EN BANC

G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986

RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS.

SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as
Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), Respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a
person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel? chanrobles virtual law li brary

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-
Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he
holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former
corporation. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight
from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and
together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to
the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter
of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro
Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management
committee was organized and appointed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law l ibrary

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission
requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear
petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation
Division.
chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was
suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against
petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of
Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were
filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and
Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
WON the Court allowed the accused to exercise his rights.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1 The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the
same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:

Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing
ground that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions and opportunities. chanroblesvirtualawlibra rychanrobles virtual law library

The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is
discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law lib rary

In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or
in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated . 2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would
allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail bonds
in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their undertakings
because it was the Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law lib rary

3
WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED.

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter

requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4,
1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law li brary

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of
Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon
and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law li brary

5
On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on
April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana,
U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc
Securities, Inc." 8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive
officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W.
Miller 9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies
who would be involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on
August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the
prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc
Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to
him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the
other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered
merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was
president and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of
Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en
banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 12 chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right
to travel.
chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's contention is untenable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him. 13 chanrobles virtual law library

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As
we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit
said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public
officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties
become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right
to prevent the principal from leaving the state. 14 chanrobles virtual law library

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so
then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose
jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail
to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he
would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if
it were otherwise. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law library

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals'
ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly
citing the following passage:

... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as
demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines
and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most
important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle
perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that
liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is
misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy;
for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty
under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the
accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration
thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the
court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner
in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the
Solicitor General in his comment:

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is
solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will,
allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities.
From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can
be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's
motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could not be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's
absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage
of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-
presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. 15 chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety
has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he
had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country
without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal
that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under
this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result
has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the
final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal
cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobl es virtual law library

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results,
that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in
allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would
comply with the conditions of her bail bond. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual la w library

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, the Court finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the
other issues raised by petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against
petitioner.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law li brary

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 93808-09. April 7, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 94073-74. April 7, 1993.

BELARMINO DIVINA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE ROSENDO B. BANDAL, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 34, respondents.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon C. Barrameda for accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY

ACCEPTED. — On the question of credibility, this Court will not as a general rule disturb the findings
of the trial judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason is the opportunity available to the trial
court — but not to the appellate court — to observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess their
credibility not only by the nature of their testimony but also by their demeanor under questioning.

2. ID.; ID.; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; NOT IMPAIRED BY FAILURE TO DISCLOSE AT ONCE

THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED. — The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or disclose at
once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect much less impair, the credibility of the
witness. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is common and has
been judicially declared not to affect credibility. In the case at bar, it is a fact that one of the accused,
Belarmino Divina, has been the OIC Barangay Captain of Anhawan since 1986 up to May, 1988. It
cannot be gainsaid that although the incident happened after his term, having held said position, he
has a strong influence in said place. It was natural for the victim to fear for his life as explained by
him. In addition thereto, the incident also resulted in the death of Concepcion Baillo, wife of
Ambrocio Baillo and mother of Jaime and Rogelio Baillo. We have held that "(a)lthough there is a
natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed,
mourning and rites for the dead take priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover, the injuries
sustained by the victim Jaime Baillo, both physical and emotional, and the necessary period of
recuperation after his discharge from the hospital are enough reasons to understand the delay in the
filing of the complaint.

3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; NOT ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — On

the issue of conspiracy, We hold that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Nowhere in
the trial court's decision was there any mention of any act of the accused that may be construed as
an overt act in the furtherance of conspiracy. Absent such an evidentiary basis, We cannot accept
the finding of implied conspiracy. We have held that: ". . ., albeit no formal agreement is necessary to
prove conspiracy and the same way be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of
the crime, yet conspiracy must be established by the same quantum of evidence as any other
ingredient of the offense. Such evidence must show intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design or purpose. The same degree of proof necessary to
establish the crime is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It cannot be established by conjectures but by positive and conclusive evidence.
Since conspiracy must be proved beyond peradventure of a doubt, it follows that it cannot be
appreciated where the facts can be consistent with the non-participation of the accused in the
fancied cabal." In the case at bar, no conspiracy may be deduced where there is no evidence to
show the participation of accused Mecrito Baga in the shooting incident. The lone eyewitness Jaime
Baillo testified that while he was hiding behind the hagonoy plants, he saw accused Belarmino
Divina holding a gun and together with Mecrito Baga, approached the lifeless body of his mother.
The mere presence of accused Mecrito Baga does not prove his participation in the killing. The mere
fact of being with Divina does not of itself establish conspiracy.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF

ACCUSED. — The well-settled rule is that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted
to by an accused, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy
fabrication. We have repeatedly held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by witnesses for the prosecution and that to establish it, the accused
must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to
have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. Record shows
that the victim Jaime Baillo while hiding behind the hagonoy plant saw accused Belarmino Divina
approach the dead body of his mother Concepcion Baillo and uttered "PUSIL RAY TAMBAL SA
MGA TESTIGOS SA CONTRA SA MGA DIVINA" which means "ONLY THE GUN CAN SILENCE
THOSE WITNESSES AGAINST THE DIVINAS." In addition thereto, accused Belarmino Divina in his
cross examination admitted that the house of his father-in-law where he was allegedly drinking tuba
with his friends is only about two and a half (2 1/2) kilometers from where the victims Concepcion
Baillo and Jaime Baillo were shot at. Hence, it was not physically impossible for accused Belarmino
Divina to be at the place where the crime was committed. Moreover, although motive is unnecessary
when the assailant has been positively identified, in this case, accused Belarmino Divina has the
motive to commit the crime charged because the victim Concepcion Baillo was shown to be a
witness against the former's brothers in another criminal case.

5. ID.; ID.; POLICE BLOTTER; ENTRIES THEREIN NOT INCLUSIVE. — A police blotter is a book
which records criminal incidents reported to the police. Entries in official records, as in this case of a
police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. It is
undisputed that the alleged time of the commission of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17,
1988, was supplied only by the parish priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting
incident happened nor presented as a witness during the trial. The information supplied is therefore
hearsay and does not have any probative value.

6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NOT AVAILABLE TO ACCUSED UNDER SO

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 2-92. — With regards to G.R. Nos. 94073-74, We are
constrained to deny accused Belarmino Divina's petition for certiorari in line with this Court's
Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 "Re: Cancellation of Bail Bond of Accused
Convicted of Capital Offense in the Regional Trial Court," pertinent provisions of which are quoted
hereunder: "The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3
of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: "Sec. 3. Bail, a
matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as
a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong." Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who
is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." Accused Belarmino
Divina was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of murder which is an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92, he is no longer
entitled to bail even if he appeals to Us since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG
appealed from the judgment ** rendered by the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 35
of Dumaguete City convicting both accused for murder and frustrated murder for the death of
Concepcion Baillo and the gunshot wounds sustained by Jaime Baillo.

In G.R. Nos. 94073-74, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" filed a petition for certiorari
alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction for disapproving his property bond because it consists of unregistered or untitled land.

On July 30, 1990, this Court resolved to consolidate the two abovementioned cases.

In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, the accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y
HIYOG were charged with murder and frustrated murder in the two informations as follows.

The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 8342 dated August 30, 1988, alleged:

"That on or about the 17th day of June, 1988, at Barangay Malungcay Daku, Municipality of Dauin,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Concepcion Baillo with the use of a firearm which said accused
were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon the body of Concepcion Baillo a gunshot
wound at her back which directly caused her death immediately thereafter.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code." 1

The information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 8362 dated September 9, 1988, alleged:

"That in the evening of June 17, 1988, at Barangay Malungcay Daku, municipality of Dauin, Province
of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, conspiring and
confederating together and acting under the same accord and purpose, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a gun, shoot one JAIME BAILLO inflicting upon the latter
the following injuries, to wit:

1. Gunshot wound of entrance 0.5-1 cm. long posterior chest wall lower left penetrating abdominal
cavity with injury to the liver left lobe thru & thru.

2. Hemoperitoneum approximately 250 cc. with metallic foreign body at submuscular area,
epigastrium.

3. Retro peritoneal hematoma.

4. Gunshot wound of entrance 0.5 cm. left buttock upper portion.

5. Gunshot wound of exit left inguinal area.

6. Pneumonia both lower lung fields.

thus the offenders performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
MURDER, as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is, by the timely medical assistance rendered to the
victim that prevented his death.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code." 2

On May 18, 1990, the court a quo rendered its decision convicting both accused for murder and
frustrated murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA Y HIYOG are
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, qualified by treachery, in
Criminal Case No. 8342 for the killing of Concepcion Baillo; and for Frustrated Murder, also qualified
by treachery, in Criminal Case No. 8362, for the deadly wounds inflicted on Jaime Baillo, and the
Court hereby imposes the following penalties to wit:

1. For the Murder of Concepcion Baillo in Criminal Case No. 8342, accused Belarmino Divina and
co-accused Mecrito Baga are hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Accused shall also jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim the
sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), and to pay the costs;

2. For the Frustrated Murder of Jaime Baillo in Criminal Case No. 8362, accused Belarmino Divina
and co-accused Mecrito Baga are hereby sentenced, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended, to suffer an imprisonment ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS AND FOUR (4) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum, and to pay the costs.

Also considering the fact that the two (2) accused are charged with a capital offense and taking into
account their conviction today where it can no longer be said that the evidence against them is not
strong, and considering that the possibility of their jumping bail and evading arrest is not now
remote, the two accused are likewise hereby ordered to be detained at the Negros Oriental
Detention and Rehabilitation Center without prejudice to their filing an appeal, if so, unless they
could put up an additional bail bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED." 3

On July 16, 1990, the accused-appellants Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga filed an appeal with
this Court which was docketed as G.R. Nos. 93808-09.

Pursuant to the trial court's decision, accused-appellant Belarmino Divina on June 29, 1990 filed an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Approval Of Bail Bond before the trial court offering untitled properties as
property bond. On the same date, the trial court in its Order dated June 29, 1990, directed the said
accused-appellant to put up a titled property as property bond otherwise, he may put up a surety
bond or a cash bond. 4

Accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied. 5

Hence, accused-appellant Belarmino Divina filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for approval of bail bond, docketed as G.R. Nos. 94073-74.

In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, accused-appellants contend that the court a quo erred in finding that their
guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and in convicting them of the crime charged. 6

The prosecution's version, as culled by the Solicitor General, is as follows:

"In the evening of June 17, 1988 at around 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Ambrocio Baillo, his
thirteen (13) year old son Jaime Baillo and his wife Concepcion Baillo just came from the "tabuan"
(flea market) at Barangay Anhawan, Dauin, Negros Oriental and were heading for home at
Barangay Daku, Dauin, Negros Oriental (TSN, January 3, 1984, pp. 4-5; TSN, April 10, 1989, pp. 4-
5). Just after crossing the Maayong-tubig river and while walking one behind the other (Ambrocio,
Jaime then Concepcion) along the trail, suddenly and without any warning, they were shot from
behind (Ibid.). Concepcion, being hit and mortally wounded, fell down and cried "agi!" (Ibid.). Jaime
also fell down because he was hit at the back and at the left hip. Ambrocio was not hurt. Upon
seeing his wife and son fall, he instructed his son Jaime to hide as he was going to get a vehicle
(TSN, April 10, 1989, pp. 5-7). Immediately, Ambrocio ran away and proceeded directly to their
house and told his other son Rogelio to go and see his mother and younger brother Jaime who were
shot at Malungcay Daku (Ibid., p. 7). Then Ambrocio reported the incident to the police of Dauin and
to the parish priest (Father Badoy) whose truck they used to return to the place of the incident (Ibid.,
p. 8). Policemen Ikoy Tubil and Dadoy Elumir rode on the truck while Ambrocio rode with June Alta
Marino on the latter's motorcycle (Ibid., p. 9).

Meantime, at the scene of the incident, Jaime, upon being instructed by his father Ambrocio, was
able to crawl and hide himself behind a hagonoy plant despite the wounds he sustained (TSN,
January 3, 1989, p. 5). While hiding, two (2) men whom he recognized as their neighbors -
Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga (accused-appellants) approached the lifeless body of his mother
(Ibid.)

Then Belarmino Divina, with a gun, said in the dialect: "PUSIL RAY TAMBAL SA MGA TESTIGOS
SA CONTRA SA MGA DIVINA" which means "ONLY THE GUN CAN SILENCE THOSE
WITNESSES AGAINST THE DIVINAS". (Ibid., p. 6). (The records show that victim Concepcion
Baillo was a witness against the Divinas in another pending case.)
Meanwhile, Rogelio Baillo, after being told by his father of the incident, immediately proceeded to
Malungcay-Daku, the place of the incident (TSN, April 10, 1989, p. 33).

Upon arrival, he was told by his brother Jaime that Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga had
approached the dead body of their mother Concepcion Baillo with Belarmino holding a gun (Ibid., p.
35). Rogelio saw wounds at the arms and at the back of his mother and he was not able to talk with
her anymore (Ibid., pp. 36). He also observed that Jaime sustained wounds at his left hip and at the
back (Ibid.).

Thereafter, at about 10:00 o'clock that same evening, Ambrocio Baillo arrived with the truck of Fr.
Badoy accompanied by policemen Ikoy Tubil and Dadoy Elumir and, Jun Alta Marino, a teacher in
Malungcay Daku. Ambrocio noticed that his wife Concepcion was already dead while his son Jaime
was alive (Ibid., pp. 9-10). Ambrocio further observed that his wife Concepcion sustained six (6)
wounds at the back and both her arms were lacerated (Ibid.). His son Jaime also sustained gunshot
wounds at the back and at the left hip (Ibid.). They then loaded the dead body of Concepcion on the
truck and brought her to their house while Jaime was brought to the provincial hospital for treatment
(Ibid.). Jaime was operated twice. As testified to by the attending physician, Dr. Nerissa Calumpang,
Jaime could have died were it not for the timely medical attention (TSN, April 11, 1989, pp. 2-18).
Jaime was discharged only after two (2) weeks of confinement after which, he temporarily lived with
their relatives at Valencia (a nearby municipality) because of fear that he might be killed by the
Divinas (TSN, March 29, 1989, p. 18)." 7

Accused-appellants, Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga interpose the defense of denial and alibi.

Accused Belarmino Divina's defense as contained in his Brief is as follows:

"Accused Belarmino Divina has been living in his parents-in-law's house at Anhawan, Dauin, Negros
Oriental, since January, 1984. (TSN, January 13, 1990, p. 2). He was the OIC Barangay Captain of
Anhawan since 1986 up to May, 1988 (ibid., p. 3).

On June 17, 1988, from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., he was plowing in his farm, after which he ate his
lunch. At about 3:00 p.m. of the same day, he went to the "tabu-an", (a flea market) about 40 meters
from his in-law's house where he met Sabino Sarense, Dedio Tubil, Porferio Tubil, Alberto Deloria
and Nicolas Sarense. At about 3:30 p.m., the group, including accused Divina, played volley-ball.
The group finished playing at about 4:00 p.m. after which they ate bread. At about 5:30 p.m.
accused Divina invited the group to his in-law's house where he also lives with his family, to drink
tuba. The group was joined by Tony Regalado and Lucero Regalado, accused Divina's brothers-in-
law. They drank tuba until 7:00 p.m. that night after which accused Divina with his family, Dedio Tubil
and Porferio Tubil stayed around to view the TV.

Sabino Sarense, after the group stopped drinking at 7:00 p.m., left together with his son Nicolas
Sarense and Alberto Deloria. The rest of their group, Dedio Tubil, Porferio Tubil and accused Divina
with his family were watching the TV. At about 8:00 p.m., Dedio and Porferio Tubil also left.

Accused Divina came to know of the killing of Concepcion Baillo the following day, June 18, 1988.
Since that day accused Divina never heard of the identity of the suspect until he was arrested on
July 26, 1988, as the suspect himself at about 4:00 p.m., at the Poblacion of Dauin while waiting for
transportation going to Anhawan where he lives." 8

On the other hand, Mecrito Baga's defense is as follows:

"Mecrito Baga and Douglas Divina were plowing the latter's field on June 17, 1988, starting from
7:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00 o'clock that morning and from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon that same day. They rested for a while in the house of Douglas Divina
and at about 6:00 o'clock p.m. Mecrito Baga with his mother Nicolasa Baga joined the Divina family
in praying the Holy Rosary which prayer had been going on for the last six months. After the prayer
which ended at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused Mecrito Baga and his mother joined the
Divina family for supper. After supper, Mecrito Baga joined Guillermo Divina, Douglas Divina and
Restituto Delvo in drinking tuba. At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Mecrito Baga and his mother
left the residence of Douglas Divina.

Mecrito Baga learned about the killing of Concepcion Baillo and the wounding of her son the
following day, June 18, 1988, but he never heard of any suspect, not until July 25, 1988, when he
was arrested by four policemen in his house." 9

This appeal hinges on the credibility of the lone eyewitness and victim Jaime Baillo.

On the question of credibility, this Court will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial
judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. The reason is the opportunity available to the trial court — but not
to the appellate court — to observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess their credibility not
only by the nature of their testimony but also by their demeanor under questioning. 10

Accused-appellants allege that the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jaime Baillo, is far from
credible for being conflicting, uncorroborated, unreliable and inconclusive. In support of this
contention, accused-appellants point out that Jaime Baillo upon admission in the hospital on the
night of the incident allegedly told Dr. Calumpang that he (Jaime) was shot by an unknown assailant.
11

Dr. Calumpang's testimony on cross examination is quoted as follows:

"ATTY. BARRAMEDA:

Q And did he tell you who shot him?

A No. By an unknown assailant.

Q That was what he said?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Unknown assailant?

A Yes, Sir.

Q That is very clear to you that he was shot by an unknown assailant?

A Witness nodding her head.

Q Please vocalize your answer. Yes, he said that?

A Yes, your honor.

". . ."." 12 (Emphasis Ours.)

A reading of the above-quoted testimony shows that the response of the doctor to the question: "Did
he tell you who shot him?" was "No". The phrase "by an unknown assailant" was merely volunteered
by the doctor which can be taken to mean that the assailant was unknown to her but not necessarily
unknown to the victim, Jaime Baillo. The succeeding question propounded by the defense counsel,
to wit "That is very clear to you that he was shot by an unknown assailant?" calls for a statement of
an opinion and not a statement of fact.

It is the duty of the defense counsel to propound questions that will not result in two or more
interpretations as what happened in this case. The resulting inconsistencies were the product of the
kind of questions propounded by defense counsel.

As to the alleged testimony of one Feliciano Parao given in another criminal case that the victim
Jaime Baillo allegedly told him that it was Guillermo Divina and Douglas Divina, brothers of
Belarmino Divina, who shot him and his mother, the said testimony cannot but be considered as
hearsay for Feliciano Parao was not presented as witness during the trial of this case. His testimony
has no probative value. The trial court was correct in rejecting said statements.

The defense makes a big issue of the fact that the prosecution witnesses Ambrocio Baillo, Jaime
Baillo and Rogelio Baillo reported the identities of the accused only after one month and nine days
have elapsed despite the fact that the accused's identities were already known to them on the very
night of the incident. 13

The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or disclose at once the identity of the accused
does not necessarily affect much less impair, the credibility of the witness. 14 The initial reluctance
of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially declared not to
affect credibility. 15

In the case at bar, it is a fact that one of the accused, Belarmino Divina, has been the OIC Barangay
Captain of Anhawan since 1986 up to May, 1988. It cannot be gainsaid that although the incident
happened after his term, having held said position, he has a strong influence in said place. It was
natural for the victim to fear for his life as explained by him.

In addition thereto, the incident also resulted in the death of Concepcion Baillo, wife of Ambrocio
Baillo and mother of Jaime and Rogelio Baillo. We have held that "(a)lthough there is a natural
tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, mourning and
rites for the dead take priority as dictated by our culture. 16

Moreover, the injuries sustained by the victim Jaime Baillo, both physical and emotional, and the
necessary period of recuperation after his discharge from the hospital are enough reasons to
understand the delay in the filing of the complaint.

Both accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial. It is Our view that the trial court was correct
in convicting accused Belarmino Divina on the strength of the testimony of the lone eyewitness
Jaime Baillo but in the case of the accused Mecrito Baga, We find the evidence of the prosecution
not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On the issue of conspiracy, We hold that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Nowhere
in the trial court's decision was there any mention of any act of the accused that may be construed
as an overt act in the furtherance of conspiracy. Absent such an evidentiary basis, We cannot accept
the finding of implied conspiracy. 17

We have held that:

". . ., albeit no formal agreement is necessary to prove conspiracy and the same way be inferred
from the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet conspiracy must be established
by the same quantum of evidence as any other ingredient of the offense. Such evidence must show
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design or
purpose. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to establish a
finding of criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be established by
conjectures but by positive and conclusive evidence. Since conspiracy must be proved beyond
peradventure of a doubt, it follows that it cannot be appreciated where the facts can be consistent
with the non-participation of the accused in the fancied cabal." 18

In the case at bar, no conspiracy may be deduced where there is no evidence to show the
participation of accused Mecrito Baga in the shooting incident. The lone eyewitness Jaime Baillo
testified that while he was hiding behind the hagonoy plants, he saw accused Belarmino Divina
holding a gun and together with Mecrito Baga, approached the lifeless body of his mother. The mere
presence of accused Mecrito Baga does not prove his participation in the killing. The mere fact of
being with Divina does not of itself establish conspiracy. 19

Having found that no conspiracy attended the commission of the crime and that the prosecution
failed to establish the guilt of accused Mecrito Baga beyond reasonable doubt, We are constrained
to acquit him of the crime charged.

With regards to accused Belarmino Divina, his conviction must be sustained.

The well-settled rule is that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an
accused, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy
fabrication. We have repeatedly held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by witnesses for the prosecution and that to establish it, the accused
must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to
have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. 20

Record shows that the victim Jaime Baillo while hiding behind the hagonoy plant saw accused
Belarmino Divina approach the dead body of his mother Concepcion Baillo and uttered "PUSIL RAY
TAMBAL SA MGA TESTIGOS SA CONTRA SA MGA DIVINA" which means "ONLY THE GUN CAN
SILENCE THOSE WITNESSES AGAINST THE DIVINAS."

In addition thereto, accused Belarmino Divina in his cross examination admitted that the house of his
father-in-law where he was allegedly drinking tuba with his friends is only about two and a half (2
1/2) kilometers from where the victims Concepcion Baillo and Jaime Baillo were shot at. 21 Hence, it
was not physically impossible for accused Belarmino Divina to be at the place where the crime was
committed.

Moreover, although motive is unnecessary when the assailant has been positively identified, 22 in
this case, accused Belarmino Divina has the motive to commit the crime charged because the victim
Concepcion Baillo was shown to be a witness against the former's brothers in another criminal case.

Accused Belarmino Divina argues that as stated in the police blotter, the shooting incident happened
at around 7:40 o'clock in the evening of June 17, 1988 and not 6:30 o'clock as claimed by the
prosecution witnesses. It was therefore, not possible for the victim Jaime Baillo to have seen the
accused without the aid of a lighted torch.

We do not agree. A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the police.
Entries in official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. They are not conclusive. 23 It is undisputed that the alleged time of the commission
of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the parish priest Fr.
Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor presented as a witness
during the trial. The information supplied is therefore hearsay and does not have any probative
value.

With regards to G.R. Nos. 94073-74, We are constrained to deny accused Belarmino Divina's
petition for certiorari in line with this Court's Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992
"Re: Cancellation of Bail Bond of Accused Convicted of Capital Offense in the Regional Trial Court,"
pertinent provisions of which are quoted hereunder:

"The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

"Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong."

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong." (Emphasis Supplied.)

Accused Belarmino Divina was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of murder which is
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92, he is
no longer entitled to bail even if he appeals to Us since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

We therefore find no reason to dwell on the issue raised in said petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused

MECRITO BAGA of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 8342 and of Frustrated Murder in
Criminal Case No. 8362 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The convictions of accused BELARMINO DIVINA in Criminal Cases Nos. 8342 and 8362 are
AFFIRMED with the modification that he be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Concepcion
Baillo in the amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.

The petition for certiorari filed by accused BELARMINO DIVINA is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 94554. February 19, 1993.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANACLETO COLCOL,

JR., Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Querubin, Butuyan, Rasiles for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; GENERALLY NOT

AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
Court has said often enough that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
may be disregarded if they do not impair the essential veracity of his testimony. In the
case at bar, however, the flaws in the testimony of the complainant and her father
strike at the very core of their credibility and strongly suggest that they were lying
under their oaths. Quite simply, the Court cannot accept Nora’s testimony that she was
raped three times in weekly succession under the unseemly circumstances she
narrates, including the curious happenstance that the road where Anacleto met her,
although usually busy, was exceptionally deserted each of the three times he dragged
her into the bushes and ravished her the almost magical way her red panty dropped
when he kicked her in the thigh to denude her; the time of the alleged rapes, which
were supposedly committed not under cover of darkness or solitude but in broad
daylight in the early morning when people were already up and about; and the
incredible blindness of Nora’s parents, who were living with her in the same house but
did not notice her pregnancy until the very day she delivered. These improbabilities,
together with the minor oddities, like her being enrolled in two schools and not
attending her classes in either, have injected the reasonable doubt that Anacleto raped
her and caused her to be pregnant.

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE; MAY BE OVERCOME ONLY WITH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT HE IS GUILTY. — It cannot be said often enough that the accused is entitled to
the constitutional presumption of innocence which may be overcome only with proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty. His conviction must be based on the strength
of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Stated otherwise, it is for the
prosecution to prove that he is guilty, not for the accused to prove that he is innocent.
It is part of the rule that if the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, with the inevitable
consequence that the accused must be set free.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant comes to this Court to protest his conviction, claiming that the
evidence for the prosecution is implausible and should not have been given credence by
the trial court. We agree. The evidence is less than substantial and far below the
quantum required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We shall
reverse.

The information against Anacleto Colcol, Jr. was for rape allegedly committed on Nora
Escalona. It was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on
November 11, 1987, on the basis of her original complaint dated December 19, 1986.
After arraignment, trial was conducted successively by Judge Alfredo P. de Vera, Judge
Benito A. Dacanay, and finally Judge Alicia G. Decano, who wrote the decision of the
court.
chanrobles virtual lawl ibrary

Anacleto was at the time of the alleged incidents 24 years old and engaged in his
family’s business of duck farming Nora was 14 and a second year high school student.
They were neighbors in Barangay Sobol, Asingan, Pangasinan, living within a stone’s
throw of each other.

The complainant testified that sometime in the first week of March 1986, at about 6:30
in the morning, she was walking along the barangay road leading to her school when
Anacleto confronted her. Without much ado, he dragged her into the bushes nearby and
raped her. 1

She said that the road was usually busy but there were no people at the time, and
nobody saw their encounter Anacleto was able to impose his will on her because he
carried a balisong which he pointed at her neck. He kicked her when she tried to resist
and he succeeded in deflowering her because he was much stronger than she was. The
deed done, he threatened to kill her if she reported it to anyone. 2

She said she bled during the first attack and her body was bruised and scratched. She
did not proceed to her school but went back home instead because of her condition. Her
parents were out and returned only in the evening. She told them nothing of her
experience. 3

One week later, she took the same road again on her way to school, and there was
Anacleto again waiting for her. As before, no-one else was on the road. Once again, he
dragged her into the bushes, pointed his balisong at her, kicked her in the thigh, and
then raped her. This was again followed by the expected death threat. Again she went
back to her house and said nothing to her parents when they returned. 4

Another week passed and Nora was again walking to school along the once more empty
road, also at about 6:30 in the morning. And who should meet her again but her
accustomed attacker, who was nothing if not consistent. Not surprisingly, Anacleto
again pulled her into the bushes and then, applying his tried and tested technique,
forced himself upon her. Then he again dismissed her with his now familiar threat. 5

Nora said she became pregnant as a result of the rapes but she never told anyone
about her condition, not even Anacleto. Incredibly, her parents did not notice her
pregnancy until only on December 4, 1986, the very day she started laboring and
delivered her baby. The boy died five weeks later and she named him in the death
certificate as Joel Escalona Colcol, after Anacleto. She did this on her lawyer’s advice. 6

There was no medical evidence of her rapes because the doctor presented by the
prosecution testified only to the fact of her delivery and estimated that it must have
been conceived sometime in March 1986. 7 Nora’s father, Saturnino Escalona, affirmed
on the stand that he really learned of her pregnancy only on the day she delivered. 8

Anacleto derided the charges against him and said he was in Lumayao, San Quintin,
Pangasinan, at the time of the alleged rapes. He stayed there from February to April
30, 1986, attending to the pasturing of the ducks in their farm with his live-in partner,
Bonifacia Caramat, whom he later married. 9 Juanito Antonio testified that the couple
resided in his house and never left Lumayao during that period. 10 This was
corroborated by Santos Badua, the caretaker of the compound near the alleged scene
of the crime, who said he saw no one when the rapes were supposedly committed. 11

The accused-appellant’s father, Anacleto Colcol, Sr., supported his son’s testimony that
Saturnino Escalona offered to withdraw his daughter’s complaint for P30,000.00. They
said they rejected the offer because the charge was fabricated. 12 The defense also
insinuated that Nora was a promiscuous girl and her child could have been sired by any
of her several boy friends. 13

The trial court, expressing the general suspicion of the alibi, dismissed this defense of
the accused-appellant, noting that he had been positively identified by Nora, besides
the fact that Lumayao was only 2 or 3 hours ride from Barangay Sobol. Judge Decano
declared that Nora’s "story was impeccable and rang throughout and bore the stamp of
absolute truth and candor." She added that the complainant "was able to withstand the
rigorous cross-examination and her answers were firm and steadfast." 14

Her Honor was going by the record only because she did not conduct the trial when
Nora testified on direct and cross-examination. Judge de Vera was the presiding judge
then. 15 In fact, Judge Decano took over only during the concluding part of the trial,
when Anacleto was under cross-examination before the defense rested. 16 She had no
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and all the other witnesses,
for that matter - when she was on the stand. cralawnad

What the Court gleans from its own examination of the same record is that Nora was
confused, to say the least, if not actually lying when she narrated the supposed outrage
to her honor, Her account of the three successive rapes is difficult to believe because of
its many convenient coincidences and improbabilities.

Nora herself said that the barangay road where she and Anacleto met was usually busy
but it was not so, providentially enough, during the three times he dragged her into the
bushes. On none of the three occasions when this happened did anyone see their
violent encounter on the inexplicably empty street.

It is said that once burned, twice careful, but Nora, if she is to be believed, having been
raped the first time, willingly exposed herself to the same risk a second time, and then,
not having learned her lesson yet, risked the same danger a third time. And so she was
raped three times in as many weeks. For his part, Anacleto having succeeded once,
decided to push his luck a second time and, grown more reckless with his success, even
tried a third time. Thus he thrice impaled the hapless maiden with his manhood with
weekly regularity.

It is noteworthy that all his attacks on Nora took place at 6:30 in the morning. Anacleto
pulled her from the unusually deserted street and raped her, not in the hush and dusk
of night but in the bright right of the sun.

The fact that Nora was only 14 years at the time does not mean that she was stupid or
even only naive. A second year student would not have acted the way she did unless —
assuming her account to be true — she really looked forward to Anacleto’s attentions
and willed the rapes to happen. The argument that there was no other way to the
school does not convince the Court. It seems to suggest that she had to use the road
by all means even if it meant that she had to pay costly toll with her own body.

And there was the school also — or the schools — that she said she was attending. First
she said she was enrolled in the Barangay Sobol High School, where her uniform was a
white blouse and a green skirt, 17 and then she said she was also enrolled in the Rizal
Academy, where she had a white shirt and a blue skirt for her uniform. 18 She even
named her teachers in both schools and the subjects they were teaching. 19 The
prosecution explained that although she was enrolled in both schools, she was not
really attending her classes but only pretending to do so because she was afraid of her
father. To the Court, this duplicity of enrollment and the show of attending classes only
reflect on the duplicity of Nora’s character.
chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Nora said she did not denounce Anacleto because she was afraid of him but she
remained, silent even after learning that he had left Barangay Sobol and the impact of
his threat had been removed or at least lessened. She also said she stopped attending
her classes when her pregnancy began to show, yet her own father — and presumably
also her mother — with whom she lived in the same house, did not notice her condition
during the entire course of her pregnancy until the day she delivered.

The trial court said that Anacleto did not deny the rapes and noted that "he only made
fun of the answer which was in answer to a funny question propounded by the
defense." In fact, the Court also sees something comic, and also unbelievable, in the
following exchange between Nora and the defense counsel: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ATTY. RASILES

Q Now, let us go back to that first intercourse. How did the accused remove your
panty?

WITNESS

A He kicked me, sir.

ATTY. RASILES

Q When he kicked you, your panty was removed?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about during the second intercourse, did he kick you again?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when he kicked you, your panty was removed?

A Yes, sir.

Q On the third intercourse, he again kicked you and your panty was removed?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, what kind of panty were you using at that time of the first intercourse?

A Red, sir.

Q What part of your body was hit when he kicked your panty?

A My thigh, sir.

Q What thigh?

A Left thigh, sir. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Q You mean to say that when the accused kicked you, your panty was removed?

A He intentionally kicked my panty off, sir.

The trial judge was also less than accurate when she said Anacleto did not deny the
rapes. In fact, the transcript of stenographic notes dated April 16, 1990, plainly shows
that he repeatedly denied the three rapes imputed to him. A little more care in the
study of the record could have avoided this erroneous conclusion.

Nora’s father explained that she filed her complaint against Anacleto only on December
19, 1986, because she was still recuperating from her delivery on December 4. But in
our view, the delay should not have been counted from that latter date but earlier. The
delay should have been counted from March 1986, when the rapes were allegedly
committed, or at the latest, from the time Anacleto left Barangay Sobol and so removed
or lessened the menace of his threat to kill her.

We cannot believe that Nora’s parents did not notice her pregnancy although they were
living together in the same house, and saw and talked to each other day after day
during the entire term of her pregnancy. Nora herself said she stopped attending her
classes because her pregnancy was beginning to show. She was afraid her classmates
would notice, yet her own father did not.

It would seem to us that after discovering Nora’s pregnancy when she was no longer
able to conceal it — and that was before she delivered - her parents would have asked
her who had-caused her condition, and having learned the culprit’s identity, confronted
and accused him. The parents did this ultimately, true, but only after the delivery, and
presumably only as an afterthought. It is also strange that Nora did not see fit to tell
Anacleto about her pregnancy, a secret that one would naturally share with the person
who had caused it.

The Court has said often enough that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a
witness may be disregarded if they do not impair the essential veracity of his
testimony. In the case at bar, however, the flaws in the testimony of the complainant
and her father strike at the very core of their credibility and strongly suggest that they
were lying under their oaths.

Quite simply, the Court cannot accept Nora’s testimony that she was raped three times
in weekly succession under the unseemly circumstances she narrates, including the
curious happenstance that the road where Anacleto met her, although usually busy,
was exceptionally deserted each of the three times he dragged her into the bushes and
ravished her the almost magical way her red panty dropped when he kicked her in the
thigh to denude her; the time of the alleged rapes, which were supposedly committed
not under cover of darkness or solitude but in broad daylight in the early morning when
people were already up and about; and the incredible blindness of Nora’s parents, who
were living with her in the same house but did not notice her pregnancy until the very
day she delivered. These improbabilities, together with the minor oddities, like her
being enrolled in two schools and not attending her classes in either, have injected the
reasonable doubt that Anacleto raped her and caused her to be pregnant. chanrobles virtual lawl ibrary

It cannot be said often enough that the accused is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence which may be overcome only with proof beyond reasonable
doubt that he is guilty. His conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution
and not the weakness of the defense. Stated otherwise, it is for the prosecution to
prove that he is guilty, not for the accused to prove that he is innocent. It is part of the
rule that if the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, with the inevitable consequence that the
accused must be set free.

So it must be in the case at bar. As the Court sees it, the evidence for the prosecution
is not credible enough to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction and must therefore
be rejected. Even if it be assumed that his alibi is indeed weak, he must just the same
be absolved and released at once. The reason is that the evidence of the prosecution,
as the record plainly shows, is even weaker.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is reversed and the accused-appellant Anacleto

Colcol, Jr. ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, J., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 78732-33 February 14, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOVENIANO SOLIS y CABUG, JOEL CABUG y PAYE, ROGER SOLIS y CABUG, ROLANDO
BAHIA y CATINDOY, NESTOR EGUAC y ANSENG AND DANILO VIDAL y BROSIO, accused-
appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Accused-appellants Joveniano Solis y Cabug, Joel Cabug y Paye, Roger Solis y Cabug, Rolando
Bahia y Catindoy, Nestor Eguac y Anseng and Benhur Lomo y Berioso were charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 6419-V-84 RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
171, in an information which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of August, 1984, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, together with Danilo Vidal alias 'Danny' who is still-at-large
and the preliminary investigation against him is still pending with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, armed with a bladed weapons (sic) and blunt instruments,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and violence, take, rob
and carry away with them the cash amounts of P118,318.00 belonging to Rita Kho,
P30,000.00, Sanyo Cassette assembly, and a gold-plated 'Citizen' wristwatch of
unknown value, all belonging to Johnny Sai Tung to the damage and prejudice of
said Rosita Kho and Johnny Sai Tung in more than P148,318.00; and by reason of
and during the occasion of the said robbery, the said above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and stab Demetrio Paranada and Johnny Sai Tung with the bladed
weapons and blunt instruments they were then provided hitting them on the different
parts of their body which directly caused their death.

That the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength are
present during the commission of this crime. Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 59-60)

The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

On September 15,1984, a similar information was filed against Danilo Vidal y Brioso upon his arrest
before the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6456-V-
84, as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of August, 1984, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with Joveniano Solis y Cabug, Joel Cabug y Paye,
Roger Solis y Cabug, Rolando Bahia y Catindoy, Nestor Eguac y Anseng and
Benhur Lomo y Berioso who are already charged in Criminal Case No. 6419-V-84 of
the same offense, armed with bladed weapons (sic) and blunt instruments,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and violence, take, rob
and carry away with them the cash amounts of P118,318.00 belonging to Rita Kho,
P30,000.00, Sanyo Cassette assembly, and a gold-plated 'Citizen' wristwatch of
unknown value, all belonging to Johnny Sai Tung, to the damage and prejudice of
said Rosita Kho and Johnny Sai Tung in more than P148,318.00; and by reason of
and during the occasion of the said robbery, the said above- named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and stab Demetrio Paranada and Johnny Sai Tung with the bladed
weapons and blunt instruments they were then provided hitting them on the different
parts of their body which directly caused their death.

That the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength are
present during the commission of this crime. Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 60-61)

Accused-appellant Danilo Vidal, likewise, entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. A joint trial of
the two cases ensued. Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the discharge of
accused Benhur Lomo to be utilized as a state witness.

On March 3, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision convicting all of the accused, the dispositive
portion of which rules:

WHEREFORE, accused Joveniano Solis y Cabug, Joel Cabug y Paye, Roger Solis y
Cabug, Rolando Bahia y Catindig, Nestor Eguac y Anseng and Danilo Vidal y Brosio
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua on two (2) counts.

The accused are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the offended party the
sum of P118,318.00, deducting therefrom the recovered amount of Pl,677.00,
representing the proceeds for the two days of the business; the amount of
P30,000.00 the personal money of Johnny Sai Tung that were taken by the accused.

The accused shall jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Johnny Sai
Tung and Demetrio Paranada the sum of P30,000.00 for each (People vs. Dela
Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251- 52, December 29, 1983).

Each shall pay the proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 89)

Hence this appeal.

The antecedent facts as summarized by the trial court are as follows:

It appears on record that weeks prior to August 5, 1984, Joveniano Solis told Benhur
Lomo and Joel Cabug, both his cousins, of the plan to rob and kill Johnny Sai Tung,
brother-in-law of Mrs. Rita Kho, owner of the Swine Country Farm located at Parada,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that the said piggery farm is owned by the spouses Kho
King and Rita Kho that after the death of Kho King, Mrs. Rita Kho continues the
business; Johnny Sai Tung, brother of Kho King, helps in managing the piggery
business and was keeping the proceeds of the sale; that Joveniano Solis is the
foreman in the Swine Country Farm; that Benhur Lomo is a laborer in the said
piggery farm; that Joel Cabug also worked with the said farm but left his employment
and is working at E.S. Second hand Cartoons at No. 103, 5th Avenue, 6th Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan City at the time of the incident in question; that Roger Solis,
brother of Joveniano is a laborer of the said piggery farm; that Rolando Bahia also
worked in the said farm but was dismissed on March 26, 1984; that Nestor Eguac
was also a former laborer in the same farm; that no date was agreed when to carry
out the plan; that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of August 4, 1984, Joveniano
Solis ordered Benhur Lomo to enter the Bodega located at the lower portion of the
house where Sai Tung lives; that he will wait inside the bodega and allow them
(Joveniano and companions) to enter by opening the main door of the house; that as
instructed, Benhur earlier entered the bodega, hid himself behind a pile of sacks and
waited; that the security guard padlocked the door of the bodega; that at about 1:00
o'clock in the early morning the following day, there was a knock on the door of the
bodega, Benhur opened the front door; Joveniano Solis, Danilo Vidal and Joel Cabug
entered; that there was (sic) no electric lights because the current was already cut
off; that the barking of the dogs sent Johnny Sai Tung to come down the stairs
focusing a flashlight on them; that Johnny Sai Tung saw Benhur Lomo and asked
him why he was there; that Lomo did not answer, sensing danger Johnny ran
upstairs; that Joel Cabug ran after Johnny and overtook him mid-way on the stairs;
that Joel Cabug stabbed the body and pulled Johnny on the waist; that they fell down
and landed on the cement floor with Johnny on top of Joel; that Danilo Vidal
approached and hit Johnny on the head several times with a pipe; that Joel pushed
Johnny's body away from him; that Danilo Vidal stabbed Johnny on different parts of
the body; that Benhur, Danilo and Joel went up to the house to the room of Johnny
while Joveniano stood guard and ordered Benhur to open the drawer; that there was
money inside the drawer and Joveniano ordered Benhur to take it; that they met at
the 'ospital ng baboy' and gave the money to Joveniano; Joveniano gave Benhur his
share of P780.00; that Benhur buried the money and went back to work cleaning the
hogs; that Demy Paranada was found dead at the farrowing section of the farm.

The post-mortem findings (Exhs. 'M' & 'O') show that the cause of death of Johnny
Kho Sai Tung and Demetrio Paranada as (sic) hemmorrhage, severe, secondary to
stab wounds of the chest.

A lead to Rolando Bahia's involvement was from the statement given to the police by
Joveniano Solis (Exh. 'H', 'H-l,' H-2' and 'H- 3'). Taking that lead, the police picked up
Rolando Bahia, and after having been apprised of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of the lawyer of his choice, Atty. Restituto Viernes of the CLAO and Atty.
Antonio Dalag gave the statement (Exh. 'D', 'D-l' to 'D- 8') admitted his involvement
and that of Joveniano Solis, Roger Solis and Nestor Eguac, in the offense. The
police also took the lead as to the involvement of the accused Joveniano Solis and
Danilo Vidal from Joel Cabug, the latter after having been informed of his
constitutional rights assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Garcia gave a written statement (Exh.
 'F, F-l' to 'F-1 2') to the effect that Joveniano planned to gag and tie Demy Paranada
and Antonio Solis, the elder brother of Joveniano, the guards at the night shift, to
prevent them from rescuing Johnny; that to avoid being recognized, Joveniano and
Danilo Vidal wore masks; that he (Joel) placed the mask inside his pocket because it
did not fit his face; that the electric power was cut off and they proceeded to where
Demy Paranada was; that Joveniano and Danilo held Demy Paranada who was then
sleeping; that Demy Paranada was awakened and Danilo advised him, 'Huwag kang
sisigaw at hindi ka maaano,' and Demy asked 'Bakit ba, ano ba ang kailangan ninyo
sa akin? Kung pera, wala akong pera;' that he (Joel) held one of Demy's hands but
Demy struggled; that he (Joel) was not able to hold the other hand; that in the
process, Joveniano's mask was taken off and Demy recognized Joveniano; that
Joveniano signalled Danilo and the latter stabbed Demy causing the latter to fall in
the canal; that Joveniano and Danilo took turn(s) in stabbing Demy; that they
(Joveniano, Danilo and Joel) proceeded to the place where Johnny Sai Tung was
sleeping; that Benhur opened the door of the bodega; that Joveniano switched off the
lights; that when they were inside the lower portion of Johnny's house the dogs
barked and Johnny wearing in (sic) briefs came down with a flashlight.

During the police custodial investigation, Joveniano Solis after having informed (sic)
of his constitutional rights and assisted by his own counsel, Atty. Manuel M. Crudo,
gave the written statement (Exh. 'I', 'I-I' to 'I-30') pointing the place where he hid the
money he claimed Joel Cabug gave him; that accompanied by police officers they
went inside the compound of Swine Country Farm and retrieved the money (Exh. 'J,'
'J-l' to 'J-2,' photographs; Exh. 'K,' 'K-l' to 'K-2,' money recovered; Exh. 'L,' 'L-l' to L-2,'
the plastic bags where the money was wrapped; Exh. 'L-3' to 'L-5,' markings in the
plastic bag). (Rollo, pp. 80- 82)

In this appeal the accused-appellants raised the following assignments of error in their brief:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING
THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA ON TWO
(2) COUNTS. (Rollo, p. 112)

The only evidence that implicates the accused- appellants in this case is their extra-judicial
confessions which they claimed were obtained through tortures. It has been held that a confessant
bears the burden of proving that the admissions in his affidavit are involuntary and untrue (People v.
Canunay, et al., L-29181, July 9, 1984, 130 SCRA 301). Appellant Rolando Bahia (Bahia for short)
testified that he was mauled. Appellant Joel Cabug (Cabug for short), likewise declared that he was
mauled and tortured by applying electricity on his sex organ and hand. Appellant Joveniano Solis
(Joveniano, for short) claimed that he was mauled, handcuffed and blindfolded and made to lie on
the "tarima."

A careful scrutiny of the records belie the assertions of maltreatment. We find that the appellants
were afforded the services of counsel during the time they executed their statements. There was
also an instance when the Presiding Judge visited Joveniano's detention cell and inquired about his
condition and complaints (TSN, July 18, 1986, p. 16). Cabug was, likewise, brought before the Fiscal
before whom the former subscribed to the veracity of his statement (TSN, March 26, 1986, pp. 25-
27). Moreover, We note that in the statement given by Joveniano dated August 8, 1984, the people
then present were counsel of his choice and two press reporters (Records, p. 112). With all these
chances to report the alleged maltreatment, appellants kept silent. They did not even file a complaint
against their alleged tormentors or ask their counsel or relatives to do so. The claim of defense
witness Marciano Mangunay, father-in-law of Cabug, of being busy as the breadwinner of the family
which prevented him from reporting the maltreatment is flimsy and unconvincing being contrary to
human behavior. We have already ruled that a confession is deemed to have been made voluntarily
if the accused did not complain to the proper authorities regarding the alleged maltreatment despite
the opportunity to do so (People v. De los Santos, L-35598, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 311). The
voluntariness of the confession is further enhanced by the silence of the press reporters who are
usually watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and physical
condition of accused persons. Appellants neither asked for medical attention nor presented any
medical certificate to attest to the bruises or injuries on their persons. The fact, too, that appellant
Danilo Vidal (Vidal, for short) and Roger Solis (Roger, for short) did not execute extra- judicial
confessions attest to the absence of maltreatment in this case.

Furthermore, We find that the confessions executed by Cabug and Joveniano corroborate and
interlock with each other as well as substantiate the testimony of state witness Lomo. Appellants'
confessions abound with details known only to them. Thus, Joveniano's plan to Rob Sai Tung and
disarm guards Demy Paranada and Antonio Solis held three weeks before the fateful day; the places
where the plan was discussed; the telephone conversation between Cabug and Joveniano wherein
the latter asked the former to look for a big and courageous person; the difficulty expressed by
Cabug in searching for such accomplice and the persons he recommended to Joveniano; the points
of entry of Cabug, Henry and Vidal to the Country Swine Farm; the first attempt to implement the
plan which was foiled because of Joveniano's fear of being blamed since Mrs. Kho put him in charge
of the entire operation in the piggery before she left for Hongkong; the food prepared by Joveniano
for Cabug and Henry; the place where Lomo hid on the night of April 4, 1984; the sequence of
events leading to the death of the victims; the respective roles performed by Joveniano, Lomo,
Cabug and Vidal in the commission of the crime; the manner of partition of the loot among them at
the "Ospital ng Baboy;" and the places where Lomo and Joveniano buried portions of the stolen
money in the farm are matters which are difficult for the police investigators to concoct. The trial
court also correctly noted that:

Joveniano Solis in his statement said that Joel Cabug handed the money to him
(Exh. "J", p. 2) while Joel Cabug claimed it was Benhur that handed the money to
Joveniano (Exh. "F", p. 5) this discrepancy Showing the statements are not Identical
inspire credence. It would indicate that the statements were not tailor made . . .
(Decision, Records, p. 293).

The post-mortem findings also substantiate the confession of Cabug and the testimony of state
witness Lomo as to the number of wounds inflicted upon the victims.

It is another matter, however, with regard to the confession of Bahia. While it is true that no
maltreatment occurred, We could not discount the suspicion that psychological pressure was
exerted upon Bahia to admit his participation in the crime in accordance with the police's pre-
conceived idea of its commission. This suspicion stems from Our finding that there are unexplained
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the said confession. It is further strengthened by the records
which showed that Bahia was the first suspect picked up by the police who were then under
tremendous pressure "to work on a 24-hour basis without let up until solution of the case" so much
so that Pfc. Wilfredo Pansanjan "actually passed out and then Ltn Tiquia had to be hospitalized at
the V. Luna Hospital." (TSN, June 26, 1985, p. 10) We also noted that Bahia was in the custody of
the police for about 28 hours before he was afforded the services of counsel when he gave his extra-
judicial confession (see TSN, January 29, 1986, pp. 8, 14 to 19).

The following facts appear in Bahia's confession: that the original plan contrived by Joveniano was to
kill Demy Paranada (Paranada for short); that Joveniano provided each one of them (Bahia, Roger,
Eguac and an unidentified male) with Santa Claus masks and knives; that Joveniano rang the
doorbell of Johnny Sai Tung's place; that somebody came down from the house but he was not sure
if it was Johnny Sai Tung; that Joveniano, Roger, Eguac and John Doe except him pounced upon
the person; that at this juncture, Paranada came along and that Joveniano with his help stabbed
Paranada; that Paranada despite his wounds fled but was chased by Joveniano and Eguac; that his
role was merely to stab Paranada; that he neither participated in the murder of Johnny Sai Tung nor
in the robbery that took place without his knowledge; that Roger gave to Joveniano something
wrapped in paper; and that Joveniano in turn handed the same thing to Nestor and said
"Singkuwenta Mil ito. Parte ninyo ni Lando." (Records, Exh. D, pp. 53-56) These facts do not inspire
belief For one, the said confession does not dovetail with the confession of Cabug and the
confession and subsequent testimony of state witness Lomo. Cabug and Lomo declared that the
latter hid in the bodega of the victim Sai Tung so as to open the door for Joveniano and their other
companions. On the other hand, Bahia claimed that Joveniano rang the doorbell of Sai Tung's
house. The use of the doorbell to call down the victim Sai Tung from his room is hardly credible. If
there were no lights at that time, the doorbell could not have functioned. Also, to use the doorbell
would have aroused not only the victim but also the other members of the household namely, Mrs.
Kho, her child and helpers. This would be an absurd situation which does not conform with the usual
behavior of malefactors in keeping a low profile to avoid attention. Secondly, the Identity of the
unidentified companion in Bahia's group was never ascertained by the police among the accused-
appellants. It is highly improbable for appellant Bahia to miss the physical features of the said person
since the latter would have no reason to hide his face from Bahia. Thirdly, Lomo (TSN, November
18,1985, pp. 9-10) and Cabug (Records, Exh. F, p. 126) categorically stated that there were only
four (4) perpetrators of the crime: Joveniano Solis, Benhur Lomo, Joel Cabug and Danilo Vidal.
Against such positive testimony, We do not find any corroborative and competent evidence to
Bahia's confession to establish the participation of Bahia, Roger and Eguac to the commission of the
crime. And, fourthly, We are confronted with the possibility that Bahia and Eguac may have been
framed-up in this case. In his confession, Cabug stated that Joveniano had already planned to cast
the blame on Bahia and Eguac in case suspicion falls on them. This was done exactly by Joveniano
when he was invited by the police to give a statement (see Exhibits G and H, Records, pp. 118-119).
The pertinent portion of Cabug's confession reads:

... Nagpunta kami sa bilyaran at nakaharap namin yong kaibigan in Ben (Joveniano's
nickname). Sinabi at inaya ni Ben yong kaibigan niyang Ilocano na holdapin namin si
Johnny. Sabi noong Ilocano ay delikado dahil si Ben pa ang namamahala sa
babuyan. Ang sagot ni Ben ay huwag mag-alala yong Ilocano dahil mayroong ibang
mapagbibintangan. Tinanong noong Ilocano si Ben kung sino ang mapagbibintangan
pag hinoldap namin ang Amo niya. Ang sagot ni Ben sina LANDO at NESTOR.
Manong noong Ilocano kung bakit sina Lando at Nestor ang mapagbibintangan. Ang
sabi ni Ben, kasi dating trabahador sila Lando at Nestor sa babuyan at bago sila
pinaalis ng trabaho ay nagbanta sina Lando at (Nestor) na darating din ang araw na
may masamang mangyayari sa babuyan. Sabi ni Ben, may banta sina Lando at
Nestor kaya sila ang tiyak na mapagbibintangan. ... (P. 123, Records)

Again, no contrary evidence was presented by the prosecution to refute the above statement. For his
part, Bahia confirmed the ill-will existing between him and Joveniano, to wit:

Atty. Restituto Viemes — counsel for the accused.

 Q And do you know the reason why you left said company?

A I was dismissed from my employment there because I testified in

favor of Mr. Eguac. Mr. Eguac was dismissed. But then Eguac filed a
case against his employer with the Bureau of Labor and I was his
witness.

Q Do you have any misunderstanding with your co-accused

Joveniano Solis prior to the date when the incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that misunderstanding between the two of you?

A Joveniano Solis, on the other hand, was the witness for the
employer in said case at the Ministry of Labor, sir. (TSN, February 17,
1986, pp, 6-7)

The foregoing observations have put the veracity of Bahia's confession in serious doubt. In the
absence of a strong and cogent evidence to the contrary, We are inclined to believe that Bahia's
statements in his confession are not his own. It is needless to say that no one in his right mind would
convict himself without compulsion by fabricating a highly self- damaging story and suppressing the
truth which would absolve him (People v. De los Santos, supra).

Another defense raised by appellants to escape criminal liability is alibi. Bahia claims that at the time
of the incident, he was asleep in his living quarters at Letre Road, Caloocan City and that he was
awakened at about 8:00 a.m. when three (3) policemen came to invite him to the police station.
Cabug avers that he was also asleep in the house of his in-laws at No. 103 5th Avenue, 6th Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan and that said fact was corroborated by his father-in-law, Mr. Marciano
Mangunay. Vidal asserts that he was asleep in their house at San Vicente, Sincaban, Misamis
Occidental. Eguac, on the other hand, claims that on that fateful night, he was talking to his co-
workers at Sandel and House Restaurant and that he went home at about 5:00 a.m. while Roger
claims that he was asleep in their living quarters at Swine Country Farm and was awakened by
Joveniano at about 3:00 a.m. For his part, Joveniano, a foreman of Mrs. Rita Kho, claims that on
August 4, 1985, at about 9:00 p.m., he was already asleep with his wife, three children and sister-in-
law in their house inside the compound.

We have already ruled that the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility and in this
respect, the relative weight which the trial court assigns to the testimony of witnesses must, unless
patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on record be accepted (People v. Artieda, L-
38725, May 15, 1979, 90 SCRA 144). The record does not support the above excuses given by
Cabug, Joveniano and Vidal. The said appellants did not show by a clear and convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for them to go to the scene of the crime and return to their place
(People v. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA 50). Additionally, appellants failed to present corroborative
evidence to prove that they were actually in the places mentioned. The testimony of defense witness
Marciano Mangunay is likewise dubious. If his statements were true, then he could have readily
apprised the authorities of the truth. Yet he bided his time without justifiable reason. We have held
that alibi is weak where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relatives
such as his father, and not by credible persons who would, in the natural order of things be best
suited to support the tendered alibi (People v. Cabanit, G.R. Nos. 62030-31, October 4, 1985, 139
SCRA 94). Besides, Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal were positively Identified by state witness Lomo as
the perpetrators of the crime. The records do not show that Lomo was prompted by any ill motive in
implicating the appellants. His positive testimony is, thus, credible.

As regards the alibis put up by appellants Bahia, Roger and Eguac, We take exception to the trial
court's finding that the same are undeserving of merit. While the rule of long standing is that alibi is a
weak defense, it is an equally enduring rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
evidence rather than on the weakness of that of the defense (People v. Hora, G.R. No. 52395,
August 7, 1987, 153 SCRA 21). In the case at bar, their alibis become significant and strong in the
face of the unreliability of the prosecution's evidence against them. We entertain serious doubts on
the voluntariness of the statements given by appellant Bahia in his extra-judicial confession. These
doubts remain considering the absence of corroborative and convincing evidence to convict the said
appellants. In line with the constitutional presumption of innocence, these doubts must necessarily
be resolved in favor of the accused, it being preferable to acquit a guilty person rather than convict
an innocent one (People v. Robles, L-30060, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 107).

To further destroy the prosecution evidence against them, Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal impugn the
credibility of state witness Lomo on the basis of the alleged variance between Lomo's first and
second sworn statements dated August 5 and August 9, 1984 respectively before the Valenzuela
Police. In his first statement, Lomo denied participation in the killing of the victim and in his second,
he admitted his involvement in the crime and implicated the aforesaid appellants. Joveniano, Cabug
and Vidal submit that if Lomo were telling the truth, then he could have immediately admitted his
guilt or informed or warned the authorities, Rita Kho or the victim Johnny Sai Tung of the plot to rob
and kill Sai Tung weeks before the execution of the crime. They maintain the theory that Lomo's
change of heart could be attributed to the alleged instruction of Rita Kho to put the blame on the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime (Appellants' Brief, Rollo, p. 144).

Appellants' theory is unmeritorious. The alleged instruction given by Rita Kho was purportedly
recounted by state witness Lomo to Joveniano. Hence, Joveniano's testimony on this matter is
hearsay evidence which cannot be given probative value. Lomo's reason for changing his original
statement of innocence was because he was already implicated by Joveniano as one of the
perpetrators of the crime (TSN, December 9, 1985, pp. 7-8). His second statement is significant as it
confirms not only his involvement in the commission of the crime but also the participation of the said
appellants, some of whom are his cousins. The fact that Lomo's second statement was made before
the case was filed in court, against his interest and without any inducement or reward from the police
shows that he was prompted by his conscience to reveal the truth as anyway the cat was now out of
the bag so to speak. Lomo's failure to warn or report the plot to the concerned persons or the
authorities should not militate against his credibility. His predicament lies in the fact that two of the
perpetrators are his cousins; that cousin Joveniano was instrumental in giving him a job at the
piggery (Exhibit D, Records, p. 138); and that cousin Joveniano was the boss at Swine Farm who
should be followed (TSN, November 20, 1985, pp. 14-16). This overpowering moral influence
exerted by Joveniano naturally stifled Lomo's urge to squeal on his companions.

The evidence on record fully sustains the trial court's finding that Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It is the nature
of this crime that the homicides or murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their numbers,
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of
"robbery with homicide." (People v. Pedroso, et al., L-32997, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 599). The
trial court, therefore, erred in treating the death of the victims as double homicide. The death of
Paranada should be considered then as an additional aggravating circumstance, the reason being
that there will be an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense,
robbery with one killing would be on the same level as robbery with multiple killings (ibid, p. 609).
However, We agree with the trial court that all the above appellants conspired to commit the crime
which was attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nocturnity.
Nonetheless, We noted that the trial court failed to consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against Joveniano. As testified to by state witness Lomo, Joveniano had planned
three weeks before the incident to rob the house of Johnny Sai Tung because he wanted to kill Sai
Tung (TSN, November 18, 1985, p. 11). Joveniano then had sufficient time to reflect on the act he
was about to commit and to desist, if he wanted to, from carrying out his evil design, but he did not.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "(w)hile evident premeditation is inherent in crimes
against property (People v. Daos, 60 Phil. 143), it may be considered in robbery with homicide if
there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing (People v. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570; People v.
Nabual, 28 SCRA 714." (Rollo, p. 216)

Under the Revised Penal Code, Article 294(l) thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is
imposable when by reason or on occasion of a robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. Considering the aggravating circumstances in the instant case, the proper penalty that
should be imposed upon the appellants is death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(l) of the
1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al. (L-38968-70, February 9,1989) that the
cited constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death
penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same
to reclusion perpetua. Thus, Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal should each be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

The other appellants Bahia, Eguac and Roger, should be acquitted of the charge on ground of
reasonable doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction (1) with respect to appellants Joveniano Solis, Danilo
Vidal and Joel Cabug, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as specified above; and (2) with
respect to appellants Rolando Bahia, Nestor Eguac and Roger Solis, is hereby REVERSED in that
appellants are ACQUITTED of the charge on ground of reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52090 February 21, 1980

BIANITO ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. GERARDO M. S. PEPITO, Presiding

Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Aklan, Respondent.

Niovady V. Marin for petitioner. chanrobles virtual law library

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Upon petitioner's arraignment and plea of not guilty to the Crime of Homicide before
the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch III, presided by respondent Judge, the
latter issued an Order, dated July 6, 1979, of the following tenor: chanrobles virtual law libra ry

Upon petition of the accused with the conformity of the prosecution, transfer the initial
hearing of this case to AUGUST 7, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual l aw library

Let it be made of record, in black and white, that the accused in this case admits in
open court that he killed the deceased but that he acted in self-defense. For this
reason, the Court requires the defense counsel, first to prove evidence in self-defense
and the prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same. 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, reiterated in an Amended Motion, of the

aforequoted Order contending that the Court action was violative of Section 3, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the presentation of evidence by
the parties in criminal cases, first by the prosecution and then by the defense, and not
vice versa. Additionally, petitioner claimed that the procedure adopted by respondent
Judge is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused in the sense that the same
would give rise to the presumption that the prosecution had already established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt when what is only on record is the
accused's admission that he had killed the victim in self defense. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

On the other hand, the prosecution maintained that section Rule 119 is not mandatory,
relying on the ruling in U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (1910) to the effect that a
departure from the order of trial, when rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, does
not constitute a reversible error, that the admission by the accused of having killed in
self-defense did not give rise to the presumption of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
but, rather, would result in his acquittal, if self-defense is proved; and finally,
citing People vs. Besana, 64 SCRA 84 (1976), that having pleaded self-defense,
petitioner admitted having stabbed and killed the deceased so that the burden is shifted
on him to establish that he was justified in doing so. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Respondent Judge denied reconsideration in an Order dated October 9, 1979, reading in

part:chanrobles virtual law lib rary
For resolution is an amended motion dated August 13, 1979 for reconsideration of the
order of this court dated July 6, 1979, requiring the counsel for the accused in the
above-entitled case to first present his evidence on self-defense ahead of the
prosecution - the herein accused himself having admitted in open court the killing but
that he acted in self-defense. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual la w library

The prosecuting Fiscal interposed an opposition which was filed on August 30, 1979,
citing the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 in which it was held among others that
the substantial rights of the accused were in no way prejudiced by the change in the
order of presentation of evidence. chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtu al law library

The court is pretty aware of the sequence in the representation of the evidence of the
parties indicate in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court to be generally followed in
criminal cases. While Sec. 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court generally establishes a
procedure to secure an orderly conduct in judicial proceedings in criminal cases, the
Court, however, in an effort to find ways and means to speedily dispose of the cases to
de-clog its docket has altered the sequence above referred to without in any way
prejudicing the substantial rights of the accused herein. chanroblesvirtualaw library chanrobles virtua l law lib rary

The accused is still presumed innocent, only that he was ordered to first present his
evidence on self-defense as the killing has been admitted but that he acted in self-
defense. It will indeed save time by dispensing with proof of death and injuries causing
death - a matter admitted by the accused in open court before actual trial on the
merits.chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing motion for reconsideration without merit, the Court
DENIES the same. 2

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with petitioner alleging that respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
defense counsel to present first its evidence of self-defense and the prosecution to
present its evidence to disprove the same; that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to him and that unless
respondent Judge is properly restrained, petitioner will suffer irreparable damage and
prejudice. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We issued the Restraining Order prayed for on December 12, 1979 enjoining
respondent Judge, from proceeding with the hearing of the case below. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law lib rary

Required to comment, the Solicitor General candidly admits that there is proper ground
for certiorari and recommends that the Orders of July 6, 1979 and October 9, 1979 be
annulled and the trial of the case held in accordance with law and jurisprudence on the
matter. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

We find the recommendation well taken. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Enshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the

requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. 3 That requirement simply requires that the procedure established by
 4
law shall be followed. Section 3 of Rule 119 prescribes the order of trial in criminal
cases, to wit: chanrobles virtual law li brary

SEC. 3. Order of Trial - The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must
proceed in the following order: chanrobles virtual law libra ry

(a) The fiscal on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support
of the charges. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue in question. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual l aw library

(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is
submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the
attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The
argument by either attorney may be oral or written, but only the written arguments, or
such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the
case.

It behooved respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth. That
procedure observes, in the words of Chief Justice Fernando, the "mandate of reason
and the guarantee of fairness with which due process is Identified". 5 The procedure
outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice
and is intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies can,
the conviction of an innocent person. 6 Indeed, the form of a trial is also a matter of
public order and interest; 7 the orderly course of procedure requires that the
prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. 8 The
following excerpt from People vs. Balicasan 17 SCRA 1119 (1966) shows fidelity to that
procedure: chanrobles virtual law libra ry

In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the court
should have taken anew defendant's plea and then proceeded with the trial of the case,
in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In deciding the
case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court not only erred in procedure
but also deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.

It is noteworthy also that the Information filed herein alleges that the heirs of the
deceased suffered damages in the amount of P20,000.00. The prosecution should prove
this first before the defense presents its evidence. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil.404 (1910), relied upon by the
prosecution and the trial Court, the defense had produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused
were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however, since in that case, no
objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the presentation
of proof. In this case, the change in order of trial made by respondent Judge was
promptly and timely objected to by the defense. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

Respondent Judge's desire to abbreviate the trial and unclog his docket is commendable
but it must yield to the paramount objective of safeguarding the rights of an accused at
all stages of criminal proceedings, and to the interest of orderly procedure adopted for
the public good. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ prayed for, the Orders issued by respondent Judge on
July 6, 1979 and October 9, 1979, respectively, are hereby annulled and set aside, the
Restraining Order heretofore issued is lifted, and respondent Judge hereby directed to
proceed with the trial in accordance with section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. No
costs.
chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2809 March 22, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.

Mauricio Carlos for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MORAN, C.J.:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On may 8, 1948,
the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:

Court:

Is this the case ready for trial?

Fiscal:

I am ready, your honor.

Court: — to the accused.

Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer and I will
plead guilty.

Court:

Arraign the accused.

Note:

Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was
asked this question.

Q. What do you plead? — A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.

Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.

The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.

 Fiscal:

I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the
case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.

Court:

Sentenced reserved.

Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:

[Criminal Case No. V-118]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-
appellant.

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

SENTENCE

The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in the following

INFORMATION

That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of

Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused being a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty.

Contrary to law.

This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to
the information above described.

The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18
and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate
sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion
temporal in the medium degree as minimum, or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision
mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. The
accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the
offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is
said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In
the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of
slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense
is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial
judge in his judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have
been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts
pleaded in the information.

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment
finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten
years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.

The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our
rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right
to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the
Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties
to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said
court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the
aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to
grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the
court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did
such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before
arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by
the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a
denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that
it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to
ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of
his own.

It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty
but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to
inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed
instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making
of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the
accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense
or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the
fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court
should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified
plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counsel. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 7321. November 5, 1912. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIO CAMPO, Defendant-

Appellant.

Chas. A. McDonough for Appellant.

The Attorney-General for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED. — The accused in a

criminal case has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, would be an unauthorized
denial of that right.

2. ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION; CONVICTION. — Except in a very early case

(U. S. v. Dinsing, 1 Phil. Rep., 738), wherein a contrary view appears to have been
taken apparently without extended discussion, but which has long since been overruled,
we have uniformly and frequently laid down the rule that an accused person may be
convicted of "any crime described and charged by the facts set out in the information"
irrespective of and without regard to the designation or characterization of the crime
set forth in the title of the complaint or information by the private complainant or the
public prosecuting officer.

3. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF PROOF OF CIRCUMSTANCES. — Although a complaint or

information contains no allegation as to the fact that the commission of the crime
charged therein was marked with one or more of the generic aggravating circumstances
set out n chapter 4, book 1 of the Penal Code, nevertheless that fact may be proven at
the trial, and if proven must be taken into consideration in imposing the penalty.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — Evidence as to the existence of these aggravating circumstances is

admissible for the purpose of showing the precise manner in which the offense actually
charged in the complaint was committed, but it cannot be used for the purpose of
changing the legal characterization or designation of the offense actually charged in the
complaint or information, or in order to show that the offense committed was in fact a
higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES. — In those cases wherein, under

the provisions of the Penal Code, the legal designation or characterization of an offense
is modified by an allegation set forth in the complaint or information showing that such
offense had been marked with one of the above-mentioned generic aggravating
circumstances, this aggravating circumstance when alleged and proven is treated as a
qualifying circumstance, and in that even, having once been taken into consideration
for the purpose of giving to the acts committed by the convict a legal qualification or
characterization higher than they would otherwise have had, it should not be again
taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance marking the commission of
 this higher offense.

6. ID.; ID.; ID. — Where an aggravating circumstance, which when charged and proven
becomes a qualifying circumstance under the provisions of the Code, has not been
alleged in the complaint or information, proof of its existence is nevertheless
admissible, but in that event such circumstance is not to be treated as a qualifying
circumstance justifying the conviction of the defendant of a higher offense than that
with which he is charged, but merely as an aggravating circumstance justifying the
imposition of the penalty in a severer form but within the limits prescribed for the less
serious offense charged in the complaint or information.

7. ID.; NUMEROUS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES. — When a conviction is had on a

complaint or information charging the crime of assassination, and it appears that the
unlawful taking of the life of another was marked with two or more of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in article 403 defining and penalizing the crime of
assassination, any one of these circumstances may be treated as a qualifying
circumstance which raises the unlawful taking of the life of anothers are then treated as
generic aggravating circumstances to be taken into consideration in determining the
degree of severity with which the penalty prescribed for the crime of assassination
should be imposed.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The appellant, Patricio Campo, was convicted in the court below of the crime of
homicide as defined and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to
twenty years of reclusion temporal and to the payment of the costs of the proceedings.
The penalty prescribed by law was imposed in its maximum degree because the trial
judge was of opinion that the commission of the crime was marked with the
aggravating circumstances of alevosia (treachery).

Accepting, as we do, the findings of the court below as to the credibility of the
witnesses, we are of opinion that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable
doubt that the appellant unlawfully and treacherously (con alevosia) took the life of one
Isidro Palejo, at or about the time and place mentioned in the information. It is very
clear therefore that the crime actually committed by the appellant, as disclosed by the
evidence, was that of asesinato (murder), which, as defined and penalized in article 403
of the Penal Code, is the unlawful taking of the life of another, other than parricide,
when the act is marked by any of the following qualifying aggravating circumstances:
(1) With treachery (alevosia); (2) for a price or promise of reward; (3) by means of an
inundation, fire, or poison; (4) with deliberate premeditation; (5) with cruelty, by
deliberately and inhumanly increasing the sufferings of the offended party.

The trial judge, nevertheless, properly convicted the defendant of the crime of
homicide, marked with the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia),
and justified his action in this regard on the ground that, in the information upon which
the defendant was tried, he was charged, not with murder (asesinato), but with
homicide (homicidio).

The action of the trial judge in this regard must be sustained. We have invariably held
that an accused person cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he
is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be
convicted in the courts of these Islands of any offense, unless it is charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a
right to be informed as to the nature of the offensed with which he is charged before he
is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint
or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. (U. S.
v. Sevilla, 1 Phil. Rep., 143; U. S. v. Pascua, 1 Phil. Rep., 631; U. S. v. Ayao, 4 Phil.
Rep., 114; U. S. v. Nery, 4 Phil. Rep., 158; U. S. v. Roque, 4 Phil. Rep., 242; U. S. v.
Luzon, 34 Phil. Rep., 343; U. S. v. Andrada, 5 Phil. Rep., 464; U. S. v. Torres, 5 Phil.
Rep., 501; U. S. v. De los Santos, 5 Phil. Rep., 565; U. S. v. De Guzman, 8 Phil. Rep.,
21; U. S. v. Rojo, 10 Phil. Rep., Phil. Rep., 369; U. S. v. Gellada, 15 Phil. Rep., 120; U.
S. v. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391.)

Perhaps, however, it should be observed that, when speaking in this connection of the
offense charged in the complaint, we refer to the offense of which the court would be
justified in holding the defendant guilty on proof of the facts alleged in the body of the
information. For, except in a very early case (U. S. v. Dinsing, 1 Phil. Rep., 738),
wherein a contrary view appears to have been taken, apparently without extended
discussion, but which has long since been overruled, we have uniformly and frequently
laid down the rule that an accused person may be convicted of "any crime described
and charged by the facts set out in the information," irrespective of, and without regard
to the designation or characterization of the crime set forth in the title of the complaint
or information by the private complainant or the public prosecuting officer. (U. S. v.
Supila, 13 Phil. Rep., 671; U. S. v. Treyes, 14 Phil. Rep., 270; U. S. v. Jeffrey, 15 Phil.
Rep., 391; U. S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U. S. v. De Guzman, 19 Phil. Rep.,
350.

The information in this case charges the defendant with the commission of the crime as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about December 7, 1910, in the municipality of Santo Nino, Province of

Cagayan, P. I., the said Patrico Campo did willfully, illegally and criminally and with a
blunt instrument attack and strike Isidro Palejo, inflicting upon his head various words
and bruises which caused the death of the said Isidro Palejo. An act committed in
violation of the law." cralaw virtua1aw library

It will be seen that the information does not charge that the unlawful taking of the life
of the deceased was marked with treachery, or any one of the five qualifying
circumstances in the absence of which the act cannot be held to be asesinato (murder)
as defined in article 403 of the Code. Manifestly, therefore, in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in the cases cited above, the trial judge properly declined to convict
the defendant of that crime, although the evidence introduced at the trial conclusively
established the fact that he had committed it.
It is suggested in the brief of the Attorney-General that since alevosia (treachery) is??
expressly charge in the complaint, it was improper for the court to take it into
consideration in imposing the prescribed penalty for the homicide of which the appellant
was convicted. In support of this contention reference is made to a decision of the
supreme court of Spain wherein that court, in discussing the penalty to be imposed on
one convicted of homicide, held than the generic aggravating circumstance of alevosia
(treachery) should not be taken into consideration "because if it really exists, it
increases the penal responsibility by converting the homicide into murder; and if it is
not sufficiently proved, for the same reason that it is rejected as constituent it must be
rejected as generic, for that which is legally unjustified cannot in any way be regarded
as aggravating." (Viada, Penal Code, Vol. I, p. 253.) But this comment of the supreme
court of Spain is to be construed with reference to the judicial system of procedure in
force in the jurisdiction wherein system of procedure in force in the jurisdiction wherein
sufficient to establish the existence of the attendant circumstance alevosia, it would
have been the duty of the court to convict the defendant of the crime of asesinato
(murder); and what the court really held was, that in the case then under
consideration, alevosia (treachery) had not been proven, and for that sufficient reason
could not be taken into consideration either as a qualifying circumstance (circunstancia
cualificativa) or as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Under our Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for the offenses defined therein must be
imposed in a more severe degree, within the prescribed limits, when it appears that the
commission of those offenses is attended by one or more of the generic aggravating
circumstances expressly set out in chapter 4 book 1 of the Code: and we have
uniformly held that, although the information contains no allegation as to the fact that
the commission of the crime charged was marked with one or more of these generic
aggravating circumstances, nevertheless that fact may be proven at the trial, and, if
proven, must be taken into consideration in imposing the penalty.

This rule of practice is justified on the ground that the introduction of such evidence is
admitted only for the purpose of showing the precise manner in which the offense
actually charged in the complaint was committed; and not for the purpose of changing
the legal characterization or designation of the offense charged in the information, or of
showing that the offense committed was in fact a higher offense than that charged in
the information. It follows, of course, that proof of the existence of one or more
aggravating circumstances, not expressly charged in the complaint can and should
serve no other purpose than that of aiding the court in determining whether the penalty
should be imposed in a more or less severe form, within the limits prescribed for the
offense charge in the complaint or information.

Proof that the commission of an offense charged in the complaint or information was
marked by an aggravating circumstance not mentioned therein should not and will not
be denied its logical and normal effect in increasing the severity of the penalty to be
imposed within the limits prescribed by law for that offense, on the sole ground that,
had the aggravating circumstance been set forth in the complaint or information, proof
of its existence would have justified the treatment of that circumstance as a qualifying
circumstance, and the conviction of the accused of a higher offense than that actually
charged.

As throwing some light on this holding, attention is directed to the fact that, when a
conviction is had on a complaint or information charging the crime of assassination, and
it appears that the unlawful taking of the life of another was marked with two or more
of the above set out circumstances, any one of which is sufficient to qualify the crime
as that of assassination, then under the practice of this court, adhering to the practice
established in the supreme court of Spain, any one of these circumstances may be
treated as the qualifying circumstance which raises the crime to that of assassination,
and the others are then treated as generic aggravating circumstances to be taken into
consideration in determining the degree of severity with which the penalty prescribed
for that crime should be imposed.

Since the existence of this aggravating circumstance alone, in the absence of proof of
any extenuating circumstance, is sufficient to sustain the action of the trial court in
imposing the penalty in its maximum degree, it is not necessary for us to consider the
questions which have been raised as to the existence or nonexistence of other
aggravating circumstances.

The judgment of the court below convicting the defendant and appellant of the crime of
homicide with which he was charged, marked with the aggravating circumstance of
alevosia, and sentencing him therefor is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83463 May 27, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GENARO GINES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, SAN
FERNANDO, LA UNION, RAMON LABO, JR., and FRANCIS FLORESCA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Rex C. Rimorin for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Order of Judge Genaro Gines of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union dated October 15, 1987, which dismissed
Criminal Case No. 1829 entitled "People vs. Ramon Labo, Jr. and Francis Floresca" and the Order
dated February 8, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration.

On complaint of herein private complainant retired Supreme Court Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero in the
Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, an information for libel was filed on January 27,
1987 before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 26) of San Fernando, La Union against Ramon Labo,
Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong Taliba" in
connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986
issue.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1829 of the San Fernando, La Union Court. On March
23, 1987, accused Labo and Floresca were arraigned, and with the assistance of counsel, both
entered "not guilty" pleas. The other accused, Perfecto Manaois, was then at large. After the pre-trial
conference was conducted and thereafter terminated, public respondent set the case for hearing on
April 20 and 21, 1987. Accused Labo and Floresca waived their right to appear at the hearing of the
case.

On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for joint hearing and at the same time asked
the court to defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21, 1987, on the ground that the
other accused, Manaois, had lately been arrested and filed bond for his provisional liberty. The
motion was granted and the court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of the case with
respect to the accused Manaois for May 18, 1987.

Upon arraignment on May 18, 1987, Perfecto Manaois pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.
Trial was set for June 22, 1987.

On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for postponement on the ground that he has a
serious eye ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate medical attention. In an order
dated June 16, 1987, the Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of the case to July 30,
1987.

On July 30, 1987, when the case was called for initial reception of evidence for the prosecution, the
trial fiscal appeared together with private complainant. However, since counsel for Labor and
Floresca failed to appear despite due notice to him, the court again reset the hearing of the case to
August 17 and 18, 1987.

On September 16, 1987, with the conformity of private complainant the court issued an order for the
exclusion of accused Perfecto Manaois because it was found out that he was neither the publisher
nor the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba where the alleged libelous
article appeared. Since private complainant was not present, hearing of the case was once more
reset to October 15, 1987. The court gave warning that should private complainant fail to present
any evidence on the said scheduled hearing, the case will be dismissed for lack of interest.

According to the prosecution, when the Regional Trial Court on September 16, 1987 reset the
hearing to October 15, 1987 private complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second eye
operation, that is, "removal of cataract of his left eye and implantation of intracellular lens therein,"
done at the Manila Medical Center September 14, 1987." To support this allegation, the prosecution
attached with its petition a copy of the receipt issued by the Manila Medical Center showing payment
of his hospital deposit dated September 13, 1987, marked therein as Annex "K". (Petition, p.
7; Rollo, p. 7)

On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel against
private complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois as the editor of the August 3, 1986
issue of the People's Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 1829 in lieu of Manaois who had been discharged earlier.

On September 29, 1987, Benefredo Esquivel was required to submit his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidence. The letter was however "returned to sender" (Fiscal's office) on November
18, 1987.

On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued the now assailed Order dismissing the case as
against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice Guerrero to appear
despite the vigorous objection of the fiscal who requested that the hearing of the case be deferred as
the Fiscal's Office was then conducting a preliminary investigation with respect to Benefredo
Esquivel.

The prosecution avers that when the respondent court ordered the dismissal of the case due to the
absence of private complainant, the latter was scheduled to depart for abroad for a medical check
up. Thus, a motion for reconsideration dated October 19, 1987 asking for a reinstatement of the
case was filed by the prosecution, to which private respondents filed their opposition. The motion
was denied on February 8, 1988 hence the instant petition.

Two issues have been raised. namely:

1) whether or not the public respondent "acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case No. 1829 against the two
accused despite the pendency of the preliminary investigation against a third respondent for
his possible inclusion as one of the accused in the same criminal case pending before the
court;"
 2) whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the
dismissal of the case.

Private complainant asseverates that since Esquivel had admitted responsibility for the publication of
the libelous article in question and no preliminary investigation had as yet been conducted on the
criminal complaint against said accused when respondent judge dismissed the subject criminal case
on October 15, 1987, it follows that the case was not ready for trial on that day as Esquivel had not
yet been included in the criminal case through an amended information. Considering further that the
respondent judge had earlier granted petitioner's motion for a joint hearing of all the accused in the
interest of the speedy administration of justice, the respondent court should have directed the Fiscal
to complete the preliminary investigation within a reasonable period of time, deferred the hearing of
the case until Esquivel is arraigned, and finally set the joint hearing of the case on a definite date.
Having failed to do so, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when it dismissed the
case on the ground of private complainant's absence (Petition, pp. 10-11).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the act of initiating a suit against Benefredo
Esquivel could no longer prosper as such indictment has prescribed one year from August 3, 1986;
that to allow the prosecution to first terminate its investigation on the complaint against Esquivel after
the lapse of more than one year would unduly delay the termination of the case against private
respondents despite an appeal for speedy trial; and that if the Court grants the petition the case
would in effect be re-opened thereby placing the private respondents in double jeopardy.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the persons liable for the crime of libel include
"any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, . . . ."

In like manner, Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that "all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against
all persons who appear to be responsible therefor."

Benefredo Esquivel apparently admitted through an affidavit that he was the real editor of "People's
Bagong Taliba" and assumed full responsibility for the publication of the subject libelous article. The
prosecution should have included Esquivel as co-accused in the information against the other
respondents or through an amended information, both within the period of prescription. At the very
least, the prosecution could have flied their complaint (against Esquivel) with the fiscal's office for the
purpose of a preliminary investigation within the one-year period, It is important to note that the said
complaint was lodged in the fiscal's office only on September 25, 1987, which is already more than
one year from August 3, 1986, the date the alleged libelous article was published. Based on Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period commences to run from the day following the
commission of the offense or discovery by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and is
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The period starts to run again when the
proceeding is terminated: (a) without the accused being convicted or acquitted; or (b) the proceeding
is unjustifiably stopped for a reason not imputable to the offender. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code).
Certainly, the crime of libel has already prescribed in so far as private respondent Benefredo
Esquivel is concerned, as the complaint against him was filed beyond the one-year period of
prescription. Since Esquivel was not included in the information filed against the other respondents,
any amendment thereto would not be a mere correction but a substantial alteration. Such being the
case, for purposes of computing the prescriptive period, the date of the amendment, if any, is to be
considered and not the date the original information was filed. (LTB vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 41399,
August 9, 1934). The information against the first three respondents, having been filed within the
one-year period, did interrupt the period of prescription, but only against those three and not against
Esquivel. The alleged offense was committed on August 3, 1986; if the said offense is to be
prosecuted, any information that would be filed against Esquivel charging him with libel would have
long prescribed. Consequently, We sustain the dismissal of the case in so far as private respondent
Benefredo Esquivel is concerned.

On the issue of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the Court finds that said right has not been
violated in the case at bar and thus holds that the dismissal of the case as regards private
respondents Labo and Floresca is premature and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy
1âwphi1

trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of
a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice." (Mercado vs. CFI, et al., 66 Phil. 215; Gunabe, et al. vs.
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993; Bermisa vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 136) The Court is
convinced that private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and
that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefor. Said absences are evidently not capricious,
oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the
case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable
delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant
case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations,
hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. The subject case for libel was dismissed on October
15, 1987, some eight and a half months after the information was filed. This period is not such an
extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause capricious and vexatious delay. For, speedy
trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with
reasonable diligence prepare for trial (Mercado v. CFI, supra). While accused persons do have
rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.

The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly unmeritorious. Private respondents contend that to grant
the petition would be tantamount to reviving and re-opening the case, thus placing them in double
jeopardy. In support thereof, they cite several cases which reiterate the doctrine that "a case which
was dismissed after the accused had invoked their rights to speedy trial for failure of the prosecution
to present evidence, amounts to an acquittal which would bar the subsequent prosecution of the
accused for the same offense." (Comment of private respondents, p. 8, citing in particular the case
of Salcedo vs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811).

The requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are: a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a court of competent jurisdiction; c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and d) the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of
the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case was obviously dismissed
upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. Private respondents invoked their
constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution failed to present evidence due to the
absence of private complainant at the hearing. It was on their motion that the lower court ordered the
case to be dismissed. "For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the
case must be without the express consent of the accused. (Que v. Cosico, 177 SCRA
410 citing People v. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167, People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81, and People vs. Cuevo,
104 SCRA 312). This is the general rule.

As exceptions, the case of People vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516, states that: "There are only two
occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the
accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and
the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a
speedy trial." None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar.
We hold in sum that the criminal information for libel against private respondents Ramon Labo, Jr.
and Francis Floresca was validly filed, that the dismissal as to these two respondents was
erroneous, and that its reinstatement will not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED in part. The Orders of public respondent judge dated
October 15, 1987 and February 8, 1988 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1829, with the exclusion
of Benefredo Esquivel, is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 107211 June 28, 1996

FRANCISCO GUERRERO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former Special Seventh Division), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MALABON, BRANCH 72, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

"Does the constitutional right to a speedy trial include the right to a prompt disposition and judgment?" This is the question posed before this
Court in the instant petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to set aside (a) the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 promulgated on
February 18, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23737; and (b) the Resolution promulgated on September 10, 1992 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

By a resolution dated November 13, 1935, the First Division of this Court transferred this case, along
with several others, to the Third. After careful deliberation and consultation on the petition, comment,
reply, memoranda and other submissions of the parties, this Court assigned the writing of this
Decision to the undersigned ponente.

The Facts

The antecedents are not disputed. As summarized by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, they
are as follows: 3

On November 16, 1971, an Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless

Imprudence was filed against petitioner before the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXV, Caloocan City, presided by Judge Manuel A. Argel, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. C-2073. which reads:

That on or about the 13th day of May, 1969, in the Municipality of

Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then
the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, type Camanche PA-24-250 with
registration marking PI-C515, then in-charge of, and has complete
responsibility for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft,
without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid accidents
or injuries to persons, and without ascertaining as to whether the
quantity of fuel in the tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the flight
from Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija to MIA, Parañaque, Rizal, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate, fly, pilot, maneuver
and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from the airport at Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on board, and while the said
 aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the engine quitted
twice indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused
to make an emergency manner landing on a fishpond which he
executed in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner in the Piper
Camanche Owner's handbook, and as a result of the improper
execution of said emergency landing, the aircraft's landing gear
collided with a dike and trees near the fishpond in Malabon, Rizal,
resulting to the fatal injuries in three (3) passengers, namely, Cpl.
Teodoro Neric, Jose Mari Garcia and Lourdes Garcia which directly
caused their deaths.

Contrary to law.

Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally
able to start presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered
his plea of "Not Guilty".

On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally rested its case.

On February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case.

On March 16, 1978, the hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered by
Judge Argel to submit their respective memoranda.

On January 19, 1979, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over as
presiding judge vice Judge Argel, granted private prosecutor's omnibus motion to file
memorandum up to January 29, 1979.

On December 21, 1979, petitioner filed his memorandum.

It would appear that from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch XXXV, the case was
subsequently assigned to Branch CXXV presided over by Judge Alfredo Gorgonio
who apparently did not take action thereon.

On January 30, 1989, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the reraffling of the
case from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon
which, under the provisions of B.P. 129, had jurisdiction over the case.

The case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 7356-MN, was raffled to presiding
Judge Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas-Malabon, Branch 72.

On March 14, 1990, Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the
transcript of stenographic notes within 30 days considering that the same was found
to be incomplete.

On April 20, 1990, since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the
witnesses.

On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals
of the testimonies of Eusebio Garcia and Elena Obidosa (December 11, 1969),
 Celestino Nazareno (March 16, 1973), Cenen Miras (April 27, 1973), Ariston Agustin
(February 10, 1977) and Francisco Guerrero (December 5 and 19, 1977). The
private prosecutor manifested that he had communicated with one of the
stenographers on record, Ms. Remedios S. Delfin, who promised to look into her files
and hopefully complete the transcription of her stenographic notes.

On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses testimony
on October 24, 1990.

On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the testimonies was reset to November 9, 1990
due to petitioner's failure to appear on the scheduled hearing.

On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right
to speedy trial has been violated.

On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge dented the motion to dismiss and reset the
retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990.

On November 16, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied oil November 21, 1990. The presiding Judge set anew the retaking of the
testimonies December 5, 1990.

Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review
of the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20,
1990 anent petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for reconsideration.
The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right
to speedy trial.

In its decision which was promulgated on February 18, 1992, the Honorable Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. In a resolution dated September 10, 1992,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Errors Assigned

Petitioner now assigns the following errors 4 against the respondent Court:

I.

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the re-hearing of the
instant case will not suit the intended purpose and will only result in untold prejudice
to the petitioner.

II.

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the petitioner is entitled to a
dismissal of the criminal case equivalent to an acquittal on the merits based on the
violation of his right to speedy trial resulting from the failure to render a prompt
disposition of judgment.

The First Issue: Untold Prejudice

Petitioner claims that through no fault of his, seven of the ten witnesses who testified for the accused
will no longer be able to testify anew.

So too, three witness for the prosecution have died and thus would not be able to appear during the
re-hearing. And even if all witnesses would be able to testify again, "the passage of a long period of
time spanning more than two decades since the incident complained of will tend to confuse or hinder
than aid the accurate recall of the facts and circumstances of the case," as follows 5:

(a) Capt. Ricardo B. Stohner of the Civil Aeronautics Administration has reportedly
migrated to either the U.S.A. or Canada, after he retired from the CAA about eight (8)
years ago. Capt. Stohner's indispensable testimony as an expert witness as well as
to his personal knowledge of certain material facts as described in Francisco
Guerrero's Memorandum of 17 December 1979, crucial to the defense, is now lost to
the petitioner.

(b) Eduardo V. Guerrero, a son of Francisco Guerrero, has been undergoing

psychiatric treatment for more than two years now, as he is suffering from chronic
mental illness. He is in no condition to testify. Copies of medical certificates on
Eduardo's condition were submitted to the respondent courts as annexes to various
pleadings.

(c) Rosario V. Guerrero, wife of Francisco Guerrero. was operated on last August for
tumor of the colon and is still suffering a partial disability. She is under medical
advice to avoid activities which may cause her stress, including testifying in court.
Copies of medical certificates on Mrs. Guerrero's operation and condition were
submitted to the respondent courts as annexes to various pleadings.

(d) The whereabouts of Alberto Atanacio, Rodolfo Fontanilla, Editha Pangilinan, and
Rizal and Belen Macabole, are unknown, and despite diligent efforts exerted by
petitioner, they have not been found up to the present.

At this point, this argument is premature and at best speculative. As to whether the witnesses for the
defense would be available at the trial, and if available, whether they will still be in a position to recall
the events that transpired in the case more than twenty five years ago is a question of fact which
cannot be determined now. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his memorandum: 6

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the whereabouts of his witnesses (except Rizal

and Evelyn Macabole) are ascertainable should a diligent search be made by him.
This can be gleaned from the return of the subpoena dated October 1, 1990 which
forms part of the record of the case. Eduardo Guerrero and Rosario Guerrero were
respectively served with subpoena and their alleged mental and physical incapacity
to testify should best be left to the assessment of respondent trial court. Edith (sic)
Pangilinan was notified of the retaking and is, thus, available. Alberto Atanacio and
Rodolfo Fontanilla, on the other hand, are in Lucena City. The exact whereabouts of
the last two witnesses can be ascertained if diligent efforts were exerted to locate
them.

The alleged unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution should not be the concern of the
petitioner at this time. The burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. And if the
prosecution fails for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, he will be acquitted.
 . . . The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State succeeds in
proving his guilt. the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant
applies. The conscience must be satisfied that, on the accused-appellant could be
laid the responsibility of the offense charged. 7

. . . [C]ourts must exert utmost scrupulousness in evaluating the evidence of the

prosecution for it is elementary that the conviction of an accused must rest on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense (People vs.
Cruz, 215 SCRA 339 [1992]). The prosecution must overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence by proof beyond reasonable doubt; otherwise, the acquittal
of the accused is ineluctably demanded. . . . 8

. . . It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution

discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Acquittal then of the accused-
appellant is in order. 9

On this matter, the respondent Court, 10 citing the assailed order of the trial court, argues that there
are really only two witnesses of the prosecution whose testimonies need to be retaken and the
rehearing should not really present a monumental problem:

With only two (2) witnesses of the prosecution to be presented, coupled with a
promise of expeditiousness by respondent Judge, the Court is of the view that
petitioner's misgivings are rather exaggerated. And as to his expressed fear that his
own witnesses for the defense can no longer testify "in the same manner as before,"
the same Order well and truly states in adequate refutation that --

. . . the fear that the witnesses to the incident which occurred in 1969
may no longer have the same perception of what they saw and,
therefore, would not be able to testify in Court in the same manner
they originally testified is not the concern of the defense but of the
prosecution. If the prosecution witnesses cannot give convincing
testimony in the retaking of their testimony, that is the worry of the
prosecution. It is not even unfair to the accused if his witnesses
cannot testify in the same convincing manner that they testified
before as long as the prosecution witnesses are convincing.
Everything in a criminal prosecution should be interpreted liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state. . . .

Anent petitioner's contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy, suffice it to say
that there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution -- i.e. of that "first jeopardy." For
double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur:

. . . It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt, to commit
the same or is a frustration thereof (emphasis omitted).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment: (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
 was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(emphasis omitted).

In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element -- dismissal or
termination of the case without the express consent of the accused -- is not present. Moreover,
measured against the aforequoted standard, the re-taking of testimonies cannot in any wise be
deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is
utterly without basis.

The Second Issue: Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition

True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speedy trial but also to a speedy
judgment after trial when in Section 16, Article III, it provides:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the disposition
thereof, warranting dismissals in case of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned,
not just the accused.

In the recent case of People vs. Leviste, 12 this Court citing Gonzales vs.
Sandiganbayan 13 and People vs. Tampal, 14 reiterated the ruling that the right to speedy trial is
violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without the
participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong
the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.

On the other hand, the case of Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., 15 laid down the guidelines in determining
the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula:

. . . (S)peedy disposition of cases' is a relative term. Just like the constitutional

guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy
disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are
length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in
answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the "speedy disposition of cases" guarantee.

In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan
City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered
on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the
new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's
absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous
of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
While it may be said that it was not petitioner's fault that the stenographic notes of the testimonies of
the witnesses were not transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution's. The respondent trial judge
can hardly be faulted either because he could not have rendered the decision without the transcripts
in question. Let it be remembered that he was not the judge who conducted the trial and hence he
would not have had sufficient basis to make a disposition in the absence of the said transcripts. As
respondent Court of Appeals noted:

Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case was assigned to
respondent Judge only in late 1989 or early 1990, and that he took prompt action
thereon by setting the case for retaking of testimonies, obviously as a prelude to
judgment. The case then was finally making progress toward termination. For such
dispatch and diligence, respondent Judge hardly deserves condemnation. Petitioner
also faults the prosecution for its failure to follow up the status of the case.

As regards the other judge to whom the case was assigned prior to 1989, the accused himself could
not pinpoint the cause of the problem: 16

2) Reason for the delay No one knows why the Presiding Judge (Manuel A. Argel) of
the respondent court who heard the trial did not render a decision during his tenure.
No one knows either why another former Presiding Judge (Alfredo Gorgonio) failed
to turn over the case to the Malabon court during the Judiciary Reorganization under
B.P. Blg. 129.

It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and languished in the
court docket, Not surprisingly, since the risk of such loss through neglect and other
causes grew with each passing year, part of the records and several transcripts were
lost in the time the case lay unattended. Before being finally assigned to the
respondent trial court, the case was shuttled from court to court through various
indorsements of Executive Judges and the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court
as a result of the confusion as to which court had territorial jurisdiction over it.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right -- a situation amounting to laches --
had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his
right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, 17 or at least made some
overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a
waiver of such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy
trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and
vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public
justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused
was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on
the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair
opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense, substantial justice in the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The respondent trial court is directed to proceed with
judicious dispatch in the re-taking of testimonies and in concluding the case in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and
SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.

Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for petitioners.

Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.

Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:

The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. 1 More specifically,
did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a
guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents 2 inside the chambers of city court Judge
Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner.3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit,
although such a procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants,
the hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their
part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded
being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city
court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the
light of the facts ascertained — the unique aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to
be an unseemly altercation, force likewise being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of
private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen
thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city
court Judge in the above manner — we rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public
trial, and grant the petition.

It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by
petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968,
eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1)
Criminal Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192,
alsofor slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against
Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-
109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against
Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for
violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal
Case No. F-109200, for slander."4 The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the
aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March
30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968,
June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates
— except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 — fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties
and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under
suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as
there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5 Also
this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia."6 Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all
the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to August, 1968),
the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense
of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only
one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This
was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said
respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no
pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible
on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were
granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of
the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of
petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up
to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to — or pointed out — any
supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is
confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases." 7 It was stated in
the next petition:

"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to
September 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel respondents Calo and
Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of
Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as
counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded
upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings."8

Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in
the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty.
Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction ... [alleging jurisdictional
defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus
causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was
an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been
violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these
cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the
public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be
read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in question)
... pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'" 10

A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to
this Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3,
1969, respondents were required to answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As
was to be expected the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other
respondents on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there was a
failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the
memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any
persuasive showing of a violation of constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be
resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners
that did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as
previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for.

1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set
forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled.
So it is, as likewise made clear, under present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was
stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal
and unjust manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had
provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration what appeared in the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found
expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this
country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. 13 Historically as was pointed out by
Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re
Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in
[the] English common law heritage. 15 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure,
"but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of the
ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of
the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the
Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude his historical
survey "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision,
requires that all criminal trials be open to the public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of
the right to a public trial.

2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly
obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone
interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his
terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is
thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a
trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present
are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the
public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." 21

What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city
court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to
investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is
no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room
allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though
is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion,
it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." 22

Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been
held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen.
What was said by former Chief Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be
accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection raised. Thus: "In one case,
the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears
on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was
held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was
handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.

It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.

3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other objection to the
conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge
would seek to lend support to an order at war with obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by
harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again
here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the People of
the Philippines for whom the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an
offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that
respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have
been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. As was so
emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was
commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of
his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court
should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26

4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the
reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right
could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him
was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he
certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have
convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily
calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural
rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance
of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is
remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal
acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it
is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may
come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his
rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just
because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than
in the usual place that the trial took place.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring
bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29, 1968
for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise
granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further
action in Criminal Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of
dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of
February 3, 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against
respondent policemen Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, JJ., concur.