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VOLUME I
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DIVISION OF SAFETY
SAFETY'
OPERATING
BATTALION
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INVESTIGATIVE ~ R E P O R T
FATAL FIRE AT 62 WATTS STREET
March 28, 1994
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SUMMARY
On March 28, 1994 at 6:35 PM the New York City Fire
Department, Manhattan Borough communications .Office,
received a telephone alarm of fire. The caller reported
smoke on the top floor of 60 watts street.
Units of the N. Y C . Fire Department were
The five first alarm units arrived at the 1ncident
location almost simultaneously and out of the normal
response order. Ladder Co. 8 , although assigned second
due, arrived first at Watts street and Varick street and
encountered heavy vehicular traffic. watts st. is a west
bound feeder street for the Holland Tunnel. At 6: 40 PM
the officer in command of Ladder 8 saw smoke emitting from
62 Watts .Street and ordered a 10-75 (notification of a
fire) transmitted via department radio. 62 watts street is
a 3 story, non fireproof ,. multiple dwelling. The location
of the f1re was in the first floor apartment kitchen area.
Fire Department operations were initiated, engine
companies stretched and operated hose lines. and ladder
performed their vent, entry and search duties.
Durl.ng the initial stage of the operation there was a
sudden and unexpected intensification of fire in the first
floor apartment. Intense flame erupted from the' front
windows and the apartment entrance door on the. first
floor. Fire and extreme heat traveled up the open interior
hall and stairs and engulfed the entire hallway from the
first floor to the third floor. A large volume of flame
erupted through the skylight and roof scuttle to a height
of 12 to 16 feet above the roof. Captain John Drennan,
Firefighter Christopher Siedenburg and Firefighter James
Young of Ladder Co. 5 were on the second floor attempting
to force the apartment door, in order to conduct a search
and examination. They were exposed to intense heat,
products of combustion and direct flame contact.
Firefighter Young perished at the scene. captain Drennan
and Firefighter Siedenburg were located, first aid
and removed from the building by F1re Department
personnel. They were then medically stabilized by EMS and
transported to the New York Hospital Burn Center, in
critical condition.
Firefighter Seidenburg expired on March 29, 1994 and
Capta.in Drennan expired on May 7, 1994.
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FnmDlGS:
At the beginning of the 6 X 9 tour of duty on 3/28/94 the
officer of Ladder Co. 8 determined that there would be an
imbalance in manpower in his unit for that tour. He
contacted Battalion 2 and was instructed to exchange a
member with Ladder Co. 5 to better balance the available
ladder company personnel.
At 7:35 P.M. on Karch 28, 1994 units of the NYC Fire
Dept responded to a fire in a 3 story residential building
at 62 Watts street, in the Borough of Manhattan. The fire
originated in the first floor, kitchen area of an
unoccupied a ~ e n t .The fire had been burning in an
oxygen defic1ent atmosphere for a period of time that
could have been as long as one hour. Ladder 8 was at the
quarters of Ladder 5 exchanging personnel when this alarm
was received. Ladder 8 .was the first arriving unit and
discovered that the fire was not located on the top floor
of 60 Watts street as reported, but at 62 watts st. on the
first floor.
Heavy Holland Tunnel bound traffic produced gridlock
c:onditions on Watts street, reducing .the -.options .. for
optiDlWll. positioning of arriving apparatus.
Ladder 8, although assigned 2nd due, arrived 1st.at
the location of the alarm, and assumed 1st. due position
(fire floor) and transmitted the 10-75 signal. Ladder 5
was the 2nd ladder company to arrive and assumed the 2nd
due position (floors above the fire). The balance of the
assigned units (Engines 55, 24 and 7) arrived almost
simultaneously, but out of normal response. sequence.
Engine company operations were initiated.
While the members of Ladder 8 were in the process of
forcing the fire apartment door, the officer and forcible
entry team of Ladder 5 entered the fire building. The
officer of Ladder 5 advised the officer of Ladder 8 that
they were going up the interior stairs to operate on the
floor(s) above. This is the normal position for the
second due ladder company at a fire of this type.
The forcible entry had not been completed on the door to
the fire apartment and the door was still closed at this
time.
The members of Ladder 5 went up the interior stairs to
the 2nd floor and encountered a box spring, mattress and
piece of furniture stored in the 2nd floor ballway. They
began vent, entry and search operations on the second
floor.
Engine 55 took a position at the hydrant located at
the Northeast corner of watts and Varick st, approximately
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120 feet west of the fire building. The 1st hose line was
stretched by Engine 55, assisted by Engines 24 and 7. At
least 6 lengths of hose were stretched to the fire
building.' This led to a number of kinks in the hoseline
and required the hose to be flaked out and straightened.
When the door to the fire apartment was forced the
hose line was not yet in position. The fire intensified
in the fire apartment, smoke and flame started to lap out
of the top of the doorway and extend up the interior
stairway. The members of Ladder 8 were unable to
completely close the apartment door and isolate the fire
area. Physical control of the door could not be regained
. ' The required, self-closing apartment entrance door
fa1led to operate' in its proper manner. Although the
first floor apartment door was equipped with self-closing
devices, there is evidence that they had been inoperative
~ r i o r to the fire. This defect caused the door to remain
1n the open position.
There ,was no communication from members operatinq on
the 1st floor to the Ladder 5 forcible entry team
operatinq on'the' 2nd floor or to the incident commander,
to warn them.of the deteriorating conditions.
An URGENT-URGENT handi-talkie message was transmitted
by the officer of Ladder 5. The Jlessaqe was acknowledged
by the incident COJlllltinder. It has not been determined
what conditions existed on the 2nd floor at the time the
nozzle of Engine 55's hoseline in the first floor hallway,
messaqe was transmtted or the exact reason for the
message.
At approxill8.tely the time that water reached the
the two front windows to the fire apartment were vented,
(broken) by the outside vent man of L a d d ~ 8.
The investigative team, after analyzing the physical
evidence, interviewing w1tnesses and consultinq with
technical experts concluded that the explanation for the
unusual and violent behavior of this fire was the
occurrence of a BACKDRAFT.
After Engine 55 positioned their charged hoseline at
the fire apartment door and during the initial
extinguishment stage, a phenomena ,that is defined as a
backdraft occurred in the first floor fire apartment. This
backdraft produced a tremendous volume of fire which
erupted from the front windows, through the interior
apartment door, into the public hallway, up the interior
stairway and through-the vented roof scuttle and skylight.
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During interviews several m e m b ~ r s operating at the
fire reported hearing what was described as a garbled or
muffled handi-talkie radio message which sounded like
"Mayday", just after the backdraft occurred. The origin of
this message could not be determined.
At the time of the urgent and mayday messages the
incident commander did not have uncommitted personnel
immediately available, to institute a fire fighter assist
team
The fire continued to burn violently in the public
hallway for a period of approximately 8 to 9 minutes.
There was no extension of fire to the 2nd. floor apartment
. and only minor extension to the 3rd. floor apartment. The
heavy volume of fire produced by the backdraft initially
exceeded the' extinguishment capability. of the hose line
that was positioned and. operating in the fire apartment
entrance door.
The three members of Ladder 5, who were performing the
duties of the 2nd due ladder company on the floor above
the fire, had not completed the forcible entry of the
second floor apartment door, .. thereby denying them an area
of refuge- when the 'backdraft . occurred. They. were exposed
to extreme heat, products of combustion and direct fleae
contact. The three members received severe thermal
injuries which resulted in their deaths. These members
were expQsed to these extreme conditions for approximately
4 to 5 minutes. .
The operations at 62 Watts street basically followed
established procedures with some variations performed by
specific members.. The actions taken by the officer and
forcible entry team of Ladder 5 were prudent and .in
compliance with existing Hew York City Fire Department
standard operating procedures and practices. The position
that they assUllled, on the floor- .. over the fire, is a
hazardous location, but a critical area that must be
entered to search for possible trapped occupants.
Alterations had been made to the fire building.
Although approved. by the Department of Buildings, the
alterations created conditions that si9Dificantly effected
the development and behavior of the f1re.. The alterations
to the fire apartment produced an environment that was
conducive to the development of a backdraft condition.
Alterations to the remainder of the' building effected fire
travel and extension as well as reducing escape options to
the members trapped on the second floor.
The wood plank flooring in the 2nd floor apartment was
stripped and a polyurethane coatin9 applied approximately
24 hours prior to the mishap. In1tially it was tho'.lght
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that the freshly applied floor finishing material may have
contributed to or affected the fuel supply of the f1re in
the hallway. No evidence was uncovered to substantiate
this theory. The Bureau of Fire Investigation secured
samples of flooring and they were analyzed by the New York
City Police Department laboratory. Tests were performed
on portions of flooring removed from the second floor
hallway and fire apartment. There were no significant or
unusual findings.
The personal protective equipment (PPE) and self
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) worn by the three
deceased -members was severely damaged by heat and fire.
The equipment was not designed or constructed to fully
protect the user against the duration of extreme heat and
fire it was subjected to at this mishap. The three
members were exposed to direct flame contact and heat that
attained a temperature possibly as high as 2200 degrees
F. for a period of about 4 to 5 minutes. The estimated
temperature was substantiated by the melted glass from the
skylight and results of the computer ROdel.
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CAUSES:
1. DIRECT
Members operating in a hazardous position on the floor
above the fire.
There was no communication from the members operating
on the fire floor to the members of Ladder 5, warning
them of rapidly deteriorating conditions.
Members operating on the first floor were unable to
control the door when conditions deteriorated.
An unanticipated backdraft occurred in the fire
apartment. This is highly unusual for this type of
occupancy. The classic textbook indicators or signs
of impending were either not present or not
observed.
2. INDIRECT
Hembers.. of. Ladder 5 did not have a viable escape
route. The rear door- to the second floor apartment ..
had been removed during alterations. They were unable
to complete the forcible entry through the front
apartment door in time to exit the hallway. A heavy
volume of fire prevented their use of interior
stairway.
The magnitude of the fire generated by the backdraft
initially overwhelmed the suppression capability of
the hose line operating on the first floor.
3. EARLY
The placing of the bag of refuse on or near the
burning surface of the gas range. This was the
primary cause of the fire.
The absence of operating smoke detectors delayed the
discovery of the fire, allowing the fire to burn
undetected for a period of time which could have been
as long as one hour. This caused the buildup of
carbon monoxide and other combustible gases which
resulted in the backdraft.
Lack of maintenance of the self closing device on the
apartment door allowed the door to remain in the open
position as fire conditions worsened.
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Building alterations:
a. Created a l a r ~ e r apartment size and increased the
size of the f1re area.
b. Created an almost airtight combustion area.
c. Greatly reduced the size of the first floor
hallway.
c. Eliminated the second floor rear apartment door.
e. Changed the configuration of the second floor
hallway.
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