Interpreting the National Security Policy Document

Prof. Ijaz Khan

Former Chairman and Professor
Department of International Relations
University of Peshawar

Documenting National Security Policy is a good step. Documenting helps to know and
understand it better, thus making it easier to analyze, discuss and improve. Though, the language
of the National Security Policy document of Pakistan shared publicly is futuristic, implying
change, however, it does not claim to be a new or changed policy and reading it confirms it is
not. Though, it uses some new terms and phrases to describe it. However, the same language and
phrases read carefully shows there is neither any change nor any intentions to change. At best
one can see tactical adjustments. Expecting change without change in the political context or
Strategic Culture is futile.
The document claims to take a ‘Comprehensive Security’ Approach. In the 1970s, the term
‘Comprehensive Security’ came as a conceptual response to the changing international system,
when mainly due to nuclear weapons, it was realized direct military conflict was almost
impossible, but states survival may be threatened by non-military threats. Soviet Collapse, with
its military capability intact underscored this point. It referred to both broadening, meaning
inclusion of non-military issues, and deepening, referring to inclusion of domestic concerns in
the concept of security. We started hearing of ‘human security’ focusing on the person of
individual rather than the geography of the state. Barry Buzan, a British professor, wrote of
securitisation — referring to the broadening/expansion of the security through inclusion of
governance, economy and socio-economic elements. This meant that in the calculus of state
security, one must include much more than tanks, fighter planes and bombs. The document does
talk of all these aspects of Comprehensive Security. The problem is it does so without any
change in the primacy of traditional security.
Comprehensive Security in democratic states furthers democratization of decision-making by
increasing the role of non-security segments on security issues, along with political control.
Where the security establishment dominates decision-making, like in Pakistan, it expands its
control in fields hitherto left to the civilians. The document claims to be result of wide
consultations. However, we know political parties or parliament was not a part of this
consultation. It was not even presented in the parliament after being written, let alone debated
there. The document was authored by National Security Division after consultations with some
independent scholars and Civil Society members, whose identity is not known. It also
discussions in Universities, but mentions only National Defense University, a fully owned and
managed Armed Forces institution.
Due to limitation of space, this essay just gives an overview of the document, with the help of
some selected terms and phrases, showing why it fails to be a comprehensive security approach.
The document considers traditional military security as the primary concern and thus emphasizes
it centrality. Rather than treating the non-military elements of security at par with military
elements and the need to secure people as much important, if not more, it treats them as
supportive and required for strong military, required for territorial security from military threats
posed by (a rising Hindutva) India. There term cost effective is used to present the case for
military preparedness. There is nothing to show what is meant by ‘Cost Effective’. Though there
was no need for spelling it out in a policy document. But, a policy approach based on the concept
of ‘Comprehensive Security’ will aim for ‘Cost Effective’ by a balance between what is
allocated for military expenses and for ‘Human Development. The current tilt is heavily towards
military. Future implementations actions (Budget) will tell how much this tilt has been corrected.
The document acknowledges the diversity of Pakistan, however, the policy continues to deal
with it as State of Pakistan has always dealt with it. Same is true of acknowledgement of the
terrorist threat. The words used are to differentiate between ‘reconcilable and non-reconcilable’
along with an ‘inclusive approach’ tells the thinking between the lines .The distinction should be
between those who articulate their views on rights and wrongs, present policy alternatives and
different strategies for resolution of issues or complain and peacefully protest for/ against what
they consider to be just or unjust and those who use unconstitutional violent means to further
their views or demands. There may be some foreign elements among the later too. However, the
terms irreconcilables and reconcilable implies insistence on all agreeing on State Narratives.
The intention to carry out development activities, so that different ethnicities or people of
geographic areas, are not exploited by foreign agents shows a continuation of policy, educated by
a non-democratic, centrist and elitist mindset. This negates the claimed inclusivist approach.
Inclusive approach means, including the marginalized in decision making and not just
concerning them which should be their exclusive domain, but in decisions concerning collective
issues too. The smaller ethnicities are not people of colonies and so should be accepted as
sharing the burdens and bounties of the state. Inclusion does not mean just giving them benefits,
but letting them be a part of both good and bad. In early 2021, a consultative meeting was
convened by the office of Moeed Yosaf at University of Peshawar, for discussing Afghanistan
(whether that was part of the National Security Policy Documentation was not mentioned). Just
discussing Afghanistan or former FATA or Terrorism with Pashtun academics is not including
them in decision making. Inclusion would require inviting and considering their views on
economic policy, broader Foreign Policy as well as other common State level policies/ concerns
(to ser the record straight this is the approach of the main stream Pakistani democrats and
Liberals too).
Maintaining India as the traditional military threat (increased due to Hindutvaisation), even if
correct and justifies military preparedness, the policy to deal with it, by denying Afghanistan
(even under the control of supposedly friendly Taliban) and India to connect through its territory
and at least one very important factor for supporting Taliban in Afghanistan being stopping any
Indian influence negates the claimed policy of seeking security in connectivity and can be
justified only through a traditional security and geopolitical approach. This also continues using
Pakistan’s location as of geopolitical significance and not as that of a geo economic significance
or ‘economic hub’ as claimed by the document.
A change of policy only results from change of perceptions; perceptions change when those
whose perceptions count are changed. Democratic decision making by including by the excluded
in decision making enables inputs from the diversity of which all states are made up in the
decision making process, inclusive and comprehensive. This changes perceptions and thus
policies based on them.