Benjamin Woo, 11/10/28

Taking Advantage and the Economics of Morality:

An analysis of Richard Miller’s account of exploitation in transnational
corporations

Richard Miller believes that some aspects of globalization have created situations through

which people in developed countries are taking advantage of those in developing countries. He

believes this form of ‘taking advantage’ is morally wrong, and that people in developed countries

therefore have a responsibility to giving up the benefits yielded from these acts of exploitation

and promote the interests of the poor in developing economies. In “Globalization Moralized”, the

third chapter of his book Globalizing Justice, Miller’s identifies “unmet transnational

responsibilities” (62) in two aspects of globalization. The passage designated for reconstruction

in this paper deals with the first of these. Miller’s identifies the unmet responsibility in

transnational firms which hire those who are desperate for jobs at rates less than they deserve.

In the first part of this paper I will reconstruct Miller’s argument. First I will explain his

definition of ‘taking advantage’ which provides the moral framework for the rest of the

argument. Then I will explain why he believes the activity of these transnational firm falls under

this definition. Finally I will explain why there is a duty to stop it this moral wrong which falls

upon all people of developed countries. After the reconstruction, I will identify two possible

objections to Miller’s argument. The first objection comes from an intuition that is seemingly

contrary to Miller’s claims – that people who willingly agree to terms of an interaction are not

being exploited. I will discuss how Miller’s responds to this claim by drawing upon his definition

of exploitation. The second objection more directly addresses Miller’s framework for

understanding the value of labour and the nature of exploitation. I will argue that his definitions

are unsound and that therefore his argument rests on false foundations. Finally, in a conclusion I
will discuss the implications of my claim. While I believe Miller’s method of argument is false, I

do not necessarily disagree with all of his conclusions.

The most central concept to Miller’s Moral claim is that of ‘taking advantage’. In his own

words, “a person takes advantage of someone if he derives a benefit from her difficulty in

advancing her interests in interactions in which both participate, in a process that shows

inadequate regard for the equal moral importance of her interests and her capacity for choice.”

There are effectively two conditions inherent in the statement: first off all, one being taken

advantage of is unable to fairly express her interests and choices, and secondly, the one taking

advantage is deriving a benefit from the situation1. Finally, and this point almost doesn’t need to

be stated, Miller believes that ‘taking advantage’ in lack of special justification, is morally

wrong.23

As mentioned in my introduction, the passage of Miller’s paper I will discuss deals with the

increasing numbers of transnational firms hiring poor workers in developing countries. To show

that this constitutes taking advantage, Miller must show that the two conditions are met. The first

condition, that poor workers are in a position of bargaining weakness, is assumed – effectively it

follows from the unstated idea that in a situation without bargaining weakness labour value

would be equivalent everywhere. Importantly, Miller acknowledges that the difficulties

(disadvantages) of using labour for profit in a developing country might account for the lower
1
To clarify, this is not an absolute benefit, but a relative benefit that would not be present if the interests of the
weaker party were fully expressed.
2
Miller lists several possible such special justification. As he, as well as myself, do not find any of them to be
applicable to the issue at hand I will not include them in my reconstruction.
3
To place this definition in a context, Miller considers a hypothetical scenario in which a person dying of thirst in
the desert commits to slavery in return for water. The thirsty person is at a bargaining disadvantage (condition 1)
because he is desperate for water at the moment – the traveller giving water derives benefit from him (condition 2)
by insisting upon the egregious terms he known the desperate man will accept. The example is important to Miller
because it illustrates and important point that will aid Miller in fending off counter-argument, the fact that the thirsty
traveller is bettered by the interaction does not make the interaction fair; although the traveller saves the thirsty
man’s life, he stood took advantage of the thirsty man by presenting unfair terms. Miller will use the same argument
with respect to his examples from globalization.
value of such labour, but he argues that nevertheless there should be equality in “the ratio

between the price of labour and the value it adds” (64). To supporting the second condition that

the transnational firms derive a benefit from interaction with these poor people, Miller need only

cite data. He references a labour survey from World Bank labour showing that the labour cost to

dollar value ratio is significantly less in developing countries “.16 in Thailand, .23 in the

Philippines, .25 in China, etc.” versus .36 in the United States.

Miller completes his argument by presenting ways in which the moral injustice at hand can

be stopped; this possibility of ending the moral injustice creates the ‘unmet duty’ to do so.

Importantly he believes that the duty falls not only on the firms themselves4 but on the average

relatively affluent person in a developed country: ‘in buying and investing that generates their

benefits from mere exploitation, these affluent people play in active role in taking advantage’

(68). Miller believes any affluent person can help end the moral wrong by supporting

government measures ‘that relieve the desperate needs underlying bargaining weakness is

developing countries”.5

The first objection to Miller’s argument I would like to address is not so much a direct attack

on one of Miller’s claims but rather a separate intuition about the definition of exploitation that

conflicts with Miller’s view. Basically it is the idea that exploitation requires the exploited to feel

exploited6. Jagdish Bhagwati, who Miller quotes, states the objection as follows: “voluntary

acceptance blocks the charge that the employer exploits”. In support of this claim Bhagwati

references cases in which workers are very happy to flee dire poverty to work long hours in
4
Miller specifically details which methods taken by such firms would be effective and which methods would not. I
will not include this in my reconstruction.
5
In anticipation of potential counter-argument Miller acknowledges two commonly promoted methods that do not
work: merely abstaining from buying products of exploitation would be devastating to the needy people in concern
and individual self-monitoring to assess the extent of benefit from bargaining weakness would “interfere with
normal life, while holding little promise of accurate reallocation” (68).
6
This is assuming they are not being deceived about the terms of their interaction.
factories. Importantly this is different from Miller’s hypothetical scenario with a thirsty man in

the desert. In selling himself to slavery the thirsty man is likely aware he is being treated unfairly

– this does not seem to be so with Bhagwati’s examples. Effectively Miller responds to this

argument merely by sticking to his own definition: despite voluntary consent by employees,

employers might still be deriving benefits from the employee’s bargaining weakness7 -- this, for

Miller qualifies as immoral exploitation. Logically, one could argue that Miller need do no more

than restating this point; as I mentioned Bhagwati’s objection does not directly attack any aspect

of Miller’s argument, it merely presents an alternative. However, ultimately we are still left with

two definition of exploitation, one which is based upon involuntary interaction (or at least

resentful consent), and one that is not. Neither of the proponents of these claims have presented

any direct reasons why the other’s claim should be false; we are therefore entirely at odds in

determining which definition to use.

This brings me to my second objection. While I will not directly endorse the theory behind

Bhagwati’s claim, by revisiting Miller’s definitions I will argue that his theoretical framework is

fundamentally flawed. As I mentioned earlier, Miller effectively takes it as a given that poor

people hired by transnational firms in developing countries are in a situation of bargaining

weakness. This seems reasonable because these people are indeed in bad situations. However,

considering the flip side of the claim reveals the very concept of ‘bargaining weaknesses’ may be

fallacious. If Miller believes that some people are in situations of bargaining weakness he must

also believe that there exist situations in which one does not. As he says with regards to the

7
More specifically Miller’s responds by dividing the meaning of exploitation in two, calling his own definition the
first sense which is not necessarily morally wrong and therefore indisputably true for the scenario and hand. Miller
argues Bhagwati’s claim attempts to contradict a second sense of exploitation, “immoral exploitation”. However,
Miller believes the claim is invalid because the first sense is a ‘prima facie reason for ascribing the second sense”.
This entire ordeal of creating two senses of exploitation seems unnecessary to me – Miller could have just as well
stuck to the idea that exploitation is a single thing and that it is sometimes morally wrong and sometimes not. I think
it is fair to simplify his argument as I have done in the body of my paper.
desert example, the ‘right response … [is] pursuing an outcome that the other would accept if

bargaining power were not crippled by urgency” (61). The flaw in this idea is that it requires an

ideal situation, in which interaction (in this case, employment) has an absolute value.8

Consider what the thirsty man would offer for water if he were not ‘crippled by urgency’:

this means first of all not thirsty but also, to be fully free of urgency, able to access all the water

he might want. The answer is nothing at all. Fundamentally, in economic terms, value is

determined by demand, or urgency; one might even say despite harsher connotations, ‘bargaining

weaknesses’. Hypothesizing about a man with unlimited access to water might lend this idea a

fantastical and therefore fallacious flavour; however, consider the idea with respect to labour.

The bargaining weakness of poor workers that Miller constantly refers to is effectively the

desperate need for money: but what wages would a worker demand for labour in a situation of no

bargaining weakness, and no need for money? The very question is nonsensical.

In disputing Miller’s framework for explaining the moral injustices of inherent in

globalization I am not necessarily disputing his conclusion, that transnational firms are

committing and injustice by hiring workers at low prices – I am certainly not disputing the claim

that the traveller who trades water for slavery is committing a wrong. However, I believe that

Miller commits a fallacy by attempting to root the moral injustice in the economic transaction for

economic transactions are fundamentally based upon demand If it is wrong to trade water for

slavery (and I do believe it is) it is because of a principle separate from the economics of

interaction, perhaps a moral principle that one should save another’s life willingly if they are

able. The same goes for poor people in developing countries. If it is an injustice that they must

work such long hours at such low wages (as moral sense inclines us to think), the injustice is
8
This belief is expressed in his statement that in fair labour one would expect “equality in the ratio between the
price of labour and the value it add”.
rooted not in the interaction with employers but more fundamentally the inherent unequal global

distribution wealth that requires workers to accept such low wages and long hours.

Although my objection finds flaw the basic foundations of Miller’s main argument, there is

one aspect of Miller claim which still holds. His final paragraphs (in the section) make the claim

that affluent people have a duty to end the moral injustice of exploitation. Although I might

disagree with his reasons why exploitation is morally wrong, regardless of the specifically

theoretical background, as long as one acknowledges the injustice exists, the duty remains – and,

from a moral standpoint, this is the claim which matters most of all.

Word Count: 1546