In their works Marx and Engels
also provided most comprehensive accounts of social structure as well as its law of
change and development in an effort to formulate historical materialism. Moreover,
they set forth abundant and profound thoughts on human development (that is three
stages of human development) and human liberation. They maintained that practice
is the basic mode of human existence. They elaborated on man’s subjective initiative
23Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of
Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 524.
and individuality. Marxists tend to accord Marx’s theory of Gattungswesen which

is generally translated as “species-being,” “species-existence,” “species-essence” or
“species-nature” an important place in his critique of capitalism, his conception of
communism, and his materialist conception of history. According to a note from
the young Marx in the The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the term
“species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy
in which it refers both to the nature of each man and of humanity as a whole. In
the sixth Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx argues that the species-being is always
determined in a specific social and historical formation, with some aspects being
biological. Marx believes that humans can make their species and their lives their
object. That is to say, to make one’s life ones’ object is therefore to treat one’s
life as something that is under one’s control. What is involved in making one’s
species one’s object is more complicated. In one sense, it emphasizes the essentially
social character of humans, and their need to live in a community of the species.
In others, it seems to emphasize that we attempt to make our lives expressions of
our species-essence; further that we have goals concerning what becomes of the
species in general. The idea covers much of the same territory as “making one’s
life one’s object”; it concerns self-consciousness, purposive activity, and so forth.
All these thoughts mentioned above in the works of Marx and Engels constitute the
precious theoretical treasure of anthropology and afford the sound theoretical basis
and guidance for the establishment of the theory of “structure and choice.”
2 Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology
Mode of thinking can be viewed as one of the most powerful instruments for under-
standing and unraveling the mysteries of research objects, one and only way to solve
complicated problems and theoretical difficulties confronting objects of study, and
affords a fundamental basis for methodological creativity. Strictly speaking, the level
of theoretical construction depends upon the level that the mode of thinking for theo-
retical construction has attained, and tends to change with it. Therefore, mode of
thinking plays a key role in the theoretical construction of “structure and choice.”
2.1 How Modes of Thinking Hitherto Known to Humankind

Hamper Pioneering Efforts to Unravel the Noumenon
of Human Life
Mode of thinking constitutes the indispensible prerequisite for the study of the life
ontology of man. The research on the ontology of human life, which is stamped
with the brand of human modes of thinking, tends to be regulated and restricted by
human modes of thinking. To put it another way, unraveling the ontology of human
2 Mode of Thinking of Subjective Anthropology 59
life synchronizes with the progress of human modes of thinking. Scientific modes
of thinking may act as the fundamental prerequisites for the intensive research on
the ontology of human life and the scientific interpretation of man. However, the
long evolution of man saw a myriad of rapid changes in the external world, while
it witnessed little change in human mode of thinking as well as its discouragingly
slow development. The transition from primitive mode of thinking to modern one
may have taken approximately thousands of years or even tens of thousands of
years. Thusfar, there has been a long-drawn-out and irreconcilable conflict between
human modes of thinking, particularly between existential (ontological) thinking and
practical thinking, between the mode of thinking oriented towards species and the
one oriented towards species-beings, and between formal thinking and dialectical
thinking, which retards the progress (development) of general scientific knowledge,
aggravates the difficulty of knowing man himself, and constitutes a serious obstacle
to unraveling the mysteries inherent in the ontology of human life. Since the ancient
Greek philosopher Socrates took the lead in concerning himself with the problem of
humanity’s self-understanding, or rather, the question of knowing thyself, there has
been no wise solution to the problem of how to know himself by which humankind
has been confronted for thousands of years, and one of the fundamental reasons why
that happened lies in the fact that humankind has been deficient in effective modes of
thinking powerful enough to help himself unravel his own impenetrable mysteries.
If today witnessed neither the removal of limitations and barriers imposed by old
modes of thinking upon human mind nor the establishment of new ways of thinking,
then constructing the life ontology of man—“the theory of structure and choice”
would be only a good intention and “knowing thyself” would remain an unattainable
ideal.
As far as the research on the life ontology of man is concerned, the limitations
placed by old ways of thinking upon human mind are mainly reflected in those of exis-
tential (ontological) thinking, those of the mode of thinking oriented towards species
and those of formal thinking, among which the limitations of dualistic thinking
included in those of formal thinking are most noticeable. So far human thought is
still on a level with binary (dualistic) thinking. Although dualistic (binary) thinking,
which is so far of immense value to human beings, contributed immensely to a
vast multitude of enduring successes in human scientific knowledge, especially the
remarkable progress in science and technology, yet its disadvantages have mani-
fested themselves in huge numbers, i.e., binary (dualistic) thinking endowed with its
own inherent weaknesses not only has led the whole “human subject,” who makes
his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, who is not
only bursting with vim and vigor but also endowed with species-beings’ (conscious
beings’) distinctive characteristics and who is able to establish himself among his or
her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social practice, into
a fragmented state, but also has landed humanity in contradiction, division, conflict
and confrontation, which has brought humankind to the verge of ruin. However, thus
far humankind has been unable to remove, once and for all, the fetters of binary
thinking’s intrinsic drawbacks (or weaknesses) from human mind. It can even be
admitted that today the limitations upon the understanding of man himself may boil
down to nothing more than the limitations of the subject himself or herself, or rather
the limitations of dualistic (or binary) thinking as a basic mode of human thought, to
wit the limitations of human discontinuous (or fractured) thinking, or more specifi-
cally, the dichotomist and mechanistic Western modernist scientific paradigm initi-
ated by René Descartes, whose influence has dominated and fractured thinking in
the Western world for close to four centuries (Ramsay, 1999), and has been imposed
on the rest of the world with equally deleterious effects.24 The limitations imposed
by binary (dualistic) thinking on human mind not only hinder humankind from self-
knowledge but, more seriously, affect man’s view of himself as well as his world-
view (his comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world especially from a
specific standpoint—called also weltanschauung).
Claude Lévi-Strauss, French social anthropologist and leading exponent of struc-
turalism, could not help sighing with deep emotions at the limitations imposed by
binary (dualistic) thinking on human mind. He dedicated his own life time to the study
of human modes of thinking—“a binary (dualistic or dichotomist) mental structure”
that the nervous system of the human brain is endowed with. Considering that after the
Renaissance social sciences tended to put more value on analysis than on synthesis,
Lévi-Strauss attempted to bring about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which
social sciences have been suffering from since the Renaissance by making a life-long
study of binary (dualistic or dichotomist) mental structures” that the nervous system
of the human brain is endowed with. That is to say, Lévi-Strauss tried using the
structural method endowed with a broad vision, which postulates that an unconscious
“metastructure” emerges through the human mental process of pairing opposites and
according to which the human mind is viewed as a repository of a great variety
of natural material, from which it selects pairs of elements that can be combined to
form diverse structures, to bring about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which
social sciences have been suffering from since the Renaissance. However, this goal
has not been attained. He argued that the basis of the world is neither mode of produc-
tion nor absolute spirit, but “a binary mental structure” that the nervous system of the
human brain is endowed with. His following view is quite profound: the universe is
a continuum, but human beings look at it, think about it, or study it only by dividing
it into discontinuous parts due to the limitations of human thinking. Furthermore,
human beings divide the aforementioned parts into categories so as to bring order to
the universe. Since the fundamental essence of human thinking is the mental struc-
ture of binary opposition, the way that human beings seek to describe separate things
is often endowed with discontinuity as well as characteristics of opposition. Consid-
ering that the mental structure of binary opposition is inherent in human mind, man is
unable to extricate himself from the mental structure of binary opposition, i.e., there
is no way of avoiding the impact of the mental structure of binary opposition upon
human thought. This eventually landed him in a difficult position. On the one hand he
affirmed that classification (or categorization) and binary (or dualistic) thinking are
24 Haug, Erika. “Critical Reflections on the Emerging Discourse of International Social Work.”
International Social Work 48(2) (March 2005): 128–129. Erika Haug is a former professor in the
School of Indian Social Work at the First Nations University of Canada in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
of great significance to human rational thinking, self-knowledge and understanding

of the world, but on the other, he also awakened to the fact that classification (or
categorization) and binary (or dualistic) thinking are endowed with their respective
inherent serious limitation and harm, which constituted a constant source of worry to
him. In his view, it is mankind’s binary (or dualistic) thinking, one of our most basic
and primitive conceptual tendencies, that divides human beings into “ourselves” and
“people of a different kind (people not belonging to the same category)” as well as
“Western people” and “aboriginal (or indigenous) people” and that segments ethnic
groups into “superior” and “inferior” ones, which not only resulted in hostile rela-
tions among people, but also led to innumerable conflicts, persecutions, disasters
and wars in the history of mankind. He earnestly hoped that human beings ought to
break free from the categorization (or classification) consciousness, especially the
consciousness of binary opposition. He very much admired the teachings or practice
of Chan sect of Buddhism in China (Zen Buddhism in Japan) and yearned to reach
the state of no difference which may be identified with the Buddhist truth revealed
in the following Chinese poem: “There is no Buddhist tree at all, and there is bright
mirror nor. Now there is nothing at all, how could be dust any more?” For him,
looked at from that point of view, Islam (the Muslim religion) is inferior to Chris-
tianity, while Christianity is inferior to Buddhism. Evidently, as one of the twentieth
century’s greatest intellectuals, Lévi-Strauss became acutely aware of the limitations
of human thinking, i.e. fractured thinking or binary (or dualistic) thinking, and felt
the urgent necessity of breaking free from the limitations. However, he failed to solve
the long-drawn-out, perplexing problem, nor did he break free from the limitations
of formal logical thinking. Regrettably, he surrendered to the sway of binary (or
dualistic) thinking.
Binary or dualistic thinking constitutes a bottleneck in understanding the ontology
of human life. If he fails to break free from the limitations of dual or binary thinking,
humankind cannot view the understanding of himself or self-knowledge in its right
perspective, nor can he achieve the contradictory unity of dual life, i.e. the life of
species and the life of kind, which will eventually make impenetrable darkness settle
over the path of development mankind has to travel in the future.
In order to obtain an objective and complete understanding of the inscrutable
and paradoxical ontology of human life, Karl Marx and his followers took the lead
in attempting to unravel the problem of human fractured thinking as well as in
originating the theory of dialectics that reveals the universal law of human thought
characterized by the evolution from fractured thinking into continuous thinking.
Looking to the future, human beings ought to pin their highest hopes on the Marxist
theory of dialectics as well as its development so that they will eventually achieve
an objective and complete understanding of the inscrutable ontology of human life.
2.2 The “Triple Transcendence” and “Three Levels”

of Human Thinking
In order to understand and unravel the inscrutable noumenon of human life, we must
achieve the “triple transcendence” of old modes of thinking and attain the three
higher levels of human thinking in ascending order under the guidance of Marxist
materialist dialectics, i.e., we must triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects
of ontological thinking and strive to reach the level of practical thinking, we must
transcend the way of thinking oriented towards the life of species and adopt the mode
of thinking oriented towards the life of kind, and we must overcome the limitations
of formal logical thinking and attempt to raise the mode of human thinking to the
level of dialectical thinking.
(1) The Transcendence from Ontological to Practical Thinking—Attaining the
Level of Practical Thinking
Invariably the ancient Greek philosophers treated “knowing thyself or self-
knowledge” as the supreme goal of philosophical thinking. However, the philo-
sophical history of thousands of years bore ample witness to the regrettable fact that
generation after generation of thinkers and philosophers rose to unravel the mysteries
of “knowing thyself or self-knowledge,” but they tried in vain to attain the supreme
goal of philosophical thinking. The key to the settlement of the above-mentioned
question lies in nothing but the choice of right modes of thinking to understand man
himself, that is to say, it is the ontological way of thinking that inevitably led to
philosophers’ failure to attain the supreme goal of philosophical thinking—knowing
thyself or self-knowledge, or rather unraveling the mysteries of man himself. While
a vast multitude of philosophers appeared, one after another, on the stage of human
thought from ancient times right through to the present, Western intellectual history
of several thousands of years, in which German philosopher Hegel was the last of
the great philosophical system builders of modern times and his work marks the
pinnacle of classical German philosophy, witnessed the domination of ontological
thinking over the Western mind. Fundamentally speaking, the most serious problem
confronting the ontological way of thinking lies in the fact that in the long history of
human thought generation after generation of philosophers or thinkers invariably tried
in vain to discover the true and real world of noumena or things in themselves behind
the phenomenal world, in which an object or aspect is known through the senses rather
than by thought or intuition, made a futile attempt to find the ultimate being whose
sublime mission is designed to determine and govern the way that all other things
exist, and vainly sought to overcome the multiple contradictions inherent in human
life, which not only landed man in a one-dimensional state but also reduced him to
abstraction so that they failed to gain knowledge of real human beings themselves, nor
did they offer an elaborate and convincing explanation of human nature and human
worlds characterized by more complex contradictions arising from the contradictions
inherent in human life, those between people and those between man and nature. To
put it briefly, the philosophers or thinkers who were given to the ontological way of
thinking would reject the contradictory unity of dual life, i.e. the life of species and
the life of kind, as well as the existence of contradictory relationships inherent in
human life, of those between people and of those between man and nature. While
pondering human nature in the strict ontological sense, the philosophers or thinkers
who gave themselves up to the ontological way of thinking would understand human
beings as divinities overcoming worldly desires and attaining sainthood, or rather,
transcending worldliness and attaining holiness, or as atomized individuals, or as
natural beings that do not differ essentially from animals, or as purely rational beings
who devote themselves heart and soul to intellectual activities, or as cultural beings.
In particular, human beings are reduced to “structural beings” in structuralism, the
school of thought developed by the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss that
seeks to analyze social relationships in terms of highly abstract relational structures
often expressed in a logical symbolism, in which cultures, viewed as systems, are
analyzed in terms of the structural relations among their elements, universal patterns
in cultural systems are products of the invariant structure of the human mind, and
the human mind is viewed as a repository of a great variety of natural material, from
which it selects pairs of elements that can be combined to form diverse structures.
While the philosophers or thinkers, who indulged in the ontological way of thinking
to their hearts’ content, ventured an impressive array of hypotheses about human
nature in the strict ontological sense, the real, whole “human subject,” who makes
his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, who is not only
bursting with vim and vigor but also endowed with species-beings’ (or conscious
beings’) distinctive characteristics and who is able to establish himself among his
or her peers in social interaction and engage himself or herself in social practice,
fell into almost total neglect and was eventually plunged into the abyss of despair.
The aforementioned theoretical view can be further expressed as follows: through
abstraction or theoretical work on the part of the abovementioned philosophers or
thinkers who steeped themselves in ontological thinking, “real, whole humans” as
well as their worlds characterized by the unity of multiple contradictions landed up
in a one-dimensional state, or sank into division, opposition and fragmentation, or
were reduced to sentient or living beings or conscious existence devoid of history so
that the above philosophers failed to achieve a correct, objective and deeper under-
standing of human beings and their worlds and, to make matters even worse, had
human beings and their worlds subjected to serious deviation from their respective
true states, which eventually lead human beings and their worlds into a state of loss
and disintegration. In the final analysis, the philosophers who steeped themselves
in ontological thinking failed to gain true knowledge of human nature and human
worlds, nor did they provide a rational and illuminating explanation of human nature
and human worlds, nor did they make any convincing predictions about human nature
and human worlds.
Karl Marx made an epoch-making contribution to the fundamental change in
human thinking by substituting a practical way of thinking for the old ontological way
of thinking and tried to provide new theoretical insights into the way we understand
human beings as well as human worlds. Karl Marx took the lead in establishing
practice as the fundamental principle of philosophy by substituting the practical way
of thinking for the ontological way of thinking and seeking to raise the mode of human
thinking to the level of practical thinking as well as by providing remarkably keen
insights into human nature, provided the real foundation not only for a profound
grasp of what human beings as well as human worlds are, but also for a correct,
objective and deeper understanding of human beings, who are bursting with vim
and vigor in social interaction and practice and, more importantly, who endeavor to
throw themselves with passion into endless reconciliation between the grim realities
of life and the life-long pursuit of dreams either within the bounds of possibility or
beyond the range of possibility, as well as human worlds, and, whether in theory
or in practice, provided a wider theoretical perspective on the problem of how to
understand human beings as well as human worlds and struck out new paths in
epistemology for generation after generation of Marxist followers. According to
Marx, practice is man’s unique, conscious activity whose primary purpose lies in the
creation of value. “Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory
he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but also
because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as
a universal and therefore a free being. For labor, life activity, productive life itself,
appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need
to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It
is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is
contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s
species-character. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not
distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the
object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. Conscious
life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because
of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he
is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that
is his activity free activity. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in
his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e.,
as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as
a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man
really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life.
Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of
labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself
not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore
he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce. An
animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to
which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard
of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the
object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.”25 In
human practice, while changing the objective world, man also undergoes a complete
transformation of his subjective world as well as his world outlook, which proves that
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 96–97.
man can make his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness
and that man can act as subject of his practical activity characterized by freedom,
spontaneity, purpose and consciousness. In this sense, Marx emphasized that men
can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you
like and that they themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon
as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. In view of the fact that practice
lays the real basis for delving into vast dimensions of human nature and provides
the practical way of thinking about how to achieve true knowledge of man himself,
a thorough grasp of the real foundation as well as the practical way of thinking
will contribute immensely to humankind’s eventual success in unraveling his own
baffling and impenetrable mysteries. The chief reasons for the foregoing categorical
statement may be adduced as follows. First, the practical way of thinking provides the
real foundation for understanding man from the perspective of his personal activity.
In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, man also creates himself by
making his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and,
as a conscious being, he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means
to his existence. As a living, real being, man possesses exuberant creative vitality.
Although he comes from nature, man, far from being the ready-made product of
nature, creates himself. The essence of man, i.e. human nature, is not determined by
nature, but is brought into existence in human beings’ creative activities. Second, the
practical way of thinking provides the foundation for understanding the dialectical
unity between man and the outside world. Only from a practical point of view can we
gain a remarkably keen insight into the essential relationship between human beings
and the outside world characterized by mutual unity and reciprocal negation, i.e.,
there exists a curious causal relationship between man and nature characterized by
mutual dependence and reciprocal negation, to put it another way, man, as a living,
real being, comes from nature, but transcends nature. Practical activity is a process of
reciprocal interaction between man and nature, between the subject and the object and
between subjectivism and objectivism. In this process, man not only tries to construct
the relationship of negative unity with the objective world in accordance with the
standard of every species, but also knows how to apply everywhere the inherent
standard to the object, as a result of which the world of objects is transformed into
a world where on the one hand man follows the course of nature, but on the other,
he also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty, and thus before man
appeared on the earth, the mere relations between a myriad of species dominated
the natural world, whereas after man existed on the earth, the original world was
miraculously transformed into a humanized world, or rather a contradictory world,
where human beings and the natural world have since been on a collision course. The
aforementioned difficulties confronting humankind today can only be understood
and explained by recourse to the practical way of thinking. Third, the practical way
of thinking provides the real foundation for understanding the dialectical unity of
various binary relations inherent in human life. Human beings not only come to
understand the unity of dualistic contradictions and oppositions inherent in human
practical activity, such as affirmation versus negation, initiative versus passivity,
subjectivity versus objectivity, collectivity versus individuality, division versus unity
and necessity versus freedom, but also they can make their practical activities attain
higher levels by overcoming contradictions and removing oppositions inherent in
human practice. It was just on the basis of human practical activity characterized
by the unity of complex contradictions that man evolved from the ape and that
human nature developed ceaselessly, and it was only on the basis of human practice
that the evolution of humankind as well as the development of human nature could
be possible of attainment. In short, the main theoretical objective that human beings
strive to achieve by recourse to the practical way of thinking is to provide remarkably
keen insights into human nature, to delve into vast dimensions of human nature, to
elucidate what human nature is from the perspective of man himself, and to acquire a
thorough grasp of man as well as his world from the viewpoint of negative unity. Only
by recourse to the practical way of thinking can we achieve a correct, objective and
deeper understanding of man himself and raise the level of human understanding from
fantasy to reality, from abstraction to concreteness, from fragmentation to wholeness
and from paradox to science, and only by use of practical thinking can we provide a
scientific explanation of the unique ontology of human life, or rather human nature,
which thus in methodological terms provides the scientific foundation for the theory
of “structure and choice”.
(2) Transcending the Way of Thinking Oriented Towards the Life of Species
and Adopting the Mode of Thinking Oriented Towards the Life of Kind
To put it succinctly, by the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or
beings we mean that this way of thinking can only be used to gain knowledge of
non-human species and that it can only be applied to the nature of non-human species
rather than to the essence of human beings. Whichever way of thinking may render
immense service to human understanding of objects hinges upon the nature of objects
rather than depend on passing whims or arbitrary decisions. With the above situation
in view, it can be safely asserted that the way of thinking oriented towards species-
beings or human beings ought to be used to grasp the living, real species-being in
his wholeness. Thus, the idea that the way of thinking oriented towards non-human
species may be entitled to help with man’s understanding of himself clearly runs
counter to universal laws of cognition. During a considerable period of time, growth
retardation in human thinking as well as lower levels of cognitive development made
mankind fall into the deeply ingrained habit of understanding himself by recourse to
the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species, whose lasting, seductive
influence upon human mind can still be strongly felt today. Generally speaking,
the mode of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings are endowed
with the following characteristics. First, this way of thinking may be treated as a
kind of predetermined or closed thinking. Thus, when people endeavor to apprehend
the nature or essence of non-human species or beings in this way of thinking, it will
naturally follow that the nature or essence of non-human species or beings tends to be
conceived of as predetermined, closed and fixed. The following example will suffice
to illustrate humankind’s deep-seated tendency to understand non-human species or
beings in the way of predetermined or closed thinking. Even the nature of a higher
mammal tends to be conceived of as predetermined, i.e., people tend to endow the
higher animal with all of the nature of its kind they presume it to possess at birth, and
the remainder of its life will only witness the constant unfolding of what has been
contained in its genes. Rather than transcend itself, the higher mammal can be only
what it is for the rest of its life, to put it another way, it cannot become what it is not.
Second, people just take it for granted that this kind of thinking can be perceived
as the one characterized by sameness of essential (or generic) character in different
instances, or rather, devoid of any contradictions. Judging by the aforementioned
character unique to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or
beings, we can see how firmly entrenched the notion is that the way that a thing
exists, that is to say the objective reality of a thing, is identical with the nature of
its kind. The following example will suffice to illustrate this specious argument. The
nature of an individual animal as well as its mode of existence almost invariably
manifests itself in its close identity with that of its species, and thus there cannot
be any dichotomy between natural and supernatural phenomena or between the soul
and the body in the nature of an individual animal as well as in its mode of existence.
According to Karl Marx, “the animal is immediately one with its life activity. It
does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity.”26 Third, this way of thinking
may be conceived of as a kind of isolated thinking characterized by one-sidedness
in understanding. People endowed with this way of thinking tend to entertain the
obsessive idea that the innate character of one species, once formed, will remain
immutable ever after. According to this notion, they would be disposed to hazard the
conclusion that one species is separated from other species, individuals of one species
are isolated from each other, and the evolution of one species is independent of its
environment. More specifically, there are no dynamic relationships other than the
incessant exchange of matter and energy between species and environment, which
species tend to carry on in accordance with their respective inherent standards and
needs. Such inexorable laws of nature as the sequence of transfers of matter and
energy in the form of food from organism to organism, or rather, food chains, and the
law of the jungle, that is to say, the weak fall prey to the strong, tend to dominate the
great variability and complexity of interdependent relationships between one species
and other different ones, which may permit of no other dynamic relationships marked
by usually continuous and productive activity or change between a single species and
other different ones. Among individuals of one species, that the nature of the species is
immediately one (or identical) with that of the individual would make it clear that the
union of elements constituting the individuality and identity of the individual may be
concealed from view and that individuals of the species are almost indistinguishable
from each other. It is the way of thinking that seeks to distinguish one species from
another, i.e., it is the mode of thinking that aims to demarcate different species.
Only if we have succeeded in pinpointing the differences between one thing and
other different things can our efforts to understand things be crowned with success.
Whenever we attempt to understand one thing, we will have to pinpoint the nature
of the species to which it belongs. Only in this way can we describe the thing in
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 96.
outline and acquire a scientific grasp of it. In terms of how we view the nature
of thinking, this kind of thinking may come under the category of formal-logical
thinking. This mode of thinking can be applied only to things, that is, non-human
species or beings, rather than to human beings. When people readily call up this
way of thinking to render its substantial help with the task of understanding human
beings, this mode of thinking will inevitably result in manifold manifestations of
human alienation. Following this line of thought, it will naturally follow that human
beings are liable to digitization, objectification, atomization and simplification, to
put it another way, human beings tend to be conceived of as digitized, objectified,
atomized and simplified by those people endowed with this way of thinking. Human
image or nature tends to be stereotyped by them, that is to say, they tend to form a fixed
idea about human nature or image. This mode of thinking will be most likely to bring
about the abstract human nature as well as the loss of humanity, namely inhumanity or
dehumanization. Moreover, when people fuse with this way of thinking and attempt
to understand human beings in all his fundamental bearings, their thoughts tend to
be hedged around with psychological inflexibility, or rather, the rigid dominance of
psychological reactions over chose values and contingencies in guiding action. Man
is a special being fundamentally different from things, or rather, non-human beings,
not only because free, conscious life activity is man’s species-character, but because
man can make his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.
It is his free, conscious life activity that distinguishes man immediately from non-
human beings. In the long process of human evolution, man transcended the inherent
limitations of things or species, in particular the essence of things or species, and
evolved into a unique, negative unity of multiple contradictions, that is to say, man
changed into the only being of consciousness (or being-for-itself) that is capable of
creative practical activity in the world and whose nature presents a baffling mystery
and is capable of indefinite, open-ended development. To put it another way, human
nature is what its potentiality-for-being is capable of, is existentially surrendered to
thrownness, and in every case is delivered over to the possibility of finding itself in
its possibilities. With the above situation in view, when we devote ourselves to the
study of man, we must discard all thought of trying to understand human beings by
turning to the way of thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings, but
rather explore the special ways of thinking as well as scientific methods of analysis
that will be of universal application to our understanding of human beings.
How on earth should we grasp the nature of human beings? People at different
periods of history already woke up to numerous weaknesses inherent in the way of
thinking oriented towards non-human species or beings and sought to remedy them.
However, the aforementioned problems were far from settled on a realistic basis
because people at various historical periods invariably failed to afford a practical
basis on which to distinguish humans from species. Karl Marx founded the theory
of practice, introduced us to the way of thinking oriented towards man’s species-
life, treated the above-mentioned problems from an entirely new angle and solved
them once and for all. Marx formed the way of thinking oriented towards man’s
species-life based on man’s practical activity. According to Marx, man’s practical
activity can be summarized as follows. It is just in his work upon the objective world,
therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is

his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his
reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for
he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively,
in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. For labor, life
activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means
of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive
life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a
species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity; and
free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Men existing in the real practical
world and hence standing in the real practical relationship to other men not only form
the basis for Marx’s understanding of man’s species-nature, or rather, man’s essential
nature, but also serve as the basic premise on which he founded the theory of practice.
Marx brought about a fundamental change in the traditional way of thinking oriented
towards non-human species or beings by introducing man’s practical activity into our
understanding of species-life. From Marx’s point of view, man’s species-character
is his free, conscious activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his
will and of his consciousness. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately
from animal life activity. It is just because of this that man goes beyond the limitations
of non-human species or beings and becomes a species-being. With the situation in
view, Marx introduced us to the way of thinking oriented towards the life of kind,
that is to say the human species or human beings, as well as man’s species-being,
species-nature, species-life and species-consciousness, which beat new paths for our
understanding and grasp of human beings. For the sake of illustration, we may as well
cite the following short passage from Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844, which has been well-known to students of Marxism. “In creating a world of
objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself
a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential
being, or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. …An
animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s
product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his
product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of
the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance
with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent
standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws
of beauty.”27 Roughly speaking, Marx’s way of thinking oriented towards the life
of kind, or rather, the human species or human beings, can be understood from the
following three key aspects, despite the fact that it boasts a profusion of meanings.
(1) From a synchronic perspective, it is aimed at revealing the special nature of
man. The nature of man can be summarized as follows. First, “man is a species-
being, because he makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness, that is to say, man is the only being of consciousness (or being-for-
itself) that is capable of creative practical activity in the world.” As master of his
27 Ibid., pp. 96–97.

life activity, man is capable of creative practical activity. What’s more, man knows
how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how
to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms
objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Man cannot bear to be the slave of
his life as well as of his instincts, but tries to fight his instincts and gain mastery
over his life. Second, “man transcends himself by integrating his natural life into
his species-life.” Man transcends the limitations of his natural life, in particular the
essence of his natural life, and forms his species-life as well as his species-nature. As
far as man’s natural life is concerned, it becomes almost secondary to man’s species-
life and asserts itself as the basic premise of man’s species-life, on which man can
explore and capture the essence of his species-life, which can be conceived of as the
true nature of man. This affords a sound basis for the statement that man is what his
potentiality-for-being is capable of, is existentially surrendered to thrownness, and
in every case is delivered over to the possibility of finding himself in his possibilities,
which will be inextricably bound up with man’s multifarious pursuits through all ages.
(2) From a diachronic perspective, the main task before this very way of thinking is to
elucidate the process of human development. According to Marx, the course of human
development must of necessity pass through roughly three basic stages and hence
three historical forms in chronological order. The first stage in the historical process
of human development is characterized by dependent personality traits resulting
from social relations based on human dependence. During that period of history,
although they were already out of the animal kingdom, human beings were still
unable to break free from the dependence on nature, and so they could not but form
a community, which severely impeded the development of individual autonomy and
creativity. With the above situation in view, the form of human dependence came
into existence either in a quite natural manner or when man was at the mercy of his
environment. In the second stage of human development, human independence is
based on the dependence on money existing in the form of a special commodity and
generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In the further development of human
beings, their social connections gradually replaced those relations with nature, which
not only promoted the germination and development of individual autonomy, but
helped with the emergence of the individual, who entertains the individual-oriented
conception and attaches much value to independent personality. Human success in
ascending this step of development lies in the development of commodity market
economy as well as in the material exchange between people. This development
boasts a dual character. On the one hand, individual independence promotes human
liberation and development, but on the other, while he is liberated from the bondage
of his relations with nature, man is again held in bondage to money existing in the
form of a special commodity and generally accepted as a medium of exchange. In
the third stage of human development, free individuality is based upon the all-round
development of separate individuals and their common powers of social production
which constitute their social wealth. This is the free and conscious form of human
development. These three basic stages as well as three historical forms constitute the
process which human development must of necessity go through one after another, to
wit the course of spiral escalation which must of necessity follow the law of negation
of negation. In the historical process of human development, human beings neither

span over these three stages nor break free from them. Rather, the three stages of
human development follow the logic of historical necessity. (3) In axiological terms,
this way of thinking seeks to demonstrate that the emergence of human beings is
bound to hold manifold implications not only for man himself but also for the earth
itself. First, it is intended to reveal that the nature of life took a great leap forward—or,
to put it another way, the emergence of man brought about a fundamental change in the
way that life exists. Specifically, non-human beings survive by adjusting themselves
to the environment, whereas human beings live by engaging in practical activity as
well as by adapting themselves to their surroundings, which amply demonstrates
that man’s species-life characterized by dual dependence on man’s practical activity
as well as on his environment endows man’s species-being with new nature and
traits totally different from those of non-human beings. Second, this way of thinking
may render substantial help to us when we try to establish the truth that after the
emergence of the human species, man developed over time into a special or unique
form of life that is not only better adapted to survive changes in his environment,
but that makes nature itself as well as his work upon inorganic nature the object
of his will and of his consciousness by transcending the limitations of natural life,
which clearly and conclusively shows that eternal value is inherent in man’s species-
life. Third, it may assert itself in its own right when we endeavor to apprehend the
truth that man rid himself of nature’s absolute mastery over life and made himself
master of his life activity. That is to say, man, who is a species-being, is capable of
creative practical activity, knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of
every species as well as how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object,
and therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Fourth, it is
aimed at revealing the truth that man’s species-nature is endowed with the highest
level of activity, initiative and creativity that life has ever attained on earth. In short,
in the transition from the way of thinking oriented towards non-human beings to that
directed towards human beings, the latter transcended the inherent limitations of the
former, which not only enabled us to eliminate the detrimental effects of the way of
thinking oriented towards non-human beings once and for all which will be inevitably
produced when we attempt to understand the nature of man, or rather, the noumenon
of human life, in this very way of thinking, but which provided the theoretical basis
as well as the fundamental methodology which would be of tremendous help to us
when we try to acquire a more profound grasp of man. What is more, this will also
afford a sound line of thought which can be invariably and conscientiously followed
when we try to build up the theory concerning the life ontology of man, to wit “the
theory of structure and choice.”
(3) Transcending the Limitations of Formal Logical Thinking and Raising the
Mode of Human Thinking to the Level of Dialectical Thinking
It is the dialectical-logical thinking that seems to be most necessary for us to probe and
unravel the mystery of the nature of human life. The unity of opposites inherent in the
nature of human life manifests itself in a myriad of complex relationships as well as
in a multitude of antagonistic contradictions, which makes it most necessary for us to
apply the dialectical-logical thinking to our understanding of the life ontology of man.
It is even arguable that the reason why people create the dialectical-logical thinking
lies in the fact that they intend it to help them solve the problem of understanding
man in all its fundamental bearings. However, before people attempt to acquire a
good grasp of dialectical logic, they will have to wake up to the enormity of the task.
With the above situation in view, people would be expected to devote themselves
assiduously to the study of dialectical logic with a view to gaining thorough mastery
of it and hence making the way of thinking undergo a substantial change from
the formal-logical thinking to the dialectical-logical thinking. Generally speaking,
people tend to apply, to a greater or lesser degree, the formal-logical thinking to the
understanding of things, in particular to the consideration and analysis of problems
by giving full scope to the unique strengths inherent in it, which can be attributable to
the evolution of man. However, the formal-logical thinking applies only to the natural
sciences without the expenditure of mental effort on the part of the average learner,
rather than to the ones with abstruse principles, complex formulae and recondite ideas
featuring prominently in them, which are thus beyond the grasp of most people, nor
does it offer any scope for a scientific explanation as well as an extensive exploration
of human beings, human society and the human mind. Therefore, it can be safely
asserted that it is in the aforementioned manifold spheres of human activity that
the dialectical-logical thinking may assert itself as the dominant way of thinking
in its own right. If the dialectical-logical thinking fails to render active help to the
process of cognition, or rather, the process by which knowledge and understanding
is developed in the mind, the human mind is probably hedged by the metaphysical
thinking and even gets itself into a very difficult situation, so that it renders itself
up to the metaphysical thinking without the knowledge of the subject, which can
be probably attributable to the way that the properties of objects or things, or more
specifically, those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed
to them, are to be construed. When people apply their minds to understanding things,
they tend to regard the things that develop and change as dead or fossilized objects and
thus take a static, isolated and one-sided approach to things of the world, which is true
of a multitude of problems before them. As a logical outcome of this tendency, the
formal-logical thinking would dominate the human mind in the process of cognition.
Moreover, people are liable to distinguish things only by turning to their respective
concepts and adopt stereotyped or fixed ways of describing or considering them.
This is somewhat similar to picture-taking as well as filmmaking (or, in a academic
context, film production), that is to say, only after the film is chemically developed,
can the long strip of emulsion-coated and perforated plastic show an unbroken series
of small negative images of people and things one after the other, among which
may be included the ones recording the continuous movements of human subjects.
It is thus evident that in order to produce a photographic record of the continuous
movements of human subjects in the real world, a photographer has to record the very
movements of human subjects in a strip of photographic film, and then cuts it into a
series of individual negatives, which can be chemically developed into photographs.
When the photographs are combined and displayed in order, the illusion of motion
can be achieved. If people are only concerned with individual negatives, but not
with the unbroken continuity of objective reality captured in individual negatives,

their mind will be hedged around with the metaphysical thinking in the process
of cognition. The aforementioned difficulty we have encountered in understanding
things lies not in the objective reality or world, which, in its true nature, is continuous
rather than broken, but in the human mind and cognitive ability, which tend to make
people break the continuous world down into separate parts that fall into different
categories with their respective fixed or stereotyped concepts featuring prominently
in them. It is thus clear that when people set about understanding the world, they are
liable to form the broken and fragmented world picture in their mind. How on earth
can human brains reflect the continuous world? How on earth can people consciously
establish a correct relationship with the objective world in their minds? Evidently, the
limitations inherent in the formal-logical thinking render itself incapable of helping
people address this difficult problem. In contrast, only the dialectical-logical thinking
can help people consciously form the continuous and unbroken world picture in
their minds and acquire a complete understanding of the complexity of human life
as well as man’s practical activity, and therefore herein lies the truth that it is the
dialectical-logical thinking rather than the formal-logical thinking that helps people
acquire a general grasp of man himself as well as his practical activity. The objects
of study such as the unique ontology of human life as well as the structure and choice
of man that the theory of “structure and choice” is intended to explain in its own
right have been verified as fully entitled to rank among the most complex and the
most unfathomable in the world, and as such make it absolutely necessary for the
dialectical-logical thinking to play a dominant role in our correct understanding and
grasp of the aforementioned objects of study for the theory of “structure and choice.”
It took so many millennia for humans to undergo a slow and difficult change
from the formal-logical thinking to the dialectical-logical one, whose completion
or perfection was attributable to Hegel and Marx’s respective lifetime of thought
and work devoted to the transcendence of the dialectical-logical thinking over the
formal-logical one. Generally speaking, it is the unity of opposites between concepts
or categories that entitles the dialectical-logical thinking to assert itself as a dominant
way of thinking in its own right when people attempt to solve the myriad problems
confronting their minds. The dialectical-logical thinking differs essentially from the
formal-logical one in that the concepts and categories characterized by the unity
of opposites when rendering their service to man’s dialectical-logical thinking are
viewed not as static, isolated, dead or fossilized, but rather as interrelated and interde-
pendent, so that they may help people form a genuine picture of the objective world
in their minds, that is to say, they may help people form the world picture that can be
understood as a dynamic and genuine reflection of the objective world in the brain.
When the key concepts and categories render their service to the dialectical-logical
thinking, we must recognize the necessity of viewing the concepts and categories in
terms of interconnectedness, development, and transformation, and achieve a dialec-
tical understanding of the unity of opposites between the key concepts (or key cate-
gories) that consists in the grasping of oppositions in their unity, or of the positive in
the negative. With the above situation in view, a couple of questions as to the concepts
and categories commonly used in the dialectical-logical thinking may arise right here
that can be pressing for serious consideration and practical solution. How can we
achieve a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between being and non-
being? In view of the fact that the law of contradictions is a fundamental basis for
dialectical materialist thought, how can we acquire a dialectical understanding of the
unity of opposites between the contradictions present in matter itself and those in
the ideas of the brain? Considering that dialectics is the “logic of change” and can
explain the concepts of evolution and transformation, that all existence is the result
of constant transformation and contradiction, and that transformation is motivated
by the unity between contradictions, how can we obtain a dialectical understanding
of things’ transformation from the state of having being to the state characterized by
the negation of being, i.e. absence of existence or vice versa? How can we gain a
dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites between particularity and totality,
or rather, the relationship between the particularity in its totality and the totality in
its particularity? In actual fact, in view of the fact that people are endowed with the
formal-logical thinking and that this very way of thinking is deeply entrenched in the
human mind, they tend to use the formal-logical thinking rather than the dialectical-
logical thinking to help them understand things. Just as a valiant warrior needs to
overcome one difficulty after another when he tries to cross the passes in war, so too
a large body of brilliant minds need to make unremitting efforts to solve the above
theoretical problems. For the sake of illustration, let’s cite the following instance.
The problem of how to acquire a dialectical understanding of the unity of opposites
between the contradictions present in matter itself and those in the ideas of the brain
may be viewed as the one pressing for serious consideration and practical solution.
Concepts are the most important tools that human brains use to reflect reality—or, to
put it another way, human brains can reflect reality only through concepts. However,
the ways that human brains reflect reality are unique, that is to say, when human
brains reflect reality through concepts, they tend to break the continuity of things,
treat the things that develop and change as dead or fossilized objects, and view them
as static and isolated. When human brains reflect reality through concepts, the rela-
tionship between concepts and reality is either “to be” or “not to be,” but cannot be
both simultaneously, otherwise it would be ridiculous. Only in this way can people
think reasonably. When human thinking is directed towards objective reality, the
very nature of human thinking ordains that the process of cognition should be free
of any contradictions, that is to say, human thinking, by its very nature, tends to free
itself of any contradictions in the process of cognition. From the perspective of mental
logic, contradictions that represent absurdities occur only when human thinking goes
wrong. However, if human thinking rids itself of any contradictions in the process of
cognition, then a vast multitude of complex relationships between human thinking
and objective reality will therefore cease to exist. On the one hand one can directly
perceive such phenomena as contradiction, change and motion, but on the other, once
human thinking is directed towards such phenomena as contradiction, change and
motion, it will tend to treat them as one-sided, fossilized and inflexible. In human
thinking, the concept of “motion” is no longer in motion, the concept of “change”
stays the same and does not change, and the concept of “contradiction” is devoid
of any inconsistency or incongruity. Otherwise, human thinking would be thrown
into logical confusion, which will consequently render human brains incapable of
reflecting reality at all, and herein lies the fundamental problem confronting human
thinking. The only solution to this difficult problem lies in the creation of dialectical
thinking and logic in human thought. However, people did not wake up to the difficult
problem confronting human thinking until Hegel first awakened them to the task of
great difficulty. He found that formal logic does not apply to our understanding of the
nature of mind, that is to say human nature. Accordingly, he sought to create a new
kind of logic, which not only represents abstract universals, but which embodies the
richness of particularity, individuality, and individual things in abstract universality,
i.e. a mode of thinking that not only renders substantial service to the study of man,
but that helps us give shape to the unique nature of man as well as its manifold
manifestations. This mode of thinking can be termed “dialectical-logical thinking.”
Hegel and Marx made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the devel-
opment of dialectical-logical thinking. The German philosopher Hegel (1770–1831)
was an important figure of German idealism, whose principal achievement was his
development of a distinctive articulation of idealism, sometimes termed absolute
idealism, as well as his concept of spirit (Geist, sometimes also translated as “mind”)
as the historical manifestation of the logical concept and the “sublation” (Aufhe-
bung, integration without elimination or reduction) of seemingly contradictory or
opposing factors. Absolute idealism is Hegel’s account of how existence or being is
ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel called his
philosophy “absolute idealism” in contrast to the “subjective idealism” of Berkeley
and the “transcendental idealism” of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a
critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel’s idealism was.
Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or conscious-
ness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense
an identity of thought and being. Otherwise, the subject would never have access to
the object and we would have no certainty about any of our knowledge of the world.
To account for the differences between thought and being, however, as well as the
richness and diversity of each, the unity of thought and being cannot be expressed as
the abstract identity “A = A.” Absolute idealism is the attempt to demonstrate this
unity using a new “speculative” philosophical method, which requires new concepts
and rules of logic. According to Hegel, the absolute ground of being is essentially a
dynamic, historical process of necessity that unfolds by itself in the form of increas-
ingly complex forms of being and of consciousness, ultimately giving rise to all the
diversity in the world and in the concepts with which we think and make sense of the
world. Robert Tucker puts it this way: “Hegelianism…is a religion of self-worship
whose fundamental theme is given in Hegel’s image of the man who aspires to be
God himself, who demands something more, namely infinity.” The picture Hegel
presents is “a picture of a self-glorifying humanity striving compulsively, and at
the end successfully, rise to divinity.”28 Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a
threefold manner, was stated as comprising three dialectical stages of development:
28Tucker, Robert C. (2017). Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 43–
44.
a thesis, giving rise to reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis;
and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis. In more
simplistic terms, one can consider it thus: problem → reaction → solution. Although
this model is often named after Hegel, he himself never used that specific formulation.
Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant. Carrying on Kant’s work, Fichte greatly
elaborated on the synthesis model and popularized it. On the other hand, Hegel did use
a three-valued logical model that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel’s
most usual terms were: abstract-negative-concrete. Hegel used this writing model
as a backbone to accompany his points in many of his works. The formula, thesis-
antithesis-synthesis, does not explain why the thesis requires an antithesis. However,
the formula, abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an incomplete-
ness, in any initial thesis. For Hegel, the concrete, the synthesis, the absolute, must
always pass through the phase of the negation, in the journey to completion, that
is, mediation. This is the essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics.
According to the German philosopher Walter Kaufmann: “Fichte introduced into
German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these
three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used
these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any
of his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or
his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he
does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately
spurned […] The mechanical formalism […] Hegel derides expressly and at some
length in the preface to the Phenomenology.”29 To describe the activity of overcoming
the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung, variously translated into
English as “sublation” or “overcoming”, to conceive of the working of the dialectic.
Roughly, the term indicates preserving the useful portion of an idea, thing, society,
etc., while moving beyond its limitations. In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes
a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure
Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts).
When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning
to nothing (in life, for example, one’s living is also a dying), both Being and Nothing
are united as Becoming. As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by
making implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the product of
contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. For Hegel, the whole of
history is one tremendous dialect, major stages of which chart a progression from
self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational constitu-
tional state of free and equal citizens. The Hegelian dialect cannot be mechanically
applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the selection of any antithesis, other
than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation
is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice,
when an antithesis is selected to suit the user’s subjective purpose, the resulting “con-
tradictions” are rhetorical, not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously
29Solomon, Robert C. (1985). In the Spirit of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
pp. 215–216.
defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the
Fichtean “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” model is that it implies that contradictions or
negations come from outside of things. Hegel’s point is that they are inherent in and
internal to things. Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is “to study things in
their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial
categories of understanding.”30 One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the
transitionfrom quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure. The measure is the
qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity. Another important
principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung
(sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to another, but by the negation
of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical move-
ment involves two moments that negate each other, something and its other. As a
result of the negation of the negation, “something becomes its other; this other is itself
something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum.”31 Some-
thing in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related. In becoming
there are two moments: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; by sublation, i.e., negation
of the negation being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something new
shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases
to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained. In
dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving
the original tension. Marxist dialectic is a form of Hegelian dialectic which applies
to the study of historical materialism. It purports to be a reflection of the real world
created by man. Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could
examine personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foun-
dation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas
behind historical materialism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels proposed that Hegel’s
dialectic is too abstract. “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands,
by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working
in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It
must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within
the mystical shell.”32 In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own
dialect method, which he claims to be “direct opposite” of Hegel’s method. “My
dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To
Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under
the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demi-
urgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of
‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world
30 Stern, Robert. (2002). Routledge Philosophy Guide to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit.
New York, NY: Routledge, p. 16.
31 Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press, p. 116.

32 Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx (Ben Brewster, Trans.). New York, NY: Verso, pp. 89–94.
reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”33 Marxist dialec-
tics is exemplified in Das Kapital (Capital: A Crititique of Political Economy), which
outlines two central theories: (i) surplus values and (ii) the materialist conception of
history. Marx explains dialectical materialism as follows: “In its rational form, it is
a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because
it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of
things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its
inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form
as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less
than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its
essence critical and revolutionary.”34 Hence, philosophic contradiction is central to
the development of dialectics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration
of gradual social change; the negation of the initial development of the status quo;
the negation of that negation; and the high-level recurrence of features of the original
status quo. “As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and
the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the
greatest achievement of classical German philosophy…” “The great basic thought,”
Engels writes, “that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-
made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no
less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away…this great fundamental thought has,
especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness
that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this
fundamental thought in words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of
investigation, are two different things… For dialectical philosophy nothing is final,
absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything;
nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of
passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical
philosophy, itself, is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the
thinking brain.”35 Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is “the science of the general
laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought.”36 Thus it can be
seen or it is therefore clear that Hegelian dialectics is Hegel’s idealistic account of
how existence or being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das
Absolute) and that Marx transformed Hegelian dialectics into materialistic dialectics.
According to Marx, “the unity of opposites” as well as “the unity of contradictions”
is fully entitled to the primary concern for the dialectical-logical thinking, because
the way that they are interrelated and interact on each other not only sets matter into
33 Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: From Capitalism to Communism. Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, p. 131.
34 Mclellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
p. 458.
35 Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press, pp. 6–7.

36 Lenin, V.I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection, Moscow: Progress Publishers,
pp. 7–9.
motion but also gives shape to it, that is to say, we may never view the opposite from
this aspect, nor may we consider the unity from that aspect, nor may we think that
either this stands in opposition or that does in unity, but rather take it for granted
that just as the opposite must be the very opposite of unity, so too the unity must be
the very unity of opposites. This illustrates very clearly how human thinking moves,
changes and develops. It has now become evident to us that formal-logical thinking
tends to make people break the continuous world down into separate parts that come
into different categories with their respective fixed or stereotyped concepts featuring
prominently in them, and consequently, that when people set about understanding the
world, they are liable to form the broken and fragmented world picture in their mind,
whereas the concepts and categories characterized by the unity of opposites when
rendering their service to man’s dialectical-logical thinking are viewed not as static,
isolated, dead or fossilized, but rather as interrelated and interdependent, so that they
may help people form a genuine picture of the objective world in their minds, that is
to say, they may help people to form the world picture that can be understood as a
dynamic and genuine reflection of the objective world in the brain. Structural anthro-
pologists have been trying to rediscover the unity of binary opposites or oppositions
inherent in the dual structure of human thinking and thus reach a wise solution to
those seemingly inscrutable problems that the dual structure of human thinking has
been continuing to cause for structural anthropology over a long period of time. The
aforementioned solution can be summarized as follows. As the “duality” of human
thinking starts to exist as “the duality of unity,” so too does the “unity” of human
thought begin to exist as “the unity of opposites.” Moreover, only through action
and motion of thought can either “binary oppositions” or the “the unity of duality”
be within the range of possibility. The rediscovery and resurrection of the unity of
binary opposites or oppositions inherent in the dual structure of human thinking, to
a greater or lesser extent, may help people form a genuine picture of the objective
world in their minds, that is to say, the aforementioned solution may help people
to form the world picture that can be understood as a dynamic and genuine reflec-
tion of the objective world in the brain, in particular a true picture of man as well
as of human worlds. Hegel and Marx transcended the limitations of formal-logical
thinking and raised the mode of human thinking to the level of dialectical-logical
thinking, hence endowing human concepts and thinking with the nature of contra-
diction and motion, which marks an epoch-making development in the mode of
human thinking. In view of the fact that “the theory of structure and choice” takes
the noumenon of human life, to wit the real man himself, as the prime object of
study, people would be expected to acquire a scientific and correct understanding of
the noumenon of human life only if they devote themselves assiduously to the study
of dialectical logic with a view to gaining thorough mastery of it and hence making
the way of thinking undergo a substantial change from the formal-logical thinking to
the dialectical-logical thinking, overcome the limitations of formal logical thinking
and attempt to raise the mode of human thinking to the level of dialectical thinking.
Otherwise, people would be unable to move even a single step when trying to gain an
insight into the life ontology of man, that is to say the real man himself. In the field
of anthropological study this led to not only the deficiency in knowledge on human
beings but also the distortion of human nature and image. Some scholars even hold
that human nature is equivalent to the combination of “animals and cultures!” How
many misapprehensions and deviations have been caused when scholars engaged in
the study of anthropology attempted to gain knowledge on human beings! As one of
the central figures in the structural school of thought, French anthropologist Claude
Lévi-Strauss was arguably a leading exponent of structuralism who laid emphasis
on the function of objective “structures,” but who warranted little attention to the
role of “human” agency, or rather, “man’s” subjective initiative. He believed that the
nature and change of a social phenomenon is determined by the a priori preexisting
“structures” and that human beings’ statements and actions, which are governed
by the universal “structures,” can only be treated as their manifestations and never
change the “structures.” Hence, the “subject” of society and of history is the a priori
“structure” rather than “man.” Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in such
an unconscious “structure” characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even
coined the famous phrase “melting man” and declared his position on it, asserting that
“such a detestable favorite as the human subjectmust be expelled from structuralism,
since it has ruled over philosophy for too long.”37
References
1. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Ludwig
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House,
p. 213.
2. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 82–83.
3. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic
4. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Marx & Engels:
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 760.
6. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on
7. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The
German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 67 – 68.
8. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 23: Marx & Engels:
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 202.
9. Mao, Ze-Dong. (1991). Mao Zedong Selected Works, Volume 2: On Protracted War Beijing:
10. Shapiro, Fred R., ed. (2021). The New Yale Book of Quotations. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, p. 530.
11. Yuan, Gui-Ren. (1988). Man’s Philosophy. Beijing: Workers’ Publishing House, pp. 44-53.
12. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Dialectics
37 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.
References 81
14. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics
of Nature. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 513, 517.
15. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Complete Works, Volume 3:Marx: Theses on
16. Marx, K., Engels, F. (1958). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 4: Engels: Principles of
Communism. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 370.
Manuscripts of 1861–63. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 309.
18. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1971). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 20: Engels: Anti-
Dühring. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 316.
20. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels: The
German Ideology. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 66.
22. Haug, Erika. “Critical Reflections on the Emerging Discourse of International Social Work.”
International Social Work 48(2) (March 2005): 128-129.
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, pp. 96–97.
25. Tucker, Robert C. (2017). Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. New York, NY: Routledge,
pp. 43-44.
26. Solomon, Robert C. (1985). In the Spirit of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
pp. 215-216.
27. Stern, Robert. (2002). Routledge Philosophy Guide to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit.
28. Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press, p. 116.
29. Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx (Ben Brewster, Trans.). New York, NY: Verso, pp. 89–94.
30. Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: From Capitalism to Communism.. Chicago, IL: The
31. Mclellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 458.
32. Burns, Tony., & Fraser, Ian., eds. (2000). The Hegel-Marx Connection. New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press, pp. 6-7.
33. Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection, Moscow: Progress Publishers,
pp. 7-9.
34. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1981). The Naked Man. New York: Harper & Row, p. 149.
Chapter 4
The Essence of Human Life: Practical
Subject
When trying to probe into the mystery of man, we will have to take the scientific
and correct understanding of the essence of human life as the point of departure.
In other words, only by making a reasonable explanation of the essence of human
life can we succeed in unraveling the mysteries of the human subject. The theory
of “structure and choice” concerning the essence of human life constitutes a large
repertory of theoretical knowledge, and how to define the essence of man’s unique
life, or rather, how to determine or identify the essential qualities of man’s unique life,
forms the repertory’s theoretical cornerstone and basic foothold. When we attempt
to formulate the theory of “structure and choice,” including its knowledge system,
we must, first and foremost, realize the necessity of determining or identifying the
essential qualities of man’s unique life. “The practical species” (or “the practical
subject”) constitutes the essence of man’s unique life. In view of the fact that man
is a practical species, man’s life must of necessity be endowed with unique and
essential qualities, i.e., man’s life is “the practical life,” “the real life,” “the human
subject’s life” and “the dual life.” On the one hand, the aforementioned fact not
only supplies the fundamental reason for the complexity and uncertainty of human
life, but also reveals the underlying causes of innumerable uncertainties confronting
human destiny. On the other hand, it affords a sound basis for the encouraging fact
that despite many setbacks in his life, he still has brilliant prospects before him.
1 Man’s Practical Life
In view of the fact that the noumenon of human life or the essence of human life has
been veiled in mystery over a long period of time, the Marxian theory of practice not
only affords a theoretical basis for our general grasp of the life ontology of man or the
essence of human life, but also furnishes the key to unraveling the mystery. According
to Marx’s theory of practice, practice constitutes the life ontology of man as well as the
essence of human life. To put it another way, in essence “man is a practical species,”

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_4
84 4 The Essence of Human Life: Practical Subject
and “man’s life is the practical life.” Practice not only makes human beings differ
fundamentally from animals, but also leads to essential differences among people.
In other words, fundamentally speaking, practice not only distinguishes man from
the animal, but also makes humans differ essentially among themselves. This shows
that practice will render its substantial service to our understanding and explanation
of the life ontology of man as well as the essence of human life. In epistemological
terms, the practical way of thinking constitutes a qualitative leap as well as a complete
revolution in human understanding.
1.1 The Conception of Practice as the Essence of Human Life
In philosophy, essence is the attribute (or property) or set of attributes (or properties)
that makes a thing, i.e. an entity or substance, be what it fundamentally is, and which
it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. It is often called the “nature”
of a thing such that it possesses certain necessary, metaphysical characteristics or
properties in contrast with merely accidental or contingent ones. It is often considered
a specific power, function, or internal relation (or set of relations) which again makes
the thing be the kind of thing that it is. Particular contradictions inherent in a thing
are interrelated and act on each other, hence forming the essence of a thing. The
notion of essence has acquired many slightly but importantly different shades of
meaning throughout the history of philosophy, though most of them derive in some
manner from its initial use by Aristotle. In the history of western thought, essence
has often served as a vehicle for doctrines that “tend to individuate different forms of
existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties.”1 Karl
Marx was a follower of Hegel’s thought, and he, too, developed a philosophy in
reaction to his master. In his early work, Marx used Aristotelian style teleology and
derived a concept of humanity’s essential nature. Marx’s Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844 describes a theory of alienation based on human existence
being completely different from human essence. Marx said human nature was social,
and that humanity had the distinct essence of free activity and conscious thought.
Some scholars have argued that Marx abandoned the idea of a human essence, but
many other scholars point to Marx’s continued discussion of these ideas despite
the decline of terms such as essence and alienation in his later work. For Marx,
practice reveals exactly the fundamental nature of human life, whose formation
can be fundamentally attributable to the interrelationship as well as the interaction
between particular contradictions inherent in human life. According to Marx’s theory
of practice, the Marxian conception of practice may be briefly summarized in the
following outline. Practice is man’s unique mode of existence as well as of survival
in which man can actively know and reform the world so as to respond to the pressure
of the external environment by solving survival problems. “The human subject” is
actively engaged in changing the objective world as well as remolding the subjective
1 Coffey, Cody J. (2010). As I See It. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, p. 238.

1 Man’s Practical Life 85
world in order to overcome the contradictions between his own needs and the outside
world. Thus, practice constitutes the essence of man’s unique existence as well as the
essence of man’s unique life. According to Marx’s conception of practice, practice is a
fundamental form of human activity whereby men produce their means of subsistence
to meet their personal needs and thus prove themselves to be conscious species-
beings. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, especially various
kinds of value, man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness, hence proving himself a conscious species-being. It is just in his
work upon the objective world that man changes the external world as well as himself
and becomes the subject that in a real sense makes his personal activity the object
of his will and of his consciousness. In this very sense Marx incisively pointed
out, “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living
human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization
of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course,
we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural
conditions in which man finds himself. The writing of history must always set out
from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through
the action of men. Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves
from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step
which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of
subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. The way in which
men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the
actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode
of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical
existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals,
a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As
individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with
their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature
of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.
This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its
turn this presupposes the intercourse of individuals with one another. The form of
this intercourse is again determined by production.”2 Marx uses the term “praxis”
to refer to the free, universal, creative and self-creative activity through which man
creates and changes his historical world and himself. Praxis is an activity unique to
man, which distinguishes him from all other beings.3 The concept appears in two of
Marx’s early works: “The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844” and
“The Theses on Feuerbach (1845).” In the former work, Marx contrasts the free,
conscious productive activity of human beings with the unconscious compulsive
production of animals. He also affirms the primacy of praxis over theory, claiming
2 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: The German Ideology.
Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 67.
3 Petrovic, Gajo. “Praxis.” In The Dictionary of Marxist Thought (second ed.), eds. Tom Bottomore,
Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, & Ralph Miliband, 435. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.
that theoretical contradictions can only be resolved through practical activity.4 In

the latter work, revolutionary practice is a central theme. “The coincidence of the
changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and
rationally understood only as revolutionary practice (3rd thesis).” “All social life is
essentially practical. All the mysteries which lead theory towards mysticism find their
rational solution in human praxis and in the comprehension of this praxis (8th thesis).”
“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to
change it (11th thesis).”5 Human practice has the following implications: (1) Practice
is man’s (the subject’s) conscious, dynamic activity, which serves as the fundamental
characteristic that distinguishes human existence from animal existence. The animals
are forced to adapt themselves to the external environment, whereas man makes his
practical activity the object of his will and of his consciousness, and conscious life
activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. In his work upon
the objective world, man actively remolds his subjective world while changing the
objective world. (2) Practice is “the subject’s” or “man’s” immediate, real activity.
Man’s real, sentient or sensuous activity, which includes material activity as well
as spiritual activity, is based on material activity, in particular material production
and the distribution of material benefits. (3) Practice is the human subject’s social
and historical activity. Human beings’ practical activities characterized by change
and development take place in human society. What is contained in the constitutive
elements of practice such as the object, the nature, the scope and the method hinges on
changing social circumstances as well as different levels of historical development.
The unchangeable human practical activity is almost out of the range of possibility.
(4) Practice encompasses a wide range of human activities such as the productive
activities, the social and political activities, the scientific and cultural activities, the
practical activities carried out in one’s life and the practical activities concerned
with man’s self-reflection as well as his self-remolding, in which the human subject
attempts to know himself and remold his subjective world while trying to understand
and change the objective world.
1.2 Practice Furnishes the Key to Helping Us Understand

the Great Complexity of Human Life and Unravel
the Essence of Human Life Shrouded in Mystery
While practice is the essence of human life, “structure and choice” constitutes the
ontology (the study of what there is as well as of the most general features of what
there is and of how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically
most general ways) of human life. Only by examining and analyzing man’s unique
life from a practical perspective or in the practical mode of thinking can one truly
4Ibid., p. 437.
5Brudney, Daniel. (1998). Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
acquire a profound grasp of the ontology of human life as well as the phenomena of
human life and further gain a keen insight into them. If practice is torn away from
human beings, that is to say without practice, the ontology of human life as well as
all phenomena of life cannot be fully explained, nor can human beings guide them-
selves through the practical activities through which they seek to change the world.
There are several reasons that account for why practice is of paramount importance
to human beings. (1) Practice can be taken as the basis on which “the human subject”
adapts himself to his environment and tries to create the relationship between man
and nature which is in essence characterized by negative unity of opposites. In order
to survive, mankind must first of all be provided with the basic necessities of life
such as food, clothing, shelter and transport, which makes it imperatively necessary
for human beings to create the relationship between man and nature that is resource-
conserving and environment-friendly, which is to say human beings will have to
keep nature in a dynamic state of equilibrium and sustainability while developing
natural resources and wresting wealth from nature. This can only be achieved by
resting on a rational and scientific basis. (2) Practice can be perceived as the basis on
which people tend to establish sound relations among themselves. While conquering
and harnessing nature, people must of necessity establish interpersonal relationships
between them, in particular the profound but inscrutable relations characterized by
great complexity as well as rapid or unexpected change. There exists a wide variety of
social or interpersonal relationships including individual-to-individual, individual-
to-group, group-to-group, and group-to-society relationships as well as economic,
political, cultural and legal relationships. Today it would seem that whether people
can take a correct approach to their social relations among themselves or not depends
fundamentally upon man’s social practice. (3) Just as man’s social being determines
his social consciousness, so practice forms the basis on which one can judge his
or her consciousness between right and wrong. The initiative, consciousness and
purpose which man has of his species makes him become an amazingly creative
species-being. More specifically, man is a species-being, not only because in prac-
tice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as
his object, but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because
he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The whole character
of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity;
and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Man makes his life activity
itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity.
Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is
just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-
being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only
because of that is his activity free activity. In creating a world of objects by his
personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious
species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or
that treats itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world,
therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. The object of labor
is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not
only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore
he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce.
But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the
dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from
physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces
only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs
immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal
forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it
belongs, whilst man knows how produce in accordance with the standard of every
species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object.
Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. Human
beings are anatomically similar and related to the great apes but are distinguished
by a more highly developed brain and a resultant capacity for articulate speech and
abstract reasoning. In addition, human beings possess a variety of advanced cogni-
tive abilities believed to be restricted to them, or rather, entirely unique to them.
It is therefore clear that man’s cognitive, linguistic, and technological capabilities
offer a very promising prospect for him. However, these same capabilities unique
to humans may make them far more dangerous than animals. Correct consciousness
brings benefit, while false consciousness spells loss. In this sense, the crisis mankind
is facing today, in the final analysis, boils down to nothing more than the crisis of
human consciousness. Judging human consciousness between right and wrong can
only be based on practice, because human beings can only depend on practice to
promote the development of human consciousness, raise the level of consciousness,
establish the true facts of human consciousness and put false consciousness to rights.
(4) Practice can be treated as the basis on which “the human subject” tries to solve all
his survival problems. Myriads of complex and unintelligible contradictions inherent
in human existence as well as in human survival are always awaiting solution and at
the same time putting one individual’s ability and proficiency to the severe test. The
contradictions perceived as inherent manifestations of human existence encompass
the contradictory relationships of man to nature, man to man and man to himself
that are intertwined and superimposed and that even undergo a myriad of changes
in an instant. With the above situation in view, though he has too many contradic-
tions to cope with at the same time, “the human subject” could hardly attend to all
sorts of complex and unintelligible contradictions flooding in at once and it must
follow that he would be overwhelmed by fatigue eventually. The myriad contradic-
tions inherent in human existence encompasses man’s “dual life” (man’s “natural
life versus his supernatural life”) and man’s life endowed with multi-duality as well
as other manifold manifestations characterized by the unity of opposites such as
man’s finiteness versus his infiniteness, man’s ideal versus his reality, man’s percep-
tual knowledge versus his rational knowledge including man’s emotion versus his
reason—or, to put it another way, man’s sensibility versus his sense, man’s soul
versus his body, the phenomenon of man versus the essence or nature of man, the
particularity existing in human life versus the universality or generality residing in
human life, the experience of contingency versus necessity, or vice versa, in human
life, the myriad possibilities versus the various realities in human life and vice versa,
citizens’ or civic rights versus their civic obligations, the purpose of human life
versus the regularity of human life, the instrumentality embedded within human
existence versus the inherent value of human life, the fairness of a society, especially
the fairness associated with a given social system, versus its production efficiency,
in particular its social members’ labor efficiency, the humanistic ideals inherent in
human life versus the general patterns of market activities, and truth, good and beauty
embedded within human existence versus falsehood, evil and ugliness inherent in
human life. The aforementioned complex contradictions confronting people in their
life originate from their practical activities of daily living, manifest themselves in
their practical activities of daily living, and can only be resolved through their prac-
tical activities of daily living. Resolving the myriad contradictions inherent in human
existence through human beings’ practical activities carried out in their life consti-
tutes the fundamental mode of human existence as well as the basic way that the
ontology of man’s unique life exists.
1.3 Marx’s Practical Theory Provides the Fundamental

Principle for Our Understanding of the Noumenon
of Human Life
Marx’s practical theory provides the fundamental principle as well as the basic view-
point that can be used to cast illumination upon the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice.” The theory about “man’s practical life” introduces us to the
main points that are to be brought out in the following discussion.
(1) “The human subject” treats itself as “the actual, living species”, that is man
in his wholeness, as an individual and social being, deeply covering the basic
aspects of life. People, male or female, who carry out practical activities in their
life, are not the imaginary or abstract ones, but the actual, living species-beings
or social beings with their diverse motives and their diverse intensions, who
not only can create and maintain a myriad of social relations with other people,
but who can make and transform the world in which they live. The theory of
“structure and choice” takes “the human subject” as the main object of study
and, at the same time, tries to cast illumination upon the very research object.
“The human subject,” who treats itself as the actual, living species-being or
social being, that is as a man in his totality, on the one hand, is only flesh and
blood, that is the physical being, but on the other, he is endowed with reason
and thought, which provides the rational reason why myriad desires lie hidden
in his mind and which makes it possible for “the human subject” to cope with
external challenges and pressures. It is in man himself rather than outside of
man himself that we try to unravel the mystery of man, which is to say we can
only depend upon the practical activities carried out by the actual, living man
in his totality to probe, elucidate and solve the mystery of man.
(2) “The human subject” treats itself as the subject who makes his life activity
itself the object of his will and of his consciousness and who proves himself a
conscious species-being in creating a world of objects by his personal activity.
Man, who is master of his destiny, can prove clearly and indisputably his life of
great value to himself as well as to others by allowing full play to his initiative
and creativity in his practical activities rather than by depending upon the forces
outside himself. Man can grasp his destiny in his own hands and map out his
own future.
(3) It is common knowledge that each lock has its own individual key and that
only the appropriate measure taken under given circumstances can serve to
cope with the actual situation at a given time and place. In view of the fact
that the problems which “the human subject” encounters in his life as well
as in his practical activities invariably arise under specific conditions, the basic
principle that concrete conditions require concrete analysis can be applied to the
aforementioned problems. Only by depending upon the specific circumstances
or concrete conditions under which problems may arise as well as upon the
objective realities or actual conditions which “personality structure” as well as
“group structure” proceeds from can we come up with reasonable ways and
means of highlighting the myriad choices and challenges by which “personality
behavior” as well as “group behavior” is always confronted.
(4) “The human subject” can only make a judicious choice of personality behavior
on rational principles. More specifically, in making a judicious choice of person-
ality behavior in accordance with rational principles, “the human subject” can
neither seek purely the truth of personality behavior nor emphasize unduly the
value of personality behavior, but rather tries to achieve the internal unity of
truth and value, purpose and regularity as well as fairness and efficiency, and
by conforming to the rational principles attempts to address all the complex
problems by which he is confronted in his practical activities of daily living.
(5) “The human subject’s” practice can be perceived as the basis on which human
beings try to achieve the pluralistic unity of man’s “three worlds,” that is, the
physical world consisting of physical bodies, the world of mental or psycho-
logical states or processes, or of subjective experiences, and the world of the
products of the human mind. Man’s “three worlds” are interrelated, interdepen-
dent and interact on each other. The natural world is characterized by diverse
species and rich resources, whereas the human world boasts a galaxy of great
minds, whose names will go down in the annals of history, as well as the richness
and variety of cultures across societies. Considering what can be expected from
the human world, the richness and variety of human cultures can be attributable
to the richness and diversity of man’s practical activities. In carrying out their
practical activities, human beings try to make the richness and variety of human
cultures and the richness and diversity of man’s practical activities exist in unity
with each other, which is to say they are interdependent on each other, inter-
relate and interact with each other in the human world. “The abstract holism”
and “the abstract identity,” which fall within the scope of metaphysical theo-
ries, do not conform to the reality of nature, let alone the reality of “the human
world.” Only Marxist dialectic derived from human practice, which is embodied
in the Marxist theories of “the real holism (or the concrete totality)” and “the
pluralistic unity,” can be fully entitled to explain the richness and complexity of
human cultures that one can hardly imagine in his mind.
Marxist dialectic purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man.
Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine personal,
social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core foundation of the philos-
ophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical
materialism. In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical study became inter-
twined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works
of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels proposed that
Hegel’s dialect is too abstract. “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s
hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of
working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its
head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel
within the mystical shell.”6 In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented
his own dialectic method, which he claims to be “direct opposite” of Hegel’s method.
“My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which,
under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is
the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenom-
enal form of ‘the Idea’. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”7
Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital (Capital), in which Marx outlines
the two central theories of surplus value and the materialist conception of history and
explains dialectical materialism as follows. “In its rational form, it is a scandal and
abomination to bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its
comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same
time, also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up;
because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement,
and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary
existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and
revolutionary.”8
Friedrich Engels proposed that nature is dialectical, thus, in Anti-Dühring he
said that the negation of negation is “a very simple process, which is taking place
everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped
6 Rockmore, Tom. (2018). Marx’s Dream: from Capitalism to Communism. Chicago, IL: The
7 McLellan, David. (2000). Karl Marx: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
p. 457.
8 Moyar, Dean., ed. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 667.
of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy.”9
In Dialectics of Nature, Engels said that “Probably the same gentlemen who up
to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and
incomprehensible transcendentalism will now declare that it is indeed something
quite self-evident, trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and
so they have been taught nothing new. But to have formulated for the first time in its
universally valid form a general law of development of Nature, society, and thought,
will always remain an act of historic importance.”10
Class struggle is the primary contradiction to be resolved by Marxist dialectics,
because of its central role in the social and political lives of a society. Nonethe-
less, Marx and Marxists developed the concept of class struggle to comprehend the
dialectical contradictions between mental and manual labor, and between town and
country. Hence, philosophic contradiction is central to the development of dialec-
tics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change;
the negation of the initial development of status quo; the negation of the negation;
and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo. For Lenin, the
primary feature of Marx’s “dialectical materialism” (Lenin’s term) was its applica-
tion of materialist philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin’s main input in the
philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection, which presented
human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the objective material world that
fully shapes its contents and structure. In the USSR, Progress Publishers issued
anthologies of dialectical materialism by Lenin, wherein he also quotes Marx and
Engels. “As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and
the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the
greatest achievement of classical German philosophy…. ‘The great basic thought,’
Engels writes, ‘that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-
made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no
less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away…this great fundamental thought has,
especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness
that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this
fundamental thought in words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of
investigation, are two different things… For dialectical philosophy nothing is final,
absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything;
nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of
passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical
philosophy, itself, is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the
thinking brain.’ Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is ‘the science of the general
9 Wood, John Cunningham., ed. (1998). Karl Marx’s Economics: Critical Assessments, Volume I.
10 Seldam, Howard., & Martel, Harry., eds. (2002). Reader in Marxist Philosophy: From the Writings
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. New York, NY: International Publishers, p. 126.
laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought.’”11 In addition,
Lenin’s dialectical understanding of the concept of development can be described
as follows. “A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been
passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the
negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a
development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; ‘breaks in continuity;’ the trans-
formation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by
the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given
body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence
and the closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon
(history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform,
and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the
features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional
one.”12
Dialectics has become central to continental philosophy, but it plays no part in
Anglo-American philosophy. In other words, on the Continent of Europe, dialectics
has entered intellectual culture as what might be called a legitimate part of thought
and philosophy, whereas in America and Britain, the dialectic plays no discernible
part in the intellectual culture, which instead tends toward positivism, a philosophical
theory stating that theology and metaphysics are earlier modes of knowledge and that
positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations
as verified by the empirical sciences. Positivism is based on empiricism, a theory
that all knowledge originates in experience, and verified data (positive facts) received
from the senses are known as empirical evidence. Thus, information derived from
sensory experience, interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source
of all certain knowledge.13 Positivism holds that valid knowledge (certitude or truth)
is found only in this a posteriori knowledge. Those who accept this theory also
maintain that society, like the physical world, operates according to general laws.
Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected, as are metaphysics and theology
because metaphysical and theological claims cannot be verified by sense experience.
Although the positive approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of western
thought,14 the modern approach was formulated by the philosopher Auguste Comte
in the early nineteenth century.15 Comte argued that, much as the physical world
operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so does society.16
11 Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow, USSR: Progress

Publishers, pp. 7–9.
12 Ibid.
13 Macionis, John J., & Gerber, Linda M. Sociology. London, UK: Pearson Education, 2010.
14 Cohen, Louis., Manion, Lawrence., & Morrison, Keith. “Research Methods in Education (Six
Edition).” British Journal of Educational Studies. 55 (4): 9. London and New York: Routledge.
2007.
15 “Auguste Comte.” Sociology Guide. sociologyguide.com. Retrieved 31 January 2020.
16 Macionis, John J. (2012). Sociology (14th Edition). Boston, MA: Pearson, p. 11.
A prime example of the European tradition is Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of

Dialectical Reason, which is very different from the works of Popper, whose philos-
ophy was for a time highly influential in the UK where he lived. Sartre states that
“Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover
these concrete syntheses. It can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving,
dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the strictly cultural
point of view adopted here—‘philosophy—becoming – the world.’”17 Karl Popper
has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a paper entitled
“What Is Dialectic?” in which he attacked the dialectical method for its willingness
to “put up with contradictions.”18 Popper concluded the essay with these words: “The
whole development of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in
philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be
made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much
more modest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study
of the critical methods of science.”19 In chapter 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society
and Its Enemies, Popper unleashed a famous attack on Hegelian dialectics in which he
held that Hegel’s thought (unjustly in the view of some philosophers, such as Walter
Kaufmann)20 was to some degree responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in
Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism, a system emphasizing intuition,
instinct, feeling, or faith rather than reason or holding that the universe is governed
by irrational forces. In Sect. 17 of his 1961 “addenda” to The Open Society, entitled
“Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism,” Popper refused to
moderate his criticism of the Hegelian dialect, arguing that it “played a major role
in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany […] by contributing to histori-
cism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian modes of
thought. […] [And] undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of
intellectual responsibility and honesty.”21 The philosopher of science and physicist
Mario Bunge repeatedly criticized Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, calling them
“fuzzy and remote from science”22 and a “disastrous legacy.”23 He concluded: “The
so-called laws of dialectics, such as formulated by Engels (1940, 1954) and Lenin
(1947, 1981), are false insofar as they are intelligible.”24
17 Sartre, Jean-Paul. “The Search for Method (1st part).” In Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to
Sartre (Hazel Barnes, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1960.
18 Popper, Karl. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New
York, NY: Basic Books, p. 316.

19 Ibid., p. 335.
20 Walter Kaufmann. “Kaufmann.” Marxists.org. Retrieved 2020–01-31.
21 Popper, Karl. (1966). The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol.2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, p.395.

22 Bunge, Mario Augusto. “A Critique of Dialectics.” In Scientific Materialism, 41–63. Dordrecht,
Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1981.

23 Bunge, Mario Augusto. (2012). Evaluating philosophies. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, pp. 84–
85.
24 Ibid., pp. 84–85.
Irrationalism is a philosophical movement emerging in the 19th and early twen-

tieth century,25 emphasizing the non-rational dimension of human life and claiming to
enrich the apprehension of human life by extending it beyond the rational to its fuller
dimensions. “Rooted either in metaphysics or in an awareness of the uniqueness of
human experience, irrationalism stressed the dimensions of instinct, feeling, and will
as over and against reason.”26 As they reject logic, irrationalists argue that instinct
and feelings are superior to reason in the research of knowledge.27 The main tide
of irrationalism, like that of literary romanticism—itself a form of irrationalism—
followed the Age of Reason and was a reaction to it. Irrationalism found much in
the life of the spirit and in human history that could not be dealt with by the rational
methods of science. Under the influence of Charles Darwin and later Sigmund Freud,
irrationalism began to explore the biological and subconscious roots of experience.
Pragmatism, existentialism, and vitalism (or “life philosophy”) all arose as expres-
sions of this expanded view of human life and thought. “In general, irrationalism
implies either (in ontology) that the world is devoid of rational structure, meaning,
and purpose; or (in epistemology) that reason is inherently defective and incapable
of knowing the universe without the universe without distortion; or (in ethics) that
recourse to objective standards is futile; or (in anthropology) that in human nature
itself the dominant dimensions are irrational.”28
Historicism is the idea of attributing meaningful significance to space and time,
such as historical period, geographical place, and local culture. Historicism tends to
be hermeneutic because it values cautious, rigorous, and contextualized interpretation
of information; or relativist, because it rejects notions of universal, fundamental and
immutable interpretations.29 The term “historicism” (Historismus) was coined by
German philosopher Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel.30 Over time it has developed
different and somewhat divergent meanings. Elements of historicism appear in the
writings of French essayist Michael de Montaigne (1533–1592) and Italian philoso-
pher G. B. Vico (1668–1744), and became more fully developed with the dialectic of
Georg Hegel (1770–1831), influential in 19th-century Europe. The writings of Karl
Marx, influenced by Hegel, also include historicism. The term is also associated
with the empirical social sciences and with the work of Franz Boas. The approach
varies from individualist theories of knowledge such as empiricism and rationalism,
25 Rockmore, Tom. (2012). Lukacs Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy.New York, NY: Springer
Science & Business Media, p.5.
26 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “irrationalism.”Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8,
2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/irrationalism.
27 Kukla, Andre. (2013). Social Constructivism and the Philosphy of Science. New York, NY:
Routledge,p. 149.
28 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “irrationalism.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8,
2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/irrationalism.
29 Kahan, Jeffrey. “Historicism.” Renaissance Quarterly 50:4 (December 22, 1997): 1202.
30 Leiter, Brian., & Rosen, Michael., eds. (2007). The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.175.cf. Harloe, Katherine., & Morley, Neville., eds.
(2012). Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the
Renaissance to the Present. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 81.
which neglect the role of traditions. Historicism may be contrasted with reductionist
theories—which assumes that all developments can be explained by fundamental
principles (such as in economic determinism)—or with theories that posit that histor-
ical changes occur as a result of random chance. The Austrian-English philosopher
Karl Popper condemned historicism along with the determinism and holism which
he argued formed its basis. In his Poverty of Historicism, he identified historicism
with the opinion that there are “inexorable laws of historical destiny,” which opinion
he warned against. If this seems to contrast with what proponents of historicism
argue for, in terms of contextually relative interpretation, this happens, according
to Popper, only because such proponents are unaware of the type of causality they
ascribe to history. Talcott Parsons criticized historicism as a case of idealistic fallacy
in The Structure of Social Action (1937).
The social theory of Karl Marx, with respect to modern scholarship, has an
ambiguous relation to historicism. Critics of Marx have charged his theory with
historicism since its very genesis. Marx himself expresses critical concerns with this
historical tendency in his Theses on Feuerbach: “The materialist doctrine that men
are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are
products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men
who changed circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence
this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to
society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary
practice.”31
Karl Popper used the term historicism in his influential books The Poverty of
Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies, to mean: “an approach to
the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their primary aim,
and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the
‘patterns,’ the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of history.”32 Karl
Popper wrote with reference to Hegel’s theory of history, which he criticized exten-
sively. However, there is wide dispute whether Popper’s description of “historicism”
is an accurate description of Hegel, or more his characterization of his own philo-
sophical antagonists, including Marxist-Lenin thought, then widely held as posing
a challenge to the philosophical basis of the West, as well as theories such as Spen-
gler’s which drew predictions about the future course of events from the past. A Neo-
Marxist critic, Karel Kosik, in Dialectics of the Concrete (1976) criticizes Popper’s
statement that “All knowledge, whether intuitive or discursive must be of abstract
aspects, and we can never grasp the ‘concrete structure of reality itself.’”33 Kosik
refers to him as “a leading contemporary opponent of the philosophy of concrete
31 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1969). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Theses on
Feuerbach (V. Lough, Trans.). Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 13–15.

32 Popper, Karl. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism.London: Routledge, p. 3.
33 Kosik, Karel. “Dialectics of the Conrete Totality.” Telos 2 (Fall 1968). New York: Telos Press,
p. 18.
totality,”34 and clarifies that, “Totality indeed does not signify all facts. Totality
signifies reality as structured dialectical whole, within which any particular fact (or
any group or set of facts) can be rationally comprehended”35 as “the cognition of a
fact or of a set of facts is the cognition of their place in the totality of reality.”36 He
considers Popper’s work to be a part of atomist-rationalist theories of reality.37 Kosik
declares: “Opinions as to whether cognition of all facts is knowable or not are based
on the rationalist-empiricist idea that cognition proceeds by the analytic-summative
method. This idea is in turn based on the atomist idea of reality as a sum of things,
processes and facts.”38 Kosik also suggests that Popper and like-minded thinkers
lack an understanding of dialectical processes and how they form a totality.39
One of the most important books of the twentieth century, Karl Popper’s The
Open Society and Its Enemies is an uncompromising defense of liberal democracy
and a powerful attack on the intellectual origins of totalitarianism. From 1938 until
the end of the Second World War he focused his energies on political philosophy,
seeking to diagnose the intellectual origins of German and Soviet totalitarianism.
The Open Society and Its Enemies was the result. An immediate sensation when it
was first published in two volumes in 1945, Popper’s monumental achievement has
attained legendary status on both the Left and Right and is credited with inspiring
anticommunist dissidents during the Cold War. Arguing that the spirit of free, crit-
ical inquiry that governs scientific investigation should also apply to politics, Popper
traces the roots of an opposite, authoritarian tendency to a tradition represented by
Plato, Marx, and Hegel.40 Popper’s book remains one of the most popular defenses
of Western liberal values in the post World War Two era.41 Gilbert Ryle, reviewing
Popper’s book just two years after its publication42 and agreeing with him, wrote that
Plato “was Socrates’ Judas.”43 The Open Society and Its Enemies was praised by the
philosopher Bertrand Russell, who called it “a work of first-class importance” and
“a vigorous and profound defense of democracy,”44 and Sidney Hook who called
it a “subtly argued and passionately written” critique of the “historical ideas that
threaten the love of freedom [and] the existence of an open society.” Hook calls
34 Ibid., p.23.
35 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
36 Ibid., p.23.
37 Ibid., p.24.
38 Ibid., p.23.
39 Ibid., pp.23–24.
40 Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton, US-NJ: Princeton University Press,
2020.
41 McCrum, Robert. (2016). “The 100 best nonfiction books: No 35 – The Open Society and Its
Enemies by Karl Popper (1945)”. In The Guardian.

42 Ryle, Gilbert. “Popper, K.R. – The Open Society and Its Enemies.” Mind 222(56) (April 1947):
167–172.
43 Ibid., p.169. See also Burke, T. E. (1983). The Philosophy of Popper. Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press. p. 141.

44 Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Abingdon-on-Thames, GB-OXF: Routledge,
2012.
Popper’s critique of the cardinal beliefs of historicism “undoubtedly sound,” noting

that historicism “overlooks the presence of genuine alternatives in history, the oper-
ation of plural causal processes in the historical pattern, and the role of human ideals
in redetermining the future.” Nevertheless, Hook argues that Popper “reads Plato too
literally when it serves his purposes and is too cocksure about what Plato’s ‘real’
meaning is when the texts are ambiguous,” and calls Popper’s treatment of Hegel
“downright abusive” and “demonstrably false,” noting that “there is not a single refer-
ence to Hegel in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle or My Fight).”45 The philosopher
Joseph Agassi credits Popper with showing that historicism is a factor common to
both fascism and Bolshevism.46
Some other philosophers were critical. Walter Kaufmann believed that Popper’s
work has many virtues, including its attack against totalitarianism, and many sugges-
tive ideas. However, he also found it to have serious flaws, writing that Popper’s
interpretations of Plato were flawed and that Popper had provided a “comprehensive
statement” of older myths about Hegel. Kaufmann commented that despite Popper’s
hatred of totalitarianism, Popper’s method was “unfortunately similar to that of totali-
tarian ‘scholars.’”47 In his The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr.
Karl Popper’s Refutations of Marxism (1968), the Marxist author Maurice Cornforth
defended Marxism against Popper’s criticisms. Though disagreeing with Popper,
Cornforth nevertheless called him “perhaps the most eminent” critic of Marxism.48
The philosopher Robert C. Solomon writes that Popper directs an “almost wholly
unjustified polemic” against Hegel, one which has helped to give Hegel a reputa-
tion as a “moral and political reactionary.”49 The Marxist economist Ernest Mandel
identifies The Open Society and Its Enemies as part of a literature, beginning with
German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, that criticizes the dialectical method
Marx borrowed from Hegel as “useless,” “metaphysical,” or “mystifying.”He faults
Popper and the other critics for their “positivist narrowness.”50 The political theo-
rist Rajeev Bhargava argues that Popper “notoriously misreads Hegel and Marx,”
and that the formulation Popper deployed to defend liberal political values is “moti-
vated by partisan ideological considerations grounded curiously in the most abstract
metaphysical premises.”51 In Jon Stewart’s anthology The Hegel Myths and Legends
(1996), The Open Society and Its Enemies is listed as a work that has propagated
45 Hook, Sidney. “From Plato to Hegel to Marx.” New York Times (July 22, 1951).
46 Agassi, Joseph. (2014). Popper and His Popular Critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and
Imre Lakatos. Heidelberg, DE: Springer, p. 48.
47 Kaufmann, Walter A. “The Hegel Myth and Its Method.” In The Hegel Myths and Legends, ed.
Jon Stewart, 82–83. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996.

48 Cornforth, Maurice. (1968). The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr. Karl
popper’s Refutations of Marxism. New York, NY: International Publishers, p. 5.

49 Solomon, Robert C. (1995). In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 480.

50 Marx, Karl. (1990). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1. London: Penguin. p.22.
51 Bhargava, Rajeeve. “Karl Popper: Reason without Revolution.” Economic and Political Weekly
(December 31, 1994).

2 Man’s Real Life 99
“myths” about Hegel.52 Stephen Houlgate writes that while Hegel sought to deceive
others by use of dialectic is famous, it is also ignorant, as is Popper’s charge that
Hegel’s account of sound and heat in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
is “gibberish.”53
(6) “The human subject’s” practice can be conceived as a process of development
and change. In view of the fact that man’s immediate practice is historical,
which is to say when men engage themselves in practical activities, they cannot
carry out them as they please, that is, their activities cannot occur under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past, it must of necessity be inextricably linked with man’s
past practice as well as his future practice, which is to say, on the one hand, man’s
immediate practice can be attributable to the continued progress and cumulative
development of past practice, but on the other, it provides the sound basis and
necessary prerequisite for future practice. Considering what can be expected
from an individual, practice constitutes his life-long course of struggle. When
confronted with a myriad of external pressures and challenges, one has to engage
himself in a life-long course of struggle in order to deal with myriad pressures
and challenges closely intertwined with his life activity in the external world.
Only in this way can one grasp his destiny in his own hands and be master of
his fate. Therefore, only when one tries to identify the truth about the essence
of human life with the unalterable belief that “man is a practical species-being,”
can one gain a deeper insight into the ontology of human life—“structure and
choice,” enlighten other people about it, and further give valuable guidance to
them on how to understand and treat it.
2 Man’s Real Life
In view of the fact that “the essence of human life” as well as “the noumenon of
human life” is predicated upon the Marxist belief that “man is a practical species-
being,” the term of “the real man” borrowed from Marxist classics may render its
substantial help to us when we attempt to delve into “the essence of human life”
as well as “the ontology of human life.” The theory of “structure and choice” takes
“the actual or real man” rather than “the imaginary man” or “the abstract man” as
the primary object of study and, at the same time, tries to illuminate “the actual
or real man” in all his fundamental bearings. The theory of “structure and choice”
is based upon “the actual or real man,” starting off on the very premise to shed
light on the ontology of human life. Marx’s theory about “the actual or real man”,
which possesses unparalleled intellectual richness and profundity, not only can be
52 Stewart, Jon, ed. (1996). The Hegel Myths and Legends. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press. p. 383.
53 Houlgate, Stephen. (1998). The Hegel Reader. Oxford, GB-OXF: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 2,
253, 256.
conceived as a significant theoretical breakthrough in human studies, but also can be

perceived as a complete revolution in man’s self-knowledge in the history of human
thought. Marx refutes the long-established cardinal belief widely accepted among
idealists that, in contradiction to materialism, the active side of human thinking was
developed abstractly by idealism to the extent that the mere exercise of pure reason or
intellect would enable the idealists to gain a marvelous insight into the truth of what
it is to be a human being. In addition, Marx still contradicts the dogmatic doctrine of
the old materialism that understanding man can only proceed from the mere natural
standpoint, which must of necessity treat man as mere natural beings. In direct
contradiction to idealism as well as the old materialism, Marx, who differs essentially
from idealists as well as from the old materialists in knowing man, positively asserts
that man is an active, practical subject, which brought about epoch-making changes
in man’s self-knowledge, which made human science break through the shackles of
abstract humanity and take “the actual or real man” as the main object of study, and
which opened up the fair way for the development of human science.
2.1 The Basic Implications of the Marxist Theory About

“The Actual or Real Man”
Viewed from the perspective, man is a species-being,54 not only because in practice
and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his
object, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also because he treats
himself as “the actual, living species;” because he treats himself as a universal and
therefore a free being. The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists
physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the
more universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic
nature on which he lives. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the
universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature
is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument
of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is
not itself human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with
which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s
physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked
to itself, for man is a part of nature. For labor, life activity, productive life itself,
appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to
maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-
engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained
in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-
character. Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one
with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man
54The term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy

where it is applied to man and mankind as a whole.
makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has
conscious life activity. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from
animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only
because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is
an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. It is just because
man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere
means to his existence. In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his
work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as
a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a
species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man
really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life.
Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of
labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s specie-life; for he duplicates himself
not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore
he sees himself in a world that he has created. Admittedly animals also produce.
But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the
dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from
physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces
only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs
immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal
forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it
belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every
species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object.
Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. It has now
become evident to us that the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single
individual, but that in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. All social
life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their
rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.
From a Marxist perspective, man is an actual or real species-being. Marx and
Engels made cooperative efforts to set forth more fully developed ideas on “the
actual or real man” mainly in several of the classical works such as The Holy Family
or Critique of Critical Criticism, Theses on Feuerbach, and The German Ideology
(written from fall 1845 to mid-1846). Marx once developed a clear definition of
“real man” in The Holy Family: “Real man is the one living in a real, objective
world anddetermined by that world.”He added a few illuminating remarks on “real
man”: “The object as being for man, as the objective being of man, is at the same
time the existence of man for other men, his human relation to other men, the social
behavior of man to man.”55 Marx’s suggestive ideas on “real man” show clearly
and conclusively that Marx sought to create internal interrelationships between man
himself, the objective world and social relations and that he came to treat man’s
objective world and social relations as principal constituents of the definition of man
55 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: The Holy Family.
Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 52, 245.

as well as of the essence of man. It is thus evident that “real man” is the actual,
living man who lives in the objective or real world and at the same time establishes
complex social relations with other members and who actively engages in social
practice. The main object that “the theory of structure and choice” tries to throw
light on has always been “the human subject,” that is “the subject—man,” who, in
turn, has been identified with “real man” all along. Marx’s illuminating ideas on “real
man” can be summarized in the following aspects.
(1) “Real man” is first of all the flesh-and-blood individual who is standing before
us, empirically or sensuously perceptible and conceptually describable. In his
private letter addressed to Marx on 19th November, 1844, Engels said that “We
must take our departure from the Ego, the empirical, flesh-and-blood individual,
if we are not, like Stirner, to remain stuck at this point but rather proceed to raise
ourselves to ‘man’. ‘Man’ will always remain a wraith so long as his basis is
not empirical man. In short we must take our departure from empiricism and
materialism if our concepts, and notably our ‘man,’ are to be something real; we
must deduce the general from the particular, not from itself or, à la Hegel, from
thin air.”56 “The real man,” who lives in the real world and actively engages in
social practice, is not an imaginary, incorporeal, or unreal image, but a flesh-
and-blood, empirically or sensuously perceptible concrete species-being. Man
is endowed with reason. Aristotle famously describes reason as a part of human
nature. People are different from animals, because they possess the quality of
reason. For Baruch Spinoza, desire is the very essence of man. According to
Webster’s Dictionary, desire is the conscious impulse toward something that
promises enjoyment or satisfaction in its attainment. Aristotle acknowledges
that desire cannot account for all purposive movement towards a goal. He posits
that perhaps reason, in conjunction with desire and by way of the imagina-
tion, makes it possible for one to apprehend an object of desire, to see it as
desirable. In this way reason and desire work together to determine what is a
good object of desire. Desire is not considered to be a bad thing in and of and
of itself; rather, it is a powerful force within the human that, once submitted to
morality and reason, can become a tool for good, for advancement, and for abun-
dant living. Human reason endows man with the power of thinking in orderly
rational ways, making a wise choice or a sound judgment, and then acting judi-
ciously according to circumstances. “Real man” is a complex species-being in
its totality, who is living in the real world and endowed with exuberant vitality.
“Real man” is a unique species-being that is sensuously perceptible and empir-
ically describable. “Real man” is the actual, living species-being who has been
persistently and energetically striving for the unity of body and mind through
life. “Real man” can be grouped into three categories, including individual—
“personality;” collective—“group” (family, organization or institution, state and
international organization); mankind—“species.”
56 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 27: Engels: “Letter
from Engels to Marx.” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p.13.
(2) “Real man” is a species-being in its totality, to wit the real, whole man. “Real
man” endowed with exuberant vitality is a whole or concrete species-being,
whose existence depends upon its complex constituents and aspects possessing
their respective unique implications, positions and functions invariably indis-
pensible for its whole existence and whose complex constituents and aspects
fundamental to its existence are not isolated or separated from each other, but
jointly form the organic parts of “real man”, whose interconnection and inter-
action with each other is indispensible for their respective existence and which
perform their respective functions while conditioning each other. “Real man’s”
complex constituents and aspects fundamental to its whole existence manifest
themselves in all its fundamental bearings. “Real man” is a unique species-being
who exists in and for himself, which supplies the basic reason for the fact that
his existence is characterized by the unity of body and mind as well as by the
unity of the perceptual and the rational. “Real man” is a practical species-being,
whose practical activity manifests itself mainly in his knowledge and reforma-
tion of nature, society, the objective world and the subjective world. “Real man”
is a species-being who can develop a myriad of complex relationships with the
external world, whose myriad forms manifest themselves mainly in the relations
of man to nature, of man to society and of man to real life as well as of man to
virtual reality. “Real man” is a conscious species-being who can awake to the
paramount importance of time and space to his existence, which is characterized
by the tension between synchrony and diachrony as well as by the unity between
them. Despite the fact that they are liable to conflict with each other, manifold
manifestations of relationships inherent in “real man’s” existence are not sepa-
rated or even isolated from each other, but tend to coexist side by side with each
other, which is to say myriad forms of relationships included in “real man’s”
whole existence should be viewed from a holistic perspective or in a holistic
way, especially when they interrelate and interact with each other through “real
man’s” social practice. Therefore, “real man” when viewed as a whole or in its
totality is a man in his totality or a whole man, that is “a real, actual, whole
man”.
(3) In the capacity of a subject, “real man” develops myriad social connections
with other members of society and actively engages in a multitude of practical
activities. As the subject of the world, “real man” is endowed with the power
of carrying out practical activities and has been engaged in social practice since
he came into the world, which is to say that “real man” would spend his whole
life remolding his subjective world and improving his mind in myriad ways
while changing the objective world and working for the betterment of society
as a whole. This is the very essence of man. Human practice, that is, human
practical activity or man’s conscious life activity, not only makes human beings
fundamentally different from animals, but also constitutes an essential difference
between each individual and every other individual. Likewise, different states,
different peoples, different organizations, or different humans also base their
respective fundamental differences upon human practice. In the final analysis,
the essential differences between them can be invariably attributable to the
different practical activities they engage in separately. Marx argued that “The
premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They
are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which
they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by
their activity. These premises can be verified in a purely empirical way. The
first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human
individuals. The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends
first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence
and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply
as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it
is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing
their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life,
so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both
with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals
thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. Men are
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the
intercourse corresponding to these. The existence of men is their actual life-
process.”57 Man’s actual practical activity not only determines what constitutes
what could be called the essence of man as well as the nature of man, but also
defines the concreteness and uniqueness of what it is to exist as a human being,
an individual, or a group.
(4) “Real man” is embodied in the unity of “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as of
“what it is to exist as an actual self” and “what it will be to exist as an ideal self”. It
has been argued that the evolutionary emergence of higher-order consciousness
such as self-consciousness and self-awareness in humans is a result of human
evolution, the evolutionary process that dates back 1.7 million years. One of the
basic functions inherent in self-consciousness (or self-awareness) consisting
of essential elements manifests itself in the fact that, on the one hand, it can
differentiate between one element from the other and view constituent elements
in isolation from others, but on the other, it can coordinate component elements,
make them coexist side by side with each other and act as a unity, which is to
say that self-consciousness (or self-awareness) not only can make self existing
as a unity differentiate between “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as between
“what it is to be an actual self” and “what it will be to act as an ideal self,” but
also can make self achieve the unity of “actual self” and “ideal self” as well as
of “what it is to be an actual self” and “what it will be to exist as an ideal self”,
whereby self can triumph over its negative or restrictive aspects and strive to
strive for great progress. The characteristics and abilities that all human beings
are endowed with, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, age, culture or creed, may
act as a driving force for human progress and social advance. “Actual self”
(“what it is to act as an actual self”) is man’s immediate existence, to wit the
57Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology.
actual state in which man exists as well as the moral, intellectual and cultural
levels he has attained accordingly, whereas “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist
as an ideal self”) is about how man looks forward to the future, maps out his
future and carves out his future, that is about what man’s ideal state is like as well
as about the moral, intellectual and cultural levels he has reached accordingly.
Generally speaking, “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) tends to
lay the basis for “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”), while
“ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) is the continuation and
development of “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”). “Actual self”
(“what it is to act as an actual self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as
an ideal self”) exist in unity with each other as well as in contradiction to each
other, and “real man” exists and develops in conformity with the very law of
the unity of opposites. The unity of “actual self” (“what it is to act as an actual
self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to exist as an ideal self”) as well as the
contradiction between them not only defines “real man’s” immediate existence,
but also enables “real man” to view the future optimistically, map out his future
and carve out his future, and thus “real man” is the unity of reality and history.
The Marxist theory on “real man”, which is devoted to the study of both “actual
self” (“what it is to act as an actual self”) and “ideal self” (“what it will be to
exist as an ideal self”), serves to guide people along the right direction and point
up the surest road for the emancipation of all mankind as well as for the free
development of all.
2.2 The Essence of “Real Man”
Marx’s theory on the essence of man is consistent with his theory about “real man”. In
contradistinction to Marx’s idea of man, the philosophers before him deduced man’s
species-being from human thinking, it was from human thinking that they arrived
at man’s species-being, and hence man’s species-being is crowned with a halo of
abstraction. Likewise, the idealistic understanding of abstract man demonstrates yet
again how deeply idealistic abstraction is rooted in the idealistic mind. For Marx,
the first premise of all human history is the existence of living human individuals
and the existence of men is their actual life-process. Free, conscious activity is man’s
species-character. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. In creating a
world of objects by his personal activity, man proves himself a conscious species-
being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats
itself as a species-being. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that
man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-
life. The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a
definite way enter into definite social and political relations. These social and political
relations are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but
of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination,
but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they
work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of

their will.58 In direct contrast to all hitherto existing idealism which descends from
heaven to earth, here Marx ascends from earth to heaven. That is to say, Marx set
out from living individuals’ actual life-process and practical activity conditioned by
definite material conditions and material intercourse, whereby he could obtain a more
profound understanding of real, active men and gain a deeper insight into the essence
of man. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx proposed that man’s practical activity and
social relations may prove of cardinal importance to our understanding of man as
well as human nature. “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of
Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is that the thing, reality,
sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to
materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course,
does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects,
really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself
as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical
attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed
only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of
‘revolutionary,’ of ‘practical-critical,’ activity. The question whether objective truth
can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical
question. Man must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of
his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that
is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. All social life is essentially
practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution
in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. The human essence is
no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of
the social relations.” Likewise, in The German Ideology Marx maintained that the
paramount importance of real, active men’s actual life-process, material production
and social intercourse cannot be overemphasized to our understanding of man as well
as human essence. “Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal
does not enter into ‘relations’ with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all.
For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. We must state the first
premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely,
that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life
involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy
these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is a historical
act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago,
must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Therefore
in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact
in all its significance and all its implication and to accord it its due importance. The
production of life, both of one’s own in labor and of fresh life in procreation, now
appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a
58 Ibid., pp. 23, 29.

social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals,

no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from
this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with
a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is
itself a ‘productive force.’ Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible
to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the ‘history of humanity’ must
always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.”
In The Holy Family, Marx insisted that given the important role of the “interest”
in our understanding of human activity and human essence, one cannot attach too
much importance to the “interest.” He held that “Man is recognized as the essence,
the basis of all human activity and situations or relations. History is nothing but
the activity of man pursuing his aims.” Further, he added that “It must further be
precisely distinguished to what extent the mass was ‘interested’ in aims and to what
extent it was ‘enthusiastic’ over them. The ‘idea’ always disgraced itself insofar as
it differed from the ‘interest’. The ‘interest’ that is correctly accessible to ordinary
minds constitutes the general foundation of morals.”59 Proceeding on this line of
thought, Marx further pointed out that the fundamental difference between humans
and animals lies in man’s labor, especially man’s production, arguing that “Men can
be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you
like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they
begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their
physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly
producing their actual material life.”60 Hence Marx’s theory on “real man” lays the
theoretical basis for a deeper understanding as to the truth of human essence and
further points up the wide road for legions of theorists stepping into the shoes of
Marx and vying with one another in producing their respective theories on human
beings as well as on human nature.
Proceeding from man’s social practice and material production, Marx gave us
penetrating insights into the essence of man (human nature or human essence).
Active, real men engage not only in the production of material life but also in
the production of intellectual life. In the social production of their existence, men
inevitably enter into the social division of labor, which determines the definite inter-
course (material or mental) and relations (production or social) of different individ-
uals to one another, of different organizations to one another as well as of different
social classes or strata among themselves, which must of necessity require defi-
nite rules and systems, especially the private ownership, and which illustrates the
necessity of establishing social institutions and management styles appropriate to
various divisions among the individuals, organizations, nations, or classes (strata)
co-operating in definite kinds of labor, whereby each individual must of necessity be
a concrete one as well as a unique one, rather than an abstract one. As Marx argued,
59 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: The Holy Family.
Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp.103, 118–119, 167.

60 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: The German Ideology.
Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 67.

“For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular,
exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot
escape.”61 In view of the fact that active, real men or the actual, living individuals
engage in social practice and material production and assert their vested rights to
particular, exclusive spheres of activity, after considerable discussion on the essence
of man, Marx formulated the rational conclusion that “But the human essence is no
abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the
social relations.”62 The very way that Marx tried to reveal the essence of man can
help us recognize the fundamental difference between humans and animals as well as
between each individual and every other individual, find out exactly the truth about
human essence and enlighten us as to how to adopt a scientific approach to human
essence.
The way that Marx tried to reveal the essence of man endows the concept of human
nature with multiple implications. First, human nature and human existence are
endowed with such inherent characteristics as multiplicity and richness. As far as an
individual is concerned, his nature as well as his existence is not marked by unitariness
or one-dimensionality, but characterized by multiplicity and multidimensionality. As
Marx argued in The German Ideology, “In the case of an individual, for example,
whose life embraces a wide circle of varied activities and practical relations to the
world, and who, therefore, lives a many-sided life, thought has the same character
of universality as every other manifestation of his life. …The extent to which these
qualities develop on the universal or local scale, the extent to which they transcend
local narrow-mindedness or remain within its confines, depend not on Stirner, but
on the development of world intercourse and on the part which he and the locality
where he lives.”63 Second, human nature as well as human existence is a complex
system. On no account should one cram his mind with various plausible theories
proposed by the past philosophers in regard to human nature and human existence,
who insisted that man should be conceived as “an entity,” “a separate, physical
being (or living thing) in itself,” or “the existent endowed with self-consciousness.”
Rather man can only be perceived as a unique system. The system of human nature
is endowed with numerous constituent elements of crucial importance to human
existence, such as the ideological power, the moral power, the intellectual power, the
will power and the power of motivation, which can come under the category of man’s
inherent powers and which possess such prominent characteristics as many-sidedness
and complexity as well as system and structure. Third, human nature is historical,
which is to say that human nature is in a continuous process of development. The
progressive development of social practice as well as the steady expansion of material
production (productive activity or labor) must of necessity result in more universal
61 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology.
62 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: Marx: Theses on
Feuerbach. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p.5.

63 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 3: The German Ideology.
Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp.296–297.

or much wider spheres of human intercourse and activity, whose most prominent
manifestations can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, “humanized nature,”
which signifies a nature that is the by-product of human conceptualizations, activities,
and regulations, is undergoing an inevitable process of expansion. Accordingly, the
sphere of humanized nature on which man lives is becoming more universal than ever.
As Marx argued in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “The life of the
species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the
animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal (or the animal) is, the more
universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals,
stones, air, light, etc., constitute theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly
as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature,
spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible—
so also in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human
activity. Physically man lives only these products of nature, whether they appear in
the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, etc. The universality of man appears
in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—
both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object,
and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that
is, insofar as it is not itself human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his
body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That
man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked
to itself, for man is a part of nature.” On the other hand, when active, real men enter
into relation with one another as individuals, the intercourse and association of these
actual, living individuals, which was formerly a restricted one and characterized by
the narrowness of the individuals themselves, is getting increasingly complex and
their manifold spheres of intercourse and activity are becoming much wider than
ever. Hence these individuals will inevitably undergo a gradual transition from local,
narrow-minded beings to world-historical beings. “The further the separate spheres,
which interact on one another, extend in the course of this development, the more the
original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of
production and intercourse and the division of labor between various nations naturally
brought forth by these, the more history becomes world history.”64 The universal
development of productive forces, that is, a great increase in productive power or
a high degree of this development, itself implies the actual empirical existence of
men in their world-historical, instead of local, being. Furthermore, only with this
universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men
established, which can finally put world-historical, empirically universal individuals
in place of local ones.65
64 Ibid., p. 51.
65 Ibid., p. 39.
2.3 Deeper Understanding and Further Exploration

of the Theory on “Real Man”
Marx’s theory on “real man” is devoted to the study of man’s universal existence
as well as the essence of man in practice. In this regard, Marx conceptualized four
separate pairs of opposite categories forming an organic relationship with each other
to elaborate his argument.
First, the local, narrow-minded individual versus the universal individual. By
“the local, narrow-minded individual,” Marx means the one who is conditioned by
the development of productive forces and thus who shuts himself up within narrow
confines and exists in isolation. In sharp contrast to “the local, narrow-minded indi-
vidual,” the universal individual is “the real, universal one” who secures all-round
possession of human essence on condition that the more the mode of production is
developed, the more history becomes world history. That is to say, only the universal
development of productive forces, coupled with a universal intercourse between men
established with this full development of productive power, can finally put world-
historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones and witness the
actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being.
“The real, universal individual” can thus only exist world-historically, and its activity
can only have a “world-historical” existence. World-historical existence of “real,
universal individuals” means existence of individuals which is directly linked up
with world history.
Second, the individual in his one-sided existence versus the individual in his all-
round development. By “the individual in his one-sided existence”, Marx means
the one whose inherent powers have been rendered one-sided by external forces
beyond human control, that is the definite individuals emerging as the immediate
consequence of the division of labor coming about naturally in society. As Marx
argued in The German Ideology, “For as soon as the distribution of labor comes
into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced
upon him and from which he cannot escape.”66 In stark contrast to “the individual
in his one-sided existence,” “the individual in his all-round development” is in a
position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity and hence a free
and all-round development in all his fundamental bearings, and his essence consists
in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities.67 Only in communist
society can a concrete (or free and all-round) individual be found in existence. “…in
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening,
66 Ibid., p. 37.
67 Ibid., p. 76.
criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman,
herdsman or critic.”68
Third, the individual who is in a position to engage in self-activity versus the
individual whose existence is oriented towards what is accidental to him and who
thus leads an alienated life in an alien world inimically opposed to him. By the latter
one, Marx means the individual who can only engage in an alien activity which is
turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. When the forms of
intercourse come into conflict with the productive forces—or, to put it another way,
when the contradiction enters on the scene between the forms of intercourse and the
productive forces, the earlier forms of intercourse, which are deprived of inherent
existence imputed to them and hence assert themselves as accidental things, tend to
appear as accidental fetters upon the more developed productive forces and hence
upon the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals, are liable to deprive the
individuals engaged in practical activities of their initiative, which means “energy
or aptitude displayed in initiation of action and acting independently of outside
influence or control,” or spontaneity, which indicates “the quality or state proceeding
from natural feeling or native tendency without external constraint,” and necessarily
result in the loss of the intrinsic basis for practical human activity. The aforementioned
practical human activity is most likely to be rendered accidental by the earlier forms of
intercourse and hence change into an alien activity. Therefore, it can be safely asserted
that the individual who engages in an alien activity, which is not his spontaneous
activity, can be equated with the one whose existence is oriented towards what is
accidental to him. In stark contrast to the latter individual, the former individual
is the individual as a person, who is in a position to engage in self-activity. As
Marx argued in The German Ideology, “What appears accidental to the latter age
as opposed to the earlier—and this applies also to the elements handed down by
an earlier age—is a form of intercourse which corresponded to a definite stage of
development of the productive forces. The relation of the productive forces to the
form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or
activity of the individuals…The conditions under which individuals have intercourse
with each other, are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external
to them; conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite
relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are
thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity. The
definite condition under which they produce, thus corresponds to the reality of their
conditioned nature, their one-sided existence of which only becomes evident when
the contradiction enters on the scene and thus exists for the later individuals. Then
this condition appears as an accidental fetter, and the consciousness that it is a fetter
is imputed to the earlier age as well.”69 It is thus clear that the individual engaged
in practical activity is endowed with initiative and that he is in a position to engage
in self-activity. However, it must be admitted that there exists a relative difference
between the individual as a person who is in a position to engage in self-activity
68 Ibid., p. 37.
69 Ibid., p. 80.
and the individual whose existence is oriented towards what is accidental to him,
who thus leads an alienated life in an alien world inimically opposed to him, and
who can only engage in an alien activity which is turned against him, independent
of him and not belonging to him. That is to say, the difference between the former
individual and the latter one is “not a conceptual difference but a historical fact. This
distinction has a different significance at different times. It is not a distinction that
we have to make for each age, but one which each age makes itself from among
the different elements which it finds in existence, and indeed not according to any
theory, but compelled by material collisions in life.”70 Only in communist society,
in which man can conquer nature and control human intercourse, will man be able
to prove himself a real species-being endowed with man’s species-character, that is
man’s free, conscious activity, and hence an individual who is in a position to engage
in self-activity.
Fourth, the individual who is a member of the real community versus the individual
who is a member of the illusory community. For Marx, the community can be grouped
into two categories, to wit the real community and the illusory community, which are
utterly different from each other. Marx argued that it is of their own accord that the
separate individuals form the real community to truly represent the interests of the
individual and that it is just this voluntary combination of the separate individuals
which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals
under their control. In sharp contrast to the real community, Marx maintained that
the illusory community represents only the interests of some groups rather than
those of the separate individual and that considering what can be expected from
most groups, it represents an external force alien to them. Marx held that “Only in
community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all
directions; only in the real community, therefore, is personal freedom possible.”71
And only in the community should the collectivist principles be followed.
Let’s provide a clear and concise summary of what we have been discussing up
till now. The great strength inherent in the theory of “real man,” which affords a basis
for “the theory of structure and choice” in terms of how it is devoted to the wider and
deeper study of human nature, lies in the richness and profundity of what is contained
in the theory as well as in the fact that the theory on “real man” can enrich and deepen
our understanding of the essence of man’s unique life, which consists in the fact that
man is a practical species. To put it another way, the knowledge system that “the
theory of structure and choice” tries to construct and develop can be conceived as the
crystallization of wisdom based upon a deeper understanding and further exploration
of “practical man” as well as “real man.”
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 84.
3 The Human Subject’s Life 113
3 The Human Subject’s Life
3.1 Definition and Category of the Human Subject
(1) Conception of the Human Subject

We mean by the category of a subject that it can be readily comprehensible to ordi-
nary minds only in relation to the category of an object. A subject is a being or
an entity that has a relationship with another entity that exists outside itself (called
an “object”), whereas an object is something typically understood in contrast to a
subject. According to Marx, the subject is man, whilst the object is nature.72 A subject
means an individual, while an object is something mental or physical that exists as the
object toward which human thought, feeling, or action is directed. On no account is
a subject divorced from its object and vice versa. Therefore any discussion regarding
the nature of a subject can only be made in light of the context and hence in relation to
its object. I should like to avail myself of this very opportunity to adduce the following
quotations from Marx’s “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General” in Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in which he gave a marvelous insight into the
relationship of subject to object. “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being
and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers,
vitalpowers—he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies
and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous objec-
tive being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants.
That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent
of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects, indispensible
to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a
corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigor is to say that
he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being or of his life, or that he can
only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous,
and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be
object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing…A being which
does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no part in the
system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being.
A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being for its object;
i.e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. A non-objective being is a
non-being. Suppose a being which is neither an object itself, nor has an object. Such
a being, in the first place, would be the unique being: there would exist no being
outside it—it would exist solitary and alone. For as soon as there are objects outside
me, as soon as I am not alone, I am another–another reality than the object outside
me. For this third object I am thus a different reality than itself; that is, I am its object.
Thus, to suppose a being which is not the object of another being is to presuppose
that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for
72 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 88.
an object. But a non-objective being is an unreal, non-sensuous thing—a product of

mere thought (i.e., of mere imagination)—an abstraction. To be sensuous, that is, to
be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have
sensuous objects outside oneself—objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is
to suffer. Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being—and
because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power
of man energetically bent its object. But man is not merely a natural being: he is
a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a
species-being, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and
in his knowing. Therefore, human objects are not natural objects as they immediately
present themselves, and neither is human sense as it immediately is—as it is objec-
tively—human sensibility, human objectivity. Neither nature objectively nor nature
subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the human being.”73
Moreover, in “Private Property and Communism” of Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 Marx gave a more powerful and clarifying analysis of the
dialectical unity of subject and object to further enlighten us as to the relationship
of subject to object. “We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only
when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible
only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a
social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object. On the one hand,
therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society
the world of man’s essential powers—human reality, and for that reason the reality
of his own essential powers—that all objects become for him the objectification
of himself, become objects which confirm and realizehis individuality, become his
objects: that is, man himself becomes the object. The manner in which they become
his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power
corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this relationship
which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. To the eye an object comes
to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than
the object of the ear. The specific character of each essential power is precisely its
specific essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its
objectively actual, living being. Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not
only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses. On the other hand, let us look at
this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music,
and just as the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear—is [no]
object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential
powers—it can therefore only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists
for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes
only so far as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that
object)—for this reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-
social man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being
is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of
73
Morris, Brian. (2003). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 29.
form—in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves

as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the
five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.),
in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of
its object, by virtue of humanized nature. The forming of the five senses is a labor
of the entire history of the world down to the present….Thus, the objectification of
the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make
man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire
wealth of human and natural substance.”74
Taken in the narrow sense of the word, a subject is the mind, ego, or agent of
whatever sort that sustains or assumes the form of thought or consciousness—or, to
put it simply, a subject is a being or an individual that possesses unique conscious
experiences, while, viewed in the broad sense of the word, a subject means an entity
that has agency and hence that acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an
object). However, we should not rest contented with a mere dualistic apprehension
of the subject. Subjectivity is an inherently social mode that comes about through
innumerable interactions within society. As much as subjectivity is a process of
individuation, it is equally a process of socialization, the individual never being
isolated in a self-contained environment, but endlessly engaging in interaction with
the surrounding world. The subject tends to become involved in an activity by playing
different roles in it such as the initiator, the organizer, the leader and the decision-
maker. To be truly an individual, to be true to himself, his actions should in some way
be expressed so that they describe who and what he is to himself and to others. The
important point is that to exist, the individual must make choices—the individual
must decide what to do the next moment and on into the future. What the individual
chooses and how he chooses will define who and what he is—to himself and to
others. Hence it can be safely asserted that a subject is the actual, real, and living
individual who engages in practical activities under certain social conditions and
whose essential nature lies in the fact that he is a social species-being as well as a
practical species-being.75 In other words the subject does not exist before society.
Rather the subject owes its existence entirely to the social order. Further, the subject
can be seen as the contingent effect of society. Thus, the view that the subject is
socially limited is unquestionably true.
A subject generally refers to the social subject or the practical subject. In view of
the fact that human practice invariably manifests itself in a wide range of activities
and that the subject is always established in a particular sphere of human activity,
a subject may come into the category of the cognitive subject, of the subject of
value, of the aesthetic subject, of the moral subject and of the historical subject.
In addition, subjects can also be categorized from other different perspectives. “He
[Marx] drove the philosophical categories of the Subject… etc. from all the domains
74 Bertell, Ollman. (1976). Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–96.
75 Liu, Pei-Xian., & Chang, Guan-Wu. (1988). Marxism and the Contemporaty Dictionary. Beijing,
China: China Renmin University Press, pp. 164–165.

in which they had reigned supreme. Not only from political economy (rejection of the
myth of homo economicus, that is of the individual with definite faculties and needs
as the Subject of the classical economy); not just from history (rejection of social
atomism and ethico-political idealism); not just from ethics (rejection of the Kantian
ethical idea); but also from philosophy itself: for Marx’s materialism excludes the
empiricism of the Subject (and its inverse: the transcendental Subject).”76 A rejection
of the ‘bourgeois’ Subject of economics, and liberal ethics can also be found in Marx
who criticized the bourgeois Subject for its limitations. Marx did not aim to abolish
the historical Subject altogether. His theoretical terminology was not intended to blot
out the human agency, but to highlight the barriers to its full realization.
(2) The Fundamental Characteristics of a Subject
Man as subject is endowed with three fundamental characteristics.
First, man has an exalted position in the universe and he seeks to deeply reflect upon
his elevated position in the universe. Whilst “noumenon” is defined as a posited
object or event that appears in itself independently of perception by the senses, man’s
noumenon exists in himself and for himself. From the point of view of Marx, in actual
production the subject is man while the object is nature, and man as subject must be
the point of departure, which is to say that in this world only man can act as subject
and claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the
other natural objects can only be treated as objects. Whilst only social practice can
be the criterion of truth, man is the measure of all things. The ultimate goal of human
practical activities is to render man’s existence, development and perfection within
the bounds of possibility. In human practice, man always remains the subject – or, to
put it another way, man is the subject at all times and in all places.77 In the course of
the history of man, the laws which govern the development of society and the progress
of civilization bear ample testimony to the universal truth that, on the one hand, man
exists as the result of the movement of history, but on the other, he constitutes the
point of departure of the movement of history.78 Therefore, the historical development
manifests itself in the dialectical unity of man’s existence as the historical premise
and his existence as the historical result. As Marx argued in The Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Bonaparte (1852), “Men make their own history, but they do not make it
as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”In “Critique of
Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer
and Stirner”, that is The German Ideology (Volume I), Marx maintained that “History
is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the
materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding
generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely
changed circumstances, and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a
76 Althusser, Louis. (2005). For Marx.New York, NY: Verso, pp. 228–229.
77 Marx, K., & Engels, F.(1979). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic
78 Ibid., p.121.
completely changed activity… It shows that history does not end by being resolved
into ‘self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit,’ but that in it at each stage there is
found a material result: a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation of
individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation
from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions,
which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the
other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a
special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make
circumstances.” Man constitutes the point of departure of his own activities, and
virtually all his activities are geared to meeting man’s physical needs as well as
his spiritual needs.79 In view of the fact that man exists as the result of his own
activities and at the same time constitutes the criterion of his own activities, he can
see himself in a world that he has created and hence approach a state of perfection
and consummation.80
Second, man is master of nature, because man is a species-being, which is to
say that man is a conscious being and that free, conscious activity is man’s species-
character. Man can humanize nature through practice, which must of necessity lead
to the humanization of nature. The German poet and philosopher Friedrich Hölderlin
(1770–1843) wrote the verse—“Full of merit, yet poetically, dwells man on the earth”
in praise of nature as well as in eulogy of man. On the one hand, as a natural being,
man is rooted in nature and lives on nature, which is to say that nature is his body
as well as his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is his direct means of life
and the material, the object, and the instrument of his life, that he must remain
or live in continuous interchange with the natural world, and that his physical and
spiritual life is linked to nature if he is not to die. On the other hand, as a conscious
species-being, man can make the intellect do its utmost to know the natural objects
or the objective world and create a world of objects by his personal activity, thereby
changing natural objects into human or social objects and making them undergo
the change from “being—in—itself” or “being—for—itself” to “being—for—man
himself” that constitutes a two-way, complementary process in which the object
undergoes a process of subjectification while the subject undergoes a process of
objectification. In understanding and changing the objective world, man can allow full
play to his essential powers and change natural objects into human or social objects
endowed with man’s essential powers and hence geared towards man’s physical and
spiritual needs. In his monumental works On the Origin of Species (1859) and The
Descent of Man (1871) the great British naturalist Charles Darwin claimed that man
was descended from apes. But it is infinitely more than this. In view of the fact that
labor is the primary basic condition for all human existence, in a sense, we have to
say that labor created man himself. In Dialectics of Nature “Labor created man” is
79 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume1: Marx: “Critical Notes
on the Article: ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’.” Beijing, China: People’s
Publishing House, p. 487.
a formulation of Marx’s thought by Engels, who usually rendered Marx’s thought

adequately and succinctly. The aforementioned statement cannot be understood in
and by itself. Rather it acquires its meaning by contradicting some traditionally
accepted truth whose plausibility up to the beginning of the modern age had been
beyond doubt. “Labor created man” means first that it is labor rather than God that
created man; second, it means that man, insofar as he is human, creates himself, that
his humanity is the result of his own activity; it means, third, that what distinguishes
man from animal, his differentia specifica, is not reason, but labor, that he is not an
animal rationale, but an animal laborans; fourth, it means that it is not reason, until
then the highest attribute of man, but labor, the traditionally most despised human
activity, which contains the humanity of man. Thus Marx challenges the traditional
God, the traditional estimate of labor, and the traditional glorification of reason.81 For
Engels, the further that man in the making became removed from the animal kingdom,
the higher he rose also over animals. With each generation, labor itself became
different, more perfect, more diversified. New spheres for labor and hence new forms
of activity further and further separated man from the animal. By the co-operation of
hands, organs of speech, and brain, not only in each individual, but also in society,
human beings became capable of executing more and more complicated operations,
and of setting themselves, and achieving, higher and higher aims. The further men
become removed from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes
the character of a premeditated, planned action directed towards definite ends known
in advance. The animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it
simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This
is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it
is labor that brings bout this distinction and that makes man vanquish nature and
reign supreme over all the other creatures in the natural world. In The Tragedy of
Hamlet the English playwright William Shakespeare cannot refrain from expressing
unbounded admiration for man—“What a piece of work is a man! How noble in
reason! How infinite in faculty! In form, in moving, how express and admirable!
In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the
world! The paragon of animals!”82 Thus it can be safely asserted that it is labor
that creates man himself as well as separate individuals and that endows individuals
with the faculties of engaging in self-activities. However, let us not flatter ourselves
overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest
takes its revenge on us. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule
over nature like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and
brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists
in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and
correctly apply its laws and that we should exist in unity or harmony with nature.
81Arendt, Hannah. (2006). Between Past and Future. London: Penguin Books, pp. 21–22.
82Zamir, Tzachi., ed. (2018). Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY:
Third, man can become master of society only if all social members shall take
the initiative in having an association in which the free development of each is the
condition for the free development of all. In the course of historical evolution, men
tend to act as social subjects and historical subjects to build on themselves within
their given historical conditions and social relationships. Thus it is quite obvious
from the start that there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another,
which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old
as men themselves. This connection is ever taking new forms, and thus presents a
“history” independently of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which
in addition may hold men together. This shows that men can bring their brilliant
intellect to bear upon the task of knowing those historically created relations of
individuals to nature and to one another and that in carrying out practical activities,
men can give full play to their initiative in transforming the whole material intercourse
of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. Thus it
follows that the intercourse of individuals to one another must of necessity undergo
the transformation from a state of “being-in-itself” to a state of “being-for-itself,”
which constitutes a two-way, complementary process in which men create new forms
of intercourse and hence act as the social subjects appropriate to those historically
created relations of individuals to nature and to one another. Admittedly, that men take
the more initiative in creating more extensive and profound social relationships would
make it possible for human society and civilization to attain a more advanced stage
with greater promise of perfection for each social subject. It is commonly asserted
that man tends to play a decisive part in developing the relations of man to man as well
as of man to nature. In The German Ideology Marx famously noted that “Where there
exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into ‘relations’ with
anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others
does not exist as a relation.” However, the identity of nature and man appears in such
a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation
to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines their restricted
relation to one another. According to Marx, social activity and social enjoyment
exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly
communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment—i.e.,
activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association
with other men—will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems
from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of
the enjoyment. But also when I am active scientifically, etc.—an activity which I can
seldom perform in direct with others—then my activity is social, because I perform
it as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product
(as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social
activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society
and with the consciousness of myself as a social being. My general consciousness
is only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community,
the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction
from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general
consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social

being. Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis
the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life—even if
they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out
in association with others—are therefore an expression and confirmation of social
life. man’s individual and species-life are not different, however much—and this
is inevitable—the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more
general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular
or more general individual life. In his consciousness of species man confirms his
real social life and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely
the being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself
in its generality as a thinking being. Man, much as he may therefore be a particular
individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and
a real individual social being), is just as much the totality—the ideal totality—the
subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as he exists
also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and
as a totality of human manifestations of life.
(3) Categorization of Subjects
The first category refers to the personal subject, to wit “the subject as a personality
or individual”. In this work, “individual” is called “personality.” The concept of
“personality” that is specific to this very work comes into the category of subjec-
tive anthropology and differs essentially from the conception of “personality” used
respectively in such disciplines as philosophy, ethics, psychology and jurisprudence.
To put it simply, in subjective anthropology the term “personality” is coined to
describe “the actual, real, and concrete individual endowed with essential powers
and unique characteristics” as well as the total number of such individuals. In this
work the personal subject is referred to as “the subject as a personality or indi-
vidual.” “The subject as a personality or individual” means “the subject as an actual,
real, and concrete individual endowed with essential powers and unique character-
istics,” which is used either in the singular or in the plural. “The subject as a person-
ality or individual” is endowed with universal characteristics and essential powers
abstracted from the total number of such individuals as well as unique characteristics
and essential powers inherent in a separate individual.
The second category means the collective subject, that is “the subject as a group.”
In this work “collective” is referred to as “group.” The term “group,” which was
coined specifically for this very work, falls into the category of subjective anthro-
pology and can be conceived as the mature result of many years’ hard work. Specif-
ically, the author consumed more than twenty years in working upon the discipline
of subjective anthropology, immersed himself deeply in the study of a vast amount
of relevant literature, and eventually ventured upon the production of the concept of
“group” after many years of extensive reading, subtle analysis and deep deliberation.
The author holds that in contrast with the concept of “collective,” the concept of
“group” can be geared to meet the specific needs of subjective anthropology more
scientifically and accurately, help smooth away a multitude of academic difficulties

or address a myriad of academic problems confronting the discipline of subjective
anthropology, and hence bring the author’s abstruse ideas within the comprehen-
sion of academic circles more effectively. To put it in a nutshell, the concept of
“group” created specifically for the discipline of subjective anthropology refers to
“the community oriented towards human existence” which can only be built through
human beings’ concerted and conscious efforts. “Group” can be arranged in a hier-
archy—or, to put it another way, it can be organized into different levels of importance
from lowest to highest such as the family, the organization, the state and the inter-
national organization that may come under the same category of “the community
oriented towards human existence” which can only be built through human beings’
common and conscious efforts. In this work the collective subject is referred to as
“the subject as a group.” By “the subject as a group”, we mean “the subject as a
community oriented towards human existence that can only be built through human
beings’ joint efforts.” This shows that “the subject as a group” can be understood at
different levels. “The subject as a group,” including the family, the organization, the
state and the international organization, is endowed with the whole array of general
qualities and universal characteristics generalized from the subjects as the communi-
ties oriented towards human existence at different levels, as well as a myriad of unique
characteristics and qualities respectively inherent in the subjects as the communities
oriented towards human existence at different levels.
The third category is the human subject, namely “the subject as a species.” In
this work the totality of human beings is referred to as “species,” which has been
a generally accepted usage among philosophical circles. Likewise, the discipline of
subjective anthropology still follows the long-established usage and treats the totality
of human beings as “species” accordingly. The subject as the totality of human
beings is called “the subject as a species.” “The subject as a species” is endowed
with universal characteristics and qualities inherent in the human subject as well as
unique characteristics and qualities to itself. The concept of “the subject as a species”
can be used to symbolize the totality of human beings’ essential characteristics and
intrinsic qualities as well as the totality of human interests.
3.2 Man’s Subjectivity and Its Manifold Manifestations
Man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity refers to the human subject’s conscious-

ness, activity and initiative, to wit, such essential characteristics as purpose, activity,
initiative, choice and creativity displayed by the human subject in subject-object
relations and common to man as subject. Man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity
manifests itself mainly in the relationship between the subject and the object or in the
relation(s) of subject to object, in which the subject tries to bring the object within its
comprehension, under control and into use. Human subjectivity or man’s subjectivity
manifests itself in the following ways.
(1) Purpose
We mean by “purpose” that man as subject (the human subject) always remains an
end in subject-object relations. According to the author, man has an exalted position
in the universe. In human practice or human practical activities, man always remains
an end—or, to put it another way, man is an end at all times and in all places. On the
one hand, man exists as the result of his own activities, but on the other, he constitutes
the point of departure of his own activities. Whilst only social practice can be the
criterion of truth, man is the measure of all things as well as the criterion of his own
activities. As Marx argued, in human practice or human practical activities, man
always remains the subject—or, to put it another way, man is the subject at all times
and in all places.83 In this world, only man constitutes the rightful purpose of his own
activities, and virtually all his activities are geared to meeting man’s physical needs
as well as his spiritual needs. In view of the fact that man exists as the result of his
own activities and at the same time constitutes the criterion of his own activities, he
can see himself in a world that he has created and hence approach a state of perfection
and consummation.84 In the course of the history of man, the laws which govern the
development of society and the progress of civilization bear ample testimony to the
universal truth that, on the one hand, man exists as the result of the movement of
history, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of the movement of
history, in which the ultimate goal of human practical activities is to render possible
man’s existence, development, well-being and eternity as well as avoid any human
activity to jeopardize human survival and development.
(2) Consciousness
By “consciousness,” we mean the human subject’s (man as subject) self-
consciousness and corresponding behavior when it stands in a definite relationship
to the object. This demonstrates that man endowed with essential powers, as it were,
could command sufficient courage to become master of the world as well as of
himself, because he is a conscious being and makes his life activity itself the object
of his will and of his consciousness. Consciousness is the manifestation of man’s
essential powers, the externalization of man’s self-consciousness or self-awareness
and the natural need for the actualization of man’s essential nature. No other animal
can compare with man in this world. Man endowed with self-consciousness or
self-awareness is the most intelligent, the most competent, the most indomitable
and the most promising animal and hence entitled to reign over the world. As the
spheres of human activity are increasingly widened, man’s subjective status and
ability will be increasingly improved and his free, conscious subjectivity will be
enhanced accordingly, which will make a free, conscious subject of man himself yet.
84 Ibid., p. 97.
(3) Initiative
By “initiative,” we mean a degree of initiative or activity on the part of the human
subject (man as subject). Man’s initiative or activity constitutes a definite form
of human consciousness in the process of conscious development. Human initia-
tive endows man as subject (the human subject) with conscious wishes or desires,
brings man as subject (the human subject) within the partial comprehension of man’s
conscious purposes and patterns, and enables man as subject (the human subject) to
be partially rid of subjective arbitrariness and randomness, thereby leading man as
subject (the human subject) into a state in which he can behave consciously, or rather,
thereby causing the human subject to be in a position to behave consciously. The
function of human initiative tends to manifest itself in two ways. On the one hand
human initiative enables man as subject (the human subject), to a certain extent, to be
consciously awake to his inherent purpose and vocation, and on the other hand it can
bring man as subject (the human subject), to a certain degree, within the conscious
comprehension and grasp of the laws of development and change of objective things.
As far as mankind is concerned, the human subject’s initiative comes about as the
result of a long process of conscious evolution, while, as far as the individual is
concerned, the human subject’s initiative is formed as the result of a long process of
training and practice.
(4) Choice
By “choice,” we mean the human subject’s ability to consciously judge and choose
behaviors under the pressure of circumstances. That is to say, in responding to envi-
ronmental pressures, the human subject must demonstrate his ability to consciously
judge and choose behaviors. Human choice is the manifestation of man’s essential
powers such as free will and free judgment. It suggests that the human subject can
obtain a clear grasp of his myriad purposes as well as objects’ properties or attributes
and that he can also judge and choose behaviors by taking stock of his immediate
conditions as well as the external environment confronting him. The human subject’s
essential characteristics such as consciousness, initiative and freedom can be fully
manifested through human choice—or, to put it another way, human choice can be a
full manifestation of the human subject’s essential characteristics such as conscious-
ness, initiative and freedom. The concept of “choice” is multifaceted and carries
multiple implications. First, whilst the human subject is hedged around with all sorts
of probabilities, the human subject (man as subject) is entitled to retain the freedom
of choice. If a mere choice were left to the human subject or, even worse, if he were
deprived of the freedom of choice, there would never be any choice on the human
subject’s part. Second, human choice is also a manifestation of man’s subjective
will, without which there would never exist any choice on the part of the human
subject. Third, human choice means the human subject’s ability for choice as well
as his standard of choice. If the human subject is equipped with the definite ability
for choice as well as the definite standard of choice, he could make correct choices,
which would ensure him success and happiness. By contrast, if he is devoid of the
definite ability for choice as well as the definite standard of choice, the human subject
could make wrong choices, which would land him in failure and misfortune. Choices
are practically of most frequent occurrence in the human subject’s life so that he is
hedged around with innumerable choices, whose interrelation with each other as well
as their interaction on each other will eventually shape his course in life and decide
the destiny of a lifetime.
(5) Creativity
Human creativity is the supreme form of human choice as well as the highest mani-
festation of human subjectivity. Human choice encompasses all kinds of acts of
choosing—or, to put it another way, human choice is concerned with any kind of act
of choosing, ranging from “a regular act of choosing” to “an irregular act of choos-
ing” as well as from “a valuable act of choosing” to “a valueless act of choosing,” to
name but a few. In short, human choices are virtually of most frequent occurrence
in human society. Moreover, they occur at all times and in all places. By contrast,
human creativity, as distinct from other kinds of acts of choosing in all its fundamental
bearings, could be regarded as the supreme form of human choice. Fundamentally
speaking, creation is development, progress, qualitative change, transcendence and a
process in which something new is made or brought into existence. Considering that
the human world is undergoing massive changes in all spheres of human activity,
that tremendous advances have been made in material and spiritual civilization and
that human society is undergoing new and startling developments in social systems
and human relations, in retrospect, we are able to admire all human achievements
in every field of human endeavor throughout history, which, with few exceptions,
fall into the category of human creations and which, to a greater or lesser degree,
are connected with human creativity. As Engels pointed out, “The more that human
beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the world, the more
they make their own history consciously, the less becomes the influence of unfore-
seen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the more accurately does the
historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance.”85 Admittedly, human
history bears ample witness to the self-evident truth that the progress of civilization
as well as the development of society, both past and present alike, can be directly or
indirectly attributed to human creativity, which is true of the shape of things to come.
Human creativity is the supreme manifestation of man’s vital power. Just as allowing
full play to human subjectivity depends fundamentally upon human creativity, so
fostering man’s essential powers—a power for man’s creation and development of
himself—hinges primarily upon cultivating man’s creative powers. A progressive
society must of necessity be one overflowing with creativity, exuberant in creativity,
and full of creativity.
Human subjectivity manifests itself in manifold spheres of human activity. Hence
human subjectivity tends to assume definite forms appropriate to definite fields of
social practice. A few examples will suffice to serve as an illustration, such as “cog-
nitive subjectivity” in the field of cognition, “aesthetic subjectivity” in the realm of
85Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 3: Engels: Dialectics of
Nature. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 457.
aesthetics, “the subjectivity of the decision-maker” in the field of management and

“axiological subjectivity” in the domain of axiology, to name but a few. In view of
the fact that human subjectivity constitutes the fundamental foundation of collective,
anthropological life and that it is the necessity to be in our consciousness what we
are in and to the world at large—to others, and toward nature, we must wake up to
the imperative necessity of enhancing human subjectivity and subjective initiative as
well as bringing them into full play in manifold spheres of social practice.
3.3 Definite Values Appropriate to Definite Kinds of Human

Subjectivity
Human subjectivities can be categorized according to what category human subjects

come into. Generally speaking, human subjects fall into three categories, that is “the
subject as a personality,” “the subject as a group” and “the subject as a species.”
Human subjectivities can be categorized into the three categories of “the subjec-
tivity of personality,” “the subjectivity of group” and “the subjectivity of species”
accordingly. In addition, there exists a fourth category of human subjectivity, namely
“intersubjectivity.”
(1) The Value Inherent in “The Subjectivity of Personality”
The unique, indispensable and irreplaceable value inherent in “the subjectivity of
personality” (the individual’s subjectivity) lies in the fact that “the subjectivity of
personality” (the individual’s subjectivity) provides the basis for human existence.
As Marx argued, “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence
of living human individuals.”86 The basis for any human subject’s activity can only
be the separate individual, that is the personality. Given that the free and all-round
development of each as well as of all never appears to be something distinct, sepa-
rate or independent of social development, the way that definite individuals exist is
appropriate to the way that the definite society exists. As Marx noted, “From this
it can only be concluded that the social history of man is never anything else than
the history of his individual development, whether he is conscious of this or not.”87
Only if human and social values are married with the mentalities of living individuals
can they appear real, immediate to living individuals. Hence it is only through the
practical activities of living individuals that human and social values can be put into
practice eventually. If human subjectivity were divorced from separate individuals,
we should be at a loss what to do with it. The main purpose of marrying human
subjectivity with the separate individual is to endow the separate individual with
86 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 3:
The German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 23.
87 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 4:
Marx: “Letter from Marx to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov (December 28, 1846).” Beijing, China:
individual characteristics, which will eventually mould him into a man of individual
personality, whose inexhaustible creativity deserves to be fostered. As Marx pointed
out, “All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man
himself. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen,
and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life,
in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized
and organized his ‘own powers’ as social powers, and, consequently, no longer sepa-
rates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human
emancipation have been accomplished.”88 The fundamental thing, however, is that
we should attach importance to everyone’s initiative and creativity and give full scope
to everyone’s creative powers. In general, human personality is conceived to have
genetic as well as environmental origins. Personality is defined as the characteristic
sets of behaviors, cognitions, and emotional patterns that evolve from biological
and environmental factors.89 Personality embraces “behavioral characteristics, both
inherent and acquired, that are most clearly expressed in interactions with other
people, that can distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in
people’s relations to the environment and to the social group.”90 Therefore, it can be
safely asserted that it is on the biological basis that human personality evolves from
such factors as environmental influences, social interactions and life experiences and
that it forms as a result of human beings’ active cultivation and creation. Perfection
of personality presupposes an individual’s constant self-reflection, constant self-
transcendence, and constant self-elevation—or, to put it another way, the individual
is expected to be constantly striving after a lofty realm of thought. In The Analects
of Confucius, Confucius, who was China’s first teacher as well as the founder of the
Confucian school, enlightened us about how to cultivate and perfect human person-
ality by setting forth sensible views on the question. As he taught, “At fifteen I set
my heart on learning. At thirty I could take my stance. At forty I had no doubts. At
fifty I knew the Decree of Heaven. At sixty I was already obedient to this Decree. At
seventy I could follow the desires of my mind without overstepping the boundaries
of what is right.”91 It is thus clear that it would take one more than a lifetime to
cultivate his subjectivity and elevate his mind.
(2) The Value Inherent in the Subjectivity of a Group
As was stated above, “the subject as a group” can be understood at different levels.
“The subject as a group,” including the family, the organization, the state and the
international organization, is endowed with the whole array of general qualities and
universal characteristics generalized from the subjects as the communities oriented
88 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 1:
Marx: “On the Jewish Question.”Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 443.
89 Corr, Philip J., & Matthews, Gerald. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

90 Holzman, P. S. “personality.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 24, 2020. https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/personality.
91 Feng, You-Lan. (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China: The Publishing
House of Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, pp. 74, 76.

towards human existence at different levels as well as a myriad of unique character-

istics and qualities respectively inherent in the subjects as the communities oriented
towards human existence at different levels. By contrast, the values inherent in the
subjectivity of a group are most self-evident. How the subjectivity of a group develops
will have a great deal to do with the standard of a group’s (the family, the organi-
zation, the state and the international organization) material and spiritual life, have
a direct bearing on the extent to which each individual’s subjectivity, in contrast
with every other individual’s subjectivity, is cultivated and harnessed within a group,
and, more importantly, affect the destiny and future of a group. In contrasting the
English national character with the German and the French character, Engels set
forth well grounded views on the subject at great length. As Engels pointed out,
between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, “The Germans, the nation of
Christian spiritualism, experienced a philosophical revolution; the French, the nation
of classical materialism and hence of politics, had to go through a political revolu-
tion; the English, a nation that is a mixture of German and French elements, who
therefore embody both sides of the antithesis and are for that reason more universal
than either of the two factors taken separately, were for that reason drawn into a
more universal, a social revolution.” Nonetheless, he continued regretfully, “This
will need to be elaborated in greater detail, for the position of nations, at least with
regard to recent times, has in our philosophy of history so far been dealt with very
inadequately, or rather not all.”92 The above discussion with regard to the subject
urges that we should attach great importance to the study, cultivation and harnessing
of “the subjectivity of a group.” In general, “the subjectivity of personality” tends to
act in unison with “the subjectivity of group”, and this is manifested in two ways.
First, on the one hand “the subjectivity of personality” can only be formed in “the
subjectivity of group,” and on the other hand the cultivation and development of “the
subjectivity of group” can only depend upon the development of “the subjectivity of
personality.” Second, “the subjectivity of group” must dispense appropriate educa-
tion and guidance to “the subjectivity of personality” and make it identify with the
existing order of things and conform to definite standards of behavior. Meanwhile, it
cannot be emphasized enough that “the subjectivity of group” must also provide “the
subjectivity of personality” with appropriate education and guidance to emancipate
its mind and hence harness the substantive powers inherent in “the subjectivity of
personality”—consciousness, independence, creativity and initiative.
(3) The Value Inherent in “the Subjectivity of Species”
Before elaborating on the value inherent in “the subjectivity of species,” we feel the
necessity of furnishing some slight explanation of the concept of “species.” Looked
at from a Marxist perspective, the concept of “species” is aimed at providing a scien-
tific description of and casting illumination on the totality and universality inherent in
human existence. Admittedly, it is on his own initiative that man, as a species-being,
endows his existence with unity and universality. The true basis of this pluralistic
92Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1956). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Engels: “The
Condition of England: the Eighteenth Century.” Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 658.
unity, which can only be manifested through man’s free, conscious activity, or rather,
man’s species-character, lies in the fact that individual characteristics must undergo
an all-round or overall development and can be brought into full play, yet this unity
in man’s species-life awakens us to the paradoxical nature of human existence, that
is to say, man is condemned to self-transcendence and he is condemned to transcend
himself at all times and in all places. This is unique to man, the advanced life form in
which the nervous system attains its fullest development and in which nature attains
consciousness of itself. It is commonly asserted that man was descended from the
apes—or, to put it another way, man developed from now-extinct primates. Nonethe-
less, the more human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense
of the word, the more man’s nature and form become advanced in relation to the
animal’s. The essence of man, that is “the subjectivity of species,” manifests itself in
the multitude of essential differences existing between humans and animals. Funda-
mentally speaking, humans differ essentially from animals in the following respects.
First, animal nature forms as a result of natural selection, while man forms his species-
nature and species-character through his practical activities. Second, animal traits are
genetically determined and transmitted, whereas it is on his own initiative that man
acquires his species-nature and species-character. Third, animal traits are relatively
fixed and thus immutable. By contrast, man’s species-nature and species-character
are constantly changing and developing, thereby opening up infinite possibilities for
man. Fourth, the unity manifested in animal traits is universally applicable to cognate
species, while man’s species-nature and species-character differs from individual to
individual, depending on concrete differences among actual, real, and living indi-
viduals. This is Marx’s viewpoint on the fundamental differences between humans
and animals, which has been repeatedly emphasized in his works. As Marx put it in
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “The animal is immediately one
with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man
makes his life activity the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious
life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life
activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of
this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a
conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his
activity free activity. It is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life
activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence….The whole character of
a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of its life activity, and
free, conscious activity is man’s species-character.”93 “The subjectivity of species”
manifests itself not only in man’s species-nature and species-character, which is
contained in the character of man’s free, conscious activity, but also in a whole new
perspective on human relations, or rather, the most recently developed ideas on the
relation of man to nature, to society, and to himself. What has been discussed above
may be briefly summarized as follows. On the one hand, “the subjectivity of species”
opens up a myriad of possibilities for new angles of vision to relevant questions, new
93 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Mar& Engels Collected Works, Volume 1: Marx: Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 162.

theoretical principles, new value systems, new ways of considering problems and
new realms of thought. On the other hand, only if all “personalities” (individuals)
and “groups” (families, organizations, states and international organizations) when
confronted with severe challenges in the 21 century form and perfect “the subjectivity
of species” as well as “the consciousness of species” can they free themselves of the
pernicious influences of the polarized way of thinking, the scholastic or metaphys-
ical thesis that there exists such predetermined essence to be found in human beings
and the absolute idea of truth, extricate themselves from the awkward predicament
in which mankind has to face and endure the tragic consequences of mass suicide,
give themselves a new outlook upon life and a new orientation in life which must
of necessity exert a beneficial influence on man’s standards of behavior, help the
subject as a personality, the subject as a group, and the subject as a species get rid of
the long-standing mistaken ideas, and hence help mankind march towards a bright
future.
(4) The Value Inherent in “Intersubjectivity”
By “intersubjectivity” we mean the human subjectivity manifesting itself in a variety
of interactions between human subjects of various kinds. More specifically, “inter-
subjectivity” refers to man’s essential nature and subjective activity shared by all
human beings and manifesting themselves in a variety of interactions between human
subjects of all kinds—purpose, consciousness, initiative, choice and creativity. “Inter-
subjectivity” possesses two fundamental characteristics: first, “intersubjectivity”
constitutes a necessity to human interactions—or, to put it another way, “intersub-
jectivity” exists in human interactions as a necessity. It is commonly asserted that
none of human subjects exists in isolation. Hence human subjectivity manifests itself
in the relation of subject to object and of subject to subject as well as in the inter-
course between human beings. It is therefore clear that “intersubjectivity” mani-
fested through human interactions exists in mutual intercourse of human subjects
as a necessity and that it constitutes a necessity to the intercourse among human
subjects. Second, the formation, development and perfection of “intersubjectivity”
is attributable to man’s own initiative and subjective activity. Just as other three kinds
of human subjectivity exist as a result of man’s own initiative and subjective activity,
so the development and perfection of “intersubjectivity” depend fundamentally upon
human cultivation and social development. In cultivating and developing all kinds of
human subjectivity, human beings ought to cultivate and develop “intersubjectivity”
between human subjects in particular. Hence it can be safely asserted that how it fares
with “intersubjectivity” will have a huge bearing on the fate of human subjectivity
in general.
The concept of “intersubjectivity” as well as the theory of “intersubjectivity” orig-
inated with Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre, who attempted to wrestle with the
complicated issues of intersubjectivity in their respective writings. Edmund Husserl
recognized the importance of intersubjectivity, and wrote extensively on the topic.
He considered intersubjectivity crucial not only at the relational level but also at the
epistemological and even metaphysical levels. In Cartesian Meditations: An Intro-
duction to Phenomenology, or rather, the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl attempts
to grapple with the problem of intersubjectivity and puts forward his theory of tran-
scendental, monadological intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, each particular
man as his private synthetic formation in his transcendentally reduced pure conscious
life, or rather, each particular monad in his peculiar ownness, represents a particular
cognitive subject, and has a universe of what is peculiarly his own, that is the world
constituted transcendentally in him—the domain of his peculiarly own essentiality, of
what he is in himself, in his full concreteness or what he is in himself as a monad, or,
to put it another way, he has a universe of what is specifically peculiar to his concrete
being as a monad, purely in himself and for himself with an exclusive ownness. For
Husserl, the general consensus among men of the world is that an intersubjective
world should be established and that each particular man’s peculiar ownnes should
be connected with the intersubjective world. In his own words, “To this community
there naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open commu-
nity of monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity.”94 Similarly,
the term “intersubjectivity” has also been used in Sartre’s studies on man to refer to
the intersubjective relationship between people. Marx’s writings also touch upon the
intersubjectivity between people. For Marx, man always remains the subject – that
is, man can be reduced not merely to a conscious subject but, more importantly, to a
historical, practical subject. The relation of individuals to one another, which differs
essentially from that of individuals to things, can be reduced to the practical inter-
course of individuals. Man’s estranged, alienated relation to the other manifests itself
precisely in the fact that the subjective relation of individuals to one another resolves
itself into “a social relation between things”. It is precisely this estranged, alienated
relation of individuals to one another that the communist movement will eventually
do away with or abolish. It is thus clear that Marxist theory provides the theoretical
framework and basis for the practical construction of intersubjective relations.
Generally speaking, we will distinguish between three types of intersubjectivity
which are endowed with their own special constitutive function and performance.
What we mean by the first intersubjectivity is that the interests of subjects harmonize,
that subjects treat each other as ends and that subjects are on very intimate terms
with each other. This type of intersubjectivity exists in primitive society as well as
in modern society as exemplified by the domestic relations based upon true love
including parental (paternal or maternal), conjugal, or filial love. As for the second
type of intersubjectivity, it refers to the intersubjective relation in which subjects treat
each other as means and which exists in those forms of society founded on private
ownership in the history of all hitherto existing society, especially in the market
economy society. By the third type of intersubjectivity, we mean that this type of
inersubjectivity can only be manifested through the voluntary association of free
men and that it can only be possible of realization in the Communist society—that
is, a final stage of society in Marxist theory in which the state has withered away and
economic goods are distributed equitably. In the Communist society, subjects treat
each other as ends, and the all-round and free development of each subject is the
94
Husserl, Edmund.(1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Leiden,
NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 166.
4 Man’s “Dual Life” 131
condition for the all-round and free development of all. In pointing out the fact that
man’s rational nature exists as an end in itself, Kant gives the practical imperative
in this form: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that
of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.”95 In the work of
Kant, the principle that each person constitutes an end in itself is seen as the basis
for developing a perfect society in which each man would act, and be treated, as
an end. This “kingdom of ends” bears a striking resemblance to the social structure
envisioned by Rousseau as the voluntary cooperation of free men in the ideal state.
Surely we cannot fail to see reflected here the thoughts of Mme de Wolmar in sections
of La Nouvelle Héloïse: “It is never right to harm a human soul for the advantage of
others.”96 And Later: “Man is too noble a being to serve simply as the instrument for
others, and he must not be used for what suits them without consulting also what suits
himself….”97 On the whole, the second type or state of “intersubjectivity” asserts
itself in its own right as the dominant form of social interaction in modern society. It
has become an imperative necessity that human social interaction should undergo a
transformation from the state of “intersubjectivity’ in which subjects treat each other
as means to the state of “intersubjectivity” in which subjects treat each other as ends
as well as to the state of “intersubjectivity” in which “the voluntary association of
free men” ultimately prevails. The development of “intersubjectivity” has to meet,
among other things, the following two requisite conditions: first, economic and social
progress lays the foundation for the development of “intersubjectivity.” Second,
the cultural and moral progress may serve as necessary conditions for actuating
the development of “intersubjectivity.” In acting in concert with each other, the
aforementioned conditions are mutually conditioned, mutually complementary, and
are indispensible for the development of “intersubjectivity.” With the above situation
in view, we must make concerted and consistent efforts to fulfill the above-mentioned
conditions so that we can develop and promote “intersubjective” relations.
4 Man’s “Dual Life”
4.1 The Implications of Man’s “Dual Life”
It is generally accepted that man is the only creature in the world that is endowed with
its own distinctively characteristic species-character surpassing those of other species
and thereby distinguishing it from other species in all its fundamental bearings. To put
it another way, man is possessed of “dual life”—that is, “natural life and supernatural
life.” Thus it can be seen that man lives a natural life as well as a supernatural life,
95 Kant, Immanuel.(1949). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas

Kingsmill Abbot, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, p. 53.
96 Cassirer, Ernst. (1970). Rousseau-Kant-Goethe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 33.
97 Ibid.
that man’s natural life differs from his supernatural life and that man’s natural life is
thoroughly impregnated with a supernatural life.
(1) The Basis of Man’s “Dual Life”
What is essential in the existence of man is the fact that he is a part of nature, yet he
somehow and in some ways transcends nature, which lays the basis for man’s “dual
life.” For the sake of further clarification on the evolutionary history of life on earth,
in particular the two substantial advances in the evolutionary process of nature—
that is, the emergence of living organisms and the appearance of human beings on
earth, we feel the necessity of having recourse to Frederick Engels’ Dialectics of
Nature so that we could gain a good deal of enlightenment from it. “If, finally, the
temperature becomes so far equalized that over a considerable portion of the surface
at least it does not exceed the limits within which protein iscapable of life, then,
if other chemical conditions are favorable, living protoplasm is formed. What these
conditions are, we do not yet know, which is not to be wondered at since so far even the
chemical formula of protein has been established—we do not even know how many
chemically different protein bodies there are—and since it is only about ten years
ago that the fact became known that completely structureless protein exercises all the
essential functions of life, digestion, excretion, movement, contraction, reaction to
stimuli, and reproduction. Thousands of years may have passed before the conditions
arose in which the next advance could take place and this formless protein produce
the first cell by formation of nucleus and cell membrane. But this first cell also
provided the foundation for the morphological development of the whole organic
world; the first to develop, as it is permissible to assume from the whole analogy
of the paleontological record, were innumerable species of non-cellular and cellular
protista, of which Eozoon canadense alone has come down to us, and of which some
were gradually differentiated into the first plants and others into the first animals.
And from the first animals were developed, essentially by further differentiation,
the numerous classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals; and finally
mammals, the form in which the nervous system attains its fullest development; and
among these again finally that mammal in which nature attains consciousness of
itself—man.” According to the above copious quotations adduced from Frederick
Engels’Dialectics of Nature, it can be safely asserted that the advent of human life
on this planet marks a most important advance in the evolutionary process of nature.
This world was from thenceforth impregnated with “man’s supernatural life” and
gradually changed into “the human world” characterized by the predominance of
“man’s supernatural life.” Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account
of our human conquest over nature. For each such conquest takes its revenge on us.
Each of them, it is true, has in the first place the consequences on which we counted,
but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only
too often cancel out the first. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means
rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside
nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its
midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage
over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws. In terms
of how nature relates to organic life, the life of a human being differs essentially
from the life of an animal in two respects: first, in the evolutionary process of nature
there arose the essential difference between natural life and supernatural life among
living organisms. Animals do not transcend nature, but still belong to nature, thereby
existing merely as a part of nature. Animals solely depend upon the bounty of nature
and follow simply the natural instincts in the struggle for existence. For animals, only
natural selection can render possible the preservation of favored races in the struggle
for life. Thus it can be seen that rather than existing as “a being for itself” possessed of
consciousness or initiative, the life of an animal exists as “a self-acting being,” thereby
falling under the designation of “a self-acting being in itself,” that it follows merely the
instincts of nature in the struggle for existence and that its “self-acting being” is left
completely at the mercy of the fundamental instincts upon which the life of an animal
is built. This shows clearly and conclusively that the life of a human being differs
essentially from the life of an animal. Man is able to seize the initiative in grasping
his destiny in his own hands and hence transcends nature. Rather than depending
upon the bounty of nature, man can produce the necessary means of subsistence
which comes ultimately from human labor and practice whereby man brought about
a fundamental change in his own manner of existence as well as the animal’s mode of
life. It is therefore clear that the life of a human being exists as “a self-acting being for
itself”. Second, the process of natural development has also witnessed a fundamental
change in the relationship between the life of an animal and the environment as well
as the relationship between the life of a human being and the environment—that
is to say, the animal is at the mercy of its environment, it has to adjust itself to
its environment by instinct in the struggle for life, and thus it is the product of its
environment, whereas man, far from being the product of his environment, can grasp
objective laws independent of his will and have recourse to natural laws to remake
nature in the struggle for existence. The animal belongs to its environment, the life of
an animal merely exists as a part of its environment—that is to say, its environment
includes the animal, and the animal is in essence one with its environment. The life
of an animal is determined, governed and dominated by its environment. Whether
or not an animal can survive in its environment fundamentally hinges upon how
the animal adjusts itself to its environment. The relationship between the life of an
animal and its environment constitutes a sharp contrast to the relationship between
the life of a human being and its environment. Not only can man make his life
activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness, but through his creative
activity man can make the environment the object he has been trying to transform in
the struggle for existence—that is, man can make the environment a part of human
life, thereby making the environment an extension of his body and organs. If the
environment undergoes few changes by itself, man will bring about corresponding
changes in the environment through his practical activity. It is thus evident that it is
not that the environment governs the life of a human being, but rather that the life of
a human being dominates its environment. The way that the life of a human being
relates to its environment shows clearly and conclusively that man endowed with such
distinctively characteristic attributes as consciousness, initiative and self-discipline
can govern, dominate and conquer his environment.
(2) The Mode of Existence of Man’s “Dual Life”

The fact that man transcends nature marks a fundamental change in the nature of
living things existent in the universe—that is to say, with the advent of human life
on this planet, man’s natural life as well as his supernatural life is bound to leave
its mark upon the evolutionary history of nature. The fact that man is no longer at
the mercy of his environment demonstrates indisputably that nature has lost abso-
lute control and domination over human life and that man becomes “a self-defined
being.” The life of an animal, which exists merely as a part of nature, belongs to
its environment and is at the mercy of its environment, because nature dominates
its existence and governs its life. The way that the animal relates to its environment
manifests itself in two ways. First, in terms of how the animal relates to its environ-
ment, the animal is at the mercy of its environment, which dominates its existence
and governs its life. Only if an individual animal adjusts itself to its environment
can it survive, otherwise it must perish. As A. G. Brown argues, “The success of
an animal species in its relationships with the external environment is dependent
on how well it can adapt to changes in that environment. Part of this adaptation is,
of course, evolutionary and, by the process of natural selection, leads to the emer-
gence of new species over time. Within the lifetime of an individual animal success
is strongly dependent on that animal’s ability to adapt to the environment, and, in
particular, to alter its behavior in appropriate ways.”98 Second, in terms of how an
animal alters its behavior to adapt to its environment, animal behavior is completely
controlled or totally governed by nature—that is to say, animal behavior is guided
by the animal’s natural instincts. An animal is devoid of self-consciousness, nor is
it possessed of “the sense of self.” The life of an animal, which differs essentially
from human life, follows simply the instincts of nature and is completely at one
with nature. When human life underwent the change from natural life to “supernat-
ural life,” man’s “supernatural life” endowed with such distinctively characteristic
attributes as “self” and “self-consciousness” started to be master of human life. Like-
wise, the fundamental change in human life also manifests itself in two ways. First,
the fact that human life is endowed with such distinctively characteristic attributes
as consciousness and self-discipline will ensure that human life is no longer guided
by instinct and that man can dominate his environment. Second, human behavior is
no longer guided by instinct, but rather is dominated by man’s consciousness as well
as by his sense of self. The fact that human life is characterized by the predominance
of man’s “supernatural life” marks a substantial advance in the evolutionary process
of natural life, demonstrating clearly and conclusively that the evolution of life on
earth witnessed a fundamental change from animal life to human life and that natural
life managed to free itself from the domination of nature eventually. Marx gave a
brilliant exposition of the aforementioned subject in his writings, which made a deep
impression on us. We may gain a good deal of enlightenment from the following
quotations adduced from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
“The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself
98Brown, A. G. (2001). Nerve Cells and Nervous Systems: An Introduction to Neuroscience.

London: Springer-Verlag, p. 231.
from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and
of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with
which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately
from animal life activity.”99 In addition, Frederick Engels’ illuminating remarks in
his Dialectics of Nature can also enlighten us on this subject. “In short, the animal
merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it simply by his presence;
man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential
distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labor that brings
about this distinction.”100
Fundamentally speaking, the distinction between human life and animal life lies in
the fact that an animal lives merely a “natural life,” while man finds himself possessed
of a “dual life”—that is, man lives “a natural life as well as a supernatural life” or, to
put it another way, man is endowed with “instinctive life and super-instinctive life.”
Herein lies the uniqueness of human life as well as the essence of human life. Based
on the single instinctual life bestowed upon humankind by nature, man gradually
found himself possessed of a second life by his labor, that is, a “supernatural life”—
or, to put it another way, man has “conscious life activity” and makes himself master
of his life activity. All the distinctively characteristic attributes such as initiative,
value, consciousness, complexity and infinity inherent in human life may trace their
origin to the advent of man’s “supernatural life” on earth. Admittedly, the fact that
human life represents the supreme form of life in the universe demonstrates clearly
and conclusively that the evolution of life in the universe has attained a new stage
of development. Man’s “dual life” shows us that the essence of man is dependent
upon man’s “dual life”—that is to say, man’s “natural life and supernatural life.” To
put it another way, the human essence not merely depends upon man’s natural life,
but more importantly hinges upon his “supernatural life.” It is therefore clear that
the being of a man differs essentially from the being of an animal in all respects.
In particular, the manner and value and manifestations and characteristics of human
existence are fundamentally different from those inherent in the being of an animal.
It can be safely asserted that, in contrast to animal life, human life is absolutely
new and unique. With the above situation in view, when we attempt to acquire a
deeper understanding as to the truth of what it is to be a human being and throw
clear impartial light upon man, we must start out from the premise that man finds
himself possessed of a “dual life”—that is, man lives “a natural life as well as a
supernatural life” or, to put it another way, man is endowed with “instinctive life and
super-instinctive life,” otherwise we will have a fragmentary knowledge of man. For
“the theory of structure and choice,” the theory about “man’s dual life” may serve
as a fundamental principle that can be used to throw considerable further light upon
man.
99Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 41.
100McCormack, Teresa., Hoerl, Christoph., & Butterfill, Stephen., eds. (2011). Tool Use and Causal
Cognition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 111.
4.2 The Multiple Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life
The hard and fast distinction between human life and animal life lies in the fact
that an animal lives merely “a natural life,” while man finds himself possessed of
“a dual life”—that is, man is endowed with “natural life and supernatural life” or,
to put it another way, man is born to lead a natural life and a supernatural life. The
constant contradiction, opposition and struggle between man’s natural life and his
supernatural life that manifest themselves in human practical activity as well as in
man’s struggle for existence assuredly make it possible for human life to evolve
into a dual life, which manifests itself in multiple or manifold forms, and to be
characterized by multiple or manifold manifestations of a dual life, which tend to
display myriad, vivid and complex characteristics that defy description. To put it
in a nutshell, the life of a human being in the strict sense of the word is nothing
but a negative unity manifested through its inherent multiplicity of contradictory
relationships. This negative unity manifests itself mainly in the relation of man to
himself as well as in the relation of man to the world including the relation of man
to nature and the relation of man to society.
(1) The Multiple or Manifold Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life in the Relation
of Man to Himself
When we concentrate our attention upon the relation of man to himself, we tend
to find that our self is a dialectical unity of multiple or manifold contradictions
inherent in man’s dual life wherein the multiple or manifold contradictions inherent
in man’s dual life, which intermingle with each other and interact on each other, on
the one hand follow the law of the unity of opposites, but on the other, act together
to form a pluralistic, open, dynamic and changing system. The multiple or manifold
oppositions inherent in the self such as man’s historicity versus his super-historicity,
man’s finitude versus his infinity, man’s reality versus his ideality, man’s sensibility
versus his sense and man’s soul versus his body tend to make man live a full and
varied life.
First, the duality of man’s historicity versus his super-historicity. In the customary
sense, man’s historical being manifests itself mainly in the fact that man lives in the
past, in the present and in the future. As fate would have it, the life of a human
being is bound up with his life, past, present and future. With the above situation
in view, man always strives after a fuller, brighter and nobler life in the future.
Man’s future cannot exist without his past or history. Hence, man’s past and history
constitute determining factors in shaping his future. It is commonly asserted that a
lofty ideal possible of realization in the future is usually the best guidance in difficult
situations and that it will impel people to advance courageously. Without an ideal
he deems worth cherishing, defending and pursuing, man cannot live in the present,
let alone live a fuller, brighter and nobler life in the future. It is therefore clear that
the contradiction or opposition between man’s “history” and his “future,” or rather
man’s historicity and his super-historicity, is indispensably necessary to human life.
Second, the “duality” of man’s finitude and infinity. Given that human existence
is in a way reducible to the problem of time, it can be safely asserted that man is a
finite being as well as an infinite being, which is to say that when we recognize man’s
finitude, we must at the same time recognize his infinity. With the above situation in
view, the formidable rift, the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite must of
necessity open in man’s search for temporal fulfillment and the fusion of his past,
present and future. Man who comes into the world finds no escape from the finality of
death, but rather has to accept death with fatalistic resignation. Not only does death
come to all men, but also death may come at any hour. Despite this, in fighting against
death, man who is capable of creative achievements tries to transcend his finitude and
overcome the finality of death, thereby striving after immortality of mortal nature as
well as infinity absorbed in the finite. In the face of death, man’s life vanishes like the
dew, yet man can make his life endure for ages by his productive labor. Confronted
with his finitude, man can strive after the infinite goal of moral perfection and cultural
creation. It is therefore clear that man recognizes the aspiration to immortality as the
base on which all of human cultural creativity is built and that infinity is the mighty
foundation of all cultural life in every aspect. The way that man strives after eternity
and infinity manifests itself in the fact that man sees no limits to his natural life,
but rather that he strives after his “supernatural life” oriented towards value, mind
and reason, which will, in turn, make it possible for human life to be endowed with
the attributes of eternity and infinity, or rather possessed of an eternal and infinite
essence.
Third, the “duality” of man’s reality and his ideality. It is commonly asserted that
man who lives a real life possesses an ideal he deems worth cherishing, defending
and pursuing, that man can reconcile the realities of life with the dreams of life
and that man can exert all the endeavors in his power to convert his dream into
reality. “Reality” is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within a
system, as opposed to that which is only imaginary. The term is also used to refer
to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence. Hence, “reality” can be
defined in a way that links it to man’s immediate existence. By “ideal” we mean that
man who cherishes high hopes for the future is always building hope into the future.
It is commonly argued that man’s reality lays the foundation for the attainment of his
ideal, while man’s ideal constitutes the extension of his reality, which is to say that
man’s ideal can bridge the gap between the realities of life and the dreams of life.
Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man
exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, finds himself divorced from reality, he
will be devoid of any basis or foundation on which men shall have an association, in
which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.
Whoever voluntarily forsakes ideals must of necessity have a dim future before him.
Man with his feet firmly on the solid ground always looks forward to the future and
strives after a lofty ideal. For an individual, not merely does the “duality” of man’s
reality and his ideality aid him materially in choosing the basic orientation towards
life, but also it serves as a source of motive power underlying all his life activity. Man
never rests content with things as they are, or rather the existing state of affairs, nor
does he feel content with his immediate existence, but rather cherishes high hopes
for all that brightens and beautifies existence. It is common knowledge that both
man and animal are mortal in their physical lives. But whereas an animal’s existence
ceases with its physical death, man’s essence lives on in a spiritual existence. When
an animal experiences physical death, its body is still in existence, but its life-force—
its soul—ceases to exist. But when a person dies, his soul passes to a higher realm
where it lives on. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need
of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance
of beauty. With the above situation in view, it can be safely asserted that an animal’s
existence can be described as what it is to be an animal, whereas human existence
can be characterized as both what it is to be a human being and what it is not to be
a human being. To summarize, the “duality” of man’s reality and his ideality may
act as a source of motive power that serves to aid man materially in actuating the
development of man’s “dual life” as well as achieving the unity of man’s “dual life.”
Thus it is clear that man’s historicity versus his super-historicity, man’s finitude
versus his infinity and man’s reality versus his ideality that can be attributed to the
“duality” of man’s natural life and his supernatural life may justify their concurrent
existence in human life wherein the inherent attributes in contradiction to each other
meet each other, interact on each other, transform themselves into each other, and
act together to form the system of human life. Human life can be characterized, so
to speak, as a gigantic nexus of huge significance consisting of multiple or manifold
contradictions inherent in man’s dual life. The essence of human life manifests itself
not in either of two opposing extremes, but in the dialectical unity of the multiple or
manifold contradictions inherent in man’s dual life.
(2) The Multiple or Manifold Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life in the Relation
of Man to the World
Man and the world merge into an organic whole, and the complex relationship
between them, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society,
not merely constitutes a necessary prerequisite to man’s dual life characterized by
multiple or manifold inherent contradictions, but also forms the basis of it. Man’s
dual life characterized by multiple or manifold inherent oppositions never forms in
isolation, nor does it exist or develop separately from other things that are connected
with it. Man and the world merge into an organic whole, and it is in the complex
relationship between them, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to
society, that man’s dual life characterized by multiple inherent contradictions forms,
exists and develops. Without the merging of man and the world into an organic whole
or the complex relationship between man and the world, i.e. the relation of man to
nature and the relation of man to society, man’s dual life characterized by multiple
inherent oppositions will not form, nor will it exist or develop. Human life is not
an isolated, closed system, but rather an open one, in which the relation of man
to nature and the relation of man to society are inextricably interwoven with each
other in the merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as in the
dynamic, complex relationship between man and the world. It is in the very merging
of man and the world into an organic whole as well as in the complex relationship
between man and the world that man’s dual life characterized by manifold inherent
oppositions unfolds itself to the outer world and meanwhile imparts an interesting
and colorful aspect to the outside world. Man’s dual life characterized by multiple
inherent contradictions, the merging of man and the world into an organic whole,
and the dynamic, complex relationship between man and the world, i.e. the relation
of man to nature and the relation of man to society, coexist with each other, undergo
a concurrent development, and are hardly ever divorced from each other.
The merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as the dynamic,
complex relation of man to the world is determined by the distinctively characteristic
attributes which are peculiar to human beings—or, to put it another way, what is
distinctively and uniquely characteristic of a human being necessarily determines
the merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well as man’s dynamic,
complex relationship to the world. In contrast with man’s relation to the world,
animals’ relations with nature as well as with each other, which are simple and rigid,
tend to be determined by the natural instincts upon which animal life is fundamentally
built. The genes of one species tend to determine the relationship of the species to
its environment. Fundamentally speaking, how the genes of a species are structured
and organized will shape the species-specific behavioral patterns, which hardly ever
transcend what has been identified in the genetic structure of a species. It is therefore
clear that, for a species, freedom or initiative almost never manifests itself in the
relationship of a species to its environment. On the contrary, the relationship between
man and the world is characterized by man’s freedom, initiative (subjective activity),
change and development—that is to say, man’s freedom and initiative are embodied in
the change and development of man’s relation to the world, which is to say that man’s
freedom and initiative are inextricably interwoven with the change and development
of man’s relationship with the world. On the one hand, man and the world merge
into an organic whole, and on the other hand, the development of man’s relation to
the world and the development of man himself are interrelated with each other and
interact on each other, or rather condition each other. Specifically, man’s dual life
characterized by manifold inherent oppositions actuates the development of multiple
forms of duality manifesting themselves in the relationship between man and the
world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of man to society, and vice
versa. It is in the very merging of man and the world into an organic whole as well
as in the complex relationship of man to the world that man’s dual life characterized
by multiple inherent oppositions attains its richness and variety as well as its full
development. As Marx put it, “As individuals express their life, so they are. What
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce
and with how they produce.”101 That is to say, the “multiple duality” aspect of what
they are coincides with the “multiple duality” aspect of “what they produce,” i.e.
the relation of man to nature, and of “how they produce,” i.e. the relation of man to
society as well as the relation of man to nature.
101Marx, K., Engels, F. (1960). Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol.3: Marx & Engels: The
German Ideology. Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, p. 229.
Man’s relation to the world, i.e. the relation of man to nature and the relation of
man to society, which is characterized by “multiple duality,” manifests itself in the
following three aspects:
First, the relationship between man and nature. In man’s practical activity as
well as in his struggle for existence, man’s relationship to nature becomes an object
of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple duality” makes it possible for
man’s relationship with nature to be characterized by “duality,” or rather by “multiple
duality” such as the contrasting poles of phenomenon and essence, particularity and
generality, fortuity and necessity as well as possibility and reality. In the relation
of man to nature characterized by “multiple duality,” man’s physical and spiritual
life is linked to nature. Man takes the initiative in remaking nature—that is, leaving
man’s mark upon nature and transforming nature into the humanized or human world
whereby while man is engaged in a constant struggle with nature, humanized nature
meets man’s survival needs as well as his development needs. In his Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx gave a brilliant exposition of man’s
relationship to nature. “The life of the species, both in man and animals, consists
physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the
more universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic
nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., constitute
theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science,
partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which
he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible—so also in the realm of practice
they constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only on
these products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a
dwelling, etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality
which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct
means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity.
Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body.
Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in
continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is
linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of
nature.” Just as Frederick Engels put it in his Dialectics of Nature, “whilst the animal
merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it simply by his presence,
man by his changes makes it serve his needs, masters it …Let us not, however, flatter
ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each such
conquest takes its revenge on us. Each of them, it is true, has in the first place the
consequences on which we counted, but in the second and third places it has quite
different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first….Thus at every
step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over
a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh,
blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of
it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able
to know and correctly apply its laws.”
Second, the relationship between man and society. In man’s practical activity
as well as in his struggle for existence, man’s relationship to society, i.e. man’s
relation to man, becomes an object of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple
duality” makes it possible for man’s relationship with society to be characterized by
“duality,” or rather by “multiple duality” such as the contrasting poles of individual
and group, reality and ideality, rights and obligations as well as truth, good and beauty
versus falsehood, evil and ugliness. In man’s relationship to society characterized by
“multiple duality,” i.e. man’s relation to man, the reciprocal and all-sided dependence
of individuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. Given
that there are likely to be tensions and personality clashes in any group, individuals
(personalities), collectives (groups) and human beings (species-beings) will have to
mediate differences that may arise between them, act in harmony with each other,
and work together with one accord in time of difficulties so that they can coexist with
each other and undergo simultaneous development in pursuit of eternal happiness.
Third, man’s relation to nature and his relation to society are interrelated with
each other, interact on each other and merge into an organic whole. In man’s practical
activity as well as in his struggle for life, man’s relation to nature is characterized by
simultaneous coexistence with his relation to society, and vice versus. Neither the
relationship between man and nature nor the relationship between man and society
can exist in isolation, that is to say, man’s relation to nature cannot exist in isolation
from his relation to society. Given that man’s relation to nature asserts itself as
an object of human practice in its own right, which is true of man’s relation to
society, the relationship between man’s relation to nature and his relation to society
is fully entitled to become an object of human practice. The nature of man’s “multiple
duality” makes “the relationship between man’s relation to nature and his relation to
society” certain to be endowed with “duality” and “multiple duality,” such as purpose
and regularity, instrumental rationality and value rationality, “What can I know?”
and “What ought I to do?”, equity and efficiency as well as humanistic ideals and
patterns of market economy. By making recourse to the aforementioned relationships
characterized by “multiple duality,” human beings attempt to make man’s relation to
nature and his relation to society act in harmony with each other, interact on each other
and merge into an organic whole, thereby actuating the harmonious and sustainable
development of nature, humans and society, that is to say, making “Heaven, Earth and
man,” i.e. all things in the world, coexist with each other and undergo harmonious
and sustainable development.
In addition, we feel the necessity of pointing out that the aforementioned complex
relationship between man and the world merging in unity with each other, i.e. man’s
relation to nature and his relation to society, which may prove of profound importance
to human life and development, not merely makes man’s dual life endowed with
multiple inherent contradictions and man’s relation to the world characterized by
multiple duality, i.e. man’s relation to nature and his relation to society, act in harmony
with each other, but also renders possible the integration of the potent forces in the
world, that is, natural and social forces, by making man open to the world, whereby
man can become, in the true sense of the word, a giant that is brave enough to enter into
rivalry with heaven and earth, as well as the wisest of all creatures on earth in the real
sense of the term. As Marx puts it in his Grundrisse—Foundations of the Critique of
Political Economy (Rough Draft), in the beginning of human existence on the earth,
“relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first
social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent
and at isolated points.” The essential powers of a single individual, that is, man’s
natural powers or vital powers, were greatly conditioned and limited. The following
well-known quotations adduced from French philosopher Blaise Pascal show us the
greatness of humanity as well as its fragility or weakness. Pascal first stresses the
transient nature of man: “Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in the realm of
nature.…There is no need for the entire universe to arm itself in order to crush him: a
vapor, a drop of water is sufficient to kill him.” Yet this painful consciousness of the
fragility of man is juxtaposed with the capacity to think which asserts human dignity
and greatness. Then Pascal adds: “But man is a thinking reed. Should the universe
crush him, man would still be nobler than that which kills him, for he knows that he
is dying and recognizes the advantage which the universe has over him.” Thus the
loneliness of man in the universe is juxtaposed with his awareness, with the capacity
to think, which lends him dignity. “All our dignity, therefore, is in thought.” Or Pascal
simply extols reason in man in a categorical statement: “Thought forms the greatness
of man.”102 In man’s open relation to nature as well as to society, man not merely
can make the forces outside himself undergo a complete transformation, but also can
have them at his command and turn them to good account whereby man can confirm
and manifest himself both in his species-life and in his essential power that can
respectively transcend itself. In man’s relation to nature characterized by the unity
of opposites, man tries to awaken nature from a deep slumber by making recourse
to his practical activity, has natural forces integrated with his essential powers and
makes them change into more massive and more colossal material forces. The fact
that man and nature are interrelated with each other and interact on each other also
demonstrates clearly and conclusively that “man’s spiritual life is linked to nature”,
which is to say that “…the more universal man is, the more universal is the sphere
of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc.,
constitutes theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural
science, partly as objects of art—his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment
which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible—so also in the realm of
practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity.”103 In man’s relation
to society characterized by the unity of opposites, i.e. man’s relation to man, on the
one hand, the contrasting poles of human practical activity such as competition and
cooperation, conflict and alliance as well as difference and consensus may aid man
materially in transcending individual and group narrowness, and on the other hand,
human beings when faced with a myriad of pressures and challenges care for each
other, lend support to each other and march together towards a bright future. In the
relationship between man and nature characterized by man’s oneness with nature as
well as the relationship between man and society characterized by man’s oneness
102 Roshwald, Mordecal. (1999). The Transient and the Absolute: An Interpretation of the Human
Condition and of Human Endeavor. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 16.
103 Elster, Jon., ed. (1986). Karl Marx: A Reader. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 40–41.
with society, human beings make recourse to neither the powers of a single individual
nor those of a particular group, but rather utilize the myriad powers of mankind in
general as well as the human powers unleashed in the human world. These are the
“combined powers” created by “human subjects” who open to the outside world—
that is, the unprecedented life forces in history, from which originate man’s real
essential powers and in which reside man’s hopes for the future.
4.3 The Unity of Man’s “Dual Life”
(1) The Essence of the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life”

The essence of the unity of man’s “dual life” resides in the “negative” development
and transcendence of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual life” does not consist
in the fact that “one kind of human life” overpowers “the other kind of human life,”
nor in the fact that “one kind of life” cancels out or substitutes for “the other kind of
life”, but rather in the fact that by “the negation of the negation” “one kind of life”
incorporates “the other” into itself and that “man’s dual life” undergoes a negative
development and transcendence, that is to say, the unity of man’s “dual life” lies
in the “negative” development and transcendence of man’s “dual life.” Here it is
necessary that we have a clear idea what exactly is meant by “negation.”
In Marx’s materialist dialectic, “negation” refers to a process of internal “self-
transcendence”. We mean by “negation” that in the unity of opposites, which Lenin
described as the most important of the dialectical principles,104 a thing is determined
by its internal oppositions. Dialecticians claim that unity or identity of opposites can
exist in reality or in thought. According to Kant, thought has a natural tendency to
issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks to apprehend the infinite.
By referring to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of reason, we have
shown that how the recognition of their existence helped largely to get rid of the
rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding, and to direct attention to the
dialectical movement of thought. But Kant never got beyond the negative result that
the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the discovery of what the
antinomies really and positively mean. For Hegel, that true and positive meaning
of the antinomies is this: that every actual thing involves a coexistence of opposed
elements. Consequently to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is
equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations.
The old metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the objects of which
it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by applying categories abstractly
and to the exclusion of their opposites.105 Marx and Engels hold that everything in
existence is a combination or unity of opposites, that everything contains two mutu-
ally incompatible and exclusive but nevertheless equally essential and indispensable
104Lenin, V.I. (1927). Collected Works, XIII. New York: International Publishers, p. 321.
105Sorensen, Roy. (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the
Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 305.
parts or aspects, and that this unity of opposites in nature is the thing that makes
each entity auto-dynamic and provides this constant motivation for movement and
change.106 This idea was borrowed from Hegel who said: “Contradiction in nature is
the root of all motion and of all life.”107 In Das Kapital (Capital), Marx gave a bril-
liant exposition of the essence of “dialectics”—“negation”: “In its rational form, it is
a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because
it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of
affairs, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of the state, of its
inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form
as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less
than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its
essence critical and revolutionary.”108 Lenin quotes Marx and Engels to demonstrate
convincingly that philosophic contradiction is central to the development of dialec-
tics—the progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social change,
the negation of the initial development of the status quo, the negation of the nega-
tion, and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo. “As the most
comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content,
Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of
classical German philosophy…. ‘The great basic thought,’ Engels writes, ‘that the
world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex
of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images
in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being
and passing away… this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time
of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it
is now scarcely ever contradicted. But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in
words, and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two
different things. …For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It
reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure
before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of
endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself,
is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain.’ Thus,
according to Marx, dialectics is ‘the science of the general laws of motion both of the
external world and of human thought.’”109 According to Lenin, “the identity of oppo-
sites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference
between the terms ‘identity’ and ‘unity’ is not particularly important here. The condi-
tion for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of
106 Skousen, W. Cleon. (1962). The Naked Communist. Orem, UT: Verity Publishing, p. 33.
107 Giovanni, George Di. (2010). George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 382.
108 Moyar, Dean., ed. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 667.
109 Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers,
pp. 7–9.
opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites. The two basic conceptions

of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repeti-
tion, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually
exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation). In the first conception of motion,
self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this
source is made external—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief atten-
tion is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of ‘self-movement.’ The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes
the key to the ‘self-movement’ of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the
‘leaps,’ to the ‘break in continuity,’ to the ‘transformation into the opposite,’ to the
destruction of the old and the emergence of the new. The unity (coincidence, identity,
equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are abso-
lute.”110 Lenin describes his dialectical understanding of the concept of development:
“A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but
repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a
development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development
by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; ‘breaks in continuity;’ the transformation of
quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contra-
diction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or
within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the
closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history
constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and
universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the
features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional
one.”111
By “negation” we also mean that the preservation of our nation’s historical and
cultural heritage is based on the principle that we should discard the dross, select the
essence, and critically assimilate whatever is beneficial to us. The following copious
quotations adduced from Mao Tse-tung’s “On New Democracy” may render substan-
tial help to us when we attempt to develop an objective understanding of how we can
draw upon our nation’s splendid historical and cultural heritage and of how we can
absorb foreign civilization to enrich our own. “New-democratic culture is national.
It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the
Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation and bears our own national character-
istics. it links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations
and they are related in such a way that they can absorb something from each other
and help each other to develop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revo-
lutionary national culture it can never link up with any reactionary imperialist culture
of whatever nation. To nourish her own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal
of foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past. We should
110 Knight, Nick. (2018). Li Da and Marxist Philosophy in China. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 43.
111 Lenin, V. I. (1980). On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers,
pp. 7–9.
assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist
and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for
example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlight-
enment. However, we should not gulp any of this foreign material down uncritically,
but must treat it as we do our food—first chewing it, then submitting it to the working
of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and separating it into
nutriment to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded—before it can nourish
us. To advocate ‘wholesale westernization’ is wrong. China has suffered a great deal
from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism
to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of
Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the
universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics
and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can
it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas
are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no
room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its
own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content—
such is our new culture today. …A splendid old culture was created during the long
period of Chinese feudal society. To study the development of this old culture, to
reject its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence is a necessary condition
for developing our new national culture and increasing our national self-confidence,
but we should never swallow anything and everything uncritically. It is imperative
to separate the fine old culture of the people which had a more or less democratic
and revolutionary character from all the decadence of the old ruling class. China’s
present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and
old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture;
therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off. However, respect
for history means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical
development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising
every drop of feudal poison.”112
Hence the dialectical negation is not a simple logical negation that behaves like
A and not-A, nor is it a sharp opposition wherein this something substitutes for or
prevails over the other. For Hegel, the negation of the negation is one important
dialectical principle, which he also terms “sublation” (Aufhebung), that is to say,
something is only what it is in its relation to another, but by the negation of the
negation this something incorporates the other into itself. The dialectical movement
involves two moments that negate each other, something and its other. As a result of
the negation of the negation, “something becomes its other; this other is itself some-
thing; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum.”113 Something
112 Mao, Tse-Tung. (1965). Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II. Oxford, GB-OXF:
Pergamon Press, pp. 380–381.

113 McTaggart, John., & McTaggart, Ellis. (1910). A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic. Cambridge,

in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related.114 In becoming there
are two moments115 : coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, that is to say, by sublation,
i.e., negation of the negation, being passes over into nothing and ceases to be, but
something new shows up and is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on
the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved
and maintained.116 In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then
self-forgetful, relieving the original tension. Thus it can be seen that the essence of
negation resides not in the fact that contradictions or negations come from outside
of things, but rather in the fact that they are inherent in and internal to things.
In this sense, we mean by “negation” that the unity of opposites inheres in the
multiple or manifold contradictions immanent in human life. It is only fitting that
the law of “the negation of negation” which serves as an important dialectical prin-
ciple for Hegel should provide a most appropriate description of the aforementioned
unity of opposites. For Hegel, the dialectical unity of opposites can be achieved
by “the negation of negation”, that is to say, “the concrete,” “the synthesis,” and
“the absolute” must always pass through the phase of the negative in the journey to
completion, that is, mediation, whereby the tension between a “thesis,” which gives
rise to its reaction, and an “antithesis,” which contradicts or negates the “thesis,” can
be resolved or relieved by means of a “synthesis.” This is the essence of what is
popularly called Hegelian dialectics. By “synthesis” we do not mean that it rejects a
“thesis” or an “antithesis,” but that, as a determinate negation, it preserves the useful
portion of a “thesis” and of an “antithesis,” or rather the valuable elements inherent
in a “thesis” as well as in an “antithesis,” and that it incorporates the “thesis” and the
“antithesis” into itself, thereby forming a totality characterized by self-relatedness
and self-forgetfulness. With “the human subject”, namely “the subject-man”, the
aforementioned dialectical unity of opposites, which can conceived as a process of
determinate negation, is nothing more or less than a clear and unequivocal manifes-
tation of the essence of human life characterized by man’s constant introspection,
unceasing transcendence and unlimited potential of human creativity. The following
example I am now going to adduce will assuredly serve to afford a telling illustration
of this. The unity of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” is a process of nega-
tion of negation, or rather, a process of self-transcendence wherein man’s “natural
life” and “supernatural life” must of necessity merge into an organic whole. In man’s
“dual life,” the “natural life” and the “supernatural life” are by no means diametri-
cally opposite to each other, nor do they form a polar relationship with each other
in the sense of “either/or,” which forces us permanently to take decisions: to take
up one alternative, and simultaneously exclude the other. In The German Ideology,
Marx averred that “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence
of living human individuals.” It is therefore evident that as the first premise of all
human existence, man’s “natural life” lays the basis for human existence—or, to put
114 Ibid.
115 Dorrien, Gary. (2015). Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern
Theology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 204.
116 Ibid.
it another way, human existence, as is clear from what has been said above, has as its
premises and basis the “natural life” of man. Only if a single individual is possessed
of the “natural life” can he be regarded as a corporeal, living, real, sensuous being
full of natural vigor and endowed with essential powers, that is to say, a man with
his feet firmly on the ground, or a man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature.
Otherwise, he can only be an ethereal soul. However, a single individual must of
necessity be possessed of the “supernatural life” as well as the “natural life” or he
will be assuredly devoid of the true essence of man and thereby does not differ essen-
tially from the animal. Thus it can be seen that man is still bound to a supernatural
life. Despite the fact that man’s “supernatural life” is the negation of his “natural
life,” yet the very negation does not mean that the “supernatural life” simply discards
or merely rejects the “natural life,” but that the “supernatural life” incorporates the
“natural life” into itself whereby they merge into an organic whole. It follows from
what has been said above that the dialectical principle of negation of negation as
well as the dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis may contribute greatly to a
fundamental understanding of man’s relationship to his “supernatural life.” That is to
say, man neither simply discards nor merely rejects his “supernatural life,” but rather
incorporates the “supernatural life” into himself whereby they merge into an organic
whole. It is therefore clear that by the “negation of negation,” which constitutes the
moving soul of scientific progression, man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life”
merge into a new single whole after passing through a dialectical process of deter-
minate negation in which the dialectical process leads to concepts or forms that are
increasingly comprehensive and universal, the result of which “is a new concept but
one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the
preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the
unity of itself and its opposite” (Hegel’s Science of Logic 33; cf. Hegel’s Philosophy
of Mind 54), and through which new determinations thereby grow out of the process
itself and integrate with the essence of man. This shows clearly and conclusively that
the unity of man’s “dual life” is in essence the dialectical merging of man’s “natural
life” and “supernatural life” as well as the dialectical transcendence of man’s “super-
natural life” over his “natural life.” Moreover, the dialectical principle of “negation
of negation” and the dialectical model of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” may aid mate-
rially in understanding the mechanisms of the personality (the individual), the group
(the family, the organization, the state and the international organization) and the
species (the human species). Finally, the negative unity of man’s “dual life” asserts
itself as a complicated, progressive and unfettered development in its own right.
(2) How to Achieve the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life”
“Structure and choice,” or rather, “practical man’s structure and choice,” constitutes
the scientific method to bring about the unity of man’s “dual life.” It is only through
practical human activity as well as by the instrumentality of “practical man’s structure
and choice” that the unity of man’s “natural life” and “supernatural life” can be
possible of realization. To put it another way, “practical man” has no alternative but
to resort to his “structure and choice” as the only method to secure the unity of man’s
“dual life.”
By man’s “structure and choice” we mean “personality structure” as well as the

“behavioral choices” that “personality structure” tends to attribute to definite circum-
stances. “Personality structure” refers to man’s “dynamic structural system” with
constituent elements not only consistent with each other but also working in unity
with each other, whose gradual development from a simple to a more complicated
form can be attributed to hereditary factors as well as to man’s long term educa-
tion, learning and social practice. We mean by “behavioral choice” that “personality
structure” responds appropriately to a diverse range of external stimuli or acts appro-
priately in response to various outside pressures. The unity of man’s “dual life,”
which is founded on practical human activity, can only be possible of realization
through the instrumentality of “personality structure” and its “behavioral choice.”
Man’s “structure and choice” constitutes the noumenon of man’s unique life, the
basic mode of existence peculiar to man’s unique life, and the basic mode of survival
in which man’s unique life exists. To put it another way, the essence of man’s unique
life, the basic mode of existence in which man’s unique life exists, and the basic
mode of survival peculiar to man’s unique life can all be reduced to man’s “structure
and choice.” Man’s “structure and choice,” which asserts itself as an all-embracing
concept in its own right, must of necessity be nothing more or less than the totality
of man’s material and spiritual power, all of man’s behavior including the totality of
man’s behavior patterns, all of man’s history, the sum total of all that is related to man’s
immediate existence in the real world as well as all human possibilities including
man’s unfathomable potential for the future. Arguably, it can be safely asserted that
man can be identified with man’s “structure and choice,” that man’s “structure and
choice” can be equated with man, and that man can not by any manner of means be
divorced from man’s “structure and choice” and vice versa. The fundamental reason
for these assertions lies in the fact that man’s “structure and choice” constitutes the
essence of man’s unique life.
Not merely does man’s “dual life” as well as the unity of man’s “dual life” assert
themselves as a predominant characteristic of man’s “structure and choice” in its own
right, but also they perform a primary and indispensable function in man’s “structure
and choice.” The unity of man’s “dual life” can only be realized or achieved through
the instrumentality of man’s “structure and choice.” The general course of human
development has been in line with the way that the unity of man’s “dual life” evolves.
In making whatever behavioral choices man wishes, man invariably tries to have his
existence closely aligned with the unity of man’s “dual life” and thereby seek a wise
solution to the fundamental problem of how the unity of man’s “dual life” can be
achieved. Whenever man chooses to bring about the unity of man’s “dual life,” man’s
life will tend towards the unity of man’s “dual life.” On the contrary, whenever man
chooses to divorce the natural life from the supernatural life, man’s “dual life” will
of necessity be divorced from each other. In view of the fact that the development of
modern man is not yet complete, but in its still unfinished state, whether or not man’s
“dual life” tends towards the unity of man’s “natural life” and his “supernatural life”
will hinge fundamentally upon man’s “structure and choice”—or, to put it another
way, whether or not the unity of man’s “dual life” can be possible of realization will
depend entirely upon man’s structure as well as his choice. In the final analysis, how
the unity of man’s “dual life” can be brought about will be completely dependent
upon what behavioral choices “real man” will make as well as how he will make
behavioral choices.
(3) The Manifestations of the Unity of Man’s “Dual Life”
The unity of man’s “dual life” manifests itself mainly in three forms.
The first form, namely the real unity of man’s “dual life.” We mean by the real unity
of man’s “dual life” that it is only through practical human activity as well as by the
instrumentality of “real man’s structure and choice” that the unity of man’s “natural
life” and “supernatural life” can be possible of realization. To put it another way, “real
man” has no alternative but to resort to his “structure and choice” as the only method
to secure the unity of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual life” manifesting
itself in the very form may be conceived of as the most basic as well as the most
universal. It is therefore evident that the unity of man’s “dual life” is possible of
realization basically through the instrumentality of every concrete behavioral choice
“real man” makes. The way that the unity of man’s “dual life” is brought about can
be described as follows: external pressures set in motion “real man’s personality
structure” and force it to make behavioral choices according to circumstances and
respond appropriately to myriad environmental stresses or challenges. On the one
hand, the unity of man’s “dual life” inheres in every behavioral choice man makes,
and on the other hand, every behavioral choice man makes is a vivid manifestation
of how the unity of man’s “dual life” is possible of realization, which is true of such
groups as the family, the organization, the state and the international organization.
It can be safely asserted that the unity of man’s “dual life” happens to mankind as a
whole at all times and in all places and that it is possible of realization only through
the instrumentality of innumerable behavior choices made by the personality (the
individual), the group (the family, the organization, the state) and the species (human
beings).
The second form, or rather, the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life.” Man is not
just an entity but a living creature endowed with self-awareness. Self-awareness, as
distinct from other kinds of consciousness, has personal identity (the self), particu-
larly one’s own personality or individuality, for its object. Specifically, self-awareness
is how an individual consciously knows, understands, analyses and evaluates his own
character, feelings, motives and desires. Moreover, by self-awareness we mean how
an individual’s character, feelings, motives and desires should be directed by moral
laws or “categorical imperatives.” It is arguable that self-awareness aids man materi-
ally in producing a myriad of theories about the world as well as about “man himself.”
Fundamentally speaking, the myriad theories about “man himself” were originated
by man so that they would be designed to guide man in bringing about the unity of
man’s “dual life.” From ancient times through the present, man has been trying to
achieve the unity of man’s “dual life” by having his Herculean efforts oriented in
two directions: on the one hand, in real life, man tends to lend every effort within
his power toward the realization of the unity of man’s “dual life;” on the other hand,
in theory, man essays various methods of bringing about the unity of man’s “dual
life.” The latter solution to the problem of how the unity of man’s “dual life” is
possible of realization can be designated as the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life.”
The real unity of man’s “dual life” and the theoretical unity of man’s “dual life”
are interdependent on each other, interrelated with each other and inseparable from
each other whereby they are indispensable for the unity of man’s “dual life.” “The
theory of structure and choice,” as is clear from what we have said above, must of
necessity have as its premises basis man’s real life as well as his practical activity
when it is aimed at providing a theoretical exposition of man’s mode of existence as
well as his mode of survival. Only if it incorporates all the theories of different ages,
different styles and different schools into itself, discarding the dross and selecting
the essence, can “the theory of structure and choice” when confronted with the task
of bringing about the real unity of man’s “dual life” explore and open up the myriad
possibilities of the real unity of man’s “dual life” and thereby allow full scope to
enormous potentialities inherent in the real unity of man’s “dual life.”
The third form, to wit the free unity of man’s “dual life.” The unity of man’s “dual
life” has passed through a long and arduous process of evolution. Marx’s theory
about the three stages of personality development shows clearly and conclusively
that the unity of man’s “dual life” must of necessity progressively pass through three
successive stages of development and that only when human society attains the stage
of development in which the association of free men becomes the predominant form
of social organization and in which the free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all can the free unity of man’s “dual life” be possible of
realization. According to Marx, the first stage of personality development is based
on relations of personal dependence and a group-oriented personality features most
prominently in the phase of personality development. We will assuredly gain a good
deal of enlightenment from the following quotations adduced from Britt Leslie and
Philip Esler respectively when we attempt to obtain a deeper understanding of what a
group-oriented personality is like. As opposed to an individualistic personality type,
“a group-oriented personality type” or “a collectivist personality type” considers
people to be inextricably bound or embedded in a collective or a group. A group-
oriented personality derives his or her self-image and understanding from the group
in which they are embedded. This group is usually the family, and by extension it
can also be the tribe, village, nation, ethnic group. The collectivist personality type
will conceive of herself or himself as always being in inter-relationship with those
who are on an equal social stratum as well as with those who are on higher and
lower social strata. This horizontal and vertical interrelatedness is essential for being
human. Those who are of this communal orientation will understand other individ-
uals not as individuals, but rather as part of the group in which they are embedded.
Individuals are judged based on the family, tribe, village, or nation in which they
are embedded. Likewise, a group is judged based on the actions of an individual
member of that group.117 In group-oriented cultures, individuals tend to align their
activities and attitudes with those of the groups to which they belong. Typical virtues
117Leslie, Britt. (2015). One Thing I Know: How the Blind Man of John 9 Leads an Audience
toward Belief . Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, p. 130.
in such contexts are obedience to elders, respect for tradition, a willingness to share
goods with other group members and a pronounced tendency to represent the group
in its relations to other groups, which is often associated with inter-group competi-
tiveness.118 In the first stage of personality development, human productive capacity
developed only to a slight extent and at isolated points, and the substantive powers
latent within man himself were severely restricted. In the early phase of personality
development, man’s “dual life,” to wit the natural life and the supernatural life, was
still in its primeval state and devoid of any differentiation or unity. The second stage
of personality development can be designated as the phase of independent personality
development characterized by personal independence founded on objective [sach-
licher] dependence. The second stage of independent personality development is
appropriate to the second social form, according to Marx, in which a system of general
social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities
is formed for the first time. In the second phase of personality development, man’s
substantive powers underwent an alarming development and an individual began
to lead a full and varied life whereby he was able to free himself from the control
and domination by a single group and started to develop an independent personality.
Despite what has just been said above, two big troubling problems hamper the free
and all-round development of independent personality, thereby awaiting solution. (1)
An individual tends to misconstrue independent personality as “isolated personality”
and identify independent personality with “isolated personality.” Hence he is most
likely to be dominated by me-first mentality and follow the principles of egoistic
individualism. (2) An individual tends to value material gains more than spiritual
development, and it becomes more and more prevalent for an individual to employ
all possible means of seeking after material gains and comforts. In the second stage
of personality development, man’s “dual life” undergoes a rapid and progressive
differentiation, which, on the one hand, guides man’s “dual life” out of its primeval
state, but which, on the other hand, makes man’s “dual life” sink into a one-sided
state, which tends to manifest itself in the antagonism or separation between man’s
natural life and his supernatural life as well as in the blind, headlong advocacy of
the one-sided unity of man’s “dual life.” The third stage of personality development
can be described as the phase of free individualistic personality development, which
corresponds to the third stage of social development wherein, according to Marx,
free individuality is based on the universal development of individuals and on their
subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth. It is
only in the third phase of personality development that man’s essential powers can
attain their fullest development and that man’s relationship to man, his relationship
to nature and his relationship to himself can tend towards the true and essential unity.
It is only in this period that man can shake himself free from the yoke of the relations
of personal dependence and break away from the yoke of the relations of objective
dependency and that eventually man can pass beyond his narrow confines whereby
the differentiation and unity of man’s “dual life” may attain the highest possible level.
118 Esler, Philip Francis., ed. (2000). The Early Christian World, Volume I-II. London: Routledge,
p. 16.
References 153
Nonetheless, the differentiation and unity of man’s “dual life” still occur in the stage
of free individualistic personality development, in which the unity of man’s “dual
life” attains the highest possible level and reaches a free state, in which, according
to Marx, free individuality is based on the universal development of individuals and
on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth,
in which, for Marx, the free and all-round development of each is the condition for
the free and all-round development of all, and in which, according to the Taoists
represented by Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu of ancient China, things different in their
nature and their natural ability are all equally happy when they have a full and free
exercise of their natural ability whereby the identification of man with the universe
can be achieved.
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Chapter 5
The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s
“Structure and Choice”
The purpose of the book is to explore and explicate the noumenon of human life,
to decipher the philosophical question—that is, “what is man?”, which mankind has
been confronting for thousands of years, to advance and develop the noumenon of
human life—“structure and choice,” and to construct the ontology of human life—
“the theory of structure and choice.”
Marx’s philosophical anthropology as well as his dialectical thought demonstrates
that the mechanism of “structure and choice” not only exists between society and
man, but also inheres in the noumenon of human life. Moreover, the mechanism of
“structure and choice” inherent in the noumenon of human life is more typical and
more fundamental, thereby possessing more explanatory power.
When it comes to the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as
it is), it is a regrettably long-standing fact that structuralism and existentialism tend
to make man’s “structure and choice” separate from each other and contradictory
to each other—that is to say, either man’s “structure” is antithetical to his “choice”
or man’s “choice” goes beyond its proper bounds and acts to negate the existence
of any structure upon which human life depends. Hence it must of necessity follow
that the above two types of theory cannot but sink into the quagmire of dualism.
Therefore, it has become an urgent demand of the times that the ontology of human
life should undergo a transformation from “dualism” to “duality.” Marxist dialectical
thinking constitutes the scientific method to bring about this transformation. An inte-
grated duality—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” is inherent in the noumenon
of human life. The noumenon of human life as an integrated being is at once man’s
“structure” and his “choice,” the unity of which lies primarily in the fact that they are
connected with each other and transformed into each other and that they condition
and determine each other. Multiple modes of existence such as diachronic existence,
synchronic existence and interactive existence inhere in the noumenon of human life,
which also possesses numerous characteristics and functions specific only to human
beings. It can be safely asserted that the noumenon of human life can be summarized

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_5
158 5 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice”
as man’s “structure and choice.” In passing criticism upon structuralism and existen-
tialism, the author tries to reconstruct the ontology of human life, whereby his theory
provides an ontological foundation for the humanities and social sciences, a theoret-
ical framework for an idealistic anthropological commitment to self-transcendence,
a scientific philosophy of life for us, and a good deal of enlightenment about many
theoretical prerequisites.
1 The Noumenon of Human Life: From “Dualism”

to “Duality”
This book attempts to apply the theories and methods of philosophical anthropology
to the interpretation of the noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself
as it is). The difference between philosophical anthropology and other philosophies
lies not in the fact that philosophical anthropology devotes a general discussion to
ontological questions but rather that it tends to lay undue emphasis upon the ontology
of human life. According to Liu Fangtong, the Chinese philosopher, “arguably, one of
the most distinguishing characteristics of philosophical anthropology is the fact that
philosophical anthropology seeks a philosophical explanation of the vast stores of
human knowledge—knowledge about humans, which have been amassed in empir-
ical sciences over centuries.” “Philosophical anthropology seeks abstraction of man’s
ontological structure in the anthropological sense from human knowledge in all its
variety, or rather by taking into account the physical, spiritual, biological, psycho-
logical, religious, and cultural dimensions of humans.”1 Michael Landmann, the
prominent German philosophical anthropologist, argues that while physical anthro-
pology and ethnology explore the external characteristics—biological and cultural—
of human beings, philosophical anthropology critiques the supposed knowledge and
suggests that man himself or herself is a problem that raises fundamental questions
about being and what if anything distinguishes the human race from other forms of
existence inhabiting the universe.2 Generally speaking, as well as being one of the
most distinguishing characteristics of philosophical anthropology, exploring man’s
ontological structure from an anthropological perspective has also become an impor-
tant field of inquiry for philosophical anthropology. Philosophical anthropology had
been under the long-term impact and domination of technology in the twentieth
century, which in turn made philosophical anthropologists look back at human exis-
tence in a technocratic culture in retrospective reflection in the late twentieth century.
As American scholar Calvin O. Schrag points out in his “Philosophical Anthropology
in Contemporary Thought”: “A new inquiry and new categories of self-understanding
have been developed. This inquiry standpoint and these categories are primarily the
1 Liu, Fang-Tong. (2000). Contemporary Western Philosophy (revised ed.). Beijing, China: People’s
2 Landmann, Michael. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China:
Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 4.

1 The Noumenon of Human Life: From “Dualism” to “Duality” 159
result of the historicizing of human existence and the crisis of consciousness which
such historicizing uncovers when it confronts the threats and negativities of a tech-
nocratic culture. It is thus that a new rostrum of interpretive categories has been
delineated. Included in this rostrum are such categories as estrangement, objectifica-
tion, depersonalization, dehumanization, loneliness, conformism, anonymity, guilt,
and absurdity …. Traditional metaphysics would reduce this question to a question
about an anima naturaliter humana, but as we has already suggested, contemporary
thought has reopened and reasked the question more specifically from the stand-
point of historical considerations.”3 It is against the larger historical background
characterized by critical reflections upon Western culture as well as by intellectual
transitions in Western society that the author addresses himself to the arduous task
of reconstructing the ontology of human life—“the theory of structure and choice”
under the guidance of Marxism by devoting more than twenty years to exploring the
noumenon of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) and studying an
impressive array of philosophical anthropological theories and methods.
When it comes to the ontology of human life, there exists the long-standing
antithesis between existentialism and structuralism. While denying the existence
of any choice in human life, structuralism tends to exaggerate the structure of the
human mind (or the structure of human consciousness) and to enshrine it as an
absolute. Claude Lévi-Strauss, the French social anthropologist and leading exponent
of structuralism, maintains that the structure of human consciousness as well as the
cultural and social structures, which are products of the invariant structure of the
human mind, tends to remain unchanged—or, to put it another way, it tends to stay
the same and not changed. It would be ludicrous (or ridiculous) nonsense to say that
human choice, or more specifically, the behavioral choice on the part of a subject,
could make any difference to the social structure or the cultural structure. On the
contrary, while negating any structure inherent in human life, existentialism tends to
exaggerate the existence of any choice in human life and to enshrine it as an absolute.
The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the leading figures in the philosophy
of existentialism, holds that neither objective structures nor objective laws inhere in
human life or in the empirical world and that everything depends on human choice,
or rather the free choice of individuals. The aforementioned two kinds of theories
tend to make man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the unified noumenon of human
life, separate from each other, depreciate each other and negate each other. Hence,
when it comes to the ontology of human life, it must of necessity follow that there
exists the binary opposition between “structure” and “choice.” It is therefore clear
that either of them, whether existentialism or structuralism, tends to go from one
extreme to the other and to lapse into some kind of one-sidedness.4
Marxist dialectical thinking has proven to be an important tool as well as an essen-
tial prerequisite for our understanding and interpretation of the noumenon of human
3 Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East and

West 20:1(1970): 83–89.
4 Chen, Bing-Gong. “Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System.” Jilin
University Journal Social Sciences Edition 3 (2011).

life (the reality of human life in itself as it is). In order to make the ontology of human
life undergo a transformation from “dualism” to “duality,” we must achieve the “triple
transcendence” of old modes of thinking and attain the three higher levels of human
thought in ascending order under the guidance of Marxist materialist dialectics, i.e.,
we must triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects of “ontological thinking” and
strive to reach the level of “practical thinking,” we must break free from the limita-
tions of “metaphysical thinking” and seek to raise the mode of human thought to the
level of “dialectical thinking,” and we must transcend ‘the way of thinking oriented
towards the life of species” and adopt “the mode of thinking oriented towards the
life of kind.” Marxist dialectical thinking reveals the essence of human life—prac-
tice. Marx’s “practical thinking” helps us to analyze and understand the noumenon
of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is), and affords a scientific
foundation on which can be understood the dialectical unity of manifold dualistic
relationships whereby we can overcome an array of binary oppositions (or oppo-
sites) such as subjectivity versus objectivity, subject versus object, activity versus
passivity, materialism versus idealism, natural versus supernatural, and structure
versus choice, and whereby we can turn multiple binary oppositions, which bear no
relationship to each other, into “integrated dualities.” While metaphysical thinking
tends to make us view the people and things that develop and change in the objective
world as static, isolated, and fossilized, Marxist dialectical thinking tends to over-
come the limitations inherent to metaphysical thinking and to endow the images of
people and things in the human mind with continuity, movement and systematiza-
tion, thereby making the images of people and things in the human mind conform to
objective reality. During a considerable period of time, growth retardation in human
thinking as well as lower levels of cognitive development made mankind fall into the
deeply ingrained habit of understanding himself by recourse to the way of thinking
oriented towards non-human species or beings, including animal life, whose absur-
dity is manifest for reasons which can be summarized as follows. First, this way
of thinking may be treated as a kind of predetermined or closed thinking. Second,
people just take it for granted that this kind of thinking can be perceived as the one
characterized by sameness of essential (or generic) character in different instances,
or rather, devoid of any contradictions. Third, this way of thinking may be conceived
of as a sort of isolated thinking characterized by one-sidedness in understanding.
In exposing the manifest absurdities which seem inherent in the mode of thinking
oriented towards non-human species or beings, Marxist dialectical thinking proves
clearly and indisputably that man is possessed of “a dual life”—that is, man is born
to lead a natural life and a supernatural life or, to put it another way, man is endowed
with “the integrated duality of natural life and supernatural life.” Marxism provides
a new perspective, develops a new methodology and thereby opens up many lines
of theoretical research by bringing about a revolution in human thinking whereby
Marxist theory can provide a powerful analytical tool in the critique of the dualistic
fallacies of structuralism and existentialism as well as in the scientific interpretation
of the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice”.
The ontology of human life, or rather, the theory of “structure and choice”, which
originated with Chen Binggong, represents a revolution in human understanding
of the essence of life. Human practical activity, human language and the human
brain serve to provide foundations as well as conditions for the evolution of the
noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” During the long
course of human evolution, the brain of the anthropoid ape gradually changed into
the human brain, which is to say the cognitive structure of non-human primates grad-
ually evolved into that of human beings. The aforementioned statement seems to be
rather trite, but a more detailed analysis might conceivably make us adduce evidence
of evolutionary changes attributable to human practical activity, social interaction
and human language. Fundamentally speaking, man’s cognitive structure triumphs
over the negative or restrictive aspects inherent in the cognitive structure of non-
human primates—or, to put it another way, the cognitive structure of human beings
transcends that of non-human primates in all its fundamental bearings. The transcen-
dence of man’s cognitive structure over that of non-human primates manifests itself
mainly in the following ways. First, the simple cognitive structure of non-human
primates is devoid of consciousness and self-awareness, but consists of an almost
undifferentiated chaotic mass of desires, which is true of the cognitive structures
of other animals. In contrast, the transcendence of man’s cognitive structure over
that of the animal manifests itself in the fact that there is a differentiation between
consciousness, subconsciousness and self-awareness in the cognitive structure of
human beings. Second, the anthropoid ape is endowed with the cognitive structure,
but it cannot make a conscious choice. Its response to the environment depends
essentially on instinct. By contrast, man’s “structure and choice” are inherent in
his cognitive structure. Man’s response to the environment depends primarily upon
his consciousness and initiative—or, to put it another way, in responding to the
environment, man can make complex behavioral choices on his own initiative. The
transcendence of man’s cognitive structure over that of the animal marks a qualitative
leap in the evolution of life on our planet, by which we mean that the noumenon of
human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” came into existence.
When the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” first
came into existence, it may have proven of far-reaching importance to humanity,
for the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” represents
the second qualitative leap in the evolution of life on our planet. There occurred
two major qualitative leaps in the evolution of life on our planet. The evolutionary
history of life has seen transformations from inorganic to organic matter, and then
to proteins and primitive living organisms. It is generally accepted that the trans-
formation from inorganic matter to primitive living organisms constitutes the first
major qualitative leap in the evolution of life and that the transformation from the
oldest forms of life to the earliest hominines represents the second major qualitative
leap in the evolution of life. The appearance of human life on the earth represents a
decisive qualitative leap in the evolutionary history of life. With the above situation
in view, it may be safely asserted that the noumenon of human life—that is, man’s
“structure and choice,” came into existence when man made his advent upon the
earth, along with the world of human subjects. The noumenon of human life—that
is, man’s “structure and choice,” may prove of great significance to humankind when
viewed in the perspective of the relationship between life and nature. The reasons for
this can be summarized as follows. First, the transcendence of being-for-itself over

being-in-itself manifests itself in the fact that being-for-itself is the man’s conscious-
ness, which is fluid and changeable, while being-in-itself is the object, which is fixed
and deterministic.5 In Being and Nothingness Sartre gives an account of two funda-
mental types of being: being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself refers to
non-conscious entities or brute matter. Unlike consciousness, being-in-itself cannot
transcend itself. In contrast, being-for-itself refers to consciousness. Unlike being-
in-itself, being-for-itself is defined in terms of possibility and transcendence. In
other words, being-for-itself must transcend itself towards a particular possibility,
becoming something that has not yet been realized.6 Just as man belongs to nature
and is an essential part of it, so animals are an integral part of the natural world.
Animals are determined by their instincts, which is to say animals simply follow
their propensities and obey the laws of their being, from which they have no power
to depart. Animals, as a rule, do no more than follow their natural instincts.7 Far
from being the for-itself endowed with conscious initiative, the animal should be
conceived as the in-itself in the sense that it displays a not-having of initiative—that
is to say, the being of the animal in itself is constituted by poverty in initiative. The
noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” endows man with
the capacity to transcend nature as well as the initiative in assuming control over his
own life, thereby bringing about the unity of being-for-itself and being-for-others.
Second, on the one hand, nature governs all life on the earth, but on the other, man
can change the natural environment, adjust himself to it, and live in harmony with
it. That is to say, the evolutionary history of life saw the transformation from life’s
submission to nature to man’s domination of nature. Animals exist as an integral
part of the environment. Moreover, the environment relates to animals as dominator
between animals and their environment. On the contrary, man’s relationship with the
environment is entirely different from that between animals and their environment.
The noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice”, enables man
to change the natural environment by making creative choices on his own initiative
and to coexist in harmony with the natural environment. To put it another way, the
relationship between man and the environment manifests itself mainly in the fact that
man can take the initiative in changing the natural environment, adjusting himself
to the natural environment, and harmonizing with the natural environment. The very
existence of man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the noumenon of human life,
enables man to become the conscious subject, which is to say, as such man can
master his own life and the world.
An integrated duality—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” is inherent in the
noumenon of human life. The noumenon of human life as an integrated being is at
5 Robert, K. Wen. (2014). Philosophy—One Man’s Overview. Bloomington, IL: iUniverse LLC,
p. 80.
6 Joseph, Felicity., Reynolds, Jack., & Woodward, Ashley., eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury Companion
to Existentialism. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 366.

7 William Crookes, F. R. S., & C., eds. “Animal Depravity.” Journal of Science: Natural sciences
6 (October 1875): 416.

once man’s “structure” and his “choice.” The “structure” of human life refers to all
forms of vital power or life force inherent in the noumenon of human life as well
as the ways in which they are interrelated and interact on each other. The structure
of human life, which asserts itself as the basis of human life in its own right, not
only marks the degree and level of development that human life attains, but also
determines the nature and level of human behavioral choices. By “human behavioral
choice(s)” we mean that man can make decisions regarding his myriad behaviors and
choose the most effective ones accordingly in a certain environment, which is to say,
humans can make decisions based on an appraisal of the utility of available behavioral
options or choices and choose that which affords maximum utility,8 that man can
remold his subjective world while changing the objective world, and that man’s
practical behavior represents a concrete manifestation of his conscious initiative.
Man’s behavior choice changes the objective world as well as his subjective world,
which is to say, the behavioral choice on the part of a human subject changes the
noumenon of human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice,” thereby exerting a
determining influence on the structure of human life. Hence, the noumenon of human
life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an integrated duality in
its own right.
The integrated duality inherent in the noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s
“structure and choice,” came into existence when man made his advent upon the earth,
and will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the future. According to
the findings of archaeological anthropology, mankind went through an evolutionary
change from ape to human, and in the process, the unified noumenon of human life
has been integrated with the two aspects of “structure” and “choice” from its incep-
tion, which tend to find frequent expression in human productive activities as well
as in social and intellectual activities, such as making tools, engaging in produc-
tion, building up social relationships, etc. To put it another way, in the evolutionary
process from ape to man, the two aspects of “structure” and “choice” which tend to
find frequent expression in human productive activities as well as in social and intel-
lectual activities, such as making tools, engaging in production, building up social
relationships, etc., have been inherent in the unified noumenon of human life since
the beginning of human existence on the earth. In the long process of human spiritual
evolution, the noumenon of non-human primate life, or rather, the anthropoid ape’s
“structure and choice,” was still in an early stage of spiritual development which
was characterized by a vague awakening of spiritual consciousness. However, the
noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,” which started into
existence in the spiritual consciousness of anthropoid apes, endowed non-human
primate life with the “integrated duality” unique to human life, thereby making
anthropoid apes differ essentially from other animals. Practical human activity is
inextricably linked with the noumenon of human life and provides the motive force
for its evolutionary development. On a practical basis, the noumenon of human life,
or rather, man’s “structure and force,” passed through a long process of evolution,
8Bernasco, Wim, Gelder, Jean-Louis Van., & Effers, Henk., eds. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of
Offender Decision Making. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 71.
and took nearly two million years to go through different stages of development. In
the long process of evolution, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure
and choice,” first appeared in an embryonic form, then gradually took shape, and
eventually evolved into the modern form, which is to say, the noumenon of modern
human life came to maturity and attained relative perfection. It can be safely asserted
that man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, do not
stand in a dualistic relationship to each other, which is to say, man’s “structure and
choice” do not exist in absolute isolation from each other, but rather that an inte-
grated duality is inherent in the unified noumenon of human life, or rather, in the
relationship of man’s “structure” to his “choice.” In the unified noumenon of human
life inhere the two constituent parts of “structure” and “choice,” which are different
from each other, inseparable from each other, and closely connected with each other,
and which are integrated into one whole. By the essence of the integration achieved
in man’s “structure and choice,” or rather, in the noumenon of human life, we mean
not that man’s “structure” overwhelms or replaces his “choice” (structuralist thought,
for example), or that man’s “choice” overpowers or takes the place of his “structure”
(existentialist ideas, for example), but that dialectical integration, development and
transcendence, the unity of opposites, and the inner mediation can be achieved in
man’s “structure and choice,” that is, in the noumenon of human life, and that man’s
“structure and choice” tend to reveal themselves in an ongoing process of dialec-
tical unity and self-transcendence. Through the instrumentality of man’s behavioral
choice, the structure of human life lays the organizational basis for human prac-
tical activity, whereas the behavioral choice on the part of a humansubject tends to
manifest itself in a variety of practical behaviors. Man’s “structure” and “choice” are
connected with each other, dependent upon each other, and changed into each other.
Man’s “structure” determines his “choice”, and vice versa, whereby the noumenon
of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” has turned out to be one of the
most unfathomable mysteries in the world. Just as a human subject, who is endowed
with the structure of human life, but who is rendered incapable of making choices,
cannot exist in the world, so one who is endowed with the power of making choices
cannot prove beyond a possibility of doubt he is devoid of any structure whatsoever
inherent in the noumenon of human life. Hence, it can be safely asserted that an inte-
grated duality is inherent in the noumenon of human life and that man’s “structure
and choice” are inherently integrated into one whole. The noumenon of human life,
that is, man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an open-ended being in its own
right, and is endowed with infinite possibilities of the future only awaiting develop-
ment. The noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” which is
endowed with a spatial dimension, is integrated with the world and exists synchron-
ically with it, thereby endowing the human world with a most copious and unfailing
source of intellectual development. Moreover, the noumenon of human life, that is,
man’s “structure and choice,” also possesses a temporal dimension, which manifests
itself in the fact that the noumenon of human life is integrated with the world and
exists diachronically with it, whereby the noumenon of human life that is integrated
with the human world can reveal itself in an ongoing process of development and
transcendence, and will exist for all periods infinitely extending far into the future.
2 Chinese and Foreign Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon of Human Life 165
The noumenon of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” tends to
assert itself as the mode of human existence and as the mode of human survival in its
own right. When the external environment imposes pressure on the human subject
to which he has to respond, the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure
and choice,” will respond accordingly on its own initiative by directing the human
subject’s behavioral choices towards the external environment as well as towards
his own “metastructure,” whereby the human subject not only changes the external
environment, but also makes readjustments to a greater or lesser extent to his own
“metastructure.” When faced with new pressures from the external environment, the
human subject tends to bring the noumenon of human life into operation again, and to
make new behavioral choices, whereby the new behavioral choices can bring about
changes in the external environment as well as in the subject’s “metastructure.” That
is to say, when faced with mounting pressures from the external environment, man’s
“structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, tend to be transformed
into each other, to change each other, and to determine each other. The interaction of
man’s “structure” with his “choice” tends to repeat itself in endless cycles, or even
to infinity. “The integrated duality” inherent in the noumenon of human life, that is,
the essence of man’s species-life, finds expression in the interactive process of man’s
“structure and choice,” which gives material form to the unique mode of existence
of the species-being, and which is a dynamic and genuine reflection of the human
life course unfolding itself on a magnificent scale from ancient times to the present,
in which human beings will be able to attain infinite transcendence while marching
into the future.
2 Chinese and Foreign Scholars’ Inquiries

into the Noumenon of Human Life
Looking back on the course of the history of civilization, we will find that Chinese
and foreign scholars from ancient times to the present have never ceased their serious
and assiduous efforts to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the noumenon of human
life, and that there have been dozens of such competing theories put forward, which
make an extensive literature of speculation on this intriguing subject and which
embody the admirable results of their own original researches. Regrettably, their
conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to provide the key to a true and
complete understanding of the noumenon of human life, but paved the way for
worthy successors’ continuous and indefatigable researches on this question. Though
their ingenuous but hazardous attempts at working out this absorbing but perplexing
question failed, every failure constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution
of this question. In so doing they have made substantial contributions of permanent
value to the sum of human knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the essence of
human life.
2.1 Ancient Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon

of Human Life
The noumenon of human life has always proved so tempting both to Chinese and to
Western scholars since ancient times that they made genuine and painstaking efforts
to pry into the mysteries of human life and that they advanced a multitude of ingenious
and laudable theories on this question. There are a few impressive historical examples
in illustration of this argument.
Confucius was a ju and the founder of the Ju school, which has been known in the
West as the Confucian school. The Ju school is the Ju chia or School of Literati. This
school is known in Western literature as the Confucianist school, but the word ju
literally means “literatus” or scholar. Thus the Western title is somewhat misleading,
because it misses the implication that the followers of this school were scholars as
well as thinkers; they, above all others, were the teachers of the ancient classics and
thus the inheritors of the ancient cultural legacy. Confucius, to be sure, is the leading
figure of this school and may rightly be considered as its founder. Nevertheless the
term ju not only denotes “Confucian” or “Confucianist,” but has a wider implication
as well.9 In the Analects, Confucius enlightened us about the threefold Way of an
exemplary person (or a superior man). Here the Way or Truth means Tao. The Master
said: “Set your heart on the Tao.” (Analects, VII, 6). And again: “To hear the Tao in
the morning and then die at night, that would be all right.” (Analects, IV, 9) It was
this Tao which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now call
“learning” means the increase of our knowledge, but the Tao is that whereby we can
elevate our mind. Confucius said, “The Way of an exemplary person (or a superior
man) is threefold, but I am unable to accomplish them: the wise are free from doubts;
the virtuous are free from anxiety; the brave are free from fear.” (Analects, XIV)10
It is thus clear that, according to Confucianism, the noumenon of human life can be
reduced to his “humanity,” “wisdom,” and “valor.”
Mencius developed orthodox Confucianism, especially the Confucian theory
about the noumenon of human life, and thus he was venerated by later genera-
tions as the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius.
Mencius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism. The Mencius in seven books
records the conversations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time as well
as between him and his disciples, and in later time it was honored by being made
one of the famous “Four Books,” which for the past one thousand years have formed
the basis of Confucian education.11 Mencius said: “The feeling of commiseration
belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and
respect; and that of right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration implies the prin-
ciple of benevolence (or human-heartedness); that of shame and dislike, the principle
of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that
9 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin, China:
Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 48, 50, 64.
10 Ibid., p. 74.
11 Ibid., p. 110.
of right and wrong, the principle of wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety,

and wisdom are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with
them.”12 To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them
the following: “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others
… If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without excep-
tion experience a feeling of alarm and distress … From this case we may perceive
that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a
feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and
yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man.
The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling
of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and
yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning
of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs … Since all
men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full
development and completion. The result will be like fire that begins to burn, or a
spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and
they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that develop-
ment, they will not suffice even to serve one’s parents.” (Mencius, IIa, 6).13 All men
in their original nature possess these “four beginnings,” which, if fully developed,
become the four “constant virtues,” so greatly emphasized in Confucianism. These
virtues, if not hindered by external conditions, develop naturally from within, just
as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a flower from the bud. There remains
another question, which is: Why should man allow free development to his “four
beginnings,” instead of to what we may call his lower instincts? Mencius answers
that it is these four beginnings that differentiate man from the beasts. They should
be developed, therefore, because it is only through their development that man is
truly a “man.” (Mencius, IVb, 19).14 For Mencius, on the one hand human nature
is a social tendency which is inborn, but on the other, it consists of natural quali-
ties, which is to say, Mencius maintained that man has two essences: One is man’s
natural essence; the other is man’s social essence. By man’s natural essence, Mencius
means that human desires for food and sex are directly associated with physical form,
which is to say, ordinary human desires for food and sex are our natural physical
or psychological instincts, and that our mouths have a common taste for flavor.15
Mencius means by man’s social essence that all men in their original nature possess
these four “constant virtues” such as human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety,
and wisdom.16 Herein, in fact, lies the essential difference between man and the
12 Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK:
Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 278.
Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 112.

14 Ibid., p. 114.
15 Chǒng Chedu. (2020). The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea: The
Chonǒn (Testament) (Edward Y. J. Chung, Trans.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 257.
Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, pp. 112, 114.

animals in the Mencius sense of the term. Animals may be said to possess the pure
essence of nature, which Mencius calls the material senses xiao ti (the small, 小体),
whilst man is a social being as well as a natural being—or to put it another way, man
possesses the natural essence as well as the social nature, which is rightly described
as the reflecting and thinking mind/heart da ti (the great, 大体) in the Mencius. If man
allows free development to his lower instincts, that is, his natural essence (the small,
小体), instead of to what we may call his “four virtues,” or rather, his social nature
(the great, 大体), he will be called a “little man” who does not differ essentially from
birds or beasts. Mencius says: “A man who only eats and drinks is counted mean by
others;—because he nourishes what is little to the neglect of what is great. If a man,
fond of his eating and drinking, were not to neglect what is of more importance, how
should his mouth and belly be considered as no more than an inch of skin? Some
parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, and some small. The great
must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the
little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man.
Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who
follow that part which is little are little men. The senses of hearing and seeing do
not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact
with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office
of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it
fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us.
Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution,
and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which
makes the great man.” (Mencius, XIV, 2, 5, 6; XV, 2).17 For Mencius, the function
of the mind / heart is to reflect or think. It is this mind / heart, Mencius says, that
enables man to think or reflect. It is only by thinking or reflecting that man is truly a
man. Specifically, it is only by thinking or reflecting that the “four beginnings”—the
feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and respect, and the sense
of right and wrong, which, he says, are inherent in man’s nature, when elevated or
developed, may result in the “four constant virtues,” that is, “goodness,” “righteous-
ness,” “propriety,” and “wisdom,” whereby man can become a “superior man.” It
is therefore clear that Mencius tries to build up a new theory about the noumenon
of human life whose origin, formation, and development rightly deserve deep and
extensive discussion.
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato also advanced a theory about the noumenon
of human life. In his treatise the Republic, Plato established the tripartite soul, which
is to say, the Platonic soul consists of three parts which are located in different regions
of the body. Animals and plants possess only lower souls. What distinguishes man
from the lower orders of creation is thus that man alone has a higher soul, that is, the
rational soul, whereby man is a species-being most similar to God and therefore dear
to him. According to Plato, the soul has three distinguishable layers, or levels: The
lowest layer of the soul is described as man’s appetites (temperance), the second layer
17Legge, James. (1861). The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius, Vol. II. London, UK:
Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, pp. 293–294.
is called the spirit (courage), and the third layer is what Plato described as reason
(wisdom). For Plato, just as men are made out of three metals, gold, silver, and bronze
(or iron), so there are three kinds of people in any society: The philosopher-king,
whose soul is made of gold, is the embodiment of wisdom and virtue. He knows the
statesmanship and statecraft while governing the state. The guardians, whose souls
are made of silver, whose virtue is to be courageous, and whose purpose is to direct
the state with the virtue of wisdom, are suited to protect the state. Those lesser people
such as farmers, craftsmen, and traders, whose souls are composed of bronze and
iron and whose virtue is to practice temperance in appetites and passions, should
be engaged in productive and economic activities, and thus provide all necessary
goods and services for their fellow countrymen.18 Thus it can be seen that Plato
divides the community into three classes or professions, i.e., the wise rulers, the
auxiliary protectors and the working class of producers.19 According to him, if the
three classes can perform their own functions faithfully and resign themselves to
their own destinies, unity and harmony will prevail in the State in that justice, or
the public virtue, tends to grow with the specialization of functions.20 It is thus
clear that in the early days of human civilization a multitude of eminent scholars
in Chinese and Western countries made serious and indefatigable researches on the
noumenon of human life, which gave them fascinating insights into this absorbing
but perplexing question and which stimulated them to advance numerous ingenious
and enlightening theories.
2.2 Modern Scholars’ Inquiries into the Noumenon

of Human Life
In modern times, a number of notable scholars put forward many ingenious theories
about the noumenon of human life, which, regrettably, were far from reaching a
genuine solution of this question, but which in great leaps have carried forward our
understanding of this question. Several representative theories may be adduced to
support this argument.
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was an Austrian neurologist and the founder of
psychoanalysis. Freud may justly be called the most influential intellectual legis-
lator of his age. His creation of psychoanalysis was at once a theory of the human
psyche, a therapy for the relief of its ills, and an optic for the interpretation of culture
and society. Despite repeated criticisms, attempted refutations, and qualifications of
18 Gao, Qing-Hai. (1990). Essentials of European Philosophical History (new edition). Changchun,
China: Jilin People’s Publishing House, pp. 91–93.
19 Reeves, M. Francis. (2004). Platonic Engagements: A Comtemporary Dialogue on Morality,
Justice and the Business World. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 284.
20 Jayapalan, N. (2002). Comprehensive Study of Plato. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic Publishers and
Distributors, p. 30.
Freud’s work, its spell remained powerful well after his death.21 Freud advanced
his own ingenious theory about the noumenon of human life by dividing the human
psyche into three portions, that is, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” and further devel-
oping a model of psychic structure comprising the three provinces of the psychic
apparatus, viz. the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” which he discussed in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle (1920) and expounded in The Ego and the Id (1923), to capture
the dynamics of the mind, which is to say, the three agents are theoretical constructs
that describe the activities and interactions of the mental life of a person. He proposed
that the noumenon of human life could be divided into three parts, or rather, the “id,”
“ego,” and “superego.” The id is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in
psychoanalytic theory that is completely unconscious and is the source of psychic
energy derived from instinctual needs and drives. The “id,” whose basic biological
needs are primarily sexual, or rather, libidinal drives, is the most primitive component
of the human personality that comes into being at birth, and is the source of basic
biological needs and drives, emotional impulses and desires, including sexual and
aggressive motives. The “id,” which is unconscious, operates on the pleasure prin-
ciple, according to which it tries to seek pleasure, avoid pain, and gain immediate
gratification of instinctive drives and impulses. It’s filled with basic biological energy
reaching it from the instincts, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the
instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle.22 Freud called
the “Id” the “true psychic reality” because it represents the inner world of subjective
experience, with no knowledge of objective reality. The “Id” seeks immediate grat-
ification without regard to personal or social consequences or to external reality in
general, that is, it mediates between its biological and psychological needs on the one
hand and external reality on the other. The “Ego” is the one of the three divisions of
the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that serves as the organized conscious mediator
between the person and reality especially by functioning both in the perception of and
adaptation to reality. Conscious awareness resides in the ego, although not all of the
operations of the ego are conscious.23 The ego represents what may be called reason
and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions and impulses.24
Hence the ego helps us to organize our thoughts and to make sense of them and the
world around us. For Freud, the ego acts according to the reality principle, which
is a regulating mechanism that enables the individual to delay gratifying immediate
needs and function effectively in the real world.25 Accordingly, it seeks to please the
21 Jay, Martin Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” From https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sigmund-

Freud.
22 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Company, pp. 105–106.

23 Snowden, Ruth. (2006). Freud: Teach Yourself. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 105–107.
24 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–364.

25 Schacter, Daniel L., Wegner, Daniel M., & Gilbert, Daniel T. Psychology. New York, NY:
Macmillan Higher Education, 2008.

id’s drive in realistic ways that, in the long term, bring benefit, rather than grief.26 As
the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the
external world,27 it attempts to mediate between id and reality, find a balance between
primitive drives and reality while satisfying the id and super-ego, and bring about
harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.28 Freud concedes
that the ego serves three severe masters, that is, the external world, the super-ego,
and the id, that the ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego, and repulsed
by reality, has to do its best to suit all three, thus is constantly feeling hemmed by
the danger of causing discontent on two other sides, and that the ego seems to be
more loyal to the id, preferring to gloss over the finer details of reality to minimize
conflicts while pretending to have a regard for reality.29 In Freudian theory the ego
is the psychic system that mediates between the id and the superego to get our needs
met. The ego meets the needs of the id in a reasonable, moral manner approved by the
superego, which is what Freud called the moral guardian, and which as such observes
and guides the ego. Superego is the one of the three divisions of the psyche in psycho-
analytic theory that is only partly conscious, represents internalization of parental
conscience and the rules of society, and functions to reward and punish through a
system of moral attitudes, conscience, and a sense of guilt. The superego, the mental
system that reflects the internalization of cultural rules, mainly learned as parents
exercise their authority, consists of a set of guidelines, internal standards, and other
codes of conduct that regulate and control our behaviors, thoughts, and fantasies. It
acts as a kind of conscience, punishing us when it finds we are doing or thinking
something wrong (by producing guilt or other painful feelings) and rewarding us
(with feelings of pride or self-congratulation) for living up to ideal standards.30 The
superego, which acts as the conscience, maintains our sense of morality, and controls
our sense of right and wrong and guilt,31 whereby it helps us fit into society by getting
us to act in socially acceptable ways.32 According to Freud, the installation of the
superego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental
agency, while as development proceeds the superego also takes on the influence of
those who have stepped into the place of parents—educators, teachers, and people
chosen as ideal models. Thus a child’s superego is in fact constructed on the model
not of its parents but of its parents’ superego. It becomes the vehicle of tradition and
of all the time-resisting judgments of value which have propagated themselves in
26 Noam, Gil G., Hauser, Stuart T., Santostefano, Sebastiano., Garrison, William., Jacobson, Alan
M., Powers, Sally I., & Mead, Merril. “Ego Development and Psychopathology: A Study of Hospi-
talized Adolescents”. Child Development. Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Society for Research
in Child Development. 55:1 (February 1984): 189–194.
27 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.). New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 363–364.


29 Ibid.
30 Schacter, Daniel L. (2011). Psychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, p. 481.
31 Sédat, Jacques. (2000). “Freud.” Collection Synthese. Armand Colin, p.109.
this manner from generation to generation.33 Hence the superego functions as the
guardian of morality as well as the guardian of civilization. The superego, on the one
hand, aims for perfection,34 but on the other, it has to work in contradiction to the
id. The super-ego strives to act in a socially appropriate manner, whereas the id just
wants instant self-gratification.35 Psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method, originated
by Sigmund Freud, for treating mental disorders by investigating the interaction of
conscious and unconscious elements in the patient’s mind and bringing repressed
fears and conflicts into the conscious mind, using techniques such as dream interpre-
tation and free association. Freud’s psychoanalysis is based on his conception of a
person which can be represented by his three schemes for describing the mind, that
is, the human psyche consists of id, ego, and superego, the mind could be divided
into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and the driving force of our action
is the pleasure principle, as well as its derivatives, which is the instinctive seeking
of pleasure and avoiding of pain to satisfy biological and psychological needs.36 It
can be safely asserted that in developing a theoretical framework of the noumenon
of human life, Freud made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the
ontological study of human existence by blazing a new and different path towards
true knowledge of the human essence. However, Freudian ideas received scathing
criticisms after his death, because in the Freudian theory a universal sexual motive
was found to have been inherent in the customs and dreams of primitive societies
as well as in the early civilizations. In addition, some severe criticisms were also
leveled at Freud’s exclusively sexualistic stand, including his definition of energy
and libido in a purely sexual sense. The Freudian theory reveals that Freud confines
himself almost exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the psyche.
Nonetheless, his theory concerning the psychological basis of sexuality, especially
the purely sexually defined concept of libido and the exclusively sexual interpreta-
tion of energy, is purely hypothetical and actually pure conjecture. This limitation
compelled Freud to explain man’s psychic energy in exclusively sexual terms, and
to reduce all psychological motives to one single unit, that is, libido. There is today
a growing consensus that Freud’s psychoanalytical theory provides an inadequate
explanation of how the three elements of personality, i.e. the id, ego, and superego,
may exist in dynamic equilibrium or in conflict with one another. It is thus evident
that the deficiencies inherent in the Freudian theory are apparently obvious.
33 Freud, Sigmund. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. New York: W.W.
34 Meyers, David G. “Module 44: The Psychoanalytic Perspective.” In Psychology Eighth Edition
in Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007.

35 Calian, Florian. (2012). Plato’s Psychology of Action and the Origin of Agency. Paris, FR:
L’Harmattan, pp. 17–19.

36 Sigmund, Freud. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Jue-FuGao, Trans.). Beijing, China:
The Commercial Press, 1984; Sigmund, Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud (Chinese edition) (Chen Lin, Huan-Min Zhang, & Wei-Qi Chen, Trans.,
Rev. Ze-chuan Chen). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986.
Karen Horney (1885–1952), German-born American psychoanalyst whose work

exerted a decisive influence upon the course of psychoanalysis,37 was among the
most influential of 20th-centuray psychologists through her critiques and revisions of
Freudian theory.38 Departing from some of the basic principles of Sigmund Freud,39
her theories questioned some traditional Freudian views, which was particularly
true of the theories of sexuality and of the instinct orientation of psychoanalysis.
She disagreed with Freud about inherent differences in the psychology of men and
women, and traced such differences to society and culture rather than biology.40 She
suggested an environmental and social basis for the personality and its disorders. In
her major theoretical works, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) and New
Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), she argued that environmental and social condi-
tions, rather than the instinctual or biological drives described by Freud, determine
much of individual personality and are the chief causes of neuroses and personality
disorders.41 Horney formulated a theory of psychopathology that was at once more
comprehensive in its scope and more penetrating in its insights. Her ideas, grounded
in clinical experience, are almost totally devoid of the dramatic speculation that
frequently marked the writings of the man she always acknowledged to be her indis-
pensable forerunner, Sigmund Freud.42 Despite these variances with the prevalent
Freudian view, Horney strove to reformulate Freudian thought, presenting a holistic,
humanistic view of the individual psyche which placed much emphasis on cultural
and social differences worldwide. As such, she is often classified as neo-Freudian.43
Horney put forward her own original theory about the noumenon of human life, in
which there are three manifestations of the self, that is, the “actual self,” the “real
self,” and the “ideal self.” Following a psychodynamic tradition, Horney defined the
“real self” as an “intrinsic potentiality” or “central inner force, common to all human
beings,”44 or rather, the “original force toward individual growth and fulfillment.”45
She maintained that the “real self” constitutes “the reservoir of spontaneous ener-
gies,”46 which includes the basic physiological and psychological needs, and that
37 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan.

38 “Horney, Karen (1885–1952).”Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia. Ency-
clopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

39 Britannica, The Editor of Encyclopedia. “Karen Horney”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov.
2020, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney>. Accessed 3 February 2021.

40 Schacter, Daniel L., Gilbert, Daniel Todd., & Wegner, Daniel M. Psychology. New York, NY:
Worth Publishers, 2011.

2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karen-Horney. Accessed 3 February 2021.

42 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan.
43 “Karen Horney.” en.wikipedia.org. 31 Jan. 2021 <https://www.en.wikipedia.com>.
44 Horney, Karen. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company,
p. 17.
45 Ibid., p. 158.
46 Ibid., p. 159.
it represents an innate developmental tendency. Hence, the “real self,” according to

Horney, is the potential self who tends to strive for its unfettered growth. For Horney,
the “actual self,” as distinguished from the “real self,” is derived from the sum total
of our actual experiences, and it is the empirical self—that part of the actual self
which is immediately apprehendable and observable at any given moment. She also
defines an “actual self” as “everything a person is at a given time: body and soul,
healthy and neurotic.” The “actual self,” says Horney, is that fluid combination of the
neurotic and the real that we are in daily existence. According to Horney, the “ideal
self,” as opposed to the “actual self,” may be viewed as neurotic and the source of
the grandiose aspects of the self, and psychologically healthy people, with very few
exceptions, strive to reach an ideal self that is reasonably attainable, which means
that man, by his very nature and of his own accord, strives toward self-realization,
which Horney views as both a “prime moral obligation” and a “prime moral privi-
lege,” and that his set of values evolves from such striving. The consistent struggle
between the “actual self” and the “ideal self” constitutes what Horney refers to as “the
central inner conflict,” which results in excessive compulsions and “shoulds” that the
individual develops to rule his life and hereby finds meaning in life. For a person
who is striving for his ideal self, the natural striving constitutes the central inner
force of his actual self as well as the most serious obstacle to healthy growth, that is,
the neurotic solution which Horney called self-realization, the attempt to see and to
mold oneself into a glorified, idealized, illusory image with strivings for superiority,
power, perfection, and vindictive triumph over others.47 It must be admitted that
Horney’s theory about the noumenon of human life rejected the pansexual Freudian
view and corrected this serious weakness inherent to the Freudian theory, and that
she tried to gain a deeper and fresh insight into the structure of human life by delving
into the central inner conflict between the “actual self” and the “ideal self.” Thus it
can be safely asserted that Horney’s theory embodies substantial improvements over
Freud’s. However, there are still weaknesses in her theory. Clearly, human behaviors
and neuroses cannot be given a full explanation when viewed from the perspective
of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” which is far from explaining human behaviors
that are complex and unpredictable.
Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970), often referred to as the “father of humanistic
psychology,”48 was a prominent personality theorist and one of the best-known Amer-
ican psychologists of the twentieth century. Skeptical of behaviorism and psycho-
analysis, Maslow worked to develop a more expansive theory of human motivation,
47 Horney, Karen. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Chuan Feng, Trans.) Guiyang, China:
Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 1988; Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts (Zuo-Hong Wang,
Trans.) Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 2004; “Karen Danielsen Horney.”
Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 https://www.encyclopedia.
com.
48 “Maslow, Abraham.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 12
Jan. 2021 <https://www.enyclopedia.com>.

one that could accommodate the powerful influence of biology and the environ-
ment while honoring the human capacity for free will.49 He postulated a hierarchical
theory of human motivation, wherein needs arrange themselves in a hierarchy from
basic biological needs to those of self-esteem and self-actualization.50 Influenced by
existentialist philosophers and literary figures, Maslow was an important contrib-
utor in the United States to humanistic psychology, which was sometimes called the
“third force,” in opposition to behaviorism and psychoanalysis.51 Maslow remains
a figure of considerable renown in psychology. For all of his influence on academic
psychology, Maslow’s most enduring legacy is cultural.52 Maslow proposed his own
theory about the noumenon of human life—that is, the theory of Maslow’s needs, also
known as the “hierarchy of human needs.” In his 1943 paper “A Theory of Human
Motivation” as well as in his major works, Motivation and Personality (1954) and
Toward a Psychology of Being (1962), Maslow argued that humans possess five
sets of basic needs, ranging from basic “physiological” needs to “safety,” “love”
or “belongingness,” “esteem,” and “self-actualization,” that these innate needs are
arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency—or, to put it another way, human needs can
be described as ordered in a pre-potent hierarchy, and that individuals are motivated
to fulfill lower-level needs before they are motivated to fulfill higher-level needs. He
postulated that these motivational needs underlie all human behavior, which is to say,
they constitute the primary sources of behavioral motivation. These needs, according
to Maslow, are critical in our survival and ongoing existence, for without having these
needs met, an individual will fail to develop into a healthy person, both physically and
psychologically. He asserted that an individual tends to be dominated by these hier-
archically arranged needs all through life, and that at any given time he is struggling
to meet these needs until he reaches the apex of the hierarchy, self-actualization.
He believed that humans aspire to have all of these needs met and experience a
sense of genuine fulfillment when this is achieved. According to Maslow’s theory
of motivation, known as the “hierarchy of needs,” all human behaviors are deemed
to be motivated by five sets of hierarchically arranged needs.53 Maslow argued that
his theory of motivation integrated existing formulations from psychoanalysis and
behavioral psychology with insights derived from the study of the “psychologically
healthy,” while psychoanalytically inspired theory, which was based largely on the
study of people experiencing personal difficulties, resulted in a distorted and unduly
49 “Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan.

2021 <https://www.enyclopedia.com>.
50 Sternlicht, Manny “Maslow, Abraham H.” Encyclopedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan.
51 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Abraham Maslow”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 Jan.
2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abraham-H-Maslow. Accessed 5 February 2021.

53 Maslow, Abraham H. Self-Actualizing Man (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu & Feng Liu, Trans.)
Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987; Hoffman, Edward. The Right to Be Human: A
Biography of Abraham Maslow (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu, Trans.) Beijing, China: Reform
Publishing House (1988–2000), 1998.
narrow conception of human motivation.54 Maslow’s theory of motivation is reason-

able in the sense that he contended human needs constitute the primary driving force
behind human behavior, and that they rightly serve to explain the entire spectrum of
human behavior. It may be safely asserted that Maslow’s theory represents a substan-
tial improvement on its forerunners, such as Freud’s and Horney’s theories. Freud
saw the libido as the sole driving force behind all human behavior, and Maslow’s
theory overcame the weakness inherent in the Freudian theory. According to Horney,
human behaviors and neuroses can be given a full explanation only when viewed
from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” and in his theory Maslow
corrected the inherent weakness of Horney’s theory. Nonetheless, Maslow’s theory
is far from comprehensive. When it comes to the noumenon of human life, Maslow’s
theory cannot offer an all-embracing and full explanation. Maslow’s theory attempts
to describe and explain human behavior in terms of human needs and desires, which
is neither scientific nor practical. While human needs tend to provide the basic energy
for human behavior, and to influence the basic behavioral tendencies, they cannot
directly determine whether humans behave or how they behave. Man is a rational
animal—or, to put it another way, man is endowed with reason. Human reason is
the ultimate determining force in human behavior. Generally speaking, human needs
and rational judgment jointly determine human behavior. Under certain external envi-
ronmental pressures, human behavior tends to be initiated through needs. Then an
individual tends to make behavioral choices whenever he (or she) exercises his (or
her) power of rational judgment. Thus it can be seen that rational judgment is the
ultimate determining force in human behavior. To sum up, the obvious weakness of
Maslow’s theory lies in the fact that he rejected and even ignored the determining
influence of consciousness and reason upon human behavior. Thus it must of neces-
sity follow that his theory cannot offer a scientific explanation of man’s unpredictable
and unfathomable behavior.
There are still many learned and intelligent men who have made important contri-
butions to the study of human ontology. Some eminent scholars devoted themselves
assiduously and faithfully to the study of human ontology, while there are still more
prominent figures who provided valuable knowledge and methods for the study of
human ontology. A constellation of illustrious names include Ferdinand de Saus-
sure, Jean Piaget, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Max Weber, Bruno Latour, Arnold
Toynbee, and Kurt Lewin. Of these two notable names, that is, Claude Lévi-Strauss
and Jean-Paul Sartre, which appeared at the beginning of the book, claim particular
mention. They proposed many profound and stimulating theories as well as relevant
methods. It is regrettable that their conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to
provide the key to a true and complete understanding of the noumenon of human life.
However, their mental efforts paved the way for worthy successors’ continuous and
indefatigable researches on this question. Although their ingenuous but hazardous
attempts at working out this absorbing but perplexing question failed, every failure
constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution of this question. In so doing
54“Maslow, Abraham.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Jan.

they have made substantial contributions of permanent value to the sum of human
knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the essence of human life.
With the above situation in view, we must inherit and develop Marxist dialectical
thinking, and follow in the footsteps of our forerunners who have achieved valuable
results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology. Only in this way can we
unravel the mystery of human existence. In 1986 and 1987, the author Chen Binggong
got 42 colleagues and students organized several times to undertake investigations
on “personality and values” in Chinese metropolises such as Changchun, Beijing,
Xi’an, Wuhan, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. From 1995 to 2005,
he carried out a series of experiments in “personality structure and holistic personality
development” in Chinese regions and cities like Jilin Province, Henan Province, and
Shenzhen. Based upon these investigations and experiments, the author published
relevant articles and works, such as “The 21st Century and Chinese Traditional Ideal
Personality Models: From a Modern Perspective” and General Tendencies in Chinese
Personality. While following in the footsteps of his predecessors who have achieved
the latest results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology, the author
devoted more than 30 years of his life to the study of human ontology by drawing
upon previous results in the field. Eventually, the author, in conjunction with his
colleagues and students, made preliminary findings from long-term investigations
and experiments, and proposed tentative ideas about the noumenon of human life.
The author asserts that “the integrated duality” is inherent in the noumenon of human
life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” and that “the integrated duality” mani-
fests itself in the organic unity of “structure and choice.” The author’s view may be
briefly summarized in the following statement, that is, the noumenon of human life,
or rather, man’s “structure and choice,” is basically composed of “the three levels
of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” (1) By the “triple structure,”
that is, the “three levels of personality structure,” we mean the basic structure of the
noumenon of human life, or rather, the basic make-up of man’s “structure and choice,”
which consists of three organic levels of personality structure. By the first level of
personality structure, or rather, “the power of personality demand (or need),” which
constitutes the basic level of the noumenon of human life that the author terms man’s
“structure and choice,” we mean that man’s basic needs and driving forces as well
as their manifold manifestations are inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious)
mind, which, according to the author, can be regarded as “the great reservoir” of
man’s basic needs and driving forces, and that “the power of personality demand
(or need)” can provide primitive energies and basic tendencies for human behavioral
choices. By the second level of personality structure, that is, “the power of personality
judgment,” which is the crucial level of the noumenon of human life, and which is of
paramount importance to man’s “structure and choice,” we mean that the conscious
mind is endowed with man’s rational powers that tend to manifest themselves in
manifold forms, and that “the power of personality judgment” tends to be inextri-
cably linked with “the power of personality demand (or need),” thereby determining
man’s behavioral choices. By the third level of personality structure, that is, “person-
ality behavior choice,” we mean that man can determine his own behavior and make
appropriate behavioral choices in a certain environment, that “personality behavior
choice” manifests itself in a person’s practical activities throughout his whole life,
and that “personality behavior choice” is man’s conscious practical activity whereby
he can remold his subjective world while changing the objective world. (2) By “eight
kinds of powers” we mean that eight kinds of essential (or substantive) powers are
inherent in the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure
and choice.” “Eight kinds of powers” can be grouped into three separate levels of
“the triple structure.” “The power of personality demand (or need),” which belongs
to the first level of personality structure, includes three kinds of power inherent in
human life: (1) “the power of survival demand (or need),” for instance desire for food,
sexual desire, and desire for safety. (2) “the power of belonging demand (or need),”
for example desire for love, desire for group, and desire for self-esteem. (3) “The
power of development demand (or need)” such as desire for knowledge, desire for
achievement, and desire for perfection. Basically, “the power of personality demand
(or need)” is inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind. “The power of
personality judgment,” which comes into the second level of personality structure,
contains four kinds of power inherent in human life: (1) “ideological and moral
power;” (2) “wisdom power;” (3) “will power;” (4) “power of introspection.” The
first three kinds of power inherent in human life, which are three principal manifesta-
tions of “the power of personality judgment,” exist in the conscious mind, while the
fourth kind of power, which is a major form of “the power of personality judgment,” is
present in man’s self-awareness. “Personality behavior choice,” which can be grouped
into the third level of personality structure, consists of one type of power inherent in
human life, that is, “personality behavior choice.” The author spent over 30 years of
his life following in the footsteps of his forerunners and contemporaries, who have
achieved the latest results of scholarly research in philosophy, anthropology, philo-
sophical anthropology, and other related disciplines, in order to unravel the mystery
of human existence, or rather, to gain a fresh and deeper insight into the noumenon
of human life which the author terms man’s “structure and choice.” His untiring
and unremitting efforts were eventually crowned with success. He drew preliminary
conclusions from long-term investigations and experiments. His monograph entitled
Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the Knowledge System, which
was published trough China Social Sciences Press in 2012, was chosen as one of
“National Achievements Library of Philosophy and Social Sciences” in 2011. In
this scholarly work the author proposed and expounded the theory of “personality
structure and choice,” which was illustrated by charts and diagrams, and which took
pages 177–311 of this book to go into details, holding that the noumenon of human
life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” is basically composed of
“three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” Based on an intel-
ligent and clarifying analysis of the noumenon of human life, it can be safely asserted
that man’s “structure and choice” do not exist in a binary relationship where one half
of the binary represents the opposite of the other, and that nor the relationship of
man’s “structure” to his “choice” exists outside the noumenon of human life. Rather,
“the integrated duality” is inherent within the noumenon of human life, which the
author terms man’s “structure and choice,” the relationship of which is essentially a
negative unity of those opposites or contradictions inherent within the noumenon of
human life. The noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure
and choice,” includes the complex structure of human life and the more complex
choices that have to be made in man’s life, whereby it can assert itself as a very
complex life system in its own right. Or to be more precise, the noumenon of human
life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” is a concrete historical
unity of the complex structure of human life and the more complex choices that
have to be made in man’s life. Herein lies the fundamental reason that human life
differs essentially from animal life. It is the very noumenon of human life, which the
author terms man’s “structure and choice,” that makes humans qualitatively different
from all other life forms, including animals, and that makes human life so rich, so
colorful, so picturesque, so deep, so complex, and so mysterious. The noumenon of
human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and choice,” exists not only as
a natural being but also as a social being. It is endowed with superior reason and
conscious of having in itself infinite desires. On the one hand, it can possess brilliant
intelligence and boast of noble lineage, but on the other, it may be kept in ignorance
and humbled in the dust. It can be as firm as a rock, but it can be the most feeble
thing in nature. A vapor, a drop of water suffices to kill it. It has a natural tendency
towards introspection whereby it can achieve transcendence, but it is liable to error
when it falls into an ossified way of thinking. It can look forward to a bright future
with unbounded confidence, but it can bring destruction upon itself. The tragedy
repeats itself an infinite number of times in history. It may find itself in a woeful
predicament and be driven to the brink of desperation, but it has boundless hope in
itself. It is thus far regarded as the highest stage of evolutionary development, but it
will exist in an unfinished state for all periods extending infinitely far into the future.
People can attain knowledge of it, but they can never offer an intellectually ultimate
explanation of it. Indeed, in passing judgment on a man, we tend to make regrettable
mistakes. Sometimes we seem to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of what
man is, but in fact our explanations are far from satisfactory. Sometimes it seems to
us that human society is undergoing a remarkable development in manifold spheres
of human activity, but it is regrettable that these stunning developments should lead
to the crisis of civilization as well as the alienation of man from nature, from society,
and from himself. “What a piece of work is a man!”55 It defies all comparison.
What an unfathomable life system man is! Man has become a prime object of study,
for which scientists cannot refrain from expressing their boundless admiration, but
which makes them puzzle their brains over it! Admittedly, knowing what man in the
world is would be no more a perfectly simple and easy thing to do than knowing the
world. Such eminent figures as William Shakespeare, Blaise Pascal, Max Scheler,
Ernst Cassirer, and Michael Landmann, who went down in the history of human
thought, sang the praises of man, and devoted themselves assiduously and faithfully
to the study of man. Their scholarly researches on what man is throw light on a mere
portion or a mere aspect of man at the most, rather than man’s totality! Man must of
55Shakespeare, William. (2001). The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: The Tragedy of
Hamlet (in the English and Chinese languages), Vol. 32. (Shi-Qiu Liang, Trans.) Beijing, China:
China Radio and TV Press, &Taipei, China: The Far East Book Company, p. 110.
necessity be a prime object of study for all periods extending infinitely far into the
future. The noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s “structure and
choice,” and which exist in many modes, is endowed with superior properties (or
qualities) and functions that are unique to man. It tends to manifest itself concretely
in its synchronic existence, in its diachronic existence, and in the unified duality of
man’s “structure and choice” that depend on each other.
3 Several Theoretical Patterns About the Ontology

of Human Life
It is arguable at any rate that man’s recorded history of nearly five thousand years can
be seen as a process moving towards man’s self-knowledge, which is in effect nothing
but man’s developing knowledge of nature, of himself and of history. As will be seen
in due course, human history can be represented as a movement towards the fuller
realization of man’s freedom in knowing himself. Differing theories, which originated
with myriad schools of thought in the course of human history, vied with one another
in helping man to gain deep insights into himself. In broad terms, other theoretical
patterns about the noumenon of human life, as opposed to the Marxist theory about
the noumenon of human life, can be classified into four categories—that is, we
still can distinguish between other four types of theoretical patterns concerning the
noumenon of human life as contrasted with the Marxist theory about the noumenon
of human life.
3.1 “Man Is Created by God”
One of these basic types is religious anthropology. In the Bible, God creates man—
or, to put it another way, man is God’s unique creation. God creates man on the last
day of creation as the last living creature: man is the goal or at least the “crown of
creation.” That is to say, man constitutes the conclusion, the pinnacle and crown
of God’s creation. The Biblical creation account shows clearly and conclusively
how religious anthropology treats of the ontology of human life. At this point we
seem to feel the necessity of providing a brief explanation of how the long tradition
of Western Christian anthropology shaped the theory about the nature or essence
of human life. Many Christian teachings, such as “the doctrine of Genesis,” “the
doctrine of original sin,” “two groups of men according to the anthropology of the
Apostle Paul,” “the Calvinist doctrine of the double predestination of all people—that
is, humanity consists of two kinds of people, those who are predestined to eternal
bliss and those who will not reach salvation,” “the doctrine of grace” and “the faith
or belief in immortality,” provide valuable insights into the truth of human existence.
On the one hand, these theses of religious anthropology as well as those theories
3 Several Theoretical Patterns About the Ontology of Human Life 181
of secular anthropology cast illumination on the basic questions such as the origin,
nature, mode of existence, ways of salvation and eternal pursuits of human beings, but
on the other, religious anthropology differs from secular anthropology in shedding
light on the basic questions in religious ways rather than in secular ways. “Already in
antiquity the attempt was made to define man as the only being with religion. It was
an idea that Berdyaev always repeated, ‘that the ontological question of man and the
question of religion lie in the same stratum of existence.’”56 Hence we have good
reason to believe that these Christian teachings can be properly treated as valuable
anthropological documents for permanent reference.
It is common knowledge that the Bible is the Word of God and Genesis is the
foundation stone of that great literary edifice. Still, it can be safely asserted that
the first chapters of Genesis amalgamate old anthropological myths. In the Biblical
creation accounts, God creates man by creating a first primeval couple from whom
all men are then descended and at the same time endows man with his exclusive
or unique properties. “Man communicates his creation by God to all the rest of
‘creation.’ But in the Bible the creation of the world is only a preparation for the
creation of man. God does not create him together with the animals, but on his own
day of creation: man originates from a new act of creation, he is—something shocked
later natural science—not a part of the animal kingdom, but a separate kingdom all
by himself. And indeed God creates man on the last day of creation as the last living
creature (according to modern biology, too, man appears as one of the last species
on earth): man is the goal or at least the ‘crown of creation.’ This is confirmed by
the most important anthropological thesis of the creation account: ‘God made man
in his image; in the image of God he made him.’ The other beings are only God’s
creatures; man, however, is his likeness, imago dei. Words full of implications, full
of destiny, repeated thousands of times and later used as postulates: man gains his
highest dimension by virtue of his likeness to God: ‘You shall be holy, for I the Lord
your God am holy’ (Lev. 19:2; cf. Matt. 5:48).”57
In the Old Testament, Adam and Eve sinned, and therefore men no longer live in
Paradise, which means that everyone born thereafter share this guilt. To this day the
pious Christian still lives in the feeling of being burdened with an original sin. The
fall of the first man did corrupt all human nature. Christian theology understands
man as homo peccator (man the sinner). He is imperfect and worthless, not only
as compared to God; he is also fundamentally sinful and guilty as such.58 Each
individual finds himself sinful as a member of the human race; he is sinful only
because of original sin, which Adam as the first man brought down upon all men
and which is communicated from generation to generation. By the very fact that
we exist after the Fall we all share in original sin. Sinfulness is therefore for us
post-Adamites an original inheritance of human nature. Adam’s fall has vitiated our
56 Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia,

PA: The Westminster Press, p. 74.
57 Ibid., p. 75.
58 Ibid., p. 79.
nature.59 According to the Bible, God created the first primeval couple called Adam
and Eve in a special act of creation—that is, God made man in his image; in the image
of God he made him. Despite man’s likeness to God, however, the Bible never leaves
any doubt as to the tremendous distance between God and man; indeed the Bible
regards as the basic situation of man the fact that he is situated at this distance, and
that the awareness of this can therefore never be sufficiently kept alive and intensified.
Perhaps the verse on man’s likeness to God should even be translated: God created
man as his shadow image and only as a dark outline of himself. The transcendent
God takes on a human destiny in his Son. But this neither drags him down to the level
of man nor lifts humanity to the divine.60 How little the likeness to God draws man to
God’s level is shown in the prohibition against eating of the tree of knowledge. God
has reserved knowledge of good and evil for himself. That knowledge of good and
evil is a divine property and make him like to God is what the serpent says in its words
of seduction. Giving in to its temptation, Adam and Eve eat of the tree of knowledge.
In this way they arrogate to themselves a divine quality that God did not intend for
them: man is an ethical being, knowing good and evil, and precisely this is a divine
trait in him. He has seized it from God against God’s intention. He wins his highest
quality through guilt. And as he is punished for his guilt, so are Adam and Eve are
expelled from Paradise. And that does not mean merely that they have to exchange
the beautiful garden for the rough field. Beside the tree of knowledge there grew in
Paradise the tree of eternal life. Originally Adam and Eve had been permitted to eat
of it: it was not all prohibited. But after they have committed sacrilege, God takes
back the godlike immortality he had originally intended for them. He had announced
this punishment from the first in case of their violation. “From the day on which
you eat of it you will be mortal.” He casts them out of Paradise and places an angel
before it “to guard the path to the tree of life,” from which they thus remain forever
separated. This means: man must die; and he is himself to blame for this fate. Man
will consume his whole life in making atonement for his sins and thereby strives to
seek God’s forgiveness. In connection with this later so-called “fall into (original)
sin” the Biblical author brings together a whole series of further human properties he
has observed. He has already noted that man, as distinguished from the beasts, has a
sense of shame and wears clothes, that he is the only creature that must work to earn
a living, and that the human female suffers more strongly from pregnancy ailments
and birth pains. Now all this must be mythically explained and a cause for it be given.
Originally, so it says, Adam and Eve went naked “and were not ashamed”; only by
eating of the tree of knowledge were “their eyes opened” to this. Originally man did
not have to work; in Paradise he got his food without effort. That he now must work,
and also woman’s pains at childbirth, both these things—as well as mortality—are
now interpreted as a divine penalty for violating God’s prohibition, as a curse to an
existence that is so hard only for that reason.61 In the Old Testament, Adam and Eve
sinned, and therefore men no longer live in Paradise, but this does not at all mean
59 Ibid., p. 81.
60 Ibid., pp. 76–77.
61 Ibid., pp. 77–78.
that everyone born thereafter shares this guilt. To this day the pious Jew does not
live in the feeling of being burdened with an original sin. The fall of the first man
did not corrupt all human nature. “The soul that you have laid in me, it is pure.”
In contrast, extreme forms of Christian theology understand man as homo peccator
(man the sinner). He is imperfect and worthless, not only as compared to God; he is
also fundamentally sinful and guilty as such. He lives constitutionally in a state of
deficiency.62
Theological anthropology further reveals man’s “duality,” thereby bringing new
hope to men. The Apostle Paul distinguishes between two groups of men: those who
live according to the flesh and those who live according to the spirit. There are natural
and spiritual men, the unconverted and the converted, the lost and the saved, children
of the world and children of God. The first group is derived from Adam, the second
from Christ,”63 The “natural man” is not, however, as one might perhaps believe at
first sight, a coarse primitive! Paul is not concerned with secular differences such as
culture and good breeding. The opposite of natural man is not the cultured man, but
the one who has received grace and forgiveness.64
Here the Christian doctrine of grace may merit a brief explanation. The theory of
progress opposes the Christian doctrine of sin by its faith in the original goodness of
man, but it also is against the Christian doctrine of grace. For in Christianity, fallen
man, powerless of himself, can be saved only by the gift of divine grace. The theory
of progress, however, holds that man, whom it regards as not fallen very deep, can
lift himself up by his own powers and “work his way up the paths to Olympus.” Both
know a “self-redemption.” But Christianity itself has variously strict formulations
of the doctrine of grace. It admits of no self-redemption, but still various Christian
teachings allow for some participation on man’s part in his salvation. The point at
issue between Augustine and Pelagius was whether every human effort, however
pure, is inadequate and vain and we can be saved only by grace –sola gratia– or
whether man can move at least a bit towards grace and, as it were, prepare the
ground for it. Pelagius too held that man’s salvation does not depend totally on
himself but needs a supernatural completion. But for him an innate nobility dwells
in us. Because of this innate natural nobility we are not completely dependent on
an outpouring of salvation from above, but can strive toward it on our own. God’s
efficacy and his activity in man are joined by human cooperation. Augustine, on the
contrary, regards sinfulness as a basic property of man, which has been imposed on
man by God, and which we cannot change by our own power, for only God by his
grace can remove it. Whether we perform good works or not, they do not contribute
to the obtaining of grace. And so Augustine formulates statements almost weird in
their religious radicalism: e.g., “Ama deum et fac quod vis” (“Love God and do what
you will!”). This sentence is often interpreted as though it meant: whoever truly
loves God can do no evil; he needs no further guideline than to do the right thing
on his own. Augustine means something quite different: the believer is still capable
62 Ibid., p. 79.
63 Ibid., p. 82.
64 Ibid., pp. 82–83.
of committing evil; but for grace, so he believes, that is not important, it does not
direct itself by good behavior or evil deed. Augustine is thinking religiously while
Pelagius, though not denying the religious significance of sin and that grace is a
free gift, does not want to remove moral responsibility from our own shoulders. In
Pelagius, as his opponents have correctly seen, there still lives a portion of “pagan”
antiquity. Man is, for him, not exclusively dependent on divine mercy, but himself
achieves something through his mind and will. Although Pelagianism was bitterly
persecuted in its time, a modified form of it, called semi-Pelagianism, survived in
Catholicism. Original sin has weakened the divine spark in man but not extinguished
and destroyed it completely. By his actions man can earn merit through his “good
works,” and he can climb a few stages of knowledge of God in a “natural theology”
prior to any revelation, relying on his own reason. Just as grace does not do away
with morality, revelation does not devalue the truth of philosophy.65
In Christianity as in many other religions and philosophies, a personal existence
beyond the grave awaits each one of us. In life itself, after all, Christianity expects an
individual relationship to God from each person and discovers, in Harnack’s words,
“the infinite value of the individual soul.” In this respect Christianity can rightly
claim to be a precursor of the modern breakthrough, by Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz,
Schleiermacher, and others, to the appreciation of the individual, whether human
or nonhuman. In contrast to Platonism, the highest value is seen as residing not
in the general but in the unique singular object that is never repeated. As we have
seen, in Christianity the body also participates in life beyond the grave. Under the
impression of the corruption of the body the idea soon emerged that not the whole
man but only his soul becomes immortal. Originally that is what “soul” meant,
namely, the quintessence of the numinous in us as contrasted with the numinous
outside us. Thus it was natural to ascribe the divine attribute of immortality to it.66
The Christian teachings about the immortality of the soul can be used as evidence
or proof of the relationship between man’s finitude and infinity. Thus it can be seen
that religious anthropology covers nearly all aspects of man’s essence and hence
that it can rightly claim to be a branch of anthropology. However, there are many
deficiencies in religious anthropology, and the fundamental one resides in the fact
that the very branch of anthropology always asserts itself as a theological system
shrouded in mystery in its own right, that it maintains the Christian principle that
God is the center of the earth, of all the spheres, and of all things that are in the world,
that God is creator and master of the world, and that man who is willing to make
himself a humble servant of God is nothing more or less than a derivative creature
intended to derive his nature, life, identity, behavior and immortality from God in
order to function as designed by God and to experience the destiny God intended.
65 Ibid., pp. 97–99.

66 Ibid., pp. 100–101.
3.2 “Man Is a Living Creature”
Biological anthropology’s interpretative approach to the essence of human life may be

briefly summarized in one statement as follows: “Man is a living creature.” According
to the theory, man is primarily an animal, his reason depends on the somatic phys-
iology—that is to say, reason depends genetically or functionally on the vital side
investigated by biology or physiology, and man is but one link in the continuous
chain of organisms. Despite the fact that man and animals each rightly claim their
respective places at the top of the biological chain, however, man never leaves any
doubt as to the enormous distance between animals as contrasted with the appreciable
distinction between man and animals. “But the distance between man and animal
is not uniform. Not all animals are at the same distance from man. Some are closer
to him, some farther away. And perhaps the distance between man and the animals
closest to him is less than that between these animals in turn and the ones farthest
from him. Let us juxtapose the infusorium as the lowest and most dissimilar to man,
the chimpanzee as the animal most similar to man, and man himself: obviously in
this series, the infusorium and the chimpanzee do not contrast with man, but man and
chimpanzee are closer to one another compared with the infusorium. The differences
within the animal kingdom are thus greater than the difference between the highest
animals and man.”67
“At a very early date philosophy sought to lessen the emotionally drastic evaluative
contrast between man and animal. Plato in his The Statesman dealt ironically with the
naive arrogance of contrasting the totality of other creatures with ourselves under one
concept ‘animal,’ when he said that this is just as if one day the cranes got together
and declared: we are the cranes, the other living creatures, however, are only animals
(Gulliver has the same experience on the island of horses). Thus Plato, like Aesop,
has man sees his own errors in the mirror of the animal world. As in the Theaetetus
(dialogue) he unmasks the class mentality of the nobility as full of prejudices and
vanity, so here he reveals hoministic arrogance. Of course Plato is thinking more
logically than objectively. What does not apply to the crane might apply to man.”68
“In his late period Plato is said to have once defined man as ‘a two-legged creature
without feathers.’ (Frederick the Great appropriated this definition which seemed
to confirm his misanthropy: he speaks of the two-legged unfeathered race.) In an
anecdote, Plato’s adversary Diogenes is said to have plucked a chicken and said:
this is Plato’s man. Therefore Plato added to his definition: ‘with flat nails.’ Thus
in Plato two different types of anthropology collide and are left standing, without
interlinking or complementing each other: a zoological definition of man, which
places him completely in the animal kingdom, and man’s definition as a rational
being, in which absolutely no mention is made of his animal side. This incoherent and
unbalanced juxtaposition of two anthropologies is, however, a consequence of both
a purely spiritualistic and a purely naturalistic conception, which mutually condition
67Ibid., p. 152.
68Landman. Michael. Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania: The Westminster Press, 1974, pp. 152–153.
one another in their one-sidedness. Therefore the juxtaposition has survived down to
the threshold of our time. Even as bearer of the mental equipment that contemplates
ideas, man remains for Plato closely related with the animals: like the Hindus he
allows for gradation from human to animal souls (and vice versa). Man is superior
to the animals, as it were, only potentially: most men make but little use of their
reason. As a penalty, after death they do not attain pure incorporeal immortality, but
they must begin a new life. Yet the reincarnation of the soul in an animal destiny is
no greater punishment than that in a human destiny, for according to The Statesman
many souls voluntarily choose animal destinies.”69
“Aristotle is the teacher of a unified world structure in which matter and idea are
much less separate than in Plato. In his theory the realms of nature fit together, as later
for Leibniz, like rising stairs, and the soul is even the entelechy of the body. Man is
the pinnacle in the hierarchy of beings; that makes them tower above them but at the
same time remain linked with them. Thus his decision remains in the balance. The
ethically accentuated faith in the divine-spiritual special destiny of man, which has
survived in Christianity, and the more metaphysical belief in the indivisible unity of
the universe, which also includes man, both are retained.”70 It is therefore clear that
biological anthropology reduces man’s ontology and nature to his natural properties,
thereby reducing man to a natural being that exists as an integral part of nature.
Darwin’s theory of evolution asserts itself as a new basis for biological anthro-
pology as well as for human knowledge in its own right, thereby rightly claiming
to be a new sort of biological anthropology. Darwinism provided a unified picture
of the evolution of the universe, the evolution of life on the earth, and the evolution
of human knowledge. According to Darwin’s theory of evolution, man came into
existence only in the last two-thousandth part of total geological history. Humans
are related to animals in many respects, and it is with the evolution of species that
man emerged as a distinct species on the earth. Anthropologists and biologists alike
generally accept it for a scientific fact that we and the extinct hominins are somehow
related and that we and the apes, both living and extinct, are also somehow related.
“But that man’s kinship with the animals goes back to a common descent, that they
develop one from the other and that finally man too developed from them as the last
creature, this transition of thought from merely morphological similarity to genetic
development, from the post hoc to the propter hoc, is an achievement only of the
nineteenth century, of Lamarck and above all Darwin.”71 However, the idea of evolu-
tion had been repressed by the dogma of creation and Platonism. The idea that there
is an “origin of species” (Darwin)—that is, one species can eventually evolve into
another species over long periods of time, shook people’s deep-seated faith in the
Biblical dogma of creation, according to which God created all species of animals
right at the beginning, as well as in the Platonic realism of universals, according to
which the species preexist unchangeably as eternal ideas, prior to all process, and thus
according to which the species can be defined as primary and eternal realities, as what
69 Ibid., p. 153.
70 Ibid., p. 154.
71 Ibid., p. 161.
“always remain the same,” thereby raising a storm of rationalistic skepticism and crit-
icism against the Christian doctrine of creation. Darwin argued that the animal and
vegetable kingdoms are governed by the same general biological laws such as “the
brute struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest” and that only a relatively
small number of descendants of any animal couple can survive in the end. Moreover,
Darwin discovered and proved the law of biological evolution stating that the heredity
of a species tends to undergo an infinite deviation from the prototype—that is to say,
the filial generation is far from the simple copy or exact replica of the parental gener-
ation, but there always occurs slight deviations in the evolutionary process. Darwin
further argued that these constant changes would be inherited by the next generation
and produce slow adaptation to the environment. It was this secondary mechanism
of adaptation to the environment through the inheritance of acquired characteristics
that would influence the evolution of species. Hence, only those offspring that adapt
themselves to their environment can survive. The slight deviations occurring in the
evolutionary process may lead to the transmutation of species as well as the genetic
mutations in populations, and eventually one species can evolve into another species
over long periods of time. Darwin believed that species, advancing up a linear ladder
of complexity that was related to the great chain of being, evolve from the simple
to the complex, from the lower to the higher, and from the natural to the spiritual.
“Already in The Origin of Species (1859) Darwin had left no doubt that the laws by
which new species develop can also be applied to the origin of man. But as a pious
Anglican he formulated, in all caution, only: ‘Light will be thrown on the origin of
man and it history.’ That, was popularly said, man comes from the animal, specifi-
cally from the ape, first appears only in The Descent of Man (1871).”72 “In the ’70s
many others, such as Huxley, Vogt, and Haeckel, began to draw the consequences
of the theory of evolution, also concerning man. ‘Anthropology is a part of zoology’
(Haeckel). This, then, is the real ‘Darwinism.’ Man too, is now known, shares with
all other animals the fact of originating from another species. The exciting similarity
between man and, especially, the ape rests on blood relationship. ‘In tremendous
distances which the mind can never fathom’—and it doesn’t matter whether it was
hundreds of thousands or millions of years—man must have originated from animal
ancestors and prior forms. In view of this, however, the assumption (now disproved)
seemed inevitable that the separation between man and animal had previously been
exaggerated, that what they have in common far outweighed and that man basically
was ‘only an animal.’”.73
Biological anthropologists attempted to examine and explain many biological
characteristics of human life, such as its unspecialization, from a evolutionary
perspective. Just as a key is adapted to a lock, so the animal’s specialization in its
organs and behaviors enables it to adapt to the particular living conditions, which is
true of each species’ specialized patterns. On the contrary, man is “unspecialized” in
his general constitution, which makes such a creature find it harder to maintain itself
in the world than animals especially adapted to their environment and better equipped
72 Ibid., p. 165.
73 Ibid., pp. 165–166.
for the struggle for existence. Therefore man is poor in instincts, and this seems at
first to be a disadvantage for the progress of human life. But, though unspecialization
may have negative effects at the start, in the long run it means an invaluable advan-
tage. Because man’s organs are archaically unspecialized, man can adapt himself to
more complex and more unpredictable environments. Because he is not controlled
by instincts, man can himself reflect and invent, thereby possessing inexhaustible
potentialities. Man’s unspecialization endows him with infinite power, enables him
to meet nearly all challenges and thus makes him far outpace the animals though
they seem to be better equipped for the struggle for existence.
Moreover, biological anthropologists also gave a clear and lucid explanation of
man’s “rhythm of growth” and “openness to the world,” and their pioneering efforts
have been crowned with success. It is thus clear that biological anthropology is
concerned with many aspects of man’s ontology (man’s existence) and that it forms
a substantial contribution of permanent value to our knowledge of the ontology of
human life. However, there are many deficiencies inherent in biological anthropology,
and the fundamental one lies in the fact that man is reduced to the animal, that man’s
natural life replaces “social man’s” or “whole man’s” life and that biological laws
substitute for human laws, which makes biological anthropology far from offering a
scientific and convincing explanation of man and which thus lands this very discipline
in an absurd situation.
3.3 “Man Is a Rational Creature—That Is, Man Is Endowed

with Reason”
Rational anthropology’s interpretative approach to the essence of human life may

be briefly summarized in one statement as follows: “Man is a rational creature—
that is, man is endowed with reason.” Rational anthropologists attempt to reduce
man’s ontology to his reason—that is, man is a rational creature, and devote vast
scientific efforts to the exploration of various aspects of man starting off on the
premise of reason alone. According to this theory, human reason is the essential
characteristic that distinguishes man from the animal, and the absolutely unique
quality of man enables him to engage in sublime thought and reflection, thereby
making him become wise and noble in character. Only man has reason in this world.
Man’s reason establishes his superiority compared with earthly things, places him
above everything else that exists, and hence gives him a special dignity. In the famous
metaphor of the thinking reed, Pascal compares humanity to the entire universe,
stating that man, though the universe is gigantic enough to be crushing him, can
point out to it something that he is which is greater than it: he is the weakest reed
of nature, “but a thinking reed.” “Pascal admires humanity’s essential frailty but
also its unalienable nobility. While the human being is set in the universe as nature’s
weakest creature like a delicate reed, he is nonetheless nobler than the entire universe
for he is endowed with the faculty of thought; the human person is a thinking reed
who is conscious of his state, whereas the universe knows absolutely nothing of its
own existence. Therefore, the use of reason displays our ultimate dignity; human
reason is a wonderful and unparalleled source of humanity’s delicate greatness.”74
Rational anthropology originated with the classical Greeks. “They understand man,
not by starting with God, nor by starting with man’s corporeality or sensuousness,
but by starting with himself and his own intellectual gifts. For them he is the being or
creature that has reason. Thus the Anacreonic poems say: ‘Nature gave the ox horns,
the horse hooves, the hare speed, but man thoughts.’ For Plato the power of logic is
the highest part of man’s soul, and the same is true of Aristotle and the Stoics.”75
Thus, “man assumes a unique and incomparable rank among all other creatures.”76
According to rational anthropology, the unique functions that reason performs can
be roughly summarized as follows. First, reason has the function of knowing the
world. Reason can grasp the universality, generality and essence of things through
categorization, reasoning and abstraction, thereby knowing the world. Second, reason
performs the creative function. Reason endows man with abstraction and reasoning
as well as with imagination, which enables man to engage in remarkable creative
activities and which makes man become the most creative creature in the world.
“Knowledge seeks to apprehend the factual; imagination rises above the factual
and explores the nonfactual. But precisely for that reason it develops a fertility for
knowledge too, for it leads toward new facts! That man is the creature most capable
of knowledge is based not only on his much-praised ability for abstraction and his
logic but just as much on the fact that he is the most imaginative creature. ‘For God
linked it with us alone with a heavenly bond’ and ‘Only he finds content who has
something to add to it’ (Goethe). Receptivity also gains from that quality which
is seen today as the primary human quality: creativity. Our reasoning power not
only knows; it is also formative and inventive. We are unique not only because we
have a comprehensive and objective picture of the world. We can construct a world
ourselves and produce religion, law, art, in short the entire cultural sphere. Homo
sapiens is just as much homo inveniens (man the inventor). And as knowledge, on
the one hand, is the foundation of all cultural inventions, so vice versa the inventive
mind is the basis for progress in knowledge.”77 Third, reason enables man to devote
himself to good works. Reason can be directed towards the mind, purify the mind,
impose constraints on human behaviors, free man of the confusion characteristic of
a primitive man or a child “who lives more in individual, mutually incommensurable
percepts than in comprehensively higher conceptualizations,”78 and thereby enable
him to lead a rational and moral life. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an
illustration. Buddha, who as a king’s son was kept from all negative impressions
74 Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the
Heart. Cambridge, England: ISD LLC, p. 6.
75 Landman, Michael. (1974). Philosophical Anthropology (David J. Parent, Trans.). Philadelphia,
PA: The Westminster Press, p. 109.

76 Ibid., p. 113.
77 Ibid., p. 143.
78 Ibid., p. 141.
during his childhood, takes his first independent walk into the city and meets a
poor man, a sick man, and a dead man carried on a bier: at a stroke the true fate
of men and his own task of helping them are revealed to him. On the one hand,
rational anthropology proves the enormous value of reason to human beings, and
leaves no doubt at all reason asserts itself as man’s ontology and essence in its own
right, but on the other, rational ontology tends to exaggerate man’s reason, negate
man’s “wholeness,” reject and even suppress man’s nature. “As reason conflicts
with tradition on the outside, it also has opposition within man himself, namely the
other powers of the soul, the drives and passions (Max Weber distinguishes between
three main motives of action: traditional, rational, and emotional).”79 This is what
we would expect as well as what is certain to happen. As opposed to this, rational
anthropology tends to make reason conflict with tradition on the outside and have
opposition within man himself, namely the other powers of the soul, the drives and
passions, maintaining that reason is supposed to rule over the desires and that reason
is supposed to completely suppress the emotions as well as the nonrational layers of
the soul, which pushes rational anthropology to an absurd extreme. Many Western
scholars hold that mind and life are essentially opposite forces and that there seems
to be no room for mutual compromise between them. The opposition between mind
and life appears to hold true for the Chinese traditional Confucianists who believe
that people should eradicate human desires and maintain the heavenly principles—
ethics as propounded by the Song Confucianists of ancient China. Many scholars’
attack on the anthropology of spirit, or mind, namely rational anthropology, is thus
not at all directed against their great tradition and real meaning. They are taking a
stand against the later debasement of their theory. Klages expressly states that “All
the intellectual accomplishments of which mankind has been proud, the change from
the symbol to the concept, from magic to technology, from the chthonic matriarchal
law and faith to the father principle, all these things were really stations on the path
of decline.”80
3.4 “Man as a Creature of Culture”
We have studied man as a creature of God, as a rational being, as a living being. Now
we must get to know him as a cultural being. Cultural anthropology’s interpretative
approach to the essence of human life may be briefly summarized in one statement as
follows: “Man is a cultural being.” Cultural anthropologists attempt to reduce man’s
ontology to his culture—that is, man is a cultural creature, and devote vast scientific
efforts to the explanation of various aspects of man from the point of view of culture.
It is an undeniable fact that cultural anthropology rightly claims to be the mainstream
of contemporary anthropology. According to this theory, man is a cultural creature,
and this is mainly manifested in two important aspects: on the one hand, man is
79 Ibid., p. 110.
80 Ibid., p. 138.
the creator of culture, and on the other hand, man is the product of culture. Man
creates culture, but in creating culture man also creates himself. Man creates his
cultural patterns and transmits them from generation to generation. Man’s inherited
cultural patterns tend to evolve new cultural patterns and determine the patterns of
human existence. Thereby man will of necessity become “a creature of culture.”
Some cultural anthropologists even identify man with culture, asserting that man is
his culture and vice versa, that studying culture is synonymous with studying man,
that what seems like cultural hatred can be equated with misanthropy, or rather self-
hatred, and that giving up cultures will mean giving up cultural identities. Therefore,
as was seen above, each culture, after man has formed it, forms man in turn, so that
indirectly he forms himself by forming it. “Instead of having the permanent nature
typical of other beings, man is in the situation of always creating himself. Since he is
based on no plan, he designs himself. ‘Man invents man.’ In an incessant surpassing
of himself, he never exists statically: he is cast again and again into a virginal future,
becoming what he wants to be.”81 Philosophical anthropologist Michael Landmann’s
intelligent and clarifying analysis of man as creator and creature of culture may be
briefly summarized in “four beings.”
First, man is a cultural being. Man is the creator of culture as well as the product
of culture. The inseparable unity between “man as the creator of culture” and “man
as the product of culture” constitutes man’s mode of existence—that is, “man is a
creature of culture.” “Culture would not exist without man to fulfill it. But he would
also be nothing without culture. Each has an inseparable function for the other. Any
attempt to separate these intermeshing parts from this unity must necessarily be
artificial.”82
Second, man is a social being. Culture tends to manifest itself in particular social
forms. Man must live in society. “Whoever stands outside the community is not a man
but ‘either an animal or God.’” “But man becomes a complete man only by growing
up in a tradition-bearing group of his own kind. His cultural side can develop only
in that way.” “Thus if man is seen as a social being, he is also seen as a cultural
being.”83
Third, man is a historical being. “Precisely speaking, man does not produce
culture, he produces cultures.” “As was stated above in general, we are not only
builders of but also built by culture; the individual can never be understood by
himself alone, but only from the cultural preconditions that support and permeate
him. This is also true concretely. As we can never produce culture in general, but
rather a historically particular culture, so the retroactive influence of that culture
always makes historically particular men of us. Our freedom to create history is
counterbalanced by our being bound within it, by productivity on the one hand, by
plasticity on the other, and so man is changed along with his changing milleu. We not
only imitate what has previously been lived in the culture that surrounds us, but even
the things we produce are impregnated with its overall style. We are far more strongly
81 Ibid., p. 212.
82 Ibid., p. 219.
83 Ibid., pp. 221–222.
determined by cultural factors than by hereditary factors –which race theoreticians

consider the only decisive ones.”84 Therefore, “as a cultural being he is a historical
being too. And this also in a double sense: he both has power over and is dependent
on history, he determines history and is determined by it.”85
Fourth, man is a traditional being. “The instincts that control the behavior of
animals are a natural property of his species. They are transmitted in the same way
as physical traits, purely biologically by heredity. Therefore, as was seen above,
an animal brought up among creatures of another species behaves just as if it had
been brought up by its own parents. Human behavior, however, is controlled by
the culture which men have once acquired. How man feeds and procreates, how he
dresses and dwells, how he behaves practically and ethically, how he speaks and looks
at the world, all the cultural forms he makes use of, are based on historical creation.
Since they have been historically created they cannot be transmitted by heredity.
Yet they must be preserved: what the ancestors have discovered must benefit later
generations. Instead of heredity then, another, purely spiritual form of preservation
is called tradition. Through it, knowledge and skills are passed from generation to
generation like buckets on a fire line and transmitted to posterity by example and
instruction from their predecessors.”86
“Although tradition is the principle of conservation, it is alterable, and, because
created once itself, it is accessible to enrichment and modification by new creation. It
did not arise earlier all at once either. It sums up a multiplicity of individual achieve-
ments. And this process of accretion still continues today and into the unforeseeable
future, so much so that finally, as Simmel has shown, the individual can no longer
assimilate everything that objective culture offers him and can no longer acculturate
himself subjectively by doing so. And as successively new elements are added to
it and likewise transmitted by it, other elements undergo a transformation while
yet others die out. Man’s body, in which the law of heredity prevails, is relatively
unchanged from that of his remotest ancestors, but each subsequent generation finds
itself spiritually in a different world.”87
“Not every change of tradition, of course, results from a conscious intention.
Language, mores, styles, etc., often develop by immanent laws without anyone
intending it, in fact, as Simmel has shown, even contrary to man’s will: these changes
follow the particular logic of their products. Even where such a will is prevalent and
at work, its bearers need not be aware of it, and therefore they need not stand out as
individuals. The real subject of the development can be an anonymous collectivity.
As it can take place unwilled or not consciously willed, so also can it go unno-
ticed. Each individual and generation may subjectively believe that they are merely
passing down their age-old traditions faithfully to their offspring. But in fact they
change them. When two generations do the same thing, it is no longer the same, and
in the course of long periods of time something new in principle arises through an
84 Ibid., p. 224.
85 Ibid., p. 221.
86 Ibid., pp. 226–227.
87 Ibid., pp. 229–230.
accumulation of slight modifications. But the change becomes visible only where
earlier documents have been preserved.”88
Tradition tends to exercise rigid constraints on the individual. There seems to be
a contradiction between the rigidity of tradition and the creativity of the individual,
which tends to bring forth new ideas in culture and actuate cultural development. “For
the deeper we go back into history the more piously we find men clinging to their
inviolable traditions. The traditions were considered sacred as ancestral heritage
and community property, and they were preserved from generation to generation
down to the present. Every deviation from them could call forth the anger of higher
powers, could cast the community into misfortune. Therefore every violation was
punished as sacrilege. So in early times, only such changes could take place as either
did not cross the threshold of consciousness or could appeal to a higher sanction
and necessity. Only late, only in higher cultures and after repeated loosening from
the Greeks on, did tradition gradually lose its rigidity. The ‘constraint’ (Durkheim)
which it exercised on the individual decreased. He has gained greater leeway against
it and can disregard it to develop his own creativity. In great individuals, whose
works everyone admires and who invent new directions for the life of later-comers
to follow, mankind thus honors, as it were, crystallization points of its own creative
power. They are representatives of humanity (Emerson).”89
“Purely from logic one might think that in the beginning the least was created
and therefore the creative gift could develop most unrestrictedly; conversely, one
might think: the more there has already been created, the less the field of appli-
cation creativity finds, and so it must recede. In reality it is most restricted at the
start by traditionalistic coercion, and finds insufficient groundwork and possibili-
ties of combination. Of course an excess of already created material can cause it
to recede again. Thus the creativity of the individual can apparently advance most
unrestrictedly in the middle stage of a culture. Here it has its greatest blossoming.
Universal necessary tasks still exist and save productivity from declining into mere
play and whimsicality. The most favorable times are the transition periods when an
old world-structure is collapsing but individualism has not yet reached its peak.”90
Many cultural anthropologists attach great importance to man’s creative powers,
holding that man creates his culture—that is, man is the creator of culture, and that
man also creates his own essence by making his own decisions. Human creativity
is a fundamental manifestation of man’s inner, subjective spirit as well as a basic
characteristic of man as “a creature of culture,” which makes man differ essentially
form animals and which makes man rightly claim an exalted place in the universe.
“As was said above, no one ever starts ‘right from the beginning.’ Not every situation
challenges our creative originality. Generally we need only adopt the results of earlier
creativity. We can sail on an extensive canal system that was excavated by others
long before our time. We are born not only with our own gifts as individuals but
simultaneously into the ‘external apparatus’ of a culture that has been accumulated
88 Ibid., p. 230.
89 Ibid., pp. 230–231.
90 Ibid., p. 231.
by our ancestors and handed down to us. In addition to our subjective spirit that we
bring with us we receive from them the gift of objective spirit. Our life need only, as
it were, be poured into the tracks of this objective spirit which are available to us. For
long stretches it needs absolutely no spontaneity, but merely reactualizes preexistent
patterns of life. As with ethical norms, we are led by the hand by preexistent norms
in all fields.”91
“That is the only way for us to maintain ourselves in a strange and hostile world and
at the same time reach a much higher stage than we could attain by ourselves. What
the individual can invent his short lifetime is relatively little. In culture, however,
our basis is the collected wealth of experiences and inventions that an entire people,
indeed all nations, have undergone during many generations. We are beneficiaries of
this wealth and our work is made easier and more differentiated by this preparatory
work which others have done.”92
“The psychosomatic constitution that man gets from birth is still not everything. It
is only a part of his total reality. As long as one asks only about man’s psychosomatic
qualities, one will fail to understand him. Man can be completely understood only
by studying his roots in objective spirit in addition to these qualities, and cultural
conditioning in addition to the natural qualities he gets from birth; by studying, in
other words, not only the eternal and constant heritage of his species but also that
which, though likewise inevitably belonging to the species, varies in content from
people to people, from age to age. Each human individual becomes such only as a
particular in the supra individual medium of culture, which surpasses the individual
and is common to an entire group. Only its support holds the individual upright; only
in its enveloping atmosphere can he breathe. Its directives interweave in him like a
system of blood vessels that constitutes an integral part of him. This system must, it
is true, be filled with the blood of his subjectivity; he must, so to speak, fill the ideal
with the reality of life. Culture would not exist without man to fulfill it. But he would
also be nothing without culture. Each has an inseparable function for the other. Any
attempt to separate these two intermeshing parts from this unity must necessarily be
artificial.”93
Objectively speaking, cultural anthropologists, as contrasted with religious
anthropologists, biological anthropologists and rational anthropologists, made a
more extensive and profound exploration of various aspects of man and culture and
produced more abundant fruits, which have had wider implications for the develop-
ment of anthropology. However, there is still one of the most fundamental problems
awaiting solution—that is, “what is man?” The fact that man creates culture and that
culture also creates man, far from solving the problem of “what man is”, merely
throws light on the interrelationship between man and culture. Strictly speaking, the
interpretative approach to culture can only make us obtain a superficial understanding
of what man is, rather than truly unraveling the mystery of “man himself.” Despite
the fact that there exists a close and intimate relationship between man and culture,
91 Ibid., pp. 217–218.

92 Ibid., p. 218.
93 Ibid., pp. 218–219.
4 The Synchronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s … 195
we still cannot draw an equal sign between them—that is, culture cannot be equated
with man and vice versa. To summarize, in order to truly solve the problem of “what
man is,” we maintain that the problem of how to understand “man himself” may
assert itself as a matter of primary consideration in its own right.
4 The Synchronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human

Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice”
By the synchronic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and

choice,” we mean the mode by which the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice exists in the same space. The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice”
in his life constitute the organic parts of the unified noumenon of human life when
viewed in the synchronic perspective—or, to put it another way, “the integrated
duality” is inherent in man’s “structure and choice.” Man’s “structure and choice”
are indispensable for the unified noumenon of human life. With man’s “structure” or
his “choice,” it has its own particular status and function, whereby man’s “structure
and choice” act jointly to meet external pressures and challenges, achieve the unity
of opposites, and can be transformed into each other. The noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself, first of all, in its static existence as well
as in its dynamic existence.
4.1 The Static Existence of the Noumenon of Human

The static existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
can be described as follows. The “structure” of human life constitutes the organi-
zational basis of human life, while man’s “choice” is man’s behavioral practice in
his life. Hence, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the
dualistic unity of the organizational basis of human life and man’s behavioral choice
in his life.
The “structure” of human life, which is a life system organically composed of
several powers of life, constitutes the organizational basis of human life as well as
the essential prerequisite to human life. While providing a solid basis for man’s
“choice,” the “structure” of human life controls and even determines man’s “choice”
in his life. The “structure” of human life, which asserts itself as a complex, unpre-
dictable, and unfathomable being in its own right, is one of the great products of
human evolution as well as the proper object of study that defies any attempt to offer
an intellectually ultimate explanation for itself. Marx pointed out: “man is man’s
world.” Man has never ceased his efforts to offer an intellectually ultimate expla-
nation of himself and to make a thorough inquiry into himself. To this end man
has proposed myriad theories and hypotheses. The life-long pursuit of his chosen
subject—the noumenon of human life has made the author of this work fully awake
to the fact that the “structure” of human life, which asserts itself as an elaborate,
complex, and unfathomable life system in its own right, tends to perform a primary
and indispensable function by laying the organizational basis of human life. Man’s
life as well as his all-embracing forms of choice is founded largely on the structure
of human life. It is the “structure” of human life that renders possible man’s “choice”
in a certain environment (e.g., nature and society). Without the “structure” of human
life, there is no possibility of man’s life, not to mention his all-embracing forms of
choice. In addition, the “structure” of human life also constitutes the basis on which
to explain man’s choice in his life. It is in the “structure” of human life that we may
find some explanation for man’s choice in his life, which is to say, the “structure” of
human life serves to explain, to a greater or lesser degree, all of man’s choices in his
life. Moreover, in the “structure” of human life we may find some internal explana-
tion for the complexity of human nature, which, in turn, tends to be determined by
the complex structure of human life. In the final analysis, it is the unpredictable and
unfathomable structure of human life that makes man’s life as well as his “choice”
unpredictable and unfathomable. The “structure” of human life can be viewed as
both synchronic and diachronic in nature. On the one hand, just as the present is an
extension of the past, so the “structure” of human life is one of the great products of
human evolution. On the other hand, it will exist for all periods extending infinitely
far into the future. On the one hand, the “structure” of human life provides a solid
basis for the unfettered development of man’s essential powers such as “creativity”
and “freedom,” but on the other, it tends to place restrictions on man’s “creativity”
and “freedom.” The “structure” of human life tends to exert a determining influence
on the survival, development and destiny of man. It can determine man’s choice in a
certain environment (e.g., nature and society), thereby indirectly affecting and even
deciding the destiny of man. Hence, we would rather say that personality structure
determines fate, than that character determines destiny. The personality structure,
i.e. “the triple structure and eight kinds of powers,” is the organizational basis of
one’s character. Thus it can be asserted that personality structure tends to determine
character, and that character tends to determine destiny. The “structure” of human
life constitutes the organizational basis of human life, and man’s “choice” in his life
will never for a moment be divorced from the “structure” of human life.
By man’s “choice” in his life we mean that man’s behavioral choices that have to
be made in a certain environment tend to result from the workings of the “structure”
of human life, that man has to make appropriate behavioral choices to resolve the
contradictions between him and the external environment (e.g. nature and society),
and that man can consciously remold his subjective world while giving full play to
his subjective initiative in an effort to change the objective world. Man’s “choice” in
his life is distinctively characteristic of man, which is to say, man can exercise the
subjective initiative in his conscious practical activity as well as in making appropriate
behavioral choices. The rich meanings derived from man’s “choice” in his life may
be summarized as follows. First, man tends to make appropriate behavioral choices
to meet external environmental pressures, and man’s choice in his life tends to result
from the workings of the “structure” of human life. Man’s choice in his life, which
is characterized by universality, constancy and abundance, is a response to external
environmental pressures, a basic way in which man can change the objective world
as well as his own subjective world and in which man can grasp his destiny in his own
hands and march towards freedom, and, at the same time, a manifestation of man’s
active, tenacious and unstoppable life-force. Second, the essence of man’s “choice”
in his life is man’s life-practice. Innumerable eminent scholars from ancient days
to the present cherished unbounded admiration for man’s “choice” in his life, but
they invariably failed to offer an intellectually ultimate explanation of the essence
of man’s “choice.” Marx made a scientific interpretation of man’s “choice” in his
life—man’s life-practice. Man’s “choice” is a basic way of man’s life-practice as well
as a concrete expression of the essence of man’s unique life—practice. Man tends
to carry out all his practical activities through the instrumentality of man’s “choice”
in his life, which is to say, on the one hand, all human practical activity tends to
find expression in man’s “choice”, and on the other hand, it is only through the
instrumentality of man’s “choice” that all human practical activity can be within the
bounds of possibility. Man’s life-practice is impossible without man’s “choice” in his
life. There is no practical activity whatsoever lying outside man’s “choice,” that is to
say, man’s practical activity in his life will never for a moment be divorced from man’s
“choice” in his life. Therefore, in this sense, it may be asserted that man’s “choice”
in his life is man’s practical activity in his life, and that the former’s process amounts
to the latter’s. Third, man’s “choice” in his life could prove of decisive importance to
man’s survival, development and destiny. Generally speaking, man’s destiny depends
primarily not upon the environment and manpower, nor upon any gods whatsoever,
but upon his own choices that have to be made in a certain environment. Under certain
environmental conditions, if you make correct choices in your life, you will attain
success. On the contrary, if you make wrong choices in your life, you will invite
failure. Hence it must be admitted that a series of important choices which may be
correct or wrong will largely determine one’s success or failure. In the final analysis,
man’s “choice” in his life will determine his destiny under certain environmental
conditions.
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is the dualistic unity
of the organizational basis of human life and man’s behavioral choice in his life.
The “structure” of human life is the organizational basis (physical and nonphysical),
while man’s “choice” in his life is man’s life-practice that tends to find expression in
man’s behavioral choices. The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his
life jointly constitute the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.”
The “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his life depend on each other for
existence, determine each other’s essential qualities or characteristics, lend support
to each other, and transform into each other. Between the “structure” of human
life and man’s “choice” in his life exist manifold complex relationships that are
characterized by “integrated duality.” These manifold complex relationships that
are characterized by “integrated duality” are a clear manifestation of the “dualistic
unity” of the organizational basis (physical and nonphysical) of human life and man’s
life-practice that tends to find expression in man’s behavioral choices. They work
together to influence and even determine man’s survival, development and destiny.
4.2 The Dynamic Existence of the Noumenon of Human

The dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
can be defined as follows. Under certain environmental pressures man must of neces-
sity respond to the environment. Specifically, the constituent elements inherent in
the “structure” of human life tend to start working into operation, and the over-
arching one in relation to other constituent parts thereof is capable of integrating
itself with other constituent elements by unifying its vital functions with those of
other constituent parts, thereby exercising a decisive influence upon man’s behav-
ioral “choice.” By man’s “choice” in his life we mean that man can respond to the
environment by making decisions and putting them into practice. It is therefore clear
that the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” is the “dualistic unity” of two mechanisms for responding to the environment
by man’s “structure” as well as by his “choice.”
Under external environmental pressures the component elements inherent in the
“structure” of human life tend to secure close coordination of mental processes from
each other, and to work successfully together to respond accordingly by making
appropriate behavioral choices. Hence it can be safely asserted that the process which
the integrated workings of the “structure” of human life and man’s “choice” in his
life tend to follow can be briefly described as follows: “the environmental stimulus”
+ the “structure” of human life → “man’s behavioral choices that have to be made
in his life.” All the essential (or substantive) powers inherent in the “structure” of
human life will be integrated into the working process. Man tends to follow a certain
process in making appropriate behavioral choices. In responding to the environment,
man tends to devise available means as well as workable strategies first, then to
make well-considered decisions, and finally to put them into practice by making
appropriate behavioral choices. In so doing, man who tends to act on his own initiative
can demonstrate his subjective initiative in addressing environmental concerns and
pressures, can play an active role in the struggle for remolding his subjective world
while changing the objective world, and can create himself, develop himself with
practice, and transcend himself. Thus it can be seen that the “dualistic unity” of man’s
“structure and choice,” or rather, the noumenon of human life, as well as the dynamic
existence of the noumenon of human life, that is, man’s “structure and choice,”
invariably finds expression in this very working process. Whether it be an individual’s
survival and development under certain environmental pressures, or whether it be the
evolutionary progress of human civilization under certain environmental pressures,
it can be possible of realization only through the “dualistic unity” of man’s “structure
and choice” as well as through the dynamic existence of the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice.”
The “dualistic unity” of man’s “structure and choice” as well as the dynamic exis-
tence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself
mainly in the fact that while undergoing a complicated process of planning, decision-
making and implementation under certain environmental pressures, the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to render possible man’s coordinated
or unified behavior that can be roughly categorized into four types. (1) “Procedural”
behavior. Under external environmental pressures man must of necessity struggle for
survival and development. With the above situation in view, the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” deems it indispensably necessary to create a
general mechanism for man’s behavioral choice. Specifically, under external envi-
ronmental pressures “the power of personality demand (or need)” is set in motion
first, then “the power of personality judgment” takes part in decision-making, and
ultimately, it is still “the power of personality judgment” that determines man’s behav-
ioral choice. “Procedural behavior” is of a general and universal character. Basically,
man’s general behavioral choices come into the category of “procedural” behavior. (2)
“Performative” behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures only “the
power of personality demand (or need)” performs the primary and indispensable func-
tion of determining man’s behavioral choice. Under certain external environmental
pressures, for some reason or other either “the power of personality judgment” fails
to take part in decision-making or it is incapable of making any decisions whatsoever.
Only “the power of personality demand (or need)” is the single most important factor
in determining man’s behavioral choice. “Performative” behavior belongs to a special
type of behavior, thereby possessing particularity. Under normal circumstances, “the
power of personality judgment” is master of the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice,” constitutes the ultimate determining factor in determining
man’s behavioral choice, and acts as a loyal guardian for man’s behavioral choice.
Hence “the power of personality judgment” tends not to produce “performative”
behavior. However, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is
the most complicated as well as the most miraculous of all the manifestations of
the Deity. There are almost invariably a multitude of phenomena associated with
man’s behavioral choice that simply defy explanation. Of all the special phenomena
connected with man’s behavioral choice, a fairly large number of them fall into
the category of “performative” behavior. A few ready-at-hand instances from life
will suffice to illustrate this argument. In childhood most children are capable of
performing certain behaviors. For example, they fear big animals, frighten small
animals, and like climbing trees. Sometimes even you yourself may be unable to
explain what your rare gestures or facial expressions are communicating! Two more
examples such as “having a dream” and “being drunk with wine” may prove relevant
to the subject under discussion. The aforementioned behaviors tend to be deter-
mined not by “the power of personality judgment” (consciousness) that is symbolic
of reason, but rather by “the power of personality demand (or need)” (the subcon-
scious or the unconscious) that represents the irrational desires in humans. While
man’s “performative” behavioral choice is either possessed of particularity or is of
rare occurrence, it may prove of great importance to the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice.” Some “truth” about the noumenon of human life that
stands as it is tends to manifest itself in man’s “performative” behavior, and to reveal
itself before our eyes. Hence man’s “performative” behavior is fully entitled to the
claim of being the prime object of study that will assuredly enable us to gain a fresh
and deeper insight into the truth about man. (3) “Truth-oriented” behavior. Under
certain external environmental pressures, “the power of personality judgment” alone
serves to determine man’s behavioral choice, which is to say “the power of person-
ality judgment” is the sole factor in determining man’s behavioral choice. Under
certain external environmental pressures, either “the power of personality demand
(or need)” fails to get working or “the power of personality judgment” firmly discour-
ages it from taking part in decision-making, even though it has been brought into
operation. Rather, “the power of personality” alone determines man’s behavioral
choice. This type of behavioral choice is very few and only applicable to individual
or exceptional cases, but it never fails to justify its existence. Man is a rational
animal—or, to put it another way, only human beings are endowed with reason and
capable of reason. Human reason that is the sole criterion of man’s behavioral choice
tends to act as the ultimate decision-maker that serves to determine man’s behavioral
choice. By this type of behavioral choice is meant that man will sacrifice himself for
truth. Exalted human nature tends to find expression in this type of behavior that we
term “truth-oriented behavior.” For example, revolutionary martyrs and people with
high aspirations looked death calmly in the face, and were ready to suffer death for
the sake of their country. It is in the interests of the people that innumerable officers
and soldiers do not flinch (or shrink) even if they are threatened with destruction. The
best exposition of this type of behavior that gives expression to exalted human nature
is to be found in the inscription Mao Zedong wrote on the Monument to the People’s
Heroes on September 30, 1949: “Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid
down their lives in the people’s war of liberation and the people’s revolution in the past
three years! Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the
people’s war of liberation and the people’s revolution in the past thirty years! Eternal
glory to the heroes of the people who from 1840 laid down their lives in the many
struggles against domestic and foreign enemies and for national independence and
the freedom and well-being of the people!”94 Hence it can be safely asserted that the
only power that determines their behavioral choice is truth and justice. (4) “Inaction
(or nonaction).” Under certain external environmental pressures, after much consid-
eration “the power of personality judgment” decides not to make behavioral choices.
Specifically, under certain external environmental pressures, after profound consid-
eration and careful planning “the power of personality judgment” has refrained from
exhibiting all possible behavioral manifestations, deciding not to make any behav-
ioral choice at all. “Inaction (or nonaction)” that is devoid of all possible behavioral
manifestations is also a type of behavioral choice, and in most cases it is only after
94Mao, Ze-Dong. “Eternal Glory to the Heroes of the People!” (Epitaph on the Monument to the
Heroes of the People drafted by Comrade Mao, Tse-Tung) in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.
Retrieved from “Marxists.org”. Access Time: February 21, 2021.
5 The Diachronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s … 201
deep deliberation and elaborate planning that “the power of personality judgment”
can refrain from exhibiting all possible behavioral manifestations. In fact, “inaction
(nonaction)” tends to pass through the actual behavioral process, and hence can be
termed another type of “procedural” behavior.
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” must of neces-
sity endow man’s behavioral choice with unique dimensions. By the behavioral
dimension we mean the direction of human behavior. In general, in making behav-
ioral choices, man tends to choose behavior in two directions, that is, “the internal
behavioral choice” and “the external behavioral choice.” By “the external behav-
ioral choice” we mean that under certain external environmental pressures man’s
behavioral choice tends to be directed towards the external environment whereby
man can adjust to or transform the external environment. This kind of behavioral
choice is what is normally meant by “changing the objective world.” We mean by
“the internal behavioral choice” that under certain external environmental pressures
man’s behavioral choice tends to be directed towards the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice.” “The internal behavioral choice” tends to manifest itself
mainly in the fact that man can reflect upon, transform, and transcend the noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” This is what people usually mean
by “remolding one’s subjective world.” Generally speaking, by man’s behavioral
choice we mean that “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral
choice” interact with each other and transform into each other. In man’s life-practice,
if, as commonly happens, “the external behavioral choice” turns out to be so frus-
trating, man will turn to “the internal behavioral choice” instead, transforming and
transcending the original noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
through learning and introspection, and then again he will turn to “the external behav-
ioral choice.” Whoever he (or she) is, frequent alternations between “the external
behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice” are characteristic of his (or
her) entire life.
5 The Diachronic Existence of the Noumenon of Human

The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself in the
synchronic existence as well as in the diachronic existence. By the diachronic exis-
tence of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” we mean that
the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists in time—or, to
put it another way, it has a temporal mode of existence, and that it develops over
time from a primitive to a more advanced form. According to the German philoso-
pher Heinrich Rombach, “all things are living and so is the universe.” “It is in the
structure itself that structure comes into being.” That is to say, structure is “the struc-
ture of the process itself” at all times and in all circumstances.95 The noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice,” which is immediately real, asserts itself
as a process of development in its own right, which is to say it exists as an ongoing
process. Ancient and modern scholars did considerable research on the evolutionary
process of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” and achieved
some valuable and admirable results. In modern times,96 many eminent scholars in
China, such as Lin Yaohua, Lin Huixiang, and Liu Wenying, as well as a number of
renowned scholars in Western countries, including Thomas Hunt Morgan, Charles
Robert Darwin, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg,
and Erik Homburger Erikson, conducted a profound study of the subject and made
important contributions to the study of human ontology. Liu Wenying, a distinguished
Chinese scholar, once advanced a theory about the human spirit that can be embodied
in “the diagram of cosmological scheme” and find expression in “the Taiji symbol”
consisting of a circle with S-shaped dividing line between white or light, or Yang and
black or dark, or Yin halves. He believes that the spiritual world is composed of two
parts, that is, consciousness and subconsciousness, and that the Yin and Yang, which
are regarded as two opposite cosmic principles or forces and which are connected
with each other and complementary to each other, take up their abode in the spiritual
world, whereby “the diagram of cosmological scheme” constitutes a vivid graphic
representation of the interaction of these two primary principles—Yin and Yang,
through which all phenomena of the universe are produced. For him, only after “the
diagram of cosmological scheme,” which constitutes a vivid graphic representation of
the relationship between the human spirit and “the Taiji symbol,” has passed through
“three historical stages of development” can it gradually come into existence. “The
three historical stages of development” can be briefly described as follows. “The
diagram of cosmological scheme” in its embryonic stage of development serves as a
manifestation of the primitive mind that is dominated by simple-minded ignorance.
“The diagram of cosmological scheme” in its formative stage of development consti-
tutes a graphic representation of the mind of early Homo sapiens. “The diagram of
cosmological scheme” in its finished stage of development is a dynamic reflection of
the mind of modern Homo sapiens.97 This is quite original and thought-provoking,
in so far as the scholar with an inquiring mind divides the process of human spiritual
development into three historical stages, and depicts the characteristics of primitive
thought through the agency of the diagrams of cosmological scheme that are a vivid
representation of human spiritual development. Nonetheless, the scholar seemed
to put a strained interpretation upon the assertion that the principles of Yin and
95 Rombach, Heinrich. (2009). Die Welt als lebendige Struktur: Probleme und Lösungen der
Strukturontologie (Chinese version) (Jun Wang, Trans.). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Bookstore
96 In Chinese historiography, “the modern times” specifically refer to the period from the middle
of the nineteenth century to 1919 as well as the period from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to
the present.
97 Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and
Cultures. Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 403–433.

Yang, which find expression in “the diagram of cosmological scheme,” constitute

the noumenon of human life, that “the diagram of cosmological scheme” depicts the
interaction of these two primary principles—Yin and Yang, whereby it forms a vivid
graphic representation of human spiritual development, and that the noumenon of
human life can be interpreted in terms of the principles of Yin and Yang. This view
deviates from the truth about the noumenon of human life, and thus it is far from
scientific. It is therefore clear that the scholar’s view on the noumenon of human life
still remains a mystery to us.
The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget has theorized that there are four distinct and
universal stages of cognitive development which roughly correlate with chronolog-
ical age, and that each stage is characterized by a unique form of cognitive structure
which affects all of the child’s thinking. Piaget views man as a complex, active,
and dynamic organism whose cognitive ability tends to manifest itself in the greater
adaptability of an organism to the world through the dual processes of assimilation
and accommodation, modifying one’s mental schemes to allow room for new infor-
mation. Piaget notes that the cognitive development of children without exception
follows a temporal sequence, and that this qualitative development of cognitive struc-
tures can be divided into four main stages: “sensorimotor stage” (from birth to age
two), “preoperational stage” (roughly from age two to age six or seven), “concrete
operational stage” (from age seven to age eleven or twelve), and “formal opera-
tional stage” (from age eleven to sixteen and onwards).98 Piaget maintained that the
stages appear in an invariable order, but recognized that they do so at somewhat
different ages, in different individuals, cultures, and settings.99 Piaget saw the child
as constantly creating and re-creating his own model of reality, achieving mental
growth by integrating simpler concepts into higher-level concepts at each stage. The
first, or sensorimotor, stage is chiefly concerned with mastering his own innate phys-
ical reflexes and extending them into pleasurable or interesting actions. During the
same period, the child first becomes aware of himself as a separate physical entity
and then realizes that the objects around him also have a separate and permanent
existence. In the second, or preoperational, stage, the child learns to manipulate
his environment symbolically through inner representations, or thoughts, about the
external world. During this stage he learns to represent objects by words and to
manipulate the words mentally, just as he earlier manipulated the physical objects
themselves. In the third, or concrete operational, stage, occur the beginning of logic
in the child’s thought processes and the beginning of the classification of objects by
their similarities and differences. During this period the child also begins to grasp
concepts of time and number. The fourth stage, or the period of formal operations, is
characterized by an orderliness of thinking and a mastery of logical thought, allowing
a more flexible kind of mental experimentation. The child learns in this final stage
to manipulate abstract ideas, make hypotheses, and see the implications of his own
98 Huang Xi-Ting. (2002). Personality Psychology. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang Education

99 “Piaget, Jean.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encylopedia.com. 23 Feb. 2021
https://www.encyclopedia.com.
thinking and that of others.100 Also, Piaget acknowledged that there is a close corre-
spondence in development between intellectual and affective structure. Moreover,
he held that cognition and affect reflect a functional parallelism, and that we shall be
able to parallel, stage by stage, the intellectual structures and the levels of emotional
development.101 According to him, the development of mental structures is closely
tied to the development of cognitive structures such as the capacity for abstraction
and logical thinking. Thus in a certain sense it may be said that cognitive devel-
opment accelerates or retards mental development. Before he was 30 years of age,
Piaget was world renowned for his explorations of the cognitive development of
children. Throughout a brilliant research career that spanned more than 60 years,
Piaget refined his structural and holistic methodology for observing, describing, and
evaluating the stages of human cognitive development from the point of view of the
child. Piaget is credited with foundational contributions to the emerging disciplines
of child psychology, educational psychology, and cognitive developmental theory.
The ingenuity of his approach to the study of children’s ways of thinking continues
to inform and influence the fields of epistemology, education, and developmental and
child psychology. His pioneering research and prolific publications on the nature of
thought and the development of intelligence assured Piaget’s place as a major influ-
ence in the scientific thinking of the twentieth century. His genuine respect for and
appreciation of the mind of the child and his prodigious research accomplishments
continue to inspire and challenge scholars and researchers worldwide.102
The American psychologist and educator Lawrence Kohlberg is best known for his
stage theory, which postulated that human moral development progresses through
a series of cognitive stages defined as total ways of thinking about moral issues
rather than as attitudes toward specific situations.103 He was a follower of Jean
Piaget and held him in high regard. His doctoral dissertation was prompted by his
consuming interest in Piaget’s work on the moral development of children. Based on
Piaget’s four-stage theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg put forward his inge-
nious theory of moral cognitive development (or moral judgment). Kohlberg’s theory
consists of six stages of moral development, which are arranged such that each stage
is the logical prerequisite of the next, and which he organized into three general levels
of moral development, with two stages at each level. His theory of moral development
can be briefly described as follows. (1) “The preconventional level” consists of the
first and second stages of moral development, that is “the punishment-and-obedience
orientation” (or “heteronomous morality”) and “the instrumental-relativist orienta-
tion” (or “individualism and instrumental purpose”) respectively; (2) “The conven-
tional level” encompasses the third and fourth stages of moral development, that is
100 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia. “Jean Piaget”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 16 September,
2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Piaget. Accessed 24 February 2021.
101 Piaget, Jean. Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child (Chinese version) (Tong-Xian
Fu, Trans.). Beijing, China: Culture and Education Publishing House, 1981.
102 “Piaget, Jean.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Feb.
2021https://www.encyclopedia.com.
103 “Kohlberg, Lawrence.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 24
Feb. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

“‘the good boy, good girl’ orientation” (or “interpersonal expectations and confor-
mity”) and “the ‘law-and-order’ orientation” (or “social system and conscience”)
respectively; (3) “The postconventional level,” also known as “the principled level,”
includes the fifth and sixth stages of moral development, that is “social contract or
legalistic orientation” and “universal ethical principle orientation” respectively.104
Kohlberg’s theory consisting of “three levels and six stages of moral development”
was highly influential, especially in psychology and education. There is profound
truth in both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories. Mental development tends to be influ-
enced, to a greater or lesser degree, by various factors such as social practice, cultural
variables, and information transmission. Additionally, it has to be taken into consid-
eration that there are also internal factors, such as the development of cognitive
structures, which must of necessity accelerate or retard mental development. It may
even be said that we can parallel, stage by stage, the levels of cognitive development
and those of mental development, which is to say cognitive development, stage by
stage, tends either to promote or to arrest mental development, thereby assuring the
mental world of a higher or lower level of development. It is therefore clear that
in normal development both the mental world and cognitive structure are so highly
parallel as to ensure synchronized development.
The diachronic existence of the noumenon of human Life—man’s “structure and
choice” can be roughly described as follows.
5.1 The Formative Process of the Noumenon of Human

The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” one of the rarest and
most valuable gifts with which man can be endowed, asserts itself as a mental system
in its own right, the formation of which depends fundamentally on human practice,
social life, and the human body (especially the cerebrum, that is, the physical seat
of man’s mental faculties). It is after millions of years of evolution that the cerebral
structure of the anthropoid apes, especially the unconscious part of the brain, evolved
into the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” In other words, the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” gradually came into being
only after it had passed through a long process of evolution, which may be explained
by analogy, though it is merely a superficial and forced analogy; and moreover, it
is not always reliable to argue by analogy. Let us take two analogical examples to
serve as an illustration. Daybreak tends to be preceded by a long, dark night. If he
gets drunk with wine, he will consume much time in making himself sober-minded.
This long process of evolution can be roughly divided into three stages:
The first stage, namely the ape-man period, which can be termed “the embryonic
stage” or “the dawning stage.” At the incipient stage of development, the ape-man
104Wei, Xian-Chao. (1995). Moral Psychology and Moral Education. Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang
evolved from the anthropoid ape, and his noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” operated primarily at a subconscious level. At the early stage of develop-
ment, the ape-man’s subconsciousness predominated in its cerebral structure, while
its consciousness was just beginning to come into being, manifesting itself merely as
a small bright spot. Although the tiny bright spot only dimly illuminated an infinites-
imally small part of the ape-man’s mental world, it may have proven of tremendous
importance to the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” because
it heralded the great dawn of man’s mental world, which can best be illustrated by
the following diagram of “the first glimmers of dawn in man’s mental world.” Basi-
cally, the ape-man’s behaviors remained dependent upon subconscious instincts for
guidance and control in this stage.
The second stage, or rather, “the formative stage,” in which human development
occurred in early Homo sapiens. In this stage early Homo sapiens’ consciousness
and subconscious continued to develop their respective differential or distinguishing
characteristics. While early Homo sapiens’ “conscious awareness” gradually grew
and illuminated some parts of the mental world, on the whole, it remained at a
lower level of consciousness, and was hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious.
This shows that it was the subconscious that predominated in early Homo sapiens’
noumenon, that is, their “structure and choice,” which is to say, the subconscious
tended to exert the supreme determining or guiding influence on the mental activ-
ities that occurred in the cerebral structure of early Homo sapiens. Hence it was
a frequent phenomenon that early Homo sapiens’ consciousness and subconscious
would alternate in dominating the mental world, which is to say, sometimes it was the
consciousness that controlled their behaviors, and sometimes it was the subconscious
that governed their behaviors, thus making it possible for such mental phenomena as
clear-headedness and muddle-headedness to alternate with each other. This demon-
strates that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” has passed
through a long process of evolution that consists of three stages of development, and
that the noumenon of early Homo sapiens is rightly considered to be intermediate
between the noumenon of the ape-man and that of modern Homo sapiens.
The third stage may be briefly described as a process of development, in which
the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—that is, their
“structure and choice,” evolved into a “Gestalt” system, a structure so integrated
that the properties of the whole are not reducible to the sum of the properties of
its parts. At this stage the differentiation between consciousness and subconscious-
ness was nearly complete in the cerebral structure of modern Homo sapiens (or
early modern humans). Basically, the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early
modern humans)—that is, their “structure and choice,” evolved into a “Gestalt”
system. In this stage the distinctive characteristics such as richness, exactitude, and
profundity inherent to the human mental processes began to manifest themselves
in modern Homo sapiens’ conscious awareness, which progressively acquired func-
tional specialization. The conscious awareness at the forefront of human mental
activity began to take center stage in the mental world. By contrast, the subconscious
was forced to relinquish control of the mental world and to recede into the back-
ground, thenceforth sinking into obscurity. Under normal circumstances, modern
Homo sapiens’ behaviors were directly determined by their consciousness (including

self-awareness), rather than by their subconscious. However, under peculiar circum-
stances, there are always a few exceptions, such as hypnosis, dream, and certain
behaviors typical of children, which tend to be controlled by the human subcon-
scious. The differentiation between consciousness and subconsciousness represents
a fundamental leap forward in the process of human development; thereafter, the
noumenon of modern Homo sapiens gradually evolved into a “Gestalt” system,
whereby mankind became removed from animals and eventually rose above the
animal kingdom. After having passed through a series of evolutionary stages leading
from an anthropoid to the modern human type, modern Homo sapiens eventually
evolved into modern humans, that is “real men,” in a strictly taxonomic sense.
Nonetheless, there is one thing that needs to be pointed out. The fact that modern
Homo sapiens’ subconscious receded into the background and sank into obscurity
does not mean that the subconscious must of necessity lose the enormous energies
inherent in itself, or that it fails to exercise an important influence upon human life
and destiny. In actual fact, except for the tiny bright spot symbolizing the emergence
of human consciousness in the ape-man’s cerebral structure, modern Homo sapiens’
subconscious contains almost all the substantive powers inherent in the noumenon
of the ape-man. The essential powers that had already evolved into a mass of needs,
desires (or drives), and passions must not be trifled with in view of the fact that they
vainly attempted to control human behavior. As Hippolyte Taine pointed out in The
Logic of the Humanities: “Our so-called nature is actually a mass of hidden passions.
… We tend to flatter ourselves for guiding them, but in fact it is them that guide us;
we tend to attribute our behaviors to ourselves, but in fact it is their actions, beyond
all our reasoning and control, that may justify our behaviors.”105 Heedless of the
above-mentioned fact, we’ll be unable to attain true knowledge of the noumenon of
human life—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” Moreover, it should also be noted
that in view of the fact that the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens took shape in an
earlier stage of the evolutionary process, it was relatively simple, far from mature,
and even less perfect. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,”
which is based on social life and human practice, manifests itself as an immediately
real being, and at the same time presents itself as an ongoing process of develop-
ment, which is to say it exists as a continuous process of evolution. In other words,
the noumenon of human life can reveal itself in an ongoing process of introspec-
tion and transcendence, and will exist for all periods infinitely extending far into the
future. In the human life course unfolding itself on a magnificent scale from ancient
times to the present, human beings will be able to attain infinite transcendence while
marching into the future.
105Cassirer, Ernst. (2004). The Logic of the Humanities (Zi-Yin Guan, Trans.). Shanghai, China:
5.2 The Developmental Stages of the Noumenon

of Individual Human Life—An Individual Human
Being’s “Structure and Choice”
The German evolutionary biologist (or evolutionist) propounded “Recapitulation

Theory,” also called “the fundamental biogenetic law,” postulating that ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny—i.e., the stages of an individual organism’s evolutionary
development repeats, recapitulates or reflects in compressed, miniaturized form the
evolutionary history of the species. Otherwise put, each successive stage in the devel-
opment of an individual represents one of the adult forms that appeared in its evolu-
tionary history. The same is true of the evolutionary history of the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice”—that is, the developmental stages of the noum-
neon of individual human life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice”
roughly replays the formative process of the noumenon of human life—man’s “struc-
ture and choice.” The development process of the noumenon of individual human
life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice” roughly underwent the
following three stages of evolution:
The first stage: the infancy period (from birth to age three), also called “the
dawning stage of the noumenon of individual human life—an individual human
being’s ‘structure and choice.’” At this early stage the noumenon of individual
human life—the infant’s “structure and choice,” which is far from perfect, is almost
exclusively occupied by the infant’s subconscious presenting a great contrast to its
consciousness, which is merely a small bright spot in the infant’s cerebral structure.
It is in this very first stage of development that the infant’s behaviors are basically
dependent upon subconscious (or instinctive) guidance and control. The noumenon
of individual human life—the infant’s “structure and choice,” which bears some
resemblance to that of the ape-man, can be best illustrated by the diagram of “the
first glimmers of dawn in the ape-man’s mental world,” or rather, in the noumenon
of the ape-man—his “structure and choice.” As the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung
once pointed out: “The individual mind has its origins in a chaotic, undifferentiated
unity.”106 The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget described the child during the first two
years of life as being in a sensorimotor stage, in which the infant does not become
aware of himself as the one that is able to start and control his actions.107 At this
early stage these common and interesting phenomena such as thumb-sucking and/or
toe-sucking can often be observed in infants. It is the earliest noumenon of individual
human life—the infant’s “structure and choice” that renders these “chaotic phenom-
ena” possible and actual—that is, infants are not in a position to distinguish between
subject and object, nor can they recognize the difference between self and the outside
world. Basically, it is the subconscious that dominates the infant’s mental world as
well as the noumenon of infant life (from birth to age two)—that is, its “structure
106 Hall, Calvin Springer., & Nordby, Vernon J. (1987). A Primer of Jungian Psychology (Chuan
Feng, Trans.). Beijing, China: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 112.
107 Piaget, Jean. (1987). The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (Xian-Dian Wang, Trans.). Beijing,
China: The Commercial Press, p. 23.

and choice.” Nonetheless, the infant’s conscious awareness that bears some resem-
blance to the noumenon of the ape-man, by which is meant that the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and chocie” attained “the dawning stage,” has started
to manifest itself as a small bright spot, which will hold out unlimited prospects,
although it is hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious.
The second stage: the period spanning early and middle childhood (from three
to ten years), also referred to as “the formative stage.” In this stage the child’s
consciousness and subconscious tend to undergo continuous differentiation. While
his “conscious awareness” gradually grows and illuminates some parts of the mental
world, on the whole, it is hemmed in on all sides by the subconscious, and remains at
a lower level of consciousness. The noumenon of individual human life at the period
of early to middle childhood resembles that of early Homo sapiens, and thus can be
illustrated by the diagram of the noumenon of early Homo sapiens—their “structure
and choice,” which corresponds roughly to the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” in the formative stage of development. This demonstrates that
it is the subconscious that predominates in the child’s noumenon—his “structure and
choice,” which is to say, the subconscious tends to exert the supreme determining or
guiding influence on the mental activities that occur in the child’s cerebral structure.
Hence it is a frequent phenomenon that the child’s consciousness and subconscious
tend to alternate in dominating his mental world, which is to say, sometimes it is
the consciousness that controls his behaviors, and sometimes it is the subconscious
that governs their behaviors. Thus the chaotic phenomena observed in children’s
contrasting behaviors such as cleverness versus muddle-headedness and obedience
versus disobedience are almost incapable of explanation. Generally, for children
over two years of age, not only does their consciousness begin to develop, but also
their self-awareness starts into existence and undergoes rapid development. With
the egocentric thinking typical at this stage, they tend to understand the world and
to form their ideas of the world in egocentric ways. For example, they tend to use
“I,” “my” or “mine” to express what they intend to communicate. This indicates
that they begin to discover themselves as individual beings, similar to others, yet
unique in their own way, and that they gradually disengage their mind from certain
“chaotic” behavioral patterns, for example, they are not in a position to distinguish
between subject and object, nor can they recognize the difference between self and
the outside world. Rather, they begin to distinguish between subject and object,
and try to develop subjective consciousness (self-awareness), whereby they, acting
as independent subjects, will be able to fulfill the rights and duties of a citizen in
the future. It may be safely assumed that the subjective consciousness acquired by
children at this stage is of tremendous importance to their future development. As
Kant once pointed out, when the child begins his talk by using “I,” for him, it looks
as if a ray of light streamed into his mind.108 It is thus evident that the period of early
to middle childhood at between about the ages of three and ten is a crucial stage
108Kant, Immanuel. (1987). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Xiao-Mang Deng,
Trans.). Chongqing, China: Chongqing Publishing House, p. 2.
in which “consciousness and subconsciousness” as well as “consciousness and self-

awareness” undergo rapid differentiation. In this stage the important task before us
is to guide them towards a correct understanding of the relationship between oneself
and others, by which is meant that on the one hand we should make them take the
initiative in developing subjective consciousness, and prepare themselves to grasp
their destiny in their own hands, and that on the other hand we should make them
grasp the relationship between oneself and others or society, and prepare themselves
to render service to others and the community at large. Otherwise, they may encounter
enormous difficulties in adapting themselves to the social life of their time.
The third stage: the period from middle childhood to late adolescence (at between
about the ages of ten and eighteen), also termed “the stage of Gestalt formation.”
During this period children pass through the transition from childhood to youth. The
noumenon of individual human life spanning middle childhood through late adoles-
cence bears some resemblance to that of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern
humans), and thus can be illustrated by the diagram of the noumenon of modern
Homo sapiens (or early modern humans)—their “structure and choice,” or rather,
the diagram of the noumeno of human life—man’s “structure and choice” at the
stage of Gestalt formation. During this stage the differentiation between conscious-
ness and subconsciousness in their cerebral structure is nearly complete, which is true
of the differentiation between consciousness and self-awareness working together
to form conscious awareness. During this period conscious awareness undergoing
rapid development tends to take center stage in the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice,” while the subconscious recedes into the background. Under
normal circumstances, their behaviors are directly determined by self-awareness,
rather than by the subconscious. Nonetheless, under peculiar circumstances, there
are always a few exceptions. In early youth the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” gradually takes shape and eventually evolves into a gestalt
system, which, in turn, enables individual human beings at between about the ages of
ten and eighteen to meet environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones,
and which enables them to engage in the struggle of life while acting as individual
beings or independent subjects. However, in early youth, although the noumenon
of human life has already taken shape and evolved into a gestalt system, yet it’s
still relatively simple, far from mature, and even less perfect. Hence the noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice” will be faced with the arduous task
of developing and perfecting itself. To sum up, the noumenon of individual human
life—an individual human being’s “structure and choice,” which invariably unfolds
itself through a process of self-development, self-transcendence, and self-perfection,
must of necessity cease with his death.
The reason why the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
underwent these three evolutionary stages lies in the fact that social practice forms
the basis of its evolution, that the brain attains practically its full size and weight
and reaches its full maturity of growth and vigor, and that human beings possess
mastery of the language as an instrument of communication. Specifically, social
practice forms the basis of social life for the evolution of the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice.” The brain provides the biological (or physical)
basis for the evolution of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.”
Language as an instrument of communication serves as a necessary condition for the
evolution of the nomenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” It is these
three essential evolutionary factors that made it possible for the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” to pass through the following three evolutionary
stages by a gradual process of development, that is, “the dawning stage,” “the forma-
tive stage,” and “the gestalt stage.” Despite this, the noumenon of human life is still
in a process of evolution, development and perfection, and thus opens up before itself
an infinite future. In view of this, Marx formulated the theory about the three stages of
human development—that is, the three major historical forms of human existence.
In delving into the “negative” essence of human life, Marx proposed the “three-
stage” theory about human development. According to him, the first stage, or rather,
the primitive form of human existence, is based on relations of “personal depen-
dence.” At this stage of human development are primitive people such as ape men,
early Homo sapiens, modern Homo sapiens, etc., early modern humans in a strictly
taxonomic sense, and people who lived in slave and feudal societies. The second
stage—that is, the second great form of human existence, is “personal independence
based upon dependence mediated by things.” The third stage, namely the third major
form of human existence, is “free individuality based on the universal development
of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as
their social wealth.”109 Whether they are the three great stages of human develop-
ment—that is, the ape-man period (or “the dawning stage” of human development),
“the formative stage” in which human development, particularly the differentiation
between consciousness and subconsciousness, occurred in early Homo sapiens, and
the third stage in which the noumenon of modern Homo sapiens (or early modern
humans)—their “structure and choice” evolved into a “Gestalt” system, or they are
the three major historical forms of human existence—that is, the first forms of society
based on “personal dependency relations,” the second great form that is “personal
independence based on dependence mediated by things,” and the third stage based on
“free individuality,” their developments are invariably attributed to social practice, the
growth and development of the brain, and the existence of language as an instrument
of communication and thought. The development of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” is a dynamic and ongoing process of self-reflection and
self-transcendence. Man can justly lay claim to being an independent subject that
is endowed with the power of planning his life, of creating his life, and of gaining
mastery over his life, whereby the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice,” as well as its attendant cultures that are the products of human creativity,
can of itself pass through a continuous process of evolution, sometimes progressing
in spurts, sometimes in leaps and bounds, but always continuously developing, and
can render possible the slow and gradual unfolding of man’s species-life, his real
109 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Collected Works, Volume 46: Marx: A Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s
objectivity as a species-being that not only can look towards future, but also can open
up before himself an infinite future.
6 The Dualistic Unity of Man’s “Structure and Choice”

in a State of Mutual Dependence—The Noumenon
of Human Life
The dualistic unity of man’s “structure and choice” in a state of mutual dependence—
that is, the noumenon of human life, can be described as follows. “The structure of
human life” determines “man’s life choice,” which, in turn, determines “the structure
of human life.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends
to manifest itself in the dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s
life choice” in a state of mutual dependence.
“The structure of human life” determines “man’s life choice.” It may be safely
asserted that the totality of man’s choices in life is determined by “the structure of
human life,” which will bring into operation the constituent elements inherent in
itself when faced with environmental pressures, particularly natural and social ones.
That is to say, not only can the totality of man’s choices in life be conceived as
the result of the workings of the constituent elements inherent in “the structure of
human life,” but also it can be attributed to the planning and decision-making by
“the structure of human life.” The dependency of “man’s life-choice” in relation to
“the structure of human life” manifests itself mainly in the following aspects. First,
“the structure of human life” lays the basis for “man’s choice in life,” which is to
say “the structure of human life” furnishes the underlying reason for “man’s choice
in life.” “The structure of human life” provides the organizational basis for “man’s
choice in life”—that is, “the structure of human life” is the necessary prerequisite to
“man’s choice in life.” When faced with certain environmental pressures, particularly
natural and social ones, “the structure of human life” tends to bring into operation
the various constituent elements inherent in itself—that is, the various life forces,
and thereby to build up an integrated life system in which the component elements
are well integrated with each other in an organic way. It is only through careful
planning that “the structure of human life” can find ways and means to cope with
environmental pressures, which is to say it is only by making appropriate behav-
ioral choices that “the structure of human life” can respond to certain environmental
pressures, especially natural and social ones. Generally speaking, under certain envi-
ronmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, what kind of structure an
individual human being is endowed with will determine what kinds of behavioral
choices he tends to make. Hence it must of necessity follow that a difference in
“the structure of human life” will assuredly cause a difference in “human behavioral
choice.” Even a difference in “human behavioral choice” under the same environ-
mental pressures is mainly attributable to a difference in “the structure of human
life.” Second, “the structure of human life” asserts itself as the unfailing source
6 The Dualistic Unity of Man’s “Structure and Choice” in a State … 213
of motive power for human behavioral choices in its own right. “The structure of
human life,” which can justly lay claim to being a dynamic structural system kept
in constantly good working order, tends to be brought into operation whenever it is
subject to external environmental influence, whereby it can react or respond to the
external environment by making appropriate behavioral choices. “The whole struc-
ture of human life” contains motive forces, by which is meant that the various vital
powers inherent in “the whole structure of human life,” the mutual relationship of
the different kinds of life force, and the relationship between “the structure of human
life” and the external environment (nature and society), with very few exceptions,
contain motive (or driving) forces, and form an unfailing source of motive power
for a variety of behavioral choices in a broad band of life situations. Under certain
environmental pressures, natural and social ones in particular, the motive (or driving)
forces inherent in “the structure of human life” not only motivate human beings to
make a variety of behavioral choices, but also aid them materially in determining
various behavioral choices. It is thus evident that “the structure of human life” can
justly lay claim to being an unfailing source of motive power for human behavioral
choices, and that it can rightly assert itself as an ultimate source of motivation for
man’s choice in life. Under certain environmental pressures, natural and social ones
in particular, an array of behavioral choices, e.g. “whether or not man will make
behavioral choices,” “what kinds of behavioral choices he will make,” “when he will
start making behavioral choices,” “when he will stop making behavioral choices,”
etc., in the final analysis, depends on the various motive (or driving) forces inherent
in “the structure of human life” as well as the workings of the dynamic structural
system—that is, the structure of human life. The dependency of “man’s life-choice”
in relation to “the structure of human life” may be briefly summed up as follows:
under certain environmental pressures, e.g. natural and social ones, “the structure of
human life” invariably serves as an unfailing source of motivation and motive power
for human behavioral choices. Third, when it comes to the question of how their
respective development and changes affect each other, it may be safely asserted that
“the structure of human life” tends to exert a determining influence upon “man’s life-
choice”—that is, “the structure of human life” tends to decisively influence “man’s
life-choice” in its development and change, or the development and change of “the
structure of human life” tends to determine how “man’s life-choice” develops and
changes accordingly. “The structure of human life” lays the organizational basis
for “man’s life-choice,” and hence its development and change must of necessity
make “man’s life-choice” undergo a definite development and change. Generally
speaking, as long as the external environmental conditions are much the same, any
development (or change) that occurs in “the structure of human life” invariably leads
to a corresponding development (or change) in “man’s life-choice,” and thus some
reason or another that is to be found in “the structure of human life” may be used
to offer a possible explanation for any development or change that occurs in “man’s
life-choice.” Moreover, on further reflection, the course of development followed
by the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may awaken us to
the fact that the qualitative difference in behavioral choice between ape-men, early
Homo sapiens and Modern Homo sapiens as well as the substantive changes their
respective behavioral choices underwent in the long process of evolution, in the final
analysis, can be attributed to their respective cerebral structures—that is, ape-men’s,
early Homo sapiens’ and modern Homo sapiens’ cerebral structures, which differ
essentially from each other, and which underwent fundamental changes in the long
evolutionary process of the noumenon of human life that can be divided into three
stages, that is, “the dawning stage,” “the formative stage,” and “the gestalt stage.” In
summary, how “the structure of human life” develops tends to determine how “man’s
choice in life” develops, and the course of development followed by “the structure of
human life” tends to exert a determining influence upon the process of development
“man’s choice in life” undergoes.
“The structure of human life” determines “man’s choice in life,” which, in turn,
tends to exert a determining influence upon “the structure of human life.” “The struc-
ture of human life,” far from being the product of pure imagination, can be invari-
ably understood as the product of subjective construction through the agency of the
mechanism for behavioral choice in its long process of evolution. The development
of “man’s life-choice” provides the basis and motivation for the development of “the
structure of human life.” This is mainly manifested in the following aspects. First,
“man’s choice in life” lays the basis for the formation of “the structure of human life.”
When viewed from the perspective of mankind as a whole, “man’s choice in life” is
believed to lay the basis for the formation of “the structure of human life”—or, to
put it another way, “man’s choice in life” constitutes the indispensable prerequisite
to the formation of “the structure of human life.” There is a fundamental difference
between the structure of human life and that of animals—that is, the structure of
animals is naturally formed, whereas “the structure of human life” can be conceived
as the product of subjective construction through the agency of the mechanism for
behavioral choice in its long process of evolution. In making each great leap forward
in its long evolutionary process, “the structure of human life” invariably takes the
development of “man’s choice in life” as a fundamental basis or a basic prerequisite.
Liu Wenying, a distinguished Chinese scholar, once fathomed and formulated the
causes of the evolutionary process the structure of primitive thought underwent. He
postulated that primitive thought roughly passed through three developmental stages
in its long process of evolution, that is, the operational stage of “image-action,” the
operational stage of “image-image,” and the operational stage of “image-concept.”
At a later period of the operational stage of “image-concept” the structure of human
thought began to reach the basic level of conceptual operation. For him, such basic
factors as “making tools,” “social interaction,” “the use of language as an instrument
of communication and thought” contribute immensely to the development of prim-
itive thought and its transformation into the modern consciousness. He pointed out
that hand in hand with the emergence and development of primitive thought went the
development of the instrumental behavior patterns of primitive peoples and of prac-
tical human activity such as making tools—that is, primitive thinking emerged and
developed side by side with the development of the instrumental behavior patterns of
primitive peoples and of practical human activity such as making tools, or the emer-
gence and development of primitive thought is accompanied by the development
of the instrumental behavior patterns of primitive peoples and of practical human
activity such as making tools. Making tools, which in Marxism is the fundamental
form of productive practice, establishes a profound objective basis for primitive
thinking.110 “Making tools,” “social interaction,” and “the use of language as an
instrument of communication and thought” without exception come into the cate-
gory of “man’s life-choice.” “Man’s choice in life” lays the fundamental basis for
the formation and development of “the structure of human life,” and meanwhile
constitutes the basic prerequisite to them. When viewed from the perspective of an
individual, “man’s choice in life” rightly asserts itself as a basic way in which “the
structure of human life” will be brought into existence. It is invariably on the basis
of its genetic inheritance that “the structure of individual human life” is gradually
established through “man’s choice in life” and that it can rightly assert itself as the
product of subjective construction through the agency of the mechanism for behav-
ioral choice in its long process of evolution. Without “man’s choice in life,” “the
structure of human life” wouldn’t be able to exist, nor would its development and
leap forward. In actual fact, it is since his infancy that an individual human being has
been engaged in developing and perfecting his structure of human life through the
agency of a wide variety of choices that have to be made in a broad band of life situ-
ations. Just as highly sensitive magnetic heads, which are of extremely high fidelity,
can scan a wide range of magnetic fields and perform a full range of recording oper-
ations, so the infant in his infancy can take the initiative in making a wide variety of
behavioral choices through the media of his ears, eyes, mouth, tongue and body. In
other words, senses can be understood as transducers from the physical world to the
realm of the mind where the infant can interpret the information, creating his percep-
tion of the world around him. In receiving all kinds of information from the external
environment and storing them in the brain, he can gradually construct his sensory
structure, perceptual structure and knowledge structure. He will take the initiative
in making behavioral choices like “jumping or dancing for joy,” thereby gradually
training the sense of rhythm and developing the sense of time and space, so that he is
able to develop his thinking in images. He can develop his logical thinking by making
behavioral choices like “babbling (the production of meaningless strings of speech
sounds by infants)” as well as by gradually mastering the vocabulary and grammar
of his mother tongue. In making behavioral choices such as “learning to read and
write” and “choosing behaviors towards other people in daily life,” he can gradually
fathom the mysteries of the world and conform to social norms, whereby he can start
developing his ideological and moral power, wisdom power, will power and power
of introspection. In making behavioral choices such as summing up experience and
learning lessons from it, he begins to answer the call of reason, curbing his own
needs, desires, and feelings, and attempting to harmonize them with social demands
and expectations, whereby “his own structure of human life” will be tending and
growing up, though by slow and imperceptible degrees, to a state of maturity and
perfection. When he grows a little older, he will enter school and receive academic
training that tends to instill in him the sentiment that whatever the characteristic may
110Liu, Wen-Ying. (1996). Ancient Historical Origins: A New Study of Primitive Thought and
be, e.g. system, purpose, planning, method, etc., it has become an almost indispens-
able concomitant to his behavioral choice, and that dimensions of regular schooling
reach into and define nearly every facet of human life whereby “his own structure of
human life” must of necessity undergo systematic and effective development. Obvi-
ously, it is on the basis of genetic inheritance that “man’s choice in life” constructs,
develops, and perfects “the structure of human life.” In a certain sense, just as the
difference in “man’s choice in life” tends to determine the differentiation in “the
structure of human life,” so the level that “man reaches in his life-choice” tends
to exert a determining influence upon the level that “the structure of human life”
attains. Second, “man’s choice in life” may assert itself as a basic way in which
“the structure of human life” achieves self-transcendence. Generally speaking, it is
through the agency of “the internal behavioral choice” that “the structure of human
life” achieves self-transcendence. Under external environmental pressures, natural
and social ones in particular, man tends to make two kinds of behavioral choice in his
life—that is, “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice.”
Specifically, by “the external behavioral choice” we mean that under the influence
of environmental stimuli the various component elements inherent in “the struc-
ture of human life” that are well integrated with each other in an organic manner
tend to be brought into operation and to respond accordingly by directing man’s
behavioral choice towards the objective environment, particularly natural and social
ones. This kind of behavioral choice is what is normally meant by “transforming
the external environment” or by “changing the objective world.” We mean by “the
internal behavioral choice” that under the influence of environmental stimuli the
various component elements inherent in “the structure of human life” that are well
integrated with each other in an organic manner tend to be brought into operation and
to respond accordingly by directing man’s behavioral choice towards “the structure
of human life” itself. This is what people usually mean by “transforming one’s meta-
structure of human life” or by “remolding one’s subjective world.” In most cases,
these two kinds of behavioral choice either alternate with each other or change to
each other. He whose “external behavioral choices” lead to successful outcomes will
be likely to make “internal behavioral choices,” whereby he can sum up experience
and make his “original structure of human life” tend towards a more perfect state.
He whose “external behavioral choices” have all met with failure will be more likely
to make “internal behavioral choices,” and to give serious reflection to failures and
learn lessons from them, whereby he can transform and transcend “his own original
structure of human life.” Generally speaking, he who has a good prospect opened
before him is in a position to make “external behavioral choices” as well as “internal
behavioral choices,” and to make them alternate with each other and work together
harmoniously, so that “his own original structure of human life” will be constantly
transcending itself. Hence it may be safely asserted that “man’s choice in life” rightly
asserts itself as a basic way in which “the structure of human life” achieves devel-
opment and self-transcendence. Otherwise put, without “man’s choice in life,” it is
well-nigh impossible for “the structure of human life” to achieve development and
self-transcendence. Third, “man’s choice in life” may rightly assert itself as a basic
way in which “the structure of human life” achieves freedom. Freedom is inextri-
cably bound up with man’s species-life that longs for freedom, on the one hand, and
that seeks freedom, on the other. “Man’s conscious choice in life” may justly assert
itself as the basic way in which “the structure of human life” achieves freedom. Marx
postulates that only in the final stage of human society, i.e. that further advanced stage
of communist society, in which “the free development of each is the condition for the
free development of all,”111 can the freedom of “man’s species-life” be possible of
realization in a real sense. Engels argues that “the more that human beings become
removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more they make their
own history consciously, the less becomes the influence of unforeseen effects and
uncontrolled forces of this history, and the more accurately does the historical result
correspond to the aim laid down in advance.”112 There is not the least doubt that
in order to make the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance,
and to make the freedom of “man’s species-life” possible of realization, invariably
human beings must depend upon “man’s choice in life,” and cannot but depend upon
“man’s choice in life.” Hence we assert that “man’s choice in life” can justly lay
claim to being the basic way in which the lofty ideals of life mentioned above can
be attained. Marx further points out that “free, conscious activity is man’s species-
character.”113 Man’s “free, conscious activity” is expressed as “man’s free, conscious
choice in life”—or, to put it another way, it is only through the agency of “man’s
free, conscious choice in life” that man’s “species-life” can achieve freedom. The
aforementioned fact tends to manifest itself in the following two aspects. On the
one hand, man can know and change the objective world through “free, conscious
external behavioral choice,” and on the other, he can remold and perfect his subjec-
tive world through “free, conscious internal behavioral choice.” Only in this way can
“the structure of human life” tend towards freedom and infinity. It is mere empty
talk, when we are assured that “the structure of human life” that is divorced from
“man’s choice in life” can attain freedom and infinity.
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to manifest
itself in the dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s life choice”
in a state of mutual dependence. Such mutual dependence is invariably in a normal
state—that is, such mutual dependence exists at all times and in all circumstances,
or such mutual dependence will exist for all periods extending infinitely far into the
future. The dualistic unity of “the structure of human life” and “man’s life choice”
in a state of mutual dependence is also termed “the dualistic unity achieved through
a two-way process” which tends to manifest itself in manifold manifestations such
111 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx & Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels:
Manifesto of the Communist Party (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing,
112 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2009). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 9: Engels: Dialectics
of Nature (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing
House, pp. 421–422.
113 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.).
as permeating each other, defining each other, supporting each other, conditioning
each other, mutual connection, and mutual transformation.
It should be further pointed out here that not only does “the two-way deter-
mining relationship” inhere in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice,” but also it exists outside the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice”—that is, between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” and “social structure” also exists “the two-way determining relationship.” For
the sake of survival and development the nomenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” must of necessity take the initiative in accommodating, creating or trans-
forming “social structures,” whereby it can create a “social structural space” to better
meet its survival and development needs. At the same time, it must of necessity follow
that, on the one hand, for the sake of its own existence and development “the social
structure” tends to be actively engaged in constructing, guiding, developing, and
reforming the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” thus making
it achieve progress, development, and self-transcendence, and that, on the other, the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can develop an adequate
understanding of social structures, integrate individual behavioral dispositions with
the changing needs of social structure, and give impetus to necessary changes in
social structure. This is what is meant by “the two-way determining relationship”
outside the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” which can be
briefly described as follows. On the one hand, the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and chocie” determines—namely, accommodates, creates or transforms—
“social structures.” On the other hand, “social structures” also determine—that is,
construct, guide or reform—the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice.” The relationship between the noumenon of human life (man’s “structure
and choice”) and “the structure of society” is most commonly manifested in the
fact that they lend impetus to each other, on the one hand, and that they are well
integrated with each other, on the other. Such relationship will exist for all periods
extending infinitely far into the future. Whether it is “the two-way determining rela-
tionship” within the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” namely,
between “the structure of human life” and “man’s choice in life,” or the one outside
the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” that is, between the
noumenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) and “the social structure,”
it is invariably through human behavioral choice as well as on the basis of social
life and human practice that “the two-way determining relationship” can be possible
of realization. In summary, human behavioral choice may justly assert itself as the
basic way in which the aforementioned “two-way determining relationships” can
be brought about. Without human behavioral choice, it is well-nigh impossible for
the abovementioned “two-way determining relationships” to exist, let alone achieve
development.
7 The Unique Human Characteristics and Functions of the Noumenon … 219
7 The Unique Human Characteristics and Functions

of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure
and Choice”
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” may justly lay claim
to being a closely knit, finely structured, and infinitely changeable system, which
tends to exist as an unique being endowed with vitality and power, as well as endued
with numerous uniquely human characteristics and functions that make man far
surpass animals and capable of making his own choices, planning his own destiny,
and controlling his own fate, whereby man becomes a species-being full of bound-
less vitality, thus opening up before mankind unlimited prospects of progress and
development.
7.1 The Unique Human Characteristics of the Noumenon

of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice”
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists as an unique

being endowed with vitality and power, as well as endued with numerous uniquely
human characteristics that distinguish human beings from animals. The noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and its uniquely human characteristics
merge into an integrated whole, by which is meant that the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” lays the physical basis of life for its uniquely
human characteristics, which, in turn, necessarily assert themselves as the mode of
existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice.” The uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” are mainly as follows.
(1) Practicality
Practice is a fundamental human characteristic inherent in the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” as well as an essential distinction between man
and other animals. As Marx points out in The German Ideology, “men can be distin-
guished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical
organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing
their actual material life.”114 Fundamentally speaking, practice is a uniquely human
characteristic. Just as the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
and its inherent practicality merge into an integrated whole, so do the noumenon
of human life and the essence of human life, which is to say, on the one hand the
114Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1995). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 1: Marx & Engels:
The German Ideology (excerpts) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing:
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” forms the organizational

basis as well as the physical basis for the essence of human life—human practice,
but on the other, human practice is the essence of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” as well as the concentrated expression of other unique
human characteristics inherent in the noumenon of human life. The noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice” is not only a unique organizational system
in the world, which is highly developed, extremely complex, and full of vitality,
but also the only living being that is capable of engaging in practical activities.
Hence the essence of human life—human practice must of necessity be at once
incorporated and manifested in the noumeon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice.” Higher animals other than humans are not endowed with the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice,” nor are they endued with the essence of
human life—human practice. “The integrating relationship” between the noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and the essence of human life—human
practice tends to manifest itself in the fact that the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice,” and the essence of human life—human practice, merge to
form an integrated whole, and that they tend to undergo integrated development. The
development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” parallels
that of the essence of human life—human practice, which is to say, just as the develop-
ment of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” can definitely be
changed into that of the essence of human life—human practice, so the development
of the essence of human life—human practice can certainly be transformed into that
of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” Whether it is for the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” or for the essence of human
life—human practice, one party’s progress and development will promote the other
party’s progress and development. Likewise, one party’s regression or retardation
will cause the other party’s regression or retardation. The relationship between the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” and the essence of human
life—human practice can be reduced to the relationship of “the noumenon of life”
to “the essence of life,” which must necessarily manifest itself in the fact that they
merge to form an integrated whole, that they undergo integrated development, and
that they cannot be separated from one another even for an instant.
(2) Reality
Reality, which is one of the uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice,” asserts itself as an essential prerequisite
for the existence and development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice.” As Marx points out in The Holy Family, “real man is the man living in a
real, objective world and determined by that world.”115 In one of his letters to Marx,
115Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: Marx & Engels:
The Holy Family (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s
Engels said that “‘man’ will always remain a wraith so long as his basis is not empir-
ical man.”116 Man is never abstract but always actual (or real) man. The being of men
is their actual life process, so the collective, generic character of human life is real life.
It is thus evident that reality asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the existence
and development of human life. Marx’s theory about “real man,” which treats “real-
ity” as a prerequisite for man’s self-knowledge, not only offers us a more scientific
definition of man himself but, more importantly, represents a profound revolution in
human self-understanding. Between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” and man’s reality exists “the integrating relationship.” The noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to exist in the real mode of man’s
existence, that is, the noumenon of human life that is composed of “the triple struc-
ture of human life” and “the eight kinds of substantive (or essential) powers” is a kind
of real being full of life and power as well as composed of flesh and blood. It is not
something ethereal or intangible, but rather something sensuously perceptible and
empirically describable—or to put it another way, it exists in both nature and society.
It is to be conceived as a real living thing existent as a whole, as well as endowed with
the capacity to engage in practical activity, definitely human motives, desires, and
reason. It is a concrete, historical existence in which the unity of body and spirit, of
synchronicity and diachronicity, and the unity between changing the objective world
and remolding one’s subjective world, as well as the unity between desire and reason,
are invariably achieved. “The integrating relationship” exists between the noumenon
of human life—namely, man’s “structure and choice,” and man’s reality—that is, one
of the uniquely human characteristics. The noumenon of human life—man’s “struc-
ture and choice” can rightly assert itself as the real life, and thus must necessarily be
endowed with one of the uniquely human characteristics—man’s reality, which, in
turn, can justly lay claim to being the necessary manifestation of the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice” as well as the mode of existence in which
the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” exists.
(3) Subjectivity
Subjectivity, which is one of the uniquely human characteristics of the noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” is of fundamental importance to the
existence and development of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice.” For Marx, man is the subject, whilst nature is treated as object.117 In human
practice man always remains the subject.118 According to Marx, man as subject must
be the point of departure, which is to say, in this world only man can act as subject and
116 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 27: Engels: A Letter
from Engels to Marx (19 November 1844) (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.).
117 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1972). Marx and Engels Selected Works, Volume 2: Marx: A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing,
can claim to be the rightful purpose and point of departure of all activities while the
other natural objects can only be treated as objects. In the course of the history of man,
the laws that govern the development of society and the progress of civilization bear
ample testimony to the universal truth that, on the one hand, man exists as the result of
the movement of history, but on the other, he constitutes the point of departure of the
movement of history.119 Therefore, the historical development manifests itself in the
dialectical unity of man’s existence as the historical premise and his existence as the
historical result. Subjectivity, which comes into the category of the uniquely human
characteristics, is of fundamental importance to man’s existence and development.
Specifically, man’s subjectivity or human subjectivity refers to the human subject’s
consciousness, activity and initiative, to wit, such essential characteristics as purpose,
activity, initiative, choice and creativity displayed by the human subject in subject-
object relations, as well as common to man as subject. Man’s subjectivity or human
subjectivity manifests itself mainly in the relationship between the subject and the
object, in which the subject tries to bring the object within its comprehension, under
control and into use. Between the noumenon of human life (man’s “structure and
choice”) and human subjectivity exists “the integrating relationship,” by which is
meant that the nomenon of human life (man’s “structure and choice”) lays the physical
basis of life for human subjectivity, and that it asserts itself as an essential prerequisite
for the existence and development of man’s subjectivity, which, in turn, necessarily
asserts itself as the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon
of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” It is the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” that can make man far surpass other higher animals
in intelligence and adaptability, and that can accomplish man’s rise from the animal
kingdom and lift mankind above the rest of the animal world, whereby man can
become a subject in the proper sense of the word. The more that human beings
become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more that
they are likely to achieve free consciousness. The noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” may aid materially in making man become the conscious
subject of the world, in making man, nature and society undergo progressive and
harmonious development, and in making man occupy an exalted place in the universe.
It is on the basis of social life and human practice that the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” and human subjectivity must necessarily merge to form
an integrated whole and undergo integrated development, thereby coordinating with
each other to reach higher levels of development.
(3) Duality
Duality is a typical human characteristic inherent in the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice.” Man is the only creature in the world that can justly lay
claim to being the possessor of two kinds of life which can be brought into contrast.
The one is a natural life, which man has in common with the lower animals, which he
receives in the first birth from his human progenitors, and which is corruptible, frail
and transitory. The other is a supernatural life, which he has in common with God
119 Ibid., p. 121.

Himself, which must be received from a Divine Progenitor, and which is incorrupt-
ible, abiding and eternal.120 Hence it can be safely asserted that man is the unity of
“natural life” and “supernatural life.” As Marx maintained: “The animal is immedi-
ately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity.
Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He
has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges.
Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is
just because of this that he is a species-being.”121 The animal has only a “natural life,”
while men are the possessors of a “dual life”—or to put it another way, the human
life possesses the dual nature, namely, the “natural life” and the “supernatural life.”
Animals that have no conscious awareness whatsoever are wholly dependent upon
inherited abilities and natural instincts for the direction of their life activities, whilst
man endowed with his conscious awareness gains a proper rational control over his
life activities, whereby man becomes the highest being (or the supreme form of life)
in the universe—the conscious “species-being.” Between the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” and man’s “dual life” exists “the integrating rela-
tionship,” by which is meant that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” forms the basis for man’s “dual life,” which, in turn, necessarily asserts itself
as the mode of existence and form of expression of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice.” The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” endows man with “a natural life and a supernatural life,” and the dual char-
acter of human life further forms the basis for multiple or manifold manifestations
of man’s “dual life,” such as man’s ideality versus his reality, man’s finitude versus
his infinity, man’s historicity versus his super-historicity, man’s necessity versus his
freedom, man’s soul versus his body etc., which can be reduced to the multiple duality
of human life. These two opposites of duality stand in the relation of contradiction
to each other, intermingle with each other, act upon each other, and change into each
other, thus achieving the unity of opposites, whereby man can make his life rich and
colorful beyond compare, behaving as if he owned the universe. In summary, on the
one hand, the multiple duality of human life can make man become a giant in the true
sense of the term who is brave enough to enter into rivalry with heaven and earth,
but on the other, it can also make heaven, earth and man coexist with one another
and undergo harmonious development. The complexity of the noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice,” the high level of development attained by it, and
the way that the system is finely structured tend to find profound expression in the
“duality” of human life as well as in its “multiple duality.” The noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” and the duality of human life must necessarily
merge to form an integrated whole and undergo integrated development, thereby
120 Pettingell, John Hancock. (1887). Views and Reviews in Eschatology: A Collection of Letters,
and Other Papers Concerning the Life and Death to Come. Yarmouth, ME.: Scriptural Publication
Society, p. 273.
coordinating with each other to attain higher stages of development or higher levels
of development.
Moreover, between the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
and its uniquely human characteristics such as choice, transcendence and infinity
exists “the integrating relationship,” by which is meant that the nomenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” lays the physical basis of life for its manifold
human characteristics, and that it asserts itself as an essential prerequisite for the
existence and development of its manifold human characteristics, which, in turn,
must necessarily lay claim to being the mode of existence and form of expression of
the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.”
7.2 The Functions of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s

“Structure and Choice”
The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” rightly asserts itself as
an unfailing source of power indispensable for human life, and at the same time it is
held accountable for making behavioral choices through careful planning, decision
making and execution, and regulation and control of behavior that are of habitual
occurrence in human life. By the function of the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” we mean that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” is endowed with the capacity for responding and adapting to external
environmental pressures, transforming the objective world as well as the subjective
world, and gaining mastery and control over one’s own destiny, and that, accord-
ingly, it must of necessity perform its manifold functions to accomplish the fore-
going objectives. Generally speaking, the functions performed by the noumenon of
human life—man’s “structure and choice” tend to manifest themselves mainly in the
following two aspects.
(1) The Overall Function of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure
and Choice”
By the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
we mean that the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” tends to
perform an important function in human life as a whole, particularly in its overall
situation as well as in its whole destiny. This function tends to manifest itself mainly
in the following three aspects.
First, the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” may assert itself as a basic way in which the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” meets environmental pressures and challenges, partic-
ularly natural and social ones, and in which man and the world coexist with each
other and undergo harmonious development. The primary overall function of the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” manifests itself in the fact
that in responding to external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly
natural and social ones, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
will be motivated to make appropriate behavioral choices, and to capitalize upon

its opportunities for survival and development, thereby making man and the world
coexist with each other and undergo harmonious development. Man who lives in a
certain environment, especially in a particular natural and social environment, has to
meet external environmental pressures and challenges at all times and in all circum-
stances. On the one hand, if he successfully responds to external environmental
pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones, man will be able to
adapt himself to the environment, particularly nature and society, and thereby to seize
the initiative in grasping his destiny in his own hands. On the other hand, if he fails
to meet external environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and
social ones, man will assuredly find himself in the midst of insuperable difficulties in
making adjustment to the environment, particularly nature and society, and thereby
lose the initiative in gaining mastery over his own fate. It is therefore evident that the
noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” is endowed with substantive
powers, that it is in a position to engage in higher forms of self-reflection and self-
transcendence, and that in meeting external environmental pressures and challenges,
particularly natural and social ones, it can take the initiative in making man and the
world coexist with each other and undergo harmonious development.
Second, the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” may assert itself as a basic way in which man can improve and transcend
himself, thereby achieving self-development. The key to the harmonious develop-
ment of mankind and nature lies in the development of human beings, whereby man
can justly lay claim to being the subject of the world. Man is hedged around with
various environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social ones,
which are too changeable to be predictable, which will constantly exist in myriad
forms, and which invariably involve, to a greater or lesser extent, some kind of risk.
With the above situation in view, only if the noumenon of human life—man’s “struc-
ture and choice” is able to engage in constant self-reflection and self-transcendence
can it meet environmental pressures and challenges, particularly natural and social
ones, and exercise initiative in grasping its own destiny. The noumenon of human
life—man’s “structure and choice” endowed with the capacity to engage in profound
self-reflection and constant self-transcendence is in a position to engage in conscious
self-reflection and self-transcendence through the differentiation inherent to self-
consciousness as well as through the identification of self-consciousness with object-
consciousness, whereby the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
can constantly decrease the discrepancy between the real self and the ideal self and
bring the real self into alignment with the ideal self, thus continually tending towards
improvement and perfection.
Third, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” asserts itself
as a basic way in which man can gain mastery over his own destiny and embark on
the long march towards freedom. Not only can the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” transform these two worlds by itself—the objective world
and the subjective world, but it can bring about unity of these two worlds and build
up an integrated objective and subjective world—the human world, whereby it can
achieve the integrated development of man and the world and make man embark on a
long march towards freedom. In pursuing his lofty ideals, engaging in constant self-
development and self-transcendence, and embarking upon a long march towards the
final state of human freedom or salvation through unity, man no longer depends solely
upon his personal powers, but rather on the combined powers of “the human world” as
a whole, including his personal powers, which the world has never witnessed before.
In the famous metaphor of “the thinking reed,” the French scientist and philosopher
Blaise Pascal compares humanity to the entire universe, stating that man, though the
universe is gigantic enough to be crushing him, can point out to it something that he
is which is greater than it: he is the weakest reed of nature, but “a thinking reed.”
“Pascal admires humanity’s essential frailty but also its unalienable nobility. While
the human being is set in the universe as nature’s weakest creature like a delicate reed,
he is nonetheless nobler than the entire universe for he is endowed with the faculty of
thought; the human person is a thinking reed who is conscious of his state, whereas
the universe knows absolutely nothing of its own existence. Therefore, the use of
reason displays our ultimate dignity; human reason is a wonderful and unparalleled
source of humanity’s delicate greatness.”122 Because man is “a thinking reed,” it can
be safely asserted that he is powerful beyond compare, that he is able to gain mastery
over his own destiny, and to enter into rivalry with heaven and earth, and that he has
unlimited prospects before him.
(2) The Concrete Function of the Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Struc-
ture and Choice”
By the concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” we mean that the concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s
“structure and choice,” or more specifically, its whole and any component elements
contained therein, as well as the grouping of component elements, tends to exer-
cise concrete influence on human behavioral choices as well as on a wide variety
of life situations in which human behavioral choices will have to be made—or,
to put it another way, by the concrete function of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice” we mean how the whole and any component elements
contained therein, the various component parts contained in the whole, or rather, the
structure of human life and the external world, exercise concrete influence on one
another. The concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” rightly asserts itself as the internal basis and concrete manifestation of
the overall function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.”
The concrete function of the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice”
tends to manifest itself in the following aspects.
First, the choice function. It is the basic function of the noumenon of human life—
man’s “structure and choice.” When faced with certain environmental pressures,
particularly natural and social ones, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” tends to make human behavioral choices by bringing into operation the
various constituent elements inherent in itself so that it can respond to the external
122
Toth, Beata. (2016). The Heart Has Its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the
8 Comments on Two Types of Ontology of Life 227
environment, particularly nature and society. As long as an individual human being’s

life endures, his behavioral choice will remain with him throughout his life.
Second, the dynamic function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” tends to assert itself as a complex dynamic structural system consisting
of “three levels of structure and eight kinds of powers.” Under external environ-
mental pressures, particularly natural and social ones, the system will come into
operation automatically and respond to the external environment, particularly nature
and society, by making appropriate behavioral choices that can be almost invariably
traceable to definite motives of action, whereby the system must necessarily undergo
constant self-improvement and self-transcendence.
Third, the directional function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” includes the intellectual and moral system composed of many compo-
nent elements, such as ideology, value, morality, and emotion, which are a genuine
reflection of—or rather truly representative of—the demands and interests that are
of crucial importance to the survival and development of individuals, society and
mankind in general. Moreover, the intellectual and moral system can also regulate
and determine the direction of human behavioral choice in such a way that “Heaven,
Earth and man” can coexist in harmony with one another.
Fourth, the methodological function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “struc-
ture and choice” encompasses the wisdom system consisting of knowledge structure,
modes of thought, and inherited and acquired abilities, which contribute substan-
tially to the formation and development of man’s creative powers that tend to find
expression in manifold spheres of human activity. The wisdom system may serve as a
living repository of various methods and styles that can be used to solve innumerable
difficulties and problems by which man is most assuredly confronted in practice.
Fifth, the regulative function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure
and choice” embraces the volition system that can consciously regulate and control
human behaviors whereby they can be directed towards premeditated or preconceived
ends. The volition system is in a position to maintain, regulate, and control human
behaviors, or more specifically, to control the start or end of a behavior, and to regulate
the input or diversion of mental and physical energy.
Sixth, the reflective function. The noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and
choice” includes the self-reflective system that is capable of self-reflection and self-
transcendence. The self-reflective system is in a position to examine the relationship
between “the ideal self and the real self” through the differentiation inherent to
self-consciousness as well as through the identification of self-consciousness with
object-consciousness, thereby making man undergo constant self-development and
self-transcendence and embark upon a long march towards freedom.
8 Comments on Two Types of Ontology of Life
While addressing ourselves to the question of how to gain a deeper insight into
the ontology of human life, we tend to find ourselves in the midst of enormous
difficulties in instituting a comparison between two types of theory—structural and

existentialist—each being characterized by classicality and one-sidedness. We feel
the necessity of giving the two kinds of theory as to the ontology of human life a
profound understanding as well as a thorough analysis when we attempt to have a
better understanding of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life
in itself as it is)—that is, man’s “structure and choice.” The structure of human
life has been widely accepted as a general truth in the structural theory about the
thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the
other hand, tends to deny the existence of any choice in human life. According to the
structuralist theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in
itself as it is), under given cultural conditions, whether it is the structure of collective
consciousness or the social structure that is rooted in the cultural pattern and in the
collective consciousness, it tends to remain unchanged—or, to put it another way, it
tends to stay the same and not changed. Individuals can only submit themselves to
the structure of society or the structure of collective consciousness and follow old
traditions as well as established conventions. It would be ludicrous (or ridiculous)
nonsense to say that human choice, or more specifically, the behavioral choice on the
part of a subject, could make any difference to the social structure or the structure
of collective consciousness. On the contrary, human choice, or more specifically,
the behavioral choice on the part of a subject, has been universally recognized as an
undeniable truth in the existentialist theory about the thing-in-itself of human life
(the reality of human life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to negate
the existence of any structure upon which human life depends. The existentialist
theory about the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as
it is) holds that man’s real being or existence lies in his freedom, that the nature (or
essence) of man is nothing but the product of man’s self-creation and that everything
is possible and free. According to the existentialist theory as to the ontology of human
life, neither objective necessity nor objective value inheres in human life or in the
empirical world—or, to put it another way, what you choose tends to define who you
are. The one-sidedness characteristic of the aforementioned two kinds of theories
manifests itself in the fact that man’s “structure and choice,” to wit the thing-in-itself
of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is) characterized by the unity
of “structure and choice,” tends to be separated from each other and contradictory
to each other—that is to say, either man’s “structure” is antithetical to his “choice”
or man’s “choice” goes beyond its proper bounds and acts to negate the existence of
any structure upon which human life depends. Hence it must of necessity follow that
the above two types of theory cannot but sink into absurdity. On the one hand, man’s
“structure and choice” combine to form the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality
of human life in itself as it is) wherein its component elements tend to be brought
into operation and kept in good working order, and on the other hand, they constitute
the two organic constituent parts of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of
human life in itself as it is) wherein each of the two occupies a specific place and
performs unique functions. Man’s “structure and choice,” which are characterized by
the unity of opposites, permeate each other and support each other, but they cannot
replace each other.
While they stick to their own arguments, the structural theorists and their existen-
tialist counterparts, whose writings have had a wide-spread influence upon people’s
conception of the thing-in-itself of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it
is), write in great quantity and present clear-cut viewpoints. The writings published
by the structural theorists as well as by their existentialist counterparts will be of
immense value to us in our research work. It can even be asserted that only if we
subject the aforementioned two types of theory to a profound analysis and a critical
evaluation can we obtain a deeper understanding of the thing-in-itself of human life
(the reality of human life in itself as it is), that is to say man’s “structure and choice.”
The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre may rank as the leading exponent of the
existentialist kind of theory, while the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss
has been unquestionably the foremost proponent of the structural type of theory.
8.1 A Critical Commentary on Sartre’s Existentialism
Generally speaking, existentialism may be defined as the philosophical theory which

deals with “the fundamental condition of human existence,” which is to say existen-
tialism is a form of philosophical enquiry that explores the nature of existence by
emphasizing experience of the human subject—not merely the thinking subject, but
the acting, feeling, living human individual.123 Throughout their writings the major
philosophers identified as existentialists tend to describe and analyze our most basic
existential experiences, which reveal the fundamental human condition in our rela-
tion to the world and others. Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), who was a nineteenth
century Danish philosopher, has long been known as “the father of existentialism”—
or, to put it another way, Søren Kierkegaard is widely considered to be the first exis-
tentialist philosopher, though he did not use the term existentialism, and his ideas
are recognized as the groundwork of existential thought. Much of his philosophical
work deals with the issues of how one lives as a “single individual,” giving priority
to concrete human reality over abstract thinking and highlighting the importance
of personal choice and commitment.124 Kierkegaard’s thought is a corrective to the
rationalism of much of philosophy, reminding us of the inward dimension of exis-
tence, the experience of subjectivity. His overall existential philosophy had a tremen-
dous influence on twentieth century thought, particularly in the areas of philosophy,
theology, psychology, literature, and art.125 Existentialism became popular early in
the twentieth century, flourished in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the 1970s
the cultural image of existentialism had become a cliché. As a cultural movement,
existentialism belongs to the past. As a philosophical inquiry that introduced a new
norm, authenticity, for understanding what it means to be human existentialism has
123 Macquarrie, John. (1972). Existentialism. New York: Penguin, pp. 14–15.
124 Gardiner, Patrick. (1969). Nineteenth Century Philosophy. New York, NY: The Free Press,
pp. 289–320.
125 “Søren Kierkegaard”, “New World Encyclopedia”, <https://newworldencyclopedia.org>.
continued to play an important role in contemporary thought in both the continental

and analytic traditions.126 Among the major philosophers identified as existentialists
were Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger, whose classical writ-
ings “gave philosophical shape to the basic existential insight that thinking about
human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire
of ancient or modern thought,” that “human beings can be understood neither as
substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects,”
and that “all the themes popularly associated with existentialism find their philo-
sophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorical framework,
together with its governing norm.”127 While existentialism is generally considered
to have originated with Kierkegaard, the first prominent existentialist philosopher to
adopt the term as a self-description was Jean-Paul Sartre, who is arguably one of the
leading figures in the 20th-century French philosophy of existentialism and whose
philosophical ideas have been widely disseminated in Europe and North America
and have had a widespread influence throughout the world.
(1) Sartre’s Primary Existential Ideas
First, one of Sartre’s primary existential ideas is the notion that existence precedes
essence. The Sartrean claim is best understood in contrast to the traditional philosoph-
ical view that there is a predetermined essence to be found in humans. This view
is in contradistinction to what the major existential philosophers hold; they teach
that “existence precedes essence”—that is, man first of all exists and defines himself
afterwards by his own free choice. Sartre’s early masterwork, Being and Nothing-
ness (1943), in which he developed a philosophical account of his existentialist ideas,
tends to be regarded as both the most important non-fiction expression of Sartre’s
existentialism and his most influential philosophical work. Sartre accords an ontolog-
ical primacy to human existence or human reality while developing a philosophical
system of his own. (1) Like most twentieth century existential thinkers Sartre was
greatly influenced by the phenomenological movements of Edmund Husserl. This
teaching held that all human knowledge can be reduced to an original “lived experi-
ence.” This gave concrete descriptive analyses for our basic experiences priority
over purely logical, abstract reasoning. Like Heidegger, Sartre appropriated the
phenomenological method and applied it to the subject of “existence.” For Sartre
this meant dividing all reality into two basic modes of being: the in-itself (en-soi),
which is the state of all material beings as they exist apart from our consciousness of
them; and the for-itself (pour-soi), which is all things as they are experienced by or for
human consciousness.128 For Sartre ontology is primarily descriptive and classifica-
tory, and his phenomenological ontology presupposes that there exist two distinct and
irreducible categories or kinds of being: the in-itself (en-soi) and the for-itself (pour-
soi), roughly the nonconscious and consciousness respectively. Being-in-itself and
126 Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existe
ntialism/>.
127 Ibid.
128 “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org.
being-for-itself have mutually exclusive characteristics and yet we (human reality)

are entities that combine both, which is the ontological root of our ambiguity. The
in-itself, by which we mean the reality of the objective world, is solid, self-identical,
passive and inert.129 Sartre contends that human existence is a conundrum whereby
each of us exists, for as long as we live, within an overall condition of nothingness
characterized by fortuity, absurdity and chaos, devoid of purpose, causality, ratio-
nality, regularity, order, time, development or change. In the view of the existentialist,
human existence is characterized by what has been called “the existential angst,” or
a sense of disorientation, confusion or isolation in the face of an apparently mean-
ingless or absurd world. In all probability people tend to regard this very world with
disgust and hatred. In contrast to the in-itself, the for-itself, by which we mean human
existence or human reality, is fluid, nonself-identical, and dynamic. It is the internal
negation or “nihilation” of the in-itself, on which it depends.130 Sartre argues that
one’s existence and one’s formal projection of a self are distinctly separate and within
the means of human control and that the for-itself is always something that is what
it is not and something that is what it is. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always
“more” than our situation and that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom.
We are “condemned” to be free, in his hyperbolic phrase.131 Given that being-in-
itself is an immanence which cannot realize or transcend itself, an affirmation which
cannot affirm itself, an activity which cannot act, because it is glued to itself, the
world of the in-itself, which is superfluous because it has no meaning independent
of consciousness,132 tends to work in unity with the world of the for-itself, which
asserts itself as the foundation of the world in its own right and which gives meaning
to things by virtue of the projects that it pursues,133 which is to say the objective
world, the human world and man’s existence tend to exist as an organic unity. On the
one hand, we are bound to the physical world, but on the other, we are constrained to
make continuous, conscious choices. We are free to create ourselves by giving some
flexibility in choosing our actions for ourselves, and it is through our freedom that
we accept responsibility for our actions, which in turn determines who we are.134 It
is therefore clear that people are defined only insofar as they act and that they are
responsible for their actions. (2) The proposition that “existence precedes essence”
is a central claim of existentialism, which reverses the traditional philosophical view
that “essence precedes existence”—that is, the essence (the nature) of a thing is
more fundamental and immutable than its existence (the mere fact of its being).135
129 Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/>.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Joseph, Felicity., Reynolds, Jack., & Woodward, Ashley., eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury
Companion to Existentialism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 366.

133 Ibid.
134 “Jean-Paul Sartre”, “New World Encyclopedia”, https://newworldencyclopedia.org.
135 Plato, Timaeus; Aristotle, Metaphysics; St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Pars 3:1,
Summa Theologiae, Pars 1:1, etc. Analysis of “existence before essence” in Etienne Gilson, The
To claim that existence precedes essence is to assert that there is no such predeter-
mined essence to be found in humans, and that an individual’s essence is defined by
the individual through how that individual creates and lives his or her life. As Sartre
puts it in his lecture given in 1945—namely, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,”136
“What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man
first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself
afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin
with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he
makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have
a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself
to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as
he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which
he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.”137 According to
Sartre, if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before
its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That
being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. For we mean to say that man
primarily exists—that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards
a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a
subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before
that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man
will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be.138
Second, while they are opposed to all forms of determinism, existentialists tend to
espouse the theory of radical freedom. To put it another way, for the existentialist the
concept of freedom tends to be established on the basis of arguments against deter-
minism.139 Sartre’s views on freedom can be briefly summarized as follows. (1) Man
is entitled to complete freedom forever. Human beings are born to be free even when
they do not want to. They cannot but be free. They are unavoidably free. For Sartre,
freedom is the fundamental, necessary and inalienable possession of every conscious
human being, every being-for-itself.140 Human beings are in Sartre’s phrase “thrown”
into freedom, they spend much of lives devising strategies for denying or evading the
anguish of freedom, but this flight from freedom is shown to fail, according to Sartre,
Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Introduction. See “Existence precedes essence” in
“en.m.wikipedia.org”.
136 The lecture was delivered on Monday, October 29, 1945, although not published until 1946. An
English translation by Carol Macomber, with an introduction by the sociologist Annie Cohen-Solal
and notes and preface by Arlette EIkaïm-Sartre, was published under the title Existentialism Is a
Humanism in 2007.
137 Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York: New American
Library, 1975.
138 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

ntialism/>.
140 Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group,
p. 85.
in the experience of anguish.141 Freedom is an ontological necessity for every man

or woman and any attempt to escape from freedom is impossible.142 Man is freedom,
which is to say, human existence is at one with human freedom and there is little or no
difference between them. Existentialists tend to take man’s existence as well as his
freedom as the thing-in-itself of human life or the essence of man; in other words,
when it comes to what is essential to a human being, there are no other essential
properties except man’s free existence. Man is condemned to be free—or, to put it
another way, man is completely free forever. Otherwise, man cannot exist. Further-
more, freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made to be at the heart of man,
and which forces human reality to make itself. This is so because freedom is iden-
tical with man’s existence. This means that no limit to man’s freedom can be found
except freedom itself. Man therefore originates and develops himself in freedom
such that nothing determines his action and nothing causes or sustains him except
his freedom. He automatically becomes the author and architect of himself. Thus,
man radically becomes free from determinism, and hence free from any antecedently
fixed standard. He is not controlled by any force outside of himself. As Sartre puts
it that man is condemned to freedom, a situation he cannot run away from. We are
all condemned to be free, which means that there is no limit to our freedom, in fact,
we are not free, not to be free, we are not free to cease to be free.143 For Sartre,
man is condemned to be free, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless
at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible
for everything he does.144 Here what Sartre means by “freedom” is the freedom of
human choice as well as the freedom of human will, rather than the freedom we can
become. In discussing freedom, Sartre argues that the formula “to be free” does not
mean “to obtain what one has wished,” but rather the ability to determine what one
wishes, that is, in making a choice. Hence, freedom is tied to choice, and choice is
the concrete actualization of freedom. To be free is to be compelled to make a choice.
We cannot avoid choosing because a refusal to choose is itself a choice. Freedom is
therefore the freedom of choosing and not the freedom of not choosing because not to
choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose. For Sartre therefore, our freedom consists
in the fact that we must choose what it means to exist and how we will continue to
exist at every moment.145 (2) The proposition that existence precedes essence is a
central claim of existentialism, which presupposes human freedom. For Sartre, it is
ntialism/>.
142 Rev Fr. Francis lyke Agada MSP, ed. “Chapter Three—The Autonomy of Human Reason” in
God and Human Freedom: A Philosophico-Theological Enquiry into the Nature of Human Free
Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2015.
143 Ibid.
144 Kaufmann, Walter., ed. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York, NY: New American
Library, 1975.
Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, US-IN: AuthorHouse, 2015.
true that existence precedes essence precisely because man is born free, free without
preordination or predetermination. There are no objective laws, or objective values,
or objective standards in the world as well as in man’s life. Rather, everything is
free and possible, and everything depends on personal choices made by individuals.
Moreover, only the theory of existentialism can make man possess and maintain
human dignity. (3) Man must assume responsibility for his behavioral choice. Sartre
holds that human beings are not only given the ability to make free choices, which
can be understood as manifestation of their free will, but they must take responsibility
for what they are and do. In discussing freedom, Sartre argues that freedom is tied to
choice and that choice is the concrete actualization of freedom. For Sartre therefore,
our freedom consists in the fact that we must choose what it means to exist and how
we will continue to exist at every moment.146 Man must bear responsibility for his
free choices—or, to put it another way, people can affirm that they are free by contin-
ually striving to take responsibility for their choices.147 The reason why man tries to
escape from freedom is because he wants to evade responsibility. For Sartre, human
freedom is accompanied by a heavy and inescapable responsibility and a disturbing
anguish, for “to be free” is the same thing as “to be responsible” because they are
intertwined. This implies that responsibility of our action and facticity of our freedom
is the essence of our being. In his existential psychoanalysis theory, Sartre asserts the
inescapable responsibility of all individuals for their own decisions.148 (4) Sartre’s
claim in No Exit that “Hell is other people” is a conditional claim, not a categorical
one.149 Sartre believes that the absolute freedom of the individual inevitably brings
about diametrically opposite relationships between people. According to Sartre, from
the moment that we exist we establish a factual limit—in terms of our desires—to
the other’s freedom. And the Other’s freedom does, likewise, set an actual limit to
our own freedom. Therefore, the Other’s freedom forms the object, that is, limit of
our desires or projects.150 Sartre argues that from the moment that I exist I establish a
factual limit to the Other’s freedom. I am this limit, and each of my projects traces the
outline of this limit around the Other.151 We always perform our actions in a world
of others where one’s existence in relation to the Other’s may appear so redundant,
superfluous and unnecessary. Thus, says Sartre, to claim “respect for the Other’s
freedom is an empty word; even if we would assume the project of respecting this
146 Ibid.
147 Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London, UK: Continuum International Publishing
Group, p. 85.
Will and the Problem of Evil in the World. Bloomington, US-IN: AuthorHouse, 2015.
149 Benko, Steven A., & Pavelich, Andrew., eds. “Is Hell Other People?” In The Good Place and
Philosophy. Chicago, US-IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 2020.

150 Kariuki, Joseph., & Utz, Arthur Fridolin. (1981). The Possibility of Universal Moral Judgement
in Existential Ethics: A Critical Analysis of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience According to

Jean-Paul Sartre. Lang, p. 311.
151 Merkel, Bernard. The Concept of Freedom and the Development of Sartre’s Early Political
Thought. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.

freedom, each attitude which we adopted to the Other would be a violation of that
freedom which we claimed to respect.” Once I exist, I must affect other people and,
by the same reasoning, if I choose to terminate my existence I will still inevitably
be affecting other people. In this way, Sartre argues that finally I must “force” the
Other to be free.152 Sartre also believed that each person is only absolutely free when
he is opposing other people. For Sartre, the unending struggle between lovers for
recognition or within loving relationships turns love into perpetual conflict. Conflict
is thus the inevitable basis of the love relationship. It is primarily for this reason that
Sartre concludes that love is always doomed to failure.
Apart from being commonly considered the father of Existentialist philosophy,
whose indefatigable pursuit of philosophical reflection gained him worldwide renown
and whose writings set the tone for intellectual life in the decade immediately
following the Second World War,153 Paul Sartre also ranks as the most versatile
writer who turned to playwriting and eventually produced a series of theatrical
successes which are essentially dramatizations of his existentialist ideas.154 Sartre’s
own ideas were and are better known through his fictional works (such as Nausea
and No Exit) than through his more purely philosophical ones (such as Being and
Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason).155 He who had a deeper knowl-
edge of Marxism put forward many enlightening theories and thought-provoking
viewpoints concerning Marxist theory. Sartre seemed to think that existentialism
and Marxism were not contradictory philosophies. The incompatibility, or apparent
incompatibility, concerns freedom. Existentialism is a theory that above all main-
tains that human is inalienable, whereas, according to many Marxists of Sartre’s
time, Marxism is a deterministic theory of human history at the centre of which
is the notion of dialectical materialism. What Sartre does not agree with is what
some Marxists have seen as the main implication of Marx’s theory, namely, that it
is deterministic and that there is no place in it for human freedom. Sartre’s reading
of Marx is that his theory of dialectical materialism gives an all-important role to
human consciousness and, by implication, human freedom because freedom is an
essential characteristic of consciousness. Sartre argues that it is a misreading of Marx
to suppose that his materialism is a reductionist theory that proposes the development
of matter by matter with human being nothing more than a material product of the
process. Sartre treats “dialectical materialism,” with its reductionist connotations, as
a corrupted term, preferring instead the term “historical materialism” which reflects
more accurately the materialism Marx actually proposed. So, Sartre begins to synthe-
size existentialism and Marxism by arguing that it is a misunderstanding of Marxism
to view it as utterly materialistic and deterministic, as fundamentally opposed to
152 Ibid.
153 Flynn, Thomas, “Jean-Paul Sartre”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/>.
154 “Jean Paul Sartre.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Aug. 2020 <https://
www.encyclopedia.com>.

ntialism/>.
any theory of human freedom, individuality or even consciousness. Sartre goes on

to argue that Marxism can accommodate the existentialist view of human freedom
and indeed must do so if it is to make sense. Sartre argues that Marxism is not
only a theory of history that requires a notion of human consciousness and there-
fore freedom, Marxism is “history itself become conscious of itself.” In the Critique
of Dialectical Reason Sartre recognizes far more than he does in Being and Noth-
ingness that a person, a whole social class of people, can be without freedom in
any real practical sense as a result of political and economic oppression. A person’s
existential freedom remains inalienable, he cannot not choose, but his freedom does
not amount to much if his only choice is, for example, to endure drudgery and
exploitation in a factory for a subsistence wage or to die. This view is, in a sense, a
development rather than a departure from views expressed in Being and Nothingness
in so far as Sartre recognizes in that work that the most serious threat to a person’s
freedom is the freedom of the Other. Just as one person can transcend another and
reduce him to an object, to a transcendence-transcended, so one social class can,
through economic and social exploitation, transcend another social class and reduce
its members to objects. In this way the Sartre of the Critique develops his theory of
being-for-others, a central plank of existentialism, into a Marxist theory of man’s
alienation by man. Sartre is fully prepared to place existentialism at the service of
Marxism in this way. He identifies Marxism as the dominant philosophy of the age
and existentialism as a subordinate theory the purpose of which is to function within
Marxism positively influencing its future development towards the realization of a
classless, harmonious society. Such a society, according to Sartre, is possible but
not inevitable.156 Sartre remained committed to the value of freedom as self-making
throughout his life. This commitment led Sartre to hold that existentialism itself was
only an “ideological” moment within Marxism, which he termed “the one philos-
ophy of our time which we cannot go beyond”. As this statement suggests, Sartre’s
embrace of Marxism was a function of his sense of history as the factic situation
in which the project of self-making takes place. Because existing is self-making
(action), philosophy—including existential philosophy—cannot be understood as a
disinterested theorizing about timeless essences but is always a form of engagement,
a diagnosis of the past and a projection of norms appropriate to a different future
in light of which the present takes on significance. It therefore always arises from
the historical-political situation and is a way of intervening in it. Marxism, like exis-
tentialism, makes this necessarily practical orientation of philosophy explicit. Sartre
holds that a philosophy of self-making could not content itself with highlighting the
situation of individual choice; an authentic political identity could only emerge from
a theory that situated such choice in a practically oriented analysis of its concrete
situation. Thus it appeared to him that the “ideology of existence” was itself merely
an alienated form of the deeper analysis of social and historical reality provided by
Marx’s dialectical approach. Marxism is unsurpassable, therefore, because it is the
156 Cox, Gary. (2008). The Sartre Dictionary. London: Continuum International Publishing Group,
pp. 53–56.
most lucid theory of our alienated situation of concrete unfreedom, oriented toward
the practical-political overcoming of that unfreedom.157
(2) A Critical Analysis of Sartre’s Existentialism
First, Sartre made a substantial contribution of permanent value to the development
of existential thought as well as of existential theory. (1) Sartre’s existentialism filled
the value vacuum created by “purely technical philosophy” in Europe and America.
Logical empiricism, which flourished in Europe and America in the twentieth century,
gradually evolved into “purely technical philosophies” such as analytic philosophy,
philosophy of language and logical positivism. More specifically, logical empiricism
is a philosophic movement rather than a set of doctrines, and it flourished in the
1920s and 30s in several centers in Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the United
States. Logical empiricism probably never commanded the assent of the majority of
philosophers in either Europe or America, and by 1970 the movement was pretty
clearly over—though with lasting influence whether recognized or not. According
to logical empiricism, or logical positivism, the question about man’s outlook on life
has traditionally been dismissed as unimportant in philosophy. Logical empiricists
(or logical positivists) also refused to explore the origin of the world as well as the
ultimate value and meaning of human life, and this created a “value vacuum” in
the realm of ideas, beliefs and values as well as the realm of theory. It is Sartre’s
existentialism that filled the value vacuum created by “purely technical philosophy”
in either Europe or America. (2) In his existential philosophy Sartre affirms and
advocates man’s subjective initiative. “Man is free,” he wrote. “The coward makes
himself cowardly. The hero makes himself heroic.” For Sartre, man’s subjective
spirit as well as his subjective initiative, which is entitled to high praise, cannot fail
to produce a positive and material effect upon man’s practical activities as well as
his mental activities. While stimulating them to embrace their careers and strive for
further progress, Sartre’s existentialism impels people to throw off spiritual shackles
and emancipate the mind.
Second, there are unquestionably deficiencies or problems in Sartre’s existential
philosophy. (1) Sartre’s existential theory is of an illusory nature. Sartre is an advocate
of absolute freedom, but the idea of absolute freedom he advocates is impossible to
put into practice. An absolute freedom exists nowhere. It is truly astonishing to
find a man like Sartre, who seeks to give us in his phenomenological approach a
strictly objective view of what appears in reality, managing nevertheless to build up
a conception of freedom which is so thoroughly unrealistic.158 We can only declare
this unlimited “absolute freedom” to be a mere illusion, because Sartre fails to justify
his interpretation of “absolute freedom” as something which would be compatible
with the existence of restrictions and limitations. Human existence cannot be divorced
from restrictions or limitations, but rather it could be hedged around with all kinds of
ntialism/>.
158 Detmer, David.(2013). Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre.
La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing, pp. 84–85.

constraints or all sorts of conditions. Hence human freedom can only depend on how
man understands or grasps the conditions which surround him. The more he knows
of the conditions which surround him, the freer he becomes, and vice versa. Whoever
fails to know of the conditions which surround him will find himself in the midst of
insurmountable difficulties in enjoying freedom. As Sartre puts it, “being situated”
is an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom. Man cannot retain absolute
freedom because freedom can exist only as restricted—or, to put it another way,
freedom always operates within a context in which some things are possible, others
are impossible, and still others are merely more or less difficult.159 It is therefore
clear that advocating absolute freedom can only be reduced to a mere slogan. Sartre’s
existentialism flourished in Europe and America in the 1950s and 60s and then was
on the wane in the 70s and 80s. In theory, its decline may be related to the illusory
nature of Sartre’s existentialism. (2) Immorality. There are internal contradictions
inherent in Sartre’s existential philosophy. First, if man retains absolute freedom, it
must of necessity follow that he has the freedom to choose “the good” or “the evil”
and that morality will not exist. Second, if a person has absolute freedom, it must
of necessity follow that more people will be denied freedom. If all have absolute
freedom, it must of necessity follow that all will be denied freedom. Such a world
cannot exist. Anyone endowed with reason and conscience cannot advocate the so-
called absolute freedom. Third, in terms of the specific relationship between one
individual and every other individual, if each one insists upon enjoying absolute
freedom, it must of necessity follow that immorality will exist among them, that is,
“Hell is—other people.” As Sartre describes it in his play No Exit, three damned souls
are locked up together for eternity in one hideous room in hell. Ironically, the torture
is not of rack and fire, but of the burning humiliation of each soul as if it is stripped
of its pretenses by the curious souls of the damned. As one of the characters, Garcin,
says, “So this is hell. I’d never have believed it. You remember all we were told about
the torture chambers, the fire and brimstone, the ‘burning marl.’ Old wives’ tales!
There’s no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is other people!”160 Thus it can be seen
that while Sartre insists, with all the emphasis at his command, that the individual
should enjoy absolute freedom, his emphasis upon human freedom of choice and
moral responsibility for it has become nothing but empty talk.
8.2 A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism
As an intellectual movement, structuralism refers to one of the dominant trends

in modern philosophy that gives primacy to the structuralist methodology appli-
cable to a wide range of disciplines. Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, is
universally recognized as one of the founders of twentieth century structuralism.
159 Ibid., p. 84.

160 Bernasconi, Robert. ‘Hell Is Other People.’ In How To Read Sartre. Granta Books.
Although not its originator, the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is gener-
ally considered the most notable exponent of the movement and he is arguably
the first such scholar sparking a widespread interest in structuralism. Along with
Lévi-Strauss, other prominent structuralists associated with structuralism include the
linguist Roman Jakobson, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the Marxist philoso-
pher Louis Althusser. Probably the most distinctive feature of the structuralist method
is the emphasis it gives to wholes or totalities and the logical priority of the whole
over its parts. Structuralists maintain that it is the relationship of parts to each other
and to the whole that is important. They insist that the whole and the parts can be
properly explained only in terms of the relations that exist between the parts. Thus
a structuralist approach focuses on the relationship of individual parts to the larger
whole—the structure, which means what an internal analysis of a given whole reveals,
viz, elements, relationships among elements, and the arrangement or system of these
relations. Hence, structuralism might be defined as follows: The whole is more than
the parts, and cannot be reduced to the parts. What is important is the relationship
between the parts. It is also worth noting that structuralists claim that to understand
the surface structure, one has to understand the deep structure and the ways in which it
influences the surface structure. According to structuralists, there is a deep underlying
structure to most surface phenomena, and this structure can be conceptualized as a
series of generative rules that can create a wide variety of empirical phenomena.161
Lévi-Strauss’ work struck a chord in French left-wing culture in the early 1960s as the
expression of a philosophy that shared much of the inspiration of the then dominant
philosophies of phenomenology and existentialism, while avoiding what had come
to be seen as the insoluble problems of the latter. Many of the pioneers of the struc-
turalist movement, such as Lacan, Foucault, and Poulantzas, came to structuralism
from phenomenology or existentialism and created new variants of structuralism that
sought to integrate structuralism with phenomenology. Many followers of the struc-
turalist movement brought to structuralism the fervor and missionary zeal with which
the previous generation had embraced phenomenology and existentialism. The ease
and speed with which so many intellectuals made the transition from phenomenology
to structuralism should warn us against the common belief, held by the proponents
of one or the other doctrine, that the two movements are absolutely opposed to one
another, a belief that is apparently validated by the antithetical terms in which the
debate between the two is conducted. There is no doubt that between structuralism
and existentialism, in particular, there is an unbridgeable gulf, expressed in the by-
now standard oppositions of structure to history, object to subject, unconscious to
conscious, determinacy to free will, immanence to transcendence. However, this
unbridgeable gulf is not a gulf between two absolutely antithetical philosophies, but
is one between philosophies that offer complementary, but divergent, solutions to a
common set of problems. Although the structuralist movement emerged in reaction
to existentialism, and came to prominence two decades after the heyday of exis-
tentialism, the two philosophies have a common origin in the inter-war intellectual
161Turner, Jonathan H. (2012). Theoretical Sociology: 1830 to the Present. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE
crisis in France. It is these common problems, to which Sartre and Lévi-Strauss

offered antithetical solutions, that provide the common foundation of structuralism
and existentialism, and it is the shared origin that explains the ease with which a
new generation of intellectuals could move from one to the other, or could propose
a synthesis of the two.162
(1) The Substance of Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralist Theory
Claude Lévi-Strauss, one of the leading figures in structuralism, was an eminent
French anthropologist whose work was key in the development of the theory of
structuralism and structural anthropology. In 1959 he was appointed to the chair of
social anthropology at the College de France. In 1967 he was awarded the Gold Medal
of the French National Centre for Scientific Research (French: Centre national de
la recherché scientifique, CNRS).163 In 1973 he was elected to the French Academy
of Sciences in recognition of his distinguished achievements in anthropological
research. In 1974 he received the accolade of election to the Académie Française. The
widespread impact of Lévi-Strauss’ thought can be felt in academic circles around
the world. His influence has been significant not only throughout the social sciences,
but also in philosophy, religion, and literature.
Three main sources for Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism can be identified. One must
recognize the structuralist ideas developed in modern linguistics, cultural anthro-
pology and modern anthropology reaching a synthesis in structuralism. De Saussure’s
structural linguistics, Franz Boas’ structural anthropology and Sigmund Freud’s
psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious exerted an important influence upon the
development of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism. It was Lévi-Strauss who stated that
“ethnology is first of all psychology.” The basic ideas of Lévi-Strauss’ structural
anthropology can be summarized as follows.
First, structuralism is above all a method, that is to say a structural method.
(1) Lévi-Strauss tried to use the structural method to prove the scientificness of
anthropology. In the days when Lévi-Strauss engaged in anthropological research,
the social sciences encountered considerable criticism from natural scientists on
their “scientificness.” Lévi-Strauss believed that we must begin with an in-depth
analysis of the structure of internal relationships in the society in order to prove the
scientificness of anthropology. For him, the concept of “structure” characterized by
abstraction and universality has the function of making anthropology scientific on
the model of a natural science. (2) By “structure” Lévi-Strauss means a structural
method or a structuralist approach applicable to a wide range of disciplines. For Lévi-
Strauss, the term “structure” indicates a method in the methodological sense, namely
certain patterns of structuralist methodology. Lévi-Strauss argues that structure has
nothing to do with empirical entities. According to Lévi-Strauss, structure does not
162 Clarke, Simon.(1981). The Foundations of Structuralism: A Critique of Lévi-Strauss and the
Structuralist Movement. Brighton, GB-ESX: The Harvester Press, pp. 7–9.
163 The CNRS was ranked No. 3 in 2015 and No. 4 in 2017 by the Nature Index, which measures
the largest contributors to papers published in 82 leading journals. “Ten institutions that dominated
science in 2015”. Retrieved 12 October 2020. “10 institutions that dominated science in 2017”.
Retrieved 12 October 2020. “Introduction to the Nature Index”. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
refer to an empirical reality but to a structural method—or, to put it another way, the
term “structure” indicates modes of thought or methodological patterns constructed
on the foundation of that reality. For him, “the term ‘social structure’ has nothing to
do with empirical reality but with models which are built after it.”164 One may agree
with Lévi-Strauss’ categorical distinction between the concepts of social structure
and social relation. In his view, social relations consist of the raw materials out of
which the models making up the social structure are built, while social structure
can be conceived of as the models built out of social relations. Therefore, “social
structure cannot claim a field of its own among others in social studies. It is rather a
method to be applied to any kind of social studies, similar to the structural analysis
current in other disciplines.”165 In addition, according to him, structure, which can be
viewed as a kind of methodological pattern, must also meet the following standards.
In other words, he believed that structure is endowed with three characteristics. First,
structure should be treated as a complete whole, in which various elements condition
(restrain) each other closely, with none of them subjected to change independent
of others. Second, if certain elements of the structure are subjected to changes, the
structure will no longer exist. Third, the implication in the term “structure” indicates
that all the observable facts can be understood directly. Lévi-Strauss asserts that
only a structuralist approach to anthropology can make it a scientific discipline. (3)
Structuralism could be described as a systematic approach universally applicable
to a wide range of disciplines. Lévi-Strauss’ major work has been devoted to the
development of a systematic, universal method, and this same systematic method
could be applied to anthropology as well as to other disciplines. For him, this method
can be treated as a structural method. According to Lévi-Strauss’ structural method,
any set of phenomena empirically observable in human society should be treated not
as a mechanical agglomeration but as a systematic or structural whole. In addition,
this structural method can also be used to explain the relations among the elements
of a system and the relationships among various systems, as well as among different
fields of research. Academic research should break down the absolute boundaries
between phenomena and reduce every phenomenon whatsoever to its systematic
whole. (4) Structuralism firmly rejects the idea of the human subject as well as of the
subjective choices of individuals. Structuralism replaces the ontologically privileged
human subject with a decentred conception of the self. At the height of the popularity
of structuralism, it was common to talk of the death of the subject—the demise of the
idea of individuals acting and choosing voluntarily.166 Lévi-Strauss laid emphasis
on the function of objective structures, but he bestowed little attention on the role of
human agency, that is to say man’s subjective initiative. For him, all human social
phenomena as well as human beings’ statements and actions, which are governed
by the universal structures, can only be treated as their manifestations, and they
164 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China:

165 Ibid., p. 300.
166 Gordon Marshall. “structuralism.” A Dictionary of Sociology. Encyclopedia.com. 16 Oct. 2020
<https://www.encyclopedia.com>.
never change the structures. Hence, the subject of society as well as of history is
the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be ruthlessly melted in
such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness. He even
declared the position on “melting man,” asserting that “such a detestable favorite as
the subject (man) must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled over the
philosophical territory for too long.”
Second, structuralism views the binary opposition as the key to understanding
structural relationships among elements—or, to put it another way, the idea of binary
oppositions is central to structuralist thought. For Lévi-Strauss all relations can be
ultimately reducible to binary oppositions. The structuralist method, then, is a means
whereby social reality may be expressed as binary oppositions. The main contents
contained in this method can be summarized as follows: (1) Structures are charac-
terized by relations, which for Lévi-Strauss can be all ultimately reducible to binary
oppositions. According to Lévi-Strauss, all structural relations can be reduced to
binary oppositions, which will be a basis for the attribution of social value to each
element—or, to put it another way, this may serve to fix the social value of each
element. This method tends to lay emphasis upon their wholes or totalities when
it is used to describe and understand social phenomena. Hence the great advantage
of the structuralist method lies in the fact that it allows us to apprehend a social
phenomenon as a whole embracing the totality of its parts, since each of its compo-
nents has its value in terms of its relation to the totality. Indeed, the relations that
are most important in structural analysis are binary oppositions. Whatever else the
structuralist method may have done, it has undoubtedly encouraged structuralists
to think in binary terms, to look for binary oppositions in whatever phenomenon
they are studying whereby they can discern underlying structures behind the often
fluctuating and changing appearances of social reality. The principle of this method
lies in the fact that the structuralist method is used primarily to study the network
of relations connecting interdependent elements, rather than the elements within a
given whole. For Lévi-Strauss, a preliminary understanding of structural relation-
ships among elements of a structure can help us to explain the relation between the
whole and its parts. (2) Lévi-Strauss held binary oppositions to operate based on the
structures of the human brain—or, to put it another way, binary oppositions were part
of the structures of the human brain. He argued that the basis of the world is neither
the mode of production nor the absolute spirit, but rather the human subconscious,
that is, the subconscious layer of the human mind. The subconscious can be regarded
as the ultimate source of all human action—or, to put it another way, the realm of the
subconscious lies behind all human behavior. Since the nervous system of the human
brain (the subconscious) is endowed with a binary mental structure, which is to say
the essence of human thinking is the structure of binary oppositions, the way that
human beings attempt to describe separate or discontinuous things tends to be charac-
terized by a binary opposition. The universe is a continuum, but human beings study
(look at or think about) it only by dividing it into discontinuous parts (segments) due
to the limitations of human thinking. In knowing the universe, human beings tend
to divide the discontinuous parts (segments) into categories so as to bring order to
the universe. In view of the fact that the mental structures (the subconscious) which
underlie human behavior usually take the form of binary oppositions, human beings
tend to describe, interpret and make sense of the world in terms of binary oppositions.
(3) There are limitations inherent in binary thinking. For Lévi-Strauss, this kind of
binary thinking is far from the best possible one. Rather, it asserts itself as interme-
diate between primitive and modern thought as it actually exists. He tried to make
us recognize the limitations inherent in binary thinking by pointing out that human
beings are endowed with mental structures, the constitution of which is simple and
incomplete compared with the structure of the objective world. A “binary opposition”
is intrinsic to the primitive or ancient mind, and this kind of binary thinking continues
to this day. On the one hand, this kind of mental structure can be used to know the
world-parts and explain survival phenomena, but on the other, there are many limi-
tations inherent in it. Although he affirmed that classification (categorization) is of
great significance to human rational thinking and understanding of the world, Lévi-
Strauss also sensed a deep concern over potential outcomes of this innate tendency
to categorize (classify) natural objects that human thinking is endowed with. It is
mankind’s classification (categorization) consciousness that divides human beings
into “ourselves” and “people of a different kind (people not belonging to the same
category),” that segments ethnic groups into “superior” and “inferior” ones, and that
may cause contradictions between people of different nationalities, ethnic discrim-
inations, and divisions in society, as well as national conflicts and wars, which had
been repeatedly inflicted upon human societies in the history of mankind. In addition,
classification consciousness may constitute a barrier to human knowledge in such a
way that human beings may find themselves amidst insurmountable difficulties in
viewing things in their totality as well as in obtaining a deeper understanding of the
physical world and human behavior.
Third, Lévi-Strauss’ application of structural methods can be perceived most
clearly in his Structural Anthropology (1958). He applied structural analysis to the
study of kinship, myth and primitive thought, which has proved of great value to the
development of anthropology. (1) The elementary structures of kinship. For Lévi-
Strauss, there are two serious limitations to traditional kinship studies. First, the
traditional analysis of kinship systems merely involves a treatment of the units of
kinship as independent entities, whereas a structural analysis of kinship systems
involves a treatment of the units of kinship not as independent entities but as related
entities, and an overall focus on the concept of a system which bears structure. For
him, kinship systems constitute coherent and patterned wholes, and are subject to
structural analysis. Lévi-Strauss argues that kinship must be treated as one relation-
ship within a system, while the system itself must be considered as a whole in order to
grasp its structure.167 Second, perhaps the weakest point in traditional kinship studies
has been the failure to treat kinship as a system which bears structure. One area that
particularly needs emphasis in traditional kinship studies is the historical develop-
ment of the kinship system. Lévi-Strauss’ application of structural methods can be
perceived most clearly in his brilliant analysis of kinship systems. According to him,
167Witherspoon, Gary. (1975). Navajo Kinship and Marriage. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, p. 12.
“the recurrence of kinship patterns, marriage rules, similarly prescribed attitudes

between certain types of relations, and so forth, in scattered regions of the globe and
in fundamentally different societies, leads us to believe, that in the case of kinship as
well as language, the observable phenomena result from the action of laws which are
general but implicit.”168 In his seminal work The Elementary Structures of Kinship
Claude Lévi-Strauss identified the kinship structure as the underlying principle of
social life. He holds that societies exist with binary distinctions like patrilineal-
matrilineal, kin non-kin etc. and that binary oppositions or opposites are cardinal to
his analysis and explanation of kinship structures. In applying binary opposition to
the study of kinship structures in human societies, Lévi-Strauss tried to show that
kinship systems could be summarized in terms of five binary oppositions. He argues
that kinship relations may ultimately be divided into two groups, which each repre-
sents two generations. One group describes blood relations—brother, sister, father,
and son; the other describes ties established by marriage—maternal uncle, nephew,
husband, and wife.169 (2) The structural study of myth. For the first half of the twen-
tieth century anthropologists and mythologists mainly went their separate ways, the
anthropologists adhering to some version of myth-ritualism and functionalism and the
mythologists proceeding on the assumption that myths could be studied as literature,
narrative, or historical text. Dissatisfied with any interpretation of myth mentioned
above, Claude Lévi-Strauss changed all of that. Lévi-Strauss’s principal innovation
in the analysis and explanation of myth is referred to as structuralism. His inspiration
derived from linguistics, specifically from the so-called Prague school and the work
of Roman Jacobson in particular. The point of his analysis was to reveal the struc-
ture of myth.170 Shortly after his monumental work –The Elementary Structures of
Kinship appeared in 1949, Lévi-Strauss shifted the focus of his research away from
kinship studies to the structural study of myth. He asserted that just as the human
mind is dominated by structure in the realm of myth, which is in some sense separate
from everyday life, so it will necessarily be dominated by structure in the manifold
spheres of human activity. He pointed out that there are a myriad of myths around
the world, with plots and themes similar to each other. He emphasized the presence
of the same logical patterns in myths throughout the world. Myth is the initial or
ancient form which the structure of human mind takes to manifest itself, as well as
the primitive form which primitive human beings assume to express their primitive
mentalities—or, to put it another way, myth tends to be viewed as a direct and undis-
guised expression of man’s inner thoughts as well as their connections to each other,
that is, the structure of human mind. For Lévi-Strauss, myth represents the collective
dream of humanity (mankind) in the earliest days of civilization (in his infancy), or
rather, the dream manifestations of the collective unconscious. He even believed that
168 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China:
169 Wheater, Kitty. (2017). An Analysis of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology. London,
UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 30.

170 Winzeler, Robert L. (2008). Anthropology and Religion: What We Know, Think, and Question.
Plymouth, UK: Altamira Press, p. 126.

the creation of myths by primitive people was aimed at transmitting information, that
just as the powerful and resounding notes of a symphony strike the sensitive, respon-
sive and sympathetic chord in the heart of the listener, so repeated transmission of
information will produce almost the same impression upon the mind of the receiver,
and that just as an orchestra has to read the music score repeatedly before it sets
about playing a symphony, so a reader will have to ponder over the myth before he
can succeed in grasping its implications. According to Lévi-Strauss, meaning resides
in the combination of elements—or “mythemes”—and in the relations that can be
drawn, by the structuralist reader, between them. Lévi-Strauss, then, fabricates an
analogy between language, myth and music as a means of re-imagining Saussure’s
distinction between the syntagmatic-diachronic and paradigmatic-synchronic dimen-
sions of language: “By getting at what we call harmony, we would then see that an
orchestra score, to be meaningful, must be read diachronically along one axis—
that is, page after page, from left to right—and synchronically along the other axis,
all the notes written vertically making up one gross constituent unit, that is, one
bundle of relations.” We find the juxtaposition of myth and music repeated in the
essay “The Story of Asdiwal”, where Lévi-Strauss distinguishes between the narra-
tive or syntagmatic-diachronic sequence of events, or “the chronological order in
which things happen”, and various paradigmatic-synchronic levels arranged verti-
cally across which the happenings that the myth recounts, take place. Whereas the
former is compared to melody, which proceeds along the syntagmatic-diachronic
axis, the latter is compared to “contrapuntal schemata which are vertical,” again
insinuating that the practice of reading (Western) music provides a model for reading
myths, in that it is a process that must proceed both horizontally from page to page
and vertically from stave to stave at the same time. Lévi-Strauss clarifies the analogy
between language, myth and music further in Myth and Meaning: “Therefore, we
have to read the myth more or less as we would read an orchestral score, not stave
after stave, but understanding that we should apprehend the whole page and under-
standing that something which was written on the first stave at the top of the page
acquires meaning only if one considers that it is part and parcel of what is written
below on the second stave, the third stave, and so on. That is, we have to read not
only from left to right, but at the same time vertically, from top to bottom. We have
to understand that each page is a totality. And it is only by treating the myth as if
it were an orchestral score, written stave after stave, that we can understand it as a
totality, that we can extract the meaning out of the myth.”171 (3) The structure of
primitive thought. Lévi-Strauss insists on fundamental similarities between primitive
and modern thinking—or, to put it another way, he argues that there is no essential
difference between primitive and modern thinking. Lévi-Strauss believed that primi-
tive people’s nature taxonomy, that is, classification of natural objects, which belongs
in a scientific category, is as practical as modern science. According to Lévi-Strauss,
the thought we call primitive, that is the primitive thought, is founded on a demand
for order—or, to put it another way, this “demand for order” underlies much primitive
171
Tremlett, Paul-François. (2014). Lévi-Strauss on Religion: The Structuring Mind. New York,
NY: Routledge, pp. 58–59.
thought. This “demand for order” forms the basis for both primitive and scientific
thought. All human thought shares this fundamental “demand for order.” This is
equally true of all thought but it is through the properties common to all thought that
we can most easily begin to understand forms of thought which seem very strange
to us.172 Lévi-Strauss postulates two distinct modes of scientific thought and writes,
“These are certainly not a function of different stages of development of the human
mind, but rather of two strategic levels at which nature is accessible to scientific
enquiry: one roughly adapted to that of perception and imagination; the other at a
remove from it.”173 “It is therefore better, instead of contrasting magic and science,
to compare them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge, which, on the one
hand, require the same sort of mental operations, and on the other, differ not so
much in kind as in the different types of phenomena to which they are applied.”174
Lévi-Strauss attacked the traditional dichotomy of primitive and modern thought. It
must be admitted that his binary analysis reveals no evidence that primary thought
differs from modern thought. In essence there is hardly any difference between prim-
itive and modern thought. Moreover, Lévi-Strauss’ structural analysis of totemism
is enlightening. His work, Totemism, offers a unique insight into the worship of a
deified object and helps in the understanding of tribal rites.
(2) A Critical Analysis of Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism
First, Lévi-Strauss’ contribution to structuralism. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
structuralism was the dominant Western intellectual movement, whose popularity led
to its spread across the globe. There can be no doubt that Lévi-Strauss is the central
figure in the movement and that his writings have sparked a widespread interest in
structuralism. He has been acclaimed as “the father of structuralism.” The cultural
anthropologist Clifford Geertz remarks, “Lévi-Strauss made anthropology undergo
a rational training. He endowed anthropology with theoretical, rational and philo-
sophical dimensions. He tried to integrate the main global trends in rational thought
into anthropology. He made anthropology break away from handicraft models. ...It is
thanks to Lévi-Strauss that anthropologists are just beginning to wake up to the impor-
tance of thinking, which is indeed unprecedented in anthropological studies.”175 His
substantial contributions to structuralism can be summarized as follows. (1) There
is a renewed emphasis on wholes or totalities in academic circles. Lévi-Strauss’s
structuralism holds that the structure of a thing is a complete whole. His writings,
on the one hand, give emphasis to the closely interdependent relations among the
constituent elements that make up a given whole as well as between the whole and
its parts, and on the other hand demonstrate how the whole and its parts as well
172 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The
Commercial Press, p. 14.
173 Morris, Brian. (1987). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge,

174 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The

175 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1997). Cultural Capital and Social Alchemy. Shanghai, China: Shanghai

as the constituent elements that make up a whole condition or restrain each other.
The basic principle followed by the structuralist approach emphasizing the whole or
the totality is as follows. The whole ought to be analyzed in terms of the structural
relations among its elements rather than the internal elements as entities in them-
selves. To wit, Lévi-Strauss’s structural method focuses on the relationship between
elements of the whole, rather than on elements as entities in themselves. Considering
that after the Renaissance social sciences tended to put more value on analysis than
on synthesis and give primacy to the whole over its parts, to a certain extent, the
structuralist approach, or rather the structural method, which boasts a broad vision,
has brought about an effectual cure for the deep-rooted ills which social sciences
have been suffering from, especially since the wave of scientism launched before
and after World War I prevailed. Structuralist thought, especially in the writings
of Lévi-Strauss, has changed the way scholars in a wide range of disciplines think
about their work, thereby steering their scholastic studies in the right direction. (2)
Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism made anthropologists wake up to the fact that structure
may prove of great importance to anthropological theories—or, to put it another way,
Lévi-Strauss made anthropologists attach more importance to the place occupied by
structure as well as the value possessed by it in anthropological theories. He argued
that we should embrace structure as man’s mode of existence and way of thinking
and that structure can be treated as a universal method applicable to a wide range of
disciplines. In his writings, which demonstrate how structure affects and determines
human life, Lévi-Strauss gave a thought-provoking and enlightening analysis of the
binary structure of human thought. He devoted his life to the study of man’s mode of
thinking—that is, “a binary mental structure” that the nervous system of the human
brain is endowed with. For Lévi-Strauss, on the one hand, innumerable achievements
in the history of mankind should be credited or attributed to the binary structure of
human thought, but on the other, he tried to demonstrate in his writings that the binary
structure of human thought led to oppositions, conflicts, disasters and wars threat-
ening the survival and development of mankind, whereby he made anthropological
circles and social scientists wake up to the importance of structure and entertain a
lively concern for structure. (3) Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism has awakened anthro-
pological circles to conscious rational thought. It has been known since a long time
ago that anthropology gives primacy to field work over theoretical thought and that
anthropologists show contempt for theoretical thought or even declare themselves
dead against it. It must of necessity follow that anthropology has been deficient in
theory over a long period of time. Lévi-Strauss tried to develop a systematic theory
as well as a universal method while applying himself to the study of internal social
relationships with the structural method that he is credited with. He was far from
the attainment of his goal, but the rational spirit in which he pursued his researches
impressed anthropological circles tremendously.
Second, the limitations and problems inherent in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism.
There are manifold limitations and problems inherent in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism.
(1) Lévi-Strauss maintains a negative attitude towards man’s subjectivity. On the one
hand, his structuralist theory lays undue emphasis upon the place of structure as
well as its function, but on the other, man’s subjectivity tends to be dismissed as
unimportant in his writings. For Lévi-Strauss, the subject of society as well as of

history is the a priori structure rather than man. Social beings can but be ruthlessly
melted in such an unconscious structure characterized by objectivity and facelessness.
He even declared the position on “melting man”, asserting that “such a detestable
favorite as the subject (man) must be expelled from structuralism, since it has ruled
over the philosophical territory for too long.”176 According to Lévi-Strauss’s method
of anthropological research, anthropology should neglect and even reject the study
of “man himself”—or, to put it another way, the author’s beliefs and assumptions as
well as the subject’s own personal experience (knowledge) should be removed from
anthropological research. It is therefore clear that Lévi-Strauss’s method of anthropo-
logical research is far from applicable to the study of human beings as well as human
cultures, which asserts itself as the object of anthropological inquiry in its own right.
Culture creates man who in turn is fully entitled to be the maker of culture. If we
disregard the relationship of the dialectical unity between man and culture—or, to put
it another way, if we have man and culture stand in contradiction to each other, use
culture to screen man, repress man or supersede man, and even negate man’s subjec-
tive status as well as his subjective role, there will exist no culture, not to mention
cultural reform and innovation. Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is essentially an ahis-
torical method. Hence it must of necessity follow that when he uses his structuralist
method to explain cultural phenomena, the explanation is completely ahistorical.
Lévi-Strauss contends that history is the product of the unconscious working of the
mind. To put it another way, history can only be described or understood in terms of
the inherent and unconscious structure of the human mind. Lévi-Strauss reveals an
unconscious structure of binary oppositions which can be applied to the interpreta-
tion of all cultural phenomena. However, the invariant structure of the human mind
tends to treat human beings as well as human cultures as fossilized. In other words,
in applying the invariant structure of the human mind to the interpretation of human
beings as well as cultural phenomena, Lévi-Strauss tends to treat them as ahistorical
beings, which is to say they tend to remain the same over or through time. Sartre
objected to Lévi-Strauss’ approach to the study of man on existential grounds. In
his view, structuralism is remote from human existence and even denies its funda-
mental condition—that is, freedom.177 Sartre considers the structuralist approach
to be guilty of transforming men into static, timeless objects, related to things in
the world and to other men in purely formal, objective and timeless ways.178 This
makes the structuralist interpretation of man and culture far from complete. Gener-
ally speaking, structuralism as well as the theories denying man’s subjective initiative
fails to offer a scientific interpretation of man and culture. (2) Lévi-Strauss’s struc-
turalism denies man’s subjective choice. Structuralism, on the one hand, lays undue
176 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (2007). Mythologiques: L’Homme nu (The Naked Man) (Chinese
translation). Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, p. 149.
177 Kurzweil, Edith. (1996). The Age of Structuralism: from Lévi-Strauss to Foucault. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 24.

178 Lévi-Strauss. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China: Shanghai
Translation Publishing House, p. 11.

emphasis on objective structures, but on the other, it tends to treat man’s subjective
initiative and choice as unimportant. For Lévi-Strauss, all social phenomena as well
as human beings’ words and actions, which tend to be determined or governed by the
a priori preexisting structures, can only be treated as their manifestations, but they
never change the universal structures. This runs counter to the very law of human
existence. The human subject that is inherently endowed with structure and choice
is the unity of structure and choice. In the sphere of the human world, as there is
no choice that has nothing to do with structure, so there is no structure that has no
connection with choice. Structure and choice are connected with each other and can
transform to each other—that is, as structure can transform to choice, so choice can
change to structure. As structure determines choice, so choice determines structure.
Lévi-Strauss insists upon the structure that has nothing to do with choice, but in fact
the Lévi-Straussian structure does not exist at all in the human world. (3) Lévi-Strauss
attempts to apply scientific method to the interpretation of man and culture. Lévi-
Strauss nurses a perennial desire to break down barriers between disparate fields of
knowledge, such as natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, which claim
superiority for their respective methodologies, and to apply the methods of struc-
tural linguistics to anthropology. As early as 1964 Claude Lévi-Strauss criticized
the dualism humanities versus sciences arguing that methodological aspects of the
so called “hard sciences” could occur in different disciplines of the humanities as
well as in the social sciences. Only by borrowing from the empirical sciences and
transforming themselves into theoretical equivalents could the humanities achieve
any sort of objective and systematic parity.179 Given that the Lévi-Straussian style
of research has evoked much controversy, we must pronounce a fair judgment on its
merits and demerits. The Lévi-Straussian style of research runs counter to an impor-
tant principle of scientific inquiry—that is, research methods must be appropriate
to specific movements of objects, especially their respective forms of movement.
Specifically, we must not apply the lower forms of movement to the study of the
higher forms of movement. If we apply the lower forms of movement to the study of
the higher forms of movement, it must of necessity follow that we will reach wrong
conclusions. The German philosopher and sociologist Theodor W. Adorno once put
forward an influential argument—that is, the paradigms of natural sciences cannot be
transplanted to the social sciences. Structures, as we have seen, are characterized by
relations, which for Lévi-Strauss are all ultimately reducible to binary oppositions.
The structuralist method, then, is a means whereby social reality may be expressed as
binary oppositions. However, when Lévi-Strauss applies his structuralist method to
the interpretation of anthropological phenomena, some explanations are impressive,
while others are somewhat far-fetched and unconvincing. Perhaps the main problem
lies in the fact that the methods for the study of the lower forms of movement have
been applied to the study of the higher forms of movement. The methods for the
study of the higher forms of movement are a new set of methods represented by
Marx’s materialist dialectics.
179Vlacos, Sophie. (2014). Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination. New York, NY: Bloomsbury
Publishing, Inc., p. 25.
9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure

and Choice” Preparing Certain Theoretical Prerequisites
for Human Studies
The theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and
choice”—can only be established under the guidance of Marxism, or more specif-
ically, in integrating man’s existential experience with theoretical knowledge from
different disciplines such as Chinese and foreign philosophies, philosophical anthro-
pology, anthropology, psychology, and history, particularly in analyzing and criti-
cizing the principle of binary opposition as well as its manifold manifestations that
both structuralists and existentialists loyally maintained in their academic studies.
Hence it can be safely asserted that the theory about the noumenon of human life—
or rather man’s “structure and choice”—is in a better position to make us acquire
a deeper understanding of “the principles of subjective anthropology,” and to make
“the discipline of subjective anthropology” undergo further development. Moreover,
it is also of much importance in preparing certain theoretical prerequisites for human
studies.
First, the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice” attempts a new
interpretation of “the actual whole man.” Over longer periods of time, mankind
has been in the midst of a grave crisis, that is, “knowing thyself.” As American
scholar Calvin O. Schrag points out in his “Philosophical Anthropology in Contem-
porary Thought”: “The representatives of the different disciplines display a common
concernful disquietude about the objectivizing tendencies in the modern world which
threaten humanism and humanity alike. These objectivizing tendencies are seen
as being the result of the conspiring of many factors, but always generally posi-
tioned against the background of an encroaching technocracy and scientism. Pitirim
Sorokin, the American sociologist, finds the greatest threat of ‘sensate culture,’ which
in his view is dominant in the contemporary Western world, to reside in the sacri-
fice of the humanness of man by reducing him to a scientific object. The threat of
depersonalization through objectivization is discernable in virtually every aspect of
man’s contemporary cultural and technological existence.”180 As anyone acquainted
with the literature can testify, we are not alone in this assessment. Already in 1928
Max Scheler, the founder of philosophical anthropology, who had conceived of it as
a fundamental discipline of philosophy and the human sciences, called our attention
to the troubled condition affecting the scientific and philosophical study of man.
“We have a scientific, a philosophical, and a theological anthropology in complete
separation from each other. We do not have a unified idea of man. The increasing
multiplicity of the special sciences, valuable as they are, tends to hide man’s nature
more than reveal it. Man is more a problem to himself at the present time than ever
180Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East

and West 20: 1 (January 1970): 83–89.
9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” … 251
before in all recorded history.”181 Technologism has long since obscured the image of
but any man, and “knowing thyself” has become a 21st-century problem. According
to Marxist theory, the scholarly monograph advances and develops the theory about
the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” and in
so doing seeks to elaborate the categorical system as well as the theoretical and
methodological frames.
Second, the theory about the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s
“structure and choice”—is set to embark upon a new study of human ontology from
a Marxist perspective. The fundamental task before philosophical anthropology is to
provide the ontological basis for the humanities and social sciences connected with
human studies. Max Scheler, who was a pioneering German philosopher known for
his original and substantial contribution to the advancement of philosophical anthro-
pology, rightly contended that philosophical anthropology is a meta-philosophy as
well as a metascience. The Chinese philosopher Liu Fangtong maintained that “only
such an anthropological discipline can reestablish the basis for those sciences that
take man as the object of study.”182 The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer, admit-
tedly approaching the issue from a somewhat different perspective, nonetheless came
to a remarkably similar general conclusion: “Psychology, ethnology, anthropology,
and history have amassed an astoundingly rich and constantly increasing body of
facts. …But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a wealth of thoughts. Unless we
succeed in finding a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this labyrinth, we can have
no real insight into the general character of human culture; we shall remain lost in
a mass of disconnected and disintegrated data which seem to lack all conceptual
unity.”183 No significant progress, however, has been made so far in solving this
problem. Let us take a few examples to serve as an illustration. Philosophy traces
“the assumption on human nature” back to the essence (or nature) of man; ethics, to
man’s morality; psychology, to the human psychology; jurisprudence, to citizens’ (or
civic) rights and obligations before the law. However, their respective assumptions
on human nature cannot be equated with the concrete and whole man, but rather can
only represent different parts of the concrete and whole man. After all, man exists and
acts the way that the concrete and whole man does. Since the turn of the twenty-first
century, the paradox of human existence has been increasingly manifest, and against
this backdrop the incomplete and faulty “assumptions on human nature” will surely
make the humanities and social sciences fall into their respective areas of mistaken
theories. In this very book the author advances and develops the theory about the
noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” and attempts
to make certain assumptions about “the concrete and whole man,” and to provide
the ontological basis for the humanities and social sciences closely connected with
181 Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. (1983). The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condi-
tion: Individualization of Nature and the Human Being. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
Company, p. 77.
182 Liu, Fang-Tong. (2000). Contemporary Western Philosophy (revised ed.). Beijing, China:

183 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 22.
human studies, whereby the humanities and social sciences will be able to conform
to the realities of “the concrete and whole man” in a more scientific, more perfect
and more efficient way.
Third, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “struc-
ture and choice,” rightly asserts itself as a scientific philosophy of life. Generally
speaking, there is a close identity between the theory about the noumenon of human
life and the scientific philosophy of life. How a man thinks reflectively on life tends
to determine what his philosophy of life is. The structure of human life has been
widely accepted as a general truth in the structural theory about the noumenon—or
rather the thing-in-itself—of human life (the reality of human life in itself as it is)
which, on the other hand, tends to deny the existence of any choice in human life.
Hence it must of necessity follow that the structuralist theory takes a negative attitude
towards “any choice in human life.” On the contrary, “any choice in human life” has
been universally recognized as an undeniable truth in the existentialist theory about
the noumenon—or rather the thing-in-itself—of human life (the reality of human
life in itself as it is) which, on the other hand, tends to negate the existence of any
structure upon which human life depends. There can be little doubt that existential-
ists will adopt a nihilistic attitude towards the structure of human life. The theory
about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s “structure and choice,”
holds that man’s “structure and choice” can justly lay claim to being “the integrated
duality” of the noumenon of human life, that is to say, the noumenon of human life
consisting of both “structure” and “choice” tends to assert itself as the unity of man’s
“structure and choice.” Moreover, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or
rather, about man’s “structure and choice,” maintains that man’s “structure” deter-
mines his “choice,” which, in turn, tends to exercise a determining influence upon
man’s “structure.” It’s therefore evident that this very theory is at once a form of
human ontology and a sort of philosophy of life. He who advocates the theory about
the noumenon of human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—tends
to insist on paying due recognition to the social structure, the structure of human life,
and “man’s choice in life.” He who is endowed with the structure of human life is
in a position not only to consciously cultivate an active rational attitude towards life,
but to make conscious and active choices. In brief, the theory about the noumenon of
human life—or rather about man’s “structure and choice”—is of much importance
in preparing certain theoretical prerequisites or frames for the scientific philosophy
of life an individual human being may adopt in his life, whereby he can take a
correct approach towards the relationship among the various component elements
inherent in the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice,” as well as
towards man’s relationship to other people, to society, to nature, and to himself, and
criticize or reject the one-sided theories such as structuralism, existentialism, and
anthropocentrism, thus gaining mastery over his own destiny.
Fourth, the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about man’s
“structure and choice,” serves to prepare certain theoretical frames of reference for
an idealistic anthropological commitment to self-transcendence. The marginaliza-
tion of anthropology has long since become an indisputable fact when viewed from
a global perspective. To make people wake to the gravity of the situation, we may
9 The Noumenon of Human Life—Man’s “Structure and Choice” … 253
as well make reference to the article entitled The Future of Anthropology, which
James L. Peacock, president of the American Anthropological Association between
1993 and 1995, published in the March issue of American Anthropologist for 1997,
and which was translated in Chinese in the second issue of Study of Nationalities in
Guangxi for 2001. The article showed that in view of the fact that American anthro-
pology today has been in the midst of marginalization and standing in a serious
predicament, he sought to analyze the inner causes, and to come up with strategies
to cope with the awkward situation. James L. Peacock remarked, “…despite the
yeoman’s service that anthropology does in teaching a large number of students,
anthropology is still marginal as a category. Anthropology is virtually absent in
the minds and hearts of students, student leaders, parents, administrators, alumni,
trustees, legislators, and donors. …anthropology remains marginal as a category.
We are ‘outside the envelope,’ as they say.” For this, he further noted that anthro-
pology in the twenty-first century would be faced with such three possible scenarios
as extinction, standing aloof, and developing and applying the core ideas that are
part of our great tradition. “So what is the future of anthropology? Let’s look at
three scenarios: The first is extinction. Götterdämmerung; we go up in flames. In this
period of downsizing, universities and institutions see small, vulnerable programs
such as anthropology as likely candidates for hit lists. Unfortunately, this is more
than a distant; it is a viable possibility. A second scenario, perhaps likely, is that
we do not die but seek refuge in our enclave, hanging on as living dead. Anthro-
pology in the twenty-first century, in this vision, consists of disorganized, quaintly
intriguing, and slightly amusing naysaying eccentrics who relish vaguely recalled
avant-garde ideas from the fin de siècle 20th-century but who are merely a curiosity
in the 21st. The third alternative, as viable as extinction, is a flourishing redirec-
tion of our field into a prominent position in society. Anthropology would remain
intriguing and creatively diverse, iconoclastic and breathtaking in its sweep and
perception, profound in its scholarship, but would become integral and even leading
in addressing the complex challenges of a transnational, yet grounded, humanity.”
Moreover, he pointed out, “What are liabilities of the discipline and its practitioners?
One argument is that it is not society that is to blame for anthropology’s marginaliza-
tion, but anthropology itself. …Whether it survives, flourishes, or becomes extinct
depends on anthropology’s ability to contribute: to become integral and significant
to our culture and society without becoming subservient.” An in-depth analysis of
the awkward situation facing anthropology may awaken us to the fact that, essen-
tially, it is anthropology itself that is to blame for its own marginalization. It has
long since become a regrettable fact that “culture,” “society” and “human physique”
asserted themselves as the research objects of anthropology, while “the study of man
himself” has fallen into almost total neglect in anthropological circles. Academic
anthropology’s regrettable separation from its proper object of study must of neces-
sity cause “man himself” to cold shoulder anthropology. A workable solution to the
problem of “anthropology’s marginalization” should be based on the premise that
anthropology must take “man himself” as the prime object of study. Hence the author
advances and develops the theory about the noumenon of human life, or rather, about
man’s “structure and choice,” and makes a thorough inquiry into the noumenon of
human life, holding that only in this way can anthropology lay a solid foundation for
the transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one and enter into a
virtuous circle, in which anthropology is interested in man himself and man himself
is also concerned with anthropology, whereby it can succeed in bringing about the
historical transition from the borderline discipline to the mainstream one.
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Plymouth, UK: Altamira Press, p. 126.
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115. Tremlett, Paul-François. (2014). Lévi-Strauss on Religion: The Structuring Mind. New York,
NY: Routledge, pp. 58–59.
116. Lévi-Strauss. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China: The
117. Morris, Brian. (1987). Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge,
118. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1987). The Savage Mind (in a Chinese translation). Beijing, China:
The Commercial Press, p. 18.
119. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1997). Cultural Capital and Social Alchemy. Shanghai, China: Shanghai
120. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (2007). Mythologiques: L’Homme nu (The Naked Man) (Chinese
translation). Beijing, China: China Renmin University Press, p. 149.
121. Kurzweil, Edith. (1996). The Age of Structuralism: from Lévi-Strauss to Foucault. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 24.
122. Lévi-Strauss. (1995). Structural Anthropology (Chinese translation). Shanghai, China:
123. Vlacos, Sophie. (2014). Ricoeur, Literature and Imagination. New York, NY: Bloomsbury
Publishing, Inc., p. 25.
124. Schrag, Calvin O. “Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Thought.” Philosophy East
and West 20: 1 (January 1970): 83–89.
125. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. (1983). The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condi-
tion: Individualization of Nature and the Human Being. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, p. 77.
126. Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 22.
Chapter 6
Personality Structure
Man is a conscious automaton, by which is meant that man asserts himself as a social
being through conscious control and regulation of his own behavior. Fundamentally,
it is man himself who determines whether he is active or inactive as well as how he
is active or inactive in a given external environment. Whatever external environment
man is confronted with, for his part, can be described, to a larger or lesser extent,
as some kinds of external stimuli. Any external environment tends not to exert an
immediate or determining influence on human behavior, but rather it is man himself
who determines whether he is active or inactive as well as how he is active or inactive
in a given external environment. Moreover, human actions (or behaviors)—or rather
whether he is active or inactive as well as how he is active or inactive—are among
the most complex and inscrutable phenomena that have ever appeared in this world.
This may awaken us to the truth that one of the most complicated and advanced
dynamic structural mechanisms, which have ever appeared in the long evolutionary
history of living things, must of necessity be inherent in each single individual. It
is the dynamic structural mechanism that determines man’s complex motives and
behaviors. However, the dynamic structural mechanism is supposed to be essentially
invisible, impalpable, inexplicable, and even undetectable by any accessible means
of investigation, and hence it may be not inaptly termed the “black box,” by which
is meant that the personality structure, or more specifically, the dynamic structural
mechanism, would surely remain an unfathomable mystery. In view of this, only if we
appeal to both the input and output ends of the “black box” for help can we gain a more
profound insight into the workings of the dynamic structural mechanism. The struc-
ture and workings of the “black box” are extremely complicated, and, as yet, we know
very little indeed about the “black box.” With the above situation in view, the theory
about man’s “structure and choice” is essentially aimed at expanding and deepening
our insight into the fundamental workings of the dynamic structural mechanism in
that a real grasp of the operation of psychological processes within the unknowable
“black box” may aid materially in coming to grips with a conceptualization of the
personality structure, or rather, the dynamic structural mechanism.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_6
262 6 Personality Structure
1 The Concept of Personality
At first glance, the concept of personality may seem quite simple, but in reality it is
far too complicated and difficult to pin down precisely. In actual life, not only may
the concept of personality be susceptible of various interpretations in different disci-
plines, but even each single individual may form a divergent conception of person-
ality. Researchers from many different fields of study have long since developed
different versions of the concept of personality. Nevertheless, of the myriad versions
that had been offered, not a single one has, so far, been generally accepted. Let us
take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. In his monograph Personality—a
Psychological Interpretation the American psychologist G. W. Allport ferreted out
fifty definitions for the word “personality” and gave a critical summary and anal-
ysis of them whilst sketching out the history of how definitions of personality have
changed and developed. In view of this, in order to make an in-depth study of an
independent individual, we feel the necessity of giving the concept of personality a
clear and lucid explanation.
1.1 The Origin and History of the Term “Personality”
It is generally believed that the term “personality” derives its origin from the classical
Latin word “persona,” which originally referred to the masks worn by ancient Greek
and Roman actors in theatrical performances. By the first century B.C., these ancient
theatrical masks began to appear on ancient Roman stages—or, to put it another way,
ancient Roman performers began to use these masks when performing their roles in
tragedies or comedies. According to Diomedes, Quintus Roscius (ca.126 B.C.–62
B.C.), the most celebrated comic actor of ancient Rome, who is spoken of in terms
of the highest commendation by Cicero, supposedly introduced masks, which had
been unknown before on the Roman stage, because he wanted to conceal his natural
squint of the eye with the mask. Thenceforth the practice of wearing masks, which
was rather an advantage than an inconvenience in the ancient Greek and Roman
theatres, was widely followed in theatrical performances. However, sometimes the
real differences between drama and social life, particularly between theatrical and
real social roles, seem to have blurred. Hence, in the history of Western civilization
the word “personality” underwent changes in connotation and eventually came to
be used as an abstract noun, which basically refers to “the state of being a person.”
While perusing the admirably written treatises of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43
BC), we may definitely discern that the word “personality” in his extensive writings
underwent further changes, acquiring ever more complex layers of meaning and
connotation. Cicero was a Roman statesman as well as the greatest Roman orator,
and his “unique and imperishable glory,” according to John William Mackail, “is
that he created the language of the civilized world, and used that language to create
1 The Concept of Personality 263
a style which nineteen centuries have not replaced, and in some respects have hardly
altered.”1 In his extensive writings the word “personality” acquired at least four types
of meanings.
First, how one behaves himself towards others, or how one’s behavior appears to
others, or what impression he makes on others. To put it another way, how others
judge his behavior, or what others think of him, or how others view him. It is generally
admitted that there are obvious discrepancies between what others think of him and
what he is really like.
Second, “just as in the theatre actors play multiple roles by wearing different
masks, so in ordinary life human beings play various roles, too, to be distinguished
as it were by the various masks they wear.”2 “The role based on life choices human
beings make in relation to their careers tends to proceed from their own deliberations;
as a consequence, some people apply themselves to philosophy, others to civil law,
and others again to rhetoric.”3 It has now become evident to us that in the case of the
second persona we have to take account of the social position we find ourselves in
as well as the role that we adopt by choice, such as philosophy, law, or oratory.
Third, in this sense “personality” may be conceived as the sum total of an indi-
vidual’s qualities, innate and acquired, which reveal themselves in the performance
of one’s work, and which make one competent to take up his work.
Fourth, Cicero’s use of the concept of “personality” in his writings is accompanied
by a reinterpretation of the traditional Roma value of dignity (dignitas) as well as by
the introduction of the notion of human superiority.4 Hence in the case of the fourth
persona the concept “personality” is to be associated with the superiority and dignity
of our nature (for instance, the style of writing).
From Cicero’s time until fairly recently, or rather, at later stages of Western social
development, the concept of “personality” underwent constant changes in connota-
tion and gradually acquired more extended meanings, whereby it came to acquire
certain connotations inherent in the modern notion of “personality.” For the sake of
illustration, let us cite the following instances.
First, the concept of “personality” means the outward appearance of a person.
Originally it meant “the mask worn by an actor on the stage;” by extension it has
come to mean “the outward appearance of a person.” The word “personality” in this
sense, however, does not refer to “the true self” or “the real self,” but rather means
“the false (imaginary or fictitious) self,” “the feigned self” or “the pretended self.”
Second, the word “personality”—or rather the Latin “persona”—designates a
person endowed with excellent qualities. Originally the term “personality” referred
directly to the theatrical masks that the ancient Greek and Roman actors wore in the
theaters of antiquity. Later it came to be applied to the actors themselves, then to the
1 Gunnison, Walter Balfour., & Harley, Walter Scott., eds. (1912). Marcus Tullius Cicero Seven
Orations, with Selections from the Letters, De Senectute, ans Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae. Boston,
US-MA: Silver Burdett, xxiv.
2 Lolordo, Antonia., ed. (2019). Persons: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 32.
4 Ibid., p. 33.
character acted, portrayed or created by an actor on the stage. In much later times, by
extension it came to acquire the meaning of unique individuality, that is, the totality
of an individual’s distinctive characteristics and essential qualities peculiar to and
distinguishing him from others. In view of the fact that unique individuality tends
to find its fullest expression in the true (or real) self rather than in the feigned (or
pretended) self, there is an antithesis between the true (or real) self and the feigned (or
pretended) self. The very extended meaning imparted to the word “personality” was to
have important implications for the later development of the concept of “personality.”
Third, the term “personality” refers to qualities of distinction and dignity, and
in this sense it becomes almost identical with reputation. Before long the concept
of “persona” carrying connotations of reputation and dignity was incorporated into
the Roman social class system as well as the Roman legal system, and the word
“personality,” when used in this extended sense, may awaken us to the fact that
the different Roman classes allowed for different rights and duties—that is, the
members of one class might fulfill certain rights and obligations, while the members
of another class would not. However, the concept of “persona” in this sense applied
only to Roman citizens—that is, all freeborn inhabitants of the Roman Empire who
were granted citizenship status, rather than to slaves. Only free Roman citizens were
endowed with a legal personality, while slaves in ancient Rome were deprived of
personality in the legal sense (servus non habet personam).
Fourth, the term “personality” refers to a representative of a particular group or
organization (institution). In this sense the word “personality” indicates the rights and
duties imposed on the personal representative. For example, the word “personality”
is also used to designate the priest or minister in the Christian church. The Latin
“persona” was used in Christian contexts for “a parish priest,” probably from his
being the most important person in the parish.
Only after we have examined how the concept of “persona” evolved and changed
in the early period of Greco-Roman civilization will the realization sink in that
originally the term “persona” designated both the actor and the masks worn in ancient
theaters, that later it came to denote a fictional character exhibiting no truth of human
nature, and that at a much later period it began to mean a real individual endowed
with an original essence, or specific nature, by which he or she is distinguished
from every other individual.5 Hence it could be argued that the evolution of the
concept of “persona” in the Greco-Roman period provided the fundamental basis
for its semantic extension and enrichment in later periods. Generally speaking, the
word “personality” derived from the Latin “persona” refers roughly to “a distinct
individual” or “an individual person”—more specifically some aspect of who an
individual is, or rather, some aspect of a person who retains one’s individuality (or
at least a substantial portion of it).6
5 Zavatta, Benedetta. (2019). Individuality and Beyond: Nietzsche Reads Emerson (Alexander
Reynolds, Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 34.

6 Martin, Michael., & Augustine, Keith., eds. (2015). The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against
Life after Death. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 1.

In modern times,7 Chinese and Western scholars’ persistent attempts at a generally

acceptable definition for such a broad abstract word as personality made it clear that
the Western interpretation of “personality” is mainly oriented towards the psycho-
logical aspects of an individual person, whilst the Chinese version of it is primarily
concerned with individual ethics or morality. Philip S. Holzman, who was the Esther
and Sidney R. Rabb Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Harvard University, put
his own interpretation on personality in Encyclopedia Britannica. “Personality, a
characteristic way of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Personality embraces moods,
attitudes, and opinions and is most clearly expressed in interactions with other people.
It includes behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that distinguish one
person from another and that can be observed in people’s relations to the environ-
ment and to the social group.”8 Looking at the definition of “personality,” we will
find that three main meanings of this word are listed in Modern Chinese Dictionary
(the seventh edition). First, personality is the sum total of an individual’s characteris-
tics—that is, personality is the integration of character, temperament (or disposition)
and ability (or intellect) of a person. Second, by personality we may mean an indi-
vidual’s moral qualities. Third, a person may enjoy legal personality—the status of
being a subject (or bearer) of rights and duties under law. The second meaning of the
word “personality” as compared with the other two meanings has been widely used
in Chinese society. Admittedly, the concept of personality virtually synonymous with
the second meaning of the word has won general acceptance in Chinese community.
1.2 An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Concept

of Personality
Once the concept of “personality” is used to describe “man himself,” it quickly comes
into common use in many of the humanities and social sciences. Two main reasons
may be adduced to account for this. First, “personality” is a concept for which we tend
to frame a concise and clear definition, and hence conciseness and clearness constitute
the essential characteristics of the concept of personality. The concept of personality
can be used to describe “man himself” in an admirably concise manner and to give a
clear definition of “man himself” so that we can avoid the unnecessary confusion in
distinguishing the concept of personality and other concepts or categories in a certain
discipline. Second, “man himself,” or rather, “what man is,” constitutes the theoretical
prerequisite as well as the logical premise for many disciplines of the humanities and
social sciences, whereby the concept of personality comes into common use in the
7 In Chinese history the term “modern times” refers specifically to the period from the middle of
the nineteenth century to 1919 as well as the period from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to
the present. Wu, Jing-Rong., & Cheng, Zhen-Qiu., et al., eds. (2001). New Age Chinese-English
Dictionary. Beijing: The Commercial Press, pp. 805, 1675.
8 Holzman, Philip S. “Personality”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 24 Feb. 2020, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/personality. Accessed 7 April 2021.

humanities and social sciences, for which “man himself,” or more specifically, “what
man is,” is postulated (or posited) to be a logical premise. For reasons stated above,
the concept of personality, which asserts itself as a very unique one in its own right,
comes into common use in the course of time. “Personality,” which is one of the
most abstract words in English, carries a wide range of connotations, but at the same
time it falls short of denotative meanings, whereby the word has great elasticity of
meaning. Not only can it be used in almost any discipline of the humanities and
social sciences, but it can be used without ambiguity in various contexts, though any
ambiguity as to the meaning is not entirely precluded by the context. Thus it stands
to reason that the concept of “personality” is highly susceptible of most diverse
interpretations in different disciplines of the Western humanities and social sciences,
and that the scholars thereof as such, as the case may be, either emphasize a certain
aspect of the concept, or choose to ignore other aspects of it, which is true of the
Chinese situation. In view of this, in order to achieve a more profound understanding
of the concept of “personality,” we feel that the concept of “personality” is deserving
of closer examination and further investigation, particularly when it is being used in
certain disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.
(1) A Philosophical Perspective on the Concept of “Personality”
In philosophical terms, the concept of “personality” refers basically to the nature
of man and the inherent (fundamental or essential) characteristics (qualities or
attributes) thereof as well as human values. We may adduce a few examples to
support this argument. Boethius, who “was the last of the Roman philosophers, and
the first of the scholastic theologians,”9 is one of the main sources for the trans-
mission of ancient Greek philosophy to the Latin West during the first half of the
Middle Ages,10 and became the main intermediary between Classical antiquity and
following centuries. He had conceived a plan to translate into Latin the entire body
of writings by Aristotle and Plato so that they would remain available to a Western
Europe that was rapidly losing its intellectual ties with the Greek-speaking east.11
He did not realize this plan in its entirety, but he did translate a number of the logical
works of Aristotle and wrote several commentaries on these writings. In doing so, he
rendered a very important service to the early medieval West by providing the only
Latin translations of Aristotle available until the gradual introduction of the “new
9 Rubenstein, Richard E. (2004). Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews
Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages. Orlando, US-FL: Harcourt, Inc.,
p. 63.
10 Spade, Paul Vincent, “Medieval Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/

medieval-philosophy/>.
11 Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian., ed. (2005). Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theolo-
giae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Ada, US-MN: Brazos Press, p. 14.

learning” in the late Middle Ages.12 As a result, when learning revived in the Latin
world half a millennium later, virtually every thinker’s starting point was the logic
of Aristotle as translated, interpreted, and applied by Boethius.13 In his theological
treatises Boethius draws on Aristotelian metaphysics to define “person” as “an indi-
vidual substance of a rational nature.”14 This classical definition for the concept of
“personality” reflects the truth about human personhood as well as the rationality of
an individual. In other words, all of the connotations that the concept carries with
it are invariably related to the essential (basic or fundamental) nature of man—that
is, the concept contains nothing other than what human nature is intended to be.
This definition of “personality” by Boethius in the sixth century was accepted by
almost all medieval philosophers, and hence it stands to reason that this Boethian
tradition informs later philosophical definitions of “personality” and thus influences
man’s understanding and explanation of the concept from the Middle Ages to our own
century. In A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester, which
was published in 1698, John Locke set down his definition of the word person, viz.
“that person stands for a thinking intelligent being that hath reason and reflection, and
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being in different times and places.”
In this definition, Locke specifies some of the elements that comprise our concept
of self-consciousness. In particular, he holds these features, viz. thinking, intelli-
gence, reason, reflection and the ability to engage in tensed first-person judgments,
to be constitutive of our concept of a person.15 Locke concludes that consciousness
is personality because it “always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes
everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things: in this alone consists personality identity, i.e., the sameness of a
rational being;” and remains constant in different places and at different times.16
According to Leibniz, a representative of the seventeenth-century tradition of ratio-
nalism, a person is a rational entity who “is supposed to be thinkable as a monadic
entity whose features are intelligible without a nexus of relations, including a nexus
of relations to other monadic entities.”17 In his notion of a person, “although Leibniz
12 Sutherland, A. “Boethius.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Encyclopedia.com. 10 Apr. 2021 <https://

www.encyclopedia.com>.
13 Rubenstein, Richard E. (2004). Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews
Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages. Orlando, US-FL: Harcourt, Inc.,
p. 63.
14 Adams, Marilyn McCord. (2006). Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 80.

15 Craig, Edward., ed. (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nihilism to Quantum
Mechanics. London: Routledge, p. 319.

16 Locke, John. (1854). The Works of John Locke: Philosophical Works, with a Preliminary Essay
and Notes by J. A. St. John. London: Henry G. Bohn, p. 466.

17 Lolordo, Antonia., ed. (2019). Persons: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
p. 246.
rejects Locke’s identification of the person with consciousness, he nevertheless shares

his conception of the cogito as the decisive characteristic of rationality.”18
(2) An Ethical Perspective on the Concept of “Personality”
From the ethical perspective the concept of “personality” refers primarily to an
individual’s moral character, the respect he deserves for his good moral qualities,
and the esteem that rests only on his morality. For example, one of the main tenets
of the Kantian moral philosophy, in which Kant uses the concept of “personality” in
its ethical or moral sense, is its supreme emphasis on the moral value of personality.
According to Kant, “this respect-inspiring idea of personality, which sets before our
eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows
the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self-conceit, is
even natural to the commonest reason, and easily observed.”19 For him, “personality
is that quality in every man which makes him worthwhile, aside from the uses to
which he may be put by his fellows.”20 In addition, just as Kant points out in his
Critique of Practical Reason, “A man also may be an object to me of love, fear, or
admiration, even to astonishment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocose
humor, his courage and strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others,
may inspire me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him is wanting.
Fontenelle says, ‘I bow before a great man, but my mind does not bow.’ I would add,
before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher
degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose it or not,
and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank.”21
Thus it can be seen that in his moral philosophy Kant elaborated in minute detail and
at inordinate length the ethical conception of personality as well as the moral value
of personality.
(3) The Concept of Personality in Jurisprudence
In general, by the concept of personality in jurisprudence we mean that the subject
enjoys the basic rights of persons guaranteed by the constitution and law and at
the same time fulfills the fundamental obligations of persons as stipulated in the
constitution and law. It may be said as a general rule that the legal personality of
a natural person begins with his birth and ends with his death, though for certain
purposes the law recognizes capacity for rights and duties beyond the limits of a
human being’s life. It is to be noted that the concept of legal personality, which is
18 Tipton, I.C., ed. (1977). Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. New York, NY: Oxford
19 Kant, Immanuel. (1889). Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of
Ethics. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., Paternoster-Row, p. 181.

20 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York, NY:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 33.

21 Kant, Immanuel. (1898). Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory
of Ethics. (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, B.D., Trans.). London: Longmans, Green, and Co., P. 169
[193].
sometimes used to express our notion of the legal status of a person,22 has its origins
in Roman law. Under Roman law a person is any individual enjoying legal status.23
In Roman law a person’s capacity to exercise civil rights depended primarily upon
whether he was free or a slave.24 Only freeborn citizens were recognized as possessing
legal personality by Roman law—or to put it another way, only freeborn men could
be bearers of legal rights and were invested with the dignity of persons, claiming the
privileges and protection of law.25 In ancient Rome slaves were considered property
under Roman law and had no legal personhood. “The American jurist Roscoe Pound
wrote that in ancient Rome a slave ‘was a thing, and as such, like animals could
be the object of rights of property,’ and the British historian of Roman law Barry
Nicholas has pointed out that in Rome ‘the slave was a thing … he himself had
no rights: he was merely an object of rights, like an animal.’”26 “What was the
working of slavery on the legal rights of the person enslaved? It was, as we have
already seen, to destroy them altogether. Practically it reduced him to a chattel, the
property of his owner, subject like a horse or a dog to his master’s absolute will
and disposal. … But when we are speaking of legal personality, personality invested
with legal rights, which can be asserted and maintained by process of law, no such
personality was allowed to the slave by Roman law.”27 Christian moralists who were
against such social discrimination insisted that each man is a person,28 and that
each one has a personality and character of his own.29 In modern states the law
treats personality as “a human living organism possessed of all its things.” Hence
all human beings that “are looked upon as capable of being invested with rights, or
made liable to the performance of duties,” are endowed with legal personality.30 In
the further development of law, “just as law unproblematically recognizes the legal
personality of individual human beings, so it must acknowledge the legal personality
of groups. … Groups of any kind, possessing a unified and living will” as well as
meeting the necessary legal requirements, “ought to be recognized as independent
22 Howe, William Wirt. (1896). Studies in Civil Law and Its Relations to the Law of England and
America. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, p. 63.

24 Sherman, Charles Phines. (1917). Roman Law in the Modern World: Manual of Roman Law
Illustrated by Anglo-American Law and the Modern Codes. Boston, MA: Boston Book Company,
p. 26.

26 Wise, S.M. (2016, August 18). Animal rights. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.
com/topic/animal-rights.
27 Hadley, James (LL.D., late professor of Greek literature in Yale College). (1881). Introduction to
Roman Law: In Twelve Academic Lectures. New York City, NY: D. Appleton & Co., pp. 113–114.
28 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1957). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York City,
NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 35.

29 Weaver, George Sumner, D.D. (1891). Heaven. Boston, MA: Universalist Publishing House,
p. 27.
30 The Law Magazine and Review: For Both Branches of the Legal Profession at Home and Abroad,
Volume 1(1872). London: Butterworths, p. 1091.

agents capable of legal personality.”31 Such groups are also called legal persons,
the classical examples of which are corporations, institutions, funds, and agencies,
and any species of which is endowed by virtue of its legal personality with various
rights and all the duties attached thereto, which shall be also conferred upon a single
person by law. To summarize, “legal person” can be defined as “a body of men or of
property,” that is, a group of individuals organized for some purpose, “which the law,
in imitation of the personality of human beings, treats artificially as subject of rights
and duties independent of its component parts.”32 In order to seek more clarification
of the concept of “legal person,” we feel the necessity of bringing out several essential
points involved in our deeper understanding of the conception of “legal person.”
“The term institution is intended as a broad category embracing most organized and
relatively enduring social bodies, corporations, communities, or associations—such
as marriages, families, religious organizations, business corporations, trade unions,
and voluntary associations. … A full account of institutional rights would require
attention to these wider social contexts that substantially shape the definition and
exercise of such rights.”33 “Institutions so defined possess ‘agency’ and are thereby
capable of ‘legal subjectivity,’ by which is meant that they can exercise legal rights,
discharge legal duties, and wield legal powers (this term is intended to be taken more
widely than legal personality, which refers essentially to the capacity of an entity to
be recognized by the state as a bearer of legal rights and duties).”34 “An association
is formed by the transfer of a part of the essence and will of each individual member
to the social whole. It is not simply an aggregate of externally related individual
wills, but a real, organic unity constituting an independent communal whole. Such
a whole possesses a reality distinct from and transcending the separate wills of its
individual members and capable of willing and acting on its own account. It possesses
personality; it is a ‘group-person.’”35 “The reality, unity, and agency of the group are
prior to any positive legal ordering. … Law arranges and penetrates this inner unity
and hence the inner structure of the group, but it does not serve as its source. Rather,
law must accept the existence of a force, an urge, a stream of consciousness that has to
be place in a legal context. … Group-persons should, like individuals, be recognized
as capable of possessing rights, and this legal capacity does not depend on recognition
by the state, even though the state supplies the legal form for group-rights.”36 “In
Germanic legal theory, groups are accorded legal recognition as real personalities.
… A sphere of individual will is always recognized, but seen as being balanced by
the requirements of communal life. In the Germanic conception, personality is not
31 Frohnen, Bruce P., & Grasso, Kenneth L., eds. (2008). Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political,
and Philosophical Perspectives. Columbia, US-MO: University of Missouri Press, p. 219.
32 “Legal Person.” Encyclopaedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com. 12 Apr. 2021 <https://www.encycl
opedia.com>.
33 Frohnen, Bruce P., & Kenneth L. Grasso, eds. (2008). Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political,
and Philosophical Perspectives. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, p. 214.

34 Ibid., p. 215.
35 Ibid., p. 218.
36 Ibid., p. 219.
seen as indivisible. The possibility exists of transferring part of one’s will to a group-
person and thereby establishing an entirely new and distinct personality endowed
with rights and duties of its own. Once a group is organized as a collective person
with a unified will, there exists a presumption that it will be recognized in law as
possessing legal personality.”37
(4) The Sociological Conception of Personality
The sociological conception refers basically to a human being’s distinctive personal
character characterized by the unity and fixity of individual behavioral characteris-
tics which “are intrinsically social, in that they describe how an individual relates
to others,”38 and which must be blended in a harmonious and coordinated manner
to form a balanced personality.39 Generally speaking, sociologists are more inclined
to define personality from a social perspective, by which is meant that they don’t
attach much weight to the internal structure of personality, the dynamics of person-
ality structure or the human behavioral choices, and that they don’t seem to attach
any importance to the self-sufficiency of human choice or the internal structure of
personality. Some sociologists intend the concept of personality as a sociological
category embracing the ultimate particles to which human groups can be reducible.
In the eyes of some sociologists, in one way or another personality is always consid-
ered a reflection of the social background as well as the subjective reflection of
culture.40 According to one succinct and fairly typical statement made by Ellsworth
Faris, personality is but “the subjective aspect of culture.”41 He maintains that the
formation and development of human personality tend to be concurrent with the indi-
vidual human being’s subjectivization of social mores (or customs) and conventions
(or traditions) in his or her life, particularly at an early period of life. Admittedly,
Faris had a partial, one-sided conception of personality in that he did not attach
any importance to the role and position of biological factors in the development of
personality and nor did he attach much weight to the complex internal structures, the
diverse structural functions or the ability to make appropriate choices, with which
the human subject is endowed. Still other sociologists define personality from the
perspective of social effectiveness, contending that personality is the integration of
the traits that determine personal effectiveness. Ernest W. Burgess held that “per-
sonality, from the standpoint of group life, is the integration of all the traits which
determine the role and status of the person in society. Personality might, therefore,
be defined as social effectiveness.”42 Careful reading of this definition may lead one
37 Ibid., p. 220.
38 Deaux, Kay., & Snyder, Mark., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social
Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 294.
39 Li, Jian-Hua., &Fan, Ding-Jiu. (1984). A Concise Dictionary of Sociology. Lanzhou, China:
Gansu People’s Publishing House, pp. 12–22.

40 Pandora, Katherine Ann. (1993). Dissenting Science: Psychologists’ Democratic Critique During
the Depression Era. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 279.

41 Chen, Zhong-Geng., & Zhang, Yu-Xin. (1986). Personality Psychology. Shenyang, China:
Liaoning People’s Publishing House, p. 38.

42 Ibid., pp. 37–38.
to assume it is a simplistic approach to the personality of every human being that

tends to be complex, unpredictable and sometimes unfathomable.
(5) Personality: A Psychological Interpretation
In psychology, “personality” rightly asserts itself as a vexing and intractable topic
that is fraught with and steeped in controversy.43 In the psychological sense of the
word, “personality,” which can roughly be seen as the total constellation of an indi-
vidual’s various psychological characteristics, or more specifically, the totality of
an individual’s behavioral and emotional characteristics, is generally believed to be
a synonym of “individuality,” which is synonymous with “personality” when it is
used to mean the attributes that make up the character and nature of an individual,
or that distinguish an individual from others. In this sense it may be safely asserted
that an individual’s personality is in many ways a reflection of his or her mental
outlook.44 Nonetheless, we feel the necessity of distinguishing between individuality
and personality. “Personality is that which makes us such as we are, which constitutes
our character and determines the greater or lesser worth and dignity of our individu-
ality. Personality and individuality are not two separate entities, but two abstractions
of the same reality. Each term emphasizes a different aspect. The former comprises
those features which change an individual into a person of a definite character, while
the latter denotes their bodily actualization in material concreteness. Both terms
are synonymous, being at times interchangeable, but forming a contrast when we
distinguish between the essential and accidental of man’s life, between that which is
permanent and that which is transient.”45 Psychology, as compared with other disci-
plines devoted to the study of personality, has probed more deeply and extensively
into the field personality research. To date, psychologists have formed many diver-
gent conceptions of what “personality” means, in which they managed to embody
their original ideas. Although different psychologists emphasize different aspects
of personality, most agree that personality is the totality of an individual’s charac-
teristics—or put it another way, personality can be viewed as the integrated total
of the distinctive traits or qualities possessed by an individual. John T. MacCurdy,
while defining personality, has emphasized its integrative features. According to
him, personality is “an integration of patterns (interests) which gives a peculiar indi-
vidual trend to the behavior of the organism.”46 Kempf’s definition of personality lay
emphasis on the organization and integration of certain qualities by an individual in
the process of effecting adjustment to his environment. In terms of biological adapta-
tion, Kempf stated that “personality is the integration of those systems of habits that
43 Raeff, Catherine. (2020). Exploring the Complexities of Human Action. New York, NY: Oxford
44 Yang, Qing. (1985). A Concise Dictionary of Psychology. Changchun, China: Jilin People’s

45 Carus, Paul. (1903). Whence and Whither: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Soul, Its Origin and
Its Destiny. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, pp. 106–107.
46 MacCurdy, John T. (2013). Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology. New York:

represent an individual’s characteristic adjustments to his environment.”47 To put it

another way, “personality is the habitual mode of adjustment which the organism
effects between its own egocentric drives and the exigencies of environment.”48 J. P.
Guilford began the tradition of studying the structure of personality variables using
factor analysis.49 For him, the definition of personality adopted for use starts logi-
cally from an axiom to which everyone seems agreed: each and every personality is
unique.50 Hence, in order to obtain a clear understanding of “personality,” we must
first of all be clear as to the differences between personality as a general phenomenon.
According to J. P. Guilford, “An individual’s personality then, is his unique pattern
of traits—a trait is any distinguishable, relatively enduring way in which one indi-
vidual differs from another.”51 Kurt Lewin considered personality as “a dynamic
totality of systems.”52 In framing a definition of personality, Gordon Willard Allport
accentuated the importance of the dynamics of personality and defined personality as
“the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that
determine his unique adjustments to his environment.”53 The American psychologist
Gordon Willard Allport (1897–1967) is generally acclaimed as one of the founding
figures of personality psychology, moving away from psychoanalytic and behavioral
theories toward humanistic theories of psychology.54 He was one of the first psychol-
ogists to focus on the study of personality and developed his own original, eclectic
theory of personality based on traits.55 His important introductory work on the theory
of personality was Personality: A Psychological Interpretation,56 which is widely
viewed as an important landmark in the establishment of “personality” as a legiti-
mate subdiscipline in psychology.57 He consistently related his approach to the study
of personality to his social interests and sought to introduce the leavening influence of
humanism into psychology by honoring human potential and individual uniqueness
47 Allport, Gordon Willard. (1937). Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York City,
NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 45.
48 C., Aggarwal J. (2014). Essentials of Educational Psychology. New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing
House, P. 344.
49 Derlega, Valerian J., Winstead, Barbara A., & Jones, Warren H. (2005). Personality: Contempo-
rary Theory and Research. Boston, MA: Thomson/Wadsworth, p. 196.

50 Mischel, Harriet N., & Mischel, Walter., eds. (1973). Readings in Personality. New York, NY:

House, P. 344.
52 Ibid.
53 Henry, Nelson Bollinger., ed. (1946). Changing Conceptions in Educational Administration,
Volume 45, Part 2. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 79.

54 Sperry, Len. (2015). Mental Health and Mental Disorders: An Encyclopedia of Conditions,
Treatments, and Well-Being. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 47–48.

55 Ibid., 47.
56 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Gordon Allport.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November
7, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gordon-W-Allport.
57 “Allport, Gordon Willard.” Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 15
Apr. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

as well as by emphasizing the importance of the present context, as opposed to past

history.58 He had a profound impact in shaping humanistic theory as a whole.59 As is
evident from the above description and discussion of personality research, although
psychology has probed deeply and extensively into the field of personality research,
these psychological conceptions of personality without exception revolve around
“human psychology.”
1.3 A Description of Personality Based on the Theory

of “Structure and Choice”
It is only in the realm of subjective anthropology that the theory of “structure and
choice,” which has for its prime object of study “the real, concrete, unique and whole
man,” is in a position to describe, define and even employ the concept of “personality.”
(1) A Description of Personality Based on the Theory of “Structure and
Choice,” as Contrasted With other Traditional Disciplines’ Conceptions
of Personality
As previously stated, each of the traditional disciplines mentioned above has formed
its own distinct conception of personality, which is certainly entitled to provide justifi-
able reasons for its superiority over other versions of personality, and which assuredly
constitutes a valuable contribution to the study of the problem of how to know man
himself as well as to the study of the problem of how to obtain a deeper understanding
of personality. Among the total conceptions of personality as described above, some
conception of personality tends to mark a significant academic milestone. Moreover,
they possess one characteristic in common, that is, each of the traditional disciplines
mentioned above attempts to put its own interpretation on personality largely based
upon the admirable results of scholarly research achieved in its own field of research,
and each conception of personality is, as it were, a conscientious attempt to provide
a concise and illuminating explanation of the qualities and characteristics inherent
in what one sees as some portion or aspect of one’s own unique personality. Looked
at from “the concrete whole man’s” point of view, this very characteristic shared by
the conceptions of personality as described above tends to turn into one of the weak-
nesses that these concepts of personality possess in common. Specifically, there is
a prevailing tendency among the traditional disciplines mentioned above to neglect
the study of all that is relevant to “the concrete whole man.” Rather, each of the
traditional disciplines that have been described above is only devoted to the study
of some portion or aspect of “the concrete whole man.” In other words, rather than
view “the concrete whole man” in all his bearings, each of the traditional disciplines
58 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Gordon Allport.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November

7, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gordon-W-Allport.
59 Sperry, Len. (2015). Mental Health and Mental Disorders: An Encyclopedia of Conditions,
Treatments, and Well-Being. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 48.

mentioned above only casts illumination on a certain part of “the concrete whole
man.” The above situation can be thought of as being in some way analogous to
what happened in the familiar story about the six blind men exploring different parts
of an elephant. As the famous traditional Indian tale goes, a group of blind men were
asked to describe an elephant, but each given the chance to feel only one part of
the animal’s body. Each man came in contact with a different part of the beast and
attempted to describe the animal based on the part he felt. The first blind man who
grabbed hold of the elephant’s trunk said that it is long and rubbery like a snake, but
with two sticky holes in the end. The second man who stretched out his arms and
took hold of a tusk insisted that it is hard and cold and round and curved with a sharp
point like a needle. The third man who touched a leg concluded that it looks like a
tree, solid and strong and growing out of the ground. The fourth man who bumped
into the elephant’s belly asserted that it is rough and flat, like a high wall. The fifth
man who took hold of an ear declared that it is like a big leaf of leather, smooth and
thin. The last man who reached out and grabbed the elephant’s tail claimed that it
is thin and long, and all tattered at the end like an old rope.60 How can you view or
judge the blind men reporting on their several appraisals of the elephant? By what
possible course of reasoning can you justify yourself in thinking that their hasty
judgments about what the elephant is really like are right and wrong at the same
time? On the one hand, when the blind men put their hands on the different parts
of the elephant and each tried to describe the whole animal from the part he felt,
none of the blind men was incorrect, which was to say his assertive description of
what the part of the elephant he felt is like was indisputably correct, but on the other,
when they made judgments of the whole elephant based only on the parts they felt,
they were actually making inferences that must of necessity be proved one-sided
and wrong. This parable illustrates that human knowledge or understanding can be
reduced to the dialectical interaction between the whole and the part and that one
must grasp the parts of things and their relations to each other and to the whole.61
A profound analysis of the parable suggests that all the blind men were right in
regard to the particular part of the elephant they had described, but that they were
completely wrong in describing the whole elephant. Each man’s conclusion is valid
within its own context but does little to explain what an elephant is really like. Each
man’s account is a most accurate description of the part he felt, but none comes
remotely close to an accurate picture of the whole elephant. Each of these blind men
got a wrong idea of the elephant because he mentally saw only a small portion of the
animal. Based on an intelligent and subtle analysis of this terribly overused yet still
helpful Indian parable, we may seek further enlightenment from it. Firstly, one is
really not qualified to make a judgment on matters until all sides of the question have
been considered. Secondly, every judgment is true only in relation to a particular
60 Fisman, Ray., & Sullivan, Tim. (2015). The Org: The Underlying Logic of the Office. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 167. cf. Kadodwala, Dilip. (1996). Hinduism Teacher’s Resource
Book. Cheltenham, UK: Nelson Thornes, pp. 10–11.
61 Palmer, Richard E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 87.

aspect of the thing seen from a particular point of view. Thirdly, all judgments are
therefore necessarily relative, conditional and limited. Lastly, one should perceive
the same phenomenon from a different perspective and then generalizes about the
whole.
Put succinctly, among the basic concepts of personality developed by the various
traditional disciplines mentioned above, the philosophical conception of personality
serves to shed light on the nature (or essence) of man, the ethical conception of
personality may cast light on human morality, the legal conception of personality is
expected to throw light on citizens’ rights and obligations as stipulated in the consti-
tution and other laws, the sociological conception of personality may give us an
illuminating insight into the social nature of personality as well as into the influence
of cultural diversity upon personality formation, and the psychological conception of
personality may aid significantly in gaining a deeper insight into human psychology.
Each of the theoretical concepts of personality as described above sheds light upon
only one portion or region of the whole personality rather than the totality of person-
ality, to wit “the concrete whole man.” With the above situation in view, the arduous
but glorious task before the theory of “structure and choice” is exactly to offer a most
illuminating explanation of what is meant by “the concrete whole man” rather than to
cast light upon only one part, portion or region of “the concrete whole man,” whereby
we will be enabled to attain to a more complete and profound understanding of “the
concrete whole man.” The conception of personality formulated by the theory of
“structure and choice” will be enabled to embrace all that is meant by “the concrete
whole man” and to offer a more comprehensive explanation of “the concrete whole
man,” thereby providing supreme enlightenment about the total essence of man,
the whole noumenon of human life, and an ensemble of denotative and connota-
tive meanings inherent in the conception of human life. As evident from the above
discussion, none of the theoretical concepts of personality developed by the various
traditional disciplines mentioned above is in a position to give a full explanation of
what is meant by “the concrete whole man,” whereby we may gain a complete and
profound understanding of “the concrete whole man.” With the above situation in
view, we feel the necessity of introducing a new concept of personality whereby this
new concept of personality will be enabled to offer a most illuminating explanation of
“the concrete whole man” and to throw considerable further light upon “the concrete
whole man.”
Looked at from “the concrete whole man’s” point of view, “personality” refers to
“the real, concrete, unique and whole man.” “Personality,” as the term is used here,
simply means a single individual who has his own peculiar structure of personal
characteristics and his own unique dynamic structure of personality, each of which
has an internal unity of its own and is characterized by relative stability. Personality
is acquired through socialization. Personality is the totality of personality structure as
well as the ensemble of behavioral choices. Personality is the unity of man’s natural
life and his spiritual life. Personality is the mode of human existence, as considered
in relation to all its manifold forms of existence, and it therefore stands to reason that
personality is a certain state or level of human development.
(2) The Denotative and Connotative Meanings Inherent in the Concept of

Personality
Specifically, the concept of personality described above may be formulated as
follows.
A. Personality can be regarded as synonymous with the real, concrete, individual
man. Hence personality is intimately bound up with the fact of man’s real corpo-
real living existence. Personality is a manifestation of man’s essence, but it
contains more than it. More specifically, personality refers to a concrete social
being that actually exists in the real world and engages in everyday practical
activity.
B. Personality deals with the whole individual and not with particular aspects which
make up a person or group of persons, which is to say personality is the sum
total of individual characteristics that make one person distinct from another.
In this sense “personality” does not cast emphasis upon any particular aspect
of an individual person, nor does it assert itself as an abstract conception of
human essence. Rather, it is designed to provide an overall description of man,
or rather, to give expression to man’s whole existence. Generally speaking, there
are two primary aspects to the aforementioned concept of personality that can
be explored in more detail. (a) There is a natural tendency on the part of the
human personality toward consistency or integration. In other words, the inte-
grative nature of personality tends to give some consistency to the behavior of the
individual, for whom to be effective in a social context,62 the personality must
be integrated, that is, the tendencies when organized must be consistent with
one another, and the whole must be consistent with the norms of society.63 “…
there is a basic tendency within people to move toward greater coherence and
integrity in the organization of their inner world. Inherent in the nature of human
development is the intrinsic tendency toward greater consistency and harmony
within; that is, people are intrinsically motivated to integration and harmony.”64
“Even other psychologists have hinted at human organismic integration. Freud
spoke of the synthetic function of the ego that suggested that throughout life
people work to bring coherence to their experience and thus to the development
of their own personality. Child psychologist Jean Piaget hypothesized a similar
organizational principle in children, whereby they imbued everything with life.
Carl Rogers and fellow humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow spoke of the
self-actualization principle within people leading them toward greater internal
harmony and integrity. In a similar way, argue Deci and Ryan, people’s perceived
sense of competence and perceived sense of autonomy enhance intrinsic moti-
vation that empowers organismic integration. The development of integration in
personality reveals who you truly are and indicates becoming all you are capable
62 Barnouw, Victor. (1963). Culture and Personality. Belmont, CA: Dorsey Press, p. 6.
63 Pacific Perspective 3–4 (1974): 8.
64 Mascarenhas, Oswald. (2019). Corporate Ethics for Turbulent Markets: Executive Response to
Market Challenges. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, pp. 14–15.

of—these ground and empower the concept of human authenticity. … Deci right-
fully asserts that intrinsic motivation and the inherent integrative tendency are
natural whereby we discover, develop, and enjoy ourselves as a human integrated
personality that is truly individual an social, immanent and transcendent at the
same time.”65 (b) “Jung believed that psychic energy could be channeled exter-
nally, toward the outside world, or internally, toward the self.”66 Hence, on the
one hand we mean by the aforementioned concept of personality the integration
of various component elements of personality structure that are relatively fixed
and interdependent, but on the other, we intend the term “personality” used in
this sense as a broad category embracing the multiplicity of human behavioral
choices that tends to assume myriad forms of human practical activity. Allport
saw personality as striving toward unity of internal and external psychic energy.67
C. The noumenon of personality is the personality’s “structure and choice.” The
personality structure tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part of a
human personality, which, in turn, tends to affect and determine the personality
structure. The behavioral choice on the part of a human personality represents a
dynamic manifestation of the personality structure. In actual fact, not only can
the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality affect the personality
structure, it can build and change the personality structure as well. The person-
ality structure is far from being accepted as a natural formation, but rather is
conceived as a subjective construct whose formation depends fundamentally
on the behavioral choice on the part of a human personality. The relationship
between the personality structure and the behavioral choice on the part of a
human personality is a unity of opposites, which is to say they are opposite to
each other, yet dependent on each other and presupposing each other in their
relationships with each other. The unity of the personality structure and the
behavioral choice on the part of a human personality lies primarily in the fact
that they are connected with each other and transformed into each other, that
they support and condition each other, and that they corporate with each other in
enabling the human personality to achieve infinite transcendence. Whether we
treat personality as purely equivalent to the personality structure or regard it as
simply synonymous with the behavioral choice on the part of a human person-
ality, in either of two cases it must be admitted that we may hold a partial and
one-sided view of personality. Rather, personality should be viewed as the unity
of the personality structure and the behavioral choice on the part of a human
personality.
D. Personality refers to what is distinctive about an individual. According to
Merriam-Webster, personality is the complex or totality of an individual’s
distinctive characteristics and traits that distinguishes an individual or a nation
65 Ibid., pp. 15–16.

66 Schultz, Duane P., & Schultz, Sydney Ellen. (2000). Theories of Personality. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Thomson Learning, p. 97.
67 Ryckman, Richard M. (2004). Theories of Personality. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth,
p. 265.
or group. For J. P. Guilford, an individual’s personality can be regarded as a

unique structure of traits that characterize the individual, that is, “an individual’s
personality is his unique pattern of traits—a trait is any distinguishable, relatively
enduring way in which one individual differs from another.” To Muir, “person-
ality is the individual considered as a whole. It may be defined as the most char-
acteristic integration of an individual’s structure, modes of interests, attitudes,
behaviors and capacities or abilities.” Mark Sherman stated that “personality
is the characteristic patterns of behaviors, cognitions and emotions which may
be expressed by the individual and manifest to others.” To put it another way,
personality may be defined as “the distinct and unique organization of traits in
an individual as reflected in how he reacts to himself and others” and in how he
speaks and behaves differently from others.68 Just as no two individuals share
exactly the same personality structure in the world, so no two persons have
identical personalities.
E. Kurt Lewin considered personality as “a dynamic totality of systems.” According
to G. W. Allport, “personality is the dynamic organization within the individual
of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustment to the
environment.” Kempf stated that “personality is the habitual mode of adjustment
which the organism effects between its own egocentric drives and the exigen-
cies of environment.”69 “The personality is a dynamic structure which feeds on
experiences in the same say that the body feeds on animal or vegetable matter.”70
“Personality refers to the composite behavior-pattern of an empiric individual
in all of his interpersonal and group relations. Personality is thus indicated to
be a dynamic quality.”71 “Personality structure is the individual’s structural and
dynamic traits reflected in his typical mode of reaction, thought and behavior
in various situations.”72 The dynamic-psychic energy, which Freud described as
an inherent force within the individual and which is susceptible to the influence
of environmental stimuli and provoked into manifestation in the context of envi-
ronmental stimuli, tends to determine the particular pathway the individual will
take to fulfilling a need, motive, or incentive, to wit the process of personalizing
motivation, and to shape the particular behaviors the individual enacts.73 The
internal interactions among component elements inherent in the dynamic struc-
ture of personality not only provide driving forces for human behavioral choices,
68 Klausmeier, Herbert John., & Ripple, Richard E. (1971). Learning and Human Abilities:
Educational Psychology. New York, NY: Harper & Row, p. 554.
House, pp. 343–344.

70 West, Roger. (1986). Philosophy and Evolution: The Evolution of Philosophy and the Philosophy
of Evolution. Columbia, SC: Summerhouse Press, p. 298.

71 Wilcox, Lloyd. (1942). Group Structure and Personality Types Among the Sioux Indians of North
Dakota. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 69.

72 Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics 42, 37 (1985).
73 Hogan, Robert., & Jones, Warren H., eds. (1991). Perspectives in Personality (Part 1). Shoals,
IN: Kingsley, p. 45.

but also constitute internal factors that account for the fact that an individual is
likely to suffer frustrations and illnesses when making behavioral choices.
F. “Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes that the human organism is constantly,
though slowly, changing through perpetual interactions, and that, therefore, the
human personality can be conceived of as a locus of change with fragile and
indefinite boundaries. It suggests that research should focus not only on studies
of traits, attitudes, and motives but also on studies that reflect the psychoanalytic
view that personality never ceases to develop and that even the rate of personality
modification changes during the course of a life. Although the theory holds that
conflict and such basic drives as sex and aggression figure prominently in person-
ality development and functioning, their presence may be neither recognizable
nor comprehensible to persons untrained to look for those motives. However,
personality characteristics are relatively stable over time and across situations.”74
“It was widely believed that personality patterns are established during child-
hood and adolescence and then remain relatively stable over the rest of the life
span.”75 “We have just pointed out that the personality of an individual is not
absolutely fixed or unchanging. We have noted that personality goes through
a process of growth, development and change during a lifetime.”76 “In other
words, personality is characterized by change and stability, by consistency and
transformation. … the basic personality structure of the individual remains rela-
tively stable or is not significantly affected by the passage of time.”77 Hence we
may safely assert that the internal structure of personality as well as the behav-
ioral choice on the part of a human personality is characterized by change and
transformation as well as by stability and consistency.
G. “Personality includes behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that
distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in people’s rela-
tions to the environment and to the social group.”78 To put it another way,
by personality we mean “the totality of inherited and acquired psychic quali-
ties which are characteristic of one individual and which make the individual
unique.”79 According to Prince Morton, personality can be seen as “the sum total
of biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, aptitudes and instincts
of the individual and the dispositions and tendencies acquired by experience.”80
W. Brown was of the view that “personality is the total differentiation which the
74 Holzman, P.S. (2020, February 24). Personality. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britan

75 Zanden, James Wilfrid Vander. (1985). Human Development. New York, NY: A. A. Knopf, p. 480.
76 Skaggs, Ernest Burton. (1935). A Textbook of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology. Boston,
MA: Christopher Publishing House, p. 413.

77 McKenzie, Sheila C. (1980). Aging and Old Age. Northbrook, IL: Scott Foresman, p. 134.
78 Holzman, P. S. (2020, February 24). Personality. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britan
79 Maddi, Salvatore R., ed. (1971). Perspectives on Personality: A Comparative Approach. London,
UK: Little, Brown, p. 330.

House, p. 344.
individual makes by incorporating the inherited and acquired powers to stimu-

late and to activate the imagination of others in art, science and public affairs
and also to live in and partake of a super-individual and super temporal world
of values.”81 It is therefore evident that personality is the combination of innate
inherited qualities (traits or characteristics) and acquired learning experiences.
The innate inherited traits (qualities or characteristics) form the biological basis
of personality, while the acquired learning itself, which is “the process of change
in behavior resulting from experience or practice,”82 serves as the key to the
formation of personality.
H. Personality is a product of the socialization process. “Sociologists almost univer-
sally view personality as the product of socialization, although the role of biology,
particularly as a transmitter of potentialities, is not ignored.”83 “Sociologists
refer to the overall process through which an individual develops personality as
socialization.”84 “Human personality is a product of experience in a socializa-
tion process and the resulting structure varies with the nature and conditions of
such experience.”85 “Socialization is the broad learning process by which we
acquire the attitudes and values of our culture.”86 “From the perspective the indi-
vidual, socialization is the complex learning process through which individuals
develop selfhood and acquire the knowledge, skills, and motivations required
for participation in social life.”87 “Socialization is the process by which an indi-
vidual’s personality is developed.”88 “Nevertheless, the socialization process
never ends with adolescence, but rather continues throughout a person’s entire
life … an individual’s personality is largely a product of his social environment,
as acquired through social interaction.”89 “The basic personality type is a product
of socialization in a particular society.”90 “Each individual, as a personality, is a
product not only of existing relations, but also of all previous history.”91 “Social
learning theorists believe that learning is the key to understanding personal-
ity” and that “your interactions with your environment determine much of what
81 Ibid., pp. 343–345.

82 Craig, Grace J. (1989). Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 23.
83 Perry, John Ambrose, & Seidler, Murray Benjamin. (1973). Patterns of Contemporary Society:
An Introduction to Social Science. San Francisco, CA; Canfield Press, p. 66.

84 Ibid., p. 110.
85 The Journal of Asian Studies 747: 31 (1972).
86 Craig, Grace J. (1989). Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 23.
87 Hagedorn, Robert. (1983). Essentials of Sociology. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of
Canada, p. 60.
88 Rogers, Everett M., & Burdge, Rabel J. (1972). Social Change in Rural Societies. New York,
NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, p. 64.

89 Olsen, Marvin Elliott. (1968). The Process of Social Organization. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, p. 121.

90 Merrill, Francis Ellsworth. (1965). Society and Culture: An Introduction to Sociology. Hoboken,
NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 197.

91 Heiliger, Wilhelm. (1980). Soviet and Chinese Personalities. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, p. 27.
you become.”92 “A behavioral approach suggests that learning is the process

that shapes personality and that learning takes place through experience.”93 “An
individual’s basic personality and behavioral tendencies are seen as results of
previous learning experience.”94 “In a broad sense, then, common values shape
and control all social life as they are expressed through norms, which are insti-
tutionalized in collectivities and internalized within personalities.”95 Thus it can
be seen that an individual’s learning experiences, social values and behavioral
trainings contribute significantly (or substantially) to the formation and devel-
opment of personality. The process of socialization of the personality can be
understood as referring to the process of personality formation and development,
which could be formulated as follows: “Personality as a product of socializa-
tion comes about as a result of the interplay of various factors, including our
biological inheritance or heredity, the cultural environment, social groups and
social structures, and past experiences. … For almost a century, there has been
a continuing debate among social scientists on how much of what we are and
who we are result from heredity (nature) and how much is determined by our
socio-cultural environment (nurture). Those who view nature as the determining
factor of personality maintain that an individual’s traits and social behavior are
the product of heredity or ‘nature.’ The kind of individual one becomes is genet-
ically preordained and the human social drama is a predetermined genetic script.
The other view holds that individual traits and social behavior are the product
of experience and learning (nurture), and one’s personality depends on the envi-
ronment and the way one is raised, and the social scripts are a result of one’s own
making.”96 Likewise, culture can be defined as the sum total of human creation.
On the one hand culture and personality influence each other, condition each
other, and shape each other, but on the other, the two entities are inseparable
from each other and undergo simultaneous development.
I. Personality is the unity of two lives within us: the one, the natural life, tending
surely to decay; the other, the spiritual life, tending to perfection. Man differs
essentially from the animal, not only because he possesses both the natural and
supernatural life in himself, but also because “an animal forms only in accordance
with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man
knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and
knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object.”97 To put it
92 McConnell, James V., & Philipchalk, Ronald P. (1992). Understanding Human Behavior. New
York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, p. 445.
93 Lefton, Lester A., & Valvatne, Laura. (1986). Mastering Psychology. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon, p. 456.
94 Proceedings—Academy of Management (Issue 3 of Michigan business papers), 1973, p. 283.
95 Olsen, Marvin Elliott. (1968). The Process of Social Organization. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, p. 256.

96 Panopio, Isabel S., &Rolda, Realidad Santico. (2007). Society and Culture: An Introduction to
Sociology and Anthropology. Quezon City, PH: Katha Publishing Co., Inc., p. 102.
97 Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (Martin Milligan, Trans.). Moscow:
Progressive Publishers, 1959.

2 A Critical Commentary on Classical Theories of Personality 283
another way, “man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory
he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object,
but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats
himself as a universal and therefore a free being. The life of the species, both
in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal)
lives on organic nature; … For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears
to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to
maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is
life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is
contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s
species-character.”98 “Of all organized beings with which we are acquainted,
there are none in which are so wonderfully united the three different kinds of
life.”99
2 A Critical Commentary on Classical Theories

of Personality
Personality structure refers to the way in which constituent elements of person-

ality structure interconnect and interact with each other in an organic manner at
all times and in all places, whereby personality structure can be conceived as the
organic organization of constituent elements inherent in the personality. Not only
does personality structure afford the intrinsic basis for the behavioral choice on the
part of a human personality, but it also asserts itself as the source of motive power
for the personality’s behavioral choice in its own right. Personality structure, which
is a real entity, has been well likened to a mysterious “black box” whose contents
cannot be examined objectively. The basic personality traits as well as the component
elements inherent in the personality structure characterized by great complexity inte-
grate various functions and hence form a powerful source of stability of the person. In
view of the fact that the structure of human personality is neither visible nor tangible,
we can only form a judgment by inference from both ends of the structure of human
personality, by which we mean, respectively, the input end of the structure of human
personality, that is, the environmental stimulus that a human personality receives,
and the output end of the structure of human personality, or rather, the behavioral
choice on the part of a human personality. Suppose we cultivate a knowledge of
both ends of the structure of human personality in our mind—that is, the environ-
mental stimulus that a human personality receives and the behavioral choice on the
part of a human personality, we can assuredly infer the structure of human person-
ality from these known facts. Supposing that we have learned about the structure of
human personality as well as either end of the structure of human personality, i.e.
98Ibid.
99Paine, Martyn. (1872). Physiology of the Soul and Instinct, as Distinguished from Materialism:
With Supplementary Demonstrations of the Divine Communication of the Narratives of Creation
and the Flood. New York, NY: Harper, p. 24.
either the environmental stimulus that a human personality receives or the behavioral
choice on the part of a human personality, then we can definitely infer the other end
of the structure of human personality from these known facts. The above method
for the scholarly investigation and scientific examination of the structure of human
personality tends to be characterized by complexity and indirectness, thus causing
uncertainty in the interpretation of the structure of human personality. This method
for the study of personality structure constitutes the major reason for the existence
of the fact that human knowledge on the structure of human personality has been
scanty, inaccurate, and incomplete (one-sided or partial) for thousands of years. If
we look at the structure of human personality from such an angle we’ll see that man
has been faced with the difficult task of understanding and revealing personality
structure and what an arduous task man has set for himself! Looking back on the
course of the history of civilization—or, to put it another way, in taking a retrospec-
tive glance over the recorded history of mankind, covering nearly 5000 years, we
will assuredly find that Chinese and foreign scholars (including some theorists) from
ancient times to the present have never ceased their serious and assiduous efforts to
gain a fresh and deeper insight into the structure of human personality, and that there
have been dozens of such competing theories put forward, which make an extensive
literature of speculation on this intriguing subject, on the one hand, and embody the
admirable results of their own original researches on the other. It is regrettable that
their conscientious and unremitting endeavors failed to provide the key to a true and
complete understanding of the structure of human personality, but we’ll be relieved
to find that their efforts paved the way for worthy successors’ continuous and inde-
fatigable researches on this question upon which just at the present time there is much
controversy. Though their ingenuous but hazardous attempts at attaining a complete
and exhaustive or comprehensive knowledge of personality structure failed, every
failure constitutes a stepping stone to reaching a wiser solution of this question. In
so doing they have made substantial contributions of permanent value to the sum of
human knowledge as well as to our knowledge of the structure of human personality.
In view of this, we should make a painstaking and conscientious study of the basic
tenets underlying some of the classical theories of personality, as well as making an
intelligent and subtle analysis of them, in order appropriately to absorb the essence
and discard the dross, whereby we can establish the theory of “structure and choice”
that can be used as the basis for a theoretical conception of personality structure.
2.1 The Ancient Chinese and Western Theories of Personality
In the early days of human civilization a multitude of eminent scholars in Chinese

and Western countries made serious and indefatigable researches on the structure
of human personality, which gave them fascinating insights into this absorbing but
perplexing question and which stimulated them to advance numerous ingenious and
enlightening theories. The light thrown upon the structure of human personality
by some ancient Chinese and Western philosophers has revealed it in a rational
perspective. The various postulated versions of personality structure tend to give

prominence to the rational qualities inherent in individual human beings—or, to put
it another way, their respective theories of personality structure are fundamentally
marked by the rational qualities with which an individual human being is endowed.
“Confucius was a ju and the founder of the Ju school, which has been known in the
West as the Confucian school.”100 The Ju school is the Ju chia or School of Literati.
This school is known in Western literature as the Confucianist school, but the word ju
literally means “literatus” or scholar. Thus the Western title is somewhat misleading,
because it misses the implication that the followers of this school were scholars as well
as thinkers; they, above all others, were the teachers of the ancient classics and thus the
inheritors of the ancient cultural legacy. Confucius, to be sure, is the leading figure of
this school and may rightly be considered as its founder. Nevertheless the term ju not
only denotes “Confucian” or “Confucianist,” but has a wider implication as well.101
“Confucius, however, was more than a ju in the common sense of the word. It is true
that in the Analects we find him, from one point of view, being portrayed merely as an
educator. He wanted his disciples to be ‘rounded men’ who would be useful to state
and society, and therefore he taught them various branches of knowledge based upon
the different classics. His primary function as a teacher, he felt, was to interpret to his
disciples the ancient cultural heritage. That is why, in his own words as recorded in
the Analects, he was ‘a transmitter and not an originator.’ But this is only an aspect
of Confucius, and there is another one as well. This is that, while transmitting the
traditional institutions and ideas, Confucius gave them interpretations derived from
his own moral concepts. ... In this way Confucius was more than a mere transmitter,
for in transmitting, he originated something new. This spirit of originating through
transmitting was perpetuated by the followers of Confucius, by whom, as the classical
texts were handed down from generation to generation, countless commentaries and
interpretations were written. ... This is what set Confucius apart from the ordinary
literati of his time, and made him the founder of a new school. Because the followers
of this school were at the same time scholars and specialists on the Six Classics,
the school became known as the School of the Literati.”102 Confucius entertains a
deep-seated respect for the personality of a superior man, the very essence of which
tends to manifest itself in the fact that the superior man, or more specifically, a
man of great benevolence of character, should be filled with benevolence toward
his fellow-men—or, to put it another way, his benevolence must of necessity cause
him to love all men, (Analects, XII, 22).103 and that the superior man, or rather, the
man of perfect virtue, “seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and doesn’t
seek to perfect their bad qualities.” (Analects, XII, 16).104 “With regard to the virtue
100 Feng, You-Lan (or Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. Tianjin,
China: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, p. 64.
101 Ibid., pp. 48, 50, 64.
102 Ibid., p. 66.
103 Legge, James. (1867). The Life and Teachings of Confucius: With Explanatory Notes. London,
UK: Trübner & Co., 60, Paternoster Row, p. 198.

104 Ibid., p. 196.
of the individual, Confucius emphasized human-heartedness and righteousness (yi),

especially the former. ... The idea of yi is rather formal, but that of jen (human-
heartedness) is much more concrete. The formal essence of the duties of man in
society is their ‘oughtness,’ because all these duties are what he ought to do. But the
material essence of these duties is ‘loving others,’ i.e., jen or human-heartedness.
... Confucius says: ‘Human-heartedness consists in loving others.’ (Analects, XII,
22). The man who really loves others is one able to perform his duties in society.
Hence in the Analects we see that Confucius sometimes uses the word jen not only
to denote a special kind of virtue, but also to denote all the virtues combined, so
that the term ‘man of jen’ becomes synonymous with the man of all-round virtue. In
such contexts, jen can be translated as ‘perfect virtue.’”105 In the Analects we find
the passage: “When Chung Kung asked about perfect virtue (jen), the master said:
‘.... Do not do to others as you would not wish done to yourself ....’” (Analects, XII,
2).106 Again, Confucius is reported in the Analects as saying: “The man of jen is one
who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself,
develop others. To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel for the treatment
of others; that may be called the way to practice jen.” (Analects, VI, 28).107 To put
it another way, “Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself,
seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge
others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves;—this may be
called the art of virtue.” (Analects, VI, 28).108 “Thus the practice of jen consists in
consideration for others. ‘Desiring to sustain oneself, one sustains others; desiring to
develop oneself, one develops others.’ In other words: ‘Do to others what you wish
yourself.’ This is the positive aspect of the practice, which was called by Confucius
chung or ‘conscientiousness to others.’ And the negative aspect, which was called by
Confucius shu or ‘altruism,’ is: ‘Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself.’
The practice as a whole is called the principle of chung and shu, which is ‘the way to
practice jen.’”109 “The principle of chung and shu is at the same time the principle
of jen, so that the practice of chung and shu means the practice of jen. And this
practice leads to the carrying out of one’s responsibilities and duties in society, in
which is comprised the quality of yi or righteousness. Hence the principle of chung
and shu beomes the alpha and omega of one’s moral life. ... Everyone has within
himself the ‘measuring square’ for conduct, and can use it at any time. So simple as
this is the method of practicingjen, so that Confucius said: ‘Is virtue a thing remote?




I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand.’” (Analects, VII, 29).110 To put it
another way, “Is jen indeed far off? I crave for jen, and lo! jen is at hand!” (Analects,
VII, 29).111 In the Analects, Confucius enlightened us about the threefold Way of
an exemplary person (or a superior man). Here the Way or Truth means Tao. The
Master said: “Set your heart on the Tao.” (Analects, VII, 6). And again: “To hear the
Tao in the morning and then die at night, that would be all right.” (Analects, IV, 9).
It was this Tao which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now
call “learning” means the increase of our knowledge, but the Tao is that whereby
we can elevate our mind.112 This is why Confucius said, “The Way of an exemplary
person (or a superior man) is threefold, but I am unable to accomplish them: the
wise are free from perplexities (or doubts); the virtuous from anxiety; and the bold
(or the brave) from fear.” (Analects, IX, 28).113 It is thus clear that, according to
Confucianism, the various aspects of a superior man’s character can be reduced to
his “humanity,” “wisdom,” and “valor.” “In the Taoist work, the Chuang-tzu, we see
that the Taoists often ridiculed Confucius as one who confined himself to the morality
of human-heartedness and righteousness, thus being conscious only of moral values,
and not super-moral values. Superficially they were right, but actually they were
wrong.”114 In actual fact, Confucius, who is equipped with a higher ambition than that
of worldly honors, is a man of vast worldly experience as well as a man of extensive
learning, whose genuine knowledge was invariably acquired through diligent study,
serious reflection and widened (or enlarged) experience. Thus speaking about his own
spiritual development, Confucius said: “At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning.
At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of heaven.
At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could
follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right.” (Analects, II,
4)115 To put it another way, “At fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I could
stand. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Decrees of Heaven. At sixty I
was already obedient [to this Decree]. At seventy I could follow the desires of my
mind without overstepping the boundaries [of what is right].” (Analects, II, 4)116
“His statement that at forty he had no doubts means that he had then become a wise
man. For, as quoted before, ‘The wise are free from doubts.’ Up to this time of his
life Confucius was perhaps conscious only of moral values. But at the age of fifty

112 Ibid., p. 74.




and sixty, he knew the Decree of Heaven and was obedient to it. In other words, he
was then also conscious of super-moral values. Confucius in this respect was like
Socrates. Socrates thought that he had been appointed by a divine order to awaken
the Greeks, and Confucius had a similar consciousness of a divine mission.”117 For
example, when he was threatened with physical violence at a place called K’uang,
he said: “If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish, then I, a future
mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not
let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K’uang do to me?” (Analects,
IX, 5).118 To put it another way, “If Heaven had wished to let civilization perish,
later generations (like myself) would not have been permitted to participate in it. But
since Heaven had not wished to let civilization perish, what can the people of K’uang
do to me?” (Analects, IX, 5).119 One of his contemporaries also said: “The empire
has long been without the principles of truth and right; Heaven is going to use your
master as a bell with its wooden tongue.” (Analects, III, 24).120 To put it another
way, “The world for long has been without order. But now Heaven is going to use the
Master as an arousing tocsin.” (Analects, III, 24).121 “Thus Confucius in doing what
he did, was convinced that he was following the Decree of Heaven and was supported
by Heaven; he was conscious of values higher than moral ones.”122 According to
Confucianism, the superior man should manifest illustrious virtue throughout the
world, order well his own state, bring peace to the world, love the people, and rest
in the highest good. “The Great Learning was attributed by the Neo-Confucianists,
though with no real proof, to Tseng Tzu, one of the chief disciples of Confucius.”
As the opening section of the Great Learning reads, “Things being investigated,
only then did their knowledge become extended. Their knowledge being extended,
only then did their thought become sincere. Their thought being sincere, only did
their mind become rectified. Their mind being rectified, only then did their selves
become cultivated. Their selves being cultivated, only then did their families become
regulated. Their families being regulated, only then did their states become rightly
governed. Their states being rightly governed, only then could the world be at peace.
... In the above quotation, the steps preceding the cultivation of one’s own self, such
as the investigation of things, extension of knowledge, etc., are the ways and means
for cultivating the self. And the steps following the cultivation of the self, such as the
regulation of the family, etc., are the ways and means for cultivating the self to its
highest perfection, or as the text says, for ‘resting in the highest good.’ Man cannot
develop his nature to perfection unless he tries his best to do his duties in society.
117 Ibid., p. 76.




122 Ibid.
He cannot perfect himself without at the same time perfecting others. ‘To manifest
one’s illustrious virtue’ is the same as ‘to cultivate one’s self.’ The former is merely
the content of the latter. Thus several ideas are reduced to a single idea, which is
central in Confucianism. It is unnecessary that one should be head of a state or of
some world organization, before one can do something to bring good order to the
state and peace to the world. One should merely do one’s best to do good for the state
as a member of the state, and do good for the world as a member of the world. One is
then doing one’s full share of bringing good order to the state and peace to the world.
By thus sincerely trying to do one’s best, one is resting in the highest good.”123
By throwing considerable further light upon the rational qualities inherent in
individual human beings, Mencius developed orthodox Confucianism, especially the
classical Confucian personality theory, and thus he was venerated by later generations
as the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius. Mencius
represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism. The Mencius in seven books records
the conversations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time as well as between
him and his disciples, and in later time it was honored by being made one of the
famous “Four Books,” which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis
of Confucian education.124 Mencius said: “The feeling of commiseration belongs to
all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that
of right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence
(or human-heartedness); that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness;
that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of right and wrong,
the principle of wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not
infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them.”125 To support his
theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: “All men
have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others… If now men suddenly
see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling
of alarm and distress… From this case we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling
of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not
a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he
who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the
beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of
righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The
sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings,
just as he has four limbs… Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves,
let them know how to give them full development and completion. The result will
be like fire that begins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them
have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four
seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one’s
123 Ibid., pp. 298, 300.

124 Ibid., p. 110.

parents.” (Mencius, IIa, 6).126 All men in their original nature possess these “four
beginnings,” which, if fully developed, become the four “constant virtues,” so greatly
emphasized in Confucianism. These virtues, if not hindered by external conditions,
develop naturally from within, just as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a
flower from the bud. There remains another question, which is: Why should man
allow free development to his “four beginnings,” instead of to what we may call his
lower instincts? Mencius answers that it is these four beginnings that differentiate
man from the beasts. They should be developed, therefore, because it is only through
their development that man is truly a “man.”(Mencius, IVb, 19).127 For Mencius, on
the one hand human nature is a social tendency which is inborn, but on the other, it
consists of natural qualities, which is to say, Mencius maintained that man has two
essences: One is man’s natural essence; the other is man’s social essence. By man’s
natural essence, Mencius means that human desires for food and sex are directly
associated with physical form, which is to say, ordinary human desires for food and
sex are our natural physical or psychological instincts, and that our mouths have a
common taste for flavor.128 Mencius means by man’s social essence that all men in
their original nature possess these four “constant virtues” such as human-heartedness,
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom.129 Herein, in fact, lies the essential difference
between man and the animals in the Mencius sense of the term. Animals may be said
to possess the pure essence of nature, which Mencius calls the material senses xiao
ti (the small, 小体), whilst man is a social being as well as a natural being—or to put
it another way, man possesses the natural essence as well as the social nature, which
is rightly described as the reflecting and thinking mind/heart da ti (the great, 大体)
in the Mencius. If man allows free development to his lower instincts, that is, his
natural essence (the small, 小体), instead of to what we may call his “four virtues,”
or rather, his social nature (the great, 大体), he will be called a “little man” who does
not differ essentially from birds or beasts. Mencius says: “A man who only eats and
drinks is counted mean by others;—because he nourishes what is little to the neglect
of what is great. If a man, fond of his eating and drinking, were not to neglect what is
of more importance, how should his mouth and belly be considered as no more than
an inch of skin? Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great,
and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the
ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who
nourishes the great is a great man. Those who follow that part of themselves which
is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men. The
senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When
one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To
127 Ibid., p. 114.
128 Chedu, Chǒng. (2020). The Great Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea:
The Chonǒn (Testament). (Edward Y. J. Chung, Trans.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 257.

the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things;
by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what
Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler
part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It
is simply this which makes the great man.” (Mencius, XIV, 2, 5, 6; XV, 2).130 For
Mencius, the function of the mind/heart is to reflect or think. It is this mind/heart,
Mencius says, that enables man to think or reflect. It is only by thinking or reflecting
that man is truly a man. Specifically, it is only by thinking or reflecting that the
“four beginnings”—the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and
respect, and the sense of right and wrong, which, he says, are inherent in man’s
nature, when elevated or developed, may result in the “four constant virtues,” that is,
“goodness,” “righteousness,” “propriety,” and “wisdom,” whereby man can become
a “superior man.” It is therefore clear that Mencius tries to build up a new personality
theory whose origin, formation, and development rightly deserve deep and extensive
discussion.
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato, whose voluminous writings on almost every
conceivable subject constitute a veritable encyclopedia of ancient Greek thought, and
who “is, by any reckoning, one of the most penetrating, wide-ranging, and influential
authors in the history of philosophy,”131 also advanced his own personality theory
by throwing considerable further light upon the rational qualities inherent in indi-
vidual human beings. The widely known tribute paid to him by the philosopher and
mathematician Alfred North Whitehead may attest to Plato’s relation to the Western
philosophical tradition: “The safest general characterization of the European philo-
sophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean
the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his
writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.”132 As the
distinguished Cambridge professor Simon Blackburn points out, Plato’s best-known
work The Republic, which “is commonly regarded as the culminating achievement
of Plato as a philosopher and writer,”133 has proven to be one of the world’s most
influential works of philosophy and political theory, both intellectually and histor-
ically, and has been the cornerstone of Western philosophy for over two thousand
years.134 Norbert Blössner argues that the Republic is best understood as an anal-
ysis of the workings and moral improvement of the individual soul with remarkable
131 Kraut, Richard, “Plato”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/plato/.

132 Griffin, D. R., & Sherburne, D. W., eds. (1978). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology.
New York, NY: Free Press, p. 39. cf. Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic:
A Biography. London, UK: Atlantic Books.
133 Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic: A Biography. London, UK:
Atlantic Books.
134 National Public Radio (8 August, 2007). “Plato’s ‘Republic’ Still Influential, Author Says.” Talk
of the Nation.
thoroughness and clarity.135 In the dialogue of the Republic, Socrates, who “is the
first and greatest liberal hero and martyr to freedom in thought and speech,”136 made
very wise reflections and observations upon the possibility of an ideal personality. In
his treatise the Republic, Plato established the personality theory about the tripartite
soul, which is to say, the Platonic soul consists of three parts which are located in
different regions of the body. Animals and plants possess only lower souls. What
distinguishes man from the lower orders of creation is thus that man alone has a
higher soul, that is, the rational soul, whereby man is a species-being most similar to
God and therefore dear to him. According to Plato, the soul has three distinguishable
layers, or levels: The lowest layer of the soul is described as man’s appetites (temper-
ance), the second layer is called the spirit (courage), and the third layer is what Plato
described as reason (wisdom). For Plato, just as men are made out of three metals,
gold, silver, and bronze (or iron), so there are three kinds of people in any society:
The philosopher-king, whose soul is made of gold, is the embodiment of wisdom
and virtue. He knows the statesmanship and statecraft while governing the state.
The guardians, whose souls are made of silver, whose virtue is to be courageous,
and whose purpose is to direct the state with the virtue of wisdom, are suited to
protect the state. Those lesser people such as farmers, craftsmen, and traders, whose
souls are composed of bronze and iron and whose virtue is to practice temperance in
appetites and passions, should be engaged in productive and economic activities, and
thus provide all necessary goods and services for their fellow countrymen.137 Thus
it can be seen that Plato divides the community into three classes or professions,
i.e., the wise rulers, the auxiliary protectors and the working class of producers.138
According to him, if the three classes can perform their own functions faithfully and
resign themselves to their own destinies, unity and harmony will prevail in the State
in that justice, or the public virtue, tends to grow with the specialization of func-
tions.139 For Plato, slaves in ancient Greece were deprived of personality in the legal
sense (servus non habet personam). It is thus clear that the light thrown upon the
structure of human personality by Plato in the Republic has revealed it in a rational
perspective, and that, in a similar way, in the early days of human civilization a
multitude of eminent scholars in Chinese and Western countries invariably provided
a rational insight into the structure of human personality. Their respective theories
of personality structure tend to throw considerable further light upon the rational
qualities inherent in individual human beings.
135 Blössner, Norbert. “The City-Soul Analogy.” (G. R. F. Ferrari, Trans.). In The Cambridge
Companion to Plato’s Republic, eds. G. R. F. Ferrari & Giovanni R. F. Ferrari, 345–385. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
136 Blackburn, Simon. (2007). “Introduction.” In Plato’s Republic: A Biography. London, UK:
Atlantic Books.
137 Gao, Qing-Hai. (1990). Essentials of European Philosophical History(new edition). Changchun,
China: Jilin People’s Publishing House, pp. 91–93.

138 Reeves, M. Francis. (2004). Platonic Engagements: A Contemporary Dialogue on Morality,
139 Jayapalan, N. (2002). Comprehensive Study of Plato. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic Publishers and
2.2 The Freudian Theory of Personality Structure
In modern times, a number of notable scholars put forward many ingenious theories
about the structure of human personality, which, regrettably, were far from providing
a comprehensive knowledge of personality structure, but which in great leaps have
carried forward our understanding of personality structure. Several representative
theories may be adduced to support this argument.
Sigmund Freud, who was an Austrian neuropsychologist, psychoanalyst, the
founder of psychoanalysis, and one of the major intellectual figures of the 20th
century,140 aimed to “throw light upon the unusual, abnormal, or pathological mani-
festations of the mind” by tracing them to the psychological forces that produced
them,141 and formulated the original psychoanalytic theory of personality structure.
“Freud may justly be called the most influential intellectual legislator of his age. His
creation of psychoanalysis was at once a theory of the human psyche, a therapy for
the relief of its ills, and an optic for the interpretation of culture and society. Despite
repeated criticisms, attempted refutations, and qualifications of Freud’s work, its
spell remained powerful well after his death. If, as the American sociologist Philip
Rieff once contended, ‘psychological man’ replaced such earlier notions as political,
religious, or economic man as the twentieth century’s dominant self-image, it is in no
measure due to the power of Freud’s vision and the seeming inexhaustibility of the
intellectual legacy he left behind.”142 “Sigmund Freud’s contribution to psycholog-
ical knowledge and treatment is remarkably comprehensive in that he developed not
only the psychoanalytic theory of personality development and functioning, but the
treatment model that follows from the theory as well.”143 Freud advanced his own
ingenious theory about the structure of human personality by dividing the human
psyche into three portions, that is, the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” and further devel-
oping a model of psychic structure comprising the three provinces of the psychic
apparatus, viz. the “id,” “ego,” and “superego,” which he discussed in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle (1920) and expounded in The Ego and the Id (1923), to capture the
dynamics of the mind, which is to say, the three agents are theoretical constructs that
describe the activities and interactions of the mental life of a person. He proposed that
the structure of human personality could be divided into three parts, or rather, the “id,”
“ego,” and “superego.” “In the tripartite structural theory, Freud placed sexual and
aggressive instincts in a special part of the mind called the id, which he believed to be
a completely unorganized, primordial reservoir of instinctual energies under domina-
tion of primary process. The id, therefore, belonged to the unconscious, though was
140 Jay, M. Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2, 2021. https://www.britan
nica.com/biography/Sigmund-Freud.
141 “Freud, Sigmund.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 15
Apr. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

142 Jay, M. Evan. “Sigmund Freud.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2, 2021. https://www.britan
nica.com/biography/Sigmund-Freud.
143 Hersen, Michel, & Van Hasselt, Vincent B. eds. (1994). Advanced Abnormal Psychology. New
York, NY: Plenum Press, p. 404.

not coextensive with it. The instinctual drives were biologically given, hereditary, and
concerned only with seeking immediate discharge.”144 The id is the one of the three
divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is completely unconscious and
that is the source of psychic energy derived from instinctual needs and drives. The
“id,” whose basic biological needs are primarily sexual, or rather, libidinal drives,
is the most primitive component of the human personality that comes into being at
birth, and is the source of basic biological needs and drives, emotional impulses and
desires, including sexual and aggressive motives. The “Id,” which is unconscious,
operates on the pleasure principle, according to which it tries to seek pleasure, avoid
pain, and gain immediate gratification of instinctive drives and impulses. It’s filled
with basic biological energy reaching it from the instincts, but only a striving to bring
about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure
principle.145 Freud called the “id” the “true psychic reality” because it represents the
inner world of subjective experience, with no knowledge of objective reality. The
“id” seeks immediate gratification without regard to personal or social consequences
or to external reality in general, that is, it mediates between its biological and psycho-
logical needs on the one hand and external reality on the other. Freud even believed
that libido was the ultimate driving energy in human affairs and considered libido
to be the ultimate driving force behind every human action. He maintained that, in
the final analysis, it is the sexual drive or instinct (libido) that determines whether
people are happy or sad, whether they desire wealth, status, or fame, or whether
they launch a war or conclude a peace. Developmentally, the id precedes the ego;
the psychic apparatus begins, at birth, as an undifferentiated id, part of which then
develops into a structured ego.146 The “ego” is the one of the three divisions of
the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that serves as the organized conscious medi-
ator between the person and reality especially by functioning both in the perception
of/and adaptation to reality. Conscious awareness resides in the ego, although not
all of the operations of the ego are conscious.147 The ego represents what may be
called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions
and impulses.148 Hence the ego helps us to organize our thoughts and make sense of
them and the world around us. For Freud, the ego acts according to the reality prin-
ciple, which is a regulating mechanism that enables the individual to delay gratifying
immediate needs and function effectively in the real world.149 Accordingly, it seeks
to please the id’s drive in realistic ways that, in the long term, bring benefit, rather
144 Nicholi, Armand M. (1999). The Harvard Guide to Psychiatry. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, p. 177.

146 Ramachandran, Vilayanur S., ed. (2012). Encyclopedia of Human Behavior. Cambridge, MA:
Academic Press, pp. 393–399.

148 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology (James Strachey, Trans.).

149 Schacter, Daniel L., Wegner, Daniel M., & Gilbert, Daniel T. (2008). Psychology. New York,
NY: Macmillan Higher Education.

than grief.150 As the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct
influence of the external world,151 it attempts to mediate between id and reality, find
a balance between primitive drives and reality while satisfying the id and super-ego,
and bring about harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.152
Freud concedes that the ego serves three severe masters, that is, the external world,
the super-ego, and the id, that the ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego,
and repulsed by reality, has to do its best to suit all three, thus is constantly feeling
hemmed by the danger of causing discontent on two other sides, and that the ego
seems to be more loyal to the id, preferring to gloss over the finer details of reality
to minimize conflicts while pretending to have a regard for reality.153 In Freudian
theory the ego is the psychic system that mediates between the id and the superego
to get our needs met. The ego meets the needs of the id in a reasonable, moral
manner approved by the superego, which is what Freud called the moral guardian,
and which as such observes and guides the ego. Superego is the one of the three
divisions of the psyche in psychoanalytic theory that is only partly conscious, that
represents internalization of parental conscience and the rules of society, and that
functions to reward and punish through a system of moral attitudes, conscience, and
a sense of guilt. The superego, the mental system that reflects the internalization of
cultural rules, mainly learned as parents exercise their authority, consists of a set of
guidelines, internal standards, and other codes of conduct that regulate and control
our behaviors, thoughts, and fantasies. It acts as a kind of conscience, punishing us
when it finds we are doing or thinking something wrong (by producing guilt or other
painful feelings) and rewarding us (with feelings of pride or self-congratulation) for
living up to ideal standards.154 The superego, which acts as the conscience, main-
tains our sense of morality, and controls our sense of right and wrong and guilt,155
whereby it helps us fit into society by getting us to act in socially acceptable ways.156
According to Freud, the installation of the superego can be described as a successful
instance of identification with the parental agency, while as development proceeds
the superego also takes on the influence of those who have stepped into the place
of parents—educators, teachers, and people chosen as ideal models. Thus a child’s
superego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents’
superego. It becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments
150 Noam, Gil G., Hauser, Stuart T., Santostefano, Sebastiano., Garrison, William., Jacobson, Alan
M., Powers, Sally I., & Mead, Merril. “Ego Development and Psychopathology: A Study of Hospi-
talized Adolescents”. Child Development. Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Society for Research
in Child Development. 55(1) (Feb., 1984): 189–194.
151 Freud, Sigmund. (1989). The Ego and the Id: On Metapsychology. (James Strachey, Trans.).


153 Ibid.
155 Sédat, Jacques. (2000). “Freud” in Collection Synthese. Paris; Armand Colin, p. 109.
of value which have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to gener-
ation.157 Hence the superego functions as the guardian of morality as well as the
guardian of civilization. Freud believed that the three portions of the mind—the id,
ego, and superego—are often in conflict, but that the three parts of the psyche interact
with each other within the structure of human personality. The id that is a mass of
instinctive drives and impulses needs immediate satisfaction and wants instant self-
gratification. Hence, whenever the id is striving to bring about the satisfaction of the
instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle158 —the psychic
force oriented to immediate gratification of impulse and desire,159 the ego, which
represents what may be called reason and common sense and which acts according
to the reality principle, either has to hold in check the id’s impulses and passions
and represses them again into the unconscious or allows some of the id’s desires and
wants to be expressed while trying to find a balance between the id, superego, and
reality. The superego, on the one hand, aims for perfection,160 but on the other, it has
to work in contradiction to the id. The super-ego strives to act in a socially appro-
priate manner, controls our sense of right and wrong and guilt,161 and helps us fit into
society by getting us to act in socially acceptable ways.162 Thus it can be seen that
“the ego, driven by the id, confined by the superego, repulsed by reality, struggles to
bring about harmony among the forces and influences working in and upon it.”163 If
the ego tries to satisfy the needs of the id as well as the demands of the superego in
ways that are reasonable and rational, or rather, in ways acceptable to the superego,
that is, if the ego attempts to meet the id’s demands within the limits imposed by
the superego, or when the ego often tries to channel the id’s impulsive demands into
more socially acceptable channels, the development of a normal, healthy person-
ality is to be achieved. On the contrary, if the ego constantly represses the primitive
needs and instinctual demands of the id, forcing them back into the unconscious, the
individual will have problems in living or behave deviantly, and even suffer from an
illness, particularly a neurosis. Psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method, originated
by Sigmund Freud, for treating mental disorders by investigating the interaction of
conscious and unconscious elements in the patient’s mind and bringing repressed
fears and conflicts into the conscious mind, using techniques such as dream interpre-
tation and free association.164 Freud’s psychoanalysis is based on his conception of
158 Ibid., pp. 105–106.
160 Meyers, David G. “Module 44: The Psychoanalytic Perspective”. Psychology Eighth Edition in
Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007.

161 Calian, Florian. (2012). Plato’s Psychology of Action and the Origin of Agency. Paris:


164 Langwith, Jacqueline., ed. (2008). Perspectives on Diseases and Disorders: Depression. San
Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, p. 150.

a person which can be represented by his three schemes for describing the mind, that
is, the human psyche consists of id, ego, and superego, the mind could be divided
into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and the driving force of our action
is the pleasure principle, as well as its derivatives, which is the instinctive seeking
of pleasure and avoiding of pain to satisfy biological and psychological needs.165
It can be safely asserted that in developing a theoretical framework of the structure
of human personality, Freud made a substantial contribution of permanent value
to the study of personality structure by blazing a new and different path towards
true knowledge of personality structure. However, Freudian ideas received scathing
criticisms after his death, because in the Freudian theory a universal sexual motive
was found to have been inherent in the customs and dreams of primitive societies
as well as in the early civilizations. In addition, some severe criticisms were also
leveled at Freud’s exclusively sexualistic stand, including his definition of energy
and libido in a purely sexual sense. The Freudian theory reveals that Freud confines
himself almost exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the psyche.
Nonetheless, his theory concerning the psychological basis of sexuality, especially
the purely sexually defined concept of libido and the exclusively sexual interpreta-
tion of energy, is purely hypothetical and actually pure conjecture. This limitation
compelled Freud to explain man’s psychic energy in exclusively sexual terms, and
to reduce all psychological motives to one single unit, that is, libido. There is today a
growing consensus that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides an inadequate expla-
nation of how the three elements of personality, i.e. the id, ego, and superego, may
exist in dynamic equilibrium or in conflict with one another. It is thus evident that
the deficiencies inherent in the Freudian theory are apparently obvious.
2.3 Karen Horney’s Theory of Personality Structure
Karen Horney (1885–1952), German-born American psychoanalyst whose work

exerted a decisive influence upon the course of psychoanalysis,166 was among the
most influential of 20th-centuray psychologists through her critiques and revisions
of Freudian theory.167 “Horney is sometimes described as a neo-Freudian member of
‘the cultural school,’ a group that also included Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan,
165 Sigmund, Freud. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Chinese edition) (Jue-FuGao,

Trans.). Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984; Sigmund, Freud. The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Chinese edition) (Chen Lin, Huan-MinZhang, &
Wei-Qi Chen, Trans., Rev. Ze-Chuan Chen). Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House,
1986.
166 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan.
167 “Horney, Karen (1885–1952).” Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia.
Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

Clara Thompson, and Abraham Kardiner.”168 As Thompson says: “The contribu-

tions of Sullivan and Fromm have come to be called the ‘cultural school,’ because
of the great emphasis of both on the interpersonal factors in personality forma-
tion and personal difficulties.”169 “Karen Horney was perhaps the first psychoan-
alyst to emphasize the importance of culture.”170 What interests Horney is “the
problem of normal and neurotic structures in a given culture.” She insists that “we
cannot understand these structures without a detailed knowledge of the influences
the particular culture exerts over the individual.”171 “Horney criticizes Freud for
emphasizing biological factors to the exclusion of cultural factors.”172 “Freud’s disre-
gard of cultural factors not only leads to false generalizations,” she says, “but to a
large extent blocks an understanding of the real forces which motivate our attitudes
and actions.”173 “Karen Horney also used culture as a facilitator of the individual’s
developmental patterns. … she developed this argument into a theoretical position
that culture determined the observed frequency of developmental patterns. Thus,
individual factors caused an individual’s development, but cultural factors deter-
mined the frequency with which the pattern was seen in society.”174 “After Karen
Horney immigrated to the United Sates in 1932, her emphasis on cultural deter-
minism became increasingly dominant in her work. By 1939, when she published
New Ways in Psychoanalysis, she had completely rejected Freud’s instinct theory
and adopted a thorough-going cultural determinism.”175 “Her move from Germany
to the United States facilitates this shift in two ways. First, her experience with
a different culture illustrated how powerful culture was in shaping psychological
development. Second, her professional association and close personal relationship
with Erich Fromm and other members of the cultural school served to reinforce and
develop her earlier ideas about the importance of culture.”176 Departing from some
of the basic principles of Sigmund Freud,177 her theories questioned some traditional
168 Adams, Bridget. (2009). The Psychology Companion. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
p. 241.
169 Adams, Michael Vannoy. (2004). The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination.
New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge, p. 133.

170 Ibid.
171 Horney, Karen. (1937). The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York, NY: W. W. Norton,
p. 20.
172 Adams, Michael Vannoy. (2004). The Fantasy Principle: Psychoanalysis of the Imagination.
New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge, p. 133.

173 Horney, Karen. (1937). The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York, NY: W. W. Norton,
pp. 20–1.
174 Kimball, Meredith M., Cole, Ellen., & Rothblum, Esther D. (1995). Feminist Visions of Gender
Similarities and Differences. Binghampton, NY: Haworth Press, pp. 72–73.

175 Ibid., p. 73. See also Westkott, Marcia. (1986). The Feminist Legacy of Karen Horney. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 57–65.

176 Ibid. See also Holland, Dorothy., & Quinn, Naomi., eds. (1987). Cultural Models in Language
and Thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–274, 277–294.

Freudian views, which was particularly true of the theories of sexuality and of the
instinct orientation of psychoanalysis. She disagreed with Freud about inherent differ-
ences in the psychology of men and women, and traced such differences to society
and culture rather than biology.178 She suggested an environmental and social basis
for the personality and its disorders. In her major theoretical works, The Neurotic
Personality of Our Time (1937) and New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), “Horney
stressed that cultural and social conditions, rather than sexual instincts, contribute to
neurosis and sexual disturbances.”179 She argued that environmental and social condi-
tions, rather than the instinctual or biological drives described by Freud, determine
much of individual personality and are the chief causes of neuroses and personality
disorders.180 Horney formulated a theory of psychopathology that was at once more
comprehensive in its scope and more penetrating in its insights. Her ideas, grounded
in clinical experience, are almost totally devoid of the dramatic speculation that
frequently marked the writings of the man she always acknowledged to be her indis-
pensable forerunner, Sigmund Freud.181 Despite these variances with the prevalent
Freudian view, Horney strove to reformulate Freudian thought, presenting a holistic,
humanistic view of the individual psyche which placed much emphasis on cultural
and social differences worldwide. As such, she is often classified as neo-Freudian.182
Horney put forward her own original theory about the structure of human personality,
in which there are three manifestations of the self, that is, the “actual self,” the “real
self,” and the “ideal self.” Following a psychodynamic tradition, Horney defined the
“real self” as an “intrinsic potentiality” or “central inner force, common to all human
beings,”183 or rather, the “original force toward individual growth and fulfillment.”184
She maintained that the “real self” constitutes “the reservoir of spontaneous ener-
gies,”185 which includes the basic physiological and psychological needs, and that
it represents an innate developmental tendency. Hence, the “real self,” according to
Horney, is the potential self who tends to strive for its unfettered growth. For Horney,
the “actual self,” as distinguished from the “real self,” is derived from the sum total
of our actual experiences, and it is the empirical self—that part of the actual self
which is immediately apprehendable and observable at any given moment. She also
defines an “actual self” as “everything a person is at a given time: body and soul,
healthy and neurotic.” The “actual self,” says Horney, is that fluid combination of the
178 Schacter, Daniel L., Gilbert, Daniel Todd., & Wegner, Daniel M. Psychology. New York, NY:
179 Adams, Bridget. (2009). The Psychology Companion. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
p. 241.

181 “Horney, Karen.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com. 13 Jan.
182 “Karen Horney.” en.wikipedia.org. 31 Jan. 2021 <https://www.en.wikipedia.com>.
183 Horney, Karen. Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1950,
p. 17.
184 Ibid., p. 158.
185 Ibid., p. 159.
neurotic and the real that we are in daily existence. According to Horney, the “ideal
self,” as opposed to the “actual self,” may be viewed as neurotic and the source of
the grandiose aspects of the self, and psychologically healthy people, with very few
exceptions, strive to reach an ideal self that is reasonably attainable, which means
that man, by his very nature and of his own accord, strives toward self-realization,
which Horney views as both a “prime moral obligation” and a “prime moral privi-
lege,” and that his set of values evolves from such striving. The consistent struggle
between the “actual self” and the “ideal self” constitutes what Horney refers to as
“the central inner conflict,” which results in excessive compulsions and “shoulds”
that the individual develops to rule his life and hereby finds meaning in life. For a
person who is striving for his ideal self, the natural striving constitutes the central
inner force of his actual self as well as the most serious obstacle to healthy growth,
that is, the neurotic solution which Horney called self-realization, the attempt to
see and to mold oneself into a glorified, idealized, illusory image with strivings for
superiority, power, perfection, and vindictive triumph over others.186 In the case of a
normal person, the actual self is not far removed from the ideal self, but rather they
are tied up with each other. The normal person can adjust the ideal self to the changes
wrought on him, which is to say the normal person can adapt (or accommodate) the
ideal self to the changed or altering conditions of the actual self. When the normal
person has reached his ideals implanted in his or her breast, he or she will pursue new
ideals he or she deems worth cherishing and defending. Hence, where the normal
person is concerned, he or she tends to be motivated by his or her ideals which he or
she can reconcile with the realities of life. By contrast, the neurotic person’s self is
split between an idealized self and a real self. On the one hand, the real self, in the
eyes of a neurotic person, tends to degenerate into a despised self and thus should be
held in contempt because of its coarse and philistine tastes, but on the other, neurotic
individuals tend to feel that the ideal self is imbued with a sense of mystery and
wonder and that they somehow cannot live up to the ideal self. Thus, looked at from
the perspective of a neurotic person, the ideal self is not a natural extension of the real
self, but rather it is divorced from real life and becomes a mere illusion of reality. In
this case, the more persistently a neurotic person pursues his or her ideals, the more
miserable failures he or she may experience, and the more serious illnesses he or she
may suffer accordingly. It must be admitted that Horney’s theory about the struc-
ture of human personality rejected the pansexual Freudian view and corrected this
serious weakness inherent to the Freudian theory, and that she tried to gain a deeper
and fresh insight into the structure of human personality by delving into the central
inner conflict between the “actual self” and the “ideal self.” According to Freud’s
pansexual theory, the neurotic suffers from mental disorder merely because he or
she is unable to achieve sexual satisfaction. In delving into the structure of human
personality, Horney tried to throw considerable further light upon the discrepancy
186 Horney, Karen. The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Chuan Feng, Trans.). Guiyang, China:
Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 1988; Horney, Karen. Our Inner Conflicts (Zuo-Hong Wang,
Trans.). Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Publishing House, 2004; “Karen Danielsen Horney.”
Encyclopedia of World Biography. Encyclopedia.com. 13 Jan. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.
com>.
between the ideal self and the real self, thereby giving us a different perspective on
deviant behaviors and mental illnesses. It can be safely asserted that in developing a
theoretical framework of the structure of human personality, Horney made a substan-
tial contribution of permanent value to the study of personality structure by blazing a
different path towards true knowledge of personality structure as well as by providing
a new perspective on human behavior. Thus it can be seen that Horney’s theory
embodies substantial improvements over Freud’s. However, there are still inherent
weaknesses in her theory. Clearly, human behaviors and motives that are complex
and unpredictable cannot be given a full explanation when viewed from the perspec-
tive of the “actual self” or the “ideal self,” which may keep us from seeing human
behaviors and motives in their various aspects. As a general rule human behavior
has no connection with what it is to be the ideal self, though in some cases human
behavior has something to do with it. Rather, in numerous cases human behavior is
mainly associated with personality judgment. When, for example, a teacher decides
about how to perform an experiment or how to work out a difficult math problem,
or when a student calculates how much two divided by two equals, which is to say,
when people make purely cognitive judgments or engage in logical reasoning, their
behavioral choices either have nothing to do with the ideal self or have something to
do with it. Rather, their behavioral choices depend primarily upon their logical judg-
ments. As stated above, “a key concept of Horney’s personality theory is the concept
of self, which she subdivides into real, actual, and ideal.”187 In some cases Horney’s
personality theory can offer a most illuminating explanation of deviant behaviors
and neurotic disorders. Although Horney’s personality theory provides a new and
different perspective on the structure of human personality, it is far from sufficient
to account for all the diverse facets of human behavioral phenomena. To put it in a
nutshell, Horney’s personality theory cannot be placed on a par with a scientific law
that should be accepted as absolute valid within the scope of application.
2.4 Maslow’s Theory of Personality Structure
Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970), one of the founding fathers of humanistic

psychology and a former president of the American Psychological Association,188
was a prominent personality theorist and one of the best-known American psychol-
ogists of the twentieth century. Maslow contributed significantly to the develop-
ment of the humanistic school of psychology with its roots running from Socrates
through the Renaissance. Humanistic psychology rose to prominence in the mid-
twentieth century in answer to the limitations of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic
187 Forgus, Ronald H., & Shulman, Bernald H. (1979). Personality: A Cognitive View. Hoboken,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 61.
188 “Maslow, Abraham H.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15
Apr. 2021 <https://www.enyclopedia.com>.

theory and B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism.189 Maslow, founder of the humanistic school

of psychology, believed that “humans are inherently good by nature,” that “their
behavior is driven by a necessity to satisfy their basic needs,”190 and that human-
istic psychology is designed to “encourage subjects to change their state of mind
from having negative thoughts and reactions to one focused on self-awareness and
thoughtfulness.”191 Humanistic psychology stands in stark contrast with Sigmund
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and John Watson and Ivan Pavlov’s behaviorism.192
Maslow set his views in contrast to classical Freudian psychoanalysis, disagreeing
with “the dark, pessimistic, and largely negative picture of personality presented by
Freudian psychoanalysis,”193 and turning away from the psychoanalytic idea that
normal behavior could be inferred from studies of abnormal behavior.194 He refuses
to recognize the role of society and culture in personality formation and develop-
ment—or, to put it another way, he places too little emphasis on the social and cultural
determinants of personality. By pointing out the fundamental flaws of the two leading
schools of psychology, Maslow established humanism as a third force in the field of
psychology, with a large company of followers.195 In his distinguished and influential
work entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation (1943),” which is now considered to
be one of the classic works in psychology, Maslow proposed his holistic-dynamic
theory of personality, which is largely a theory of human motivation. “What Maslow
has done is try to explain human motivation in a way that takes account of indi-
vidual differences in personality and that is an advance on the purely biological
or reductionist approaches of some personality theorists.”196 Maslow argued that
humans possess five sets of basic needs, ranging from basic “physiological” needs
to “safety,” “love” or “belongingness,” “esteem,” and “self-actualization,” that these
innate needs are arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency—or, to put it another way,
human needs can be described as ordered in a pre-potent hierarchy, and that indi-
viduals are motivated to fulfill lower-level needs before they are motivated to fulfill
higher-level needs. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is often represented as a pyramid
with the more basic needs at the bottom and self-fulfillment needs at the top. These
needs are related to each other in a hierarchy of prepotency, from physiological needs
at the bottom up to self-actualization at the apex. Maslow asserts that the physiolog-
ical needs that occupy the bottom level in the hierarchy are the most prepotent of all
189 Benjafield, John G. (2010). A Macat History of Psychology. Third Edition. Don Mills, ON:
Oxford University Press, pp. 357–362.

190 Stoyanov, Stoyan. (2017). A Macat Analysis of Abraham H. Maslow’s “A Theory of Human
Motivation.” London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 31.

191 Ibid., p. 62.
192 Ibid., p. 61–62.
193 Engler, Barbara. (1985). Personality Theories: An Introduction. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin,
p. 275.
194 “Maslow, Abraham H.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15
Apr. 2021 <https://www.enyclopedia.com>.

195 Stoyanov, Stoyan. (2017). A Macat Analysis of Abraham H. Maslow’s “A Theory of Human
Motivation.” London, UK: Macat International Ltd, p. 62.

196 Gorman, Phil. (2004). Motivation and Emotion. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 61.
needs and that lower order needs are inherently more important to people than higher
order needs. He argues that all the lower level needs show a linear inverse relation-
ship between satisfaction and importance, that lower order needs in the hierarchy are
prepotent, more urgently demanding than higher order needs, and that higher-order
needs only become prepotent as lower-order needs are reasonably met. Maslow’s
theory proposes that lower order needs must be satisfied before individuals are moti-
vated to pursue higher order needs—or, to put it another way, Maslow’s hierarchy
states that a lower level must be completely satisfied and fulfilled before moving onto
a higher pursuit. Maslow makes the point that until one level of needs is fulfilled,
behavior is not motivated by the next higher level of needs. That is to say, individuals
first need to satisfy needs at lower levels of the hierarchy before they seek satis-
faction of higher level needs. “Research has supported the position that lower-order
needs do take precedence over higher-order needs, but critics have suggested that
Maslow’s hierarchy is too simplistic and too rigid to explain the motivation of those
who cannot meet the lower-order needs but still strive for the higher-order needs.”197
Self-actualization or self-fulfillment is the highest order need in Maslow’s hierarchy,
or more specifically, “the instinctual need to fulfill one’s creative, moral, and intellec-
tual potential.”198 The hierarchical ordering of needs differs greatly from individual
to individual, and this further contributes to individual differences in personality.
Maslow maintains that needs are biological or instinctive and that individuals tend
to behave in ways that satisfy them. Maslow refers to lower needs as “deficiency
needs” and to higher order needs as “growth needs.” “Maslow distinguishes between
deficiency motivation characteristic of the lower needs and growth motivation, or
‘metamotivation,’ characteristic of self-actualization.”199 Maslow advocated viewing
human behavior from a perspective of needs. According to Maslow, the basic human
needs are responsible for generating all motivation, and all behavior is deemed to
be directly or indirectly motivated by such basic human needs. Human behavior is
largely motivated or determined by the different levels of human needs. “Man’s lower
needs are the biologically-rooted animal instincts that our species has inherited as part
of our mammalian evolution. … In stark contrast with mankind’s lower biological
needs, our higher needs only motivate us consciously; we ordinarily must be aware of
these higher needs and choose to meet them.”200 Only if we have fulfilled our higher
order needs can we remain fulfilled in our uniquely human dimension; that is, we
can remain ultimately happy and complete.201 “The hierarchical relationship within
this spectrum of needs means that any one motivator from this enormous range of
motivators may become the operant factor in shaping the behavior of the organism
197 Sullivan, Larry E., ed. (2009). The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 234.
198 Ibid.
199 Kventensky, Erma Dell. (1972). On Relationships Between the Creative Personality and Some
Dimensions of Cognitive Style. Davis, CA: University of California Press, p. 13.

200 McNamara, Thomas Edward. (2004). Evolution, Culture, and Consciousness: The Discovery of
the Preconscious Mind. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 157.

201 Ibid.
at a particular time simply by virtue of its being the lowest level, unfulfilled need
within the hierarchy at that time. In other words, if all needs were equally unsatisfied,
then the lowest, most instinctual need would be the primary motivator until it was
satisfied. Then, the next higher, unmet need would dominate behavior until it was
satisfied, and this process would continue until all needs were satisfied.”202 “Man’s
lower needs are the biologically-rooted animal instincts that our species has inherited
as part of our mammalian evolution. We do not have the freedom to remove them
from our nature. Indeed, if we try to ignore our primate instincts, they will still moti-
vate us—even unconsciously, if necessary—to satisfy them. The unconscious power
of these needs to control human consciousness, and thereby, behavior, was one of
Freud’s greatest discoveries. Maslow greatly expanded the definition of human needs
beyond Freud’s, but he also pointed out that these higher needs, unlike our primate
instincts, do not normally have the power to create unconscious motivation. In other
words, if we are not aware of these higher needs or if we choose not to act upon them,
they will not motivate us on the unconscious level as much as the more instinctual
needs do. In stark contrast with mankind’s lower biological needs, our higher needs
only motivate us consciously; we ordinarily must be aware of these higher needs and
choose to meet them, if they are to be satisfied at all. Of course, if we choose not
to meet them for whatever reason, we will inevitably suffer the consequences of not
growing on that higher level of our personality, which fits well with Jung’s theory of
self-actualization.”203 “The problem with not fulfilling our higher needs is simply that
we remain unfulfilled in our uniquely human dimension; that is, we remain ultimately
unhappy and incomplete, as Jung first pointed out and Maslow reaffirmed. Whereas
we must fulfill our instinctual primate needs because they are hard wired into our
CNS, we are not so neurologically compelled to fulfill our higher needs. Therein
lies the essence of the human predicament. We must satisfy our primate needs, but
having done so, on any particular occasion, presents us with a new problem. On
those occasions, which usually occur on a daily basis in the modern world, we can
either go on to fulfill higher needs, or we can attempt to control our environment
so as to always be able to fulfill those lower needs, and then some, in the future.
Western culture has programmed us to think of this critical juncture as a decision
point, but I am suggesting that the concept of decision making is a theological one
that is a misunderstanding of the human CNS. All decisions are predetermined by the
neurological activities in the brain that are themselves the product of the following
influences: acculturation, individual past experiences, current homeostatic needs,
and the current environment. Every decision is simply a preconscious summation
of the interactions between all these forces acting on the CNS at the moment the
decision is made.”204 “If all cultures have evolved in order to ensure the fulfillment
of our primate needs, as I have proposed, then we can conclude that all past and
present forms of acculturation program their members to be more aware of those
primate needs than our higher needs. Indeed, I believe that even awareness of the
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid., pp. 157–158.
higher needs of human needs of human nature is a very recent development in the
evolution of the human mind. For most of our history as a species we were driven
by instinctual necessity and the rise of civilization did little to change that, since all
cultures inculcate the scarcity mentality of our EEA. So human beings have always
been programmed to focus awareness on primate needs and not the higher needs that
only came into existence with the evolution of self-consciousness. The problem is
that if we do not fulfill those higher needs we will never be complete human beings.
This emphasis on basic instincts is at the core of modern Western egocentric self-
consciousness simply because it is, like all previous stages of consciousness, a form of
instinct.”205 “When Maslow’s theory is examined in light of the structure of egocen-
tric consciousness, it becomes evident that the contents of awareness must be selected
by a kind of preconscious scanning process, driven by the lower instinctual needs
and intended for their satisfaction. We know from experimental psychology that the
human nervous system is constantly bombarded by enormous numbers of stimuli,
originating from different levels and sources of sensory stimulation. For example,
there is continual organic stimulation, such as the somatic sensations generated over
the surface of the skin by such constants as contact with clothing and exposure to
air and light. Besides somatic sensations, auditory and visual stimuli impinge upon
us from our physical and social environment. Then, there is the whole arena of
mental stimulation within the cortex, such as associations between thoughts present
in awareness and the contents of memory. The CNS must have evolved a hierarchy to
deal with all of these constant, concurrent stimulation on an instinctual priority basis.
So, the human CNS must preconsciously filter every stimulus through a hierarchy of
classes of stimulation that automatically prioritizes them on the basis of a neurolog-
ical architecture that manifests a combination of universal primate instincts and of
local values acquired in the process of acculturation, as well as learning from expe-
rience.”206 He postulates that these motivational needs underlie all human behavior,
which is to say, they constitute the primary sources of behavioral motivation. These
needs, according to Maslow, are critical in our survival and ongoing existence, for
without having these needs met, an individual will fail to develop into a healthy
person, both physically and psychologically. He asserted that an individual tends to
be dominated by these hierarchically arranged needs all through life, and that at any
given time he is struggling to meet these needs until he reaches the apex of the hier-
archy, self-actualization. He believed that humans aspire to have all of these needs
met and experience a sense of genuine fulfillment when this is achieved. The higher
order needs an individual person is trying to fulfill, the more of the best of humanity
the individual is endowed with, and the more likely the individual is to be relieved
from the condition of inferior animality—or, to put it another way, the individual is
less driven by primitive, self-serving, and animalistic instinctual forces. According to
205 Ibid., p. 158.

206 Ibid., pp. 158–159.
Maslow’s theory of motivation, known as the “hierarchy of needs,” all human behav-
iors are deemed to be motivated by five sets of hierarchically arranged needs.207
Maslow argued that his theory of motivation integrated existing formulations from
psychoanalysis and behavioral psychology with insights derived from the study of
the “psychologically healthy,” while psychoanalytically inspired theory, which was
based largely on the study of people experiencing personal difficulties, resulted in a
distorted and unduly narrow conception of human motivation.208 Maslow’s theory of
motivation is reasonable in the sense that he contended human needs constitute the
primary driving force behind human behavior, and that they rightly serve to explain
the entire spectrum of human behavior. It may be safely asserted that Maslow’s
theory represents a substantial improvement on its forerunners, such as Freud’s and
Horney’s theories. Freud saw the libido as the sole driving force behind all human
behavior, and Maslow’s theory overcame the weakness inherent in the Freudian
theory. According to Horney, human behaviors and neuroses can be given a full
explanation only when viewed from the perspective of the “actual self” or the “ideal
self,” and in his theory Maslow corrected the inherent weakness of Horney’s theory.
Nonetheless, Maslow’s theory is far from comprehensive. When it comes to the
structure of human personality, Maslow’s theory cannot offer an all-embracing and
full explanation. Maslow’s theory attempts to describe and explain human behavior
in terms of human needs and desires, which is neither scientific nor practical. While
human needs tend to provide the basic energy for human behavior, and to influence
the basic behavioral tendencies, they cannot directly determine whether humans
behave or how they behave. Man is a rational animal—or, to put it another way, man
is endowed with reason. Human reason is the ultimate determining force in human
behavior. Generally speaking, human needs and rational judgment jointly determine
human behavior. Under certain external environmental pressures, human behavior
tends to be initiated through needs. Then an individual tends to make behavioral
choices whenever he (or she) exercises his (or her) power of rational judgment. Thus
it can be seen that rational judgment is the ultimate determining force in human
behavior. To sum up, the obvious weakness of Maslow’s theory lies in the fact that
he rejected and even ignored the determining influence of consciousness and reason
upon human behavior. Thus it must of necessity follow that his theory cannot offer
a scientific explanation of man’s unpredictable and unfathomable behavior.
207 Maslow, Abraham H. Self-Actualizing Man (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu& Feng Liu, Trans.).
Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987; Hoffman, Edward. The Right to Be Human: A Biog-
raphy of Abraham Maslow (Chinese version) (Jin-Sheng Xu, Trans.) Beijing: Reform Publishing
House (1988–2000), 1998.
2.5 Kurt Lewin’s Theory of Personality Structure
Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), German-born American social psychologist, is often recog-

nized as the founder of modern experimental social psychology. At the time of Kurt
Lewin’s death in February 1947, he was widely regarded as one of the outstanding
psychologists of his generation. Edward Tolman, the colleague who delivered a
tribute to Lewin at a meeting of the American Psychological Association later that
year, thought that Lewin could be compared to Freud himself. “Freud the clini-
cian and Lewin the experimentalist—these are the two men whose names will stand
before all others in the history of our psychological era. For it is their contrasting
but complementary insights which first made psychology a science applicable to real
human beings and to real human society.”209 Lewin originated the concept of field
theory to explain how human behavior interacts with the environment, and developed
his psychological field theory that was applicable to a wide variety of psychological
and sociological phenomena. “Lewin’s dynamic view on psychological structure and
human action was a significant contributor to psychological ideas. It was a general
methodological orientation that radically transcended the associationist worldview
of most of psychology. Thus, he stated that ‘field theory is probably best character-
ized as a method: namely, a method of analyzing causal relations and of building
scientific constructs. This method of analyzing causal relations can be expressed in
the form of certain statements about the conditions of change.’”210 “Force” is the
core concept at the heart of the eminent social psychologist Kurt Lewin’s topolog-
ical psychology. “Lewin distinguished three types of forces: driving forces, which
arise from needs and cause locomotion toward a goal; restraining forces, which are
associated with barriers; and induced forces, which are related to the wishes of other
people in the person’s life space. Lewin regarded forces as having both direction and
strength, and represented them in his drawings as vectors (arrows), with the direc-
tion of the vector representing the direction of the force, and its length representing
its intensity or strength.”211 Lewin believes that force is the latent internal energy
that serves to motivate human behavior. He devised the concept of dynamic field
that describes social and psychological phenomena and serves as foundations for his
psychological theory. “Central to Lewin’s theorizing was the idea of dynamic field,
which refers to the complex constellation of forces that determine a person’s move-
ment toward or away from a particular state or course of action. Any factor having
an effect on a person in a given context could be included in the person’s dynamic
field. In incorporating a wide range of potential influences on thought and behavior,
the concept of dynamic field allows for the integration of different disciplines and
209 “Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021
210 Damon, William., & Lerner, Richard M. (2006). Handbook of Child Psychology, Theoretical
Models of Human Development. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 194.
211 “Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021
levels of analysis.”212 Dynamical social psychology owes its biggest debt to Kurt
Lewin, and he is widely regarded as the father of “dynamic psychology.”213 He also
proposed the concept of tension system, contending that the system of psycholog-
ical tension, which would be discharged when “need” in a person is met, forms
the determining cause of human behavior. Tension and need are Lewin’s two major
dynamic concepts. Tension, according to Lewin, is the outcome of the state of dise-
quilibrium, and need refers to physiological or psychological condition that causes
either decrease or increase in tension of a system.214 Whenever a psychological need
is felt, there is a state of tension, and the individual tends to act in order to achieve
relief.215 The release of tension tends to provide dynamic energy for human behavior
and psychological activity, thereby constituting a hidden factor in determining man’s
psychological activities and behavioral manifestations. “Lewin’s field theory utilizes
the concept of tension systems in order to explain human personality in action. In
essence, a tension system is an energy system created by a need and released when the
person achieves the goal related to that need. Lewin does not use the word ‘tension’
in the sense of an undesirable stress or emotional strain; rather, he regarded tension as
a desirable condition of readiness for action toward attaining a goal. He saw tension
as increased by any barrier between the need and the goal. In addition to barriers,
Lewin also related tensions to forces. … Lewin maintained that tension tends to
equalize itself by spreading from one region throughout a person’s psychic system;
he called the means of this equalization a process. Processes include such activities as
thinking, remembering, perceiving, performing an action, and many others. Several
different tension systems and processes may coexist simultaneously within a person
and remain for various lengths of time. … Lewin developed his concept of tension
systems in part because he disagreed with the associationist explanation of human
behavior. Associationist psychologists explained behavior as the end result of simple
ideas derived from sense experience that became associated in the mind through
repetition and conditioning. An associationist psychologist would regard doing any
purposeful action as setting up a tendency to repeat the action. Lewin observed that
there are many purposeful actions that people do not ordinarily repeat once they have
achieved their goal. … Another important feature of Lewin’s concept of tension
systems is his emphasis on the here-and-now. He parted company with Freudian
psychoanalysis in looking for long-term historical explanations of human behavior.
Lewin argued instead for what he called the principle of contemporaneity in a person’s
212 Vallacher, Robin R., Coleman, Peter T., Nowak, Andrzej., Bui-Wrzosinska, Lan., Liebovitch,
Larry., Kugler, Katharina G., & Bartoli, Andrea. (2014). Attracted to Conflict: Dynamic Foundations
of Destructive Social Relations. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 57.
213 Ibid.
214 Mishra, B. K. (2008). Psychology: The Study of Human Behavior. New Delhi, IN: PHI Learning
Private Limited, p. 441.

215 Wolman, Benjamin B. (2012). Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology. New York,
NY: Springer Science & Business Media, p. 479.

life space, meaning that only present facts can influence present behavior.”216 It is
therefore evident that “Tension,” for Lewin, invariably exists in a system. In view of
this, in order to arrive at a true understanding of “tension,” we feel the necessity of
giving such concepts as “force field” and “life space” a clear and lucid explanation. By
“life space” Lewin means “the sum of all facts that determine the person’s behavior
at a given point in time.”217 That is to say, the life space includes all the possible facts
that may influence human behavior and psychological activity at a given time—or,
to put it another way, an individual’s behavior, at any time, is manifested only within
the coexisting factors of the current “life space” or “psychological field.”218 In other
words, “the sum total of all environmental and personal factors in interaction is called
the life space or the psychological space.”219 In what follows, we will inquire about
the exact relationship between the person and the environment and how their entan-
glement might influence behavior, and lay out the fundamentals of Kurt Lewin’s field
theory, which represents the earliest framework for predicting behavior based on the
interaction of the person and the environment. “Lewin represented ‘the person in
the life space’ (that is, the behaving self) with topological diagrams that depicted
relevant dispositional and environmental factors, using boundaries to differentiate
them and arrows to symbolize facilitating or inhibiting forces. With these map-like
diagrams, which he hoped would eventually lead to formal mathematical solutions,
Lewin sought to express the dynamic interchange among the diverse factors that
constitute the psychological ‘field’ and that causally influence behavior. In field
theory, all behavior is the product of two sources, the person and the environment,
hence the well-known equation B = f (P, E). … Lewin believed that P and E were
fully interdependent and inseparable. … Lewin theorized about how each factor
affected the other: ‘The person and his environment have to be considered as one
constellation of interdependent factors’. That person factors are always in a state of
dynamic interrelation with environmental factors, and that all psychological events
are the result of these interacting forces is the major conceptual contribution of field
theory.”220 “Lewin’s central assumption is that human behavior is dependent on the
psychological field at a given time. A psychological field encompasses the combina-
tion of all possible factors that (can) affect an individual’s behavior. Human behavior
can thus be perceived as a function of the prevailing forces within the psychological
field that an individual perceives at a given time. A psychological field, however,
includes more than just external factors of the environment. It rather originates from
216 Gale, an imprint of Cengage Learning. (2015). A Study Guide for Psychologists and Their Theo-
ries for Students: Kurt Lewin. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. See also “Lewin, Kurt.” Psychologists and
Their Theories for Students. Encyclopedia.com. 15 Apr. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.
217 Nicholi, Armand M. (1978). The Harvard Guide to Modern Psychiatry, Volume 2. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 136.

218 Deutsch, Morton. “Field Theory in Social Psychology.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology,
Vol.1, eds. Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
219 Rice, F. Philip. (1992). The Adolescent: Development, Relationships, and Culture. Boston, MA:
Allyn & Bacon, p. 85.

Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 74.

the interaction of the individual and the individual’s psychological representation

of the environment. In other words, the person and the environment must be under-
stood as a constellation of interdependent factors. Lewin calls the entirety of these
factors the ‘life space’. It is this life space that an individual experiences at any given
moment and that determines the individual’s behavior in that moment. This famous
theoretical assumption is well represented in the following formula: B = F (P, E)
= F (LS). Accordingly, behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person (P) and the
environment (E). Lewin assumed that this formula is valid for affects, goal-directed
behavior, dreams, wishes, and also thinking. Both the person and the environment
have to be understood as intertwined factors. The potentially complex interaction
between the two—represented by the function (F) in the formula—is what deter-
mines people’s behavior. Human behavior is thus even-handedly dependent on what
type of person an individual is, how his or her personality plays out in a given situa-
tion, and on the subjectively perceived environment in a given situation.”221 Hence
the life space may be briefly summarized as follows. The interaction of the person
(P) and the environment (E) produces the life space, and the life space that is the
combination of all the factors may influence a person’s behavior at any time. An
individual’s behavior, at any time, can be expressed as a function of the life space B
= f (LS).222 The environment as demonstrated in the life space refers to the objective
situation in which the personperceives and acts. The life space environment (E) is
completely subjective within each context as it depends not only on the objective
situation, but also on the characteristics of the person.223 It is necessary to consider all
aspects of a person’s conscious and unconscious environment in order to map out the
person’s life space.224 “The behaving self may be seen as the individual’s perception
of his relations to the environment he perceives.”225 Field theory holds that behavior
must be derived from a totality of coexisting facts. These coexisting facts make up
a “dynamic field,”226 which means that the state of any part of the field depends on
every other part of it. Behavior depends on the present field rather than on the past or
the future. Human behaviors can make large or small influences on the totality of the
life space.227 The development of the person inevitably affects the life space. Devel-
opment also plays a major role in life space behavior. From the beginning of one’s life
221 Masur, Philipp K. (2018). Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure: Communication Processes
in Online Environments. New York, NY: Springer, p. 132.
Vol.1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
223 Ibid.
224 Burnes, Bernard., & Cooke, Bill. (2013). “Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory: A Review and
Revaluation.” International Journal of Management Reviews15(4): 408–425.

Vol.1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
226 Martin, John Levi. (2003). “What Is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology 109(1):
1–49.
227 Ibid.
behavior is molded in all respects to his or her social situation.228 “Like other Gestalt
psychologists, Lewin focused on the person’s subjective perceptions, not on ‘objec-
tive’ analysis. He emphasized the influence of the social environment, as perceived
by the individual, which he called the psychological field. A full understanding of a
person’s psychological field cannot result from an ‘objective’ description by others
of what surrounds the person because what matters is the person’s own interpreta-
tion. This is not to say that the person can necessarily verbalize his or her perceived
environment, but the person’s own reports typically provide better clues than do the
researcher’s intuitions. … Just as in Gestalt psychology generally, Lewin empha-
sized the individual’s phenomenology, the individual’s construction of the situation.
Another theme imported from Gestalt psychology to social psychology was Lewin’s
insistence on describing the total situation, not its isolated elements. One must under-
stand all the psychological forces operating on the person in any given situation in
order to predict anything. … No one force predicts action, but the dynamic equilib-
rium among them, the ever-changing balance of forces, does predict action. The total
psychological field (and hence behavior) is determined by two pairs of factors. The
first pair consists of the person in the situation. Neither alone is sufficient to predict
behavior. The person contributes needs, beliefs, and perceptual abilities. These act
on the environment to constitute the psychological field. … Ever since Lewin, social
psychologists have seen both person and situation as essential to predicting behavior.
… The second pair of psychological field factors that determine behavior is cognition
and motivation. Both are functions of person and situation, and jointly they predict
behavior. … To summarize, Lewin focuses his analysis on psychological reality as
perceived by the individual; on a whole configuration of forces, not single elements;
on the person and the situation; and on cognition and motivation. These major themes,
which date back through Gestalt to Kant, are theoretical points that still survive in
modern approaches to social cognition as well as in psychology as a whole.”229
“Lewin’s field theory integrates biological and environmental factors into behavior
without trying to judge which has the greater influence.”230 “Lewin did not offer
propositions about which dimensions of situations were more or less relevant to field
theory.”231 “Field theory provides a classificatory framework for the investigation
of person-environment interactions. However, it remains unclear how the situation
itself fits into this theoretical framework. Is the psychological field a synonym for
the term situation? Or is a situation something different? These questions are only
implicitly and often times ambiguously addressed in field theory.”232 Kurt Lewin,
228 Lewin, Kurt. (1939). “Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology.” American Journal
of Sociology 44(6): 868–896.
229 Fiske, Susan T., & Taylor, Shelley E. Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture. Newbury Park,
CA: SAGE Publications, 2016.

230 Rice, F. Philip. (1992). The Adolescent: Development, Relationships, and Culture. Boston, MA:

Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 74.

232 Masur, Philipp K. (2018). Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure: Communication Processes
in Online Environments. New York, NY: Springer, p. 134.

who “regards the human mind as a dynamic tension system and all behavior as an
attempt to relieve tension and to establish equilibrium,”233 and who “views activity or
behavior as a dynamic balance of forces working in opposite directions,”234 proposed
“the quasi-stable equilibrium theory” by developing most comprehensively the force-
field concept in his psychological field theory. The keystone of the homeostatic equi-
librium is the idea that the organism is endowed with a mechanism of self-defense,
which serves to protect the organism itself from perceived danger by automatically
and unconsciously modifying the organism’s perception of and/or reaction to danger,
and is endued with a tendency toward the maintenance of a relatively stable equilib-
rium, that the capacity for self-control inherent in the organism enables the functional
system of the organism to interact dynamically with the larger environment, a need
that supports the survival of the system, and to form a cause-and-effect relationship
between the system and the environment, both of which are constantly changing in
consequence of this interaction, and that an upset in the equilibrium of forces, on
the one hand, tends to create a state of tension in the organism, but on the other, to
prompt the organism itself to achieve a new form of dynamic equilibrium with the
environment through adaptive behavior, or rather, through a process of ordering and
growth. To put it slightly differently, “the ability of the system to adapt to its environ-
ment through changes in its structure leads to states of equilibrium and homeostasis,
both of which relate to different types of balance. Equilibrium is the sense of being
in balance. When something is in balance, there is little variability in movement
before the state of balance is disrupted. On the other hand, homeostasis is a state of
variable balance where the limits to maintaining balance are more flexible.”235 As
Lewin points out, whenever the original psychological equilibrium is disrupted (at
least temporarily), the major cause of disruption can invariably be attributed to the
arousal of a need that serves to prompt action because the organism tends to maintain
a constant internal equilibrium, or rather, “a steady state of homeostasis that is not
to be construed as a stationary balance but rather as quasi-stationary equilibrium
comparable to a river which flows at a given velocity in a given direction during a
certain interval of time,”236 and the resultant internal tension that may occur as a
result of an upset in the mental equilibrium tends to incite the organism to restore the
equilibrium, or rather, to establish a new permanent internal equilibrium, a dynamic
balance of the driving (promoting change) and restraining (inhibiting change) forces,
even though some aspects of the original equilibrium may persist. Lewin’s studies
demonstrated that “psychological processes—no less than biological, physical, and
economic—may often be deduced from their tendency towards equilibrium. The
transition from a state of rest to a dynamic state, or the modification of a stationary
233 Broudy, Harry S., & Freel, Eugene Lawrence. (1956). Psychology for General Education.
London, UK: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 214.
234 Milton, Charles R. (1981). Human Behavior in Organizations: Three Levels of Behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 374.

235 Brandell, Jerrold R. (2010). Theory & Practice in Clinical Social Work. Newbury Park, CA:
236 Gius, John Armes. (1966). Fundamentals of General Surgery. Chicago, IL: Year Book Medical
Publishers, p. 72.
process occurs when systematic equilibrium has been upset. There results a process
in the direction of a new equilibrium.”237 Based on the ancient philosophical idea that
human behavior is motivated by the desire to seek pleasure and to avoid pain, human
behavior can be perceived through such a type of explanatory theory as the pleasure
principle or the doctrine of hedonism, which is to say, people tend to explain human
behavior in terms of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Likewise, “Bentham held
that man is constructed in such a manner that he is incapable of doing anything other
than to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The mainspring of human action is the desire to
secure pleasure and to avoid pain.”238 By contrast, Lewin advanced a newer view of
human behavior, postulating that human behavior can best be explained according to
the homeostatic theory based on the assumption that “human behavior is a function of
an individual’s psychological environment and should be seen as part of a continuum,
with individual variations from the norm being a function of tensions between percep-
tions of the self and of the environment.”239 The homeostatic equilibrium theory may
well form a substantial contribution of permanent value to our deeper knowledge of
human behavior. Either the field theory or the theory of homeostasis or equilib-
rium, which originated with Kurt Lewin, requires an interdisciplinary approach to
psychological and social phenomena, thus opening up new perspectives on modern
social psychology. For centuries the prevailing psychological entity was a philo-
sophically postulated one. During that same period and, in particular, before one of
social psychology’s towering figures emerged: Kurt Lewin, with very few exceptions
earlier psychologists postulated the existence of specific psychological entities and,
in particular, of some specific motivational forces affecting behavior and mood. By
contrast, “Lewin’s theory attempts to account for the many forces that are interacting
at any given time to influence motivation or behavior and how a given motivation
or behavior is the result of these multiple influences. Lewin (1935) postulates that
a person’s motivation or behavior is the result of interactions of the person and the
perceived environment, or life space which refers to one’s psychological reality.”240
Lewin’s psychological differentiations, which show the changes from substantialism
to relationalism (or relativism), not only open up new perspectives on psychology
and human sciences, but also provide a revolutionary approach to psychological
and social reality, thus helping to make psychology a modern pragmatic discipline
in its own right. “Lewin’s revolutionary approach to psychology was based on the
idea that all psychological and social phenomena need to be understood in terms
of ‘social space’ that represents a relational view of the world. … Social space and
field theory were central to the social psychology of Kurt Lewin and provided one of
the foundations of organization development and action research. … Social space is
237 Ellis, Willis D. (1999). A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. New York, NY: Psychology Press,
p. 290.
238 Andres, Tomas Quintin D. (1980). Understanding Values. New Day Publishers, Quezon City,
PH: New Day Publishers, p. 147.

239 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “Kurt Lewin.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 8,
2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kurt-Lewin.
240 Keller, John M. (2009). Motivational Design for Learning and Performance: The ARCS Model
Approach. New York, NY: Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 103–104.
distinct from physical space, though the two constantly influence each other. Social
space forms out of links created when people’s thinking and feeling are put into
action and elicit responses from others, which then shape their thinking, feeling and
action. If the interaction is temporary or fleeting, a social space is unlikely to form.
However, when interactions are sustained over time and become patterned, they take
on a particular configuration that differentiates them from other patterned interac-
tions. Differentiation is a mental act that leads to the creation of a space outside,
but not wholly independent, of the individuals who constitute it. All relationships,
from the simplest to the most complex, are differentiated social spaces. Couples,
groups, organizations, cultures and whole societies are all configurations of social
space. They differ in the level of complexity and their specific characteristics, but
they all are based on the same fundamental construct. Lewin’s use of social space was
strongly influenced by the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer and his concept of ‘relation-
alism’. Cassirer made a distinction between the logic of things, or substantialism,
and a logic of relations, or relationalism. Substantialism is rooted in the intuitive
sense that the world is constructed from independent, material objects and can be
best grasped by understanding these things. It is also reflected in the widely accepted
notion of causality as change, or variance, induced in one distinct thing as the result
of the impact of another distinct thing. A ‘relational logic,’ on the other hand, accords
primacy to the relations among entities. In other words, reality is best grasped as an
ordering of the elements of perception through a process of construction that gives
them intelligibility and meaning. Cassirer (1923/1953) argued that modern science
was moving steadily from a substantive to a relational logic, using the concept of
geometric space as a totally abstract way of representing physical relations. Space is
not a physical concept but rather a mental creation that can be used to think relation-
ally about making order from any given set of elements. Lewin adopted this idea of
space as an essential construct for theorizing about the social world. He was one of the
first social scientists to realize that psychology, and the social sciences in general, was
limited by a substantialist logic that viewed reality in terms of separate entities (i.e.
variables) that directly influence each other. He introduced the idea of a social space
in order to shift the focus to a relational logic, which is essentially the basis for holism
and ‘synergy’—that is, the whole (i.e. the relations) is greater than the sum of its parts
(i.e. substantive entities). This whole, however, is totally abstract and invisible. What
makes social space such a useful construct is that it focuses neither on the individual
nor on the collective as the unit of analysis but rather on the processes through which
individuals, in interaction with others, construct their shared worlds. It became the
basis for the idea of group dynamics and concepts such as norms and cohesion.”241
“The concept of field was borrowed by Lewin from physics as a way of accounting
for causality in social space. By the twentieth century, physics increasingly faced
problems that could not be solved through Newtonian mechanics, which attributed
causality to the behavior of physical bodies when subjected to forces or displacement
from each other. The main difficulty was explaining how certain bodies seemed to
241Coghlan, David., & Brydon-Miller, Mary., eds. (2014). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action
Research. London, UK: SAGE Publications, p. 347.
influence other bodies without direct contact (e.g. electromagnetism). The turning
point was the Faraday-Maxwell concept of the electromagnetic ‘field,’ in which
causality is attributed to the influence of this field on the elements that constitute it.
Thus, fields can be understood as spaces that not only link different elements into a
kind of network but also exert force on and shape the behavior of their constituents.
The basic components of a social field are (a) the individual and collective actors or
agents who constitute the field; (b) the relationship among these actors, with a partic-
ular focus on relative power (e.g. hierarchical or equalitarian); the shared meanings
that signify what is going in the field and make it intelligible—meaning holds the
social field together and exerts a truly human force that differentiates social fields
from fields in the world of nature—and (4) the ‘rules of the game’ that govern action
within it. In the social world, fields cause people to think, feel and act in certain
ways. The meanings and rules of the game become internalized into the constituents
of the field and shape their behavior. Lewin introduced the construct of the ‘life
space,’ which he defined as the ‘totality of facts’ which determine the behavior of an
individual at a certain moment. When Lewin referred to ‘facts,’ he was not referring
to ‘objective’ facts but to the internalized field—all those perceived elements that
have an influence on a person at any given moment. This construct was expressed
symbolically in the well-known formula B = f (P, E) (behavior is a function of person
and environment) and pointed to the link between the internal and external worlds.
Thus, human psychology was conceived as a ‘field’, and the life space represented
the state of the field at any given moment. Each change of a person’s life space means
either expanding or contracting that person’s ‘space of free movement’—that is, the
range of what is possible for that person to do or achieve. A generation after Lewin,
Bourdieu, who was also influenced by Cassirer, used the concepts of social space and
field theory in building his ‘reflexive sociology.’ In this framework, social space is a
set of points differentiated into fields (e.g. a professional field, artistic field, academic
field, religious field), each of which has its particular ‘structure of difference’—that
is, a unique logic and hierarchy that shapes the behavior of different position holders.
The social world consists of individuals who occupy ‘points’ in particular fields that
determine their positions vis-à-vis each other. Bourdieu used the term habitus to
designate the logic that governs a particular field. The habitus is a cognitive structure
that regulates the behavior level of an entire field and is internalized by people as
a kind of psychological schema that determines how to perceive reality and how to
act. The mutual shaping of social structures and individual consciousness accounts
for the relative stability of social fields. Field theory provided Lewin and Bour-
dieu with a construct for understanding the seemingly invisible influence of social
structures on individuals and one another. What makes social space and field such
useful constructs is that they focus neither on the individual nor on the collective
as the unit of analysis but rather on the circular, reflexive processes through which
individuals, in interaction with others, continually construct and reconstruct their
shared worlds (Friedman, 2011). Fields are both phenomenal (i.e. in people’s minds)
and structural (‘out there’), linking the internal world of people with the external
social world through an ongoing shaping process. Field theory obviates the distinc-
tion between agency and structure, seeing them as integrated and analyzable by the
same set of constructs. For this reason, both Lewin and Bourdieu believed that field
theory provided a general theory that could dissolve the strict disciplinary distinctions
among the social sciences.”242 “Although many of Lewin’s ideas and concepts had a
major, lasting effect on the social sciences, his followers mostly abandoned the field
theory itself. One reason for this was the fact that field theory presented a fundamental
challenge to social science in terms of the knowledge it produced, its division into
separate disciplines and its research methods. Rather than carrying on the revolution,
most of Lewin’s disciples tool many of the ideas and concepts out of the context of
fieldtheory and researched them using the methods of mainstream social science.
Another reason for the stagnation of field theory was that Lewin failed to clearly and
systematically conceptualize field theory and its conceptual tools in ways that others
could learn and use. For example, after Lewin’s death, almost no one continued to
use the visual representations of social space and field that are so prevalent in his
writings. Bourdieu’s version of field theory had a somewhat greater impact on soci-
ology, but it too was relegated to the margins and was rarely applied systematically.
Field theory, however, maintains its potential because the fundamental problems in
the social sciences which led both Lewin and Bourdieu to field theory have not gone
away. Thinkers and researchers in a number of fields have recognized the usefulness
of field theory for unifying dualities (agent and structure) and capturing the tension
between stability and change.”243 In Chen Binggong’s view the weaknesses inherent
in Lewin’s theory mainly manifest themselves in the following two aspects. First, on
the one hand, to some extent Lewin’s theory lays undue emphasis upon the dynamic
relationship between the person and the environment, but on the other, the dynamic
value inherent in psychological elements as well as in their relationships to each other
is given but scant attention. Second, as is well known, Kurt Lewin originated the clas-
sical formula B = f (P, E) as a basis for explaining and predicting behavior, and tried
to utilize this famous psychological equation of behavior to illustrate the functional
dependency of human behavior. However, this celebrated formula for behavior can
only be used to describe simple patterns of behavior rather than to explain complex
ones, especially the inscrutable and unpredictable behavior of people. Despite the
shortcomings that we have pointed out in Lewin’s theory, we have rarely disputed
the considerable contributions of his theory to our comprehensive and profound
understanding of psychological and social phenomena, or his role as one of the most
influential social psychologists of the twentieth century.
This trying situation discussed above may result from certain limitations inherent
in the discipline of psychology as a whole. Most psychologists opt to maintain value
neutrality rather than take a stand on the debatable issue of values in their researches—
that is, they advocate steering clear of or taking a neutral stand on the issue of values
that is often observed as a trigger for a variety of debates in contemporary society,
whereby they may be spared from the ordeal of dealing with the vast complexity of
human beings as well as of human behavior that surely and ultimately rests upon a
vast array of human values. If that is the case, especially when psychologists give up
242 Ibid., pp. 347–348.

243 Ibid., p. 348.
3 Personality Structure: The Concept, Characteristics and Functions 317
the study of inscrutable and unpredictable behavior of people, how can they come to
a full appreciation of human complexity, depth and mystery? To put it another way,
if the situation described above is true, how can they gain a more profound insight
into the complexity, depths and mystery of human behavior? If we cannot offer
a convincing and elaborate explanation of human complexity, depth and mystery,
particularly the complexity, depths and mystery of human behavior, how can we
unravel the mystery of man that has been haunting the human mind for at least five
thousand years?
3 Personality Structure: The Concept, Characteristics

and Functions
3.1 The Concept of Personality Structure
In general, “structure” refers to the way in which constituent elements of a partic-

ular system interconnect and interact with each other. By “the structure of human
personality” we mean the organic organization of internal elements inherent in a
definite personality as well as the appropriate forms or modes of organization. In
other words, “personality structure” refers to the formation of a definite person-
ality system as well as the appropriate modes of formation, or more specifically, the
way in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect
and interrelate with each other. “Personality structure” as the organic organization
of constituent elements inherent in a definite personality system refers to the way
in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect and
interact with each other in an organic manner at all times and in all places. The
kindred meaning of the term can be formulated as follows so that we could form a
clear and comprehensive conception of personality structure. (1) Personality struc-
ture should be viewed as “an organized whole and more than a mere aggregate of
discrete parts.”244 The central conception of personality structure is “that of a whole;
it is the most holistic entity in the universe; hence no other category will do justice to
it, and certainly not mechanism. … The Personality is thus a more or less balanced
whole or structure of various tendencies and activities maintained in progressive
harmony by the holistic unity of the Personality itself.”245 Personality structure is at
all times an integrated (or integral) whole functioning holistically—that is, a holistic
conception of personality insists that personality structure functions as a whole.
“The personality arises out of social and physical experiences, and these experi-
ences are molded into a unified structure, an integrated whole.”246 In this regard,
244 Frick, Willard B. (1989). Humanistic Psychology: Conversations with Abraham Maslow,
Gardner Murphy, Carl Rogers. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, p. 137.
245 Smuts, Jan C. (1926).Holism and Evolution. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 290.
246 Lazarus, Richard S. (1961). Adjustment and Personality. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, p. 123.
we can say with perfect safety that personality structure is “a holistically func-
tioning entity.”247 From the foregoing it will be seen that each personality structure
is an integral personality system which functions as an integrated whole. Personality
structure that exists as a unique and highly integrated or holistic system tends to
respond to the external environment in a holistic manner, whereby it will be able
to make behavioral choices. (2) “Personality structure” as the organic organization
of constituent elements inherent in a definite personality system refers to the way
in which constituent elements of a particular personality system interconnect and
interact with each other in an organic manner at all times and in all places. When we
attempt an intelligent and clarifying analysis of personality structure, we tend to envi-
sion the different constituent elements which enter into the constitution of personality
structure. Moreover, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of personality struc-
ture, we feel compelled to take into consideration the correlation between the various
constituent elements as well as the internal relationships between the various compo-
nent elements and the personality as a whole. Let us adduce a concrete example to
serve as an illustration. We may conceive a total personality structure consisting
of three major systems—the personality demand (or need) system, the personality
judgment system, and the system of personality behavior choice—and the various
constituent elements contained therein, which form a unified and harmonious whole
while interacting with each other and interrelating with each other. Hence, the struc-
ture of human personality that is conceived of as a complex network of interacting
systems may be described in terms of the three major systems and the constituent
elements contained therein. Probably few psychologists would disagree with the
proposition that the structure of personality is a whole embracing the three major
systems as well as the different constituent elements contained therein, which relate to
one another and to the whole in various ways. (3) The structure of human personality
is real, concrete, and unique. On the one hand, each personality structure is broadly
similar in form to every other personality structure, which is to say that whatever
form every personality structure may take, with very few exceptions, they are of
similar form or structure, and that careful contrast of the two forms of personality
structure will show clearly that they have something in common with each other.
On the other hand, each personality structure is vastly different in content from
every other personality structure; that is to say, each concrete personality structure
has its own distinct or unique content. It is therefore clear that there are assuredly
similarities in form among myriad forms of personality structure and that identical
structures would never exist between them. With the above situation in view, when
it comes to a scientific analysis of the structure of a definite personality, it is not
that we view the structure of a particular personality superficially and thereby take
a static, isolated and one-sided approach to it, but that we should apply the materi-
alistic conception of history as well as the methodology of historical materialism to
the dialectical analysis of the real life of a definite personality, or rather, its actual
247Brinich, Paul., & Shelley, Christopher. (2002). The Self and Personality Structure. Philadelphia,
PA: Open University Press, p. 94.
situation at a given time and place, which plays a crucial role in shaping the struc-
ture of personality. (4) Personality structure rightly asserts itself as one of the most
fundamental characteristics of personality. Fundamentally speaking, the difference
among people lies not so much in gender, age, or skin color, but rather in personality
structure. Basically speaking, the level or degree of personality development may
find its fullest expression in personality structure that, in turn, rightly asserts itself
as one of the most fundamental characteristics of personality. To put it another way,
people differ essentially from each other in having their own different personality
structures—that is, the essential difference between people resides in the fact that
each personality structure is different from every other personality structure. Let us
adduce a few examples to serve as an illustration. Humans can be divided into the
yellow race (the Mongolian race), the white race (the Caucasian race), and the black
race (the Negroid race) according to the color of their skin. People can be divided
into the male sex and the female sex according to their function of producing young.
People can be divided into the old and the young according to their age. In spite of
their physical differences, the essential difference between people lies in the fact that
they are endowed with different personality structures. (5) Personality structure may
be conceived as a determining factor that tends to influence and even determine the
fate of personality. Generally speaking, of all the factors that can influence the fate
of personality, personality structure may assert itself as one of the most important
deciding factors in determining the fate of personality. Personality structure not only
marks the degree and level of development that a particular personality attains, but
also determines whether the behavioral choice on the part of a particular personality
meets with success or results in failure, as well as the nature and level of behavioral
choice on the part of a definite personality, thereby deciding the fate of personality
marked by vicissitudes. (6) Personality structure may be regarded as a result of the
interaction between environmental influences and the behavioral choice on the part
of a definite personality. In terms of how personality structures interact with the
environment to generate behavior, especially in terms of how a definite personality
meets environmental pressures and challenges, the structure of human personality
may be conceived as the product or result of practical human activity. In terms of how
personality structures interact with the behavioral choice on the part of a particular
personality, under certain environmental conditions the structure of human person-
ality tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality– that
is, in most cases the structure of human personality susceptible to the influence of
external environmental stimuli tends to determine the behavioral choice on the part
of a particular personality. Generally speaking, what kind of structure a personality
is endowed with will determine what kinds of appropriate choices it tends to make,
which will, in turn, affect and even shape the destiny of a particular personality. It is
only through the agency of the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality
that the personality can mold itself into a particular structure of personality. Hence,
personality structure may be conceived as a result of the interaction between environ-
mental influences and the behavioral choice on the part of a definite personality. (7)
The structure of personality that holds an exceptional place in the knowledge system
based on the theory of “structure and choice” forms an essential part of the theory of
“structure and choice,” or rather, constitutes the nucleus of the theory of “structure
and choice.” Only if we take up the thorough study of personality structure can we
give the theory of “structure and choice” a clear and lucid explanation, whereby we
can render considerable service to man’s survival and development.
3.2 The Characteristics of Personality Structure
By the logic of events, in elaborating upon personality structure, we feel the necessity
of giving a brief critical summary of the fundamental characteristics inherent in
personality structure.
(1) Wholeness
The structure of human personality must invariably be considered with reference to
all its inherent constituent elements. Personality structure exists as a whole—that
is, all its inherent constituent parts work together to constitute an organic unity. We
can build up a system of hypotheses as to the structure of personality by taking into
consideration the constituent elements of personality structure that are meticulously
arranged and highly organized and that interrelate and interact with each other in an
orderly manner. On the one hand, these inherent constituent parts that are arranged
and organized in an orderly manner tend toward an organic unity. On the other hand,
these constituent elements of personality structure that are characterized as complex
and changeable can be integrated into an organic whole. Moreover, personality struc-
ture tends to respond holistically to environmental pressures and challenges, which
is to say, under certain external environmental conditions the constituent elements
inherent in personality structure tend to work in unity with each other to make the
behavioral choices, which a particular personality susceptible to the influence of
external environmental stimuli has to make, in agreement with each other rather than
in contradiction with each other. The contradictory behavioral choice on the part of a
particular personality suggests serious defects in personality structure and may cause
personality disorders.
(2) Hierarchy
There are different levels or differentiations in levels within the structure of human
personality. That is to say, the constituent elements of personality structure can be
organized into different levels, or rather, into higher and lower levels. Looked at from
the angle of a certain level in the hierarchy of personality structure, the structure of
personality is endowed with duality. At the three levels of personality structure—that
is, the power of personality demand (or need), the power of personality judgment,
and the behavioral choice on the part of a personality, each level is endowed with
duality—or, to put it another way, while asserting itself as one of the constituent
elements of personality structure, each level in the “triple structure of personality”—

“the three levels of personality structure” constitutes a self-sufficient personality
subsystem consisting of the constituent elements contained therein.248
(3) The Unity of Stability and Changeability
On the one hand, the structure of personality can be seen as having an open-ended
and changeable tendency, but on the other, it develops a natural tendency to maintain
internal order and stability, whereby personality structure brings about the unity of
stability and changeability. The structure of personality possesses relative stability
and rightly asserts itself as a system with an orderly structure, which is to say, the
constituent elements of personality structure and the relationships contained therein
are interrelated with each other and interact on each other. The stable interconnec-
tion and orderly interaction between constituent elements of personality structure
enables the structure of personality to lie in a state of relatively stable equilibrium.
Once this kind of stability is overturned, the structure of personality tends to be in
a state of disorder. Personality structure may be viewed across the life cycle both
as an open-ended and as a changeable entity. On the one hand, the structure of
personality that is probably continuously susceptible to the influences of environ-
mental stimuli can exchange energy and information with the outside environment,
but on the other, it can maintain close relationships with the environment and keep
a dynamic balance between itself and the environment by making adjustment to the
environment. In so doing, the structure of personality will be enabled to undergo a
constant transformation while bringing about changes in the external environment.
(4) The Unity of Isomorphism and Uniqueness
Personality structures that are of similar form, or rather that are expressed in similar
forms, have their own unique contents. These forms and contents cannot be separated
from each other, but rather bring about the unity of isomorphism and uniqueness.
Personality structures are of identical or similar form, that is, in terms of the “form”
of the personality structure every individual on earth is endowed with roughly the
same structure of personality. Hence the author champions the proposition that each
individual’s personality structure consists of “the three levels of personality struc-
ture” and “eight kinds of powers.” First, by the “triple structure,” that is, the “three
levels of personality structure,” we mean the basic structure of human personality,
or rather, the basic make-up of human personality, which consists of three organic
levels of personality structure. By the first level of personality structure, or rather,
“the power of personality demand (or need),” we mean that man’s basic needs and
driving forces as well as their manifold manifestations are inherent in the subcon-
scious (or unconscious) mind, which, according to the author, can be regarded as
“the great reservoir” of man’s basic needs and driving forces, and that “the power
of personality demand (or need)” can provide primitive energies and basic tenden-
cies for human behavioral choices. By the second level of personality structure, that
248
Liao, Gai-Long., Sun, Lian-Cheng., & Chen, You-Jin. (1993). An Encyclopedic Outline of
Marxism. Beijing: People’s Daily Press, pp. 219–220.
is, “the power of personality judgment,” which is the crucial level of personality
structure, and which is of paramount importance to man’s “structure and choice,”
we mean that the conscious mind is endowed with man’s rational powers that tend
to manifest themselves in manifold forms, and that “the power of personality judg-
ment” tends to be inextricably linked with “the power of personality demand (or
need),” thereby determining man’s behavioral choices. By the third level of person-
ality structure, that is, “personality behavior choice,” we mean that man can determine
his own behavior and make appropriate behavioral choices in a certain environment,
that “personality behavior choice” manifests itself in a person’s practical activities
throughout his whole life, and that “personality behavior choice” is man’s conscious
practical activity whereby he can remold his subjective world while changing the
objective world. Second, by “eight kinds of powers” we mean that eight essential
(or substantive) powers are inherent in the structure of human personality. “Eight
kinds of powers” can be grouped into three separate levels of “the triple structure.”
“The power of personality demand (or need)” that belongs to the first level of person-
ality structure includes three kinds of power inherent in human personality: (1) “the
power of survival demand (or need),” for instance desire for food, sexual desire,
and desire for safety; (2) “the power of belonging demand (or need),” for example
desire for love, desire for group, and desire for self-esteem; (3) “the power of devel-
opment demand (or need)” such as desire for knowledge, desire for achievement,
and desire for perfection. Basically, “the power of personality demand (or need)”
is inherent in the subconscious (or unconscious) mind. “The power of personality
judgment” that comes into the second level of personality structure contains four
kinds of power inherent in human personality: (1) “ideological and moral power;”
(2) “wisdom power;” (3) “will power;” (4) “power of introspection.” The first three
kinds of power inherent in human personality, which are three principal manifes-
tations of “the power of personality judgment,” exist in the conscious mind, while
the fourth kind of power, which is a major form of “the power of personality judg-
ment,” is present in man’s self-awareness. “Personality behavior choice,” which can
be grouped into the third level of personality structure, consists of one type of power
inherent in human personality, that is, “personality behavior choice.” With very few
exceptions, every individual on earth develops a personality structure that is basically
composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,”
regardless of their age, gender, race or ethnicity. However, each individual’s person-
ality structure possesses its own unique content, and from this it follows that, just as
no two personality structures in the world are identical in content, so it should not be
surprising that no two personalities are exactly alike—that is, no two human person-
alities are ever precisely the same, although there exist innumerable combinations of
personality content. As Rousseau pointed out, “I mean to present my fellow mortals
with a man in all the integrity of nature; and this man shall be myself! I know my
heart, and have studied mankind: I am not made like any one I have been acquainted
with, perhaps like no one in existence; if not better, I at least claim originality, and
whether nature did wisely in breaking the mould with which she formed me, can
only be determined after having read this work.”249
(5) The Unity of Synchronicity and Diachronicity
The structure of personality that can be conceived both as a synchronic and
as a diachronic entity rightly asserts itself as the unity of synchronicity and
diachronicity.250 Thus, we should devote ourselves to the synchronic study of person-
ality structure as a state as well as the diachronic study of it as change through time
or evolution over time. By the synchronicity of the structure of personality in its
immediate concrete existence in itself we are justified in holding that the structure
of personality rightly asserts itself as an immediate concrete entity—or to put it the
other way round, under certain conditions the structure of personality in its imme-
diate concrete existence consists of certain constituent elements, is endowed with
its own properties (or characteristics) as distinct from those of others, evolves a
variety of possible neural mechanisms for behavioral choice, and develops its own
unique behavior patterns. By the diachronicity of the structure of personality that
is subject to change over time we mean that the structure of personality that tends
to undergo change through time is not simply a product of individual personality
development, but rather a miniature replication of the process of human evolution.
The individual’s personality structure tends to be a miniature manifestation of the
life-long process of growth and development in which the lapse of days and years
is marked chiefly by the vestiges of personal events—by the ordinary vicissitudes
of individual prosperity or misfortune, some of which may prove of far-reaching
importance to the formation and development of personality structure as well as to
the whole period of one’s life.251 At this point in time we find it highly necessary to
lay special emphasis upon that fact that the structure of personality can be conceived
of not simply as a diachronic structure of the conscious being—or to put it the other
way round, the author insists, with all the emphasis at his command, that too strong
emphasis cannot be put on the diachronic aspect of personality structure, but rather
as a diachronic structure species-beings (human beings) share in common—that is,
the structure of personality is not simply a product of individual personality devel-
opment, but rather a miniature replication of the process of human evolution.252
Generally speaking, the initial stages in the historical development of personality
structure are invariably marked (or characterized) by a replication of the process of
human development and, in particular, the stages of human development extending
from infancy through late childhood can be seen as an approximate replication in
miniature of the earlier stages of human evolution. Furthermore, we can safely assert
249 Gao, Qing-Hai., Hu, Hai-Bo., & He, Lai. (1998). Man’s Species-life (Gattungsleben) and
Species-consciousness (Gattungsbewusstsein). Changchun, China: Jilin People’s Press, p. 398.
250 Jin, Bing-Hua. (2003). A Voluminous Dictionary of Marxist Philosophy. Shanghai, China:
Shanghai Lexicographical Press, pp. 178–179.

251 Hubbard, L. Ron. (1989). Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health (Xiao Yu, Trans.).
Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 3.

252 Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing: China
Renmin University Press, p. 167.

that the unity of synchronicity and diachronicity inherent in the structure of person-
ality will ensure that infinite potentialities awaiting development must of necessity
exist in the structure of personality, which is to say, the structure of personality
is endowed with enormous potentialities and energies, but in practice we can only
develop and utilize them to a very limited extent. This also suggests that the potential
possibilities inherent in each individual’s personality structure are roughly same or
similar—or to put it the other way round, in terms of those genetically determined
and transmitted potentialities, there is no essential difference in them between each
healthy personality and every other one—that is, those genetically determined and
transmitted potentialities inherent in each healthy personality is not essentially or
qualitatively different from those inherent in every other one. In real life, however,
the difference, especially the vast difference, in personality structure between one
individual and another, can be attributed primarily more to nurture than to nature.
While delving into the unity of synchronicity and diachronicity that may prove of
great importance to a deeper understanding of personality structure, we should adopt
a rational attitude toward the object of knowledge so that it may ensure us of a sure
way of working out our potentialities and arriving at the true understanding of man
as a species-being.
3.3 The Functions of Personality Structure
The functions of personality structure mainly manifest themselves in the following

aspects.
(1) The Cognitive Function
The structure of personality is endowed with the most wondrous creation in the
world, that is to say the cognitive structure that may exceed all hitherto known bounds
of human knowledge. Hence, not only can the structure of personality have direct
knowledge of the immediate world, but also it can have indirect knowledge of a much
wider world and a more remote world. The structure of personality is endowed with a
unique function, which is to say, it can create and recognize symbolic forms as carriers
of cultural meanings, “with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural life in
all their richness and variety” and to “understand the new way open to man—the way
to civilization.”253 This fact may supply the basic reason why man is so developed
both intellectually and spiritually. According to Ernst Cassirer, man who lives in a
symbolic universe is endowed with the symbolic capacity for knowing and thinking,
thereby rightly asserting himself as an animal symbolicum. In his work entitled An
Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture Cassirer advanced
elaborate and ingenious arguments in a sane, sober, and convincing manner to show
that “Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the
253
Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 26.
distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively
enlarged; it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered
a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system
and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man
a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition
transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives
not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.”254
“Yet there is no remedy against this reversal of the natural order. Man cannot escape
from his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the conditions of his own life. No
longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. They are the
varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience.
All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net.
No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face
to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity
advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly
conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic
images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything
except by the interposition of this artificial medium.”255 “Hence, instead of defining
man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum.”256
“The human being for Cassirer is not merely an animale rationale, it is an animale
symbolicum. In all the major precincts of human expression we can see how we
construct our worlds through acts of symbolization. Everywhere we turn we see the
evidence of our own symbolic activity, whether we look at mythical representations,
at language, at art, or even at science itself. Without symbolism, human beings would
be locked within the confines of a brute biological existence. It is only in virtue of
our own symbolic capacity that we gain access to higher realms of meaning. In The
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Cassirer develops this argument in stepwise fashion,
moving from a stage of ‘primitive’ symbolization in mythical thought-systems to the
intermediary stage of monotheistic religion; he then addresses the symbolic role of
human language, before turning to natural science, which he regards as the highest
and most objective domain of symbolic expression. He does not see these stages
as superseding one another historically, as if the symbolic worlds of myth were
shrugged off as mere fiction when humanity progressed toward greater rationality
and enlightenment. Instead he sees the stages as incorporating one another in the
manner of a dialect, so that each stage could be said to build upon and surpass the
one that precedes it. But he nonetheless believes that the capacity to structure our
symbolic worlds has genuinely expanded and has permitted humanity a heightened
degree of self-knowledge. In myth we live at the mercy of the beings we have endowed
with an illusory independence; in science, however, we recognize that our symbolic
worlds are our own creation. In this sense the entire history of human expression is
also a record of our efforts to gain a greater knowledge of ourselves. It fulfills the
254 Ibid., p. 24.

255 Ibid., p. 25.
256 Ibid., p. 26.
ancient injunction of Western philosophy: ‘Know thyself.’”257 Cognitive symbols

open up an infinity of possibilities for human cognitive ability. The functions of
cognitive symbols mainly manifest themselves in the following aspects.
First, cognitive symbols endow language with objective characteristics—that is,
the instrument of objectification or the depository of objectivity. As Cassirer points
out in the aforementioned work, which “is not destined for scholars or philosophers
alone,” the subject matter of which, that is, the fundamental problems of human
culture, “should be made accessible to the general public,” and in which he tried
to “avoid all technicalities and to express his thoughts as clearly and simply as
possible,”258 “Yet the decisive feature is not its (word) physical but its logical char-
acter. Physically the word may be declared to be impotent, but logically it is elevated to
a higher, indeed to the highest rank. The Logos becomes the principle of the universe
and the first principle of human knowledge. … Heraclitus does not admit that above
the phenomenal world, the world of ‘becoming,’ there exists a higher sphere, an ideal
or eternal order of pure ‘being.’ Yet he is not content with the mere fact of change;
he seeks the principle of change. According to Heraclitus this principle is not to be
found in a material thing. Not the material but the human world is the clue to a correct
interpretation of the cosmic order. In this human world the faculty of speech occupies
a central place. We must, therefore, understand what speech means in order to under-
stand the ‘meaning’ of the universe. If we fail to find this approach—the approach
through the medium of language rather than through physical phenomena—we miss
the gateway to philosophy. Even in Heraclitus’ thought the word, the Logos, is not
a merely anthropological phenomenon. It is not confined within the narrow limits
of our human world, for it possesses universal cosmic truth. But instead of being
a magic power the word is understood in its semantic and symbolic function.”259
“Not all language, though, can perform this function. Cassirer distinguishes between
language on the merely expressive or emotional level (1), representative or semantic
language (2), and symbolic language, i.e., language on the level of pure meaning (3).
Only gradually does man seem to be able to raise himself form lower to higher forms
of language, that is to say, language that brings with it higher forms of objectivity
in signification or meaning giving. One of the most important ways of giving or
expressing meaning is, of course, through language. Through language we learn to
direct our actions, find a way of controlling our emotions, and convey our intentions
and thoughts. This cannot be though merely through language on the emotional level,
for example through sorrow or yelling in anger, despite the possibilities of emotional
discharge. First when man has distanced himself from these immediate emotions,
and has tried to represent them or mediate them through some modus of meaning
giving, he can achieve some form of objectivity or determinacy. Still later, man may
257 Gordon, Peter E. “Introduction.” In An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human

Culture, Ernst Cassirer. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021.
258 Cassirer, Ernst. “Preface.” In An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human
Culture, Ernst Cassirer. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021.
259 Cassirer, Ernst. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture.

be in the position to take a more objective view of an event. In that instance, he

finds himself in the sphere of the symbolic or pure meaning, whereby meaning exists
separated from all original sense impressions that accompanied an event.”260 “Cas-
sirer mentions as symbolic forms or forms of objectivity: Myth, Language, Religion,
Science, Art, Technology, Economy, State, Ethics, and Law, but they are not limited
to the forms enumerated here. Every symbolic form is a closed world of images and
signs, that operates through symbols, but one must not ask about the role the symbol
plays therein, but rather investigate in what way this world (be it in language, myth,
or science) in its totality bears the character of symbolic formation. Every type of
symbolic form stands for a different kind of objectification and cannot be understood
save ‘in terms of its own canon of intelligibility.’ In other words, each symbolic form
is autonomous, has its own ‘inner form,’ and is not reducible to any other symbolic
form completely.”261 “In the philosophy of symbolic forms, each particular form
takes its meaning solely from the systematic place in which it stands. The content
and significance of each form is characterized by ‘the richness and specific quality
of the relations and concatenations in which it stands with other spiritual energies
and ultimately with totality.’ For this, according to Cassirer, we have to discover a
factor, which recurs in each basic cultural form but in no two of them takes exactly
the same shape, i.e., without losing the incomparable particularity of any of them.
The question is whether there exists a medium, through which all the configurations
effected in the separate branches of cultural life must pass, ‘but which nevertheless
retains its particular nature, its specific character.’”262 “Cassirer finds this medium
in the concept of the ‘symbol’ taken in its broadest meaning, i.e., as the expression of
something intellectual through sensory signs and images. Through the concept of the
symbol, Cassirer finds ‘anall-embracing medium in which the most diverse cultural
forms meet,’ and for which the idealistic opposition between the mundus sensibilis
and the mundus intelligibilis is no longer irreconcilable and exclusive. The symbol
is characterized by a new form of reciprocity and correlation, i.e., a new coopera-
tion between the senses and the spirit. The cooperation consists in the fact that ‘The
concept of the spirit is disclosed only in its manifestations; the ideal form is known
only by and in the aggregate of the sensible signs which it uses for its expression.’ As
a result, for Cassirer, ‘[t]he conceptual definition of a content (…) goes hand in hand
with its stabilization in some characteristic sign.’ Accordingly, Cassirer describes
the meaning of experience as a progressive process of determination. In the symbolic
sphere, what we call the intellectual or the spiritual ultimately has to find its fulfill-
ment in something sensory; it appears only by and in a sensory sign.”263 “For Cassirer
the opposition between the objective and the subjective is not so much the solution,
as it is the perfect expression of the problem of cognition. According to Cassirer,
sensibility consists not merely of passivity and receptivity, but also has an active
260 Coskun, Deniz. (2007). Law as Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric View
of Law. Dordrecht, NL: Springer, p. 167.
261 Ibid., p. 188.
262 Ibid., pp. 188–189.
263 Ibid., pp. 189–190.
element of formation. Out of the chaos of immediate sense impressions man creates
order or some kind of permanence, paradigmatically by using linguistic signs, such
as names. Through language, the content of what was first perceived to be chaos
receives a certain intellectual mark. As a result, the content of sense impressions
rises above the mere sensual level: because it has acquired an intellectual articu-
lation the sensory qualities no longer regulate it absolutely. Symbolic forms create
systems of sensuous symbols, which display a function or mode of objectification. It
is characteristic of symbols that they transgress individual consciousness and claim
universal validity by confronting the subjective with the universal. In the sciences,
the symbol embodies the ‘fundamental principle of cognition that the universal can
be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be thought only in
reference to the universal.’ For Cassirer, this function is not limited to the sciences
but runs through all the other cultural forms as well. Therefore, all symbolic forms
contain and display a specific kind of symbolic formation, whereby the symbol repre-
sents the relationship between the idea and the sign, the universal and the particular.
However, Cassirer is not interested in a substantial definition of the ‘symbol’ or what
the symbol signifies in this or that specific discipline. He rather asks in what respect
a certain discipline, such as language, myth, or science carries with it the general
function of symbolic formation: ‘all truly strict and exact thought is sustained by
the symbolic and semiotics on which it is based.’ Symbolic forms are, therefore,
functional systems.”264 “‘The fundamental concepts of each science, the instruments
with which it propounds its questions and formulates its solutions, are regarded no
longer as passive images of something given but as symbols created by the intellect
itself.’ In this regard, Cassirer is importantly inspired by the mathematical physicist
Heinrich Hertz, who was among the first to formulate this new ideal of knowledge.
He observed that in the attempts of the natural sciences to foresee future experience,
the scientists make use of ‘inner fictions or symbols’ of outward objects, ‘and these
symbols are so constituted that the necessary logical consequences of the images are
always images of the necessary natural consequences of the imaged objects. (…)
The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of things; they have with things
the one essential agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement,
but further agreement with things is not necessary to their purpose.’ In place of
the requirement of a similarity of content between the image of the object and the
object itself, the natural sciences now introduce a highly complex logical relation.
The natural sciences now describe an object only within the essential categories of
natural science, and therewith have come to renounce the claim of an ‘immediate’
grasp and communication of reality. Accordingly, scientific concepts are never mere
designations for the given and present, rather they point the way to new, hitherto
unexplored fields. Therewith, they prepare the way for “a process of interpolation
and extrapolation.’ In fine, concepts must no longer be taken in their substantial,
but in their functional sense, i.e., ‘not primarily as an expression of a simple exis-
tence or occurrence, but as an expression of a determinate order, a specific mode of
264 Ibid., p. 190.

contemplation.’ They are not responsive to reality, but confront reality with a partic-
ular question and direction of thought.”265 “Cassirer maintains that the concept can
be understood only by investigating the structure of conceptualization itself and the
possibility of such a structure. This structure cannot be derived back to a single mate-
rial principle, which holds good for all concepts. Rather, what comprises the ultimate
foundation of a concept and accounts for its fundamental character is its meaning.
With his account of the functional theory of knowledge, Cassirer makes clear, that an
object of knowledge can be described only when mediated by a particular logical and
conceptual structure, i.e., by symbols articulated through symbolic forms. Accord-
ingly, Cassirer concludes, ‘a variety of media will correspond to various structures
of the object, to various meanings for ‘objective relations.’ To put it otherwise,
the form (or ‘meaning machine’) with which an object is articulated determines its
fundamental meaning.”266 “As referred to above, for Cassirer, next to cognition, the
life of the human spirit as a whole also knows a variety of other modes or forms of
‘objectification,’ by means of which it raises a particular to the level of the universally
valid. Although these forms of objectification achieve universal validity by methods
entirely different from the logical concepts and the laws of logic, nevertheless, each
one of them has in common with cognition, that ‘it does not merely copy but rather
embodies an original formative power. It does not express passively the mere fact
that something is present but contains an independent energy of the human spirit
through which the simple presence of the phenomenon assumes a definite meaning,
a particular ideational content.’ Furthermore, the answer to the question of how a
certain phenomenon assumes a certain ‘meaning’ or how it is possible that some-
thing assumes ‘meaning,’ Cassirer finds in the concept of ‘symbolic pregnance.’
By symbolic pregnance, Cassirer understands, ‘the way in which a perception as a
sensory experience contains at the same time a certain non-intuitive meaning which
it immediately and concretely represents.’ ‘The simplest and in a sense the most
original and primitive type of this relation [i.e., symbolic pregnance] is found,’ says
Cassirer, ‘wherever a sensory experience of some sort confronts us possessing a
certain content of meaning such that a kind of expressive value adheres to it with
which it seems to be saturated.’ In this regard, the sensory content does not stand
before us like a ‘mute picture on a tablet,’ ‘but rather immediately manifests an inner
life as something that appears through its objective nature.’ Symbolic pregnance is
the condition for the possibility of all of giving meaning (through signs). Through
the concept of symbolic pregnance, it becomes understandable what Cassirer means
by symbolic form. A symbolic form is a certain way to interpret signs and images, an
intermediate process through which we first gain access to reality, and through which
we relate ourselves to the outer world. Cassirer gives the following definition of a
symbolic form, which can be dissected in four components: it comprises of ‘every
energy of the mind [Energie des Geistes]’ [1], through which ‘a mental content
of meaning [geistiger Bedeutungsgehalt] [2] is connected to a concrete, sensory
265 Ibid., pp. 191–192.

266 Ibid., pp. 192–193.
sign [konkretes sinnliches Zeichen] [3] and made to adhere internally to it [4].’”267
“Whereas the sign fades away when the physiognomic characteristics that make up
a sign lose their force to appeal to the senses, symbols maintain their force in the
sphere of meaning, irrespective of the diminishing quality of the sensory material that
accompanied them. However, the sign for the philosophy of symbolic forms is never
a mere cloak, an accidental and outward garment for thought, because when thought
uses a sign it represents a basic tendency and form of thought. The sign ‘serves not
merely to communicate a complete and given thought-content, but is an instrument,
by means of which this content develops and fully defines itself.’ This becomes more
obvious when we discuss the fourth component of the symbolic form, to which we
turn now. The sensory material, the material of perception, i.e., the sign, is not a real
being that can be isolated and put to the fore in this isolation as a pure given, as a
psychological datum. We apprehend the symbolic sign as an inward energy, which
assumes objective form in the outward world. In other words, when we strive to
(intersubjectively) objectify our subjective intentions through symbolic formations
of various kinds, we do not merely make meaning, but also give it a place in our
own perception and consciousness. Once conferred, we ourselves as the originators
of meaning eventually cannot circumvent them. The meanings we have produced (in
conjunction with other members of an interpretative or symbolic community) become
part of that (particular) objective world, and we subsequently have to deal with them
as any other outward reality; in other words, we are ‘made to adhere internally to
it’—or rather bring ourselves to adhere to them when acting accordingly (as we are
also free to negate them).”268 “It is characteristic of the symbol—as the expression
of a universal in some concrete, sensory sign—that in it expression, representation,
and signification converge with one another. However, not all symbolic forms are
equally well equipped to grapple with pure meaning or even display representational
features. Cassirer distinguishes three various dimensions in symbolic formation, i.e.,
the expressive or mythic, the mimetic or representational, and the significative dimen-
sion or the sphere of pure meaning. When Cassirer takes up Kant’s insight that objects
are not ‘given’ to consciousness in a rigid and finished state, but are first constituted by
a synthetic unity of the consciousness, and broadens its range of applicability to any
(cultural) cosmos that was formed out of a chaos of impressions; he does not contend
that every phase of human consciousness is on a par as to its level of symbolization
or objectification. Mythic mentality has objective claims of validity, and comprises
of an independent cosmos or a characteristic and typical worldview, but its claims
only apply in the mythic realm. For Cassirer myth also involves a process of objecti-
fication, that is to say, of transforming mere impressions into formed representations.
However, as is explicated below, the transformation myth achieves in our percep-
tual or sensual world does not reach a representative or significative dimension,
because that is reserved for the symbolic forms of language, religion, science, and
so forth. If we want to understand myth, though, we cannot do that by contrasting
it with the claims of science. To understand myth, we have to consider it only in
267 Ibid., pp. 193–194.

268 Ibid., p. 196.
its own terms, and for that we have to reach back to strata preceding theoretical
object-consciousness. As Cassirer writes, ‘(…) before man thinks in terms of logical
concepts, he holds his experiences by means of clear, separate mythical images.’
However, not only does Cassirer explore the typical formation of objectifications in
the depths of mythical thought, he also contends that myth in this respect is the matrix
of all cultural life.”269 “In a way, every act of the human intellect is symbolic insofar
as it makes representations of certain processes or laws, or when it puts a certain
occurrence in a certain perspective or functionality. That is important, but not defini-
tive of a symbolic form. A symbolic form encapsulates and fully contextualizes a
certain experience and as a result gives it a characteristic meaning that is contestable
on its own terms. It is a process that involves the phenomenon of symbolic pregnance,
because through every symbolic form we give shape to our perceptions by already
directing them into a certain direction. Progressively, according to Cassirer, we reach
higher forms of objectivity, i.e., pure forms of meaning, that is, only when the human
being can freely develop and realize his symbolic functions. In this regard, the all-
comprehensive characteristic of the various symbolic forms can also obstruct the
development toward increasingly higher of objectivity. Whereas each symbolic form
is a self-sufficient medium for understanding and making understandable the world,
it can also assume a dominant or hegemonic position with respect to the complete
intellectual horizon of the individual. In pejorative terms, these are aberrations or
reductions of the multi-dimensionality of human life. When myth holds the life of
man in its grip, in an absolute and domiant way, we may call it archaism, primitivism,
or barbarism. In the case of religion, we encounter the same totalizing effect upon
human life in the form of fundamentalism (as distinct from Puritanism). Law, too
can degenerate in a mere formalism or a total juridification of human life. It is up to
philosophy to explicate their interconnectedness, and the delicate balance between
them that stands at the core of human freedom.”270
Second, symbolic forms endow man with the unique gift of symbolic imagination,
whereby he can conceive something he has never seen before, and imagine things he
has never experienced directly. To put it otherwise, man who possesses an unbounded
and vigorous imagination can conceive of something that has never existed before,
and imagine what has never happened yet. “In defining man as an animal rationale,
as a technological animal, or a social or political animal, we do not capture the
differentia specifica of the human mode of being. Wherein lies the difference? For
Cassirer the essential difference is that the structure in which the animal finds itself
is a merely formal and biological structure, whereas the structure in which man finds
himself is a symbolic structure of his own creation.”271 “In short, we may say that
269 Ibid., p. 197.

270 Ibid., p. 199.
271 Lofts, S. G. (2000). Ernst Cassirer: A “Repetition” of Modernity. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, p. 65.

the animal possesses a practical imagination and intelligence whereas man alone has
developed a new form: a symbolic imagination and intelligence.”272
Third, the ability to create symbols puts man in full possession of extraordinary
intellectual endowments such as symbolic intelligence. “The symbol is tied to the
development of intelligence that characterizes the human individual. Cassirer brings
forth the example of Hellen Keller as a means to portray the interconnection between
symbolism and the development of human mentality.”273 Cassirer says: “The prin-
ciple of symbolism, with its universality, validity, and general applicability, is the
magic word, the Open Sesame (something that unfailingly brings about a desired
end)! giving access to the specifically human world, to the world of human culture.
Once man is in possession of this magic key further progress is assured.”274 “For
Cassirer, it is this ability to create symbols which serves as the defining character-
istic to separate humans from mere animals. … For the animal, the phenomenon can
never manifest itself as a symbol, either of itself or of anything else, either concrete
or abstract. This assertion does not deny that animals are intelligent—in fact, Carrier
claims that many species of animals do indeed exhibit intelligence in the way that
they relate objects to each other, not as symbols, but as signs or signals.”275 “Signals
and symbols belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is a part of the
physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning.”276
Signs are always given; symbols are always created. Cassirer is emphatic on this
point: “All the phenomena which are commonly described as conditioned reflexes
are not merely very far from but even opposed to the essential character of human
symbolic though… In short, we may say that the animal possesses a practical imag-
ination and intelligence whereas man alone has developed a new form: a symbolic
imagination and intelligence.”277
Fourth, symbolic forms enable man to develop the variety of cultural perceptions
of symbolic space and time. “(…) it is the idea of abstract or symbolic space which
clears the way for man not only to a new field of knowledge but to an entirely
new direction of his cultural life.”278 “The fact of the existence of such a thing as
abstract space was one of the first and most important discoveries of Greek thought.
… We must admit that abstract space has no counterpart and no foundation in any
physical or psychological reality.”279 “Geometrical space, or rather, the space of
273 Verene, Donald Phillip. (2011). The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel,
and Cassirer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 94.


275 Luft, Eric von der. (2019). Ruminations: Selected Philosophical, Historical, and Ideological
Papers: Volume 1, Part 1, The Infinite. North Syracuse, NY: Gegensatz Press, pp. 309–310.

277 Ibid., pp. 32–33.
278 Ibid., p. 43.
279 Ibid., p. 44.
geometry (a theoretical or scientific concept of space), abstracts from all the variety
and heterogeneity imposed upon us by the disparate nature of our senses. Here we
have a homogeneous, a universal space. And it was only by the medium of this new
and characteristic form of space that man could arrive at the concept of a unique,
systematic cosmic order. The idea of such an order, of the unity and the lawfulness of
the universe, never could have been reached without the idea of a uniform space.”280
“Astronomy supersedes astrology; geometrical space takes the place of mythical
and magical space. It was a false and erroneous form of symbolic thought that first
paved the way to a new and true symbolism, the symbolism of modern science.
One of the first and most difficult tasks of modern philosophy was to understand
this symbolism in its true sense and in its full significance.”281 “Memory implies a
process of recognition and identification, an ideational process of a very complex
sort. The former impressions must not only be repeated; they must also be ordered
and located, and referred to different points in time. Such a location is not possible
without conceiving time as a general scheme—as a serial order which comprises all
the individual events. The awareness of time necessarily implies the concept of such a
serial order corresponding to that other scheme which we call space.”282 “In man we
cannot describe recollection as a simple return of an event, as a faint image or copy
of former impressions. It is not simply a repetition but rather a rebirth of the past; it
implies a creative and constructive process. It is not enough to pick up isolated data of
our past experience; we must really re-collect them, we must organize and synthesize
them, and assemble them into a focus of thought. It is this kind of recollection which
gives us the characteristic shape of memory, and distinguishes it from all the other
phenomena in animal or organic life.”283 “According to Bergson’s view, memory
is a much deeper and more complex phenomenon. It means ‘internalization’ and
intensification; it means the interpretation of all the elements of our past life. …
Symbolic memory is the process by which man not only repeats his past experience
but also reconstructs this experience.”284 “So far we have taken under consideration
only one aspect of time—the relation of the present to the past. But there is yet another
aspect which seems to be even more important to, and more characteristic of, the
structure of human life. This is what might be called the third dimension of time, the
dimension of the future. In our consciousness of time the future is an indispensable
element. Even in the earliest stages of life this element begins to play a dominant
role. ‘It is characteristic of the whole early development of the life of ideas,’ writes
William Stern, ‘that they do not appear so much as memories pointing to something
in the past, but as expectations directed to the future—even though only to a future
immediately at hand. We meet here for the first time a general law of development.
Reference to the future is grasped by the consciousness sooner than that to the past.’
In our later life this tendency becomes even more pronounced. … To think of the
280 Ibid., p. 45.

281 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
282 Ibid., pp. 50–51.
283 Ibid., p. 51.
284 Ibid., p. 52.
future and to live in the future is a necessary part of his nature.”285 “On the basis of
this evidence it seems to follow that the anticipation of future events and even the
planning of future actions are not entirely beyond the reach of animal life. But in
human beings the awareness of the future undergoes the same characteristic change
of meaning which we have noted with regard to the idea of the past. The future is not
only an image; it becomes an ‘ideal.’ The meaning of this transformation manifests
itself in all the phases of man’s cultural life. So long as he remains entirely absorbed
in his practical activities the difference is not clearly observable. It appears to be a
difference of degree, not a specific difference. To be sure the future envisaged by man
extends over a much wider area, and his planning is much more conscious and careful.
But all this still belongs to the realm of prudence, not to that of wisdom. The term
‘prudence’ (prudentia) is etymologically connected with ‘providence’ (providentia).
It means the ability to foresee future events and to prepare for future needs. But the
theoretical idea of the future—that idea which is a prerequisite of all man’s higher
cultural activities—is of a quite different sort. It is more than mere expectation; it
becomes an imperative of human life. And this imperative reaches far beyond man’s
immediate practical needs—in its highest form it reaches beyond the limits of his
empirical life. This is man’s symbolic future, which corresponds to and is in strict
analogy with his symbolic past.”286
Fifth, the dependence relationship of relational thought to symbolic thought is
made explicit by Ernst Cassirer: “It is symbolic thought which overcomes the natural
inertia of man and endows him with a new ability, the ability to constantly reshape
his human universe.”287 Man’s symbolic thought ensures him of the unique posses-
sion of relational thought. “Without a complex system of symbols relational thought
cannot arise at all, much less reach its full development. It would not be correct to
say that the mere awareness of relations presupposes an intellectual act, an act of
logical or abstract thought. Such an awareness is necessary even in elementary acts
of perception. The sensationalist theories used to describe perception as a mosaic
of simple sense data. Thinkers of this persuasion constantly overlooked the fact
that sensation itself is by no means a mere aggregate or bundle of isolated impres-
sions. Modern Gestalt psychology has corrected this view. It has shown that the
very simplest perceptual processes imply fundamental structural elements, certain
patterns or configurations. This principle holds both for the human and the animal
world. Even in comparatively low stages of animal life the presence of these struc-
tural elements—especially of spatial and optical structures—has been experimentally
proved. The awareness of relations cannot, therefore, be regarded as a specific feature
of human consciousness. We do find, however, in man a special type of relational
thought which has no parallel in the animal world. In man an ability to isolate rela-
tions—to consider them in their abstract meaning—has developed. In order to grasp
this meaning man is no longer dependent upon concrete sense data, upon visual, audi-
tory, tactile, kinesthetic data. He considers these relations ‘in themselves’ as Plato
285 Ibid., p. 53.

286 Ibid., pp. 55–56.
287 Ibid., p. 62.
said. Geometry is the classic example of this turning point in man’s intellectual life.
Even in elementary geometry we are not bound to the apprehension of concrete indi-
vidual figures. We are not concerned with physical things or perceptual objects, for
we are studying universal spatial relations for whose expression we have an adequate
symbolism. Without the preliminary step of human language such an achievement
would not be possible. In all the tests which have been made of the processes of
abstraction or generalization in animals, this point has become evident. … They, or
more specifically, the processes of abstraction or generalization in animals, cannot
develop because they do not possess that invaluable and indeed indispensable aid of
human speech, of a system of symbols.”288
Sixth, symbolic forms are condemned to sustain humanity in a meaningful cultural
world. “No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe.”289
“In language, in religion, in art, in science, man can do no more than to build up
his own universe– a symbolic universe that enables him to understand and interpret,
to articulate and organize, to synthesize and universalize his human experience.”290
“There is a profound difference between philosophical and sociological perspec-
tives of social symbols and symbolic communication. The philosophical perspectives
emphasize what might be called ‘a new dimension of reality’ or ‘a fifth dimension’
(Elias 1991:47) of human existence which reshapes the four dimensions of space–
time into a shared universe of symbols communicating the meaningful existence to
both individuals and societies. Its primary purpose is to examine social symbols as an
expression of human nature and/or the media communicating and searching for the
meaning of human existence. The fifth dimension of social symbols constitutes the
cultural life of human beings which, since early mythologies, has incorporated both
anthropological explanations of the origins of human existence and cosmological
explanations of the origins of the world. If there still remains ‘a clue to the nature
of man’ in the modern world of science and functionally differentiated society, it is
to be found in a symbolic universe of humankind responding to the physical world
by the active and complicated process of thinking. In this respect, Ernst Cassirer,
for instance, states that ‘instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should
define him as animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific differ-
ence, and we can understand the new way open to man—the way to civilization’.
According to this anthropological philosophy, symbols do not have actual existence
in the physical world, yet they have a ‘meaning’ and thus make a clear distinction
between actual reality and possibility. The difference between things and symbols
constitutes human culture as a realm of the difference between facts and ideals. The
general function of symbolic thought is thus the establishment of ideals, which, by
definition, are impossible to materialize. They are in the state of potentiality which
is both a necessary and indispensible part of our social reality.”291
288 Ibid., pp. 38–39.

289 Ibid., p. 25.
290 Ibid., p. 221.
291 Klink, Bart van., Beers, Britta van., & Poort, Lonneke., eds. (2016). Symbolic Legislation Theory
and Developments in Biolaw. New York, NY: Springer Nature, pp. 108–109.
Seventh, symbolic forms ensure for man free access to an “ideal world,” parts
of which are language, myth, art, and religion. “Even here man does not live in a
world of hard facts, or according to his immediate needs and desires. He lives rather
in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions,
in his fantasies and dreams.”292 “But Cassirer’s philosophy does contain a rational
principle of organization, albeit one that cannot be separated from its empirical
unfolding. This principle is embedded in the central notion of the symbol itself, in
what Jürgen Habermas has aptly called its ‘liberating power.’ If animals are captive
to their environment, reacting to it in purely instinctual fashion, man, the ‘symbolic
animal,’ is able to grasp it as a world, as the object of aspirations, projects, and theo-
ries. Symbolism thus opens the way ‘from animal reactions to human responses.’”293
“Without symbolism the life of man would be like that of the prisoners in the cave of
Plato’s famous simile. Man’s life would be confined within the limits of his biological
needs and his practical interests; it could find no access to the ‘ideal world’ which is
opened to him from different sides by religion, art, philosophy, science.”294
Eighth, “Every organism, even the lowest, is not only in a vague sense adapted
to (angepasst) but entirely fitted into (eingepasst) its environment. According to
its anatomical structure it possesses a certain Merknetz and a certain Wirknetz—a
receptor system and an effector system. Without the cooperation and equilibrium of
these two systems the organism could not survive. The receptor system by which a
biological species receives outward stimuli and the effector system by which it reacts
to them are in all cases closely interwoven. They are links in one and the same chain
which is described by Uexküll as the functional circle (Funktionskreis) of the animal.
… Obviously the human world forms no exception to those biological rules which
govern the life of all the other organisms. Yet in the human world we find a new
characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. The functional
circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also undergone a qualitative
change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his
environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be
found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the
symbolic system. … There is an unmistakable difference between organic reactions
and human responses. In the first case a direct and immediate answer is given to an
outward stimulus,”295 that is, “animals can easily be trained to react not merely to
direct stimuli but to all sorts of mediate or representative stimuli,”296 and “almost
all animal actions are governed by the presence of an immediate stimulus.”297 “In
293 Skidelsky, Edward. (2012). Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, pp. 103–104.


295 Ibid., p. 24.
296 Ibid., pp. 31–32.
297 Ibid., p. 33.
the second case it is interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated process
of thought,”298 whereby man can make behavioral choices. “The transition from
a merely practical attitude to a symbolic attitude is the final result of a slow and
continuous process.”299
To put it in a nutshell, the structure of human personality opens up infinite possi-
bilities for man’s cognitive ability to develop in an all-round way, whereby man can
obtain a quicker, keener, and deeper insight into what Karl Popper called the three
worlds of physical process, psychological states, and the abstract products of the
intellect.
(2) The Function of Choice
The chief function of personality structure is to make behavioral choices, which is to
say, the component elements inherent in the structure of human personality suscep-
tible to external environmental stimuli tend to act jointly by securing close coordi-
nation of mental processes from each other and to respond accordingly by making
appropriate behavioral choices. In view of the fact that the structure of personality
responsive to external environmental stimuli tends to struggle for survival and devel-
opment, the structure of personality deems it indispensably necessary to create a
general mechanism for making behavioral choices. Specifically, under external envi-
ronmental pressures “the power of personality demand (or need)” is set in motion
first, then “the power of personality judgment” takes part in decision-making, and
ultimately, it is still “the power of personality judgment” that ensures to the struc-
ture of personality appropriate responses to external environmental stimuli and that
prompts it to make behavioral choices accordingly. When examining the behavioral
choices that the structure of personality has to make to address external environ-
mental challenges, we must bestow some consideration on the multifaceted nature
of behavioral choices. The structure of personality makes behavioral choices either
to meet the challenges of the external environment or to bring about a change in
itself—or to put it the other way round, the behavioral choice on the part of the struc-
ture of personality can be purely directed toward the external environment or simply
aimed at bringing about a change in the structure of personality itself. Here we feel
the necessity of distinguishing the difference between “one-way choice” and “two-
way choice.” We mean by “one-way choice” that the behavioral choice on the part
of the structure of personality under the influence of many and varied environmental
stimuli can be purely directed toward either the external environment or the structure
of personality itself. The one-way behavioral choice on the part of the structure of
personality tends to be made in a small way and in a relatively simple manner and to
exist extensively and universally in human life. By “two-way choice” (also termed
“two-way composite choice”) we mean that the structure of personality responsive
to external environmental stimuli can be faced with “internal choice” and “external
choice” simultaneously that interrelate with each other, interact with each other, and
298 Ibid., p. 24.

299 Ibid., p. 33.
condition each other. Let us adduce a few concrete examples to serve as an illustra-
tion. In some cases, under the influence of environmental stimuli the personality first
tends to make internal behavioral choices by adjusting and improving its own person-
ality structure and putting itself in readiness, and then proceeds to make external
behavioral choices by responding or reacting to the external environment. In other
cases, the personality first tends to make external behavioral choices by responding or
reacting to the external environment, and then, depending on the responses it receives
from the external environment, the personality proceeds to make internal behavioral
choices by adjusting and improving its own personality structure. Moreover, when
faced with “internal choice” and “external choice” at the same time, the structure of
personality under the influence of many and varied environmental stimuli can make
“internal behavioral choices” and “external behavioral choices” simultaneously that
either alternate with each other or overlap with each other. Generally speaking, those
relatively complex behavior choices that exert a really wide-spread and tremendous
influence over the external environment will invariably come into the category of
“two-way choice” (also termed “two-way composite choice”) which tends to mani-
fest itself in the fact that “internal choice” and “external choice” either alternate with
each other or overlap with each other when the structure of personality is faced with
“internal choice” and “external choice” simultaneously. The basic way in which man
strives for the realization of his goal in life lies in his behavioral choice. The behav-
ioral choice on the part of any individual human being invariably manifests itself
in every deed, at all times and in all places. Admittedly, the basic mode of human
existence tends to manifest itself in the fact that an individual human being under
certain more or less specific external environmental conditions may enlist the aid of
his personality structure in making behavioral choices whereby he can determine his
own survival, development and destiny.
(3) The Structure and Dynamics of Human Personality
The structure of personality can be likened to a power set that may serve as an
unfailing source of power readily available to man’s behavioral choice as well as
to its manifold behavioral manifestations. The source of power for the structure of
personality manifests itself mainly in the following three aspects. First, the compo-
nent elements inherent in the structure of personality and personality dynamics. The
various component elements inherent in the structure of personality (“the three levels
of personality structure” and “their respective corresponding eight kinds of powers”)
possess their respective potentialities and constitute sources of power on which
human personality depends for its existence, development and change.300 Second, the
internal structure of personality and personality dynamics. The relationships among
the various component elements inherent in the structure of personality as well as
those between the structure of personality as a whole and the various component
elements contained therein possess motive powers and thereby constitute sources
of power on which human personality depends for its existence, development and
300Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Classic Propositions of Western Marxism. Beijing:

Oriental Publishing House, pp. 234–235.
change. Third, the external environment and personality dynamics. The relationships
between the external environment and the structure of personality are also closely
related to personality dynamics. The contradictions that invariably exist between the
structure of personality and the external environment regardless of whether the struc-
ture of personality adapts to the external environment or not and that exist throughout
life undergoing development and change tend to produce different levels of tension
in the personality and to prompt the human personality to make behavioral choices,
thereby achieving personality balance. It’s just the aforementioned three kinds of
motive power that promote the human personality to make behavioral choices and
maintain the existence and development of human personality as long as life endures.
(4) The Creative Function of Personality Structure
In terms of their respective functions, the structure of human personality differs
essentially from that of the animal body in being endowed with innate creative powers
that lift man from the purely animalistic level of living for living’s sake onto the human
level of making living worthwhile and purposeful. It’s through the exercise of its
creative powers that not only can the structure of personality remold and transcend
its subjective world, but also it can change and transcend the objective world, whereby
the structure of personality can grasp its destiny in its own hands. Of all the creative
functions of personality structure that manifest themselves in all the manifold spheres
of human activity, the most basic one is nothing other than productive practice. As
Marx points out in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, “Admittedly
animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers,
ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its
young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only
under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he
is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal’s
product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his
product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of
the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance
of beauty.”301 The creative function of personality structure that enables one to gain
firm control of his destiny not only makes man’s life vibrant with pride for its past
and present glories, but also must of necessity make man’s life pride itself upon its
future glories.
(5) The Integrative Function of Personality Structure
301Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1979). Collected Works, Volume 42: Marx: Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844. (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s
Moreover, personality structure also has the function of holistic self-integration. The
component elements of personality structure that are characterized by complexity
and changeability tend to present themselves holistically and to make behavioral
choices in a more holistic manner, whereby the structure of personality can meet
external environmental pressures and challenges. The basic reason why the structure
of personality is able to respond to environmental pressures and challenges is that
personality structure serves a powerful integrative function. No matter how the human
personality is required to adapt to a complex environment or no matter what changes
the human personality may seem to have undergone, the integrative function of
personality structure will invariably ensure that the human personality presents itself
as “a whole man” at all times and in all places. This function manifests itself mainly in
the following three aspects. First, the structure of personality is enabled to integrate
the totality of all those elements to itself into a unified living whole capable of
adapting to an ever-changing internal and external environment. Second, under the
influence of external environmental stimuli and pressures the totality of all those
substantive powers inherent in the human personality tends to be integrated with each
other in an organic way and to be brought into operation and kept in good working
order, working together to secure close coordination of mental processes from each
other, whereby the ensemble of all those essential powers to itself will act jointly
to react or respond to the external environment by making appropriate behavioral
choices that can be almost invariably traceable to definite motives of action. Third, the
constituent elements inherent in the structure of personality are just as well integrated
on a synchronic level as well as on a diachronic level, whereby the structure of
personality can be justifiably proud of being the unity of synchronicity and diachrony
in its own right. Hence we are fully entitled to say that it’s the integrative function of
personality that enables the personality structure itself to rank with the world’s most
unified (or holistic) living structures man’s mind has ever conceived.
(6) The Self-construction of Personality Structure
By the self-construction of personality structure we mean that the structure of person-
ality is able to perform such important functions as setting itself fitting goals in life,
integrating various constituent elements into an organic unity, achieving its goals in
life, and engaging in a constant, unending struggle for self-transcendence. The struc-
ture of personality depends chiefly on human self-awareness (or self-consciousness)
to carry out the foregoing functions. The differentiation and unity of human self-
consciousness will naturally follow after human self-consciousness has reached its
full development, which is to say, in human self-consciousness, the self that expe-
riences itself as divided or split may be characterized as a division between the
ideal and the real self. In human self-consciousness the structure of personality tends
to carry out comprehensive analysis of the various aspects of the real self and to
render judicious judgment upon the real self by appealing to the ideal self for help,
whereby human self-consciousness may bring about the unity between the ideal
and the real self and the structure of personality may achieve self-transcendence.
This process tends to move in cycles as long as life endures. It’s just the differen-
tiation and unity of human self-consciousness that bring about the unity of man’s
4 The Basic Structure of Human Personality 341
dual life (man’s natural and supernatural life) as well as of multiple binary oppo-
sites (or oppositions) inherent in man’s dual life and that enable man’s dual life
characterized by multiple binary oppositions (or opposites) to engage in a constant,
unending struggle for self-transcendence. Whether or not the human personality can
open itself up to the outside world or whether or not the human personality can
carry out a free and open exchange of information with the external world depends
on whether or not the differentiation and unity of human self-consciousness can be
possible of realization. The differentiation and unity of human self-consciousness,
or rather, the self-construction of personality structure, provide a sound foundation
for the human personality’s unique project of self-transcendence and thereby open
up infinite possibilities for the development and perfection of personality structure.
4 The Basic Structure of Human Personality
4.1 The Basic Structure of Human Personality—“The Three

Levels of Personality Structure” and “Eight Kinds
of Powers”
The structure of personality is basically composed of “the three levels of personality

structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” By “the three levels of personality structure”
we mean “the power of personality demand (or need),” “the power of personality
judgment,” and “the behavioral choice on the part of the human personality.” We mean
by “eight kinds of powers” that “the three levels of personality structure” consist of
“eight kinds of personality powers.” Specifically, “the power of personality demand
(or need)” includes three kinds of power inherent in human personality—that is,
“the power of survival demand (or need),” “the power of belonging demand (or
need),” and “the power of value (or development) demand (or need).” “The power of
personality judgment” contains four kinds of power inherent in human personality,
viz. “ideological and moral power,” “wisdom power,” “will power” and “power of
introspection.” “The behavioral choice on the part of human personality” consists
of one type of power inherent in human personality, that is, “personality behavior
choice.”
At this point in time we feel the necessity of giving the basic structure of human
personality a clear and lucid explanation.
First, the basic structure of human personality consists of “the three levels of
personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers.” “The power of personality demand
(or need)” can be seen as tantamount to human needs and desires inherent in the
subconscious mind. By “the power of personality judgment” we mean man’s rational
powers, or rather, man’s powers of reason and will, with which the conscious mind
is endowed. By “the behavioral choice on the part of human personality” we mean
the latent powers of behavioral choice that the human personality tends to draw
forth from within itself when it seeks to meet a myriad of environmental pressures
and challenges. “The behavioral choice on the part of human personality” includes
the behavioral goals as well as the personality powers that the human personality
tends to call forth from within itself in striving for the realization of the foregoing
behavioral goals. To put it the other way round, under the influence of external
environmental stimuli the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of
personality judgment tend to work together and secure close coordination of mental
processes from each other, thereby ensuring that the human personality can respond
to the external environment by making appropriate behavioral choices. Generally
speaking, the workings of the basic structure of human personality can be described
briefly as follows. Under the influence of external environmental stimuli the power of
personality demand (or need) will be first brought into operation, and then the power
of personality judgment will exercise judgment in helping the human personality to
make appropriate behavioral choices, or more specifically, to direct the behavioral
choices either towards the external environment or towards the personality structure
itself.
Second, the isomorphic structure of human personality. Whoever is born into this
world and enters into ordinary human life is invariably endowed with roughly the
same personality structure, that is, “the three levels of personality structure” and
“eight kinds of powers.” Put otherwise, with very few exceptions the personality
structure of each individual human being is composed of “the three levels of person-
ality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,” regardless of gender, age, ethnic origin,
state of residency or skin color. The difference in personality structure between each
individual and every other individual can invariably be reducible to the difference in
their respective contents of personality structure. Each personality structure differs
from every other personality structure as to the concrete content of personality struc-
ture—or to put it another way, no two individual human beings share exactly the
same contents of personality structure. Hence we may safely assert that there is no
or little difference in personality structure between each individual and every other
individual—that is, every personality structure consists of “the three levels of person-
ality structure” and “eight kinds of powers,” and that the isomorphism inherent in
the structure of personality results from human evolution and genetic inheritance.
If the structure of personality is found woefully lacking in any level of personality
whatsoever or any kind of power contained therein, then either case will result in
what we call, for want of a better term, “serious defects of personality (or defective
personalities)” or “personality disturbances (or disorders).”
Third, “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of powers” are
indispensable for ensuring the smooth workings of the basic structure of human
personality wherein each kind of personality power is quite on a par with every
other kind of personality power in importance or value, which holds true for the
relationship of each level of personality structure to every other level of personality
structure. Among “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of
personality powers,” while there is a difference in level, power, status or function
between each kind of personality power and every other kind of personality, which
holds good for the relationship between each level of personality structure and every
other level of personality structure, there is practically no difference in importance or
value between each level of personality structure and every other level of personality
structure, which holds true for the relationship of each kind of personality power
to every other kind of personality power. “The three levels of personality structure”
and “eight kinds of personality powers” inherent in the basic structure of human
personality may prove of fundamental importance as well as indispensably necessary
to the survival and development of human personality. Hence “the three levels of
personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers” should undergo their
full and balanced development, whereby the whole personality can be constructed
and attain its full development. Either showing a deliberate disregard for any level
of personality structure or any kind of personality power or rejecting them with
contempt (or scorn) will invariably be detrimental to the human personality. Such
attitudes towards to the structure of personality seem to be highly unreasonable and
unscientific.
Fourth, manifold complex relationships are inherent in the basic structure of
human personality that consists of “the three levels of personality structure” and
“eight kinds of personality powers.” Taken as a whole, it’s the relationships between
structure and function that predominate among the manifold and complex relation-
ships inherent in the basic structure of human personality. The relationship between
structure and function tends to find concrete expression in the relationships among
the various constituent elements of the personality structure as well as in those
ones between the whole structure of personality and the various elements contained
therein. The personality structure as a whole and the various elements contained
therein are connected with each other, condition each other, permeate each other,
determine each other, support each other, restrain each other, cooperate with each
other and work in unity with each other, which holds true for the various constituent
elements inherent in the basic structure of human personality. Meanwhile, it should
be noted that among “the three levels of personality structure” as well as among
“eight kinds of personality powers” also exist other types of relationships. First, let
us take a concrete example in illustration of the relation between cause and effect.
Under certain external environmental conditions the power of personality demand
(or need) and the power of personality judgment conspire to ensure the behavioral
choice on the part of human personality. It is common knowledge that everything
that happens has a cause and an effect. This cause-and-effect relationship demon-
strates that the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality
judgment conspire to form the determining cause, whilst the behavioral choice on
the part of human personality constitutes the effect. Second, we’ll have the task
of explaining the relation between essence and phenomenon. We may safely assert
that the behavioral choice on the part of human personality must of necessity mani-
fest itself as an inevitable phenomenon resulting from the coordinated workings
of the power of personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judg-
ment acting in harmony towards a common end when viewed in the perspective of
the relation between essence and phenomenon. The very relation between essence
and phenomenon mentioned above may awaken us to the fact that the power of
personality demand (or need) and the power of personality judgment rightly assert
themselves as the essence that manifests itself through phenomena and unfolds itself
in phenomena, while the behavioral choice on the part of human personality presents
itself as a manifestation (or a phenomenon) of the essence. It may, therefore, be
safely asserted that a multitude of complex relationships are inherent in the structure
of personality that is composed of “the three levels of personality structure” and
“eight kinds of personality powers” and that it is the basic relation between structure
and function that predominates in the multiplicity of complex relationships present
as natural parts of the personality structure.
Fifth, it is universally agreed that the basic structure of human personality must be
understood as a unified whole. The constituent elements of personality structure that
are characterized by complexity and changeability ensure that the human personality
presents itself as “a whole man” at all times and in all places. On the one hand the
structure of personality is in a position to open itself up to the external environment,
behaving as a free and open system that is involved in a continuous exchange of
both information and energy with the external environment, but on the other, it is in
a position to preserve its own holistic unity that is in its essence nothing other than
simple existence which has unfolded as a whole person who is primarily responsible
for making appropriate behavioral choices at all times and in all places. To put it the
other way round, if the structure of personality fails to exist as a whole person or
to make behavioral choices in a more holistic manner, then either case will result in
what we call, for want of a better term, “defective personalities (or serious defects
of personality)” or “personality disorders (or disturbances).”
4.2 Carrying Forward and Drawing Upon Various

Theoretical Traditions of Personality Structure
in an Integrated Fashion
As stated above, man’s recorded history spanning nearly 5000 years saw the
increasing availability of an extensive literature on the subject of personality struc-
ture, or rather concerning the knowledge of personality structure as well as dealing
with the theory of personality structure. The theory of personality structure, or more
specifically, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight
kinds of personality powers,” which the author advances in this very monograph and
tries to explain in the accompanying diagram, rightly asserts itself as an original theo-
retical system endowed with such characteristics as completeness, independence, and
systematicity, which critically assimilates whatever is beneficial while incorporating
previous knowledge of personality structure belonging to different ages, different
styles and different schools, and which differs greatly from all previous theories of
personality structure that can be grouped into their respective schools of thought. The
theory of personality structure, or rather, the theory about “the three levels of person-
ality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” is by no means seen as the
creation of anything out of nothing—or, to put it the other way round, the foregoing
theory of personality structure is not like water without a source, or a tree without
roots. The theory of personality structure, that is, the theory about “the three levels
of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers,” which originated
with Cen Binggong and rests upon a solid practical foundation, rightly asserts itself
as the result of his thirty years of continuous research and exploration in its own right,
which is to say, the foregoing theory of personality structure can be viewed either as
an organic integration or a theoretical distillation of both the extensive knowledge
the author acquired through interdisciplinary exploration and the wide experience he
gained from long and exhaustive experiments in multidisciplinary research. More-
over, the foregoing theory of personality structure also achieves a comprehensive
integration of all previous theories of personality structure that can be grouped into
their respective schools of thought as well as of all relevant knowledge derived from
other disciplines bearing on the subject of personality structure, thereby achieving
self-transcendence. The theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and
“eight kinds of personality powers” has as its prime object of study the basic structure
of human personality and takes in all the valuable theories and viewpoints that belong
to different ages, different styles and different schools and that the author tries his
utmost to integrate into his theory of personality structure. The author’s integration
or incorporation of different ideas into his theory of personality structure manifests
itself mainly in the following aspects.
First, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds
of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the rationalistic assump-
tions about personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give us a good
insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought. Previous
personality theories based on rationalism tended to reduce the structure of person-
ality to the rational powers inherent in personality structure. An example or two will
suffice to make this clear. From the rationalist perspective, the structure of person-
ality can be understood as a combination of “the true, the good and the beautiful,”
a fusion of “humanity, wisdom and valor,” or a blending of “truth, good, beauty
and sacredness.” In the examples listed below, whether they be the theories about
personality structure advanced by Confucius, the founder of the Confucian school,
and then developed more fully by Mencius, the “Second Sage” of Confucianism after
the “Supreme Sage,” Confucius, or the theories about personality structure advocated
by the ancient Greek philosophers, of whom Plato is the most prominent represen-
tative, or the theories about personality structure widely accepted among academic
circles in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with very few exceptions, they may come into
the category of personality structure based on rationalism. The theories listed above
invariably verify the validity of the rational powers inherent in personality structure
and lay emphasis upon their respective positions and functions in relation to those
of other constituent elements contained in the structure of personality. Admittedly,
the theories mentioned above took correct approaches to the subject of personality
structure, thereby providing the basis for reflection on human reality. If the struc-
ture of personality is devoid of any rational power whatsoever, then serious defects
in the personality structure will result therefrom—or to put it the other way round,
the personality structure as described above, far from reaching the state of being
a person, reduces itself merely to the status of an inanimate being. Hence, from a
rationalist perspective the rational powers are inherent in the structure of personality
and herein lies the important contribution by the rationalists who tended to adopt
rationalist approaches to the study of personality structure. However, the significant
drawback to the rationalistic theories about personality structure is that the structure
of personality deserves an epitomized description and merits an elaborate explana-
tion merely on the conscious and rational level, that the depths of the subconscious
and the irrational regions of the personality structure fall into almost total neglect,
and that the rationalists who took rationalist approaches to the study of person-
ality structure tended to retain a totally negative attitude towards the existence of
the subconscious and irrational aspects of personality structure as well as towards
their respective functions. Hence it is patently absurd to believe such things as the
rationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do not conform to human
reality on the one hand and that run contrary to human nature on the other. A probing
and subtle analysis of the rationalistic theories about personality structure in rela-
tion to the theory about “the three levels of personality structure and eight kinds of
personality powers” may help awaken us to the fact that the first level of person-
ality structure—that is, the power of personality demand (or need), according to the
rationalistic theories about personality structure, should be dismissed as unimportant
and, therefore, must be discarded as unnecessary, whereby the rationalistic theories
about personality structure must of necessity fall into incompleteness and absurdity.
Second, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight
kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the irrationalistic
assumptions about personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give
us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought.
Previous personality theories emphasizing human irrationality tended to reduce the
structure of personality to the irrational powers inherent in personality structure.
We may adduce a few classic examples in illustration of this argument. From the
point of view of irrationalists, some hold that the structure of personality can be
understood as composed of human needs and desires—or to put it the other way
round, the personality structure can be conceived as consisting of the natural instincts
of social animals with which man’s species being is endowed. Maslow’s hierarchy
of needs may be regarded as representative of the foregoing irrationalist ideas on
personality structure. Others maintain that while the structure of personality includes
both rational and irrational elements as its natural constituent parts, the irrational
powers inherent in personality structure, such as human needs and desires, as well as
irrational drives and impulses, tend to run afoul of the rational ones contained therein
and to overwhelm them in our decision making, whereby they seek to dominate the
whole structure of personality, which is to say, not only will the irrational powers
inherent in the structure of personality determine the way a person behaves, or more
specifically, the way he or she perceives, values, and interacts with others and the
environment, but also they will lay the basis for a sound mind and a sound body—or to
put it the other way round, how a person develops the irrational powers latent within
his or her structure of personality will influence, to a larger or lesser extent, whether
or not he or she is sound in mind and body. Freud’s theory of personality structure
may represent the above irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure. With
very few exceptions, the theories mentioned above recognize the validity of the
irrational powers inherent in personality structure and cast emphasis upon human
needs and desires as well as the natural instincts of social animals with which man’s
species being is endowed. Moreover, the foregoing theories also give prominence
to the positions and functions respectively belonging to human needs and desires as
well as to man’s natural instincts. It may be safely asserted that the aforementioned
theories took correct approaches to the study of personality structure and expanded
and deepened our insight into certain important aspects of human nature, thereby
providing the basis for reflection on human reality. If the structure of personality is
devoid of any irrational power whatsoever, then deficiency of these irrational powers
can lead to serious defects in personality structure—or to put it the other way round,
the personality structure as described above, far from reaching the state of being “the
whole man,”302 reduces itself to nothing more than a mere inanimate thing. Hence,
from an irrationalist viewpoint, the structure of personality must of necessity include
irrational powers as its natural constituent parts, such as human needs and desires,
as well as the natural instincts of social animals with which man’s species being
is endowed. There are, however, also significant flaws in a variety of irrationalist
theories of personality structure, or rather, in the various theories of personality
structure that are perceived as exclusively based on irrationalism. The weaknesses
and limitations inherent in the irrationalist theories of personality structure may be
briefly summarized as follows. In the case of each significant theoretical drawback as
listed below, in its main outlines, though not in the details, it’s the same. It’s merely
on the subconscious or irrational level that the structure of personality deserves a
detailed description and merits an elaborate explanation, the conscious and rational
aspects of personality structure—or the cultural determinants of personality structure
fall into almost total neglect, and the irrationalists who took irrationalist approaches
to the study of personality structure tended to maintain a totally negative attitude
towards the existence of the conscious and rational aspects of personality structure
as well as towards their respective values. Hence it is palpably absurd to believe such
things as the irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do not by any
means correspond with human reality. One of the fundamental differences between
humans and other animals lies in the fact that the human being is endowed with the
power of reason and consciousness that can lift mankind above the rest of the animal
world. Herein lies the fundamental reason why humans can be raised from bestiality
to humanity, why from the very dawn of history man has arrogated to himself all the
honor and power due to his supreme elevation above the rest of the animal world,
and why man can rightly assert himself as a conscious species-being.
If the structure of personality is woefully lacking in any rational power whatsoever,
then deficiency of these rational powers may result in serious defects in personality
structure—or to put it the other way round, the personality structure as mentioned
above fails to elevate itself to the status of “the whole man,”303 but rather reduces
302 Cohen, Marshall., Nagel, Thomas., & Scanlon, Thomas. (2014). Marx, Justice and History: A
Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 60.
303 Ibid.
itself to a mere inanimate being. In other words, just like animal behaviors are totally
guided by instinct, human behavior fails to transcend the instincts of nature, but rather
undergoes a retrograde reversion to the primitive human instinct. More specifically,
the less that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of
the word, the less they make their own history consciously, the more becomes the
influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the less
accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance.
Whether the conscious and rational aspects of personality structure—or the
cultural determinants of personality structure fall into almost total neglect or whether
the rationalists who took rationalist approaches to the study of personality structure
tended to retain a totally negative attitude towards the depths of the subconscious
and the irrational regions of personality structure as well as towards their respective
values or functions, it is invariably patently or palpably absurd to believe such things
as the rationalistic or irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure that do
not conform to human reality on the one hand and that run contrary to human nature
on the other. An intelligent and clarifying analysis of the various irrationalist theories
of personality structure in relation to the theory about “the three levels of person-
ality structure and eight kinds of personality powers” may help awaken us to the
fact that the second level of personality structure—that is, the power of personality
judgment, according to the irrationalists who tended to adopt irrationalist approaches
to the study of personality structure, should be dismissed as unimportant and, there-
fore, must be discarded as unnecessary, whereby the various irrationalist theories of
personality structure must of necessity fall into incompleteness and absurdity.
Third, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds
of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself the behaviorist theo-
ries of personality structure that vied with one another in trying to give us a good
insight into the structure of personality in the history of human thought. Generally
speaking, behaviorists devote little attention to the structure of personality, show
little interest in internal personality structures, and put little value upon the study of
internal personality structures which, according behavioral theories of personality
structure, can never aspire to objectivity in any accurate scientific sense. Whereupon
it must of necessity follow that behaviorists tend to reject internal personality struc-
tures as a scientific subject deserving of serious and enthusiastic study. To put it the
other way round, behaviorists contend that only the study of behavioral responses
to particular environmental stimuli can be accepted as objective and reliable in the
true sense of the word. Hence they devote themselves exclusively to the study of
various environmental stimuli to which individual organisms are subjected, appro-
priate behavioral reactions of individual organisms that respond to environmental
stimuli, and acquired behavior patterns or habits that are regularly followed until
they have become almost involuntary. “Behaviorism is a term coined by J. B. Watson
in 1913 to indicate that all habits may be explained in terms of conditioned glandular
and motor reaction. ‘Behaviorism holds that the subject matter of human psychology
is the behavior or activities of the human being. Behaviorism claims that ‘conscious-
ness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another word for
the ‘soul’ of more ancient times (Behaviorism, 1924). Classical behaviorism asserted
that the proper subject for psychology was not the operation of the mind but rather
the examination of objective, observable behavior. Behavior was to be understood
in terms of the stimulus–response formula; the organism thus is essentially passive
and can only react to stimulation. The leading psychologists of the next generation
were trained in Watson’s orbit—Clark Hull, B. F. Skinner, Kenneth Spence, and
E. L. Thorndike. Modern behaviorism, as exemplified by Skinner’s operant behav-
iorism, eschews a mechanistic view of human nature. The core theme of operant
behaviorism is that activities of the organism bring consequences that shape and
influence further action. It is the environment that produces the consequences, so it
is the environment that shapes, influences, and determines a person’s behavior.”304
“Behaviorism was founded by John Watson, in reaction to the structuralist school of
psychological thought, which took the quality of conscious experience as its subject
and deployed self-examination of mental events (introspection) as its method. In crit-
icizing this approach, Watson’s aim was to turn psychology into a natural science,
arguing that the impossibility of an objective examination of an internal, hidden
mind necessarily required a focus on behavior. This redirection of attention carried
with it the requirement that mind and consciousness be removed from psychological
consideration.”305
Some behaviorists such as American psychologists Edward L. Thorndike, John
B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), who are among the most prominent
representatives of the behaviorist traditions, hold that all modes of behavior can be
understood and explained in terms of the classical behaviorist formula of “stimulus
and response” that one can represent by letters and signs as “S → R.” Among other
behaviorists who belong to the American school of behaviorism rejecting the study
of mind and consciousness as unscientific and focusing on objective and observable
behavior, Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), German-born American social psychologist,
who is often recognized as the founder of modern experimental social psychology,
and who deservedly ranks as the 18th-most eminent psychologist of the twentieth
century,306 rightly ranks as one of the leading exponents of the behaviorist school
which has developed almost wholly in America. Kurt Lewin originated the classical
formula B = f (P, E) as a basis for explaining and predicting behavior, and tried
to utilize this famous psychological equation of behavior to illustrate the functional
dependency of human behavior. This famous theoretical assumption is well repre-
sented in the following formula: B = F (P, E) = F (LS). Accordingly, behavior (B)
is a function (F) of the person (P) and the environment (E). Both the person and the
environment have to be understood as intertwined factors. The potentially complex
interaction between the two—represented by the function (F) in the formula—is
what determines people’s behavior. Hence the life space may be briefly summarized
304 Campbell, Robert Jean. (2009). Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary. New York, NY: Oxford
305 Vonk, Jennifer., & Shackelford, Todd K. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Evolutionary Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 19.

306 Haggbloom, S. J. et al. (2002). The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century. Review
of General Psychology 6(2):139–152.

as follows. The interaction of the person (P) and the environment (E) produces the
life space, and the life space that is the combination of all the factors may influence a
person’s behavior at any time. An individual’s behavior, at any time, can be expressed
as a function of the life space B = f (LS).307
“E. L. Thorndike (1874–1949), a pioneer in the experimental investigation of
animal behavior, advanced an influential learning theory known as connectionism.
His practical work focused on behavior, and he can be considered a forerunner of
behaviorism.”308 A Review of General Psychology survey, published in 2002, ranked
Thorndike as the ninth-most cited psychologist of the twentieth century.309 In 1912,
Thorndike was elected president for the American Psychological Association.310 In
1917, he was one of the first psychologists to be admitted to the National Academy
of Sciences. “In 1925, for his contributions to psychological measurement and its
applications to education, Columbia University awarded Thorndike the Butler medal
in gold, granted once every five years for the most distinguished contribution made
anywhere in the world to philosophy or to educational theory, practice, or administra-
tion.”311 In 1934, Thorndike was elected president of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science.312 “In Animal Intelligence Thorndike set down what
proved to be a lasting framework for his theory of mind and the laws of learning.
He brought into the twentieth century the British tradition of ‘associationism,’ and
his own learning theory came to be called ‘connectionism,’ or sometimes ‘stimulus–
response theory.’ … Mind, said Thorndike, is man’s ‘connection system,’ forming a
bond between some stimulus—Thorndike preferred the word ‘situation,’ recognizing
the complexity of many stimuli—and some response made to it by the learner. All
that a man knows, feels, ‘wants,’ or does is dependent upon his having formed
a connection between some situation and some response. … Thorndike’s ‘laws of
learning’ explain the connection processes. His ‘laws of exercise’ recalls the principle
of ‘frequency,’ or ‘use,’ found in nineteenth-century association theory: a response
made is likely to be made again, merely as a result of having been made before.
The ‘law of effect’ states that the consequences (satisfying or not satisfying) of a
response will increase or decrease the probability that the connection was formed
and that the response will be repeated.”313 “A thoroughgoing Darwinist, Thorndike
was convinced that, because of evolutionary continuity, the study of animal behavior
Vol. 1, eds. GardnerLindzey & ElliotAronson, 412–487. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
308 Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward., eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of
Psychology, Volume 3. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p. 1340.
of General Psychology 6(2):139–152.

310 Zimmerman, Barry J., & Schunk, Dale H., eds. (2003). Educational Psychology: A Century of
Contributions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., p. 113.

311 “Thorndike, Edward L.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia. com.
7 Aug. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

312 Thomson, Godfrey., & Thorndike, Edward L. Nature 164, 474 (1949).
313 “Thorndike, Edward L.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com.

is instructive to human psychology. … His painstaking study of animal behavior

convinced Thorndike that the process of animal learning rested not on some form of
reasoning and not even on imitation. Learning depends, instead, upon the presence
of some situation or stimulus (S) requiring the animal to make various, more or less
random responses (R); as a result of such trial and error, the correct, or most adaptive,
response is eventually made. The effect produced by the appropriate response is a
sort of reward. … The effect acts physiologically, creating or reinforcing a neural
connection between that response and the situation which provoked it; repetition
of that or a similar stimulus becomes more readily able to produce the previously
successful response, and inappropriate responses are forgone. … The basic principle
which Thorndike formulated to account for the S-R connection is the law of effect;
in the language of such later psychologists as Clark Hull and B. F. Skinner, this is a
reinforcement theory of learning.”314 Reviewing in retrospect Thorndike’s academic
career and theoretical work, we may safely assert that Thorndike made a substantial
contribution of permanent value to the advancement of psychology. Thorndike intro-
duced the concept of reinforcement and was the first to apply psychological principles
to the area of learning. His theory of learning, especially the law of effect, is most
often considered to be his greatest achievement. Thorndike influenced many schools
of psychology as Gestalt psychologists, reflexologists, and behavioral psychologists
all studied his research as a starting point. Thorndike had a powerful impact on rein-
forcement theory and behavior analysis, providing the basic framework for empir-
ical laws in behavior psychology with his law of effect.315 His work on comparative
psychology and the learning process led to the theory of connectionism and helped
lay the scientific foundation for educational psychology.316 Thorndike’s work would
eventually be a major influence to B. F. Skinner and Clark Hull.
John B. Watson (1878–1958) was an American psychologist who both pioneered
and publicized the scientific theory of behaviorism, establishing it as a psychological
school.317 “He was honored as the initiator of a ‘revolution in psychological thought’
and a person whose work was a vital determinant of ‘the form and substance of
modern psychology.’”318 A Review of General Psychology survey ranked Watson
as the 17th most cited psychologist of the twentieth century.319 “As the founder of
American behaviorism, Watson placed an extreme emphasis on the environment
314 CLIFFORD, GERALDINE JON çICH “Thorndike, Edward L. (1874–1949).” Encyclopedia of
Education. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

315 Adams, M. A. (2000). Reinforcement Theory and Behavior Analysis. Behavioral Development
Bulletin 9(1): 3–6.

316 Zimmerman, Barry J., & Schunk, Dale H., eds. (2003). Educational Psychology: A Century of
Contributions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., pp. 113–154.

317 Cohn, Aaron S. (2014). “Watson, John B.” In The Social History of the American Family: An
Encyclopedia, eds. Marilyn J. Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, 1429–1430. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
318 “Watson, John B. (1878–1958).” Learning and Memory. Encyclopedia.com. 7 Aug. 2021
of General Psychology 6(2): 139–152.

in shaping behavior. With an unswerving belief in determinism and materialism,

Watson argued that complete prediction and control of behavior could be achieved
only by a psychology that found identity with the natural sciences.”320 Watson cher-
ished the belief that “psychology could become an objective and practical science
only if it rid itself of unverifiable, unreliable introspective methods and focused on
the study of observable behavior—events that could be recorded by an outsider—
rather than on inferred, private states of consciousness or experience.”321 He artic-
ulated his first statements on behaviorist psychology in the epoch-making article
“Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It” (1913), claiming that “psychology is the
science of human behavior, which, like animal behavior, should be studied under
exacting laboratory conditions,”322 and that “the goal of psychology was to predict
and control behavior, not to analyze consciousness into its elements or to study vague
‘functions’ or processes like perception, imagery, and volition.”323 In his first major
work, Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, which was published
in 1914, “he argued forcefully for the use of animal subjects in psychological study
and described instinct as a series of reflexes activated by heredity,”324 maintaining
that “animal learning and behavior, which had generally been relegated to a minor
position in psychology or had not been viewed as part of psychology at all, was
the one truly objective, scientific area of psychology,” and that “the techniques used
in the animal laboratory could be profitably, objectively, and practically applied to
human beings.”325 “The definitive statement of Watson’s position appears in another
major work, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (1919), in which he
sought to extend the principles and methods of comparative psychology to the study
of human beings and staunchly advocated the use of conditioning in research.”326
“In any event, his approach was original because of how it combined a variety of
emphases, dissatisfactions, and opinions in a unique, revolutionary way. … The new
method was essentially the conditioned-reflex procedure of Ivan Pavlov and Vladimir
Bekhterev, which he appreciated and examined. (Previously he had stressed the asso-
ciationist laws of frequency and recency; he frowned on Edward L. Thorndike’s law
of effect because the notion of strengthening or weakening S-R bonds by means of
subsequent satisfaction or discomfort seemed subjective to him, although it is the
320 Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward., eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of
322 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. “John B. Watson.” Encyclopedia Britannica, January
13, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-B-Watson.



forerunner of Skinner’s law of operant reinforcement). From his own studies with
human beings Watson illustrated a variety of Pavlovian conditioning phenomena
that seemed relevant for everyday human behavior. … Watson denied any significant
initiating or mediating role for the brain, and he would not consider possible cognitive
processes intervening between the external S and the subject’s R. His approach was
thus peripheralistic in its focus on movements and secretions, and not on changes in
the central nervous system. He worried that serious consideration of the existence
of such intervening, unobservable processes would be subjective and unscientific; in
any case it was unnecessary for behavioral prediction and control.”327
“Arguably, B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), an American psychologist, was the fore-
most behaviorist of the twentieth century. Drawing inspiration from Thorndike more
than Watson, Skinner argued that scientific psychology must concern itself with the
analysis of behavior rather than the study of cognition. In his seminal book, The
Behavior of Organisms, Skinner established an experimental analysis of behavior
that featured operant conditioning as the centerpiece.”328 “B. F. Skinner provided
the experimental foundations of contemporary behavior analysis and its applications.
He introduced the terminology of operant behavior and elaborated on the concept
of reinforcement. He interpreted verbal behavior in terms of those foundations and
was outspoken about the differences between the methods of behavior analysis and
those of cognitive psychology. His contributions provided the foundations for exten-
sions to a variety of applications both in and outside of psychology.”329 A Review
of General Psychology survey listed Skinner as the most influential psychologist of
the twentieth century.330
When behaviorist theories of personality structure introduced environmental
factors into the study of personality structure, the shift in the focus of research interest
suggested that the study of personality structure underwent a transition from the mere
study of internal personality structures to the study of the interactive relationships
between humans and the environment—or to put it the other way round, the study
of personality structure underwent a change from the mere study of “entities” to the
study of “relationships,” which demonstrated that the study of personality structure
has made a great advance both theoretically and methodologically. The reason why
the structure of personality cannot for one moment be divorced from the environment
lies in the fact that the structure of personality tends to be molded by the external
environment on the one hand, and that only the environment can afford the struc-
ture of personality every chance of survival and development on the other. Hence,
we may safely assert that, in delving into the mysteries of personality structure, if
we fail to take into account environmental factors, we will have great difficulty in
328 Weiner, Irving B., & Craighead, W. Edward, eds. (2010). The Corsini Encyclopedia of
329 “Skinner, B. F.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 6 Aug.
of General Psychology 6(2): 139–152.

forming a clear conception of personality structure, not to mention the complexity

of human behavior. In view of the foregoing facts, we must fully recognize that
behaviorists have made substantial contributions to the scientific study of personality
structure. However, we must point out several significant weaknesses and limitations
inherent in behavioral theories of personality structure, which can be summarized
in the following two aspects. First, it is generally recognized that no convincing or
scientific explanation for the complexity of human behavior has yet been found in
behavioral theories of personality structure. They tend to lay undue emphasis upon
“the stimulus–response formula,” discouraging instead any deeper study of values
and possibilities inherent in internal personality structures. Hence they are generally
applicable to the study of a wide range of simple repetitive behaviors, rather than the
complexity of behavioral choices, to say nothing of those human behaviors that are
liable to be much more changeable and unpredictable. Second, behavioral theories
of personality structure fail to place the structure of personality in the clearest light.
Far from giving us a good insight into the structure of personality, they generally
hold an oversimplified view of personality structure, and even discourage any deeper
study of personality structure. According to Chen Bing-Gong’s theory of person-
ality structure, or rather, the theory about “the three levels of personality structure
and eight kinds of personality powers,” behavioral theories of personality structure
tend to either dismiss the structure of personality as unimportant or discourage any
deeper study of personality structure, whereby in all human probability behaviorists
will be placed in a position of considerable difficulty, which is to say, behavioral
theories of personality structure neither give us a good insight into the structure of
personality nor place far more complex behavioral patterns, which man is capable
of learning than are other creatures,331 in the clearest light, either theoretically or
methodologically.
Fourth, The theory about “the three levels of personality structure” and “eight
kinds of personality powers” integrates or incorporates into itself other relevant
theories of personality structure that have been vying with one another in trying
to give us a good insight into the structure of personality in the history of human
thought, as well as theoretical knowledge derived from other related disciplines.
In the history of human thought, the rationalistic assumptions about personality
structure, the irrationalistic assumptions about personality structure, and the behav-
ioral theories of personality structure have been vying with one another to make
substantial contributions to the scientific study of personality structure. Many other
theories of personality structure also constitute a valuable contribution to the scien-
tific study of personality structure. Moreover, one feature that distinguishes Chen
Bing-Gong’s theory of personality structure from many other theories of personality
is the inclusion of original ideas derived from other related disciplines as one of the
most fundamental aspects of the theory about “the three levels of personality struc-
ture” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” Hence we feel the necessity of inte-
grating or incorporating the foregoing theories and ideas into the very theory about
331 Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public Choice III. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
p. 325.
“the three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.”
Let us adduce several relevant examples in illustration of the aforementioned argu-
ment. In the history of philosophy, a multitude of theories and conceptions of “the
subject’s self-consciousness” were brought forth, and all types of ideas and beliefs
were postulated regarding “the subject’s self-consciousness,” whereby our knowl-
edge of “the subject’s self-consciousness” has been greatly broadened, enriched, and
deepened. In particular, Hegel’s philosophy reduced the evolution of philosophy itself
as well as the course of human history, that is the progress of the human world, to a
product of the self-development of the Idea that might be construed as tantamount to
“the subject’s self-consciousness,” or more specifically, the product of the immanent
dialect of the Absolute Idea.332 German-born American psychoanalyst Karen Horney
(1885–1952), who is often included in the group of neo-Freudian psychoanalysts who
focused their attention on man’s functioning in his social and cultural environments,
and who is usually listed among the first major theorists of the cultural school of
psychoanalytic psychiatry,333 was emphatic in her assertion that the self tends to be
at the core of human personality and to occupy a dominant place in the structure of
personality, and that all persons possess a dual perception of the self: the real self,
who we are, and the ideal self, who we wish to be. Horney’s particular emphasis
upon the discrepancy and conflict between the real self and the ideal self led her to
believe that the tension between the real self and the ideal self as well as the unity of
the real and ideal selves furnishes an unfailing and reliable source of motive power
that may facilitate free and full development of personality on the one hand, while
on the other constituting the basic reason why people suffer from some neurosis or
other, why the neurotic person, whose self is split between the ideal self, who strug-
gles with the tyranny of the should (striving for perfection), and the real self, who
degenerates into the despised real self (self based on false evaluations of others), is
like a clock’s pendulum, oscillating between a fallacious perfection and a manifes-
tation of self-hate, and why Horney referred to this phenomenon as the tyranny of
the should and the neurotic’s hopeless search for glory.334 Moreover, it is important
to note that deep insights into the structure of personality as well as original ideas
on the very subject can also be found in both other relevant theories of personality
structure and theoretical knowledge derived from other related disciplines. Hence
we should attain full comprehension of these insights and ideas so that we are able
to make good use of them when we seek to expand and deepen our understanding of
personality structure. Despite this, it by no means follows that these deep insights and
original ideas would enable us to make a comprehensive exposition of “the whole
man’s” personality structure in that the potential weaknesses and limitations inherent
in the foregoing theories and theoretical explanations contained therein assuredly
332 Wood, John Cunningham. (1998). Karl Marx’s Economics: Critical Assessments. New York,
NY: Routledge, p. 96.
333 Balis, George U., Wurmser, Leon., & McDaniel, Ellen. (2013). The Behavioral and Social
Sciences and the Practice of Medicine: The Psychiatric Foundations of Medicine. Woburn, MA:
Butterworth-Heinemann, p. 216.
334 Ge, Lu-Jia., & Chen, Ruo-Li. (1999). Cultural Dilemmas and Inner Conflicts: Cultural
Psychopathology. Wuhan, China: Hubei Educational Publishing House, pp. 130–181.

discourage us against seeing and understanding the truth about personality structure.
One or two examples will suffice to make this clear. Philosophy, the rational, abstract,
and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of
human existence and experience,335 can be defined as “the human attempt to system-
atically study the most fundamental structures of our entire experience in order to
arrive at beliefs that are as conceptually clear, experientially confirmed, and rationally
coherent as possible.”336 However, because of the limitations inherent in the very
discipline, philosophy, far from giving a comprehensive explanation of “the concrete
whole man’s” personality structure, is concerned primarily with the study of human
nature as well as any fundamental distinguishing characteristics contained therein.
Likewise, owing to the limitations inherent in the discipline proper, psychology is
devoted solely to the study of human psychology, rather than giving a comprehensive
exposition of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. As a matter of fact,
the ideal of value freedom or value neutrality psychologists deem worth cherishing
and defending is rooted in psychology to such an extent that the very science holds
out the promise of predisposing psychologists to study personality structure without
invoking the aid of any given ideologies, values or theoretical knowledge.337 By
contrast, anthropology, the future of which can best be assured if its development
is built on its own inherent strengths rather than on the basic characteristics that are
common to such traditional disciplines as philosophy, anthropology and psychology,
deservedly ranks high among humanities and social sciences, and as such would
be in a better position to give a comprehensive exposition of “the concrete whole
man’s” personality structure. “As a science of man, the Humanities, which focus first
and foremost on facts concerning archaeology, anthropology, psychology, cultural
studies, history, language, art, and literature, are a cognitive activity that attempts to
procure knowledge about the conditions of human beings as acting, thinking, and
willing creatures; it is a systematic activity that attempts to explain and understand
facts from the theoretical possibilities each discipline leaves open.”338 “Different
social sciences study the different aspects of man and society in different ways.
Anthropology is the science of man. It studies all aspects of man. It studies human
behavior in every time and place and in different cultures. It studies man everywhere
on earth. It studies man in both the periods, historic and prehistoric. It studies man
on all levels, civilized and uncivilized. In the words of Herskovites, anthropology
is a science of man and his actions. It studies the origin and evolution of man from
material, cultural and social points of view. In this way, different fields of anthro-
pology study man in different aspects. … Redfield says that holiest tendencies are
on the increase in anthropology, which is to say, man is being studied on different
335 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Philosophy.” Encyclopedia Britannica, August 20,

2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy.
336 Lawhead, William. (2007). The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth / Thomson Learning, p. 5.

337 Osbeck, Lisa M. (2019). Values in Psychological Science: Re-Imagining Epistemic Priorities at
a New Frontier. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12–15.
338 Jensen, Julio Hans Casado., & Gensen, Julio. (2004). The Object of Study in the Humanities.
Copenhagen, DK: Museum Tusculanum Press, p. 53.

levels of culture and interest in the study of values and personality is increasing. All
these tendencies show that in future anthropology will come closer to social science
in comparison with natural sciences.”339 However, the long-term development of
anthropology saw the gradual but irreversible estrangement of the discipline proper
from its object of study—“man himself,” which, for want of a better term, we may
as well call “object of knowledge” (the field or subject matter that a discipline is
investigating).340 That is to say, anthropology has long been concerned primarily
with the study of human physique and human culture. Anthropologists failed to
focus attention on “man himself,” or rather, to give a comprehensive explanation
of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. To make matters worse, they
either set themselves against the study of “man himself” or resigned themselves to
the study of human physique and human culture which in time predisposed anthro-
pologists to divorce anthropology from the study of “man himself.” Clark Wissler
(1870–1947), American anthropologist who was curator of the American Museum of
Natural History in New York City for nearly 40 years and also taught at Yale Univer-
sity (1924–40),341 maintained that “Anthropology is the science that studies man. It
includes the study of all questions that relate to human beings as social animals.”342
Polish-born British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), one of the
most important anthropologists of the twentieth century who played a decisive part
in the formation of the contemporary British school of social anthropology, is widely
recognized as a founder of social anthropology.343 Through his scientific activities,
especially his methodological innovations, he was a major contributor to the trans-
formation of nineteenth-century speculative anthropology into a modern science
of man.344 His professional training and career, beginning in 1910, were based in
England. In 1927 he was appointed to the first chair in anthropology at the Univer-
sity of London. In 1936 he was awarded an honorary doctor of science degree at the
Harvard University tercentenary celebrations. From 1940 to 1942 he taught as Bishop
Museum Visiting Professor of Anthropology at Yale University.345 Malinowski held
that “Anthropology is a science that studies the human race and its culture in all
degrees and levels of development. It includes the study of the physical nature of
human beings, the racial differences among them, civilization, and societal formation
339 Sharma, Ram Nath., & Sharma, Rajendra K. (1997). Anthropology. New Delhi, IN: Atlantic
Publishers and Distributors, p. 22.
340 Powell, Jason L., & Owen, Tim., eds. (2007). Reconstructing Postmodernism: Critical Debates.
New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., p. 24.

341 Britannica, T. Editors of Encylopaedia. “Clark Wissler.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September
14, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Clark-Wissler.

342 Cheng, Guo-Qiang. “The Chinese People Need Anthropology.” In Anthropology in China:
Defining the Discipline, ed. Gregory EliyuGuldin. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.
343 Firth, R. William. “Bronislaw Malinowski.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, May 12, 2021. https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Bronislaw-Malinowski.
344 “Malinowski, Bronislaw.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com.

345 Ibid.
as well as questions related to Man’s mental and spiritual responses to the environ-
ment.”346 Dr. Gonzales, who was once vice-president of the University of Maryland,
noted that “today in America anthropology is deemed a science that studies Man in
general.”347 Lin Huixiang, Chinese anthropologist and professor at Xiamen Univer-
sity, proposed that “anthropology should be the study of both the physical properties
and the cultural conditions of the human race, but with emphasis placed on the prim-
itive age.” He contended that “Anthropology is a science that employs a historical
perspective in studying humanity and its culture.”348 “The theory of structure and
choice” takes “man” in general as the object of study and integrates or incorporates
into itself various classical theories about man, whereby we may safely assert that
“the theory of structure and choice” is quite equal to the task of giving a compre-
hensive explanation of “the concrete whole man’s” personality structure. The author
spent over 30 years of his life following in the footsteps of his forerunners and
contemporaries, who have achieved the latest results of scholarly research in philos-
ophy, anthropology, philosophical anthropology, and other related disciplines, in
order to unravel the mystery of human existence, or rather, to gain a fresh and deeper
insight into the noumenon of human life which the author terms man’s “structure and
choice.” His untiring and unremitting efforts were eventually crowned with success.
He drew preliminary conclusions from long-term investigations and experiments.
His monograph entitled Principles of Subjective Anthropology: Concepts and the
Knowledge System was chosen as one of “National Achievements Library of Philos-
ophy and Social Sciences” in 2011. Subsequently, this work was published through
China Social Sciences Press in 2012. In this scholarly work the author proposed
and expounded the theory of “personality structure and choice,” which was illus-
trated by charts and diagrams, and which took pages 177–311 of this book to go
into details, holding that the noumenon of human life, which the author terms man’s
“structure and choice,” is basically composed of “three levels of personality struc-
ture” and “eight kinds of personality powers.” In 1986 and 1987, the author got 42
colleagues and students organized several times to undertake investigations on “per-
sonality and values” in Chinese metropolises such as Changchun, Beijing, Xi’an,
Wuhan, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. From 1995 to 2005, he
carried out a series of experiments in “personality structure and holistic personality
development” in Chinese regions and cities like Jilin Province, Henan Province, and
Shenzhen. Based upon these investigations and experiments, the author published
relevant articles and works, such as “The 21st Century and Chinese Traditional Ideal
Personality Models: From a Modern Perspective” and General Tendencies in Chinese
Personality. While following in the footsteps of his predecessors who have achieved
the latest results of scholarly research in the field of human ontology, the author
devoted more than 30 years of his life to the study of human ontology by drawing
upon previous results in the field. Eventually, the author, in conjunction with his
346 Cheng, Guo-Qiang. “The Chinese People Need Anthropology.” In Anthropology in China:
Defining the Discipline, ed. Gregory EliyuGuldin. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
References 359
colleagues and students, made preliminary findings from long-term investigations

and experiments, and proposed his theory of personality structure, or rather, the
theory about “three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality
powers.”
To sum up, the author adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of person-
ality structure that encourages a neutral approach free of any disciplinary bias, which
is to say, the author acknowledges the necessity of studying personality structure
from multiple disciplines, but he has no decided preference among diverse disci-
plines and refrains elevating any particular discipline’s importance in the study of
personality structure so as to minimize or neglect the importance of others—or put it
the other way round, he holds a neutral attitude towards the scientific knowledge from
diverse disciplines despite the fact that individual interdisciplinarians who tend to be
characterized by a host of ideological, ethical, epistemological, theoretical, method-
ological, and other biases may like some disciplines more than others.349 The author
attaches great importance to all previous theories about personality structure and
gives adequate consideration to creative and original ideas about personality struc-
ture he tries to seize and assimilate from the stock of knowledge produced by each
of related disciplines. In time the author succeeded in incorporating and integrating
the abundant material and sufficient data he gathered for the study of personality
structure into his system theory of personality structure, or rather the theory about
“three levels of personality structure” and “eight kinds of personality powers.”
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Chapter 7
Group Structure
Not only does “personality” rightly assert itself as a mode of human existence, but also
“group” reveals itself as a mode of human existence. Hence we may safely assert
that both “personality” and “group” reveal themselves as basic modes of human
existence. In the case of mankind’s remote, primate ancestors such as anthropoid
apes, their modes of existence could invariably be reduced to both “personality” and
“group.” These two modes of existence were continued in the course of the history
of man, passing through a long process of evolution, and in time evolved into man’s
two basic modes of existence.
Not only does “personality” rightly assert itself as a mode of human existence, but
also “group” reveals itself as a mode of human existence. Hence we may safely assert
that both “personality” and “group” reveal themselves as basic modes of human
existence. In the case of mankind’s remote, primate ancestors such as anthropoid
apes, their modes of existence could invariably be reduced to both “personality” and
“group.” These two modes of existence were continued in the course of the history
of man, passing through a long process of evolution, and in time evolved into man’s
two basic modes of existence.
The study of man’s modes of existence thus requires that we should make a
systematic and exhaustive investigation of both “personality” and “group,” which
is to say, the study of man’s modes of existence necessitates making a serious and
enthusiastic study of both “personality” and “group.” In other words, only if we have
made an elaborate and scholarly investigation of both “personality” and “group” can
we help forward the study of man’s modes of existence. It is regrettable, however, that
it was neglect of the study of “group” that left us in the dark of the universal concept
of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein, thereby causing a
great blank in the history of human thought. In the past only the specific concepts of
“group” such as those of family, institution, state and international organization, as
well as the concrete knowledge contained therein, were created and developed, while
the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant ideas derived from it was
almost never consciously articulated let alone explained or embraced. International

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8883-7_7
372 7 Group Structure
academic or theoretical circles are now faced with the arduous and urgent task of
creating the universal concept of “group” and evolving new knowledge from it, which
has become an issue of great and lasting importance facing them at present. Creating
and developing the general concept of “group” as well as the systematic knowledge
contained therein may prove of great value, or rather, of supreme importance, in
understanding and addressing the great theoretical and practical issues of today. For
example, the universal concept of “group” as well as the concrete knowledge derived
from it can make man know himself in a new light, endow humanities and social
sciences with their respective allegedly scientific assumptions (or presuppositions)
about human nature, make up for the deficiencies inherent in the concrete knowledge
about “group,” prompt people to cultivate or develop a rational knowledge of their
existence and to hold or grasp their destinies in their own hands.
1 The Total Absence of the General (or Universal) Concept

of “Group” and the Negative Effects Resulting Therefrom
The five thousand years of man’s recorded history saw the total absence of the general
concept of “group,” and it was neglect of the study of “group” that left us in the dark
of the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained
therein, thereby causing a great blank in the history of human thought. In the past
only the specific concepts of “group” such as those of family, institution, state and
international organization, as well as the concrete knowledge contained therein, were
created and developed, while the universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant
ideas derived from it was almost never consciously articulated let alone explained
or embraced. The total absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any
body of theoretical knowledge contained therein can be perceived as tantamount to
a most serious deficiency inherent in man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems,
which tended to exercise its restraints upon human thought and thus to impede (or
hinder) the development of human thinking, and which tended to reduce the previous
generations of scholars to a passive position when they sought to gain a deeper insight
into the multiple modes of human existence as well as the myriad ways in which
human beings secure their survival in both nature and society, or rather, the various
forms of human adaptation to the environment, and to build up their own theories
about them. With the above situation in view, we must awake to the fact that the
universal concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained therein
has been absent in man’s repository of basic concepts and knowledge systems, and
realize the urgent necessity for addressing this serious problem.
In view of the fact that human beings have had no such general notion of “group”
as yet and that none of the existing concepts or categories can serve as a linguistic
expression of the notion of “group” in a general sense, only if we have created and
developed the general concept of “group” as well as the relevant knowledge contained
1 The Total Absence of the General (or Universal) Concept of “Group” … 373
therein can we in a very real sense make up for the serious deficiency inherent in
man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems.
It is obvious, at once, that there can be no such specific notion of “group” as shall,
at the same time, embrace all that is contained in the general concept of “group”—or
to put it the other way round, there is no such notion as a specific concept of “group”
that can rightly assert itself as a substitute for the universal concept of “group.” Such
concepts as those of family, institution, state and international organization, when
compared with the universal concept of “group,” fall into the specific categories of
“group.” Only the specific concepts of “group” can place their multifarious services
at the disposal of those people who are trying to gain a comprehensive knowledge
of particular “groups” and give a full explanation of the relevant theories about
them. One or two examples will suffice to make this clear. The concept of “family”
may aid people in gaining a comprehensive knowledge of families and giving a full
explanation of the relevant theories about them. The same is true of such concepts as
those of “organization” and “state.” However, the specific concepts of “group” cannot
by any means place their services at the disposal of those people who attempt to gain a
comprehensive knowledge of the general “group” and to give a full explanation of the
relevant theories about it. As a general rule, linguistic concepts or categories can be
organized or grouped into complex conceptual hierarchies in which a single concept
may be a superordinate or a subordinate concept in relation to others. “The lowest
species-concept has the smallest extension. The genus-concept always has a greater
extension than all the species-concepts subordinate to it. The highest genus-concept
within a series of concepts has relatively the greatest extension, for it includes all
the lower species that belong to that series; while each of the subordinate species-
concepts includes only a part of these lower species and has, therefore, a smaller
extension.”1 “Since species concepts cover proper parts of the generic extension, we
can see the content of a species as composed out of, and therefore defined by, the
genus itself, plus some differentia marking off its particular way of having the genus
concept.”2 “The genus is the ‘single idea’ spread through many separate things and
existing in each of them; for the genus is not an assemblage of species, like a whole
of parts, but is present in each of the species as existing before them and participated
in both by each of the separate species and by the genus itself. The species are the
many ideas different from one another but comprehended by one single embracing
idea, which is the genus; though it is outside them, as transcending the species, yet
it contains the causes of the species; for to all those who posit Ideas, real genera are
thought to be both older and more essential that the species ranged under them; the
realities existing prior to species are not identical with the characters that exist in
the species by participation.”3 Thus one seems fairly justified in concluding that the
genus concept (“the superordinate-level concept”) is normally entitled to embrace
1 Pfänder, Alexander. (2013). Logic. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter, p. 166.

2 Guyer, Paul., ed. (2010). The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New
3 Proclus. (1987). Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Glenn R. Morrow & John M.

all that is contained in the species concept (“the subordinate-level concept”), while
the species concept neither includes or encompasses what is contained in the genus
concept nor substitutes for the genus concept itself. In the conceptual system of
“group,” the notion of “group” used in a general sense rightly asserts itself as a genus
concept, while such conceptions as those of family, institution, state and international
organization rank indisputably among the species concepts. Hence it can be safely
asserted that such conceptions as those of family, institution, state and international
organization cannot by any means embrace or encompass the content contained in
the general concept of “group” respectively, nor can they each substitute for the
universal concept of “group” itself.
The general concept of “group” cannot be replaced by any other existing concepts
that are in a position to place their services at the disposal of those people who attempt
to give a clear and lucid explanation of “human groups.” Several examples might be
adduced in explication of this argument.
Some words in English, such as “colony” and “population,” are used to refer to
“a group (or body) of people”—or to put it the other way round, the English words
like “colony” and “population” can be used to give clear, concrete and intelligible
to what we mean by the concept of “group.” Generally speaking, “we mean by
‘group’ that two or more figures (individuals or people) that are connected with
each other directly or indirectly are assembled together to form a complete unit in
a composition.”4 Or to put it more pertinently for the present purpose, “a group can
be defined as two or more people between whom there is an established pattern of
psychological and social interaction, which is recognized as an entity by its members
and usually by others because of its particular type of collective behavior.”5 There
are many similar definitions for the term “group” in Baidu Encyclopedia, the world’s
largest user-generated encyclopedia in Chinese language. For example, “the term
‘group’ as opposed to the word ‘individual’ refers to a unified body of individuals. A
group can be seen as formed by a number of individuals ‘having in common certain
characteristics such as gender, age, living in the same area, working in the same sector,
having a similar professional qualification, belonging to the same ethnic group, or
even belonging to the same bracket or fraction (decile, quintile, etc.) in the distribution
of income.’6 The term ‘group’ can also be defined as any combination of two or
more individuals acting jointly or entering into direct or indirect intercourse with
one another.” In Baidu Encyclopedia, in addition, groups can be divided into distinct
categories according to different criteria, such as real versus hypothetical groups,
actual versus reference groups, formal versus informal groups, and large versus
small groups. It is thus obvious that the specific concept of “group” differs essentially
from the general concept of “group.” The universal concept of “group” refers to any
4 Li, Jian-Hua., & Fan, Ding-Jiu. (1984). The Concise Dictionary of Sociology. Lanzhou, China:
5 Goetschius, George W. (2013). Working with Community Groups: Using Community Development
as a Method of Social Work. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 219.

6 Badie, Bertrand., Berg-Schlosser, Dirk., & Morlino, Leonardo., eds. (2011). International

community oriented towards human existence, which can be organized into different
levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions, and
which should be seen as autonomous subjects of social practice, whereby practice
must of necessity constitute the essence of community life. By contrast, the specific
concept of “group” is devoid of any such distinguishing characteristics or essential
qualities as are inherent in the general concept of “group.” Thus it can be seen that
some particular groups come under the universal category of “group,” while other
specific groups cannot by any means fall into the general category of “group.” The
informal groups at various levels, for instance, do not belong to the universal category
of “group.” Likewise, certain specific groups by which what we mean in a general
sense cannot simply fall under the particular or specific category of “group” by which
what we mean in the ordinary sense. It is therefore evident that the concept of “group”
used in the ordinary sense, or rather in a particular or specific sense, is not by any
means tantamount to the general concept of “group,” nor can it substitute for the
universal concept of “group” itself.
For the sake of illustration, let’s adduce another example and discern the subtle
difference between the concept of “collective” and the general concept of “group.”
The word “collective” in English denotes “an organized group of people considered
as a whole, who ‘live together linked not by family ties but by shared ideology,’7 who
‘are united by joint socially useful activity’—or, to put it another way, ‘a collective
is possible only under the condition that it combines people in an activity which is
clearly beneficial for society,’8 and who ‘together bring about a certain event through
the aggregation of their individual efforts’ or ‘work concertedly in the pursuit of a
common goal.’9 ” Baidu Encyclopedia, which deservedly ranks as the world’s largest
user-generated encyclopedia in Chinese language, provides many similar definitions
of the term “collective.” In Baidu Encyclopedia, for example, the term “collective” is
defined to read as follows: “The term ‘collective’ means any organized group of any
kind, which has been circumscribed and assigned to one particular sphere of human
activity, and whose members have the autonomy of decision-making in their own
particular spheres of activity. A collective rests upon a sound socio-economic founda-
tion for establishing collective identity as well as upon an ideological foundation—a
shared set of values and ideas, which is to say, a collective also shares a common ideo-
logical underpinning. A collective can establish or identify common political goals
and unite in pursuit of them. A collective can be expected to act on behalf of common
social interests and promote collective values and common social interests—to put
it the other way round, its members are committed to common social interests.” In
addition, according to Baidu Encyclopedia, “A collective may rightly assert itself as
a form of group organization, which tends to reach a higher level of performance,
7 Harriss, John. (1991). The Family: A Social History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford, GB-ENG:
8 Shelyag, V. V., Glotochkin, A. D., & Platonov, K. K., eds. (1976). Military Psychology: A Soviet
View. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 280.

9 Kolb, Robert W., ed. (2008). Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society. Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications, pp. 341–342.

and which, in most cases, tends to find expression in group values, group attitudes
and group orientations, such as collectivist values and morals.” It is thus obvious that
the specific concept of “group” used in the ordinary sense differs essentially from the
general concept of “group.” As stated above, the universal concept of “group” refers
to any community oriented towards human existence, which can be organized into
different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions,
and which should be seen as autonomous subjects of social practice, whereby prac-
tice must of necessity constitute the essence of community life. By comparison, the
specific concept of “group” used in the ordinary sense is devoid of any such distin-
guishing characteristics or essential qualities as are unique to the general concept of
“group.” Hence we may safely assert that the term “group” used in a general sense is
by no means tantamount to the term “collective,” nor can it be replaced by the term
“group.” Let us take a concrete example to serve as an illustration. A collection of
people assembled temporarily in any manner or for whatever purpose can only fall
into the category of “collective” rather than under the category of “group” used in
a general sense. Similarly, certain specific “groups” by which what we mean in a
general sense cannot simply fall under the category of “collective.” Thus it can be
seen that the concept of “collective” is not by any means tantamount to the general
concept of “group,” nor can it substitute for the universal concept of “group” itself.
In the past only the specific concepts of “group” such as those of family, institution,
state and international organization, as well as the concrete knowledge contained
therein, were created and developed, while the universal concept of “group” as well
as the relevant ideas derived from it was almost never consciously articulated let alone
explained or embraced. The total absence of the general concept of “group” as well as
any body of theoretical knowledge contained therein can be perceived as tantamount
to a most serious deficiency inherent in man’s basic concepts and knowledge systems
and as such must of necessity bring about the existence of more lacunae in human
knowledge. More lacunae in human knowledge will, in turn, deprive man of an
accurate knowledge of concrete “groups” as well as a rational knowledge of human
existence, and bring about the existence of a broken chain of human knowledge that
tends to exercise its restraints upon man’s two distinct kinds of cognition: perceptual
knowledge and rational knowledge.
The complete absence of the general concept of “group” as well as any body of
theoretical knowledge contained therein must of necessity lead people to face some
difficulty in acquiring an accurate and scientific knowledge of concrete “groups.”
As a general rule, linguistic concepts or categories can be organized or grouped into
complex conceptual hierarchies in which a single concept may be a superordinate
or a subordinate concept in relation to others. Hence we may safely assert that the
genus concept (“the superordinate-level concept”) tends to embody and express the
intrinsic qualities and essential characteristics inherent in the species concept (“the
subordinate-level concept”), and that the former is normally entitled to embrace
all that is contained in the latter, which neither includes or encompasses what is
contained in the genus concept nor substitutes for the genus concept itself. More-
over, one seems fairly justified in concluding that only if we have acquired a thorough
grasp of the genus concept can we obtain an accurate understanding of the intrinsic
qualities and essential characteristics inherent in the species concept, which is to

say, if one fails to achieve a good grasp of the genus concept, it must of necessity
follow that he will find himself in the midst of insurmountable difficulties in having
a correct and scientific understanding of the intrinsic qualities and essential charac-
teristics inherent in the species concept. The above situation may even lead people
to form some mistaken ideas about the species concept either blindly or randomly so
that these misconceived ideas may prevail on their minds over long stretches of time.
In other words, the total absence of the genus concept as well as relevant knowledge
contained therein must of necessity lead people to face some difficulty in acquiring an
accurate and scientific understanding of the species concept and concrete knowledge
derived from it. Researchers’ personal idiosyncrasies widespread in contemporary
academic circles awake us to the fact that they tend to lay undue emphasis upon
the understanding and explanation of the various specific concepts of “group” (the
species concepts of “group”) almost to the total neglect of the creation and formu-
lation of the general concept of “group” (the genus concept of “group”), thereby
inevitably leading to a significant lacuna in certain specific concepts of “group” as
well as in certain concrete theories about specific “groups.” Let us cite an apt example
in illustration of this argument. Some scholars argue that the cultural and structural
perspectives dominate in explaining the specific concept of “group.” Some scholars
incline to the view that we should explain the specific concept of “group” in terms
of the stratification of human subjects. Other scholars are more likely to elaborate
the specific concept of “group” in developing both the theory of “group choice” and
the actor-network theory. “The theory of structure and choice” holds that the general
concept of “group” is organically constituted out of the three elements of “subjective
group behavior,” “group culture” and “group choice,” each of which cannot by any
means exist in isolation from others or work separately from others, nor can each of
the three elements substitute for the whole system. Thus one seems fairly justified
in asserting that any group by which what we mean in a general sense can only exist
and work in a holistic manner.
Let us take another example to serve as an illustration. The total absence of the
general concept of “group” as well as any body of theoretical knowledge contained
therein must of necessity lead man to suffer a deficiency in rational knowledge
of human existence and render incomplete the system that comprises the human
self as well as the human subject,10 incomplete in itself by definition.11 It is only
within the whole system comprising the human self as well as the human subject
that we can theorize the conception of the human subject as a personality, a group
that is understandable in a general sense, and a historical species-being, which is to
say, the whole system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject
can be classified into three separate categories of the human subject in its triple
capacity of personality, group and species-being. However, it is neglect of the creation
10 Allan, George., & Allshouse, Merle F., eds. (2005). Nature, Truth, and Value: Exploring the
11 Corse, Sandra. (2000). Operatic Subjects: The Evolution of Self in Modern Opera. Madison, NJ:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, p. 53.

and formulation of the general concept of “group” that necessarily brings about the
existence of missing links in the series of concepts and categories connected with the
system that comprises the human self as well as the human subject, from which, for
example, would be found missing the concept of the human subject in the capacity
of a “group” that is understandable in a general sense, thus inevitably constituting
a serious and regrettable lacuna in the foregoing series of concepts and categories.
Woefully neglecting the creation and formulation of the concept of the human subject
in the capacity of a “group” by which what we mean in a general sense, in turn, must
of necessity lead man to suffer a deficiency in rational knowledge of human existence
or to have a one-sided account of the rational logic that governs human existence.
As a result, it must of necessity follow that a rational knowledge of human existence
is not predicated upon the idea of the whole system that comprises the human self
as well as the human subject and that can be classified into three separate categories
of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, group and species-being,
which is to say, the foregoing notion of the whole system fails to furnish a theoretical
footing for the rational knowledge of human existence. Rather, a rational knowledge
of human existence tends to be presupposed by the mere conception of only one
category of human subject in the capacity of personality, group or species-being,
which in turn serves as a footing for the rational knowledge of human existence. If
we attempt to establish a rational system of existence by having as the theoretical basis
or footing the mere conception of the human subject in the capacity of personality, or
rather, by rejecting the notion of the human subject in its dual capacity of group and
species-being, it is impossible for us, indeed any human being, to avoid one-sidedness
in formulating the rational system of existence. This is what we mean by mainstream
theories or ideologies in modern western societies to the effect that modern western
societies tend to establish a rational system of existence by having as the theoretical
basis or footing the mere conception of the isolated human subject in the capacity
of personality, or rather, by rejecting the notion of the human subject in its dual
capacity of group and species-being. The Western rational system of existence that
was in the ascendant a few hundred years is now facing a serious crisis whereby
western societies as well as the rest of the world may be placed in a very difficult
position.
2 The Concept of “Group” and the Categorization

of “Groups”
2.1 The Concept of “Group”
By the concept of “group” we mean that any community when confronted with
the struggle for life must of necessity respond to external environmental pressures
in diverse ways, that any community condemned to be in the bitter struggle for
survival can be organized into different levels of structure or organization with their
2 The Concept of “Group” and the Categorization of “Groups” 379
respective integrative functions, and that any community which is engaged in the
ceaseless struggle for existence should be seen as autonomous subjects of social
practice, whereby practice must of necessity constitute the essence of community
life. To put it in a nutshell, any “group” that is understandable in either a general
or specific sense may rightly assert itself as a universal mode of existence in which
man as subject exists. Man in a particular environment is engaged in the ceaseless
struggle with his environment and, as such, is ultimately the product of interactions
with his environment. On the one hand the environment provides suitable conditions
for human life, but on the other, it exerts pressure upon human beings, thereby
posing a serious challenge to the survival of humanity. As it is commonly believed,
man must of necessity respond to the environmental pressures and challenges for
the sake of survival. Forming a group or groups, to wit gathering into a group or
groups, as a basic means of survival for mankind, enables human beings to meet
environmental pressures and challenges. In a famous passage of his Zoology Aristotle
distinguishes gregarious animals from the dispersed and solitary. The anthropoid apes
or primates were from the beginning social or gregarious animals. “As a consequence
of selection to cope with ecological pressures, most primates live in social groups
(Wrangham 1980),”12 which is to say, “the living primates have evolved as gregarious
animals, and much of their behavior is specifically adapted to life in groups.”13
Various kinds of “groups” endowed with their respective structures and functions
took center stage one after the other in the course of the long history of human
social development and we can trace such “groups” back through successive stages
of development. We can trace the specific forms of the human family across the great
transformations of human history.14 “In evolutionary anthropology, following the
classification devised by E. R. Service (1971), societies may be categorized according
to complexity as bands or nomads, tribes, chiefdoms and states.”15 With the progress
of civilization, socio-political organizations, especially international organizations,
began to hold dominating sway among various kinds of “groups,” which, for want
of a better term, we may as well call “human communities that have to engage in
a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.”16 As it
is commonly believed, human beings surely will, in years to come, create many
more “groups” with more complex structures and more comprehensive functions. It
is generally believed that human beings are especially expert in forming “groups”
and that any other animals cannot be placed on a par with humans in this respect.
Chinese Confucian philosopher Hsün-tzu gave an exposition of his views on man’s
12 Russon, Anne E., & Begun, David R., eds. (2004). The Evolution of Thought: Evolutionary
13 Mason, William A. Sociability and Social Organization in Monkeys and Apes. In Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, L.Berkowitz, 319. New York, NY: Academic Press, 1964.
14 Harrell, Stevan. (2018). Human Families. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 551–552.
15 Curchin, Leonard A. (2004). The Romanization of Central Spain: Complexity, Diversity, and
16 Reich, Jennifer A., ed. (2021). The State of Families: Law, Policy, and the Meanings of

natural gift for forming groups. Xunzi (c.300–c. 230 BCE), also spelled Hsün-tzu
or Hsün-tze, original name Xun Kuang, honorary name Xun Qing,17 lived during
the Warring States period of ancient China, one of the most fertile and influential in
Chinese history, which not only saw the rise of many of the great philosophers, but
also witnessed the establishment of many of the governmental structures and cultural
patterns that were to characterize China for the next 2000 years.18 He contributed to
the Hundred Schools of thought, i.e. philosophies and schools that flourished from
the sixth to the third century BCE, an era of great cultural and intellectual expansion
in ancient China, which is also known as the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy
because during this period a great variety of philosophies and schools vied with one
another to expound their views and proposals for attaining a happy social and political
order and freely developed, discussed and refined a broad range of thoughts and ideas
that have profoundly influenced lifestyles and social consciousness up to the present
day in East Asian countries and the East Asian diaspora around the world. “Hsün-tzu
was one of the three great Confucian philosophers of the classical period in China.
He elaborated and systematized the work undertaken by Confucius and Mencius,
giving a cohesiveness, comprehensiveness, and direction to Confucian thought that
was all the more compelling for the rigor with which he set it forth; and the strength
he thereby gave to that philosophy has been largely responsible for its continuance
for over 2000 years.”19 Hsün-tzu maintains that “men cannot live without some
kind of a social organization. The reason for this is that, in order to enjoy better
living, men have need of co-operation and mutual support. Hsün-tzu says: ‘A single
individual needs the support of the accomplishments of hundreds of workmen. Yet
an able man cannot be skilled in more than one line, and one man cannot hold two
offices simultaneously. If people all live alone and do not serve one another, there
will be poverty.’ Likewise, men need to be united in order to conquer other creatures:
‘Man’s strength is not equal to that of the ox; his running is not equal to that of the
horse; and yet ox and horses are used by him. How is this? I say that it is because
men are able to form social organizations, whereas the others are unable…. When
united, men have greater strength; having greater strength, they become powerful;
being powerful, they can overcome other creatures.’ For these two reasons, men
must have a social organization.”20 If they fail to form groups of any kind, men
cannot possibly by any means successfully respond to environmental pressures and
challenges, nor can they maintain their existence, development or well-being, to
say nothing of harmonious coexistence with nature. When external environmental
17 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Xunzi.” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 9, 2017. https://

www.britannica.com/biography/Xunzi.
18 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Warring States.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September
25, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/event/Warring-States.

19 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Xunzi.” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 9, 2017. https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Xunzi.
20 Feng, You-Lan (also spelled Fung, Yu-Lan). (2007). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy:
English-Chinese Bilingual Version (ZhaoFu-San, Trans.). Tianjin, China: Tianjin Academy of Social
Sciences Press, p. 234. cf. Needham, Joseph. (1956). Science and Civilization in China (Vol. 2):
History of Scientific Thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 23.
pressures mount, men who are condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for
both immediate survival and long-term existence tend to take the initiative in forming
or establishing various kinds of communities that can be organized into different
levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative functions. These
communities condemned to be in the struggle for life can be collectively referred
to as “groups.” The struggle for existence acts like a sieve separating the more fit
from the less fit, or rather, sifting those whom it wants to survive from those who are
doomed to perish.21 Charles Darwin advocated the theory of the survival of the fittest
and, in setting out his theory of evolution by natural selection as an explanation for
adaptation and speciation, he called “this principle, by which each slight variation
[a trait], if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark
its relation to man’s power of selection,”22 arguing that “if variations useful to any
organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best
chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of
inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterized,”23 and that
“man by selection can certainly produce great results, and can adapt organic beings
to his own uses, through the accumulation of slight but useful variations, given to
him by the hand of Nature. But Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a
power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man’s feeble
efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art.”24 The concept of natural selection
may enlighten us about the truth that individuals best adapted to their environments
are more likely to survive and reproduce and that as long as there is some variation
between them and that variation is heritable, there will be an inevitable selection
of individuals with the most advantageous variations. According to Prof. Paulsen,
natural selection occurs as follows: “Life is for the living being a constant strife for
vital conditions. The number of creatures that live and desire to preserve themselves
is always greater than the number of seats at the table of nature—a consequence of her
lavish production of living germs. The fertility of species differs very much; but there
is no species a single pair of which would not, under favorable circumstances, be able
to fill the earth with their offspring in the course of a few centuries. That this does
not happen is due to the parsimony of life-conditions. In the battle ensuing for the
possession of these, the great majority prematurely perish. It is, however, a further fact
that the individuals of a species do not enter the struggle with exactly equal powers;
many minute deviations occur. The result is that the individuals whose variations are
advantageous have the greatest prospect of surviving the struggle; superiority means
preservation of life. The qualities which constitute superiority may be very different
in kind: excessive strength, swiftness, sagacity, and intelligence, or advantages in the
21 Vyas, R. N. Peace is Certainly Possible. In A New Vision of History, R. N. Vyas. New Delhi, IN:
Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 2020.
22 Darwin, Charles. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the
p. 61.
23 Ibid., p. 127.
24 Ibid., p. 61.
possession of weapons of defense or attack; the power to avoid detection, or a greater

ability to resist injuries of all kinds. Each of these advantages may make its possessor
superior in a struggle, successful in flight, able to endure frost and famine, while other
less-favored animals will perish. Accordingly, also, the same individuals will have
the best prospects of leaving numerous offspring; and by transmitting to them their
endowments, it happens that advantages which were at first individual gradually
become properties of the species. The individuals best adapted to the conditions
of life determine the type of the species. A one-sided excess in the evolution of
certain qualities, for example in that of size or defensive organs or swiftness, could
not be the result, because such qualities would disturb the general equilibrium and
thus diminish the capability of life. An animal economy must, like an economic or
political system, distribute its tasks among the different functions according to the
measure of their importance: among the functions of defense, locomotion, nervous
activity, etc.”25 “In such a way, then, development or progressive evolution, in the
sense of immanent teleology, can take place without the need of an intelligence,
interfering from without, as a principle of explanation. And with the enhancement of
the species, a differentiation of types also occurs. The maximum of life possible at any
given moment is increased by a division into different types having different needs
and different organizations. More individuals of different species can exist together
than individuals of one species because they fit into the vacant places and fill out all
possible space.”26 “Alongside of and together with the principle of natural selection
which Darwin places in the foreground, he furthermore recognizes other principles
as co-operative; thus the principle which Lamarck regarded as the essential cause of
variation: changes in the conditions of the earth’s surface. By producing alterations
in vital conditions, they necessitate modifications in function, and changes in the use
of organs finally lead to alterations in structure. Migrations, which are occasioned
by the struggle for existence, since it forces animals to wander, produce the same
effect. And as a second co-operative principle Darwin mentions the principle of
correlative changes.”27 “The presupposition of all development, without which the
above-mentioned principles would have no support for their activity, is, of course,
the will to live, the will to struggle for existence, common to all beings taking part
in the evolution. They do not suffer the development passively, they are not, like
the pebbles in the brook, pushed into a new form by mechanical causes acting from
without. Their own inner activity is the absolute condition of the efficacy of natural
selection. The struggle for existence is not imposed upon individuals from without;
it is their own will to fight the battle; and without this will, the will to preserve and
exercise individual life and produce and preserve offspring, there could be no such
struggle for existence at all. And moreover, the will to live is the absolute original
precondition; it cannot in turn be derived from natural selection.”28 If we just care
25 Paulsen, Friedrich. (1895). Introduction to Philosophy (Frank Thilly, Trans.). New York, NY:
26 Ibid., p. 184.
27 Ibid., p. 185.
28 Ibid., pp. 185–186.
to go into the details of human psychology, we find that cooperation and cordiality
is quite natural for the human animal. Even in the low species of the beings like ants
and bees we find simple testimony about the fact of the mutual aid pervading the
human psychology.29 In emphasizing the role of the gregarious instinct, Dr. Trotter
is of the opinion that the gregarious instinct is the basis of all social life. “When
we come to consider man we find ourselves faced at once by some of the most
interesting problems in the biology of the social habit.” States Trotter, “It is probably
not necessary now to labor the proof of the fact that man is a gregarious animal in
literal fact, that he is as essentially gregarious as the bee and the ant, the sheep, the ox,
and the horse. The tissue of characteristically gregarious reactions which his conduct
presents furnishes incontestable proof of this thesis, which is thus an indispensable
clue to an inquiry into the intricate problems of human society.”30 “Vestiges of these
instinctive activities may often be seen in man’s behavior,” state Edwin Boring,
Herbert Langfeld and World, “but learning, habit, intelligence and culture have so
overridden them that is seldom proper to speak of instinctive behavior in man”
(Foundations of Psychology. 46).31 “The foregoing theories concerning instincts do
establish this fact that it is the basic nature of man to remain in some social system.
We cannot imagine at present that in some distant past the man was a solitary figure.
His constitution is so that he cannot remain all alone. When he is born, he needs the
support of his parent, when he is grown up he needs the hand of a woman, when
he is married (legally or otherwise) he needs progeny. And to support this large
paraphernalia he needs the society in its multifarious form.”32
In view of the fact that no satisfactory explanation for the concept of “group” has
yet been offered, we feel the necessity of giving it a more comprehensive explanation.
(1) Human beings can take the initiative in forming or establishing various kinds
of communities that may aid materially in making men engage in a constant
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. There can be
little doubt that whenever a single individual is facing intense challenges and
pressures to adapt to the changing environment and new social needs, he or she
will be really in no position to address them, thus feeling how weak, powerless
and vulnerable he or she may be. Man is the weakest animal. He has neither the
huge build of an elephant nor the sharp teeth and claws of a crocodile. Despite
these deficiencies, the bountiful nature has endowed him with one crowning
virtue viz. intelligence coupled with an instinct for association, or rather, forming
groups. In truth, it does not take much stretch of imagination to realize that sole
dependence upon human intelligence as well as upon his instinct for association,
or rather, his gift for forming groups, has been rendered absolutely necessary
by man’s immediate survival and long-term existence. Human intelligence as
30 Trotter, W. (2019). Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Glasgow, GB-SCT: Good Press, p. 112.

32 Ibid.
well as his gift for forming groups, namely his instinct for association, enables
man to stand on a par with nature in power. The fundamental difference between
man’s gift for forming groups and the animal’s gregarious instinct lies in the fact
that, like the human animal, many other animals tend to live in social groups, or
rather, to live in their natural social structure, whereas man’s gregarious behavior
tends to be influenced, to a larger or lesser degree, by his consciousness—
or to put it the other way round, man can take the initiative in forming or
establishing various kinds of groups. In the earliest societies primitive people
formulated various taboos and prohibitions, a considerable number of which
were rules and sanctions that were significant for the social order, that, as such,
belonged to the general system of social control,33 and that proved effective in
forming or establishing groups as well as in drawing clear lines of demarcation
between them. For example, the customs and practices of primitive people were
very much shaped by reservations about the most universal of all taboos, the
incest taboo, which prohibits sexual relations between close relatives.34 Human
beings are condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for existence at
different levels of economic, political, and social development which tend to
find expression in manifold spheres of human activity. With the progress of
civilization, man will be in a better position to exercise more and more initiative
in forming or establishing various kinds of groups. At this point in time we feel it
necessary to point out that almost any kind of group can rightly assert itself as an
open community that will open up infinite possibilities of the prospect of future
development on the one hand and that will be engaged in a constant struggle
for existence on the other. Human beings will never cease their conscious and
consistent efforts in order to form or establish various kinds of groups, which is
to say, such constant efforts on the part of social members will be continued not
only for periods in the immediate future but for all periods extending infinitely
far into the future. Moreover, various kinds of groups will assuredly undergo
ceaseless change and development in the far-off future.
(2) Any community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for
existence must of necessity meet its members’ basic or essential needs for the
sake of their immediate survival and long-term existence. To become human ad
remain human necessitates man’s multifarious needs, such as the material needs,
the spiritual needs, the need for social interaction, etc. At the same time, we must
also awake to the fact that while there are innumerable deficiencies inherent in
the structure of the human animal, “there is no limit to the needs he can create,
or to the means of satisfying them.”35 Man can take the initiative in forming or
establishing various kinds of groups in order to satisfy his multifarious changing
33 Merriam-Webster staff. (1999). Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia of World Religions. Spring-

34 Fellmann, Ferdinand. (2016). The Couple: Intimate Relations in a New Key (Walsh, Rebecca,
Trans.). Münster, DE: LIT Verlag, p. 134. cf. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Taboo.”
Encyclopdedia Britannica, February 28, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/taboo-sociology.
35 Horosz, William. (1987). Search without Idols. Dordrecht, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
p. 200.
needs of life. Only if man makes conscious and consistent efforts to establish and
perfect various kinds of groups can he meet his various needs of life arising from
the innumerable deficiencies inherent in the structure of the human animal. As
Marx argued, “The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not
merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in
the midst of society.”36 Holbach believed that “of all beings the most necessary
to man is man.”37 In other words, the separate individual cannot by any means
satisfy man’s various needs of life. Rather, only different types or forms of
“groups” that members of a community organize or establish by working in
close association and cooperation with each other can meet man’s multifarious
needs of life. To put it in a nutshell, any type or form of “group” can rightly assert
itself as a community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle
for both immediate survival and long-term existence and that man tends to build
through conscious and consistent efforts in order to meet his multifarious needs
of life.
(3) Man’s species-character, i.e., man’s conscious life activity, is inherent in any
community that is condemned to be engaged in a constant struggle for both
immediate survival and long-term existence. One seems fairly justified in postu-
lating that the concept of “group” may rightly assert itself as the unity of the
two meanings that inhere in itself, namely man’s species-character and the
community-character of human existence. Groups of any kind possess a funda-
mental characteristic in common, to wit man’s species-character, which, in turn,
determines the essential nature of a community. It is of such a nature so to
render it possible that human “groups” differ essentially animal “populations.”
Any type or kind of “group” can be considered tantamount to a community
of “species-beings” and possesses all the characteristics with which “species-
beings” are endowed. For example, by its practicality (or practicalness) we mean
that any group may conceive of itself as a particular practical subject38 capable
of “engaging in various cognitive and perhaps practical activities”39 as well as
in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.40
Its subjectivity suggests that the human subject in the capacity of a “group” that
is understandable in either a general or specific sense rightly ranks among the
three separate categories of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality,
36 Marx, Karl. (1979). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 46(Part I): Marx: Grundrisse:
Introduction (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing
House, p. 21.
37 Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1957). Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 2: Marx & Engels:
The Holy Family (Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, Trans.). Beijing: People’s Publishing
House, pp. 169–170.
38 Engstrom, Stephen. (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical

39 Elder, Crawford L. (2011). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. New York, NY: Cambridge
40 Reich, Jennifer A., ed. (2021). The State of Families: Law, Policy, and the Meanings of

group and species-being. The duality of human life inherent in a “group” under-
standable in a general or specific sense indicates that whether it be the human
subject in the capacity of personality or the human subject in the capacity of
group, either of them possesses both the natural life and the supernatural life
and asserts itself as the unity between the natural life and the supernatural life.
As with any particular personality, groups of any kind are fully entitled to claim
man’s “structure and choice” to be the common noumenon which, in turn, must
of necessity possess all the defining characteristics with which the noumenon
of human life, or rather, man’s “structure and choice” is endowed. Hence one
seems fairly justified in concluding that any type or kind of “group” under-
standable in either a general or specific sense invariably possesses the unique
species character of man and, as such, is condemned to be engaged in a constant
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.
(4) By the concept of “group” we mean that any community when confronted with
the struggle for life must of necessity respond to external environmental pres-
sures in diverse ways and that any community condemned to be in the ceaseless
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence can be organized
into different levels of structure or organization with their respective integrative
functions. Any type or kind of “group” contains its internal organizations and
structures that may be officially termed “group structures.” There are particular
necessary connections or relationships among the constituent elements inherent
in the structure of a particular group as well as between the whole structure of
a particular group and the constituent elements contained therein. More specif-
ically, it is special mechanisms in good working order rather than disorderly or
unsystematic relationships that exist among the constituent elements inherent
in the structure of a particular group as well as between the whole structure of
a particular group and the constituent elements contained therein. It is worth
noting that the structure of a particular group is entitled to assert itself as a self-
integrated organization which not only makes the constituent elements contained
therein “exhibit a particular internal order,”41 but also enables them to secure
close cooperation and coordination from each other, whereby the very group
will be in a better position to take concerted and unified action to meet external
environmental pressures and challenges. Hence we may safely assert that any
type or kind of group can rightly assert itself as a self-integrated community
that is condemned to be in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and
long-term existence and that can be organized into different levels of structure or
organization with their respective integrative functions. Self-integration is one
of the distinctive features that distinguish the foregoing conception of “groups”
from our usual understandings of other human groups. We should not identify
any notion of human groups with the foregoing conception of “group” in that any
41Westle, Bettina., & Segatti, Paolo., eds. (2016). European Identity in the Context of National
Identity: Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries in the Wake of the Financial Crisis.
human group that cannot be organized into different levels of structure or orga-
nization with their respective integrative functions—or to put it the other way
round, any human group whose structures or organizations contained therein
cannot engage in self-integration, cannot be called a “group” in the proper
sense of the term. The defining characteristic with which the foregoing concept
of “group” is endowed may lead us to the conclusion that families, institutions,
states and certain international organizations can be termed “groups” in the fore-
going sense of the term. Some groups, such as a group of people temporarily
assembled for a specific purpose, a group of employees engaged in some line
of trade and loosely organized in society, etc., cannot be called “groups” in the
foregoing sense of the word in that their structures or organizations contained
therein cannot engage in self-integration.
(5) Any type or kind of “group” that is condemned to be engaged in a constant
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence must necessarily
be endowed with one of the distinguishing characteristics of the human subject,
to wit man’s “structure and choice.” The concept of “group” that serves as a
linguistic expression of the notion of “the human subject in the capacity of
group” must bear within itself the fundamental characteristic of the human
subject, that is man’s “structure and choice.” Any type or kind of “group” that
may be conceived as composed of autonomous subjects of social practice can
rightly assert itself as an organic living whole that tends to take man’s “structure
and choice,” i.e. the noumenon of human life, as the most fundamental char-
acteristic of the human subject. Such “groups” when confronted with external
environmental pressures and challenges can engage in independent decision
making and choose responding behaviors to address the external environmental
pressures and challenges. This kind of responding behavior may be directed
outwardly in direct response to external environmental challenges, or it may
be directed inwardly to readjust the structure of “group.” However, whether
they be outwardly-directed behaviors or inwardly-directed behaviors, they are
invariably predicated upon independent choice-making and decision-making
by the group itself, which is to say, they tend to result from the workings of
the noumenon of human life—man’s “structure and choice.” For the “group”
understandable in the foregoing sense, all the instructions or hints from other
human groups can only be regarded as certain external environmental pres-
sures and stimuli. It is only the “group” itself that can determine exactly what
decisions it will make as well as what behaviors it will choose. In the light of
the foregoing understanding of the notion of “group,” any type of community
that is endowed with the most fundamental characteristic of human life—man’s
“structure and choice” can be perceived as a “group,” while on the contrary
any kind of community that is devoid of the most fundamental characteristic of
human life—man’s “structure and choice” cannot be defined as a “group.”
(6) The concept of “group” understandable in the foregoing sense represents a
holistic expression of the notion of the human subject in the capacity of “group”
and can adequately provide a holistic explanation of it as one of the three forms
of the human subject in its triple capacity of personality, group, and species-
being. The concept of “group” that serves as a linguistic expression of the notion
of the human subject in the capacity of “group” is sufficient to enlighten us on
the aforementioned human subject. More specifically, the category of “subject”
serves to describe and explain the structure, function, characteristics and work-
ings of the human subject in the capacity of “group.” On the whole, the concept
of “group” covers or includes all kinds of the concrete human subject in the
capacity of “group.” The concept of “group” used in either a general or specific
sense is a genus concept, while the concept of a concrete human subject in
the capacity of “group” is a species concept. Generally speaking, between the
concept of “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense and the
concept of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group” exists the
relationship between the general and the individual, between the universal and
the particular, and between the abstract and the concrete. Each concrete human
subject in the capacity of “group” must of necessity contain the structure, func-
tion, characteristics and workings of a “group” understandable in either a general
or specific sense, which, in turn, must necessarily find expression in their respec-
tive counterparts of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.” We
must make a deep study of the structure, function, characteristics and work-
ings of a “group” understandable in either a general or specific sense and place
them in the clearest light. Only in this way can our conscious and unremitting
efforts provide theoretical basis and guidance for a still more profound, more
adequate and more complete elucidation of the structure, function, character-
istics and workings of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group”
as well as for a deeper insight into them. It can thus be seen that a profound
elucidation of the structure, function, characteristics and workings of a “group”
understandable in either a general or specific sense is the necessary prerequisite
to the systematic study and profound exposition of the corresponding counter-
parts of the concrete human subject in the capacity of “group.” What’s been
discussed above may be briefly summed up as follows. Only if we make serious
and patient efforts to make an in-depth study of the “group” understandable
in either a general or specific sense can our conscious and consistent efforts
provide correct guidance and prerequisites for a more profound understanding
and explanation of all kinds of the concrete human subject in the capacity of
“group.”
2.2 The Categories of “Group”
After various considerations such as consanguinity, locality, occupation, belief and

power have been taken into account, multifarious “groups” can be roughly grouped
into the following four major categories:
(1) The Family
The family is the oldest and most enduring social unit (institution or group) of human
society42 and historically most common form of social organization.43 It may be
safely asserted that the family, which rightly asserts itself as one of the oldest and the
most common forms of communities in the world, is a group of people who are closely
related to one another by consanguinity (by blood ties or through birth), by affinity
(through marriage), or through adoption, and who tend to engage in economic coop-
eration based upon a division of labor by sex to secure a better livelihood.44 “Marriage
exists only when the economic and the sexual are united into one relationship, and
this combination occurs only in marriage. Marriage, thus defined, is found in every
known society.”45 The term “family” is used either in the broad or narrow sense. The
“family” in the narrower sense of the word can refer to “the classic nuclear family,
defined in terms of a couple (male and female) and their biological offspring.” “But
the family in its narrower or more specific sense is itself regulated in various ways
by state laws that define the family as a legal structure. In this sense, the family is
founded on a state-recognized form of licensed sexual union between people. In a
monogamous union, this bond is notionally exclusive. Transgressing this exclusivity
may lead to civil or criminal sanctions and may also be grounds for divorce.”46 In his
influential work Social Structure (1949), George Peter Murdock defined the family
as “a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and
reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially
approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexu-
ally cohabiting adults.”47 “The two-generation family composed of mother, mother’s
husband, and their offspring was defined by Murdock as the nuclear family. This form
is mostly found in hunting-and-gathering and industrial societies. On the one hand,
in times of hardship and catastrophes, little help is shown from outside, which means
that in the case of the mother’s or the father’s death, the children’s lives become
insecure. On the other hand, this form of family is well-adapted to a high-mobility
life, be it the society of the Inuits or contemporary industrialized societies. This form
of family is also common where there is a sexual division of labor. Murdock took
this form of family as a universal human social grouping.”48 “The nuclear family is
a universal human social grouping. Either as the sole prevailing form of the family
or as the basic unit from which more complex familiar forms are compounded, it
42 Sokalski, Henryk J. (2001). xii Foreword. In Family-Centered Policies and Practices: Interna-
tional Implications, Katharine Briar-Lawson, Hal A. Lawson, & Charles B. Hennon. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press.
43 Perry, John A., & Perry, Erna K. (2016). Contemporary Society: An Introduction to Social Science.

44 Sumner, William Graham., & Keller, Albert Galloway. (1927). The Science of Society, Volume

45 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, p. 8.
46 Strathern, Andrew., & Stewart, Pamela J. (2016). Kinship in Action: Self and Group. New York,
48 Birx, H. James., ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Anthropology, Volume I. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Inc., p. 945.

exists as a distinct and strongly functional group in every known society. No excep-
tion, at least, has come to light in the 250 representative cultures surveyed for the
present study, which thus corroborates the conclusion of Lowie: ‘It does not matter
whether marital relations are permanent or temporary; whether there is polygyny or
polyandry or sexual license; whether conditions are complicated by the addition of
members not included in our family circle: the one fact stands out beyond all others
that everywhere the husband, wife, and immature children constitute a unit apart
from the remainder of the community.’”49 “The reasons for its universality do not
become fully apparent when the nuclear family is viewed merely as a social group.
Only when it is analyzed into its constituent relationships, and these are examined
individually as well as collectively, does one gain an adequate conception of the
family’s many-sided utility and thus of its inevitability. A social group arises when
a series of interpersonal relationships, which may be defined as sets of reciprocally
adjusted habitual responses, binds a number of participant individuals collectively to
one another. In the nuclear family, for example, the clustered relationships are eight
in number: husband-wife, father-son, father-daughter, mother-son, mother-daughter,
brother-brother, sister-sister, and brother-sister. The members of each interacting pair
are linked to one another both directly through reciprocally reinforcing behavior and
indirectly through the relationships of each to every other member of the family. Any
factor which strengthens the tie between one member and a second, also operates
indirectly to bind the former to a third member with whom the second maintains
a close relationship. An explanation of the social utility of the nuclear family, and
thus of its universality, must consequently be sought not alone in its functions as
a collectivity but also in the services and satisfactions of the relationships between
its constituent members.”50 Only when group marriage (a marital union embracing
at once several men and several women) came into existence as an institution of
marriage can we safely assert that the family in the broadest sense of the word
reaches beyond the nuclear family to a whole array of family forms. For example,
Lewis H. Morgan, an American ethnologist of eminence, who is generally acknowl-
edged as a representative of the American school of classical evolution, who is known
especially for establishing the study of kinship systems,51 and whose later research
in social evolution and kinship organization resulted in a number of monographs and
the book Ancient History (1877), long considered a hallmark in social anthropology,
as well as in Marxist social theory, undertook to demonstrate that “Five different and
successive forms of the family may now be distinguished, each having an institution
of marriage peculiar to itself. They are the following: I. The Consanguine Family. It
was founded upon the intermarriage of brothers and sisters, own and collateral, in
a group. II. The Punaluan Family. It was founded upon the intermarriage of several
sisters, own and collateral, with each other’s husbands, in a group; the joint husbands
49 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company,
pp. 2–3.
50 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
51 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Lewis Henry Morgan.” Encyclopedia Britannica,
December 13, 2020. https://.Britannica.com/biography/Lewis-Henry-Morganwww.

not being necessarily kinsmen of each other. Also, on the intermarriage of several
brothers, own and collateral, with each others’ wives, in a group; these wives not
being necessarily of kin to each other, although often the case in both instances. In
each case the group of men were conjointly married to the group of women. III. The
Syndyasmian or Pairing Family. It was founded upon marriage between single pairs,
but without an exclusive cohabitation. The marriage continued during the pleasure
of the parties. IV. The Patriarchal Family. It was founded upon the marriage of one
man with several wives; followed, in general, by the seclusion of the wives. V. The
Monogamian Family. It was founded upon marriage between single pairs, with an
exclusive cohabitation.”52 These forms, Mr. Morgan claimed, “sprang successively
one from the other, and collectively represent the growth of the idea of the family.”53
Generally speaking, marriage forms the basis for the founding of a family—or, to
put it another way, marriage rightly asserts itself as the foundation of every family.54
Whenever a man and a woman enter into wedlock, it naturally follows that the newly
wedded couple will found a family. Thus it can be seen that the traditional family
as a social unit tends to be founded on heterosexual marriage.55 The husband-wife
relationship established by marriage may rightly assert itself as the primary one, or
rather, the most basic and fundamental one, in the mesh of family relationship, next
to which rank the various relationships between parents and children as well as those
between other constituent members of the family, which thus tend to evolve into a
more complex and institutionalized system of kinship relationships. “Incest taboos,
however, create an overlapping of families and arrange their members into different
degrees of nearness or remoteness of relationship. A person has his primary rela-
tives—his parents and siblings in his family of orientation and his spouse and children
in his family of procreation. Each of these persons has his own primary relatives,
who, if they are not similarly related to Ego, rank as the latter’s secondary rela-
tives, e.g., his father’s father, his mother’s sister, his wife’s mother, his brother’s son,
and his daughter’s husband. The primary relatives of secondary kinsmen are Ego’s
tertiary relatives, such as his father’s sister’s husband, his wife’s sister’s daughter,
and any of his first cousins. This stepwise gradation of kinsmen extends indefinitely,
creating innumerable distinct categories of genealogical connection.”56 “Some of
the intimacy characteristic of relationships within the nuclear family tends to flow
outward along the ramifying channels of kinship ties. …Owing to the ramification of
kinship ties which results from incest taboos, a person may have 33 different types
of secondary relatives and 151 different types of tertiary relatives, and a single type,
such as father’s brother, may include a number of individuals. All societies are faced
52 Morgan, Lewis Henry. (1985). Ancient Society. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press,
pp. 383–384.
53 Ibid., p. 385.
55 Katrougalos, George., & Lazaridis, Gabriella. (2003). Southern European Welfare States:
56 Murdock, George Peter. (1949). Social Structure. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company,
p. 14.
with the problem of establishing priorities, as it were, i.e., of defining for individuals
the particular group of kinsmen to whom they are privileged to turn first for material
aid, support, or ceremonial support. All cultures meet this problem by adopting a
rule of descent. A rule of descent affiliates an individual at birth with a particular
group of relatives with whom he is especially intimate and from whom he can expect
certain kinds of services that he cannot demand of non-relatives, or even of other
kinsmen. The fundamental rules of descent are only three in number: patrilineal
descent, which affiliates a person with a group of kinsmen who are related to him
through males only; matrilineal descent, which assigns him to a group consisting
exclusively of relatives through females; and bilateral descent, which associates
him with a group of very close relatives irrespective of their particular genealogical
connection to him. A fourth rule, called double descent, combines patrilineal and
matrilineal descent by assigning the individual to a group of each type.”57 “Descent,
in fine, does not necessarily involve any belief that certain genealogical ties are closer
than others, much less a recognition of kinship with one parent to the exclusion of
the other, although such notions have been reported in exceptional cases. It merely
refers to a cultural rule which affiliates an individual with a particular selected group
of kinsmen for certain social purposes such as mutual assistance or the regulation
of marriage.”58 The family as an independent social unit tends to perform certain
important functions that are essential to human social life—the reproductive, the
economic, the educational, the cultural, and the political. “In the nuclear family
or its constituent relationships we thus see assembled four functions fundamental
to human social life—the sexual, the economic, the reproductive, and the educa-
tional. Without provision for the first and third, society would become extinct; for
the second, life itself would cease; for the fourth, culture would come to an end. The
immense social utility of the nuclear family and the basic reason for its universality
thus began to emerge in strong relief.”59 In its capacity as a relatively independent
social unit, the family is normally entitled to make decisions for family members in
almost all spheres of life. Generally speaking, the primary responsibility for bearing
and rearing children ever remains with the family. The family must see to it that
old parents are properly provided for, provide its members with the basic necessi-
ties of life—food, clothing, shelter and transport, render appropriate assistance to its
members on important occasions such as marriages, funerals, and medical treatment,
and, in particular, give meticulous care to those confined to bed by sickness. It is
therefore evident that the family plays a crucial role in almost all areas of life. For
any living person, concluding a marriage, bearing and rearing children, earning a
livelihood, and departing this life may be conceived as the most basic activities of
life. Moreover, an individual’s basic emotions, the values formed early in life, and
the basic behavior patterns are most likely shaped first and foremost by the family.
To sum up, no matter how advanced a modern industrialized state or society has
become today, no such state or society can rightly assert itself as a substitute for the
57 Ibid., pp. 14–15.

58 Ibid., p. 16.
59 Ibid., p. 10.
family in its status or function as a social service, and the constituent members of a
family will not give up their respective roles in the family.
(2) The Organization
By the organization we mean a formal social organization that rightly asserts itself as
one of the basic categories of “group.” Those informal organizations devoid of any
particular structures cannot by any means fall under the basic category of “group.”
By the so-called “formal organization” we mean a community that is engaged in a
constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence and in which
its constituent members tend to work in association with each other by coordinating
mutual behaviors and activities in order to achieve a common goal. “Any activity
involving the conscious cooperation of two or more persons can be called organized
activity. However, in modern society cooperative activity is carried on within a much
more formal structure than the one just described. Participants have tasks assigned to
them; the relationships between participants are ordered in such ways as to achieve the
final product with a minimum expenditure of human effort and material resources.
Thus, by formal organization we mean a planned system of cooperative effort in
which each participant has a recognized role to play and duties or tasks to perform.
These duties are assigned in order to achieve the organization purpose rather than to
satisfy individual preferences, although the two often coincide.”60 “It should not be
thought, however, that all the influences operating upon the employees of an organiza-
tion further cooperation. There may be, for example, conflicting interpretations of the
organization goals, or various units of the organization may have inconsistent goals.
Incompatibility among members of the organization may lead to friction and may
increase, rather than reduce, resistance to organizational influence. Certain methods
of supervision may curb rather than stimulate initiative. Nevertheless, the first set
of influences—those encouraging cooperation, viz. value premises, acceptance of
influence, expectations and organizational morale—predominate most of the time
in most organizations. If they did not, organized behavior would not be an effective
way of carrying out tasks, members would receive no inducement toward continued
participation, and the organization itself would disappear. Hence only those orga-
nizations survive for any length of time whose net influence upon their members
is to preserve and develop habits of cooperation. …The ability of organizations to
develop in their members habits of cooperation is greatly increased by the attitudes
and habits that these members bring to organizations. …the patterns of cooperation
will generally reflect to a very considerable degree the patterns of cooperation that
are incorporated in the mores and training procedures of the larger society.”61 For
any organization endowed with particular structures as well as with vital powers, its
constituent members tend to engage in a complex series of holistically structured
activities based on norms. To put it in a nutshell, the organization tends to refer to
a community that is formally organized by following formal procedures and legally
60 Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Public Administration.
61 Ibid.
recognized as an independent entity and that is engaged in a constant struggle for both
immediate survival and long-term existence. Judith R. Blau spells out this argument in
more neutral terms: any organization is endowed with legitimacy.62 “By formal orga-
nization is meant the pattern of behaviors and relationships that is deliberately and
legitimately planned for the members of an organization. …Now of course anyone
in an organization (or outside it, for that matter) may make such a plan. Several plans
may be made, and these may conflict. Formal organization comes into existence
when there is an agreed-upon and accepted procedure for giving ‘legitimacy’ to one
of these plans. …We cannot pursue further at this point the subject of legitimacy
and the acceptance of authority except to warn against certain misconceptions. First,
legitimacy is at root not a legal but a psychological matter. A legal or any other system
of authority is legitimate only to the extent that those persons to whom it is directed
feel that they ought or must accept it. Second, the legitimacy of an organizational plan
is seldom accepted as absolute by those whom it seeks to govern. There are always
limits—often fairly narrow limits—which, if exceeded, will cause refusal to accept
the plan or even to admit its legitimacy. Third, legitimacy need not be hierarchical
in its structure, resulting from successive acts of delegation.”63 The more advanced
human societies become, the greater number of discrete organizational units there
will be, the more comprehensive functions organizations tend to perform. Today’s
society has become more highly organized on the one hand, and organizations of
various kinds have proved to be of crucial importance to societies and individuals
alike on the other. As James Burnham points out, “What is occurring … is a drive
for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class by the
social group or class of the manager.”64 “Burnham’s thesis is that a declining capi-
talist form of society is giving way to a managerial one. The managerial revolution
by which this is being accomplished is not a violent upheaval, but rather a transition
over a period of time, in much the same way as feudal society gave way to capi-
talism. …But there was no reason to think of socialism as the alternative. …In this
society it will be the managers who are dominant, who have power and privilege, who
have control over the means of production and have preference in the distribution
of rewards. In short, the managers will be the ruling class. This does not necessarily
mean that political offices will be occupied by managers, any more than under capi-
talism all politicians were capitalists, but that the real power over what is done will
be in the hands of managers.”65 Generally speaking, such organizations are endowed
with the following characteristics. First, organizational objectives and personal goals,
or rather, the objectives set for the organization by those who control it, as well as
the goals established by its constituent members. “As already noted, much human
behavior is neither conscious nor rational. In many cases the actor cannot explain
62 Blau, Judith R. (1992). The Shape of Culture: A Study of Contemporary Patterns in the United
63 Ibid.
64 Pugh, Derek S., & Hickson, David J. (2016). Great Writers on Organizations: The Third Omnibus
Edition. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 283.

65 Ibid., p. 288.
why he behaves in a particular way—or if he does explain, the explanation is simply

a rationalization of the real unconscious motivations. Since organizations are set up
to accomplish purposes, the study of administration must necessarily be concerned
with the rational aspects of human behavior. …for the present, the emphasis will
be upon those behaviors that can be analyzed as deliberate and purposive choices.
…It will suffice for our purposes if the reader understands that the justification of
any choice depends, first, on the ends to be achieved and, second, on the appropri-
ateness of the particular course of action chosen for the realization of these ends.
…Before an individual can rationally choose between several courses of action, he
must ask himself: (1) ‘What is my objective—my goal?’ and ‘Which of these courses
of action is best suited to that goal?’ …A basic test of any proposed course of action
is whether it will contribute to the organization objective. Determining the objective
of an organization usually involves not only questions of what values the activity is
to be directed toward, but also what groups of people it is to serve and what levels
or quality of service it is to provide. …The value premises (goals, objectives) upon
which the employee bases his decisions tend to be the objectives of the organization
or organizational unit in which he works. …To be more accurate, the value premises
that the individual employee incorporates into his behavior are not usually the goals
of the organization as a whole, but intermediate goals—means to the larger organi-
zation ends—that define his particular job in the organization. …Here we feel the
necessity of pointing out the intimate connection between the organization objective
and the process by which a new organization comes into existence. …At the same
time it will become equally clear that the organization objective is of vital signif-
icance in the survival and continued existence of the organization.”66 Second, any
given organization endowed with particular structures may be realized through many
different structures. Hence we should be concerned with identifying different forms
of organizational structures and exploring their implications. The fact that organiza-
tional activities can be arranged in various ways means that organizations can have
differing structures, such as the ideological structure, the psychological structure,
the technical structure, the systematic (or institutional) structure, the structure of
personnel organizations and the structure of personnel systems. Third, a structured
and holistic approach to organizational activities should be adopted to ensure that
the organization as a whole may engage in holistically structured activities and that
consistency and integration are achieved within all organizational activities. Fourth,
any particular organization that denotes a group of people with a common purpose
may rightly assert itself as an independent social subject that enjoys corresponding
rights according to their obligations on the one hand and that fulfills corresponding
obligations according to their rights on the other. Any given organization is endowed
with the following functions. First, organizations are in a unique position to meet
66 Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Characteristics
of Behavior in Organizations in “Chapter Three Human Behavior and Organization.” In Public
external environmental pressures and challenges. “According to U. S. officials, inter-

national organizations are often in the best position to respond quickly to crisis situ-
ations. For example, WHO is often in the best position to recognize the early stages
of infectious disease outbreaks through its interactions with the various networks
of its member countries and collaborating centers. Also, WHO is often best suited
to coordinate international health activities that often draw on experts’ knowledge
from multiple countries, including the United States.”67 Second, the organization
tends to make its constituent members reach consensus of opinion, have a clear
understanding of their respective roles, and act in unison to achieve the organiza-
tion’s objectives effectively and efficiently. “The employee tends to assume not just
a passive but an active attitude toward the furtherance of the organization’s objec-
tives. He does not merely accept the organization goals in deciding those questions
that come to him, or accept the instructions he receives, but he exercises more or
less initiative in finding ways of furthering those goals.”68 Third, the organization
can best meet the deep-felt human needs of its constituent members. “The primary
functions of any organization, whether religious, political, or industrial, should be
to implement the needs of man to enjoy a meaningful existence.”69 “For many years
Frederick Herzberg conducted, with colleagues and students, a program of research
and application on human motivations in the work situation and its effects on the
individual’s job satisfaction and mental health. …The major finding of the study was
that the events that led to satisfaction were of quite a different kind from those that
led to dissatisfaction. Five factors stood out as strong determinants of job satisfac-
tion: achievement, recognition, the attraction of the work itself, responsibility, and
advancement. Lack of these five factors, though, was mentioned very infrequently in
regard to job dissatisfaction. When the reasons for the dissatisfaction were analyzed,
they were found to be concerned with different factors: company policy and adminis-
tration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations, and working conditions. Because
such distinctly separate factors were found to be associated with job satisfaction and
job dissatisfaction, Herzberg concludes that these two feelings are not the opposites
of one another; rather, they are concerned with two different ranges of human needs.
The set of factors associated with job dissatisfaction are those stemming from the
individual’s overriding need to avoid physical and social deprivation. Using a biblical
analogy, Herzberg relates these to the Adam conception of the nature of humanity.
When Adam was expelled from the Garden of Eden, he was immediately faced with
the task of satisfying the needs that stemmed from his animal nature: food, warmth,
avoidance of pain, safety, security, belongingness, and so on. Ever since then, people
have had to concern themselves with the satisfaction of these needs, together with
67 United States General Accounting Office. (1997). United Nations U. S. Participation in Five
Affiliated International Organizations: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U. S. Senate. Washington, D. C.: Diane Publishing, pp. 9–10.
68 Simon, Herbert A., Thompson, Victor A., & Smithburg, Donald W. (2017). Influence of the
Formal and Informal Organization in “Chapter Three Human Behavior and Organization.” In
Public Administration, New York, NY: Routledge.
69 Pugh, Derek S., & Hickson, David J., eds. (2007). Writers on Organizations (6th ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 130.

those that, as a result of social conditioning, have been added to them.”70 “In contrast,
the factors associated with job satisfaction are those stemming from people’s need
to realize their human potential for perfection. In biblical terms, this is the Abraham
conception of human nature. Abraham was created in the image of God. He was
capable of great accomplishments, development, growth, transcending his environ-
mental limitations, and self-realization. People have these aspects to their natures,
too; they are, indeed, the characteristically human ones. They have needs to under-
stand, to achieve, and, through achievement, to experience psychological growth;
these needs are very powerful motivating drives.”71 Fourth, the organization can
improve its constituent members’ work efficiency and make them work with great
efficiency whereby the organization as a whole can achieve maximum efficiency
and benefit. The formation of an organization tends to follow formally established
procedures that are always associated with the comprehensive and accurate defini-
tion of objectives and characteristics of the organization as well as with the clear
and lucid explanation of interpersonal relationships and behavioral norms that are
generally accepted among its constituent members. Formal organizations include
schools, institutions of higher education like colleges and universities, companies,
enterprises, business unions, hospitals, research institutes and farmers’ organiza-
tions, to name but a few. Informal organizations encompass social groups, such as
friendship groups, charitable (philanthropic) groups, a group of people temporarily
assembled for a specific purpose, and a group of employees engaged in some line of
trade and loosely organized in society, etc., which cannot be called “formal organi-
zations” in the general sense of the term “group” in that such organizations and any
structures contained therein cannot engage in self-integration.
(3) The State
Let us begin with the most popular of Engels’ works, The Origin of the Family,
Private Property and the State, the sixth edition of which was published in Stuttgart
as far back as 1894. Summing up his historical analysis, Engels says: “The state is,
therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it
‘the reality of the ethical idea’, ‘the image and reality of reason’, as Hegel maintains.
Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission
that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it
has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order
that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not
consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a
power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep
it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen our of society but placing
itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.”72 “This
expresses with perfect clarity the basic idea of Marxism with regard to the historical
70 Ibid., p. 145.
71 Ibid., p. 146.
72 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau,

role and the meaning of the state. The state is a product and a manifestation of the
irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as
class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of
the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable. …the state only exists
where there are class antagonisms and a class struggle. …According to Marx, the
state could neither have arisen nor maintained itself had it been possible to recon-
cile classes. …According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for
the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of ‘order’, which legalizes
and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes.”73 Marx
and his followers reinforced this belief by treating the state merely as an instru-
ment of oppression in the hands of the dominant class that was defined primarily in
economic terms,74 as well as by conceiving the state as representing the interests of
the economically dominant class.75 “Because the state arose from the need to hold
class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of
the conflict of these classes, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also
the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and
exploiting the oppressed class….”76 “The state is an organ of the rule of a definite
class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it). …it is
not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagonisms are irrec-
oncilable. …if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if
it is a power standing above society and ‘alienating itself more and more from it’, it is
clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent
revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was
created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this ‘alienation.’”77 As
distinct from any other groups (organizations) understandable in either the general
or particular sense of the word, states have been vested with supreme power since
the earliest forms of states emerged in human history. It has traditionally been argued
that states possess a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, whereby we cling
to a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence as the defining characteristic of the
states—or to put it the other way round, we just take it for granted that a monopoly
of the legitimate use of violence should be accepted as a central feature of any defini-
tion of the state. More specifically, modern states tend to use violence as a means of
governing, or rather, to rely on the threat (let alone actual use) of violence as a tool.78
“According to Gandhi, the basic distinguishing characteristic of a state compared to
73 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

74 Fukui, Haruhiro., Merkl, Peter H., Muller-Groeling, Hubertus., & Watanabe, Akio., eds. (1993).
The Politics of Economic Change in Postwar Japan and West Germany, Volume 1: Macroeconomic
Conditions and Policy Responses. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., p. 2.
75 Prior, Mike. (2010). The Popular and the Political: Essays on Socialism in the 1980s. New York,


77 Ibid., 6–7.
78 Richardson, Jeremy, & Mazey, Sonia., eds. (2015). European Union: Power and Policy-
making.New York, NY: Routledge, p. 7.

other organizations, lies in its power of coercion. A society possesses plurality of

organizations and institutions, but only the state is endowed with this unique power
of physical coercion. From his experience of the British government and politics in
India, when Gandhi was writing, he became convinced that a state is an engine of coer-
cion and oppression. To Gandhi, modern states represent centralization of power, but
centralization cannot be sustained and defended without the application of adequate
force. Thus, modern states are essentially violent in nature. In this connection, he
writes: ‘The State represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The indi-
vidual has a soul, but as the State is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from
violence to which it owes its very existence.’ Gandhi observes that it is impossible
for a modern state based on force to be non-violent because violence is in-built in the
system.”79 “ The state is a ‘special coercive force’. Engels gives this splendid and
extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that
the ‘special coercive force’ for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie,
of millions of working people by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a ‘special
coercive force’ for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dicta-
torship of the proletariat). This is precisely what is meant by ‘abolition of the state
as state’. This is precisely the ‘act’ of taking possession of the means of production
in the name of society.”80 Hence we may safely assert that the ruling class tends to
exercise its power in its own interest by the use of the state as an instrument of class
domination.81 While the legislative, executive, judicial and procuratorial hierarchies
are central to the authoritarian aspects of states, the military, police and prison hier-
archies are central to their coercive apparatuses.82 Thus one seems fairly justified in
concluding that the state is a polity, or rather, a specific form of political organization,
organized around the foregoing central aspects of political power. At the same time,
in view of the fact that states are primary subjects of international law, regardless
of their internal constitutions, whether unitary or federal, republican or monarchic,
national or multinational,83 all states that enjoy sovereign equality should have equal
rights and duties and rightly assert themselves as equal members of the international
community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other
nature, which is to say, each state has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations
under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and to live in
peace with other States. “The identity of the State as subject of international law and
as subject of national law means that, finally, the international legal order obligating
and authorizing the State and the national legal order determining the individuals
79 Ghosh, B. N. (2012). Beyond Gandhi Economics: Towards a Creative Deconstruction. New


81 Harvey, David. (2012). Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. New York, NY:
Routledge, p. 270.
82 Scott, John. (2006). Power. Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 37.
83 Rommen, H. A. “State, The.” New Catholic Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Sep. 2021
who, as organ of the State, execute its international duties and exercise its interna-
tional rights, form one and the same universal order.”84 As an existential community
the state, which is always subject to the universal “rule of reason and conscience”
and which is endowed “only with the most inclusive human authority in the area of
its jurisdiction,”85 must ensure that individual members can successfully engage in a
constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. “In relation
to the many other societies creatively produced by man in the course of his intellec-
tual, moral, socioeconomic, and cultural growth and differentiation, the state is the
ordering and unifying authority, the unitas ordinis of the common good in which all
individual persons and their many free associations participate and through which
they enjoy legal security and self-fulfillment in the stability and tranquility, i.e., the
peace, of the public order. More than any other temporal community, the state, as the
name implies, tends toward perpetuity and survival into an indefinite future. …But in
its mode of being the state does not exist independent of, outside, or above the persons
who are organized within it, but wholly in them. …Nor is the end of the state so much
its own and so independent of the ends of the persons forming it that their lives, rights,
and fortunes can be unlimitedly sacrificed for its end or good. Instead, the rights of
individual persons are themselves essential parts of the end of the state, which, like all
societies, must ultimately serve the ends of its individual members.”86 The traditional
theory asserts that “the state is composed of three elements—the people, the territory
and the power of the state exercised by an independent government,” and that “these
elements can be conceived of only as the validity and the spheres of validity of a legal
order,”87 which is to say, “the state can be conceptualized as an entity of the three
basic elements of the German legal philosopher Georg Jellinek—territory, people,
sovereign power (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt).”88 “From this perspective,
the state is seen as a normative order, and it is intersubjectively constructed norma-
tive values that provide the unifying standards and symbols of legitimate authority
and allow us to perceive the state as a unitary and sovereign actor. Thus, sovereignty
‘is negotiated out of interaction within intersubjectively identifiable communities’
and it is this institution which legitimates ‘the state’ as an agent in international
social life. As Michael Walzer notes, unity can only ever be symbolized, but it is
through the claim to sovereignty made on the state’s behalf, and how this is articu-
lated and put into practice, both domestically and internationally, that a sense of unity
84 Leben, Charles. (2010). The Advancement of International Law. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing,
p. 118.
85 Long, Michael G. (2002). Against Us, But for Us: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the State. Macon,
GA: Mercer University Press, p. 82.

86 Rommen, H. A. “State, The.” New Catholic Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia.com. 23 Sep. 2021
87 Leben, Charles. (2010). The Advancement of International Law. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing,
p. 117.
88 Merkel, Wolfgang., Kollmorgen, Raj., & Wagener, Hans-Jürgen., eds. (2019). The Handbook of
Political, Social, and Economic Transformation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 657.
is created.”89 While the world’s economy is undergoing rapid integration into the
global economy, up to the present time the state has remained the most fundamental
and authoritarian of all the existential communities man creatively organized in the
course of human history. “State and society overlapped and interacted across broad
historical time spans” whereby between state and society emerged the third realm,
that is “public sphere” or “civil society,” which is to say, state and society formed
an either/or binary in Jurgen Habermas’s very widely discussed concept of “public
sphere,” as well as in the later concept “civil society.”90 After the emergence of the
modern nation-state, in many areas state and society are superimposed upon each
other and they overlap each other to such a degree that it is never possible properly
to draw a clear distinction between them. On the one hand, the state tends to lay
the basis for various “group activities,” to provide the general conditions in which
various “group activities” take place, and to set the stage for various “group activi-
ties,” but one the other, by virtue of the supreme authority invested in the state by its
people, the state has full authority to govern and direct various groups by laying down
and enforcing rules and regulations as well as by making sure that various “group
activities” shall be regulated by law. As a result, the various groups mentioned above
may be deprived of their autonomy and thus fail to assert their independence. As
a general rule, the existence and activities of various groups tend to be subject to
the existing social system as well as to state rules and regulations whereby only
relative independence and autonomy shall be guaranteed or granted to the various
groups mentioned above. States endowed with hierarchical structures as well as with
the multitude of functions “are faced with a number of options in framing strategic
responses” which “are tailored to the specific circumstances of the state in question—
both to optimize the best possible response from the state as a whole and to create
a strategy that accurately reflects the challenges and threats that the state actually
faces.”91 Thereby, the state tends to make strategic decisions and choices as to how
best to meet domestic and international challenges or, more specifically, to promote
economic development and social welfare through a coherent use of internal and
external policies, whereby the state should retain freedom “to follow its own path,
to control its own life and existence, to determine its own course of development
and to pursue its own happiness and evolutionary destiny.”92 Therefore, “the state
is expected to anticipate critical developments and avoid detriment by an effective
crisis management, supply the economy with an appropriate infrastructure, initiate
technological progress, and provide favorable conditions for economic growth. In
addition, the welfare state philosophy requires social compensation for all sorts of
89 Rae, Heather. (2002). State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples. Cambridge, UK:
90 Huang, Philip C. (2010). Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, p. 15.
91 Taddeo, Mariarosaria., & Glorioso, Ludovica., eds. (2016). Ethics and Policies for Cyber Opera-
tions: A NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Initiative. London, UK: Springer
Nature, p. 209.
92 Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. (2017). Lions of the North: Sounds of the New Nordic Radical

individual disadvantages so that today the state can be said to bear again an all-
embracing responsibility for the social and cultural welfare of society.”93 There are
three fundamental and traditional functions of the state. First, for Marx the state can
be viewed as an instrument of class rule whereby the state can maintain the unity of
the ruling class and ensure its position as the politically dominant class. The state that
acts as an apparatus of class domination tends to exercise dictatorship over a handful
of hostile elements, or rather, a small number of antisocial elements doing harm to
society in general and, more specifically, bent only on promoting general disorder.
Second, the state is faced with the immense task of promoting economic, social and
cultural development whereby its primary objectives, to wit rapid economic growth
and sustainable social development, can be achieved. Third, the state is under an
obligation to safeguard national independence, to defend state sovereignty, and to
preserve territorial integrity. To trace the historical origins and development of the
state, one must go back to the time when human social organization took the form
of distinct societies. According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of social develop-
ment, “The development of society proceeds through the consecutive replacement,
according to definite laws, of one socioeconomic formation by another. …Mankind
as a whole has passed through four formations—primitive communal, slave, feudal,
and capitalist—and is now living in the epoch of transition to the next formation,
the first phase of which is called socialism.”94 “Although Marx does not mention
socialism as a mode of production, Marxists generally agree that between capitalism
and communism, there exists a transition phase called socialism, which Lenin called
‘the first phase of communist society.’ During this stage, the state is controlled by
the working class, or what Marx calls ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat,’ through
its political organ the communist party.”95 Marx and Engels’ conception of history
as straight-line progress through a series of universal social forms and world-wide
class systems is essential to the historical category of the state in that their ideas on
history demonstrate irrefutably that the state has not existed from all eternity and that
the earliest form of the state emerged out of the primitive commune—or to put it the
other way round, “until about 10,000 years ago, all human societies were at the stage
of primitive communism.”96 Hence we may safely assert that “The emergence of
the state coincided with the emergence of social classes and class struggles resulting
from the transition from a primitive communal to more advanced modes of produc-
tion when an economic surplus was first generated.”97 Summing up his historical
analysis, Engels points out that “The state is a product and a manifestation of the
irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as
93 Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver., ed. (1991). The Public Sector: Challenge for Coordination and
94 Gandy, D. Ross. (1979). Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future.

95 Berberoglu, Berch. (2016). Political Sociology in a Global Era: An Introduction to the State and
Society. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 60–61.

96 Ibid., p. 58.
97 Ibid., p. 57.
class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence

of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.”98 “In orthodox
Marxist vein, Mao Zedong believed the existence of classes and class struggle to
be a fundamental and omnipresent feature of all human societies except the most
primitive,” insisting that “prior to the elimination of the class system, there is no way
that class contradictions can be abolished”—or to put it another way, “class struggle
cannot be eliminated.”99 In the remote future, when the social productive forces have
reached a higher stage of development, on the one hand class distinctions will disap-
pear and the class system will be eliminated, while on the other hand the state will
pass away and the whole state machinery will become a thing of the past, consigned
to the museum of antiquities along with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.100
(4) The International Organization
The term international organization generally refers to an organization that is
composed mainly of member states (or nations) and usually established by a formal
agreement. International organizations have traditionally been conceived as formal
institutions that tend to be established formally through treaties, or rather, according
to formal legal agreements entered into by member states with one another. Interna-
tional organizations created on the basis of legal agreements tend to represent and
protect their members’ interests and to achieve economic, political, and cultural goals
in accordance with their statutes. “As a formal organization structured for a contin-
uous purpose, an international organization has a permanent administrative capacity,
‘a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate,
resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures’ (Biermann
et al. 2009: 37). …We conceive an international organization as having an institu-
tionalized capacity for collective decision making. Most units that are classified as
international organizations have a standing assembly or executive and a permanent
secretariat that is separate from its member state administrations.”101 It therefore
stands to reason that the majority of international organizations have set up special-
ized standing subcommittees to seek the solution of economic, political, and juridical
problems that may arise among them and to promote, by cooperative action, their
economic, social, and cultural development. “What then are the irreducible essen-
tial characteristics of international organizations and what are the other elements
which often typify such organizations? The outstanding features have three head-
ings: membership, aim and structure. An international organization should draw its
membership form two or more sovereign states. The organization is established with
98 Lenin, V. I. (1990). Lenin Collected Works, Volume 31 (Central Compilation and Translation
99 Knight, Nick. (2007). Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong’s Thought. Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, p. 176.

Trans.). Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, pp. 13–14.

101 Hooghe, Liesbet., Marks, Gary., Lenz, Tobias., Bezuijen, Jeanine., Ceka, Besir., & Derderyan,
Svet. (2017). Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume

III. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–16.
the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members. The organization should
have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by an agreement
such as a treaty or constituent document. …So an international organization can be
defined as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members
(governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with
the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.”102 International orga-
nizations possess international legal personality that derives from the will of the
members as expressed in the constitutive documents such as treaties or formal legal
agreements,103 and that tends to confer on international organizations the capacity
to have legal rights and obligations under public international law.104 Generally
speaking, the various types of international organizations are determined by aims,
activities and functions, membership and structure. “According to the UN Economic
and Social Council, ‘Every international organization which is not created by means
of inter-governmental agreements shall be considered as a non-governmental interna-
tional organization (Economic and Social Council, Resolution 288 (x) of 27 February
1950).’ This suggests a distinction between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs, sometimes shortened to
NGOs).”105 Hence one seems fairly justified in concluding that the most perti-
nent classification of international organizations should be based on the nature of
their respective members,106 and that the first and foremost distinction between the
kinds of international organizations should be those which are interstate or inter-
governmental and those whose membership is non-governmental.107 Nonetheless,
“the most common way of classifying international organizations is to look at what
they are supposed to do and what they actually do. These two interrelated aspects
of the behavior of the organizations get to the heart of their existence, and it is by
these that they are best classified.”108 Thus international organizations can be clas-
sified into political organizations, economic organizations, cultural organizations,
etc., according to their area of activity or the nature of their activity. “However,
any clear-cut classification of organizations according to main objects of activity—
preservation of peace and security, economic development, financial aid, technical,
scientific and cultural exchange, humanitarian or military assistance—would prove
to be less than accurate and lead to glaring inconsistencies in a number of cases,
102 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, p. 33.
103 Thirlway, Hugh. (2014). The Sources of International Law. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 4.
104 Frid, Rachel. (1995). The Relations Between the EC and International Organizations: Legal
105 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 34–36.
106 Mulvaney, Dustin. (2011). Green Politics: An A-to-Z Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
107 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 35.
108 Ibid., p. 50.
because of the overlap of functions and responsibilities.”109 International organi-

zations can be classified by their reach and scope of competency,110 which is to
say, in view of the fact that a broad distinction may be made between organizations
endowed with comprehensive competence and organizations with limited compe-
tence, a further possible distinction may be based on the global, regional or subre-
gional scope of an organization.111 To put it in a nutshell, international organizations
may be classified on a regional or global basis.112 According to the foregoing crite-
rion for the classification of organizations, it would be fair to conclude that the UN
is the most important global institutional structure.113 Regional intergovernmental
organizations, by contrast, include such organizations as the European Union (EU),
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (short for Comecon), Associa-
tion for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), World Trade Organization (WTO) and
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It should be noted, however, that the
term “international organization” is a broad and disputed category, which is to say
there exists controversy around the boundaries of the category of organization most
clearly classified as “international organizations.” Hence we may safely assert that
not all international organizations can come into the category of “groups.” Generally
speaking, intergovernmental organizations, which refer to entities created by treaty,
involving two or more nations, to work in good faith, on issues of common interest,
may fall into the category of “groups,” but there is debate as to whether or not other
types of international organizations can qualify as “groups.” With the above situa-
tion in view, the categorization of international organizations must be based on the
principle that concrete conditions require concrete analysis. On analysis, one seems
fairly justified in concluding that some international organizations may come within
the category of “groups,” while other cannot. The international organizations that
fall into the category of “groups” may assert themselves as an important form of
“group” and serve as a kind of human community whose members tend to engage
in the constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. In
general, the international organizations that fall into the category of “groups” tend
to possess the following characteristics, albeit in varying degrees. First, the inter-
national organizations that come into the category of “groups” are, for the most
109 Schiavone, Giuseppe. (2005). International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory. New
110 Nordquist, Myron H., Wolfrum, Rüdiger., Moore, John Norton., & Long, Ronán., eds. (2008).
111 Schiavone, Giuseppe. (2005). International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory. New

112 Araim, Amer Salih. (1991). Intergovernmental Commodity Organizations and the New

113 Jovanović, Miodrag A. (2019). The Nature of International Law. New York, NY: Cambridge

part, interstate or intergovernmental organizations.114 To put it the other way round,

international organizations tend to be established by their member states in order to
perform certain tasks that those member states are unable or unwilling to perform
on their own.115 Hence we may safely assert that “an international organization
should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states, though members
need not be limited to states or official state representatives such as government
ministers.”116 “The traditional notion of international organizations being estab-
lished between governments is based on the sovereign state view of international
relations, which contains three important elements: that, with few exceptions, only
sovereign states are the subjects of international law; that sovereign states are equal
in their standing in international law; that sovereign states are institutionally self-
contained and international law cannot interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of their
governments.”117 Thus, “it is claimed that the term ‘interstate’ or ‘intergovernmental’
should be used when describing an activity—war, diplomacy, relations of any kind—
conducted between two sovereign states and their governmental representatives.”118
However, “with all these relationships—intergovernmental, transnational and trans-
governmental—being included under the heading ‘international,’” “this state and
government-oriented view of the word ‘international’ has been increasingly chal-
lenged over the past four decades.”119 Second, the international organizations that
fall into the category of “groups” tend to be established by way of a bilateral treaty,
an agreement between two states or governments that governs some aspects of the
relationship between those two states or governments, as well as by way of a multilat-
eral treaty, an agreement among more than two states or governments.120 According
to Wallace and Singer, “The intergovernmental organization ‘must consist of at least
two qualified members of the international system’ and should have been ‘created by
a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of national states’. Bilat-
eral international organizations are included on the grounds that they are still interna-
tional organizations and because otherwise certain multilateral organizations would
have to be excluded for the periods when their membership was reduced to two.”121 So
an international organization can be defined as “a formal, continuous structure estab-
lished by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental)
from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of
114 Butler, William E., & Butler, William Elliot. (2002). The Law of Treaties in Russia and
the Commonwealth of Independent States: Text and Commentary. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
115 Cogan, Jacob Katz., Hurd, Ian., & Johnstone, Ian., eds. (2016). The Oxford Handbook of

116 Archer, Clive. (2015). International Organizations (4th ed.) New York, NY: Routledge, p. 30.
117 Archer, Clive. (2001). International Organizations. NewYork, NY: Routledge, pp. 36–37.
118 Ibid., p. 1.
119 Ibid.
120 O’Keefe, Roger. (2015). International Criminal Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
p. 89.
3 Several Theoretical Patterns of “Group Structure” 407
the membership.”122 Third, an international organization is capable of developing a

certain degree of autonomy from its membership, which is to say the international
organization is endowed with the ability to act independently, to make free choices,
and to integrate itself. In other words, formal IOs can be seen as “entities created
with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, ongoing,
multilateral processes of decision-making between states, along with the capacity to
execute the collective will of their members (states).”123 Fourth, Wallace and Singer
maintained that the international organization “should have a permanent secretariat
with a permanent headquarters arrangement and which performs ongoing tasks.”124
Fifth, “An intergovernmental organization is supposed to be at the service of the
international community to perform its mission in full independence and without
any kind of interference or the impression of influence from any particular state. It
is for this reason that sovereign States have made intergovernmental organizations
subjects of international law.”125 It thus seems justified in concluding that “all inter-
governmental organizations are general subjects of international law in the sense that
they have the capacity to perform any ‘sovereign’ and international acts which they
are in a practical position to perform.”126 As stated above, international organizations
endowed with the capacity to act independently tend to develop a certain level of
autonomy, coupled with a high degree of organization. With all these relationships—
intergovernmental, transnational and transgovernmental—being included under the
heading “international,” we may safely assert that “the international organization that
is established with the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members should
draw its members from two or more sovereign states.”127 With the globalization
of the world economy, the various international organizations that are undergoing
phenomenal development will prove of increasing value to human beings in their
constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.
3 Several Theoretical Patterns of “Group Structure”
In modern times there has been a tendency to develop a reasonable explanation

of the multiple aspects of “group structure” and a host of ingenious theories have
thus far been proposed as a tentative explanation for the different aspects of “group
structure.” All such explanations provide the epistemic basis for the study of “group
122 Ibid., p. 31.

123 Ibid., p. 29.
124 Ibid.
125 Ziadé, Nassib G., ed. (2008). Problems of International Administrative Law: On the Occasion
of the Twentieth Anniversary of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal. Boston, MA: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, p. 163.
126 Seyersted, Finn. “Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental Organization Valid vis-
à-vis Non-Members?” Indian Journal of International Law 4 (1964):233–265.

structure,” which is to say, only if we have made a serious and enthusiastic study of the
various theoretical patterns of “group structure,” as well as conducting a probing and
subtle analysis of them, can we establish the scientific theoretical patterns of “group
structure” whereby any particular “group” can be properly guided in its behavioral
choice, as well as being master of its own destiny. With the above situation in view,
we fully recognize the need to make an intelligent and clarifying analysis of the
following five representative theoretical patterns of “group structure” as well as give
them a clear and lucid explanation.
3.1 Radcliffe–Brown’s Theory of “Group Structure”
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), one of the most eminent anthropol-

ogists of the first half of the twentieth century, was a British anthropologist closely
associated with the development of structural-functionalism and is universally recog-
nized as the founder and leading proponent of the British functionalist school. By
example and teaching he helped to develop and establish modern “social” anthro-
pology as a generalizing, theoretical discipline. The most notable of his many impor-
tant contributions was his application to primitive societies of some of the ideas
of systems theory, which led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of
social relations. In brief, he may be said to have turned social anthropology from
its preoccupation with historical development and psychological extrapolation to the
comparative study of persistent and changing social structures. Among his many
professional distinctions were membership in the Amsterdam Royal Academy of
Sciences, honorary membership in the New York Academy of Sciences, fellowship
in the British Academy, first presidency of the British Association of Social Anthro-
pologists, and the presidency of the Royal Anthropology Institute, which awarded
him the Rivers Medal in 1938 and the Huxley Memorial Medal in 1951.128 In late 1935
Radcliffe-Brown left for a four-month’s visit to China at the invitation of Professor
Wu Wenzao, who invited him to lecture at Yenching University and other places
in China.129 As soon as Professor Radcliffe-Brown arrived at Yenching University,
he was invited to lead a workshop on the application of anthropological methods in
studying modern society. He gave two lectures, volunteering to speak on “The plan
of investigating sociologically rural life in China.” From then on, the vast country
of China has become an experimental area of his comparative sociology.130 There
128 “Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com.

25 Oct. 2021 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.
129 Shils, Edward., ed. (1991). Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and

130 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2014). The West As the Other: A Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism.
he had a major influence on a number of younger scholars and his lectures were
translated and published in a special volume of the Chinese Sociological Circle.131
The basic tenets of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism can be summa-
rized in the following assumptions.
(1) Radcliffe-Brown laid particular stress upon the synchronic study of anthro-
pology. He pointed out that cultural anthropology boasts two kinds of study,
namely the synchronic study and the diachronic study. A diachronic study,
which is intended to trace the historical origin of culture, is a longitudinal study,
while a synchronic study, which is oriented towards the essence, structure and
function of culture, is a horizontal (or lateral) study. There exists a grave defect
in the method of diachronic study, or rather, it is difficult to draw scientific
conclusions by introducing the method of diachronic study and impossible to
test and verify the drawn conclusions. Hence it is essential to make a synchronic
study of cultural anthropology. The synchronic study described by him can be
summarized as follows: culture can be treated as an integrated system regard-
less of the history or origin of culture. In this integrated system, each cultural
element plays a specific role and performs a specific function. The essence of
cultural study consists in the study of the overall structure of a culture, the
interrelationship between various elements of a culture, and the function of
external adaptation and internal integration performed by each element of the
overall system, as well as the comparative study of similarities and differences
between different systems of cultural integration. However, he was not alto-
gether opposed to the diachronic study, merely thinking that the synchronic
study ought to take precedence over the diachronic study.
(2) Radcliffe-Brown addressed the question of social structure as a part of his larger
interest in the interconnectedness of individuals and societies and led the way
in developing his theory of social structure.132 He had put forth the notion of
“social structure” as early as 1914. In the 1920s his use of the notion became
more explicit, and in the 1930s quite precise. In his final formulation, struc-
ture refers to an arrangement of persons and organization to an arrangement
of activities. Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism is best articulated in
the idea that the life of a society can be conceived and studied as a system
of relations of association and that a particular social structure is an arrange-
ment of relations in which the interests or values of different individuals and
groups are coapted within fiduciary “social values” expressed as institutional
norms. He phrased the determinants of social relations of all kinds in terms
of the coaptation or fitting together or harmonization of individual interests or
values that makes possible “relations of association” and “social values.”133
131 Shils, Edward., ed. (1991). Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and
132 Birx, H. James., ed. (2005). Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE

He attempted to explain social phenomena as enduring systems of adaptation,

fusion, and integration of elements. He held that social structures are arrange-
ments of persons and that organizations are the arrangements of activities; thus,
the life of a society may be viewed as an active system of functionally consistent,
interdependent elements.134 His notion of social structure can be summarized
in the following four aspects.
First, Radcliffe-Brown delineated an ahistorical focus on social structure as the
main determinant of social function.135 The most notable of Radcliffe-Brown’s many
theoretical contributions lies in the establishment of functionalist anthropology. In
The Andaman Islanders, Radcliffe-Brown made a number of illuminating remarks
upon cultural functionalism. Every custom and belief of a primitive society plays
some determinate part in the social life of the community, just as every organ of a
living body plays some part in the general life of the organism. The mass of institu-
tions, customs and beliefs forms a single whole or system that determines the life of a
society, and the life of a society is not less real, or less subject to natural laws, than the
life of an organism.136 He believed that every cultural phenomenon performs partic-
ular functions and that either the whole society or a community therein constitutes a
functional entity. The constituent parts of a unified whole coordinate with one another,
condition one another and act in harmony with one another. Only if we succeed in
revealing the functions of the whole as well as its constituent parts can we understand
their respective meanings. Malinowski had argued that cultural institutions had to be
understood in relation to the basic human psychological and biological needs they
satisfied. Radcliffe-Brown, however, stressed a “structural–functional” approach to
social analysis which viewed social systems as integrated mechanisms in which all
parts function to promote the harmony of the whole. Radcliffe-Brown thought that
social institutions should be studied like any scientific object. The job of the social
anthropologist was to describe the anatomy of interdependent social institutions—
what he called “social structure”—and to define the functioning of all parts in relation
to the whole. The aim of such analysis is to account for what holds a functioning
society together. He further elaborated on the value of social structure to anthropo-
logical research. He argued that society presents problems to anthropologists in the
same way as nature presents problems to physicists and biologists alike, that is to
say, the foregoing problems are all presented in a structural form to their respective
objects. For an anthropologist, only if he has gained a perfect understanding of social
structure can he acquire true knowledge of the structure itself as well as the functions
performed by the constituent parts thereof. With the above situation in view, it is not
difficult to understand that Radcliffe-Brown gave priority to what he termed “social
134 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “A. R. Radcliffe-Brown.” Encyclopedia Britannica,

135 Bell, Catherine. (2009). Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 27.
136 Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1922). The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology.

structure” in his structural functionalism that “focuses on the structure of social rela-
tionships” and that “attributes functions to institutions in terms of the contribution
they make to maintaining that structure.”137
Second, the social anthropology of function, structure, and relational networks
deals with the relations of real interconnectedness, with “…the continuing arrange-
ment of persons in relationships defined or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially
established norms or patterns of behavior”. The substance of this study is the “real
and concrete” social structure resulting from “role-activities” of persons acting from
“positions” in that structure.138 Social structure mainly refers to the relations between
people (or personal relations) in a cultural entity. This includes various groups
comprised of individuals as well as the positions of individuals in their respective
groups. Such two predictors as social stratification and classification may render great
service to our deeper understanding of social groups. In terms of social stratification,
considering that society is divided into upper, middle and lower classes, hence there
exist social strata (that is, all classes of the community) such as the nobility (or the
aristocracy), the populace (or the masses), the laboring (or working) class and the
farming (or peasant) classes. As far as the social classification is concerned, there
exists the systematic arrangement in groups or categories according to established
criteria such as woman, man, family and clan.
Third, the social relations between people are regulated by institutions. Interre-
lational concepts apply only to what he called “the internal nature” of particular
social systems, a system being a set or assemblage of interdependent parts forming
“a naturally occurring unity,” a complex, ordered, and unified whole in a particular
region over a period of time. Institutions generally refer to some socially recognized
principles, normative systems or behavioral patterns related to social life. Socially
accepted principles can be conceived of as the basis of group formation. In primitive
society, the core of social relations is kinship, and different principles of heirship in
kinship are of crucial importance, because they exert a decisive influence on other
family relations, especially the relationship between father and son as well as between
uncle and nephew. Behavioral patterns and social norms are normal behaviors recog-
nized or accepted in a specific relationship between people. There are universally
recognized or widely accepted norms and patterns of behavior binding upon not only
parents when they treat children but also children when they deal with parents as well
as other family relationships. He believed that shedding light on social institutions
could be available to help us describe and illustrate social structures. He was of the
opinion that the study of social institutions is an important aspect of social structure.
Thus, according to him, social structure has to be described by the institutions, which
define the proper or expected conduct of persons in their various relationships.139
137 Layton, Robert. (1997). An Introduction to Theory in Anthropology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

139 Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1988). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Jinan,
China: Shandong People’s Publishing House, p. 146.

Fourth, while the actual content of social structure tends to undergo a constant
change, the general structural form may remain relatively constant over a longer
period of time.140 Essentially, Radcliffe-Brown saw social structure as a network of
real people in a real society, albeit one in which social processes had left changes to
be understood and analyzed in terms of an evolving structural form.141 The current
use of social structure in British social anthropology in terms of a body of principles
underlying social relations, rather than their actual content, stems from Radcliffe-
Brown’s concept of structural form rather than from his own use of the term social
structure as defined above. To Radcliffe-Brown the social structure was an empirical
reality existing at a single moment of time, while the structural form was an abstrac-
tion from reality by the investigator and implied a period rather than a moment of
time.142 To put it the other way round, social structure is also a dynamic social process,
albeit one in which relationships between people are subject to change, whereas the
form of social structure is relatively stable. The contents of social structure represent
the individuals that make up society, and social forms constitute social institutions.
Based upon the aforementioned points, his definition of social structure is as follows:
“social structure is the continuing arrangement of persons in relationships defined or
controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns of behavior.”
It is often useful to make the comparison of social phenomena with physiological
phenomena. The analogy between individual organisms and the social organism is
one that has in all ages forced itself on the attention of the observant.143 The validity
of the analogy is further strengthened by the fact that every single day old cells die
away and new ones are formed to take their place and that practically all the cells in
the body are replaced completely within seven years. In other words, as an individual,
every human being in society is a biological organism, a collection of a vast number
of molecules organized in a complex structure, within which, as long as it persists,
there occur physiological and psychological actions and reactions, processes and
changes.144 Despite this fact, one seems fairly justified in concluding that while the
cells of the human body undergo a complete change every seven years, the form of
the human body as a living organism remains unchangeable.
(3) Radcliffe-Brown drew his theory of process from Herbert Spencer who
conceived evolution as at one and the same time a process toward higher
140 Kuper, Adam., ed. (2004). The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. New York, NY:
Routledge, p. 29.
141 Barnard, Alan., & Spencer, Jonathan., eds. (1996). Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural

142 Mitchell, G. Duncan., ed. (2017). A New Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York, NY:
Routledge, p. 199.
143 Spencer, Herbert. (1878). Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Volume 3. London, UK:
Williams and Norgate, p. 414.

144 Kuper, Adam., ed. (2004). The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. New York, NY:
Routledge, p. 30.
integration and differentiation.145 His thoughts upon evolution can be summa-

rized as follows. First, on the one hand Radcliffe-Brown advocated the idea
of social evolution, declaring himself a lifelong proponent of the theory of
social evolution, but on the other, he passed trenchant criticism upon the argu-
ments brought forward by anti-evolutionists, who had been characterized as
ideologically confused and ignorant, that is, who possessed such characteris-
tics in common as ideological or mental confusion or muddled thinking and
ignorance.146 Second, both organic evolution and social evolution are natural
processes subject to the laws of nature. Third, either organic evolution or social
evolution is an anisotropic process of development, or rather, a process of evolu-
tion from a simple form to a complex one, which holds true for animals and
plants as well as for social structure. Fourth, either organic evolution or social
evolution exhibits a general tendency, namely the progress of organic or social
organization and diversified forms of life, which tend to involve the complication
of structure and function as well as the intimacy and expansion of social inter-
course. Radcliffe-Brown accepted Emilé Durkheim’s classic argument that two
factors interact to bring about social change and can likewise lay the groundwork
for social evolution: “material density” by which he means density of popula-
tion in a given area, or more specifically, the number of inhabitants per unit of
area as well as the development of the means of communication and transmis-
sion, and “moral density” which refers to the increased density of interaction
and social relationships within a population, or rather, the frequency of social
exchange and rate of social interaction,147 which is to say, by moral density
Durkheim means, roughly, the number of social relationships per person.148
“The degree and mode of concentration of the social mass—demographic fluc-
tuations, urbanization, improved communications and transport, and so on—
bring about heightened rates of social interaction.”149 “Moral density cannot
grow unless material density grows at the same time, and the latter can be used
to measure the former. It is useless, moreover, to try to find out which has deter-
mined the other; it is enough to state that they are inseparable.”150 To put it
the other way round, “Moral density cannot therefore increase without phys-
ical density increasing at the same time, and the latter can serve to measure
the extent of the former. Moreover, it is useless to investigate which of the

146 Radcliffe-Brown. (2002). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Beijng,

147 Saunders, Peter. (2007). Social Theory and the Urban Question. London, UK: Routledge, p. 43.
148 Waters, Malcolm. (1994). Modern Sociological Theory. London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd,
p. 297.
149 Traugott, Mark., ed. Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis (Mark Traugott, Trans.). Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 29.

150 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings (Anthony Giddens, Trans.).

two has influenced the other; it suffices to realize that they are inseparable.”151
Fifth, Radcliffe-Brown also believed that evolution does not necessarily mean
progress. For him, evolution refers to the gradual change in structure and func-
tion as well as the complexity of social interactions, while progress simply
means the progress of knowledge, science and technology as well as the devel-
opment of morality. Progress should be judged by other standards. As a result
of evolution society tends to grow more complex in its social structure and
social development—both internal and external—tends to maintain a proper
balance. However, social development, be it for better or for worse, can be
judged by other scientific standards. Radcliffe-Brown deservedly ranks as one
of the masters of structural functionalism, who advanced a multitude of original
ideas and theories, some of which were so scientific and enlightening that they
led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of social structures and
functions. We may gain a good deal of enlightenment from his seminal ideas
and theories, among which we most assuredly can find the nearest parallel to
“the theory of structure and choice.”
3.2 Émile Durkheim’s Theory of “Group Structure”
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), a prominent French social scientist and zealous cham-
pion of cultural anthropology, is widely regarded as the founder of the French school
of sociologist,152 is retrospectively acclaimed as one of the founding figures of soci-
ology as an academic discipline and,153 and, with Max Weber and Karl Marx, is
commonly cited as a principal architect of modern social science.154 Durkheim,
whose ideas remain influential in the theory and practice of sociology to this day,155
is rightly credited with originating the theory of social structure and is hailed as
developing this insight into what would become the functionalist theory of change in
his first major work, The Division of Labor in Society (1947).156 The basic tenets of
Durkheim’s theories of structural functionalism and social structure can be roughly
summarized in the following fundamental assumptions.
(1) Durkheim’s sociological position rests upon two theoretical premises: the theory
of social evolution and the holistic view of society. First, according to his theory
of social evolution, Durkheim held evolutionary views on the transition from
151 Lukes, Steven., ed. (2014). The Division of Labor in Society (W. D.Halls, Trans.). New York,

152 Peyre, H. M. “Émile Durkheim.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 11, 2021. https://www.
153 Lynch, Michael. “Sociology.” In The Social Science Encyclopedia, eds. Adam Kuper & Jessica

154 Calhoun, Craig., et al., eds. (2002). Classical Sociological Theory. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, p. 107.
155 Livesey, Chris. (2014). Cambridge International AS and A Level Sociology Coursebook.

156 O’Byrne, Darren. (2013). Introducing Sociological Theory. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 39.
traditional to modern society. He agreed with Spencer that increased special-

ization among the individuals of a group led to the cooperative interdependence
that has characterized the evolution from primitive to civilized society.157 For
Spencer, evolution was progress from the primitive and simple to the modern
and complex; differentiation and mutual cooperation would inevitably continue
to increase. He combined a market and utilitarian theory of society with a theory
of progress: the history of social evolution is a process of increasing size, divi-
sion of labor, differentiation, and mutual cooperation (specifically in the form
of contractual relationships).158 But where Spencer, a leading exponent of utili-
tarian individualist theory in economics, attributed social cooperation to contrac-
tual relations between individuals for their mutual advantage, Durkheim, on the
other hand, insisted that such regulations are created by society rather than by
individuals, who are in the course of pursuing their own immediate interests.
Thus, the happiness or self-interest principle, which, according to the classical
utilitarian view, was supposed to lead men to social cooperation, was entirely
discounted by Durkheim.159 Durkheim also tried to demolish Spencer’s view
that mutual cooperation was the basis of social activity and to replace that view
with the conception of interdependence. For him, cooperation in a complex
contract society cannot explain how society holds together; it cannot explain
the existence of order. In primitive societies, order is maintained by a collective
conscience or collective sentiments. By contrast, it is the division of labor char-
acteristic of modern society that generates the various forms of interdependence
which are much more profound than either the primitive collective conscience
or the Spencerian idea of mutual cooperation in the market. Hence it is this
interdependence existing in a modern society that forms the true basis for social
order as well as for social cooperation.160 In other words, it is modern men’s
interdependence, or rather, their need for each other’s specialties, that creates
social bonds and social order based on interdependence and cooperation among
people performing a wide range of diverse and specialized tasks.161 Second,
according to Durkheim’s holistic view of society, in spite of the fact that society
is merely the sum of its individual members—or to put it the other way round,
even though the sole elements of which society is composed are individuals,
society is more than the sum of the individuals who comprise it,162 which is to
157 Upadhyay, Vijay S., & Pandey, Gaya. (1993). History of Anthropological Thought. New Delhi,
158 La Porte, Todd R., ed. (1975). Organized Social Company: Challenge to Politics and Policy.

159 Upadhyay, Vijay S., & Pandey, Gaya. (1993). History of Anthropological Thought. New Delhi,


161 Lamanna, Mary Ann. (2002). Emile Durkheim on the Family. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
162 Teubert, Wolfgang. (2010). Meaning, Discourse and Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

say, “Society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics.”163
For Durkheim, the social or collective has emergent properties that transcend
the combination of individuals,164 that is to say, the combination of individuals
to form a society produces a new type of existence with properties not found
in the individuals but deriving from their association.165 In Durkheim’s view,
society is an entity that exists in its own right, beyond the ideas, hopes and
desires of its individual members,166 which is to say, a social entity’s putative
existence is scarcely ever subject to the will of its individual members. For
Durkheim, each society may be conceived as a discrete, self-contained entity
with its own individuality, which could be defined in terms of a specific combi-
nation of constituent elements.167 Durkheim held that “society is not a mere
sum of individuals; rather the system formed by their association represents a
specific reality which has its own characteristics” and that it was “in the nature
of this individuality, not in that of its component units, that one must seek the
immediate and determining causes of the facts appearing there.”168 According
to Durkheim, the individual tends to be controlled externally by “social facts,”
which Durkheim defined as “facts with very distinctive characteristics: they
consist of ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual, and
endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him.” Social
facts tend to be recognized by their coercive function, which includes the sanc-
tions, either deliberate or non-intended, imposed on those who try to resist their
influence.169 Durkheim argued that in well regulated societies individuals tend
to follow a framework of normative controls and social regulations and that
laws as a form of social control should set limits on individual propensities.
He tried to emphasize that interdependence (“dynamic density”) in a modern
society binds men to each other and that this dependence can be characterized
as compulsory and normative because it gives us a sense of limits. Moreover, he
contended that our social dependences make us what we are and that we should
163 Mearsheimer, John J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities.
164 Bammer, Gabriele., ed. (2015). Change ! Combining Analytic Approaches with Street Wisdom.

165 Benton, Ted. (1977). Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. New York, NY:
Routledge, p. 85.
166 Livesey, Chris. (2014). Cambridge International AS and A Level Sociology Coursebook.

167 Ingold, Tim. (2011). Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description. New York,

168 Lukes, Steven. (1985). Emile Durkheim – His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study.

169 Brown, Stuart., Collinson, Diané., & Wilkinson, Robert., eds. (1997). Biographical Dictionary

be obligated to that society which formed us.170 Durkheim believed that social
inequalities are largely determined by what he called “macro-social structures”
and that a change in the nature of “macro-social structures” tends to bring about
a change in social inequalities, or rather, to overcome social inequalities. Thus,
when we come to describe the social stratification in a particular society, we
need to give adequate consideration to any macro-social structures contained
therein, that is, to give the social stratification an adequate explanation at the
macro-structural level.
(2) The basic assumptions of Durkheim’s sociological theory can be summarized
as follows.
First, we feel the necessity of making a searching examination of Durkheim’s
two central concepts in his sociology, to wit “social facts” and “the conscience
collective,” which he considered to be of utmost importance to sociological
studies. For Durkheim, the object of study for sociologists should be “social
facts” rather than individual behaviors. Only “social facts” can be used to explain
society itself, which is not true of individual behaviors. In other words, society
itself that can be treated as an organic entity must be explained in terms of “social
facts,” not in terms of individual behaviors. In The Rules of Sociological Method
Durkheim defined a social fact as “every way of acting, fixed or not, capable
of exercising over the individual an external constraint” and further as “[every
way of acting] which is general throughout a given society, while existing in
its own right, independent of its individual manifestations.”171 It thus can be
seen that Durkheim’s definition embodies three distinguishing criteria: exter-
nality, constraint and generality plus independence.172 In his magnum opus, The
Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim defines “the conscience or commune”
as “the set of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a
single society [which] forms a determinate system that has its own life.” The
French word “conscience” is ambiguous, embracing the meanings of the two
English words “conscience” and “consciousness.” Thus the “beliefs and senti-
ments” comprising the conscience collective are, on the one hand, moral and reli-
gious, and, on the other, cognitive. He also defined the term as meaning “social
facts.”173 Durkheim believed that society exerts a coercive force on individuals,
whose norms, beliefs and values make up the collective consciousness, which
is crucial in explaining the existence of society: it produces society and holds it
together. According to the thesis of The Division of Labor, the simpler societies
are founded upon a strongly defined moral consensus, an enveloping conscience
collective. There are four principal dimensions along which we can analyze
the properties of the conscience collective in such societies, and each of these
171 Lukes, Steven. (1985). Emile Durkheim – His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study.

172 Ibid., pp. 11–15.
173 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
characteristics undergoes change in the course of social development, as the

division of labor expands, and society becomes more complex. These concern
the volume, intensity, rigidity and the content of the beliefs and values which
compose the conscience collective. The degree of “intensity” of the constituent
elements of the conscience collective concerns the extent of the emotional and
intellectual hold which these beliefs and values exert over the perspectives of
the individual.174 In the pre-modern world the collective consciousness is an
all-embracing social force. It is high in volume, enveloping the entirety of the
consciousness of individuals, impressing itself on nearly every facet of their
lives. It is high in intensity, exerting a powerful effect on people’s thinking
and behavior, forcefully steering them in a “collective direction.” It is high in
rigidity, consisting of well-defined rules of conduct, leaving little room for indi-
vidual interpretation or discretion. And it is high in religious content, investing
shared values and ideas with divine authority. In pre-modern society, where the
group is preeminent, the “individual consciousness is almost indistinct from the
collective consciousness.”175 Thus, when we come to describe the social strat-
ification or social structure in a particular society, we must focus our attention
on the “social facts” or “collective consciousness” contained therein.
Second, Durkheim believed that the shift from mechanical to organic soli-
darity would be the basic way in which modern societies would enable social
cooperation and equality. In The Division of Labor in Society Durkheim provided
sociology with a pair of its most revered and enduring concepts: mechanical
and organic solidarity. It may be safely asserted that Durkheim’s most famous
typology is that of mechanical and organic solidarity which he used to talk about
how societies have changed and evolved. For Durkheim, social relationships that
dominated traditional societies tend to be characterized by “mechanical solidar-
ity” based on social homogeneity, and individuals in such repressive societies
tend to be integrated into a social whole by their common values and beliefs
as well as by punitive laws and sanctions. In modern industrial societies, by
contrast, the relationships among members tend to be marked by “organic soli-
darity” based on a complex division of labor—or to put it the other way round,
social interactions in modern society tend to be based around a division of labor
that created increasing social heterogeneity and interdependency. According to
Durkheim, despite the fact that the conscience collective, the fund of common
beliefs and sentiments which makes possible mechanical integration on the basis
of resemblances, is contracting and destined finally to disappear, it continues
to exist under organic solidarity by undergoing a transformation in its content
and a redefinition of the scope of its jurisdiction to the smaller subunits where
174 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Readings. New York, NY: Cambridge
175 Royce, Edward. (2015). Classical Social Theory and Modern Society: Marx, Durkheim, Weber.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 72.

primary relations retain their vigor,176 which is to say, the collective conscious-
ness of societies based on mechanical solidarity gives way to a more prob-
lematical collective consciousness grounded in individualism and emerging out
of modern complex societies based on organic solidarity,177 which has greatly
encouraged the development of individuality. In the stage of mechanical soli-
darity, the community resorts to punitive law and repressive sanctions to reassert
the common conscience. With the development of organic society, restitutive law
becomes predominant and most assuredly promotes the development of individ-
ualism.178 According to Durkheim, pari passu with the decrease of the power
of the collective consciousness is the change from “repressive” to “restitutive”
law. A study of the codes of peoples in different stages of social development
reveals a progressive decrease in the importance of the repressive, and a corre-
sponding increase of this restitutive law. Durkheim considers this strong proof
of the decrease of the strength of the social consciousness as a whole.179 In
Durkheim’s opinion, restitutory law, in contrast to penal law, is the hallmark of
a complex society.180 Hence one seems fairly justified in concluding that the
greater the degree of the division of labor within a society, the higher the degree
of social differentiation and interdependence in it, the more likely its members
will be to achieve social equality. It thus can be seen that Durkheim analyzed
social stratification as related to equality as much as inequality and that he tried
to apply the new concept of division of labor to the age-old problem of social
class and inequality, attempting to put to rest the specter of a deficit of social
equality in the world of today. In Durkheim’s vision, the division of labor into
finer and finer parts tends to ensure that social members are more likely to attain
mutual equality under the law. As Durkheim argued, the higher the level of
social development, the more likely a society will be in the midst of a transition
from the segmentary type of society based on the territorial principle to the
“organized” type of society based on the functional principle, the more easily
social inequalities will be leveled off.181 By the “organized” society Durkheim
meant that it is composed of occupational groups which are interdependent
functional units and that this type of social organization increases pari passu
with the increase of the segmentary type of society, though it is never completely
realized. Some elements of segmentary organization persist, and the functional
176 Traugott, Mark., ed. Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis (Mark Traugott, Trans.). Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 13.
177 Hvattum, Mari., & Hermansen, Christian., eds. (2004). Tracing Modernity: Manifestations of
178 Selznick, Philip. (1994). The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of

179 The Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, ed. (1915). Studies in History,
Economics, and Public Law, Volume 63. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pp. 165–166.
180 Bell, Duncan., ed. (2006). Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship
181 Durkheim, Emile. (2000). The Division of Labor in Society (Jing-Dong Qu, Trans.). Shanghai,

unit never becomes the sole basis of the structural arrangement of societies;
we continue to have national groups and other, smaller, territorial units. But “it
is permitted to look forward to the continuation of this double movement, and
to foresee that a day will come when our whole political and social organiza-
tion will have a basis, exclusively, or exclusively, professional.”182 However,
he concluded, the division of labor “develops regularly” to the extent to which
he called the “segmentary” type of society disappears, and the vanishing of
the older segmentary type of society is primarily the cause and not the effect
of specialization.183 As stated above, Durkheim was one of the leading propo-
nents of structural functionalism, a sociological theory which interprets each
part of society in terms of how it contributes to the whole society, which is to
say, this approach sees the society as a whole unit, with all its constituent parts
interrelated into a functioning whole, and analyses events and institutions in
terms of the functions they serve for the society and the individuals.184 From
the 1930s to the 1960s structural functionalism, which was developed from the
writings of Emile Durkheim, was the dominant sociological theory. The term
“structure” is generally used to refer to the fabric of society—that is, the social
institutions and systems that combine to make it up—whereas “function” refers
to the role played by each social institution in the maintenance of society as a
whole. Structural functionalism involves a macroscopic approach to the study
of social phenomena, a focus on the social system as a whole and interest in
the subsystems that comprise it. Structural functionalists regard the subsystems
as interdependent, and all make a contribution to the wellbeing of society as a
whole. According to structural functionalists, we need to understand how the
various aspects of the social system contribute to society as a whole. Of partic-
ular interest is the role that those aspects play in promoting social order and
cohesion.185
(3) Emile Durkheim was essentially a positivist as far as his methodology is
concerned. Durkheim adopted a positivist approach to sociological research.
His approach to social phenomena stressed that social facts are things and must
be treated as such and that they could be approached via a scientific method
stressing objectivity and rationality. Through his positivist approach Durkheim
attempted to develop a unique understanding of social phenomena and to ground
his sociological theory on differing assumptions about social facts. The central
assumptions of Durkheim’s sociological theory can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, Durkheim held the view that an interpretation of social stratification
necessarily depends upon a holistic understanding of the functioning of a society
183 Schmaus, Warren., & Schmaus, Warren S. (1994). Durkheim’s Philosophy of Science and the
Sociology of Knowledge: Creating an Intellectual Niche. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press, p. 138.
184 O’Reilly, Karen. (2012). Ethnographic Methods. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 19.
185 Churton, Mel., & Brown, Anne. (2010). Theory and Method. New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, p. 38.
and that social stratification is determined largely by the forms of social structure
and social organization—or to put it the other way round, structural differentia-
tion tends to affect social stratification.186 Secondly, the foregoing discussion is
sufficient to indicate that Durkheim not only introduced a series of stimulating
hypotheses about the role of social differentiation, but also added certain impor-
tant positive corollaries to the theory of structural differentiation. He argued that
some degree of inequality contributes to functional integration. As Durkheim
pointed out, “the process of social differentiation generates inevitably its logical
opposite, social integration—that is, the establishment of superordinate values
and patterns of behavior that override occupational, regional, confessional, and
other differences, or at least limit their potential for conflict.”187 According to
Durkheim, social development or, as it used to be known, tends to manifest itself
as a continuous process of social differentiation as a result of which societies
become structurally more complex.188 For him, the increasing differentiation of
social functions tends to elevate living standards and to reduce social conflicts.
In social differentiation, Durkheim saw the ultimate basis of social solidarity. In
his view, social solidarity is primarily a function of the degree of social differ-
entiation and normative regulation.189 The particular form of social solidarity
tends to be shaped by the degree of social differentiation, which, in turn, neces-
sarily corresponds with the overall level of solidarity of a society. Social order
and stability tend to be maintained through organic solidarity based on social
differentiation, which is to say, functional differentiation in industrialized soci-
eties played an essential function for society as a whole, Durkheim suggested, by
sustaining solidarity and cohesion, maintaining order and stability,190 or rather,
maintaining a stable social whole.191 It has been argued that “an important aspect
of Durkheim’s theorizing on social change that particularly resonates today is
his distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity in society.”192 In its
mechanical form, typically found in traditional communities, society tends to
be organized on the basis of differences between the scared and the secular,
which tends to play a crucial role in maintaining social stability and cohesion.
186 Smith, Brian Clive. (1996). Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change
187 Ambrosius, Gerold., & Hubbard, William H. (1989). A Social and Economic History of
Twentieth-Century Europe (Keith Tribe & William H. Hubbard, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
188 Randall, Vicky., & Theobald, Robin. (1998). Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical
Introduction to Third World Politics. London, UK: Macmillan Press, p. 20.

189 Meulen, Ruud ter., Arts, Wil., & Muffels, Ruud., eds. (2001). Solidarity in Health and Social
190 Norris, Pippa., & Inglehart, Ronald. (2004). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics

191 Scott, John. (2014). A Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 264.
192 Madge, Nicola., Hemming, Peter J., & Stenson, Kevin. (2014). Youth On Religion: The Devel-
p. 7.
Thirdly, Durkheim theorized occupational differentiation as the basis of social

stratification. According to him, occupations tend to be considered as the basic
units of modern social hierarchy and occupational groups that become central
elements of the new stratification system tend to confer identity, status, and
material rewards.193 In The Division of Labor (1933), Durkheim attempts to
show how the process of occupational differentiation leads to the emergence
of distinct social classes and hence gives rise to new structures of social strat-
ification. For Durkheim, the distinction between the sacred and the profane is
one crucial dichotomy that is characteristic of occupational differentiation in a
society based on mechanical solidarity and that also provides us with a basis
on which to analyze the mechanical society’s implication in social inequalities.
Durkheim contended that when a society is organized on the basis of organic
solidarity that “consists in the ties of co-operation between individuals or groups
of individuals which derive from their occupational interdependence within the
differentiated division of labor,”194 the multiplicity of occupational life which
is subject to the fair contracts that tend to be framed and honored by some kind
of collective morality necessarily calls forth the development of social justice
and equality opportunity within occupational groups. The social stratificationist
theory owes its origins to the French sociology of Emile Durkheim, which treats
the occupational structure as a continuous hierarchy of occupations that runs
from high to low on some attribute.195 “In analyzing the data of social strati-
fication, Durkheim mainly focused on occupational differentiation by empha-
sizing the effect of occupational functions on social stratification.”196 Hence,
the foregoing analogy leads to a perspective on social stratification far different
from that of Marx and Webster. In Durkheim’s view, occupational differentia-
tion can be considered as the major factor contributing to social stratification.
Indeed Durkheim could be said to have developed his own distinctive theory of
social stratification, that is to say, one of the distinctive features of Durkheim’s
theory of social stratification is the preoccupation with the organic specializa-
tion of cooperative occupational divisions, or rather, the moral sanctioning of
specialization in the division of labor.197 In Durkheim’s theory modern society
is organized in the sense that “it is composed of occupational groups which
are interdependent functional units. This is indeed the real essence of modern
social organization.”198 In the type of society of organic solidarity, “the solidarity
193 Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
194 Giddens, Anthony., ed. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings. New York, NY: Cambridge
195 McAllister, Ian., Dowrick, Steve., & Hassan, Riaz., eds. (2003). The Cambridge Handbook of
Social Sciences in Australia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 436.

196 Chen, Yu-Ting. (2021). The Gender Wage Gap. Ottawa, CA-On: Dandybooks Canada, p. 10.
197 Giddens, Anthony. (2003). Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings
of the members of society is produced not by the functional interdependence

based on the development of the division of labor but by the generally binding
and authoritative convictions operative in moral individualism, contract law, and
mores.”199 Thus Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society can be interpreted
as a theory on the moral basis of cooperation for the communal production of
collective goods.200 Admittedly, Durkheim’s sociology of social interdepen-
dence through division of labor is enormously consequential for modern soci-
eties. Other classic sociological theorists, such as Kinsley Davis, Wilbert Moore,
and Talcott Parsons, who have been universally recognized as leading propo-
nents of the functionalist school of thought, followed closely in the footsteps of
Durkheim and helped lay the groundwork of modern sociology of social strati-
fication by proposing a functionalist perspective on social stratification, which
was first advanced by Emile Durkheim. Hence it may be safely asserted that
aside from Karl Marx and Max Weber whose works have bequeathed a rich
legacy of social stratification theories to posterity, the French sociologist Emile
Durkheim rightly asserts himself as the founding father of the third perspective
on social differentiation, or rather, the functional theory of social stratifica-
tion. However, the aforementioned theory contains some serious weaknesses
inherent in itself. Few specific criteria for social stratification have ever been
suggested. The foregoing theory can never come into the category of critical
theories. In particular, the role of human subjective initiative is never brought
into full play in Durkheim’s theory of social stratification—or to put it the other
way round, human subjective initiative has fallen into almost total neglect in his
theory of social hierarchy. Hence it follows justly that the functionalist theory
of social stratification fails to give a scientific explanation of the origin of social
inequality. Despite this, Durkheim’s theory of social stratification remains to be
a most practical and sensible method of viewing the problems of social stratifi-
cation in their true perspective, thereby enabling us to approach a wider range
of theoretical and substantive issues such as social structure and occupational
differentiation from an entirely new angle.
3.3 Max Weber’s Theory of “Group Structure”
Max Weber (1864–1920) is widely considered the greatest of German sociologists

and has become a leading influence in European and American thought.201 He
deservedly ranks as the most influential and in many respects the most profound
199 Beckert, Jens. (2002). Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency
200 Ibid.
201 Gerth, Hans Heinrich., & Mills, Charles Wright., eds. (2009). From Max Weber: Essays in

of twentieth-century social scientists.202 He is now recognized as one of the great

minds of the twentieth century.203 He is a scholarly, conscientious and prolific author.
His scholarly output was extremely impressive in both range and quality.204 In the
last several decades his reputation as a scholar and thinker of the first order has
continuously increased.205
Weber’s theory of social stratification forms a substantial contribution of perma-
nent value to our knowledge of modern society. For Weber, social stratification can be
succinctly defined as the unequal distribution of resources in society, such as wealth,
income, occupation, education, prestige, and power. More specifically, by social
stratification Weber means that valued resources are unequally distributed among
the various status or social groups that make up a society—or to put it the other way
round, according to Weber, social stratification refers to the unequal distribution of
valued goods and services based on social statuses among different social groups in a
hierarchical system of social classes or strata whereby durable and marked differences
among different social or status groups tend to manifest themselves in differing access
to and unequal distribution of social resources and opportunities. Weber developed a
multidimensional approach to social stratification that reflects the interplay between
class (the economic dimension), status (or prestige, the cultural and social dimension)
and party (or power, the political dimension).206 Weber’s approach to stratification
was built on the analysis developed by Marx, but he modified and elaborated it.207
Weber took issue with Marx’s unidimensional view of social stratification in writ-
ings often referred to as a debate with Marx’s ghost.208 “Like Marx, Weber regarded
society as characterized by conflicts over power and resources. Yet where Marx saw
polarized class relations and economic issues at the heart of all social conflict, Weber
developed a more complex, multidimensional view of society. Social stratification
is not simply a matter of class, according to Weber, but is shaped by two further
aspects: status and party. These three overlapping elements of stratification produce
an enormous number of possible positions within society, rather than the more rigid
bipolar model which Marx proposed.”209 Max Weber’s multidimensional view of
social stratification became the most accepted perspective among twentieth-century
202 “Weber, Max.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Encyclopedia.com. 28 Nov. 2021 <https://www.enc

yclopedia.com>.
203 Lachmann, L. M. (2007). The Legacy of Max Weber. Berkeley, CA: The Glendessary Press,
p. 144.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Hurst, Charles E. (2007). Social Inequality: Forms, Causes, and Consequences. Boston, MA:

207 Giddens, Anthony., & Griffiths, Simon. (2006). Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 302.
208 Bryant, Clifton D., & Peck, Dennis L., eds. (2007). 21st Century Sociology: A Reference

sociologists.210 The main thrust of Weber’s multidimensional theory of stratification

may be roughly summed up as follows.
(1) Two basic hypothetical prerequisites. First, when it comes to the causal anal-
ysis of social stratification, “causality was not for Weber something that could
be reduced in sociological explanation to any one set of phenomena, such as
the economic variables, but rather involved a multiplicity of causal factors.”211
Weber recognized that the control or possession of property is a crucial determi-
nant of stratification, and he acknowledged that income and wealth are impor-
tant factors in determining class situation.212 However, through his analysis
of a number of historical societies, Weber sought to demonstrate that various
factors other than the ownership of the means of production were influential in
shaping social stratification. Another predominating factor which Weber iden-
tifies as influential in determining social stratification is the social action of
individuals.213 Weber argues that class situations emerge only on the basis of
social action.214 According to Weber, under conditions of a market economy, or
rather, in the modern capitalist market-economy, or more specifically, within the
area in which pure market conditions prevail, the mere ownership of property
is only a first step towards the formation of social classes, that is, the control of
property is by no means the final factor in determining social stratification. In
other words, Weber also identifies other factors contributing to the formation
of classes in a real sense. For Weber, social stratification may be shaped, to
a lesser or greater degree, by many possible relationships of an individual or
group to markets. Thus it can be seen that “it is the nature of chances in the
market which is the common factor determining the fate of a number of individ-
uals.”215 In this sense, the “class situation” is ultimately a “market situation.”216
Second, Max Weber viewed social structure as constituted by the social actions
of individuals and groups, which is to say, the social actions of individuals and
groups that make up the social structure constitute the basic elements of social
structure.217 Weber’s sociological thought is quite the opposite of Durkheim’s.
Weber and Durkheim that are often seen as being “at opposite poles as social
210 Bryant, Clifton D., & Peck, Dennis L., eds. (2007). 21st Century Sociology: A Reference
211 Hamilton, Peter. (2015). Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical

212 Keister, Lisa A., & Southgate, Darby E. (2012). Inequality: A Contemporary Approach to Race,
Class, and Gender. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 47.

213 Gamble, Andrew., Marsh, David., & Tant, Tony., eds. (1999). Marxism and Social Science.

214 Abrutyn, Seth., & Lizardo, Omar., eds. (2021). Handbook of Classical Sociological Theory.

215 Whimster, Sam., ed. (2004). The Essential Weber: A Reader. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 184.
216 Ibid.
217 Swedberg, Richard., & Agevall, Ola. (2005).The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central
Concepts. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 209.

theorists” represent “diametrically opposed” approaches to sociological anal-

ysis. In his essay “Two sociological traditions,” Reinhard Bendix argues that
Durkheim, who “modeled his sociology after the natural sciences,” is represen-
tative of the Baconian or Saint-Simonian tradition, in which the major goal is
“the discovery of general laws.” In contrast, Weber was heir to a tradition dating
back to Burckhardt and Tocqueville, in which the major goal is “to discover the
genesis of historical configurations.”218 Durkheim viewed society as an inde-
pendent entity existing in its own right and apart from the sum of individuals
that happen to comprise it, while Weber conceived society as a system made up
of social actors linked to one another by ties of different social actions between
them, that is to say, society cannot be said to exist apart from individuals and
their actions. Rather, society and the collection of individuals that make it up
must be understood as integrally tied to one another. It thus can be seen that
Weber’s orientation towards sociological solutions as a whole diverges signifi-
cantly from Durkheim’s social theory. Weber contends that social action should
be the object of sociological research and that the social actions of individuals
and groups characterized by their subjective orientations constitute the basic
building blocks of social structures. In “Basic Concepts of Sociology,” which
was written as an introduction to Economy and Society, Weber defined social
action as follows: “Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes
into account the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.”219 For
Weber, action can be defined as “all human behavior when and in so far as the
acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it,”220 and “social action is
related in its intended meaning and oriented in its progression to the behavior of
others.”221 It is on the basis of the foregoing discussion about the two hypothet-
ical prerequisites that Weber developed a multidimensional approach to social
stratification that reflects the interplay between wealth, prestige and power.
(2) Weber’s three-component theory of social stratification. Weber formulated a
three-component theory of stratification that describes social class as emerging
from the interplay between variables of class, status and party and that examines
how wealth, prestige and power work together in determining the social strat-
ification of an individual. In his magnum opus Economy and Society, which
remains today perhaps the only systematic sociology in world historical and
comparative depth, Weber discussed exhaustively the three-component theory
of stratification, with class, status and party as conceptually distinct elements.
This distinction is most clearly described in Weber’s essay “Class, Status, and
Party” which is a far-reaching contribution to social-stratification theory. In this
218 Thompson, Michael., Ellis, Richard., & Wildavsky, Aaron. (2018). Cultural Theory. New York,
219 Greenwood, John D. (2004). The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology.

220 Campbell, Colin. (1998). The Myth of Social Action. New York, NY: Cambridge University
press, p. 30.
221 Ringer, Fritz. (2004). Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago, IL: The University of

classic work on social stratification, Weber conceptualized the three-component

theory for understanding social hierarchies as the interplay between class, status,
and power and “discussed the conceptualization of power in relation to issues of
social stratification through ‘class’ (Klasse) and ‘status’ (Stand), seeing these
social phenomena as being closely associated with each other.”222 For Weber,
class is a fundamentally economic phenomenon,223 which is to say, class based
on economic factors is the economic measure of stratification and can thus be
defined as the grouping of people according to economic position—or to put it
the other way round, social class can be defined as a broad category of people
sharing the same economic position. According to Weber, “status refers to a
form of social stratification in which social positions are ranked and organized
by legal, political, and cultural criteria into status groups.”224 In Weber’s theory
of social stratification party forms an additional source of stratification char-
acterized by differential access to political or social power. As Weber pointed
out, “in modern times party formation is an important aspect of power and can
influence stratification independently of class and status.”225 More specifically,
party refers to the ability of political groups and associations to exercise power
and influence the social and political system, and parties tend to engage in
action “oriented toward the acquisition of social power, that is to say, toward
influencing social action no matter what is content may be.”226
First, class and the market situation. In view of the fact that the concept of class
plays an important role in Weber’s theory of social stratification, we feel the necessity
of examining how Weber formulates the concept of class in Economy and Society. He
supplies the following definition of class: “We may speak of a class when a number
of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar
as this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession
of goods and opportunities for income, and is represented under the conditions of the
commodity or labor market. This is class situation.”227 It is therefore clear that class
situation, for Weber, is identified with market situation. Weber believed that under
given market conditions class situation that is founded on objectively given economic
conditions tends to be determined by the life chances of the market situation that can
be understood as, in Gidden’s terms, “the chances an individual has for sharing in
the socially created economic or cultural ‘goods’ that typically exist in any given
222 Hanke, Edith., Scaff, Lawrence A., & Whimster, Sam., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of
223 Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge

224 Mennen, Inge. (2011). Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193–284. Leiden, NL: Brill,
p. 6.
226 Dillon, Michele. (2020). Introduction to Sociological Theory: Theorists, Concepts, and their
227 Swedberg, Richard., & Agevall, Ola. (2005). The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and central
Concepts. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 37.

society” or, more simply, as “the chances that individuals have of gaining access to
scarce and valued outcomes.”228 In the modern capitalist market economy people are
engaged in economically oriented action. An aggregate of people who share common
economic interests in a similar market situation tend to act collectively, or rather, to
develop communal social relationships, thereby grouping themselves into different
social classes—or to put it the other way round, “for Weber, an individual’s class
position is determined by their ‘market situation’. Individuals are grouped together
on the basis of a similar position in a market economy.”229 Similar to Marx’s concept,
Weber saw a class as made up of people sharing similar or the same economic interests
and life chances in a similar economic situation. In Weber’s theory of stratification
we can get three significant terms in relation to class, viz. “life chances,” “economic
interests” and “market conditions,” which rightly assert themselves as the essential
ideas of Weber’s concept of class. Central to Weber’s conceptualization of class is
the notion of “life chances,” by which he means “the kind of control or lack of it
which the individual has over goods and services and existing possibilities of their
exploitation for the attainment of receipts within a given economic order.”230 It is
the mutual interaction of these three factors that leads to the formation of social
classes. Weber, on the other hand, pointed out that “ownership or non-ownership of
material goods or of definite skills constitutes the class situation” and that “it would
appear, therefore, that property and the lack of property comprise the basic cate-
gories of all class situations.”231 For Weber, the unequal exchange occurs through
the intermediary of the market between the propertied classes, among whom are the
owners of the means of production, and the non-propertied classes, whose labor the
property-owning classes purchase by way of waged employment. Compared with
the labor force of the non-propertied class, the capital or land of the propertied class
whose livelihood rests principally on the utilization of it is in an essentially advanta-
geous market position. “According to the law of marginal utility, it then follows that
using the market as the mode of distribution excludes the ‘propertyless’ from effec-
tively competing with the ‘propertied’ for highly valued goods. In fact, the law of
marginal utility produces an effective monopoly for the acquisition of highly valued
goods. This monopoly belongs to the propertied. Thus, other things being equal,
this mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals to those
who already have goods, and therefore quite simply are not dependent on trading for
their livelihood. Generally then, using the market as the mode of distribution also
increases the propertied people’s power in price wars with propertyless people over
highly valued goods. Propertyless people have nothing to offer but their labor itself
or the products created through their own labor. Unlike the propertied owner, such
228 Wright, Erik Olin., ed. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
229 Gamble, Andrew., Marsh, David., & Tant, Tony., eds. (1999). Marxism and Social Science.

230 Berberoglu, Berch. (2017). Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary – A Critical Perspective.

231 Hamilton, Peter. (1991). Max Weber: Critical Assessments 2. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 56.
laborers are forced to use their products and labor in a timely fashion in order to
simply eke out the most basic existence.”232 To put it another way, “it is the most
elemental economic fact that the way in which the disposition over material property
is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting competitively in the market for the
purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific life chances. The mode of distribution,
in accord with the law of marginal utility, excludes the non-wealthy from competing
for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to
acquire such goods. Other things being equal, the mode of distribution monopolizes
the opportunities for profitable deals for all those who, provided with goods, do not
necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in
the price struggle with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but their
labor or the resulting products, and who are compelled to get rid of these products in
order to subsist at all. The mode of distribution gives to the propertied a monopoly
on the possibility of transferring property from the sphere of use as ‘wealth’ to the
sphere of ‘capital,’ that is, it gives them the entrepreneurial functions and all chances
to share directly or indirectly in returns on capital. All this holds true within the area
in which pure market conditions prevail.”233 From what has been discussed above,
Weber seems fairly justified in concluding that social class rightly asserts itself as a
strictly objective dimension of stratification and that under given market conditions
class situation that is founded on objectively given economic conditions tends to be
determined by the life chances of the market situation.
Second, status and the social honor. To begin with, we will examine how Weber
formulated the definition of social status or social honor. As noted earlier, Weber
offered a multidimensional view of social stratification in his theoretical scheme.
As a general rule, social status refers primarily to the cultural dimension or aspect
of stratification based upon such variables as social honor and prestige accorded to
people, groups, and organizations in a society. Social status in Weber’s terminology,
on the other hand, relates to the common status situations, lifestyles and values shared
by a status (or identity) group which, in turn, tends to be bound and distinguished by
their shared status situations, values and lifestyles. Hence it may be safely asserted
that “all persons who are accorded the same estimations of social honor or pres-
tige and who live the same style-of-life generally fall within the same status group of
‘status situation’.”234 Weber distinguishes “class situation” from “status situation” by
contending that status cannot be solely determined by economic factors. Rather, the
latter has to be defined according to the distribution of social honor. “In contrast with
the ‘class situation’, which is determined by purely economic factors, we shall use the
term ‘status situation’ to refer to all those typical components of people’s destinies
which are determined by a specific social evaluation of ‘status’, whether positive or
232 Waters, Tony., & Waters, Dagmar., eds. (2015). Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society: New
Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification (Tony Waters & Dagmar Waters,
Trans.). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 43.
233 Giddens, Anthony., & Held, David., eds. (1982). Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and

234 Pandey, Rajendra. (1989). Mainstream Traditions of Social Stratification Theory. New Delhi,

negative, when that evaluation is based on some common characteristic shared by

many people.”235 Weber argues that the factors determining an individual’s social
prestige are multidimensional and that the various factors, such as birth, family back-
ground (or family status), etiquette, deportment (or manners), education, breeding
(or upbringing), and lifestyles, may all contribute to an individual’s social status.
For Weber, members of the same status (or identity) group tend to share a collective
identity or strong sense of group affiliation (group identity or “belonging together”).
In particular, the privileged status groups or prestige classes who enjoy a higher level
of prestige by virtue of their social status (social standing or social position) are more
likely to possess a strong sense of superiority in relation to those groups with a feeling
of inferiority, thereby consciously marking themselves off from those groups. In what
follows, we will concern ourselves with the complex interplay between social class
and cultural stratification. Weber asserts that there is no necessary causal relationship
between economic resources and cultural resources, insofar as economic resources
are convertible to cultural resources. To put it simply, economic resources cannot
be identified with cultural resources. Weber admits that in reality separation of class
from status is a fairly common phenomenon, that is, a disjuncture between class posi-
tion and status position is liable to occur in the real world. In actual fact, at any given
moment there is often likely to be some discrepancy between the economic power
of a social group and the social esteem, respect, or admiration that a society confers
on the social group. Moreover, even where wealth and social honor are roughly on
a par, social esteem or respect tends not to go hand in hand with private wealth.236
Wealth cannot ensure the new rich any chances of securing for themselves a position
in a privileged status group. Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to
the same status group. Weber suggests that it is a complex combination o factors
including their family background, history, lifestyles, education, and breeding that
leads to the above paradoxical situation. “Precisely because of the rigorous reac-
tions against the claims of property per se, privileged status groups have for that
reason never accepted the ‘parvenu’ personally, and genuinely without reservations,
however completely he has adopted their way of life; it is his descendents who are
first accepted, since they have been brought up within the status conventions of their
social stratum and have never defiled their standing as members of the status group
by their own employment for gain.”237
Third, party and the power. In Weber’s multidimensional theory of stratification
political power constitutes the basis of a third dimension of stratification. Weber
defined power as “the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in
a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on
which this probability rests” and as “the chance of a man or of a number of men
to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others
235 Runciman, W. G., ed. (1978). Max Weber: Selections in Translation (Eric Matthews, Trans.).
236 Parkin, Frank. (2002). Max Weber. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 96.
237 Runciman, W. G., ed. (1978). Max Weber: Selections in Translation (Eric Matthews, Trans.).

who are participating in the action.”238 Weber has defined a political party “as a
voluntary society of propaganda and agitations, seeking to acquire power in order to
procure chances for its active adherents to realize objective aims or personal advan-
tages or both,” which is to say, according to Weber, “The end to which [a party’s]
activity is devoted is to secure power within a corporate group for its leaders in order
to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members.”239 In other words,
political parties can be defined as groups organized for the purpose of seeking and
seizing political power, of pursuing and safeguarding their economic interests, and
of seeking and maintaining their social statuses. Inequalities in the political sphere
tend to manifest themselves in the hierarchical distribution of political power and
authority, which Weber also highlights as the key aspect of social inequalities in
modern societies.240 Weber sees bureaucracy as central to comprehending modern
society,241 and his theory of bureaucracy constitutes an important contribution to
the study of the question as well as to the sociology of knowledge.242 First, Weber
defined authority as legitimate power, maintaining that power and authority tend
to provide the basis of social stability and thereby to rightly assert themselves as
the underlying factors conducive to social order and stability. Second, Weber distin-
guished three types of legitimate authority: rational-legal authority derived from the
legality of normative rules, traditional authority as in the sanctity of traditions and
status, and charismatic authority, or authority ordained by one’s character or heroic
nature.243 In contrasting the rational-legal type of authority system as manifested in
bureaucratic organizations with traditional and charismatic authority systems, Weber
seemed fairly justified in concluding that bureaucracy would be the most rational and
efficient form of organization for modern societies. Weber also contrasted different
forms of social organization, asserting with emphasis that bureaucratic organization
represents the triumph of instrumental rationality as applied to various forms of social
organization,244 such as churches, states, armies, political parties, economic enter-
prises, private associations, clubs, and many others. In modern industrial societies
characterized by the growth and ubiquity of large-scale bureaucratic organizations,
a majority of resources tend to be controlled largely by bureaucratic organizations,
238 Lukes, Steven. (1986). Power. New York, NY: New York University Press, pp. 1–17. cf. Rubin,
Edward L. (2005). Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 76–84. See also, Pandey, Rajendra. (1989). Mainstream
Traditions of Social Stratification Theory. New Delhi, IN: Mittal Publications, p. 80.
239 Rustow, Dankwart A. (2015). Politics of Compromise. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
p. 228.
240 Wright, Erik Olin. (2005).Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, p. 161.
241 Michie, Jonathan., ed. (2013). Reader’s Guide to the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge,
p. 139.
242 Burke, Peter. (2000). A Social History of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Polity Press, pp. 4–5.
243 Calhoun, Craig. (2002). Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, p. 26.
244 Johnson, Doyle Paul. (2008). Contemporary Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level
rather than by individual members. Taking the above into account, it can be concluded
that formal or legal authority is always a matter of position—it belongs to the posi-
tion, not to the person in an organization, that is, formal or legal authority tends to be
vested in organizational positions—it is not personal characteristics or resources but
rather the positions he or she holds in an organization that decides about authority of a
person.245 Precisely, “the organizational authority is the right inherent in managerial
position to make decisions, give direction, give orders and expect them to be obeyed,
reward or punish those lower in hierarchy and to select actions affecting part or the
whole of an organization.”246 More generally, “authority may result from an explicit
or implicit contract allocating the right to decide on specified matters to a member or
group of members of the organization.”247 From what has been discussed above, we
may safely assert that various types of resources with which bureaucratic organiza-
tions are endowed are in fact placed in the hands of such controllers as officials and
managers, who must, of necessity, occupy higher positions in a bureaucratic structure
as well as in a social hierarchy, compared with individuals in lower positions.
To sum up, as noted above, Weber’s three dimensions of stratification—the
economic, the cultural and the political, which tend to be closely interrelated and
mutually dependent, led him to develop a multidimensional approach to social strati-
fication. In his three-component theory of stratification, Weber attached more impor-
tance to cultural stratification, asserting with emphasis that cultural stratification can
be the basis for economic and political stratification. There is, however, no necessary
causal relationship between these three dimensions of stratification. Under certain
social conditions each of these three dimensions of stratification can rightly assert
itself as the central axis of stratification. As such, Weber’s multidimensional theory
of stratification appeared perfectly suited to capturing the reality of social stratifica-
tion in a society characterized by a market economy, or rather, in modern capitalist
societies. In formulating his multidimensional theory of stratification, Weber delved
into the origins of social stratification, explored the complex mechanisms for social
change, and pursued the rational solutions to the problem of social stratification. It
may be safely asserted that we can gain a good deal of enlightenment from Weber’s
original ideas on social stratification.
3.4 Bruno Latour’s Theory of “Group Structure”
Bruno Latour, French philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist, who rightly asserts
himself as one of the leading figures in social sciences today and deservedly ranks
among the top foundational figures in science and technology studies, has been
245 Bezzina, Frank., & Cassar, Vincent., eds. (2021). Proceedings of the 17th European Conference
on Management Leadership and Governance. Reading, UK: Academic Conference International
Limited, p. 307.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
widely recognized as a leader of the Paris school of sociology, or more specifi-

cally, as a pioneer in the field of actor-network theory, whose innovative and icon-
oclastic work in the study of science and technology in society forms a substantial
contribution of permanent value to the sociology of scientific knowledge as well as
to the development of actor-network theory. In his seminal work Laboratory Life:
The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, co-authored with Steve Woolgar, Latour
“began to explore the laboratory as a kind of anthropological field,”248 claiming
to use an anthropological approach to the study of life and science in the labora-
tory,249 where “scientists constitute a tribe whose daily manipulation and production
of objects is in danger of being misunderstood, if accorded the high status with
which its outputs are sometimes greeted by the outside world,”250 which is to say,
“Latour pioneered what he thought of as an ‘ethnographic’ or ‘anthropological’ study
of scientists and engineers at work,”251 seeking to capture in detail “the everyday
laboratory practices of science” and technology that “may give very interesting new
perspectives on the construction of scientific beliefs or knowledge in the scientific
community.”252 Admittedly, whether it be Latour’s “micro-sociological or labora-
tory studies approach,” which “features ethnographic study of particular research
groups, tracing the myriad activities and interactions that eventuate in the produc-
tion and acceptance of a scientific fact or datum,”253 whether it be his actor-network
theory (usually abbreviated to ANT), which provides us with a unique socio-technical
perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system of its own, and which “attempts to
disengage constructivism from what he considers an overemphasis on human inten-
tion in order to bring the material layers of the network into focus,”254 or whether
it be his seminal work Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory, in which Latour endeavors “to show why the social cannot be construed as a
kind of material or domain and to dispute the project of providing a ‘social explana-
tion’ of some other state of affairs, and in which “after having done extensive work
248 Lampland, Martha., & Star, Susan Leigh., eds. (2009). Standards and Their Stories: How Quan-
tifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, p. 19.
249 Greenhouse, Carol J., Mertz, Elizabeth., & Warren, Kay B., eds. (2002). Ethnography in Unstable
Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, p. 122.
250 Latour, Bruno., & Woolgar, Steve. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts.

251 Benton, Ted., & Craib, Ian. (2011). Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations
of Social Thought. London, UK: Macmillan International Higher Education, p. 69.

252 Niiniluoto, IIkka. (1999). Critical Scientific Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
p. 269.
253 Longino, Helen, “The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/

archives/sum2019/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/>.
254 Feenberg, Andrew. (2017). Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

on the ‘assemblages’ of nature,” he believes “it’s necessary to scrutinize more thor-

oughly the exact content of what is ‘assembled’ under the umbrella of a society,”255
Latour’s innovative and iconoclastic studies in the areas mentioned above have left
a deep and enduring mark upon social scientific academic circles. For Latour, “to be
faithful to the experience of the social, we have to take up three different duties in
succession: deployment, stabilization, and composition.”256 First, by “deployment”
Latour means that in the real life-world any uncertainty as to what counts in a given
situation has to be rendered traceable whereby ANT at our disposal can “render the
social world as flat as possible in order to ensure that the establishment of any new
link is clearly visible,”257 that is, “we first have to learn how to deploy controversies
so as to gauge the number of new participants in any future assemblage.”258 Thus,
according to Latour, “we should not limit in advance the sort of beings populating
the social world. Social sciences have become much too timid in deploying the sheer
complexity of the associations they have encountered. …it’s possible to feed, so to
speak, off controversies and learn how to become good relativists—surely an indis-
pensable preparation before venturing into new territory.”259 Second, Latour means
by “stabilization” that “we have to be able to follow how the actors themselves stabi-
lize those controversies arising from uncertainty by building formats, standards, and
metrologies.”260 As Latour suggests, the aforementioned means allowing actors to
stabilize those controversies can be used as effective methods and be readily avail-
able to actors, thus deserving to be kept. Third, by “composition” Latour means
that the involvement of a multiplicity of actors in myriad processes and procedures
would make it possible to “reassemble the social not in a society but in a collec-
tive.”261 In Latour’s words, “we want to see how the assemblages thus gathered can
renew our sense of being in the same collective.”262 From what has been discussed
above, we may safely assert that actor network theory provides us with a unique
socio-technical perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system of its own. Broadly
speaking, actor network theory, along with other constructivist approaches to the
study of science and technology, is commonly described as a constructivist approach
in that “Latour seems to take emergence as an important feature of reality and argues
for a particular ontology of the world as inhabited by agents with their own ‘irre-
ducible powers, capabilities, propensities, etc., interacting and remaking the world
in a continuous process of interaction’.”263 Moreover, actor network theory offers
255 Latour, Bruno. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–2.
256 Ibid., p. 249.
257 Ibid., p. 16.
258 Ibid., p. 249.
259 Ibid., p. 16.
260 Ibid., p. 249.
261 Ibid., p. 16.
262 Ibid., p. 249.
263 Lawson, Clive. (2017). Technology and Isolation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
p. 45.
a theoretical framework for understanding social structure and has been influential
in constructivist discussions of social structure. Considering actor network theory
embraces the actual contents as they are, we feel the necessity of providing it with a
fuller description.
(1) As discussed above, actor-network theory is a theoretical and methodological
approach to social theory as well as a constructivist approach to the study of
science and technology. However, “it is important to see actor-network theory
not as complete in itself and well developed theory,” but as a theoretical prereq-
uisite (or position) within the broader debate of the studies of the sociology of
associations as well as of the sociology of technology.264 In his seminal work
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Bruno
Latour inaugurates a new sociological paradigm named “sociology of asso-
ciations” or “associology” which is opposite to the standard sociology of the
social.265 “This is what distinguishes Latour’s sociology from the prevailing
disciplinary models that trace back to Durkheim. While traditional sociology
(which Latour calls the ‘sociology of the social’) takes social aggregates as
already given, Latour’s ‘sociology of associations’ focuses on how social aggre-
gates are connected together.”266 In Bruno Latour’s words, “Whereas soci-
ologists (or socio-economists, socio-linguists, social psychologists, etc.) take
social aggregates as the given that could shed some light on residual aspects
of economics, linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other
scholars, on the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained
by the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, law,
management, etc.”267 In Latour’s view, traditional sociology tends to “posit the
existence of a specific sort of phenomenon variously called ‘society,’ ‘social
order,’ ‘social practice,’ ‘social dimension,’ or ‘social structure.’ For the last
century during which social theories have been elaborated, it has been impor-
tant for traditional sociology to distinguish its own special domain of reality
from other domains such as economics, geography, biology, psychology, law,
science, and politics.”268 “A given trait was said to be ‘social’ or to ‘pertain to
society’ when traditional sociology could be defined as possessing specific prop-
erties.”269 Generally speaking, traditional sociology tends to make recourse to
“social factors” as starting points for describing and explaining society. Despite
this fact, this sort of explanation characterized by needless repetition can be
264 Avgerou, Chrisanthi. (2002). Information Systems and Global Diversity. New York, NY: Oxford

266 Concannon, Cavan W. (2017). Assembling Early Christianity: Trade, Networks, and the Letters
of Dionysios of Corinth. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 51.


268 Ibid., p. 3.
269 Ibid.
of little avail, or rather, nothing more than a tautology, if traditional sociolo-

gists still cling to the belief that “the social could explain the social.”270 Bruno
Latour claims that “there is nothing specific to social order; that there is no social
dimension of any sort, no ‘social context,’ no distinct domain of reality to which
the label ‘social’ or ‘society’ could be attributed; that “there is no such a thing as
a society;” and that ‘society,’ far from being the context ‘in which’ everything
is framed, should rather be construed as one of the many connecting elements
circulating inside tiny conduits.”271 Specifically, “even though most social scien-
tists would prefer to call ‘social’ a homogeneous thing, it’s perfectly acceptable
to designate by the same word a trail of associations between heterogeneous
elements.”272 Bruno Latour avows his sympathy with the second sociological
paradigm or the second version of sociology, or more specifically, “sociology
of associations”, which has become known as “actor-network-theory”. Latour’s
use of the concept “network” in actor-network theory, which tends to form a
source of misunderstanding,273 should not be confused with the conception of
a network either in the everyday sense of the word or in the sociological usage
of the term,274 nor with the conventional notion of a social network.275 Rather,
Latour asserts that “Network is a concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help
describe something, not what is being described.”276 By traditional network we
mean the “net” drawn with a pen, while by actor-network Latour means the
pen used as a tool of expression. As stated above, actor-network theory (gener-
ally shortened to ANT) rightly asserts itself as a theoretical and methodological
approach to social theory. To be more precise, ANT is not a theory pertaining to
what is described, but rather “a theory about how to learn or study what makes
up collective life—by letting the actors have some room to express themselves
and by being attentive to their enunciations.”277 Latour’s innovative and icon-
oclastic method for reassembling the social can then be extended under the
rubric of “actor-network theory,” alternatively, and more appropriately, called
“sociology of translation” or “actant-rhyzome ontology.”278
(2) Bruno Latour introduced and developed three key concepts, viz. “actor,” “medi-
ator” and “network,” to illuminate ANT, and utilized them as starting points for
research. First, in developing his original conception of “actor,” Latour tried to
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
272 Ibid., p. 5.
273 Vries, Gerard de. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 92.
274 MacKenzie, Donald A. (1998). Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change. Cambridge,



endow the sociological concept with two defining characteristics, that is “free-
dom” and “ubiquity,” for the sake of conceptual clarification. By the “freedom”
inherent in the concept of “actor” Latour means that actors enable freedom
of action. He rejects the functionalist approach to understanding actors as free
agents performing predetermined functions at particular loci. For Bruno Latour,
any such agent, far from rightly asserting itself as an actor in the proper sense
of the term, can itself be treated either as a semiotic sign or as a “black box.” As
Latour has argued, actors are not treated as intermediaries, but rather as media-
tors. In the words of Bruno Latour, the acts of a mediator tend to be involved in
the transformation of the contingent circumstances as well as in the translation of
the available information. By the second distinguishing characteristic—“ubiq-
uity,” with which the concept of “actor” is endowed, Latour means that ANT is
a heterogeneous amalgamation of human and non-human actors, that an actant,
which is consistently synonymous or virtually interchangeable with an actor,279
is “neither an object nor a subject but an ‘intervener’… an operator which by
virtue of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in
the right place in the right time, makes the difference, makes things happen,
becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event,”280 and that actors in ANT,
known as actants, which are sources of action that can be either human or non-
human, include both human beings and non-human actors such as ideas, tech-
nologies, institutions, and biological organisms. Second, while the sociology
of the social, as Latour has polemically argued, “limits itself to describing and
explaining human social actions and the social structures that constrain their
action,”281 ANT “follows the actors in their weaving through things they have
added to social skills so as to render more durable the constantly shifting interac-
tions.”282 To be more precise, we feel the necessity of introducing two technical
terms. “An intermediary,” Latour insists, “is what transports meaning or force
without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs. For
all practical purposes, an intermediary can be taken not only as a black box,
but also as a black box counting for one, even if it is internally made of many
parts.”283 In contrast, “mediators cannot be counted as just one; they might
count for one, for nothing, for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a
good predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account
every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or
the elements they are supposed to carry.”284 Furthermore, Latour is emphatic
279 McGee, Kyle. (2014). Bruno Latour: The Normativity of Networks. New York, NY: Routledge,
p. 49.
280 Navaro, Yael., Biner, Zerrin Özlem., Bieberstein, Alice von., & Altuǧ, Seda., eds. (2021). Rever-
berations: Violence Across Time and Space. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press,
p. 164.

283 Ibid., p. 39.
284 Ibid.
in his assertion that “no matter how complicated an intermediary is, it may, for
all practical purposes, count for just one—or even for nothing at all because it
can be easily forgotten,” whereas “no matter how apparently simple a mediator
may look, it may become complex; it may lead in multiple directions which
will modify all the contradictory accounts attributed to its role.”285 Essentially,
a mediator can be understood either as an attitude towards the actor or as a view
on it. Third, “ANT has a different conceptualization of the network,” which is
to say, “the network in ANT gains a different meaning from the common under-
standing of networks such as the Internet and social networks.”286 The network
in ANT is far from assuming or elucidating networks as stable structures that
can be mapped or pictured, but rather “explains networks as cumulative and
dynamic collections of interactions, which change continually.”287 Networks,
for Latour, are the emergent properties of movements and relations, a series of
actions and mediations, and a collection of interactions. “A network in ANT,”
as Latour holds, “is a collection of heterogeneous actors that align their interest
to perform an action.”288 In other words, “the network makes actants act in a
certain way. Hence, action in ANT is a characteristic of the network because
there are many actants that are involved in enacting a specific action.”289 As
such, actor-networks tend to exist in a constant process of making and becoming.
Furthermore, as Latour has stated, the network in ANT may refer to “any connec-
tion established between human and non-human actors in a social sequence of
events,” and the concept of “network” can be used to “highlight the dynamic
process whereby new connections are created and changed.”290 Thus, Latour is
emphatic in asserting that “network is an expression to check how much energy,
movement, and specificity our own reports are able to capture. Network is a
concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help describe something, not what
is being described.”291
(3) Five uncertainties or controversies. Latour identifies and discusses five “sources
of uncertainty” or controversies regarding the “social world” in actor network
theory (ANT). First, groups tend to exist in an ongoing process of formation and
thus to undergo constant change. For Latour, groups are not stable but rather in a
constant process of becoming, classification, regrouping and collapse. If people
are no longer concerned about the on-going process of formation and change
relating to one group or another, they will be most likely to form an empty
285 Ibid.
286 Dahlgaard-Park, Su Mi., ed. (2015). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Quality and the Service
Economy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 11–12.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid., p. 11.
289 Ibid., p. 12.
290 Blok, Anders., & Jensen, Torben Elgaard. (2011). Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid


conception of group barren of all thought. As Latour has argued, “there are no
groups, only group formation,”292 that is, groups are constantly in a state of
flux: “there is no relevant group that can be said to make up social aggregates,
no established component that can be used as an incontrovertible point.”293
Second, on the one hand actions occur, but on the other, actions are overtaken.
According to Latour, “action is overtaken or action is other-taken! So it is taken
up by others and shared with the masses. It is mysteriously carried out and at the
same time distributed to others.”294 “For the social sciences to regain their initial
energy, it’s crucial not to conflate all the agencies overtaking the action into some
kind of agency—‘society,’ ‘culture,’ ‘structure,’ ‘fields,’ ‘individuals,’ or what-
ever name they are given—that would itself be social. Action should remain a
surprise, a mediation, an event.”295 Latour defines an actor or actant as “some-
thing that acts or to which activity is granted by others.”296 That is to say, “an
actor is what is made to act by many others”—or to put it the other way round,
“an ‘actor’ in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an
action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it.”297
Hence it may be safely asserted that any course of course is not initiated by the
actor or actant itself, but rather is caused by others. Furthermore, “the direction
of the action is uncertain,”298 and “any course of action will thread a trajectory
through completely foreign modes of existence that have been brought together
by heterogeneous actors.”299 Actions are not controlled, continuous, fixed, or
predetermined. In Latour’s words, action “is not a coherent, controlled, well-
rounded, and clean-edged affair.”300 Rather, many forces combine to produce an
action or to make actions occur, which is to say, actions can be attributed to the
influence of many forces. For Latour, “by definition, action is dislocated. Action
is borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, and trans-
lated.”301 In other words, actions that are continually subjected to influences
of many kinds tend to undergo constant change or transformation. As Latour
suggests, to grasp the various forces that combine to produce actions and have
them overtaken by others, or rather, to understand the contours, detours and sedi-
mentations of power in an assemblage of actions, “you have ‘to follow the actors
292 Ibid., p. 27.

293 Ibid., p. 29.
294 Ibid., p. 45.
295 Ibid.
296 George-Graves, Nadine., ed. (2015). The Oxford Handbook of Dance and Theater. New York,


298 Latour, Bruno. (2013). An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (Catherine Porter, Trans.).


300 Ibid., p. 46.
301 Ibid.
themselves’, that is try to catch up with their often wild innovations in order to
learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which
methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best
define the new associations that they have been forced to establish.”302 Third,
Latour’s innovative and iconoclastic work in the study of social phenomena
is to extend the sociological concept of an actor to include a potentially infi-
nite range of social, natural and/or technological phenomena, that is include
objects and non-human entities. Latour’s definition of what it means to “act”
can be either human or non-human. For him, “action” is always composite,
and agency is embodied in humans as well as in non-humans, which is to say,
agency is therefore perceived as a “distributed phenomenon,” residing not only
in humans but also in objects as well as in their “intra-actions.”303 Admittedly,
“Latour’s critical contribution to a social theory of objects is his claim that not
only humans but also nonhuman things have agency.”304 Thus, the ANT theory
of “action” should be extended to include both human and non-human actions
and be reserved for humans as well as for non-human entities. As Latour has
argued, “Social action is not only taken over by aliens, it is also shifted or dele-
gated to different types of actors which are able to transport the action further
through other modes of action, other types of forces altogether. …If action is
limited a priori to what ‘intentional,’ ‘meaningful’ humans do, it is hard to see
how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a rug, a list, or a tag could act.
They might exist in the domain of ‘material’ ‘causal’ relations, but not in the
‘reflexive’ ‘symbolic’ domain of social relations. By contrast, if we stick to our
decision to start form the controversies about actors and agencies, then anything
that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor—or, if it
has no figuration yet, an actant. Thus, the questions to ask about any agent
are simply the following: Does it make a difference in the course of some other
agent’s action or not? Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this differ-
ence?”305 In Latour’s words, objects are also mediators that have the capacity to
“transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are
supposed to carry.”306 Latour contends that objects or non-human actors “are
mutable entities that are both complex and essential to understanding the social
world and that “are significant in explaining human and non-human actions
in that they are actors that have power and influence.”307 As such, the ANT
conception of objects or non-human actors “decentralizes humans as the sole
302 Ibid., p. 12.

303 Eming, Jutta., & Starkey, Kathryn., eds. (2021). Things and Thingness in European Literature
and Visual Art, 700–1600. Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, p. 131.
304 Tischleder, Babette Bärbel. (2014). The Literary Life of Things: Case Studies in American


306 Ibid., p. 39.
307 McAtackney, Laura. (2014). An Archaeology of the Troubles: The Dark Heritage of Long Kesh
/Maze Prison. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 103.

site of influence in the world. …For Latour, each and every thing, unique at
each given moment, is inextricably intertwined through mediators with other
things and can act upon them without there being any necessity for intent or
cognition on behalf of that thing.”308 Therefore, when we devote ourselves to
the study of the complexity and multiplicity of objects’ or non-human actors’
actions, we should follow Alfred Gell’s contention that “a thing can appear as
an agent, temporarily becoming a locus of agency either of its owners or its
own, in particular social situations” and that “agency is relational and context-
dependent.”309 Fourth, Latour addressed the distinction between matters of fact
and matters of concern in order to propose a new way to look at “things.”
The real connection between things, as Latour holds, is the social itself that is
constructed from these associations and their movements. For Latour, “Social
is nowhere in particular as a thing among other things but may circulate every-
where as a movement connecting non-social things.”310 We have to unravel the
connection between things before we understand what the social is. To make this
possible, we have to “shift the world of matters of fact to the worlds of matters of
concern,”311 that is, “we have to shift from an impoverished repertoire of inter-
mediaries to a highly complex and highly controversial set of mediators.”312
Moreover, “when we list the qualities of an ANT account, we will make sure
that when agencies are introduced they are never presented simply as matters of
fact but always as matters of concern, with their mode of fabrication and their
stabilizing mechanisms clearly visible.”313 Latour asserts with emphasis that
“Once the artificial boundary between social and natural was removed, non-
human entities were able to appear under an unexpected guise. …Empiricism
no longer appears as the solid bedrock on which to build everything else, but as
a very poor rendering of experience. This poverty, however, is not overcome by
moving away from material experience, for instance to the ‘rich human subjec-
tivity,’ but closer to the much variegated lives materials have to offer.”314 Fifth,
the fifth source of uncertainty is about how to write down risky accounts that
tend to realize all of the above uncertainties. The purpose of a risky account
is, in Latour’s words, to “extend the exploration of the social connections a
308 Whybray, Adam. (2020). The Art of Czech Animation: A History of Political Dissent and
309 McAtackney, Laura. (2014). An Archaeology of the Troubles: The Dark Heritage of Long Kesh
/Maze Prison. New York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 103.


311 IbiD., p. 116.
312 Ibid., p. 118.
313 Ibid., p. 120.
314 Ibid., pp. 111–112.
little bit further.”315 According to Latour, “textual accounts are the social scien-
tist’s laboratory” and they “can fail like experiments often do.”316 However, “it
seems that too often sociologists of the social are simply trying to ‘fix a world
on paper’ as if this activity was never in risk of failing. If that is the case, there
is no way they can succeed, since the world they wish to capture remains invis-
ible because the mediating constraints of writing are either ignored or denied.
No matter what pains they have taken to be accurate during the course of their
inquiries, their textual account has been missed.”317 Moreover, “the dissem-
ination of rather simple-minded visual representations” (or graphs), which is
endowed with “the drawback of not capturing movements and of being visually
poor,” will inevitably lead to “the very poverty of graphical representation.”318
“Masses of social agents might have been invoked in the text, but since the prin-
ciple of their assembly remains unknown and the cost of their expansion has
not been paid, it’s as if nothing was happening. No matter what their figuration
is, they don’t do very much. Since the reassembling of new aggregates has not
been rendered traceable through the text, it’s as if the social world had not been
made to exist.”319 With the above situation in view, Latour maintains that “a
text, in our definition of social science” should be thus deserving of “a test on
how many actors the writer is able to treat as mediators and how far he or she
is able to achieve the social.”320 For Latour, “a good text elicits networks of
actors when it allows the writer to trace a set of relations defined as so many
translations,” while “in a bad text only a handful of actors will be designated as
the causes of all the others, which will have no other function than to serve as a
backdrop or relay for the flows of causal efficacy.”321 “In keeping with the logic
of our interest in textual reports and accounting,” as Latour suggests, “it might
be useful to list the different notebooks one should keep—manual or digital, it
no longer matters much. The first notebook should be reserved as a log of the
enquiry itself. …A second notebook should be kept for gathering information
in such a way that it is possible simultaneously to keep all the items in a chrono-
logical order and to dispatch them into categories which will evolve later into
more and more refined files and subfiles. …A third notebook should be always
at hand for ad libitum writing trials. …A fourth type of notebook should be
carefully kept to register the effects of the written account on the actors whose
world has been either deployed or unified.”322
315 Ibid., p. 128.

316 Ibid., p. 127.
317 Ibid., pp. 127–128.
318 Ibid., pp. 132–133.
319 Ibid., p. 131.
320 Ibid., pp. 128–129.
321 Ibid., pp. 129–130.
322 Ibid., pp. 134–135.
(4) As has been discussed above, Latour’s original conceptualization of “stabiliza-

tion” and “composition” is geared toward expanding upon his actor-network-
theory. Latour means by “stabilization” that “we have to be able to follow
how the actors themselves stabilize those controversies arising from uncertainty
by building formats, standards, and metrologies.”323 By “composition” Latour
means that the involvement of a multiplicity of actors in myriad processes and
procedures would make it possible to “reassemble the social not in a society
but in a collective.”324 In Latour’s words, “we want to see how the assemblages
thus gathered can renew our sense of being in the same collective.”325 After
having had an adequate discussion on the five major uncertainties mentioned
above, Latour began to focus his chief attention upon the problem of how to
“reassemble the social.” Latour argues for an “anctant –rhizome ontology,”326
insisting that “starting almost anyplace will provide traces, vestiges, and link-
ages to other nodes or actors in the network” and that “the establishment of
every link in complex interlocking sets of associations is visible.”327 Latour
suggests three analytically separate but deeply related moves by which an actor-
network analysis proceeds: localizing the global, redistributing the local, and
connecting the sites. As Latour has argued, “we will first relocate the global so
as to break down the automatism that leads from interaction to ‘Context’; we
will then redistribute the local so as to understand why interaction is such an
abstraction; and finally, we will connect the sites revealed by the two former
moves, highlighting the various vehicles that make up the definition of the social
understood as association.”328 In the chapter entitled “First Move: Localizing
the Global” of his seminal work Reassembling the Social, Latour emphasizes
the importance of examining connectivity itself: “We have to lay continuous
connections leading from one local interaction to the other places, times, and
agencies through which a local site is made to do something. This means that we
have to follow the path indicated by the process of delegation or translation.”329
In the chapter entitled “Second Move: Redistributing the Local” of the same
book, Latour notes that “what has been designated by the term ‘local interac-
tion’ is the assemblage of all the other local interactions distributed elsewhere
in time and space, which have been brought to bear on the scene through the
relays of various non-human actors.”330 In the chapter entitled “Third Move:
323 Ibid., p. 249.

324 Ibid., p. 16.
325 Ibid., p. 249.
326 Ibid., p. 9.
327 Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant Univer-
sity: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State

329 Ibid., p. 173.
330 Ibid., p. 194.
Connecting Sites” of the aforementioned work, Latour contends that “through

tracing chains of activity across multiple sites we were able to identify complex
connections between them.”331 In taking up three different duties in succession,
viz. deployment, stabilization, and composition, Latour does care to fulfill the
last duty, namely composition. He concludes his book by tackling the question
of what he has called political epistemology, or more specifically, “the onto-
logical question of the unity of this common world.”332 As Latour has argued,
“two other sets of procedures should be brought into the foreground: a first
set that makes the deployment of actors visible” and that renders possible the
analysis of the five sources of uncertainty; “and a second that makes the unifica-
tion of the collective into a common world” which is “acceptable to those who
will be unified” and, more importantly, which is “to render the cohabitation
possible.”333 “It’s because of the first set that ANT looks more like a disinter-
ested science combating the urge of sociology to legislate in the actor’s stead. It’s
because of the second set that ANT should most resemble a political engagement
as it criticizes the production of a science of society supposed to be invisible to
the eyes of the ‘informants’ and claims by some avant-garde to know better.”334
To this, Latour adds philosophically that “something like disinterestedness is
offered by the deployment of the four sources of uncertainty reviewed earlier,
while engagement comes from the possibility offered by the fifth uncertainty
of helping assemble in part the collective, that is, to give it an arena, a forum, a
space, a representation through the very modest medium of some risky account
that is most of the time a fragile intervention consisting only of text.”335 To sum
up, Latour’s actor-network theory (usually abbreviated to ANT) provides us
with a unique socio-technical perspective and rightly asserts itself as a system
of its own. His innovative and iconoclastic studies in the domains of human
society, science and technology have left a deep and enduring mark upon social
scientific academic circles. In particular, we are deeply impressed that Latour
accentuates the importance of human and non-human agencies and does care
to elaborate more fully upon this point. Nonetheless, it should be noted that his
theory has obvious limitations. Let us take a concrete example to serve as an
illustration. In mapping those metaphysical innovations, his theory involves a
strong dedication to relativism. It therefore follows that Latour tends to have his
theoretical models and frameworks predicated upon metaphysical assumptions
in the hope of producing a closer approximation to reality. Thus far his theory,
331 Fraiberg, Steven., Wang, Xi-Qiao., & You, Xiao-Ye. (2017). Inventing the World Grant Univer-
sity: Chinese International Students’ Mobilities, Literacies, and Identities. Logan, UT: Utah State

333 Ibid., pp. 256, 259.
334 Ibid., p. 256.
335 Ibid.
far from being universally accepted within the academic community, has been
the subject of animated controversy.
3.5 Arnold Toynbee’s Theory of “Group Structure”
Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975), one of the most remarkable thinkers of this century
as well as the most famous historian of his time, won world-wide recognition as the
author of the massive and monumental work of historical science A Study of History
in twelve volumes. Toynbee did not bring out any scholarly work devoted exclusively
to the study of social or civilizational structures. Despite this fact, some of Toynbee’s
basic assumptions about civilizational structures, which stand out conspicuously in
his treasure-house of ideas on history and civilization, rightly assert themselves as
the necessary prerequisites for analyzing and explaining civilizational phenomena.
In what follows, we will set out to summarize his theories and assumptions about
civilizational structures and to provide a judicious evaluation of his intellectual legacy
for the study of history.
(1) Toynbee’s assumptions about civilizational structures and frameworks. “By
‘civilization’ Toynbee means not a mere ‘field of historical study’ but a united
system, or the whole, whose parts are connected with one another by causal
ties.”336 In Toynbee’s own words, “Civilizations are wholes whose parts all
cohere with one another and all affect one another reciprocally… It is one of the
characteristics of civilizations in process of growth that all aspects and activities
of their social life are co-ordinated into a single whole, in which the economic,
political, and cultural elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another
by an inner harmony of the growing body social.”337 For Toynbee, these three
elements—the economic, the political, and the cultural—are not only inherent in
civilizational structures but also are in harmony with one another.338 Meantime,
Toynbee holds that the human elements of civilization, or rather, creative minori-
ties (or dominant minorities), internal proletariats, and external proletariats,339
are almost on a par with the above three elements in importance. Moreover,
Toynbee attaches great importance to “creative minorities,” believing that the
possession or failure of creative power in the creative minority tends to consti-
tute one of the fundamental reasons for the rise and fall of civilizations as well
as for the growth and decline of historical societies.340
336 Sorokin, Pitirim A. (1956). “Toynbee’s Philosophy of History.” In Toynbee and History: Critical
Essays and Reviews, ed. M. F. Ashley Montagu. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, pp. 179–180.
337 Toynbee, Arnold J. (1956). A Study of History, Volume 3. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
p. 380.
338 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New

339 Ibid., pp. 370–372.
340 Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Caoet al., Trans.). Shanghai, China:

(2) Toynbee’s formula of challenge and response. In Toynbee’s view civilizations’

survival can be explained by the formula of challenge and response that has
been widely read and pondered,341 or rather, in terms of responses to challenges
emanating from the external environment.342 To put it the other way round, the
growth and decline of historical societies can be understood as a challenge and
response interaction between societies and their environments,343 which is to
say, the rise and fall of civilizations can be viewed in terms of the inexorable
dynamics of challenge and response. As Toynbee has argued, “man achieves
civilization, not as a result of superior biological endowment or geographical
environment, but as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty
which rouses him to make a hitherto unprecedented effort.”344 According to
Toynbee, the external environment can be subdivided into “the human environ-
ment, which for any society consists of the other human societies with which it
finds itself in contact, and the physical environment constituted by non-human
nature.”345 For him, any society or civilization is almost invariably confronted
with myriad pressures and challenges emanating from the external environment,
either human or physical, that is, formidable pressures and challenges origi-
nating either from the human environment or from the physical environment
are always presented to societies or civilizations. Each society or civilization
when faced with a multitude of external pressures and challenges has to respond
by addressing them in myriad ways, for example by taking the form of removing
external pressures, of surmounting external obstacles or of overcoming external
adversaries. It therefore follows that the origin and growth of civilization can
be viewed as a result of successful responses to a succession of challenges and
that, by contrast, failure to respond successfully to successive challenges either
can arrest the development of civilization or can result in an inevitable demise
of civilization.
(3) The genesis, growth, decline and breakdown of civilizations depend fundamen-
tally upon civilizational structures. In setting forth this argument, we shall find
it convenient to subdivide it into the following three points. First, the genesis
of civilizations. Toynbee asserts that “if the geneses of civilizations are not the
result of biological factors or of geographical environment acting separately,
they must be the result of some kind of interaction between them. In other words,
the factor which we are seeking to identify is something not simple but multiple,
341 Wolin, Sheldon S. (2016). Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political

343 Fraser, J. T. (2021). Of Time, Passion, and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence.


345 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.189.

not an entity but a relation.”346 To put it another way, “the genesis of civilization
is due neither to the race factor nor to geographic environment as such but to a
specific combination of two conditions: the presence of a creative minority in
a given society and of an environment which is neither too unfavorable nor too
favorable. The groups which had these conditions emerged as civilizations; the
groups which did not have them remained on the sub-civilization level.”347
Second, the growth of civilizations. As Toynbee has argued, “geographical
expansion, or ‘painting the map red’, is no criterion whatever of the real growth
of a civilization.”348 Rather, “the growth of civilization tends to manifest itself in
a progressive and cumulative inward self-determination or self-articulation.”349
In other words, “the criterion of growth is progress towards self-determination
or self-articulation.”350 Moreover, “real progress is found to consist in a process
defined as ‘etherialization’, an overcoming of material obstacles which releases
the energies of the society to make responses to challenges which henceforth
are internal rather than external, spiritual rather than material.”351 In Toynbee’s
opinion, a growing society is a unity consisting of creative minorities (or domi-
nant minorities) freely imitated and followed by the uncreative majority—the
internal proletariat of the society and the external proletariat of its barbarian
neighbors.352 “The growths of civilizations are the work of creative individuals
or creative minorities,”353 and “the uncreative majority shall follow the creative
minority’s lead,”354 “either by the mass undergoing the actual experience which
has transformed the creative individuals, or by their imitation of its externals—
in other words, by mimesis,”355 that is by “enlisting the faculty of mimesis (or
imitation) in the souls of the uncreative rank and file,”356 who had not originated
such social “assets”—aptitudes or emotions or ideas, and who “would never have
possessed them if they had not encountered and imitated those who possessed
them.”357 Third, the breakdown or disintegration of civilizations. In Toynbee’s
346 Ibid., p. 60.

347 Toynbee, Arnold J. (1986). A Study of History (Wei-Feng Cao et al., Trans.). Shanghai, CN:
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p.453.
348 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New

349 Ibid., p. 199.
350 Ibid., p. 208.
351 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume 2. New

352 Ibid., pp. 370–372.
353 Toynbee, Arnold J., & Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New

354 Ibid., p. 215.

356 Toynbee, Arnold J., and Somervell, David Churchill. (1987). A Study of History, Volume I. New

357 Ibid., p. 216.
formulation, “the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations can be summed up

in three points: a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering with-
drawal of mimesis on the part of the majority and a consequent loss of social
unity in the society as a whole.”358 In an expanded form this formula runs as
follows: “when, in the history of any society, a creative minority degenerates
into a dominant minority which attempts to retain by force a position that it has
ceased to merit, this change in the character of the ruling element provokes, on
the other side, the secession of a proletariat which no longer admires and imitates
its rulers and revolts against it servitude…this proletariat, when it asserts itself,
is divided from the outset into two distinct parts. There is an internal proletariat,
prostrate and recalcitrant, and an external proletariat beyond the frontiers who
now violently resist incorporation. And thus the breakdown of a civilization
gives rise to a class-war within the body social of a society which was neither
divided against itself by hard-and-fast divisions nor sundered from its neigh-
bors by unbridgeable gulfs so long as it was in growth.”359 From what has been
discussed above, it naturally follows that Toynbee is inclined to favor the view
that the cause underlying the breakdown or collapse of civilizations resides in
the disintegration of civilizational structures.
(4) The development of civilizational structures runs parallel with the course of
civilization. Given that the course of the history of man and the process of the
development of civilization are manifestly bound up with each other, it is not
surprising that there should be a close affinity between the rhythms of these two
processes. The notion of either the history of man or the progress of civilization
as a process of gradual unfolding from lower to higher stages seems to be a
generally established idea in people’s mind. The process of gradual unfolding
from lower to higher stages, which is true of the history of man as well as of the
evolution of civilization, may be briefly summarized as follows. Just as “sub-
man succeeded in turning himself into man in the course of human history,”
so “man, in all the time that has elapsed since sub-man’s achievement made
man human,” will succeed in attaining a super-human level.360 Thus Toynbee
envisions either the whole human history or the total civilizational process as a
progression (or evolution) unfolding its richness and leading through separate
civilizations and their uniform but concretely different rhythms from “under-
Man” and “under-Civilization,” through Man and Civilization, and finally to
Superman and Transfigured Ethereal Super-Civilization of the Kingdom of
God.361 According to Toynbee, the process of gradual unfolding from lower
to higher stages involves the progress of civilization, the development of civi-
lizational structures, and the evolution of man. As the above discussion has
suggested, Arnold Toynbee deserves to rank with the foremost thinkers of this
358 Ibid., p. 246.

359 Ibid.
360 Ibid., p. 197.
361 Sorokin, P. A. (1950). Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis. Boston, MA: Beacon Press,
p. 120.
4 The Concept, Characteristics and Functions of “Group Structure” 449
century as well as among the most eminent historians of his time. Admittedly,
Toynbee did not bring out any scholarly work devoted exclusively to the study of
social or civilizational structures. Nonetheless, his original and impressive ideas
on civilizational structures and the workings thereof would entitle Toynbee to
richly merit the distinction of being one of the most remarkable thinkers that
have devoted themselves ardently and assiduously to the study of civilizational
structures. Toynbee’s philosophy of history based on the basic assumptions
about the framework of civilizational structures and the formula for civiliza-
tions’ survival—the formula of challenge-and-response constantly asserts itself
in providing him with a basis for explaining the rise and fall of civilizations as
well as for generalizing about the history of civilizations in the way philosophy
of history required. It goes without saying that some deficiencies and limitations
inherent in Toynbee’s theory of civilizations would be far from helping him to
clear up certain uncertainties he would surely face when he devoted himself
ardently and assiduously to the study of civilizational phenomena, and that they
would be far from being of any help to him when he attempted to work out wise
solutions for the myriad problems confronting humanity and civilization. With
the above situation in view, Toynbee has no choice but to prostrate himself and
invoke God and the Kingdom of God whereby he could arouse in himself an
intuitive sense of history. Nevertheless, it can be safely asserted that Toynbee’s
life-long study of human societies and civilizations not merely makes a stunning
addition to the vast treasure house of civilizational theories, but, more impor-
tantly, forms a substantial contribution of permanent value to our knowledge of
the history of human societies and civilizations and of the past achievements of
mankind in the manifold spheres of human activity.
4 The Concept, Characteristics and Functions of “Group

Structure”
As shown in the preceding chapter, the author formed an original conception of

personality. Following the same train of thought as in the foregoing chapter, the author
argues that any given group can be conceptualized as a self-contained conscious
entity that asserts itself as an independent self-sufficient being through conscious
control and regulation of its own behavior and that any given group can be defined
as a particular human community that has to engage in a constant struggle for both
immediate survival and long-term existence. The behavioral choice on the part of
any given group that tends to be susceptible to the influence of external stimulus
can be viewed as self-driven and self-determined. For any given group, whatever
forces of nature can only count as mere external stimuli, that is, they tend not to
exercise any determining influence on the behavior of a particular group. Rather, the
behavioral choice on the part of any given group that is subject to the influence of
external stimulus tends to be determined by the group’s internal structure, which is to
say, the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group tends to occur as a result
of the mutual interaction of its constituent elements making up the group’s internal
structure. The internal structure of a group can become the motivating force behind
the behavioral choice on the part of a group and thereby can form the determining
cause underlying the growth and decline of a group. It may be safely affirmed that
the key to a profound grasp of any given group and the structure thereof as well as
to a deep understanding of the existence, development and destiny of a particular
group lies in the fact that we must give the concept of group structure a clear and
lucid explanation.
4.1 The Concept of Group Structure
By “group structure” we mean the interactive relationships between the various

constituent elements of a given institutionalized group and the behavioral norms
thereof that govern the dynamic interactions among the various constituent elements
of a given institutionalized group that “has been instituted by its members or by others
in order to fulfill a specific purpose.”362 Moreover, we mean by “group structure”
the organic system consisting of such subjects as individuals and cultural elements
making up a given institutionalized group as well as of their complex relationships,
such as those among individuals, those among cultural elements, and those between
individuals and cultural elements. The structure of any institutionalized group is a
living and dynamic system, is differently endowed with regard to the integrative
capacity, and is in a position to make appropriate behavior choices so as to cope
with external environmental pressures. In making appropriate responses to external
stimuli the structure of any institutionalized group is capable of constant adjustment
to both internal and external environmental changes so as to make itself undergo
development and change.
The rich connotations inherent in the concept of “group structure” can be
summarized as follows.
(1) The creation of “group structure” tends to stem from the institutionalization of
an organic system, thereby asserting itself as an institutionalized system in its
own right. In a general way “group structure” is an organic system that the sepa-
rate sets of institutions work together to establish, to support, and to maintain
while the various institutions interact with each other and operate as an organic
system. Whatever type of “group structure” constitutes no exception to the
universal creation of “group structure” stemming from the institutionalization
of an organic system. The separate sets of institutions, which tend to be estab-
lished by various “groups,” include the established rules, patterns of life, and
behavioral norms that are designed to handle or deal with the complex relation-
ships manifesting themselves in the manifold spheres of human existence. As
the famous British functionalist anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown pointed out,
362Taylor, Claire., & Vlassopoulos, Kostas., eds. (2015). Communities and Networks in the Ancient
Greek World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 179.
the study of social institutions is an important aspect of social structure, and

social structure has to be described by the institutions, which define the proper
or expected conduct of persons in their various relationships.363 Institutions that
are the most distinguishing characteristics of group structures tend to provide a
sound basis for the existence and development of group structures.
(2) “Group structure” is an organic whole made up of many complex elements.
“Group structure” includes subjective structures and cultural structures. The
former is composed of the relationships among people, the hierarchical structure
of groups, and the group categorization system, while the latter consists of a
particular group’s ideologies and institutions as well as of its productive forces
mainly associated with the power of science and the power of technology. In
addition, “group structure” also includes the functions of subjective structures
and of cultural structures as well as the relationships between subjective and
cultural structures. Despite the fact that “group structure” consists of numerous
and diverse constituent elements and the various complex relationships thereof,
it can integrate itself into an organic whole through its internal mechanisms and
as such can render possible the unity of the whole system.
(3) “Group structure” is a dynamic system. In a general way “group structure” can
be likened to a complicated organism that can be brought into existence through
the efforts of human subjects. In itself, “group structure” rightly asserts itself
as a dynamic system endowed with abounding vitality and enormous energy.
When we concern ourselves with the problem of how driving (or motive) forces
exist within a particular group, we may safely assert that motive (or driving)
forces are inherent in the internal relationships among the constituent elements
composed of a particular group’s ideologies, institutions, and productive forces
closely connected with the power of science and the power of technology, as
well as in the correlations between the several different subsystems making
up the structure of a particular group. Likewise, driving (or) motive forces
also manifest themselves in the relationships between subjective and cultural
structures. In the proper sense of the term, “group structure” constitutes a living
and dynamic system, which can be described as a power set in a metaphorical
sense, and which may be represented as a self-contained conscious entity in a
philosophical sense.
(4) “Group structure” is marked by continuous and productive activity and thus is
subject to change. “Group structure” tends to undergo constant evolutionary
change and development. “Group structure” when faced with external environ-
mental pressures tends to undergo constant transformation and adjustment so
as to adapt itself to an ever-changing external environment. Hence it may be
safely asserted that “group structure” existing as a living and dynamic system
can be regarded as the most sophisticated system in existence that in itself can be
viewed as undergoing constant self-transcendence. Moreover, it is worth noting
that “group structure” tends to present itself as the immediate system that in
363Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1988). Method in Social Anthropology (Jian-Zhong Xia, Trans.). Jinan,
China: Shandong People’s Publishing House, p. 146.
its turn is liable to undergo a continuous process of change and development.

More often than not, “group structure” tends to find itself in a delicate situation,
having to adjust to changes in environment while at the same time expected
to change itself. It seems quite likely that once “group structure” is tardy in
responding to environmental changes and ceases transcending itself, it tends to
find itself facing enormous pressures and formidable challenges coming from
the external environment, whereby it can incur the risk of being eliminated.
(5) “Group structure,” which exists as an organic system with a purpose in view,
tends to display a great adroitness in making behavioral choices. Just as man,
who exists as a complicated organism, that is as a conscious being or as a species-
being, makes his own life and his life activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness and has the unique gift of being able to make behavioral choices,
so any given group that is brought into existence through the efforts of human
subjects tends to exist as a living system with a purpose in view and to show
considerable adroitness in making behavioral choices. Any group structure that
is innately endowed with unique operating mechanisms is immediately one with
its life activity it adopts as an object for itself. The structure of any given group
when confronted with a myriad of external environmental pressures can make
various decisions and behavioral choices that tend to exercise a determining
influence on its survival and development, whereby it will be able to determine
its own destiny by properly exercising its own free will. The reasons for the above
argument are twofold. The reason lies not only in the fact that groups structures
tend to be brought into existence through the efforts of human subjects, but
also in that fact that any group structure is innately endowed with the unique
mechanisms for making appropriate decisions and behavioral choices, that is the
inherent mechanisms of subjective decision-making, by which we mean that any
group structure when faced with enormous pressures and formidable challenges
from the external environment is able to make appropriate decisions by properly
exercising its own free will as well as by working properly its highly complex
and efficient mechanisms of decision-making, whereby any given group can
make appropriate behavioral choices so as to influence and determine its own
destiny. From what has been discussed above, we may, therefore, reasonably
conclude that man rightly asserts himself as the only organism in the world that
can make conscious choices and thereby grasp his destiny in his own hands.
4.2 The Basic Hierarchy of Group Structures
The main ideas about the basic structure of groups underlying the theory of “structure
and choice” may be summarized as follows.
(1) The basic component parts making up the whole structure of any particular
group.
“Group structure” is an organic system consisting of “a three-tier structure and
seven kinds of powers.” The “three-tier structure or system” is composed of three
constituent (or component) subsystems—that is, the subject acting in the capacity
of a particular group, the culture of a particular group, and the behavioral choice
on the part of a particular group, which in their turn organize themselves into an
organic system in the way any particular system or structure requires. In the three-
tier system, each tier comprises several constituent subsystems, or rather, several
lower-level component structures.
Thus, “group structure” can be succinctly summarized in the general statement—
“the three-tier structure and seven kinds of powers.”
The first tier in the three-tier system is the human subject acting in the capacity
of a particular group. The first tier in the three-tier structure is mainly composed of
three constituent elements—that is, subjective leadership, subjective qualities, and
subjective stratification or identification. The several constituent elements comprising
the human subjects of a particular group, when contrasted with other component parts
of a particular group, can be characterized as the most fundamental, the most lively,
and the most energetic. The subject acting in the capacity of a particular group tends
to possess all of the characteristics of the human subject, such as the social character,
practicality (or practicalness), initiative, creativity, transcendence, the unique ability
to make rational choices, etc. The three constituent elements inherent in the human
subject of a particular group correlate with each other, interact with each, and depend
on each other in the way any particular system or structure is required. What applies to
the correlations among the three constituent elements making up the human subject of
a particular group also holds of the relationships between the above three component
parts and the other two constituent subsystems of the three-tier structure.
The second tier in the three-tier system is the culture of a particular group primarily
composed of three constituent elements, or rather, a particular group’s productive
forces mainly associated with the power of science and the power of technology as
well as its ideologies and institutions. By the culture of a particular group, that is the
most basic constituent part of a particular group, we mean the aggregate of material
and intellectual wealth created by the human subjects of a particular group. The three
constituent elements inherent in the culture of a particular group correlate with each
other, interact with each, and depend on each other in the way any particular system
or structure is required. What applies to the correlations among the three constituent
elements making up the culture of a particular group also holds of the relationships
between the above three component parts and the other two constituent subsystems
of the three-tier structure.
The third tier in the three-tier system is the behavioral choice on the part of
a particular group. The third tier consists of a mere constituent element, that is
the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group. In view of the fact that a
particular group is susceptible to the influence of external stimuli, the behavioral
choice on the part of a particular group tends to be the outcome of an interaction
among the various constituent elements of the whole structure of a particular group.
Specifically, by the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group we mean that
the structure of a particular group acting in the capacity of a living subject, when
confronted with enormous pressures and formidable challenges coming from the
external environment, tends to make appropriate responses and behavioral choices
to address them, and that the human subject acting in the capacity of a particular
group and the culture thereof correlate with each other and interact with each other
so as to make it possible for the whole structure of a particular group to cope with
external environmental stress. The mechanism for rendering possible the behavioral
choice on the part of a particular group can be briefly described as follows. When
faced with external environmental pressures, the human subject acting in the capacity
of a particular group first makes an extensive exploration of its culture and seeks
workable solutions for the problems by which it is confronted and then makes well-
considered decisions and appropriate behavioral choices, thereby rendering possible
the behavioral choice on the part of a particular group. The behavioral choice on the
part of a particular group is constantly going through the same process again and will
never cease repeating this process so long as the group exists as a living organism.
(2) The internal relationships and their defining characteristics within the structure
of a particular group.
In a general way, what applies to the relationships between the whole structure of a
particular group and its constituent elements as well as to the relationships among
the various constituent elements inherent in the structure of a particular group does
not hold true for the relationships between the whole and its component parts in
the usual sense or for the relationships among the component parts of the whole in
the ordinary sense. Rather, the relationships between the whole structure of a partic-
ular group and its constituent elements as well as the relationships among the various
constituent elements making up the whole structure of a particular group are inherent
in a particular system or structure. The basic tenets of systems theory may help to
enlighten us about the theoretical assumptions underlying the internal relationships
within the structure of a particular group as well as about the defining characteristic
with which these internal relationships are endowed. Systems theory is the interdis-
ciplinary study of the general patterns, structures, and regularities manifested in a
system. Specifically, systems theory helps to throw considerable light upon the rela-
tionships among the various constituent elements both within and outside a particular
system, upon the interrelationships between the various constituent elements within
a particular system and their counterparts outside the particular system, and upon
the functions of the various constituent elements both within and outside a particular
system, whereby on the one hand systems theory can provide further enlightenment
about the nature of the structure of a particular group and of its internal relationships
as well as about the inherent regularities manifested in the internal relationships
among the various constituent elements of the structure of a particular group; and,
on the other, it can provide us with the proper methods for the study of the nature and
regularities with which the structure of a particular group is endowed. The defining
characteristics, with which are endowed the interrelationships between the whole
structure of a particular group and its constituent elements as well as the relation-
ships among the various constituent elements of the structure of a particular group,
can be summarized as follows.
First, in a specific external environment the three constituent subsystems of the
three-tier structure—that is, the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group,
the culture of a particular group, and the behavioral choice on the part of a particular
group, are correlated with one another in a particular way or in particular ways
and ultimately are closely integrated into an organic whole, namely the structure
of a particular group. The structure of a particular group when confronted with
external environmental pressures tend to ensure integration of the human subject of
a particular group with the culture of a particular group and to render possible the
holistic workings of the three-tier system, whereby the structure of a particular group
can make it possible for a particular group to make appropriate behavioral choices
and respond to external environmental pressures.
Second, the holistic mode of thinking, with which the structure of a particular
group is endowed, may prove of great importance to the existence and development
of a particular group and thus merits special emphasis. The structure of a particular
group rightly asserts itself as an organic whole, and its constituent elements, which are
endowed with their respective specific functions and which deserve their respective
unique places in the whole structure of a particular group, are linked or correlated with
one another in a particular way or in particular ways. From a holistic point of view, the
structure of a particular group tends to require that the function of the whole should
be greater than the sum of the functions of its component parts. However, it does not
naturally follow that its constituent elements in good working order will ensure that
the whole structure of a particular group is functioning perfectly. From what has been
discussed above, we may safely assert that only if the various constituent elements
making up the structure of a particular group observe the principles and regularities
that may prove of fundamental importance to the existence and development of a
particular group can they give full play to their respective functions, thereby allowing
full scope for the function of the whole structure of a particular group.
Third, the “systematic or structural relationship” unique to the structure of a
particular group is fundamentally different from the relationship between the whole
and its parts as well as from the relation of essence to phenomenon. We feel that
it is our first task to distinguish the “structural (or systematic) relationship” from
that of “the whole to its parts.” By the “systematic or structural relationship” we
mean the relationship between the whole and its parts belonging by nature to the
human world, while the relationship of the whole to its parts in the usual sense is
unique to the natural world. It is therefore clear that the essential difference between
these two relationships lies in that fact that the former is characterized by subjective
participation and domination, while the latter belongs to a purely natural category.
In addition, either of these two relationships undergoes different developmental or
evolutionary pathways and thus follows its own law. In what follows, we’ll concern
ourselves about the difference between the “structural (or systematic) relationship”
and the relation of essence to phenomenon. In the relation between essence and
existence (phenomenon or appearance) the constituent elements or component parts
tend to be viewed as the phenomena or appearances of the whole whereas the whole
tends to be conceived of as the essence of the constituent elements or component parts.
Thus it can be seen that what applies to the relation of essence to phenomenon does not
hold of the relationship of the whole to its parts unique to the structure of a particular
group that belongs by nature to the human world. Therefore, we seem reasonably
justified in concluding that the relationship between the whole structure of a particular
group and its constituent elements as well as the relationships among its component
parts is neither the simple relationship of the whole to its parts nor the relation
of essence to phenomenon, but rather the “systematic or structural” relationship
belonging by nature to the human world. As already discussed above, the “systematic
or structural” relationship refers to the particular structural relationship belonging by
nature to the human world, or more specifically, the relationship between the whole
and its component parts as well as the relationships among the constituent elements.
It is commonly asserted that man is “capable of more comprehensive consciousness
than the powers of brutes are susceptible of.”364 Thus, in the “systematic or structural”
relationship characterized by subjective participation and domination as well as by
the human subject’s more comprehensive consciousness, the whole that is made up
of its constituent elements cannot be reduced to the sum of its component parts
which in their turn cannot substitute for the whole. Admittedly, on the one hand the
“systematic or structural” relationship, in its true nature, is more complicated and
changeable, but on the other, for the structure of a particular group, this relationship
does constitute a realistic one.365
Fourth, what applies to the special complex relationships among the constituent
elements of a particular system also holds of the relationships between the subject
acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof, which tend to
manifest themselves in myriad ways across manifold aspects of the structure of a
particular group. To begin with, let’s set forth the relation between end and means.
In a general way what applies to the relation between end and means also holds good
for the relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group
and the culture thereof, which is to say, the former is the end of the latter, while, on
the contrary, the latter is a means to its end. The culture of a particular group, in its
original and strict sense, tends to be created and developed by the human subjects
of a particular group, who have to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate
survival and long-term development, and to be a means of serving the human subjects
of a particular group. Some keen students of “group culture” even liken the culture of
a particular group to the organs based outside the living human body. The comparison
of “group culture” to extracorporeal organs in no way better reveals that what applies
to the relation between end and means also holds true for the relationship between
the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture thereof. In
addressing ourselves to the relationship between the human subjects of a particular
group and their culture, we come to a keen realization of the fact that our second task is
to demonstrate that what applies to the relation between subject and object also holds
of the relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group
and the culture thereof. By way of comparison we can safely affirm that the subject
acting in the capacity of a particular group enjoys the unique distinction of being
364 Bebeke, Eduard Friedrich. (2001). Elements of Psychology on the Principles of Beneke. Carlisle,
MA: Applewood Books, p. 23.
365 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental

subject and that the culture of a particular group rightly asserts itself as object. From
what has been said above, we may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the subject
acting in the capacity of a particular group is the initiator of the behavior, whereas
the culture of a particular group is the recipient of the behavior, and that the human
subject of a particular group is, of necessity, endowed with certain distinguishing
characteristics such as initiative, independence, creativity, transcendence, and the
unique gift of making behavioral choices. It must, however, be pointed out that
despite acting in the capacity of object, as compared with the subject acting in the
capacity of a particular group, the culture of a particular group acting in the capacity
of the recipient of the behavior is far from passive. The culture of a particular group,
which is, of necessity, endowed with objectivity and initiative independent of human
will following its creation, could not fail to exercise a permeating and determining
influence on the human subject of a particular group, to lend unfailing moral support
to it or to put a restraint on its activity, whereby the subject acting in the capacity of
a particular group can only enjoy relative independence and freedom. In a general
way the culture of a particular group tends to open up infinite possibilities for the
behavioral choice on the part of a particular group which, in turn, cannot by any means
occur outside the range of possibilities allowed by the culture of a particular group. In
what follows, we’ll try to give a concise description of the third relationship between
the human subjects of a particular group and their culture, which is to say, the culture
of a particular group tends to lay the basis for the existence and development of the
human subjects of a particular group and to provide the necessary conditions under
which the human subjects of a particular group give full play to their functions as an
integral whole. By contrast, the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group
is essential to giving full play to the functions with which the culture of a particular
group is endowed. In other words, the human subjects of a particular group can render
possible their behavioral choices only if the culture of a particular group provides
a sound basis for their behavioral choices and opens up infinite possibilities for
them or provided that cultural tendencies are comprehensible to the human subjects
of a particular group. However, it is worth noting that when compared with the
behavioral choice on the part of a particular group, there is little scope left for group
cultures’. It thus stands to reason that only the behavioral choice on the part of the
human subject of a particular group can ensure that all of the cultural tendencies of
a particular group manifest themselves in myriad ways across diverse aspects of a
particular group and that infinite possibilities for a particular group become possible
of realization. It is therefore evident that for the culture of a particular group, the key
to giving full play to its functions lies in the absolute dependence of the culture of
a particular group upon the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group. The
fourth relationship between the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group
and its culture is characterized by mutual support as well as by mutual conditioning,
or mutual causation. Whereas the levels of culture and of development achieved by
the human subjects of a particular group tend to provide enough of what the culture
of a particular group needs in order to exist and develop, they may make the culture of
a particular group undergo arrested development. Likewise, the level of development
the culture of a particular group has attained, on the one hand, may rightly assert
itself as the motive force behind the existence and development of the human subjects
of a particular group, but on the other, it may stunt the growth of a particular group
in all its bearings. As regards the fifth relationship, it is abundantly attested that the
culture of a particular group creates the subject acting in the capacity of a particular
group, and vice versa. That is to say, they create each other and build up each other.
To recapitulate briefly, the relationship is perhaps best summarized in the following
statement: the human subjects of a particular group tend to be created and built up
by their cultures, and vice versa.
4.3 The Characteristics of Group Structure
In a general way the structure of a particular group is endowed with the following
characteristics.
(1) In what follows, then, our discussion is primarily concerned with the holistic
character of the structure of a particular group. Rather than asserting itself as
a mechanical combination of its constituent elements or as a simple aggregate
of its component parts, the structure of a particular group can only be regarded
as an organic whole. The various constituent elements inherent in the structure
of a particular group tend to exist the way a particular system or structure does,
and each separate constituent element fails to perform the holistic function of
the structure of a particular group, that is, the whole is greater (or more) than
the sum of its parts. However, it is worth noting that it is within the structure
of a particular group that each component part is, of necessity, endowed with
its own functions and characteristics, whereas each constituent element cannot
by any means possess such functions and characteristics when it is divorced
from the whole structure of a particular group. Since the holistic character of
the structure of a particular group tends to manifest itself in two especially
salient dimensions—the spatial and the temporal—it is necessary to distinguish
these two distinct but mutually interactive aspects of the structure of a partic-
ular group. To put it in a nutshell, we can acquire a good grasp of the holistic
characteristic inherent in the structure of a particular group both spatially and
temporally. In spatial terms, the structure of a particular group tends to exist
as a separate entity, or rather as an organic whole, which is to say, notwith-
standing the complicated relationships among its separate constituent elements,
with very few exceptions, the various constituent elements making up the struc-
ture of a particular group are almost invariably integrated into a unity that tends
to be kept in good working order, whereby the separate constituent elements
could at least be brought to act in unison so as to make sure that the structure
of a particular group and any subsystem thereof can engage in the constant
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence. Moreover, when
confronted with external environmental pressures and challenges, the structure
of a particular group can depend upon its own mechanisms to secure close coor-
dination among its constituent elements and make them come into operation
in a holistic way, whereby the structure of a particular group can bring about
the unity of its constituent elements which, in their turn, may take a holistic
approach to their behavioral choices. In temporal terms, in primitive society
primitive men began to concern themselves with the alternation of seasons and
observations of such natural phenomena generated curiosity in their minds as to
how the seasons revolve in the course of nature. Let us take a concrete example
to serve as an illustration. In earlier civilizations, a calendar is any system for
dividing time over extended periods, such as years, months, days, or hours,
and arranging such divisions in a definite order—or to put it the other way
round, a calendar is an orderly arrangement of the divisions of time as years,
months, weeks and days adapted to the purpose of civil life. Among primi-
tive peoples, such a calendar system suggests that the holistic conception of
the universe shared by primitive peoples was wedded to “the orderly arrange-
ment of a primitive group effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a
common purpose,”366 and that primitive peoples sought to synchronize their
life with the rhythm of the seasons and thus to preserve their life in its proper
unity. In The Classic of Poetry (or The Book of Songs), which is the oldest
existing collection of Chinese poetry in world literature and the finest treasure
of Chinese traditional songs that Chinese antiquity has left us, there are many
popular poems such as lyrics, folksongs, eulogies, and hymns describing how
the holistic conception of time and particularly of the course of seasons held by
the people of the Chinese Zhou dynasty is closely connected with the orderly
organization of their social activities, whereby the Zhou people could preserve
their life in its proper unity. As Martin Kern has argued, the Book of Songs
creates “normative cultural memory” for Chinese people of different gener-
ations, by which he means “a social construction that comprises those parts
of the Chinese past that are fundamentally meaningful to present-day Chinese
society.”367 According to him, “the most comprehensive and lasting representa-
tion of archaic Chinese poetry is the corpus preserved in the Poetry, an anthology
of songs that encompasses the voices of rulers as well as those of the common
people, verses of mythological remembrance and celebration, as well as lyrics
of love and hope, solitude and despair. It is this all-embracing view of human
existence, expressed in the solemn and straightforward diction of pre-classical
Chinese, that has established the Poetry as the foundational text of Chinese
literature.”368 For example, the oft quoted poem “The Seventh Moon” (七月
Qi Yue) in the subsection of Airs of Bin “specifies at what time a certain action
366 Bedworth, David A., & Bedworth, Albert E., eds. (2010). The Dictionary of Health Education.
New York, NY; Oxford University Press, p. 123.
367 Daniel, Ding. (2020). The Historical Roots of Technical Communication in the Chinese Tradition.
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 62.

368 Owen, Stephen., ed. (2010). The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Volume I. Cambridge,

is performed” and it “does this by juxtaposing natural phenomena with human

actions” so that “we could understand the natural phenomena as descriptions
of the chronological context in which human actions are performed.”369 As
Martin Kern puts it, the “Airs of Bin” are mostly shorter lyrics composed in
simple formulaic language, that is, they are generally ancient folk songs that
record the voice of the common people.370 “So often the poem presents a situ-
ation where human actions are performed when a specific natural phenomenon
occurs, such as in ‘七月流火’ (In the seventh moon/Scorpio sets down) and in
‘九月授衣’ (In the ninth moon/it is time to give clothes to peasants).”371 The
poem under discussion, which comprises eight stanzas, each of which has a
marked lyric quality, describes how the Zhou people managed to synchronize
their sacrificial ceremonies and daily life such as food, clothing, shelter and
transport with the regular succession of months. Moreover, it is safe to assume
that “this poem, in its juxtaposing of certain natural phenomena that occur in a
moon, with human activities in that moon, represents the Chinese philosophical
thought of ‘oneness of nature and humans’ that the oracle-bone-inscription texts
championed.”372 From what has been discussed above we seem fairly justified
in concluding that the people of the Zhou dynasty began to attach great impor-
tance to the marriage of the holistic conception of the course of seasons and the
orderly organization of social activities so that they could preserve their social
life in its proper unity.373
(2) The structure of a particular group rightly asserts itself as an organic system
and as such stands to reason that it is endowed with the distinguishing charac-
teristics of a particular system or structure. The constituent elements inherent
in the structure of a particular group, far from existing as discrete entities to
such an extent that there is little correlation between them, are related to each
other by causal laws and connected with each other in an orderly and relatively
predictable manner. The separate constituent elements, which are endowed with
their respective specific functions and which deserve their respective unique
places in the whole structure of a particular group, are linked or correlated
with one another in a particular way or in particular ways. Only if the various
constituent elements making up the structure of a particular group observe the
principles and regularities that may prove of fundamental importance to the
existence and development of a particular group can they give full play to their
respective functions with which the separate constituent elements are inherently
endowed, thereby allowing full scope for the overall function of the structure of
370 Owen, Stephen., ed. (2010). The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Volume I. Cambridge,


372 Ibid., p. 66.
373 Wang, Ming-Ming. (2005). What is Anthropology ? Beijing, China: Peking University Press,
pp. 103–106.
a particular group. As regards the structural character of group structures, there

is, in addition, one further point to make, that is, the structural character of group
structures tends to manifest itself in the fact that group structures, with very few
exceptions, invariably assume an isomorphic form. Despite the fact that group
structures each have rich and varied contents to themselves, they are of iden-
tical or similar form—or, to put it another way, the structural forms of different
groups are almost identical to each other. To recapitulate briefly, the structural
form of any given group can be reduced to “the three-tier structure and seven
kinds of powers.” In order to make us abundantly clear about the fact that group
structures, with very few exceptions, invariably assume an isomorphic form,
Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, both professors of social anthropology at
the University of St Andrews, developed a critical comparison between, and
assessment of, modern Western societies and existing primitive communities.
“McGrane argues that the idea of the superiority of Western culture, particu-
larly its spectacular scientific success, became the potent and decidedly unliberal
yardstick through which anthropologists assessed the accomplishments of other
cultures. There is the superior Western culture, and then there are all the rest
as contrast. A sharp divide is created, with epistemological privilege always on
the side of the West. In general, the process of exoticizing other cultures has
been intensified through this tendency of characterizing their salient features
in contrastive frames to our own. The content varies somewhat in accordance
to context, but in each contrastive frame, we find lurking the underlying idea
that ‘unsophisticated’ technology is understood to entail weak religion, weak
thought, weak ritual, weak politics, weak economics. Thus, we have science,
they have magic; or we have history, they have myth; we have high-tech agricul-
ture, they have subsistence practices; we have priests, they have shamans; or we
have scientists, they have shamans; we have philosophy, they have beliefs; we
are literate, they are illiterate; or we have writing, they have oral literature; we
have theater, they have ritual; we have government, they have elders; we have
rationality, they are pre-logical; we have individualism, they have community—
and so on through a myriad of cultural traits that are suggestive of a thesis long
popular in the history of Western thought that equates ‘simple’ technology with
simple minds.”374 From what has been discussed above it is therefore clear that
group structures are endowed with roughly the same structural form, which is to
say, group structures, with very few exceptions, invariably assume an isomor-
phic form. The very fact that group structures invariably assume an isomorphic
form, for Claude Lévi-Strauss, can be analyzed in terms of the invariant structure
of the human mind, or rather an unconscious “metastructure” emerging through
the human mental process of pairing opposites.375 Just as the invariant structure
of the human mind, that is an unconscious “metastructure” emerging through the
374 Rapport, Nigel., & Overing, Joanna. Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts. New
375 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “structuralism.” Encyclopedia Britannica. March 18,
2014. https://www.britannica.com/science/structuralism-anthropology.
human mental process of pairing opposites, is to a considerable extent common

to all human beings, so group structures that are brought into existence largely
through the conscious efforts of human beings are, of necessity, endowed with
roughly the same structural form.376
(3) Group structure is in a constant process of change or development and is thereby
endowed with an intrinsically dynamic character. The structure of a particular
group is far from static, inflexible, rigid or ossified. Rather, the structure of any
given group rightly asserts itself as a dynamic system involving constant change
and development. Any particular group can be conceived of as being at once a
structure and a process. By way of illustration, let us examine how Marx and
Engels viewed social structures in their proper historical perspective so that
their powerful and subtle analyses of how social structures function and change
threw considerable further light upon the nature of social structures as well
as upon the dynamic character of group structures. Marx and Engels believed
that “society is a social structure, or system,” that is, society can be seen as
composed of organically interrelated parts,377 such as the productive forces,
the relations of production, the economic base, the superstructure, and so forth.
Furthermore, Marx and Engels argue that the structure of society must of neces-
sity show itself as the class structure and social stratification in a given kind of
class society. For Marx and Engels, the contradictions and struggles inherent
in the social structures in question tend to constitute the main driving forces
for the development of human society from the lower to the higher, or rather to
provide the dynamic for the internally motivated transformation from lower to
higher stages of society. Accordingly, “it is often asserted that Marxism holds
a teleological, evolutionist notion of history, which posits a number of distinct
stages through which societies pass,”378 namely primitive communism, slavery,
feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism.379 It can thus be seen that the
structure of society is a structure as well as being a process. In his pointed critique
of structuralist Marxism, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist
and Structuralist Theories of History, German philosopher Alfred Schmidt, who
has established distinction as a noted scholar of critical theory, leveled pene-
trating and shrewd criticisms at two one-sided views on Marx and Engels’ theory
of social structure—that is to say, some scholars are inclined to favor the view
that the Marxian theory of social structure can be reduced to mere conceptu-
alizations of “structure without history,” while others tend to endorse the view
that Marx’s theory of social structure can be simply defined as the materialistic
376 Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Major Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing,
377 Turner, Jonathan H. (2013). Theoretical Sociology: 1830 to the Present. Thousand Oaks, CA:

378 Jones, Branwen Gruffydd.(2006). Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach. New

379 Vidal, Matt., Smith, Tony., Rotta, Tomás., & Prew, Paul., eds. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of
Karl Marx. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 157.

conception of “history without structure.” “Against a mere standpoint philos-

ophy, which believes it can reach truth through the unwavering absolutisation
of isolated ideological certainties, Schmidt always claimed that knowledge can
only be attained in the critical passage through conflicting positions—that is to
say, neither as a middle position between extremes nor through the simple affir-
mation of one side.”380 Schmidt returns instead to Hegel’s and Marx’s historical
texts and presents an original and suggestive account of Marx’s appropriation of
Hegel, and, most importantly, of the concept of “dialectical mediation” of logic
and history. Whilst expounding on the perennial opposition of “logic,” “theory,”
“system,” and “structure,” on the one hand, and “history-as-narrative” on the
other, Schmidt argues that holding with only one side of this opposition—either
structure without history or history without structure—is unfaithful to Marx and
also makes for inadequate history. He went on to propose a new thesis about
Marx’s theory of social structure, which is to say, Marx’s social theory is inher-
ently endowed with the dual-character—history and structure. In other words,
Marx takes a historical view of human society, holding that human society can be
viewed not only as a structure but also as a process of historical development.381
Hence it may be safely asserted that the structure of society rightly asserts itself
as the unity of structure and history, which holds true for any kind of group
structure. Whether it be the family structure, the organizational structure or the
state structure, with very few exceptions, it will invariably assert itself both as a
structure and the course of history, which tend to undergo a process of constant
change and development.
(4) In what follows our primary concern is to gain a clearer conception of the core
of a particular group structure. It is often asserted that the structure of a partic-
ular group rightly asserts itself as an organic system that tends to be brought
into existence through the conscious efforts of human subjects, whereby its
most important constituent element must of necessity bring into existence the
central character of a particular group structure. Among the various constituent
elements inherent in the structure of a particular group exists the central element
that has its own enormous dominating power in relation to other elements of
a particular group structure, whereby the fundamental constituent element can
get other elements to cohere, exercise control over them, acquire great influence
over them, submit them to restraint, and provide for the rational and scientific
management of their affairs. The central element tends to ensure that every
other element has its own vested interest that is due to itself and that the various
constituent elements act in concert to meet environmental pressures and chal-
lenges, whereby any particular group with all its varied elements integrated into
an organic whole can engage in the constant struggle for both immediate survival
and long-term development. Conducting a systematic examination of the habits
380 Best, Beverley., Bonefeld, Werner., & O’kane, Chris., eds. (2018). The SAGE Handbook of
Frankfurt School Critical Theory. London, UK: SAGE Publications, p. 305.
381 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004). A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental

and characteristics of many higher primate groups and, in particular, of the

evolutionary roots of dominance and hierarchy among higher primates may be
sufficient to enlighten us as to how the key distinguishing characteristic of the
fundamental constituent element inherent in the structure of a particular group
started into existence. As a general rule dominance hierarchy forms the basis
of many, if not most, primate social structures—that is, hierarchical structure
characterizes group organization in many primate species.382 For most primate
groups, leadership is expressed through a male-based dominance hierarchy,383
in which an alpha male, to use the scientific term, tends to dominate as the group
leader.384 Among many primates, dominance hierarchies tend to result in leader-
ship functions and in social regulation of individual behavior,385 which is to say,
the dominant group leader is responsible for controlling, governing, or directing
the behavior of the whole group, or rather, “deciding where to move next,
initiating travel, and leading a group between food, water resources, and rest
sites.”386 Once the order of dominance is established in a primate group, this hier-
archical structure serves to maintain order among the members of the primate
group, or, more specifically, to head off conflict and socially disruptive activi-
ties or to reduce chaotic behaviors and promote orderly, adaptive conduct. Most
species of nonhuman primates are social and have evolved to live in complex
societies. They form intricate social relationships, engage in species-specific
social behaviors, and develop many social skills necessary for group living. In
general, the study of social development and affiliation in primates tends to
be organized around the study of interactions, relationships, and social struc-
ture.387 In the complex hierarchical structure of a nonhuman primate society, the
relative social position of a primate tends to be determined by “the social status
of individuals relative to other group members (e.g., dominance rank).”388 For
most nonhuman primate groups, maintaining social order through dominance
hierarchy tends to depend primarily upon whether or not more dominant indi-
viduals, who, more often than not, can compete successfully with their peers for
more food and mating opportunities, are able to control access to resources at
382 Haviland, William A., Prins, Harald E. L., Walrath, Dana., & McBride, Bunny. (2016). The
Essence of Anthropology. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, p. 65.
383 Andrea, Alfred J., Neel, Carolyn., & Aldenderfer, Mark., eds. (2011). World History Encyclo-
pedia, Volume 2. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 222.

384 Mayseless, Ofra. (2016). The Caring Motivation: An Integrated Theory. New York, NY: Oxford

385 Boehm, Christopher. (1987). Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in
Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies. Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press,
p. 231.
386 Spotte, Stephen. (2012). Societies of Wolves and Free-ranging Dogs. New York, NY: Cambridge

387 Maestripieri, Dario., ed. (2005). Primate Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, p. 173.
388 Vonk, Jennifer., & Shackleford, Todd K., eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative

the expense of more subordinate members.389 The hierarchical structure, which

rightly asserts itself as one of the most fundamental characteristics of higher
nonhuman primates, has been undergoing constant evolution and development
in the human world, whereby group structures, which tend to be brought into
existence through the conscious efforts of human beings, are becoming more
complex and more sophisticated. On the one hand human beings are espe-
cially expert at creating group structures of various kinds, such as the family
structure, the organizational structure, the state structure, the international orga-
nizations, and so forth, but on the other, each individual is inseparably bound
up with the existence and development of a particular group structure. Any
particular group has a unique structure to itself, which tends to comprise the
fundamental constituent element and other less important component parts. In
general, within the traditional family structure the parents are the core of the
family and perform the roles that modern society associates with the parents.
In the ordinary sense of the word the term “management” refers to the collec-
tive body of those who manage or direct an organization and who tend to be
classified in a hierarchy of authority and to perform different tasks, such as the
manager, the chairman of the board of directors, president (or chancellor), dean
(the head of a division, faculty, college, or school of a university), the head of
an institute, office, etc., director (or chief), and other persons assuming manage-
rial roles at various levels of the managerial hierarchy of an organization. The
core of an organizational structure is the top manager or senior management
group who perform management functions and oversee both the organization’s
internal and external structures.390 “From a managerial perspective, structure
enables management to define lines of responsibility and authority, control work
activities, and accomplish organizational goals. From a worker’s perspective,
different structural configurations affect not only productivity and economic
results, defined by the marketplace, but also the job satisfaction, commitment,
motivation, and perceptions about expectations and obligations.”391 As often as
not, “it is the top management who establish norms that filter down through the
organization and thereby sustain the organization’s culture.”392 State leaders or
the core leadership of the state are the core of the state structures. The core
of international organizations tends to consist of the various types of manage-
ment groups well as of the persons in charge such as chairperson, president
of a society or association, chief executive officer, and so forth. The core of
a particular group structure is the center of supreme power and authority in
the group, which is vested with adequate powers of execution and supervision
389 Li, Fa-Jun. (2007). Biological Anthropology. Guangzhou, China: Zhongshan University Press,
pp. 111–112.
390 Lauffer, Armand. (2011). Understanding Your Social Agency. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
391 Mills, Albert J., Mills, Jean C. Helms., Bratton, John., & Forshaw, Carolyn. (2007). Organiza-
tional Behavior in a Global Context. Peterborough, CA-ON: Broad view Press, p. 459.
392 Aquinas, P. G. (2008). Organization Structure and Design – Applications & Challenges. New
Delhi, IN: Excel Books, p. 435.

clearly defined by law and which is required to undertake important responsi-

bilities involving a variety of tasks such as collecting and analyzing information
and making decisions. Hence we may safely assert that the core of a particular
group structure tends to play a key (or fundamental) role in rendering possible
the existence and development of a particular group and that in some cases it
constitutes a decisive factor in the existence and development of a particular
group.
4.4 The Functions of Group Structures
Just as the structure of the human body has its normal functions, so any given group
structure has unique functions to itself. By the functions of group structures we
mean that any given group structure tends to affect the way people conduct their
lives, to influence how a particular group can engage in the constant struggle for
both immediate survival and long-term development, and to determine, to a greater
or lesser extent, the nature of a particular group. In general, any given group structure
tends to accomplish the following four functions.
(1) The basic function of a particular group structure is to make behavioral choices.
When confronted with external environmental pressures, any given group struc-
ture tends to invoke the aid of the inner workings of these two subsystems,
namely the subject acting in the capacity of a particular group and the culture
thereof, to make appropriate behavioral choices whereby it will be in a positon
to respond to environmental pressures and challenges. The behavioral choices
made by any given group structure fall into two categories. “The external
behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure tends to be made
in direct response to external environmental pressures and challenges, while
“the internal behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure has
to be made when any given group structure indirectly responds to external
environmental pressures and challenges. In other words, it seems indispens-
ably necessary for a particular group structure to be constantly adjusting itself,
transforming itself, and improving itself when it indirectly responds to external
environmental pressures and challenges. The subjectivity and initiative inherent
in the structure of a particular group tend to find full expression in the two cate-
gories of behavior choice that encompass all the behaviors of a particular group
structure. The ensemble of the subjective characteristics inherent in group struc-
tures, such as initiative, independence, autonomy, creativity, transcendence, and
so forth, almost invariably manifest themselves through the basic function of
making behavioral choices—or to put it the other way round, it is only through
the basic function of making behavioral choices that the totality of the subjec-
tive characteristics common to group structures can reveal themselves and come
into play. A host of other functions with which group structures are endowed,
such as the dynamic function, the function of creating and maintaining order,
and the self-construction function, can only become possible of realization
and be brought into operation through the basic function of making behav-
ioral choices—or, to put it another way, it is only through the basic function of
making behavioral choices that a multitude of other functions inherent in group
structures can be brought into full play. The basic function of making behav-
ioral choices is common to various types of group structures, such as the family
structure, the organizational structure, the state structure, international organi-
zations, and so forth. Only if the subject acting in the capacity of a particular
group exercises initiative in making behavioral choices can the myriad goals of
existence and development group structures set themselves can become possible
of realization. The theory of practical materialism, which originated with Marx
and Engels, places historical materialism and historical dialectics in the clearest
light and thus greatly enlightens us as to the truth that the human subject can
exercise initiative in making behavioral choices and that we can explore the
laws, principles, and methods that are generally applicable to the behavioral
choice on the part of a particular group structure.
(2) The dynamic function is common to group structures. The structure of a partic-
ular group that rightly asserts itself as a dynamic structure tends to afford an
unfailing source of power for the behavioral choice on the part of a partic-
ular group as well as for the existence and development of a particular group.
In itself, the structure of a particular group can be likened to a power set, in
which the various constituent elements as well as the complex relationships
among them are inherently endowed with enormous potentialities. The subject
acting in the capacity of a particular group, which is mainly composed of
three constituent elements—that is, subjective leadership, subjective qualities,
and subjective stratification or identification, possesses great potentialities in
conjunction with the culture of a particular group primarily composed of three
constituent elements, or rather, a particular group’s productive forces mainly
associated with the power of science and the power of technology as well as
its ideologies and institutions. Likewise, enormous potentialities are inherent
in the contradictory unity of the human subjects of a particular group and the
culture thereof. On the one hand, the great potentialities latent within the group
enable the group itself to engage in the constant struggle for both immediate
survival and long-term development. On the other hand, the enormous poten-
tialities, especially when external environmental pressures mount, can stir up
latent forces and spur the group itself on to make behavioral choices, including
the internal and external behavioral choices, whereby the group can address
external environmental challenges. As long as group structures exist, driving
forces will inhere in the structure of a particular group, which, in its turn, may
provide an unfailing source of power for its own existence and development.
The theory of historical materialism that originated with Marx and Engels may
greatly enlighten us about the driving forces behind social structures. “When
Marx and Engels applied the law of the unity of contradictions to the study of
the socio-historical process they discovered the basic causes of social develop-
ment to be the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of
production, the contradiction of class struggle, and also the resultant contradic-
tion between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology),”393
which is to say, the dialectical interplay between the productive forces and
the relations of production as well as between the economic base and its super-
structure, which tend to be in their contradictory unity and historical movement,
affords an unfailing source of power for the existence and development of human
society, thereby providing the dynamic for the internally motivated transforma-
tion from lower to higher stages of society. In class society Marxism tends to
place prime emphasis on class contradictions and class struggles as the motive
forces of social development. It can thus be seen that the antagonism between
the forces and relations of production, the contradiction between the economic
base and its superstructure, and the struggle between classes not only together
constitute the driving forces of social development, but also jointly determine
the basic direction of social development.394 To recapitulate briefly, not only
can historical materialism greatly enlighten us about the motive forces of social
development as well as about the dynamic functions of social structures, but it
can provide theories and methods for scientific researches on group structures
of various kinds, such as the family structure, the organizational structure, the
state structure, international organizations, and so forth, so that we may invoke
the aid of these theories and methods to gain a deeper insight into the driving
forces and dynamic functions of group structures and to throw considerable
further light upon them.
(3) The structure of a particular group tends to perform the function of creating and
maintaining order, by which we mean that the structure of a particular group
tends to make the human subjects of a particular group identify themselves
with human institutions and conform to a code of conduct whilst it is in the
course of bringing order to individuals’ lives of the group, whereby the human
subjects of a particular group will be able to adjust themselves to the existing
order of the group and to use the standards of behavior generally accepted by the
group to regulate their conduct. Any particular group, for example “small groups
like the members of a family, community organizations including schools and
churches, large-scale organizations such as state and national governments, and
global societies such as the United Nations,”395 which is in a position to assert
its power in all its multifarious forms and, meanwhile, to promote various essen-
tial interests that are conducive to the well-being of the group, rightly asserts
itself as a community that has to engage in a constant struggle for both imme-
diate survival and long-term existence. As a general rule any particular group
is expected to bring order to individuals’ lives rather than throw social life into
393 Knight, Nick., ed. (1990). Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy,
1937. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., p. 177.
394 Chen, Xue-Ming. (2004).A Dictionary of Western Marxist Theses. Beijing, China: Oriental

395 Ballantine, Jeanne H., Roberts, Keith A., & Korgen, Kathleen Odell. (2018). Our Social World:
Introduction to Sociology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 14.

disorder. The universal law of survival holds true for any particular group that
has to engage in a constant struggle for both immediate survival and long-term
existence. Disorder tends to cause contradictions, to breed turbulence, and to
create conflicts within a particular group itself. In some cases disorder can lead
to the disintegration of the group as a whole. With the above situation in view,
any particular group structure almost invariably takes the initiative in creating
and maintaining order. In his justly famous monograph Political Systems of
Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure, Edmund R. Leach, an
iconoclastic British social anthropologist, is trenchantly committed to the view
that real societies are in fact open and not bounded, and never in equilibrium,
which is to say, societies cannot be viewed in terms of a static equilibrium, but
rather of a dynamic one.396 As Leach has already pointed out, in view of the
fact that social structures do not remain in a state of equilibrium, one must be
ready to reckon with the ensuing contradictions and potential conflicts within
and among social members. For Leach, it is the opposition inherent in indi-
vidual and group interests that renders possible “a continuous back and forth
oscillating pull of personal and collective interests.”397 Furthermore, Leach sees
transience as inherent “in the mechanistic sort of oscillating equilibrium that
he famously described for Highland Burma.”398 It can thus be seen that the
functions of social structures tend to manifest themselves in the maintenance
of dynamic equilibrium as well as in the creation of institutionalized relation-
ships (links or connections) between individuals and interest groups.399 In his
monumental magnum opus The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion,
which illuminated “the forgotten milestones of the road which man has trav-
elled,”400 the prominent British anthropologist James G. Frazer, who is “a major
molder of the modern mind,”401 narrated a myth that may be briefly summed
up as follows: only if a runaway slave first had to break off the magic golden
bough and then slew the incumbent priest of Lake Nemi, who had gained his
place by murdering his predecessor and who stood guard at all times, awaiting
a challenger to his supremacy, can he qualify himself for the office of priest and
reign with the title of King of the Wood.402 A moral we draw from the myth
396 Tambiah, Stanley J. (2002). Edmund Leach: An Anthropological Life. Cambridge, UK:
397 Horsman, John Henry. (2018). Servant-Leaders in Training: Foundations of the Philosophy of
Servant-Leadership. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 105.

398 Comaroff, John L., & Comaroff, Jean., eds. (2018). The Politics of Custom: Chiefship, Capital,
and the State in Contemporary Africa. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p. 11.
399 Xia, Jian-Zhong. (1997). The Major Theoretical Schools of Cultural Anthropology. Beijing,
China: China Remin University Press, pp. 289–292.

400 “Frazer, James George.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com.
1 Mar. 2022 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

401 Stade, George., & Karbiener, Karen., eds. (2009). Encyclopedia of British Writers, 1800 to the
Present. New York, NY: Infobase Publishing, p. 189.

402 Smith, Jonathan Z. (1993). Map is not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions. Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 208–239.

is that imperial power must be kept in equilibrium with social power and inter-
ests. As already stated above, the structure of a particular group is in a position
to perform the basic function of creating and maintaining order. In addressing
itself to the problem of how to establish and maintain order, the structure of a
particular group must commit itself to accomplishing the following stupendous
tasks which may prove of crucial importance to the existence and develop-
ment of a particular group. Rational institutions must be brought into existence
through the conscious efforts of the human subjects of a particular group. The
standards or rules of behavior for the individual members of a particular group
must be established. The rationality of social institutions and norms must be
expounded adequately. Those members who contravene the social code or fail
to conform to social institutions must be punished. Social institutions and norms
must undergo continuous change and improvement. The individual members of
a particular group must identify themselves with their social institutions and
code that tend to represent the consensus of thoughtful opinion throughout the
whole group. The structure of a particular group must mitigate the contradic-
tions and reduce (or resolve) the conflicts among the individual members of a
particular group, who, in their turn, must learn to relieve (or allay) antagonistic
feelings and to express hostile emotions. The human subjects of a particular
group must adjust themselves to the existing order of the group and use the
standards of behavior generally accepted by the group to regulate their conduct.
Keeping the individual members of a particular group in pursuit of the above
tasks and working towards the successful completion of them will ensure that
the structure of a particular group can engage in a constant struggle for both
immediate survival and long-term development. In actual fact, any particular
group structure tends to address itself to the myriad problems confronting the
individual members of a particular group. Only a concerted effort on the part
of all members can render individual and collective efforts more likely to be
crowned with success. Otherwise, if the human subjects of a particular group
relax their efforts and even abandon them, the structure of a particular group will
assuredly be confronted with the problem of how to maintain the existing order
of a particular group as well as of how to bring about the unity of a particular
group. To make matters even worse, lacking united effort would be greatly to
the detriment of the existence and development of a particular group structure.
(4) Apart from the above-mentioned functions, the structure of a particular group
also has a self-construction function, by which we mean that any particular group
structure is endowed with the capacity for self-examination, self-regulation,
self-improvement and self-transcendence. When confronted with external envi-
ronmental pressures and challenges, the structure of a particular group tends to
invoke the aid of a self-construction function to take the initiative in improving
the comprehensive performance of the various constituent elements making up
a particular group, to commit itself to raising the moral, cultural and intellectual
level of the individual members of a particular group, to make the relation-
ships among these inherent constituent elements, to a greater or lesser extent,
undergo necessary changes, and to ensure for itself the highest attainable level
of performance, whereby the structure of a particular group will be able to

adjust itself to external environmental changes. This function of cooperative
self-construction is in fact an internal mechanism of a particular group structure,
that is the workings of a particular group structure. Given that the structure of a
particular group tends to exist as a self-conscious entity, in general, a particular
group structure when faced with external environmental pressures and chal-
lenges must be ready to reckon with two different types of behavioral choices,
namely “the external behavioral choice” and “the internal behavioral choice.”
“The external behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure tends to
be made in direct response to external environmental pressures and challenges,
while “the internal behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure
has to be made when the structure of a particular group indirectly responds to
external environmental pressures and challenges. In other words, it seems indis-
pensably necessary for a particular group structure to be constantly examining
itself, adjusting itself, improving itself and transcending itself when it indirectly
responds to external environmental pressures and challenges. “The internal
behavior choice” on the part of a particular group structure suggests that the
structure of a particular group is “a self-constructing adaptive control system,”
thus undergoing a constant process of behavioral self-construction.403 The struc-
ture of a particular group tends to invoke the aid of behavioral self-construction to
improve and heighten the powers latent within the human subjects of a particular
group, to enhance and increase the cultural power of a particular group, to bring
about appropriate changes in the relationships among the various constituent
elements of a particular group, and to make itself engage in self-examination,
self-improvement and self-transcendence, whereby the structure of a particular
group can successfully respond to external environmental pressures and chal-
lenges. History attests the fact that the “behavioral self-constructing capabili-
ties” with which the structure of a particular group is endowed,404 whether weak
or strong, not only have a great deal to do with the rise and fall of a particular
group structure, but also have bearing on the destiny of a particular group struc-
ture. The more conscious efforts the structure of a particular group is putting
forth in order to enhance the capabilities for behavioral self-construction and
to get the behavioral self-construction function undergoing continual improve-
ment, the more defects it will most probably find within itself, and the more
likely it is that the expenditure of conscious effort on the part of the particular
group structure will enable the structure itself to atone for its numerous short-
comings, whereby the structure of a particular group will be able to engage in
self-transcendence, to bring about a most salutary improvement, and to stand
up to any test in hard times. In a certain sense, the much greater the capabilities
for behavioral self-construction seem to us, the more likely will it be that the
403 Ford, Martin E. (1992). Motivating Humans: Goals, Emotions, and Personal Agency Beliefs.
Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., p. 21.
404 Ibid.
structure of a particular group is able to smooth away the innumerable difficul-

ties that beset its path, and vice versa. Only if the structure of a particular group
takes the initiative in enhancing the capabilities for behavioral self-construction
can it bring all its potentialities into full play and approach perfection in the
course of time.
In general, the behavioral self-construction function tends to have important impli-
cations for the existence and development of a particular group structure. In support of
this argument, the fact is to be aptly cited that “China has created an economic miracle
in world development history” and “has sustained a high and continuing growth for
more than half a century,” whereby “the reform period from 1978 onwards has been
heralded as a time when China’s economic miracle was created.”405 After the Third
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
came to a victorious close, the second generation of leaders began to gain ascen-
dency in China’s political arena. Under the collective leadership of the CPC Central
Committee with Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the core, the Chinese government, which
took the initiative in reflecting upon what had happened during the pre-reform period
(1949–78) and learning lessons from their past mistakes, led Chinese people to carry
out “reform and opening up,” to advance the transition of the basic economic system
from a planned economy to a market economy, and to achieve an economic miracle
by sustaining high-speed economic growth, whereby China has become the world’s
second largest economy. The amazing success story of China’s reform and opening
up stands as a living testimony that the behavioral self-construction function is of
immense value to the structure of a particular group that has to engage in a constant
struggle for both immediate survival and long-term existence.406
In actual fact, from primitive society onwards, group structures of different kinds
hitherto known to us began to exercise initiative in performing their respective self-
construction functions, which, in their turn, enabled the various group structures to
undergo continual development and improvement. In the era of globalization, espe-
cially against the backdrop of a sluggish global economy, with very few exceptions,
any particular group structure is now almost invariably faced with the urgent necessity
of bring into full play the behavioral self-construction function.
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Principles of Subjective Anthropology Concepts and The Knowledge System

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Binggong Chen

ISBN 978-981-19-8882-0 ISBN 978-981-19-8883-7 (eBook)

Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023

4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences

4.2 The Multiple Manifestations of Man’s Dual Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

6 Personality Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

1 Subjective Anthropology and the Reconstruction

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 1

York, NY: Oxford University press, p. 86.

University Press, p. 510.

their cultures.”10 In the midst of a transition from theological through biological to

10 Wulf, Christoph. (2013). Anthropology: A Continental Perspective (Winter, Deirdre., Hamilton,

Publishing House, pp. 77–78.

Second, the author established seven fundamental principles of “subjective

ethnology and linguistics.14 The discipline system of modern anthropology is

Oxford University Press, p. 96.

1 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research

1.1 The Discipline System of Anthropology

According to the academic views widely accepted among Chinese anthropologists,

1.2 The Excursion of the Discipline System and Research

In general, the concepts of anthropology endowed with interdisciplinary character-

University Press, pp. 2–3.

anthropology is scientific and correct and subjected to no excursion.4 However, in the

1.3 The Excursion of the Research Object and Discipline

(1) The Imposition of Cultural Repressiveness upon Man’s Subjectivity

respective territories of study. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the truthfulness of

2 The Mission of Anthropology and an Idea

2.1 The Historic Mission of Anthropology

Anthropology is faced with two tasks of historical importance in the twenty-first

6 Boorman, Howard L. (1968). “Fei Hsiao-tung.” In Biographical Dictionary of Republican China.

2.2 An Idea for the Reconstruction of the Discipline System

anthropology, is the comprehensive study of human beings as well as of human

to achieve a breakthrough in the formulation of relevant theories as well as the recon-

3 The Concept and Research Object of Subjective

3.1 The Concept of Anthropology

Press, pp. 1–2.

Education Press, pp. 268–269.

3.2 The Concept of Subjective Anthropology

3.3 The Research Objects of Subjective Anthropology

and development. Subjective anthropology is the concrete study and illumination of

diagrammatical theory on “the structure of personality and choice”. Meanwhile, it

to ameliorate the prospects and destiny of humanity by improving the “structure

4 Significance of the Construction of Subjective

4.1 Providing Rational Frameworks and Methods for Man’s

4.2 Furnishing Humanity with Rational Knowledge He Can

15Landmann, M. (1988). Philosophical Anthropology. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s

(2) Top-down Construction of the Value System of Group

4.3 Laying the Foundation of Anthropology’s Transition

Anthropology’s marginalization has become an indisputable fact when viewed from

anthropology came on the anthropological stage, anthropology changed from the

4.4 Providing the Humanities and Social Sciences

sciences. Whether or not it is profound or whether or not it is wrong, knowledge

4.5 Providing a Theoretical Basis for the Discipline in Order

1 Theoretical Foundation of Subjective Anthropology

1.1 World Outlooks of Dialectical Materialism and Historical

© Social Sciences Academic Press 2023 45

As a core category of “the theory of structure and choice,” Marxist historical

and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs

Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 121.

Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, p. 760.

1.2 Marx’s Theory of Practice

Historical materialism (also materialist conception of history) constructed by Marx