Should Creationism be Taught in Public-Schools?

              Herein I intend to present the debate between two philosophers of science, Michael

Ruse and Larry Laudan, on the scientific status of “creation science” and whether it should be

taught in public-school classrooms. The first portion of this paper presents five characteristics

that Ruse proposes as a way of determining what is and is not a genuine science, suggesting, in

addition, that “creation science” lacks all five of these characteristics in different ways. The next

portion of this paper presents Laudan’s rejection of Ruse’s five demarcating characteristics in

which he offers several counter-examples that show that “creation science” does possesses some

of the characteristics Ruse claims it lacks, while also showing that “true sciences” (e.g. physics)

can fall short, at times, of possessing all five of his characteristics. Finally, I present my defense

of Laudan’s rejection of Ruse’s five characteristics and the reasons why I, despite the fact that I

accept Darwinian (atheistic) evolution, believe that creation science’s more recent version, i.e.

intelligent design, in specific, should be taught in public-school courses.

           Creationism is the view that the universe and all the living things within it were brought

into existence by a divine Creator-being typically called “God”. The processes by which God

brought everything into existence are said to be supernatural, i.e. they go beyond the laws of

nature and beyond scientific understanding. This view stands in stark contrast with the view that

the universe and living organisms were brought about as a result of natural processes such as

those described by the theory of evolution and cosmology. In 1981, teachers of Arkansas’ public-

schools were required by way of Arkansas Act 590 to teach both evolution and creationism in the

biology classroom with “balanced treatment” (i.e. as if they are competing models that have an

equal potential of being the more accurate scientific model) (Curd et al., pg. 37). In 1982, Act

590 was challenged in the McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education court case on the grounds

that Act 590 was unconstitutional (Curd et al., pg.64). The following issues were to be discussed

and resolved during the trial: “Is creationism really a competing scientific model for the origin of

the universe and the origin of species? Should creationism be taught in public-school courses?”
Brought in to defend the position that creationism should not be taught in public-school

classrooms was the philosopher of science, Michael Ruse. In his defense of the view that

creation science should not be counted as a genuine science and, hence, should not be taught in

public-schools, Ruse offers five characteristics that he believes a theory must have in order to

count as a genuinely scientific theory—characteristics which he believes the creationist’s theory

of origins lacks.

         According to Ruse, a theory must have the following five characteristics in order to count

as a genuinely scientific theory: it must be guided by natural law, it has to be explanatory by

reference to natural law, it must be testable against the empirical world, its conclusions must be

tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word, and it must be falsifiable (Curd et al., pg. 65).

With his first characteristic, Ruse argues that one of the fundamental features of science as an

academic discipline is that it studies regularities occurring in nature and speaks nothing of

supernatural forces existing outside the bounds of the physical universe (Curd et al., pg. 40).

Unlike any of the models or explanations provided by physics, chemistry, or biology,

creationism, Ruse points out, clearly invokes supernatural processes (e.g. the act of God creating

the universe ex nihilo) that are fundamentally unlike any of the natural laws that science appeals

to (Curd et al., pg.41). With this characteristic, Ruse is raising the question, “If the origins story

of creationists does not involve any natural laws based on the regularities of nature observable in

the world around us, what right does this theory have to stand beside scientific theories such as

physics, chemistry, and biology?”

             Ruse’s next characteristic, i.e. the model must be explanatory by reference to natural

law, is intimately linked with the first characteristic (Curd et al., pg. 65). According to Ruse,

explanation and prediction is not even possible without appealing to natural laws (Curd et al., pg.

41). Unlike the supernatural explanations offered by creationists, natural laws, says Ruse, give a

reason why some phenomena had to occur given a particular set of circumstances (Curd et al, pg.

41). Ruse writes, “Given the crucial role that law plays for the scientist in these processes,
neither explanation nor prediction is possible where no law exists… scientific

explanations/predictions must lead to the thing being explained/predicted, showing why that

thing obtains and not other things.” (Curd et al., pg. 41) In other words, Ruse is arguing that,

because natural laws can provide an explanation as to why something exists or has happened

rather than something else, they provide a better explanation of phenomena than do explanations

grounded in the unknowable supernatural processes of a heavenly being existing outside of time

and space.

         Ruse’s third characteristic of a genuinely scientific model is that the model is testable

against the empirical world, i.e. it must be able to make predictions about what the empirical

world would look like if that model were true (Curd et al., pg. 65). In short, in order for a theory

to be scientific one must be able to go out into the world, as opposed to sitting at home in his or

her armchair, and find experimental or observational data in favor of their view. According to

Ruse, there is a “virtual absence of any experimental or observational work by creation

scientists” (Curd et al., pg. 42). In other words, creationists have not tried to show their position

to be right by finding empirical evidence in favor of the view. If there is any mention at all of

observation or discovery in creationist literature, says Ruse, it is usually in reference to the

observations and discoveries that scientists have made in favor of evolutionary theory (Curd et

al., pg. 42). According to Ruse, Creationists will then offer ad-hoc rationalizations as to why the

experiments were unreliable or as to why the findings do not truly support evolution—“twisting

the conclusions to their own ends.” (Curd et al, pg. 42)

              With his fourth characteristic, Ruse points out that genuine scientific theories must be

tentative, that is to say, genuine science is not dogmatic (Curd et al., pg. 65). According to Ruse,

creationists will, in most cases, stick to what they believe no matter what. In short, they are

simply not open to changing their views even if the evidence calls for them to do so. Ruse writes,

“…there is absolutely no way in which the creationists will budge from their position.”

continuing, “Science must be open to change, however confident one may feel at present.” (Curd
et al., pg. 43). Unlike the theories of creationists, Ruse suggests, the theories of scientists evolve,

or even change entirely, if the empirical evidence leads them in a different direction. Lastly,

alongside Karl Popper, Ruse offers his fifth characteristic which says that genuine scientific

theories must be falsifiable (Curd et al., pg. 65). This means that a theory must make extremely

clear predictions about the world, so as to avoid any ad-hoc rationalizations from the supporters

of opposing theories. Seeing as creationists rarely make any testable claims against the empirical

world and are fanatically dogmatic, it only follows, Ruse suggests, that creationism is not

falsifiable.

             In his essay Science at the Bar—Causes for Concern, fellow philosopher of science

Larry Laudan goes head-to-head with Ruse, rejecting Ruse’s five characteristics as the proper

demarcating criteria between scientific and unscientific theories. Laudan begins the battle by

knocking three of Ruse’s characteristics and claims about creationists via one counter-example:

Laudan writes, “…it would be easy for a creationist to say the following: ‘I will abandon my

views if we find a living specimen of a species intermediate between man and apes.’” (Curd et

al., pg. 50). With this, Laudan suggests that Ruse is completely wrong in saying that creationists

never make any empirical claims about the world, that their theories are not tentative, and that

their theories are not falsifiable. In other words, Laudan shows that creationists do, in fact, make

empirical claims that are testable against the world and that would falsify their beliefs if found to

be true (in this case, their belief being that man did not evolve from lower animals). This

counter-example also reveals that they are not dogmatic when it comes to the core tenets of their

religion, seeing as they would be willing to admit they are wrong and even give up their views, if

this falsifying evidence were ever to be discovered. Additionally, Ruse points out that although it

is clearly possible that some creationists are dogmatic about their views, it is also true that

scientists themselves can be and have been dogmatic about their own beliefs. Ruse writes,

“historical and sociological researches on science strongly suggest that the scientist of any epoch
likewise regard some of their beliefs as so fundamental as not to be open to repudiation or

negotiation.” (Curd et al., pg. 49).

           Laudan then proceeds to throw another jab Ruse’s way by offering two more counter-

examples that reveal the flaw in Ruse’s first and second characteristics. He starts off by scolding

Ruse for suggesting that “existence claims” (i.e. a claim that something exists or that some event

occurred) are not scientific until the natural laws responsible for that thing’s existence are

discovered (Curd et al., pg. 50). Laudan points out that even famed scientists like Galileo,

Newton, and Darwin thought themselves to have established the existence of various phenomena

or processes (e.g. gravity and natural selection) long before the laws responsible for said things

were ever identified (Curd et al., pg. 50). If one must discover the natural laws responsible for a

thing’s existence in order for it to count as a scientific theory, he adds, then the theory of plate

tectonics remains unscientific, seeing as the natural laws responsible for this phenomenon have

yet to be discovered (Curd et al., pg. 50). With this, Laudan shows that Ruse’s first and second

characteristic are not reasonable, seeing as many scientists themselves have theories that are not

guided by or explainable in terms of natural laws.

           By attacking Ruse’s characteristics for genuine science, Laudan is not attempting to make

an argument for creationism. In fact, according to Laudan, Ruse’s criteria for a genuine science

actually robs science of its strongest arguments against creationism (Curd et al., pg. 48).

Showing that the claims of creationism fail to match up with the empirical data that the world

provides is a much stronger argument, says Laudan, than simply claiming that creationism is

somehow “unscientific” (especially when, in reality, philosophers of science—let alone the

general public—hardly agree on what makes something scientific) (Curd et al., pg. 50). As seen

above, there are clearly testable claims that creationists can and do make about the world, and it

serves the other side better to tackle those claims head on, rather than saying creationists do not

even make any claims. The various claims that creationists make about the world are the very

thing that show it to be the inferior theory, Laudan says, writing, “if any doctrine in the history of
science has ever been falsified, it is the set of claims associated with “creation-science.”’ (Curd

et al., pg. 48). In short, creationist claims have been tested and they have simply failed those tests

(Curd et al., pg. 48).

         In conclusion, it seems to me that Laudan is absolutely right in criticizing Ruse’s five

criteria in the way that he does. For instance, it seems to me that it is unquestionably true that

there are at least some creationists that are not fanatically dogmatic, i.e. they are willing to make

changes or completely abandon their view in the face of falsifying evidence, and there are some

creationists that do make claims that are falsifiable and testable against the empirical world. In

addition, it seems correct for Laudan to point out that even scientists have theories that are not

explanatory in reference to natural laws, yet they still take themselves to have scientifically

established some phenomenon or set of processes. I also think Laudan is right in making the

Kuhnian and “Lakatosian” point that scientists often hold on to (at least initially) the core claims

of their theories in the face of falsifying evidence. Finally, I think that Laudan is correct in

saying that simply calling creation science “unscientific”, without proper justification, is indeed

robbing evolutionists of some of their strongest arguments against creationism. Showing that the

empirical data goes against the creationists claims about the world does a lot more damage, it

seems to me, than groundlessly asserting that the view is unscientific.

             Although I myself accept Darwinian (atheistic) evolution, with Laudan’s points in mind,

I argue that students should learn about intelligent design (rather than creationism, seeing as

“ID” speaks nothing about the personal characteristics of the designer, other than that it or they

are intelligent) in public-school classrooms. The main reason I think intelligent design should be

discussed in public-school classrooms is because it seems to me that this would help students

better understand exactly why evolutionary theory is better supported by the empirical data than

is intelligent design. In other words, students should be taught what the claims of intelligent

design are and what the data should look like if it were true, as well as what the claims of

evolutionary theory are and what the data should look like if it were true, so that upon seeing and
learning about the empirical data, students can form a clear understanding as to why the data

supports one theory better than the other. So, unlike those who were in favor of the Arkansas Act

590, I do not think that evolution and intelligent design should necessarily be treated

as competing views, especially considering the fact that much of the empirical data does seem to

speak persuasively against many of the empirical claims of creationists (e.g. evidence supports

an old-earth view, rather than a young-earth view) (Curd et al., pg. 48). Alongside Laudan, it

seems to me that it would actually serve acceptors of atheistic evolutionism (such as myself)

better to allow for intelligent design, along with all of its shortcomings (and while, of course, still

applying the principle of charity), to be taught in public-school classrooms. In addition, I also

think it is important that students are taught about any questions currently left unanswered by

evolutionary theory, so that they understand that there are still unresolved questions left for

mankind to tackle in the pursuit of discovering as much as possible about our origins.