F - 04.23.23 FTCA Pet'n Re Court Employees

Notice of Federal Tort Claims Act, RICO, and Conspiracy claims filing against Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit employees: Chief Circuit Judge Debra Ann Livingston,1
Robert D. Sack, Amalya L. Kearse, Catherine O’Hagan-Wolf, Dina Kurot, and Ralph LNU;
and District Court (SDNY) employees Edgardo Ramos, Laura Taylor-Swain, Ruby Krajick,
and Colleen McMahon, and others, jointly, (the “Court employees”).
The Office of Ulysses T. Ware
123 Linden Blvd.
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
Utware007@gmail.com
April 23, 2023
Via regular mail and email to
Office of the General Counsel
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
1 Columbus Ave, NW
Washington, D.C. 20544
Re: Notice of filing of Federal Tort Claim Act (“FTCA”). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is
codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), and §§2671-2680. Claimant, Ulysses T. Ware, files claims
under New York State (NYS) tort law, (the “Tort Laws”) against (1) Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, District Court (SDNY, NDGA, D. NV, and BC NDGA) employees, jointly, (the
“Court employees”), acting in their official capacity, within the scope of their employment
as Court of Appeals and District Court employees, and (2) agents, proxies, surrogates, and
alter-egos of the Court employees completely controlled, and/or completely mentally
dominated by the Court employees to such an extent the actions of the agents constituted
the actions of the Court employees as the Court employees’ alter-egos and/or unindicted
coconspirators.
1
The leader and organizer, the ringleader--the supreme and spiritual leader for the unindicted
coconspirators. The claims presented herein regarding Chief Circuit Judge Livingston, Circuit Judges Robert
D. Sack, and Amalya L. Kearse; and District Judges (SDNY) Edgardo Ramos, Laura Taylor-Swain, Kent J.
Dawson, Thomas W. Thrash, Jr., and Colleen McMahon, and Bankruptcy Judge (NDGA) Wendy L. Hagenau
constitute high crimes and misdemeanors, impeachable offenses, and ipso facto violations of the Code of
Conduct for Federal Judges, Canons 2, 2(A), 3B(2), 4A, 5A(1), 5A(2), 5A(4) and federal and state (NYS)
criminal laws.
Page 1 of 103
Sunday, April 23, 2023
Re: Notice of Federal Tort Claim Act, RICO, Conspiracy, and claims against Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, District Court (SDNY), and Bankruptcy Court (NDGA) employees.
General Counsel:
The Claimant, Ulysses T. Ware, has submitted for settlement, adjustment, and review the
enclosed FTCA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), and §§2671-2680 based on NYS, Nevada,
and GA tort law. Also included are other viable claims (RICO and Civil Rights conspiracy claims)
which the Claimant will bring in the U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) naming each Court employee and
others as defendants in a RICO civil complaint, and 42 USC 1985 civil rights conspiracy and
obstruction of justice claims; the Claimant will seek compensatory damages of $2.225 billion,
punitive damages of $5.225 billion, attorney’s fees, costs, expenses, and other damages.
Please review the enclosed claims, and supporting evidence2 of the NYS, Nevada, and GA
torts, notify Claimant, and confirm your receipt of the FTCA petition. The evidence and the law is
clear, convincing, indisputable, and overwhelming regarding the negligence, liability, culpability,
and recklessness of the Court employees’ violation of NYS, Nevada, and GA torts. There is no
good faith, nonfrivolous defense in law or in fact to the NYS, Nevada, and GA torts presented
herein. Any oppositional litigation of the claims in the District of D.C. federal courts by the United
States, the real party in interest, will be reckless, vexatious, initiated for an improper purpose, in
bad faith, manifestly frivolous, lacking a legal or factual basis to defend the FTCA lawsuit, and
vexatious, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1-4); and subject to draconian and dire Rule 11(c) and 28 USC
1927 sanctions for any DOJ lawyer foolish enough to commit professional suicide, sign, and
2
Especially see Adar Bays v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022) (March 15, 2022), read in pari
material with Appx. U—the decision that held that NYS Penal Law, section 190.40, the criminal usury
cannot be waived; and therefore, ipso facto, as a matter law and public policy, the 02cv2219 (SDNY)
plaintiffs and their agents’ design of criminal usury terms and conditions within Group Management Corp.,
convertible promissory notes, (the “Criminal Usury Notes”—government trial exhibits GX 1-4 in U.S. v.
Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), the subject matter of the manifestly frivolous, fraudulent, bogus, and bad faith
02cv2219 (SDNY) lawsuit, In re Group Management Corp., 03-93031-WLH (BC NDGA), U.S. v. Ware,
04cr1224 (SDNY), and U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) proceedings) “cannot be waived” and thus, ipso
facto, the collection activities conducted regarding the Criminal Usury Notes by the Court employees and
their agents ipso facto, as a matter of law and fact violated 18 USC 1961(6)(B), and NYS tort law of
conspiracy, fraud, and other torts. There is no defense in fact or in law for the violation of NYS, NV, or GA
tort claims—the liability of the United States for the claim is subject to entry of final judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c) in favor of Claimant, only damages remain to be determined.
Page 2 of 103
submit an oppositional pleading in the Ware v. United, et al. (D.D.C.) FTCA lawsuit.3 Cf., 28 USC
1927 sanctions against a DOJ or private lawyer.4
Accordingly, Mr. Ware, the Claimant, is requesting that the AOC’s General Counsel
immediately, not later than Monday, May 1, 2023, at 10:00 AM, time of the essence, provide any
and all extant legal precedent(s) which have overruled Supreme Court binding authority in
Calderon and Hazel Atlas-Glass—according to Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis no such precedents exist,
which authorized the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court employees to not file
and adjudicate Claimant’s recall of mandate motions.5
3
Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
"(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—
whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies
that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information."
4
After May 1, 2023, unless the FTCA claims are settled by the AOC Claimant will move to compel the AOC
to either (i) settle, or (ii) officially deny the FTCA claims given the United States has no legal or factual
defense to the claims—that is, (i) the facts are not in disputes, the recall of mandate motions were
returned not filed or adjudicated, see Ex. 6, infra, and (ii) Calderon, Hazel Atlas-Glass, and Sargent have
not been overruled, see Ex. 1, and Ex. 2, infra, the law is “unquestioned.” (quoting Sargent, Id. at 89).
5
An exhaustive search of all online legal research databases has found not one single case that has
overruled the Supreme Court’s decisions in Calderon v. Thompson and Hazel Atlas-Glass v. Hartford-
Empire Co., as well as circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir.
1996). See Ex. 1, and Ex. 2, infra, all of which confirmed and authorized a court of appeals with the
“inherent” jurisdiction to recall its mandate. Accordingly, the United States and its agent, the AOC, have
no good faith, nonfrivolous factual or legal basis to not in good faith settle and compromise the FTCA
claims presented herein given the ongoing, recklessness, insidiousness, extensive, egregious, and
malicious nature of the torts and crimes committed by the Court employees against the personal and
business interests of the Claimant. Please provide the Claimant with any legal precedent(s) that contradicts
the above binding legal authorities.
Page 3 of 103
If the AOC’s General Counsel wishes to discuss settlement or compromise of the FTCA,
and other claims presented herein, the Claimant will discuss settlement up to but not after May
1, 2023, at 12:00 noon PM, time of the essence. If the AOC’s General Counsel has no good faith
intentions of settling the enclosed FTCA or other claims, please forward the required FTCA denial
letter by certified mail to Mr. Ware on May 1, 2023, and the litigation can commence on the FTCA
and other claims in the District Court (D.D.C.).
After May 1, 2023, no settlement will be discussed or considered by Claimant if the AOC
and the United States have not presented legal authority that contradicts Calderon, Hazel Atlas-
Glass, and Sargent; and contradicts Adar Bays v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022),
March 15, 2022, decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Submitted by:
Claimant Ulysses T. Ware
April 23, 2023
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
cc: Office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Director of the FBI
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Whistleblower counsel
Attachments.
Page 4 of 103
Table of Contents
Notice of Federal Tort Claims Act, RICO, and Conspiracy claims filing against Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit employees: Chief Circuit Judge Debra Ann Livingston, Robert D. Sack, Amalya L. Kearse,
Catherine O’Hagan-Wolf, Dina Kurot, and Ralph LNU; and District Court (SDNY) employees Edgardo
Ramos, Laura Taylor-Swain, Ruby Krajick, and Colleen McMahon, and others, jointly, (the “Court
employees”). ................................................................................................................................................ 1
Opening statement—statement of the factual and legal basis for the FTCA, RICO, and 42 USC 1985(2),
and 1985(3) claims. ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Declaration of Ulysses T. Ware ................................................................................................................... 12
I. Introduction. ....................................................................................................................................... 12
1.0 Claimants-Plaintiffs: ................................................................................................................... 12
2.0 Second Circuit Court of Appeals employees:............................................................................. 12
3.0 District Court (SDNY) court employees...................................................................................... 12
3.1 Atlanta, GA District Court and Bankruptcy court employees. .................................................. 13
3.2 Las Vegas, NV federal court employees. .................................................................................... 13
4.0 Official capacity and status of the Court employees................................................................. 13
II. Court Employees’ NYS Torts. .............................................................................................................. 15
A NYS tort of obstruction of justice based on the below fact pattern and assumptions: ............... 15
I. Introduction. ........................................................................................................................................ 15
I. Factual Background. ........................................................................................................................ 15
NYS tort: Elements of Obstruction of Justice. ................................................................................... 18
Conclusion. ............................................................................................................................................. 20
B Civil conspiracy NYS tort claim against the Court of Appeals and Court employees: .................. 20
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 20
II. Parties ............................................................................................................................................. 21
III. Background .................................................................................................................................... 21
IV. Conspiracy between Court of Appeals Employees. ...................................................................... 22
V. Claim for NYS Civil Conspiracy........................................................................................................ 22
C NYS Tort—Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress. ................................................................... 26
III CLAIM FOR CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY UNDER 42 USC 1985(2) and 1985(3). ................................. 27
VI. Conclusion. .................................................................................................................................... 29
Page 5 of 103
IV RICO Claim .......................................................................................................................................... 30
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 30
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ................................................................................................................ 31
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 31
IV. RICO CLAIM ........................................................................................................................................ 31
V. DAMAGES ........................................................................................................................................... 33
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................................... 33
A The pattern of racketeering activities committed by the Court Employees. ............................ 33
B An illegal association-in-fact as defined in 18 USC 1961(4), a continuing criminal enterprise.
35
C Claim for Violation of 18 USC 1962(a), 1962(b), 1962(c), and 1962(d) by Court Employees. .. 36
18 USC 1962(a): .................................................................................................................................. 37
18 USC 1962(b): .................................................................................................................................. 37
18 USC 1962(c): ................................................................................................................................... 37
18 USC 1962(d): .................................................................................................................................. 38
18 USC 1961(6)(B):.............................................................................................................................. 38
V NYS tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Court employees based
on their misconduct. Each element of the claim is described below: ...................................................... 40
Factual Basis for Each Element of Proof: ............................................................................................... 40
VI NYS tort claim for fraud...................................................................................................................... 42
I. Misrepresentation of Material Fact .................................................................................................... 42
II. Scienter ............................................................................................................................................... 42
III. Intent to Deceive ............................................................................................................................... 43
IV. Justifiable Reliance ............................................................................................................................ 43
V. Damages ............................................................................................................................................. 43
End of document ........................................................................................................................................ 44
Supporting Exhibits and Evidence.............................................................................................................. 45
Exhibit 1—Form T-1080 Memorandum of law regarding Second Circuit jurisdiction to recall
mandates. ............................................................................................................................................... 46
Exhibit 2—Supplemental Memorandum of law regarding Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to recall
mandates. ............................................................................................................................................... 52
Exhibit 3—Omnibus Appendices to Recall of Mandate Motions. See attachment. ............................. 62
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Exhibit 4—Ulysses T. Ware’s request for judicial counsel review of denial of Edgardo Ramos’ 2022
complaint for criminal judicial misconduct—no review was ever conducted by the Judicial Council.
No signed order from the Judicial council has ever been received. ..................................................... 63
Exhibit 5---McMahon, J., Court employee, Dina Kurot’s bogus and fraudulent return of District
Judge Colleen McMahon’s complaint for judicial misconduct. The statement of fact was only 4
pages, not more than 5 pages as Kurot fraudulently stated. ................................................................ 77
Exhibit 6-1—Court of Appeals bogus, deceptive, and fraudulent “non-jurisdiction” letters returned
regarding the recall of mandate motions. ............................................................................................. 78
regarding the recall of mandate motions ............................................................................................. 79
regarding the recall of mandate motions. ............................................................................................. 80
Exhibit 7---Omitted. ................................................................................................................................ 81
Exhibit 8—EOUSA’s March 20, 2023, In re Ware, 22-000907 FOIA response regarding actual innocent
Brady exculpatory and impeachment in the U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) and U.S. v. Ware,
04cr1224 (SDNY) proceedings. ............................................................................................................... 82
Exhibit 9---12.25.22, McMahon, J. re 02cv2219 (SDNY) bogus and ultra vires orders,
unconstitutional purported “leave to file” sanctions, and other matters............................................ 83
Rule 60(b)(4) re Lack of Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) diversity subject matter jurisdiction over the
Criminal Usury Subject Matter, GX 1-4, and GX 5, and Dkt. 50 (GX 7), 54, 58 (GX 11), 65 (GX 24),
80, 102, 120, 137, 141, and 151. ........................................................................................................ 86
Exhibit 10—October 2022, collusion and conspiracy of Colleen McMahon, and Wendy L. Hagenau
(BC NDGA) to obstruct justice, violate Claimant’s Brady production rights, and to commit a fraud on
the 03-93031 and 02cv2219 (SDNY) federal courts. .............................................................................. 90
Exhibit 11—IRN’s coverage of USAO and NYC federal court’s conspiracy. ........................................... 91
Exhibit 12---Media opinion and editorial regarding NYC federal court employees’ crimes. ............... 92
Exhibit 13—Media reporting on the Court employees; public corruption........................................... 93
Exhibit 14—12.20.2007, Rule 41(a)(2), Dkt. 90 (02cv2219 (SDNY) superseding final judgment—actual
innocent “special circumstances.” ......................................................................................................... 94
Exhibit 15---FINRA’s May 17, 2021, certification of unregistered broker-dealer status for each
02cv2219 (SDNY)—actual innocent “special circumstances.”............................................................... 95
Exhibit 16-1—USAG’s Executive Branch Art. II actual innocent “special circumstances,”—the
abandonment, termination, and dismissal with prejudice of U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) and 07-
5670cr (XAP)(d Cir.) on Nov. 7, 2008. ..................................................................................................... 96
Exhibit 16-2--Gov-I, Aug. 18, 2009, final judgment—terminated 07-5222cr and 05cr1115 subject
matter jurisdiction; and conferred prevailing party status on Ulysses T. Ware. .................................. 97
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Exhibit 17—Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.’s Sept. 1, 2004, RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B), GA torts, 42 USC 1985(2),
and 1985(3), and RICO crimes committed against Claimant as overt acts in furtherance of the
collection of the criminal usury unlawful debts, GX 1-4. ...................................................................... 98
Exhibit 18-1—Federal Rule of Civ. Proc. Rule 12(c) memorandum of law. ........................................... 99
Exhibit 18-2—(follow up Rule 12(c) Memorandum to AOC’s General Counsel). ............................... 100
Exhibit 19--Omitted .............................................................................................................................. 102
End of document ...................................................................................................................................... 103
Page 8 of 103
Opening statement—statement of the factual and legal basis for the FTCA,
RICO, and 42 USC 1985(2), and 1985(3) claims.
The Court employees' negligence, recklessness, and egregious misconduct in the Ulysses
T. Ware cases has been nothing short of, sinister, devious, malicious, and insidious. Their actions,
which range from recklessness, bad faith, to willful and deliberate negligence, have resulted in
Mr. Ware being wrongfully incarcerated for over a decade. The reckless misconduct can be
categorized into three distinct areas: (A) violation of Brady production court orders, (B) failure to
order the search of the “over 15 boxes of materials” in possession of the United States Attorney
(SDNY), Andre Damian Williams, Jr., and (C) refusal to file and adjudicate actual innocent petitions
to recall a mandate.
The willful nonenforcement and egregious violation of Brady production court orders by
officers of the court is perhaps the most egregious of all the misconduct. Brady production
requires the government to turn over any exculpatory evidence to the defense “prior to trial.” In
this case, the Court employees willfully and deliberately suppressed evidence that could have,
and would have exonerated Mr. Ware. They deliberately and recklessly concealed "over 15 boxes
of materials" that "could be" Brady exculpatory evidence for more than 16 years, which is a clear
and indisputable violation of the law and the Brady doctrine.
The reckless and deliberate failure to “search over 15 boxes of materials” in the possession
of the United States Attorney is equally concerning. These boxes of materials could, and do
contain evidence that could have exonerated Mr. Ware, put the case in a different light, or have
been used to impeach the government's cases against him. The Court employees' negligent and
reckless misconduct in failing to order the immediate full and complete search of these materials
after the EOUSA’s March 20, 2023, admission and confession, see Ex. 8, infra, of the existence of
the 15 boxes of unsearched materials is a clear violation of their duty to ensure that justice is
served—per se and ipso facto violations of the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges.
The Court employees' refusal to file and adjudicate Claimant’s petitions to recall a
mandate is yet another example of their misconduct—ipso facto violations of the Code of
Conduct for Federal Judges. In doing so, they violated extant Supreme Court authority in Calderon
v. Thompson and circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc. This reckless and
irresponsible refusal to follow established legal precedent is a clear violation of their duty to
uphold the law and ensure that justice is served; and again, knowingly committed clear violations
of the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges, and Federal Employees.
All of these actions, individually or taken together, irrefutably demonstrate an insidious
and pernicious pattern of unethical and criminal misconduct that rises to the level of civil and
Page 9 of 103
criminal conspiracy. The Court employees, conspired and acted in concert with each other, and
others, and engaged in a deliberate and willful effort to:
I. conceal evidence,
II. steal evidence,
III. steal judicial court records from the District Court (SNDY) records department,
prevent justice from being served, and
IV. deny Mr. Ware, the Claimant, his constitutional and civil rights.
Their concerted actions were taken in their individual, personal, and official capacity as
employees of the court, and they knew or should have known that their actions were illegal and
unethical.
The Court employees' conduct also constitutes violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Their pattern of misconduct, including the concealment of
evidence, the obstruction of justice, and the aiding, abetting, assisting, and facilitation of the filing
of illegal and unlawful debt collection lawsuits, 6meets the definition of an illegal association in
fact under 18 USC 1961(4). They engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that includes
multiple overt acts, such as withholding evidence, stealing evidence, filing false pleadings, aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, unlawful debt collection, perjury, bribery, and conspiring to obstruct
justice.
Furthermore, the appeals regarding 02cv2219 (SDNY), 11-4181cv, and U.S. v. Ware,
04cr1224 (SDNY)—(i) 09-0851cr and (ii) 17-3527, as a matter of law are moot, given (1) Ex. 14,
infra, the 02cv2219 (SDNY) 12.20.2007, Dkt. 90, voluntary Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal with prejudice
of the 02cv2219 (SDNY) law, and the annulment and vitiation of the government’s trial exhibit in
U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), GX 1-4, GX 5, GX 7, GX 11, GX 24, and GX 34, and (2) given Ex. 15,
infra, FINRA’s May 17, 2021, unregistered broker-dealer certification for each of the 02cv2219
(SDNY) plaintiffs7—that is, actual innocent “special circumstances.”
6
Alpha Capital, AG, et al v. IVG Corp., a/k/a Group Management Corp., et al., 02cv2219 (SDNY), U.S. v.
Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), and U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) proceedings were orchestrated and concocted
by the Court employees, and DOJ USAO (SDNY) prosecutors as retaliatory RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B)
unlawful debt collection activities lawsuits, having the express and implicit purpose of extortion and
fraudulent and illegal money laundering criminal usury debt (GX 1-4) collection; according to the 02cv2219
(SDNY) plaintiffs’ counsel, Kenneth A. Zitter, Esq., designed “to punish” and “get that stock from that nigger
… who does he think that he is … we are not fucking around with you … don’t give us the stock and see
what happens to you … we will put you in prison and you will never get out ….” (quoting Leonard B. Sand
(deceased); and Kenneth A. Zitter, Esq. and Ari Rabinowitz in 2003, and during the 2007 04cr1224 trial).
7
See In re Group Management Corp., 03-93031 (BC NDGA), Dkt 256, and 02cv2219 (SDNY), Dkt. 137,
(McMahon, J.) frauds on the court, obstruction of justice, fraud, and conspiracy by the Atlanta, GA
Page 10 of 103
Finally, the Court employees' conduct constitutes a violation of 42 USC 1985, which
prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. Their actions were taken with the specific intent
to deny Mr. Ware his constitutional rights and to deprive him of his liberty without due process
of law. They acted in concert with each other, and their actions were taken in their official capacity
as employees of the court.
In conclusion, the Court employees' misconduct in the Ulysses T. Ware cases is a clear
violation of their duty to uphold the law and ensure that justice is served. Their actions, which
range from negligence to willful and deliberate misconduct, frauds on the court, conspiracy,
money laundering, criminal usury, and racketeering have resulted in Mr. Ware being wrongfully
incarcerated for over a decade. The misconduct constitutes violations of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, civil conspiracy, RICO, and 42 USC 1985. Mr. Ware is entitled to compensation for the harm
that has been done to him, and the Court employees must be held accountable for their actions.
It is my hope that this petition will bring justice to Mr. Ware and serve as a warning to others who
might engage in similar misconduct in the future; and lastly Claimant draw the attention of the
AOC’s employees to the fact that the AOC’s employees are not immune from judicial process, and
are therefore, subject to District of Columbia tort, fraud, and other tort laws, including RICO
1962(a-d), and 42 USC 1985(2), and 1985(3) civil rights claims.
Sincerely,
Ulysses T. Ware
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
April 23, 2023
bankruptcy court’s employees (Hagenau, Thomas, Sinback, Murphy, Bihary, and Mullins) to aid, abet,
assist, and facilitate the RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B) unlawful debt (GX 1-4 gov’t trial exhibits in 04cr1224
(SDNY)) collection activities of the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs. See Appx. U—NYS Penal Law, section
190.40, the criminal usury law, a class E felony, cannot be waived, ergo, the 03-93031 bankruptcy court,
the 02cv2219, and 04cr1224 courts were required to reverse, set aside, vacate, and annul all relief
granted to the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs. Cf., Ex. 10, infra, for the conspiracy to obstruct justice by
Hagenau and McMahon.
Page 11 of 103
Declaration of Ulysses T. Ware
I Ulysses T. Ware, (the “Claimant” or “Plaintiff”), hereby this 23rd day of 2023, under oath,
subject to the penalty of perjury, having personal knowledge of the facts, pursuant to 28 USC
1746, in Brooklyn, NY have made this Declaration of facts, (the “Facts”), in support of Federal Tort
Claims Act claims—the violation of NYS and Georgia tort laws by the Court employees, and other
claims (RICO and Federal Civil Rights).
I. Introduction.
1.0 Claimants-Plaintiffs:
Ulysses T. Ware, Silver Screen Studio Group, Group Management, and GOIH Group
Holdings, jointly, (the “Claimant”).
2.0 Second Circuit Court of Appeals employees:
Debra Ann Livingston, Robert D. Sack, Amalya L. Kearse, Catherine O’Hagan-Wolfe, Dina
Kurot, and Ralph LNU, collectively, (the “Second Circuit Employees”).
3.0 District Court (SDNY) court employees.
Edgardo Ramos,8 Laura Taylor-Swain, Colleen McMahon, and Ruby Krajick, District Court
(SDNY) employees.
8
Ramos, Taylor-Swain, (Dkt. 60, 22cv3409 (SDNY)), McMahon, (Dkt. 120, 137, 141, and Dkt. 151
(02cv2219)), and Krajick (fabricated and falsified the 05cr1115 docket to conceal the alleged Sept. 22,
2006, Rule 11 proceedings regarding Jeremy Jones) knowingly, willfully, recklessly, and negligently, jointly
and severally, as unindicted coconspirators on 12.12.22, see Dkt. 126 (22cv3409)(SDNY), and at other
times colluded, conspired, acted in concert, and confederated with Andre Damian Williams, Jr., and others
including Wendy L. Hagenau (BC NDGA) and M. Regina Thomas, see Ex. 10, infra, to (i) aid, abet, assist,
and enable the USAO (SDNY) to willfully violate the Brady court orders; (ii) stole and removed judicial
Page 12 of 103
3.1 Atlanta, GA District Court and Bankruptcy court employees.
Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.,9 Wendy L. Hagenau10 and M. Regina Thomas, jointly with the Court
of Appeals, and District Court’s employees.
3.2 Las Vegas, NV federal court employees.
Kent J. Dawson,
Jointly and collectively, (the “Court employees” or “Unindicted Coconspirators” or
“Defendants”).
4.0 Official capacity and status of the Court employees.11
public records from the District Court (SDNY) record department; entered bogus, fraudulent, fabricated,
and ultra vires purported judicial orders in proceedings in which all Article III jurisdiction was absent; stole
and removed Jeremy Jones alleged Sept. 2006 Rule 11 judicial public records; lied, committed perjury, and
attempted to mislead Claimant on 12.12.22, Dkt. 126 (22cv3409 (SDNY)) by fraudulently converting
Claimant’s 28 USC 2241(a) habeas corpus petition to a moot and ultra vires 2255(a) motion regarding
04cr1224 (SDNY) and 05cr1115 (SDNY).
9
See Ex. 17, infra, for Thrash’s crimes, GA torts (kidnapping, illegal detainment, unlawful search and
seizure), RICO, and 42 USC 1985(2), and 1985(3) civil rights violations on Sept. 1, 2004, in Atlanta, GA, to
collect, 18 USC 1961(6)(B), the NYS criminal usury unlawful debts, GX 1-4. Direct violations of the Code of
Conduct for Federal Judges, and impeachable offenses. The United States and the Defendant have no good
faith, nonfrivolous legal or factual defense to Thrash’s Sept. 1, 2004, FTCA and other claims.
10
Wendy L. Hagenau and M. Regina Thomas knowingly, willfully, recklessly, and negligently in violation of
GA and NYS tort law colluded, conspired, acted in concert, and coordinated with Colleen McMahon to
both enter bogus and fraudulent purported “leave-to-file” sanctions, see Oct. 24, 2022, Dkt. 256 (03-
93031) (BC NDGA), and see Oct. 27, 2022, Dkt. 137 (McMahon, J.) (bogus and fraudulent purported leave
to file sanction) (02cv2219) (SDNY), cf., Ex. 10, infra, as the illegal means and method to conceal and
suppress the contents of the “over 15 boxes of materials” reflected in the EOUSA’s March 20, 2023, FOIA
response, see Ex. 8, infra.
11
Claimant asserts to the extent the Defendants acted and functioned in their official capacities and were
performing official duties “within the scope of their assigned employment” as court employees Claimant
Page 13 of 103
The included NYS and Georgia torts were reckless, negligently, willfully, and
wantonly committed in the official,12 personal,13 and individual capacities of each Court
employee, while they were acting within and/or without the scope of their employment
as court employees, while knowingly and willfully colluded, acted in concert, and
confederated with each other, and with others known and unknown, acted and essentially
functioned as a willing and knowing, direct and/or indirect participant in an illegal
association-in-fact, as defined in 18 USC 1961(4), a continuing criminal enterprise.14
brings FTCA NYS, Nevada, and GA tort claims. To the extent the Defendants were acting and functioning
outside the “scope of their employment” as court employees—that is, the commission of federal and state
crimes or offenses, the Defendants are personally and individually liable for the NYS, NV, and GA torts,
and personally and individually liable, acting under the color of federal law, for the RICO and Federal Civil
Rights conspiracy and obstruction of justice claims presented herein.
12
For the purpose of the FTCA the United States is the real party in interest and the defendant regarding
torts committed in the official capacity of the Court employees, acting within the scope of their respective
duties of employment; which does not include the commission of crimes and other civil offenses.
13
For the purpose of the 42 USC 1985 and RICO claims the Court employees acted and functioned in their
personal and individual capacities, as knowing and willing participants in the activities of a conspiracy, and
directly and/or indirectly knowingly participated—committed two or more acts of racketeering activity, in
the racketeering activities of a criminal enterprise—they aided, abetted, assisted, and enabled the RICO
18 USC 1961(6)(B) collection of the criminal usury unlawful debts, GX 1-4, by and through the unlawful
and corrupt use of the judicial processes and procedures of the New York, Las Vegas, and Atlanta, GA
federal courts.
14
As a matter of law, it is not “within the scope” of a court employee’s official duties and responsibilities
to commit, aid, abet, or enable the commission of two or more acts of racketeering activities as defined
in 18 USC 1961(1)—e.g., 18 USC 1961(6)(B) unlawful debt (GX 1-4) collection activities, regarding the
02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs and their agents (Kilpatrick, Townsend, & Stockton, LLP, Atlanta, GA; Ari
Rabinowitz, Loeb & Loeb, LLP, Mitchell Nussbaum, Esq., Trailblazer Merger Corp. I, Tailwind Capital
Management LLP, Frank V. Sica, LH Financial Services, Alpha Capital, AG (Anstalt), Kenneth A. Zitter, Thomas
W. Thrash, Jr., Wendy L. Hagenau, M. Regina Thomas, Colleen McMahon, Edgardo Ramos, Debra Ann
Livingston, Barbara S. Jones, Leonard B. Sand, Robert D. Sack, Peter W. Hall, Robert A. Katzmann, Amalya
L. Kearse, Laura Taylor-Swain, et al.) RICO criminal collection activities associated with the creation,
underwriting, funding, and collection of the criminal usury, unlawful debts (GX 1-4), cf., U.S. v. Grote, 961
Page 14 of 103
II. Court Employees’ NYS Torts.
A NYS tort of obstruction of justice based on the below fact pattern and assumptions:
I. Introduction.
I. Factual Background.
1. Ulysses T. Ware ("Claimant") brings this action against the employees of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Court of Appeals"), and the Court employees for
F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2020) (aff’d conviction, sentence, and +$3.0 billion RICO forfeiture judgment for unlawful
debt collection activities). See Ex. 9 thru Ex. 13, infra.
(1) The United States as a matter of law, ipso facto, cannot in good faith, assert a nonfrivolous defense
and defend this claim in federal court. See Appx. U—NYS Penal Law, section 190.40, the criminal usury law,
a class E felony, criminal usury (GX 1-4, criminal usury convertible promissory notes purchased by the
02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiff, and the moot, null and void ab initio, subject matter of U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224
(SDNY), U.S. v. Ware, 09-0851cr (2d Cir.), 11-4181cv (2d Cir.), and 17-3527 (2d Cir.)).—NYS criminal usury
“cannot be waived.”
(2) Also see the March 15, 2022, decision in Adar Bays v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022)
(convertible promissory notes (GX 1-4) that charged 2x the NYS authorized interest rate are ipso facto—
criminal usury which “cannot be waived”: (i) unenforceable, (ii) null and void ab initio, (iii) violated NYS
Penal Law, section 190.40, the criminal usury law, a class E felony, and (iv) the collection of the unlawful
debts (GX 1-4) criminally violated 18 USC 1961(6)(B)—see (i) 03-0831 (D. NV), (ii) In re Group
Management Corp., 03-93031 (BC NDGA), (i.e., the criminal actions of KTS and its clients (the 02cv2219
plaintiffs)), (iii) 02cv2219 (SDNY) lawsuit, (iv) U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), (v) U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115
(SDNY), and (vi) Sept. 1, 2004, Atlanta, GA kidnapping of Claimant by District Judge (NDGA) Thomas W.
Thrash, Jr., and the Court employees (see Ex. 17, infra)—jointly, the retaliatory racially-motivated Jim
Crow hate crime, RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B) unlawful debt collection proceedings.
(3) Accordingly, given as a matter of law NYS criminal usury claims “cannot be waived” see Appx. U,
this claim is subject to entry of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings against the United
States and the Defendants, jointly and severally, in the D.D.C. federal court in the Ware v. USA, et al., FTCA
lawsuit. Damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion is the only remaining nonfrivolous issue.
Page 15 of 103
obstruction of justice under New York State tort law in their personal, individual, and
official capacity, acting within and without the scope of their employment.
2. Beginning in or about 2009, and continuing without interruption in the Southern District
of New York, and elsewhere, by and through the use of the means and methods of
interstate commerce, to April 2023, and beyond, Claimant (1) submitted for filing and
adjudication complaints of judicial misconduct regarding District Judge (SDNY) Edgardo
Ramos, and Colleen McMahon which the Court employees, jointly and severally refused
to properly adjudicate on the merits in violation of the Rules for review of complaints for
judicial misconduct;15 (2) submitted appeals for adjudication on the merits, and (3)
submitted several petitions to recall mandates with the Court of Appeals, which were
negligently, recklessly, wantonly, in bad faith, and intentionally either (i) not adjudicated
on the merits, or (ii) returned by the Court of Appeals unfiled and unadjudicated in
violation of Supreme Court authority in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) and
circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).
3. The employees of the Court of Appeals negligently, reckless, wantonly, in bad faith, and
intentionally (i) violated NYS torts, obstructed justice and refused to file Claimant's
petitions to recall the mandates, (ii) refused to adjudicate on the merits the recall of
mandate motion, (iii) refused to adjudicate the merits of the appeals, and (iv) refused to
15
Debra Ann Livingston deliberately, willfully, recklessly, and in bad faith violated the Rule by making
unauthorized and unsupported fact-finding regarding issues of disputed material fact, as an overt act to
cover up, suppress, and conceal judicial public court records, and to cover up and suppress actual innocent
Brady exculpatory evidence.
Page 16 of 103
properly review the complaints of judicial misconduct according to the requirement of the
Rules.
4. The Court employees (Kearse, Sack, and Hall (deceased)) in 2010 in the U.S. v. Ware, 07-
5222cr (2d Cir.) appeal16 knowingly, willfully, reckless, negligently, and maliciously
conspired, colluded, and entered the bogus, fraudulent, and fabricated “leave-to-file”
sanction in violation of due process of law; and entered as the illegal means and methods
to deny Claimant due process of law, and to deny Claimant full and unfettered access to
the Court to have his claims adjudicated on the merits.
16
See Nov. 5, 2010, bogus, fraudulent, and negligent “leave to file” unconstitutional sanction imposed in
07-5222cr (2d Cir) by Circuit Judges Kearse, Sack, and Hall (deceased), as the illegal means and methods—
an “unconscionable plan and scheme”—that is, a fraud on the court by officers of the court to impede,
obstruct, and deny Claimant access to the Court, and to obstruct, delay, deny, impede, and hinder
Claimant’s obtainment and access to actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the
possession of the Office of the U.S. Attorney (SDNY), see March 20, 2023, EOUSA’s FOIA response, Ex. 8,
infra, regarding Brady exculpatory evidence, “ … over 15 boxes of materials” in the current possession of
the USAO (SDNY) have not been searched for actual innocent Brady exculpatory or impeachment
evidence—that is, an actual innocent “special circumstance” that authorized the Court of Appeals to recall
the mandate in U.S. v. Ware, 07-5222cr (August 18, 2009) (Kearse, J.).
Notwithstanding the indisputable fact the Court of Appeals (07-5222cr/07-5670) lacked Article III and
subject matter and appellate jurisdiction to decide the 07-5222cr appeal, precluded by res judicata, and
the Double Jeopardy Clause, as of Nov. 7, 2008, upon the USAG’s Executive Branch actual innocent Article
II, Rule 42(b), and 18 USC 3742(b) voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the gov’t U.S. v. Ware, 07-5670cr
(XAP), Gov-I, cross-appeal of the 05cr1115 district court (Pauley, J.) Oct. 2007 post-trial Rule 29 acquittal
verdicts entered in favor of Claimant—that is, the Court employees (Kearse, Sack, Hall, Livingston,
O’Hagan-Wolfe, Kurot, and Ralph LNU) all knew and currently know the 07-5222-cr appeal and the
05cr1115 (SDNY) proceeding went moot on Nov. 7, 2008, ipso facto as a matter of law, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause and res judicata conferred prevailing party status on Claimant, Ulysses T. Ware, apropos
the U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) proceeding, i.e., actual innocent exculpatory evidence.
Page 17 of 103
5. As a result of the Court of Appeals employees' negligent and intentional refusal to file
Claimant's petitions, Claimant was denied access to the courts and was unable to seek
relief for the Brady violations committed against him.
NYS tort: Elements of Obstruction of Justice.
1. The Court of Appeals and Court employees' negligent, intentional, reckless, and bad faith
actions constitute obstruction of justice under New York State tort law.
2. To establish a claim for NYS obstruction of justice, Claimant must prove:
a. The existence of a judicial proceeding;
b. Knowledge of the proceeding by the Court Employees;
c. The Court Employees' actions were done with the intent to interfere with the
proceeding or its administration;
d. The Court Employees' actions impeded, caused a disturbance or interruption of the
proceeding;
e. The proceeding was actually impeded, corrupted, interfered with or disrupted; and
f. Claimant suffered damage as a result.
3. Here, Claimant can prove each element of the tort of obstruction of justice.
a. The existence of a judicial proceeding:
Claimant was involved in a judicial proceeding in which the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction (07-5222, 09-0851, 11-4181cv, and 17-3527) to recall its mandates.
Page 18 of 103
b. Knowledge of the proceeding by the Court of Appeals employees:
The Court of Appeals employees were aware of the proceedings, and were aware
that as a party to the proceedings, and having standing to file the recall of mandate
petitions, Claimant was lawfully exercising his right to due process of law, to seek an
available procedural remedy in the Court of Appeals.
c. Intent to interfere:
The Court of Appeals employees negligently, recklessly, intentionally and
negligently refused to file Claimant's petition to recall the mandate, which was designed
and recklessly coordinated to interfere with Claimant's ability to seek relief for the Brady
violations committed against him; and Debra Ann Livingston conspired and colluded with
Edgardo Ramos to conceal, suppress, and remove judicial court records from the custody
of the District Court (SDNY) record department control and custody.17
d. Disturbance or interruption of the judicial proceeding:
17
Edgardo Ramos and Debra Ann Livingston knowingly and willfully violated18 USC 2, 371, 1519, and
2071 and stole, removed, suppressed, and concealed Jeremy Jones’ alleged September 2007 Rule 11
proceedings judicial public records from the custody of the District Clerk (SDNY)—that is, Jones alleged
Rule 11 plea, plea transcript, cooperation agreement, record of bribe and benefits payments, debriefings
with the Jencks Act USAO (SDNY), actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence, USSG
5k1.1 letter received from the government for with the consent of the government knowingly committed
perjury, lied, and gave intentionally misleading and false testimony during the U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115
(SDNY) criminal trials, sentencing memoranda, and sentencing transcripts, and other judicial records
associated with the government’s “principal witness” as characterized by the Court of Appeal, August 18,
2009, opinion (Kearse, J.) entered in U.S. v. Ware, 07-5222cr (2d Cir. 2009), (Ware-I).
Page 19 of 103
The Court of Appeals employees' negligent and reckless actions caused a
disturbance or interruption of the judicial proceedings.
e. Interference or disruption:
The Court of Appeals employees' negligent and reckless actions actually impeded,
interfered with or disrupted the judicial proceeding.
f. Damages:
Claimant suffered the sum certain damages in the amount of $2.225 billion as a
result of the Court of Appeals employees' obstruction of justice, NYS civil conspiracy, 42
USC 1985(3) conspiracy, including being denied access to the courts and being unable to
seek relief for the Brady violations committed against him.
Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, Claimant respectfully requests that the Administrative Office find
in his favor and award him damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion for the Court
of Appeals employees' obstruction of justice under New York State tort law.
B Civil conspiracy NYS tort claim against the Court of Appeals and Court employees:
I. Introduction
Page 20 of 103
1. This is an action brought by Ulysses T. Ware against the employees of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals employees") for civil conspiracy in violation
of New York State law.
II. Parties
1. Claimant Ulysses T. Ware is a resident of New York State.

2. The Court Employees are the Court of Appeals employees (Debra Ann Livingston,
Catherine O’Hagan-Wolfe, Dina Kurot, and Ralph LNU, who conspired to violate NYS civil
conspiracy law, apropos (i) Rules for Complaints for Judicial Misconduct, and (ii) Supreme
Court authority and circuit precedents, as detailed below.
III. Background
1. As detailed in the previous sections of this complaint, Ulysses T. Ware was wrongfully
convicted and imprisoned due to the deliberate and willful suppression and concealment
of Brady exculpatory evidence by employees of the U.S. Department of Justice.
2. In an attempt to seek justice, beginning in April 2022 Ulysses T. Ware filed multiple
petitions with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to recall a mandate in his cases,
based on newly discovered evidence of his innocence, and based on new circuit authority,
and because Claimant is actually and factually innocent of all charges; and submitted to
the Court of Appeals complaint for judicial misconduct regarding District Judge Edgardo
Ramos (SDNY).
Page 21 of 103
3. However, the Court of Appeals employees conspired to violate Supreme Court authority
and circuit precedent by refusing to file the petition to recall the mandate, and returned
all recall of mandate motions back to Claimant; and violated the Rules on Complaint for
Judicial Misconduct by making unauthorized and manifestly false, and fraudulent fact-
finding regarding Edgardo Ramos’s complaint for judicial misconduct.
IV. Conspiracy between Court of Appeals Employees.
1. The Court of Appeals employees entered into an implicit (unwritten) agreement and
formed an illegal association-in-fact, a criminal enterprise, to violate Supreme Court
authority and circuit precedent by refusing to file Ulysses T. Ware's petitions to recall the
mandate.
2. The Court of Appeals employees coordinated and collaborated with each other to ensure
that the petition was not filed.
3. The Court of Appeals employees committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy,
including refusing to file the petition to recall the mandate.
4. As a result of the conspiracy, Ulysses T. Ware was denied the opportunity to seek justice
and obtain relief based on newly discovered evidence of his innocence.
5. The actions of the Court of Appeals employees were intentional, malicious, and in
violation of New York State law.
V. Claim for NYS Civil Conspiracy
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1. The Court Employees are employees of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
2. The Claimant is Ulysses T. Ware.
3. The Court Employees knowingly, deliberately, and intentionally colluded, acted in concert,
and coordinated to violate the Claimant's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by concealing,
suppressing, and withholding exculpatory and impeachment evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. The Court Employees also knowingly and willfully violated the Claimant's First
Amendment right to access the courts and the due process of law by refusing to file a
petition to recall a mandate submitted to the Court in violation of Supreme Court
authority in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) and circuit precedent in Sargent
v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).
II. Elements of Civil Conspiracy
5. The Court Employees, acting in their official capacity as employees of the Court, engaged
in a common plan or agreement to violate the Claimant's civil rights.
6. The Court Employees knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy to commit the
underlying torts.
7. The Court Employees committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Page 23 of 103
list of overt acts that could have been committed by each Court employee in
furtherance of the NYS civil conspiracy:
a. Failing to file petitions to recall a mandate in violation of Supreme Court authority and
circuit precedent;
b. Intentionally delaying or obstructing the processing of legal documents and filings;
c. Engaging in ex parte communications with other members of the alleged conspiracy;
d. Concealing or destroying evidence relevant to pending cases or legal proceedings;
e. Providing false or misleading information to litigants, judges, or other court personnel;
f. Refusing to follow established court procedures or legal standards in order to achieve a
desired outcome;
g. Coordinating with other members of the alleged conspiracy to influence court decisions
or outcomes;
h. Retaliating against litigants or attorneys who oppose or challenge the alleged conspiracy;
i. Failing to recuse oneself from a case despite a conflict of interest or other ethical
concerns; and
j. using one's position within the court to benefit oneself or other members of the
alleged conspiracy.
III. Specifics of the Conspiracy
Page 24 of 103
9. The Court Employees knew that actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment
evidence existed in the case, but intentionally concealed, suppressed, and withheld that
evidence from the Claimant in violation of Brady v. Maryland.
10. The Court Employees colluded and acted in concert to violate the Claimant's due process
rights by refusing to file a petition to recall a mandate submitted to the Court in violation
of Supreme Court authority and circuit precedent.
11. The Court Employees' actions were motivated by malice, willfulness, and bad faith.
12. The Court Employees' actions were done with the intent to injure the Claimant.
13. The Court Employees' actions were taken to cover up their own misconduct and to
protect themselves and others from criminal and civil liability.
IV. Damages
14. As a result of the Court Employees' conduct, the Claimant has suffered damages
including emotional distress, lost wages, and other damages.
15. The Claimant seeks $2.225 billion in damages, plus punitive damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees.
V. Conclusion
16. Based on the above facts and assumptions, the Court Employees are liable for civil
conspiracy under NYS tort law, and also liable for 42 USC 1985 conspiracy claims.
Page 25 of 103
C NYS Tort—Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress.
The Court of Appeals employees' refusal to file petitions to recall a mandate submitted to
the Court in violation of Supreme Court authority in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)
and circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996),
was done with the intent to cause severe emotional distress to Claimant, who was wrongfully
imprisoned for over 11.5 years.
The Court of Appeals employees' conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond the
bounds of decency, and intolerable in a civilized society.
As a direct and proximate result of the Court of Appeals employees' conduct, Claimant
suffered severe emotional distress, including but not limited to anxiety, depression, humiliation,
and anguish.
The Court of Appeals employees' misconduct was a substantial factor in causing
Claimant's emotional distress.
The Court of Appeals employees' conduct was willful, wanton, and/or reckless, and was
committed with a conscious disregard of Claimant's rights.
As a result of the Court of Appeals employees' intentional infliction of emotional distress,
Claimant is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Claimant prays for relief as follows:
Page 26 of 103
A. That this Court enter judgment in favor of Claimant and against the Court of Appeals
employees on all counts;
B. That Claimant be awarded compensatory damages in the sum certain amount of $5222
million; and
C. That Claimant be awarded such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
III CLAIM FOR CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY UNDER 42 USC 1985(2) and 1985(3).
1. Claimant, Ulysses T. Ware, brings this claim against the individual Court Employees, the
employees of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to 42 USC 1985(3),
alleging a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights; and 42 USC 1982(2) alleging the Court
employees obstructed the due administration of justice by refusing to file and adjudicate
the recall of mandate motions.
2. Court Employees acted in concert with each other, colluded, and conspired with each
other and with the DOJ employees of the USAO (SDNY) as alleged in the NYS civil
conspiracy claim above.
3. Court Employees knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, and in bad faith colluded, conspired,
and acted in concert to (1) obstruct justice, and (2) interfere with Claimant's civil rights by
deliberately refusing to file petitions to recall a mandate submitted to the Court in
violation of Claimant’s First Amendment right of access to the Court, in violation of
Page 27 of 103
Supreme Court authority in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), circuit precedent
in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996),18 and in violation
of Claimant’s right to due process of law by suppressing and concealing evidence that
could be Brady exculpatory evidence.
4. Court Employees' actions were motivated by intense and vile Jim Crow racial animus
against Claimant, an African American man, and by a desire to protect their colleagues in
the DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office from liability for their criminal prosecutorial
misconduct—that is, an insidious and pernicious form of Jim Crow white supremacy
judicial doctrine19.
5. Court Employees' actions resulted in a deprivation of Claimant's civil rights, including his
right to a fair trial and his right to due process of law.
6. Court Employees' actions were done under color of law, as employees of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and therefore were in violation of 42 USC 1985(3).
7. Claimant suffered damages as a result of Court Employees' actions, including emotional
distress, reputational harm, and prolonged incarceration.
18
See Ex. 1, infra, T-1080 Memorandum of law dated regarding the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to recall its
mandated in the appeals submitted to the Court by Claimant.
19
See Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984—black-white, newspeak doctrine—that is, we “inherently” have
jurisdiction to recall the mandates, but we don’t have jurisdiction to recall mandates. Looking Glass
jabberwocky incoherent thought processes, e.g., the subordinate Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
clerk’s office has overruled Supreme Court precedent in Calderon v. Thompson, and Hazel Atlas-Glass Co.
The canonical case of incongruent duplicity.
Page 28 of 103
8. As a direct and proximate result of Court Employees' actions, Claimant is entitled to
damages, including compensatory damages for emotional distress, reputational harm,
and prolonged incarceration, as well as punitive damages to deter Court Employees and
others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.
WHEREFORE, Claimant requests relief as follows:
a. Judgment against Court Employees for compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to
be determined at trial;
b. An award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs;
c. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law; and
d. Any other relief the court deems just and proper.
VI. Conclusion.
1. The Court of Appeals employees conspired to violate Supreme Court authority and circuit
precedent, and are liable for civil conspiracy under New York State law.
2. Ulysses T. Ware suffered damages as a result of the conspiracy, and is entitled to recover
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
3. Ulysses T. Ware respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment against the Court of
Appeals employees and award him the relief requested above.
Page 29 of 103
IV RICO Claim
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Plaintiff Ulysses T. Ware brings this RICO claim against the Court employees, and others
("Defendants") for their violations of 18 USC 1961(6)(B), and 1962(a-d) based on their
participation in:
1. the collection activities associated with and related to Group Management Corp.’s
convertible promissory notes, (the “Criminal Usury Debts”)—which were
deliberately and intentionally designed to violate NYS Penal Law, section 190.40,
the criminal usury law, a class E felony, by the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs, and their
agents, Ari Rabinowitz, LH Financial Services, convicted felon Edward M. Grushko,
Esq., Barbara R. Mittman, Esq., and others known and unknow a conspiracy to
violate his civil rights and engage in racketeering activities in violation of federal
and state law; and
2. knowing, intentional, deliberate, and bad faith direct and/or indirect participation
in the operations of an illegal association in fact, as defined in 18 USC 1961(4), a
continuing criminal enterprise, by the knowing, and reckless commission or two
or more acts of racketeering activities as defined at 18 USC 1961(4), and
1961(6)(B), “a [sustained] pattern of racketeering activities,” committed by and
through the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, within and
without the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of New York, and
Page 30 of 103
elsewhere, including the District of Columbia, the District of Nevada, and the
Northern District of Georgia, beginning in or about 2001, and continuing without
interruption to April 23, 2023, and Defendants will continue to commit
racketeering activities beyond April 23, 2023, unless restrained and enjoined by
law.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. The District Court (D.D.C) will have jurisdiction over the defendants (the Court employees,
and their unindicted coconspirators) in this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
3. Venue is proper in this District under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) because a substantial part of the
events giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred within this District.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4. The factual background of this case is set forth in Plaintiff's NYS civil conspiracy and 42
USC 1985 claims, which are incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein
supported by the attached Omnibus Appendices.
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all RICO claims raised herein.
IV. RICO CLAIM
5. Defendants have violated 18 USC 1962(a-d) by engaging in a deliberate, intentional, and
bad faith pattern of racketeering activity, as defined by 18 USC 1961(1), through their
Page 31 of 103
participation in the civil conspiracy and unlawful acts described in Plaintiff's NYS, NV, and
GA civil conspiracy and 42 USC 1985 claims.
6. Defendants' acts of racketeering activity include, but are not limited to, aiding and
abetting (18 USC 2), conspiracy (18 USC 371), criminal contempt of court orders (18 USC
401(3)), obstruction of justice (18 USC 1519), concealment of court records (18 USC 2071),
unlawful debt collection activity (18 USC 1961(6)(B)), and money laundering (18 USC
1956-57); bankruptcy fraud conspiracy (18 USC 157), racketeering conspiracy (18 USC
1962(d), and the violation of NYS Penal Law, section 190.40, the criminal usury law, a class
E felony.
7. Defendants' conduct constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity because it involves at
least two acts of racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1) and it poses a threat
of continued criminal activity.
8. Defendants have conducted their affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of 18 USC 1962(c), which prohibits any person employed by or associated with
an enterprise from conducting or participating in such enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.
9. Defendants have conspired to violate 18 USC 1962(a-d) in violation of 18 USC 1962(d),
which makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of 18
USC 1962(a-d).
Page 32 of 103
V. DAMAGES
10. Plaintiff has suffered damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion as a result of
Defendants' violations of 18 USC 1962(a-d), including but not limited to loss of reputation,
loss of income, and emotional distress.; seeks punitive damages of 3x any compensatory
damages awarded; and seeks an award of all costs, expenses, and any other damages
awarded by the jury.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests relief as follows:
a. Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on the RICO claims alleged herein;
b. An award of compensatory damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion, including
damages for lost income, emotional distress, and other damages proximately caused by
Defendants' violations of 18 USC 1962(a-d);
c. An award of treble damages pursuant to 18 USC 1964(c);
d. An award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 18 USC 1964(c);
e. Pre- and post-judgment interest on all damages awarded; and
f. Any further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
A The pattern of racketeering activities committed by the Court Employees.
Page 33 of 103
The following is a detailed presentation of how the Court employees engaged in a pattern
of racketeering activities and the statutory basis for each act in the pattern. Beginning in or
around 2001 and continuing without interruption to the present, April 23, 2023, and will continue
into the future unless restrained, the Court employees and the Defendants, organized themselves
as an illegal association-in-fact, a continuing criminal enterprise, have knowing, willfully,
intentionally, and in bad faith engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities as defined at 18 USC
1961(1), including, but not limited to the below acts of racketeering activities, to wit:
1. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents knowingly and willfully
suppressed the "over 15 boxes of materials" that "could be" Brady exculpatory evidence,
which is a violation of 18 U.S. Code §§ 2, 241, 242, 371, 401(3), criminal contempt of court
orders, 1519, and 2071.
2. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents knowingly and willfully violated
the Supreme Court authority in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), and circuit
precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996), by
refusing to file petitions to recall a mandate submitted to the Court.
3. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agent engaged in a civil conspiracy to
conceal and suppress evidence, to obstruct justice, and to violate Ulysses T. Ware's civil
rights, which is a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 1962(d).
4. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents committed acts of mail and
wire fraud by using the mail and interstate wires to further their scheme to conceal and
Page 34 of 103
suppress evidence and to obstruct justice, which is a violation of 18 U.S. Code §§ 1341 and
1343.
5. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents committed acts of obstruction
of justice by concealing and suppressing evidence and refusing to file petitions to recall a
mandate submitted to the Court, which is a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 1512.
6. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents committed acts of money
laundering by using the proceeds of their RICO unlawful debt collection activities and
Alpha Capital, AG (Anstalt)—the GX 1-4 (criminal usury unlawful debts of LH Financial
Services and the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs, and Colleen McMahon and Frank V. Sica) to
conduct financial transactions, which is a violation of 18 U.S. Code §§ 1956 and 1957.
In sum, the Court employees and the Defendants and their agents engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activities in violation of RICO, which included criminal contempt, violating Supreme
Court authority, civil conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and money
laundering.
B An illegal association-in-fact as defined in 18 USC 1961(4), a continuing criminal enterprise.
An illegal association-in-fact, also known as a criminal enterprise, is a group of individuals or
entities who agree to work together to commit illegal acts. In this case, the Court employees can
be considered an illegal association-in-fact based on the following facts:
Page 35 of 103
1. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agent agreed to work together to
suppress the recall of a mandate in violation of Supreme Court authority and circuit
precedent.
2. The Court employees and the Defendants and their agents engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activities, including obstructing justice, concealing court records, and
violating civil rights laws.
3. The Court employees' and the Defendants and their agents’ actions were ongoing and
continuous, indicating a long-term criminal enterprise.
Under 18 USC 1961(4), an illegal association-in-fact is defined as "any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." The Court employees and Defendants
and their agents can be considered an association-in-fact because they functioned as a group to
achieve a common goal of suppressing the recall of a mandate, engaging in a pattern of
racketeering activities to achieve that goal.
Their actions were willful, knowing, and continuous, with the intent to harm Ulysses T.
Ware and deprive him of his constitutional rights. As such, they can be considered a criminal
enterprise, subject to penalties under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act.
C Claim for Violation of 18 USC 1962(a), 1962(b), 1962(c), and 1962(d) by Court Employees.
Page 36 of 103
The Court employees and their agents named in the previous claims, acting in concert
with each other, have violated the following elements of 18 USC 1962(a), 1962(b), 1962(c), and
1962(d), including the violation of 18 USC 1961(6)(B) regarding the unlawful debt collection
activities, and obstruction of justice, as follows:
18 USC 1962(a):
• The Court employees and their agents have received income derived, directly and
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1), including
acts of concealment of court records (18 USC 2071), and aiding and abetting (18 USC 2),
among others.
• The Court employees and their agents have used or invested, directly or indirectly, the
income derived from the pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in, or
establish or operate, an enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 USC 1962(b):
• The Court employees and their agents have acquired or maintained an interest in, or
control of, an enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, through
a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1).
18 USC 1962(c):
Page 37 of 103
• The Court employees and their agent, associated with the enterprise, have conducted or
participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1).
• The Court employees and their agents have conspired to violate the above provisions of
18 USC 1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c) by agreeing to commit and engaging in a pattern of
racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1).
18 USC 1962(d):
• The Court employees and their agents have conspired to violate the above provisions of
18 USC 1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c) by agreeing to commit and engaging in a pattern of
racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 1961(1).
• The Court employees and their agents have knowingly and willfully conspired to conduct
and participate in the affairs of an enterprise engaged in, or affecting, interstate or foreign
commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity.
18 USC 1961(6)(B):
In addition, the Court employees and their agents have violated 18 USC 1961(6)(B) by
engaging in unlawful debt collection activities regarding the government trial exhibits GX 1-4 in
U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), and in Alpha Capital, AG, et al. v. IVG Corp., a/k/a Group
Management Corp., ("GPMT"), et al., 02cv2219 (SDNY)—that is, the Court employees and their
unindicted coconspirators rigged, fixed, and coordinated judicial proceedings to favor (i) the RICO
Page 38 of 103
loan sharking, money laundering criminal enterprise, LH Financial Services, Ari Rabinowitz, and
the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs’ and (ii) Colleen McMahon, and Frank V. Sica’s criminal and
unlawful interests in criminal usury convertible promissory notes, in exchange for bribes,
kickbacks, pay offs, favors, gifts, illegal gratuities, and other things of value.
Furthermore, the Court employees and their agents have obstructed justice by
suppressing and concealing court records, including the GX 1-4 exhibits, and by failing to file
petitions to recall a mandate submitted to the Court in violation of Supreme Court authority in
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) and circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest
Products, Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court employees' and their agents’ actions have caused significant harm to the
plaintiff, Ulysses T. Ware, including emotional distress, loss of liberty, and financial loss. As a
result, the plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $2.225 billion dollars and other damages as
deemed appropriate by the court.
Page 39 of 103
V NYS tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against
the Court employees based on their misconduct. Each element of the
claim is described below:
1. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: The Court employees and their agents engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct by intentionally and willfully concealing and suppressing
evidence that could have exonerated Claimant in his criminal case, and by unlawfully
initiating an unlawful debt collection lawsuit against him.
2. Intent or Recklessness: The Court employees and their agents acted with the intent to
cause severe emotional distress to Claimant or acted recklessly in disregard of the high
probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress.
3. Causation: The Court employees' and their agents’ intentional and reckless conduct
caused severe emotional distress to Claimant, resulting in his loss of reputation, mental
anguish, and economic harm.
Factual Basis for Each Element of Proof:
1. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: The Court employees' and their agents’ conduct was
extreme and outrageous because they intentionally and willfully concealed and
suppressed over 15 boxes of material that could have exonerated Claimant in his criminal
case. They also unlawfully initiated an unlawful debt collection lawsuit against Claimant,
causing him additional emotional distress.
Page 40 of 103
2. Intent or Recklessness: The Court employees and their agents acted with intent to cause
severe emotional distress to Claimant or acted recklessly in disregard of the high
probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress. They knew that
their conduct was wrongful and could cause harm to Claimant, but they still engaged in
such conduct.
3. Causation: The Court employees' and their agents’ intentional and reckless conduct
caused severe emotional distress to Claimant, resulting in his loss of reputation, mental
anguish, and economic harm. Claimant suffered anxiety, depression, and humiliation as a
result of the Court employees' misconduct. Additionally, the Court employees' actions
caused Claimant to incur substantial legal fees and expenses.
The sum certain damage amount of $2.225 billion is based on the emotional distress, loss
of reputation, and economic harm suffered by Claimant as a result of the Court employees'
misconduct. This includes damages for lost income, lost earning capacity, medical expenses, and
punitive damages to deter the Court employees from engaging in such egregious misconduct in
the future.
In conclusion, the Court employees' and their agents’ intentional and reckless conduct in
concealing and suppressing evidence and initiating an unlawful debt collection lawsuit caused
severe emotional distress and economic harm to Claimant. Therefore, Claimant Ulysses T. Ware
seeks the sum certain $2.225 billion in damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
caused by the Court employees' misconduct.
Page 41 of 103
VI NYS tort claim for fraud.
Claimant Ulysses T. Ware brings this fraud claim against the employees of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, District Courts (SDNY, DV, NDGA, and BC NDGA) (hereafter
referred to as "Court employees") for their fraudulent misrepresentations that jurisdiction was
lacking in the Court of Appeals to recall its mandates. These misrepresentations were made in
connection with their refusal to file the recall of mandate motions, which deprived Claimant of
his rights to due process and a fair trial, causing him significant harm and damages in the amount
of $2.225 billion.
I. Misrepresentation of Material Fact
The Court employees made the negligent, reckless, intentional, and bad faith fraudulent
misrepresentation that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to recall its mandates. This
misrepresentation was material as it deprived Claimant of his rights to due process and a fair trial,
causing significant harm and damages.
II. Scienter
The Court employees knew or should have known that their misrepresentation was false.
They were aware or should have been aware of the Supreme Court authority in Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) and circuit precedent in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products,
Inc., 75 F.3f 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996), which clearly established the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to
Page 42 of 103
recall its mandates. Despite this knowledge, the Court employees intentionally made the false
representation to prevent the recall of the mandates.
III. Intent to Deceive
The Court employees intended to deceive Claimant by making the false representation
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to recall its mandates. Their intent was to prevent
the recall of the mandates and deprive Claimant of his rights to due process and a fair trial.
IV. Justifiable Reliance
Claimant justifiably relied on the Court employees' misrepresentation that the Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction to recall its mandates. As a result of this reliance, he was deprived of
his rights to due process and a fair trial, causing significant harm and damages.
V. Damages
As a direct and proximate result of the Court employees' fraudulent misrepresentations,
Claimant suffered significant harm and damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion.
In conclusion, the Court employees' fraudulent misrepresentations that the Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction to recall its mandates, made in connection with their refusal to file the
recall of mandate motions, deprived Claimant of his rights to due process and a fair trial, causing
significant harm and damages. Therefore, Claimant brings this fraud claim against the Court
employees and seeks damages in the sum certain amount of $2.225 billion.
Page 43 of 103
Signed by Ulysses T. Ware, under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, this 23rd day of April
2023 in Brooklyn, NY.
Ulysses T. Ware
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
April 23, 2023
End of document
Page 44 of 103
Supporting Exhibits and
Evidence.
Page 45 of 103
Exhibit 1—Form T-1080 Memorandum of law regarding Second Circuit jurisdiction to
recall mandates.
Page 46 of 103
Memorandum of law
I The Courts of Appeals are authorized to recall their own mandate to ensure the integrity of their
own proceedings, and are authorized to reopen a case at any time to do justice.
The legal standard—Recall of mandate by the courts of appeals.

The legal standard is well-settled, and “is unquestioned”--a court of appeals is authorized,
has the inherent Article III authority [jurisdiction], to reopen a case at “any time”20 and recall its
mandate,21 and to not do so when “good cause” or “special circumstances” has been presented
will be reviewed as an abuse of judicial22 discretion.23 (emphasis added). The 07-5222cr, 09-
20
“From the beginning, there has existed along side the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that, under
certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments
regardless of the term of their entry.” (emphasis added) Hazel Atlas Glass, Id. at 244. Put another way
there is no statute of limitation or prohibition to reopen the [07-5222cr (2d Cir.), 09-0851 (2d Cir.), or 11-
4181 (2d Cir.)] judgments regarding fraud on the court committed by officers of the court, or the judges.
21
See binding circuit precedent Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Our power to recall a mandate is unquestioned … it exist as part of the [Court of Appeals] power to
protect the integrity of its own proceedings” … and thus “we have the power [jurisdiction] to reopen a
case [07-5222cr, 09-0851cr, and 11-4181cv] at any time.” (emphasis added). Cf., Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 228, 244 (1944) (same); also cf., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C.,
463 F.2d 268, 277-78, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Inherent authority [jurisdiction] of a court of appeals to recall
a mandate to (i) prevent injustice, (ii) newly discovered evidence, (iii) a fraud on the court, and (iv) to correct
a fundamental miscarriage of justice—that is, actual and factual innocence).
22
A mere court clerk employee (Ralph LNU) has no Article III judicial discretion to not file, and docket
pleadings submitted to the Court, or to adjudicate the merits of pleadings submitted to the Court of
Appeals by a litigant having Article III standing in the particular judicial proceeding.
23
An “abuse of discretion” occurs when a court selects the incorrect legal standard or incorrectly applies
the correct legal standard. Ralph LNU, a mere court clerk has no Article III judicial authority to adjudicate
or conduct judicial review regarding Applicant’s April 17, 2023, emergency applications to recall mandates.
Ostensibly, clerk Ralph LNU usurped the Article III judicial authority of the court of appeals which is a
crime, an overt act, to obstruct justice, willfully violated Applicant’s First Amendment right of access, and
Page 47 of 103
0851cr, and 11-4181cv courts of appeals are therefore authorized to recall their mandates for
“good cause” or for “special circumstances,” that being:
i. Fraud on the court;24
ii. newly discovered evidence;25
iii. to correct an injustice caused by continued enforcement of the judgment;
iv. misconduct during the U.S. v. Ware, 07-5222cr (2d Cir.)26 or U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115
(SDNY) proceedings that affect the integrity of the judicial process; and
v. to correct and prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice,27 collectively, (the “Special
Circumstances”).28
frivolously denied Applicant access to the Court of Appeals—a criminal fraud on the court by an officer of
the court, cf., 18 USC 401(2) criminal contempt (negligence in the performance of official duties).
24
An “unconscionable plan and scheme” by officers of the court, or judges, to tamper with and affect the
judicial process such that a litigant is prevented or inhibited from presenting his claims to the court. See
Hazel Atlas Glass, Id. at 245.
25
Greater Boston T.V., 463 F.2d at 280.
26
Hazel Atlas Glass, Id. at 245, “Here, even if we consider nothing but Hartford's sworn admissions, we
find a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme [by the USAO (SDNY), the SEC, and the
Respondents] to defraud not only the Patent Office, but the Circuit Court of Appeals.” (emphasis added).
27
Id. at 246, “Furthermore, tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown
here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to
protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated
consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the
judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the
agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of
deception and fraud.” (emphasis added).
28
Greater Boston, T.V., at 278-80.
Page 48 of 103
The legal standard—The Government’s Brady “duty to search” the “over 15 boxes
of materials”29 and produce the contents—that is, newly discovered Brady
evidence regarding the government’s “principal witness” Jeremy Jones.30
The Court in In re Sealed Case, 185 F.3d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Garland, J.)31 interpreted the
government’s disclosure and production duties under Brady and Kyles to encompass the “duty
to search” for and to produce all Brady evidence to the defendant; and where a search had not
been made, the Court ordered the government to undertake a post-trial search for Brady
evidence, produce what was found on the defense, and ordered the district court to conduct
evidentiary hearing to assess the materiality of the newly-discovered Brady evidence.32
29
The DOJ’s EOUSA on March 20, 2023, confessed and admitted in its FOIA (22-000907)response that the
USAO (SDNY) currently is in possession of “over 15 boxes of materials” which have not been searched for
materials that “could be” Brady exculpatory, impeachment, Giglio, Jencks Act, or Rule 16 materials—an
ipso facto admission and concession the USAO knowingly, willfully, and in bad faith have resisted and
violated the two Brady Court Orders, civil and 18 USC 401(3) criminal contempt, entered in the Criminal
Proceedings; and the USAO’s prosecutors and their supervisors lied, committed perjury, and committed
a fraud on the court regarding its Brady disclosures and productions.
30
Jeremy Jones’ alleged September 2006 Rule 11 plea and cooperations contracts, Rule 11 plea transcripts,
sentencing proceedings transcripts, government sentencing memorandum, and all other judicial public
records and Brady evidence associated with Jeremy Jones that were never produced or disclosed as
required by the U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) May 19, 2006, Dkt. 17, Tr. 5-10 Brady court order (Pauley,
J.) (deceased).
31
The Court of Appeals followed the procedure outlined in U.S. v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502-03 (D. C.
Cir. 1992) which followed the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ precedents requiring the government to
search for Brady evidence and disclose what it found. In every court of appeals decision found by
Applicant, newly-discovered Brady evidence found after trial required the district court to conduct
evidentiary hearings to assess the materiality of the new evidence, and its effect on the outcome of the
criminal proceedings.
32
Cf., Dennis v. Sec’y Penn. Dept. of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 275-78 (3d Cir. 2010) (followed In re Sealed Case
and aff’d the district court’s grant of writ of habeas corpus for gov’t Brady violation—undisclosed material
exculpatory and impeachment evidence was concealed by the state) (“The District Court granted Dennis
habeas relief based on Dennis’s Brady claims as to the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the Cason
Page 49 of 103
Conclusion.
Applicant, the party-appellant in each of the appeals, (i) 07-5222cr, (ii) 09-0851cr, and (iii)
11-4181cv indisputably has Article III standing to file a L.R. 27-1 motion to recall mandates, a
substantive motion, which must be resolved by a motion panel (circuit judges) of the Court of
Appeals in a written order.
Applicant has presented and has met the requirements of the prevailing legal standards
necessary for the Court of Appeals to recall its mandates and grant the requested emergency
relief—that is, remand to the respective district courts for evidentiary hearings to undertake the
Kyles “cumulative materiality assessment” process regarding the “newly discovered,”33
dispositive, actual innocent Brady exculpatory evidence.
The Office of the Circuit Clerk (i.e., Ralph LNU) has no lawful Article III judicial authority
to decide the merits of the April 17, 2023, substantive emergency recall of mandates motions.
Ralph LNU exceeded his lawful authority.
Respectfully submitted by:
Appellant Ulysses T. Ware
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
April 17, 2023
receipt, the Frazier documents, and the police activity sheet containing Howard’s inconsistent
statement. Dennis V, 966 F.Supp.2d at 518.”).
33
See Applicant’s Local Rule 27-1 (2d Cir.) April 17, 2023, Emergency Motion to Recall Mandates, Section
F(IV) Exhibits A thru K, and Appendices A thru U for the newly discovered actual innocent Brady
exculpatory and impeachment evidence.
Page 50 of 103
End of document
Page 51 of 103
Exhibit 2—Supplemental Memorandum of law regarding Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to
recall mandates.
07-5222cr/09-0851cr/11-4181cv (01S)
In the U.S. Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
EMERGENCY ACTION REQUESTED
Filed on 4/18/2023 11:52:22 AM
____________
123 Linden Blvd.
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
Utware007@gmail.com
Tuesday, April 18, 2023, 11:52:22 AM
Via email to Chief Circuit Judge

Office of the Chief Circuit Judge
The Hon. Debra Ann Livingston
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Thurgood Marshal Courthouse
40 Foley Sq.
New York, NY 10007
Re: Local Rule 27-1 Emergency Motion for leave to file petition to recall mandates based on
(i) newly discovered actual innocent Brady exculpatory evidence, new circuit precedent,
Adar Bays v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022), and (iii) actual innocent fraud
on the court, pursuant to circuit precedent, Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75
F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996), and Supreme Court precedent in Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v.
Page 52 of 103
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1994). Ulysses T. Ware has Article III standing to file
and have the Court of Appeals adjudicate the merits of the claims in the April 17, 2023,
applications.
Page 53 of 103
From: Applicant Ulysses T. Ware
To: United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
Date: April 18, 2023, 11:52:22 AM
Re: Supplemental Memorandum of Law I—Recall of

mandate authorities in support of the April 17, 2023,
application for emergency reliefs.

123 Linden Blvd.
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
Utware007@gmail.com
Applicant Ulysses T. Ware

/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
April 18, 2023
Page 54 of 103
Local Rule 27-1 Supplemental Memorandum of Law I
I Supreme Court recall of mandate authority.

The Court in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) noted citing Hazel Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1994) that the courts of appeals had the “inherent
authority” to recall their mandates, which would be reviewed for an “abuse of discretion.”
“Although some Justices have expressed doubt on the point, see, e.g., United
States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98, 102-103 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the
courts of appeals are recognized to have an inherent power to recall their
mandates, subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 463 U. S. 1323, 1324 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); see
also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238, 249-250 (1944).”
Id. at 549-50. (emphasis added).
II. Circuit Courts of Appeals Recall of Mandate Authority.
In United States v. Davila, 890 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2018) the Court granted the recall of its
mandate, and granted leave to file an out-of-time petition for panel rehearing where a later en
banc decision by the Court created an “injustice” in the sentence of a criminal defendant.34 The
Court explained, Id. at 587,
34
“Defendant-Appellant Jesus Montalvo Davila moves to recall the mandate and for leave to file an out-
of-time petition for panel rehearing in light of United States v. Herrold, 883 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2018) (en
banc). In addition, the Federal Public Defender moves to be reappointed as Montalvo's counsel on appeal.
We grant the motions.”
Cf. with this Court’s March 15, 2022, decision in Adar Bays v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022)
which annulled, vitiated, voided ab initio the government’s indictment and trial exhibits, GX 1-4 (the
criminal usury convertible promissory notes), GX 5 (the criminal usury illegal underwriting contract), GX
7 (the 02cv2219 (SDNY) final judgment), and orders of the 02cv2219 (SDNY) litigation GX 11, GX 24, and
GX 34 collectively (the “Annulled Judgments”); notwithstanding the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs’
Page 55 of 103
“Courts exist not merely to decide cases, but to decide them correctly. The public
interest in correcting an erroneous conviction or sentence may counsel a more
generous recall rule in criminal cases than in other contexts. 16 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3938, p. 880 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter, "WRIGHT & MILLER").”
(emphasis added). (internal quotes, and citations omitted).
The Court was concerned and guided its equitable consideration to grant the recall of the
mandate, and granted the petitioner permission to file the out-of-time petition for a panel
hearing to make sure that an ”injustice” was not committed--that is, the Court’s primary
consideration and concern as a disinterest, and impartial democratic institution for the
protection of the “public interest” was to do justice, and get it right regarding the petitioner’s
liberty interests, the highest interest, then in play.
In Taylor v. United States, 822 F.3d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 2016) (Katzmann, C.J.) this Court granted
a defendant in a criminal proceeding Local Rule 27-1 motion, remanded to the district court for
fact-finding, and delayed its decision whether or not to recall the mandate—that is, this Court
remanded the criminal proceedings to the district court for further fact-finding to determine
whether the mandate should be recalled.35 The overriding consideration in the Court’s decision
12.20.2007, Dkt. 90, voluntary Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) dismissal with prejudice of the 02cv2219 (SDNY)
lawsuit which rendered the criminal proceeding U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY) and the appeal U.S. v.
Ware, 09-0851cr (2d Cir.) null and void ab initio, and moot—that is, “good cause” and “actual innocent
special circumstances.”
35
“In Nnebe v. United States, we held that the “unusual remedy” of recalling a mandate is available when
counsel appointed under the CJA interferes with that right by “promis[ing] to file a certiorari petition, but
failing] to do so.” 534 F.3d 87, 88, 91 (2d Cir.2008). Recalling the mandate allows us to reenter judgment
in the direct appeal and, thus, restart the clock for filing a petition so that the defendant may timely
seek relief.” (emphasis added).
Page 56 of 103
to tentatively grant recall of the mandate pending fact-finding in the district court and restart the
appeals clock was predicated on the equitable judicial concept to do justice in every criminal
proceeding—special circumstances, where the equities require a remedy. In other words,
formality and rigidity should not outweigh the liberty interest of a defendant in a criminal
proceeding to receive justice according to equitable considerations.
Compare Id. at 9136 this Court’s equitable process undertaken in the Nnebe case, supra.
Nnebe’s 2255 motion was denied by the district, and on appeal of the denial of the 2255 motion,
Id. at 90, “We possess an inherent power to recall a mandate, subject to review for abuse of discretion.
No formal test governs the exercise of this discretion. See 16 Charles A. Wright, et al, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3938 (3d ed.2015). In recognition of the need to preserve finality in judicial proceedings,
however, we exercise our authority sparingly ... and only in exceptional circumstances.” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). (emphasis added).
36
“When the case reached this Court, we declined to review the merits of the district court’s decision and
instead construed Nnebe’s appeal as a motion to recall the mandate in his direct appeal. We recognized
— and, indeed, the government did not dispute — that Nnebe’s counsel’s conduct violated the provision
of our CJA Plan that incorporates the requirement that, when a client requests assistance seeking review
in the Supreme Court, counsel must either file a petition for certiorari on the client’s behalf or move to
withdraw from the case if the petition would be frivolous. See id.; CJA Plan § IX.C (Dec. 12, 2007).
In light of this violation and in order to make relief available, we determined that the appropriate remedy
would be to “construe Nnebe’s appeal as a motion to recall the mandate and vacate our judgment so
that a new one can be entered in order to afford him an opportunity to petition for
certiorari.”3Nnebe, 534 F.3d at 91.
In doing so, we rejected the government’s argument that a defendant should be required to show
prejudice before the mandate can be recalled, reasoning that imposing such a requirement “would both
be inconsistent with our responsibilities to effectuate the CJA and to implement properly our CJA Plan,
and would unduly interfere with our obligation to supervise court-appointed counsel.” Id. at 91. At the
same time, however, we emphasized that we were “not retreating] from our view that recalling a mandate
is an unusual remedy intended for extraordinary circumstances,” and we cautioned that we likely would
not recall the mandate when a defendant fails to act with diligence or to proffer adequate proof [cf., with
Ulysses T. Ware’s April 17, 2023, Rule 27-1 Motion to Recall the Mandates, Exhibits A thru K, and
Appendices A thru U, actual innocent Brady exculpatory evidence] of his allegations. Id. at 91-92.”
(emphasis added).
Page 57 of 103
this Court used its discretion to construe Nnebe’s appeal of the 2255 motion as “a motion to recall
the mandate” regarding the “direct appeal” of his criminal conviction.
In Taylor, Id. at 94, this Court delayed the recall of the mandate, and instead remanded
the proceedings to the district court with instructions to conduct fact-finding evidentiary hearings,
and adjudicate the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and return the finding to
the Court of Appeals for a determination whether or not the mandate should be recalled. 37
III. Application of the above legal standards to the pending Local Rule 27-1
Emergency Motion to Recall Mandates.
Attached to Applicant’s April 17, 2023, Local Rule 27-1 Emergency Motion to Recall
Mandate, (the “Recall Motion”), Applicant presented (i) “good cause” and (ii) “actual innocent
special circumstances” to the Court in support of the requested relief. Based on the newly
discovered actual innocent Brady exculpatory evidence attached to the Recall Motion, see
Exhibits A thru K, and Appendices A thru U, (the “Brady Exculpatory Evidence”)—that is, clear
and convincing actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence which established
Applicant’s actual and factual innocent of all charges in the sub judice U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224
37
“We agree with the government that this deficiency precludes recalling the mandate at this stage.
Because Taylor’s [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim was rejected below on the ground that he had
failed to demonstrate prejudice without any inquiry into whether his allegations are true, however, the
appropriate course is to remand to allow the district court to make factual findings regarding whether
Taylor’s counsel failed to timely inform Taylor of our decision affirming his conviction and sentence.
On remand, the district court should also receive evidence on whether Taylor’s counsel ever informed
him of the opportunity to petition for certiorari or moved to withdraw from the case. See CJA Plan ¶
IX.C. Finally, in considering each issue, the district court should offer Taylor’s original CJA counsel “an
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live testimony, affidavits, or briefs”
regarding his allegedly deficient representation of Taylor.” (emphasis added).
Page 58 of 103
(SDNY) and U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) criminal proceedings, (the “Criminal Proceedings”).
Applicant has (i) overwhelmingly presented the required factual predicates in support of “special
circumstance” and “good cause” requirements for this Court to recall his mandates, or
alternatively (ii) for the Court to undertake the procedure approved in Taylor or Nnebe and
“remand to the district court” to conduct fact-finding Kyles “cumulative materiality assessment”
evidentiary hearings apropos the actual innocent newly discovered Brady exculpatory evidence,
to wit, Exhibits A thru K, and Appendices A thru U.
Furthermore, Applicant presented to the Court of Appeals its March 15, 2022, Adar Bays
decision, which is subsequent, material, dispositive, and constituted new, actual innocent circuit
precedent similar to the subsequent en banc decision in the Davila, Id. at 587, which the Fifth
Circuit used to justify its recall of the mandate to “prevent an injustice” and correct an error, else
a fundamental miscarriage of justice would have gone uncorrected.
IV Conclusion.
The applicable rule is law is well-settled, and the factual predicates submitted to the Court
in the April 17, 2023, Recall Motion are clear and convincing--the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
regarding the 07-5222cr/09-0851cr/ and 11-4181cv appeals has the legal authority and
responsibility to recall its mandates to “prevent an injustice,” to correct an injustice, to protect
the integrity of its proceedings from all fraud on the court, and other instances of professional
misconduct; and the responsibility if opposed by the Respondents, to remand to the district
courts and allow Applicant to present the actual innocent Brady exculpatory evidence to the
district court for Kyle materiality assessment evidentiary hearing proceedings, and the
Page 59 of 103
adjudication of the merits of all claims that would give the Court additional information on which
to base its recall of mandate decision.
V Relief requested.
I. Applicant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals grant the Emergency Reliefs in
the April 17, 2023, Recall Motion.
II. Or, alternatively, grant a remand to the respective district courts with instructions to
forthwith conduct public, adversarial, impartial fact-finding evidentiary hearings on all
issues of disputed material facts regarding Applicant’s claims of judicial and prosecutorial
misconduct, professional misconduct, fraud on the court, and other nefarious acts and
actions committed during the sub judice Criminal Proceedings,
Committed during the Las Vegas 03-0831 (D. NV) proceedings,
III. committed during the In re Group Management Corp., 03-93031-WLH (BC NDGA),
IV. committed during the In re Ware (2008) State Bar of GA purported disbarment
proceeding,
V. committed during the September 1, 2004, RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B) criminal usury unlawful
debt collection kidnapping proceeding, and
VI. committed during the RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B) unlawful debt collection 02cv2219 (SDNY)
proceedings.
Page 60 of 103
123 Linden Blvd.
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
Utware007@gmail.com
Applicant Ulysses T. Ware

/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
April 18, 2023
End of document
Page 61 of 103
Exhibit 3—Omnibus Appendices (E thru T) to Recall of Mandate Motions. See attachment.
Page 62 of 103
Exhibit 4—Ulysses T. Ware’s request for judicial counsel review of denial of Edgardo
Ramos’ 2022 complaint for criminal judicial misconduct—no review was ever conducted
by the Judicial Council. No signed order from the Judicial council has ever been received.
Exhibit A
Page 63 of 103
123 Linden Blvd.
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
utware007@gmail.com
Monday, January 9, 2023

Resubmitted on January 30, 2023, per the Clerk’s letter dated January 12, 2023.
Office of the Circuit Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
Thurgood Marshall Courthouse
40 Foley Sq.
New York, NY 10007
Re: Complaint of criminal judicial misconduct regarding District Judge Edgardo Ramos (SDNY).
In re Edgardo Ramos: No. 02-22-90049-jm (2d Cir.)
Review of November 30, 2022, Order of the Chief Judge pursuant to 28 USC 352(c).
Dear Ms. Wolfe:38

“I hereby petition the judicial council for review of the Chief Judge’s order dated
November 30, 2023.”
Please docket and file this “review of the Chief Judge’s order” dated November 30, 2022,
regarding criminal judicial misconduct matters concerning District Judge Edgardo Ramos (SDNY)
for his ongoing and past commission of civil and criminal contempt of multiple court orders and
judgments, 18 USC 401(2), 401(3), high crimes and misdemeanors, impeachable offenses, and
his ongoing conspiracy to obstruct justice while aiding and abetting the Government to suppress
and conceal actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in U.S. v. Ware,
04cr1224 (SDNY) and U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY).
38
This petition for review is being resubmitted on January 30, 2023, per the Clerk’s letter dated January 12, 2023,
attached hereto as Ex. A.
Page 64 of 103
Please notify the undersigned once this matter is docketed and confirm your file number
regarding this complaint.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
Page 65 of 103
Table of Contents
Reasons why the petition should be granted. .......................................................................................... 67

Preliminary Statement. .............................................................................................................................. 68
A. Reckless, Negligent, Irresponsible, Deliberate, and Intentional Errors and Frauds committed and
made by the Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston as a fraud on the court, and an overt act in the
conspiracy to suppress and conceal actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in
the November 30, 2022, order, in refusing to conduct any investigation into the facts and evidence
submitted to the Court of Appeals, or have the Judge, Edgardo Ramos, deny the charges under oath.
70
B. Federal law, 28 USC 455(a), 455(b)(1-5), and the Constitution required the Judge (Edgardo Ramos)
to have recused himself from 1224, 1115, and the pending 22cv3409 (SDNY) 2241 habeas corpus
proceedings. ............................................................................................................................................... 73
C. The Chief Judge negligently and recklessly refused to investigate whether the government has
fully and completely produced and disclosed “all” Brady actual innocent exculpatory and/or
impeachment evidence required by the Brady Court Orders. See Rule 11(b). ........................................ 73
D. Conclusion. ......................................................................................................................................... 74
E. Requested relief. ................................................................................................................................ 75
Page 66 of 103
Office of the Clerk of the Court:
January 8, 2023
Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to 28 USC 252(c), I, Ulysses T. Ware petition the Judicial Council for review of
the Chief Judge’s order dated November 30, 2022.
Reasons why the petition should be granted.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons, to wit:
1. the Chief Judge denied the complaint without conducting any investigation into the
allegations,
2. did not require the subject Judge, Edgardo Ramos, deny the allegations under oath,
3. the Chief Judge conducted illegal fact finding in violation Rule 11(b)39 and,
4. the Chief Judge violated due process of law, the Rules on Professional Conduct for Federal
Judges, and improperly in violation of due process law purported to “determine” and
frivolously deny the facts, allegations, and claims in the Complaint without conducting
any investigation into the facts that supported the claims—a reckless, disgraceful,
biased, partial, and criminal fundamental miscarriage of justice.
5. The Chief Judge, Debra Ann Livingston, egregious and execrably violated her oath of
office, violated the constitutional due process rights of Ulysses T. Ware, violated the
Codes of Conduct for Federal Judges, and did nothing more than rubber-stamp and deny
the fully supported by the records, the facts presented, and allegations claims and
allegation of criminal judicial misconduct—18 USC 2, 241, 242, 371, 401(3), 1519, and
2071 perpetrated and willfully committed by Edgardo Ramos while he knowingly
colluded, conspired, and acted in concert with the U.S. Department of Justice to conceal
and suppress actual innocent Brady exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence required
to be disclosed and produced by the Brady Court Orders.
39
“In conducting the inquiry, the chief judge must not determine any reasonably disputed issue. Any such
determination must be left to a special committee appointed under Rule 11(f) and to the judicial council that
considers the committee’s report.” (emphasis added).
Page 67 of 103
That is why the Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston ipso facto committed clear error of
fact and herself committed criminal judicial misconduct.
Preliminary Statement.40
The Complainant contends that the Chief Judge, Debra Ann Livingston, knowingly,
deliberately, intentionally, with malice aforethought, with an evil and callous mind, to obstruct
justice, criminally rigged and fixed the outcome of the Complaint in favor of the Judge, Edgardo
Ramos; and conspired, colluded, and acted in concert with the Judge, Edgardo Ramos, and the
government, as an overt act in furtherance of the ongoing DOJ criminal enterprise to hide,
conceal, suppress, and cover up actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in
the actual and/or constructive possession of the United States Department of Justice, (the
“DOJ”). Brady evidence the government was ordered to have produced and disclosed “prior to
trial” in 2007.
A competent, unbiased, and impartial investigation into the facts and the claims would
have shown that to this day the government and Edgardo Ramos have continued to suppress
and conceal Brady actual innocent exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and have never
produced or disclosed that:
1. The plaintiffs in the 02cv2219(SDNY), (“2219”), lawsuit have at all times since February
1, 2001, according to Brady exculpatory evidence obtained by the Complainant in 2021,
from the SEC and FINRA have never been lawfully registered as broker-dealers as
required by federal law, 15 USC 78o(a)(1).41
40
See Dkt. 155, 22cv3409 (SDNY), Rule 5(f) Brady motion for the government and the Judge, Edgardo
Ramos, to certify that “all” actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence has been
produced as ordered by the Brady Court Orders entered in the sub judice 1224 and 1115 criminal
proceedings. The Judge, Edgardo Ramos, has refused to enforce the Brady Court Orders for a favor, a bribe,
a kickback, a gift, an illegal gratuity, a thing of value—a fraud on the court, to the government to cover up
and conceal the numerous Brady violations, and criminal contempt, 18 USC 401(3), of the Brady Court
Orders committed by the U.S. DOJ and its prosecutors, and Edgardo Ramos. To date, Edgardo Ramos has
deliberately and intentionally conspired and colluded with the government in violation of the Codes of
Conduct for Federal Judges, and federal criminal law, 18 USC 2, 241, 242, 371, 401(3), 1519, and 2071, and
deliberately blocked, impeded, and obstructed all attempts by the Complainant to have the government
produce and disclose Brady actual innocent exculpatory and impeachment evidence in its possession
regarding the 04cr1224 (SDNY) and 05cr1115 (SDNY) criminal proceedings.
41
On May 17, 2021, fifteen (15) years after trial in U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY) in 2007 FINRA certified
that neither of the 02cv2219 (SDNY) plaintiffs had never lawfully registered as broker-dealers as required
Page 68 of 103
2. The plaintiffs in the 2219 lawsuit lacked Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) standing to have
filed the 2219 lawsuit.
3. The 2219 district court lacked Article III and Section 1332(a) subject matter jurisdiction
over the 2219 lawsuit, and accordingly, ipso facto, all orders, judgments, and proceedings
therein are null and void ab initio, and moot.
4. The SEC and the DOJ in 2003 conducted an illegal and unconstitutional bootleg grand jury
in the bogus Las Vegas commingled 03-0831 (D. NV) proceedings; used as a ruse—the
Bootleg Grand Jury to circumvent the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, violated
Complainant’s right to remain silent, and illegally used to gather inadmissible evidence
for illegal and unconstitutional use in the imminent criminal proceedings, U.S. v. Ware,
04cr1224 and U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY).
5. The government’s “principal witness” in 05cr1115 a person who claimed to be “Jeremy

Jones” allegedly on September 22, 2006, entered an alleged Rule 11 guilty plea to the
05cr1115 superseding indictment (S1); allegedly entered into an alleged USSG 5k1.1
cooperation agreement; at sentencing received an alleged USSG 5k1.1 substantial
assistance letter from the government, yet there is no record anywhere in any court of
the alleged September 22, 2006, purported Rule 11 plea contract of any person by the
name of “Jeremy Jones.” Either the government lied and committed perjury regarding the
September 22, 2006, alleged event, or the government, the Judge, Ramos, the U.S.
Attorney (SDNY), Andre Damian Williams, Jr., and Merrick B. Garland are currently
suppressing and concealing the judicial public records—with the assistance and enabling
of the Judge, Ramos, required to have been disclosed “prior to trial” in 2007.
6. The government deliberately and intentionally violated the 04cr1224 Brady Court order
and refused to disclose “prior to trial” its FRE 404(b) ‘bad acts’ witness, disgraced former
SEC lawyer Jeffrey B. Norris’ professional “bad acts”—while Norris testified for the
government during the 04cr1224 trial in 2007 the government was in actual possession
of Norris’ SEC disciplinary file that showed that Norris had been sanctioned twice by the
SEC for “professional misconduct” “associated with his government email account” and
Norris was subsequently fired by the SEC for his professional misconduct, which the
by federal, 15 USC 78o(a)(1), and NYS law; and therefore lacked Article III standing to have filed the
02cv2219 (SDNY) lawsuit, and the government lacked probable cause, and an 18 USC 3231 “offense” with
respect to the 2219 lawsuit’s null and void ab initio, and moot orders (GX 11, GX 24), judgments (GX 7),
and proceedings.
Page 69 of 103
government is currently in possession of the Brady impeachment evidence, and in
possession of Norris’ medical records that showed that while Norris testified for the
government during the 04cr1224 trial in 2007, Norris was then suffering from mental
illness, and was under the care of a psychiatrist—Giglio impeachment evidence the
government was required to have disclosed “prior to trial” pursuant to the Brady Court
Order’s written commands.
7. The government, the trial judge, William H. Pauley, III (deceased), and the Judge, Edgardo
Ramos, since being assigned 05cr1115 in 2021 after the death of Judge Pauley, during
the 05cr1115 trial in 2007 deliberately and intentionally suppressed and concealed
actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the possession of the
SEC and DOJ that established (1) there was no alleged “artificial” “inflation” of the
“prices” of the INZS and SVSY stock—the subject matter of the (i) September 2005
perjured affidavit for the arrest warrant for the Complainant, and (ii) the subject matter
of the 05cr1115 superseding (S1) indictment; (iii) the government suppressed and
concealed Brady actual innocent exculpatory and impeachment evidence there was no
alleged conspiracy between the Complainant and the government’s trial witnesses; (iv)
the government’s 05cr1115 trial witnesses all testified pursuant to “cooperation
agreements” which the government has never disclosed as required by the Brady Court
Orders.
8. Concealed and suppressed that in December 20, 2007, in 02cv2219 (SDNY), Dkt. 90, after
the statute of limitation had run on all claims in the complaint, the plaintiffs moved the
district court (Sand, J.), ex parte, and voluntarily pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) to
vacate, set aside, moot, vitiate and annul all orders, judgments, and all proceedings in
02cv2219 (SDNY), and by necessary implication the same in U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224
(SDNY)—that is, the orders and judgments (GX 7, GX 11, and GX 24) used by the
government in its 04cr1224 indictment, and admitted at trial, were annulled on
December 20, 2007. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1952)
(voluntary dismissal of law by plaintiff annulled and vitiated all prior orders, judgments,
and proceedings as “if the lawsuit had never been filed” and left the proceedings moot,
and terminated the court jurisdiction over the matter). (emphasis added).
A. Reckless, Negligent, Irresponsible, Deliberate, and Intentional Errors and Frauds committed and
made by the Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston as a fraud on the court, and an overt act in the conspiracy
to suppress and conceal actual innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the November
30, 2022, order, in refusing to conduct any investigation into the facts and evidence submitted to the
Court of Appeals, or have the Judge, Edgardo Ramos, deny the charges under oath.
Page 70 of 103
First, in the November 30, 2022, order, (the “Order”) at 3, the Chief Judge claimed, “The
misconduct complaint is difficult to understand,42 …, the Complainant alleged that the Judge is
an unindicted co-conspirator who, among other things, [aided, abetted, assisted, and enabled
the Government to continue to violate two (2) Brady Court Orders entered on the sub judice
criminal proceedings, to wit, (1) U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY), (“1115”), Dkt. 17, May 19, 2006,
Tr. 5-10, Pauley, J. (deceased); and (2) U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY), (“1224”), Dkt. 32, August
10, 2007, Sweet, J. (deceased), jointly, (the “Brady Court Orders”)]. Which all are true statements
of fact, which are undenied and unopposed.
There is nothing in the record where the subject actually denied the allegations, the facts,
and the claims under oath. Thus, the submitted facts remain true, and undenied. The Chief Judge
is not lawfully permitted to respond on behalf of the subject judge where and if the facts are in
dispute. Only the subject judge is permitted to deny or admit the facts, not the Chief Judge.
Conversely, the Chief Judge is not permitted to admit or deny the facts for the subject
judge. Clearly, a procedural irregularity has occurred that impaired the proceeding’s integrity and
fidelity. See Rule 11(b).
As of today, January 9, 2023, it is an undisputed material fact the Government has yet to
confirm in writing on the record that “all” Brady actual innocent exculpatory and/or
impeachment evidence, Rule 5(f), Rule 16, U.S. Attorney’s Manual, and Giglio materials have
been disclosed and produced to the Complainant despite being ordered to produce and disclose
“all” Brady evidence “prior to trial” scheduled for 2007. Accordingly, the Chief Judge is not in any
credible position to make any binding determination with respect to the facts presented in the
Complaint—any alleged unsupported and contrived purported fact-finding is in violation of the
Act, 28 USC 351-364.
Moreover, exactly what methodology was used by the Chief Judge to make a binding
determination the facts submitted, without any denial from the subject judge, were not credible
is an obvious biased, partial, and conflicted personal conjecture, rather than a finding of facts.
There is nothing, not one word, in the sardonic November 30, 2022, purported order, which
supports the conclusion reached by the Chief Judge. Nothing whatsoever, other than a personal
42
The chief judge claimed the complaint is difficult to understand” yet the chief judge did not contact the
Complainant and seek clarification of what the chief judge claimed she did not “understand” in the
complaint. Clearly a dereliction of duty, and reckless application of judicial authority. If there was no
alleged “understanding” by the chief judge, then, palpably, the chief judge was not in position to make
any factual determinations adverse to a proper understanding of the complaint’s claims, facts, and
allegations.
Page 71 of 103
bias and prejudice regarding what the Chief Judge thinks, in her personal opinion is true, rather
than what the record and the evidence—see Dkt. 155 (22cv3409 (SDNY)) says is true.
Second, the dockets, the records, in the sub judice criminal proceedings, 1224, 1115, and
the pending 28 USC 2241(c)(3) actual innocent habeas corpus petition Ware v. USA, Garland,
Ramos, and Taylor-Swain, 22cv3409 (SDNY), named in the sworn declaration of fact numerous
frauds, and criminal contempt, 18 USC 401(2), 401(2), of the outstanding Brady Court Orders
committed by the Judge, Edgardo Ramos.
The record and the evidence supplied to the Chief Judge, who refused to conduct any
credible “review”—how was the alleged “review” conducted was not stated in the November 30,
2022, purported order, of the records in 1224 and 1115, or to competently review the Brady
Court Orders’ written commands, which alone supports the undisputed fact the Government was
and has been aided, abetted, assisted, and enabled by Edgardo Ramos; has deliberately,
intentionally, in bad faith, and as a fraud on the court, suppressed and concealed Brady actual
innocent exculpatory and impeachment evidence before, during and after the 2007 trials in 1224
and 1115; and since the Judge, Ramos, has been assigned to the 1224 and 1115 cases he has
deliberately, intentionally, with an evil and callous mind impeded, obstructed, and refused all
attempts made by the Complainant to enforce the Brady Court Orders and have the Government
certify pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(f), 16, the Brady Court Orders, and the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual that all Brady evidence has been disclosed to the Complainant. See Dkt. 155 in
22cv3409(SDNY), Rule 5(f) Brady certification motion (pending).
Thus, at bottom the claim is that the Judge, Edgardo Ramos, has breached the Codes of
Conduct for Federal Judges by aiding, abetting, assisting, and enabling the Government to be in
civil and criminal contempt, 18 USC 401(2), 401(3), of the two Brady Court Orders entered in the
1224 and 1115 sub judice criminal proceedings since he was assigned in 2021; violated federal
law, 18 USC 2, 241, 242, 371, 401(3), 1519, and 2071; and violated the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause. That is what the Complaint alleged supported by citations to the records, and supported
with submission of a Declaration of fact which has not been denied by the subject Judge, Edgardo
Ramos.
The Chief Judge is not lawfully permitted to deny and oppose, or admit the “facts” in
the Complaint in place of a written and sworn denial or admission from the subject judge,
Edgardo Ramos; and thus, the “facts” remain undenied for the purpose of this “review.”43
43
The sworn undisputed or opposed “facts” and the records established a prima facie case of egregious
violations of the federal criminal laws, 18 USC 2, 241, 242, 371, 401(2), 1519, and 2071—the concealment
and suppression of judicial public records of the person the government claimed, without any proof in the
record, on September 22, 2006, entered a Rule 11 plea of guilty in U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY), S1,
pursuant to a USSG 5k1.1 cooperation agreement. There is no record on any docket in the federal courts
Page 72 of 103
B. Federal law, 28 USC 455(a), 455(b)(1-5), and the Constitution required the Judge (Edgardo
Ramos) to have recused himself from 1224, 1115, and the pending 22cv3409 (SDNY) 2241 habeas corpus
proceedings.
Federal law and the Codes of Conduct for Federal Judges required the Judge to recuse
and remove himself from all judicial involvement in the pending matters because, (I) he has
been named as a hostile, adverse, material fact witness in the proceedings, (II) named as an
adverse party-respondent, and (III) named an unindicted coconspirator in the sworn and
verified declaration of facts filed in support of the pending 22cv3409(SDNY) 2241 actual
innocent habeas corpus petition—the Judge knew, or was reckless and negligent in not knowing
he was judicially disqualified from any judicial participation in matters where he will be a
material fact witness, and the Judge has continued to interfere, conceal, and cover up his
criminal contempts of the Brady Court Orders by his knowing, and willful aiding, abetting,
assisting, and/or enabling the government to willfully violate and resist the Brady Court Orders’
disclosure and production obligations.
C. The Chief Judge negligently and recklessly refused to investigate whether the government has
fully and completely produced and disclosed “all” Brady actual innocent exculpatory and/or
impeachment evidence required by the Brady Court Orders. See Rule 11(b).
Thus, to properly resolve the claims and ensure the public due process was delivered the
Chief Judge was required to have conducted a thorough and complete investigation, (1)
of the alleged September 22, 2006, Rule 11 plea contract. This should be a cause for great concern by a
federal judge—if “Jeremy Jones” actually entered a Rule 11 plea to S1 where is the Rule 11 plea contract?
If Jones “cooperated” pursuant to USSG 5k1.1 where is the cooperation agreement? Who has the judicial
public records if the events actually occurred on September 22, 2006, as claimed by the government?
Obviously, the district court and the government are required to have copies of all judicial public records
regarding any alleged Rule 11 plea and USSG 5k1.1 cooperation by a government witness. So why have
the district court (Ramos, J.), and the government not produced the judicial public records? What are their
motivations? Who benefited? Who was harmed by the suppression and concealment of judicial public
records? Those are issues the Chief Judge, Debra Ann Livingston, was required to have thoroughly
investigated and referred the Complaint to the Director of the FBI and the DOJ’s Division of Public Integrity
with a judicial request to open a criminal investigation into the conduct of Edgardo Ramos, William H.
Pauley, III, Robert W. Sweet, Robert D. Sack, Amalya L. Kearse, Barbara S. Jones, Michael H. Dolinger,
Leonard B. Sand, Peter W. Hall, Robert A. Katzmann, Debra Ann Livingston, and Colleen McMahon. That
was not done.
Page 73 of 103
confirmed whether or not the Brady Court Orders have been fully complied with by the
government by having the government provide written proof of complete production and
disclosure; (2) have the subject judge, Edgardo Ramos, under oath admit or deny the allegations
and provide an explanation for his judicial misconduct. That was deliberately not done by the
Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston. Not done as a deliberate and intentional omission, an overt
act, in furtherance of Edgardo Ramos and the DOJ’s conspiracy to suppress and conceal actual
innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment evidence—an execrably and criminal fundamental
miscarriage of justice. An “unconscionable plan and scheme to commit a fraud on the court” and
to impede and obstruct the “judicial machinery from performing as designed.”
The Chief Judge negligently failed the public and the rule of law and with bias, prejudice,
and gross negligence refused and deliberately failed to conduct any credible “review” of the
records and the evidence submitted to the Chief Judge.
D. Conclusion.
The Codes of Conduct for Federal Judges, and 28 USC 351-364 required the Chief Judge
to order the subject judge, Edgardo Ramos, to file a sworn response that admitted or denied the
facts and allegations within the Complaint. That was not done. The Chief Judge illegally,
unethically, criminally, 18 USC 2, 241, 242, and with bias, prejudice, and partiality substituted her
own biased and prejudicial personal conjectures and views as fact. That was not lawfully proper
or permissible according to the Act.
The records, the facts, and the evidence submitted with the Complaint fully supported all
claims and allegations made against the subject judge, Edgardo Ramos, cf., Dkt. 155, 22cv3409
(SDNY) (Rule 5(f) Brady Disclosure and Production motion pending in the 2241 habeas corpus
proceedings, where Ramos was named as an adverse party-respondent, yet has refused to recuse
himself, and has entered a trivially frivolous and fraudulent order, Dkt. 126, to relieve himself of
responding to the claims in the 2241 petition).
The Chief Judge, Debra Ann Livingston, violated the Codes of Conduct for Federal Judges
by her reckless, negligent, and judicially irresponsible purported processing of the Complaint—
the facts or allegations have not been denied by Ramos, and Ramos has not filed any sworn
response in denial of the fact or claims, which are deemed true until Ramos responds.
The Chief Judge, Debra Ann Livingston, acted deliberately, intentionally, with reckless
disregard for the truth, the facts, and the law; and rigged, fixed, impeded, obstructed, and has
egregiously delayed justice, and the application of the rule of law to the criminal judicial
Page 74 of 103
misconduct perpetrated by Edgardo Ramos, William H. Pauley, III, Robert W. Sweet, Debra Ann
Livingston, the government’s prosecutors, and others.
E. Requested relief.
The Complainant is requesting that the November 30, 2022, purported order entered by
the Chief Judge be vacated, set aside, and voided, and the Complaint be referred to the full
Judicial Council;
Edgardo Ramos be ordered to not later than January 16, 2023, to file a sworn admission
or denial to all facts, allegations, and claims in the Complaint and serve a copy of his response on
the Complainant;
Complainant shall have 30 days from receipt of the response of Edgardo Ramos to file a
reply;
The Judicial Council shall conduct a full and complete public investigation of the facts,
allegations, and claims in the Complaint; and
The Judicial Council shall resolve all disputed facts or allegations by public evidentiary
hearings and make a public report of the findings regarding this matter.
Submitted by:
Ulysses T. Ware
January 9, 2023
January 30, 2023
I Ulysses T. Ware under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, having personal knowledge
of the facts, pursuant to 28 USC 1746, have this 9th day of January 2023, made this Petition for
Review.
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
Page 75 of 103
END OF DOCUMENT
Page 76 of 103
Exhibit 5---McMahon, J., Court employee, Dina Kurot’s bogus and fraudulent return of
District Judge Colleen McMahon’s complaint for judicial misconduct. The statement of
fact was only 4 pages, not more than 5 pages as Kurot fraudulently stated.
Page 77 of 103
Exhibit 6-1—Court of Appeals bogus, deceptive, and fraudulent “non-jurisdiction” letters
returned regarding the recall of mandate motions.
Page 78 of 103
returned regarding the recall of mandate motions
Page 79 of 103
returned regarding the recall of mandate motions.
Page 80 of 103
Exhibit 7---Omitted.
Page 81 of 103
Exhibit 8—EOUSA’s March 20, 2023, In re Ware, 22-000907 FOIA response regarding actual
innocent Brady exculpatory and impeachment in the U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) and
U.S. v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY) proceedings.
Page 82 of 103
Exhibit 9---12.25.22, McMahon, J. re 02cv2219 (SDNY) bogus and ultra vires orders,
unconstitutional purported “leave to file” sanctions, and other matters.
Office of Ulysses T. Ware
123 Linden Blvd
Ste 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
Utware007@gmail.com
December 25, 2022
Via regular U.S. mail on December 25, 2022

The Hon. District Judge Colleen McMahon
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse
40 Foley Sq.
New York, NY 10007
Re: Alpha Capital, AG, et al. v. Group Management Corp., et al., 02cv2219 (SDNY),
(“2219”).
Administrative Matters Letter Brief Application to (1) clarify, Rule 59(e), Dkt. 151,
(2) permission to file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(4) motion to vacate Dkt. 151, Order for
(i) mootness, and (ii) lack of due process of law; and (3) application for a stay of
Dkt. 151 (Order) pending the United States Attorney (SDNY) appearance herein
and filing its litigation position with respect to GX 1-4, GX 5, (jointly, (the “Criminal
Usury Subject Matter”); and GX 7 (Dkt. 54), GX 11 (Dkt. 58), and GX 24 (Dkt. 65).
Judge McMahon:
Ulysses T. Ware, the Prevailing Party with respect to the 2219 proceedings—see
12/20/2007, Dkt. 90, superseding Rule 41(a)(2) final judgment, (the “Rule 41 Final Judgment”),
the Petitioner herein, respectfully for good cause shown, applies to the Honorable District Court
to clarify outstanding issues with respect to Dkt. 151, Order, matters predicated on “hornbook
law” legal precedents of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal appeals courts.
See L-3 Comm’cs, 921 F.3d at 18-19, infra.
Page 83 of 103
Administrative Issue #1: A transcript of the required due process hearing apropos the leave to
file sanction does not exist.
Judge McMahon, on December 23, 2022, Petitioner was informed by the District Court
(SDNY) personnel that “no transcript exists for any hearings conducted prior to December 22,
2022,” the entry date of Dkt. 151, regarding the required due process hearing required by Second
Circuit precedents to have been conducted “prior to” entry of Dkt. 151.44
Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully seeks instruction from the District Court regarding the
administrative process to obtain a copy of the due process hearing’s transcript vis-à-vis Dkt. 137
and Dkt. 151 to perfect the appellate record.
Administrative Issue #2: Request for Clarification.
Petitioner submits this letter brief, (the “Letter Brief”), and respectfully applies to the
Court for (I) clarification of Dkt. 151, and (II) for permission for (1) an order authorizing the filing
of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate Dkt. 50, 54, 58, 65, 80, 102, 120, 137, 141, and 151, (the
“Moot Orders”); (2) to vacate 102, 120, 137, 141, and 151 for lack of due process of law—the
required due process hearing was not conducted by the Court prior to entry of the leave to file
orders (Dkt. 102, Dkt. 137, 141, and 151); and (3) for an order directed to the parties in interest,
the 2219 plaintiffs, and the United States, to immediately appear and show cause why 2219 is
not moot for lack of Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) subject matter jurisdiction over the Criminal
Usury Subject Matter, GX 1-4 (the “GPMT’s criminal usury convertible promissory notes”), and
GX 5 (the “2219 plaintiffs’ criminal usury underwriting contract”), jointly, (the “Criminal Usury
Subject Matter”).45
44
“The unequivocal rule in this circuit is that the [02cv2219, 05cr1115, or 04cr1224] distinct court[s] may
not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua sponte without providing the litigant [Ulysses T. Ware] with
notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1998). “Indeed, we
strictly enforced this rule when a district court in our circuit had earlier imposed a filing ban on this very
litigant without providing him with notice or a hearing.” See Moates v. Rademacher, 86 F.3d at 15.
(emphasis added); also see Board of Managers of 2900 Ocean Avenue Condominium v. Bronkovic, 83
F.3d 44 (1996) (2d Cir. 1996) (“Because the court enjoined farther filings and removals to the Eastern
District sua sponte without giving defendants [Ulysses T. Ware] notice or an opportunity to be heard, our
precedent requires that we reverse and remand so that the district court may conduct such a
hearing.”). (emphasis added).
45
Petitioner respectfully requests that if the Court is inclined to grant permission to file the requested Rule
60(b)(4) motion, the Court accepts this letter brief, (the “Letter Brief”), as the application for the requested
stay, the Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate Dkt. 151, and the Rule 12(h)(3) motion challenge to the Court’s
Page 84 of 103
Judge McMahon, respectfully, Petitioner in compliance with the Court’s Order, Dkt. 151
(12/22/22), Petitioner is not seeking to “prolong” the 2219 matter. Rather, Petitioner is bringing
to the Court’s attention relevant on-point binding Second Circuit precedent and authority for
Petitioner’s position that the 2219 proceedings, orders, and judgments went moot, were vitiated,
and annulled on 12/20/2007, Dkt. 90. That is the sole purpose for Petitioner’s communication
with the Court, and to perfect the record for subsequent appellate review—which requires
Petitioner to first present the argument to the District Court. Petitioner has no intentions or
desires to “prolong” the proceedings. Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that the
Honorable District Court accept this Letter Brief Application in good faith based on the prevailing
Second Circuit’s binding precedents, and the indisputable fact of the Rule 41 Final Judgment.
Good Cause Shown.
Petitioner for good cause, (a) based in Circuit authority, the law, L-3 Comm’cs, infra, and
(b) based in fact, the 12/20/2007, Dkt. 90, Rule 41 Final Judgment, seeks the Court’s permission
to file this Rule 60(b)(4) Letter Brief motion for the following reasons:
1. because former District Judge Sand on 12/20/2007, Dkt. 90, after the statute of limitation
had run on all claims in the 2219 complaint, on ex parte motion by the 2219 plaintiffs,
vacated, set aside, reversed, vitiated, and annulled all aspects of the proceedings,
annulled all prior orders and judgments, rendered the 2219 proceedings moot, and
terminated the Court jurisdiction over the Criminal Usury Subject Matter. 46
Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) jurisdiction over the Criminal Usury Subject Matter, GX 1-4, and GX 5. If the
Court is not inclined to grant permission to clarify Dkt. 151 and permission to file the Rule 60(b)(4)
application, Petitioner respectfully requests the District Court to enter an order on the docket that denies
the requested relief that enables meaningful appellate review—that is, with findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and citations to the records regarding all factual findings.
46
United States v. L-3 Comm’cs EOTech, Inc., 921 F.3d 11, 18-19 (2d Cir. 2019). (Kearse, Katzmann, and
Pooler) (“it is hornbook law that "a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) leaves the
situation as if the action never had been filed," Wright & Miller § 2367, at 559 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
8 Moore's Federal Practice § 41.34[6][d] (2018) (stipulation for dismissal "without prejudice terminates
the action as if it were never filed" (emphasis added)). This long established principle has been recognized
by this Circuit and most others. See, e.g., A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1952) ("voluntary
dismissal of a suit leaves the situation so far as procedures therein are concerned the same as though the
suit had never been brought"), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 169, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952); Bomer v.
Ribicof, 304 F.2d 427, 428 (6th Cir. 1962) (dismissal of an action without prejudice leaves the situation the
same as if the suit had never been brought); In re Piper Aircraft Distribution System Antitrust Litigation,
551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Beck v. Caterpillar, Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir. 1995) (same);
EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Matthews, 395 F.3d 477, 480
(4th Cir. 2005) (same); Harvey Specialty & Supply, Inc. v. Anson Flowline Equipment, Inc., 434 F.3d 320,
Page 85 of 103
2. Accordingly, applying Second Circuit binding precedent and reasoning in L-3 Comm’cs, Id.
at 18-19, the law, to the fact of the Rule 41 Final Judgment’s legal and preclusive effect,
as of 12/20/2007 the 2219 proceedings went moot; and all prior orders, proceedings, and
judgments therein were vitiated and annulled.47
3. The Court in L-3 Comm’cs, Id. observed that the law is not in doubt or debate regarding
the legal effect of the 12/20/2007, Dkt. 90, “voluntary [Rule 41(a)(2)] dismissal,” noting
that “it is hornbook law” that all prior orders, proceedings, and judgments entered in
2219 have been annulled, and vitiated, and the 2219 court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter “as if the [2219 lawsuit] had never been filed.”
Rule 60(b)(4) re Lack of Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) diversity subject matter jurisdiction
over the Criminal Usury Subject Matter, GX 1-4, and GX 5, and Dkt. 50 (GX 7), 54, 58 (GX 11), 65
(GX 24), 80, 102, 120, 137, 141, and 151.
(I) The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s legal standard for Rule 60(b)(4) relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes a federal court to vacate a judgment where (i) the
entering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or (ii) the court violated due process of law in
entering its judgment.
324 (5th Cir. 2005) (same); City of South Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (same;
"any future lawsuit based on the same claim [is] an entirely new lawsuit" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 1990) (same; "the page is once again
pristine").
47
See A.B. Dick, 197 F.2d 501-02 (“And this action of the court—granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
the lawsuit [cf., Dkt. 90 in 2219, the Rule 41 Final Judgment], was the equivalent of vacation of the
judgment theretofore entered [see 02cv2219 orders and judgments that were vacated—that is, Dkt. 50
and Dkt. 54 (GX 7), Dkt. 58 (GX 11), Dkt. 65 (GX 24), Dkt. 80] and the subsequent, Dkt. 102, Dkt. 120, Dkt.
137, Dkt. 141, and Dkt. 151], (the “Moot Orders”)], in the case [02cv2219] in the plaintiff's favor, so that,
perhaps, the [2219] court would have been well advised to have entered on its own motion an order
vacating that judgment. See Ericson v. Slomer, 7 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 437, 439. The reason for this is that
voluntary dismissal of [the 2219 lawsuit] suit leaves the situation so far as procedures therein are
concerned the same as though the suit had never been brought, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Latham, 5 Cir.,
1930, 41 F.2d 312, 313, thus vitiating and annulling all prior proceedings and orders in the case, and
terminating jurisdiction over it for the reason that the case has become moot. Bryan v. Smith, 7 Cir.,
1949, 174 F.2d 212, 214, 215.” (emphasis added).
Page 86 of 103
A judgment is void if it is "so affected by a fundamental infirmity [the exercise of Article
III jurisdiction over the Criminal Usury Subject Matter—the lack of an Article III justiciable
controversy] that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final." United
Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). Accordingly, for purposes
of Rule 60(b)(4), "jurisdiction" refers to the court's adjudicatory authority. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61 (2010); see also Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir.
1985); 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.44[2][a] (2019).
The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction precedents all hold that the federal courts’
authority—the “power to declare the law,” is the “threshold matter” that every federal court is
required to “sua sponte” determine for itself, even in not noticed by the parties, “prior to”
addressing the merits of the claims, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,
89, 93-95 (1998) (“subject-matter jurisdiction” refers to “the courts' statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (emphasis in original)); Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court
rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties' ” (quoting Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v.
United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concurring))).”).
In fact, for all intents and purposes, a motion to vacate a default judgment as void `may
be brought at any time.'" Beller Keller v. Tyler 120 F.3d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1997), (quoting 12 James
Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.44[5][c] (3d ed. 2003)). McLearn v. Cowen
Co., 660 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1981); Crosby v. The Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.
1963) (judgment vacated as void thirty (30) years after entry).
Conclusion.
Judge McMahon, Petitioner, the Prevailing Party to the Rule 41 Final Judgment, has but
one legitimate purpose in this litigation—that is, to vindicate his legal rights vis-à-vis Judge Sand’s
12/20/2007 Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal of the 2219 lawsuit, after the statute of limitation
had run on all claims in the 2219 lawsuit, which Second Circuit precedents, L-3 Comm’cs, Id. and
A.B. Dick, Id., support the good faith legal basis for Petitioner’s requested relief apropos this
Letter Brief and the prior filings made in 2219.
If the Court would take a few moments of its busy schedule to address and clarify the
issues raised herein, the parties in interest—Petitioner, the 2219 plaintiffs, and the United States
(GX 1-4, and GX 7, GX 11, and GX 24), the appellate Courts will have a perfected record to enable
Page 87 of 103
meaningful appellate review, if necessary, without delays of a remand to the District Court
required by an incomplete record.48
Accordingly, respectfully, Petitioner requests:
(1) that the District Court stay Dkt. 137 (show cause order) and Dkt. 151 (Order) pending a written
response from the United States Attorney (SDNY) and the 2219 plaintiffs—the alleged Article III
adverse party-plaintiffs, regarding their positions on the mootness (“concrete adverseness”), and
(“concrete injury in facts”) apropos the 2219 proceedings, orders, and judgments per Second
Circuit binding authority,49 and/or
(2) sua sponte vacate all proceedings, orders, and judgments entered in 2219, nunc pro tunc,
March 20, 2002, the filing date of the 2219 complaint per Second Circuit binding authority L-3
Comm’cs, Id. at 18-19; A.B. Dick, Id. at 501-02; and Adar Bays LLC v. GeneSys ID, Inc., 28 F.4d
379 (2d Cir. 2022); the entry of the Rule 41 Final Judgment, Dkt. 90 (December 20, 2007), and
FINRA’s May 17, 2021, certification of unregistered broker-dealer status for each 2219 plaintiff
on February 2, 2001 (the formation of the Criminal Usury Subject Matter), March 20, 2002 (the
filing date of the 2219 complaint), and May 19, 2019, (the entry of Dkt. 120); and/or
(3) pursuant to the DOJ’s Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.3 (a), (b), and (c), Duty of Candor
to the Tribunal, order Andre Damian Williams, Jr., the U.S. Attorney (SDNY), to file a Declaration
into the Court regarding the matters raised herein this Letter Brief, in Dkt. 145, and in Dkt. 148.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
48
Petitioner is unaware of any filing(s) made by the adverse party-plaintiffs (the 2219 plaintiffs and the
United States) in regard to Petitioner’s Rule 12(h)(3) motion, Dkt. 144 (Notice of Rule 12(h)(3) motion),
and Dkt. 145 (Rule 12(h)(3) motion). Petitioner is respectfully requesting that the District Court direct
Petitioner to the adverse party-plaintiffs’ filings in opposition to the Rule 12(h)(3) motion, Dkt. 145.
49
See Adar Bays LLC v. GeneSys ID, Inc., 28 F.4d 379 (2d Cir. 2022); L-3 Comm’cs, Id., and A.B. Dick, Id.
Page 88 of 103
Ulysses T. Ware and Group Management served the individuals listed below via email
with a copy of this Letter Brief on December 26, 2022.
cc: Office of the U.S. Attorney General (Merrick B. Garland)

Office of the Director of the FBI
Executive Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
The Supreme Court of the United States, Office of the Judicial Congress of the United
States
Office of the United States Attorney (SDNY)
Office of the Chief District Judge (SDNY), Laura Taylor-Swain, personally.
District Judge Edgardo Ramos (SDNY), personally
Office of the U.S. Attorney General
Office of the Chief Bankruptcy Judge (NDGA), Wendy L. Hagenau, personally
The State Bar of Georgia, Office of the General Counsel
Office of the United States Attorney (EDNY)
U.S. Bureau of Prisons (Warden, MDC, Brooklyn, NY)
The Wall Street Journal
The New York Times
J. Henry Walker, IV (representative of the 02cv2219 plaintiffs)
John W. Mills, III
Edward T. M. Garland for Garland, Samuel, & Loeb, P.C., and Michael F. Bachner, Esq.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
Sims W. Gordon, Jr.
Thomas J. Leghorn
Marlon G. Kirton
The Conviction Integrity Committee of the Office of the United States Attorney (SDNY).
Daniel Gitner, and Margaret M. Garnett, personally
Andre Damian Williams, Jr, personally
Colleen McMahon, personally via the Office of the Chief District Judge (SDNY)
Debra Ann Livingston, personally via the Office of the Chief District Judge (SDNY)
Office of the Solicitor General of the United States (via U.S. mail).
Law Office of Kenneth A. Zitter, Esq. (via U.S. mail)
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
Page 89 of 103
Exhibit 10—October 2022, collusion and conspiracy of Colleen McMahon, and Wendy L.
Hagenau (BC NDGA) to obstruct justice, violate Claimant’s Brady production rights, and to
commit a fraud on the 03-93031 and 02cv2219 (SDNY) federal courts.
Page 90 of 103
Exhibit 11—IRN’s coverage of USAO and NYC federal court’s conspiracy.
Page 91 of 103
Exhibit 12---Media opinion and editorial regarding NYC federal court employees’ crimes.
Page 92 of 103
Exhibit 13—Media reporting on the Court employees; public corruption.
Page 93 of 103
Exhibit 14—12.20.2007, Rule 41(a)(2), Dkt. 90 (02cv2219 (SDNY) superseding final
judgment—actual innocent “special circumstances.”
Page 94 of 103
Exhibit 15---FINRA’s May 17, 2021, certification of unregistered broker-dealer status for
each 02cv2219 (SDNY)—actual innocent “special circumstances.”
Page 95 of 103
Exhibit 16-1—USAG’s Executive Branch Art. II actual innocent “special circumstances,”—
the abandonment, termination, and dismissal with prejudice of U.S. v. Ware, 05cr1115
(SDNY) and 07-5670cr (XAP)(d Cir.) on Nov. 7, 2008.
Page 96 of 103
Exhibit 16-2--Gov-I, Aug. 18, 2009, final judgment—terminated 07-5222cr and 05cr1115
subject matter jurisdiction; and conferred prevailing party status on Ulysses T. Ware.
Page 97 of 103
Exhibit 17—Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.’s Sept. 1, 2004, RICO 18 USC 1961(6)(B), GA torts, 42
USC 1985(2), and 1985(3), and RICO crimes committed against Claimant as overt acts in
furtherance of the collection of the criminal usury unlawful debts, GX 1-4.
Page 98 of 103
Exhibit 18-1—Federal Rule of Civ. Proc. Rule 12(c) memorandum of law.
MEMORANDUM
To: General Counsel, AOC
From: Senior Partner, Civil Litigation Department ****************************
Re: Application for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c) by Ulysses T. Ware
Date: April 22, 2023
I have been retained by Mr. Ulysses T. Ware and have reviewed the claims and supporting
evidence submitted by Ulysses T. Ware, the Claimant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and §§
2671-2680 based on NYS, Nevada, and GA tort law, as well as the other viable claims, including
RICO and Civil Rights conspiracy claims. It is evident that the Court employees committed
negligence, recklessness, and violated NYS, Nevada, and GA torts, as presented by the Claimant.
There is no good faith, non-frivolous defense in law or in fact to the NYS, Nevada, and GA torts
presented herein. The United States, the real party in interest in a FTCA claim, cannot dispute
these facts.
Furthermore, it is factually undisputed that the Court employees refused to file and adjudicate
the recall of mandate motions, as evidenced by the Claimant's supporting evidence. The United
States and the AOC cannot dispute this fact either.
Calderon, Hazel-Atlas Glass, and Sargent are binding precedents that have not been overruled,
and they authorized the filing and adjudication of recall of mandate motions. The AOC and the
United States cannot present any legal authority that contradicts these precedents. As a result,
the Claimant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) based on the
undisputed facts and binding legal authority.
In conclusion, the United States and the AOC cannot dispute the facts presented by the Claimant,
and the binding legal authority supports the filing and adjudication of recall of mandate motions.
Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). I
recommend that the AOC's General Counsel take appropriate action to settle this matter before
May 1, 2023, or to prepare for litigation if a settlement cannot be reached.
Sincerely,
Robert Strauss
Page 99 of 103
Exhibit 18-2—(follow up Rule 12(c) Memorandum to AOC’s General Counsel).
To: AOC's General Counsel

From: Senior Partner, **********************************
Subject: Mr. Ware's FTCA Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(c).
AOC’s General Counsel:
I am writing to follow up on our previous correspondence regarding Mr. Ulysses T. Ware's FTCA
claims, and specifically to address the application of Rule 12(c) to these claims.
As you are aware, Mr. Ware has submitted FTCA claims based on NYS, Nevada, and GA tort law,
as well as RICO and Civil Rights conspiracy claims. The evidence supporting these claims is clear,
convincing, and overwhelming, and there is no good faith, non-frivolous defense in law or fact to
the NYS, Nevada, and GA torts presented.
In light of this evidence, Mr. Ware is entitled to judgment in his favor on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c). This conclusion is supported by the following elements of the legal standard for
Rule 12(c):
1. Mr. Ware's FTCA claims are legally sufficient. The claims are based on well-established
principles of tort law in NYS, Nevada, and GA, and the evidence clearly establishes the
elements of these torts.
2. The FTCA claims are not subject to any genuine dispute of material fact. The evidence is
clear and convincing that the Court employees violated NYS, Nevada, and GA torts, and
the United States, as the real party in interest, cannot dispute the fact that these
employees refused to file and adjudicate Mr. Ware's recall of mandate motions.
3. The FTCA claims are not subject to any plausible legal defense. There is no good faith, non-
frivolous defense in law or fact to the NYS, Nevada, and GA torts presented, and the
binding authority of Calderon, Hazel-Atlas Glass, and Sargent has not been overruled.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ware is entitled to judgment in his favor on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c). We request that the AOC's General Counsel immediately review the evidence
supporting Mr. Ware's FTCA claims and confirm receipt of the FTCA petition. If the AOC's General
Counsel has no good faith intentions of settling the claims, please forward the required FTCA
Page 100 of 103

denial letter by certified mail to Mr. Ware on May 1, 2023, and the litigation can commence on
the FTCA and other claims in the District Court (D.D.C.).
Please contact Mr. Ware if you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter.
Sincerely,
Robert Strauss, Senior Partner
Page 101 of 103

Exhibit 19--Omitted
Page 102 of 103

End of document
Page 103 of 103


F - 04.23.23 FTCA Pet'n Re Court Employees

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F - 04.23.23 FTCA Pet'n Re Court Employees

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Notice of Federal Tort Claims Act, RICO, and Conspiracy claims filing against Court of

claims (RICO and Federal Civil Rights).

2.0 Second Circuit Court of Appeals employees:

3.0 District Court (SDNY) court employees.

3.2 Las Vegas, NV federal court employees.

Jointly and collectively, (the “Court employees” or “Unindicted Coconspirators” or

4.0 Official capacity and status of the Court employees.11

functioned as a willing and knowing, direct and/or indirect participant in an illegal

association-in-fact, as defined in 18 USC 1961(4), a continuing criminal enterprise.14

adjudication complaints of judicial misconduct regarding District Judge (SDNY) Edgardo

the Court to have his claims adjudicated on the merits.

relief for the Brady violations committed against him.

NYS tort: Elements of Obstruction of Justice.

2. To establish a claim for NYS obstruction of justice, Claimant must prove:

a. The existence of a judicial proceeding;

b. Knowledge of the proceeding by the Court Employees;

proceeding or its administration;

d. The Court Employees' actions impeded, caused a disturbance or interruption of the

f. Claimant suffered damage as a result.

a. The existence of a judicial proceeding:

jurisdiction (07-5222, 09-0851, 11-4181cv, and 17-3527) to recall its mandates.

available procedural remedy in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals employees negligently, recklessly, intentionally and

of the District Court (SDNY) record department control and custody.17

d. Disturbance or interruption of the judicial proceeding:

disturbance or interruption of the judicial proceedings.

interfered with or disrupted the judicial proceeding.

seek relief for the Brady violations committed against him.

of New York State law.

1. Claimant Ulysses T. Ware is a resident of New York State.

Court authority and circuit precedents, as detailed below.

of Brady exculpatory evidence by employees of the U.S. Department of Justice.

finding regarding Edgardo Ramos’s complaint for judicial misconduct.

IV. Conspiracy between Court of Appeals Employees.

formed an illegal association-in-fact, a criminal enterprise, to violate Supreme Court

that the petition was not filed.

including refusing to file the petition to recall the mandate.

and obtain relief based on newly discovered evidence of his innocence.

violation of New York State law.

V. Claim for NYS Civil Conspiracy

2. The Claimant is Ulysses T. Ware.

suppressing, and withholding exculpatory and impeachment evidence in violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

petition to recall a mandate submitted to the Court in violation of Supreme Court

v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).

II. Elements of Civil Conspiracy

in a common plan or agreement to violate the Claimant's civil rights.

7. The Court Employees committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

furtherance of the NYS civil conspiracy:

b. Intentionally delaying or obstructing the processing of legal documents and filings;

c. Engaging in ex parte communications with other members of the alleged conspiracy;

d. Concealing or destroying evidence relevant to pending cases or legal proceedings;

e. Providing false or misleading information to litigants, judges, or other court personnel;

f. Refusing to follow established court procedures or legal standards in order to achieve a

III. Specifics of the Conspiracy

evidence from the Claimant in violation of Brady v. Maryland.

of Supreme Court authority and circuit precedent.

protect themselves and others from criminal and civil liability.

including emotional distress, lost wages, and other damages.

imprisoned for over 11.5 years.

bounds of decency, and intolerable in a civilized society.

The Court of Appeals employees' misconduct was a substantial factor in causing

Claimant's emotional distress.