International Journal of Psychology

International Journal of Psychology, 2019

Vol. 54, No. 2, 197–204, DOI: 10.1002/ijop.12459

Moral foundations, worldviews, moral absolutism and

belief in conspiracy theories

Luigi Leone, Mauro Giacomantonio, and Marco Lauriola

Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, “Sapienza” University of Rome, Rome,
Italy

I n the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater
endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super-individual
relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns
pertaining to group- and community-concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well-being (i.e.,
individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that
such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found
support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.

Keywords: Moral foundations; Personality; Conspiracy theories; Worldviews; Moral absolutism.

Although conspiracy beliefs cover a wide range of issues
and content they share one common theme: momentous
and negative social events are explained as intentional
plots enacted by powerful groups to pursue evil goals by
unlawful means (e.g., Sutton & Douglas, 2014). Psycho-
logical research has found several correlates of endorse-
ment of conspiracy theories, such as psychopathological
and maladaptive traits (e.g., Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron,
& Furnham, 2016); narcissism (e.g., Cichocka, March-
lewska, & de Zavala, 2016); and social attitudes such as
anomie, distrust and political cynicism (e.g., Moulding
et al., 2016). Given that conspiracy theories are especially
widespread about political issues, worldviews (Mould-
ing et al., 2016), and the socio-political constructs of
right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orien-
tation have also been connected with conspiracy beliefs
(e.g., Wilson & Rose, 2014), with generally more reli-
able effects for authoritarianism than for social domi-
nance (e.g., Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015).
Such a rich body of research accounts for many
psychological routes favouring the adoption of con-
spiracy theories. Notwithstanding this, we believe that
one important feature of conspiracy theories has been
somewhat overlooked: conspiracy beliefs imply a moral
evaluation because they generally interpret negative and
frightful events as intentional plots originating from
malevolent agents (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, &
Harvey, 2016). Therefore, conspiracy theories apply to
the agent-harming-patient dyadic template triggering
moral reasoning (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Moral constructs
appear thus relevant in understanding conspiracy beliefs.
In this study, we have investigated whether prioritising
different moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011) might
facilitate or inhibit the endorsement of conspiracy the-
ories. We anticipated that individual differences in the
binding foundations, those emphasising group cohe-
sion, and group-based traditional norms, would relate to
conspiracy beliefs, and that such associations occur via
threatening worldview beliefs (Moulding et al., 2016) and
through the habitual use of an either/or disjunctive logic
in making moral judgments—moral absolutism/splitting
(MAS; Lauriola, Foschi, & Marchegiani, 2015).
Moral foundations and conspiracy beliefs
Moral foundations theory (e.g., Graham et al., 2011)
distinguishes between two broad categories of moral
concern: (1) the binding foundations of authority/respect,
in-group/loyalty, and purity/sanctity, which bind the
individual to the values and norms of the group in order

Correspondence should be addressed to Luigi Leone, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, “Sapienza” University of Rome, Via
dei Marsi 78, Rome 00145, Italy. (E-mail: luigi.leone@uniroma1.it.)
Luigi Leone wrote most of the paper and performed the analyses. Mauro Giacomantonio and Marco Lauriola managed data collection, prepared the
data and wrote some sections of the paper.

© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science

198 LEONE, GIACOMANTONIO, LAURIOLA
to foster the maintenance and flourishing of a group
or culture; and, (2) the individualising foundations of
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, which emphasise
respect for individual rights in order to protect and foster
the well-being of the individual.
Here, we would propose that the moral foundations
should relate to conspiracy beliefs and, specifically, that
individuals prioritising the binding foundations would
more strongly endorse conspiracy beliefs. The focus on
in-group cohesion and community of the binding foun-
dations (Graham et al., 2011) would match with the
us-versus-them mentality that features in most conspir-
acy beliefs (van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014). The typi-
cal events triggering conspiracy-focused explanations are
of super-individual relevance because they are construed
as threats to nations (e.g., 9/11), faiths (e.g., jihadist) or
even larger groups (e.g., the people) in the case of eco-
nomic recessions or environmental crisis. Because the
victims in the conspiracy theories are frequently framed
as large groups as opposed to small cliques of powerful
individuals (van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014), this asym-
metry easily activates an in-group/out-group perspective
that should resonate more with individuals emphasising
the moral foundations that bind individuals into groups.
In addition, the events explained by conspiracy beliefs
invariably represent a threat to the foundations of soci-
ety, and such threats resonate strongly with the defensive
stance of a way of life embodied in the binding founda-
tions. Thus, we anticipate a positive association between
individual differences in the binding foundations and con-
spiracy beliefs.
We maintain a more exploratory position in the role of
the individualising foundations. It could be argued that the
individualising moral foundations should be less in tune
with conspiracy beliefs when compared with the binding
foundations. Fairness/reciprocity and harm/care empha-
sise an individualistic perspective and a more detached
attitude towards communal cohesion. The threats focal to
conspiracy theorising are group-threats, and it has been
argued that it is group deprivation—rather than individual
deprivation—that makes people more susceptible to con-
spiracy beliefs (Simmons & Parsons, 2005). Hence, we
would tentatively propose that the individualistic outlook
of those prioritising the individualising foundation would
inhibit the activation of conspiracy theorising. Further-
more, the importance assigned to individual rights and
protection from harm is coupled with a more optimistic
view of human nature (Nilsson & Strupp-Levitsky, 2016),
which is at odds with the pessimism on human nature
that underpins the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
(Moulding et al., 2016). Thus, we could expect that the
1 DWB are tightly connected with right wing authoritarianism (e.g., Federico et al., 2013), which in turn has been connected with conspiracy ideation
(e.g., Wilson & Rose, 2014). We preferred to measure DWB instead than Authoritarianism because the DWB construct is at a broad level of generality
and does not measure directly, as Authoritarianism scales do, ideological orientations. Ideology could be connected with conspiracy ideation, but we
preferred to maintain a level of analysis focused on broad worldviews, instead than on ideological orientations.
association between the individualising foundations and
conspiracy beliefs, if any, should be negative.
Mediators
Moral foundations and conspiracy beliefs differ in terms
of generality/specificity. Therefore, the associations
described above are likely to rely on the intervention of
more proximal correlates of conspiracy beliefs. The bind-
ing moral foundations reflect concern for the communal
well-being. Consistently, the binding foundations should
relate to dangerous world beliefs (DWB), a worldview
picturing the social world as threatening a cherished
way-of-life (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013). In
turn, the high degree of uncertainty and anxiety implied
by DWB should make such a worldview a proximal
correlate of conspiracy beliefs (Moulding et al., 2016).
The individualising foundations should instead be nega-
tively related with DWB because of the optimistic view of
human nature that goes hand-in-hand with prioritising the
individualising foundations (Nilsson & Strupp-Levitsky,
2016).
We also considered a different worldview based on
competitive jungle beliefs (CJB). These are correlated
with DWB (e.g., Federico et al., 2013), and share some
conceptual features with the construct of Machiavel-
lianism, which has been connected with conspiracy
ideation (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). Such associations
could make CJB a suitable candidate to relate with
conspiracy beliefs.1 However, CJB taps mainly into a
dominance motive that should be kept as distinct from the
threat-related motives underpinning DWB (e.g., Duckitt,
Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). It could be argued
that the threat-related motives reflected in DWB are key
in fostering conspiracy beliefs (Moulding et al., 2016),
whilst dominance-related motives are relatively less
important (e.g., Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015). Hence, we did
not expect much meditational capability from CJB; this
anticipation is also consistent with previous research that
found negligible associations of CJB with the binding
foundations (Federico et al., 2013).
We also propose that the binding moral foundations
should relate to a moral absolutist stance, which in turn
should be related to conspiracy beliefs (Oliver & Wood,
2014). Binding moral foundations serve a communal and
even transcendent point of view. They unambiguously
define the terms of the good life for the community.
The absolute character of the binding moral foundations
should be conducive to a splitting moral stance, where
there is an unambiguous splitting separating good and
© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science

evil, and no shades of grey may exist, especially when the
communal life is threatened. Hence, the binding founda-
tions should relate positively with individual differences
in MAS (Lauriola et al., 2015). Those who are high on the
MAS tend to frame intergroup relations within a disjunc-
tive logic that create binary oppositions: good in-group,
evil out-group (Lauriola et al., 2015). Likewise, believ-
ers in conspiracy theories explain threatening events as
originating from a thoroughly evil out-group agent (Sut-
ton & Douglas, 2014). Recent research has shown that
a construct similar to the MAS, dubbed Manichaeism
(measured with a single item) was related to conspiracy
beliefs (Oliver & Wood, 2014). Therefore, we anticipated
that MAS would be connected with conspiracy beliefs,
and mediate the association between the binding foun-
dations and conspiracy beliefs. In contrast, the individ-
ualising foundations assume a form of moral relativism
because the individualising stance emphasises the right of
the autonomous individual to his/her personal moral stan-
dards (Taylor, 2007). This is at odds with MAS, which
should then relate negatively with individual differences
in the individualising foundations.
METHOD
Participants and procedure
Given the novelty of our predictions concerning the role of
moral foundations, we aimed at investigating the expected
associations in two independent samples, collected a few
months apart. A total of 362 individuals participated in
the first data collection (Sample A), and 539 individuals
(Sample B) participated in the second data collection.
For each sample, a snowballing recruitment procedure
was used. Psychology students were offered course-credit
for recruiting mostly non-student adult individuals; the
psychology students helping with the data collection were
not allowed to fill out the questionnaire. They were also
instructed to avoid recruitment of family members or
roommates, in order to reach a relatively diverse pool of
respondents. As a result, non-student adult respondents
were a majority (69.4% in Sample A and 83.3% in Sample
B). The questionnaires were administered on-line for both
samples. Because of incomplete responses and missing
values, final Ns were 319 for Sample A (179 females,
M age = 35.42, SD = 13.68), and 514 for Sample B (270
females, M age = 36.30, SD = 11).
All participants in both samples were Italian native
speakers. The decision to use two independent samples
was a focus of our research project from the outset, in
order to increase confidence on the generalizability of
findings. Samples A and B, although both non-random
samples, differed considerably from each other. Sample
2 These distributions differed significantly across samples: χ2 (2) = 6.25, p = .044, for education; χ2 (7) = 25.2, p = .001, for occupation.
© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science
MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 199
B differed from Sample A not only because the former
was larger, but also because Sample B was arguably more
balanced and diverse. More specifically, Sample B was
more balanced as far as the gender distribution was con-
cerned (i.e., no significant departure from an ideal 50/50
gender ratio), χ2 (1) = 1.31, p = .259). In addition, Sam-
ple B was less dependent on student participants, with
a complementary significant increase in the proportion
of non-student participants in Sample B (χ2 (1) = 12.18,
p < .001). Samples differed in their composition on other
demographics. In Sample A, 6.6% of respondents did
not finish high school, 48% completed high school and
45.5% had a college degree (in Sample B the figures
for education were 6, 39.4 and 54.3%, respectively).
In Sample A, a plurality of respondents were students
(30.4%), followed by employees (24.8%), and a 15%
of professionals (remaining respondents were dispersed
across various occupations). In Sample B, a plurality
of respondents were employees (33.1%), followed by
professionals (19.3%), and then by students (16.7%,
the rest of respondents were dispersed across various
occupations).2 Thus, we could confidently conclude that
Sample B was larger, less biased and relatively more rep-
resentative than Sample A, therefore providing favourable
ground for replication. As a whole, successful replication
of results across the two samples could be considered as
encouraging evidence on the tenability of our hypotheses.
Measures
The same scales were used in Samples A and B.
Responses for all variables were coded on 7-point scales.
Moral foundations were measured with the moral
foundations questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011;
Italian version: Bobbio, Nencini, & Sarrica, 2011).
The MFQ is composed by two distinct sections of
15 items each. One section examines how much each
moral foundation is relevant for the respondents (e.g.,
whether or not someone was harmed; whether or not
someone violated standards of purity and decency).
The second section focuses on moral evaluations of
behavioural instances (e.g., If I saw a mother slap-
ping her child, I would be outraged; I would call some
acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural
or disgusting). In our research, we only included the
moral relevance section to keep the questionnaire short
and suitable for online data-collection. Some previous
studies had similarly relied on the moral relevance
scores only (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, Study 1).
In addition, we were mainly interested in the general,
worldview-like, level of analysis that is best provided by
the moral relevance section. Also, the moral judgement
section typically yields unsatisfactory reliabilities, whilst
200 LEONE, GIACOMANTONIO, LAURIOLA
the relevance scales attain in general satisfactory relia-
bilities (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Sinn & Hayes, 2016.)
We averaged the scores for the binding foundations
(authority/respect, in-group/loyalty and purity/sanctity)
and for the individualising foundations (harm/care and
fairness/reciprocity). Reliabilities were satisfactory for
both the binding (αs .85 and .79 in Samples A and B,
respectively), and the individualising foundations (αs .85
and .86 in Samples A and B, respectively).
Worldviews were measured using the 10-item belief
in a dangerous world scale, and the 20-item belief in a
competitive jungle world scale (Duckitt et al., 2002). In
Sample B, a shorter (10-item) version of the latter was
administered. DWB scores showed satisfactory reliability
(αs = .80 in both samples), as it was the case for CJB
scores (αs .88 and .79 in Samples A and B, respectively).
MAS, the rigid and stereotyped view that reflects
black-and-white thinking related to the ambiguous
behaviours in terms of moral opposites, was measured
with a 10-item scale comprising the seven items of the
original Lauriola et al.’s (2015) measure of the construct,
and three additional items which broadened the scope of
the measure and strengthened the reliability of the scale:
“That who lies once, would lie forever”; “When honesty
and loyalty are concerned, there are no shades of gray,
just black or white”; “It’s not true that one can find some
good even in an evil person: if one is evil, he/she is evil.”
Reliabilities were satisfactory in both samples (αs .88
and .86 in Samples A and B, respectively).3
A total of 13 conspiracy beliefs were measured
to include a multiplicity of events and concerns such
as 9/11, diseases, economic crisis. Some items were
adapted from beliefs investigated in other measures
(i.e., Swami et al., 2016), others were generated focus-
ing on beliefs with wide currency in Italy (vaccines,
chemtrails—Mancosu, Vassallo, & Vezzoni, 2017). A
fictitious conspiracy belief (item 10) was also included
to tap into the “monological” processes that use one
conspiratorial ideation as evidence for other – even
fictitious – conspiracy beliefs (Swami et al., 2011). Reli-
ability was satisfactory in both samples (αs .88 and .89 in
Samples A and B, respectively). Table 1 reports the list
of beliefs, as well as the component loadings obtained
in the two samples for a one-dimensional solution. To
gauge the measure’s structural stability across samples,
we computed a measure of factor congruence (Tucker’s
phi, which reflects the correlation of the factor patterns
across samples) and obtained a coefficient of .99.
RESULTS
As a preliminary step, we ascertained the similarity of the
zero-order associations across samples and tested the null
3 The pattern of results was unaffected whether the original 7-item measure described by Lauriola et al. (2015) or the 10-item scale described herein
was used.
hypothesis of invariance of the variance/covariance matri-
ces using the appropriate procedures within the LISREL
software (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). The hypothe-
sis of equality could not be rejected (χ2 (21) = 30.27,
p = .087; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) = .033; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .99).
The associations (Table 2) could, therefore, be deemed
invariant across samples. It should be noted that the
associations of the binding and individualising founda-
tions with conspiracy beliefs were small in magnitude.
Nonetheless, the binding moral foundations were related
significantly to conspiracy beliefs. The binding founda-
tions correlated, as expected, with DWB and MAS, but
not with CJB. Instead, the individualising foundations
correlated negatively with CJB. DWB and MAS corre-
lated with conspiracy beliefs, as expected, whilst CJB
appeared unrelated at the bivariate level with conspiracy
beliefs.
To more closely test for our anticipated pattern of
associations, we tested in both samples a path analy-
sis with multiple mediators with the LISREL software
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). The correlation matrices
in Table 2 were used as input. The model specified
the moral foundations as the exogenous variables and
beliefs in dangerous world, competitive jungle, and
MAS as mediators; conspiracy beliefs were modelled
as the final criterion (Figure 1). This was a relatively
parsimonious total mediation model where no direct
effects of the moral foundations were estimated (James,
Mulaik, & Brett, 2006). Because the model fitted the data
nicely in both samples (Sample A: χ2 (2) = .03, p = .98;
RMSEA = .00; CFI = 1.00; Sample B: χ2 (2) = .10,
p = .94; RMSEA = .00; CFI = 1.00) a total mediation
hypothesis could be retained.
Figure 1 summarises the standardised parameter esti-
mates. The binding foundations related positively with
DWB (.34 in both Samples A and B) and MAS (.50
in Sample A; .42 in Sample B), but non-significantly
with CJB (again, in both Samples A and B). Instead,
the individualising moral foundations related negatively
with CJB (−.26 and −.10 in Samples A and B, respec-
tively) and DWB (Sample A: −.13; Sample B: −.09),
although more weakly so in Sample B. The individu-
alising moral foundations were also negatively related
with MAS in both samples, with very similar coefficients
(−.19 and −.17 in Samples A and B, respectively). The
effects of the supposed mediators on conspiracy beliefs
were positive for DWB (.17 and .33 in Samples A and B,
respectively) and MAS (Sample A: .18; Sample B: .11)
but non-significant for CJB, a pattern that replicated con-
sistently across samples. The proportion of variance in
conspiracy beliefs accounted for by the effects included
in the model was .09 for Sample A, and .15 for Sample B.
© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science
 MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 201

TABLE 1
Principal component analysis of conspiracy beliefs in Samples A and B

Component loadings
Item Sample A Sample B

1. The U.S. government did not prevent the 9/11 attacks in order to justify the Afghanistan .59 .71
and Iraq campaigns
2. A cure for cancer already exists, but the pharmaceutical industrial complex keeps it secret .70 .75
in order to maximise its profits
3. The 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession represent the intended result of .63 .64
deliberate actions by banks, financial speculators and multinational corporations
4. The financial crises of the last decade have been deliberately caused by political and .67 .67
financial authorities
5. The U.S. government knew in advance about the 9/11 attacks, and deliberately decided not .67 .76
to stop them
6. Soft-drinks corporations add addictive substances in their products .63 .52
7. Infective diseases, such as Ebola, are deliberately spread by governments and .74 .79
pharmaceutical multinationals
8. The so-called Islamic State does not really exist; it is a smoke-screen concocted by Western .61 .62
Governmental Agencies
9. LGBT groups have a plan to turn people into homosexuals by means of bogus “gender .44 .47
theories”
10. The assassination of judge Giacomini was committed by mafia killers with the political .67 .57
complicity of the Italian Government
11. Vaccines are useless and dangerous, they are only instrumental to the financial interests of .62 .59
pharmaceutical companies
12. Groups of powerful people use chemtrails to poison the air, or to manipulate the .64 .70
environment
13. Few groups of powerful individuals (Bilderberg Group, Trilateral Commission, the .68 .72
Rotschild family, the Free Masonry, etc.) secretly rule the world

LGBT = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender.

TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics

1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Binding — .50** .29** −.07 .50** .13*

2. Individualising .40** — .08 −.11** .04 .02
3. Dangerous world .29** .01 — −.02 .39** .38**
4. Competitive jungle −.08 −.24** .18* — .09* .04
5. Moral absolutism/splitting .41** .00 .42** .13* — .24**
6. Conspiracy beliefs .12* .01 .24** .01 .26** —
Means (SD) Sample A 3.84 (.82) 4.73 (.67) 4.04 (.86) 2.62 (.70) 3.62 (1.31) 2.79 (.77)
Means (SD) Sample B 3.87 (.87) 4.78 (.72) 4.18 (.92) 2.29 (.72) 3.62 (1.24) 2.75 (.71)

Note: Intercorrelations: Sample A (N = 319) below the diagonal and Sample B (N = 514) above the diagonal.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

This stable pattern of associations yielded indirect
effects for the moral foundations, with opposite signs.
As expected, a positive indirect effect of the binding
foundations was detected in both Sample A (.15, SE = .03,
p < .0001), and Sample B (.16, SE = .03, p < .0001). A
weaker—albeit significant—and negative indirect effect
of the individualising foundations on conspiracy beliefs
was similarly found in both samples: −.07, SE = .02,
p < .001, and −.05, SE = .02, p < .01, for Samples A and
B, respectively. The indirect effects, although reliable,
were nonetheless small.
Such indirect effects could be decomposed further.
The indirect effect for the individualising foundations
was channelled by MAS (Sample A: −.034; Sample B:
−.012) and DWB (Sample A: −.022; Sample B: −.029),
and more weakly by CJB (Sample A: −.013; Sample B:
−.003). The indirect effect of the binding foundations
was channelled mainly through DWB (Sample A: .058;
Sample B: .112) and MAS (Sample A: .09; Sample B:
.047). The portion of the effect of the binding founda-
tion channelled by CJB was negligible in both samples
(Sample A: .002; Sample B: .001).
DISCUSSION
As anticipated, the moral foundations related positively
to conspiracy beliefs were those of the binding kind. The

© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science

202 LEONE, GIACOMANTONIO, LAURIOLA
Figure 1. Path analysis model: Standardised parameters. Sample B in parentheses. Note: † < .10; *p < .05. **p < .01.
positive association was channelled through perceptions
of insecurity and an either/or disjunctive moral logic.
An indirect association of the individualising foundations
also materialised, but with a negative sign. The indirect
association materialised because the individualising foun-
dations related negatively with both moral absolutism
and with the pessimistic evaluation of human-to-human
interactions that transpires from DWB. In turn, moral
absolutism and DWB related as expected with con-
spiracy beliefs (Moulding et al., 2016; Oliver & Wood,
2014).
The results were consistent with the line of research
that conceptualises endorsement of conspiracy theories
as an inter-group phenomenon that is activated to face
threats traced back to groups outside the in-group’s bor-
ders (e.g., van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014). The bind-
ing moral foundations are inherently social because they
emphasise the group over the individual and they are
designed to foster the flourishing of the community and
its internal cohesion around binding practices. For those
individuals whose moral stances are rooted in binding,
group-centred concerns, events perceived as threatening
can readily be framed within an us-versus-them moral
mould that fits with conspiracy ideation. To the best
of our knowledge, the present research was the first to
emphasise that moral foundations would be important in
understanding conspiracy ideation, inasmuch conspiracy
beliefs unambiguously identify victims and culprits and
discriminate right from wrong, good from evil. Future
research could investigate how other morally relevant
constructs, as moral identity and personality traits linked
with morality, relate with conspiracy ideation and conspir-
acy mentality. Implicit measures of honesty and morality
(Perugini & Leone, 2009) might be used to gauge more
subtle connections between moral perceptions of self and
other and conspiracy ideation.
Individuals prioritising the individualising foundations
appeared unresponsive to the us-versus-them mindset that
is inherent in conspiracy thinking. The finding that pri-
oritising the individualising foundation, which comprises
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity concerns, was nega-
tively related with conspiracy beliefs might be considered
somewhat puzzling. Conspiracy theories generally deal
with adverse events whereby individuals are unfairly
treated, harmed, even deprived of their lives. Harm/care
and fairness/reciprocity concerns should be activated by
such events, but apparently not in the group-focused way
that fosters conspiracy-based explanations (van Prooijen
& van Lange, 2014). It may be speculated that the individ-
ualising foundations do indeed represent an outcome of
the “great moral narrowing” of the Enlightenment (Haidt
& Kesebir, 2010, p. 798): the Enlightenment successfully
narrowed the moral domain dislodging an older moral
order built around collective identities and moral tradi-
tions with a modern moral understanding focused on the
individual (Taylor, 2007). Current differences in moral
foundations across liberals and conservatives reflect such
“narrowing,” as liberals assign moral relevance mainly to
the individualising foundations, whilst conservatives are
sensitive to the whole spectrum of the moral foundations
assessed by the MFQ (Graham et al., 2009). The tradi-
tional “broader” moral order interpreted social events
as of relevance for the whole community; consequently,
any social threat represented a threat to the group. A
conspiracy mindset fits with such a moral order, and its
embodiment in moral foundations of the binding kind.
Instead, the moral foundations of the individualising
kind do not frame momentous social events as threats for
© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science

the individual’s identity. The liberal post-Enlightenment
morality gravitating around individualising moral con-
cerns also implied a more benign perception of the
world as more sympathetic to human flourishing and
populated by well-meaning individuals (Taylor, 2007).
As a consequence, conspiracy narratives do not fit with
the optimistic individualising moral sensibility as they do
with the pessimistic binding moral sensibility.
The diverging pessimistic/optimistic views of human-
ity and moral stances relying on the absolutism/relativism
dimension might be interpreted as the crossroads where
the associations of the moral concerns with conspiracy
beliefs bifurcated into opposite paths. Interestingly, the
pathways leading to conspiracy-based accounts of trou-
bling events might be perceived as consistent with a com-
plex and dynamic interpretation of conspiracy thinking
(Moulding et al., 2016) where some elements (threaten-
ing perceptions, dangerous worldview) may work to raise
uncertainty, and others (Manichaeism, Moral absolutism)
to resolve it by embracing a simplified account of reality,
as that provided by conspiracy beliefs. Such complex pat-
tern is reminiscent of other dynamic processes, as those
peculiar to the anxious and avoidant attachment styles
(e.g., Dykas & Cassidy, 2011), where a similar unstable
sequence of perceptions of insecurity and rigid responses
can be observed. Such dynamics appear to be an interest-
ing area for future research on the psychological function
of conspiracy theories and beliefs.
Limitations
The main limitation of the present study resides in the cor-
relational and cross-sectional nature of the data, which
prevented us from making causal inferences. However,
the main goal of the present work was to establish a pat-
tern of associations, with conspiracy beliefs differently
associated with the binding compared with the individu-
alising foundations, and with such associations operating
through indirect pathways.
Generalizability of results can be regarded as another
limitation of the present research. We tried to deal with
this issue by analysing two independent samples. The
two samples differed in some demographic characteris-
tics, and therefore the stability of results observed across
samples might be interpreted as an encouraging finding,
as far as replicability was concerned. Of course, stud-
ies relying on more representative samples could provide
more solid evidence on the generalizability of our find-
ings. It is also apparent that the associations hypothe-
sised explained only a relatively small amount of varia-
tion in conspiracy ideation. Yet, we would emphasise that
because of the novelty of the proposed association, even
small associations could provide valuable insights for
a multifaceted conceptualization of conspiracy ideation.
Finally, it should be also acknowledged that our measure
© 2017 International Union of Psychological Science
MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 203
of conspiracy beliefs had its limitations that are nonethe-
less shared by other validated scales focusing on specific
beliefs (i.e., some degree of cultural specificity, and sensi-
tivity to the vagaries of the news cycle) as has been noted
elsewhere (e.g., Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013).
CONCLUSION
Results emphasised the importance of different moral
foundations as the moral background that could favour or
inhibit a conspiracy-laden interpretation to negative social
events. The indirect associations of individual differences
in moral foundations with conspiracy beliefs open a novel
interpretation of conspiracy theories as morally infused
perceptions of social events. A programme aiming at
reducing the recognised negative impact of conspiracy
mindsets at the social level (e.g., van der Linden, 2015)
could take into account that conspiracy beliefs are not
simply sheer consequences of cognitive failures or mal-
adaptive personality traits, but that they are also based on
moral stances on what is right or wrong, and who is to
blame. Perceiving moral injustices is key to social ame-
liorative action, and moral sources are important to spur
social engagement and civic behaviours (Taylor, 2007).
However, morally rigid (Manichean) perceptions of the
world and conspiracy beliefs breed suspicion and social
impotence (e.g., Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2015).
Aiming at weakening the link between individual differ-
ences in binding moral foundations and a rigid either/or
disjunctive logic in making social judgments (MAS) may
rouse the attention to social problems, and avoid yielding
to cynicism and social impotence.
Manuscript received March 2017
Revised manuscript accepted August 2017
First published online September 2017
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