Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2349 October 22, 1948

FRED M. HARDEN, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.
Claro M. Recto for the intervenor.

TUASON, J.:

The petitioner, Fred M. Harden, is being confined in prison for contempt of court by virtue of an order
of the following tenor:

It appearing that the defendant Fred M. Harden has not up to this date complied with the
orders of this court of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948;

As prayed for, the court orders the arrest of the defendant Fred M. Harden as well as his
confinement at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he complies with the
aforementioned orders.

The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the
petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the
administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a
receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable consideration
and with the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other
properties and assets, real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be
found in the names of said defendants or either of them.

On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000
in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an
unknown person, P50,000.

On September 9, 1947, Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts
and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China. On
October 7, 1947, Judge Peña granted the motion in an order worded as follows:

Wherefore, finding the motion of the plaintiff of September 9, 1947, to be well founded, for
the purpose of preserving the status quo and in order that the amounts above referred to
 may stand ready to answer for any legitimate claims of the Government in the form of taxes,
the aforementioned motion is hereby ordered to return, within a period of 15 days from the
receipt of a copy hereof, the amount of P1,000,608.66 to the Philippines and to redeposit the
same with the accounts of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia and China, with the understanding that upon failure to comply with this order
he will be declared in contempt of court.

After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court and decided, and after
various motions were filed and heard, Judge Peña, on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was
a modification of that of October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a copy of this order the
money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong, without prejudice to passing upon later on the
different amounts that the defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has submitted to
the court an itemized account of those expenses.

In the same order there was this decree:

With respect to the plaintiff's motion filed on March 16, 1948 praying that Fred M. Harden be
ordered to deliver the certificate covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Company shares either
to the Clerk of this Court or to the receiver in this case for safekeeping after his compliance
with the order of January 17, 1948, the Court, after considering the different pleadings filed,
denies defendant's motion for extension of time to register the said certificate of stock,
thereby maintaining its order of January 17, 1948. The said defendant is further ordered,
after the registration of the said certificate, to deposit the same with the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.

The last part of the order was the culmination of another series of motions with their corresponding
hearings. The facts taken from the pleading were in brief as follows:

In a motion dated May 28, 1947, the receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates
of stock of the conjugal partnership, among them 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., alleged
to be in the possession of defendant Harden, be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that he
might have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62. On June 7, 1947,
the court "authorized" Harden "to register not later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his
possession, notifying the court afterwards of such action.

On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order
and prayed that he be ordered to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. On
August 1, 1947, Harden filed a perfunctory compliance, and in order dated August 2, 1947, he was
required to "make a detailed report of the stock certificates which have been duly registered in
accordance with Republic Act No. 62." In his "compliance" dated August 7, 1947, Harden stated that
he had been granted an extension until December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc
Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No. 62.

In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that, notwithstanding the
expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's extended time to comply with Republic Act No. 62,
the records of the Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of
January 7, 1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948, was issued giving Harden
"an extension until March 31, 1948 within which to comply with the Order dated June 7, 1947."

In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons therein stated, that
defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co.
shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after
registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a motion stating
that the registration of shares of stock under Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30,
1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within such period
as by law or regulations is or may be provided."

It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail.

Broadly speaking, the grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or (3)
excessive penalty. (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 1 L-1083, Jan. 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz., 1231.)

The fact that the property is in a foreign country is said to deprive the court of jurisdiction, the
remedy in such case being, it is contended, ancillary receivership. We can not agree with this view.

While a court can not give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the
courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391), yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to
property beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the
court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition (Id. 118)

Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise
immaterial.

In Sercomb vs. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

It is true that the property attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but
the appellant, who caused it to be attached, is in this state, and within the jurisdiction of its
courts. If the superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the
power to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its receiver from getting possession of the
goods. It makes no difference that the property was in a foreign jurisdiction.

The facts of that case as stated in the decision were as follows:

On April 14, 1887, in the case of Ada S. Havens et al. vs. Caleb Clapp et al. then pending in
said superior court, the appellee was appointed receiver of all the property and effects, real
and personal, of the defendants therein, Caleb Clapp and Thomas Davies. Prior to that date
Clapp and Davies had forwarded, on consignment, to Elijah E. Newton, an auctioneer and
commission merchant in Washington city, in the District of Columbia, a lot of jewelry,
watches and silverware, to be by him disposed of for their benefit. So far as appears to the
contrary, the goods so consigned were still in the possession of Newton at Washington when
the order was entered on April 7, 1887, for the commitment of appellant for contempt. Within
a week or 10 days after his appointment as receiver, appellee gave notice of such
appointment to Newton, and demanded a return of the goods. On May 18, 1887, the Meriden
Britannia Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut,
being a creditor of Clapp and Davies, commenced an attachment suit against them for the
amount of its claim in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and attached the goods
in the hands of Newton.

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U. S.,
436, the United States Supreme Court said that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.

The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its
objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court which provides that "when the
contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform,
he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.

If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural life of the
petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it
by complying with the orders of the court, and in this manner put an end to his incarceration. In these
circumstances, the judgment can not be said to be excessive or unjust. (Davis vs. Murphy [1947]
188 P., 2nd, 229-231.) As stated in a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147),
"to order that one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in civil contempt is purely a remedial
measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contender to do an act within his or her power to perform. He
must have the means by which he may purge himself of the contempt." The latter decision cites
Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is
expressed in this language:

In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is
to coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act
specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in
purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by
the defendant by the doing of which he many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the
imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket."

The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner fails to do are still
in his power to perform, does not void the order of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not
require such finding to appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error in saying that section
237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has
been copied, was of California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that
section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure.
(Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.) The exact similarity in substance though not in
language between the two provisions is a confirmation of this statement.

At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it should
be taken, in connection with the orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the
charges for contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the
grounds for the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The orders of
October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the acts with the petitioner was
commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner
is in a position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the Balatoc
shares he had remitted to that colony.

Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence is a different matter;
it is a matter of fact which can not be reviewed by habeas corpus.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus does not lie to correct
errors of fact or law. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; Quintos vs. Director of
Prisons, 55 Phil., 304; Toronto Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; Gutierrez Repide vs.
Peterson, 3 Phil., 276; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, L-1083, 1 44 Off. Gaz., 1231; McMicking vs.
Schields, 238 U.S. 99. 41 Phil., 971; Tinsley vs. Anderson, 43 Law. ed., 91.) When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order or decree
is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. the writ of habeas corpus can not be made to
perform the function of a writ of error; and this holds true even if the judgment, orders or decree was
erroneous, provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued
such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of
Prisons, supra.) So whether the act charged has been committed or can still be performed is
conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the
petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. (Ex-parte Fisher, 206 S.W. 2d. 1000.).

The petition is denied with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20478 March 14, 1923

In the matter of the petition of AMZI B. KELLY, for the issuance of habeas
corpus for Ivon Pumutkin, et al., Petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, Respondent.

The petitioner on behalf of Ivon Pumutkin et al.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:

Amzi B. Kelly, a member of the Philippine Bar, has made applications in this court for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to set at liberty sixteen young Russians,
members of the crew of a fleet of boats now at anchor within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine Islands. The return of the Attorney-General states that these Russian
subjects are confined in Bilibid Prison, at the request of the Admiral of the Russian
ships, and pursuant to the orders of the Governor-General. The Attorney-General
further states that the said persons do not desire that any writ of habeas corpus be
issued in their behalf, and accept and abide by the order of the Governor-General
pending such disposition as it is the wish of the Chief Executive to make in their
respective cases. This last statement is supported by an affidavit subscribed and sworn
to by the sixteen Russians before the Director of Prisons. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

The writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by a person unlawfully imprisoned or

restrained of his liberty, or by some person in his behalf. Where the application is made
in the prisoner's behalf by a third person, and where the prisoner repudiates the action
taken, the writ will be denied. The writ of habeas corpus ought not to issue if the
restraint is voluntary because unnecessary. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law library

Petition denied without costs. So ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51637 October 15, 1979

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of FAUSTINO ROMOS y CARMONA;
VISITACION GALAN CARMONA, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER, respondent.

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated OCT.
15, 1979,

"G.R.No. 51637 [Formerly UDK-4139] (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Faustino
Ramos y Carmona; Visitacion Galan Carmona vs. United Doctors Medical Center"). — At the
hearing held this morning, Atty. Alfredo M. Cargo of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of
Justice appeared for the petitioner Visitacion Galan Carmona and her husband Faustino Ramos y
Carmona who were both personally present; Maj. Sotero Soriano and Capt. Rodolfo Rosales
appeared on behalf of Maj. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Brig. Gen. Antonio P. Uy pursuant to their
return of the writ; and Atty. Constantino A. Nunez, together with Attys. Jose B. Puerto and John P.
Basco, appeared on behalf of respondent United Doctors Medical Center.

In the course of the interpellations, Atty. Nunez, together with Dr. Dante Estares, credit and
collection officer of respondent United Doctors Medical Center, affirmed that they were in no way
detaining in the hospital premises petitioner's husband Faustino Ramos y Carmona for non-payment
of his bills and that he was free at any time to pack up his things and to be discharged from the
hospital. They further stated that they had stopped charging petitioner's husband for his stay in the
hospital since June 26, 1979 as of which date his total account amounted to some P40,791.00
(some P15,000.00 of which were due to the hospital and the balance was for doctor's fees for the
three operations performed on petitioner's husband). They admitted, however, requiring petitioner
and her husband to endorse in their favor all their rights against the insurance company to the client
of the amount due to the hospital and doctors, manifesting that petitioner and her husband had
already succeeded in collecting the sum of P5,000.00, no part of which was ever applied to their
account with the hospital and this was admitted by petitioner who stated that she had spent the
amount to take care of the needs of her husband.

Petitioner and her husband undertook in turn that as required by respondent, they would forthwith
assign and endorse in favor of respondent their claim for damages against the insurance carried by
the car bearing plate No. GR 961 L-Filipinas '78 driven by Rodolfo Lee which had bumped him and
inflicted serious physical injuries upon him on May 2, 1979 and would assist in the prosecution of
such claim, and that Atty. Cargo undertook that he would assist them in the preparation and
execution of such assignment and endorsement to the extent of the amount due and owing by them
for hospital and medical fees.

It was made clear and the Court accordingly informed petitioner and her husband Faustino Ramos y
Carmona that he could pick up his belongings from the hospital and go back home this very day.
The Court further REQUIRED (a) Atty. Cargo to submit copies of the exchange of letters between
him and respondent hospital and the certification read by him at the hearing, and (b) Atty. Nunez to
file his written return of the writ on behalf of respondent hospital, both by the close of office hours
tomorrow, October 16, 1979, after which the case will be considered closed and terminated.

The letter of Atty. Melquiades C. Virata, Sr. to appear and submit a memorandum as amicus
curiae was NOTED.

Very truly yours,

(S) GLORIA C. PARAS
(T) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court
First Division

The Chief (x,

Philippine Constabulary
and/or The Commanding Officer (x)
CIS, HPC, Camp Crame
Quezon City

Atty. Constantino R. Rapanut & Alfredo M. Cargo (x)

Counsel for Petitioner
CITIZENS LEGAL ASSISTANCE OFFICE
Ministry of Justice, Padre Faura
Manila

Atty. Constantino A. Nunez, Jose B.Puerto and

John P. Basco (x)
c/o Dr. Dante Estares
Counsel for Respondent
Credit and Collection Officer
UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER
Rotonda, Espana, Quezon City
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4855 October 11, 1951

JOSE M. NAVA ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN,

ETC., Respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-4964 October 11, 1951

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, vs. HON, AGUSTIN P.MONTESA,

ETC., Respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-5102 October 11, 1951

EUGENIO ANGELES, ETC., Petitioner, vs. HON. GAVINO S.ABAYA,

ETC., Respondent.

Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel, Antonio Barredo and Enrique Fernando for
petitioner Amado V. Hernandez.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz, Solicitor Felix Makasiar and Solicitor
Matriniano P. Vivo for respondent Judges Montesa and Gatmaitan.
City fiscal Eugenio Angeles, in his own behalf.
Vicente A. Rafael and Macario L. Nicolas for the respondents in case L-5102 except the
respondent judge.
Judge Gavino S. Abaya in his own behalf.
Abeto and Soriano and Fermin Z. Caram, Jr. for the petitioners in case L-4855.
Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, and fred Ruiz castro as amici curaie.

PARAS, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library

By express mandate of the Constitution (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 14), the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which
events the same may be suspended whenever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist. The power to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas
corpus in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it, has been lodged by the Constitution (Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph 2) in the President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vir tual law libra ry

On January 31, 1905, for the first time in Philippine history, the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite under the following
Executive Order issued by governor General Luke E. Wright:

WHEREAS, certain organized bands of ladrones exist in the Provinces of Cavite and
Batangas who are levying forced contributions upon the people, who frequently require
them, under compulsion, to join their bands, and who kill or maim the most barbarous
manner those who fail to respond to their unlawful demands, and are therefore
terrifying the law-abiding and inoffensive people of those provinces; and chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, these bands have in several instances attacked police and constabulary
detachments, and are in open insurrection against the constituted authorities, and it is
believed that the said bands have numerous agents and confederates living within the
municipalities of said provinces; and chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of insecurity and
terrorism among the people which makes it impossible in the ordinary way to conduct
preliminary investigations before the justices of the peace and other judicial officers: chanrobles virtual law li brary

In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ of habeas corpus is
from this date suspended in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas.

On October 22, 1950, for the second time in the Philippine history, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue of the following
Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President:

WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition,
insurrection and rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
authorities and, in pursuance thereof, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder
affecting public safety and the security of the state; chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion consisiting of armed raids,
sorties and ambushes and the wanton acts of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson,
planned destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against civilian lives
and properties, as reported by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, have
seriously endangered and still continue to endanger the public safety; chanrobles virtual law lib rary

WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been perpetrated by
various groups of persons well organized for concerted action and well armed with
machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic weapons, by reason whereof there is
actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country; chanrobles virtual law libra ry

WHEREAS, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended
and are presently under detention, and strong and convincing evidence has been found
in their possession to show that they are engaged in rebellious, seditiuos and otherwise
subersive acts as above set forth; and chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure
the peace and security of the population and to maintain the authority of the
government; chanrobles virtual law lib rary

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested upon me by Article VII, section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently
detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of
sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance or on the occassion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith.

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relive persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. (Villavicencio vs, Lukban, 39 Phil., 778,788.) It secures to a prisoner
the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of
justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority.
(Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304, 306.) chanrobles virtual law library

The necessity for suspending the writ of habeas corpus in 1905 arose obviously from
the fact that it was "impossible in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary
investigations before the justice of the peace and other judicial officers," so that
undoubtedly it was never aimed at the indefinite detention of suspects, but at an
investigation (other than judicial) to determine whether there is evidence sufficient for
the filing in court of the necessary information. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210 on October 22, 1950,
was the apprehension and detention of 100 alleged leading members of lawless
elements in whose possession strong and convincing evidence was allegedly found
showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had to be suspended not only because it was
desirable for the prosecuting officials to have sufficient time to investigate and file the
necessary charges in court, but also because a public officer or employee who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, shall suffer the penalties
provided in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the only effect of
Proclamation No. 210 is that any person detained thereunder has no right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice through a writ
of habeas corpus. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtua l law lib rary

The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the Proclamation
has been formally indicted in court by the filing against him of an information charging
rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, he may be entitled to bail. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the Constitution,all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficientsureties, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a
capital offense, because it is penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
20,000pesos. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily
provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of
Ex parte Miligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 Law Ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to
only one great right, leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable.
It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like the one we
have just passed through, there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ
of habeas corpus. In every war, there are men of previously good character, wicked
enough to counsel their fellow citizens to resist the measures deemed necessary by a
good government to sustain its just authority and overthrow its enemies; and their
influence may lead to dangerous combinations. In the emergency of the times, an
immediate public investigation according to law may not be possible; and yet, the peril
to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.
Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the government, if it
should see fit, in the exercise of a proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be
required to produce the person arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The
constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a
citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common law. If it had
intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished it. The
illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding the foundations of civil
liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons
of history informed them that a trial by an established court, asisted by an impartial
jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong.
Knowing this, they limited the suspension of one great right, and left the rest to remain
forever inviolable.

The purpose of the proclamation has already been accomplished inrespect of those who
are now facing charges in court, to be dealtwith necessarily in accordance with the
constitution and the law.The court, in passing upon petitions to bail and granting
thesame in proper cases, does not inquire into the cause of their detention which is
plainly under and by virtue of commitmentsissued by the court upon the filing of the
information forrebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies. The court,therefore,
cannot be said to be interfering in an act of theExecutive, for it cannot be seriously
contended that, after thefiling of the information, the accused continues to be
underdetention as a result of an executive commitment and stillcovered by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. otherwise, the suspension will
operate as a judgment of conviction, in violation of the constitutional mandate that no
person shall be held to answer for criminal offense without due process of law (Article
III, section 1, Paragraph 15). "The laws which protect the liberties of the whole people
must not be violated or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized
though merited justice." Ex parte Milligan, supra. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of
the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal.
If it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at
liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to
be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute
freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable. it is not
correct to say that, if a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be
released before he is indicted in court, there is more reason to hold that he should not
be released after an information is filed against him, because it is then logical to
assume that the Government holds sufficient evidence. If he cannot secure his release
before the filing of the information, it is because, in view of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the court cannot look into the legality of his
detention under an executive act, and not because he is assumed to be guilty. As
already stated, after the filing of the information, in granting to bail in proper cases, the
court does not determine the legality of his prior detention which has already been
superseded by a detention underjudicial process, but merely proceeds with and carries
into effect its jurisdiction over the criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Besides, it is significant that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
be presumed to be innocent (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17). chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual la w library

We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of the crime of rebellion
suggests the likehood that a person accused thereof will jump his bail. The remedy,
however, is unfortunately not in the hands of the court. The lawmakers or the framers
of the Constitution should have made the offense capital or even unbailable. chanroblesvirtualaw libra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion so
complexed with other offenses as to make them capital. Their right to bail is accordingly
not absolute and may be denied when evidence of guilt is strong. The filing of the
information implies that the prosecution holds sufficient evidence for conviction, and it
is fair to suppose that the court will duly exercise its judgment when called upon to
pass on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. At any rate, on
admission to bail, the accused is delivered to the custody of his sureties as a
continuance of the original detention. (U.S. vs. Sunico and Ng Chiong, 40 Phil.
826).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law li brary

And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the worst - to the extent that
the security of the State is in factimperiled and the regular constitutional processes can
no longerbe observed with general safety to the people, - the President isauthorized by
the Constitution (Article VIII, Section 10,Paragraph 2) to "place the Philippines or any
part thereof undermartial law." Even then, the primordial objective should be a"regime
of justice" as contemplated in the Preamble of the Constitution. The stubborn fact,
however, is that the meresuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
anadmission that the courts can function and are functioningnormal; otherwise, there is
no need for the suspension as therewill be no court to grant the writ. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law library

Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013

ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO
WYCOCO), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through habeas
corpus.

Antecedents

On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with
syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City
(MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as
overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees,
membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one
of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail.2 On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were
transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate
action in accordance with the prevailing rules. 3

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation;
that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of
arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a
prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas
corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus
was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the
warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the
case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. 5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003, 6 the CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for
its lack of merit, explaining:

As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have
been procured by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner is
detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not
a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a
reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Municipal Judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation shall transmit his resolution, together with the record of
the case, including the warrant of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same and
order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the
proper remedy available to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be
released from detention on the grounds alleged in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, 8 but the CA
denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court discoursed on
the nature of the special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a
civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to
inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a
prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case
in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the
sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of
his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the
unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner
fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which
does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a
writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object
of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint under
which a person is held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however,
is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.12

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts
on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge
could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its
conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that
there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against
1âwphi1

Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus
because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge
Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct
preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-
26-SC.

With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint
on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not
be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in
Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful
authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody
under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was
issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)

Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge Pangilinan in her
attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She
insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its having been issued
without an exhaustive examination of the complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath;
without a prior finding of probable cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its issuance
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus.14

Mangila fails to persuade.

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding
the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the
City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her
petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy
of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the existence
of probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, 16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public
prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should
beultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring
the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of
the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the
most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. 17 We agree with the
CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and
November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR
GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR.
and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 1 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order
dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding
No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri
Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan 2 (PO1 Ampatuan).

Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat
Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the
Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter
brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of
Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1
Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine
Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director
Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was
announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila.
Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law
Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional
Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. 3

Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the
release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. 4 The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito
Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.

This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch
37.5

Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at around 7:08
o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del
Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District
(MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition.
Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge
Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with
Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
hearing.

On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

CHARGE SHEET

THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named respondent of the

administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 8551 6 in relation
to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:

That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil St.,
Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of the PNP and within the
jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his
death.

Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations. 7

Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr.
directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:

1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser
Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers.

2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place
police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative
case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against
such police personnel.

3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the
killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under
your restrictive custody.

4. For strict compliance.8

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police Director
Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1
Ampatuan.9
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acuña, placing
PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008.
Said Special Order No. 921, reads:

Restrictive Custody

PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional Director,
NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).

BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1
Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is
being held for other charges/legal grounds.11

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner,
who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before
the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-
119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.

On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge
Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein
respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause
why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.12

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:

Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by
the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April
21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan.

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert
that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave
misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet.
Further, in support of their position, respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon.
Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under
restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of administrative case for grave misconduct.

Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to
make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.

The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is
sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.

Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore the
filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its
own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief
PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4
of R.A. 8551.

The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.

Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has
rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted by this
Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police
1avvph!1

officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the
active status of the PNP.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.13

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED

TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN
WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC.
52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN
FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.14

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty.15

Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the
writ. The Rule provides:

RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS

SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.

SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court
of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted
by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

xxxx

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it
is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of,
at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at
its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned
in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. 16

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over
the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. 17

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 19

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is
an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.20

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause
of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused. 21

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 22
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on 20
April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief
Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of
PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by
any judicial authority against him.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue
that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the
prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be
held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for
Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or
restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention
or restraint of liberty.25

The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act
of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions,
including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent
officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No.
8551 reads:

Sec. 52 – x x x.

xxxx

4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal
from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not
exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have
the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature,
against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of
illegal detention or restraint of liberty. 26

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for.27
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him,
his remedy is within such administrative process.

We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To
date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his
restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:

SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment:
Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the
complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP
member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day:
Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if
the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent:
Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency
of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous
trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to
dismiss the petition.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of
the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face
that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO
RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL
GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL,
CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT,
PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL,
RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, Respondents.

For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated September 26, 2010 filed by
petitioner Francis Saez of our Resolution 2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the Petition for Review3 he
filed on July 21, 2008.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does not find
cogent grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.

Antecedent Facts

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and
production of documents.5 In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence,
he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the
military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his
name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo
commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.The case before the CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
00024 WOA.

In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains Lawrence
Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents also alleged that the
names and descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny,"
and "Joel" were insufficient to properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as among
the respondents in the petition.

On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt. Jacob
Thaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico
Duquil submitted their affidavits.
The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to determine
specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was
always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended
peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner was
apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in
Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS.
When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after
having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who
was always at the pier.

CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA

On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs
prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent.
The CA ratiocinated:

There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s presence at
their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing
there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court
cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s
entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation
or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the
rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that
the privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available
to address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.

xxxx

Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the supposed threat or
violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration
of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life,
liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

xxxx

A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated
requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent rule. The petition is
bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner’s right to privacy was
violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include any allegation as to what recourses he
availed of to obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither did petitioner allege what
specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what particular office of the government
he prays to obtain them. The petition prays "to order respondents to produce any documents
submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all
military intelligence reports."

xxxx

Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and
Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement to the privilege of the writs
applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own admission that nothing happened between
him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have been precipitated by his
fear that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or visible threat to
violate his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who
among the respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute
violation or threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to privacy thereof.

xxxx

x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:

"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. x x x."

xxxx

IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.8

On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with the following
issues submitted for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION

AND DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM THE

PETITIONER IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF
THE PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED

TO CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY
BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE
LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.9

Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution 10 denying the petition for review for the following
reasons, viz:

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the petition was bereft
of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents violated or threatened
petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as
he was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly
held that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and security
were violated, or how his right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the
particular documents to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody
thereof, and who has possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be
ordered "to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case
of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."

Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had
specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order of Battle and
promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a military asset. However,
despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices during the hearing, he still failed to
enlighten the appellate court as to what actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether
his right to life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the
unsubstantiated claims of petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.

As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-respondent, we find
the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
that the President, during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President be freed from
any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the
performance of official duties and functions.11 (Citation omitted)

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the
respondents’ own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were threatened. Military
personnel, whom the petitioner had named and described, knew where to get him and they can do
so with ease. He also became a military asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents
allegedly linking him to the CPP and including him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that
the foregoing circumstances were not denied by the respondents.

The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered incommunicado as he
was even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that the phone was only given to him
for the purpose of communicating with the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of
target legal organizations.

The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 13 which pronounced that "in the amparo
context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom from
threat’".14 According to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was undoubtedly violated, hence, to him
pertains a cause of action. Anent the quantum of proof required in a petition for the issuance of the
writ of amparo, mere substantial evidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings".15

Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof than what
the rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’ evidence.

The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice Reynato
Puno who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen against any
governmental agency or register to find out what information is held about his or her person." The
person can likewise "request the rectification or even the destruction of erroneous data gathered and
kept against him or her." In the petitioner’s case, he specifically sought the production of the order of
battle, which allegedly included his name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous
data relative to his involvement with the CPP.

OSG’s Comment

In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner advances
no cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The Court’s Disquisition

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court nevertheless
finds ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the

requirements of the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data

Section 517 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 6 18 of A.M. 08-1-16-SC
(Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations
relative to his personal circumstances and those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise
indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some of
the respondents in their commission. As to the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation
prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the
military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human
rights organization, then a direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of
the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been
satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the
petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making
references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not
identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and
identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights.19 Thus, despite the lack of certain
contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as
their absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However, they are mere allegations,
which the Court cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so to speak, and whether substantial
evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether.

No substantial evidence exists to

prove the petitioner’s claims
The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing
of a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data, not only direct evidence, but
circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.20

With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in
declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence on record and finds no reason to
reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.

In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the petitioner if the latter
was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty that the
petitioner was being monitored. The encounter happened once and the petitioner, in his pleadings,
nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was asked about his involvement with ANAKPAWIS,
he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance operations on him. He alleged that he was brought to
the camp of the 204th Infantry Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but was sent home at 5:00 p.m.
The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired thereafter. The
petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in
places under the latter’s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the
petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former
still doubted his motives and affiliations.

Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact
and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule
then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the
judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in
the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that
Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their
coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat
and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity –
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat". 21

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the surrounding
circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats
against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the
surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel
him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of
the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly
made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and
thus stand on nebulous grounds.

The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition for the issuance of the
writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of cases involving enforced disappearances or extra-
judicial killings that calls for flexibility in considering the gamut of evidence presented by the parties,
this case sets a different scenario and a significant portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have
been easily corroborated. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet
dated December 9, 200723 executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights-
Southern Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was invited and
interrogated at the military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he brought with him his uncle Norberto
Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and Edwardo Estabillo – five
witnesses who can attest and easily corroborate his statement – but curiously, the petitioner did not
present any piece of evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, to buttress such claim nor did
he give any reason for their non-presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the
denials made by the respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.

The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another allegation by
the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such
allegation was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit
dated March 31, 2008, stated that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP." 24 This
was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the petitioner identified as the one who told him that he was
included in the order of battle.25 The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army also
conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Esperon,26 and it was
shown that the persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly committed the acts complained of
were not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division. 27

Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he
was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of
KARAPATAN-ST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to
Mindoro on several instances. And while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier,
there was no claim by the petitioner that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding
any vehicle that may transport him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile
phone; hence, he had unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance from
non-governmental organizations and even government agencies.

The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a military
informant and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one. Thus, in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay28 executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew the
petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still students. He also stated that when he saw the
petitioner again in 2007, the latter manifested his intention to become a military informant in
exchange for financial and other forms of assistance.

The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a certain "Joel",
e.g., the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about his
personal circumstances. Such allegation by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his
part, a mere impression that the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the
circumstances. The petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a
conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he was still
connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident
occurred between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows that "Joel"
committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the petitioner,
especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the
reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data
cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even
the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence." 30

The President cannot be

automatically dropped as a
respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility
In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al., 31 the Court stated:

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military,
can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We
rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and

the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over
the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through
circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be
charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order
No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in
all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the

Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a
government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command
responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or
has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately
after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed
when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts
have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command,
control and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed
with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in
conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. 1âwphi1
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the president’s incumbency.32

Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even
for acts committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege
of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. 34

The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of
rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the
President’s name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual
involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there
was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus,
while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief,
under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Compliance with technical rules of

procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy

Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo
and habeas data was the defective verification which was attached to the petition. In
Tagitis,35 supporting affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not
submitted together with the petition and it was ruled that the defect was fully cured when the
petitioner and the witness personally testified to prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings
held before the CA. In the instant case, the defective verification was not the sole reason for the
CA’s denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless, it
must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in effectively administering
justice, primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where there was at
least substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the
hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded
primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his
allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the
petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition was deemed cured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

*G.R. No. 178497 February 4, 2014

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO
GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 183711

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO
GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 183712

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO
GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

*G.R. No. 178497 is included.

G.R. No. 183713

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO;
and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON,
JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case, specifically:
 (a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public disclosure of the
documents submitted by respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Lt. Gen. Romeo
P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col. Noel Clement, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Director General Oscar Calderon, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.; Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano; and Chief of the Philippine National Police,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this Court per paragraph III (i) of the fallo of our July 5,
2011 Resolution; and

(b) The Urgent Ex Parle Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela 1 (together with sealed attachments)
filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos praying that the Court: (1) order the persons named in the
sealed documents impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue
a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachments to
the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the
newly discovered evidence.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

A. The Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution

These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the obligation to report
its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This referral was necessary as the
investigation by the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-
CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR
investigation had been less than complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the
handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the
cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on
their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.

In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and
issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo who was then entitled, as
President, to immunity from suit.

The March 15, 2011 CHR Report

On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
On the basis of the gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following findings:

Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life
liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.

Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible
abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

xxxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who
at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag
Kainan Restaurant.

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the
cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures
in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years
thereafter.

The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-
uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company Commander in the 56th IB while he
was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but
under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and
brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp. The
similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass unnoticed by
the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight they are in right
now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon
seeing the face of Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.

Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it was indeed Baliaga that he
saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas’ abduction. Jeffrey was able to give a
graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the incident, including
the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented
him from interfering in their criminal act.

A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the
female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her
identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the Team
that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were involved
in counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from
March 2006 until she left the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozada’s involvement in
counter-insurgency operations together with Lt. Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR
Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008.

Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is otherwise
called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate
refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents does not only defy the
Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable presumption that AFP
personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if
not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the disputable
presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e),
Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines).

In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested
documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two
abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one of the intelligence operatives
involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A.
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG
witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affiliation with the military have
been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-
uman.

For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of
particular importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in the cartographic
sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes are
AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the
abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the
court for failure of the lone witness, an army man of the 56th IB to testify against him.

Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ),
revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among
the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben
Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.

Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down
the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so-called "Erap 5" abduction on the
ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated
September 21, 2010.

Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts
cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the
same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the "Erap 5" on its own time and
authority as an independent body.2

B. The Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution

On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a Resolution:
(1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2)
holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of the case; referring back the
same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file
their Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the
Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the
subsequent CHR investigation. To quote the exact wording of our Resolution:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to:

I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)

a. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that
decided the habeas corpus petition;

b. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R.
No. 183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and
the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the
 time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano,
to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the Court of
Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not
be released from detention;

c. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of
Appeals which shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have
been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30) days after the case is
submitted for decision; and

d. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate
from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the dropping or deletion
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent.

II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)

e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
100230, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be
warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court has ordered;
and

f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as

party-respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge
against her.

III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)

g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and
G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to
others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations
and proceedings;

h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.

i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010
Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause and
explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their
defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of
the documents requested by the CHR, particularly:

1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason

Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force);
M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved
in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
 2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon
City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said
covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information
and individual pictures; and

3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and
69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and
pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to
the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical
Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.

These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to
determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public
disclosure.

j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in
representation of their respective organizations, separately from the original
respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;

k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of

Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program,
subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and

l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter
may investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.3

C. The Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution

On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:

(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto Jose C. Roa,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo A. David, Jr., AFP (ret.),
and Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr., AFP;

xxxx

(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those assigned at the
56th Infantry Battalion (IB) from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, and to SUBMIT
these materials within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, without prejudice
to the submission of the other documents required under the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution, pertaining to those assigned at the other units of the AFP, should the
relevance of these documents be established during the Court of Appeal’s hearing;

(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution,
of the Summary of Information and individual pictures of the intelligence operatives
involved in the ERAP 5 incident, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution;
 (e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution,
of the profile and Summary of Information and pictures of an alias T.L., reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer in the counter-insurgency operations of the
56th IB in 2006 to 2007, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution.4

The Respondents’ September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion

On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in compliance with
the Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation and Motion are the following
documents:

a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the
56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;

b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were

involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and

c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the
56th IB, 7th ID.5

D. The Court’s September 6, 2011 Resolution

On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory Order praying
among others that she be allowed to examine the documents submitted to the Court pursuant to
paragraph III (i) of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our September 6, 2011 Resolution, we
resolved, among others, to:

(3) DENY the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted to this Court
per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without prejudice to our later
determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public disclosure of those
documents/materials;6

E. The Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution

On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio Eustaquio’s
affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing investigation of Jonas’ abduction, viz:

(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all available measures
to obtain the affidavit of witness Virgilio Eustaquio in connection with his allegation
that one of the male abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, appearing in the
cartographic sketch, was among the "raiders" who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
(otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE");

(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Resolution, a Report, with its recommendations of its
ongoing investigation of Burgos’ abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if
any, copy furnished the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, the incumbent Chiefs of the
AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the present respondents before the Court
of Appeals.7
F. The Court’s November 29, 2011 Resolution

On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner
Jose Manuel S. Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting
photocopies of the following documents:

i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007;

ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and

iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID. 8

In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR's request considering the
confidential nature of the requested documents and because the relevance of these
documents to the present case had not been established. We referred the CHR to our July 5,
2011 Resolution where we pointedly stated that these documents shall be "released
exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their relevance to the present case
and the advisability of their public disclosure."9

We held that "[w]e see no reason at this time to release these confidential documents since
their relevance to the present case has not been established to our satisfaction. It is
precisely for this reason that we issued our October 24, 2011 Resolution and directed the
CHR to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Resolution, a Report
with its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Jonas Burgos’ abduction, and the
affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any. Simply stated, it is only after the CHR's faithful
compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution that we will be able to determine the
relevance of the requested documents to the present case."10

G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquio’s Affidavit

On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure the affidavit
of witness Eustaquio in relation with his allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas,
appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as
the "ERAP FIVE"). Attached to this Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012,
which pertinently stated:

1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on May 22, 2006 otherwise
known as ERAP 5 and because of that, we filed a case with the Ombudsman against
Commodore Leonardo Calderon, et al., all then ISAFP elements, docketed as OMB-
P-C-06-04050-E for Arbitrary Detention, Unlawful Arrest, Maltreatment of Prisoners,
Grave Threats, Incriminatory Machination, and Robbery.

2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the CHR Special Investigation
Team regarding the information I have previously relayed to them sometime in
September 2010 as to the resemblance of the cartographic sketch of the man as
described by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and Jeffrey Cabintoy in the
abduction case of Jonas Burgos;
 3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic
sketch is among the raiders who abducted me and my four other companions
because the cartographic sketch almost exactly matched and/or resembled to the
cartographic sketch that I also provided and described in relation to the said incident
at my rented house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22, 2006.

4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and attest to the truth of the
foregoing.11

H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision

On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution
referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and
ruling on the merits of the petitions.

Petition for Habeas Corpus

The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or
detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas corpus.

Petition for the Writ of Amparo

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that the
present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the
evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt. Baliaga
as one of the abductors who approached him and told him not to interfere because the man being
arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga – the
face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt.
Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive identification,
considering especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper
motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP
and the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.

Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:

1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance covered by

the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

2) With regard to authorship,

a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the enforced

disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and

b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Army, ACCOUNTABLE for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos;

3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the conduct of an

exhaustive investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To this end, the
 PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, is directed to exercise extraordinary
diligence to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to
establish the link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5
incident.

(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Director General of the Philippine National Police, and their successors, to ensure the
continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;

(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of
diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and

(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s
investigation.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police
and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights are hereby DIRECTED to submit a quarterly
report to this Court on the results of their respective investigation.

The filing of petitioner’s Affidavit-Complaint against Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., et al. before the
Department of Justice on June 9, 2011 is NOTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to immediately inform
this Court of any development regarding the outcome of the case.12

The Respondent’s April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP
Director General), filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. The
motion made the following submissions:

5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the Honorable Court’s
findings that the PNP, specifically the CIDG, "failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
conduct of its investigation." x x x [T]hat this Honorable Court arrived at a conclusion
different from that of the CIDG, or accorded different credence to the statements of the
witnesses presented by the parties, does not necessarily translate to the CIDG’s failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence.

6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings that the
"Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General should
be held accountable for Jonas Burgos disappearance for failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence in conducting an internal investigation on the matter. The unwillingness of the
respondent officers of the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation conducted by the CHR is
a persuasive proof of the alleged cover up of the military’s involvement in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos."

The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to determine the
veracity of the allegations implicating some of its officers and personnel. After the conduct of
the same, it is the conclusion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
Army, based on the evidence they obtained, that Jonas Burgos has never been in custody.
 7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding of the Honorable
Court "recognizing the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance."

xxxx

That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or even a group of military men to
be responsible for the abduction of Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily make the same a case of
"enforced disappearance" involving the State. There is dearth of evidence to show that the
government is involved. Respondent Baliaga’s alleged participation in the abduction and his
previous membership in the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army, by themselves, do not
prove the participation or acquiescence of the State. 13

I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013

On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’ motion for partial
reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP was concerned, its failure to elicit leads and
information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent proof of its failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation. As far as the AFP was concerned, the CA
held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of the Philippine Army was positively identified as one of the
abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of serious effort to conduct further investigation,
spoke loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.

To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.14

J. The Petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated April 1, 2013

On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to:
(1) order the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-
WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
(the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the
newly discovered evidence.

The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain anonymous)
documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine
Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This documentary evidence consists of: (1)
After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report dated April
28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The petitioner also claimed that these are copies of
confidential official reports on file with the Philippine Army.

i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007

This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007, addressed to
the Commanding Officer, 7MIB, 7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay, NE. The report detailed
the planning and the objective of apprehending target communist leaders, among
them, one alias "Ramon" who was captured at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth,
Quezon City on April 28, 2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and S2, 56th IB.
This report also listed the names of the military personnel belonging to task
organization 72 MICO and 56th IB who conducted the operation.
 ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007

This report details Jonas’ abduction and "neutralization"; the results of his
interrogation and the intelligence gathered on his significant involvements/activities
within the CPP/NPA/NDF organization.

iii. Undated Autobiography

This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his recruitment
and eventual ascent in the CPP/NPA as an intelligence officer.

K. The Court’s April 11, 2013 Resolution

In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the respondents to Comment on the
petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela and its attachments, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution, the Court:

(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully comply with the
terms of Section III (i) of the dispositive portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution;

(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written assurance within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Resolution that the military personnel listed in the
submitted After Apprehension Report can be located and be served with the
processes that the Court may serve;

(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and all the
members of her immediate family;

(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to the petitioner
and her immediate family and to submit a confidential memorandum on the security
arrangements made;

(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the
CHR as it may require pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22,
2010 Resolution.15

i. The respondents’ Comment from the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
dated June 6, 2013

On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their comments
on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the petitioner do not exist in the
concerned military units’ respective records, nor are they in the custody or possession of their
respective units. To support their allegations, the respondents submitted the following:

a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio P. Catapang, Jr.
Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the
documents16 submitted by the petitioner "do not exist nor in the possession/custody of
this Headquarters."
 b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S. Villanueva, Assistant
Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner
"could not be found nor do they exist in the records of this Command."

c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M. Ona, Commanding
Officer, 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the
documents submitted by the petitioner "do not exist at this unit."

d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias, Acting Commanding
Officer, 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the
petitioner "do not exist at the records or in the possession of this unit."17

The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Maj. Allan M.
Margarata and Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:

a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:

1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry
Division, PA last 17 January 2007 to 17 August 2007.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After Apprehension Report dated 30 April
2007 wherein members of 56th IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said document and the
participation of my men listed thereat. There were no military operations that I have
authorized or approved regarding Jonas Burgos. The contents thereof are false and
utter fabrication of facts.

b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:

1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry
Division, PA from 01 July 2006 to 01 July 2008.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28

April 2007 and After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which
purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on
the last page of the Pyscho-Social Processing Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the
implication of my name in the said documents. The contents thereof are purely a
product of wild imagination. I have never seen such document until now.

4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing expedition on the part of Mrs.
Edita Burgos. A ploy to implicate any military personnel especially those belonging to
the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.

c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:

 1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry
Division, PA.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28

April 2007 and After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which
purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on
the last page of the Psycho-Social Processing Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the
implication of my name in the said documents. The contents thereof are false and
utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be at 72MICO if I was never assigned
thereat.

4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire military service. I have never been a
member of any operation which involves the name of Jonas Burgos or any other
military operation for that matter. I have never seen such document until now.

5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan Margarata or of his unit,
72MICO.18

Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by the petitioner were signed; a
writ of Amparo cannot be issued and the investigation cannot progress on the basis of false
documents and false information.

Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and CHR are
conducting their own investigations of the case, the petitioner’s motion at this point is premature; the
proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very least redundant.

ii. The Respondents’ Compliance dated June 7, 2013

On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate General, complied with our
April 11, 2013 Resolution by submitting the following documents:

a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the personnel of 56th

Infantry Battalion (IB), 69th IB, and 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA). These
documents were submitted by the 7th ID in sealed nine (9) small and three (3) big
boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);

b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines

(ISAFP) on the 2007 "ERAP 5" incident in Kamuning, Quezon City; Profile/Summary
of Information (SOI) with pictures of the Intel Operatives involved in the "ERAP 5"
incident; and certification issued by the Command Adjutant of ISAFP concerning
T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), an alias T.L., all reportedly
assigned with the Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service, AFP (MIG
15, ISAFP). These documents were submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;

c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT Fernando PA. This

document was submitted by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a sealed
envelope;
 d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning captured/surrendered
rebels;

e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of military personnel

listed in the submitted After Apprehension Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly
identified as members of the Task Organization -72 MICO and 56th IB with the
inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from Commander, 7ID, PA, Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7ID, PA, Commanding Officer, 72 MICO,
and 56Ib, 71ID, PA, respectively, stating the non-existence of the following
documents: Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007; After-
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007; Autobiography of Jonas Burgos; and
Picture of Jonas Burgos;

f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, the Chief of Staff,

assuring that the active military personnel mentioned in the purported apprehension
report can be located at their given locations and be served with the processes that
may be issued by the Honorable Court.19

OUR RULING

A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph III(i) of
the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution

The directive for the submission of the above-mentioned documents arose from our determination in
our June 22, 2010 Resolution that the PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two
(one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with
eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court directly commissioned the CHR to
continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the gathering of evidence.

Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim made by Eustaquio,
Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice, that the male abductor of Jonas
appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
known as the "ERAP FIVE."

This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of the fallo of the
Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially denied this request but eventually complied with the
Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the documents via the September 23, 2011 Manifestation
and Motion and the June 7, 2013 Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made
it plain that these documents shall be released exclusively to the Court for its examination to
determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.

Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20, 2012
Progress Report on its continuing investigation of Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this Progress Report
was Virgilio Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of the victims of the abduction
incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE" incident; (2) as a result of this
incident, they filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other
members of the Intelligence Service, AFP (ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest,
maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, incriminatory machination and robbery; and (3) the male
abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the
raiders who abducted him and his four companions because it resembled the cartographic sketch he
described in relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May 22, 2006.
After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the Court’s July
5, 2011, August 23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR access to
these requested documents to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the true identities of the
persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.

At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the resemblance of
one of Jonas’ abductors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the sought-after missing link
that establishes the relevance of the requested documents to the present case. We note that this
lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those depicted in the cartographic sketches as two
of Jonas’ abductors (one male and one female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.

In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives of the CHR to inspect the
requested documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two
abductors of Jonas, without copying and without bringing the documents outside the premises of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be within
office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to allow the CHR to comprehensively
investigate the lead provided by Eustaquio.

To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation using the standard
of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by
Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation being conducted by the Department
of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of Jonas. 22 In this regard, we direct the NBI
to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require,
pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.

For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the DOJ, copy
furnished the petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and
all the respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the
developments of the case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of
the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the
writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of
action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a
preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. 24 The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific
to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, 25 we defined what the terms
"responsibility" and "accountability" signify in an Amparo case. We said:

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers
to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.26

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the
Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause for arbitrary
detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance. 27

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on the
entities responsible and accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by substantial
evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of Cabintoy’s positive
identification that he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere because the
latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA also held the AFP and
the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to
address the enforced disappearance of Jonas:

(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the
abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link between the
abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident;

(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Director General of the Philippines National Police, and their successors, to ensure the
continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;

(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of
diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend
full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s
investigation; and

(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General,
Philippine National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a
quarterly report to the Court on the results of their respective investigation. 28

We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013
CA resolution denying their motion for partial reconsideration.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity
of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of
Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We so
conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case
by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this
Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in
crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of
the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that
would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the
CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.

We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the admissibility or the
merits of the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose
any investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose
identities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future
investigations and proceedings. Considering that the present case has already reached the
prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and
prosecutory agencies of the government.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to
the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper
courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this purpose,
we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from
receipt of this Resolution.

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through the NBI, of
the disappearance of Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of the criminal aspect of this
case should the case be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. 29

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall continue to be
undertaken by the CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation
under the terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the additional directives under the present
Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. 1âwphi1

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case
with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage,
criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of
Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been served and exhausted.

Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;
 (2) REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this Resolution
and its covered cases to the Department of Justice for investigation for the purpose of filing
the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties if such action
is warranted by the gathered evidence. The referral to the Department of Justice is without
prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
investigation should the case be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;

(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of
Investigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the
sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution;

(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized
representatives of the Commission on Human Rights to inspect the requested documents in
camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For this purpose, the documents
shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of
Jonas Burgos without copying and bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be
conducted within office hours and for a reasonable period of time that would allow the
Commission on Human Rights to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Virgilio
Eustaquio;

(5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as the latter may require,
pursuant to the authority granted under the Court's June 22, 2010 Resolution.

(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental investigation

report to the Department of Justice, copy furnished the petitioner, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine
National Police and the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, and all the respondents, within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

(7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without prejudice to
the concerned parties' compliance with the above directives and subject to the Court's
continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,

LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ
AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5
Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION
COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and
Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff
Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in
Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private
respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the
"MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay
Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does
numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio
Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's
prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private
respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint.
They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2)
on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate
of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private
respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents' favor, thus:

"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties
have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land
in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green
highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by
the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and
sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on
May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.),
they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio
Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in
actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by
the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz
entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building
structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police
Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their
confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they
agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any
structures thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005
when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April
19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain
firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation
forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex
'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the
proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the
entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with
the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan
but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G',
Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership
by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4,
Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a

perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the
Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the
plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to
April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force.
Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al.
vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to
April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable
because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities.
 Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in
question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their
Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the
commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land
in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to
247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants'

witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or
about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and
built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away
from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on
April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their
numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures
attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended
report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that
these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of
their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006 6."

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo,
Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance
conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 - authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del
Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with
the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007 8.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent Judge nevertheless
issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the
Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for
Review11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition
on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008.
The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions
diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners
maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the
private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:

"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns
intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in
uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two
houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their
shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as
SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad,
Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at
minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their
intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against
women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners
continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and
they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants
and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are
attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore
disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is
submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid
to unjustly evict the defendants.13"

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry
that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact
involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed
value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable
by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was
appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly
issued the assailed orders.
 OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both
in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other
hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for
certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the
petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the
same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in
the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition,
however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the
assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1
August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or
more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8)
months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from receipt of the assailed order or
orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance
with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the
RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel
but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by
LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of
this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary
period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders
assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in
compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that
has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be
the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this
case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the
above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's
Prayer patently shows.17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful
and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA -
G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the
present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for
the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot
and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined
to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18

Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the
same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance 19 that:

"x x x
 (e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the
ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not
capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA
is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the
same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x"

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is
replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act
of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date"
while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide
the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the
RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already
undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the
same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The
petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before
the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that
are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve
as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and
penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all
of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals
and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is
identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side
by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal
or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of
the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt."20

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1)
of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7;
Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of
those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting
attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private
respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners
may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level
courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law
established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully
detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of
possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite
Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or
the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As
the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error
correctible by certiorari under the present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for
violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of
the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the
issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as
the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
 (f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what
extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations
are supported by the following documents:

"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners,
id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed
by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns,
etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's

affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the
incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,
including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned
by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of
the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can
hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments
implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y
Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer
Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y
Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry
case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and
detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a
court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with
incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon
by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later
brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory
incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners
advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism
that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to
us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to
seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in
the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry
the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC
that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators,
clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a
mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before
the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the
petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and
from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on
grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the
ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial
measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will
suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when
applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere
with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and
civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for
the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute
and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to
life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately
filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP
may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of
violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National
Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was
conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of
police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is
nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these
lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN.
JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision,
the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return
of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that
Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said
Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family
while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may
be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in
an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States
of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner
toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join
members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future
medical mission.7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo
(Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of
someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her
name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped
away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to
alight.19 After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing
and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to
"the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the
petitioner.25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during
which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. 27 There were also a
few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon
City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen
to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of
her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded public
officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on
the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner
likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention
areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash. 40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also
directed the respondents to file their verified written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of
the public officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In
support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as
contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and
his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the
distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way
of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and
her companions themselves.48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims
that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while
the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have
easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and
knee caps.50

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’s
alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public
respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade
fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great
media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist
on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as
against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from
suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any
specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission
of such atrocities.53

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth
behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19
May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station
to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the
report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators
of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas,
Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed
that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight
(8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction
also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2)
Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report61 that was
transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy
Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police
Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional
Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN
(Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc.64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the
victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately,
the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and
the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes
of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by
the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded. 67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the
abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her
fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts. 69

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing
him and the other respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a
Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among
others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP
Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General
Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause
an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen.
Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report 77 detailing
the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated"
and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. 78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate
court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in
open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 80

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the
abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation
that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly
taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only
affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter
claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and
then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was
released.83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure
of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records
from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito
Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating
in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a
female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals,
the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner
is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but
also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this end, the appellate court granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to
the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to her abduction and torture. 88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or
any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the
Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of
petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of
Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. 96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement.97

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her
amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. 99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility
as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate,
if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that:102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In
this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions
of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode
of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to
crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is

more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While
the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo
writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo:108

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders
on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In
Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were
given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the
public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption
that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were
behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces. 112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat.113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the
present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the
involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence
that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy
inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the
cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind
of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police
chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and
by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take
the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were
made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner
in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in
itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does
the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to
the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure
of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117 We
agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it.
To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to
fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the
abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed
in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact
that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of
property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property
rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the
military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by
the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected
is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo
Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner
failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot
be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public
any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not
raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular
ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information
from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel.
Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another,
to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing
acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public,
Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by
persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity
certainly violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem
it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ operates to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is
the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy
of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and
other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering
that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by
the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public
respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,"
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being
kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of
the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form
of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide
Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary
diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the
petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional
mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128 must be tapped in order to
fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture,
may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government
itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate
the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the
"respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the
amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot
shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same
time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain
the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical
first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the
need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer
in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have
facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the
former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other
means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence
before a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must
be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo
Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to
explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the
victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any
attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the
one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any mask. 1avvphi1

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included
in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and
first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as
of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under
the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this
case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very
real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the
bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the
primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon
the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most
promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital
for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify
the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and
torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor,
and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the
ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of
its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the
records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during
her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall
submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will
continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas
of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
 Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify
the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s
abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his

successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations,
other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court
of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports
on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or
continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR,

the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under
any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the
public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those
found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for
any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.