11/14/21, 12:18 AM Ijaz Khan: There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

(This write up appeared in 'The Friday Times' Lahore in three parts, on 17, 24 and 31 January
2014. The author (that's me) consider it needs to be read as one whole. So, has taken the liberty to
share the whole write up in one go) 
There is no insurgency in FATA – I 
 - 17 Jan 2014
There is no insurgency in FATA – II  - 24 Jan 2014
There is no insurgency in FATA – III - 31 Jan 2014There is No Insurgency in FATA
Prof. Ijaz Khan
Dept of International Relations
University of Peshawar

There is a continuous talk of an insurgency in FATA and the need to Counter Insurgency (COIN)
action there since at least 2003-4. In 2004, Pakistan Army moved into FATA for COIN
operations.  Experts and others interested have strong opinion about how to end insurgency in
FATA restore ‘writ of the State’ there.
One plans and acts according to the problem or challenge one is facing. Like a doctor can only
prescribe correct medicine if s/he diagnoses the disease correctly, decision makers must first
correctly identify the problem, its level, intensity and location, assess their own capabilities and
take a decision accordingly. The debate revolves around a situation in FATA and more specifically
in the two agencies, North and South Waziristan. That situation is termed as insurgency and
experts and others interested give opinion on how to deal with it, suggesting various counter
insurgency policies and actions. The contention of this scribe is the situation in Waziristan and
rest of FATA is not that of insurgency. This mistake in identifying the situation has resulted in
counterproductive policies and actions.

Insurgency is a stage of taking of arms by a group of people against an established Government /

State with a purpose of forcefully capturing the government or seceding from the state. It is a stage
of advanced level of rebellion that has not reached the stage of Civil War yet. A rebellion is the
initial taking up of arms by a group of individuals without much popular support or strength to
control any territory and without any legitimacy. Insurgency is a step forward with some support
among people and some limited control of territory. Both these stages are within the domestic
jurisdiction of the given state. Civil war is the highest stage when the group challenging the
established authority has almost equal power and exercises governmental authority is more
control over a portion of territory. This stage may justify international intervention and thus the
conflict becomes an international armed conflict.
There is another type of violent situation, when a territory of one party to a conflict falls in the
hands of another, and is in its effective control. Such territory is referred to as enemy occupied
territory. In the enemy occupied territory the armed conflict may be between those from the local
population taking up arms against foreign occupiers, and the occupation forces suppressing them.
The taking up of arms by the locals is referred to as resistance movement. In such situation the
regular forces of the party to which this territory belonged legitimately can and normally will
support the local resistance as well as take action against the occupation forces to re claim its
territory. On the other hand the occupation forces will do all it can to end the resistance and
protect its occupation.

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11/14/21, 12:18 AM Ijaz Khan: There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

Now let us see what is happening in FATA, as the different types of conflict require different
strategies and actions. FATA is Pakistani territory with a special status, administered through
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)(made in 1901 with minor amendments in 2012) aimed at
securing government property there and denial of its use as safe haven by fugitives from the
settled areas. FCR provides for a system of collective responsibility, which simply means the whole
tribe is held responsible on whose territory a violation of FCR takes place. The tribal people are
expected to hand over / take action against any wanted persons taking refuge on their territory.
For violations the whole tribe is punished through confiscation and / or destruction of property
and arrest of elders, without any judicial overview. Check. The system worked well for a long time.
However, the socio economic changes taking place had gradually eroded the basis of Pashtun
tribal traditions on which the system was erected. By 2001, it had become an ungoverned territory
and just the appearance of the system remained, in short an administrative vacuum. After 2001,
when the Taliban government was overthrown in Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban and terrorist
groups from around the world for whom Afghanistan had become a safe haven, found FATA, for a
variety of reasons, a convenient space for refuge and taking action inside Afghanistan. These
groups filling the existing vacuum were able to get some limited support due to ethnic, religious
and economic considerations.
The international forces in Afghanistan soon realized this abuse of FATA as a major hurdle in their
success in Afghanistan. On their, specially US demands, Pakistan decided to send in Army in
2004, which started clashes between the outsiders, their local collaborators and the Pakistan
Army, gradually leading to the emergence of Tehrik–e–Taliban Pakistan (TTP).  The main
function of TTP was and is to protect the use of FATA as safe haven for global terrorists, more
specifically for all those acting inside Afghanistan. For that purpose, TTP has gradually filled the
vacuum created by the collapse of the erstwhile administrative system, replacing the State and the
tribal elder. However, the clashes there led Pakistani State, its Military, experts and the general
public starting talking of an insurgency in FATA and debated the best possible method for counter
insurgency.
When the situation was identified as insurgency, the strategy, plans and / or actions were educated
by Counter Insurgency (COIN) considerations. The matter was further confused by Pakistan’s
security policy that focuses on India, finds religious extremists as good tools of policy, determining
choice of friends, solutions and approach to Afghanistan. This context led to a policy of separating
those fighting in Afghanistan or supporting them from those active inside Pakistan, hence the
policy of ‘Good and Bad Taliban’.
Pakistani State has followed a COIN policy towards the groups’ active inside Pakistan. COIN
strategy normally has both military and non military parts. Both aim to isolate and gradually
eliminate the insurgents.   Military action in addition to targeting the active insurgents and
reclaiming territory from insurgent control and/or influence also makes siding with the insurgents
a bad bargain for the general public / potential insurgent recruits. The non military component
popularly referred to ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ (WHAM) aims to win the support of the general
public, isolate the insurgents and also reduces / eliminates the attraction of insurgent recruitment
and sympathy for them.
Pakistan’s COIN policy relies on the use of selective use of force against selective terrorist targets,
mostly reacting when attacked, making Civilians take up arms against Terrorists under the
collective responsibility system and a policy of deals with different groups. The WHAM part is also
there and can be seen in the shape of Army engaged in various developmental activities that
includes construction of roads, schools, water supply schemes etc. This policy follows the
understanding that there is no relationship between those active inside Afghanistan and those
inside Pakistan. The state and many others also consider there is a widespread support to the
terrorists inside FATA.  

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11/14/21, 12:18 AM Ijaz Khan: There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

In fact, the clashes in FATA were not insurgency in the standard understanding of the term. The
people of FATA or any group of them has not take up arms against the authority of the state. The
situation in FATA is closer to a territory under enemy occupation, the occupier being a collection
of non-state force. Outsiders who include Arabs, Chechen, Uzbeks, Afghan Taliban and a number
of Pakistani extremist religious elements mostly from South Punjab, with some from other parts
too, have found FATA a good safe haven. The clashes between State forces and some of the armed
groups, most grouped in the loose alliance of TTP, are more for the protection of these outsiders.
These outsiders are mostly active in Afghanistan as well as elsewhere, even in a friendly country
like China.
Pakistani forces using the outdated system of collective responsibility which is irrelevant to the
current conflict and the socio economic situation in FATA, takes action against the tribe and its
property for failing to stop any action against State that may have used that tribe’s territory results
in situations like the tragic happenings of Mir Ali. In Mir Ali the State shelled the town of Mir Ali
and also destroyed its Bazaar as punishment under collective responsibility rather than as action
against terrorists. Such actions does not harm the terrorists, rather alienates the population. This
also feeds the mistrust in the Pakistani State among the people. The policy of selective and
reactionary actions also feeds the popular belief of collusion between the State and the terrorists. 
Those who can are leaving FATA towards different settled areas of the country becoming IDPs as
they feel they cannot fight both the terrorists and the State.
The terrorists in a well thought out strategy give the appearance of a split between those whose
interests are focused in Afghanistan and those who act inside Pakistan. In fact those acting inside
Pakistan have kept the Pakistani forces engaged, thus providing a respite to those active inside
Afghanistan.  This also makes Pakistani state believe it is taking advantage of the split between the
Terrorists.  This policy, referred to as a policy of ‘Good and Bad Taliban’ also fits well in the
perceptions of the mindset that considers Afghan Taliban as Pakistan’s best bet in Afghanistan,
besides being a result of a mistaken reading of the situation.
The suspicions and mistrust of the people makes the WHAM actions of the State ineffective. The
State as well as most others looks towards the nonexistent traditional Malik to reach out to the
people.   Political Parties which are main vehicle of connecting people with each other as well as
with the State, though permitted to operate are still weak to assert themselves and are also not
considered of much relevance by the State. There is a disconnect between the people of FATA and
the State, which worsens the situation, alienates the people and leads to State policies and actions
which are not based on ground realities.
Pakistan’s policy and action, Military, Administrative or political are based on mistaken reading of
the situation in FATA.  It needs to be understood that the people of FATA has not risen in any sort
of revolt or insurgency. It is a territory under the effective occupation or if the word is too strong
then effective control of forces inimical to the State and society of Pakistan which includes FATA.
Therefore, the aim of policy and action should be to free a part of the territory of Pakistan known
as FATA from illegitimate occupiers / controllers. These forces are a mix from outside Pakistan as
well as inside it. The challenge in FATA is part of the challenge of terrorism and extremism present
all over Pakistan. The object of policy and action has to be denial of the use of FATA space to these
forces. Punishing people for being unable to fight these occupants is bad policy. Military action
cannot succeed if it does not differentiate between Civilians and the Occupiers and if it continues
to differentiate between Good and Bad Taliban. It is also vital to educate the security personnel
that their job, especially in territory under their control is not securing an occupied enemy
territory but securing a freed territory; the people of these territories are your people, not civilians
of an enemy territory under your occupation. Reports from Swat as well as FATA shows Pakistani
armed forces are behaving like an Army of occupation or at least the citizens of Pakistan from
there (FATA) view it as such.

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11/14/21, 12:18 AM Ijaz Khan: There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

Negotiations with the opposite party in a war are not abnormal. However, that yields results when
the ground situation demands it. You negotiate with the enemy when you want to either surrender
or respond to the request from the other side that is ready for surrender. The opposite party is not
the people of FATA, so suggestions of Jirgas or other such means traditionally used to resolve
issues with the people of FATA, are not relevant.
Political solution does not mean negotiations with the occupiers but engaging the people in such a
way that denies political space to the terrorists. Political party structures from within FATA and
elected parliamentarians needs to be part of all deliberations supplanting and gradually replacing
the Malik. The policy that aims at the impossible of reviving traditions and reversing social change
to re create the changed tribal system, the basis of FCR has to go. It is not the question of whether
that system was good or bad; it is a simple of socio economic evolution and accepting the
irreversibility of such evolution. The people of FATA should own developmental policies and they
should not be a type of bribe a foreign occupant gives to the people.

To conclude, the problem in FATA is one of the many manifestations of the problem with the State
of Pakistan. The mistake in identification of the problem in FATA is a consequence of uneven and
undemocratic basis and development of the State and Society of Pakistan. The corrective measures
must start from correcting the relations between Islamabad and Rawalpindi and between the
provinces and Islamabad. The self styled saviors of Pakistan must understand, the
responsibility to save it lies squarely with the all the peoples inhabiting all the territories with all
their diversities, not with the self-chosen few in sitting pretty in the corridors of power.  

http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/author/prof-ijaz-khan/

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