Reconsidering The Look in Sartre's Being and Nothingness - Luna Dolezal

Reconsidering the Look in Sartre's "Being and Nothingness"
Author(s): Luna Dolezal

Source: Sartre Studies International , 2012, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2012), pp. 9-28
Published by: Berghahn Books
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42705181
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Sartre Studies
International
This content downloaded from

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Reconsidering the Look in Sartre's
Being and Nothingness
Luna Doležal
Abstract: Jean-Paul Sartre's account of the Look in Being

and Nothingness is not straightforward and many conflicting
interpretations have arisen due to apparent contradictions in Sartre's
own writing. The Look, for Sartre, demonstrates how the self gains
thematic awareness of the body, forming a public and self-conscious
sense of how the body appears to others and, furthermore, illustrates
affective and social aspects of embodied being. In this article, I will
critically explore Sartre's oft-cited voyeur vignette in order to provide
a coherent account of the Look and to illustrate the significance of
intersubjectivity and self-consciousness in Sartre's work. Through
considering Sartre's voyeur vignette and other examples of reflective
self-consciousness, this article will examine epistemological, self-
evaluative and ontological concerns in the constitution of reflective
self-consciousness. It will be contended that Sartre's accounts of
the Look and reflective self-consciousness within social relations can
provide insight into the intersubjective nature of the shaping of the
body and the significance of self-presentation within the social realm.
Keywords: Jean-Paul Sartre, the Look, intersubjectivity, self-

presentation, self-consciousness.
Introduction
In Being and Nothingness , Jean-Paul Sartre attempts to develop

a comprehensive description of the lived body and intercorporeal
relations, reflecting on the role of objectification in the constitution
of reflective self-consciousness. Sartre is not often acknowledged as a
phenomenologist of embodiment, and his reflections on the nature
of embodied subjectivity are often overshadowed by Merleau-Ponty's
Sartre Studies International Volume 18, Issue 1, 2012: 9-28

doi:10.3167/ssi.2012. 180102 ISSN 1357-1559 (Print), ISSN 1558-5476 (Onli

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
Phenomenology of Perception } Despite this lack of recognition,

Sartre also developed an insightful description of the lived body
confronting the existential and ontological question of the character
of existence for an embodied subject. In fact, writings on the body
pervade much of the work in Being and Nothingness through Sartre's
reflections on intersubjectivity, consciousness, self-consciousness, bad
faith and freedom.
Sartre's phenomenological description of the body posits
intersubjective relations as a central and constitutive feature of
embodied subjectivity. For Sartre, the encounter with the other is an
ontological event which awakens reflective self-consciousness and the
discursive realm. His analysis of embodied social relations privileges
the visual field and the seen body, and the encounter with the other is
described at length in his account of the Look {le regard)? The
Look demonstrates, for Sartre, how the self gains thematic awareness
of the body, forming a public and self-conscious sense of how the
body appears to others and, furthermore, illustrates affective and
social aspects of embodied being.
However, Sartre's account of the Look is not straightforward, and
many conflicting interpretations have arisen due to apparent
contradictions in Sartre's own writing. As we shall see, Sartre seems
to slip between epistemological, ontological and self-evaluative
concerns when considering the role of intersubjectivity and of
objectification in the constitution of reflective self-consciousness.
Weaving between these three layers, Sartre's description of
intercorporeal relations is often fraught with contradictions and
ambiguities. Hence, in this article, I will critically explore Sartre's
accounts of the Look, particularly focusing on the oft-cited voyeur
vignette.
I will begin with an overview of Sartre's ontological structure. I
will then consider his investigations and reflections concerning the
body, in particular the role of the for-itself, the constitution of self-
consciousness through the Look and other self-reflective experiences.
Sartre's account is not straightforward, and some time will be spent
reconsidering his reflections on the Look, exploring epistemological,
self-evaluative and ontological concerns in the constitution of
reflective self-consciousness. Despite rejecting certain of his
ontological claims, I believe that Sartre's account of the Look and
reflective self-consciousness within social relations can provide insight
into the intersubjective nature of the shaping of the body. For this
reason, it is worth going into Sartre's account at some length.
-10-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Reconsidering the Look in Sartre's Being and Nothingness
Sartre's Ontological Structure
Influenced by Heidegger and Husserl, Sartre distinguishes between

two principle characters of being, the in-itself ( en-soi ) and the for-
itself ( pour-soi ), which form the basis of his ontology. For Sartre, the
in-itself is self-identical: it is founded on itself and not dependent
on anything else. Furthermore, it is passive: it is uncreated and
unchanging; it simply is. As such, en-soi is used to characterise the
existence of worldly objects. In contrast, the for-itself is not self-
identical; it is active and dynamic; for Sartre, it is consciousness.
Sartre describes the pour-soi as the negation or surpassing of the
in-itself, on which it necessarily depends.3 Being-for-itself does not
exist in the world in the same manner as objects. Being-for-itself
intends towards the future, and in this manner, transcends the world.
As such, when talking of being, the in-itself is often characterised
as facticity, whereas the for-itself is seen as transcendence (of this
facti city).
Sartre also discusses the ontological category of for-others, which
encapsulates the intersubjective nature of human existence. Sartre
argues, as shall be discussed below, that in order to fully realise all
the structures of one's being, the subject requires the existence of
others, as some modes of consciousness (in particular reflective self-
consciousness) can only be realised from the point of view of the
other. Central to this idea is the notion of embodiment; intentional
consciousness for Sartre, as for Merleau-Ponty and Edmund Husserl,
is lived through the body. Human existence is by necessity incarnate
existence. The body is the ground for subjectivity and furthermore
constitutes 'the totality of meaningful relations to the world'.4 The
projects and possibilities of subjectivity are constituted through the
body.
As such, Sartre asserts that being-for-itself is necessarily embodied;
it 'must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness'.5 In a
large section of Being and Nothingness , Sartre turns his attention to
the status of the body, characterising three ontological dimensions of
the body: (1) the 'body as being-for-itself;6 (2) the 'body-for-
others';7 and (3) 'myself as a body known by the Other'.8 Through a
discussion of these three dimensions of the ontological status of the
body Sartre endeavours to develop a system which can follow the
order of being and give an understanding of the various levels or
dimensions of embodiment. Let us consider each of these three
dimensions in turn.
-11-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
1. The Body as Being-for-Itself

The first dimension of bodily being that Sartre discusses is that 'I
exist my body' (J*existe mon corps);9 this is the body as being-for-
itself. In this mode of being, the body is transparendy lived-through,
it is the means through which the world appears: the 'for-itself is a
relation to the world'.10 Sartre asserts that the body, as lived, cannot
be regarded in-itself. In this sense, my body, for me, is not just one
physical object among other objects. My body cannot be an object
to me in the same manner as a chair or a pen, for example, precisely
because in the state of being-for-itself I am my body and I do not
consciously thematise it as an object (which I have).
In this mode of being, the body is often experienced as receding
from awareness, or as Sartre describes, as 'surpassed'11 or 'present in
every action although invisible'.12 In short, the body is not 'visible'
or regarded as an object of perception when it is engaged
intentionally with the environment around it. Sartre gives an
example: in the act of writing, 'I do not apprehend my hand ... but
only the pen which is writing ... my hand has vanished'.13 As such,
the body-for-itself 'is lived and not known '14
2. The Body-for-Others
The second ontological dimension of the body's existence is the
body-for-others ( pour V autrui). In this dimension, my body,
according to Sartre, 'is utilized and known by the Other'15 and
I realise that I exist as an object for the other. In short, Sartre is
indicating the fact that through my own experience I have one
kind of knowledge of myself and my body which is different from
the knowledge given to me through the perspective of the other.
Through the second dimension, I acquire a conceptual awareness
of my body in an abstract way, as a knowing organism, with certain
objective features (biological, physiological, cultural, etc.) in the
world and in the midst of other bodies.
For Sartre, it is important to distinguish these first two ontological
dimensions of the body as he asserts that they are incommunicable
and cannot co-exist: 'the nature of our body for us entirely escapes us
to the extent that we can take upon it the Other's point of view'.16
Sartre claims that either the body is an object or thing, among other
things, or it is that which reveals things to me; however, it cannot be
both at once. This claim has important consequences for the nature
of intersubjective relations, as shall be discussed below.
-12-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
3. The Body as Known by the Other : The 'Seen' Body

The third ontological dimension of the body, for Sartre, arises in
some sense through the interaction of the other two: my awareness
of my being an object for others means that I also 'exist for myself as
a body known by the other'.17 In this case, I cannot apprehend my
own body as an object, but I can recognise the body of the other as
an object and hence realise that my body can likewise be an object
for others; that is, I recognise that the other is a subject for whom
I am an object. In the third dimension, I experience my body not
on my own and not as lived-through, but as it is reflected in the
experience of it by others; this is what I will call the 'seen' body.18
The seen body is a visual representation of one's own body as seen
from a distanced perspective (as though through the eyes of
another).19 Paul Valéry, writing contemporaneously with Sartre,
describes this body as follows:
Our [seen body] is the one which others see, and an approximation of
which confronts us in the mirror or in portraits. It is the body which
has a form and is apprehended by the arts, the body on which materials,
ornaments, armor sit, which love sees or wants to see, and yearns to
touch. It knows no pain, for it reduces pain to a mere grimace.20
The seen body is distinct from the 'visible' body Sartre alludes to
(which arises in states such as pain, illness or dysfunction) in that it
involves a view of the self as though from a distanced perspective and
is not concerned with salient internal bodily events. In contrast to
the visible body, the seen body 'goes little farther than the view of a
surface'.21
While being a conscious representation of one's public body, at
the same time, the seen body is what one presents to the world and
to others in the visual field. This is important because the experience
others have of my body is dominated by sight for Sartre: it is how
others see (and judge) my comportment, aspect and appearance that
is of interest in his analysis. Through the third dimension, and
through awareness of my seen body, I become reflexively self- aware
of how I appear to others. Hence, our self knowledge depends
largely on objectifying responses from other people who make us
objects of their judgements. In short, in the third dimension, as
Sartre describes it, I experience and am aware of how (I think) the
other sees me.
-13-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
The Look
The experience of being seen by others and being an object to

others is far from inconsequential to Sartre. To be a subject is to be
embodied; as we have seen, the body plays a central role in Sartre's
existential ontology. Being a body subject presupposes that the self
be experientially accessible to others; the body is a possible object
of others' perception. As we have seen, Sartre famously argues that
the origin of reflective self-consciousness is located in the perceptual
encounter with the other: CI see because somebody sees me'.22
Following Husserl, Sartre sees consciousness as intentional.
Consciousness is always consciousness of something. The mode of
consciousness as discussed above is that of pour-soi. Reflection about
the self can occur when the self becomes an object for consciousness.
Being able to 'see' myself, and manifest the structures of consciousness
which allow reflective self-awareness and self-judgement, occurs as a
result of an encounter with the other. Sartre asserts: 'I need the Other
in order to realize fully all the structures of my being'.23 Without
awareness of others and their regarding me, Sartre argues that I can
only be conscious of myself as a body-for-itself, that is as something
which has projects and possibilities and which is not thematised. It is
only through the encounter with the other that the body can be
regarded as an intentional object for certain attitudes and beliefs, and,
as such, that an explicit, public body image is formed.
Sartre famously characterises the encounter with the other as a
conflictual relation where a power struggle to maintain one's
subjective status ensues. For Sartre, being-for-others cannot co-exist
with being-for-itself. As a result, in his account the subject is
necessarily reduced to an object that is objectified in the relation with
the other (who becomes the objectifying subject). Being objectified
means being treated as a type of object, rather than as a human being
whose complexity eludes simple thematisation. The subject's
transcendence, as Sartre describes it, is transcended by the
transcendence of the other: the subject becomes 'transcendence
transcended'.24 The only way for the subject to reclaim his or her
subjectivity is correspondingly to reduce the other to an object.
Influenced by Hegel's account of subjective constitution in
Lordship and Bondage , where the constitution of subjectivity is
oudined through the dialectic of mutual recognition and negation,25
Sartre characterises the encounter between consciousnesses as a
struggle for subjectivity, an unceasing conflict:
-14-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is
trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the
Other seeks to enslave me . . . Conflict is the original meaning of being-
for-others.26
He insists that, c[t]he essence of the relations between consciousnesses

is not the Mitsein [Being-with]; it is conflict'.27
This conflictual encounter with the other is dominated by the
visual field; it is described by Sartre through his account of 'the
Look' (le regard).29. The Look for Sartre is not merely about being
within the other's perceptual field; it is not a neutral seeing , but
rather, it is a value-laden looking which has the power to objectify
and causes the subject to turn attention to him- or herself in a self-
reflective manner. When I am looked at by another, I am reduced to
an object. Sartre's discussion of the Look in Being and Nothingness is
illustrated by his oft-cited vignette of the voyeur overcome by
jealousy kneeling by a keyhole to spy on his lover.29 This vignette has
been discussed frequently in philosophical writing and the Sartre
literature. The account Sartre gives has been seen as unproblematic
by some thinkers. They contend that it illustrates how being looked
at by another person (or at least believing someone is looking at you)
can modify one's actions, and demonstrates the other's power to
objectify. In contrast, other thinkers have critiqued this account for
offering a simplistic and pessimistic view of intersubjective relations
and personal encounters.
At times, it seems that Sartre intends the Look to have significance
in lived day-to-day encounters with others when considering
experiences of body-objectification and social instantiations of
evaluative emotions such as shame, pride and embarrassment.
However, it also seems clear that Sartre intends the Look to extend
beyond the possibilities afforded by an actual encounter with another
person who is really looking at me: there are cases when the other is
merely imagined or possible (there is a rustle in the bushes, but no
one is really there).30 In these cases, Sartre seems to be concerned
with self-evaluative states, and again experiences such as shame, guilt
or pride, when one can see oneself as though through the eyes of the
Other. At other times, Sartre's concern is primarily ontological: as
discussed above, he believes that the encounter with the other is the
condition for the possibility for reflective self-consciousness. Hence,
the Look, in this case, is a symbolic (rather than merely literal)
encounter which awakens the capacity for reflective self-consciousness.
Hence, Sartre's discussion of the Look is a multi-layered account
of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, visibility, objectification, absence
-15-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
and presence, that seems to slip between ontological, epistemological

and self-evaluative concerns.31 As such, the Look can be schematised
to have the following three layers or aspects (which I will discuss in
turn below):
1. The other is present. Actually being looked at and seen by another

person (epistemological case).
2. The other is imagined or absent (the Other). Seeing oneself as
though through the eyes of another (self-evaluative case).
3. The Look is symbolic for an awakening of reflective self-
consciousness. Self- awareness and self-reflection are made possible
by the 'appearance' of the Other and maintained by the continued
'presence' of the Other (ontological case).
In many discussions of the Look these three separate aspects are

conflated and confused and sometimes quite improbable conclusions
are drawn from Sartre's discussion. Consider the following from
Steven Earnshaw: 'If I am alone (unobserved) I am not self-
aware, such things as "shame" and "guilt" - as provoked by being
discovered as a voyeur - cannot occur'.32 It seems rather implausible
to claim that shame and guilt do not occur when one is alone, as
though every time I am left on my own in a room, my capacity for
reflective self-evaluative emotions disappears, only to be rekindled
the next time I notice that someone is looking at me. This, of course,
cannot be what Sartre means. Indeed, in his voyeur vignette, it
turns out that the voyeur is alone - the footsteps are a false alarm;
there is no one behind him in the hallway - and the feeling of
being objectified and shamed occurs in solitude. In fact, in many
places Sartre denies that the Look is necessarily related to the actual
presence of another person; it is 'not bound to the Other's body '33
Hence, in order to elucidate what Sartre intended with the voyeur
example, in the next section I will discuss each of the three cases of
the Look, as outlined above, in turn.
Reconsidering the Look
1. The Epistemological Case

As mentioned above, Sartre's account of the Look seems
to be a multi-layered account, which can be described as having
three schematic layers. In the first case, which I have called the
'epistemological case', Sartre seems to be using the Look quite
-16-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
literally, discussing the real experience of being seen ('the convergence

of two ocular globes in my direction')34 and concomitantly objectified
by another person. For example, Sartre writes:
I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me;
I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it . . . But now suddenly I raise
my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the
vulgarity of the gesture and I am ashamed.35
In the case of being seen by another person, the Look gives

epistemological information, I 'realize', as Sartre puts it, 'the
vulgarity' of my gesture. When the Look is considered in this literal
manner as a feature of an intersubjective encounter, it is the means
through which I can garner some information about myself and
the nature of my acts. The Look in this case is instructive in the
formation of my seen body: through being seen by the other, I
realise certain features of my body and self.
Sartre argues that until I am objectified in this manner by the
Look of the other, I do not have reflective self- awareness of the
nature of my acts. Of the aforementioned 'awkward gesture' he
writes: 'I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it'.36 In Sartre's
voyeur example, we find a similar structure:
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued
my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the
level of a non- the tic self- consciousness. This means first of all that there
is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can
refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known ; I am
my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification.37
In this case the subject is wholly pour-soi , pre-reflectively engaged in

an act, there is no need to thematise, explain or justify one's actions:
they are simply lived. 'My consciousness sticks to my acts, it is my
acts'.38 At this moment, there is no transcending view which could
objectify my acts and on which a judgement could be passed. While
I am engaged in the act, I am that act, there is no 'I' and the act
separate from one another. However, Sartre argues that with the
appearance of the other, my being-for-itself is disrupted:
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at
me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my
being and that essential modifications appear in my structure ... First of
all, I now exist as myself î òr my unreflective consciousness ... I see myself
because somebody sees me.39
The encounter with another and the subsequent Look of the other
confers the relation of 'Being-seen-by-another'.40 Sartre argues
-17-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
that once we are captured in the Look of another we suddenly

separate ourselves from the activity in which we are engaged and
see the activity and ourselves as though through the eyes of the
other. Through this ability to 'see' oneself, afforded by being seen
by another, we gain knowledge about the self, knowledge which is
essentially unavailable through introspection. Instead of being lived
through, one's actions or appearance become laden with value,
conditioned by the judgemental attitude inherent in the other's
Look. In this way, the Look gives me a body image or, as Sartre
puts it, an 'outside'.41 I suddenly realise and know that I am vulgar;
I am a voyeur; I am spying, and so on. Furthermore, I suddenly
know that the other can see all these things about me too. This is
what Sartre means when he says that the other 'teaches me who I
am'.42 However, it seems to me that unless the Look has a deeper
significance than that of literally being seen by another person,
Sartre's account here is unconvincing. It seems improbable that the
voyeur had no awareness of the nature of his acts prior to undertaking
them. The voyeur has a whole life history which has shaped and given
meaning to his situation. He has not, as Marjorie Grene points out,
'been dropped from heaven to watch and listen at the keyhole'.43
When Sartre claims that, 'there is no self to inhabit my consciousness,
nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify
them. They are in no way known ; I am my acts and hence they carry
in themselves their whole justification',44 he is referring to a state of
pour-soi which entails an engrossed engagement of living through the
body without symbolically reflecting on the self or one's actions.
Hence, in this case, despite moments of engrossed engagement,
the voyeur's past as a social agent embedded in a social world
governed by language, norms and rules cannot escape him: the
voyeur must know throughout, at some level, that what he is doing
is perhaps morally questionable, and in fact it is only with that
knowledge already present before, during and prior to his actions,
that the experience of shaming could occur. The moment of being
seen kneeling at the keyhole could in no way be an originary
awakening of self-reflective consciousness, as this passage implies.
2. The Self-evaluative Case

However, Sartre's account is not limited to a literal 'looking'; it turns
out that sometimes it is 'only probable that the other is looking at
me'.45 Or, in fact, not looking at me at all; there is no one there:
'I straighten up. My eyes run over the deserted corridor. It was a
false alarm'.46 Sartre asserts, 'the look will be given just as well on
-18-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a

footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or
a light movement of a curtain'.47 Here, it seems that Sartre is using
the Look to describe a self-evaluative structure, rather than a real
intersubjective encounter. In this case, there may be some event
to indicate the possible presence of an Other (the footsteps, for
example), and this event may act as a cue to invoke a self-evaluative
stance. Hence, the Look, in what I have termed the 'self-evaluative
case', illustrates how, in addition to living through my body ( pour -
soi ), I can also regard my body as an object, that is, as something
with observable characteristics which can be regarded in an alienated
way (as though seen through the eyes of another). Sartre writes: 'By
the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in a position of passing
judgment on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to
the Other'.48
Sartre's use of the capitalised 'Other' here is instructive. Some
commentators claim the 'Other' merely indicates another person,
albeit one who may not be specified. For example, Gary Cox asserts
that the 'Other' is 'Sartre's term for another person, particularly one
who looks at me, sees me and judges me'.49 However, this formulation
seems to be at odds with Sartre's own assertions. In Sartre's example
of appearing "'in public" to act in a play or to give a lecture, . . . the
Other's presence remains undifferentiated'.50 Rather than signifying a
person - an 'other' who can literally see me, as in the epistemologica!
case described above - the 'Other', in this case, denotes a point of
view from which the world is apprehended; it is not a 'concrete and
individualized being',51 but rather it is simply a point of view which is
not my own. This point of view can belong to a particular person, and
in this case the 'Other' can become the 'other'. However, it must be
stressed that this point of view is not necessarily bound to any
particular body or set of eyes.
As such, throughout Being and Nothingness Sartre uses 'Other' to
signify a variety of things: first, he uses it straightforwardly to signify
another person; second, he uses it to mean a distanced perspective
from which I regard myself; and lasdy, he intends 'Other' to be any
object or person which is not me. In the self-evaluative case of the
Look, the Other's, Look is not about being literally seen by another
person, but rather, it is about seeing oneself from a distance, as
though through the eyes of another. Certain events - footsteps,
rusding bushes, moving curtains - can invoke the feeling of being
under the watch of the Other, but these events are by no means
necessary for judicative self awareness.
-19-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
Sartre spends some time discussing the self-evaluative case,

attempting to refute the solipsistic suggestion that the existence of
others is put into question when it turns out that the presence of a
concrete other is not needed for the Look to activate reflective self-
consciousness. Instead, Sartre argues that 'what is doubtful is not the
Other himself. It is the Other's bein¿f-there' i.e., that concrete
historical event which we can express by the words, "There is
someone in the room'".52 The absence of the other does not imply
nothingness, but rather entails a presence. The other is somewhere
(if not here) and therefore could see me; his or her absence at this
moment does not preclude the possibility of presence. In this sense,
Sartre argues that the Other 'is present to me everywhere'.53 When I
realise that there is no one in the hallway, '[f]ar from disappearing
with my first alarm, the Other is present everywhere, below me,
above me, in the neighbouring rooms, and I continue to feel
profoundly my being-for-others'.54
3. The Ontological Case

When the Other, for Sartre, begins to take on this diffuse and
ubiquitous character, Sartre seems to slip into talking about what
I have termed the 'ontological case'. In this case, he gives the
Look ontological significance, endeavouring to demonstrate that,
'I can know myself only through the mediation of the other'.55 It
is through the Other's Look that I discover my body and awaken
the capacity for reflective self-consciousness. In this case, the Look
is intended ontologically as a symbolic structure which signifies
some originary realisation of the self as separate to but necessarily
in relation with Others. The capacity for reflective self-knowledge is
awakened through some sort of originary experience of the Look:
The experience of my condition as man, as an object for all other living
men . . . this experience I realize concretely on the occasion of the upsurge
of an object into my universe if this object indicates to me that I am
probably an object at present functioning as a differentiated this for a
consciousness.56
The awakening of reflective self-consciousness is a singular event: I

do not need to keep encountering others and being subjected to the
Look (in the literal or imagined examples described above) in order
to maintain self- awareness and the ability for self-reflection. The
ensuing permanence of the capacity for reflective self-consciousness
is ensured because the 'presence' of the Other is actually an
'omnipresence',57 reminiscent of the all-knowing and all-seeing God
in the Christian tradition: 'each instant the Other is looking at me' 58
-20-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
So, is the Look actually a 'phenomenological occasion'59 as Peter

Caws describes it, involving being seen by another person or other
people? Or is it to be understood merely as a 'metaphor',60 as Hazel
E. Barnes suggests, for a self-reflective capacity of consciousness
(being able to 'see' oneself)? In some passages Sartre distances the
look from actual perceptual activity: 'it is never eyes which look at
us',61 while in others he seems to suggest more than a merely
structural similarity: 'Of course what most often manifests a look is the
convergence of two ocular globes in my direction'.62 It seems that the
case of a concrete intersubjective encounter is one example of how
the Look can function, but is by no means the only case. In short,
Sartre wants the Look to signify all experiences of reflective self-
consciousness: It can be reduced to or captured in an intersubjective
encounter with another empirically present individual whose eyes are
cast in my direction (and the possibility of this configuration seems to
be what gives the Look its originary characterisation); however, it also
captures a general sense of 'my fundamental presence to all men [and]
the presence of all men to myself,63 in that its permanent possibility
signifies the inherendy intersubjective nature of my being.
If we are to understand the Look in this sense, that is ontologically,
then when we return to consider Sartre's example of the voyeur, it can
be regarded as a symbolic illustration for an originary awakening of
reflective self-consciousness, perhaps something akin to Lacan's
description of the mirror stage,64 but in no way should we understand
it to be intended literally. Indeed, if it is understood literally, it seems
that the subject is deprived of a coherent and enduring self-
understanding and instead waits for the Other, in each moment, to
give meaning and a normative framework to his or her actions.65
Again, this cannot be what Sartre intends. If the Other is 'everywhere'
and the Look is ever-present then the voyeur does not need to hear
footsteps in the hall or even imagine the probable presence of a
concrete other in order to have thematic awareness of his actions. The
voyeur, as discussed, already knows the nature of his actions and is able
to shame himself at any moment by turning attention reflectively to
himself. Hence, the Other must already be a feature of the self.
Furthermore, Sartre's suggestion that solitude necessarily implies a
state of pour-soi ('I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-
consciousness This means first of all that there is no [reflective] self
to inhabit my consciousness...'66 or consider, 'Nobody can be vulgar
all alone!'67) is grossly inaccurate, and for this reason we must believe
that Sartre does not intend 'alone' ( seul) to be taken literally, but
rather to signify some sort of extreme and impossible solipsism: alone
-21 -

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
in the sense that I have never encountered another or in the sense

that no others have ever existed.68
It is clear that Sartre is aware that shame and other self-evaluative
and self-reflective experiences, although dependent on the existence
of other people and a social milieu (social norms, culture and
language are of course necessary for the full expression of these
experiences), often occur when one is alone and without the need for
explicit judgement or evaluation from any other. Returning to the
voyeur example, the criteria for his shame arises not from the eyes
who look at him (for ultimately there is no one there), but rather
from previous encounters and learned and internalised social rules
and mores. Ultimately it comes from the standards of an internalised
other who is not the sort of person who is overcome by jealousy and
resorts to spying.
Within this discussion of the Look, shame appears as a structural
feature of the encounter (whether actual or imagined) with the
Other. In fact, the opening passages of the section 'The Existence of
Others' in Being and Nothingness Sartre turns to shame (la honte).
Beyond its intentional structure ('it is a shameful apprehension of
something and that something is me'69)y the experience of shame
also demonstrates how one's self-relation is mediated by the other
('it is in its primary structure shame before somebody*70). But through
a closer reading of the section, it seems, for Sartre, that shame is
more than one example among many of mediated self-relations (such
as pride and fear). It comes up again and again and seems to have a
deeper existential significance. Sartre calls this 'pure shame'71 and
argues that it arises because I am disgusted or disappointed with the
dependency or vulnerability I feel before the other:
Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in
general of being an object; that is, of recognizing myself m this degraded,
fixed and dependent being which I am for the Other. Shame is the feeling
of an original fally not because of the fact that I may have committed this
or that particular fault but simply that I have 'fallen' into the world in the
midst of things and that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be
what I am.72
Pure shame, as Sartre conceives it, seems to be a necessary feature

of every Look and hence a permanent background to reflective
consciousness.
However, to suggest that shame (as an emotional response) arises
every time we are objectified, seems fundamentally misguided.
Consider this statement from Peter Caws: 'while we are not necessarily
nauseated by an encounter with the indifference of objects, we are
-22-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
almost certain to be shamed ... if treated as an object by another

subject'.73 However, objectification and shame are not necessarily
bound together, as Sartre and Caws seem to imply, and this
conclusion seems to arise when objectification is conflated with the
related term 'alienation'. Indeed, there are many moments of reflective
self-consciousness where one has a thematic regard for oneself as an
'object', and this does not involve a shame experience. For instance, if
I turn my attention to my body, regarding my reflection in the mirror,
I can see myself as an object (how the Other sees me) and yet not feel
ashamed of this object state or what I see: the image pleases me, I may
feel pleasure or pride. Hence, objectification does not necessarily entail
alienation, or some sort of compromised state.
Perhaps the problem with Sartre's accounts of the Look, shame,
objectification and reflective self- awareness is a problem concerning
examples. It is widely acknowledged that Sartre tends to focus on
negative encounters where subjectivities find themselves in conflict or
in some compromised state, and furthermore that he insists on
dichotomising the subject-object positions within intersubjective
encounters. Almost all of the examples that Sartre offers are tinged
with a pessimistic and misanthropic attitude with regard to
interpersonal relations, and it is perhaps no wonder these encounters
always culminate in a shame experience. As van den Berg notes,
'Sartre's look is the look from behind, the malicious look of an
unknown person, the look that causes a shiver from neck to ankle'.74
Many of Sartre's critics resist the idea that the essence of all
intersubjective relations is conflict and he is often criticised for his
misanthropic attitude. Merleau-Ponty was particularly critical of this
aspect of Sartre's ontology, believing that it provides an inaccurate
and inhuman description of embodied social relations which are
more complex and ambiguous. Commenting on Sartre's account of
the Look, Merleau-Ponty writes:
The other transforms me into an object and denies me, I transform
him into an object and deny him, it is asserted. In fact the other's gaze
transforms me into an object, and mine him, only if both of us withdraw
into the core of our thinking nature, if we both make ourselves into
an inhuman gaze, if each of us feels his actions to be not taken up and
understood, but observed as if they were an insect's.75
Merleau-Ponty suggests that it would be more accurate to characterise

alienation as arising from objectification as one example, among
perhaps many, that can characterise intersubjective encounters: 'This is
true: this objectivation [sic] by the look is a profound truth . . . But it is
a particular case of a more general relation'.76
-23-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
Merleau-Ponty and other commentators suggest that there are

other modes of relating which do not necessarily lead to objectification
and alienation or a dichotomising batde between subject and object.
For example, Marjorie Grene suggests that there are many situations
when the Look is not threatening, she asks us to consider the 'rare but
still indubitable experience of mutual understanding, of the reciprocal
look of peers; or the look of mother and infant, where the one protects
and the other is protected'.77 There are coundess instances where an
encounter with the other leads to what the phenomenologist Drew
Leder terms 'mutual incorporation'.78 He writes: 'As long as the Other
treats me as subject - that is experiences with me the world in which I
dwell, mutual incorporation effects no sharp rift'.79 Indeed, van den
Berg offers an account of the 'accepting look' of the Other which
'gives me the almost exceptional right to be myself as a moving
body'.80 Moreover, the sociologist Erving Goffman likewise offers a
description of social interaction that is not self-conscious, denoting this
experience as 'euphoric interplay',81 arguing that there are many
occasions in which people are 'unoriented to and unconcerned about
being under observation'.82 In short, visibility should not be equated
with vulnerability, as is done in Sartre's schema. In fact, it is through
visibility that positive self-reflective experiences such as recognition and
affirmation can arise.
Conclusion
Despite recognising that Sartre tends towards the negative in his

examples, and that not every instance of objectification leads to
alienation or the affective experience of shame, Sartre's account of
embodied subjectivity through the Look and shame are of interest
and importance. In casting the Look and visibility as constitutive
features of reflective self-consciousness, Sartre highlights the fact
that a concern around self-presentation and bodily visibility is
neither trivial nor insignificant. In contrast, Sartre demonstrates
that embodied social relations are constitutive of reflective self-
consciousness and form part of the very fabric of our being.
Considered in phenomenological terms, it is not as though action
and perception come first and then self-presentation follows as
some sort of second-order concern. Instead, they are entangled
such that one cannot be said to precede the other. We can neither
chose to turn away from others, nor to not present ourselves to
others. The seen body, Sartre demonstrates, is not optional or
-24-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
secondary to consciousness, but instead is an inherent part of the

structure of reflective awareness. As such, self-presentation and body
management play constitutive roles in subjectivity.
As we have seen, through his account of the Look, Sartre
illustrates the necessarily social dimension of bodily invisibility.
Beyond the 'invisibility' afforded by the physical body in instances of
engrossed action, such as the hand in the act of writing, invisibility
depends in large part on the social field and one's relations to others
within that field. Objectification by the other can disrupt one's
experience of bodily invisibility, bringing thematic awareness to the
body. However, as we have seen, Sartre's discussion of the Look and
objectification is not straightforward. Instead, it is a multi-layered
account that concerns intersubjectivity, self-evaluation and
ontological constitution. These three layers are by no means wholly
distinct and exclusive in their concerns, and Sartre's account is best
understood as an intertwining of affective, existential,
phenomenological and ontological features of existence.
How the body is presented to others (present, imagined or
absent) is fundamental for one's own conception of oneself, and
furthermore through objectifying moments of shame and other self-
conscious experiences, one learns about oneself. As we have seen,
Sartre insists that the Other, through his or her 'objectifying power
... teaches me who I am'.83 However, as Sartre's voyeur example
demonstrates, the Other is not necessarily another person who is
empirically present with their eyes cast in my direction. In contrast,
he implicitly argues that objectification and experiences of shame are
primarily experiences of self-evaluation. Although it is dependent on
a broader rule- and norm-governed intersubjective field, shame
occurs as a result of internalised ideas of who one would like to be.
Although Sartre does not explicitly discuss internalisation, he
underscores the idea that the other must already be a feature of the
self in order for reflective self-consciousness to be possible.
Hence, Sartre's account of embodied subjectivity demonstrates that
the solitary embodied subject of phenomenological investigations, as
described for example by Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, is necessarily a social subject, already and necessarily in relation
with others. The notion that individual phenomenological experience
of motility, action and perception in some sense precedes social
relations and intersubjectivity is misguided. Instead, the other is a
constitutive feature of the self. As a result, concerns around self-
presentation and body management are not merely features of
experience, but rather are constitutive of that experience itself.
-25-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
Luna Doležal recently completed a PhD in Philosophy at University

College Dublin, Ireland where she now works as the IJPS Postdoctoral
Fellow. She previously studied Physics and Philosophy at the University
of New South Wales and Literary Theory at the University of
Lisbon. Her research is primarily in the area of phenomenology of
embodiment. Her previous publications have appeared in several
journals including Hypatia , Body and Society , Human Technology and
the International Journal of Philosophical Studies .
Contact details: Luna Doležal, School of Philosophy, University
College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.
Email: luna.dolezal@ucd.ie
Notes
1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge,

2006).
2. Throughout this article, I will employ the capitalised 'Look' to designate Sartre's
le regard.
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness-. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology
(London: Routledge, 2003), 333; Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Être et le Néant: Essai
d'ontologie Phénoménologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 348. All following
citations give the pagination of the English translation followed by the pagination
of L'Être et le néant.
4. Sartre, Being and Nothingness , 368/385.
5. Ibid., 329/344.
6. Ibid., 330/345.
7. Ibid., 362/379.
8. Ibid., 375/392.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 330/345.
11. Ibid., 350/366.
12. Ibid., 348/364.
13. Ibid., 347/363.
14. Ibid., 348/364. All italics in original unless otherwise indicated.
15. Ibid., 375/392.
16. Ibid., 382/399.
17. Ibid., 375/392.
18. The 'seen' body is a term also employed by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone. See
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 'The Body as Cultural Object/The Body as Pan-
Cultural Universal', in Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines , ed. Mano
Daniel and Lester E. Embree (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1994), 86.
19. The seen body can be compared to Charles Horton Cooley's conception of the
'looking glass self. This term refers to a social and psychological process where
people get a sense of self based on other people's perception of them and their
-26-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
bodies. See Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (Glencoe,
IL: The Free Press, 1956), 184.
20. Paul Valéry, 'Some Simple Reflections on the Body', in Fragments for a History
of the Human Body - Part 2, ed. M. Feher, & Naddaff and N. Tazi (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1989), 399.
21. Valéry, 'Some Simple Reflections on the Body', 400.
23. Ibid., 246/260-261.
24. Ibid., 287/302.
25. Georg W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
19 77). In Hegel's account of the constitution of subjectivity, the Lord and
Bondsman are initially in an equal and reciprocal state, mutually recognising one
another's consciousnesses through their co-constitutive relation. The Bondsman
serves the Lord, but as a result the Lord is confronted with a dependent
consciousness and no longer recognises his own independent state in the other
who faces him; the Lord cannot get the kind of recognition he sought in the
Bondsman. The Lord ultimately negates the independence of his own self-
consciousness because he has negated the independence of the Bondsman, who
provides him with insufficient recognition of himself.
27. Ibid., 451/470.
28. Ibid., 276/292.
29. Ibid., 282-283/298.
30. Ibid.
31. Katherine J. Morris discusses how the mediation of the other (through the
can be understood as epistemological or as ontological. In this formulat
she takes the self-evaluation to form part of the epistemological structure. Se
Katherine J. Morris, 'The Graceful, the Ungraceful and the Disgraceful
Reading Sartre , ed. Jonathan Webber (London: Routledge, 2010), 137.
32. Steven Earnshaw, Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Londo
Continuum, 2006), 86.
3 3 . Sartre, Being and Nothingness , 300/ 316.
34. Ibid., 281/297.
35. Ibid., 245/259-260.
36. Ibid., 245/260.
37. Ibid., 282-283/298.
38. Ibid., 283/298.
39. Ibid., 284/299.
40. Ibid., 281/296.
41. Ibid., 283/298.
42. Ibid., 298/313.
43. Marjorie Grene, 'Sartre and the Other', Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 45 (1971-1972): 32.
45. Ibid., 299/315.
46. Ibid., 300-301/316.
47. Ibid., 281/297.
48. Ibid., 246/260.
49. Gary Cox, The Sartre Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2008), 157.
50. Sartre, Being and Nothingness , 305 /32 1 .
-27-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC
Luna Doležal
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 301/317.
53. Ibid., 303/319.
54. Ibid., 301/316.
55. Ibid., 74/85.
56. Ibid., 304/320.
57. Ibid., 375/392.
58. Ibid., 281/297.
59. Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 99.
60. Hazel E. Barnes, 'Sartre on the Emotions', in Sartre: An Investigation of Some
Major Themes , ed. Simon Glynn (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), 83.
6 1 . Sartre, Being and Nothingness. , 300/316.
62. Ibid., 281/297.
63. Ibid., 314/319.
64. Jacques Lacan, 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the "I"', in
Ecrits : A Selection (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), 1-7.
65. This is a line of criticism taken by Honneth. See, for example, Axel Honneth
and Charles W. Wright, The Struggle for Recognition : On Sartre's Theory of
Intersubjectivity (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 164.
67. Ibid., 246/260.
68. It would not even be enough if all others were destroyed or ceased to be. As
Hazel E. Barnes points out, 'the memory of the Other's look would live on
forever in my own conscious memory, inseparable from whatever idea I might
try to form of my object self (Hazel Barnes, Sartre [London: Quartet Books,
1973], 63).
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 312/328.
72. Ibid.
7 3 . Caws, Sartre , 97 .
74. Jan Hendrik van den Berg, 'The Human Body and the Significance of H
Movement: A Phenomenological Study', Philosophy and Phenomenolog
Research 13, no. 2 (1952): 181.
75. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology , 420.
76. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de Pra
Evanston:, Northwestern University Press, 2003), 28.
77. Marjorie Grene, Sartre (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983),
78. Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990)
79. Leder, Absent Body , 96.
80. Van den Berg, 'The Human Body', 182.
81. Michael Schudson, 'Embarrassment and Erving Goffman's Idea of Hu
Nature', Theory and Society 13 (1984): 641.
82. Erving Gofiman, Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl
Press, 1969), 11.
8 3 . Sartre, Being and Nothingness , 298/3 1 3 .
-28-

189.55.181.180 on Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:48:20 UTC

Reconsidering The Look in Sartre's Being and Nothingness - Luna Dolezal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Reconsidering The Look in Sartre's Being and Nothingness - Luna Dolezal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Reconsidering the Look in Sartre's "Being and Nothingness"

Author(s): Luna Dolezal

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42705181

This content downloaded from

Abstract: Jean-Paul Sartre's account of the Look in Being

Keywords: Jean-Paul Sartre, the Look, intersubjectivity, self-

In Being and Nothingness , Jean-Paul Sartre attempts to develop

Sartre Studies International Volume 18, Issue 1, 2012: 9-28

This content downloaded from

Phenomenology of Perception } Despite this lack of recognition,

This content downloaded from

Sartre's Ontological Structure

Influenced by Heidegger and Husserl, Sartre distinguishes between

This content downloaded from

1. The Body as Being-for-Itself

This content downloaded from

3. The Body as Known by the Other : The 'Seen' Body

This content downloaded from

The experience of being seen by others and being an object to

This content downloaded from

He insists that, c[t]he essence of the relations between consciousnesses

This content downloaded from

and presence, that seems to slip between ontological, epistemological

1. The other is present. Actually being looked at and seen by another

In many discussions of the Look these three separate aspects are