Reflecting on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Reflecting on the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations

Editor
Lee Yoong Yoong
Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore
Published by
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224
USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601
UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ASEAN matters! Reflecting on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations / edited by Yoong Yoong
Lee.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN-13: 978-981-4335-06-5
ISBN-10: 981-4335-06-1
1. ASEAN. 2. Southeast Asia--Politics and government--1945– 3. Regionalism--Southeast Asia. 4.
Security, International--Southeast Asia. 5. Southeast Asia--Economic policy. 6. Southeast Asia--
Economic integration. 7. Economic development--Southeast Asia. 8. Southeast Asia--Foreign
economic relations. 9. Southeast Asia--Foreign relations. I. Lee, Yoong Yoong.
JZ5333.5.A84A74 2011
337.1′59--dc22

2011008247

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2011 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

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THE INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES (IPS) was established in 1988
to promote a greater awareness of policy issues and good governance.
Today, IPS is a think-tank within the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy at the National University of Singapore. It seeks to cultivate clarity
of thought, forward thinking and a big-picture perspective on issues of
critical national interest through strategic deliberation and research. It
adopts a multi-disciplinary approach in its analysis and takes the long-term
view. It studies the attitudes and aspirations of Singaporeans which have an
impact on policy development and the relevant areas of diplomacy and
international affairs. The Institute bridges and engages the diverse
stakeholders through its conferences and seminars, closed-door discussions,
publications, and surveys on public perceptions of policy.
 CONTENTS

Foreword
Tommy Koh

Introduction
Lee Yoong Yoong

Acknowledgements

The Contributors

THEME ONE ASEAN’S HISTORY, IMAGE AND CHALLENGES

Chapter 1. ASEAN: What It Cannot Do, What It Can and Should Do
by Rodolfo C. Severino
Chapter 2. ASEAN’s Potential and Role: A Review
by Tran Duc Minh
Chapter 3. The Promises and Contradictions of ASEAN
by Liu Yanling
Chapter 4. Can We Do Anything about the Unimplemented ASEAN
Agreements?
by Bernard K.M. Tai
Chapter 5. ASEAN’s Perception Problem
by S. Tiwari
Chapter 6. ASEAN: The Challenge Is Upon Us
by Bandol Lim
Chapter 7. Covering ASEAN for Three Decades
by Kavi Chongkittavorn
Chapter 8. Three Decades of ASEAN Linkage: Brunei Darussalam,
from 1984 Towards 2015
by Pushpa Thambipillai
Chapter 9. ASEAN and East Timor: Family Someday?
by Noordin Azhari

THEME TWO POLITICS AND SECURITY

Chapter 10. ASEAN: A Pillar of Regional Stability
by Johari Achee
Chapter 11. Relevance of ASEAN in Forging Regional Peace, Security
and Prosperity
by Nicholas T. Dammen
Chapter 12. The Nargis Experience: Pragmatic Solutions Towards
Change
by Moe Thuzar
Chapter 13. ASEAN Efforts in Dealing with Transnational Crime
by Un Sovannasam

THEME THREE ECONOMICS

Chapter 14. ASEAN Economic Integration: The Strategic Imperative
by Ong Keng Yong
Chapter 15. Overcoming the Obstacles: Increasing ASEAN Relevance in
the Promotion of Regional Trade
by David Martin
Chapter 16. Trade Dispute Settlement within ASEAN
by David Chin Soon Siong
Chapter 17. From AFTA to Free Movement within ASEAN: A Bridge
Too Far?
by Lok Hwee Chong
Chapter 18. ASEAN Integration Enters the Critical Stage: A Private
Sector’s Narrative
by Tai Hui
Chapter 19. The Germination of Asian Financial Security
by Suthad Setboonsarng
Chapter 20. Does ASEAN Benefit Business?
by Raul L. Cordenillo
Chapter 21. ASEAN and Australia Partnership: Time for Business and
People to Lead
by Christopher Findlay and David Parsons
Chapter 22. Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline: More than Just a Pipe Dream
by Zainal Abidin Matassan and Lee Yoong Yoong
Chapter 23. Encompassing the AEC Blueprint into ASEAN’s
Subregional Frameworks: A Commentary
by Gary P. Krishnan

THEME FOUR SOCIO-CULTURAL

Chapter 24. Population Ageing in ASEAN: Prospects and Implications
by Kang Soon Hock and Yap Mui Teng
Chapter 25. Making ASEAN Relevant to the Young
by Diana Lee
Chapter 26. ASEAN and Human Capital
by Faizal Bin Yahya
Chapter 27. The ASEAN Quest for Greater Engagement and
Commitment
by Braema Mathiaparanam
THEME FIVE EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter 28. Lao PDR’s Role in ASEAN-China Trade Ties
by H.E. Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh
Chapter 29. ASEAN’s Diplomatic Importance to China
by Sheng Lijun
Chapter 30. ASEAN as a Mover of Asian Regionalism
by Akiko Fukushima
Chapter 31. What I have Always Wondered about ASEAN: A
Perspective from ROK
by Lee Sun-Jin
Chapter 32. India’s Place and ASEAN’s Primacy in the New East Asia
by P.S. Suryanarayana
Chapter 33. Reflections on Regionalism: The ASEAN Journey
by Simon Murdoch
Chapter 34. ASEAN and Latin America: Time for a Vibrant Connectivity
by Paulo Alberto da Silveira Soares
Chapter 35. Building a Strategic Partnership: A Review of Relations
between ASEAN and the ILO
by Ng Gek-Boo

THEME SIX THE FUTURE

Chapter 36. The Future of ASEAN: Obsolescent or Resilient?
by Amitav Acharya
Chapter 37. How Can ASEAN Stay Relevant?
by Joergen Oerstroem Moeller
Chapter 38. ASEAN into the Future: Towards a Better Monitoring and
Evaluation of Regional Co-operation Programmes
by Azmi Mat Akhir
Chapter 39. Strengthening the Foundation for an ASEAN Community
by Wilfrido V. Villacorta

Glossary

Annex I: Press Statement

Index
 FOREWORD
Tommy Koh

I commend my colleagues, Ong Keng Yong and Lee Yoong Yoong, for
taking the initiative to edit this volume of essays on ASEAN (Association
of Southeast Asian Nations). I understand that the intention is not to
produce a book just for scholars and specialists, but also for a wider
audience.
These 39 essays are written by well-known individuals who have rich
personal experiences of working either with ASEAN or between ASEAN
and its dialogue partners. The scope of the book is very comprehensive.
Anyone interested in ASEAN will find this a useful reader.
I thank the editor for inviting me to contribute the foreword to the book. I
shall use the foreword as an opportunity to contribute an essay of my own,
as I have been following the evolution of ASEAN since its birth in 1967,
and have played a small role in several of its key events.

Born in Challenging Times

ASEAN was born on the 8th of August 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand.
Pundits at that time thought that the new regional organisation would
probably not survive its infancy. Their scepticism was understandable.
Singapore had separated from Malaysia only two years earlier. The
reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia, after the end of
Konfrontasi, had just begun. There was a territorial dispute between
Malaysia and the Philippines. The Vietnam War was intensifying. The five
founding members of ASEAN did not share a common language, religion
or culture. Given all these problems in Southeast Asia, it was not surprising
that some scholars in the West described the region as the Balkans of Asia.
ASEAN has a track record of proving its sceptics wrong. It survived the
difficult circumstances surrounding its birth and, with pragmatism and
goodwill, gradually increased mutual confidence, and developed a habit of
consultations and a culture of forging consensus. In the beginning, the five
founding members of ASEAN wisely focussed on what united them and on
creating a peaceful and stable environment in the region, which would
enable them to concentrate their energies on their internal development.
This process continued from 1967 until 1975 when ASEAN faced its first
test.

The First Test

In 1975, Saigon fell and the Americans withdrew from South Vietnam.
North and South Vietnam were united to form the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. The red tide toppled the non-communist governments in Laos and
Cambodia. There was fear in America that Thailand, Malaysia and
Singapore would fall like dominoes. They under-estimated the resolve of
the five ASEAN countries to close ranks, to be non-confrontational, but, at
the same time, not to be intimidated by an arrogant and triumphalist
Vietnam. Things came to a head in December 1978, when Vietnam
responded to the provocations of the Khmer Rouge regime by invading and
occupying Cambodia.
ASEAN faced its first test: whether to acquiesce in Vietnam’s invasion
and occupation of Cambodia or to oppose it, at the UN and on the ground.
Although the Khmer Rouge regime was universally hated, ASEAN decided
that Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of its weaker neighbour would set
an unacceptable precedent. From December 1978 until the Paris Peace
Conference (1989 and 1991), ASEAN led a successful diplomatic campaign
against Vietnam at the UN and other international fora. ASEAN’s
successful diplomacy brought it credit and credibility.
The Second Test
ASEAN faced its second test when the Cold War ended. Some Western
scholars had mistakenly thought that ASEAN was an American-inspired
creature of the Cold War. With the end of that era, they predicted that
ASEAN would lose its raison d’être and would face the threat of being
irrelevant. ASEAN again confounded its critics. ASEAN welcomed
Vietnam into the family. It decided to support APEC. Sensing that the Asia-
Pacific region was in need of an inclusive forum, consisting of all the
stakeholders, to discuss issues of peace and security, ASEAN took the
initiative to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Therefore,
instead of fading away with the end of the Cold War, ASEAN succeeded in
re-inventing itself and gaining a new salience.

The Third Test

With the exception of Thailand, all the members of ASEAN had been
colonised, by the British, Dutch, French, Spanish and the Americans. It is
natural for a newly independent country to be sensitive about its
sovereignty and wary of the former colonial powers. This was also true of
ASEAN. Their initial instinct was to protect their newly won sovereignty
and independence and to keep the two superpowers and other major powers
at arm’s length. Fortunately, the leaders of ASEAN decided that, since their
prospects for peace and prosperity were partly dependent upon the external
powers, it was better to give them a stake in the region rather than to keep
them out. In this respect, ASEAN is unique. There is no other regional
organisation in the world which is so proactive in engaging and so
welcoming of its external partners.
Beginning in 1973, ASEAN established dialogue partnerships with
external powers having a keen interest in Southeast Asia. By the mid-1990s,
ASEAN had ten dialogue partners, namely Australia, Canada, China, the
EU, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the USA and the Soviet
Union (now Russia). ASEAN would invite the foreign ministers of its
dialogue partners to meet with the ASEAN foreign ministers, following
their annual meeting, both individually and collectively. This has become
an annual fixture in the international diplomatic calendar.
The Fourth Test
In order to attract the interest of its external partners, ASEAN has to have
substance and credibility. If the ASEAN countries were economically
unsuccessful, politically unstable, and incoherent and disunited, the world
would have no interest in engaging ASEAN. Fortunately, except during the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998, ASEAN has been one of the fastest
growing regions of the world. In addition, unlike other regions of the
developing world, ASEAN Member States welcome free trade and
investment and have pro-business environments. In order to compete with
China and India, ASEAN has implemented a free trade agreement and will,
by 2015, have a single market and production base. Even now, ASEAN is
an economy of significant reckoning. It has a combined population of 600
million. ASEAN’s GDP is equal to that of India. The US, for example, has
more investment (FDI) in ASEAN than in China and India combined. The
US exports more to ASEAN than it does to India or the whole of Latin
America.
Apart from its economic significance, ASEAN is also of interest to its
external partners because it has kept the peace in Southeast Asia. It is richly
endowed with natural and human resources. It sits astride some of the most
important sealanes of the world. It is a constructive player in global affairs,
often acting as a bridge between North and South and between East and
West. Southeast Asia is also the place where the great civilisations and
religions of the world meet, co-mingle and interact. ASEAN is an exemplar
of multi-culturalism.

The Fifth Test

The fifth test is the centrality of ASEAN in regional institutions. In 1997,
Asia was hit by a financial tsunami. One of the insights gained from the
crisis was that Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia were linked to each other
and shared a common destiny. This was the key reason for the decision of
ASEAN to convene the inaugural ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea) in Kuala Lumpur that year. ASEAN+3 has taken off and
has spawned such offsprings as the Chiang Mai Initiative. In the meantime,
India was rising and looking East. ASEAN realised that it was mutually
beneficial for India and ASEAN to intensify their engagement. ASEAN
also wisely decided to include Australia and New Zealand in the East Asian
family. For these reasons, ASEAN took the initiative, in 2005, to convene
the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS), consisting of ASEAN+3+India,
Australia and New Zealand. At the October 2010 ASEAN Summit in
Hanoi, ASEAN decided to invite the US and Russia to join the EAS, in
2011, when Indonesia will assume the chairmanship of ASEAN.
ASEAN+3, EAS and ARF are ASEAN-centred institutions and
processes. ASEAN’s role has often been described as that of the driver of a
bus. Many have questioned ASEAN’s right and qualifications to drive the
bus. My answer to the critics is twofold. First, many of the passengers, such
as China, Japan and India, would not trust each other to drive the bus. All of
them can accept ASEAN as the driver. Second, ASEAN’s weakness, as
Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo has said, is also its strength. It is
neutral and non-threatening. It has a track record of pragmatism and
prudence and can be trusted to drive the bus cautiously and to take into due
account the interests and preferences of all the passengers on board.
ASEAN’s centrality is, however, constantly under challenge. I can
understand why. ASEAN’s centrality of the region’s institutions is
abnormal. For example, the UN Security Council is led by five permanent
members, with veto powers. It is normal for the strong to lead the weak and
not for the weak to lead the strong. This is why we have, in the past, and
will continue to, face proposals that the bus should be driven either by a
committee of the major and medium powers of the region or by the +3
countries, namely, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, a bus
driven by a committee or by three co-drivers who do not trust each other is
very likely to meet with disaster. Thoughtful individuals would realise that,
given our history and the special circumstances prevailing in our region, the
only solution is for ASEAN to be the bus driver.

Conclusion
I am very optimistic about ASEAN’s future. It has embarked upon an
ambitious journey of self-renewal. The changes are nothing short of a
paradigm shift. ASEAN will transform itself from an association to a
community by 2015. ASEAN has adopted a Charter which has rationalised
its structure and decision-making processes. The Charter will strengthen
ASEAN’s institutions and ASEAN’s adherence to the rule of law. ASEAN
has established a human rights commission, and a commission on the rights
of women and children. The Charter has also empowered ASEAN’s civil
society and consolidated the linkages between the political leaders, the
officials, the business community, civil society organisations, academia,
youth, students and the ordinary citizens of ASEAN. Let us join hands to
build a bright future for ASEAN and its 600 million stakeholders.

Tommy Koh
Special Adviser
Institute of Policy Studies
 INTRODUCTION
Lee Yoong Yoong

Background
On 8 August 1967, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and the Foreign
Ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand gathered in
Bangkok to sign a declaration establishing an “Association for Regional
Cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia to be known as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)”. This document, now
known as the Bangkok Declaration, led to the birth of ASEAN. Since then,
ASEAN has grown to become a ten-Member grouping, with Brunei
Darussalam joining in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic and Myanmar in 1997, and finally, Cambodia in 1999.
ASEAN has been considered one of the world’s more successful regional
organisations. Today, however, as it moves past its fourth decade, there is
concern on the part of government officials, academics, and business
leaders — both in and out of ASEAN — that the organisation needs some
rejuvenation or else it could become irrelevant. In fact, as far back as the
year 2000, Singapore’s then Foreign Minister, Professor S Jayakumar, had
cautioned that if ASEAN continued to be ineffective, ASEAN’s Dialogue
Partners would relegate it to the sidelines. Jusuf Wanandi, Chair of the
Indonesian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,
said in 2006 that ASEAN had a challenge to maintain its relevance and that
it must respond effectively to globalisation.
Against this backdrop, where there have been questions on ASEAN’s
relevance, this collection of 39 essays is meant to help bring about a general
appreciation of ASEAN’s value and achievements, and indeed its
limitations as well. It also comes at a critical time when the grouping is
embarking on realising an ASEAN Community by 2015. The authors of
these essays include current and former office holders at the ASEAN
Secretariat, as well as specialists and diplomats who have either had
extensive knowledge or have been involved in ASEAN’s external and
economic relations with its Dialogue Partners. Their cumulative experience
on ASEAN issues is deep and wide, lending this volume a certain degree of
authenticity and authority.

Organisation of this Collection

The 39 essays in this collection are organised around six themes.

Theme 1: ASEAN’s History, Image and Challenges

There are nine chapters which explore both the macro, as well as specific
issues confronting ASEAN.
In Chapter 1, Rodolfo Severino looks at the nature of ASEAN — “what
it is and what it is not, what it can do and what it cannot do and what can be
expected of it and what should not” — and assesses the opportunities and
challenges this presents. For instance, ASEAN’s nature as an
intergovernmental — not supranational — organisation has dictated its
approach to decision-making, which has been a source of frustration to
some. Severino also examines two distinct characteristics of ASEAN that
have been regarded as its strengths: political and economic openness to the
rest of the world, and inclusiveness in its approach to regional endeavours.
He concludes that while ASEAN has some limitations due to its inherent
nature, this does not mean ASEAN cannot achieve what is good for its
people, particularly in economic integration.
Tran Duc Minh, in Chapter 2, assesses ASEAN’s role and its potential by
looking at ASEAN’s achievements, especially in the economic and
financial fronts. Intra-ASEAN cooperation as well as bilateral partnerships
with non-ASEAN countries resulted in increased trade and investment in
the region but many investors still view ASEAN as ten separate economies,
rather than a single market envisioned for the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC). For the AEC to succeed, he advocates official adoption
of the “Two Plus X” and/or “ASEAN Minus X” principles, and supports the
creation of an “AEC supranational institution” that would be able to make
tough decisions and provide policy directions.
In Chapter 3, Liu Yanling takes a different view and argues for the
removal of the “ASEAN Minus X” principle as it has been conveniently
used as a fall-back and excuse for some ASEAN Member States to avoid
implementing ASEAN policies and agreements. She argues that without the
opt-out clause, Member States would need to be more forthcoming in
providing the political support necessary for ASEAN to move ahead.
Bernard Tai in Chapter 4 focusses on the non-implementation of ASEAN
agreements. ASEAN has signed more than 270 operations and integration
agreements but only 30% of these have been implemented. Ratification of
agreements has also been a challenge given the different domestic and legal
constraints in each Member State. He proposes that unimplemented
ASEAN agreements could be repackaged to be operational in smaller sub-
regional groupings, such as the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East
ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) as the likelihood of cultural and
economic similarities within small groups would make implementation less
complex.
Chapter 5 sees S Tiwari pointing out that despite ASEAN’s
accomplishments in keeping regional peace and stability, providing
assistance for natural disasters, and establishing trade linkages and dialogue
partnerships with countries beyond Southeast Asia, there appears to be
insufficient recognition given to ASEAN. He puts this down to an
information gap and the ingrained perception among businesses in ASEAN
that the Member States are not committed to implementing agreements and
initiatives. ASEAN needs to make a concerted effort to show that
implementation schedules in ASEAN agreements would be strictly adhered
to, so that businesses and policy makers would treat these seriously.
In Chapter 6, Bandol Lim talks about the need to improve media
coverage and the dissemination of information on ASEAN’s achievements,
for instance, ASEAN’s role in mediating tensions within the region as many
ASEAN citizens would not know the impact of ASEAN’s work. He opines
that one of ASEAN’s foreseeable challenges is to convince people in the
region to identify themselves as “ASEAN citizens”. At the same time, he
hopes to see ASEAN work more cohesively to “put its house in order”, as
the region plays a more vital role in global affairs.
Kavi Chongkittavorn recounts, in Chapter 7, how his affection for
ASEAN began as a reporter covering the Cambodian conflict in 1980,
following ASEAN’s moves and countermoves against its adversaries
throughout the war and seeing how ASEAN consolidated itself quickly in
the face of common crisis. Chongkittavorn advocates the importance of
young journalists writing regularly about ASEAN to provide progress
reports to the public, as the creation of a people-oriented ASEAN
community would remain unattainable if ASEAN citizens are left ignorant
of what happens in ASEAN.
The notion of enlargement of ASEAN features in the next two articles.
Pushpa Thambipillai, in Chapter 8, looks back to when Brunei Darussalam
joined ASEAN in 1984 as the first new Member admitted since its founding
in 1967. She elaborates on how ASEAN has since become the cornerstone
of Brunei Darussalam’s domestic, foreign and economic policies.
In Chapter 9, Noordin Azhari takes a candid look at the possibility of
Timor-Leste joining ASEAN. He states that as early as the year 2000,
Timor-Leste had made known its desire to be part of ASEAN and its current
President, Jose Ramos-Horta, expressed hope to join ASEAN by 2012. The
country has since acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia in 2007. While ASEAN is not perfect and has been
criticised by many, including President Ramos-Horta himself in the past,
Timor-Leste’s desire to be in ASEAN suggests that the organisation has
something valuable to offer its Members and is “certainly worth more than
what it appears to be”.

Theme 2: Politics and Security

There are four chapters which explore political and security issues in
ASEAN.
In Chapter 10, Johari Achee examines the possibility of forming an
ASEAN Peace Corps, modelled along the lines of the American Peace
Corps, to help enhance regional stability for the present and future
generations of ASEAN citizens. He asserts that one of the benefits of
establishing such a Peace Corps would be to inspire a greater sense of
ASEAN identity among the people and nurture a sense of togetherness,
especially at the grassroots level and among the young generation.
The role of ASEAN in fostering regional peace, security and prosperity is
the focus of Nicholas Dammen in Chapter 11. A stable and peaceful
ASEAN creates an environment conducive to economic and social
development in the region, but preserving regional stability is not without
its challenges. Apart from the traditional security issues (e.g., border
disputes, nuclear armament) that have required the attention of the ASEAN
Member States, Dammen also identifies the challenge posed by “regional
and global borderless threats” such as terrorism, human and drug
trafficking, natural disasters and communicable disease.
In Chapter 12, Moe Thuzar looks at ASEAN’s role in facilitating the
humanitarian and rehabilitation works of various multilateral and regional
agencies that were in Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, and
how it provided a window of opportunity to alter the attitude of the
Myanmar government towards change. The humanitarian relief effort
earned ASEAN the recognition it deserved and paved the way for pragmatic
solutions through ASEAN coordination. She suggests that ASEAN could
consider developing a policy on engaging Myanmar in the spirit of the
Tripartite Core Group (ASEAN, United Nations and the Myanmar
Government) which was set up to resolve problems and remove obstacles to
delivering aid to the cyclone survivors.
Un Sovannasam, in Chapter 13, provides a factual account of ASEAN’s
efforts in dealing with transnational crimes such as drugs, arms smuggling,
money laundering, illegal migration and sea piracy. To remain effective in
dealing with such issues, he points out that ASEAN’s structure needs to be
strengthened. The setting up of legal and institutional mechanisms, under
the ASEAN Charter, as well as the adoption of the ASEAN Political-
Security Community Blueprint, appear to be steps in the right direction.

Theme 3: Economics

There are ten chapters which examine economic integration issues that
range from trade and connectivity to energy and financial cooperation in the
region.
 Chapter 14 by Ong Keng Yong reviews the strategic imperative for
ASEAN’s economic integration, namely, a response to the rise of China and
India. He describes the AEC as the most ambitious programme of economic
cooperation in the developing world, and recognises that implementing this
agenda would be technically and politically difficult. While the AEC has
brought some benefits, for instance, the growth of ASEAN’s trade in goods,
and a more competitive regional consumer market, there is still insufficient
institutional support to help galvanise the AEC.
In Chapter 15, David Martin compares regional integration in Europe and
ASEAN, and observes that unlike Europe, ASEAN has “yet to enter the
hearts and minds of its people”. For the AEC to succeed, more needs to be
done, for instance, improving institutional capacity to implement and
enforce ASEAN commitments and actions; enhancing the coordination
between the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Member States on the
regional integration agenda; and embracing the dispute settlement
mechanism which would serve to augment the Association’s legitimacy as
“a vehicle for bringing predictable, pro-trade regulation and prosperity to
the people of the region”.
Chapter 16 by David Chin provides a first-hand account of ASEAN’s
journey towards establishing free trade and highlights the region’s approach
to the settlement of trade disputes which had been based on an “ASEAN
way of working” — one which is informal and based on personal
cultivation of relationships. This method of settling disputes quietly and out
of the limelight has worked as most of the ASEAN trade officials have
negotiated these trade concessions and trade preferences with one another
over the last 18 years. However, future officials may not have the same
relationships or historical bonding to continue such an informal approach.
He sees the likelihood of a more formal and legalistic approach to resolve
future trade disputes.
In Chapter 17, Lok Hwee Chong recalls that following the initial
euphoria over the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
the private sector felt that in reality, goods still did not seem to be traded
freely within ASEAN. Even with the AEC, the concept of the free
circulation of goods is still elusive. He stresses that if ASEAN’s aim is to
increase intra-regional trade and build a sustainable and scalable trade
infrastructure to cope with an intra-region trade volume of 30–40% of its
external trade by 2015, there must be stronger political will and more
resources dedicated to this goal.
In Chapter 18, Tai Hui offers a private sector perspective on why
ASEAN integration is now entering a critical stage and needs to be taken
seriously by both policy makers and the business community to succeed. He
assesses that slow progress on this will defer growth in the region.
However, there is scepticism among the business community over
ASEAN’s “plan to create an economic, social-cultural and security bloc
with ten Members”. For multinational corporations, the hoped-for benefits
of ASEAN integration are also “rarely relevant to the business realities they
face”.
Suthad Setboonsarng, in Chapter 19, ranks regional financial cooperation
as the most critical area of ASEAN economic cooperation but he candidly
admits that ASEAN would need bigger countries to join in the effort to
provide financial stability and influence change in global financial rules and
regulations in order to accommodate the needs of small developing
countries. However, ASEAN, given its neutrality, can be the “backbone” for
other Asian countries to build their financial and economic stability, and he
suggests that it is time for ASEAN to take the lead in pushing for the
establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, a counterpart of the International
Monetary Fund.
In Chapter 20, Raul Cordenillo looks at the relationship between ASEAN
and the business community and stresses the need for both sides to work
together to ensure ASEAN economic agreements are both useful to the
business community and helpful in meeting the national development
objectives of Member States. He highlights the importance for businesses to
keep themselves informed of policy developments in ASEAN and also
encourages the business community to keep governments informed of their
needs.
In Chapter 21, Christopher Findlay and David Parsons point to
scepticism among potential foreign investors, including those from
Australia, about the ASEAN governments’ stated determination to deliver
on the AEC. The authors also note that it has been the governments that
have largely led and driven the integration processes and cooperation
between ASEAN and Australia. However, as cooperation moves to the next
stage, it will be difficult and perilous to hold back the interests of the
business community and the people. Within the bounds of good governance
and sustainability, these two groups can now take over the lead in the
partnership between ASEAN and Australia.
Chapter 22 by Zainal Abidin Matassan and Lee Yoong Yoong assesses
the relevance of the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) as a project to
establish regional interconnecting infrastructures for electricity and natural
gas. While implementation has been slow, the authors argue that the TAGP
is a useful mechanism for ASEAN to enhance regional energy security. An
efficient, secure and integrated gas pipeline network is crucial for ASEAN
to improve its economic competitiveness and facilitate further integration
with the global economy.
Gary Krishnan, in Chapter 23, recognises the importance of subregional
development roadmaps which are distinct from the broader ASEAN
regional framework. He contends that in recent times, the subregions have
been able to outperform ASEAN in implementing projects as they are not
bound by ASEAN requirements. However, he believes that it is necessary
for the subregions to incorporate ideas from the AEC Blueprint to ensure
that projects are in sync with the ASEAN vision. By leveraging on the
ASEAN framework, the subregions can overcome longstanding
weaknesses, evaluate their own plans and institutionalise successes, leading
ultimately to sustainable development in the rural communities.

Theme 4: Socio-Cultural

There are four chapters dealing with social and cultural progress across
ASEAN.
Kang Soon Hock and Yap Mui Teng consider the prospects and
implications of population ageing across ASEAN in Chapter 24. A
shrinking working age population results in a smaller tax base, leading to
difficulties for the government to support public programmes, such as
health and social care services for the elderly. The authors note that
governments in the ASEAN region have different views towards this issue,
largely reflecting the stages of ageing in their respective populations.
ASEAN, as a regional organisation, can play a critical role to assist the
Member States to prepare for this “demographic certainty”.
Diana Lee, in Chapter 25, explores how ASEAN can be made more
relevant to its young citizens. A real ASEAN community can only come
into existence when the people feel a connection with ASEAN. While there
is much that the regional countries have in common, young people are more
likely to know about countries outside ASEAN than their own regional
neighbours. She points out that youths have to be engaged at a level beyond
providing them with facts about ASEAN in textbooks. The outreach should
be wide and the activities to engage them must be enjoyable.
In Chapter 26, Faizal bin Yahya examines how human capital mobility in
ASEAN can play a key role in regional integration. With ASEAN’s labour
force expected to grow 19.8% from 276 million in 2005 to 330 million by
2015, human capital will be extremely important as the region moves up the
economic value chain. For ASEAN to remain relevant to multinational
corporations, it needs to enhance human capital mobility, although the
diverse economic development and varied labour policies among ASEAN
Member States make this a challenging task. He suggests the establishment
of a uniform regulatory framework to address temporary and skilled
migration in the region.
Braema Mathiaparanam, in Chapter 27, looks at how ASEAN began as
an “operation very much within the circles of political leaders, quite
removed from the people” in 1967 to become one which is now
demonstrating an effort to engage in discussion with ASEAN civil society
leaders. She argues that entities such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on
Women and Children, which were set up following the establishment of the
ASEAN Charter, will help ASEAN strike a balance between economic
well-being and social justice.

Theme 5: External Relations

There are eight chapters covering ASEAN’s relations with other countries
and ASEAN’s institutional partnerships.
Chapter 28 consists of a speech delivered in 2009 by then Prime Minister
of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Bouasone Bouphavanh, in China.
In the context of ASEAN-China relations, he highlights the active part
played by his country in the construction and implementation of various
regional plans and projects, including the linking of the Mekong area and
the ASEAN region with China.
Sheng Lijun, in Chapter 29, recognises that ASEAN’s diplomatic
importance to China has been increasing due to the niche ASEAN crafted
for itself in the East Asian regional strategic structure. As ASEAN works to
maintain centrality in East Asian regionalism, it also “accidentally” serves
China’s interests as other foreign powers are prevented from setting the
rules in the region. Any proposed regional architecture without the presence
and participation of ASEAN is likely to fail. ASEAN should fully utilise its
position to establish a better role for itself and reinforce regional peace,
security and prosperity.
In Chapter 30, Akiko Fukushima provides a perspective from Japan, one
of ASEAN’s earliest Dialogue Partners. She recognises the catalyst role
undertaken by ASEAN in driving regionalism in Asia — many existing
regional groupings were initiated and coordinated by ASEAN. ASEAN had
“ploughed what was once considered infertile ground in the interests of
regionalism in Asia”, and ASEAN has the potential to “remain a mover and
a shaker”.
Lee Sun-Jin, in Chapter 31, explores the idea of the “ASEAN Way”
through the lens of a Korean. He notes that despite the many differences
among the ten Member States (ethnicity, religion, ideology, language, and
their political, economic and social systems), the “ASEAN Way” has so far
been successful in pulling the region together and ASEAN has managed to
maintain its integrity over the years. In the context of Northeast Asia, Lee
sees that ASEAN can play a useful role connecting Northeast Asia with
India, and also play a bridging role within the expanded East Asia Summit
(EAS).
P S Suryanarayana, in Chapter 32, provides an analysis on the close links
between India and East Asia, including ASEAN. He believes that if the
EAS expansion goes well, East Asia may become the next big theatre in
global affairs. The futurist agenda of an expanded EAS must be in tune with
the restrictive compulsions of any multilateral process. With the newly
expanded EAS forum having four key nuclear powers (the United States of
America, Russia, China and India) and “nuclear suppliers” like Japan,
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, he foresees global issues such as
energy security, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament finding their
way into the EAS agenda.
In Chapter 33, Simon Murdoch traces the development of ASEAN from
the height of the Cold War until the inaugural EAS in 2005. While noting
that “Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia” has been declared
as an EAS goal, and that the regional integration pathway “runs upwards
through economic towards politico-security affairs”, as it has in Europe, he
warns that this “pathway will get steeper as it goes and has many potholes
when national autonomy is felt to be threatened or domestic political
initiative is seen to be suppressed”. He affirms New Zealand’s commitment
to be a “constructive plurilateralist” through its contribution via
ASEAN/EAS for stability and prosperity.
In Chapter 34, Paulo Alberto da Silveira Soares focusses on the potential
of cooperation between ASEAN and Latin America and notes a mutual lack
of awareness on what each region is doing. He opines that little has been
done since the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and representatives of
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay) had their inaugural round of preliminary talks in 2008 to
create a dialogue partnership. He notes that several countries from
Southeast Asia and Latin America are in the Group of 20 (G-20). Hence,
there is a potential for expanding the connectivity between ASEAN and
Latin American economies.
Ng Gek-Boo provides a review of relations between ASEAN and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) in Chapter 35. Cooperation
between the two organisations has been improving steadily since the
signing of a cooperation agreement in 2007. With ASEAN’s sizeable export
of migrant workers, ILO would need to play an advocacy role in promoting
ASEAN cooperation on migrant workers. He states that ILO and ASEAN
also need to work together to reduce poverty through projects targeted at
child labour, workers affected by HIV/AIDS, informal sector workers and
unemployed youths.

Theme 6: The Future

There are four chapters in which four writers give their impressions on how
ASEAN can continue to stay relevant and how the vision of the ASEAN
Community will develop.
In Chapter 36, Amitav Acharya notes that many regional and global
developments such as the rise of China and India, ASEAN’s own
enlargement since 1967, and the increase in transnational issues have raised
questions about ASEAN’s relevance. He proposes that ASEAN charts some
new directions to show that “it means business”, for instance, setting up a
regional peace operations mechanism, granting more authority to the
AICHR, and demonstrating the effectiveness of its dispute resolution
mechanisms. Above all, to stay relevant, ASEAN needs to maintain its
unity and engage all outside powers on an equal and transparent basis.
Drawing on his experience from working on EU integration, Joergen
Oerstroem Moeller, in Chapter 37, recommends a number of key principles
for successful ASEAN integration: regional integration must improve the
welfare of ordinary citizens who in turn must be able to see the connection
between their improved living conditions and ASEAN integration;
integration must be structured in a ‘win-win’ manner so that Member States
feel better off in ASEAN than out of the grouping; and ASEAN must be
able to adapt and adjust to change.
In Chapter 38, Azmi Mat Akhir explores two approaches that can help in
the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of regional
policies, programmes and projects in ASEAN. The first is the use of the
existing ASEAN sectoral mechanisms. The second is the establishment of
special independent ad-hoc task forces comprising of academics or research
experts. He observes that tackling complex issues such as climate change
and food security would require ASEAN to adopt a more multi-sectoral
approach.
In the final chapter, Wilfrido Villacorta looks at ways to reinforce the
foundations for an ASEAN Community and emphasises the need to
strengthen ASEAN’s rules-based institutions. The character of the emerging
ASEAN Community will also be determined by the people of the region —
the extent of their commitment, their openness and their support. In view of
the diversity in political systems among the Member States, he notes that
ASEAN will always face challenges in building the envisioned community
but ASEAN’s success so far has given it the influence in driving regional
architecture, and countries from as far as Africa and Latin America have
expressed interest to be development partners with ASEAN.

Reflections
Even as this book is being prepared, new chapters in ASEAN’s
communitybuilding story are unfolding, whether they relate to a political
issue or an economic matter or a social concern.
More than 40 years after its formation, ASEAN is still a work-in-
progress and there will always be debates regarding its usefulness and
effectiveness. The future of ASEAN is not a given as many in ASEAN
remain doubtful about its long-term viability. Some have argued that in
large parts of the ASEAN territory, people hardly know of ASEAN’s
existence while in a number of the region’s parliaments, ASEAN is seen as
too intrusive. Apart from the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN
Secretariat in Jakarta, there are few region-wide institutions and
mechanisms to stand up for ASEAN. The question people often ask is
whether ASEAN matters to their lives.
I was born a few years after the establishment of ASEAN. The
organisation was not something which I needed to know or worry about for
the first half of my life. The relative peace and prosperity in the region was
a great blessing. ASEAN facilitated a positive development despite the ups
and downs of the global economy. Singapore’s relations with its neighbours
were generally progressive and ASEAN was regarded as important even
though it was a slow-moving machine for regional cooperation and
consultation. However, in 2002, many things changed as a result of the
intensification of globalisation and advancements in technology. The
Chinese and Indian economies were also growing rapidly. ASEAN
responded quickly with a plan to integrate economically to obtain the
benefits from economies of scale. ASEAN also gambled on a free trade
strategy. It decided to champion trade liberalization and market access. To
demonstrate commitment and seriousness, comprehensive blueprints
including the ASEAN Charter were drawn up. It was a question of survival.
For me, the plans and actions for the ASEAN Community by 2015 opened
up more opportunities in Southeast Asia and it was necessary to get to know
the region better for my own future.
There is a sense of excitement as ASEAN engages countries like China,
India, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, Russia and the USA.
There is also a feeling that more and more Southeast Asians have become
educated and locked into the global grid. They wish to connect and be
involved with the rest of the world in moving forward and transforming
their respective nations. ASEAN is seen by those in and out of the region as
the vehicle to realise their respective aspirations. At the minimum, ASEAN
can help to improve their basic livelihood. If well-managed by the political
leadership, ASEAN can secure the future of the Southeast Asian people.
The many essays in this book convey some of the intensive activities and
pulsations I feel as I witness the evolution of this unique inter-governmental
organisation. More and more, I hold the view that ASEAN does matter to
Southeast Asia, including citizens like myself and my children.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the outcome of an informal brainstorming session between

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Director of the Institute of Policy Studies
(IPS) and me in an afternoon in February 2010. Having both served at the
ASEAN Secretariat between 2003 and 2008, we saw the merit of
undertaking the publication of a reader-friendly book to allow ASEAN
citizens to better understand ASEAN and its role. We hope this book would
not only increase people’s appreciation of the value of ASEAN. We want
this book to find a wider readership within and outside of ASEAN.
As the editor of this book, I am grateful to the contributors for sharing
their stories, reflections and the lessons learnt. They have been very
accommodating to my endless requests to revise their original drafts to meet
the guidelines of this book project.
I would like to thank Professor Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, for taking the time and trouble to
write the Foreword, which is a succinct synopsis of ASEAN’s trials and
tribulations. I am also deeply indebted to Ambassador Ong Keng Yong for
his relentless support of this project.
My gratitude goes to Ms Cheong Yun Wan for her extremely professional
copyediting assistance, without which this book would not be complete.
She was very patient in sharing her experience and knowledge with me, and
I deeply appreciated her cooperation.
I also owe special gratitude to the many people who gave so much of
their time and insights, including the essay reviewers, in particular,
Professor Ang Cheng Guan, Ms Sanchita Basu Das, Mr Daljit Singh, Dr
Denis Hew, and Dr Ramonette Serafica. I thank them for their friendship
and frankness in suggesting changes to improve the contents of the book.
I wish to thank Ms Juliet Lee, Consulting Editor of the World
Scientific/Imperial College Press for doing an excellent job in spite of the
time pressure.
 Finally, I also like to thank my colleagues at the IPS, including Mr Arun
Mahizhnan, Ms Chang Li Lin, and Ms Rachel Hui, for their continuous
support in the preparation of this publication.
 THE CONTRIBUTORS

AMITAV ACHARYA is currently Professor of International Relations at

the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.
He is also Chair of the University’s ASEAN Studies Center. His previous
appointments include Professor of Global Governance and Director of the
Centre for Governance and International Affairs at the University of Bristol;
Professor, Deputy Director and Head of Research of the Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore; Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto;
Fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center, and Fellow of Harvard’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government. His publications number over 20
books and 200 journal and magazine articles. His most recent books are
Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Cornell,
2009) and Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on
and Beyond Asia (co-editor, Routledge 2010).

AZMI MAT AKHIR started his career with the Department of Agriculture
for Peninsular Malaysia from 1976 to 1992. He joined the ASEAN
Secretariat in January 1993 as the Senior Officer of Trade and
Commodities, and rose to Assistant Director/Head of Food, Agriculture and
Forestry Unit in the Bureau for Economic Cooperation, before being
promoted to be the Director of the then Bureau for Functional Cooperation.
Before retiring in 2007, he was the Special Assistant to the Secretary-
General of ASEAN for Institutional Affairs and Special Duties. He joined
the Asia-Europe Institute of the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur as a
Senior Research Fellow (ASEAN Network) thereafter and remains in the
service until today. Since April 2010, he is also the Deputy Executive
Director of the Institute in-charge of Academic, Research & Development.
He holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Agriculture from the Bogor
Agriculture University, Indonesia, and Doctor of Science from the
Geological Institute, State University of Ghent, Belgium.

BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH is the Prime Minister of the Lao People’s

Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). He was born on 3 June 1954 in Salavan
Province, Southern Laos. He was officially appointed to the office by the
National Assembly of Laos on 8 June 2006, at the age of 52. PM Bouasone
received his tertiary education at the Communist Party Institute in Moscow,
former Soviet Union, from 1986–1990. He is part of a new generation of
leaders in the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. As part of the overhaul of
Lao PDR’s economy, PM Bouphavanh announced concrete measures and
action plans to increase foreign direct investments (FDI) into Lao PDR and
to open a Laotian stock exchange.

DAVID CHIN started his career in the shipyards of Singapore. He entered

government service in 1985 to establish an Export of Services Division in
the Singapore Trade Development Board (TDB). He attended the Trade in
Services negotiations periodically in Geneva before moving into other
aspects of Trade Negotiations. He was appointed Director of Multilateral
and Plurilateral Trade Policies in 1987 and directed TDB’s role in the
Uruguay Round and on ASEAN’s Trade Development. In 2000 he was
assigned to be Director-General (DG) of the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MTI), and led Singapore’s participation in ASEAN’s Senior Economic
Officials Meetings (SEOM). He represented ASEAN as the Co-Chairman
and ASEAN’s Chief Negotiator in the ASEAN-Korea FTA negotiation. He
retired in 2006 and returned to the Maritime Sector as Executive Director of
the Singapore Maritime Foundation, whilst concurrently being a Consultant
(Trade) with the MTI. He was awarded the Public Administration Medal on
National Day respectively in 1993 (Silver) and 2000 (Gold) by the
President of Singapore.

KAVI CHONGKITTAVORN is an editor-at-large of The Nation, the

Bangkok-based English daily, where he has been a journalist for nearly
three decades, covering domestic and international affairs as well as
commentaries and editorials. He was a bureau chief in Phnom Penh (1987–
1988) and Ha Noi (1988–90). From 1994–1995, he served as Special
Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN before returning to The
Nation as executive editor. He was a Reuter fellow at Oxford University in
1993–1994 and a Nieman fellow at Harvard University in 2000–2001. He
was also a jury member (2000–2004) and its president (2005–2007) of the
Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize, UNESCO. Currently, he is the
chair of Southeast Asian Press Alliance, a regional free press advocacy civil
society group.

RAUL CORDENILLO is currently Project Manager of the Inter-Regional

Dialogue on Democracy Project of International IDEA (Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Prior to this, he was Deputy to the
Director of the International IDEA European Union (EU)
Presidency/Global Consultations Project, Democracy in Development.
Before joining the International IDEA, he was Assistant Director at the
Bureau for External Relations and Coordination of the ASEAN Secretariat.
He also functioned as the liaison to the ASEAN Business Advisory Council
and the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry, during his
appointment as Head of the Investment and Enterprise Unit. He had career
stints in the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats; the Philippine
Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and the Department of Trade and
Industry of the Philippines. He obtained his MA in Economics and BA in
Political Science (Cum Laude) from the University of the Philippines.

NICHOLAS T. DAMMEN is the Ambassador of Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia accredited to the Republic of
Korea since February 2009. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) of Indonesia in 1975, after graduating from the Hassanuddin
University in Makassar, majoring in Political Science, and Linchonshire
University in Humberside, UK. He has been posted to the Papua New
Guinea in 1980–1982, Finland in 1982–1985, UK in 1987–1991 and 2001–
2004, Singapore in 1994–1996, and the Indonesian Permanent Mission to
the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland in 1996–1998. Prior to his
appointment to South Korea, he held several key posts including Director
General for Policy Planning and Development Agency in MFA Indonesia,
as well as the Deputy Secretary General for Economic cooperation in the
ASEAN Secretariat. He was decorated twice with the Order of Service by
President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001 and President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono in 2007 respectively.

FAIZAL BIN YAHYA is a Research Fellow in the Multicultural and

Society cluster at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS). His
current research interests include trans-nationals, human and social capital
and state-led development. He was conferred his PhD from the University
of Sydney, Australia in 2000. His latest co-authored book is The Migration
of Indian Human Capital (with Ms Arunajeet Kaur) by Routledge, launched
in November 2010. He has written more than twenty journal articles and
book chapters. Prior his current IPS appointment, he was an Assistant
Professor in the South Asian Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and
Social Sciences at NUS. He was also a Visiting Research Fellow, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) from January 2008 to June 2009. He
has also worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Environment and Water Resources in Singapore.

CHRISTOPHER FINDLAY is Professor and Head of the School of

Economics at the University of Adelaide in Australia. Prior to that, he was
Professor of Economics in the Asia Pacific School of Economics and
Government at the Australian National University (ANU). While his
research focusses on Australia’s economic relations with Asia, he is a
foremost examiner on policy reform in the services sectors, including
studying the impediments to services trade and investment. He holds a PhD
and M.Ec. from the ANU and an Honours degree in Economics from the
University of Adelaide. He became a Member of the General Division of
the Order of Australia (AM) in January 2007. He is also the Vice-Chair of
the Australian Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation.

AKIKO FUKUSHIMA is a Senior Fellow at the Japan Foundation and

Research Fellow of the Joint Research Institute for International Peace and
Culture at Aoyama Gakuin University, where she also teaches. She holds a
PhD from Osaka University and an M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Her
carrier includes being Director of Policy Studies at the National Institute for
Research Advancement (NIRA) (1994–2006). Her publications include
Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (1999) by
MacMillan; A Lexicon of Asia Pacific Security Dialogue (2003) by Keizai
Hyoronsha; and Human Seucirty (2010) by Chikura Shobo. She has
contributed chapters to Asia’s New Multilateralism (2009) and Security
Politics in the Asia-Pacific (2009).

JOHARI ACHEE, a national of Brunei Darussalam, graduated from

University of Wales, Cardiff, UK with an MA (Journalism Studies). He was
the Assistant Director of the ASEAN Secretariat from 1989 to 1992, before
returning to Bandar Seri Begawan to head the News, Current Affairs and
Sports Radio Television Brunei (RTB) in 1993. In March 2006, he was
promoted to Deputy Director in RTB. He was also the first General
Manager cum Group Editor-in-Chief of the newly established The Brunei
Times from 2006 to 2007, and Chair of News Group (Asiavision), Asia
Pacific Broadcasting Union from 2003 to 2006. In Asiavision, he managed
the growth from 7 to 18 members by paving for admission of new
broadcasters affiliates like Afghanistan and Mongolia. As Chair of ASEAN
TV News Exchange from 2003 to 2006, he introduced annual news
exchange award funded by Asiavision, and pioneered the use of satellite in
the exchange. He is author of “Television News and Nation Building — A
Case Study of RTB”.

KANG SOON HOCK is a Research Fellow in the Family and

Demographic cluster at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS). He
received his PhD in Sociology from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. His
primary research focusses on issues relating to ageing and family in
Singapore. In particular, he is interested in the inter-generational
relationship between the elderly and their adult children. His other research
interests include health and ageing as well as population ageing and policy.
GARY KRISHNAN is presently the Institutional Development Expert
(IDE) under the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and is tasked with
assisting and providing a consultancy role to the Centre for the IMT-GT
(Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle) Sub-regional Cooperation
in materialising the visions espoused by the Roadmap for Development
2007–2011: Building a Dynamic Future. Gary has over 20 years of
corporate and public sector management experience accumulated across the
Asia-Pacific region. His career stints include the Prime Minister’s Office of
Malaysia and the ASEAN Secretariat, where in his last appointment as
Head to the Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI), he was responsible for
driving developmental aid to the newer member states of Cambodia, Laos
PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam.

DIANA LEE was a Senior Officer at the Public Affairs Office of the
ASEAN Secretariat in 2004. She obtained her Bachelor of Arts (Honours)
in Southeast Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore and
her Master of Arts in Mass Communications from Oklahoma City
University. Prior to her employment at the ASEAN Secretariat, she was an
Assistant Director with the People’s Association, Singapore. She is now a
happy house-maker with two young daughters.

LEE SUN-JIN is currently the Visiting Professor at Hallym University. He

graduated from the Department of International Relations of Seoul National
University in February 1975, and thereafter joined the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Korea. In his 23 years of diplomat services, he
served in the Korean embassies and consulate general offices in the USA,
Lebanon, Hong Kong, China, Japan and Indonesia. He also took on critical
assignments and roles, such as Director-General for Policy Planning, and as
Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) after it was established in
2000. He officially retired from the MOFAT in September 2008. He was a
Visiting Fellow to the East Asian Institute in Singapore in 2009.

LEE YOONG YOONG

Please refer to Editor’s Biography.
BANDOL LIM was born in Cambodia and was raised and educated in the
US. He received his Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the Denison
University in 1999. Thereafter, he served with the US Peace Corps and
AmeriCorps to help improve the global economic and social conditions. He
completed a Master’s degree in International Development and Social
Change from Clark University in 2007. With a commitment to equitable
economic and social development, he returned to Cambodia to bring about
positive social change, and held various positions with the University of
Cambodia, including a Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the
Institute of Research and Advance Studies. Still with the university, he now
occupies several key positions, including Director of the Asia Leadership
Center; Deputy Director of the Office of the President in Charge of
International Coordination; and Coordinator for the Asia Economic Forum
and the Asia Faiths Development Dialogue.

LIU YANLING is currently Manager with the Air Transport Division of

the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS). She has been handling
bilateral and multilateral air services negotiations with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States since joining CAAS in
2007. She was involved in the negotiations and conclusion of the ASEAN
Multilateral Agreement on Air Services, as well as Multilateral Agreements
on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight Services and Passenger Air
Services, all of which are expected to pave the way for an ASEAN Single
Aviation Market. She was also involved in the bilateral negotiations leading
up to the landmark agreement between Singapore and Malaysia, which saw
full liberalisation of air services between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and
liberalisation of air services to secondary Malaysian points. Previously a
country officer at the MFA of Singapore, she has a First Class Honours in
Political Science from the National University of Singapore.

LOK HWEE CHONG was Assistant Director/Head of the Finance &

Macroeconomic Surveillance Unit, and concurrently Head of the
Investments and Industrial Cooperation Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat
(ASEC) in 2007–2008. Prior ASEC, he served for 10 years with the
Singapore Government, holding various posts, namely First Secretary
(Commercial) to the European Communities in Brussels; Head of
International Operations (ASEAN), Trade Development Board; and Senior
Assistant Director, Trade Division, Ministry of Trade & Industry. Presently
the Regional Customs and Regulatory Affairs Director for TNT Express, he
has in-depth understanding of trade regulatory issues, having worked as a
senior consultant at PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Worldtrade Management
Services. He was a holder of the Shaw Foundation Scholarship and
graduated from the National University of Singapore with a Bachelor of
Science (Chemistry) with Merit and a 2nd Upper Honours Bachelor of
Social Sciences (Economics).

DAVID MARTIN is a regional integration specialist focussing on

economics and international trade. Since 2003, he has been based at the
ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to direct the ASEAN-EU Programme for
Regional Integration Support (APRIS), which aimed to enhance regional
economic integration, with specific emphasis on customs, standards and
goods trade. He also helped to further the EU-ASEAN relations through
Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) and Regional EU-
ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI). He is the co-author of a thematic
evaluation of EU trade related technical assistance worldwide, and had
recently contributed to the UN University’s Comparative Regional
Integration Studies’ book project, The EU and World Regionalism: the
Makability of Regions in the 21st Century.

BRAEMA MATHIAPARANAM was a former Nominated Member of

Parliament (NMP) in Singapore. Her early career stints include teaching
under the orbit of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and doing journalism
for The Straits Times. She was also a Visiting Research Fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) where she spearheaded its
Gender Studies Programme. She served as a former president of AWARE, a
women’s NGO in Singapore, as well as the founder of a migrant worker
advocacy group, the “Transient Workers Count Too”. Her other civil society
appointments include Regional President of the International Council of
Social Welfare and the executive committee member of a global network,
Institute of Women’s Empowerment. Braema is now a consultant researcher
and trainer. She currently leads a human rights group called MARUAH and
is the Singapore’s Focal Point for The Working Group on ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism.

MOE THUZAR is the Lead Researcher, Socio-Cultural Affairs of the

ASEAN Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Before
joining the Centre, she headed the ASEAN Secretariat’s Human
Development Unit. She has contributed to various ASEAN compendia and
publications on social and human development. She also co-authored
Myanmar: Life After Nargis (ISEAS, 2009), and is also co-editing a book
on the impact of Cyclone Nargis and lessons for disaster management in
Southeast Asia. She is interested in urbanisation and urban policies in
Southeast Asia, and is coordinating a project on trends, prospects and
challenges of urbanisation in Southeast Asia. Having served in Myanmar’s
Foreign Service, she is also working on a review of Myanmar’s foreign
policy. She holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the Lee Kuan
Yew School of Public Policy where she was a Temasek scholar.

JOERGEN OERSTROEM MOELLER joined the Danish diplomatic

service in February 1968 and worked on the European integration from
1971 to 1997. He served as the Danish Ambassador to Singapore and
Brunei Darussalam from 1997 to 2005. In 2002, he was also made the
Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand while based in Singapore. Since
retiring from the Danish Diplomatic Service in 2005, he joined the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) as a Visiting Senior Research Fellow,
and continues to hold concurrent appointments, such as Adjunct Professor,
Copenhagen Business School and Singapore Management University; Chair
of Advisory Board, Asia Research Center, Copenhagen Business School
(CBS); and member of INSEAD, Forum International Competitiveness,
among others. His major publications include Political Economy in a
Globalized World, World Scientific (2009) and European Integration —
Sharing of Experiences, ISEAS (2008). He has a Master of Science
(Economics) from the Copenhagen University.

SIMON MURDOCH graduated from the Canterbury University with a BA

in English and American Studies and an MA with First Class Honours in
American Studies. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of New
Zealand in 1972 and was posted to Canberra, Australia from 1974 to 1977.
From 1979 to 1981, he worked on secondment in the Prime Minister’s
Advisory Group (PAG) as foreign policy adviser, and later returned as its
director. He subsequently served in Washington from 1983 to 1987 and
returned to Canberra as High Commissioner from 1999 to 2002. He was
appointed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade in September 2002,
prior to his retirement in June 2009. In November 1998, he was Visiting
Professor (Public Policy and Management) at the Victoria University of
Wellington. He was awarded the “Companions of the New Zealand Order
of Merit” (CNZM).

NG GEK-BOO is no stranger to the labour movement. He has proven his

mettle time and again in this field by way of his various appointments in a
career at the International Labour Organization (ILO) that spanned over
three decades. At the pinnacle of his career, he was appointed the Regional
Director for Asia and the Pacific, bearing the rank of an Assistant Director-
General in the organisation in 2006. With a regional agenda, he worked
with the ASEAN Member States in the promotion of progressive labour
practices. He received his Bachelor in Commerce degree from the then
Nanyang University in 1969, before pursuing his honours degree in the
same university the following year. He did his post-graduate education in
the UK, i.e. a Master’s degree at the University of Manchester in 1971 and
the PhD qualification at the University of Sheffield in 1976.

NOORDIN AZHARI is presently the Deputy Chief of Party for the

ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility at the ASEAN
Secretariat. He was previously Chief of the Trade Efficiency and
Facilitation Section at the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) in Bangkok. Before
UNESCAP, he held assistant director and director positions at the ASEAN
Secretariat for more than 16 years. Such a long affiliation with the ASEAN
Secretariat helped him to develop in-depth knowledge and understanding of
regional economic integration and intergovernmental issues. Prior to the
ASEAN Secretariat, he was a member of the Malaysian Administrative and
Diplomatic Service and held various positions in the Ministry of Trade and
Industry. He graduated from the University of Malaya in 1975 and received
his Master’s degree in International Studies from the University of
Birmingham, UK in 1991.

ONG KENG YONG is Director of the Institute of Policy Studies in the

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of
Singapore. He is concurrently Ambassador-At-Large in the Singapore
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Singapore’s Non-Resident
Ambassador to Iran. He was Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2003 to
2008. He started his MFA diplomatic career from June 1979 and was posted
to the Singapore Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and the USA. He
was Singapore’s Ambassador to India and Nepal from 1996 to 1998. From
September 1998 to end 2002, he was Press Secretary to the then Prime
Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong. At the same time, he held senior
appointments in the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts,
and the People’s Association. He graduated from the then University of
Singapore with a LLB (Hons) and the Georgetown University (Washington
DC) with an MA in Arab Studies. In 2008, he was Visiting Research Fellow
at the Centre on Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus in the School
of Oriental and African Studies in London. He was awarded the Public
Administration Medal (Silver) in 1997, the Long Service Medal in 2002
and the Meritorious Service Medal in 2008 by the Singapore Government.
In 2007, he also received the Medal of Friendship of the Lao PDR, and the
Medal of Sahametrei of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

DAVID PARSONS is an Australian who has lived and worked in Southeast

Asia since 1993. He served as the Director-General of Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1993–95 following five years managing
PECC’s minerals and energy activities out of the Australian National
University (ANU). From 1996 to early 1999, he was based at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta working principally in PECC’s
Trade Policy Forum. In 2000 and 2001, he was engaged as a fulltime
consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam to work
on the APEC 2000 Leaders and Ministerial meetings and the APEC High
Level Meeting on Human Capacity Building in Beijing. He then returned to
become Director-General of PECC again at the start of 2002 for a two-year
term. Presently, he is advisor on trade and investment with the Indonesia
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN).

SUTHAD SETBOONSARNG is a Thailand Trade Representative, a

position equivalent to that of a minister, since May 2009. He is the special
representative of the Thai Prime Minister in carrying out international trade,
investment and related issues in accordance with the government’s external
economic policy. He has years of experience in assisting the royal Thai
government, individual ASEAN Member State, and the United Nations in
their trade and investment policy. Prior to his current position, he was a
Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, where he supported leading global
companies, in particular, the consumer goods and automotive sectors, on
international trade and customs issues. As Deputy Secretary-General of
ASEAN, he pioneered the work on the ASEAN Harmonised Tariff
Nomenclature (AHTN) which is now the common regional tariff
nomenclature system. He was also instrumental in establishing the ASEAN
Finance Ministers Meeting in 1996 and the subsequent creation of the
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). He holds a PhD (Economics) from the
University of Hawaii in 1983 under the East-West Centre Scholarship.

RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, JR. is a Filipino diplomat and was the

Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002. He is currently the Head
of the ASEAN Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in
Singapore. He studied at Ateneo de Manila University and has held a
postgraduate degree in International Studies from the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies. As a diplomat, he had been posted to the
Filipino embassies or consulate-general office in Washington DC, Beijing,
Houston, and Kuala Lumpur, among others. He also served as the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 1992 to 1997. He
is the author of Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community.

SHENG LIJUN is currently Visiting Associate Professor at the School of

Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU).
He received his MA degree from the Australian National University (ANU)
in 1988 and a PhD degree from University of Queensland, Australia in
1994. Prior to joining NTU, he was Senior Research Fellow at the Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy from 2008 to 2010. His earlier
appointments include Senior Fellow at Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(ISEAS) from 1995 to 2008, and Visiting Fellow at Strategic & Defence
Studies Centre of the ANU (1993–1994). His research focus is on
international relations in Southeast Asia and East Asia. He has written
extensively in nearly 200 publications and papers. He is author of several
books, like China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-
bian (2002); Chinese Foreign Policy 1978–84: From Anti-Hegemonic
United Front to the Independent Foreign Policy (1994); and ASEAN-China
Relations: Realities and Prospects (co-editor, 2005). His forthcoming book,
China and International Relations in Southeast Asia (sole author) is in
progress.

PAULO ALBERTO DA SILVEIRA SOARES is a career diplomat and

has assumed different positions in the Brazilian diplomatic service since
1968. He was Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Brazil in Buenos
Aires, covering mostly Mercosur. His previous assignments include the UK,
India, Spain and Sweden, as well as participation in presidential delegations
and trade missions to China, Australia, South Africa, Italy, the USA and the
South American countries. He also has extensive experience in bilateral and
multilateral foreign trade policies, as well as in international economic and
financial matters. He has attended specialised courses at the International
Trade Centre in Geneva, besides writing and lecturing on specific topics.

UN SOVANNASAM is currently Senior Officer of the Legal Services and

Agreements Division, the ASEAN Secretariat. Before the Legal Services
and Agreements Division, he had served as the Senior External Relations
Officer at the secretariat, with the responsibility of coordinating and
promoting ASEAN cooperation and partnership with countries,
international and regional oganisations, and external parties. As a Senior
External Relations Officer, he was also assigned to oversee the work on
immigration, transnational crimes and law and legal matters at the ASEAN
Secretariat. Prior to the ASEAN Secretariat, he served in different
departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of Cambodia. His last assignment was at the General
Department of ASEAN.

P. S. SURYANARAYANA has been working in Singapore since 2002 as

Asia Pacific Correspondent of THE HINDU (India’s National Newspaper
since 1878). He has also served previously as Deputy Editor, Southeast
Asia Correspondent (also in Singapore from 1998 to 2000) and Special
Correspondent in both Sri Lanka and Pakistan, all for THE HINDU. Author
of a book on India-Sri Lanka relations, The Peace Trap, he has interviewed
political leaders in East Asia over the years and also several political and
non-conventional leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. He
covered the Gulf War in 1991, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the
1990s, the East Timor crisis in 1999, and the Fiji ethnic crisis in 2000.

BERNARD TAI is currently a senior policy advisor for the German

Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Project on Promoting Economic Cooperation
in BIMP-EAGA. The project focusses on facilitating investment and trade
flows and tourism movement within this relatively less developed part of
ASEAN with the end goal of narrowing the development gap across BIMP-
EAGA and across ASEAN. Bernard is based in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah,
Malaysia. From 2002 to 2005, Bernard was Senior Infrastructure Officer at
the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. He had also worked as an economic
analyst for over eight years, including career stints as Head of the Centre
for Economic Studies at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia; Economist at
the BBMB Securities; and Senior Research Officer at the Malaysian
Institute of Economic Research. Bernard holds a Master’s degree in
Economics.

TAI HUI is the Regional Head of Research, Southeast Asia, of Standard

Chartered’s Global Research team. Based in Singapore, he monitors the
financial and economic development of the Southeast Asian economies.
Besides publishing research articles regularly in international and local
journals and newspapers, Tai also provides sound technical advice to clients
on the latest regional economic and financial development. He is also a
regular guest with both local and international financial media. Prior to his
current role, Tai spent six years as an economist with Standard Chartered
Bank (Hong Kong) researching the Greater China economies. Tai graduated
from Queens’ College, University of Cambridge, with a Master of Arts
degree in Economics. In November 2007, he was conferred a Master in
International and Public Affairs from the University of Hong Kong.

PUSHPA THAMBIPILLAI is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of

Business, Economics and Policy Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.
She teaches International Relations, International Organisations and
Regional Cooperation. Her research interests include Brunei foreign policy,
ASEAN cooperation, and international relations in the Asia Pacific region.
She is a regular participant in academic conferences both within and outside
the region and has contributed to publications dealing, among others, on
Brunei and regionalism in Southeast Asia. She received her Bachelor’s and
Master’s degrees in Social Sciences from the Universiti Sains Malaysia
(USM), and her PhD in Political Science from the University of Hawaii.

SIVAKANT TIWARI was a senior legal officer of the Singapore Legal

Service. Educated at the University of Singapore, he graduated in Law in
1971, and made the Legal Service his career, serving as head of the
Ministry of Defence’s legal department (1974), and head of the Attorney-
General’s (AG) Chambers’ Civil Division (1987) and International Affairs
Division (1995). A skilled negotiator, he was a member of the Singapore
delegation that dealt with the US-Singapore FTA signed in 2003, and served
as legal adviser to the delegation that established diplomatic relations
between Singapore and China. He was also on Singapore’s legal team in a
case concluded in 2003 that had been brought on by Malaysia to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for provisional measures
against alleged damage to its territorial waters due to land reclamation by
Singapore, and in the territorial dispute with Malaysia over Pedra Branca
before the International Court of Justice in 2007. He retired from the Legal
Service in 2007 but was re-employed by the Attorney General’s Chambers
as a special consultant. He was a recipient of the Public Administration
Medal (Gold) in 1984, the Long Service Award in 1996, the Public
Administration Medal (Gold) (Bar) in 2000, and the Meritorious Service
Medal in 2008. He later joined the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies as a
Senior Visiting Fellow. He passed away on 26 July 2010, suffering from a
fatal aneurysm and cerebral haemorrhage.

TRAN DUC MINH is currently the Director (Non-Executive) of the

Standard Chartered Bank in Vietnam, and the Vice-Deputy Secretary-
General of the Vietnam’s Economic Association. In addition, he is also a
lecturer at the Hanoi University of Business and Technology, and is Dean of
The Faculty of International Trade. Prior to his retirement from the public
service, he was Deputy Minister for Trade (1998–2007); Secretary General
of the Vietnam’s National Committee for International Economic
Cooperation (1995–1998); Chief Negotiator for the WTO accession of
Vietnam (1991–2000) and the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement
(1995–1999); and Director-General for Multilateral Trade Policy
Department in the Ministry of Trade (1995–1998). In between, he was
appointed Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2000 to 2003. He
graduated from the Australian National University with a Bachelor of Arts
in Economics in 1979. He has published extensively in English and in
Vietnamese between 1980 till 2009.

WILFRIDO VILLACORTA is presently Professor Emeritus of De La

Salle University in Manila, the Philippines. He received his PhD from the
Catholic University of America, Washington DC, and has been an educator
for most of his career: Professor of International Relations (1975–2005);
Senior Specialist, SEAMEO Regional Center for Educational Innovation
and Technology (INNOTECH) (1976–1978); and Adviser to the President,
Asian Institute of Management (2007–2008), among others. In between, he
served as the Deputy Secretary-General ASEAN from 2003 to 2006. He is
currently Honorary Professor and Academic Advisor at the Ritsumeikan
Asia-Pacific University in Japan. He is also a consultant to the ASEAN
Affairs Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines,
and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) in Sweden. He has published scholarly works on international
relations.
YAP MUI TENG is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy
Studies. She leads research in the area of Demography and Family at the
Institute. Her current research interests include policy responses to low
fertility in Singapore and elsewhere, policies on the aged, migration
policies, and poverty alleviation policies. She has written and published on
fertility and family planning, migration and ageing in Singapore. Prior to
joining IPS in 1989, she was working as a statistician at the Population
Planning Unit, Ministry of Health. She has also worked as a Research
Fellow at the Population Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, and
a statistician at the Research and Evaluation Unit, Singapore Family
Planning and Population Board. She has a Bachelor of Social Sciences
(Honours) degree from the University of Singapore, and a Master’s and
PhD degrees from the University of Hawaii.

ZAINAL ABIDIN MATASSAN is the Managing Director of MATASSAN

(M) Sendirian Berhad, Executive Director of AGROMATE Holdings Sdn
Bhd and AGROMATE (M) Sdn Bhd, Director of BAJA Niaga Sdn Bhd and
Chairman of PETROMINSAR Sdn Bhd. He was the former Secretary-In-
Charge of the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE), a regional entity
comprising all the ten ASEAN National Oil and Gas Companies and
Authorities responsible for oil and gas of the Member States. He served in
PETRONAS, the National Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Company of
Malaysia, for over 30 years, which included a term of four years in
Vietnam, as Country General Manager. In 1988, he was awarded the
Pegawai Bintang Kenyalang (PBK) by the state of Sarawak. For enhancing
cooperation and relationship between Vietnam and Malaysia in the oil, gas,
petrochemical and energy sectors, he was awarded the “BANG KHEN” in
2001 by the Government of Vietnam. He is currently a Member of the
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), Malaysian Institute of Management
(MMIM), and Malaysian Society of Soil Sciences (MSSS).
 THEME ONE

ASEAN’S HISTORY, IMAGE AND

CHALLENGES
 CHAPTER 1

ASEAN: WHAT IT CANNOT DO, WHAT

IT CAN AND SHOULD DO
Rodolfo C. Severino

I believe that the best way I can contribute to this excellent effort at a
greater understanding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) is to highlight what I see as elements in the nature of ASEAN —
what it is and what it is not, what it can do and what it cannot do, what can
be expected of it and what should not.
The first thing to be said about ASEAN is that it is an intergovernmental
entity, an association among governments. This seems obvious; but on the
basis of what is often said or written, one can say that it is often forgotten.
Many consequences flow from this nature of ASEAN as an inter-
governmental association.
First, decisions in ASEAN are made by governments. To be sure,
consultations are undertaken with non-governmental groups or individuals
concerned before positions are taken by individual governments. The
intensity of the consultations, their legitimacy, and their actual impact on
decision-making vary from political system to political system. But, in the
end, the decisions are made by governments.
In this, ASEAN is not unique. All inter-governmental groups behave this
way — the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, other
international bodies and regional associations of nations.
 Lobby groups — particularly business and civil-society organisations —
may seek to exert pressure on inter-governmental decision-making at the
regional or global level on behalf of their respective causes, but it is the
governments that make the decisions.
The second thing about regional associations like ASEAN or global
organisations like the UN is that almost all their decisions have to result
from compromises. No one nation can have its way all the way all the time.
Nor can a government take action against the wishes of most other
governments or peoples. These are often sources of frustration for nonstate
actors or for governments themselves; but that is how the real world is. It is
a world of sovereign states.
The third characteristic of regional inter-governmental associations of
states is that they do not have supra-national government with authority
superior to their Member States. A rare exception is the European Union,
which has the European Commission as a regional executive, the European
Parliament as the regional legislature, the European Court of Justice as a
regional judiciary, and the European Central Bank as the monetary authority
for those EU Members using the euro as their common currency. Of course,
in practice, these bodies have less power than they are granted on paper or
are generally perceived to possess. In any case, the EU is an exception.
Another exception is the UN system of permanent members of the
Security Council, with their anomalous and anachronistic but somehow
realistic veto powers. In the case of ASEAN and other regional
associations, no substantial decisions are made except by the Member
States. One may dream of or wish for a world or, at least, regional
government, but neither the world nor any region has one now nor will they
likely have one in the foreseeable future. Thus, one should not say,
“ASEAN should have done this” or “ASEAN should not have done that”,
when one actually means, “Such and such Member State should not have
blocked this or that regional decision” or “Such and such Member State
should have put forward this or that proposal”.
ASEAN does not have a common armed force to deploy in armed
intervention in a Member State or in a neighbouring nation. If a Member
State does send an armed contingent to some trouble spot, as the Philippines
and Thailand did in the transition of East Timor to independent nationhood,
it does so on its own and not as part or on behalf of ASEAN. The Member
States seem to have decided that it is better this way.
 Two criticisms are often levelled at ASEAN. One is its preference for
decision-making by consensus. The other is the reluctance of Member
States to interfere in one another’s internal affairs.
First, on some occasions, ASEAN does vote; only, it publicly presents
the results as having been arrived at unanimously in order to project
cohesion, save everyone’s face and avoid having winners and losers. The
ASEAN Charter does not rule out voting among the leaders if they so
choose. In any case, the ASEAN preference for consensus as opposed to
voting is the desire to avoid exposing the minority as having “lost” and the
majority as having “won”. With only ten Members, ASEAN is rather small
as numbers go, and voting 7–3 or 6–4 would be inherently divisive.
The policy of non-interference is rooted not in some principle, dogma or
doctrine but in self-interest. Countries do not interfere in others’ internal
affairs because they do not wish those others to interfere in theirs. Nor do
they wish any outside power to have the rationale for interfering in their
internal affairs — be it China or the United States or some other powerful
country or an ex-colonial master. Again, this is true not only of ASEAN but
of every other regional association of nations and of any individual nation.
It is enshrined in several resolutions of the UN General Assembly. If
ASEAN does get involved in what seems to be the internal affairs of a
Member, it is because such an internal problem is perceived to affect
neighbouring countries or the region as a whole.
Two other characteristics, however, mark the association as distinctively
ASEAN. One is its political and economic openness to the rest of the world.
The other is the inclusiveness of its approach to regional endeavours.
ASEAN pioneered the system of dialogue partnerships, which link it to
external partners that are useful to it, just as ASEAN is considered useful to
the dialogue partners. ASEAN’s dialogue partners are now Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. Through these dialogue
partnerships, ASEAN and its partners discuss and pursue matters pertaining
to trade, investments, tourism, and development co-operation. ASEAN has
economic co-operation agreements, including free trade, with China, Japan,
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. It co-operates in various degrees
of intensity with China, Japan and Korea in 20 areas. ASEAN set up with
them, initially, a network of bilateral currency swap and re-purchase
agreements, now multilateralised into one pool in the amount of US$120
billion. It has a separate forum for meeting with the leaders of Australia,
China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, called the East Asia Summit.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which now has 27 participants, is
the sole forum for the discussion of political and security issues in the Asia-
Pacific. Led and managed by ASEAN, the ARF gathers in one framework
all of ASEAN, China, Japan and the United States, India and Pakistan,
North and South Korea, and others with interests in the security and other
affairs of the Asia-Pacific region.
The watchword for all these ASEAN-centred forums and processes is
“inclusiveness”, an approach of ASEAN’s choice. ASEAN seeks to be a
friend to all and an enemy to none. The alternative to inclusiveness is an
alliance countering an explicitly or implicitly identified adversary. ASEAN
does not believe that such a confrontational stance will work under present
or foreseeable circumstances. If the ARF, because of the divergent interests
of its major participants, is not in a position to settle such issues as North
Korea’s nuclear weapons, the South China Sea disputes, and the Taiwan
question, a confrontational approach would have even less likelihood of
resolving them.
In the light of ASEAN’s realities and limitations, is there no scope for it
to grow and improve and be more effective? There definitely is.
ASEAN could, for example, be more serious and determined in
integrating the regional economy so as to attract investments more
effectively into the region and thus generate more jobs, increase
productivity, lower costs and prices, and in general improve people’s lives
— under appropriate regulation, of course. In each country, this may entail
overcoming lobbies for sectors that depend on or seek government
protection against regional competition.
The ASEAN chair has been invited to the meetings of the new Group of
20 (G20) for international financial summit and ministerial consultations.
This indicates recognition of the association’s political and economic
importance, ASEAN being the only developing-country regional
association invited to the G20. However, in order to earn its place in the
G20, ASEAN, through its chair, has to contribute to the group’s
deliberations with substantive and helpful ideas on international financial
governance and other global economic and financial issues.
ASEAN must be more trenchant in its periodic assessment of the regional
economy and of its Members’ national economies. It is only in this way that
the economic surveillance that ASEAN regularly conducts can be effective
in anticipating serious economic problems in the region.
In ASEAN Plus Three and in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN must not
only manage the process but take the lead in substance, putting forward
collective ideas for addressing the issues confronting these groups and for
strengthening co-operation in resolving them.
In the ARF, ASEAN should be steering the forum towards discussing and
co-operating on non-traditional security issues like contagious diseases,
environmental pollution, drug- and people-trafficking, and other
transnational crimes.
Within ASEAN itself, in addition to regional economic integration, the
association ought to strengthen and demonstrate its capacity to co-operate
in dealing with many regional opportunities and challenges, including the
urbanisation of the region, the protection of the atmospheric and marine
environment, the impact of natural disasters, and the regional dimension of
the growing incidence of transnational crime.
Despite the limitations inherent in its nature, there is much room for
ASEAN to strengthen itself and do more for Southeast Asia and its people.
 CHAPTER 2

ASEAN’S POTENTIAL AND ROLE: A

REVIEW
Tran Duc Minh

ASEAN: 43 Years of Comprehensive Co-Operation and

Integration
Since its foundation on 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has come a long way in 43 years of strong development
in defiance of difficulties and hardship to become a strong player in, and a
model for, regional co-operation. The organisation has earned worldwide
recognition and high appreciation. ASEAN has considerably contributed to
strengthening the basis for peace, stability, security and prosperity in the
region as well as enhancing the regional coherence and competitiveness in
the face of new challenges unleashed by globalisation and the rise of new
economic powerhouses in Asia.
The co-operation programme of ASEAN is very comprehensive,
covering all domains of social life, politically, economically, socially and
culturally in line with the ASEAN Vision 2020 (adopted in 1997) and
Hanoi Plan of Action (1998) “to build an ASEAN as a concert of Southeast
Asian Nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity,
bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community
of caring societies”. Recently, ASEAN leaders adopted the Vientiane
Action Programme (VAP) with the goal of realising it in six years (2004–
2010). It aims at accelerating the integration of the eleven priority sectors
by removing barriers to the free flow of goods, services and skilled labour
as well as facilitating the free flow of capital by 2010. It will put in place all
the essential elements and conditions for ASEAN to function as a single
market and production base by 2010.1 At the 9th Summit in Bali on 7
October 2003 the ASEAN leaders had also agreed to establish2 an ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, to turn ASEAN into a highly
competitive economic region in order to ensure closer, more comprehensive
and mutually beneficial integration among ASEAN Member States and
their peoples.
Taken together, these documents manifest the ASEAN leaders’ collective
resolve to look beyond immediate economic and financial challenges and to
enhance the momentum of growth and prosperity of ASEAN as it enters the
21st millennium.
These important and far-sighted decisions have resulted in significant and
pride-worthy achievements.

• Overall results: The ASEAN co-operation programmes have brought new

faces and new strength to ASEAN Member States despite the effects of
the current global financial crisis. Their economies have been growing at
a fast clip. Collectively, ASEAN’s gross domestic product (GDP) stood at
a mere US$645 billion in 2002. But 2008–2009 saw ASEAN take
enormous, impressive strides with its GDP at US$1,504 billion,3 an
increase of 4.4% from 2007 figures.
• Improved trade: Total ASEAN export-import value was US$1,224 billion
in 2006. This figure jumped to US$1,710 billion in 2008, up by 6.2%
compared with 2007, although ASEAN internal trade has remained
modest.
• ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): Tariffs have been reduced significantly
with about 99.11% of the tariff lines in the inclusion lists already at 0–
5%. As of 1 January 2010, the more affluent ASEAN-64 can import and
export almost all goods and services at no tariff. The commitment is for
tariffs to be reduced to zero by 2015 for ASEAN-4. AFTA is now
focussing on removing quantitative restrictions, non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) and technical obstacles to trade.
• ASEAN investment area: Barriers to investment are also being brought
down. Under the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) agreement, ASEAN
Member States are committed to opening their manufacturing sectors to
ASEAN investors and extending national treatment to them. All
exclusions were phased out in 2003. The rapid opening of ASEAN
economies to one another and the creation of an integrated regional
market have not only inspired ASEAN businessmen to sharpen their
competitiveness as a bigger market intensifies competition but also paved
the way for their business to grow. An integrated market on a regional
scale would open up more opportunities there for countries and industries
to sell their products and acquire capital goods and raw materials at a
lower cost for the benefit of all. These advantages would help ASEAN
greatly improve its chances of attracting investment into the region.
Moreover, an integrated ASEAN provides traders and investors with
platforms for the production of goods and services to be marketed in the
entire region. Hence, ASEAN businessmen are brimming with
confidence.
• Market access: It is noteworthy that ASEAN has also strongly assisted its
businessmen by adopting a strategy for bigger market access. It has
enhanced bilateral partnerships known as ASEAN Plus, for instance with
China (ASEAN-China FTA), Australia and New Zealand (AFTACER),
Japan, India, and Korea. In such arrangements ASEAN is supposed to be
the “hub”. However, it should be noted that the effectiveness of these
partnerships remains questionable. In the case of ASEAN-China,
although investment diversion may serve to increase the flows of
investment and trade as well into the proposed new region, there are
some reservations on the distribution of these gains between ASEAN and
China. If ASEAN wants to be the “hub” of all these ASEAN Plus One or
ASEAN Plus Three arrangements, ASEAN would need to have a clear
vision and strategy for responding to regionalism, and to be more
proactive in the ASEAN Plus arrangements. It would require a stronger
and more integrated ASEAN market. A fragmented ASEAN cannot
possibly dictate terms in any of these arrangements.

In the list above, I have cited some examples from a few areas of ASEAN
co-operation to highlight the fact that ASEAN, in bringing into full play
existing achievements in trade co-operation, is on its way to becoming an
ASEAN Economic Community envisaged by ASEAN Vision 2020. The
ASEAN co-operation and integration prospects for higher development are
promising in the near future.

Challenges
However, besides the success and advantages mentioned above, ASEAN
has also been facing a lot of challenges. I discuss a few of these here.

• AFTA: Although the implementation of tariff reduction generally has

been a success, the utilisation of the concessions under the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme has been very low because
of these reasons: (1) lack of clear procedures, and lack of credibility and
mutual trust between the preference-receiving and preference-granting
countries; (2) low margins of preference which make the whole process
of filling in the form unattractive; (3) bureaucratic inefficiency; (4)
significant existing NTBs and transportation costs in the region that need
to be eliminated and harmonised; (5) licensing procedures, technical
standards and customs procedures that remain major obstacles to the
trade liberalisation process; (6) lack of supranational institutions within
ASEAN to enforce mutually agreed decisions among the Member States.
The traditional ASEAN way of a consensus-based decision-making
process also slowed progress in the implementation of AFTA
commitments.
The main obstacles to ASEAN trade, in the forms of NTBs, technical
standards, and other disguised barriers such as sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) barriers or licensing, still exist. ASEAN trade still relies much
more on trade with the rest of the world.
• Co-ordination problems: ASEAN Member States have advantages in
many fields. Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are very strong in
commodity markets such as rice, coffee, cashew nuts, pepper, rubber,
shrimp and marine products. They rank first or second in the world as
producers and exporters. Unfortunately they remain fragmentary, and as
yet not well coordinated. Therefore, they become less competitive. In
short, I would not hesitate to say that co-ordination problems in
conducting agricultural business, in investment and the financial markets,
 and particularly in policy co-ordination, harm the credibility and
negotiating strength of ASEAN.
• Falling foreign direct investment: Although foreign direct investment
(FDI) is considered the first priority of all the ASEAN Member States
and great efforts have been made to attract these investors to the region,
FDI in ASEAN keeps facing difficulties. The Framework Agreement on
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), signed on 8 October 1998, merely
states the intention and objectives for integration while its
implementation is left to each individual country through its laws and
regulations at the national level. It should be noted that the non-ASEAN
sources of investment are falling in the region. Intra-ASEAN investment
is still small although it has improved somewhat in recent years and
ASEAN Member States have made big efforts to deal with this problem
by widening ASEAN integration through the formation of a free trade
area (FTA) with China to increase the market size of the region to 1.7
billion consumers. Similarly, they are accelerating the schedule of tariff
liberalisation under AFTA and AFTA Plus initiatives to deepen
integration, including the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). However,
these exercises and the current move towards bilateral FTAs in some
ASEAN Member States may also create further impediments to the free
movement of investment within ASEAN.
• Institutional problems: Since the working mechanism in ASEAN is based
on consensus, all decision-making in ASEAN must be done on the
principle of consensus. Individual ASEAN Member States unilaterally
liberalise their trade and investment regimes on consensus. But Member
States are different from one another in levels of development. There are
big gaps between the older ASEAN economies and the newer ones in
their stages of economic development, development priorities and their
readiness to liberalise. Therefore, all rushed or radical measures to impel
strict observations of commitments would inevitably encroach on
national sovereignty, which is sacred to Member States because in recent
history they had sacrificed lives and resources to regain it. Thus, it would
be insensitive to require Member States to surrender their sovereign right
to control the entry and establishment of foreign investors in their own
countries. Consensus indeed may impede the pace of integration of
ASEAN.
Some Reflections on the Way Ahead
In the context of the current status of development of ASEAN, presented in
the previous section, I next discuss the implications of this situation.

• The ASEAN Vision 2020 and ASEAN Charter have laid down an
important foundation for transforming ASEAN into an ASEAN
Community. However, in order to fully tap the great potential of ASEAN,
it should strongly promote its role in the region to gain more recognition
of its achievements, and ensure the potential is realised and utilised more
widely for the welfare of the ASEAN peoples. We should be practical,
critically analysing the gains and pains of ASEAN in order to find more
effective measures and policies to bring ASEAN to a higher plane.
• A review of ASEAN’s current status reveals that all the stated goals of
cooperation and integration programmes for trade (AFTA), investment
(AIA), industrial (AICO), agriculture (FS), services (AFAS), etc. have
not been accomplished yet. In other words, much more must be done to
attain the goals of regional integration.
• The decision to transform ASEAN into the AEC is a long-term strategic
goal in order to create a truly integrated ASEAN to become a real power,
a highly competitive production base in Asia. By doing so, ASEAN can
promote its role in shaping a new regional economic order, formulating
regional policies and setting the pace of development in the region and
the world, thus exerting strong influence on the world community. The
AEC would give ASEAN a stronger voice in international forums and at
the same time strengthen the position of each Member State. The
decision arises from the realisation of the urgent need to respond to
severe competition resulting from the current trend of globalisation, and
to other local political and economic upheavals. ASEAN has no choice
but to accelerate the process of regional integration. The forces of
globalisation and the power of modern technology are impelling this
integration. The whole ASEAN, in particular the business enterprises,
must think and work regional, if they are to survive sharper-than-ever
competition in the world and in the region. To stay in the game, ASEAN
must take decisive actions, become a strong and effective grouping, and
partner China, India and others effectively. Many investors still see
 ASEAN as ten isolated, scattered national economies, too small to be
worth paying attention to.
If ASEAN integration stagnates while the other emerging economies in
the Gulf region, Eastern European region and the rest of Asia forge
ahead, we will certainly be left behind and become irrelevant. With a
more precise understanding of the ultimate form of ASEAN economic
integration in mind, I think, an ASEAN Community is a logical extension
of the various initiatives taken and implemented by ASEAN and is
consistent with the ASEAN Vision 2020 and ASEAN Charter.

Based on the typical features and the current situation in all aspects of
ASEAN, I would like to recommend some basic elements for the future
AEC:

• The AEC should be built on the current programme of economic

integration and provide a practical roadmap to an economically integrated
ASEAN market.
• We should embark on the AEC by an “AFTA Plus” arrangement,
consolidate the achievements and then move steadily, step by step,
towards a real free trade area with no tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Rome
cannot be built overnight! The most important step is the consistent
implementation and acceleration of the AIA and other existing co-
operation programmes.
• ASEAN enterprises should unite as one in commodity groups, such as the
Rice Group, Coffee Group, Pepper Group, Cashew Nut Group and
Rubber Group, to create collective strength to survive and develop
steadily in the current sharp competitive market in the region and the
world. These groups will gather commodity-producing countries that
work under a common rule and policy and set up buffer stocks so that
they may regulate production and exports to stabilise the market. The
commodity groups I suggest here must strictly be rule-based. Participants
should think regional, work regional and dare to sacrifice short-term self-
interests in exchange for common and long-term ones of the whole bloc
in both production and exports.
• Harmonisation of external tariffs must soon be introduced into the
ASEAN agenda, especially among Members with higher tariffs.
• Allow free movement of skilled labour and talents, as well as free
movement of tourists from all ASEAN Member States. Harmonise
customs procedures and standards to become consistent with
international ones.
• A well-developed institutional and legal infrastructure should be
prioritised to govern the activities of the AEC. A credible dispute
settlement mechanism (DSM) should be reinforced by setting up a
permanent council assigned with clear-cut responsibilities and with the
competence to release early warnings and use sanctions where and when
commitments are infringed.
• Due to different levels of development among Member States, ASEAN
policy makers should officially adopt the principle of a Two Plus X or
Ten Minus X. ASEAN policy makers should support the creation of
regional units as a first step towards institutional integration. Regional
units are staffed by nationals who are formally independent of
governments and are professionals in trade, investment and finance.
• The AEC Member States should concede some of their national authority
to AEC Supranational institutions so that these institutions may become
important policy decision makers for the sake of all Member States. Of
course, national sovereignty must be respected but to prevent
ineffectiveness resulting from “consensus” and “too many cooks spoil the
soup” scenarios, a strong decision maker would be indispensable. To that
end, it is necessary to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat so as to
effectively co-ordinate and implement policies, agreements and
protocols.

I would emphasise that the integration in ASEAN should be more rule-

based. Sanctions should be adopted to ensure the implementation of
commitments, particularly when the principle of Two Plus X or Ten Minus
X is adopted.

Conclusion
ASEAN has made many important and encouraging achievements after 43
years of co-operation. ASEAN leaders formulated a long-term vision and
took initial steps to realise it by adopting the ASEAN Community with
three pillars, and extending co-operation in all fields — politically,
economically, socially, culturally — but the implementation is weak due to
the lack of an institutional mechanism and rule-based system, and levels of
legal constraints, among other issues.
Therefore, ASEAN should strengthen solidarity and cohesiveness, and
encourage each other to think and work regional for the long-term interests
of the group as a whole.
Still, despite the difficulties and challenges ahead, ASEAN economic co-
operation programmes are very promising. However, ASEAN should pay
greater attention to the existing sluggishness in some sectors by finding
effective measures to accelerate the process of regional integration. It must
sharpen its competitiveness and ensure real effectiveness of its co-operation
agenda. To fully tap the great potential of ASEAN, to strongly promote its
role in the region so as to gain much more recognition and utilise it more
widely for the welfare of the ASEAN peoples, ASEAN Member States
should unite as one, be bonded together in partnership and function
cohesively in an ASEAN Community of caring societies. To achieve that
end, a practical view with a feasible roadmap based on current
achievements and effective policy co-ordination as well as a sound
institutional arrangement would be indispensable.

_____________________
1
See “ASEAN accelerate integration of priority sectors”, at http://www.asean.org/1662.htm.
2 ASEAN Community encompasses three major pillars: (1) the ASEAN Security Community, (2) the
ASEAN Economic Community, and (3) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
3
See “ASEAN Secretariat’s Statistics” as of 6 October 2009 at http://www.asean.org.
4 ASEAN-6 comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
ASEAN-4 comprises Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam.
 CHAPTER 3

THE PROMISES AND

CONTRADICTIONS OF ASEAN
Liu Yanling

I grew up in the privileged 1980s and 1990s when the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) original mission to maintain regional
peace and neutrality amid communist threats and other external political
manoeuvrings had largely dissipated. In my memory, ASEAN was a
hodgepodge grouping of Southeast Asian states with disparate levels of
political, economic and social development, loosely co-operating on various
issues whenever they could. ASEAN Member States politely minded their
own business, nothing substantive was ever achieved other than pretty
pictures of officials doing the customary ASEAN handshake. Of course,
then I was an ignorant adolescent with other greater priorities in life.
I had my first real dose of ASEAN when I entered the Singapore Public
Service. ASEAN is almost everything I had imagined it not to be. Far from
being a pomp and show organisation, tremendous efforts go into the
formulation of substantive regional policies ranging from economic
development to human rights issues that accommodate the disparate
economic and political interests of ASEAN Member States.
Over the years, ASEAN has been slowly reinventing itself to remain
relevant to the region and the world. Having served its original purpose to
stave off foreign intervention while the countries in the region concentrated
on nation-building, ASEAN has now embarked on integration efforts to
create an ASEAN politico-security, socio-cultural and economic
community by 2015. In its external relations, in the face of the growing
confidence and influence of bigger neighbours, such as China and India,
ASEAN is also attempting to counter-balance and, at the same time,
leverage these emerging economies’ economic and political ascent.
Even as these developments herald a promising future for this relatively
young bloc, it is clear that ASEAN continues to face stark realities. The
diverse political and economic systems remain immense barriers to regional
integration. There are also underlying historical rivalries and suspicions
among ASEAN Member States that prevent deeper regional co-operation. I
distinctly recall a conversation with a senior ASEAN transport official on
maintaining the centrality of ASEAN in its relations with ASEAN’s
dialogue partners. I told the official that as family, ASEAN should accord
more privileges to fellow ASEAN brothers compared to friends such as
China. The silence from that official was sobering — he clearly did not
share my view.
The disjuncture between official policies and reality worries and
disappoints me. If ASEAN officials do not faithfully implement the policies
set by political leaders and governments, ASEAN risks falling short of the
future it promises. It was a clear contradiction, for example, even as
ASEAN leaders announced at the 15th Summit the ASEAN Connectivity
Initiative, which is aimed at enhancing intra-regional connectivity,
facilitating the building of an ASEAN Community that is competitive and
increasingly interlinked with the wider Asia-Pacific region and the world,
that Indonesia announced its ministerial decree that would nominate only 5
out of its 26 international airports for air services liberalisation under
ASEAN Open Skies. Indonesia had cited the lack of readiness on the part of
its airlines and the inequality in the number of points nominated (i.e.
Singapore only has one point to offer) for its capping of the number of
Indonesian airports to be opened for air services liberalisation.
This brings me to ASEAN’s biggest ailment and the root of ASEAN’s
contradictions — the ASEAN Minus X mechanism, which was mooted
initially as a pragmatic way to allow those ASEAN Member States ready to
proceed with implementing policies to forge ahead while the rest would
come on board when they were ready to do so. While the mechanism was a
necessity to accommodate the different pace of development among
ASEAN Member States, it has now been conveniently used as a fall-back
and legitimate excuse not to implement policies. One only needs to look
through the entire bank of agreements signed by ASEAN and the proportion
of them that is fully ratified to know that ASEAN has indeed promised
more than it really achieves.
Instead of looking at what more can be achieved by ASEAN, it is
perhaps time that ASEAN examined what it has promised to do. ASEAN
can no longer hold on to the ASEAN Minus X mechanism if it wants to be
credible in the eyes of the international community and its citizens. There
must be clear political will for ASEAN to realise its promises without the
opt-out option. With its continued availability, the good intentions and hard
work that go into regional policy making will come to naught.
ASEAN with its population of 580 million (Compared to the EU’s 500
million) has tremendous potential and many unfulfilled dreams. As a young
ASEAN citizen, I want an ASEAN with no excuses for not living up to its
potential.
 CHAPTER 4

CAN WE DO ANYTHING ABOUT THE

UNIMPLEMENTED ASEAN
AGREEMENTS?
Bernard K.M. Tai

Since its inception, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

driven largely by market and institutional factors, has signed more than 270
co-operation and integration agreements.1 Though this is an impressive
record, ASEAN is often labelled as a talk shop and its accords are seen as
nothing but smoke.
ASEAN is accused of wasting too much time and money on negotiating
and implementing free trade agreements that do not really promote
intraregional trade. Some of the economic liberalisation deals reached at the
ASEAN level are said to be insignificant, if not redundant, because the
region already has low levels of trade and investment barriers achieved
through unilateral liberalisation and the WTO process over the years.
Institutionally, ASEAN is said to be a lowest-common-denominator type
organisation: the grouping’s emphasis on consensus-seeking in decision-
making means its progress is contingent on the movement of the least
progressive Member of the bloc. Pessimists who only see the half-empty
glass are adamant that the enactment of the ASEAN Charter will do little to
improve the situation.
 This chapter does not attempt to join the discussion on the validity and
credibility of ASEAN and its economic integration agenda. Neither does it
aim to defend its record and to silence its critics.
Ostensibly, ASEAN’s own record has shown that only about 30% of its
agreements have been implemented over the past 40 years.
If this is indeed the case, and considering the amount of resources and
time that have been invested by the ASEAN public and private sectors in
negotiating and concluding those deals, the more constructive question to
ask now would be: Can we do anything about the 70% of the agreements
that have yet to be implemented? If the answer is “yes”, then how?
The ASEAN Way bears the hallmarks of consultation, tolerance,
restraint, accommodation, equality and consensus. Given the diverse needs
and interests of its Members, the ASEAN Way does not always deliver and
is often blamed for slowing down the multilateral negotiation process.
Very often an ASEAN agreement can only be reached and signed after
going through many rounds of domestic consultations and international
negotiations. This process itself can easily take several years. However,
signing does not mean crossing the finish line. It only marks the beginning
of a potentially long and treacherous road to ratification. Typically, for an
ASEAN agreement to take effect, it would require ratification by all or a
specified number of signatories.
Many ASEAN agreements have been signed but not implemented simply
because some of the signatories must overcome domestic legal and
regulatory constraints that delay completion of the required ratification
process. Domestic political resistance to market liberalisation, change in
political leadership and institutional deficiency can also delay the
ratification process. To put in place an adequate and up-to-date domestic
legislative regime to manage the resultant impact of ASEAN-wide trade
and investment liberalisation usually takes time and requires strong political
will on the part of the individual signatories. Given this, it is not uncommon
that an ASEAN agreement may remain unimplemented many years after its
signing.2
On another dimension, there are some ASEAN agreements that are being
implemented but have not achieved the desired effects. Research findings
suggest that tariff concessions offered under the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) are significantly underutilised by exporters partly because they are
deterred by the money and time required to comply with its binding rules of
origin.
What is proposed to manage these issues? The proposal here is for
ASEAN to repackage the unimplemented ASEAN agreements for
implementation in its subregional groupings like the Brunei-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and
perhaps the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT).
BIMP-EAGA has four Members, compared to the ten in ASEAN.
Culturally and economically, this subregional grouping is less diverse and
complex than ASEAN.
The focus areas of BIMP-EAGA are Brunei Darussalam; Indonesia’s
East, Central, West and Southeast Kalimantan, North, Central, South and
Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya; Malaysia’s Sabah, Sarawak and
Labuan; and the Philippines’ Mindanao and Palawan.
BIMP-EAGA’s Members are resource-based economies. They have
similar geographical characteristics (archipelago), similar cultural
backgrounds (Malay), similar levels of socio-economic development
(developing) and similar demand patterns for goods and services. These
common characteristics offered a natural platform for fast-track
implementation of ASEAN agreements.
To achieve that, the four Members of BIMP-EAGA, which are also
Members of ASEAN, must first agree to develop some form of legal
instrument to facilitate the fast-track objective. In fact, BIMP-EAGA had
been engaged in this endeavour in a rather low-key manner over the past
few years.
The liberalisation of the commercial bus industry in BIMP-EAGA is a
case in point. In November 2007, the BIMP-EAGA Member States agreed
to sign an agreement to grant market access rights to each other’s bus
operators. This agreement made possible the seamless movement of
passenger and excursion buses within the subregion. It boosted workers’
mobility within the subregion. Workers in labour-surplus Pontianak,
Kalimantan, now enjoy cheaper transport to Brunei Darussalam, which is a
labour-short economy. As of early 2010, close to 40,000 passengers had
already utilised the bus service offered under the agreement. Since a
seamless land tour of the Heart of Borneo is now possible, tour operators
are seizing the opportunities to offer new tourism packages and
destinations.
 This granting of market access rights represents a more mature level of
economic co-operation, that of moving from voluntary economic co-
operation to a relatively binding market liberalisation arrangement. What is
more remarkable is that BIMP-EAGA took less than a year to complete the
whole process of negotiation and signing to implementation of the
liberalisation agreement, a record that ASEAN can only dream of
achieving.
There is one major reason why BIMP-EAGA was able to accomplish this
feat within such a short period of time. The bus liberalisation agreement
was actually built on the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation
of Goods in Transit. This particular ASEAN agreement was signed in 1998
but has yet to be implemented more than a decade later because the
negotiations over several of its implementing protocols had reached an
impasse.
The agreed designated routes for cross-border vehicle operation in the
BIMP-EAGA bus sector liberalisation agreement were “migrated” from the
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit. It
took ASEAN almost nine years to finalise and agree on those routes but it
took BIMP-EAGA just a few short months to agree on “cutting and
pasting” the BIMP-EAGA portion of the overall ASEAN routes into the
BIMP-EAGA bus sector liberalisation agreement.
There was almost no domestic political resistance to the proposal of
“migrating” those agreed ASEAN routes to the BIMP-EAGA agreement
simply because the national governments of BIMP had already reached a
consensus on those routes at the ASEAN level.
Without reinventing the wheel, BIMP-EAGA also “migrated” the
ASEAN Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Domestic Driving
Licenses 1985 and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Visa Exemption
2006 to its bus sector liberalisation agreement.
Applying the same approach and based on the yet to be implemented
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitations of Goods in Transit and
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport
(2009), BIMP-EAGA is now on the brink of liberalising its container
transport industry.
Presently there is a proposal for BIMP-EAGA to study the feasibility of
fast-tracking the implementation of the self-certification process, currently
being discussed at the ASEAN level, to overcome the costly and complex
rule of origin requirements of AFTA with a view to boosting the AFTA
utilisation rate among the BIMP-EAGA exporters.
All the effort and money that ASEAN has spent at the negotiation tables
will not be wasted. More can be done to improve the ASEAN agreement
implementation rate through replication of the subregional approach, which
has proven to be workable and effective for BIMP-EAGA.
The unimplemented ASEAN agreements represent a hidden treasure
trove for resourceful officials. The public and private sector stakeholders of
ASEAN and its subregional groupings should be made aware of these
hidden treasures and ought to be given the subregional key to unlock the
treasure trove.

_____________________
1
See http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf, accessed on 10 June 2010. The figure cited does not
include all the official declarations of ASEAN.
2 Leaders, ministers and senior officials of ASEAN Member States may enter into regional
agreements with their counterparts with the objective of promoting domestic policy and institutional
reforms through external pressure, which also partly explains the reason behind the proliferation of
intra- and extra-ASEAN agreements over the recent years. Obviously many of them have
underestimated the challenges of achieving the reform objective through this approach.
 CHAPTER 5

ASEAN’S PERCEPTION PROBLEM

S. Tiwari

ASEAN faces a serious perception problem. It is not given the recognition

and standing it deserves, despite its success as a regional economic entity
and its many achievements.
Its progress on the economic front is well-documented. ASEAN is
moving forward on the path of economic integration with the aim of
realising an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Its completion and
signature of two economic instruments — the ASEAN Trade in Goods
Agreement 2009 (ATIGA) and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement 2009 (ACIA) — and follow-up work in relation to them and
other areas is proof that it is doing its best to achieve its economic goals.
Challenges still remain. If these are addressed, the ASEAN Economic
Community should, at a minimum, be a fully functioning free trade area
with minimal non-tariff barriers.

Keeping the Peace

Apart from the economic area, ASEAN’s other achievements are also well-
known. Keeping the peace is one of them. This story started in 1967.
Perhaps not realised by many, ASEAN came into being under difficult
circumstances for the Southeast Asian region. When ASEAN was formed in
1967, the five founding nations — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand — were very different in terms of institutions,
economies and the ethnic make-up and religion of their peoples.
Only Thailand had not been colonised. The other four nations had been
under the control of different colonial powers. This resulted in their peoples
having vastly different perspectives. The lack of interaction between their
peoples during the colonial period was an additional problematic
dimension. The populations developed different outlooks and aspirations.
There were other obstacles too. Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in
1965 had been accompanied by much bitterness on both sides. Indonesia
had treated Malaysia, which included Singapore, as an enemy during the
confrontation period, which ended in 1966. The Philippines continued to
claim Sabah, which had become part of Malaysia.
It could be said that the five founding Members had little in common
when they signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 setting up ASEAN. It is
to their tremendous credit that they utilised the feeling of togetherness in
ASEAN to keep their differences and disputes in check and maintain peace.
The continued success of ASEAN in maintaining peace is an important
achievement and asset. It has helped the ASEAN countries manage and
settle peacefully a variety of political problems and territorial disputes: the
Vietnam conflict; the flare-ups between Thailand and Cambodia over the
ownership of border land adjoining the Preah Vihear temple; the territorial
dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over Pedra Branca; the Malaysia-
Indonesia dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan and the maritime zones in the
Sulawesi Sea.
The strong desire of ASEAN to keep the peace also helped it to get China
— which had all along insisted that the disputes over the Spratly and
Paracel Islands in the South China Sea could only be dealt with through
bilateral discussions with claimants from Southeast Asia — to agree to deal
with the disputes in an ASEAN-Chinese context. This resulted in ASEAN
and China signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea. The Declaration requires the parties to exercise self-restraint and
utilise peaceful means for the settlement of disputes.

Assistance for Disasters and Disease Outbreaks

ASEAN nations can also claim credit for another achievement: helping
each other in times of need. ASEAN Member States have developed a
noteworthy record of helping each other, in the event of natural disasters,
among others. The disasters have included the 2004 tsunami, Cyclone
Nargis and earthquakes.
To take just one example, as soon as news was received of the earthquake
in Yogyakarta, many Singaporeans offered to help. As a result, the
concerned officials were able to mobilise quickly and arrived in the
earthquake-stricken area within a very short time.
During the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis, ASEAN set
an excellent example for the international community in cross-border co-
operation to tackle the disease.

Building Up Trade Linkages

A third area of achievement is the building-up of trade linkages. The ten
ASEAN Member States have a combined population of 570 million people
and a gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at around US$1 trillion.
ASEAN can thus be an important trading partner and market.
To achieve both these objectives and ensure the economic well-being of
its peoples, ASEAN is pursuing a two-pronged strategy: intensive economic
integration to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and
negotiating free trade agreements with key countries.
As at 2010, ASEAN has entered into free trade agreements with
Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea. Of the
various free trade instruments, the free trade agreement with China
establishes the world’s largest free trade area with a market of 1.7 billion
consumers.

Dialogue Partnerships
The system of dialogue partnerships has been another success story for
ASEAN. How should small countries foster prosperity, security and
stability for themselves? ASEAN has not tried to achieve these through
aligning itself to one or other group of powers. It has instead tried to expand
its economic space and get many powers engaged with the Southeast Asian
region.
It has developed a unique mechanism: the system of dialogue
partnerships. Starting with the European Economic Community in 1972,
ASEAN built up dialogue relationships with Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, the United States, China, India and Russia.
Initially the motive behind the dialogues were economic ones. However,
they also had political and security dimensions.

Why Does ASEAN have a Perception Problem and What Does

it Need to Do?
Negative perceptions of ASEAN may be due to various reasons. One major
reason is that there is a serious information gap about ASEAN. ASEAN
needs to make itself and its commendable work better known to the public,
policy makers and businesses. The latter especially need to be constantly
sensitised to the various economic-related ASEAN initiatives in a form that
they can easily understand and use.
Another reason is the ingrained perception among businesses in ASEAN
that its Member States are not serious about the timelines for implementing
the organisation’s economic-related agreements and initiatives. There is
truth in this and unless and until ASEAN makes a concerted and sustained
effort to show that implementation schedules in ASEAN agreements will be
adhered to strictly, businesses and policy makers will not treat it seriously
and the negative perceptions will continue.
For a change in perception to occur, the business community needs to
believe that a future policy action in ASEAN will really take place as
scheduled.
 CHAPTER 6

ASEAN: THE CHALLENGE IS UPON

US
Bandol Lim

During the last four decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has worked relentlessly towards realising its motto: One Vision,
One Identity, One Community. Against uncertain social, economic,
political, and global environmental conditions, ASEAN has continued to
make great strides in carrying out its obligations to build its community.
ASEAN’s achievements have been many over the last 40 years.
What is most exciting is that ASEAN’s principal goal of forming “One
Vision, One Identity, One Community” is coming into sharper focus. There
are insurmountable challenges facing ASEAN’s work to unify a diverse
region and bind over 500 million able bodies in one single common
ASEAN interest. In a globalised world governed by giants, it is more
critical than ever that ASEAN unifies to preserve the region’s socio-cultural
heritage, economic and political interests, and to improve its position as a
competitive player in global affairs.
Although ASEAN has gained remarkable ground in realising its vision,
the region is still likely to encounter challenges and obstacles as it moves
towards building a community by 2015. This chapter surveys the many of
such challenges and obstacles facing ASEAN’s unifying efforts. It will
examine ASEAN’s work in promoting regional political security, analyse
ASEAN’s current position in global affairs, and then examine ASEAN’s
progress in economic community building and socio-cultural issues.
Questions will be posed throughout this chapter to stimulate the reader’s
thinking. At the end, I will close with a few suggestions that could help
ASEAN continue its work in promoting itself as a lasting pillar in global
affairs.

ASEAN Political-Security Community

The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims to ensure that
countries within the region live in peace with one another and with the
world in a just, democratic, and harmonious environment. Community
members pledge to settle disputes through peaceful means. However, in a
diverse community with differing opinions, disputes among neighbouring
countries have challenged Members’ pledges and commitments to regional
peace and have tried ASEAN’s ability to maintain peace and security in the
region.
Ongoing border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, recent civil
unrest in Thailand, and Myanmar’s persisting domestic instability are just a
few examples that spotlight ASEAN’s work to maintain regional peace and
security. In the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, ASEAN
intervened proactively and was objective in believing that firm actions
would preserve the well-being of the community. I would only suggest that
ASEAN seeks to proactively intervene at earlier stages in such disputes, to
anticipate civil unrest, and put out the flame before it ignites. In addition,
ASEAN should use region-wide intervention when necessary to ensure
peace and tranquility.
While ASEAN’s silent diplomacy has been helping to settle tensions
within the region, there is little public awareness, news, and information
covering ASEAN’s mediation work, particularly in Cambodia. There is
clearly a need to improve media coverage and the dissemination of
information on ASEAN’s affairs.
Neighbourly disputes and civil unrest threaten and constantly challenge
regional peace and security and people’s belief in ASEAN as a body
capable of maintaining regional tranquility.
The question is: how can, or should, ASEAN do more to maintain
regional peace and security? Are there intervention measures designed to
improve governance practices for Member States? Does ASEAN need a
security council and a security force? If so, how can this be achieved?
While there is currently no immediate threat to ASEAN, preparation and
crisis prevention could help protect the region from unforeseen threats.
Would it not be better to play it safe and be prepared for an unknown
future? ASEAN must take security measures for the future and continue its
work to ensure that its community lives in peace.

ASEAN and International Relations

Parallel to these issues, economic crises, climate change, and civil unrest
threaten the way we live. The G20 Summit and Copenhagen talks gathered
global leaders to address global, political, social, economic, and
environmental concerns. While ASEAN Member States have participated in
conferences on global, economic, and environmental affairs, ASEAN, as a
whole, has played a limited role in forging ahead with global policies in the
interests of our region.

Where is ASEAN in talks on global affairs?

ASEAN’s ability to take centre stage in global affairs is often challenged.

Too often, a single ASEAN Member State participates in global dialogue,
but not ASEAN as a unit. Too often ASEAN merely reacts to crystallised
global risks, resulting in its inability to be a major player in world affairs.
It is essential for ASEAN to approach global and regional affairs as a unit
and to be proactive in working together to identify potential regional or
global risks early before they erupt into crises. ASEAN needs to reposition
itself as a global stakeholder with a voice, able to spot and prevent major
global risks from crystallising. The key to maintaining a thriving ASEAN
Community lies in the creation of a successful strategy to build a dynamic
community with a unified vision and identity.

ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

The ASEAN Secretary-General has regularly participated in fora to deliver
progressive messages regarding regional economic integration. There have
been many dialogues on ASEAN’s need to achieve regional economic
integration by 2015.
The AEC’s aim is to co-operatively create a region with a free flow of
goods and services, human resources, investments, and capital to help
develop the entire ASEAN Community. Through the achievement of an
economic community, ASEAN will produce a single market base, built on
the confidence of over 500 million residents in the region. The promise of
an integrated AEC that is able to compete in the global market and deliver
equitable economic development in the region is energising; its
achievement would be a remarkable achievement.
However, it must be pointed out that as with globalisation, the AEC
promises to transform ASEAN through building infrastructure, technology
transfer, increased knowledge and understanding, human resource
development, and greater capacity building to develop underdeveloped
areas in the region. We should be aware that, as of today, globalisation has
done little to live up to its promises. There has been limited transfer of
technology or the sharing of knowledge and know-how to help develop the
developing countries. Instead, there has been an increase in protectionist
policies, especially in intellectual property rights.

Moving beyond economic jargon and rhetoric to deliver action

As the 21st century marches on, there is a sense of urgency to complete

ASEAN’s economic integration and compete with China, India, the United
States, and the European Union. There is much of the same written jargon
in ASEAN as there is in the West about technology transfer, human
resources, and increasing knowledge and know-how to help develop
underdeveloped areas. This jargon, while seductive, lacks substance and
truth. The point is that ASEAN needs to move beyond outdated
development theories, jargon, and rhetoric towards an outcome-focussed
approach that delivers on the principles upon which it stands.
If we are to be a community, whether economic, political, or social, let us
move beyond promises and jargon, and deliver with actions for equitable
opportunities for the region. Let ASEAN be different and dynamic,
focussed on the community and not the individual, because we are ASEAN.
What is necessary for ASEAN Member States to act in a different way
and help transform the entire region by transferring technological know-
how to help one another? Will this assistance be welcomed by all Member
States? How can ASEAN further facilitate equitable regional development?

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (Promoting an ASEAN

Identity)
The final initiative I would like to highlight is the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community, which has been very well articulated thus far. But, in order to
forge a unique identity, inclusive of all the people in the region, more needs
to be done. Convincing over 500 million people that they are of ASEAN
identity will be, by far, the biggest challenge to overcome. However, in a
dynamic region, unifying such diverse people under one identity would be a
remarkable achievement. It could be accomplished simply by offering
people of all ten Member States ASEAN passports and ASEAN nationality,
while allowing them to remain citizens of their own countries.
Frankly speaking, ASEAN’s work of building and promoting an ASEAN
identity through social and cultural programmes has been limited thus far.
Not enough has been done in promoting social and cultural programmes
that encourage Cambodians to think of themselves with an ASEAN identity.
There are limited resources and very little information on ASEAN that is
made available in the classroom, libraries, tourism agencies, public
agencies, or private institutions. Furthermore, there is a lack of media
broadcasts, programming, and productions that promote an ASEAN
identity. ASEAN public cultural programmes and social events have been
either very limited or, worse yet, completely non-existent in Cambodia.
While ASEAN has been moving in the direction of building up its
community, there is still a persistent need to raise the ASEAN profile and
promote a sense of an ASEAN identity. In order to do this, I suggest
ASEAN implement these measures:

• Disseminate ASEAN-related materials, publications, video productions,

etc. to all Member States in all sectors of society, especially in education.
• Establish a more active public relations programme with the mass media.
• Develop and distribute ASEAN video productions to all public networks
to be continually televised.
• Produce more national news and information networks of Member States
focussing on ASEAN.
• Create a proactive programme focusing on cultural heritage, cultural
promotion and appreciation, and the production of cultural showcases.
• Enhance cultural co-operation, especially for the youth.
• Engage in widespread creation of materials highlighting the unique
ASEAN cultures.
• Promote greater people-to-people exchanges through cultural immersion
camps.
• Construct an infrastructure for revolving ASEAN festivals, performances,
and exhibitions.

Those who are knowledgeable about ASEAN rely on its website and fora in
which the ASEAN Secretary-General has participated in. While there are
some Cambodians who are aware of the fact that Cambodia is part of
ASEAN, for the most part people still identify themselves as being
Cambodian first. ASEAN’s challenge, therefore, is to convince people in
the region to identify themselves as ASEAN first.
In conclusion, many have talked about the 21st century being the Asian
century. It is fitting that the global power cycle has come full circle, back to
Asia. If ASEAN is to make its move and become one of the pillars of the
world, now is the ideal time. The economic crisis has levelled the playing
field. Environmental issues have created the need for new and dynamic
global leaders with innovative and creative ideas. Who better than ASEAN
to unite the dynamic global interest? It is more essential than ever for
ASEAN to put its house in order, work as one single unit, and take centre
stage.
With the anticipated induction of Timor Leste in the future, and the
completion of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, a dynamic and
energised ASEAN Community is emerging. It is a prime time for a united
ASEAN to take the global stage and become a global leader. ASEAN must
act upon the belief that it is a major superpower in the world and show the
world that we are fit to stand among the greatest nations on earth. As global
challenges have become more complex and interconnected with the rest of
the world, we in ASEAN must wake up and realise that we must stand
united in the world.
 Over the last 40 years, much work has been done in realising the ASEAN
motto of “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. Let’s not indulge
ourselves by dwelling on the progress that has been achieved. Much more
needs to be done in order to raise the ASEAN profile and identity at all
levels of society in the region. We need to continue the progress that has
been made. To do this, we need the right philosophy, the right operational
platform, and the right people! To get the right kind of citizenry that will
put ASEAN ahead, we need continued, superior leadership! The people’s
participation, education, attitude, and responsibility as ASEAN citizens
reflect ASEAN’s leadership! The challenge is upon us!
 CHAPTER 7

COVERING ASEAN FOR THREE

DECADES
Kavi Chongkittavorn

“It was so boring. Why do you keep on covering ASEAN?” asked a rookie
journalist from Khao Sod Daily at the Cha-am Summit, Hua Hin, in
February 2009.
“Nobody else does it”, I replied without hesitation.
That was a very pompous answer given to a 21-year-old beat reporter
who was in a hurry to know why I have been so consistent in reporting on
the affairs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — a
subject she found herself disinterested in and disconnected from. Actually,
there are better reasons why following ASEAN affairs can be rewarding,
engaging, fun and educational.
As an organisation, ASEAN is unique because every Member is treated
like a part of a family. It is an extraordinary one with huge diversities, both
political and cultural, under one roof. When the grouping was formed in
1967, the five founding Members from Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand made sure at the beginning that they
would be able to stay together peacefully and collectively build up
prosperity. The five countries were determined to build a new organisation
to unite them rather than be a source of bickering. That much was sufficient
for them to hang on together.
 After 43 years of existence, ASEAN continues to operate like a family —
with ten Members — with new rules contained in the ASEAN Charter. In
ASEAN, sometimes there were big quarrels and small ones. Regardless of
their natures and causes, they always ended peacefully without big
casualties or bloodshed. Obviously, reporting on such family affairs can be
boring because they lack dramatic developments and sensational headline
news. Once in a while, a family feud would occur and more media-coveted
stories appeared. The recent Thai-Khmer disputes over a 12th century
Hindu temple was one such incident.
My reporting on ASEAN began with the Cambodian conflict in 1980
when most of the ASEAN diplomatic action took place in Thailand, at the
annual ASEAN conference and during the United Nations General
Assembly. During the conflict, ASEAN backed the Cambodian resistance
forces comprising the Khmer Rouge and forces led by Prince Norodom
Ranariddh and former prime minister Son Sann. Newspapers throughout the
region often carried news on battlefield developments along the Thai-
Cambodian border where the Cambodian resistance forces were active.
Their leaders often used the Thai-Cambodian territories for their military
and civilian activities, especially after receiving diplomatic accreditation.
During the 13-year conflict, which ended with the Paris Peace Agreement
in 1991, ASEAN, as a group, became famous through regular regional and
international reports on their diplomatic manoeuvrings and lobbying efforts
worldwide. News reports from those days were focussed on ASEAN joint
efforts to bring about the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
When the conflict was nearing its end, discussions began informally on how
Vietnam would join ASEAN once the UN-sanctioned peace negotiations
ended the war. It was not surprising at all that in 1992, Vietnam was
admitted as an observer of ASEAN and joined the grouping three years
later. It was the first expansion since 1984. Former foreign minister Nguyen
Co Thach told me in Ho Chi Minh City in April 1988 that Vietnam would
one day join ASEAN despite all its quarrels with ASEAN at the time.
It was most intriguing for journalists to follow ASEAN’s moves and
countermoves against its adversaries throughout the Cambodian war or for
that matter on ASEAN’s overall relations with Myanmar (Burma) when the
latter was admitted into ASEAN in 1997. Throughout the 1980s, at every
ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting, for instance, the wording of the final
joint communiqués of the ASEAN foreign ministerial meetings would be
carefully scrutinised to understand the nuances or progress of each ASEAN
diplomatic move on Cambodia. The ASEAN leaders had to map out
strategies on how to win new friends and maintain support within the
international community, especially among the UN Members. Obviously, as
history has shown, ASEAN tended to consolidate itself quickly when it
faced common crises or issues.
Some political pundits used to predict that without the Cambodian
conflict the grouping would soon become irrelevant. That was not true.
After all, ASEAN is not a one-issue organisation. The grouping’s
programmes cover all aspects of co-operation from political and economic
to social and cultural fields. It is more dynamic than people usually
perceive. The grouping continually reinvents itself whenever it faces new
crises such as the recent global financial meltdown, pandemics, natural
disasters and other transnational issues. The ASEAN leaders could act
instantaneously in response to these challenges, sometimes faster than to the
day-to-day political demands at home.
I often tell my younger colleagues that it is important to write more about
ASEAN because we are to become a single community of 590 million in
2015. The ASEAN Secretariat and its staffers are more accessible than ever
before, providing various sources of information such as news updates,
documents and access to archives. Without regular reports of progress in
ASEAN community-building efforts, the ASEAN citizens would be left in
the dark. The plan to create a people-oriented community would remain
unattainable. Strange but true, ASEAN journalists seldom write about the
grouping’s activities. If they do, they often concentrate on bilateral issues
between their countries and ASEAN in general. They completely ignore the
significance of the whole organisation as well as its purpose and role in
regional and global politics. How many journalists today have ever written
about the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) or its sequel the current Vientiane
Action Programme (VAP)? A good background in ASEAN co-operation
and the patterns of exchange helps journalists to understand all the twists
and nuances because everything in ASEAN was done in good faith with the
best of intentions.
After the ASEAN Charter came into force in December 2008, a new
ASEAN slowly emerged. Indeed, the Charter gave ASEAN a facelift and
much-needed impetus and aspiration to move to the next level. ASEAN
established its permanent representatives system after more than two
decades of discussion. Furthermore, ASEAN formed the ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights after more than 17 years’
delay and numerous discussions with civil society organisations. It is not a
perfect human rights body, like many other tools in ASEAN. But its
existence marks real progress. Now Member States must implement these
new mechanisms and make them work to protect and promote human rights
among ASEAN citizens. Again, regional journalists are not fully aware of
these significant developments.
Each Member must comply with the rules and obligations stated in the
Charter. As a rule-based organisation, more than three dozen countries have
their resident ambassadors attached to the Jakarta-based ASEAN Secretariat
— this number could reach 100 in the near future. Obviously, with new-
found dynamism in ASEAN, it is pivotal that the younger generation of
ASEAN leaders and people take charge and move on. However, one thing
is clear: the next generation of leaders will not enjoy the luxury of political
longevity and leadership intimacy as in the past four decades that have
made ASEAN and Member State co-operation what it is today.
In the years and months to come, ASEAN journalists will have no choice
but to write more about the emerging single community. They need to
create among their readers a common sense of belonging to ASEAN — the
notion of ASEAN citizenship. In addition, many new themes reflecting the
changes within ASEAN and the region have appeared. ASEAN Centrality,
ASEAN Connectivity and the East Asia Summit are a few that will
dominate ASEAN discussions in the future. When the ASEAN journalists
write, they need to be mindful of these new developments and at the same
time be sensitive to each Member’s unique environment. They must
understand the history, political and cultural contexts that each Member is
operating in. Broad-based knowledge might be sufficient when comparative
studies are being written, but better articulation and in-depth understanding
of the unique history and cultural roots of ASEAN Member States are
indispensable for deeper and more comprehensive analysis.
 CHAPTER 8

THREE DECADES OF ASEAN

LINKAGE: BRUNEI DARUSSALAM,
FROM 1984 TOWARDS 2015
Pushpa Thambipillai

Background
Since its inception, ASEAN had remained a small grouping of five
Members till Brunei Darussalam joined as the sixth Member in January
1984. Throughout the following decade, Brunei enjoyed the special
privilege and relationship as the smallest, latest and newest state in ASEAN
before others in mainland Southeast Asia joined in the mid-1990s. It was
provided with a special learning and collaboration process, adapting to the
rigors of co-operation with the help of the “senior” Members. That special
bonding has left it with a strong attachment to the regional grouping and
unique ties to its individual Members, both old and new.
Brunei has the smallest population in the region at 400,000, of which
more than a third are non-citizens, classified as permanent residents or
temporary residents on work visas. It also enjoys the distinction of being the
only hereditary Muslim monarchy in Southeast Asia with a hybrid political
system resembling both autocracy and democracy: a written constitution,
effective rule of law, an appointed legislature, modernising bureaucracy,
open economic system, remnants of feudal social hierarchy and a well
entrenched political system supported by several advisory councils. The
export of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) has been Brunei’s main source of
income, making it one of the richest small states in the world, where per
capita income can reach more than US$30,000 depending on the surge in
global oil prices.1 However, Brunei has not overexploited its reserves. In
the meantime, new explorations continue, both onshore and offshore; some
lucrative deposits have been found and they ensure another three to four
decades of adequate hydrocarbon resources. Nevertheless, not wanting to be
too dependent on a non-renewable resource whose income may at times be
unstable, Brunei has embarked on its diversification policy to ensure varied
sources of income as well as increase employment opportunities for its
people who still prefer the public sector even though it is not expanding fast
enough to absorb all jobseekers. Most outsiders of course recognise Brunei
as a rich state with a built-in welfare system that provides free and good
education, health and social services for its citizens.
Brunei offers a complex system of traditional and modernising elements;
nevertheless, politically and economically Brunei presents an interesting
case of the significance of linkages with external partners that have
enhanced its needs and concurrently provide avenues for international
participation. Its membership in ASEAN, thus, has been a positive
experience, supportive of its development, yet without having to alter its
core values.

Finding the Niche in ASEAN

For Brunei, 7 January 1984 was a special occasion when its flag was raised
at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta at a simple ceremony marking the
admission of the new Member. However, Brunei’s links with the
organisation predate that specific moment. It is partly due to its central
geographical location in Southeast Asia, on the island of Borneo,
surrounded by the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. More important
were its political history and socio-cultural ties with its neighbours. Since
the late 19th century, Brunei had been a British protectorate.2 A previously
large kingdom extending over Borneo, Brunei had faced continual
instability and infighting till it had to accept protection from an external
force. Under a bilateral agreement in 1906, Britain introduced a Residential
System of government for Brunei. A conspicuous development was the
agreement in 1959 through which Brunei established its constitution; an
amendment in 1971 gave the sultanate full internal self-government, before
resuming its sovereignty in 1984. The British were linked not only to
Brunei; they had also been involved with other Southeast Asian states —
Malaya (that became independent in 1957), Singapore (until 1963) and the
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak (that in 1963, together with Singapore,
chose to join the Malaysian federation; Singapore subsequently left in
1965). Thus through the British connection, Brunei had close ties to
Malaysia and Singapore, through the exchange of British and local officers,
and via educational links, on top of historical experiences as a result of
royal and familial ties, underlined by a common language and religion. The
interconnectedness with Southeast Asia’s two leading countries would
come in useful later when Brunei itself became an independent player on
the regional stage.
By the late 1970s, as Brunei moved towards internal political
development, neighbouring ASEAN states were also keen to extend their
friendship to Brunei. At the forefront were the leaders of Indonesia
(President Soeharto), Malaysia (Prime Minister Hussein Onn) and
Singapore (Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew), who during their various
bilateral discussions expressed that Brunei was welcome to join ASEAN. It
was noted that Lee had approached the issue of membership with Sultan
Hassanal Bolkiah in early 1979 and reportedly said that the Sultan was
receptive to the proposal.3 Although Brunei had bilateral problems with
Malaysia initially, for instance, over the refusal of Sultan Omar Ali
Saifuddien to join the proposed Malaysian federation, the abortive coup of
1962 and the “asylum” given to the dissidents by Malaysia, and a
longstanding dispute over the status of the territory of Limbang bordering
Sarawak. But later, under the new Sultan, relations improved considerably
to the extent that exchange of visits took place, recognising the potential
place for the new state in the regional political set-up. By the early 1980s,
British leaders were also supportive of Brunei joining ASEAN.4
The ASEAN Five decided to invite Brunei as an observer to the 14th
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila in June 1981, giving it the option to
attend the annual meeting before deciding if it wanted to become a Member
later. This was the beginning of a long process of association with ASEAN
and the neighbouring states. Prince Mohamed Bolkiah led the Brunei
delegation then, Brunei’s first ever involvement in a regional meeting, and
Prince Mohamed has not stopped participating in ASEAN since that June
meeting throughout almost three decades of a busy round of schedules. For
the second time, after 2001, Brunei assumes the ASEAN Chair in 2012 and
will be preparing to host several regional meetings.

ASEAN, the Cornerstone

It is demanding for a new, small state to become engaged in international
affairs. But as the past years indicate, Brunei Darussalam has done it with
the help of its ASEAN partners. While its ties with the United Kingdom had
always supported its defence, economic and educational needs, as a newly
independent state Brunei began to develop its national strategic interests by
seeking and strengthening other ties that could support those interests. From
its early days it has realised that geo-political determinants would dictate
that it establish a friendly, non-aggressive foreign policy that would
guarantee its peace and security. Diplomacy has been viewed as the best
asset a small state could engage in, and Brunei since the inception of its
new Ministry of Foreign Affairs set about building up its young institutions
with promising personnel, most of whom were sent to the United Kingdom
for training. It ought to be pointed out that Brunei had been a protectorate,
not a colony; thus it had a well-established governmental system that could
easily adapt to the changed political environment. Its use of the English
language was also an added asset for Brunei to ease into the international
arena.5
Establishing bilateral diplomatic relations is the norm — a practice that
begins with achieving statehood but continues as more states are added to
the list of friendly states. Brunei was no different. It is worth noting that its
first two “diplomatic offices” (in addition to its inevitable diplomatic link
with London) were with Kuala Lumpur and Singapore even before its
independence. That signified Brunei’s close ties with two of its neighbours
that would ultimately become two of its staunch ASEAN allies. Over the
past two decades, the number of diplomatic ties has expanded and each year
more are added as the international interactions widen the bilateral and
multilateral contacts.
It is also interesting that a former British protectorate does not “apply” to
join the Commonwealth, the global organisation of former British colonies
and associates; it is just taken for granted that it automatically joins the
family of states on its independence unless it specifically desires otherwise.
In that respect, even though the Commonwealth may have been Brunei’s
first international organisation, its “true” membership was in ASEAN
(considering the procedures of membership), before it joined other selected
ones like the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United
Nations later in 1984. Thus, ASEAN has become the priority organisation
for Brunei and its website proudly claimed that ASEAN was the
cornerstone of its foreign policy. The centrality of ASEAN has been
acknowledged often in speeches by its leaders, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah,
Head of State and Government, and the Foreign Minister, Prince Mohamed
Bolkiah. ASEAN’s goals for regional co-operation and its promotion of
ideals associated with the ASEAN Way of seeking consensus, equal
representation for all Member States, non-confrontational approach, and
accepting each other’s national priorities without compromising each state’s
own type of political system stands well with Brunei’s own ideology of the
Malay Islamic Monarchy (Melayu Islam Beraja or the MIB philosophy). In
his latest affirmation towards ASEAN, the Sultan noted that “… our
commitment is being guided by the ASEAN Charter”.6
Brunei’s leaders have without fail attended all ASEAN summits and
meetings, underscoring their highest level of commitment. Over the years, a
large number of ASEAN-related officers have also been deployed in the
various national institutions dealing with regional issues, be it in politics,
economics, environment, disaster management or other trans-border issues.
It is not the intention here to enumerate all the advantages of being an
ASEAN Member, but Brunei is definitely a “poster boy” for regional
groupings that have positively engaged its Members, even the smaller
Members.

Functional Gains
While actively supporting initiatives in peace and development, Brunei
Darussalam has not aspired towards a major regional or international role
like some of its ASEAN partners. But through the collective approach, its
involvement has been expanded and its image strengthened. It is not often
that foreigners now wonder if Brunei is another oil-producing state in the
Middle East, or erroneously associate Brunei with “the richest man in the
world”, though it still holds a curious charm for outsiders.7 Its intraregional
trade is small compared to its neighbours given the nature of its economy
that is dependent on exports of oil and gas to the major markets outside the
region; yet it is firmly committed to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
and the realisation of the Economic Community by 2015 because it is also
dependent on its neighbours for imports. As an open economy with minimal
trade restrictions, it has been easier for Brunei to adopt the AFTA initiative
and related economic programmes. The open-border system has enabled the
free flow of goods and services from Member States, thus increasing the
range of choices available for consumers. Most of its businesses are small;
industrially it has just begun a joint investment methanol plant using its
own natural resources. The private sector has begun to participate in
investment opportunities, both inside and outside the country, through joint
ventures with interests from the dialogue partner countries including in the
BIMP-EAGA subregion.8
One of the major external linkages through ASEAN is the network of
dialogue partners and related Asia-Pacific arrangements like the ASEAN
Plus Three and the East Asia Summit. They bring relationships with the
existing dialogue partners to a higher level, including free trade agreements,
for example, with China, Japan, and South Korea, and the possibility of a
larger East Asian community of states extending south to Australia and
New Zealand, two Commonwealth states with which Brunei already had
close ties. A major player that has expanded bilateral relations as a result of
links through the ASEAN network is China, with which Brunei established
formal ties only in 1991 (the same year it did with Russia), as a
consequence of ASEAN-linked interactions. Prior to that, Brunei did not
have formal ties with socialist or communist states, and hence ASEAN
membership provided it with the opportunity to increase partnerships that
are now proving beneficial in terms of economic and socio-cultural gains.
Through the regional ASEAN Secretariat, there have also been
opportunities for the exchange of information and expert consultation in
areas where other Member States may have the necessary input Brunei is
seeking. Brunei has supported the open skies policy agreement since 2008
and will also support the subsequent agreement which provides access to
secondary cities in addition to the earlier inclusion of capital cities only.
Although Brunei offers only a single airport, its national carrier will benefit
from the new agreement. The regional organisation has also exposed Brunei
in novel areas like parliamentary affairs through the non-governmental
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) even though Brunei only
has a functionally limited, appointed national legislature.
It is arguably not the case that Brunei only absorbs from its more
experienced ASEAN partners. On its part, it has supported the integration
of the newer Members into the organisation, remembering that at one stage
it was also a new Member. The government has facilitated the training of
civil servants (in English language, and in public administration), and
offered scholarships for study in local institutions, thereby promoting cross-
cultural exchange and mutual learning. This has especially been targeted at
the newer or less developed Members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam) and to assist minority peoples from the provinces
of Mindanao in the Philippines and southern Thailand by offering language
or Islamic religious training. Brunei Darussalam is recognised for its
moderate but strict interpretation of Islamic teaching and is thus welcomed
by its ASEAN neighbours in providing the essential religious education for
its Muslim communities. As radicalisation and extremism have become
associated with some quarters of the Muslim population in neighbouring
countries, Brunei is keen to work with its ASEAN partners in securing a
peaceful environment that would not support such terrorist activities. It is
already a mini ASEAN with foreign workers from all the neighbouring
countries, the largest sources being Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines,
which each have at least about 20,000 of their nationals working in Brunei.
Being a state with a “caring monarch” (the usual term used by the local
media) and a population that is fairly well-off by regional standards, Brunei
has often given assistance to its neighbours during times of calamity. It
joined forces with other ASEAN countries to help the tsunami victims in
Aceh, Indonesia, and those of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. At other times
donations were collected for victims of floods, earthquakes and landslides.
It is not only to ASEAN victims or the Muslim communities that Brunei’s
citizens and residents open their hearts and purses; recently they also
collected donations for victims as far away as Haiti and Chile through a
humanitarian fund set up at the national level. Thus, through the ASEAN
experience, charity has extended far and wide.

Going to the Masses

It has often been argued that ASEAN is an elitist organisation catering to
the golf-cum-retreat-filled formal and informal meetings of the male elites
of each Member State.9 But that perception is slowly changing as more
issue areas involve a larger representation of participants, including women
and youths. While the various government agencies in Brunei endeavour to
promote the inter-state and inter-regional political, security and economic
ties, other agencies and non-governmental organisations have promoted
closer people-to-people interactions towards creating the ASEAN goal of a
regional community. The business group has been one of the early
participants in the regional process through their links with associates
across borders at the regional and at the subregional Brunei-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) levels and
in the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC). Other events
like cultural exchanges, regional debates, school visits and sports
competitions like the Southeast Asia Games (that has now become
synonymous with ASEAN though it originated separately) have promoted
better understanding of ASEAN by the various strata of Brunei society. For
example, during the 2010 ASEAN Tourism Ministers Meeting and the
ASEANTA Expo held in Bandar Seri Begawan, local visitors including
students were exposed to various attractions of each of the Member States
and thus went home better informed than if it has been a ministerial speech
or a television programme. Consequently, they would not limit their future
holiday excursions to only the familiar Malaysia or Singapore, but would
venture elsewhere in the region.
One of the agencies that have contributed to the spread of ASEAN
interest is the local Department of Information, which is the lead agency for
the ASEAN COCI (Committee on Culture and Information) in Brunei. It
has promoted a number of ASEAN-related activities, especially among the
young. In co-operation with educational institutions, the regular ASEAN
Quiz is held for school children; the informative ASEAN Corner has also
been set up in some of the primary schools, educating them about the
community of ten states. Thus, even if the older generation had missed the
“info-surge” on ASEAN during their earlier years, the younger generation
will be in the forefront for nurturing a regional community that looks
beyond the respective national borders.
Open borders promote trade, travel and tourism. However, with the
increased interaction, there also arise increased social issues. There has
been an increase in drug-related cases, including the sale and consumption
of banned substances among the local youth and the unemployed as the
illegal products are easily transported across the borders with visa-free
travel between Member States. Moral and religious education and training
towards responsible citizenship is widely practised in the face of increasing
challenges. The regular number of arrests of illegal immigrants and other
travellers who are able to enter legally on social visit passes but then engage
in illegal activities may be only the tip of the iceberg. Any state with an
open-door policy towards its neighbours, as practised within ASEAN, will
face similar negative consequences. Brunei has instituted strict domestic
laws that empower its enforcement agencies while simultaneously co-
operating with trans-border agencies like ASEANAPOL (organisation
grouping the police forces of the Member States) to ensure its national
security and social stability is not at stake.

Looking Back, Looking Forward

Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN have both grown in stature, recognition
and achievements. Brunei can definitely look back at its association with
the group and recognise the vast areas of benefits in being a part of a
successful regional group that has created peace, stability and the
environment for each Member to develop its national priorities without
interference to its chosen political system and national ideology. For a new
state, on the verge of independence and readying to ‘going it alone’ without
the protector, the regional leaders gave Brunei the support and
encouragement to chart its course; Brunei chose the region as its premier
stage not just for its ‘coming of age’ but also for continual engagement in
strengthening its diplomatic, security and economic interests. Collective
action and group identity is recognised as the insurance against small state
vulnerabilities in an unpredictable global environment. As ASEAN
integrates further, especially under its own Charter, Brunei views it even
more positively as indicated by its leaders’ regular statements on ASEAN.
Over the years Brunei’s leaders have shown their keen support for
ASEAN’s efforts in intra regional and extra regional policies, contributing
to the country’s share of financial and human resources, more so in the
former than in the latter, as Brunei lacks adequate manpower in vital areas.
As one of the original ASEAN 6, it has won the confidence and
expectations of its fellow Members as a state that is a loyal and active
partner, participating according to the best of its abilities. Its contributions
can only move to a higher plane as Brunei gains maturity and becomes a
developed state.
By 2015, the young population born in 1984 will be a mature 30. They
will be employed at various levels of the public and private sectors and will
be expected to contribute their services to the future of Brunei and ASEAN
that their elders had so willingly laid the foundation for. They will be
Brunei’s ‘ASEAN generation’ who have had a much more open and easy
access to information on the regional process. The increasing human and
technological connectivity will further strengthen the multilateral endeavor
towards creating a regional community irrespective of Brunei’s own size or
resources. It will be engaged in regional efforts in further bridging
governments, businesses and peoples. Towards that end, the process has
already begun.

_____________________
1
Further details on the current status of the economy can be obtained from Brunei Darussalam Key
Indicators 2009, accessed from WWW.jpke.gOV.bn.
2 The Protectorate Treaty signed between Britain and Brunei in 1888.
3
The bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (January 1979) between Britain and Brunei was
a firm indication that Brunei’s independence was imminent, at least five years from thence.
4 Some of these issues have been discussed in an article by this writer. See “Brunei in ASEAN: The
Viable Choice?” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1982, edited by Huynh Kim Khanh. Singapore: ISEAS,
1982, pp. 105–112.
5
With the increased economic activities and participation in a number of international economic
organisations like APEC and the WTO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs integrated the Department of
International Relations and Trade that had been under another ministry, to become the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade in August 2005, giving it a more national task in projecting the external
political and economic interests.
6 The Sultan’s 64th Birthday message, carried by Radio Television Brunei, 15 July 2010.
7
The local tourism authority has cleverly captured curiosity by creating this catchphrase slogan in its
advertisement: Brunei Darussalam, kingdom of unexpected treasures.
8 The Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines growth area was established in 1994 to promote
development in the eastern part of ASEAN, encompassing provinces in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Brunei Darussalam.
9
Any aspiring new Member, be forewarned, as the lighthearted tip goes, to be ready with a new
convention centre, national carrier or better a private jet, five-star hotels, well-trained chefs to cater to
the dietary needs of an array of culturally sensitive participants and English-trained young officers to
be the personal hosts during the several high level meetings in a year, in addition to a well-trained
ASEAN-related bureaucracy and adequate budget allocations.
 CHAPTER 9

ASEAN AND EAST TIMOR: FAMILY

SOMEDAY?
Noordin Azhari

When Cambodia joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) in 1999, Rodolfo C. Severino, then Secretary-General of
ASEAN, in his welcoming statement declared that “At long last, after 32
years, we have fulfilled the vision of our Founding Fathers to unite all
nations of Southeast Asia under one ASEAN roof. This is truly a historic
moment that we can all cherish”.1 No one expected another independent
country to be born in the region thereafter.
However, on 20 May 2002, East Timor became the first new sovereign
state of the 21st century. Since it is within the footprint of Southeast Asia
and is an independent country, it is qualified to join ASEAN if it so wishes.2
The desire to join ASEAN was made known as early as in 2000. East
Timor’s political leaders called for closer ties with Southeast Asia, saying
these would be the most important means of ensuring the territory’s future
security. Then independence leader of East Timor, José Ramos-Horta said,
“Our message is clear: we want more ASEAN engagement in the process of
reconstruction in East Timor”. He also said, “ASEAN membership was
more important than joining the South Pacific Forum, East Timor’s other
regional option”.3
 The country acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia in 2007, pledging to renounce the use of force and binding
East Timor to non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member
States. In December 2007, President José Ramos-Horta declared that
joining ASEAN was a top priority, and he hoped East Timor would join by
2012.

Background
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste4 had its beginnings in the 16th
century as East Timor when it was colonised by Portugal. After centuries of
colonial rule, as a result of political instability in Portugal in 1974, East
Timor was effectively abandoned. This led the citizens of East Timor to
unilaterally declare its independence in November 1975. After the
declaration of independence, Indonesia invaded and successfully occupied
the country in the same year. Consequently, East Timor became the 27th
province of Indonesia.
In 1999, President B.J. Habibie of Indonesia, after succeeding Soeharto,
offered the people of East Timor a choice of either accepting limited
autonomy or becoming independent. A referendum was held and 78.5% of
the voters opted for independence.
After achieving its independence, East Timor made known its intention
to join ASEAN. However, ASEAN’s reception was lukewarm. Some
speculated that ASEAN’s slowness in admitting East Timor was due to
pressure from certain Member States, which for various political reasons
opposed the admittance and threatened to use their veto power to block East
Timor’s membership. Others attributed the delay to the fact that East Timor
had to grapple with the reality of not having enough resources and needing
more time to prepare itself for the demands of ASEAN membership.
East Timor simply lacks the human and financial resources to manage
ASEAN membership. With no less than 600 different ASEAN meetings a
year in all fields, attendance at these meeting will incur great expense. East
Timor also lacks technical expertise in most of these fields, as well as
insufficient people with a decent command of the English language, which
is ASEAN’s lingua franca. As an ASEAN Member, East Timor would be
expected to host some of these meetings, which, depending on their
importance, can cost millions of dollars and would require an expensive
upgrade of the country’s virtually non-existent conference facilities. East
Timor’s first prime minister Mari Alkatiri admitted, “We can’t afford the
annual membership fee of US$1 million. Maybe in five years. ASEAN will
provide regional economic, trade and security partnerships”.5
In July 2006, Prime Minister José Ramos-Horta said, “We had made in
East Timor the strategic decision to join ASEAN sometime in the future …
I personally believe that it will take a few years, maybe five or more before
we are able to join ASEAN as a full Member”.6
From a foreign policy perspective, East Timor stands between two
regional blocs — ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Joining the
regional blocs of ASEAN and/or PIF is both an economic and policy issue.
ASEAN seems to be the most logical solution for East Timor to develop
international economic integration. Although sharing close moral and
emotional ties with the Pacific island nations, East Timor seemed to be
“reluctantly endorsing [sic] any formal association with the pacific forum”.7
There would be obvious benefits for East Timor in joining ASEAN.
Membership would give it access to an influential regional grouping, and
help to broaden its Southeast Asian ties beyond Indonesia. It would connect
East Timor commercially to several strong, outward-looking economies,
from which it could also learn much in the area of development policy and
practice. Since East Timor is geographically part of Southeast Asia, why
was ASEAN slow in accepting East Timor?

Is ASEAN Reluctant to Accept East Timor?

In my view there are other dynamics at work, not least among them the
fiery rhetoric prior to independence. There were unsavoury remarks made
by the same people who are now running East Timor. Of course some
ASEAN Member States have been supportive of and sympathetic to East
Timor from the very beginning. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid
said he would support East Timor’s entry into ASEAN should such a
request be made by its leaders. He said, “Indonesia will fully support” any
request by the future East Timorese state to join the regional grouping, and
that “We have to try our best to bring Timor into ASEAN, so that East
Timor does not become a part of the Pacific and stays in ASEAN”.8 The
Philippines was also very supportive of East Timor. Being the only two
predominantly Christian nations in Asia, relations between East Timor and
the Philippines became very positive as soon as East Timor was
multilaterally recognised as an independent state.
During the struggle for independence, in his effort to garner international
support, José Ramos-Horta had chosen to belittle ASEAN and its leaders.
He said, “ASEAN countries are a club of dictators, oligarchies that are alien
to their own people, that live in luxurious palaces, away from the peasants
who in the streets of Java, and many other places in Indonesia, are battling
the security forces, who want freedom, who want labour rights, who want
better pay. In Thailand, in Malaysia it is the same”.9
José Ramos-Horta was also reported to have said East Timor would resist
any attempt by ASEAN Member States to bring it within their sphere of
influence. “We will fight any attempt to have any ASEAN country …
accomplices of Indonesia, impose themselves on us”, Ramos-Horta said,
adding “We are part of South Pacific nations, we are not part of ASEAN”.
When discussing regional cooperation, East Timor would liaise with South
Pacific nations, he added. Less fiery than José Ramos-Horta was Xanana
Gusmão, who eventually became the first president of East Timor. He said,
“… he would rather join the South Pacific Forum than ASEAN”.10
When asked if he was upset at ASEAN’s apparent lack of action, Ramos-
Horta replied, “Yes. They are a club of hypocrites who play golf, display
ostentatious [ways] and crack down on students and intellectuals who
disagree with their policies and lifestyle …”11
Thus when I first heard the news that East Timor was interested in
joining ASEAN, I emailed Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong, reminding
him of all that had been said of ASEAN and its leaders. As a true diplomat,
his reply was that “in politics there are neither permanent friends nor
enemies. What to do?” I accepted that argument and 1 believe that slowly
but surely all ASEAN Member States are also accepting the reality that East
Timor is indeed part of Southeast Asia. There may be reluctant ones still but
their position is not made public. As I see it, ASEAN must eventually
accept East Timor’s membership and, more importantly, it is ASEAN’s
responsibility to ensure that East Timor will not become “a failed state” in
its backyard. The 2009 Failed States Index, compiled by the independent
Washington-based Fund for Peace, ranked East Timor 20th in the “alert’’
category, a position unchanged since 2007.
 However, just as things were about to settle down, President José Ramos-
Horta, addressing international media in Singapore on 24 May 2008,
pledged that East Timor would not be a “basket case” which might
embarrass ASEAN like Myanmar. This came at a time when no ASEAN
Member States opposed East Timor’s membership and its largest Member,
Indonesia, had even assigned a senior diplomat to help the young nation in
its membership preparations.12 In a club where every Member has a veto
power, why must an aspiring applicant make such a statement? Although
there were no retaliatory remarks reported from Myanmar, it will be very
interesting to see how ASEAN would react to similar statements in the
future if, and when, East Timor becomes a Member of ASEAN.

Conclusion
Many ASEAN observers and critics branded ASEAN as being weak and/or
ineffective, as quoted below. But is it that bad?

The conventional wisdom regarding the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations is that the organization has become unwieldy and weak.
Critics blame the rapid expansion of the 1990s that added new
Members such as Vietnam and Cambodia, and the lack of a single
unifying mission for leaving it adrift. The failure of ASEAN to address
effectively the Asian financial crisis, the collapse of Indonesia, and
China’s creeping annexation of the South China Sea are cited as
evidence of the group’s weakness.13
Despite the progress, some critics belittle ASEAN’s efforts to remake
itself in a post-crisis world. They say it stumbles on the same old,
market-led, liberal democratic mould which has been widely
discredited of late. This view echoes the concerns of civil society
groups which slam ASEAN governments for putting business gains
ahead of people gains.14

Despite clear and loud evidence to the contrary, officials from ASEAN
continue to engage in the habit of deceiving themselves by believing
that the ASEAN Charter — now fully ratified by all ten Member
States — will automatically create a new ASEAN.15
 I remain very sceptical. True, ASEAN is better than nothing. …
Beyond that, I find it difficult to take ASEAN seriously. ASEAN
rhetoric and reality have long been at odds; but the gap between the
two is widening to the extent that it is hard not to scoff.16

Be as it may, while ASEAN may not be perfect and has often been
criticised by many, including José Ramos-Horta, ASEAN is certainly worth
more than what it appears to be. Otherwise, why would East Timor, after all
that had been said, aspire to become a member of a club that José Ramos-
Horta once branded as “a club of dictators, oligarchies … a club of
hypocrites who play golf”?

_____________________
1 See http://www.aseansec.org/3338.htm.
2
The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967) made clear that “the Association is open for
participation to all States in the South-East Asian region subscribing to the [ASEAN] aims, principles
and purposes”. See http://www.asean.org/1212.htm.
3 Financial Times, 24 July 2000.
4
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is the official name of East Timor.
5 The West Australian, 29 October 2004. Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri was the first prime minister of
East Timor. He served from May 2002 until he resigned on 26 June 2006.
6
AFP, “East Timor Needs Five Years to Join ASEAN”, 27 July 2006.
7 Dionisio Babo Soares and Helder da Costa, “Timor-Leste Facing Regional Dilemma”, ETAN. See
http://www.etan.org/et2003/february/16-22/03tleste.htm.
8
AFP, 20 November 1999.
9 CNN East Timor, An Interview with Prof. José Ramos-Horta, 14 January 1997.
10
AFP, 20 November 1999.
11 South China Morning Post, 28 October 1999.
12
José Ramos-Horta addressing the Foreign Correspondents’ Association in Singapore in May
2008. See http://www.enews.ma/east-timor-won_i88956_1.html.
13 Stanley Chan, “Quiet Power: ASEAN”, Asia Times Online, 10 August 2002.
14
Bangkok Post, 20 February 2010.
15 Rizal Sukma, Jakarta Post, 24 November 2008.
16
Razeen Sally, “ASEAN Charteritis”, 3 October 2009. See http://www.ecipe.org/blog/asean-
charteritis, accessed on 20 August 2010.
 THEME TWO

POLITICS AND SECURITY

 CHAPTER 10

ASEAN: A PILLAR OF REGIONAL

STABILITY
Johari Achee

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now 43 years old.

Looking back at its formative years, we see that ASEAN has contributed a
lot to the maintenance of regional stability. And this important point is
indisputable. Since the region has been relatively peaceful, more resources
and energy could be channelled into nation-building rather than armaments.
Without a doubt the prosperity of each individual nation is a building block
of region-building. Thanks to the vision of the founding fathers of ASEAN,
the period of sustained stability has been the envy of other regions in the
world.
The onus is now on us to maintain and even enhance that stability for the
sake of the present and future generations. The region cannot afford to
experience untoward conflict in whatever manner because a crisis could
derail the efforts that have already been invested in building the regional
grouping into its present form. From five nations and then expanding to six
with the inclusion of Brunei Darussalam, ASEAN has gone from strength to
strength. And now with ten Members, ASEAN is a complete team ready to
evolve into a community by 2015, which is a mere five years away.
As we approach the target year for the creation of the ASEAN
Community, there are a number of key questions that need to be addressed
urgently. For example, at the grassroots level, have the ASEAN people
understood the regional aspiration? Have we communicated enough to the
people in the rural areas the objectives and purpose of ASEAN, and what
they stand to gain from ASEAN? Failing to win the hearts and minds of the
general population would make it difficult for ASEAN to muster solid
support in pursuing its ultimate objective of becoming a community.
Perhaps a small step in the right direction would be the inception of an
ASEAN Peace Corps along the lines of the American Peace Corps
established by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to promote international
peace and understanding. With ASEAN’s vast population of more than half
a billion comprising a sizeable young population, this would be more than
enough to form a team of volunteers. Young people with a passion for
serving as volunteers could act as cadres in the ten Member States to work
on issues related to ASEAN’s objectives in the promotion of peace,
understanding and cohesiveness as a single community by 2015.
The ASEAN Peace Corps Volunteers could be drawn from ASEAN
young graduates with multidisciplinary backgrounds. They could be experts
in agriculture, social issues and culture. They could be economists or
experts in other fields that are beneficial to the targeted community in
which they will render their services. The ASEAN Secretariat would be the
coordinator of the volunteers who would be given the necessary training
before they are dispatched to villages/kampungs, barrios, tambon and other
rural areas of ASEAN. The ASEAN volunteers could also take up the roles
of teachers and mentors. While imparting the usual knowledge, these
teachers would be on the front lines of inculcating awareness about ASEAN
and its desire to evolve into a community. In other words, they would be the
flag bearers of ASEAN.
Sourcing funding for creating an ASEAN Peace Corps would not pose
that much of a problem. We could learn from the establishment of the
ASEAN Cultural Fund in 1979 when the Japanese government contributed
5 billion yen as a start-up fund. Interest earned from the capital grew and
was used to finance the various cultural and information projects of the
ASEAN Member States. The ASEAN Secretariat has a wealth of
knowledge in managing the fund which sustains the various projects until
the present. What could be done now is to solicit financial assistance from
within ASEAN. According to Forbes there are 15 billionaires in Southeast
Asia. I was encouraged to learn from news reports that 40 US billionaires
have decided to pledge at least 50 percent of their wealth for charities. It
was also learned that in 2009, wealthy Americans gave away a total of
about $300 billion in donations. I believe the region’s billionaires are no
less compassionate and charitable than their counterparts in the West. With
all due respect to billionaires in the region, they may have their own ways
of helping the needy, and many may do charity in their own special ways.
However, a more integrated means could be instituted to help in
coordinating assistance from philanthropies in ASEAN so as to optimise its
reach and impact. It’s about time that steps be taken to initiate a move
towards the direction in setting up an ASEAN Peace Corp that could be
dove-tailed with the various ASEAN Youth programmes and other related
projects.
The above efforts could be undertaken by the Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance under the Socio-Cultural Cooperation Department
of the ASEAN Secretariat. The coordinating centre for the ASEAN Peace
Corps may not necessarily be at the ASEAN Secretariat. It could be
delegated to other venues in accordance to the given task of the ASEAN
Peace Corps. Singapore perhaps could be the centre of — for practical and
pragmatic reasons — the ASEAN Peace Corps of natural calamities. It has
all the necessary facilities and capabilities, and of course its strategic
location in mobilising resources efficiently and effectively. I recall the
number of disasters that struck the region and how military personnel co-
opted with medical staff, and various volunteers were air-flown to disaster
areas in the quickest possible manner. A lot could be learned from that
experience especially on how that could be translated into a joint ASEAN
effort.
Other ASEAN capitals may host the Peace Corps in other specialised
areas. For example, Bangkok, which is known for its advancement in
agriculture could be the host for Peace Corps in agriculture and other
related areas. Manila may offer to host the Peace Corps in business
development; Kuala Lumpur in the area of information technology and the
list goes on. Ultimately, ASEAN will have a whole range of volunteerism
that could contribute as the unifying factor to an ASEAN Community, a
community based on the spirit of togetherness that will be the hallmark for
a more meaningful and rewarding single community.
The benefits of establishing an ASEAN Peace Corps are manifold. First
and foremost, the presence of ASEAN in the midst of the people will be
felt. The targeted community will gain a better understanding of ASEAN
while at the same time the ASEAN Peace Corps Volunteers will acquire
appreciation and knowledge about the people whom they serve. The
formation of an ASEAN Peace Corps in many ways will complement the
tasks of the various committees, especially the ASEAN Committee on
Culture and Information (ASEAN COCI), in the promotion of ASEAN
amongst the masses. While ASEAN COCI focusses on more specific
programmes in its deliverance, the ASEAN Peace Corps will be people-
centric in its approach.
It may be recalled with nostalgia that there was a time when ASEAN
made a huge impact through cultural projects such as song festivals and
cultural troupes visiting ASEAN capitals. Programmes such as these could
be revived and given a fresh impetus with the intention of attracting young
people. ASEAN indeed needs something along the lines of the annual
Eurovision Song Contest that people can look forward to as regional
entertainment and which, at the same time, inculcates the spirit of
togetherness among the people of ASEAN. A byproduct of such projects
would be the creation of ASEAN stars who could become cultural
ambassadors promoting an awareness of ASEAN towards regional peace
and stability.
I have a fond memory of what a former Secretary-General of ASEAN,
Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, said about the commonality of ASEAN when
I interviewed him in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2001. Ambassador Ong said
an obvious common regional denominator is that ASEAN people eat rice,
their staple food. If everyone in ASEAN has his bowl full of rice, the
likelihood of regional tension will be at a minimum. By that he means that
when the people of ASEAN are happy, prosperous and content, there will
be less space for contention.
The other commonality is that of the people of ASEAN themselves.
When a citizen of Brunei walks in the streets of Hanoi, a Vietnamese is
bound to regard him as one of their own. Likewise, for a Singaporean
dining in a restaurant in Kuala Lumpur, a waiter serving him would likely
converse with him in Malay. This commonality could be harnessed to
further cement the bond of friendship at the individual level. It could be
also regarded as an additional advantage in the formation of a single
community aside from the political and economic integration.
 Contemplating what we have built thus far and the commonalities that we
share, we should arrive at the next level of regional integration with ease
and confidence. The sense of belonging to ASEAN among its people is still
at a nascent stage, and more could be done to nurture that sense of
togetherness at various levels, especially at the grassroots and among the
young generation. At the leadership level the bond has been firmly in place
for some time.
The road that we have travelled thus far has given us the opportunity to
learn about the potholes and the hazards that we encountered along the way.
These lessons are indeed very valuable in helping us realise our aspiration
to build a stronger community. Having harvested the fruits of co-operation
in the present setup of ASEAN, we anticipate a bumper harvest in the future
community of the region.
 CHAPTER 11

RELEVANCE OF ASEAN IN FORGING

REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY
Nicholas T. Dammen

The year 2010 marks the 43rd Anniversary of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), since it was established by the founding fathers
from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1967
in Bangkok. Later, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Myanmar, Lao PDR and
Cambodia joined the club, and then became the ASEAN 10. Since then,
ASEAN has been trying its utmost to maintain security and stability in the
region as well as to improve the welfare of its people.
ASEAN, however, is facing many hurdles in maintaining regional peace
and security. Sometimes the challenge comes from within the region.
Among the regional issues that need attention from ASEAN are border
disputes between Member States, potential conflict on the South China Sea
that would involve several Member States, conflicts in Afghanistan and the
Middle East and the threat of nuclear armament in the Korean Peninsula.
Clearly, any security incident in Northeast Asia would directly impact the
ASEAN region. Therefore, ASEAN should actively play a role in
maintaining stability in the East Asia region. Other challenges are terrorism,
human trafficking, drug trafficking, natural disasters and diseases; all are
borderless regional and global threats.
The ASEAN Charter, which came into force on 15 December 2008,
turned ASEAN into a legal entity and made it a rules-based organisation.
The Charter will enhance the decision-making process as well as ensure the
prompt implementation of various agreements and decisions which have
been agreed upon by its Member States. More importantly, the Charter will
make ASEAN more relevant to the people. As a people-oriented
organisation, the Member States hope it will focus attention on issues that
will improve the welfare of the ASEAN people. They also hope that the
Member States will be able to strengthen their co-operation towards the
establishment of an ASEAN Community in 2015.
The ASEAN Community Blueprint spells out various action programmes
in the three main areas of co-operation, namely political security, economic
and socio-cultural pillars. However, the implementation of those action
programmes needs intensive co-ordination among the Member States. It
also needs strong commitment from all stakeholders in every Member State
to support the programmes. Without such co-operation, there is no
guarantee that ASEAN will be able to deliver its commitments successfully
in the future.
The ASEAN Blueprint will strengthen co-operation among ASEAN
Member States as well as with its dialogue partners. Moreover, it will result
in improved relationships with all countries, particularly those that signed
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). It is also hoped that by having
a new Charter, ASEAN will have more confidence in managing issues with
its partners under existing mechanisms such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT),
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). It is
essential for ASEAN to maintain its co-operative and consultative
engagements with all countries that signed the TAC.
In order to anticipate the development of the political, economic and
socio-cultural constellation in the region as well as at the global level, the
establishment of a wider regional architecture needs careful attention from
the ASEAN Member States. We are aware that several new structural
designs were introduced, namely the Asia Pacific Community by Australia,
the New Asia Initiative by South Korea and the East Asian Community by
Japan. In response, ASEAN has a strategic position to play. The presence of
big powers such as the United States, Russia, China and India in the region
needs a strong ASEAN. Only a cohesive ASEAN will enable it to play a
central role in the region, and to engage these dialogue partners
constructively in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. By
doing so, it will create an environment conducive to ASEAN economic,
trade as well as social development. In turn, this will allow ASEAN to
maintain its position in the driver’s seat and bridge the interests between the
developing and developed countries.
Maintaining regional and global economic partnerships is a must for
ASEAN. This will enable the development of a more liberalised market for
trade in goods, services and investment, and result in improvements in the
labour market, capital flows and transfer of technology. In other words,
ASEAN creates a favourable environment to facilitate the free movement of
goods, investment, services, skilled labour, a freer flow of capital, and
equitable economic development across the region. A free flow of labour
also means that in future people will be able to work in any ASEAN
Member State of their choice.
As a matter of fact, creating a free market in the region will generate
competition among ASEAN Member States that will drive them to improve
their infrastructures and facilities and produce better quality products. Each
Member State will encourage their private sectors to make use of market
opportunities. It is my firm belief that with a strong ASEAN market, the
current free trade agreements (FTAs) with several dialogue partners will
provide opportunities to the Member States rather than problems. As we are
all aware, after the China-ASEAN FTA came into force on the first of
January 2010, certain ASEAN Member States were worried that cheaper
Chinese goods would be flowing into their countries. The reason is that they
were not ready to compete although negotiation for the FTA had been going
on for some years and had been endorsed by the authorities concerned. In
order to enable these Member States to utilise the benefits of the FTA, they
should improve their domestic market infrastructure. Otherwise, those
countries will always remain losers in global market competition. A strong
ASEAN market will also build Member States’ capacity to attract not only
buyers but investors as well to the region.
Besides trade, investment and the services sectors, food, energy and clean
water have become priorities for ASEAN. In food security, ASEAN needs
to co-operate with its dialogue partners to develop agricultural sectors.
Similarly, ASEAN needs to enhance co-operation for energy alternatives
and to preserve its clean water resources. It is urgent for certain Member
States to immediately develop energy alternatives in order to solve their
domestic energy crises. They should introduce alternatives such as wind
energy, solar energy and even nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They
should start to reduce their dependency on fossil energy by accommodating
green and friendly energy sources.
Co-operation in the socio-cultural sector is equally important. People are
the foundation of any community. In this context, ASEAN has been
developing its human resource sector for many years through the Initiative
for ASEAN Integration (IAI). ASEAN believes that the more education and
skills are given to its people, the stronger the economy. Besides education
and cultural co-operation, various commitments were made to tackle
specific issues related to diseases, natural disasters and climate change. One
of ASEAN’s priorities is co-operation on humanitarian issues, and this was
realised with the establishment of an ASEAN Humanitarian Centre in
Jakarta a couple of years ago.
However, the main challenge for ASEAN is how to maintain its
unanimity. Obviously, a strong and united ASEAN is required to retain its
central role in developing co-operation with its dialogue partners. It is not
easy for ASEAN to perform well in various forums such as APT, ARF or
EAS and other new initiatives from Australia, South Korea and Japan, if
they are not in harmony. Sitting in the driver’s seat, the role that ASEAN
always takes, it is important for it to be in command of the process of
shaping regional architecture. It will also enhance ASEAN’s capacity-
building to lead the path of the process and not just follow the desires of its
external partners.
Nowadays, the role of ASEAN is increasingly important in the
international arena. In order to support the work of ASEAN as well as to
facilitate co-operation with its external partners, all the ten ASEAN
Member States and its partners accredited their ambassadors to the ASEAN
Secretariat in Jakarta as permanent representatives.
Let me illustrate the increasingly important role of ASEAN in
international relations, in particular with dialogue partners, by looking at
some aspects of the ASEAN-South Korea co-operation. When writing this
paper, I had been living in Seoul for exactly a year, representing my country
as the tenth Ambassador of Indonesia to the beautiful country, the Republic
of Korea. It is a country with a great civilisation. I have had the liberty to
touch upon the issue that is close to my current job. I observed a lot of
mutual cooperation occurring between ASEAN and South Korea. To
mention a few, in 2006 both sides signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods,
and a year later in 2007 they signed the Agreement on Trade in Services. At
the ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit in June 2009, the Investment
Agreement was signed. Both sides also agreed to deepen their co-operation
in other areas such as education, science and technology, health,
environment, tourism, human resource development, energy, culture and
disaster management. In order to enhance co-operation on trade,
investment, tourism and culture, both sides agreed to establish an ASEAN-
ROK Centre, which officially opened on 13 March 2009 in Seoul.
In the meantime, the ASEAN-ROK Eminent Persons Group (EPG) set up
a future-oriented comprehensive co-operation partnership. The group
recommended a concept of 15 years’ strategic partnership and beyond to the
higher level. The main objective of this new framework of cooperation is to
promote peace, stability and prosperity for the benefit of more than 600
million people of ASEAN plus Korea. The EPG introduced the concept of
“FEEL Asia” through focussing on fellowship, education, environment, and
liberalised trade. The EPG also recommended guiding principles and some
key elements covering political security, economic and socio-cultural co-
operation, and in such a partnership both sides agreed to maintain ASEAN’s
central role in the process of shaping regional architecture.
ASEAN’s role in various international issues is much valued by many
countries, not least its dialogue partners such as South Korea. On 1–2 June
2009, the ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit was held in Jeju, a
beautiful island located in the southern part of Korea, to celebrate the 20th
anniversary of dialogue relations between ASEAN and South Korea.
ASEAN and South Korea have been maintaining positive and mutually
beneficial ties for the past two decades. South Korea places great
importance on the role of ASEAN, which was instrumental in the
resumption of the Six-Party Talks for a peaceful solution of the North
Korean nuclear issue.
As Co-chair of G20 for 2010, South Korea hosted the Summit of the
premier forum for international economic co-operation on 11–12 November
2010 in Seoul. South Korea is determined to show the world that under its
leadership, it is able to bridge the needs and interests of advanced and
emerging nations. Korea and Indonesia from ASEAN together with
Australia, China, India and Japan — all G20 Members from the East Asia
region — would join hands to solidify the forum’s premier standing on the
global stage by reflecting the interests of more than 170 non-G20 Members.
ASEAN should seize this opportunity to use South Korea’s leadership in
G20 to preserve ASEAN’s interests. During the Jeju Summit last year,
ASEAN and South Korea committed to do their utmost to stimulate
economic growth in the region. They also stressed the importance of the
Chiang Mai Initiative on multilateralism, for they believed that this
initiative would strengthen regional financial stability and defend the region
from the global crisis.
To conclude, I should say that ASEAN has brought a lot of benefits to its
people. ASEAN has become an invaluable asset for the region. Within the
framework of ASEAN, people have been living in peace and stability in the
spirit of ASEAN fraternity and brotherhood for decades. However, ASEAN
cannot be complacent about its remarkable achievements in the past four
decades, for there are many challenges ahead to deal with. Therefore, we
need a strong and cohesive ASEAN. A strong bond among Member States
will enhance ASEAN’s capacity-building and improve its competitiveness.
Together with its external partners, ASEAN can play an even greater role
not only in the region but in the global arena as well. On a similar note, I
firmly believe that the relevance of ASEAN is not questionable.
 CHAPTER 12

THE NARGIS EXPERIENCE:

PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TOWARDS
CHANGE
Moe Thuzar

I am an ASEAN believer. One could even say I am an ASEAN missionary.

Through all the stages of my adult life, as a graduate student learning
about the intricacies of Southeast Asia in international relations, as a
member of the team preparing for my country’s admission to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as an officer at the
ASEAN Secretariat co-ordinating regional co-operation in social
development, as a trainer sharing details of regional co-operation with
government officials from new ASEAN Members, and as a researcher on
ASEAN socio-cultural affairs, I have been living, breathing and talking
about ASEAN’s relevance to the daily lives of people in the region.
In recent years, my faith in ASEAN and the combined strength of its
Members was sorely tested in the frustrations over my country —
Myanmar. When Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN in July 1997, the
spirit on both sides (Myanmar and the other ASEAN Member States) was
one of optimism and opportunity. However, Myanmar’s internal political
situation affected the country’s participation in ASEAN and related forums.
It also affected how the international community perceived ASEAN’s
efforts in engaging with Myanmar.
It took the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in May
2008, to illustrate ASEAN’s continued relevance and the potential for a
wider role than the Association had been recognised for.
ASEAN’s role in facilitating the humanitarian and rehabilitation work of
various multilateral and regional agencies in the aftermath of Cyclone
Nargis provided a window of opportunity to alter the attitude of Myanmar
authorities towards change. Building on this opportunity and working with
— or complementing — ongoing efforts by the United Nations (UN) and
other agencies working in Myanmar, ASEAN can play a constructive role
in the country’s transition.
Let me elaborate.

The ASEAN Way and Myanmar

The ASEAN Way is sometimes generalised and its essence likened to how a
village community functions. The notion of mutual dependence and benefit
is based on this somewhat idealistic representation of how ASEAN
functions collectively. As much as the individual Members (who manage
their own household affairs) are expected to respect the community and
observe the rules, the individuals can also count on the collective body to
protect them from any external intrusions. This ASEAN village is governed
by the principle of non-interference, either out of self-interest or
pragmatism.
The non-interference policy has been ASEAN’s bane in dealing with
Myanmar, however, and has created the perception that the ASEAN
Member States are overly sensitive to Myanmar’s sensitivities. Differences
of opinion on how best to deal with Myanmar, and successive ASEAN
Chairs’ desire to leave a legacy of bringing about a breakthrough have also
weakened ASEAN’s leverage of the military leadership in Myanmar.
ASEAN’s collective position on Myanmar — voiced annually since 2001
through the joint communiqués of the annual foreign ministers’ meetings
and the ASEAN Summit statements — is to urge Myanmar to step up the
pace of national reconciliation and dialogue among all concerned parties
and thus bring the country onto the path of democratic rule. ASEAN does
not favour economic sanctions to bring about change, maintaining that
sanctions are ineffective, counter-productive and harmful to the people of
Myanmar. ASEAN supports the efforts of the UN and encourages Myanmar
to work closely with the UN for “meaningful dialogue with all groups” and
a “peaceful transition to democracy in the near future”. Yet, ASEAN’s
efforts at constructive engagement seem to have had minimal impact on the
military government, at best occasioning some conciliatory measures.
Two instances in 2007 indicate the frustration and concern ASEAN itself
felt over its relevance as a community of nations with shared aspirations.
The first instance was when ASEAN used untypically strong language
towards a Member State in a formal statement. In September 2007,
Singapore, then ASEAN Chair, issued a statement in New York where the
ASEAN foreign ministers regularly convene an informal meeting on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Expressing “revulsion” over the
manner in which peaceful protests had been suppressed, the ASEAN
statement revealed the Association’s concern that its credibility was at
stake. Still, ASEAN was interested in playing a role in bringing some
resolution through the UN’s efforts. The second statement, again issued by
Singapore as the ASEAN Chair, but this time at the summit level, tried to
put a good face on Myanmar’s refusal to allow Ibrahim Gambari, the UN
Secretary-General’s special envoy, to brief the Summit on his mission to
Myanmar after the September event.
Then Cyclone Nargis slammed into Myanmar’s lower delta regions on 2
May 2008, leaving a death toll of about 140,000 and some 7 million people
in the delta without family, homes or means of livelihood. The lives of 2.4
million were described as “on the brink” without immediate relief
assistance. It was through this tragedy that ASEAN’s finest hour came
about, earning the Association the recognition it deserved and paving the
way for pragmatic solutions through ASEAN co-ordination.

The Impact of Cyclone Nargis

ASEAN was initially criticised for being slow in responding to the
humanitarian crisis in Myanmar caused by the cyclone.
In the immediate aftermath of the cyclone, ASEAN Member States were
among the first to offer emergency relief aid to Myanmar, which the
country accepted, although Myanmar’s ambivalence towards aid was hitting
the headlines. The reality was that fellow ASEAN Member States and
Myanmar’s neighbours had sent aid flights since 6 May, the same day that
Myanmar’s foreign minister publicly appealed for assistance. ASEAN’s
relevance to a Member State was evident here, as Myanmar accepted this
unco-ordinated assistance from ASEAN Member States because the
assistance came without a political agenda or threats.1
This paved the way for more foreign aid and assistance, with the first UN
aid flight conveying supplies and personnel being approved on 7 May. The
airlift of US donations reached Yangon on 12 May. UN staffers in Myanmar
were the first in the delta, on 4 May, followed by the UN Disaster
Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team — supplemented by experts
from ASEAN Member States the Philippines and Singapore — whose visas
were granted on 7 May. The ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
(ASEAN-ERAT) was deployed on 9 May for a ten-day period. ASEAN
Member States also sent medical mission teams to support and assist the
Myanmar Ministry of Health’s efforts in the delta, thus helping to avert the
much-feared wave of disease outbreak in the cyclone’s aftermath.
However, the special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers took place
almost two weeks after the cyclone, after the media had sensationalised
both Myanmar’s ambivalence over accepting aid and aid workers and
ASEAN’s perceived slowness in addressing the issue. Still, at that special
meeting, Myanmar agreed to accept aid co-ordinated through ASEAN,2
yielding to ASEAN’s frank question of what the Association meant to the
country.
ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan admitted that ASEAN’s
response was slow, saying,

I do not have any defence for that. But I think the international
community also realises we have a lot of sensitivities to work
around, to the point where all international agencies have come to
accept the fact that if it has to be an ASEAN-led vehicle or structure
or architecture, they would be happy and willing to work with us
and rally behind us.3

The role of ASEAN here is critical. It successfully acted as a broker and

served as the bridge between Myanmar and the international community.
The fact that Myanmar agreed to allow ASEAN to lead and co-ordinate the
international aid effort through a tripartite mechanism is testimony to
ASEAN’s “defining moment” in responding to the situation in Myanmar.
ASEAN’s consistent emphasis on its sole focus on humanitarian assistance
helped raise confidence levels within the country and in ASEAN’s
credibility on Myanmar. The challenge would be to maintain this
confidence.4
Perhaps the tragedy of Nargis also brought some winds of change;
ASEAN may finally be on the way to a workable regional initiative that
focusses on helping Myanmar recover from and deal with the aftermath of
Nargis, as well as to strengthen a sense of trust so that the government in
Naypyidaw will be more comfortable working with ASEAN.
In fact, it may be time for ASEAN to consider developing a policy on
engaging Myanmar in the spirit of the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) — the
response mechanism comprising representatives of ASEAN, the United
Nations and the Myanmar government — to resolve problems and remove
obstacles to delivering humanitarian aid to the cyclone survivors.5 ASEAN
can take the opportunity offered by the response to Nargis and the
unprecedented occasion for co-ordination among all concerned parties to do
precisely this, and work at community and policy levels.
The TCG’s mandate, which the ASEAN foreign ministers extended for
one more year, will end in July 2010. No one knows what will happen after
the TCG mandate, and concerns remain on how the momentum of recovery
will be continued.
Recognising that relief assistance and responses in the delta area are still
inadequate in the areas most severely affected by the cyclone, the TCG
started a community-based early recovery project to assist villages in the
more remote and inner parts of the delta area in rebuilding their lives. The
project was first proposed by what can be termed “ASEAN volunteers” —
young people from Thailand joining hands with young Myanmar citizens
— who identified on their own initiative a village in Kungyangon Township
(Yangon Division), where ASEAN’s focussed assistance could help the
villagers get their livelihoods back on track. The project — which was
submitted to and approved by the TCG — was designed on the basis of the
community’s recovery needs, and helped the citizens of Seik Gyi village
recover their education and livelihood needs. The initiative has spread to
other villages in the delta and will hopefully continue after the TCG winds
up its work.
 The acceptance of relief and aid workers “regardless of nationality” since
23 May 20086 has prevailed to this day. Local non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and those from the international humanitarian
community continue to operate in the delta. There is more acceptance of
civil society and NGOs in Myanmar today. The local NGO network
continues to consolidate.
Perhaps this may be the way to go, with ASEAN integrating relevant
projects into a policy that helps Myanmar build capacities for change, in
universally important areas such as education, rural development and
poverty reduction, and health. Capacity-building initiatives should also
strengthen local civil society organisations, as the experience of responding
to Nargis has shown that shared objectives override sectarian concerns.
Taking the TCG experience in Myanmar as an example, ASEAN has
embarked on a comprehensive project in Laos where the different
stakeholders are brought together under one joint mechanism to discuss,
prioritise and co-ordinate development projects for the country. ASEAN
aims to replicate this for other Member States of the Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) group under the Initiative for ASEAN
Integration (IAI).
ASEAN has built on the good will generated by the collaborative
partnerships of the Nargis response and built bridges over old grievances by
its commitment to post-Nargis recovery in Myanmar. Many government
officials involved in the recovery process and the villagers in the cyclone-
stricken areas in the delta remember — and thank — ASEAN in connection
with Nargis, for the help and assistance brought under the ASEAN banner
and the introduction of new ways for different stakeholders to work
together. In Myanmar’s delta area, the ASEAN logo is well-known by
children and adults alike, who associate it with a glimmer of hope and
change showing through the dark clouds in the wake of Nargis.
This is how ASEAN’s legacy will live on.
To me, this is how ASEAN has proven its relevance and how it will
continue being relevant.

_____________________
1 Rodolfo Severino, “Lessons in Offering Neighbourly Aid”, The Straits Times, 15 May 2008.
2
Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, 19 May 2008.
3
“We Were Too Slow, Admitted ASEAN Chief”, The New Zealand Herald, 21 May 2008.
4 Nirmal Ghosh, “Cyclone Survivors Need Aid for Six More Months: UN”, The Straits Times, 26
July 2008.
5
Praise for the TCG’s ability to resolve problems through its frank and open discussions. The
honesty of the exchanges was underpinned with the knowledge that the TCG members had the same
goal — to save and rebuild the lives of the survivors. This and several other factors helped to clear
the inevitable bottlenecks in stabilising the relief phase and making progress towards early recovery.
6 Myanmar’s supremo Senior General Than Shwe agreed to this on 23 May 2008.
 CHAPTER 13

ASEAN EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Un Sovannasam1

Introduction
ASEAN’s integration and community-building efforts over the past years
have created conducive conditions for rapid economic growth and
development with great benefits to ASEAN and countries around the
region. Yet criminals have exploited the same forces that made possible
today’s rapid trade and advancement to extend their criminal activities and
influence across countries.
With the reduction of trade restrictions, the increasing ease with which
people and goods cross national borders, the global reach of information
and telecommunications technology and financial systems, transnational
crime is also becoming more organised, diversified and pervasive. Regional
security and development have been imperiled by terrorism, sea piracy,
illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, arms
smuggling, international economic crimes and cyber crimes. ASEAN
realises the serious threat that transnational crime poses to its security and
progress and has undertaken appropriate measures and available resources
to prevent and combat transnational crime.
 The adoption of the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for an
ASEAN Community by 2015 was a landmark decision to work towards an
ASEAN community comprising the ASEAN Political-Security Community,
ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In
building the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN subscribes to
the principle of comprehensive security which goes beyond the
requirements of traditional security but also takes into account non-
traditional aspects vital to regional and national resilience. A key purpose is
to respond effectively and in a timely manner to all forms of threats posed
by transnational crime. The entry into force of the ASEAN Charter is
another significant achievement of ASEAN.
As the ASEAN Charter also provides the region with legal and
institutional frameworks for realising the ASEAN Community and beyond,
it is perhaps time to review ASEAN’s efforts to combat transnational crime,
and examine ASEAN’s institutional mechanism to deal with transnational
crime.

ASEAN Efforts to Combat Transnational Crime

The fight against transnational crime in ASEAN can be traced back to 1972
when the first ASEAN Expert Group Meeting on the Prevention and
Control of Drug Abuse was organised. A further boost to combat the
problem was derived from the Bali Accord of 1976, signed by the heads of
government/state of the founding Members of ASEAN, which called for the
intensification of co-operation among Member States as well as with the
relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse
of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs. It also called for a study on
developing judicial co-operation, including the possibility of an ASEAN
extradition treaty. The adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to
Combat the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs in 1976 by the ASEAN foreign
ministers proved to be an important development in ASEAN’s efforts
towards regional collaboration in drug abuse prevention and control. This
declaration provided the framework for the adoption of a co-operative
programme to combat the abuse of narcotic drugs. In 1985, ASEAN
expressed its views that drug abuse and illicit trafficking could seriously
endanger the development of nations and undermine the security and well-
being of mankind. With this concern, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to
dealing with drug abuse and trafficking, which led to the formulation of a
common position on drug matters for suggestion to the International
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.
With the expansion and diversification of transnational crime to include
other forms of transnational crime such as terrorism, arms smuggling,
money laundering, illegal migration and sea piracy, as well as the highly
organised nature of such crimes, ASEAN has intensified its efforts to fight
these crimes. At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of July 1996, the
ministers called for the urgent need to tackle these transnational crimes to
prevent them from undermining the long-term viability of ASEAN and its
individual states. When ASEAN leaders met the same year in Jakarta for
their First Informal Summit, they called upon the relevant ASEAN bodies
to study the possibility of regional co-operation on criminal matters,
including extradition. At their Second Informal Summit held in Kuala
Lumpur in December 1997, the ASEAN leaders called for firm measures to
combat the different categories of transnational crime. They also adopted
the ASEAN Vision 2020 document, which sets out a broad vision for
ASEAN in the year 2020. Among the goals forecasted were the creation of
a drug-free Southeast Asia, and a region of agreed rules of behaviour and
co-operative measures to deal with problems, including transnational crime,
that can only be met on a regional scale.
ASEAN, therefore, can be said to have been committed to fighting
transnational crime since its earliest years. ASEAN’s commitment to
enhancing regional co-operation in dealing with the threat of illicit drug
trafficking and other forms of transnational crime has intensified since the
1990s. ASEAN acknowledged that new forms of security threats had
appeared in Southeast Asia in the 1990s due to a changing security
environment. The concept of regional security has extended beyond the
mere absence of armed conflict and war among and within nations. ASEAN
also realised that enduring regional security continued to be assaulted by
transnational crime and, from time to time, international terrorism, which
threaten the attainment of ASEAN’s goals and aspirations. ASEAN was
clear that it could not allow these criminals and terrorists to destroy its
future and integration agenda.
Following the leaders’ decision to task relevant ASEAN bodies with
studying possible regional co-operation on transnational crime, the first
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) was
convened on 18–20 November 1997 in Manila. The ministers adopted the
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, which underscored ASEAN’s
resolve to fight transnational crime.
In realising the need to continue addressing transnational crime, the
ASEAN leaders have reiterated their calls for strengthening and promoting
regional linkages among ASEAN institutional mechanisms in fighting drug
abuse and trafficking, and in intensifying individual and collective efforts to
address transnational crime. They adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA),
the first in a series of action plans to realise the ASEAN Vision 2020 which,
among other things, called for a strengthened regional capacity to address
transnational crime.
It is, however, important to note that the terrorist attacks against the
United States in 2001 provided a strong impetus for ASEAN to collectively
fight terrorism through co-operation at the multilateral, regional and
bilateral levels. Besides regional efforts, ASEAN has engaged in
subregional, international and multilateral arrangements aimed at enhancing
security co-operation to combat transnational crime. In May 2002,
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines signed the Agreement on
Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures to
co-operate in combating transnational crime, including terrorism. Thailand
and Cambodia subsequently acceded to that Agreement. In an effort to
render support and assistance to each other in combating transnational
crime, Southeast Asian countries also concluded the Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT) in 2004. In the
implementation of the MLAT, various workshops and training seminars are
being considered to assist officials of each Member State who are dealing
with the issue of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
ASEAN’s efforts to combat transnational crime, particularly terrorism,
reached another milestone with the conclusion of the ASEAN Convention
on Counter-Terrorism in 2007. The Convention provides ASEAN with a
framework for regional co-operation to counter, prevent and suppress
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to deepen co-operation
among law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities.
The conclusion in March 2009 of the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on
the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, comprising the ASEAN Political-
Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community, represents a significant step in ASEAN’s integration
and community-building efforts. The declaration lays out various measures
and actions to be undertaken by ASEAN in order to build the ASEAN
Community by 2015. As envisaged, the ASEAN Political-Security
Community would bring ASEAN’s political and security co-operation to a
higher plane, and strengthen co-operation in addressing non-traditional
security issues, in particular combating transnational crime and other
transboundary challenges.
In sum, transnational crime has long been recognised by ASEAN as a
threat to its national and regional security. ASEAN has undertaken every
effort to prevent, suppress and combat transnational crime. Nevertheless,
coping with transnational crime in the region is not without difficulties and
constraints.

Challenges to Regional Co-Operation in Combating

Transnational Crime
ASEAN has affirmed its commitment to fighting transnational crime. Yet
regional co-operation faces a number of obstacles that ASEAN may still
need to address.

Appropriate institutions and their effective co-ordination

An important requirement for the success of any form of regional co-

operation is the creation of necessary and appropriate institutions. Where
such institutions already exist, co-ordination is required to ensure cohesion.
Hence, it is important to examine ASEAN’s institutional framework for
combating transnational crime, which was created by AMMTC at its
Second Meeting held in June 1999 in Myanmar. The AMMTC, designed by
the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, is the highest policy-
making body on ASEAN co-operation in combating transnational crime. It
meets formally at least once every two years and informally in between
when necessary. The AMMTC co-ordinates activities and approves the
reports of relevant bodies such as the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug
Matters (ASOD), ASEAN Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL), and ASEAN
Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular
Affairs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM). The AMMTC
comprises ministerial-level representatives of each ASEAN country
responsible for combating transnational crime, which are normally ASEAN
ministers of home affairs or interior. The ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting
on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) was also institutionalised to assist
AMMTC in this matter as well as to co-ordinate and co-operate with other
relevant ASEAN bodies dealing with transnational crime.
There are, however, a number of other ASEAN bodies involved in
combating transnational crime. For instance, ASEAN Finance Ministers
(AFM), through the ASEAN Agreement on Customs, apart from enhancing
ASEAN co-operation in customs activities, will strengthen co-operation in
combating trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances, and will
facilitate joint efforts in anti-smuggling and customs control. The ASEAN
Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM), with assistance from the ASEAN
Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM), deals with ASEAN legal co-
operation. The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) is
responsible for ASEAN co-operation in disaster management, which
includes natural and man-made disasters, with a view to minimising the
adverse consequences on the social and economic development of ASEAN
countries.
Although these bodies have played their part in combating transnational
crime, they were established as separate institutional mechanisms
responsible for their own respective area of co-operation within the ASEAN
framework. However, the AMMTC assisted by the SOMTC appears to be
the main body responsible for making policies, and planning initiatives and
programme activities on combating transnational crime. The AMMTC and
SOMTC endorsed the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime,
the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime and its
Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action of 2002. The
Work Programme was later revised in 2006.
With this institutional mechanism, many may cast doubts on the
functionality of the arrangement. The question is whether the AMMTC,
consisting only of ministers of home affairs or interior, is sufficient for
ensuring a sustainable and satisfactory response to transnational crime. The
answer would probably be negative because transnational criminal activities
are also a threat to regional peace and security. The issue of formulating
policies and initiating ASEAN’s actions and activities for co-operation on
combating transnational crime, which is a cross-sectoral strategy, should not
only fall under the responsibility of the law enforcement body (AMMTC
and its senior officials). For instance, the law enforcement co-operation on
investigations and prosecutions depends upon the availability of effective
and efficient mutual legal assistance and extradition regimes, which may be
embodied in reciprocal domestic legislation, bilateral treaties or multilateral
conventions. The legal officers would be in a better position to understand
the possibilities for co-operation on mutual legal assistance because
reciprocal domestic legislation relating to legal assistance and extradition
may support extensive cross-border cooperation even in the absence of
formal treaty relationships. The important role of effective legal co-
operation in combating transnational crime would require legal officers to
directly participate in discussions on any policy, plan of action or work
programme in coping with transnational crime. Legal officers would be able
to find practical solutions to address the various problems arising from
different legal systems, ensure effectiveness of police co-operation
measures and provide legal assistance. In addition, the issue of transnational
crime is also linked to the question of national sovereignty and integrity as
well as inter-state relations which fall within the purview of the ASEAN
foreign ministers.
In short, ASEAN realises that the success of regional co-operation in the
fight against transnational crime in ASEAN cannot rest on law enforcement
co-operation alone. The creation of multisectoral working institutions which
include not only representatives of the AMMTC, but also other concerned
ministries, such as foreign and justice ministries, would be of the utmost
utility. This would ensure ASEAN’s capacity to develop a comprehensive
approach (political, legal and law enforcement co-operation) in dealing with
transnational crime.
The conclusion of the ASEAN Charter, which provides ASEAN with a
legal and institutional framework, seems to be a right step towards the
establishment of a proper mechanism in effectively and efficiently
combating transnational crime. The ASEAN Charter has created an
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Council to coordinate the
work of the different sectors under its purview. The ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Meeting, the ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime has been included under the
purview of the APSC Council. Since its establishment, the APSC Council
has met four times to review and discuss various issues under its purview,
particularly the implementation of the ASEAN Political-Security
Community Blueprint, which includes strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to
combat transnational crime. It is expected that comprehensive strategies and
policies on combating transnational crime will be developed by the APSC
Council with proper consultation and co-ordination with all relevant
ministries.

Domestic priorities and regional co-operation

ASEAN’s response on transnational crime may also have to rest on an

overlap between domestic priorities and a need for regional co-operation.
At the beginning, ASEAN’s efforts in combating transnational crime
focussed mainly on drug abuse and drug trafficking. Later, ASEAN
extended its efforts to combat transnational crimes such as terrorism, arms
smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, particularly of women
and children, drug trafficking, international economic crimes and cyber
crimes. Among the eight different types of crime, counter-terrorism, human
trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering were subsequently given
top priority in order to maintain relevance and adequacy in responding to
the threat of transnational crime in the region. Although efforts are being
made to comprehensively address all types of transnational crime, it is
important to note that individual ASEAN Member States may not consider
all of these crimes as priority crimes requiring urgent attention. Hence,
domestic priorities and regional co-operation priorities may not be
consistent. For instance, cyber crime probably would not be a cause for
major concern to ASEAN’s newer, lesser-developed Members unlike
ASEAN’s more economically advanced Members enjoying ready access to
advanced technology. As a result, newer Members may focus their efforts
on responding to those crimes that best meet their domestic priorities.

Conclusion
ASEAN has acknowledged the nature of the threat of transnational crimes,
and at the highest level affirmed its commitment to fighting transnational
crime, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally. Certainly, efforts to combat
transnational crime are growing. ASEAN and its Member States are
committed to improving national and regional capacities and capabilities to
deal with it.
Yet, combating transnational crime is not without difficulties and
constraints. There are problems such as poverty and development gaps
among ASEAN countries and other sensitive issues that require close
attention when dealing with transnational crime. ASEAN will need to
identify and adopt effective and appropriate mechanisms to fight
transnational crime so that the measures employed will be comprehensive
and practical. A proper institutional mechanism would be able to effectively
and comprehensively address new challenges of transnational crime, which
would significantly contribute to the realisation of the APSC, one of the
three pillars of the ASEAN Community. The conclusion of the ASEAN
Charter, which sets up legal and institutional mechanism, as well as the
adoption of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint appear to
be the right moves to effectively and efficiently respond to the threat of
transnational crime. The establishment of the APSC Council, which has
under its purview the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, the ASEAN Law
Ministers and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, is
an important step to strengthening the ASEAN structure to deal with
transnational crime. It remains to be seen how this new mechanism will
work and support and assist ASEAN in its efforts to realise the ASEAN
Community by 2015.

_____________________
1
Although the author is currently a Senior Officer at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, the views
expressed here are the author’s own and not those of ASEAN or the ASEAN Secretariat.
THEME THREE

ECONOMICS
 CHAPTER 14

ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:

THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE
Ong Keng Yong

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8

August 1967. At that time, it consisted of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984, after
its formal independence. Ten years later, Vietnam was admitted into
ASEAN. In 1997, Laos and Myanmar entered the grouping, and in 1999,
Cambodia became an ASEAN Member. This completed the Southeast
Asian footprint of the organisation and firmly established ASEAN’s role as
the collective enterprise for managing challenges and opportunities
affecting the region.
In the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 that brought ASEAN into being,
economic co-operation was spelled out as one of the organisation’s key
objectives and specific actions were taken to move ASEAN towards this
goal. Tariff reduction was regarded as the first step to increase trade and
strengthen economic ties but negotiations were protracted. It was only in
1977 that ASEAN produced its first-ever preferential trading arrangements.
The Cambodian crisis of the late 1970s and the following decade
strengthened ASEAN’s habit of consultation and co-operation. The
perceived common threat rallied the ASEAN countries into joint actions to
secure peace and stability, from which economic prosperity was derived.
 The geography of ASEAN has been a critical factor. Positioned between
the huge continental economies of China and India and straddling the major
sea lanes and shipping routes connecting Europe and the Middle East with
Asia, Australia and New Zealand, ASEAN is situated in a strategic location
impinging on the interests of all the major powers of the world, especially
those which dominate the global economy. This central position was
adroitly capitalised upon by ASEAN to play a prominent role in managing
stakeholders’ interests in Southeast Asia and in the immediate
neighbourhood. Various ASEAN-centric mechanisms (such as the ASEAN
Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three processes, the ASEAN Regional Forum
and the East Asia Summit) were set up to engage those interested in the
region and top-level meetings were held on an annual basis. Consequently,
ASEAN is at the centre of the regional architecture and ASEAN’s relations
with all the major powers and big neighbours have been positive and
mutually beneficial.

Globalisation and China

As globalisation snowballed into an all-pervasive development in the
1990s, and the emerging economies in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe
and Latin America became more attractive to foreign investors, ASEAN’s
economic competitiveness appeared to be under threat. The ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) initiative was seen as too slow-moving. It was feared
that ASEAN would lose out in the competition for FDI and the region
would be sidelined and become irrelevant in the globalisation process.
As the grouping entered the 21st century, ASEAN leaders decided to
commission a landmark study by the private-sector consultancy, McKinsey
and Company. The conclusion of the study persuaded ASEAN leaders to
accelerate market integration and trade liberalisation. The key was to
provide a substantial economy of scale and exploit ASEAN’s potential as a
huge market of 550 million consumers. By developing a single market,
ASEAN could reduce business cost by 20–30% and this would incentivise
foreign investors to put money in ASEAN. To obtain quick results, priority
sectors were designated. The McKinsey study was accepted by the ASEAN
leaders and it paved the way for the promulgation of the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) as we know it today.
 In the year 2000, China offered to negotiate a free trade area (FTA) with
ASEAN. This was to protect China’s own political, strategic and economic
interests. Yet, an FTA comprising ASEAN and China would be a market of
almost 1.7 billion people. The Chinese initiative came with an extraordinary
“early harvest” package. In essence, this meant that even as negotiations
were undertaken, designated goods from ASEAN countries could enter
China tariff-free. This was an enormous inducement to ASEAN and it
opened the way for the grouping to significantly advance its free trade
strategy. A boost also came from the entry of Vietnam and Cambodia into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and their domestic economic reform,
which attracted an increased inflow of FDI.
China’s move for an FTA with ASEAN triggered off similar ventures
between ASEAN and Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), India, Australia
and New Zealand. By the end of 2008, ASEAN had signed and
operationalised FTAs with all these major trade partners. The FTAs
reinforced the positive relationships between ASEAN and these powers.
They added a new dimension to the ASEAN-centric mechanisms in the
region and buttressed the role of ASEAN as a hub for multilateral
engagement and open regionalism.
The creation of a single market for trade and investment is now the
underpinning of ASEAN’s future. ASEAN leaders concretised their free
trade vision by realising the AEC. The establishment of the ASEAN
Charter also facilitated the building of the AEC because it strengthened the
rule of law in ASEAN and brought about more accountability and
predictability. It is unlikely that ASEAN leaders would let the AEC
implementation slip and undermine ASEAN’s credibility and long-term
interests. Indeed, their preoccupation in the past few ASEAN Summits
clearly demonstrated their commitment to realising the AEC. Ideas like the
AEC Blueprint, the AEC Scorecard and the ASEAN Connectivity initiative
were adopted by ASEAN leaders to fast-track the AEC.

ASEAN Connectivity
Let us take this opportunity to examine the ASEAN Connectivity initiative
in more detail since it has not been well deliberated in its entirety outside
the government circles. The ASEAN leaders had observed that ASEAN was
located at the crossroads of an economically vibrant and growing region
bounded by India in the west; China, Japan and the ROK in the northeast;
and Australia and New Zealand in the south. ASEAN thus has the potential
to physically anchor itself as the transportation, information and
communication technology (ICT), and tourism hub of this vast region.
Enhancing intra-regional connectivity within ASEAN and its subregional
groupings would benefit all ASEAN countries through enhanced trade,
investment, tourism and development. As all overland transport linkages
must go through continental Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar
and Vietnam would stand to benefit the most from infrastructure
development and the opening up of remote inland and less-developed areas.
All these efforts would significantly narrow the development gap between
ASEAN countries. In addition to the tangible economic benefits of ASEAN
Connectivity, the linkages created would intensify and strengthen ASEAN
Community building efforts, not only in the form of enhanced regional co-
operation and integration, but also through people-to-people contacts. In
this regard, the concept of ASEAN Connectivity would also complement
the ongoing regional efforts to realise a people-oriented ASEAN
Community by 2015 with a focus on fostering a sense of shared cultural and
historical linkages.
The ASEAN leaders agreed that it is vital to complete the physical road,
rail, air and sea linkages within ASEAN. Development of infrastructure and
multimodal transport projects such as, inter alia, the ASEAN Highway
Network and the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link, should be expedited in
parallel with addressing software-related issues within the relevant existing
work plans of ASEAN.
This concept could first be implemented at a subregional level, such as
the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS),
which are presently undertaking co-operation activities focussed on
enhancing transport linkages, trade facilitation, and physical connectivity.
Given the importance of the Internet in business, education and
development, it is also crucial to complete the ASEAN ICT Master Plan in
2010 to enhance intraregional ICT linkages.
As the ASEAN leaders see it, the deepening and widening of
connectivity in the region would reinforce ASEAN’s position as the hub of
East Asia, which could be further strengthened through realising the
potential of a broader connectivity in the longer term with ASEAN’s
partners in the wider region. It is the view of the ASEAN leaders that this
concept of ASEAN Connectivity would complement and support
integration within ASEAN and within the broader regional framework in
East Asia. ASEAN countries should seek the support of all their dialogue
partners and other international agencies and development partners to
realise the vision of ASEAN Connectivity, including the establishment of
an infrastructure development fund for ASEAN. ASEAN should also
explore ways to effectively capitalise upon existing co-operation funds for
infrastructure development with its dialogue partners and remain open to
future co-operation with other interested parties, where appropriate.
An ASEAN High Level Task Force, comprising relevant experts,
supported by the ASEAN Secretariat and relevant sectoral bodies, in co-
operation with relevant international organisations such as the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the Economic Research
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), was established to study
ASEAN’s internal and external connectivity, and to develop an ASEAN
Master Plan on regional connectivity, that includes, among others,
innovative infrastructure financing mechanisms, taking into account the
work done and planned to ensure optimum synergy rather than duplication
of work. In devising the Master Plan, the Task Force, which is chaired by
the ASEAN Chair Country, should ensure that the limited resources from
ASEAN, its dialogue partners and international development banks and
agencies are employed in the most efficient and effective manner to realise
the vision of the ASEAN leaders. The ASEAN High Level Task Force will
be submitting its recommendations to the 17th ASEAN Summit in Vietnam
in October 2010.
A well-connected ASEAN will be a tremendous boost for the AEC, as
well as the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN Connectivity initiative takes
regional economic integration efforts a step further by providing the
necessary physical infrastructure to make Southeast Asia the conduit
through which regional interactions take place, thereby anchoring ASEAN
centrality in the regional architecture. Economically, this physical network
will help ASEAN realise the full potential of its FTAs with China, Japan,
the ROK, India and Australia/New Zealand.
Stumbling Blocks
The urgent task now is to implement what ASEAN countries have already
agreed to and not allow local problems and certain misgivings in some ill-
informed quarters to distract the AEC from its settled course. Many
challenges lie ahead but almost all of these are internal issues that the
ASEAN leaders can resolve through a determined exercise of political will.
Let us consider some of these difficulties.
The ASEAN bureaucratic culture is not yet conducive to the promotion
of a region-wide agenda for economic integration. Officials in the
respective capital cities and provinces tend to focus on local requirements
and their narrow interests. In this respect, the ASEAN leaders need to
motivate the officials to proceed quickly and implement the agreed plans.
Otherwise, the leaders should intervene to drive the process more directly.
The decision to have two ASEAN Summits a year signifies the intention of
the leaders to pay more attention to the implementation of ASEAN plans.
The harnessing of technology can contribute significantly to such
decisive actions. For example, the computerisation of customs clearance of
goods has increased the speed of processing across national borders.
Standardised rules have been pushed out to far-flung government agencies
across ASEAN through the use of computers and other electronic
equipment. Innovative ideas like the AEC Scorecard have assisted the
relevant authorities in reviewing performance and removing bureaucratic
obstacles. AFTA and several FTAs signed by ASEAN entered into force at
the beginning of 2010, and the technological advancements and innovations
will help in the monitoring and compliance of their provisions.
Undoubtedly, more administrative reform and mindset transformation are
needed, but the ASEAN leaders are constantly looking for creative ways to
overcome bureaucratic inertia. In some ASEAN countries, a systematic
modernisation of bureaucratic practices is being pursued. With better
training and more exposure to the ASEAN agenda, officials are beginning
to make a more positive impact.
Another form of inertia is found in the business sector. There seems to be
lukewarm support of the AEC, particularly from indigenous business
quarters. The usual feedback is that the local business community is not
familiar with the details of the AEC and its implementation process. The
inclination of most domestic companies is also to carry on with business as
usual as they find standardisation of ASEAN processes and procedures a
costly adjustment and therefore not something they would readily comply
with. In some cases, the inadequate communication about the AEC and its
coverage is at fault. However, very often, it is due to the lack of willingness
to change. Hence, public awareness and education, as well as simplification
of the process, are crucial in consolidating the AEC.
The ASEAN leaders are trying to strengthen the sense of an ASEAN
identity and to widen public consciousness of the benefits of ASEAN
integration. ASEAN outreach initiatives such as the ASEAN Rock Festival,
ASEAN Festival of the Arts, and even the ASEAN Football Championship,
among others, have contributed immensely to the building of a regional
identity. ASEAN countries, on a rotational basis, take turns to convene
these festivals and programmes. At the higher level, the ASEAN Summit is
chaired and hosted by an ASEAN country yearly, and this has also helped
to keep an awareness of the regional profile in their population.

Gains from Economic Integration

According to a number of studies conducted by experts and scholars,
ASEAN countries will benefit from the AEC in various ways. In the book
Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: A Comprehensive Assessment,
edited by Michael Plummer and Chia Siow Yue, the costs and benefits of
this ambitious enterprise by ASEAN were scrutinised and evaluated.
Several conclusions in the book illustrate the gains from the economic
integration. The AEC will expand ASEAN’s trade in goods with exports
outpacing imports in almost all sectors. Many of these areas offer important
opportunities for the region to join global production chains. Keeping the
AEC open, as advocated in the AEC Blueprint, and extending the AEC to
include Plus One agreements with the major trading partners, will also
increase the benefits to ASEAN. ASEAN’s centrality in external relations
and a strong voice in regional and global affairs, together with greater
macroeconomic stability due to the implementation of policies necessary to
support the AEC, will be a boon for the grouping.
Another benefit is the greater inflow of FDI arising from the
establishment of the AEC. FDI is likely to increase as barriers to production
networks are removed and policies in the ASEAN Comprehensive
Investment Area (ACIA) are implemented. Production networks will be
particularly advantageous to SMEs throughout ASEAN. The AEC could
increase FDI stocks. One estimate put it at 28–63%. Contribution to annual
income growth could be 0.5–1% of gross domestic product (GDP) per
annum. The creation of opportunities for production networks and
spreading of best practices that raise productivity will also help narrow the
development gap. Productivity improvements will be greatest in the less
developed countries of ASEAN and the AEC will help them converge with
the rest of ASEAN.
With the AEC allowing skilled workers to move about freely, this will
make ASEAN attractive to foreign investors, encourage mutual recognition
of professional qualifications, and engender regional co-operation among
training institutes, universities and research institutions. Countries with
shortages of labour may benefit most, and professional and skilled workers
will be able to seek better jobs and higher earnings. Greater efficiency
stemming from a less restricted movement of skilled labour will also
contribute to boosts in GDP.
Consumer markets will also be more competitive. Featuring a cheaper
and wider range of imported goods and services, greater domestic
competition, and more extensive consumer protection, institutional
improvements under the AEC should encourage growth in the private sector
and make the public sector more efficient. In sum, the study by Michael
Plummer and Chia Siow Yue estimated that the net gains from the AEC will
be significant even though the initial cost to some sectors in some ASEAN
countries is likely to be high.

Insufficient Institutionalisation
One area which the ASEAN leaders need to address is the limited number
of entities championing ASEAN and the AEC. So far, there is only the
ASEAN Secretariat based in Jakarta, which employs no more than 300
personnel. Across the region, there are few agencies and facilities to
promote and strengthen ASEAN’s causes and programmes. The ASEAN
Biodiversity Centre outside Manila, the ASEAN Foundation and the
ASEAN Centre for Energy in Jakarta, the ASEAN University Network in
Bangkok and the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre in Singapore
are the few dedicated outfits helping to carry out ASEAN initiatives and
projects. Most of them, however, are confined to their specific areas of
expertise and have limited budgetary allocations. They cannot undertake
wider outreach programmes essential to galvanising popular support for the
AEC.
Frequently, the ASEAN agenda is left to officials in selected ministries
who are not full-time implementers of the ASEAN plans and they are often
distracted by other bureaucratic responsibilities. The national coordinating
mechanisms in ASEAN countries have been overstretched. Inevitably, these
bodies must pay attention to national concerns and the national ego will
always be dominant. The ad hoc task forces established by ASEAN leaders
from time to time are not enough to champion ASEAN and its region-wide
agenda.
The ASEAN Secretariat can be expanded and its mandate enlarged so
that it can organise more activities to complement ASEAN’s political vision
and economic goals, monitor implementation of ASEAN agreements and
plans, and report non-compliance to the ASEAN leaders. The spread of
more suitable ASEAN institutions in different cities across Southeast Asia
will also raise public visibility of the grouping and increase the sense of
ownership of ASEAN’s projects and programmes. The numerous business
chambers and related industry bodies in the Member States of ASEAN
could be empowered to do more for the ASEAN agenda. They could
coordinate business inputs into ASEAN initiatives and be entrusted with
championing specific policy measures at the national level to support the
implementation of the AEC Blueprint.
The path to the AEC is not the work of one person, one committee or
even one nation. It stems from the clear vision of the ASEAN leaders and
their commitment to achieving the goals they have defined. Only then will
the drive exemplified by these leaders be passed down to the thousands of
officials and private individuals within ASEAN countries. Furthermore,
belief in not only individual Member States but ASEAN’s capabilities as a
whole must be present. Each country’s strength should be leveraged, so as
to add value to various processes already in place. The lack of sufficient
institutionalisation needs to be dealt with sooner than later. For a start,
resources were extended to the ASEAN Secretariat for strengthening and
supporting the regional agenda, particularly after the signing and adoption
of the ASEAN Charter.
Conclusion
Even if not everything the ASEAN leaders aim to achieve in the AEC is
accomplished by 2015, the establishment of the AEC Blueprint, the
timeline and now the AEC Scorecard will transform ASEAN. It is
important to remember that the AEC is not an EU-type economic
integration in Southeast Asia. The AEC constitutes the most ambitious
programme of economic co-operation in the developing world, and
implementing this agenda will be technically and politically difficult.
For the ASEAN leaders, the AEC is the strategic imperative. They have
anticipated the trends and embarked on a long-term strategy to keep
ASEAN open and make it a single market. It is a response to globalisation
and the rise of the giant economies of China and India. The challenge is to
ensure ASEAN survives as a viable regional organisation which matters to
the Member States and their friends. The alternative is ASEAN becoming
adrift and fading into irrelevance and eventual oblivion. The AEC will
always be influenced by external developments, particularly the state of the
global economy. However, the AEC must also reflect the diversity, raison
d’état and will of the ASEAN nations. It should be uniquely Southeast
Asian and not simply a replication of another model from elsewhere in the
world.
The evidence suggests that the AEC implementation is intensifying. First,
the commitment to overcome the obstacles has been demonstrated albeit in
spasmodic fashion. Second, the standardisation and harmonisation of
practices and rules are ongoing and the increasing volume of such ASEAN-
centric practices and rules bears testimony to the currency of the AEC
initiative. Third, the ASEAN Charter lays down the rule of law in ASEAN
and there is more accountability and predictability even as the provisions
for dispute settlement mechanisms and protection of intellectual property
rights are being developed. Most encouraging is the fact that several
ASEAN and non-ASEAN multinational companies are already operating
production networks based on the envisaged ASEAN singlemarket model.
The prognosis is that the AEC is happening. There is a constant pressure
to give up the ASEAN agenda as political considerations surface from time
to time. Nevertheless, with a skilful balance of interests, its demonstrated
visionary leadership and its proven track record of tackling common
challenges in a collective manner, ASEAN can deliver the AEC. The
grumbling and fumbling witnessed so far should not be mistaken as buyer’s
remorse and a clawback of ASEAN economic integration.
 CHAPTER 15

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES:

INCREASING ASEAN RELEVANCE IN
THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL
TRADE
David Martin

Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

will be 43 this year. On some levels it is a mature organisation: it has a full
complement of Member States, a commendable track record of managing
inter-state relations, and a new lease of life (and responsibilities!) to look
forward to by virtue of the ASEAN Charter and the Roadmap for an
ASEAN Community adopted by the region’s leaders at successive summit
meetings since 2003.
Yet, for all its achievements, ASEAN has yet to enter the hearts and
minds of its people, something this chapter seeks, in some way, to change.
This assertion is especially true in the economic sphere. Ask any
manufacturer, businessman or trader in Europe — the “gold standard” of
regional integration (despite some well-documented failings) worldwide —
about the economic relevance of the European Union, and while they may
not have heard of the Single European Act, the Cecchini Report or the Low
Voltage Directive, per se, they will undoubtedly be familiar with — and
appreciate — many aspects of the internal market. The reason for this is
simple: since the early 1950s the European Union has pursued a meaningful
project of rules-based economic integration, starting with an economic
community, then a customs union, and more recently a single market,
backed by hard laws. These laws take the form of regulations and directives
drafted by the European Commission and voted on by the European
Council and Parliament, plus decisions from the European Court of Justice,
so that many of the regulations businesses are required to meet (for the
purposes of trade facilitation, consumer protection or fair competition) are
“European” in origin and harmonised (or mutually recognised) to create the
competitive environment and economies of scale that allow domestic
businesses to thrive.
Of course, ASEAN, in economic terms, is a much younger entity.
Economic liberalisation (mainly the reduction or removal of tariffs under
AFTA) began in earnest only in 1992. Yet much is expected of ASEAN,
both internally — through the creation by 2015 of an ASEAN Economic
Community (an ambitious project launched by the leaders at their Ninth
ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003) — and externally — as the cornerstone of
a broader framework of intra-Asian trade relations, based on the negotiation
of free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea
and New Zealand, which are expected to coalesce into an ASEAN Plus Six
FTA, or similar arrangement, over time.
So when, on the face of it, ASEAN is a relevant organisation, why is its
profile among traders and business people, not to mention consumers or the
“man in the street”, so much lower than that of the European Union?
Part of the reason is a lack of outreach. The European Commission and
other EU institutions have impressive budgets to publicise their work
among the people of Europe, whereas this is something ASEAN has only
started to work on more recently (in the form of a Communications Plan for
the ASEAN Economic Community).
But there are other reasons too. ASEAN, at least in the economic sphere,
needs to shake off its diplomatic origins, and commit itself to a clear, rules-
based system of integration that is sufficiently well articulated,
institutionalised, resourced and enforced for business to “buy into” it and
the AEC to take hold. Let’s look at some of these issues in the context of
the free flow of goods.
Above all else, manufacturers, traders and business people crave
predictability. Most ASEAN agreements, though well-intentioned, lack the
level of detail required to inform business of the regulations, procedures or
levels of service provision ASEAN Member State regulators have
committed to, and where exactly they stand. The AEC Blueprint, for
example, frequently fails to spell out what specific measures are required,
only that countries will (to quote two examples) “modernise customs
techniques” or “harmonise standards”. In some cases, details are lacking
because the relevant ASEAN bodies and working groups have yet to agree
on a course of regional action. In others, more detail may be available, but
has yet to be placed in the public domain.
Where measures are specified, for example the implementation of a
regional transit system under the 1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on
the Facilitation of Goods in Transit, they may not be followed up on
(several of the Protocols under the 1998 Agreement have yet to be drafted
or ratified) and institutional frameworks are still lacking (the Transit
Transport Coordinating Board held its first — highly productive! —
meeting only in November 2009). And yet the prospective benefits of the
agreement are clear (Box 1).

Box 1. Benefits of Transit Transport in Cross-border

Regional Trade
Traditionally, as goods move within a national territory under customs
control, and internationally across borders, controls take place at each
office of departure, exit, entry and arrival. Security for duties, taxes
and charges is required within each national territory on each
movement. This is both expensive and cumbersome, and a major
impediment to the development of trade. In the EU, the benefits of the
free flow of goods under the original Customs Union were clear from
an early stage: by 1970, member states were trading six times as much
between themselves than 12 years earlier. They were also trading three
times as much with the rest of the world. In ASEAN, too, the
administrative burden, costs and delays attendant in the repeated
export and import of goods (and changes of truck, trailer and driver) at
each national border (on a route, say, from Vientiane in Lao PDR to
Port Kelang in Malaysia for export to the EU) undermine economic
 competitiveness and serve as a brake on inward investment to the
region. A regional transit system would solve many of these problems.

Where agreements are completed, examples being the AFTA Agreement

(now incorporated into a broader ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement or
ATIGA, which entered into force after ratification by all ten Member States
in May 2010), or the ASEAN Harmonised Cosmetic Regulatory Scheme,
the challenge is to enforce them: almost 20 years after the original AFTA
Agreement, tariffs are lower, but little on the non-tariff side has been done.
One reason for this is a lack of institutional capacity (at Member State
level and centrally at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta) dedicated to the
implementation and enforcement of ASEAN commitments and actions. For
most of the last seven years, since the signature of the Bali Concord II in
2003, the ASEAN Secretariat has had just one openly recruited desk officer
tasked with managing the integration of ASEAN customs. Likewise, the
Secretariat has had only one officer for the entire field of standards and
conformance, responsible for co-ordinating the harmonisation of technical
regulations, the establishment of regional disciplines for testing,
certification, accreditation and inspection, mutual recognition of these
conformity assessment systems, plus post-market surveillance and
notification systems across a range of sectors that includes agro-based
products (fish and food safety), automotive products, cosmetics, electrical
and electronic products, medical devices and pharmaceuticals!
Nor can the working groups themselves, which typically meet once or
twice a year, be expected to effectively support and administer the
integration process unless they are made directly responsible by their
governments for delivering integration, in terms of developing and
implementing a regional agenda. An example here would be the priority
integration sectors, delivery of which relies on a system of country co-
ordinators. Yet few countries play an active role and the tasks expected of
them are not clear.
For the AEC to succeed, the core staff of the ASEAN Secretariat needs to
at least double in size, and fresh working practices be adopted (including
improvements in the preparation, management and reporting of meetings,
and increased use of the 2+X or 10–X principles as required). To date, the
2+X principle has yet to be used, although this may change in 2010 with
signature of a Memorandum of Understanding by three or four Member
States for the implementation of a pilot scheme for the self-certification (by
traders) of AFTA rules of origin.
At the same time, Member States’ officials tasked with co-ordinating
given aspects of the integration agenda, including the development and
monitoring of sectoral work plans, need to redouble their efforts to progress
the AEC, supported externally by ASEAN’s main dialogue partners as
required.
This touches on a second reason — a lack of monitoring and
enforcement. Falling somewhere between the Secretariat and the Member
States, work planning, follow-up and reporting are necessarily weak. This is
reflected in the AEC Blueprint and its accompanying Scorecard, which the
November 2009 Economic Council Meeting recognised as lacking
“specific, measurable and verifiable indicators”, needing to be far more
outcome-based (as opposed to process-based), with “more participation
from the private sector, academia and NGOs”.
The 2008–2009 “public” version of the Scorecard, released in March
2010, has similar problems: it states, for example, that 73.6% of targets
have been achieved, but fails to say what they are and how the measures
undertaken sit in the broader spectrum of the 2015 deliverables. The AEC
Scorecard must therefore be revamped and made public, detailed to a
uniform standard (based on an enhanced version of the AEC Blueprint) and
contain only “concrete” measures that can be directly implemented. This
will have the merit of improving the Blueprint’s content and coverage by
allowing business and other stakeholders to see the specific measures and
time frames for implementation that are planned, encourage stakeholders to
comment on the integration agenda, and prepare for the new economic
environment come 2015. Feedback from stakeholders should also bring
improvements to the Scorecard, encouraging Member States to
operationalise ASEAN agreements and other regional commitments at
home. As part of this process, thought should be given to condensing the
Blueprint, reducing it to more manageable proportions that can be more
easily monitored, given the finite resources at hand.
To take an example, in the area of customs, the AEC Blueprint refers to
the 15 Strategic Plans for Customs Development (SPCDs) running from
2005 to 2010. Reliant, like the priority integration sectors, on a system of
country co-ordinators, few plans have been implemented and there is no
active monitoring system. It is better, therefore, to focus on a smaller
number of practical “projects” with clear regional added value: an
operational Customs Transit System, self-certification for rules of origin, or
the implementation of the ASEAN Cargo Processing Model, through which
the underlying disciplines of a common tariff nomenclature and declaration
document, risk management, mutual assistance, post-clearance audit and
automation (e-Customs) could be naturally applied.
At the same time, as previously stated, ASEAN needs to define the
objectives of the blueprints, roadmaps, work plans and agreements
themselves. Agreements such as the 1997 ASEAN Agreement on Customs
or the 1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition
Arrangements are notoriously weak, and are only partially addressed by the
ATIGA, which calls, for example, for the “encouragement”, “promotion”
and “facilitation” of “mutual recognition” but without providing a clear
definition of the provisions required.
Urgent work is also needed on notification: many ASEAN agreements
require Member States to deposit copies of their national laws and
regulations with the ASEAN Secretariat, but this is not monitored, and
often not done. One way to address this would be to revise the ASEAN
Protocol on Notification, preferably making use of the ASEAN Trade
Repository (ATR) under the umbrella of the ATIGA. In the interests of
transparency and predictability, there is a case for making information in the
ATR publicly available and legally binding. A good place to start could be
the establishment of a regional tariff database, centred on the ASEAN
Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature (AHTN), that allowed traders to know
what duties and taxes apply, the rates of preference between most favoured
nation (MFN) and AFTA rates, and the related rules of origin. Information
on non-tariff measures could be added at a later stage.
Last but not least, ASEAN Member States must embrace the ASEAN
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The Enhanced DSM,
developed since 2003 as a vehicle for managing economic and trade
disputes and helping to enforce AEC commitments, includes an array of
useful tools, from informal advisory mechanisms (via the ACT or ASEAN
Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues website, the ASEAN
Secretariat’s Legal Services and Agreements Division, or the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting, among others), consultative mechanisms
(including the good offices of the ASEAN Secretary-General), and
adjudicatory mechanisms (through formal panel and appellate proceedings)
based on those of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Much of the case law of the European Union (that is, interpretations of
the European Treaties and Community Regulations and Directives — often
referred to as the acquis) derives from deliberations of the European Court
of Justice. A mature organisation such as ASEAN — and the rules-based
system of economic integration envisioned under the AEC — requires such
mechanisms. Their use will serve to augment the Association’s legitimacy
as a vehicle for bringing predictable, pro-trade regulation and prosperity to
the people of the region.
To sum up, with five years to go until 2015, ASEAN has taken some big
strides forward, but much more needs to be done. Europe itself went
through just such a process in the 1980s, under successive Commissions
headed by Jacques Delors. To quote President Delors’ preface to Paolo
Cecchini’s book 1992, The European Challenge: The Benefits of a Single
Market, a summary of the so-called Cecchini Report on the costs of non-
Europe, “this large market we are creating is of direct concern to every
citizen … it is revolutionary, but it will be achieved both because it is
absolutely necessary and because it carries with it the goal of a united and
strong Europe”. A similar imperative exists in ASEAN, as the Member
States work together towards achieving regional integration to benefit the
well-being of their people, the competitiveness of their businesses, and the
prosperity and stability of Southeast Asia, as a whole.
 CHAPTER 16

TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

WITHIN ASEAN
David Chin Soon Siong

Trade Disputes within ASEAN

The ASEAN Member States trade significantly among themselves and it is
only natural that trade disputes do occur periodically. The bases of
ASEAN’s trade are their agreements for the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) in goods, services and investments. ASEAN also has an Agreement
on Dispute Settlement. To understand ASEAN’s approach to the settlement
of their trade disputes, one needs to know the negotiating history of how
ASEAN’s trade agreements evolved. For this chapter, we will concentrate
on disputes involving the oldest of ASEAN’s trade agreements, its
Agreement on Trade in Goods.
The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme is the main
mechanism through which tariffs are reduced in ASEAN. The Agreement
on the CEPT for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA-CEPT) was signed in
1992 and came into effect in 1993. ASEAN adopted a process that
accommodated the differing stages of development among the original six
ASEAN countries and subsequently evolved an even more accommodating
formula for the four newer ASEAN countries.
ASEAN’s process of negotiated accommodation

In the 1992 AFTA-CEPT Agreement, the original six ASEAN Member

States committed to reducing tariffs to 0–5% over 15 years. ASEAN
Member States were free to decide on the rate and extent of their tariff
reductions as long as the target for all tariffs at 0–5% is achieved at the end
of the 15 years, i.e. the year 2008. They then voluntarily decided on their
own liberalisation programme.

Rate of liberation of goods tariffs

Initially the rate of tariff reductions was minimal and there were concerns
that too many tariff lines would be left to be concluded in the later stages,
and that reductions in effective percentages in the initial years would be too
slow. Concerns about the risk of a large “cliff jump” in tariff reductions
towards the end of the process — causing unacceptable economic effects —
were very real. Attempts were then made to accelerate liberalisation during
the earlier years in order to pre-empt that situation. This was to prevent the
process from becoming far too difficult in the later years for the ASEAN
Member States to accomplish.

Negotiated targets for liberalisation

The Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) then agreed on setting

targets for the ASEAN Member States to comply with, while maintaining
the flexibility that countries could select tariff lines for liberalisation to suit
their own development needs. The initial target was that by a certain
number of years, Member States would need to have made a reduction in an
agreed percentage of tariff lines. The formula was then improved to require
that the percentage of tariff lines committed for reduction would need to
account for an agreed percentage of the individual ASEAN Member State’s
intra-ASEAN trade. This then meant that reductions were to be made only
to those items actually traded within ASEAN. These agreed percentages
were periodically and gradually increased.

Acceleration of overall target

In tandem with the gradual increases in the percentage of lines for tariff
reduction, ASEAN ministers and heads of government also agreed on
accelerating the overall time frame. In 1994, the original time frame of 15
years (2008) was reduced to 10 years (2003). In 1998, this time frame was
further reduced to nine years (2002), which meant the original six ASEAN
Member States were committed to reducing all their tariffs to 0–5% by
2002. The next most profound development in ASEAN’s tariff liberalisation
efforts was the November 1999 decision by ASEAN’s heads of government
that all import tariffs on all products under the AFTA-CEPT scheme would
be eliminated (0% or no tariffs) for the original six ASEAN Member States
by 2010 and for the remaining four newer Members (Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar and Vietnam) by 2015.

Safety valves to underpin accelerated liberalisations

Realism also had a role to play. In order to obtain agreement for accelerated
liberalisation, the negotiators had to cater to sensitivities that may be
peculiar to the different countries. Failure or unwillingness to address this
would have resulted in no agreement for acceleration, especially if countries
felt that such sensitivities were not catered to. To build in these safety
valves, ASEAN agreed that tariff lines that are progressively reduced would
be deemed to form an Inclusion List (IL). The AFTA-CEPT mechanism
then classified the non-included tariff lines of products into four other
categories; namely the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL), the Sensitive List
(SL), and the Highly Sensitive List (HSL) as well as a General Exception
List (GE). Items in these four lists were taken out of the percentages
committed for liberalisation.

1. Temporary Exclusion List: Items in the TEL refer to products receiving

protection from a delay in tariff reductions. These products could be
held at tariffs higher than 20% until 1 January 2000, at which time they
would all have to be brought into the Inclusion List (IL). Entry into the
Inclusion List must be at the tariff rate of 20% or lower for the six
original ASEAN Member States.
2. Sensitive List: Products for the SL that comprise unprocessed
agricultural produce were given a longer time frame for liberalisation.
 These products have until 2010 to meet the reduction of tariffs to within
the 0–5% range.
3. Highly Sensitive List: The HSL consists of highly sensitive unprocessed
agricultural products, namely sugar and rice, which were given a longer
time frame before being phased into the AFTA-CEPT. These products
have up to 2010 to reach a reduction of tariffs to no more than a 20%
tariff rate.
4. General Exception List: Items in the GE List refer to products which a
country deems necessary for the protection of national security, public
morals, protection of human, animal and plant life and health, and the
protection of artistic, historic or archaeological value. These products
designated as GE are permanently excluded from the AFTA-CEPT
scheme. Initially countries are free to put a limited number of products
into this list to cover special sensitivities. Notwithstanding this liberal
allowance, ASEAN Member States have now agreed to review their
respective GE lists with a view to phasing them into the AFTA-CEPT
scheme. What this means is that only those items consistent with the
World Trade Organization (WTO) General Exceptions rules can in
future remain in the GE list.

Encouraging the liberalisation process through an interim reciprocity

rule

To encourage faster liberalisation and phasing into the Inclusion List,

ASEAN negotiators agreed that an item is only deemed to be in the IL
when its tariff has been reduced to 20%, and that an ASEAN Member State
can only enjoy the tariff reductions of other countries’ included items if its
own tariff is also in the Inclusion List. This effectively means that if an
ASEAN Member State wants to enjoy the 20% or less for item A of another
Member State, it must reduce its own tariff for item A to at least 20%. This
is a departure from the WTO’s most favoured nation (MFN) principle, but
as it is only for the interim process of liberalisation, it serves as a
motivating factor and an accelerator. This was accepted by all ASEAN
countries and is the main reason for ASEAN speeding up its process of
liberalisation by encouraging the entry of the TEL into the IL list and by
driving tariffs down to 20%. Once the process is completed, full MFN
principle will be automatically reinstated.

Setting interim targets for tariff lines in the Inclusion List to reach 0–5%
tariff and later to reach zero tariff

The ASEAN economic ministers then agreed that once a product’s line has
been put into the Inclusion List at 20% tariff or below 20% tariff, the tariff
will be further reduced to a tariff rate that is in the 0–5% tariff rate within
two years of its entry into the Inclusion List. This then resulted in all TEL
having to return to the IL by 2000 in order to meet the commitment that the
six ASEAN Member States reduce all their tariffs to 0–5% by 2002.
Interim targets were then set to ensure an orderly phase in the target
elimination of tariffs by 2010 for the original six ASEAN Member States
and by 2015 for the four newer Members. While the six ASEAN Member
States already have most of their tariff commitments at the 0–5% rate, an
additional set of targets was agreed for the four newer Members to arrive at
the 0–5% tariff rate level.
Flexibility was accorded to the four newer Members to have three more
years from 2015 to 2018 for keeping some of their tariffs at the 0–5% tariff
rate instead of reducing all the Inclusion List tariffs to zero by 2015.
Through this method of gradually accommodating the interests of
ASEAN Member States, coupled with the use of fixed negotiated targets,
all ten ASEAN Members were able to target almost all the tariffs in the
Inclusion List for a reduction down to zero for the six original ASEAN
Member States by 2010 and by 2015 for the four newer Members. Given
the large difference in the development levels in ASEAN, this was a unique
approach towards liberalisation of the trade in goods.

Adherence to WTO principles

While the process adopted by ASEAN was unique and a departure from the
Request and Offer or Formula approaches adopted by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO in their many
negotiation rounds, all other GATT and WTO principles were faithfully
observed by ASEAN. The biggest variation ASEAN adopted was the
Reciprocity Rule which differs from the full MFN principle of the WTO.
This interim non-compliance with the MFN principle was deemed a
necessity to encourage voluntary phasing in and was seen as a more
acceptable approach to the ten ASEAN Member States than the
GATT/WTO’s Request and Offer or Formula approaches. ASEAN also
followed the GATT/WTO targets of completing their FTA in goods within
ten years and ensuring that its AFTA-CEPT covers in excess of 90% of all
its tariff lines, even though the AFTA-CEPT was notified to the
GATT/WTO under the Enabling Clause. ASEAN also continues to work
progressively on the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).

The Negotiating Hierarchy in ASEAN and Settlement of

Disputes Emanating from AFTA-CEPT
Through the 18 years of negotiating the AFTA-CEPT from its initial
signing in 1992 to the completion in 2010 for the original six ASEAN
Member States (five more years till 2015 for the four newer ASEAN
Member States), the process was negotiated first by the Committee on
Trade and Tourism (COTT) and then later by the Coordinating Committee
for the CEPT-AFTA (CCCA). This co-ordinating committee consists of
officials responsible for tariffs and border controls from all ten ASEAN
Member States. Hence trade policy officials, customs officials and border
control officials are represented in this co-ordinating committee.
This committee reports to the Senior Economic Officials Meetings
(SEOM) which is the most senior body at officials’ level. Usually the
ASEAN Member States’ Director-General of Trade is their SEOM Leader.
The SEOM reports to a ministerial body called the AFTA Council. The
leader for each ASEAN Member State at the AFTA Council is usually their
Minister of Trade or their Minister for Finance.
The AFTA Council in turn reports to the ASEAN Economic Ministers
Meeting (AEM). The AEM’s leader for each ASEAN Member State is
usually the Co-ordinating Minister for their Economy or their Minister of
Trade and Industry or their Minister of Commerce.

How are issues and changes handled?

When an ASEAN Member State wishes to raise any new development, new
clarification or new modification or even disputes on any matters in the
CEPT-AFTA, it has to raise it to the CCCA. This Coordinating Committee
for the CEPT-AFTA then discusses and debates the points raised to try to
reach a consensus on how to approach the new development or on what
changes need to be made. Issues raised to the CCCA tend to be those issues
that affect more than one pair of ASEAN Member States or the resolution
of which will affect all the other ASEAN Member States. Normal simple
bilateral issues of interpretation between two ASEAN Member States,
where the resolution will not affect other ASEAN Member States, are
usually settled bilaterally without going to the CCCA.
When an issue is deemed to be of concern to all ASEAN Member States
or when its resolution affects all ASEAN Member States due to the MFN
rule, CCCA consensus is required. Once consensus is reached, it is then
reported to the SEOM for the SEOM’s endorsement.
ASEAN has a tradition that when full consensus is reached by a lower
body, the higher body does not normally re-open the issue. Issues can only
be re-opened by the higher body if a major new development has
materialised since the lower body’s consensus, and the country attempting
to re-open the consensus issue has to justify doing so to the higher body.
If the SEOM endorses the changes or new approaches or new procedures,
it next goes to the AFTA Council for its endorsement before the AEM, then
finally approves the changes and new Rules and Procedures are then written
into the Records or Amendments to the relevant parts of the Agreements are
made.

What happens when the CCCA cannot reach consensus?

If the CCCA cannot reach consensus, then the issue involved is fully
discussed and debated in the SEOM. The SEOM can then go into all
aspects of the arguments, call up the old negotiating history and examine
the Guidelines and Interpretative Notes of the CEPT-AFTA concerning this
issue to try to resolve this. As the SEOM is the highest officials’ body of
ASEAN for economic matters, the SEOM is expected to thoroughly study
all the details to resolve this and to reach a compromise consensus.
The SEOM meets four times a year normally, although more meetings
can be convened if needed to resolve thorny issues. The SEOM looks at
issues not only from the technical perspective that the CCCA is expected to
do, but also from a political aspect since the next step would be to take the
issue to the ministers.
As the SEOM annually meets with the AEM after having met twice in
the early part of the year, at the mid-year AEM Retreat, some difficult
unresolved SEOM issues can be raised to the AEM for political guidance.
Once this guidance is given, it is up to the SEOM at its next two meetings
to tie up the resolution and to oversee the drafting of the changes or
amendments for the AFTA Council to endorse for enactment.

What happens if the SEOM cannot reach consensus?

If the SEOM still fails to reach consensus (in spite of having sought
political guidance from the AEM) the issue is then raised to the AFTA
Ministerial Council. This Ministerial Council for some countries can be
represented by their Minister or Deputy Minister of Finance as revenue
implications can come from tariff issues. The AFTA Council then tries to
resolve this, where the ministers in the AFTA Council discuss and debate
the issue. The AFTA Council then strikes the necessary compromises to
reach consensus, if they can.
If after their negotiation a consensus still evades them, the AFTA Council
will normally give some more guidance or ask their officials to thoroughly
re-examine the issues again in the next ASEAN year before it comes back
to the following year’s AFTA Council Meeting. Usually the AFTA Council
will not pass on the dispute to the AEM to resolve, since it amounts to
getting the minister responsible for the economy to over-rule the trade
minister or his finance minister.
The AFTA Council meets a day before the ASEAN Economic Ministers
(AEM) meeting at the end of the year and hence any issues not resolved by
the AFTA Council are immediately known by the AEM the next day. The
economic ministers can on their own give further guidance to the SEOM
but they will usually not attempt to do what the AFTA Council have not
been able to resolve. Also in most years at least five of the AFTA council
ministers are actually the AEM ministers; hence it is unlikely for the AEM
to be able to immediately do what the AFTA Council was unable to do, the
day before.
 The SEOM then starts work again on the unresolved issue the following
year. Normally by then, it becomes so traumatic that countries would have
made a political change of mind and the SEOM would then be given new
instructions or leeway and would be able to reach a compromise and hence
resolve the issue at the following year’s AFTA Council.

What happens to issues that do not need such major rule changes

If an issue is considered one that can be resolved with a compromise at

officials’ level, meaning officials deciding to interpret the AFTA-CEPT
rules or guidelines to resolve the problem, this is to be done bilaterally at
the lowest possible level of officialdom. An example is if the customs
official of an ASEAN Member State does not accord preferential tariff
treatment to another; the CCCA leader of the affected country will then
telephone his counterpart CCCA leader of the other country to try to resolve
this at their level.
If they are unable to do so, then this is brought up to the SEOM leaders
of the two affected countries, who will then discuss the issue over the
telephone. As Singapore’s SEOM leader for seven years before my
retirement, I have on five instances called up my SEOM counterpart to
resolve these problems at my level. There was even one instance where
another SEOM leader rang me to express unhappiness at an intended
Singapore action, that I was able to amend in time to resolve the issue.
These six instances of “ASEAN trade disputes” were therefore resolved this
way amicably at SEOM level by Singapore and the affected ASEAN
Member States.
SEOM leaders meet four times a year at their SEOM meetings, and
another three times a year at the AEM Retreat, AEM meeting and the
ASEAN Summit. In addition they meet at the ASEAN Plus Dialogue
Partners FTA negotiations as well as at other ad hoc meetings over the year.
It is normal for the SEOM leaders to meet about 10 to 15 times a year either
all together at SEOM meetings or bilaterally or plurilaterally.
The SEOM leaders are therefore all very close to each other. Usually the
SEOM leader would have “grown up” in the system. They would often
have started as trade officials at the CCCA level or as officials preparing
and supporting their SEOM leaders at the various ASEAN meetings before
becoming SEOM leaders themselves. Hence the ASEAN SEOM leaders
grouping is a very effective and tightly knit unit and most SEOM leaders
treat each other as brothers and sisters in this trade regime.
Today, three years after my retirement as an SEOM leader, my mobile
phone address book still contains the mobile phone numbers of all the
SEOM leaders whom I served with until the end of 2006. We still call each
other and meet each other when we visit each other’s country.
Against this background, ASEAN’s trade disputes are often resolved
quietly, and out of the limelight, by officials working in a co-operative
manner. One needs to realise that the process of all these trade concessions
and trade preferences were negotiated in a most accommodating and
friendly way over the last 18 years by the same officials who are now
deciding on these issues. To a certain extent, this is the ASEAN way of
working that those outside the system may not understand. Hence,
sometimes they think that since they do not read about disputes in the
newspapers, not only are there no disputes, but that these very ASEAN
agreements are not working at all. Nothing is further from the truth.
When trade disputes crop up among ASEAN Member States, these are
resolved in the same accommodating and co-operative manner that we
initially drafted and agreed upon our concessions and commitments. There
are, however, two cases where ASEAN tried to evolve two separate systems
for resolving disputes over and above the earlier mentioned formal step-by-
step negotiated change and the informal SEOM solution approach. These
two systems are described in the next two sections.

The ASEAN dispute settlement agreement

ASEAN was well aware that there would be instances of trade dispute
between ASEAN Member States too difficult for the SEOM informal
approach to resolve or where the formal step-by-step negotiated change of
agreement approach is not needed. ASEAN then drafted and signed the
ASEAN Dispute Settlement Agreement in 1996. It is an agreement closely
modelled along the lines of the WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement.
Built into the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Agreement are all the
WTO/GATT processes of a time cap for the different stages of consultation
as well as the automaticity concept of acceptance and adoption of the
ASEAN DSM Panel’s decision and compensatory adjustments as recourse
for wrongful action or for violation of obligations.
 Since this Dispute Settlement Agreement was signed, and up to my
retirement in December 2006, no ASEAN Member State has invoked this
agreement for dispute resolution. A possible reason for this is that ASEAN
officials feel there is no need to resort to the use of this very formal
approach, since their disputes are suitably resolved via the SEOM informal
approach or where necessary through the step-by-step CCCA/SEOM/AFTA
Council approach.
I personally feel that another unspoken reason is that the SEOM only
trusts its own approach and does not trust the WTO/GATT legalistic
approach where the final decision rests with the appointed panel of Experts
as well as the Appeals Panel embodied in the ASEAN Dispute Settlement
Agreement. The SEOM leaders I know have among ourselves always said
that as the evolution of our trade agreements, like the CEPT-AFTA and
others, has taken place in a special accommodating and co-operative
manner, dispute resolution should also be conducted in the same manner by
people who fully understand the history and development of our special
approach and not by any outside legalistic people who are not appreciative
of our own ASEAN’s journey into free trade.
The list of the nominated panelists and composition of the Appeals Panel
will show that they are mainly WTO-trained personnel or legal academics.
Hardly any SEOM leaders or past SEOM leaders have been nominated to
these panels. I personally am of the view that the SEOM does not trust the
resolution of its disputes to these people who may not understand the
ASEAN journey towards free trade.

The protocol for the implementation of the CEPT Scheme Temporary

Exclusion List

Central to the process of the CEPT-AFTA trade liberalisation is the return

of the products in the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) to the Inclusion List
(IL) by 2000 to begin their tariff reduction from 20% till the elimination of
tariff in 2010.
In 1999 it became apparent that some ASEAN Member States would not
be able to fully meet this commitment and would have to seek the other
countries’ agreement to allow deferment in the return of some of their TEL
products back into the IL. These countries have indicated that they should
be given some leeway to do this in a manner similar to WTO/GATT Article
28, which allows a country to not meet its obligation in return for
compensatory adjustments. The protocol to allow for this was negotiated
and agreed upon through the CCCA/SEOM/AFTA Council approach and
signed into agreement by the AEM on 23 November 2000. The steps and
procedures of this protocol reflect those found in GATT/WTO Article 28.
This protocol aimed to arrive at a dispute settlement approach specific to
these TEL products and to ensure the resolution of these disputes in a
timely and agreed manner.
Two cases were cited for the possible use of this protocol in 2001. The
first case was when Malaysia indicated that it would not be able to phase in
some of its automotive products from their TEL into the IL. The second
case was when the Philippines indicated that it would not be able to phase
in some of its petrochemical products from the TEL into the IL.
In the first case involving Malaysia’s automobile products, Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines were interested parties. In accordance with
the protocol, the state having principal or substantial supplying interest in
the particular product was to commence consultations. Thailand deemed
itself to have such principal or substantial supplying interest and asked for
consultations with Malaysia. Indonesia and the Philippines having interest
too awaited the resolution of the Malaysian and Thai negotiation on
compensatory adjustments, to be extended to them on an MFN basis.
Malaysia and Thailand were not able to agree on the principal or
substantial supplying interest qualification and the consultation dragged on
without the protocol being used. Eventually, Malaysia and Thailand reached
a mutual agreement to resolve this without the use of the protocol and
similarly other forms of mutual agreement were reached between Malaysia
and Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines that resolved this “dispute”
in a manner that allowed Malaysia to delay bringing these automotive
products from its TEL into the IL.
In the second case, the Philippines accepted that Singapore had principal
supplying interest and agreed to have consultations with Singapore and to
resolve this using the TEL Protocol. After three rounds of consultation, the
Philippines and Singapore reached agreements on the compensatory
adjustments and the amicable and mutually satisfactory resolution was
enacted after the CCCA/SEOM/AFTA Council endorsed the settlement.
This is the only instance of the use of a WTO/GATT style of dispute
settlement in ASEAN up to end 2006. It is worthwhile to mention that in
this case both the Chief Negotiators were the two countries’ current SEOM
leaders, whose excellent and friendly relationship ensured that while full
GATT/WTO procedures were used, it was done in the friendly ASEAN
manner.
The author takes the view that as the original SEOM leaders and
negotiators of the ASEAN CEPT-AFTA Agreement leave the scene, the
future will be one where the SEOM leaders and negotiators will not have
the relationship or historical bonding to continue the informal approach.
They may then increasingly need to avail themselves of the more formal
and legalistic approach embodied in the ASEAN Dispute Settlement
Agreement to resolve future trade disputes.
This analysis of ASEAN’s approach towards the settlement of its trade in
goods disputes is to address the often mistaken view taken by many outside
the ASEAN trade system that the ASEAN trade agreements are not
working. They are in fact working so well that disputes are not
sensationally and publicly reported.
 CHAPTER 17

FROM AFTA TO FREE MOVEMENT

WITHIN ASEAN: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?
Lok Hwee Chong

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) enjoyed its fastest

rate of economic growth of 7.9% during 1987–1997, a period sandwiched
between the end of Singapore’s first recession in 1986 and the first Asian
financial crisis in 1997.
During this golden period, the ASEAN Economic Ministers made the
most of favourable conditions in the region to forge the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA). Their ambitious aim was to create a free trade area whereby
goods could be freely traded between the six original ASEAN Member
States and in so doing, enhance intra-ASEAN trade and investment.
Official negotiations for the AFTA started in 1989, with the main focus
on reducing tariffs to no higher than 5% for goods traded between Member
States. Recognising the mammoth task ahead for their senior economic
officials, the economic ministers agreed to a non-threatening initial time
frame of 15 years for the completion of the AFTA, starting from 1 January
1993 and ending on 1 January 2008. The ASEAN senior economic officials
also devised numerous categories, such as Fast Track, Normal Track,
Temporary Exclusion List, Sensitive List, Highly Sensitive List and General
Exception List, to facilitate accelerated tariff reductions where possible and,
more importantly, to ring-fence sensitive products which require greater
tolerance and flexibilities in tariff liberalisation.
The Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for
the AFTA (CEPT-AFTA Agreement) was eventually signed by the
economic ministers on 28 January 1992, with implementation starting from
1 January 1993. At a later stage, protocols were bolted onto the Agreement
to provide safety valves for releasing tension over contentious products.
The ASEAN senior economic officials gained experience from the
operationalisation of the CEPT-AFTA Agreement and worked diligently to
make further progress in the 1990s. They not only managed to accelerate
the timetable for tariff liberalisation from 15 years to 10 years, i.e. bring
forward the end date of 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2003 for the six
original Member States to reduce their CEPT-AFTA tariffs to 0–5%, but
also sealed an agreement by the ASEAN leaders during the 4th ASEAN
Informal Summit in 1999 to eliminate all CEPT-AFTA tariffs by 1 January
2010.
During the first ten years of CEPT-AFTA implementation from 1993 to
2003, the ASEAN senior economic officials dealt with numerous teething
problems, many of which were handled behind the scenes. They had to
badger, plea and negotiate to ensure that the target to effect the AFTA by 1
January 2003 was achieved. In addition, the officials had to contend with
accession negotiations and acceptance of the AFTA by the Indochina
countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) between 1994 and
1998.
Following the initial euphoria over the establishment of the AFTA,
however, many ASEAN businesses and citizens are trying to understand
why goods still do not seem to trade freely within the region. To many
ASEAN businesses and citizens, their idea of an AFTA is that of free
movement of goods. From an implementation point of view, a big
difference could of course be made whether it is the free movement of all
goods regardless of origin (China, India, Europa or America) or just only
ASEAN-origin goods. The next logical step forward for the AFTA is
therefore to create an ASEAN Customs Union whereby there will be free
movement of all goods within the region, a concept known as free
circulation of goods within the European Customs Union.
A potent vision on what ASEAN could and should achieve was
expounded by then Singapore Minister of Trade and Industry H.E. George
Yeo when he shared, during the signing of the e-ASEAN Framework
Agreement in 2000, his aspiration that the cost of a phone call from one
ASEAN Member State to another ASEAN Member State would one day be
the same as calling each other domestically. It has been ten years since the
e-ASEAN Framework Agreement was signed and some countries, like
Singapore, are already able to make free IDD1 calls to several ASEAN
Member States, hence realising the vision that IDD calls within ASEAN are
no different from domestic calls.
In the early 2000s, fresh off the success of launching the ASEAN Free
Trade Area, the ASEAN senior economic officials focussed their attention
on concluding a series of FTAs with the ASEAN dialogue partners, namely
China in 2004, Korea in 2006, Japan in 2008, India in 2009 and
Australia/New Zealand in 2009. These negotiations, to a large extent,
distracted the ASEAN trade negotiators from studying and undertaking new
initiatives on internal integration.
The ASEAN leaders reached a fresh mandate on 20 November 2007 to
establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2015 and
transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services,
investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital. The AEC Blueprint
was adopted for this purpose; it focusses on four primary areas to facilitate
the free flow of goods, namely elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers;
improving rules of origin and trade facilitation; accelerating customs
integration; establishing the ASEAN Single Window; and addressing
standards and technical barriers to trade. Unfortunately, it still lacks what
the business community is looking forward to — the elimination of customs
restrictions for movement of all goods between Member States, i.e. free
circulation of goods.
The first major agreement delivered under the AEC Blueprint for the free
flow of goods was the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) signed
in 2009. The ATIGA essentially consolidates key existing ASEAN
economic agreements and protocols, including a chapter on customs. The
agreement, however, did not have any new commitments to the concept of
free circulation of goods.
The experience of implementing the AFTA has shown clearly that the
economic impact from the loss of customs revenues, duties and fees was
insignificant to national budgets, which had been cited as the main concern
of Member States during the initial AFTA negotiations back in the 1990s.
This is further compounded by the fact that customs tariffs have been
falling significantly for the ASEAN Member States since the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1996. Over the past decade,
ASEAN Member States have moved towards more consumption-based
taxes to generate revenues, instead of relying on customs duties, which are
increasingly costly to collect and detract from border security and
protection. In addition, a significant increase in intra-ASEAN regional trade
would create much more economic spin-offs than the loss of customs
revenue. The second concern that negotiators had to contend with was the
argument for protecting infant domestic industries. This concern, however,
has been fully addressed through the phased-in approach for industries
deemed to need a longer period before opening up for competition. Finally,
ASEAN Member States have raised some administrative concerns on the
appropriateness of liberalising border controls that might jeopardise the
integrity of national security and health controls.
The response to all these concerns is to ask ourselves honestly whether it
is our vision to see ASEAN economic integration as a process leading to a
situation where the glass is deemed to be half-full or half-empty. ASEAN
has made great strides in liberalising intra-regional trade, and if there is
political will to dedicate all our cross-border channels as an ASEAN
Customs Green Lane, and put all other trade in other lanes, we will send a
strong signal that ASEAN is moving towards a half-full glass, and perhaps
be in a position to consider a full glass in the form of a customs union.
The task is not as daunting as it appears on paper, even starting from our
current base of 25–30% regional trade flows, and hoping to achieve 30–
40% regional trade flows by 2015 when the AEC is realised.
The first obvious question is why intra-regional trade has been stagnating
at 25% of ASEAN’s external trade over the past decade. Quantitatively, we
do recognise that the absolute value of intra-regional trade has grown
significantly from US$70 billion to US$458 billion between 1995 and 2008.
This proves that ASEAN Member States do trade and can trade vast
quantities with each other.
Hence, the second question is: what are the bottlenecks that are
preventing intra-regional trade from expanding faster than extra-regional
trade? To a certain extent, the AEC Blueprint has taken a broad and
encompassing view towards regional integration but the issue of
intraregional trade infrastructure is still very much stagnated at where it was
in 2003. A case in point is the ASEAN Customs Green Lane and the
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit
(FAFGT). When the ideas were first mooted by the ASEAN Director-
Generals of Customs back in 1996, there were strong reservations by
bureaucrats that it would open up the borders too widely. Suggestions were
made to restrict the ASEAN Customs Green Lane to a single counter, and
limit the facilitation of trucks under the FAFGT to 60 trucks per border
crossing. For accumulation of ASEAN Rules of Origin, which was put forth
to the ASEAN Economic Ministers in 2000, the bureaucrats suggested a
minimum threshold of 20% local content before originating materials could
be accumulated. On the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme,
despite representations from the business community to widen it to
recognise services with value-added within ASEAN, on top of
manufacturing activities, the idea was never accepted.
To overcome the trade infrastructure restrictions that are impeding intra-
regional trade, it is not surprising that an idea of a customs union has been
raised on and off for the past few decades. By definition, a customs union is
defined as an international association organised to eliminate customs
restrictions on goods exchanged between Member States and to establish a
uniform tariff policy towards non-Member States. The main difficulty
appears to be the reluctance of Members to consider a uniform external
tariff policy.
In this context, the question that should be asked is whether ASEAN
could push ahead to eliminate customs restrictions on goods exchanged
between Member States without a common external tariff policy. The
answer is obviously yes if our aim is to increase intra-regional trade and
build a sustainable and scalable trade infrastructure which is able to cope
with a vision of an intra-regional trade volume of 30–40% of ASEAN’s
external trade by 2015.
During the AEC Blueprint consultations, it was made very clear to the
trade officials that many physical bottlenecks exist currently that disrupt the
realisation of full AFTA benefits. Intra-ASEAN logistics costs, e.g. from
Bangkok, Thailand, to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, are currently even more
expensive on a per kilometre cost than shipping from Shanghai, China, to
Hanoi, Vietnam. Eliminating customs restrictions on the movement of
goods between ASEAN Member States would go a long way in addressing
the physical bottlenecks and market distortions that currently exist.
 The fear that eliminating customs restrictions would lead to increased
smuggling, security threats, underdeclarations, etc., are likely to be
overexaggerated at this point in time. From real, practical implementation
experience, it has been shown that establishment of the AFTA has not
reduced or diminished the customs controls or risk management
methodologies that have been deployed, nor has there been any discernable
increase in smuggling or threats. With the advent of new information
technology solutions, ranging from the Global Positioning System (GPS)
and radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, the screening, monitoring
and approval of cross-border flow of goods can be implemented with
minimal border intervention and still achieve the targets of compliance and
security.
The establishment of an ASEAN Customs Green Lane may initially seem
to compound border bottlenecks, but the demonstrative effect of political
will to achieve this will far outweigh the initial teething problems. At all
major European air hubs, one will never fail to notice that immigration
lanes are divided between EU and non-EU citizens. And the lanes for EU
citizens are longer and more congested in most cases, sometimes stretching
two to three times longer than the non-EU queues. But the efficiency and
trust of EU citizens in these dual-lane system are clear to everyone.
The path towards a fully integrated AEC is not the work of one person or
one committee; it starts with a clear vision from our leaders that eventually
cascades down to hundreds of officials and thousands of private individuals.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers must work together with the ASEAN
Finance Ministers to find a balance between national fiscal and monetary
needs and the need to expand our intra-regional economic integration.
Similarly, the ASEAN Economic Ministers need to co-operate with the
ASEAN Transport Ministers to secure the liberalisation of new
intraregional trade routes vis-à-vis air, road and sea links. There are many
more examples of co-operation, such as synchronisation of trade and
investment policies, before we can fully realise the aspirations of our
ASEAN founding fathers and, more importantly, the aspirations of 500
million ASEAN citizens.
Fundamentally, we must believe not only in our individual ASEAN
Member States’ capabilities in manufacturing and services but in our
collective ASEAN capabilities to create an integrated production base,
leveraging the unique strengths of each Member to add value, be it in
design services, logistics or assembling operations. The ASEAN Vision
2020 has already been on the table for close to two decades; it is time the
ASEAN Economic Ministers gave a definite answer of whether free
circulation is the end goal under the vision of “free movement of goods and
services” within the region by 2015.
This is a tall order. When the AFTA was first negotiated, we had the
honour and fortuity to leverage some of the brightest statesmen and most
dedicated senior officials of that era. The task at that time was fraught with
hidden dangers but they persevered till the very end. The task ahead today
is fraught with obstacles and complications, which require both experience
and ingenuity from our ASEAN negotiators.
The assessment, however, is that the resources dedicated to this task are
woefully inadequate at the regional, national and state levels. For example,
there is an urgent need to beef up the ASEAN Secretariat, to which Member
States have been contributing only US$900,000 per annum each for the last
20 years. At the national level, negotiation teams are getting smaller instead
of larger to deal with the increasing number of issues. The eventual fear is
that negotiation fatigue will set in, leading to an exodus of experienced
officials and a further entrenchment of the current status quo.
To overcome the negotiating impasse, the ASEAN High Level Task
Force on Economic Integration should redouble its efforts to crystallise an
operational plan to achieve “free movement of goods and services” within
the region by 2015. A similar concept of free circulation needs to be clearly
expounded to ensure there is no ambiguity between public expectations and
official jargon. The ASEAN business community and 500 million citizens
have waited since 1992 when the first CEPT-AFTA Agreement was signed,
and it is only fair that they finally see the tangible benefits of economic
integration: a lowering of business costs, translating into more competitive
prices for consumer goods in all Member States. A price differential of over
100% for the same consumer product should be a thing of the past with
regional economic integration. This is important not only to maintain
ASEAN’s relevance but also for the long-term prosperity of the region.
We can only hope that the concept of free movement of goods will never
be a bridge too far for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

_____________________
1
Singapore’s mobile subscribers are able to get free IDD 019 services when dialling from Singapore
to more than a dozen other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand.
 CHAPTER 18

ASEAN INTEGRATION ENTERS THE

CRITICAL STAGE: A PRIVATE
SECTOR’S NARRATIVE
Tai Hui

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) integration process

is entering a critical stage, and the credibility of this process is at stake.
Successful integration is crucial if the region is to stay relevant in the
changing global environment. In a new world order where global economic
power is shifting from the West to the East, pressure for the ten ASEAN
Member States to work together will intensify. The emerging world, led by
the likes of China, India and Brazil, will contribute more to global
economic growth in the coming years than it ever has before.
ASEAN’s economic development and prosperity will hinge on its ability
to ride this change. The bottom line is that ASEAN as a single unit has a
much better chance of achieving prosperity and improving the standard of
living of its people than as ten separate states. The world’s changing
economic dynamics may also force the region to integrate more quickly
than expected, and not necessarily on its own terms. This implies that
ASEAN must move ahead on its Roadmap for an ASEAN Community
steadily and consistently, as planned.
 ASEAN has an appealing economic story to tell. It has a combined
population almost twice the size of the United States and a total gross
domestic product (GDP) equivalent to India, Brazil or Russia. Its
purchasing power is expected to double in the next 10 to 15 years, and it is
a crucial commodity producer meeting ever-growing demand for raw
materials around the world. Nonetheless, it is no secret that the ASEAN
story does not excite the local or global business community. Some local
players feel threatened by the potential competition from other ASEAN
Member States.
For multinational corporations, the hoped-for benefits of ASEAN
integration are rarely relevant to the business realities they face.
Furthermore, they do not believe the plan to create an economic, socio-
cultural and security bloc with ten Members is realistic; they will believe it
only when they see it. For business leaders who did believe in the ASEAN
vision, years of waiting have dampened their enthusiasm.
Is such scepticism justified? Are business leaders correct to write off the
possibility of further regional integration? The unfortunate truth is that the
odds have been stacked against advocates of ASEAN integration in the
past. The region’s economic, political and cultural diversity is considerable.
In terms of economic development, ASEAN Member States range from
international financial hubs to agrarian societies, with income levels
stretching from one end of the global scale to the other.
Politically, the region is home to one of the world’s largest democracies,
as well as to countries under single-party rule. The region’s cultural and
religious diversity gives ASEAN a rich heritage, but historical bilateral
frictions can be an obstacle to integration. Achieving integration amid such
broad diversity was never going to be easy. “One size fits all” economic,
social and security policies are unlikely to work, and are even less likely to
be agreed upon.
Since 2000, international production networks and global supply chains
are being reconfigured to take account of China’s rapid economic expansion
and industrialisation. ASEAN must fulfil its commitment to AEC so that it
can take advantage of the regional trade in Asia. During 1980–2006, intra-
regional trade as a share of East Asia’s total trade went up from 37% to
55% (including Japan) or from 23% to 46% over the same period
(excluding Japan).
 Another frequent criticism from ASEAN sceptics is that leaders of
ASEAN Member States “talk regional, but act local”. National agendas,
such as long-term economic and security strategies, are seen as being given
clear priority over regional integration. This is understandable given that
national leaders are expected to be accountable to their people, and the
resulting policy decisions may not serve the integration process well. While
only through integration can all ten ASEAN Member States be represented
in an important global forum such as the G20, critics argue that some of the
more dominant Members would prefer to go it alone on the global stage.
Many believe that this “me first, us later” mentality will persist unless
there is a region-wide crisis to bind ASEAN Member States together. After
all, the Chiang Mai Initiative, a series of bilateral currency swaps aimed at
strengthening the region’s financial stability, was a product of the Asian
financial crisis. The recent decision to transform the bilateral swap
agreements into a multilateral agreement involving ASEAN, China, South
Korea and Japan was triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.
The next crisis could come in the form of financial or economic turmoil, or
a health epidemic. The good news is that ASEAN authorities have shown in
the 2008–2009 global financial crisis that they have the capability to deal
with such acute crises. Years of reducing leverage, foreign exchange
reserve-building and prudent financial management have made ASEAN
economies more resilient to external shocks.
However, if ASEAN does not take clear steps to unify, the risk is that the
region will be increasingly overshadowed by the emerging giants, both
economically and politically. This would divert investor capital from the
region and hinder economic development. A lack of representation on the
world stage means the direction of global policy — whether on climate
change, financial regulation or promotion of free trade — may not suit the
region’s development needs. This would put the regional grouping at a
disadvantage.
More importantly, in the post-crisis global economy, ASEAN is likely to
face slower growth, changing composition of global growth, changing
structure of competitiveness, higher energy prices, likely realignment of
currencies, etc. All these will have huge implications for ASEAN.
Faced with such a situation, ASEAN leaders would eventually be forced
to take integration much more seriously and put it higher on their policy
agendas. But the risk is that the damage would already be done, and the
resulting integration may take a form that is significantly different from
what ASEAN policy makers have intended. Since prevention is always
better than cure, the region should take a more proactive stance towards
integration now.
This brings us back to the question of ASEAN’s economic, financial and
political influence on the global stage. One should not underestimate the
influence of ASEAN with existing and future global powers. Its annual
summit has become a forum not only for Southeast Asian leaders to meet
and discuss regional developments, but has evolved into the East Asia
Summit as 16 East Asian nations gather to discuss regional affairs. The
Obama administration has also opened discussions with ASEAN on various
policy agendas. Obama’s much-anticipated visit to Indonesia also indicates
that the United States is taking the region more seriously and expects US-
ASEAN economic relations to strengthen in the future.
The coming into force of the ASEAN Charter in 2008 and the formation
of the ASEAN Community by 2015 are critical steps towards regaining the
confidence of the business community in the integration process. The
successful establishment of the community is the “make or break” event for
ASEAN. In fact, some businesses in the West have shown revived interest
in the region following the implementation of the charter. Having a tangible
roadmap with a timeline is a good first step, as it lends credibility to the
plan. This is arguably the easy part. The big challenges lie ahead, because
the actual integration process will be closely scrutinised and will be affected
by the prevailing economic and political conditions domestically, regionally
and globally.
It is vital that regional policy makers take ASEAN integration seriously,
since it will be a potent channel to advance the region’s economic and
social development. While the naysayers see the region’s economic,
political and cultural diversity as divisive factors, these differences can also
work to the region’s advantage — for example, having a handful of
financial and business service hubs complemented by a broad range of
manufacturing capabilities (both labour- and capital-intensive), while raw
materials are also supplied from within the region. Businesses in the region
also need to take ASEAN integration seriously. Resisting integration will
not necessarily protect these companies, because stiff competition is already
coming from China and India. Slow progress in achieving the free flow of
goods within ASEAN will merely defer the growth in potential demand
from the region. Hence, the business sector should be supportive of, and
prepared for, the move towards the ASEAN Community.
 CHAPTER 19

THE GERMINATION OF ASIAN

FINANCIAL SECURITY
Suthad Setboonsarng

The value of ten Members working together as a group can be best

illustrated by their co-operation in finance. Individually, each Member State
is tiny in the world market, but together the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) generates synergy among itself and engenders others to
share the same platform.

The Challenge
Small developing countries want assurance that the international financial
order will protect small economies from financial market instability, provide
assistance to strengthen their financial sectors and ensure fairness in the
global financial system. These requests are simple and without them the
well-being of each citizen may be compromised.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 showed that small economies can be
bullied by rogue speculators. There was neither protection for these
countries from such abuse nor prohibition of such unfair treatment. The
quick gains made by these speculators is much smaller than the damage that
wrecked these countries and the lives of their citizens. For example, ten
years after the crisis, the gross domestic products (GDP) per capita based on
purchasing power parity (PPP) at 2008 US dollars for Thailand and
Indonesia are still below the pre-crisis level (Fig. 1).
As these countries were recovering from the wreckage and still repaying
the huge debts incurred to salvage their financial institutions, they were hit
again by the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, which was caused by
problems in the financial systems in the developed countries. Nevertheless,
it has inflicted harm on the well-being of people in small developing
countries. The damage is less than that of the Asian financial crisis because
these countries were not at the centre of the quake.

Source: CIA, Global Factbook.

Fig. 1. Purchasing power parity for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

The Frustration
No single ASEAN Member State can put forward, or even consider doing
so, a proposal for changing the global financial order. The main reason is
that each country accepts the fate of its size. Each ASEAN Member State is
either small or very small, in the context of world GDP. The 2009 GDP of
its largest Member, Indonesia, is only 0.84% of GDP in the world — less
than 1%. This is a major frustration in dealing with the global financial
system (which is governed by two key institutions, the International
Monetary Fund or IMF and the World Bank) because the voting rights in the
IMF and World Bank are very much driven by the size of GDP.1
Even working as a group, ASEAN is small. As a group, its share of GDP
was only 2.55% in 2009 (Fig. 2). And even with a relatively fast economic
growth rate for the next five years, its contribution to world GDP will only
be 2.82%. ASEAN co-operation in finance, which started in 1986 under the
Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB), focussed on co-operation in
taxes, and using ASEAN currencies in ASEAN trade and funding of
ASEAN joint industrial projects. There were joint requests to obtain
technical assistance and funding from the IMF or World Bank, but there was
no ambition to jointly lobby the IMF and World Bank for modification of
rules and regulation in favour of developing countries.

Source: Outlook 2009–2010, IMF, 2009.

Fig. 2. Share of ASEAN GDP in the world.
COFAB was finally abolished in 1993 because the new structure of
ASEAN economic co-operation does not explicitly mention banking and
finance. Co-operation in trade and investment has shifted our attention away
from banking and finance. At the same time, officers in banking and finance
have had their hands full with work at home, e.g. the establishment of stock
markets and regulatory agencies. The intensity of international activities
under the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other
international regulatory agencies also grew rapidly during the economic
boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM)

On the sidelines of the APEC Finance Ministers Meeting in Kyoto in March
1996, Dr Surakiart Sathirathai, the then Thai Finance Minister, consulted
with me (then a Director of the AFTA Unit, ASEAN Secretariat) about the
possibility and protocol of convening an ASEAN Finance Ministers
Meeting in Thailand. I explained to him that if there is a consensus among
the ministers, this is possible under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation of 1992. He then convened an
informal after-dinner meeting to share this idea with other ministers. The
proposal was strongly supported, especially by H.E. Anwar Ibrahim
(Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysia) and subsequently
by H.E. Robert de Ocampo (Secretary of Finance, the Philippines). The
ASEAN leaders collectively believed in the significance of ASEAN
financial co-operation in the face of regional integration and the rapid
development in Asia. Subsequently, an informal meeting was held in Manila
in April 1996 alongside the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual
Meeting to agree on the process of establishment and a tentative schedule
for the first meeting.
The first meeting was held in March 1997 in Phuket, Thailand. Thailand’s
new finance minister, Dr Amnuay Veerawan, presided over that meeting. An
important feature of the meeting was the consultation with the IMF, World
Bank and ADB. It allowed the ten Member States to address their issues
directly to the top executives of these global and regional agencies, an
opportunity that they would not have individually.

The Asian Financial Crisis: The Turning Point

By May 1997, signs of the speculative attack on the Thai baht loomed large.
In its struggle for help, Thailand discovered that no ASEAN Member State
could help. It was beyond the capability of its fellow ASEAN Members. At
the same time, they were also vulnerable to an attack. A Member, who had
experience, advised Thailand to concede and negotiate a settlement with the
speculators. That was the best advice Thailand had, but it was not acted
upon.
At this point, every country wished that ASEAN had its own regional
fund to ward off such an attack. It would have been beneficial to all
Members to have protected the Thai baht because financial and trade
linkages in region were high. The meaning of the phrase “shared destiny”
enshrined in the ASEAN Vision 2020 became very clear.
When the crisis erupted on 2 July 1997, the value of the baht plummeted
like an object free-falling from Hkakabo Razi.2 No one knew where the
foothill was. Other ASEAN countries watched its fellow Member being
shredded into pieces and devoured by a pack of ferocious hyenas. Nothing
was forthcoming from the AFMM because there was no tool, no system and
also no resources. They could only offer their prayers. A scary thought came
to their minds: when would it be their turn? If this could happen to Thailand,
it could certainly happen to the rest of ASEAN.
The ferocious speculators did not keep these countries waiting for long.
Even before licking the bones clean in Thailand, they moved on to the next
victim, Indonesia. And from there, they marched on to the other countries in
Asia. For them, this is a game well won. They split their winnings, gave
each other high-fives, and popped open the champagne to celebrate their
victory. They did not care about the bloody trail they left behind.
Such unfair and selfish acts had not gone unnoticed. Alas, analysis by the
IMF and many prominent economists concluded that this was caused by the
weak financial sector in these countries. The mainstream economic literature
described the Asian financial crisis as “weak financial sector governance”,
“contagion” and “herd behaviour” phenomena. The blame was put squarely
on the victim. Hence, the recourse would be to strengthen the financial
sector in these countries. Opposing views that pointed at the aggressor were
either not popular or rejected as speculative. Consequently, no action was
taken to contain such speculative behaviour.
There is no denying that weaknesses existed in the financial sector in the
region. Hence, it is not incorrect to help strengthen the financial sector in the
small developing economies. However, many scholars were still puzzled as
to why many other developing countries in Latin America and Africa with
much weaker financial sectors and less stable macroeconomic positions
were not attacked.3 Unless the real cause of the financial crisis can be
determined, strengthening the financial sector may not be sufficient to
remove the risk of financial instability.4
Alternatively, it may be clearer to see the Asian crisis as a game played by
powerful hands. It is not contagion, but a deliberate movement of some
well-funded consortiums of speculators. This is a known fact because these
speculators themselves were boasting about their success. It would be naive
to think that international financial institutions (IFIs) and scholars were
unaware of the existence of such a game and the conduct of this destructive
business. If they were brave (since there is no question about their
intelligence), they would have pointed out that there is a hole in the
international financial regulation that needs to be mended. Then, the remedy
would point towards outlawing such speculative attacks or similar unfair
acts, especially against small developing countries. With such regulation,
strengthening the financial sector in small emerging countries would yield
sustainable result.
Although the AFMM did not avert the financial crisis, it served as a
forum to co-ordinate and share experiences in addressing crisis management
issues and co-ordination of long-term strategies to avoid future crises. The
IMF, World Bank and ADB were invited to participate as consultative
partners of the AFMM. The dialogues were very useful for both the IFIs and
Member States. Small countries like Laos and Cambodia were able to air
their concerns and put forward their requests to these international bodies,
an opportunity that would only be available at the AFMM. The IFIs had the
opportunity to obtain a collective request, instead of visiting individual
countries, and the peer enforcement gave some assurance of
implementation.
An important role that the AFMM played then was to present an
alternative view from small developing economies. For the first time, in
April 1999, ASEAN drafted a “Common ASEAN Position on Reforming
the International Financial Architecture”5 which outlined key features of the
reform ASEAN is seeking. The 12 points included the recognition of the
specific needs of small economies, closer monitoring of short-term capital
flow, and reforming the IFIs to protect the poor. While no serious action was
taken, the fact that this group of countries had stood up to call for fairness
caught the attention of many.
It is interesting to note that all points raised by ASEAN in 1999 were
echoed in the Action Plan to implement the principle of reform which is part
of the Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy, endorsed by the G20 Summit in London in November 2008,6
especially the reform of IFIs. I cannot help but think that had these requests
by ASEAN been heeded 12 years ago, the current financial crisis could have
been averted.

Light at the End of the Tunnel

The Asian financial crisis shook the confidence not only of small
developing countries; large developing countries such as China, India and
Russia were also concerned about being attacked. They felt the need to be
protected locally, not only by the IMF. Many developed countries like Japan
and South Korea were also keen to find alternative protection systems
beyond the IFIs.
The only mechanism in Asia available at the time was the AFMM.
Although ASEAN is small, it serves as a perfect lynchpin for bigger
economies such as China, Japan and South Korea to work cohesively. This
is why the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea)
finance ministers met for the first time in April 1999 and became a very
intensive ministerial forum very quickly.
ASEAN Plus Three realised that the best way to reform the IFIs is not
only by changing the voting rights at the IMF and World Bank. Moreover,
the IFIs are too busy with many other problems. The most effective and
practical way is to build a technically capable, reliable and regional financial
governance unit in Asia to focus on issues in the region and to interact with
IFIs.
AFMM Plus Three started to put in place a concrete work programme for
strengthening its financial sector. These activities included, for example, the
Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (a
US$120 billion regional swap arrangement). At the same time, the
consultation process among the finance ministers, central bank governors
and regulatory agencies were created under the Economic Review and
Policy Dialogue (ERPD). The degree of comfort gradually increased among
the policy makers in the ASEAN Plus Three.
A landmark decision was made during the ASEAN Plus Three Summit,
held in October 2009 in Cha-am, Thailand, which endorsed the proposal of
the AFMM Plus Three to establish a surveillance unit by the end of 2009.
This unit will provide technical support to build a strong and modern
financial sector in the region, including a regional bond market. It will
monitor and help to co-ordinate macroeconomic policies among Member
States in Asia. It will oversee the management of a multilateral swap
arrangement — the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM).
Aside from this intra-regional work, it will assist its Members in
interactions with the IFIs. The unit will study and prepare ASEAN Plus
Three contributions to the G20 to ensure that the changes in global rules and
regulations for the finance sector take into account the diversity and needs
of the small developing countries, especially in Asia. At the same time, it
should prepare new recommendations on international rules and regulations
that would accommodate the growing role of Asia in the future.
For this unit to be effective, it should have access to important strategic
information for each country. This will be a necessary hurdle to cross during
the formative years of the unit. Each Member will need to change its
legislation in order to allow access to such information.
The closer linkage of the Asian economy means that the transmission of
the impact of a crisis in one country to others in the region will be faster and
more intense. A centralised unit that ensures regional stability would mean
less flexibility for each country to pursue its own policies.
The achievement in the ASEAN Plus Three process was recognised
internationally. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was invited to the first G20
Summit in London in 2008 as the Chairman of ASEAN to participate in the
deliberation on the global financial crisis. The experience of ASEAN and
Asia in the activities of the ASEAN Plus Three for the region will have a
bearing on the global financial market and vice versa.
To have a seat at the G20 Summit means that ASEAN (with its 2.66% of
global GDP) can voice its concerns to global decision makers and contribute
to building a sound global finance architecture where the interests of small
developing economies will be taken into account. ASEAN has come a long
way since 1999 (and its 12-point declaration). ASEAN and the Plus Three
countries must build on this achievement to ensure a more stable future for
the next generation of people in this region.

Asian Monetary Fund?

At the special Finance Ministers Meeting in Bangkok in August 1997,
between some angry words calling for punishment of the speculators and the
consoling words of “let bygones be bygones”, there were some forward-
looking proposals, especially for the establishment of an Asian Monetary
Fund (AMF) to be a counterpart of the IMF. Most countries were in favour
of the idea but they could not reach a consensus. The idea was not merely
shot down, it was condemned.
However, the economic environment is very different now because the
concept that each region should be taking care of its own security (political,
economic and social) issues has gained more support. It is certainly more
practical and efficient for a regional institution to gear its service towards
the needs within the region. Global institutions pay more attention to the
global rules and standards and issues, leaving the implementation to
regional bodies.
Such a movement towards more regionalisation of global financial
governance would also reduce the financial and moral responsibilities of the
central global institutions. At the same time, the needs of each country will
be better served.
The establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund may not be a question of
yes or no, but it is a question of when. That time is drawing near and at a
faster pace as the global economy rebalances. The establishment of the
ASEAN Plus Three surveillance unit could be the seeding of a future AMF.

Epilogue
I would rank co-operation in finance as the most critical area of economic
co-operation in ASEAN because it benefits each Member and it also serves
as a forum for other countries in Asia. This is a symbiotic relationship.
ASEAN is too small in the international financial arena. ASEAN needs
bigger countries to join its effort to provide financial stability and to
influence change in global financial rules and regulations to accommodate
the needs of small developing countries. China, Japan and also South Korea
need a platform to work together. Hence, ASEAN Plus Three is an ideal
platform for co-operation in finance. Soon, this platform will have to
include India, Australia and New Zealand.
Given the dynamics of global economic and financial volatility, it is not
beyond the capability of the current global financial institutions to ensure
global financial stability. There is a growing consensus among the academic
and policy makers that it is not possible to say that there will be no more
financial crises.7 To minimise the chance of more crises occurring and to
control the damage from the next episode, a new global financial
governance design will be needed. Central in that design would be the role
of regional institutions. Regional institutions would be both more flexible
and effective in co-operating with the IFIs in governing the global financial
market.
In the coming decade, ASEAN Plus Three and AFMM Plus Three will
play a central role in providing financial stability in Asia. Many new
challenges are emerging as this region assumes the role of a global growth
engine. What we call this new institution is not important. What is important
is to set up this regional institution as quickly as possible, building upon the
existing work plan. One important principle should guide this regional
institution: it should serve the small developing countries for this is where
its strength lies.
The ASEAN “ten rice stalks” together are becoming a pillar of financial
and economic stability not only for ASEAN; it will also become the
backbone for other Asian countries to build their financial and economic
stability on.

_____________________
1
This is in contrast to the fairer system of the WTO where each country has one vote. It is noted that
the contribution to the fund managed by the IMF/World Bank is based on GDP and hence the voting
right reflects the contribution. However, the decisions governing international financial standards and
regulations should be independent of fund allocation and should adopt a “one country, one vote”
system to ensure fairness.
2 The highest peak in Southeast Asia is located in Myanmar.
3
There were also speculative attacks in Argentina, Brazil and, just before Thailand, Mexico but other
economies with weaker financial sectors were not attacked.
4 We can say, in hindsight, after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, that even with a strong
financial sector, a small country cannot avoid a financial crisis when it is attacked by speculators.
5
See http://www.asean.org/6347.htm.
6 See http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.
7
Global Redesign Initiative: Global Risks, World Economic Forum, May 2010, Doha, Qatar.
 CHAPTER 20

DOES ASEAN BENEFIT BUSINESS?

Raul L. Cordenillo

Outright, when one thinks about ASEAN and business, one cannot
straightaway discern how one relates to the other. On the one hand, ASEAN
has its ministerial bodies and senior officials meetings and their outcomes:
the agreements and declarations. On the other hand, there is business and its
drive for efficiency and bottom lines. The pace and way of working are just
different. ASEAN’s work takes a long period of time and it is really about
balancing the interests of its ten Member States in order to achieve a
direction that will benefit the region as whole. Business, on the other hand,
works at breakneck speed and is obsessed with turnaround times and
tangible returns.
This chapter endeavours to look into the relations between ASEAN and
business by pointing out where ASEAN and business relate to one another
and where businesses stand to benefit. It concludes with propositions on
what businesses could undertake in order to benefit from ASEAN.
A close look at ASEAN’s initiatives reveals two avenues that very much
relate to business. These are the various economic agreements and
ASEAN’s consultation mechanisms, which will be discussed separately
below.

ASEAN’s Economic Agreements

As reiterated in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ASEAN is
committed to creating a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN
economic region. The outcomes of this pursuit, the ASEAN Free Trade
Area agreements — the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA),1 the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement2 and the ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services — and the other ASEAN Plus free trade
agreements (FTAs)3 build on the World Trade Organization (WTO)
commitments of ASEAN Member States.
These agreements require Member States, in most cases, to undertake
domestic changes that align them with the agreements. These could include
allowing market access, e.g. according lower preferential tariff rates and
reduction or elimination of other trade barriers, and according national
treatment, which essentially enable ASEAN firms and service providers to
act like domestic firms.
These domestic changes also include measures that encourage utilisation
of these agreements by business. These are really meant to simplify
business transactions such as streamlined customs procedures and other
trade facilitation schemes. Moreover, with technological advances, there are
newer and better ways of conducting business transactions and through
these agreements (and their review), these are introduced and taken on
board.
Businesses of today are enjoying, and are set to enjoy (upon the
realisation of the agreement), the fruits of ASEAN’s work.
One such measure, which illustrates this point, is ASEAN’s Rules of
Origin (ROO). The ROO essentially determine whether a particular good
can enjoy the preferential tariff of an agreement. The ATIGA provides that
“… goods shall be deemed to be originating in the Member State where
working or processing of the goods has taken place if: the goods have a
regional value of not less than forty percent (40%) …”.4 This 40% ROO
rule has reaped praise from business for being simple and therefore quite
easy to follow. It is thus commendable that ASEAN has successfully
pursued this same ROO in its other FTAs, except for the ASEAN-India
Trade in Goods Agreement.5
Through this, businesses are able to follow the same general rule when
trading under the ASEAN Plus FTAs. This consistent practice does not
contribute to the “spaghetti bowl” of rules that is seen as a downside to
bilateral trade agreements. It also establishes ASEAN as a central actor in
the trade architecture of the region.

ASEAN Consults Business

In recognition of business as an important stakeholder in ASEAN economic
integration, consultation mechanisms were set up and are currently in place
among the various ASEAN meetings, i.e. committees, ministerial meetings
and even the Summit, in order to obtain the views of business in, among
others, implementation of the economic agreements. The ASEAN Charter
identifies business organisations as one group of entities associated with
ASEAN6 and provides for ASEAN engagement.7
Most notable among these business organisations are the ASEAN
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN CCI), an umbrella
organisation for national Chambers of Commerce, and the ASEAN
Business Advisory Council (ASEAN BAC), a council comprising 30
business leaders (ten from each ASEAN Member State), that are mandated
to provide advice on economic policies. Both organisations meet with the
ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM). The ASEAN BAC also meets the
leaders during the Summit.
Through these meetings, these business organisations are able to conduct
dialogues with government and propose activities that are business-friendly.
The ASEAN CCI, for instance, introduced the concept of the ASEAN
Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme, which is really a forerunner for the
ASEAN Free Trade Area. The ASEAN BAC organises the annual ASEAN
Business and Investment Summit (ASEAN BIS) — a gathering of
businesses alongside the ASEAN Summit, which thus allows for face-to-
face exchanges with relevant ministers and leaders on various issues of
concern, as well as networking opportunities in the region and beyond.
It is perceived, however, that the ASEAN CCI is not as active as it used
to be. This may be attributed to its rotating secretariat, which follows the
chair Chamber for a particular year. Consequently, its activities are largely
determined by the current chair Chamber. The ASEAN BAC, on the other
hand, has a secretariat that is based at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta,
Indonesia. This has enabled the ASEAN BAC to pursue projects such as the
annual ASEAN BIS.
ASEAN Benefits Business
The existence of the two avenues mentioned above indicates that ASEAN
does relate to business and business stands to benefit from it. The extent of
this benefit, however, varies and very much depends on how proactive
business is.
To this end, three propositions come to mind. The first is that business
should keep itself informed of recent policy developments in ASEAN. In
particular, it should watch out for new agreements and amendments to
agreements that are being considered. It should also be on the look out for
consultation sessions on these.
Despite ASEAN’s attempts at publicising its integration process, a great
number of businesses in the region still remain unaware of ASEAN’s
economic integration. A number of reasons could be behind this. One is that
ASEAN has not been systematic in its information dissemination and thus
was not able to capture the interest of businesses. Another is that businesses
are just not so active in understanding policy developments and as a result,
they tend to react too late. A poignant example is the announcement of the
realisation of the ASEAN-China FTA, which triggered a request for
standstill commitments from a number of businesses in Indonesia and the
Philippines. Clearly, that would have been avoided if businesses had been
engaged in the consultation process earlier. Now that the ASEAN-China
FTA is in place, the best recourse is to agree on the compensation for the
products that would be affected.
No matter what the reasons are for the lack of information, this needs to
be addressed. By being proactive, business can help prevent this problem
from recurring.
Second, and drawing from the first proposition, business should inform
government of what its needs are. This could be done nationally. In this
case, one should communicate with the national chamber of commerce or
business association, which will convey this to the relevant trade or
investment agency, or go directly to the relevant trade or investment agency.
This could also be done regionally. Via business organisations that are
associated with ASEAN, one could communicate with the relevant ASEAN
committee or ministerial meeting. One other avenue is the Secretary-
General of ASEAN, who as the Chief Administrator of ASEAN8 acts as the
guardian of its agreements. It is important that the business needs are
known so that a Member State or ASEAN can act on it.
Third, business should note that “any economic agreement is only
worthwhile if it is utilised by businesses”. In this regard, ASEAN and
business need to work together in order to make these agreements useful
and, ultimately, helpful to ASEAN Member States in meeting their national
development objectives.
There is criticism that despite dialogue and consultation between ASEAN
Member States and business, the utilisation of CEPT-AFTA (now replaced
by ATIGA) remains low. This needs to be qualified, however, because
outright there is no data on the utilisation of CEPT-AFTA. It cannot
therefore be ascertained if there is indeed low utilisation. The only instance
where there is certainty on the use of CEPT-AFTA is in the AICO scheme,
where the users must employ the CEPT-AFTA ROO. Notably, the majority
of the users of AICO are automotive companies that are based in Thailand.
With all the various agreements currently in place, it is now going to be a
challenge to really determine utilisation. From the perspective of business,
they now have various options on how best to conduct trade, i.e. not just via
commitments under the WTO but also through the various ASEAN
agreements. Business should know what works best for them.
ASEAN and business share a common interest in the region. They both
want a region that is stable and ensures the welfare of its peoples. They also
want a region that is viable and conducive for business. Surely by working
together, they can make this happen.

_____________________
1
This agreement replaced the Common Effective Preferential Tariff for the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(CEPT-AFTA).
2 This agreement replaced the ASEAN Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments
and the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.
3
These include the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade
Agreement, the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Free Trade Agreement and the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement.
4 Article 28 of the ATIGA.
5
For the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, a product shall be deemed to be originating if:
(i) the AIFTA content is no less than 35% of the FOB value; and (ii) the non-originating materials
have undergone at least a change in tariff subheading (CTSH) level of the Harmonised System,
provided that the final process of the manufacture is performed within the territory of the exporting
Party.
6
Annex II of the ASEAN Charter.
7 Article 16 of the ASEAN Charter.
8
Article 11, Paragraph 3, of the ASEAN Charter.
 CHAPTER 21

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA

PARTNERSHIP: TIME FOR BUSINESS
AND PEOPLE TO LEAD
Christopher Findlay and David Parsons

The debates of the Gareth Evans years over whether Australia is part of
Asia are no longer a feature of the political landscape in Southeast Asia or
Australia, and they are no longer relevant.
Instead, Southeast Asia and Australia have joined each other willingly as
friends and partners through a process of mutual understanding and mutual
respect. As ASEAN has shown since its formation in 1967, this is the
cement that binds countries together more closely than geography ever can.
The path that joined the two together was always there but it was the
stronger realisation that “the padi is more than food” which has mobilised
politicians, people and businesses from both sides to clear away the
blockages for emerging opportunities. ASEAN has been playing a central
role in all of this.
Australia became ASEAN’s first dialogue partner in 1974. Strategic
interests motivated Australia to support ASEAN development and
integration. Now economic interests have become a driver for the
relationship alongside other areas of co-operation, as economic
complementarity between Australia and ASEAN opens many more
opportunities. ASEAN is Australia’s largest trading partner. In 2008–2009,
two-way trade in goods and services with ASEAN totalled A$83 billion and
accounted for 14.7% of Australia’s total trade. Education has been one of
the icons of trade and has helped build a strong sense of familiarity. In
2007, about 70,000 ASEAN students were enrolled in Australian education
institutions in Australia and ASEAN, making education Australia’s biggest
services export to ASEAN.1
The ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership, signed in 2007, is
now the roadmap for future political and security co-operation, economic
co-operation, socio-cultural co-operation and development co-operation at
regional and international levels. It paved the way for the ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, regarded as a high quality
free trade agreement (FTA), which was concluded in early 2009.
Australia directly supports the development of ASEAN’s most ambitious
goal — the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. It has provided
assistance of A$57 million for the second five-year phase of the ASEAN-
Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP) in addition to
substantial development assistance for individual ASEAN countries.
In the development of the wider East Asian and APEC architecture,
ASEAN has given Australia a helping hand. In the formation of APEC,
ASEAN was pivotal in enabling the Hawke-led initiative to get its legs. In
more recent years, ASEAN governments cleared the way for the inclusion
of Australia in the emerging East Asia or ASEAN Plus Six approach to
economic integration. In return, Australia recognised and supported
ASEAN centrality in these developments, even with Australia’s own
overwhelmingly important bilateral trade and investment relationships with
the Northeast Asian economies.
Aside from this institutional co-operation with ASEAN, Australia works
closely on a wide range of programmes with individual ASEAN countries
ranging from health and education to infrastructure and rural development.
For example, the development assistance partnership with Indonesia is now
Australia’s largest — at nearly A$500 million per year, focussing on
structural reform, capacity building and pressing health issues. The
assistance to Indonesia increased markedly after the tragic tsunami of
December 2004 when Australia pledged A$1 billion for reconstruction and
development.
 At the height of the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, Australia
quickly responded to the unravelling of the Thai and Indonesian financial
systems with standby loans. Australia offered a further standby loan facility
of US$1 billion to Indonesia in 2008 to help maintain economic stability
during the global financial crisis.
These significant levels of assistance and the rapid response to the needs
of ASEAN neighbours by the government and individual Australians reflect
a deeper and wider sense of community and commitment in Australia.
Both Australia and ASEAN have earned the right to contemplate these
formal foundations and the culture of co-operation with a great deal of
satisfaction. Old judgements and fears have been cast aside, millions of
tourists and students have had a firsthand glimpse of each other’s countries,
thousands of people have crossed borders to live and work, and leaders of
politics and business regularly exchange calls and text messages in addition
to their regular meetings.

Where do Australia and ASEAN go from Here?

The key elements of the economic relationship can be expected to develop
along a similar trajectory.
Australian governments are likely to continue their commitment to
economic and social development in the less developed Member States of
ASEAN. Australian governments are also likely to continue working
together with ASEAN on the architecture for deeper regional integration,
following the basic concept of ASEAN centrality, but there will be strong
interest in integration in the wider East Asian and APEC context.
Merchandise trade and associated investment are sure to grow steadily
and broaden as both sides capitalise on the reduced impediments from FTAs
linking Australia and ASEAN, and as growth and structural change create
more complementary opportunities.
In addition to these expected developments, some new and emerging
challenges will enter the agenda that will test the relevancy and
preparedness of the architecture itself and the ability and interest of
Australia and ASEAN to work together on significant issues.
The first set of issues relates to what will be a growing interest from the
marketplace in the more complex areas of investment and services sector
integration as businesses and people take a more dominant role in their own
right.
Services and investment are still nascent issues in the ASEAN Economic
Community and in the FTAs linking Australia with ASEAN precisely
because they are sensitive and difficult issues.
The marketplace, however, will look towards deeper integration in
investment and services to solve some of the big ticket challenges of the
coming decades like ageing, skills shortages, youth employment
opportunities, food security, climate change mitigation and energy security,
water scarcity, access to technology, education and health.
This points squarely to issues that are not yet on the table like the
movement of skilled and semi-skilled people on a larger scale as well as
professionals, moving beyond food self-sufficiency to developing secure
supplies of food, rethinking how to handle sanitary and phytosanitary
impediments, shifting the delivery of education and health services to the
demanding countries, building a dynamic investment climate that will
provide more market incentives for sustained access to technology, and
working on collective solutions to climate change mitigation and energy
security.
These are areas that will be of critical economic and social importance.
While they may be difficult to address, the basis of solutions are already
evident in Australia and ASEAN’s natural and emerging economic
complementarities. Australia and ASEAN will be much better off if they
address these new challenges co-operatively.
Governments tend to be slow when working on these issues and trade
negotiators — the designers of government-led integration processes — are
reluctant to include too much detail on services and investment because of
sensitivities.
The danger is that some of the most important issues for the future may
be put off and handled in an ad hoc way outside of the systematic
framework for economic integration.
This is clearly not in the interests of the business sector and communities
of either ASEAN or Australia because these big ticket issues in services and
investment will have an increasingly significant impact on nearly every
aspect of business activity and social development as likely constraints and
bottlenecks to growth.
 These are real issues that will also have a bearing on ASEAN’s
aspirations to build an economic community and its determination for
ASEAN centrality in East Asia and beyond, as well as in the bilateral
relationship with Australia.
This points to a second set of challenges for future co-operation between
Australia and ASEAN because many of the big bilateral issues on
investment and services outlined above can be more effectively addressed
in the context of global and regional action.
Can ASEAN and Australia work together, bound by their complementary
interests, to help map out and drive a global and regional agenda for change
to ensure outcomes that are in their mutual interest?
Australia and ASEAN can offer a unique and powerful perspective to
challenges and solutions that cross the divide of developed and developing
countries and of labour- and resource-rich economies.
ASEAN Member States and Australia are already working actively in
this direction in East Asia, APEC, G20, the WTO and the United Nations,
but in reality these efforts are still tentative and formative and they are
likely to continue to be until clearer positions are formed within ASEAN
and between Australia and ASEAN.
In the charged debates on climate change and energy security, food
security and the movement of people, stronger systematic positions by
Australia and ASEAN could provide much needed leadership globally and
regionally. The most powerful signal would be to lead by example.
In Australia, there is still no consensus on climate change mitigation, on
significant inflows of skilled and semi-skilled workers and on how to adapt
the strict rules on food imports. And although Australia is still relatively
open to investment, there are still contentious debates about foreign
investment in strategic resource assets.
In the ASEAN business community and among potential foreign
investors, there is much scepticism about the determination of ASEAN
governments to deliver on the cornerstone of their integration plan — the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Without adhering to
implementation schedules and deepening the AEC agenda on services and
investment, ASEAN will have difficulty claiming the right to ASEAN
centrality and achieving its own goal of increasing its share of world trade
and investment.
 The future co-operation agenda between Australia and ASEAN would be
greatly enhanced by directing more resources toward research and capacity
building for the new and emerging challenges.
Until now, governments have largely led and driven the integration
processes and co-operation between Australia and ASEAN. They have
chosen safety and control over dynamism and innovation.
In the next steps, it will be difficult and perilous to hold back the interests
of business and people because, for them, a new agenda is already
becoming a reality. Governments have opened many new windows and
doors for business and people to view the rich and diverse padis of ASEAN.
Within the bounds of good governance and sustainability, business and
people can bring the ASEAN-Australia partnership to a new and higher
level.

_____________________
1
See http://www.dfat.gov.au/asean/index.html.
 CHAPTER 22

TRANS-ASEAN GAS PIPELINE: MORE

THAN JUST A PIPE DREAM
Zainal Abidin Matassan and Lee Yoong Yoong

Oil prices and alternative energy resources are daily headline news. They
affect the world in a big way because energy production and consumption
impact our daily lives, our society and our economy.
This is why energy security is one of the most important issues on the
international agenda. The competition for access to energy resources can be
a potential cause for misunderstanding and conflict between states. The rise
of oil prices in recent years, combined with the search for a sustainable
energy supply by emerging economic powerhouses like China and India,
have further stimulated interest in an issue that is of both economic and
strategic importance.

ASEAN Vision 2020 on Energy Co-operation

After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998, Southeast Asian countries
have promoted new investments and consumer confidence, resulting in a
decade of strong growth since. As a result, the energy sector is racing to
keep up with the speed of growth, creating varying opportunities from
country to country in the region. The ten Member States of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent one of the world’s swiftly
growing regions, and one with a rapid rising energy demand driven by
economic and demographic development. ASEAN’s primary energy
requirement was projected to triple between 2005 and 2030 (reference
scenario).1 Meeting such energy needs — with unprecedented increases in
coal use, oil and gas imports, as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
— would be an acid test.

Fig. 1. An overview of ASEAN energy resources.

Source: ASEAN Centre for Energy, ACE.

The challenge to ensure a secure regional energy supply is thus an

overriding concern, despite the fact that ASEAN is considered to be well-
endowed in energy resources, with nine Member States possessing proven
oil or gas resources, or both, or other natural resources such as coal, hydro,
and bio-mass (Fig. 1), among others. Southeast Asia is estimated to have a
reserve of 22 billion barrels of oil, 227 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 46
billion tonnes of coal, 234 gigawatts (GW) of hydropower and 20 GW of
geothermal capacity. This explains the motivation behind ASEAN Member
States’ active co-operation for the full utilisation of the region’s energy
potential for greater stability, security and sustainability, as a pathway to
building the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015.
Under the ASEAN Vision 2020, there is a call for the establishment of
interconnecting infrastructures that arrange for electricity and natural gas to
pass through the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas
Pipeline (TAGP) respectively. Both projects have been promoted by
ASEAN on the basis that they would speed up economic development and
strengthen regional energy security. Member States that export natural gas
and electricity would earn foreign exchange revenue. Greenhouse gas
emissions would decrease significantly when gas and hydropower replace
coal and fossil fuel as the primary sources of energy generation. More
importantly, the two projects are expected to reduce ASEAN’s reliance on
unpredictable energy imports.
The APG has achieved delicate progress with the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Power Grid (MOU on the
APG), which serves as a reference for the co-ordination and facilitation of
the programmes to implement the regional power interconnection projects,
at the 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) in Singapore on
23 August 2007. Through establishing a policy framework and the
modalities for power interconnection and trade, this MOU will pave the way
for the eventual APG implementation.
The TAGP, endorsed by the ASEAN heads of government in Hanoi,
Vietnam, in 1998, can be considered to be an equally, if not more, complex
challenge. To enhance the implementation of the project, an MOU of the
TAGP was signed at the 20th AMEM on 2 July 2002 in Bali, Indonesia. The
present regional cross-border gas pipeline infrastructure is laid out here:

1. Malaysia-Singapore, commissioned in 1991 (5 km)

2. Yadana, Myanmar-Ratchaburi, Thailand, 1999 (470 km)
3. Yetagun, Myanmar-Ratchaburi, Thailand, 2000 (340 km)
4. West Natuna, Indonesia-Singapore, 2001 (660 km)
5. West Natuna, Indonesia-Duyong, Malaysia, 2002 (100 km)
6. Grissik, South Sumatra, Indonesia-Singapore, 2003 (470 km)
7. Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA), 2005 (270 km)
8. Malaysia-Singapore, 2006 (4 km)

The TAGP project, with the current eight cross-borders pipelines, supplies
gas from the gas-producing ASEAN Member States of Indonesia, Malaysia
and Myanmar to Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have built
and/or are in the process of constructing additional pipelines to bring the gas
onshore for domestic consumption. The cross-border pipelines were built on
a bilateral basis, while domestic pipelines are constructed by the respective
Member States. The TAGP Master Plan 2008 indicates the existing cross-
border pipelines, existing national pipelines, work-in-progress/planned
pipelines and new likely connections. The gas pipeline connections from
East Natuna are still being discussed, whereas the other pipelines are going
ahead as scheduled.

Challenges Faced by TAGP

Change of priority

With the demand for gas energy resource increasing, the existing eight
cross-border gas pipelines of the TAGP project are almost certainly not
enough to meet the prevailing requirements for building an ASEAN
Community. More significantly, plans for the availability of gas by pipelines
may have to be re-evaluated, taking into account that a few gas-producing
ASEAN Member States have realigned their priorities by planning to
increase gas supplies for domestic use. For example, Indonesia, the largest
supplier of gas in the TAGP project, is planning to channel a major portion
of the gas from the East Natuna gas field to its domestic market. Myanmar
has held discussions to supply its gas, both by pipelines and as liquefied
natural gas (LNG), to non-ASEAN Member States. Such reduced capacities
are of concern to those ASEAN Member States currently receiving their gas
supply by pipelines. Singapore and Thailand, in particular, are now taking
steps to fulfil their energy requirements by planning to build LNG receiving
terminals, with the Middle East as a possible source of supply.

Disputed area in the region

Another immediate concern over the availability of supply arises from the
disagreements on the disputed areas within the Southeast Asian region, such
as the offshore areas between Malaysia-Thailand, Malaysia-Vietnam,
Malaysia-Brunei, Malaysia-Indonesia and Cambodia-Thailand. A great deal
of negotiations and arbitrations must be concluded before the region or the
ASEAN Member States involved can take full advantage of the potential in
these contested areas, either in the form of Joint Development Area (JDA)
schemes, or work together on a Commercial Arrangement Agreement basis.

No onward transmission

While a number of ASEAN Member States have the experience, resources

and capacities to build and run gas pipelines, most of these are designed to
supply gas directly from one point to another, without onward transmission
or transition through a third ASEAN Member State. In short, the region
lacks the relevant technical experience to operate an integrated pipeline
system. The question arises whether ASEAN would experience the same
aggravated concerns of supplying gas through a third Member State, similar
to the stoppage of gas delivery by Russia to European Union consumers
through Ukraine. It remains to be seen, although it must be reiterated that
the non-delivery of gas is covered in the contractual obligation between the
seller and the buyer.

Geographical diversity in ASEAN

Integrating infrastructures such as the TAGP have proven to be one of

ASEAN’s toughest goals, partly because the region is geographically
diverse and each Member State’s economic development is at a different
level. For example, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam,
which form the landmass of mainland ASEAN, find it challenging to build
concrete infrastructure links — connecting roads, communication and power
lines across national boundaries — because of mountain ranges and swiftly
flowing rivers. The other Member States — Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore — may have better developed
infrastructures, but are separated by deep seas, making linkages between
them costly.
Harmonisation of frameworks

One last issue faced by the TAGP is that cross-border natural gas pipelines
of the scale of the TAGP entail harmonisation of national legal and
regulatory frameworks and, possibly, gas pricing schedules. Many ASEAN
Member States, however, are still hammering out the regulations on natural
gas transmission and distribution, while legislation concerning energy and
the environment varies across the region.

Funding

More significantly, the sole key challenge faced by all ASEAN Member
States is funding, deemed to be the biggest problem for regional
infrastructure. For investors to invest, they must have the returns. The World
Bank had, at the turn of the millennium, estimated that the developing East
Asian countries, including ASEAN Member States, required up to US$1.5
trillion in infrastructure investment until 2010–2011 just to cope with
economic development and growth.

Why TAGP is Still Relevant

The private sector has been reluctant to invest in regional infrastructures
projects, arguing that these will be loss-making enterprises, as well as citing
the challenges in meeting the requirements of ten different sets of domestic
investment rules and regulations. Still, it is critical for ASEAN Member
States to work with their private sectors to get outstanding regional
infrastructure projects, such as the TAGP, off the ground, because the
interconnection of national gas pipelines will almost certainly enhance and
ensure the availability and accessibility of energy in the region. Gas
interconnections will ensure the provision of affordable and accessible gas
to regional industries, businesses and households. Availability and access to
natural gas will contribute to improving productivity and lead to changes in
the quality of life, and the standards of living.
Once completed, the TAGP network will include a series of natural gas
pipelines spanning ten Member States spread across 4.5 million square
kilometres of land. Besides the APG, the ASEAN Highways Network and
the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL), the TAGP is the one other
regional infrastructure project that connects ASEAN. Concerted and
collective action is therefore necessary for ASEAN Member States to
develop this much-awaited gas pipeline system as an essential part of an
increasingly integrated and borderless regional economy.

Conclusion
Over the past 43 years, economic linkages in ASEAN have grown
phenomenally. However, much remains to be done in building an integrated
infrastructure network in ASEAN. Basic issues are at stake: an efficient,
secure and integrated gas infrastructure system is imperative for ASEAN to
improve its economic competitiveness and facilitate further integration with
the global economy.
For TAGP to be effective, it needs the full cooperation of all the ASEAN
Member States. This may mean that some Member States may have to
reduce their returns and earnings in order to attract investors, while some
may have to prioritise the needs of the other Members. When there is a
willingness to work together, TAGP would be a success. There is no doubt
that ASEAN is serious in its integration efforts, particularly the building of
an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Energy is one of the key pillars
in the AEC Blueprint, and the TAGP is an important item within the energy
agenda. This regional cohesiveness and willingness to work together augur
well for the eventual completion of the TAGP.

_____________________
1
“ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2010–2015: Bringing Policies to
Actions: Towards a Cleaner, More Efficient and Sustainable ASEAN Energy Community”. ASEAN’s
energy demand is expected to hit 1,252 MTOE (million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 2030 from 474
MTOE in 2005, an increase by an average annual growth rate of 4%. This is higher than the world’s
average growth rate of 1.8% in primary energy consumption through 2030.
 CHAPTER 23

ENCOMPASSING THE AEC

BLUEPRINT INTO ASEAN’S
SUBREGIONAL FRAMEWORKS: A
COMMENTARY
Gary P. Krishnan

About a decade and a half ago, when the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) was already in existence for nearly 30 years, ASEAN’s
success inspired the creation of the subregional frameworks of the Brunei-
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)
and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle or IMT-GT. These
“Mini ASEANs” were modelled after its mother regional framework,
sharing a multitiered and hierarchical formation of a Summit, Ministerial,
Senior Officials and Working Groups Processes. The adoption of a similar
architecture was a deliberate attempt to encourage co-operation and mutual
inter-dependence to emulate and also deepen the ASEAN success story, in
particular, its economic development, which at that stage had yet to go
beyond ASEAN’s capital cities. The subregional frameworks were therefore
principally economic co-operation groupings that were intended to reach the
“pockets of underdevelopment” in rural states and provinces. Thus, BIMP-
EAGA and IMT-GT were actually a collection of border states and
provinces of the Member States1 rather than encompassing Member States
in their entirety. This was an enabling factor that allowed states and
provinces to have a voice and a direct role in subregions, whereas federal
governments took the lead in ASEAN.
In addition, subregions have one other characteristic difference from
ASEAN. Subregions attempted to galvanise a public-private partnership by
according the private sector “equal Member State status”. In return for
allowing the private sector to fully participate in formal meetings and be
part of the planning and implementation process, governments expected the
private sector to lead initiatives. In contrast, ASEAN remained true to its
public-orientated setup and private sector engagement is normally only
possible by formal invitation.
But despite the best of intentions, there was never really a clear
opportunity for synergy between the regional and subregional frameworks
until recently. Although the intention to empower the private sector remains
theoretically sound, practical realities in the formula meant subregions
remained poorer cousins of ASEAN and could add little value over the
years as a viable modality for economic development. Private sector
involvement never extended beyond the realm of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) which continue to rely on, rather than inspire,
government officials. Further, the institutional trappings of an ASEAN-
styled framework meant that federal governments still found it difficult to
relinquish control, somewhat stifling local governments’ enthusiasm.
However, circumstances began to change in 2006 when BIMP-EAGA
adopted its five-year BIMP-EAGA Roadmap to Development 2006–2010.
A year later, IMT-GT also adopted its own five-year IMT-GT Roadmap for
Development 2007–2011 while ASEAN adopted its first Community
Blueprint, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint. For the first
time, these entities had clear doctrines that not only articulated measurable
objectives with stated timelines but also the modality in which the
objectives were to be achieved. The Blueprint goes further by measuring
progress by means of an AEC Scorecard, literally “naming and shaming”
laggard Member States into compliance. Yet, as the Roadmaps and the
Blueprint were developed in isolation from each other, the opportunity for
contributing to each other’s vision was lost. However, as the BIMP and IMT
Roadmaps underwent their respective Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs),
subregional officials jumped at the prospect of leveraging ASEAN.
Opportunities for Synergy: Subregions Find Their Own Path
The first impressions one takes away from reading the Roadmaps is the
broad scope and impressive objectives they intend to achieve. In the BIMP
Roadmap, four developmental clusters covering natural resources, tourism,
transport infrastructure and ICT and SME further diversify into 12
subsectors. With IMT, the Roadmap branches out to encompass six strategic
thrusts ranging from agriculture and agro-industries to halal products and
services, human resources, infrastructure and transport, tourism, and trade
and investment. Such a broad spectrum cannot avoid overlapping with
ASEAN, and indeed many of the Working Groups (WGs) mirror similar
ASEAN fora WGs.
Before we can truly appreciate how necessary it is for the Blueprint to be
reflected in the development plans of subregions, we need to first appreciate
how subregions are looking away from ASEAN for new pathfinders. If we
compare the theoretical frameworks, for example, then the AEC Blueprint
utilises existing “ASEAN” methodology that has served ASEAN for well
over 40 years. Of the three Community Blueprints, the AEC Blueprint was
the first to be initiated due to ASEAN’s propensity to tackle economic
issues more readily than other community issues.
In brief, ASEAN methodology could be summed up as taking a
regionally agreed uniform measure, applying it across all ASEAN Member
States, with ASEAN sectoral bodies co-ordinating initiatives at the regional
level and national government agencies implementing initiatives at the
national level. There is a clear dichotomy between the role of the regional
architecture and that of national agencies. Hence, ASEAN was satisfied for
the Blueprint to only articulate the actionable measures to establish a
“unified economic grouping” and there was no basis for the Blueprint to
address modifications to the implementation process. As a result, the
Blueprint manual in its “what to” section was explicit and comprehensive
but in its “how to” section simply states, “refer to existing procedures”.
In this regard, the subregional Roadmaps go further than the AEC. Not
only do the Roadmaps reflect the same urgency to create “unified economic
areas” but they also address the manner and form of the co-operation. The
IMT-GT Roadmap, for example, is anchored in five “economic corridors”,
“trunk lines” from which development radiates to neighbouring areas
through transport and economic linkages. As a concept, economic corridors
are at once unique and alien to the ASEAN framework because it is based
on complementary geographical rather than national boundaries. Economic
corridors enable co-operation to be pursued irrespective of the number of
countries involved and based on how the corridor is defined, which thus
frees the implementation process from being the sole purview of national
line agencies. Moreover, measures were no longer restrained by the need for
uniformity. Instead, specific measures unique to each corridor were the new
order of the day.

Subregional Success Finally Takes Root

Unencumbered by constraints that were better suited for ASEAN’s public-
orientated framework, subregional WGs could now concentrate on creating
real, multilateral subregional projects. These efforts culminated with the
BIMP-EAGA leaders’ endorsement of 12 subregional projects worth
approximately US$1.3 billion at their 2009 Summit for implementation in
the next three years. Similarly, IMT-GT ministers are recommending eight
subregional projects for IMT-GT leaders’ endorsement in 2010,
approximately worth a further US$1 billion. This development2 highlights
the subregions’ potential to overshadow ASEAN in project development,
co-operation and co-ordination and begets the question of whether
ASEAN’s subregions have outgrown their parent. By extension, should they
continue to look to ASEAN for inspiration? The short answer is yes,
because these successes are yet to be crystallised and institutionalised. The
process of institutionalisation implies that these successes can be repeated
continuously, and perhaps it is in this area that ASEAN can be most
beneficial. Hence, on the matter of subregional potential, as illustrated by its
recent success, the question is no longer whether subregions can add value
to ASEAN’s strategy, but rather whether subregions can achieve more by
building on and leveraging ASEAN initiatives.
In order to contextualise any comparisons between parent and sibling
frameworks, it is important to reflect on how, at the current time, subregions
have managed to outperform ASEAN in the ability to undertake “regional
projects”, which are projects that are implemented jointly and across
national boundaries. Figure 1 illustrates how BIMP-EAGA’s underlying
philosophy (represented by the theoretical curve) developed and changed
after the inception of the Roadmap in 2006 (t = 0), and how those changes
reflected against the objective of the Roadmap, i.e. actual project
implementation (represented by the projects curve). Here we see that while
the supporting ideology has undergone several critical developments, from
adoption, acceptance and finally modification, success in projects remains
elusive. However, with the endorsement of the 12 priority BIMP-EAGA
infrastructure projects in October 2009, the project development curve
surpassed the theoretical development curve.

Fig. 1. Comparison of ideological development with actual project formulation and delivery.
In the case of BIMP-EAGA, it took 3 years from the adoption of the
Roadmap in 2006 before any measurable projects were adopted. Prior to
2006, both regional and subregional frameworks shared similar ideologies,
which in essence were to come together at the regional level to mutually
determine the aims and objectives of a particular project, but were
implemented separately by each Member State, often resulting in uneven
implementation across ASEAN. Post-2006, not only was BIMP-EAGA
released from the mandatory requirement that projects had to be equally
implemented in all countries, regardless of need, developmental partners or
any other stakeholder for that matter could now assist in the implementation
process of any project. The foresight of granting the private sector equal
Member State rights is finally beginning to pay dividends.
 However, the rate at which these changes are occurring has caught many
subregional stakeholders by surprise, resulting in a wide chasm between the
intent and the ability of institutional structures to deliver. The subregional
institutional structure, pre- and post-Roadmap, remains ASEAN-like
although its intent has evolved. Hence, a similar evolution is now underway
on the institutional mechanism to cope with the very different demands
stemming from economic corridor-styled objectives. As a sign of its
growing maturity, EAGA officials are appearing more comfortable in
dispensing with further “feel good” plans, roadmaps and strategies (the
present Development Roadmap ends in 2010) in favour of practical
measures to strengthen project implementation and delivery. The end of the
“visionary” stage and the beginning of the “plumbing” stage is to be
applauded. If the implementation issue remains unresolved, the project trend
line in Fig. 1 will rapidly fall off and dip below the theoretical development
line. This is a recognition that while more needs to change, much has
changed.

Drawing Inspiration from the Blueprint

Part of the enabling factor that allowed subregions to gain in importance
was the ASEAN belief that in order for subregions to play a meaningful role
in the regionalisation process, they need to chart their own path. The
synergy from a combined entity would be much greater if BIMP-EAGA and
IMT-GT were separate entities, rather than if the subregions were just a
subset of ASEAN. In view of this, project generation will be the defining
factor for the future. Given the importance of sustaining the project pipeline,
the possibility of harnessing the AEC Blueprint for subregional projects is
of paramount importance.
This explains the efforts taken to transform the traditional supporting role
of subregions. Before 2006 and the adoption of the Roadmap, the vast
majority of the subregional work plans were still activity-based. The current
emphasis on project generation means that a duality of purpose has emerged
for subregions. Given the wide range of issues preoccupying ASEAN,
subregions would still need to pursue activities and initiatives not related to
project generation. Subregions would need to champion these issues,
otherwise nobody else will. Yet, project generation is critical because it is
the defining factor for subregions to be something different from ASEAN,
enabling the synergy from a combined entity to be that much greater. So, the
usefulness of encompassing the AEC Blueprint will be in two areas; first, in
streamlining subregional activities, while cognisant of maintaining core
essential activities vital to subregions, and second, in helping to
institutionalise a methodology for project generation.
The Blueprint itself aspires to achieve four desirable characteristics that
created 17 core elements that in turn produced over 165 actionable
measures. That is not including the 12 Priority Integration Sectors (PIS),
each with its own PIS Roadmap. The considerable overlap between regional
and subregional frameworks is a strong impetus to ensure that the respective
plans are in sync with each other. As the Roadmaps and the Blueprint were
developed in their “own silos”, several permutations and combinations
apply, which are illustrated in Table 1. In all scenarios, the case for mapping
the respective plans remains strong.
Being the rich document that it is, the potential benefits of including
elements from the Blueprint into the work plans of subregional WGs are
enormous. Even when the AEC Blueprint and subregional programmes are
similar, value is being added if the efforts are contributing towards meeting
Member States’ AEC obligations. This can facilitate as a selling point for
fast-tracking common programmes and projects and for subregional
Member States to leapfrog their non-subregional counterparts in ASEAN.

Table 1. Comparing Blueprint and Roadmap Objectives

Scenario 1: Objectives are mutually Scenario 2: Similar objectives with

exclusive different methodologies

Review necessary to decide on continuity. If Review necessary to either modify or

decision is to proceed, then the review process supplement activities
must be geared to ensuring objectives are not
contradictory

Scenario 3: Objectives and methodologies Scenario 4: Objectives are yet to be defined

overlap

Review necessary to either suspend or Review necessary to ensure the many

alternatively fast-track or pilot-test common programmes and projects are at the feasibility
initiatives study stage and to avoid duplication and be
mutually reinforcing
 Leveraging the Blueprint will also provide subregions with the
opportunity to overcome some of their longstanding weaknesses. A heavy
reliance on a weak SME sector and centrally driven ministries that crowd
out local governments have led to subregional WG agendas that are lacking
in substance. An injection of AEC Blueprint ideas, tweaked to suit
subregional conditions, would compel WGs to critically evaluate their own
plans. Thus, the exposure to ASEAN programmes can help invigorate
directionless subregional WGs.

Conclusion
While ASEAN spawned the creation of subregional frameworks,
duplication of ASEAN’s success remained elusive, essentially due to a
mismatch between its composition and delivery architecture. However,
recently, with subregions realising added value could only be achieved by
charting their own path, efforts in implementing regional projects are finally
beginning to bear fruit. The challenge is to crystallise these achievements.
To this end, subregions will again need to draw inspiration from ASEAN’s
new and established initiatives to have any confidence of finally delivering
on overdue promises of bringing sustainable development to rural
communities beyond ASEAN’s vibrant capital cities.

Appendix A: Initial BIMP-EAGA Priority Connectivity

Projects
Project Preparation Year Beginning Project Preparation Year Beginning 2011
2010

Indonesia Brunei Darussalam

a) Tawau-Tarakan Road a) Kuala Lurah Border Crossing Facility
b) Sarawak-Kalimantan Power b) Pandaruan Bridge (between Brunei Darussalam
Interconnection and Malaysia

Malaysia Indonesia
a) Sarawak-Kalimantan Power a) Pontianak-Kuching Transport Link
Interconnection b) Enhancing the Manado-Bitung Link
b) Lahad Datu Palm Oil Industrial
Cluster
Philippines Philippines
a) Expansion of Mindanao Ports a) Expansion of Mindanao Ports Program II
Program I b) Rehabilitation of the Davao-General Santos Road
b) Palawan Ports Development
Program

Appendix B: Initial IMT-GT Priority Connectivity Projects

Project Preparation Year Beginning 2010

Indonesia
• Sumatra Ports Development
• Melaka-Dumai Economic Corridor Multimodal Transport
• Sumatra Toll Roads
• Melaka-Pekanbaru Power Interconnection (Indonesian component)
Malaysia
• Melaka-Pekanbaru Power Interconnection (Malaysian component)

Thailand
• Southern Thailand Ports Development Program
• Pak Bara Cargo Port (Phase 1 of the Lower Thai Land Bridge: Pak Bara-New Songkhla)
• Hat Yai-Sadao Toll Road

_____________________
1 In the case of BIMP, it comprises Brunei, the provinces of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian
Jaya for Indonesia, the states of Sabah and Sarawak for Malaysia, and the islands of Palawan and
Mindanao for the Philippines. IMT comprises the province of Sumatra, the Malaysian states of
Kedah, Kelantan, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Perak, Perlis and Selangor, and the provinces of
Krabi, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Narathiwat, Pattani, Phattalung, Satun, Songkhla, Trang, Yala,
Chumphon, Ranong, Surat Thani, Phang Nga and Phuket for Thailand.
2
To begin with, leaders from BIMP and IMT felt projects should be both visible and provide
maximum impact and therefore the projects chosen were primarily infrastructure enablers, very much
in a similar vein to how the Greater Mekong Subregion was successfully developed. Appendices A
and B respectively list the initial projects chosen by BIMP and IMT.
 THEME FOUR

SOCIO-CULTURAL
 CHAPTER 24

POPULATION AGEING IN ASEAN:

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Kang Soon Hock and Yap Mui Teng

A population is considered “aged” if more than 8% of its members are aged

65 years and older.1 Going by this definition, only Singapore among the
ASEAN Member States currently has an aged population although Thailand
and Vietnam follow closely behind (Table 1). The other Member States have
relatively younger populations; in particular, Laos, Cambodia and the
Philippines, and to some extent Malaysia, have youthful populations with the
young, aged below 20 years, making up more than 40% of their members.
Nevertheless, the needs and concerns of the aged should not be overlooked
even in the latter countries because time and resources are required for
building the necessary infrastructure and institutions to provide for the old.
Projections prepared by the United Nations,2 presented in Table 2, show
that six of the ten ASEAN Members States (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) are expected to have aged populations by
2025, and by 2050, the populations of all ASEAN Member States are
projected to be aged. The speed of population ageing can be quite rapid once
the process has started, as the experiences of Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam show.

Table 1. ASEAN Population, 2008

Source: Adapted from Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Community in Figures ACIF
2009. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010. See http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ACIF2009.pdf.
* Figures are for ages 0–19, 20–59 and 60+ respectively.

Table 2. Percentage of 65 Years and Older in ASEAN Population, 2010–

2050

Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York: United
Nations, 2009. See http://esa.un.org/unpp.
Fig. 1. Total fertility rates, 1950–2005.
Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York: UN, 2009.

As elsewhere, the two main drivers of population ageing in ASEAN are

fertility and mortality declines. In this regard, the different age compositions
of populations currently observed among ASEAN Member States reflect
differences in their stages and timing of demographic transition. Singapore
began its demographic transition the earliest, with its total fertility rate
(TFR) declining sharply from the late 1950s onwards (Fig. 1). Thailand
followed closely in the 1960s and reached below-replacement fertility rate
before the start of the 1990s. Together with Singapore, they are the only two
countries with TFRs below the replacement level.3 The high proportions of
the young in Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines and Malaysia may be
attributed to the persistence of high (even extremely high) fertility levels in
these countries and, especially in the cases of Laos and Cambodia, the
recency of fertility decline.
Fig. 2. Life expectancy at birth, 1950–2005.
Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York: UN, 2009.

On the other hand, life expectancy at birth has risen in all ASEAN
Member States, although there are again variations among them (Fig. 2).
More significantly, women are surviving to older ages than men in these
countries.
Figure 3 provides the projected increases in the number of the aged in
ASEAN Member States over the period 2010–2050. As the figure shows, the
aged population in the ASEAN countries are expected to grow much more
rapidly than among the more developed countries. By 2050, Indonesia is
projected to have more elderly persons than Japan, and the number in
Vietnam is likely to be about the same as in Germany.
Fig. 3. Increases in population aged 65+.
Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York: UN, 2009.
See http://esa.un.org/unpp.

Challenges for States in ASEAN

The age structure changes presented above have important social, economic
and political implications that will need to be addressed at the individual,
familial, community and state levels. The rest of this chapter will address
only issues at the macro, i.e. national and regional, level and their
implications for regional co-operation.
Dependency ratios are demographic constructs used to show the
implications of age structure change on potential support burdens that will
have to be borne by a society. They measure the ratios of the old (aged 65
and older) and the young (aged below 15 years) to the working age
population (aged 15–64 years). These ratios are known as the old or aged
dependency ratio and the young dependency ratio, respectively.
As Table 3 shows, the aged or old dependency ratio is projected to rise in
all ASEAN Member States over the period 2010–2050. This will raise the
overall dependency burden significantly in Singapore and Thailand and, to a
lesser extent, in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam. The
high fertility countries, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines, however, will
see a lightening of their total dependency burden, as a result of reductions in
youth dependency. These are the only countries where the working age
populations are projected to increase over the next 40 years. How long this
situation will remain depends on the speed of future fertility decline. For the
other countries, the working age population is projected to decline.

Table 3. Dependency Ratios, 2010–2050

Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York: UN, 2009.
See http://esa./un.org/unpp.

Over time, declining fertility rates will result in a smaller working age
population. This would lead to a smaller potential tax base, which would
make it more difficult for governments to support public programmes, such
as health and social care services, for the elderly. If nothing were done to
pre-empt this situation, governments would have to take on more fiscal
responsibilities to ensure the well-being of their elderly populations, cut
benefits or raise tax or contribution rates. The first option is not sustainable.
The latter two options are politically sensitive and are likely to give rise to
intergenerational conflict, as the experiences of the developed countries have
shown.4 Recently in the United States, many state governments have begun
re-examining and in some instances reducing pension benefits for current
state employees as well as retirees, which have led to many unions and in
some instances groups of retirees filing lawsuits to protect their benefits.5 A
possible remedial measure for the shortfall is to consider relying on
immigration — as Singapore has done. However, this option too has social
and political implications for receiving countries.6
As populations age, the burden of disease also changes.7 As seen in the
case of Singapore, the most aged country in ASEAN, chronic degenerative
diseases have replaced infectious diseases as the main causes of death. The
elderly also require more hospitalisation and, when admitted, are likely to
stay longer. Even though women live longer than men, older women also
report more health problems than older men, as demonstrated in Singapore.8
Hence, meeting the healthcare needs of older populations is another area of
concern for governments.9 Medical and social care services for the old
require different skills and training than those for the young. The financing
of healthcare is another area that requires attention, particularly as tax bases
shrink. In order to avoid an overly heavy burden on taxpayers, both the
system of taxation and the methods of financing healthcare require
modifications, as the Singapore experience shows.
The gender distribution of elderly populations in ASEAN Member States,
as elsewhere, is also skewed. Women outnumber men in each of the ASEAN
countries, particularly among those with older populations. This
“feminisation of ageing” is of course due to gender differences in life
expectancy.10 Although the challenges of old age affect both men and
women, living longer means that women would have to deal with these
issues for a longer period compared to their male counterparts.11 Differences
in formal labour force participation over their life course mean women have
less access to pensions and other formal instruments of old age financial
security. Even in highly developed Singapore, women continue to be more
dependent on their families (especially children) for economic security than
men. This greater expectation of reliance on their children for old age
financial support is also prevalent among baby boomer women,12 though not
to the same extent as the current elderly. Older women are more likely than
older men to live on their own and the risk of social isolation is higher.13
Table 4 below further demonstrates this gender divide in countries where
information is available.
 Increasingly, all the countries in ASEAN will move from agrarian to
urbanised societies. In fact, it has been noted that by 2030, only a handful of
countries in the region will have less than a 50% share of urban
population.14 With the opening up of markets and increasing job
opportunities, rural-urban migration of the younger population seeking jobs
in cities is likely to increase.15 In some cases, this could also mean migration
overseas of the young population in search of work. The remittances from
these children would help support the elderly in the rural areas. However, the
flipside to this is the shrinking pool of family members for care giving and
the provision of emotional support to the elderly. This is another area that
governments in ASEAN will have to deal with in the foreseeable future.

Table 4. Percentage Living Alone, Aged 60+

Female Male

Brunei NA NA
A 6.0 2.0
Cambodia
A 12.0 2.0
Indonesia
Laos NA NA
15 9.0 5.0
Malaysia
B 6.0 3.0
Myanmar
A 6.0 4.0
Philippines
A 3.0 2.0
Singapore
A 6.0 3.0
Thailand
Vietnam NA NA

Note: Letter indicates reference year: A: 1995 or later; B: 1985–1994; C: 1984 or earlier.
Source: United Nations, Population Ageing and Development 2009 (Wallchart). New York: UN, 2009.

Policy Response
Governments in the ASEAN region have taken different views towards
population ageing, largely reflecting their stages of ageing (Table 5). Not
surprisingly, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam view the ageing of their
population as a “major concern”. For the other ASEAN Member States,
ageing is seen as a minor concern with the exception of Cambodia. The
priority among the lower-income ASEAN Member States at this point is to
manage fertility levels and the large pools of working age population, and
rightly so. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the number of elderly in these
countries is large and thus some attention may also be required. Moreover, in
this age of globalisation and rapid technological development, fertility and
mortality changes may take place faster than expected and at earlier stages of
economic development than in the past, with a resultant impact on
population ageing in these countries. The window of opportunity to adjust
and adopt social institutions to meet the needs of the growing elderly
population may also shorten.
Fortunately, discussions at the governmental level regarding population
ageing have begun among the ASEAN countries. Following the initiative to
build a “community of caring societies in ASEAN” that was adopted by the
ASEAN leaders at the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004, the first ASEAN Plus
Three ministerial meeting for social welfare and development was convened
to study social sector issues such as people with disabilities and the elderly
population and was followed by a second meeting in 2007.16 The meetings
also included ASEAN Plus Three partner countries — Japan, the Republic of
Korea and China, that are themselves dealing with population ageing issues
— to share their experiences.17 Under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community Plan of Action, ASEAN has also initiated a framework for the
movement of medical and health personnel among Member States. An
impact study has shown that this would be beneficial to all Member States in
ASEAN.18 Separately, academic research on ageing in ASEAN has been
ongoing with the focus on the demographic profile and the needs of the
elderly population.19 This research is pertinent, because it contributes to the
knowledge base that governments could tap on when managing their own
population ageing issues.

Table 5. Government Views on Population-related Issues

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat, World Population Policies 2009. New York: UN, 2010.

In the spirit of ASEAN, many stakeholders have suggested ways to

improve the dissemination of information as well as to foster co-operation
and improve on co-ordination efforts within the ASEAN region to assist
countries on population ageing issues. In 2007, at the Jakarta Forum on
Social Protection for Senior Citizens in Indonesia and ASEAN countries,
participants issued a joint statement that sought to encourage greater
cooperation within the region. One of the suggestions was to form a
“Coalition of ASEAN NCA (National Commission on Ageing)” that would
engage the ASEAN mechanism to assist in addressing issues concerning an
ageing population.20 In 2009, at the Asian Gerontology Experience, a
symposium co-organised by the Institute of Policy Studies and the Council
for Third Age, Singapore, participants also suggested working within the
ASEAN mechanism for information dissemination as well as the need to
orientate public servants in Member States to the challenges posed by
population ageing.21
Amidst the challenges, there is a silver lining. As populations in the region
age, demand is likely to grow for goods and services appropriate for use by
the elderly. It has also been projected that there will be a growing silver
market as the elderly are increasingly affluent.22 In this area, there is
opportunity for ASEAN collaboration and to achieve win-win situations for
all. For example, labour-short Singapore has already started importing
helpers from its neighbouring countries to provide formal and informal care
for its elderly. Aside from employment opportunities, migrant workers from
the latter countries could also be trained for future needs in their own
countries. Studies have also shown that senior tourism and demand for
second homes in lower-cost countries are likely to rise.23 This is another
opportunity for collaboration between ASEAN Member States to facilitate
the actualisation of the wishes of the growing number of seniors. As the
more advanced countries seek to develop products for the use of seniors, the
actual manufacturing of these goods can be carried out in more cost-effective
locations in the lower-cost neighbouring countries, thereby benefiting both.
In the process, there could also be opportunities for technology transfers
from the former to the latter. Collaboration between ASEAN Member States
in developing the appropriate frameworks to facilitate such movements of
goods, services and people, and to ensure fair treatment of all stakeholders,
especially vulnerable migrant workers, would result in a win-win situation
for all.

Conclusion
In the past few decades, ASEAN has shown its ability to assist Members
through the framework of solidarity and co-operation to work on issues
multilaterally. In this same spirit, population ageing presents ASEAN with
an opportunity to assist its Member States. Countries like Cambodia,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have begun to examine these issues, and
the lessons learnt from these countries will be useful for other Member
States. This is an opportunity for ASEAN as a regional organisation to play
an important role not only in information dissemination but to assist Member
States to prepare for this demographic certainty.
Nevertheless, population ageing need not be viewed negatively. In fact,
population ageing throws up opportunities for co-operation that Member
States at different development stages may benefit from through the course
of managing this demographic phenomenon.

_____________________
1 L.A. Gavrilou and Patrick Heuveline, “Aging Population”, in The Encyclopedia of Population,
edited by Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll. New York: MacMillan Reference, 2003, pp. 32–37.
2
The projections presented here are based on the following assumptions on fertility, mortality and
international migration. Medium fertility assumes that the total fertility rate (TFR) would eventually
converge towards the level of 1.85. In instances where countries have very high or very low TFR, this
convergence may not be reached by the end of the projection period. Normal mortality levels are
assumed to decline with increasing life expectancy by sex, and HIV/AIDS is not a major mortality
risk. Normal international migration levels are based on past migration levels and the policy stance of
the country. Net migration levels are kept to a constant for most of the projection period. See
http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=4, accessed 20 August 2010.
3
P. Guest and Gavin W. Jones, “Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand”.
Population Research and Policy Review 15(1996): 109–130, at pp. 111–112.
4 R. Vos, Jose Antonio Ocampo and Ana Luiza Cortez (eds.), Ageing and Development. London and
New York: Zed Books, 2008, pp. 140–142; World Bank, Averting The Old Age Crisis: Summary.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994.
5
S. Fehr, “In some states, pension pain yields budget gains”, 2010. See
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=485980, accessed 17 August 2010.
6 United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing
populations. New York: United Nations, 2001. See
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ReplMigED/migration.htm, accessed on 9 August
2010.
7
World Health Organization, The Global Burden of Disease: 2004 Update. Switzerland: World
Health Organization, 2004, pp. 47–48.
8 A. Chan and Santosh Jatrana, “Gender Differences in Health Among Older Singaporeans”.
International Sociology 22(2007): 463–491, at pp. 485–486.
9
East-West Center, The Future of Population in Asia. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2002, p.
92.
10 World Health Organization, Active Ageing: A Policy Framework. Switzerland: WHO, 2001, p. 14.
11
J. Knodel, “Older Women in Thailand”, in Untapped Resources: Women in Ageing Societies Across
Asia, edited by Kalyani Mehta. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005, pp. 141–160; J.
Natividad, “Gender and Ageing in the Philippines”, in Untapped Resources: Women in Ageing
Societies Across Asia, op. cit., pp. 161–183.
12 A. Chan and Mui Teng Yap, Baby Boomers Survey 2008, p. 71. See
http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/pub/pa_mt_baby-boomers_survey_2009.pdf, accessed 16 August
2010.
13
World Bank, Averting The Old Age Crisis: Summary, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
14 R. Holzmann, Ian W. Mac Arthur, and Y. Sin, “Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific:
Challenges and Opportunities”, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, No. 0014. Social
Protection Unit: The World Bank, 2000, p. 15.
15
Ibid.
16 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEANWEB — Joint Statement of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial
Meeting for Social Welfare and Development, Bangkok, 17 December 2004”. See
http://www.aseansec.org/16965.htm, accessed 1 August 2010; ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement of
the Second ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting for Social Welfare and Development Ha Noi, 7
December 2007”. See http://www.aseansec.org/21227.htm, accessed 1 August 2010.
17
Ibid.
18 ASEAN-ANU Migration Research Team, “Movement of workers in ASEAN: Health Care and IT
Sectors” (REPSF Project No. 04/007), 2005, pp. 1–2. See
http://www.aseansec.org/aadcp/repsf/docs/04-007-ExecutiveSummary.pdf, accessed 18 August 2010.
19
E. Frankenberg, Lee Lillard, and Robert J. Willis, “Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers in
Southeast Asia”. Journal of Marriage and Family 64 (2002): 627–641; D. Goodkind, Truong Si Anh,
and Bui The Cuong, “Reforming Old-Age Security System in Vietnam”. Southeast Asian Journal of
Social Science 27 (1999): 139–162; J. Knodel, Jed Friedman, Truong Si Anh, and Bui The Cuong,
“Intergenerational Exchanges in Vietnam: Family Size, Sex Composition, and the Location of
Children”. Population Studies 54 (2000): 89–104; J. Menon and A. C. Melendez, “Ageing in Asia:
Trends, Impacts and Responses”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 26 (2009): 293–305.
20
See www.bappenas.go.id/get-file-server/node/2863/, accessed on 1 August 2010.
21 Institute of Policy Studies, “Summary of Asian Gerontology Experience (AGE) A
Multidisciplinary Symposium on the Gerontology Landscape in Asia”. IPS E-Newsletter 7 (2009). See
http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/enewsletter/Nov2009/AGE_301009.pdf, accessed 4 August 2010.
22
Y. Hedrick-Wong and MasterCard, The Glittering Silver Market: The Rise of the Elderly
Consumers in Asia. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd, 2007.
23 Y. Hedrick-Wong and MasterCard, The Glittering Silver Market: The Rise of the Elderly
Consumers in Asia, op. cit.; M. Ono, “Long-Stay Tourism and International Retirement Migration:
Japanese Retirees in Malaysia”, in Transnational Migration in East Asia (Senri Ethnological Reports
77), edited by Shinji Yamashita, Makito Minami, David W. Haines and Jerry S. Eades. Japan: The
National Museum of Ethnology, 2008, pp. 151–162.
 CHAPTER 25

MAKING ASEAN RELEVANT TO THE

YOUNG
Diana Lee

Growing up as a teenager in Singapore in the 1980s, I was far more in tune

with the popular culture of American and British influence than I was with
the local popular culture. I was more familiar with American and European
landmarks than I was with those in Southeast Asia. No, I had not heard of
the magnificent Borobudur in Indonesia or the ancient Angkor Wat in
Cambodia. That was how ignorant I was of the region I was living in.
Although I knew who our closest neighbours were, I was hopelessly
unaware of the historical ties between our countries. The only inkling I had
of Singapore’s link with countries in the region was my limited knowledge
of the biennial Southeast Asian (SEA) Games. I learnt to recognise the flags
of the countries as they appeared next to the names of competing athletes on
television; but I was never able to name all ten participating countries. If
truth be told, I was not the least interested in other countries because we
were competing for medals!
At that point in time, it never occurred to me that I ought to be
embarrassed by my lack of knowledge of the region. After all, most of what
I heard on the radio or watched on television were products of Western
culture, with Hong Kong influences coming in a close second. I was
watching Hong Kong drama serials from the time I was in primary school
and despite not knowing the language, I subsequently learnt to understand
and speak Cantonese! The pervasive nature of mass media proved to be a
powerful influence in our daily lives. We learnt from what we heard and
saw on a regular basis, and were contented not to know whatever else was
out of sight and out of mind.
When I entered the National University of Singapore in 1992, its Faculty
of Arts and Social Sciences had just started a Southeast Asian Studies
(SEAS) Programme the previous year. While European Studies had always
been a very popular course — especially since its students got to learn
French — most of us were a little more apprehensive about the SEAS
Programme. My interest was piqued only after I found out that the SEAS
Programme was a multidisciplinary course which covered the subjects of
History, Geography, Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Malay
Studies pertaining to the region. I thought it would be really interesting to
study the region from multiple perspectives.
The most fascinating but little known fact we first learnt was the
Indianisation of Southeast Asia. As we looked back at the region’s history,
we found out how India’s Hindu and Buddhist influences had spread far and
wide across Southeast Asia, leaving imprints in the form of monuments and
inscriptions. We studied how indigenous rulers in ancient Southeast Asia
adopted the practices of Indian kingship to develop territories and
economies, such as those in Srivijaya and Majapahit. The concept of
Indianised kingdoms, introduced by George Coedès,1 helped us understand
how Southeast Asian rulers adopted the fundamental principles of India’s
Hindu and Buddhist codes and court practices to legitimise their own rule
and affirm their royal power. India’s sphere of influence on ancient
Southeast Asia is evident in the ruins of Ayutthaya in Thailand and Angkor
Wat in Cambodia. How many people knew that?
There was definitely so much we had in common as a region. The
common theme that ran across lectures and tutorials was “Unity in
Diversity”. Historically, we learnt how all the Southeast Asian countries
became colonies of the European powers save Thailand, which evaded
colonisation and remained the buffer state between French Indochina and
the British Empire. We studied how we are geographically divided into two
subregions, Mainland and Maritime Southeast Asia, where the physical
landscape, flora and fauna determined the types of agricultural practices;
but regardless of whether it was the swidden or sawah method, rice
cultivation has always remained the staple of Southeast Asians.
I no longer looked at Southeast Asia as an unfamiliar entity as I gradually
learnt about its peoples’ shared experiences in decolonialisation and nation-
building; similar socio-political influences among clusters of countries; and
its common stance in resisting external threats. Developments in
neighbouring countries became more newsworthy and relevant. I wondered
to myself, why didn’t I know anything about the region before? Perhaps it
was the lack of education at pre-tertiary levels; or perhaps the strong
Western influences of commercialism and the mass media overshadowed
everything else. Honestly, I think it was an apathy that was prevalent among
my generation of youngsters who became accustomed to a spoon-feeding
culture. I only gave attention to whatever was brought before my very eyes,
be it education, entertainment or experience.
During the course of my work at the ASEAN Secretariat, I visited a high
school in Brunei Darussalam that had put up an impressive exhibition to
commemorate ASEAN Day. The exhibits provided a wealth of information
on the ten Member States, which included their histories, national flags,
geographical locations, landmarks, currencies, cuisines, traditional attires,
musical instruments, economic progress and so on. I was duly impressed by
the amount of research that the students had done and wished I had been
more knowledgeable as a high school student. My colleagues and I agreed
that there was so much more we could do to raise our students’ awareness
of ASEAN while they were still at an impressionable age.
To heighten awareness of ASEAN as a regional grouping, schools have
been encouraged to commemorate ASEAN Day by celebrating its cultural
diversity. School children would don the Vietnamese ao dai, savour
delectable cuisines such as pad thai and laksa, or do the singkil dance that
Filipinos are famous for. The teachers would get them to collect pictures of
flags or landmarks so they learned a little trivia about each country.
Nonetheless, merely knowing the countries’ rich diverse cultures is not
nearly enough.
The older students must be provided with a more in-depth understanding
of the regional grouping to underscore its relevance to its people. Beyond a
superficial understanding of the individual countries, youths need to know
why it is important for the region to remain cohesive and strong. They need
to understand that the peace and stability in the region is not a given but
exists as a result of a collective effort to maintain it; that ASEAN’s quiet
diplomacy has its unique way of dissolving tension arising from bilateral
disputes. They have to know that Southeast Asia holds more economic
power as a whole than as fragmented markets; and that there is economic
potential to be maximised from our popular culture and art forms. Only then
would they learn to appreciate the common thread that binds the region as a
whole.
The only obstacle to achieving these is the tendency for youngsters to
view such topics as “dry” and “political”. Reading about multilateral
diplomacy in their textbooks will more likely elicit a yawn from them than
wide-eyed wonder — or at least that was the case with my nieces when I
tutored them in Social Studies. This is because most of what they learn
about the region is either from their schoolbooks or newspapers.
Information is mostly disseminated top-down, so there is nothing they can
really relate to.
Even though the ASEAN Secretariat has been rolling out several
programmes to promote increased involvement of ASEAN youths in
regional activities, these are largely confined to small groups of student
leaders. The multiplier effect of these selected groups is simply
insignificant, if we compare the number of participants to the total number
of ASEAN youths.
There is hence a need to engage these youngsters at a different level,
other than merely providing dry facts in their textbooks. Just as individual
countries rouse nationalistic feelings among its citizens through
Independence Day celebrations, parades and songs, it would be far more
effective to appeal to these youngsters in a similar manner. A teenager who
likes the music of a pop singer will likely trawl the Internet for more
information on the artiste and his works. A youngster who is fascinated
with the fashion trend of a particular group of people will probably mimic
them in dressing. Teenagers of all generations are generally alike in that
they enjoy following the latest fads in music or fashion depicted in the mass
media. Therein lies the question: Which aspect of ASEAN culture would
appeal to the youths?
While there have been commendable efforts to promote ASEAN culture,
such as the ASEAN Rocks music festival and the ASEAN film festival,
these have largely been one-off events with a very limited reach. To
generate greater interest among the youngsters of the ten Member States,
there needs to be a more sensational means of garnering a following.
Perhaps popular artistes of each country could come together once a year to
form an ASEAN band and tour the region. Maybe there should be an
ASEAN Idol reality singing competition instead of the Asian Idol which
involved only India and five Southeast Asian countries that held the Idol
franchise. We could even hold an annual fun parade in each Member State
where other ASEAN nationals living, studying and working in the host
country would represent their own countries in their respective contingents.
Participants could do a song and dance, play their musical instruments or do
a cheer.
The important thing is that, whatever form it takes, the outreach should
be wide and people should take pleasure in participating in it. Youngsters
are more likely to be attracted to popular culture that is easily understood
and which strikes a chord with them, and shun what they deem as high
culture. Despite numerous ASEAN collaborations in the fields of the visual
arts, theatre, music and dance, many youngsters still shy away from what
they regard as highbrow cultural expressions. It is also much more effective
to create a buzz from the ground up where spontaneous feelings of unity are
generated, instead of a top-down approach where people are told what and
how to feel. Youngsters of this generation can smell propaganda from a
mile away, so such approaches would possibly backfire.
We are still at the nascent stage of forging a regional identity. Developing
a sense of belonging to any community requires time and mutual effort.
Trust needs to be built; common experiences need to be shared. It is only
when we truly feel a connection that ties begin to grow and a real ASEAN
community comes into existence. When that time comes, young ASEAN
citizens will no longer be asking what the relevance of ASEAN is. Instead,
they would be the stalwarts who will form the backbone of a peaceful
ASEAN society.

_____________________
1
George Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Histoire ancienne des états hindouisés
d’Extrême Orient), edited by Walter F. Vella; translated by Susan Brown Cowing. Honolulu: East-
West Center Press, 1968.
 CHAPTER 26

ASEAN AND HUMAN CAPITAL

Faizal Bin Yahya

The process of globalisation from an economic perspective has raised

concerns over the impact of technological change on productivity,
employment and the competitiveness of firms and nations. With greater
connectivity in transport and communications, human capital and its
mobility is at the core of a globalising world. ASEAN is proving to be an
important regional grouping for analysis because of its wide range of per
capita incomes and associated economic structures. In addition, the ASEAN
grouping has attempted to move beyond commitments made on a
multilateral basis by adopting a framework of action based on the General
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS).1
Within the ASEAN region, the vision of an ASEAN common market is
being incrementally realised by the formation of an ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC). The imperative need for the AEC is being mooted by
increasing competition from Asian economic powerhouses China and
India.2
These Asian economic giants are also reliant on scarce human capital for
their own economic expansion and are competing with ASEAN Member
States as the latter seek to form a common market. What is the economic
potential of the AEC? While the global financial crisis of 2008 had affected
intra-ASEAN trade, which contracted from US$401.9 billion in 20073 to
US$368.6 billion in 2009, the region is showing signs of further economic
recovery.4 Is human capital and labour mobility a key issue in the ASEAN
region? Interestingly, in 2007, circulating in the global economy were an
estimated 13.5 million migrant workers who originated from the ASEAN
region, with 5.3 million (39%) working in other ASEAN Member States.5
By 2015, ASEAN’s total population is expected to increase to
approximately 620 million, an approximate increase of 12%, based on
today’s population in the region.6 Most of this growth would occur in the
most economically productive age range of 25 to 54 years.7 As a result,
ASEAN’s labour force is expected to grow by 19.8% from 275.8 million in
2005 to 330.8 million by 2015. In the same period, the proportion of the
most productive age group will increase from 39.9% to 42.1%. What is the
likely impact of this population increase? Coupled with an expected decline
of economic dependents in the region, this presents a unique demographic
opportunity to enlarge the regional market.8 However, to leverage this
population increase, increasing investments in educational and skills
training could lead to deepening and widening of the human capital pool of
the region.
Broadly categorising ASEAN Member States into sending and receiving
countries for labour and human capital, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore
are primarily receiving countries, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand are
both sending and receiving countries, while Indonesia, Lao people’s
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam are sending
countries.9 Within the region, Singapore is plagued with low fertility levels
and an ageing workforce; in contrast, Laos and the Philippines have an
over-supply of young workers and inadequate employment opportunities.
While receiving countries benefit from the inflow of talent, sending
countries also benefit. Apart from knowledge and skills transfer,
remittances form an important share of the gross domestic product (GDP)
for the respective countries in the region. For example, remittances
comprise about 11.2% of the GDP in the Philippines, 7.9% in Vietnam and
1% in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.10

Circulation of Human Capital

Historically, human mobility has been part of Southeast Asia’s history and
culture. For example, commerce and trade had flourished in maritime
Southeast Asia between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. In the
Philippines, ethnic groups such as the Tagalogs came from Malacca through
Kalimantan, the Pampangos from Sumatra and the Bicolanos and Visayans
from Macassar.11 Similarly, on mainland Southeast Asia, there were
exchanges between Thailand and Yunnan Province in Southern China
which created cultural affinities. However, these population movements
subsided when countries in the region came under colonial administration.12
Colonial policies often disrupted and impeded the mobility of people in the
region by establishing boundaries and importing workers external to the
ASEAN region such as those from China and India. More than four decades
after colonial rule, human capital mobility remains pertinent to an
integrated market in ASEAN with half a billion people, a combined GDP of
US$1 trillion and immense potential as an attractive investment
destination.13
The circulation of human capital is also critical for ASEAN’s shift
towards a knowledge-based economy (KBE) manifested by the science
parks in Singapore, the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in Malaysia,
science and technology parks in Thailand, the Philippines and other
ASEAN Members. This structural shift in employment should not be
underestimated because the “newer” Members of ASEAN such as
Cambodia and Vietnam are primarily agrarian-based economies and their
move towards industry and services would entail training, retaining and
acquiring the best talents nationally and in the region.14 For the “older”
ASEAN Members like Indonesia and Malaysia, the move from low- and
mid-level manufacturing jobs towards service-sector employment would
also require retraining, retaining and acquisition of scarce talent.
Is the ASEAN region important as a source of talent? The growing
reputation of the Philippines as a source of information technology (IT)
talent, the phenomenon of business process outsourcing (BPO) and
presence of multinational companies (MNCs) in the region suggest a
positive affirmation. According to some estimates, between 1980 and 1990,
approximately 30% of IT workers and 60% of physicians from the
Philippines had moved overseas for employment purposes.15 Even
Singapore has some 150,000 to 200,000 of its professionals overseas and
likewise about 730,000 Malaysian professionals are working overseas,
mainly in Singapore. These human capital mobility trends suggest the
importance of human capital not only to the region but to the global
economy as well. Apart from IT professionals, health care professionals
from the ASEAN region have grown increasingly in reputation the world
over. Due to the scarcity of specific talent in the sciences, finance and other
fields because of growing global competition for their services, ASEAN
Members should explore means of retaining their services within the region.
These retentive efforts could be in the form of common projects among
ASEAN Members or shared databases listing these scarce talents and
allowing workers to be mobile and utilised across various ASEAN
Members. The alternative would be for these scarce talents to exit the
region altogether because of the lack of cutting edge research and
development (R&D) and or challenging career opportunities.
The mobility of human capital is also important in persuading MNCs to
remain in the ASEAN region and not to relocate to lower-cost regions. The
MNCs employ and relocate considerable numbers of their human capital
every year. For example, in 2000, China had approximately 200,000 foreign
specialists, while in the ASEAN region Malaysia had 32,000 and Vietnam
30,000.16 How would the AEC influence human capital in the ASEAN
region? Would the flow of human capital be relatively equal in terms of
intensity between Members or would it gravitate towards a hub and spoke
model? As the more advanced economies in the region, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand could be the hubs and influence the mobility of
resources, including human capital, in the region. Spokes would then
radiate from these hubs as they attract human capital from surplus
economies like Laos or the Philippines.17 However, there are constraints on
labour mobility within the region from regulations of Member States. For
example, the Alien Employment Act in Thailand prohibits foreign talent in
certain professions such as engineering and legal services.18 Other Member
States like Malaysia require foreign talent to be accredited by the respective
trade guilds or associations in areas such as accounting before they are
given a licence to practise.19

Enhancing Human Capital Circulation

As a region, ASEAN faces a number of challenges because of the mixed
levels of development and governmental styles in the region. The labour
markets among the ASEAN Members cover a large spectrum. At one end of
the spectrum are the transition economies of Laos and Vietnam coping with
the movement of labour from a command economy towards one that is
more market-oriented, and at the other end is the market-oriented economy
of Singapore with its emphasis on lifelong learning and advanced
education.20 The quality differential in tertiary and professional degrees is a
key impediment towards greater recognition of professional education and
training in the region. In this regard, cooperation and skills transfer between
more and less advanced ASEAN Members is critical. Since 1999,
Singapore has financed 488 scholars from ASEAN under the Singapore
Scholarship Programme to study in Singapore.21
Some of the key challenges facing the ASEAN region will be
employment and the development of human resources through skills and
education training that matches the new technology affiliated with new job
requirements. In addition, ASEAN Member States need to build the
capacities of their local firms to compete with MNCs and to absorb
“spillovers” from foreign direct investment.22 Between 2005 and 2015, it is
estimated that approximately 55 million jobs must be created in the ASEAN
region to match the growth in labour force.23 Employment creation should
not be about numbers alone but quality as well because the majority of the
unemployed at 58.7% are between 15 and 24 years of age.24 Demand for
human capital in the ASEAN region is increasing and has resulted in higher
wage levels and employment. For example, in Indonesia, the average wage
in the finance and business services sectors has risen by 90% between 2000
and 2006.25 Inability to provide quality employment would not only be a
waste of talent and create social unrest but also undermine ASEAN’s
ambitions and competitiveness.
Governmental policies and regulations have also impeded the movement
of professionals in the ASEAN region. These impediments include
restrictions on visa arrangements, language tests, residency and citizenship
requirements.26 These impediments to greater human capital mobility
should be reviewed because of the changing demographic needs. For
example, health care costs per capita are steadily rising in Singapore and
among the wealthy middle class in Malaysia and Thailand. A large part of
this growing demand for health care is being met by the influx of health
care professionals from the Philippines. The Philippines has been long
known as a centre for tertiary education and its graduates are proficient in
the English language, which facilitates their overseas mobility.27 Another
sector where human capital from the Philippines has made an impact is in
the IT sector. To facilitate the movement of health care professionals within
the region, mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) could be established
among the ASEAN Members.28 In this regard, the ASEAN Economic
Blueprint has urged the facilitation of the issuance of visas and employment
passes for ASEAN professionals and skilled labour in cross-border trade
and investment-related activities.29
The emerging intra-ASEAN flows of highly skilled individuals are part
of the broader trend of diverse flows within the Asian region. Increasingly,
students from China and India are opting to stay in their respective
countries for education and work purposes. Within the ASEAN region, as
the quality of education improves and more foreign tertiary institutions
establish their offshore campuses, this is likely to have a similar impact on
students in the region.30 Moreover, rapid economic growth within the Asian
region, especially in China and India and to a lesser extent the ASEAN
region, has seen decreasing migration from the region to Europe. The
emerging Asian labour migration trends seem to be mainly to the Pacific
Rim OECD countries, the Middle East and between countries in the
region.31

Conclusion
The challenge of managing the circulation of human capital is immense,
given that even at the level of the United Nations (UN) there is no agency
or formal international co-operation mechanism to regulate migration.32
However, a mechanism to assist not only in managing migration but also in
steering temporary migration is urgently required. At the regional level,
because of its common market, the European Union (EU) has been dealing
with this issue for decades. It is important to note that sending countries
consider the transient migration of human capital services as exports,
exemplified by the case of the Philippines receiving remittances from its
citizens working overseas.33 In 2009, the remittance inflow reached a
record of US$17.3 billion for the Philippines.34
The EU also provides some useful lessons in managing students or
semifinished human capital in their educational institutions. Harmonisation
of higher education through regional cooperation could contribute towards
the eventual circulation of human capital in the region. Creating a “common
space” for tertiary education by facilitating the transborder mobility of
semifinished human capital and faculty staff through increased research
collaboration and activities would pay rich dividends to all concerned.
Despite, the differences in cultures, languages and educational systems,
regional tertiary educational institutions are already leading the way
through exchanges of students and staff by mechanisms like the provision
of ASEAN scholarships and exchange programmes. This would also be in
keeping with the global trends of education liberalisation,
transnationalisation and transformation towards KBEs. The regulation of
activities by recruitment agencies and overseas employment boards acting
as “gate-keepers” to foreign professionals and skilled labour is another key
area that could facilitate the mobility of human capital.
Why the need to address the movement of intra-ASEAN talent? The
signing of two free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN’s large Asian
neighbours, China and India, has made the labour issue all the more
pressing. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) comprises a region
of 1.9 billion people and a total trade of US$4.3 trillion.35 However, the
Chinese economy has a large, low-cost production base and a large pool of
unskilled workers. In the same context, the ASEAN-India Free Trade
Agreement (AIFTA) comprises a region of 1.8 billion people36 but with a
total trade of only US$50 billion. India also has a large pool of unskilled
workers but has a sizeable number of professional diaspora as well in the
ASEAN region. In light of greater economic integration with its major
dialogue partners, ASEAN’s ambitious target of its own economic
integration by 2020 could be undermined without greater coordination and
co-operation in various sectors of the economy including regulating
movement of transboundary human capital.

_____________________
1
Chris Manning and Alexandra Sidorenko, The Regulation of Professional Migration in ASEAN,
Australian National University, unpublished.
2 Oki Hermansyah, Haris Munandar and Ferry Kurniawan, “Regional Economic Integration,
Mobility of Production Factors and the Role of the Central Bank”, Working Paper WP/17/2007, Bank
Indonesia, March 2008, p. 1.
3
Maragtas S.V. Amante, “Overview about ASEAN Regional Economic Integration: Inclusion for
Workers and the Unions”, in Mind the Gap: ASEAN Integration, the Workers and Unions,
Assessment-Study: ASEAN Economic Integration and its Impact on Workers and Trade Unions,
ASEAN Service Employees Trade Union Council and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 10. See
http://www.fes-
asia.org/media/regional%20governance/ASETUC_Assessment%20Study_Full%20report.pdf,
accessed 18 July 2010.
4 “Intra-ASEAN Investment: Talking to Our Neighbours”, Vietnam Financial Review, 16 July 2010.
See http://www.vfr.vn/focus/intra-asean-investment-talking-to-our-neighbors.html, accessed 23 July
2010.
5
“Labour and Social Trends in ASEAN 2010”, International Labour Organization, 2010, p. 12.
6 Maragtas S.V. Amante, “Overview about ASEAN Regional Economic Integration: Inclusion for
Workers and the Unions”, op. cit., pp. 10 and 15.
7
Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 15.
9
“Labour and Social Trends in ASEAN 2010”, International Labour Organization, 2010, p. 12. See
http://www.ilo.org/asia/whatwedo/publications/lang–en/docName–WCMS_127957/index.htm,
accessed 18 July 2010.
10 Ibid., pp. 13–14.
11
Aris Ananta and Evi Nurvidya Arifin, “Should Southeast Asian Borders be Opened?”, in
International Migration in Southeast Asia, edited by Aris Ananta and Evi Nurvidya Arifin.
Singapore: ISEAS, 2004, p. 5.
12 Maruja M.B. Asis, “Borders, Globalization and Irregular Migration in Southeast Asia”, ibid.
13
Speech by Goh Chok Tong, “The Third Growth Engine in Asia”, Pan-Asia Rising Stars
Conference, Singapore, 9 May 2007.
14 Maragtas S.V. Amante, “Overview about ASEAN Regional Economic Integration: Inclusion for
Workers and the Unions”, op. cit., p. 17.
15
Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, “Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Migration
Information Sources, 10 July 2009. See http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?
ID=733, accessed 17 July 2010.
16 Ibid.
17
O. Cortes, S. Jean and M. Fouquin, “Impact of Regionalisation on Employment: ASEAN”,
Employment Papers 9, ILO, Geneva, 1997, p. 30.
18 Sanchita Basu Das, “Are ASEAN Members Ready for the AEC by 2015?”, ISEAS Notes, 7 May
2010.
19
Faizal bin Yahya and Arunajeet Kaur, The Migration of Indian Human Capital. London:
Routledge, 2010.
20 John Walsh, “Labour Market Issues for the ASEAN Region”, 4th International Postgraduate
Research Colloquium IPRC Proceedings, p. 35.
21
Speech by Dr. Balaji Sadasivan, Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 11th Singapore
Scholarship Presentation Ceremony, 5 August 2009.
22
“Unions”, in Mind the Gap: ASEAN Economic Integration, the Workers and Unions, op. cit., pp.
49–50.
23 ILO, “Realising ASEAN’s Potential”, 30 May 2007. See
http://www.ilo.org/asia/info/public/features/lang–en/WCMS_BK_PR_196_EN/index.htm, accessed
17 July 2010.
24
Ibid.
25 Maragtas S.V. Amante, “Overview about ASEAN Regional Economic Integration: Inclusion for
Workers and the Unions”, op. cit., p. 17.
26
ASEAN-ANU Migration Research Team, “Movement of Workers in ASEAN: Health Care and IT
Sectors”, REPSF Project No. 04/007, June 2005, p. 1.
27 Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, p. 18.
30
Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region, op. cit.
31 Robert E.B. Lucas, “Diaspora and Development: Highly Skilled Migrants from East Asia”, World
Bank Report, November 2001, p. 4. See http://ideas.repec.org/p/bos/iedwpr/dp-120.html, accessed 17
July 2010.
32
Marion Panizzon, “Standing Together Apart: Bilateral Migration Agreements and the Temporary
Movement of Persons under ‘Mode 4’ of GATS”, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working
Paper No. 77, University of Oxford, 2010, p. 3.
33 Hein de Haas, “International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Fact”, Global
Migration Perspectives, April 2005, p. 5.
34
“Philippines’ April Remittances at $1.52 Billion, Up 5.4 pct”, Reuters, 15 June 2010.
35 Shandre Mugan Thangavelu, “How Asean can fully benefit from trade pact with China”, Straits
Times, 11 February 2010.
36
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Strengthening ASEAN-India Relations in the 21st Century”, The
Project 2049 Institute, 27 May 2010.
 CHAPTER 27

THE ASEAN QUEST FOR GREATER

ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT
Braema Mathiaparanam

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has never had it easy
as a regional bloc comprising countries in Southeast Asia.1 It has usually
been on the receiving end of more brickbats than accolades. There has
always been much scepticism, rightly or wrongly. In fact at one time a
prevailing joke among cynics was that ASEAN stood for “Always Say
Everything, Act Nothing”, in the same vein as sceptics referred to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO ) as “No Action, Talk Only”. I
remember my first ASEAN dialogue, when I was at the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, where the refrain from speakers and discussants
was ASEAN’s lack of implementation. This was later repeated at the
ASEAN People’s Assembly meeting in the Philippines where the mantra of
“Implementation, Implementation, Implementation” (which was
summarised honestly by an ASEAN Secretariat official) seemed to embrace
all that was not right with ASEAN. That was in 2005. Five years on and
there is a buzz around ASEAN. There are more activities, more meetings,
more documents, more personnel and more representatives. Perhaps change
is in the air.
It is my view that though ASEAN seems to have grown busier, there is
also a commitment, perhaps even an urgency, among ASEAN Member
States (AMS) to prove that regionalism can work in Southeast Asia.
Leaders are keen to display co-operative might, to engage with the people
and to be a reliable player on the global stage. Perhaps then regionalism is
one way to deal with globalisation, emerging common economic platforms
through bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements and deep inter-
connectivity brought on by internet access. ASEAN leaders seem to be
more acutely aware that this region cannot afford to be left behind.

A Journey
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has operated very much within the
circles of political leaders, quite removed from the people. It may well be
that the first time its citizens began to engage with ASEAN occurred in
1993 when six AMS issued a Joint Communiqué at the 26th ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting in Singapore2 affirming their commitment to a human
rights agenda. This offered a possibility for all ASEAN Member States to
become more focussed beyond economic co-operation. The Joint
Communique piqued the interest of scholars, lawyers, and advocates of
human rights who began to engage ASEAN with a view to enhancing
democratic values in ASEAN.
But sadly this “human rights” articulation remained just that for some
time and ASEAN continued as an entity with little connectivity with its
people. This is also understandable as ASEAN is an inter-governmental
organisation which can only move at the pace of its Members who are more
focussed on economic progress and/or at times preoccupied with
maintaining and sustaining their own political leadership at the national
level. To be fair too, in the 1990s many among the AMS were emerging
nations very much focussed on building infrastructures for their own
economic survival and progress. These diverse aims and the ASEAN way
of consensus contributed to the lack of close follow-up of many of the
“human touch” aspirations expressed in the 1993 Joint Communiqué.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis did not help matters. Any possibility of
building up a greater positivity towards ASEAN — both at the local and
global levels — was derailed when criticisms were made at the lack of
action to help ailing AMS counter the economic fallout. This criticism also
came hot on the heels of the public bilateral sniping between Singapore and
Malaysia over issues such as the location of customs, immigration and
quarantine operations (CIQ). All these did not help improve ASEAN’s
international image or its traction with its own people. It was also a period
of transborder tensions over the haze from land-clearing operations, and
ASEAN’s recognition of the governments of Myanmar and Cambodia
despite the illegitimate grab for power to form governments in these
countries. To a large extent ASEAN has managed to overcome the
turbulence of this period, but the reality remains as one of challenging
human development issues in the ten-Member group.
Of the more than 500 million people in the ASEAN region, more than
half are able to find work, some as informal workers. In 2006, among the
263 million workers in ASEAN nearly 150 million still did not earn enough
to lift themselves and their families above the US$2 per day poverty line.
Of this group 28.5 million lived with their families in extreme poverty on
less than US$1 per day. The International Labour Organization, while
acknowledging that there has been progress in ASEAN over the last ten
years, states that every tenth workers in ASEAN has to face the difficult
situation of surviving on less than US$1 per day for each family member.
As such almost a third of the people in ASEAN are still struggling below
the poverty line and most are in the developing ASEAN Member States.
The Human Development Index for ASEAN Member States also reveals
the wide disparity in the economic well-being of the people across the ten
states. These indices are: Singapore (0.944); Brunei (0.920); Malaysia
(0.829); Thailand (0.783); the Philippines (751); Indonesia (0.734);
Vietnam (0.725); Lao PDR (0.619); Cambodia (0.593); and Myanmar
(0.586).4 This makes economic co-operation all the more important for the
group to grow as a whole. But it also means much negotiation among AMS
to ensure that less well-off Members do not feel outclassed; and for the
better-off countries to ensure that trade deals are made on a win-win
formula with such Member States. Other human dvelopment challenges that
face AMS include dealing with about 15 million people living with HIV;
and nearly one-third of the global trafficking trade, or about 200,000–
225,000 women and children, are trafficked annually from Southeast Asia
with two-thirds of them being trafficked to ASEAN’s own cities.5
Apart from meeting development challenges, ASEAN’s role in enabling
development may be lost on the people as it is often seen as the work of
national political structures in Member States. As access to food, shelter,
clean water, health services and education affects people directly, the
positive impact of regional co-operation can easily be appropriated at the
local level for political and practical reasons. It needs to be accepted that to
the ordinary person, food on the table means that the politician has
delivered and it would not matter if ASEAN-level policies had played a
part. It can be a no-win situation for ASEAN’s relevance to be appreciated
under such circumstances.
ASEAN too has tasked itself with audacious goals such as access to
primary schooling for all children by 2015. There are already similar
criticisms levelled at the time-bound Millennium Development Goals which
include eradicating poverty by 2015. While setting targets are essential to
drive the agenda, they can also be viewed as inefficiencies when targets are
not met or as ludicrous when goals are overambitious.
ASEAN also suffers from an image deficit. There are significant
improvements, achievements and initiatives that need to be shared with the
larger community beyond mere uploading of documents onto its website. It
needs a well-organised outreach programme that allows the community to
know its achievements. Since its inception, ASEAN has had its fair share of
major successes. Following up on the motivation to maintain regional peace
and stability, ASEAN leaders adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in 1976. Countries were guided along three principles of non-interference in
internal matters, settlement of disputes by peaceful means and renunciation
of the threat or use of force. In the past ASEAN had opposed the armed
invasion of Kampuchea by the Vietnam People’s Army,6 and recently over
the skirmishes at the Thai-Cambodian border concerning ownership claims
over the ancient temple of Preah Vihear that is located on the Cambodian
side. ASEAN had also expressed its concern over conflicts in Afghanistan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and most recently over North Korea’s agitation against
South Korea. These expressions of concern are important for the AMS to
show their mettle on the stage of world politics. Singly, their voices on such
issues will be lost but as a regional bloc their statements can only add to the
process of maintaining peace and also mark clearly what is becoming
unacceptable to them and the region.
ASEAN has steered clear of commenting on internal strife in Member
States as part of observing the principle of non-interference in internal
matters. But at the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN foreign
ministers voiced their concerns on governance and democratic approaches
for Myanmar’s upcoming elections.7 This is good news, making up for the
silence from ASEAN over the 2008 Saffron Revolution in Myanmar. There
have also been tentative statements issued by various AMS over the
opposing forces in Thailand during the April–May 2010 stand-off and
subsequent violence.
Despite arbitrariness, it is my view that ASEAN today is more confident
to voice its views. This will continue to be a calibrated process as being
engaged in the internal matters of AMS will remain as a balancing act of
also observing the sovereignty of Members. This is a step in the right
direction.

ASEAN Today
Thus, it is my view that there is a certain level of optimism in relation to
ASEAN amid the griping and sniping that go on. But this is still a
cautiously held view. There is no idealism or romanticism in how one views
ASEAN and among the pessimists there is also a pervasive passive
ambivalence more than an outright discrediting of ASEAN.
Much of this optimism comes from the restructuring of ASEAN and its
efforts to engage in discussions with ASEAN civil society leaders. I will
first discuss the engagement process, which began in earnest with the
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) meeting a cross-section of the ASEAN
community. Stakeholders in turn met with their constituents to validate their
own positions and points of view. This in itself caused a ripple effect that,
for once, had more people becoming aware of ASEAN. It also gave hope to
civil society actors that they could engage with ASEAN. Never has ASEAN
moved closer to the people than in the last five years, a trailblazer effort
from the Members of the EPG. This does not mean that there were no
previous dialogues with civil society actors.8 But today that space has
opened up significantly for civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage
with ASEAN because of CSOs’ efforts to claim that space and also because
of ASEAN’s efforts to try and stay true to being people-oriented.
Admittedly this is not without its problems. Yes, currently there are many
more CSOs showing an interest in ASEAN. There is also jostling among
CSOs to ensure their presence at the dialogue table. This can be untidy and
in some instances annoying because recognising leaders among CSOs is not
an easy task. But once the dust settles, it will be easier to identify the CSOs
that can contribute to the process as partners to build a stronger regionalism.
This will take time. As the Member States too come from different political
systems, reactions to CSOs can range from aversion to tolerance. Only a
handful among the AMS are openly welcoming of views from stakeholders.
This can only change. Member States will grow, and are growing, in
confidence to deal with diverse views and dissent. This space will
eventually evolve to be one that is shared between the various stakeholders,
becoming a multi-stakeholder platform.
The second factor that has contributed to renewed optimism for ASEAN
lies in the ASEAN Charter. Before the Charter was formulated, it was easy
to dismiss ASEAN as just a meeting for the ministers and the business
community. But the Charter has given more structure, shape and impetus to
ASEAN as an entity.
This does not mean that there were no earlier efforts to build up greater
community-oriented approaches within ASEAN. Though ASEAN was
formed primarily for greater economic integration since 1976, its agenda for
regional integration has been expanding to embrace wider issues, ranging
from security to economic co-operation. In October 2003, in Bali, for
example, ASEAN agreed to establish an ASEAN Community (AC) by
2020, which will reinforce three elements of co-operation, namely political
and security co-operation, economic co-operation, and socio-cultural co-
operation, as established in the Bali Concord II agreement. This was among
some of the many steps taken to formalise ASEAN as an entity. Based on
the recommendations of the EPG, the High Level Task Force produced the
ASEAN Charter, which was accepted in 2007, that gives the regional group
its legal personality.
The Charter contains provisions for greater commitment at the
government level,9 asking for a Council of Permanent Representatives
(CPR) to be set up with one ambassador from each Member State. The
CPR, in due course, will become the link between the ASEAN Secretariat,
Member States and the people. The CPR can play a crucial role to ensure
that regional plans are driven down to the local and provincial level for
implementation. They can also build up partnerships with other country
representatives based in Jakarta to enhance co-operation in one of the three
communities, if not across all three, and also support the work of the
Secretary-General. The platforms that have emerged within ASEAN
through the ASEAN Community Councils also highlight the regular
meetings held among ASEAN ministers and senior officials to exchange
ideas and expertise.
The Charter also specified organisational restructuring for the ASEAN
Secretariat which included enhancing the powers of the Secretary-General
and creating new positions for support in the form of Deputy Secretary-
Generals. These officers work with the Coordinating Councils of ASEAN
Foreign Ministers and Community Councils of ASEAN Ministers to
strategise and also ensure that plans are realised. For example, the
Economic Community hopes to achieve full economic integration among
ASEAN Members by 2015. This is a bold target since platforms and rules
of co-operation are still being worked out. Many feel that this is an
impossible target.10 But there is hope for better target setting and goal
matching for the future or as this process evolves. Part of this process at the
national level has seen most AMS appointing dedicated ASEAN staff
within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to co-ordinate with other
government organs and national-level stakeholders on matters related to
ASEAN. As dialogue increases between these officers and community
stakeholders, it will become easier to achieve ASEAN’s goals because there
is a community-level buy-in which is key to the successful implementation
of programmes.
ASEAN today has also articulated its identity through a motto — One
Vision, One Identity, One Community — and designated 8 August as
ASEAN Day. These are opportunities for greater community bonding on
the concept of regionalism and the benefits at the local level. There are
already emerging engagements with youths, and a recent survey among
university undergraduates shows a high propensity among the students to
give ASEAN a chance.11
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint is very detailed in all
its ambitions. It is a comprehensive blueprint that covers all areas. Most of
the areas come under the governance of a department within the ASEAN
Secretariat and the same applies in terms of support staff within the
Ministries of Social Welfare or the equivalent in the ten AMS. These
ministries traditionally also receive the lowest allocation from national
budgets. For the Blueprint to move beyond the work plan, each AMS needs
to devote resources for effective implementation. The Socio-Cultural
Blueprint is also the most embracing of all issues within ASEAN. It
includes six main themes ranging from corporate social responsibility,
environmental sustainability to disaster resilience and building an identity.
In the discussion on implementation, like the Political-Security Community
Blueprint, the content is generalised. Compare this to the Economic
Community Blueprint where the implementation phase is clearly marked.
Yet we already know that with such clear target setting, it would in all
likelihood fail to meet its own turnaround target dates for effective
implementation. The challenges that ASEAN faces in meeting the
economic targets include greater connectivity through rail, air and
unhampered movement of people and capital in the AMS, on top of freeing
up trade in an environment where some countries/regional groups prefer
developing Free Trade Agreements with individual countries rather than
ASEAN, as a bloc. It remains a challenge for a 2015 deadline.
Nevertheless, from Bali Concord II to the ASEAN Charter, there has been a
commitment to getting implementation more structured and goal-oriented.
Now that most of it is being put in place, despite these challenges, I hope
the Blueprint will be reviewed to ensure better rates of success because
ASEAN is structurally stronger now to better support the implementation
process.
Another reason for optimism is that the 1993 promise to “coordinate a
common approach on human rights” as stated in the Joint Communique
finally came into fruition with the setting up of the human rights body in
2008. ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment through Article 14 in the ASEAN
Charter and so set up the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on Women and
Children. However, the human rights agenda is less visible, almost absent in
the the Economic Community Blueprint. This is a setback as economic
progress today is closely tied up with ethical business practices that include
preservation of the environment, maintaining labour standards and
enhancing sustainable livelihoods for rural and indigenous communities. As
such, it is crucial for the Coordinating Council to ensure that there are no
serious violations in the pursuit of economic progress, and to ensure that
there is transparency through information-sharing processes. ASEAN needs
to take on a balanced role between protection of livelihoods, cultural
preservation and enhancing growth areas for economic development. The
potential to be well-engaged on this dilemma can be harnessed as
Community Councils meet across the table to share views, progress reports,
and seek views from the general community for any major economic
development so as to try and keep intact a rights-based approach in the
process.
The balance that needs to be struck between economic well-being and
social justice is a constant challenge for all countries and regional groups.
This constant struggle can perhaps be best understood through the prism of
the migrant workers, which is always seen as a demand-supply issue of the
market when the social justice element of protecting the worker’s rights is
equally important.

Going Forward
The ASEAN Secretariat has done many things right. In 2005 there was an
ASEAN Baseline Report which identified key areas that need attention.
There are periodic reports on the advancement of women in ASEAN. There
is a Work Plan for Women’s advancement and Gender Equality (2005–
2010). There is also a collaborative effort on drug trafficking. There are
many efforts to strengthen peace-building processes, build up safe havens in
AMS and also engage in cultural reform for greater understanding.

Much is good

We must give ASEAN a chance. But ASEAN too must give itself a chance.
The ASEAN Secretariat needs to attract the best talents for the work to hit
the ground. Currently there are too many officers from the diplomatic
services and too few development personnel. The Secretariat also runs the
risk of becoming too costly administratively with too little funds, in
proportion to programme development at the grassroots.
ASEAN needs to become more open to its own creation, that is, its
mandate as in the ASEAN charter — to be people-oriented ASEAN.
Member States need to take bigger risks with their stakeholders and engage
them to become development partners. Those who take up office at the
political level need to be the best in the land. There is an impatience with
cronyism. Good political leaders will also ensure that they take the course
of being rules-based and people-oriented, both at the national and regional
levels. With a deeper realisation of what is at stake for the region, AMS can
further enhance and so transform ASEAN by turning the ASEAN Charter
and the AICHR — with all their limitations — into reality.
In due course, if the route is well-plotted and well-coursed, then ASEAN
should have an ASEAN Court of Justice and hopefully a Truth and
Reconciliation Council (TRC). It is my view that a TRC can prove to be a
useful tool in instances where there is internal strife between communities
in any AMS as such a structure offers opportunities for greater
understanding between communities. These are audacious goals given the
current climate of cautiousness exercised by Member States. But when it
happens we will know that we have harnessed the potential of ASEAN
well. Everything speaks right for ASEAN now to move forward with a
mindset change. ASEAN’s relevance is in the hands of the current leaders
of the ten Member States and civil society organisations who, though
frustrated or otherwise, need to give ASEAN a chance to breathe.

_____________________
1
The ten Member States are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.
2 The six ASEAN Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand) stated in the Joint Communiqué at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
(AMM) in Singapore, 23–24 July 1993, their collective view about human rights: “The Foreign
Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna, 14–25 June 1993, and reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993. They stressed
that human rights are interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights. These rights are of equal importance. They should be addressed in a balanced and
integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for specific cultural, social, economic
and political circumstances. They emphasized that the promotion and protection of human rights
should not be politicized”.
3
Regional and country reports of the ASEAN Assessment on the Social Impact of the Global
Financial Crisis; ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank; 2010.
4 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy,
education and standards of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of measuring well-
being, especially child welfare. It is used to distinguish whether a country is developed, developing
or is an underdeveloped country, and is also used to measure the impact of economic policies on
quality of life. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index, accessed 22 July 2010.
5
“Combating Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Review of Policy and Programme Responses”; 2000;
http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/ctsea.pdf, accessed 23 July 2010.
6 Kampuchea is now known as Cambodia.
7
Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, whose country holds the current ASEAN
chairmanship, said at the final press conference: “The elections should be free and democratic with
the participation of all parties involved”. He added, “This would stabilise the country, creating a base
for economic development”. Catriona Richards, The Jakarta Post, 24 July 2010;
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article, accessed 24 July 2010.
8
Other platforms include the ASEAN People’s Assembly which annually saw about 300 civil
society actors and academics gathering for discussions and point-of-view presentations to the
ASEAN Secretariat. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism from 1996 has
also been using the terms of the Joint Communiqué to influence ASEAN senior officials on setting
up a human rights body. In addition, thematic-based groups, especially those which work on rural
development, social protection and HIV, have also held discussions.
9 As stipulated in Article 12 of the ASEAN Charter, each AMS shall appoint a Permanent
Representative to ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta. Their role is primarily to
support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; co-
ordinate with ASEAN National Secretariats and other ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; liaise
with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its
work; facilitate ASEAN co-operation with external partners; and perform such other functions as
may be determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.
10
“Doubts linger on ASEAN integration by 2015”, Catriona Richards, The Jakarta Post, 22 July
2010.
11
http://www.aseanfoundation.org/documents/Attitudes%20and%20Awareness%20Toward%20ASEA
N.pdf, accessed 25 July 2010.
 THEME FIVE

EXTERNAL RELATIONS
 CHAPTER 28

LAO PDR’S ROLE IN ASEAN-CHINA

TRADE TIES
H.E. Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh of the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic

I am very glad to attend the 6th China-ASEAN Business and Investment

Summit with state leaders from China and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as well as many well-known
entrepreneur and investors.
I believe the theme of the summit, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and
ASEAN Integration: Co-Together”, is just in accordance with the situation
at present. China and ASEAN are working together to turn the financial
crisis and the challenges and impacts along with it into an opportunity for
extensive co-operation between ASEAN and China.
I am delighted to see that at the crucial time of the global financial crisis,
China’s economy is developing steadily. This has prevented the regional
economy from entering a serious recession and has become an important
driver for regional economic development. Therefore, it is of great
significance to strengthen the strategic co-operation relations, and the
establishment of ASEAN-China free trade will lay a solid foundation for
bilateral trade and investment in the future.
Today, ASEAN is accelerating its integration process, which is scheduled
for completion by 2015. All the ASEAN countries have to finish a lot of
important work and meet the challenges before integration can finally be
realised. As a strategic partner of ASEAN, China, I believe, will play an
important role in the process of ASEAN integration, co-operating with,
supporting and helping ASEAN countries. At present, the four new
Member States of ASEAN, including Laos, are developing infrastructures
and traffic facilities.
As a Member of the ASEAN, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
takes an active part in the construction of ASEAN through the
implementation of various plans and projects. At the same time, it also
creates and offers a good environment and conditions for integration with
ASEAN and other countries. For example, we have adjusted and simplified
investment law, adopted a lot of incentive policies and improved services
procedures and mechanisms, so as to facilitate investment and trade. The
government has added more investment in infrastructures, so that Laos can
play the role of a centre linking the Mekong area and the region, and we
will give priority to projects of railways and highways connecting China
and the neighbouring countries to offer better services for comprehensive
cooperation between ASEAN and China as well as Laos and China.
In the meantime, we will manage to facilitate goods transit, inspection
and handling. We will build economic development zones, including export
processing zones, special economic zones, free trade areas in the east-west
economic corridor, the northern economic zone, the southern economic
zone and the Vientiane central zone. To co-operate with China, our northern
provinces have worked out comprehensive plans to encourage investment
and co-operation. Thus, it is much more convenient for investment and co-
operation between Laos and China, especially between our northern
provinces and their Guangxi and Yunnan provinces.
I would like to take this opportunity to invite entrepreneurs and investors
from ASEAN and China to come to Laos for on-the-spot investigation to
find suitable opportunities.
I believe that co-operation between ASEAN and China, just as that
between Laos and China, will be further deepened and extended so as to
turn our region into a stable and rich area.

This speech was delivered by H.E. Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh

of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic at the 6th China-ASEAN Business
and Investment Summit, Nanning, China, in 2009.
 CHAPTER 29

ASEAN’S DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE

TO CHINA
Sheng Lijun

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a useful regional

organisation. Its diplomatic importance to China has been increasing, and
the main source of this importance is the niche it crafted for itself in the
East Asian regional strategic structure that China values.
Since its reform in the late 1970s, China’s diplomacy has been working
to cultivate a peaceful and favourable international and regional
environment for it to make the best use of this moment in time, which it
terms as “the most favorable strategic opportunity that China has ever had
for centuries”, for its modernisation at home. In the context of this overall
aim, ASEAN is of immense relevance to China because their interests,
although not identical, intersect. When ASEAN strives to promote its own
goals of closer intra-regional integration and playing a greater role in
regional multilateralism, these efforts also inadvertently serve China’s
interests.
First, the integration and hence regional stability that ASEAN is striving
for serve China’s interest of stability in its south, without the overt external
domination (by the United States) that China is concerned about. ASEAN’s
paralysis or dismemberment will likely invite external interference into this
region and result in instability that does not serve China’s current
fundamental interest of refusing to be distracted from its modernisation
drive and avoiding the assumption of unnecessary regional responsibilities
that “make its wings heavier” so that it can fly higher and faster.
ASEAN’s other aim of seeking a greater role in regional multilateralism
is also consistent with China’s interests. As a rising power that believes
time is on its side, China is apparently not interested in being prematurely
forced into a strategic straitjacket — that is, a clear-cut and strictly rule-
binding regional security architecture — but a loose and “harmonious”
arrangement that gives it enough strategic room to grow. The US attempt at
building an Asia-Pacific security mechanism — including Australia’s Asia-
Pacific Community (APC) proposal — invites strong Chinese suspicion of
such a US-dominated strategic straitjacket on China.
How can China foil these efforts without an ugly face-off with the United
States? China should not wait for the United States to set up the ground for
East Asian multilateralism and challenge it later, but ought to set it up first
and thus make it difficult for the United States to change it later. The best
way to Beijing, however, is not to set it up itself or even set up its own
rules, but to encourage a third party (in this case, ASEAN) to assume a
pivotal role in East Asian regionalism and to nudge away the United States
from setting up its own rules here. The outcome would likely be, to use a
Chinese expression, a situation of hunzhan (a messy game or spaghetti-like
entanglement with intervening of various kinds of regionalism), but not
jingwei fenming (a clear-cut and binding arrangement). This strategy is
actually “to draw but not to win”. In the present situation, for China, to
draw is to win and better than winning. This is philosophically rooted in
Chinese strategic culture such as in Lao Tzu’s and Sun Tzu’s reminder that
“to go around is better than to go straight”. In other words, to “go around”
(i.e. to draw, to let a third party play the leading role) is better than to “go
straight” (to go all out to set the rules of game by itself), which is not only
impossible but also will backfire heavily.
This is ASEAN’s relevance to China in the eyes of Beijing. As it works
to serve its own interest, ASEAN accidently serves China’s interest.
ASEAN must work to maintain its centrality in East Asian regionalism, not
as a favour to China but to further its own fundamental interest of not being
marginalised. Yet this serves China’s interest of letting a third party
(ASEAN) instead of the United States (or its sheriff) set up the rules of the
game in this region. The ASEAN Way is preferable to China than American
rules.
That is why China has been supporting ASEAN’s leading/pivotal role in
East Asian regionalism, i.e. to set up its own rules of the game in this
region. Thus, the United States is faced with hard options: (1) to accept the
ASEAN Way and ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian regionalism; (2) to
use its own rules to replace the existing rules of the game ASEAN has set
up. The United States would find it difficult to accept the first choice. But if
it persists in pursuing the second, it will be an affront to ASEAN.
The third option is to press ASEAN to revise the ASEAN Way and
compromise its leading role, an attempt we witnessed in the tussle in the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) over its leadership and process. This has
proven to be not only a difficult but also a wrong battle for the United
States, because in the ARF it is faced with at least some, if not all,
disgruntled Member States with China hiding behind them.
The fourth option is for the United States to bend a little and use ASEAN
as a platform for regional multilateralism and accept its centrality as US
President Obama proclaimed in the recent US-ASEAN Summit during the
APEC Leaders’ Summit in Singapore in late 2009. China is concerned but
not obsessed. It believes that so long as the United States does not set up its
own rules of the game but accepts those that ASEAN has established over
the past decades, that is, the ASEAN Way, perhaps even a refined version
(because ASEAN will not easily give it up totally), and accepts ASEAN’s
leadership (or even co-leadership) or centrality, US entry into this platform
is a strategic plus for China and a constraint on the United States.
That is also why China works with ASEAN in giving the cold shoulder to
Australia’s proposal for an Asia-Pacific community, but for different
reasons. For ASEAN, the APC, as it is currently defined, denies the former
a central role in the regional grouping and dooms it to eventually vanish.
For China, without ASEAN in the APC, it will lose its strategic ambiguity,
flexibility, leeway and bargaining chips. And without ASEAN as a shield it
would be forced to confront the United States on many issues, where the
latter often seeks clear-cut and binding resolutions while China prefers non-
binding, loose but “harmonious” arrangements.
Thus, ASEAN’s diplomatic relevance to China will be here to stay,
whether China keeps rising or not. The possibility of China going it alone
when it is strong is remote, as is the possibility of a so-called G2. It is up to
ASEAN to make use of its relevance to craft a better niche and
constructively coordinate this relevance with those it has with other major
powers to better reinforce regional peace, security and prosperity.
 CHAPTER 30

ASEAN AS A MOVER OF ASIAN

REGIONALISM
Akiko Fukushima

Introduction
Since the launch of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
in November 1989 — the month in which the Berlin Wall collapsed,
marking the end of the Cold War — a succession of regional architectures
have been created.
The Asia-Pacific region, once considered arid ground in which
regionalism could not take root, has witnessed the rapid emergence of so
many regional architectures that, at times, they even compete. According to
today’s wisdom, they represent the strata of the multilayered regional
architecture.
ASEAN has driven regionalism in Asia with its ASEAN Plus initiatives
that have been vital in realising dialogues on common issues. This is in
stark contrast to the Cold War period, when the lack of a common enemy, as
well as historical, cultural and economic diversity — including historical
animosities and mutual distrust — fuelled scepticism regarding the merits
of regional co-operation.
However, ASEAN’s role in Asia-Pacific regionalism, notably in the areas
of APEC’s remit, has gained weight over the years, both in terms of the
group as well as of the individual Member States. The launching of the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an Asia-Pacific security dialogue, reflects
both the role of ASEAN in meeting particular needs of the region. ASEAN
has functioned as a primary partner for Japan, which the grouping has
included in the fabric of regional co-operation that it has woven over the
past four decades and served as an essential subject for researchers in Japan
working in regionalism.
ASEAN’s place in regional architectures is recognised as significant by
other players in the region, notably as demonstrated by the US-ASEAN ten
Members’ summit meeting in Singapore at the margins of the APEC
leaders’ meeting in November 2009. Moreover, despite its long reluctance
to do so, the United States finally signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in summer 2009, allowing it to join ASEAN Plus Six,
also called the East Asia Summit (EAS).
Given the climate for co-operation in East Asia and the wider Asia-
Pacific region, this chapter examines how ASEAN has driven regionalism
and considers how the grouping might play a role as the Asia-Pacific
architecture evolves.

Evolution of Regional Architecture Since the End of the Cold

War
The 20th anniversary of the end of the Cold War was feted in November
2009 in Europe. But there could be no such celebration in the Asia-Pacific,
which still suffers from lingering Cold War legacies, such as territorial
issues.
Nevertheless, there have been changes over the past two decades, as
countries in the region gradually democratised their political systems and
their thriving economies became more interdependent with the advent of
globalisation. While economic activity in East Asia was more inter- than
intra-regional, with the major export market being the United States,
economic needs did not compel Asia-Pacific countries to consider forging a
customs union or economic community. But their economies have
undergone a sea change. Figures for 2008 reveal that, as a result of
globalisation and the phenomenal economic growth of Member States, East
Asia has been witnessing growing intra-regional trade (62%), which has
outstripped trade with the European Union (48%) and NAFTA (47%),
according to statistics issued by the Institute of Developing Economics,
Japan External Trade Organization, (IDE-JETRO) as well as investment
information and transnational production network figures. These factors
reflect deeper economic interdependence and the trend is irreversible.
Intra-regional economic interdependence has led to bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that, in
turn, have led to new Asian frameworks for co-operation in economic,
politico-security and other matters. Although the current architectures are
mainly to facilitate dialogue, and are even dubbed talk shops by some, a
number of the constructs have started to promote co-operation on issues
regarding which countries can expect more effective solutions than were
they to act alone. Examples are functional issues such as finance, terrorism,
pandemics, piracy, disaster prevention and consequence management,
environment protection, climate change, food security and energy security.
Co-operation on these matters is often triggered by a calamity, such as a
financial crisis (as occurred in 1997 and 2008), a terrorist attack, an
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or influenza caused
by viruses that have adapted to birds — the so-called avian flu — and the
occurrence of tsunamis, earthquakes and forest fires.
Today, the Asia-Pacific embraces numerous regional architectures, while
20 years ago, there were almost none — besides ASEAN. Debate has
grown as regional architectures for co-operation have been layered atop
bilateral FTAs, EPAs, bilateral security alliances and other multilateral
frameworks with Track 1, Track 1.5 and Track 2 arrangements.
One cannot but question the value of regional architectures when, for
example, one regional grouping asserts that it is the main vehicle in East
Asian community-building, while another claims that its role is significant.
And one should not overlook those who promote different geographical
footprints solely for the purpose of having themselves included in particular
architectures. The resulting competition among groupings is often portrayed
as East Asia vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific.
Furthermore, in recent years we have witnessed the growth of plurilateral
or trilateral groupings, such as Japan-China-ROK, Japan-ROK-US and
Japan-US-Australia architectures. Despite this complex — if not chaotic —
terrain of regional associations, there is no end to the proposals for new
regional groupings, although the trend in Asia is not to select one particular
architecture with which to work, but to accept that the most appropriate is
the one that survives. This echoes Darwin’s theory of the survival of the
fittest.
ASEAN has been a catalyst in promoting regional architectures. Since
the 1980s, it has promoted discussion in ASEAN Plus dialogues with
discourse partners including the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea
and the European Union. This has resulted in the Post Ministerial Meeting
of foreign ministers of ASEAN and dialogue partners, a framework which
has allowed countries to grow accustomed to a regional dialogue. In 1997,
ASEAN launched ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, and the Republic of
Korea), and in 2005 ASEAN Plus Six (adding Australia, New Zealand and
India) that is also referred to as the East Asia Summit.
Although the invitation to the Plus Three countries was issued by 1997
ASEAN Summit host Malaysia prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis,
the grave situation motivated countries to make ASEAN Plus Three
meetings an annual event. The grouping hammered out the Chiang Mai
Initiative — a web of bilateral currency swap agreements that are to be
activated in the event of another crisis — which was enhanced recently to
better cope with the 2008 crisis triggered by the failure of Lehman Brothers,
as well as an Asia Bond Market Initiative. Since 2002, the +3 nations have
been conspicuous for their exclusive threesome meetings at the margins of
the ASEAN Plus Three summit, so ASEAN clearly has been instrumental
in launching and running regional constructs in East Asia.
When APEC was launched in 1989, ASEAN feared it might be
swallowed by the bigger players in the region and debated whether it should
participate. After witnessing the evolution of APEC, ASEAN launched
ARF to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building
and preventive diplomacy in the region for security. While Canada and
Australia proposed a similar security dialogue to mirror the Conference on
Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the region could not endorse the
idea. Moreover, when Japan had earlier proposed a security dialogue at the
ASEAN post-ministerial meeting, it also had not been able to elicit support
from ASEAN and dialogue partners. When the proposal came from
ASEAN, however, it took shape and has continued to develop since its
launch, albeit criticism concerning its limitations has not been lacking.
ASEAN also has taken other initiatives: the inclusion of Russia and the
United States in the EAS every other year, when APEC is held in Asia, to
accommodate the wishes of those countries and to avoid the divide in the
Asia-Pacific region over the EAS. In October 2010, the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) also launched an initiative called the
ADMM+8, to organise a meeting of defence ministers in the region. It was
the first Defence Ministers’ Forum at Track 1 level in the region.
Several other factors have placed ASEAN at the core of Asian regional
architectures over the past two decades. One factor is its solidarity,
illustrated by its plan to launch ASEAN communities and the conclusion of
the ASEAN Charter. Another is its deference to the ASEAN Way, which
respects national sovereignty and embraces the principle of noninterference.
The ASEAN Way depends on consensus-building rather than coercion,
thereby creating a space that is comfortable for all Member States,
particularly those reluctant to adapt their approach. The ASEAN Way has
made regional policy implementation more palatable for all, although it has
occasionally caused frustration and irritation among those who would like
to see regionalism develop more speedily.
Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues have further added to the terrain, and
have been useful for the evolution of regional architectures by
recommending ideas that cannot come from Track 1 discussions. Thus it is
that the Shangri-la Dialogue, organised by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies, was launched in 2002 and holds meetings
annually in Singapore. The dialogue is a gathering of academics and
journalists, as well as the defence ministers and top military officials of
most Asia-Pacific countries, and it provides participants with an
opportunity to conduct defence and security diplomacy. Thus defence
ministers in the region have a chance to meet, as do foreign ministers at
ARF gatherings.
Many of the existing regional groupings were initiated and coordinated
by ASEAN, with the exception of APEC, since some newer Member States
of ASEAN are not yet participating economies. Thus ASEAN has ploughed
what was once considered infertile ground in the interests of regionalism in
Asia.

Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture of the Future

There is cause for concern when regional groupings are numerous and form
multiple layers that are not necessarily linked to each other. During his term
as Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd expressed concern that none of
the existing Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms (as then configured) were
capable of engaging in the full spectrum of dialogue, co-operation and
action on economic and political matters, or of meeting future challenges to
security. Moreover, he believed that existing architectures were not only
numerous, but also porous, pliable and compete with each other. A
combination of economic and security dialogues, all in the same
architecture, would be ideal, he had suggested, proposing the setting up of
an Asia-Pacific community (APC) that would span the entire Asia-Pacific
region, integrating all important states.
Meanwhile, it should not be forgotten that Japan has been promoting the
building of an East Asian community since the time of Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi, with the most recent nod in that direction having come
from then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (in power from September 2009
until June 2010) in his address to the UN General Assembly in 2009 and his
subsequent speeches delivered in Asian countries.
When the proposals were made and later, until both prime ministers were
replaced, it had been suggested by some observers that proposals
concerning the formation of an APC (as proposed by Australia) and an East
Asian community (as suggested by Japan) were counterproductive. Rather
than putting forward two separate ideas for a regional architecture, it had
been said, Japan and Australia — which had collaborated in launching
APEC two decades ago — should have co-ordinated their proposals.
Viewed from Tokyo, multilateral co-operation in Asia or in the wider Asia-
Pacific was not an option but, rather, essential if Japan were to cope with
the transnational challenges it faced.
Even now, although Rudd and Hatoyama are no longer prime ministers,
in order to understand what role ASEAN might play in an Asia-Pacific
architecture of the future, one must ponder the kind of Asia-Pacific
architecture that is likely to evolve, and that one is likely to want to build
for regional co-operation — and to what end.
It should also be decided whether we are going to keep existing
multilayered architecture for regional co-operation, or are going to build or
choose a single, new grouping to bring together existing constructs; whether
the geographical footprint of regional architecture should be East Asia or
Asia-Pacific; and whether ASEAN 10 as a group will remain in the driver’s
seat, or select Members of ASEAN will share the driving with non-ASEAN
Members.
 In considering the regional architecture of the future, it is necessary to
identify the intermediate goals by which to attain the ultimate objective: a
community enjoying peace and prosperity. Given the deepening
interdependence of states and growing transnational issues, regional co-
operation soon will be essential for economic and politico-security reasons.
The security issues that the Asia-Pacific faces are not limited to
traditional matters, and include such non-traditional issues as human
security, food security, energy security, climate change, pandemics and
natural disasters. The scope of security challenges is becoming ever more
versatile, which demands multilateral and multitasked co-operation in the
region. While one cannot alone deal effectively with aspects of security, the
gradual shifts of power distribution, most notably the rise of China and
India, demand that countries hedge as well as engage and co-operate.
So what kind of regional architecture do we want in the future? Good
would be a single architecture embracing all our stated objectives. Covering
both security and economy in a single architecture would allow us to handle
both more effectively, as the two are more interlinked than ever. However,
such a move is hard to realise as we have witnessed in the debate over the
APC.
Meanwhile a number of regional architectures have been developed to
the level of the need for non-proliferation, but none would seem to suffice.
One is hard pressed to choose any particular grouping from among those
that currently exist, and there is no lack of zeal to create another regional
construct. We should also note that existing architectures have shown their
capacity to grow, as we have witnessed in such ASEAN initiatives in the
ADMM plus and in the EAS’s invitation to the United States and Russia.
Therefore, in my view, the most realistic approach is to allow the current
architectures to develop in the knowledge that the ones achieving their
objectives will survive. I believe that the region needs the multilateral
frameworks now in place, as well as the bilateral ones. In addition, ad hoc
regional co-operation on niche topics, such as disaster relief and piracy
control, would pave the way for future regional community-building.

The Role of ASEAN as the Asia-Pacific Architecture Evolves

ASEAN, meanwhile, faces numerous hurdles. For ASEAN, it is a challenge
to develop its own communities and to forge solidarity, which is essential if
ASEAN is to drive regional architectures in the future. ASEAN, with its
Charter, has decided to take a more rules-based than consensus-based
approach, and to co-operate on sensitive issues such as human rights. While
the association certainly suffers from divisions that need patching, it is no
easy feat to make one pot of soup with ten cooks. While the flexible
ASEAN Way has worked so far for all concerned in the Asia-Pacific,
frustration over outcomes of regional co-operation is mounting on the part
of ASEAN Plus groupings in ASEAN Member States, with the ASEAN
Charter, the ASEAN Way may evolve further. As ASEAN Member States
forge bilateral EPAs and FTAs with non-Members and strengthen bilateral
relations, this may have an impact on ASEAN as a group.
Meanwhile, the Japan-China-ROK summit was launched in Northeast
Asia in 2008, independent of ASEAN Plus Three, and this may yet lead to
closer subregional co-operation and combine with the six-party process.
Together with continued ASEAN initiatives to advance Asian regionalism,
such as the expansion of the EAS, and the launch of ADMM+ 8, ASEAN
has the potential to remain a mover and a shaker.

Concluding Observations
Japan has collaborated with ASEAN Member States over the past four
decades. Although a common perception is that this partnership has been
mainly in the economic field, relations have actually been broader. One
illustration is Japan’s contribution to peace-keeping and peace-building, in
the form of the dispatch of self-defence troops to Timor Leste following
independence-related talks there on 30 August 1999 and the ensuing
outbreak of violence. Although some ASEAN Member States — most
notably, the Philippines and Thailand — were willing to send troops for
peacekeeping duty, they needed funding to make this possible, so Japan
pledged US$100 million at the United Nations to enable the troops to be
sent. The gesture reflects the degree to which Japan has benefited from its
ties with ASEAN and the resultant fostering of regional co-operation. In my
view, Japan should continue to build on this precious relationship.
For the time being, the multiplicity of regional architectures —
plurilateral, subregional and regional — should be accepted and results
should be derived through functional and pragmatic co-operation that lends
itself to the development of a common agenda, such as in the areas of
politico-security and economics, as well as in social and cultural fields.
Cultural relations and intellectual infrastructures — considerations that are
often pushed aside — would, in turn, pave the way for further co-operation.
In Asia it will take time for countries to yield even a small part of their
sovereignty for the sake of regional community-building. But what counts
is the process involved and the sharing of the vision for regional co-
operation, because that is what will lead to the ultimate goal of regional
architectures, namely, peace and prosperity. The process of regional co-
operation and architecture-building will enable countries to understand
first-hand that, while it is harder to realise than bilateral co-operation,
regional co-operation has the major merit of being able to turn intra-
regional antipathy into empathy.
 CHAPTER 31

WHAT I HAVE ALWAYS WONDERED

ABOUT ASEAN: A PERSPECTIVE
FROM ROK
Lee Sun-Jin

During my time as a diplomat I was a frequent visitor to the ASEAN

Member States, at least a couple of times a year. However, since the year
2005, when I was posted to Indonesia, I have found myself watching
ASEAN with even greater attention, taking an avid interest in the
developments there. I retired from diplomacy in 2008 and I am now
lecturing at universities on economic integration in East Asia with a focus
on ASEAN. Accordingly, I continue to watch events unfold in Southeast
Asia. Since last year, I have been on visits to ASEAN Member States such
as Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Laos, with intensive
schedules of several weeks. For example, I took a cross-border train from
Hanoi, Vietnam, to Nanning in China, and on one of my trips I took a boat
from China to Thailand down the Mekong River, each of which was a
unique experience for me. During these visits, I was again struck by the
differences between neighbouring countries and this has renewed a question
which occurred to me on my first visit to ASEAN in the 1990s: What
makes the “Unity in Diversity” in ASEAN possible?
Diversity
Differences between the Member States of ASEAN, needless to say, are
obvious: ethnicity, religion, ideology, language, and political, economic and
social systems. The economic distinctions are most striking. Indonesia has a
population and land size several tens or hundreds of times larger than Laos
or Singapore. ASEAN has a mixture of the most advanced economies and
developing economies, and the economic divide among them is growing. It
seems to me that their common denominator is confined to geographical
location, Asian values and possibly common threats?
Moreover, despite continued efforts at the government level for decades
to cultivate a sense of community, it seems to me that the peoples of
ASEAN are not treated in a “friendly” manner, let alone accorded “national
treatment”, at the immigration or customs office of other ASEAN Member
States. I have even felt tensions between ASEAN students in my university
class. Given such differences and diversity, I am curious as to why, in spite
of any possible aspects, the “ASEAN Way” has so far successfully fulfilled
its function of pulling them all together.

Unity and Resilience

It is with some sense of surprise for me that ASEAN has managed to
maintain its integrity throughout a series of crises arising either from
outside or from within.
The economic crisis in the 1990s hit most of the leading ASEAN
Member States directly: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Their economies were hardest hit; in some countries national leaders were
toppled, social turmoil swept through this region and above all national
pride was badly hurt. The crisis was unprecedented, and ASEAN Member
States faced the temptation to pursue beggar-thy-neighbour policies in the
process of implementing individual recovery measures. There might even
have been a danger of the very raison d’être of ASEAN itself coming into
question. I take for example the case of crisis-hit South Korea. At that time
there were various conspiracy rumours in Seoul that the United States and
Japan were behind the crisis. Accounts of the part Japan played in the
Korean crisis are still to this day a subject of scholarly discussions. I believe
that this serves to well illustrate how easy it is in times of crisis to lay the
blame at your neighbour’s door. By striking contrast, ASEAN took the
initiative of inviting Korea, China and Japan to an ASEAN leaders’
meeting, an invitation that was the starting point of the East Asian
community-building process, namely ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia
Summit (EAS), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralism (CMIM) and in
particular the “emerging community” in this region. I wonder how all the
ASEAN leaders were able to unite in their efforts to exercise resilience and
prudence in responding to the crisis. They might have run the risk of facing
stiff resistance at home or from other Members, out of rivalry between
Members or in conflict with national policies.
At that time, the East Asian economy was denounced as “crony”
capitalism by many world famous economists. They went further to forecast
that regional economic dynamism in East Asia would not return, a gloomy
prognosis which amounted to adding salt to the wound. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) applied harsh measures to restructure the crisis-hit
economies in East Asia. Now the global economy is being hit by economic
recession. Ironically the so-called “crony” capitalist economies in East Asia
such as ASEAN, Korea and China have been the first group to rebound
from this latest recession. Most of the ASEAN economies forecast 4–7%
growth this year, much higher than the global average. They also
participated in the G20 Summit, a premier forum tasked with a variety of
responsibilities for restructuring international economic co-operation.
Furthermore, some parts of the world hope that the East Asian region will
be able to regain its economic vitality and serve as an engine for global
recovery from the current recession. In short, the East Asian economy has
demonstrated remarkable resilience in dealing with economic crises, and
ASEAN is the most important part of this. As is well known (but sometimes
forgotten), the East Asian economy is intertwined in regional production
and distribution networks forged since the 1980s. Economic development
by any economy in this region is made possible whenever this regional
network of production and distribution is functioning well.
There is yet another case worthy of our attention in which ASEAN
overcame the possibility of division. ASEAN was not of one mind when the
issue of establishing the EAS was discussed. Indonesia and Singapore
supported the addition of India, Australia and New Zealand to ASEAN Plus
Three while most others opposed it. About this time, ASEAN was also
divided concerning UN reform issues, in particular Japan’s efforts to
become a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. However, this
division has proved to have had a reverse effect, leading to further
strengthening of the ASEAN unity. The ASEAN Charter was brought into
existence and ASEAN agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN
community, political, economic and socio-cultural, by 2015, bringing this
forward five years from the original plan. ASEAN has succeeded in
securing the “driver’s seat” in the processes of regional co-operation and
integration, with consent from non-ASEAN nations. ASEAN has shown a
stroke of genius in making use of situations, whether favourable or
unfavourable, to turn them to their advantage and use them as opportunities
for further strengthening ASEAN unity.
In July 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), an ASEAN initiative that the Bush
administration had refused to sign. ASEAN partners including China,
Russia, Japan, Australia and Canada have signed the Treaty. South Korea
signed the TAC in 2004. However, it took almost one year for Korea to
review its compatibility with the Korea-US alliance. From the Korean
experience it may be assumed that most ASEAN partners may have made
“political” decisions when they signed it, putting aside its legal
ramifications. It indeed involves many legal issues such as its ambiguity,
compatibility with other commitments they had previously made and one-
sided obligations by partners. Nevertheless, they signed it in response to the
requests by ASEAN. In the 40-year history of ASEAN, it has never allowed
any power, regional or global, to remain so dominant as to pose a threat to
its integrity.
In its early stages ASEAN played a minor and mainly political role. In
recent years, however, its status has changed. ASEAN has begun to gain
more and more economic weight, thus gaining greater political influence in
the region as well as in the world, as is evidenced by a series of recent
moves by global powers. The Prime Minister of China announced the
willingness in 2009 to use US$25 billion for the purposes of infrastructure
construction and trade promotion, and some part of the implementation
programmes were made public. The new Prime Minister of Japan hosted a
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit in November 2009 in Tokyo.
Japan also committed ¥500 billion for a GMS fund.
 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton participated for the first time in the
GMS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2009. On the first trip to Asia
since her inauguration as Secretary of State, she visited Indonesia in
addition to the Northeast Asian nations. President Obama, too, visited India,
Indonesia, Japan and Korea in November 2010, in what was his longest
foreign trip since moving into the White House. US policy towards
Myanmar has changed from “sanctions only” to “dialogue and sanctions” in
parallel. South Korea does not want to be left out of this trend of the times.
In 2009, President Lee Myung-bak announced the “New Asia Initiative”
during his visit to Indonesia in March and hosted the Korea-ASEAN
Summit in June in Korea.
All in all, a new era may now have been entered as the efforts for the
unity and resilience of ASEAN bear still greater fruit.

Opportunity or Challenge
When ASEAN was not the focus of such great attention from the outside,
diversity, or co-existence of the ASEAN Member States, poor and rich,
weak and strong, small and large, developed and developing, may have
helped to secure its unity in the face of pressures that might have
contributed to disintegration. Diversity may be a basis for success in
maintaining its resilience to crises.
However, by the same token, the diversity also brings sluggishness,
inefficiency, immobility, lack of co-ordination and corruption, which pose
formidable obstacles to the furtherance of ASEAN integration. Moreover,
these negative aspects may develop into a source of disintegration and
division in the future if not kept in check. ASEAN may have to face a
challenging turn of events in the future: the rise of China, intensifying
rivalry among China, Japan and the United States in this region, the rise of
India and a growing divide between ASEAN Member States. Above all, the
rise of China and rise of India will present both opportunities and
challenges for ASEAN in terms of national development and ASEAN
integration as a whole.
Since the 1990s, China has taken soft power approaches to ASEAN
rather than the previous sabre rattling: its assurance not to resort to a
military solution in disputes with ASEAN, active participation in regional
co-operation, being the first signatory to the TAC, the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area (CAFTA), and increase in economic assistance. A forum on
CAFTA was held by the Ministry of Commerce of China in early January
this year in Nanning (Guangxi) to celebrate the establishment of the
CAFTA. I attended the forum and listened with great interest to Chinese
presentations by representatives varying from government (local and
central) and banking sectors to private enterprises and scholars. As I
mentioned earlier, I took a cross-border train from Hanoi, Vietnam, to
Nanning in China and a boat from Jinghong, China, to Chiang Saen,
Thailand, down the Mekong River. Through these experiences, I became
further convinced that China would accelerate the pursuit of its strategy to
connect the southern part of China to the Southeast Asian economy and
thus enhance its political presence in that region. China’s policy towards
Southeast Asia has been reinforced due to the fact that the policy constitutes
part of the Great Western Development Strategy of China, a national plan to
develop the southwestern part of China. The region is the most
impoverished and rich with racial minorities. Presumably the current global
financial crisis provides another opportunity for China to get into its stride
the efforts to forge stronger ties with ASEAN. China did not lose an
opportunity to announce the commitment of US$25 billion for ASEAN
funds in response to calls for Chinese assistance. I wonder how ASEAN
will respond to the strategic love call from China. In addition, how non-
ASEAN nations including Japan and the United States will react remains to
be seen.
The rise of India will impact ASEAN differently from the rise of China.
When the East Asian economy encompasses the two axes of Northeast Asia
and Southeast Asia only, ASEAN’s influence is said to be limited and
political. However, if the East Asian economy encompasses the three axes
of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and India (and Australia), ASEAN’s
influence will be doubled. Not only is ASEAN geographically centred, its
production bases for parts and components industries established either by
foreign or ASEAN enterprises, and its experience and know-how for
economic development will be key to India’s industrialisation. Northeast
Asia lacks firsthand experience with India. Their businesses will need
connections and know-how that ASEAN businesses have long cultivated
with India. In addition, India’s (and Australia’s) entry into the process for
regional integration will set a new stage for East Asia community-building
so that a certain bridging role played by ASEAN will also be of great value.
ASEAN Capacity in Focus
There is a Chinese saying: “If you wish to govern the world, you have to
govern yourself first, and then your family, nation and world in that order” (
). Likewise, ASEAN needs to do some serious homework in
order to embrace new challenges and make use of the opportunities they
present for capacity-building. I believe that inefficiency, immobility and
lack of co-ordination between the Members are no longer factors favourable
for pulling ASEAN together since each Member will be given more
chances to prosper and advance their position on the world stage. Some
Members may assume that they will be able to move faster on their own, if
not bound by the ASEAN framework. The issue of capacity-building is not
new to ASEAN. So there have been efforts and agreements on the part of
ASEAN for actions to address this in recent years. However, given the fact
that China is fast moving, India is expanding economically at a rapid pace
and competition between rival powers in this region is intensifying, time
and speed matter. Should ASEAN be behind its opponents in a race against
time, the grouping may lose its golden opportunity to prosper and maintain
a power balance in the region or, in the worst case, experience an erosion of
its unity, which would affect peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia,
representing a loss not only for ASEAN but for the whole East Asian
region. Obviously the construction of the ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) by 2015, above all, will be the first test to show its commitment to
capacity-building.
One last suggestion concerns the forging of a coalition between ASEAN
and South Korea. Korea does not hold hegemonic ambition and many in
ASEAN say that they find Korea to be one of the easiest partners to
communicate with. In this regard, Korea will serve as a stimulus not only
for ASEAN’s efforts for its own capacity-building; an ASEAN-Korea
coalition will also contribute to the building of a community in East Asia, a
shared inspiration for all including the Chinese and Japanese. President Lee
Myung-bak of Korea is indeed a capable partner in this task since he is
proud of the firsthand business experience he accumulated as a successful
businessman with Southeast Asia for many years in the 1990s.
 CHAPTER 32

INDIA’S PLACE AND ASEAN’S

PRIMACY IN THE NEW EAST ASIA
P.S. Suryanarayana

The expanding geopolitical universe of the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) can be sustained only by a unique ecosystem of
diplomacy among the native, resident and invited countries. Such a
sustainable ecosystem is more easily visualised than created in East Asia’s
complex geopolitical circumstances. ASEAN’s role as a prime mover in
creating a new East Asian order is a study by itself.
China, Japan and the ten ASEAN Member States are among the
unquestionable natives of East Asia. Each among them is an original
Member of the 16-nation East Asia Summit (EAS), founded in 2006. No
less significantly, the United States prides itself on being the region’s
longtime “resident power” in its own right. In yet another nuance, India,
Australia, and New Zealand were invited, not long ago, by ASEAN itself to
the EAS as its other founding Members. So, India finds itself in the inner
geopolitical circles of East Asia.
Before mid-July 2010, when ASEAN began moves to admit the United
States and Russia into the EAS, a clear China-friendly ecosystem was
slowly taking shape within the diplomatic space of the 16-Member
organisation, as the EAS then was. And the then-emerging diplomatic
ecosystem in the region was characterised, too, by a gradual acceptance of
India’s rise.
Of course, China’s gigantic lead over India in the global economy gave
Beijing the pride of place in the EAS until its expansion became a reality on
October 30, 2010. And, the expanded EAS has already produced a dynamic
X-factor of potentially new equations among the major powers in East Asia.
With that, an element of unpredictability has in fact descended on the
long-term prospects of a sustainable East Asian order. Within the
limitations of informed futurology, though, such unpredictability need not
cast a shadow over ASEAN’s vision that created the newly expanded EAS.
Nonetheless, ASEAN can sustain its “centrality” in the new-look East Asia
only by paying a price. This will probably take the form of an open or
subtle erosion of the collective power that the ASEAN Member States
commanded in the original EAS.
ASEAN must also become more sensitive to the rising profiles of its
EAS partners, one of them being India. As evident during the inaugural
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Hanoi in early
October 2010, ASEAN has unmistakably signalled its belief that there can
be, while going forward, no political roadmap of East Asia without the
United States as the permanent resident power. In one sense, this suits India
into the future. At the same time, India’s potential gain need not necessarily
hurt an economically robust China.
For India, its Look-East Policy, first enunciated by Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s, has already brought a huge diplomatic
dividend in the form of the founding membership in the EAS. As this is
written, admitting the United States and Russia into this organisation,
formally at the EAS leaders’ meeting in 2011, is in sync with New Delhi’s
world view.
It is no secret that New Delhi’s newly dynamic ties with Washington
touched a dizzying high when they entered into a civil nuclear pact a few
years ago. Nonetheless, no dispassionate observer expects India and the
United States to act in concert on all major global issues of relevance to the
new East Asia or the wider world. New Delhi boasts a fine track record of
being no one’s yes-player.
In many ways, the civil nuclear pact does not erase New Delhi’s sense of
sovereign autonomy. Despite this, non-official arguments do remain aplenty
about the likely international intrusiveness in the area of India’s use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In any case, India’s defence-related
atomic arsenal programme remains outside the purview of this civil nuclear
pact. Such a simplified but precise perspective on the latest defining aspect
of New Delhi’s official equation with Washington shows that the United
States cannot hope to count on India as an all-weather friend or ally on all
issues within a new-look EAS.
Significantly, however, United States President Barack Obama,
addressing the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on November 8, 2010,
struck a totally new and upbeat note about his country’s engagement with
India, going forward. Some of his emphatic policy-related pronouncements
are worth recounting for their relevance to India’s place in the new East
Asia and in the wider world.
Obama said: “With my visit [to New Delhi in November 2010], we [the
United States and India] are now ready to begin implementing our civil
nuclear agreement ... We need to forge partnerships in high-tech sectors like
defence and civil space ... And as two global leaders, the United States and
India can partner for global security ... In the years ahead, I look forward to
a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a
permanent member ... And together, we [the United States and India] can
pursue a vision that Indian leaders have espoused since independence — a
world without nuclear weapons ... [In all] India and America are
indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time [across the
world].”
Addressing India more directly, in the grammatical usage of second
person, Obama said: “The world sees the results [of India’s indigenous
efforts] from the supercomputers you build to the Indian flag that you put
on the Moon.” In the same political refrain, he referred to the new East Asia
of November 2010 and urged India to not only look “East” but also engage
the “East.” In his view, India’s potential role in the new-model East Asia
“will increase the security and prosperity of all our nations.”
Despite Obama’s effusively befriending tone towards India in November
2010, a reality check will be in order. As this is written, New Delhi has
miles to go before it can enhance its low power-coefficient, compared to
that of Washington, in the economic and military fields. Moreover, India
can hope to be a global leader only if its power-coefficient has little or no
poverty quotient. To this extent, there cannot be a US-India orchestrated
caucus of democracies in the now-optimised EAS. Many East Asian
countries place a premium on their economic wellness, relative to their
political systems.
Significantly, in this larger context, a relevant precedent is the recent
failure of a Japanese initiative for creating a quadrilateral forum of Asia-
Pacific democracies. The four countries in that kind of passing limelight
were Japan, the United States, India and Australia. The line-up might seem
to have been quite natural, but Japan did have to make a determined effort
to secure America’s nod before floating the proposal! Diplomatic sources in
Japan and India told this writer that Tokyo first needed to overcome the
reservations of the United States, then under President George W. Bush,
about the likely reactions from other key East Asian powers.
Unsurprisingly, the ascendant China did react by wanting to know what the
idea of a democratic quadrilateral was all about. No wonder the proposal of
a foursome forum of democracies had a meteoric rise and fall in the outer
space of Asia-Pacific diplomacy!
All these realities should be viewed, though, through the prism of India’s
good and growing people-to-people ties with the United States. A
fashionable argument is that these ties are far more vibrant than those
between the Americans and the citizens of China. Because of this non-
traditional subtext of harmony, it is entirely possible that India and the
United States will cruise along similar wavelengths on at least some issues
in the new-model EAS. However, such a patent argument must still be
tested empirically, if only because they have not had a consistent habit of
co-operating on key international issues.
Relevant to the EAS, into its long-term future, are the likely complexities
in the evolution of US-China relations. This aspect falls well outside the
conventional space of India-US ties. But the seemingly parallel streams of
Washington’s engagement with New Delhi and Beijing are not all that
mutually exclusive, when viewed from the respective standpoints of these
players. Unsurprisingly, at least one Beijing-based Chinese expert has, in a
conversation with this journalist, suggested that it is time to start an
informal dialogue among China, India and the United States — preferably
at the level of Track 1.5, with diplomats as observers during the discussions
among non-official opinion-makers.
Despite this grand triangle, it is almost indisputable that the vision of an
expanding EAS will either brighten or even dim as a result of how the
changing dynamics of the relations between India and China are managed
by them. China and India are two ancient civilisation-states with
postmodern capabilities in space exploration and the cyberspace. Both
countries know that their border dispute, which admits a political pun about
the Himalayan nature of the problem, must be resolved at a mutually
opportune moment.
In a similar fashion, India and China are aware, too, that their compatible
and differential strengths can spell a future of either mutual co-operation or
indeed competition, depending on the exact field in focus at any given time.
Indeed, an oft-heard comment from both sides is that the global stage is
wide enough for them to rise fully to their respective potential without
necessarily having to engage each other in a winner-takes-all
gamesmanship.
The possibility of statesmanship on both sides of the India-China divide
of proud national identities was also facilitated by the slow evolution of a
diplomatic ecosystem within the EAS prior to its proposed expansion. The
pre-expansion ecosystem was defined by the general willingness of China’s
East Asian neighbours to acknowledge its rise, accommodate that aspect
and benefit from it. India’s growing importance, too, was not ignored in the
process.
Surely the pre-expansion ecosystem of the EAS cannot shape its post-
enlargement phase. However, ASEAN foreign ministers, while setting off
moves for an optimal-sized EAS, were certainly aware of the likely
challenges. The expansion was considered a risk worth taking. In fact, a
future calculus of power, complete with the United States and Russia as the
new EAS Members, was seen to be in the best collective interest of the
ASEAN countries themselves.
There is scope for a far greater debate on such perceptions. What cannot
be dismissed, though, is the reasoning that any East Asian power structure,
if it is to be sustained well into the future in a globalised setting, must have
the United States and Russia in the EAS. China, Japan and India are the
original major players in the EAS arena.
In a critical sense, therefore, the perceptions and policies of India and
China towards each other will be crucial for the future of the EAS. To this
extent, ASEAN cannot afford to brush aside the India-China paradigm as
something totally secondary to the attitudes of Washington and Beijing
towards each other. ASEAN has never tired of insisting on piloting the
EAS. If this principle is to remain inviolable in an expanded EAS, ASEAN
must enhance its skills in managing the big-power sensitivities.
New Delhi’s relevance to and role in a possible new-look EAS is
determined, among other factors, by Japan’s striking recognition of India as
a responsible power on the rise. By early November 2010, high-tech Japan
completed two rounds of official-level talks for a possible civil nuclear pact
with India.
For reasons of contemporary history, nuclear pacifism has remained
Japan’s article of political faith since the end of World War II. Against this
background, Tokyo first chose to stay clear of the “nuclear rush” towards
India, which was caused by its US-sponsored admission to the global
marketplace for peaceful uses of atomic energy. Because of a number of
complicated reasons, India was, for several decades, outside such an
important theatre of atoms for peace.1 It was only in 2008 that the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), acting at the behest of the United States, gave
India access to this marketplace. Even before 2008, however, few countries,
if any, seriously doubted the verifiable fact that India was, from the
beginning, a thought-leader in the worldwide debate on nuclear
disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
From the standpoint of Japan, India has been implementing the
commitments it made to the NSG and the International Atomic Energy
Agency in 2008. These commitments relate to the general area of nuclear
non-proliferation and India’s own voluntary moratorium on future atomic-
arms testing. Such fine details are relevant to the present narrative on
India’s place in an expanded East Asia. They facilitate a better
understanding of Tokyo’s newly robust attitude towards New Delhi.
Going by this journalist’s news-breaking experience of covering Japan’s
incremental engagement with India, their start-up negotiations in mid-2010
for a civil nuclear pact were no accident of diplomacy. Well before the start
of these talks, Japan had already held sophisticated naval exercises with the
United States and India in a trilateral format. And some of those exercises
took place off Okinawa, a seat of US military presence and a source of
considerable strategic value to the long-term future of the EAS.
Self-evidently, the future of the EAS now encompasses Russia’s potential
role, too. With Russia, India has in recent years remodelled its close state-
to-state equation, which had defined their bilateral engagement at one stage
during the bygone Cold War era. An often-neglected fact about the equation
is that India was never in a geostationary orbit around the Soviet Union,
unlike some of Moscow’s East European satellite states in the political
space of the Cold War era. In fact, the Soviet-Indian engagement was often
similar to the kind of mutually important ties that the United States and
France have had to this day since the end of World War II. The Franco-
American diplomatic equation cannot be mistaken for a satellite’s bond
with an enormous superpower. Illuminated by such an unusual comparison
between India and France, the current ties between New Delhi and the post-
Soviet Kremlin reflect much of their old warmth and friendliness. However,
there is a big difference now: post-Soviet Kremlin shares its Asia-related
strategic space with China, not just with India.
To visualise New Delhi’s overall diplomatic status within the brand new
EAS, the traditional East Asian players, especially ASEAN, will need to
widen their own political horizons. Easily recognisable by them is the new
vibrancy in New Delhi’s interactions with Washington across a wide
spectrum, including the domains of defence, science and technology and
counter-terrorism.
Lesser known is the fact of politically-correct ties between India and
Russia, a continuing supplier of state-of-the-art military hardware to New
Delhi. No less relevant to ASEAN in this sub-context is China’s
dramatically improved relationship with post-Soviet Russia, notably their
co-operative military-to-military exchanges, energy-security linkages, and
anti-terror coordination. Viewed objectively, the China-Russia bonhomie of
this magnitude and the remodelled Moscow-New Delhi ties can be seen by
ASEAN as potential plus factors in the evolution of the EAS.
Nonetheless, a newly emerging dynamic — evident from the increasingly
co-operative parleys among China, India and Russia — remains largely
unnoticed in ASEAN’s policy circles. Surely this triangular forum is not in
the same diplomatic league as the more-established ASEAN-Plus. Better
known to ASEAN circles is, of course, the hype about the BRIC forum that
brings together Brazil, Russia, India and China.
In the context of such sweeping ground realities, India’s actual
contributions in sensitive areas will determine its precise place in the EAS
of the future. The kaleidoscopic political complexion of the EAS may in
fact induce the organisation to set common but differential standards for its
Member States in a variety of fields: climate change, energy security,
maritime security, and perhaps even nuclear non-proliferation. In such a
possible scenario, India can hope to raise its routinely suboptimal statecraft
to a higher plane as an “emerging economic power” with the potential for
proactive roles in the regional and global domains.
At the same time, it stands to reason that ASEAN is not obliged to
promote India’s national interest as a prime objective of a new-look EAS.
Quite transparent, though, is ASEAN’s assumption that a careful expansion
of the EAS will not lead to a power struggle among the big players in
geopolitical East Asia. Surely the logic of ASEAN’s political faith of this
kind can be a matter of some divisive debate. However, one of ASEAN’s
key objectives is to prevent power struggles among major powers on the
East Asian turf. And ASEAN’s brainwave to achieve this objective was to
optimise the size of the EAS as now done. There is now a sense that the
EAS attains its optimal size with the formal inclusion of the United States
and Russia from 2011. Such a reading is consistent with the comments by
Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo after ASEAN Foreign Ministers
agreed in mid-2010 to recommend the inclusion of Russia and the United
States in the EAS.
Even from this perspective, ASEAN’s assumption about the new-look
EAS can be reinforced only by a suitable regional agenda for the expanded
organisation. Such an observation needs no laborious proof in a diverse
region like East Asia. The reason: if the EAS expansion goes well, East
Asia may in fact become the next big theatre in global affairs. The futurist
agenda of the newly enlarged EAS must, therefore, be in tune with the
restrictive compulsions of the multilateral process.
Of the global issues of East Asian concern, climate change is particularly
divisive. At the Copenhagen conference in 2009, India and China made
common cause over the inalienable rights of the developing countries. Far
from being a matter of diplomatic high drama, such co-operation was good
economics and toned up the political atmospherics on the India-China front.
However, the rapport between these two rising Asian countries took the
United States and some other developed powers by surprise. Against this
background, climate change will be a tough collective issue for the EAS in
its new configuration of powers.
Energy security can turn out to be a delicate issue, without necessarily
being easier than the challenge of Planet Earth’s future. The map of an
enlarged EAS, as visualised for 2011 and beyond, will be dotted with some
existing and prospective energy consumers belonging to the big league. A
few among them are significant producers as well. This will certainly skew
the energy-related equations within the optimal-sized EAS.
Knowingly or unwittingly, ASEAN has enlarged the EAS into a forum in
which the four key nuclear powers can, arguably, constitute a distinct
subgroup. The United States and Russia are nuclear superpowers. China’s
atomic arsenal, too, is recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. And India’s atomic weapons programme has been acknowledged by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group in a move piloted by the United States in
2008. In addition, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (all
original Members of the EAS) are in the same league as the United States,
Russia and China, in the sense that they are all in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
Another material fact was evident during the Japan-India summit towards
the end of October 2010. Tokyo wanted its proposed civil nuclear pact with
New Delhi to suitably outline a practical version of the professed Indian
commitment to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Japanese
negotiators first took a firm but polite pacifist-line that Tokyo might
“suspend” or even “stop” its civil nuclear co-operation with New Delhi, if it
were to test an atomic weapon again. The initial response from the Indian
interlocutors was that New Delhi’s unilateral and voluntary moratorium on
nuclear explosive testing should suffice. As the negotiations gathered pace,
it became obvious that the crux of the tussle could be traced to India’s long-
standing opposition to the “discriminatory” character of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT).
One of the unspoken issues, as at the time of the Japan-India summit in
October 2010, was whether America’s nuclear umbrellas for its allies,
including Japan, were compatible with the spirit, if not also the letter, of the
NPT and the CTBT. An equally complicated issue was whether a voluntary
moratorium on nuclear arms testing, such as India’s, would be compatible,
either. But the talks between India and Japan on the peaceful use of atomic
energy brought into sharp focus the depth of expertise on nuclear issues
within the EAS ranks.
In all, therefore, the new-look EAS or at least its potential nuclear
subgroup can usefully consider a regional or global non-proliferation
agenda as well. The lessons and controversies of the earlier US-led
Proliferation Security Initiative must be kept in mind.
 For the optimal-sized EAS, maritime security promises to be the best bet
as priority agenda. Significantly, this aspect came into positive focus during
the ADMM-Plus conference in Hanoi in early-October 2010. The ADMM-
Plus, with a more vibrant name than this, should be co-opted as the security
wing of the expanded EAS. In the past, issues of sovereign jurisdictions
over the Malacca Strait dominated the divisive public discourse on
maritime security in this part of the world. But the new-model EAS will be
of no avail, if the naval power of the United States, Russia, India, China,
and Japan, among others, cannot be harnessed for maritime security along
the Pacific rim of East Asia and parts of the Indian Ocean. By avoiding this
daunting challenge, the now-enlarged EAS, when in full flight, will only
lose some of its lustre.
India, like some of the other major powers in what has become a future-
oriented EAS, brings to the table skills in not only the terrestrial sciences
but also in the sciences of outer space and cyberspace. Of interest,
therefore, is the possibility that New Delhi’s potential place in the now-
bigger EAS will surpass the story of India’s ancient and mediaeval ties with
East Asia.
The historical Indian engagement with East Asia dates back to the
ancient times when the Buddhist art of Amaravati and the Buddhist
philosophy of Nagarjuna, both from the Andhra (Telugu) sub-region of
India, were spread to foreign lands. Most recently, Jiang Yili, a female
diplomat from China, has evocatively written about the influence of
Nagarjuna’s thoughts on the evolution of Chinese Buddhism.2 Nagarjuna’s
doctrines (the centrepiece being his creative idea of “sunyata” or cosmic
zero), spread to Korea and Japan through China. Such scholarly but unusual
interest in India within the present-day Chinese establishment has a
message: New Delhi and Beijing will benefit from a truly creative
awareness of each other’s past as they address the challenge of their future
engagement.
Similar positive lessons can be drawn from the significant historical links
between the Tamil sub-region of India and some parts of East Asia. On a
different aspect of India’s linkage with East Asia, the influence of ancient
Nalanda University on the Confucian heartland and its diverse cultural
environs is now sought to be replicated in a modern idiom under the
auspices of the EAS. Other illustrative examples of India’s engagement
with the Confucian heartland and its political neighbourhood are: Bengali
poet-laureate Rabindranath Tagore’s sojourn in several East Asian countries
almost a century ago, Jawaharlal Nehru’s idealist quest of a pan-Asian
identity in mid-twentieth century, Narasimha Rao’s Look-East vision two
decades ago, and the more recent economic diplomacy of politically-
dissimilar Prime Ministers like A.B. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.
On a different plane, Mahatma Gandhi, India’s globally-famous
practitioner of non-violence as policy in the 20th century, has inspired at
least one president of Indonesia and Myanmar’s democracy-campaigner
Aung San Suu Kyi. At an altogether different level, the immense popularity
of India’s Bollywood in parts of East Asia has to be experienced to be
believed. Even in such a milieu, the National Museum of Singapore blazed
a trail by screening film retrospectives of a non-Bollywood master like
Satyajit Ray in October 2010. In all, therefore, there is now an
unprecedented awareness of East Asia across all the sub-regions of India —
from the Hindi heartland to Maharashtra and Gujarat, from Jammu and
Kashmir (including Ladakh) to Kanyakumari and Kerala, and from the
plains of Punjab to the plateau of Deccan dotted with Bengaluru
(Bangalore) and Hyderabad as information technology hubs.

ASEAN IN A WONDERLAND OF POWER-PLAY

In this panoramic outlook, India faces an exciting challenge of living up to
its potential as a developing country that can make a positive difference to
the now-bigger EAS. India can still find itself constrained by the realities of
its inadequate and inequitable economic growth that has not eradicated
critical poverty at home. Similarly, ASEAN, creator of the EAS, faces a
reality check on several matters. One of them is whether ASEAN can
continue to dictate or chart the future course of the new-look EAS.
Nearly as emphatic as a political axiom, ASEAN will run the risk of
getting marginalised in the now-bigger EAS. The issue really is not whether
the United States or Russia can take the wind out of the ASEAN sails,
whereas China or Japan or India has not done so far in the EAS. It can also
be argued that Washington and Moscow, both members of the hold-all
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), are no strangers to the cautious practices
that prevailed in the region before the EAS was expanded in November
2010.
 Unlike China or Japan or India, the United States and Russia (in its
previous statehood as the Soviet Union) have already demonstrated the
political will to call the shots, by military or other means, in a multilateral
setting, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact, as
the case might be. In contrast, Tokyo is no longer governed by its bygone
imperial traditions. China, in its own right or in association with Russia, has
so far not imposed on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization a culture of
saying ‘yes’ to the big players. And, India has not stifled democratic
divergence in a far-less-ambitious forum like the South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation.
These verifiable or arguable facts (depending on one’s perspective) will
distinguish the United States fully and Russia (in a far less proportion) from
China, Japan or India in the now-larger EAS. Washington, in full possession
of many (if not all) superpower attributes at the start of the second decade
in the 21st century, can be expected to be more proactive than Beijing,
Tokyo or New Delhi in the new-model EAS.
However, the argument here is not that China, Japan and India will be
passive players, leaving policy initiatives entirely to the discretion of
ASEAN in the futurist EAS. A few years before the EAS expansion became
a reality, a senior ASEAN leader expressed a nearly-prophetic view in a
postinterview informal chat with me. According to the leader, who is not
identified on grounds of professional propriety, it was not unthinkable that
some of ASEAN’s major partners might want to guide or lead its
Plusforums by taking turns at the helm. Implicit in such a paraphrased
remark is the objective reality of power-play among the members of any
organisation, especially a big forum like the EAS over the longer term.
Viewed in this perspective, a logical question is: Why should the United
States or Russia or any major Asian power try and marginalise ASEAN in
the optimal-sized EAS? After all, these countries have so far not done so in
the ARF. But the fundamental answer is not far to seek. Shorn of diplomatic
niceties, the ARF is too large and diverse a forum to be truly effective as a
platform for action, as different from just dialogue. In the ASEAN calculus,
the hold-all ARF may well serve its please-all purposes. However, the EAS,
by definition a leaders-led entity at the summit level, is relatively compact
and is inherently capable of thinking or acting more purposefully than the
jumbo-sized ministerial ARF.
 Surely the EAS nucleus, consisting of all ten distinctive ASEAN
Members all the time, can be a drag, now and then, on the efficacy of the
new-look East Asia Summit. Also contributing to such a restrictive reality
is the obvious diversity among ASEAN’s partners in the EAS. Overarching
all these factors, though, is the EAS vision: ASEAN believes that co-
operation among the native and resident East Asian states as also the invited
countries, which now include the United States and Russia, is essential for
regional peace, stability and economic progress.
History, current realities and the projections of future trends in global
affairs tend to justify ASEAN’s faith in the EAS vision. This cannot,
however, ensure that the undoubted prime mover, ASEAN, will have
unchallenged primacy in the EAS well into the distant future. The inherent
logic of even benign power, not necessarily the temptations of power-play,
can induce one or more non-ASEAN countries to challenge the prime
mover.
It is also unrealistic to expect the collective EAS to serve as a clearing
house or arbiter for the decisive resolution of disputes that emanate from or
affect the “core interests” of the non-ASEAN Members, especially the
powerful ones among them. Nonetheless, the East Asia Summit’s collective
agenda may be substantially set or shaped, sooner or later, by these non-
ASEAN Members. Illustratively, they are the United States, still a global
superpower by 2011; China, prospectively a full-fledged global player by
the standards of 2010; Japan, potentially a resurgent and re-assertive power;
and India, a self-confident nation of the future by the same standards, more
or less, as are applicable to China. The emergence of a consortium or
caucus of some non-ASEAN powers within the futurist EAS is not also a
matter of idle speculation.
ASEAN will, in these circumstances, need to trim its sails to the likely
new winds of organisational culture from the United States and Russia. No
less relevant is the power-coefficient of each of the other non-ASEAN
players — especially, China, Japan, India, and maybe the Republic of Korea
and Australia as well. Self-evident, therefore, are two ways in which
ASEAN can try to trim its sails or set new sails in this wonderland of
power-play.
The first approach is the line of least resistance. ASEAN can continue to
sit in the cockpit and perhaps even follow the principle of Rotating Chair
among the ten Member States. In this scenario, the initiative will, however,
pass gradually into the hands of back-seat pilot(s) — Washington, Beijing,
New Delhi, Tokyo, Moscow, Seoul, Canberra or even Wellington,
individually or as a concert of two or more among them. Such a transfer of
power within the EAS may take the form of a process, whose ebb and flow
will be determined by the political identity of the ASEAN country that
occupies the EAS Chair at any given time. The effectiveness of the new-
model EAS will, therefore, depend on its Chair’s acceptability-quotient as
judged by ASEAN’s partners.
For ASEAN, a far more rewarding but creatively-destructive approach is
the second course of action. In this scenario, ASEAN can try and match its
major EAS partners on more or less equal terms. For this, ASEAN may
have to cease sitting in the EAS as ten distinctive sovereign states. Their
collective group identity, to be represented by just one ASEAN Member
State at any time, will suffice. What does this proposal mean? Only one
ASEAN Member, duly chosen by all the ten constituent states, will be a
participant in the new-look EAS and will function as its Chair at any given
time.
Such an EAS Chair, invariably an ASEAN Member, can have ten votes,
if and when a decision is to be taken by a show of hands or actual balloting.
Even if consensus is to persist as the best EAS practice into the future, the
notional or nominal weight of ten votes for the EAS Chair will deter
ASEAN’s partners from ‘ganging up’ against it on a less-than-serious note.
An intrinsic feature of this scenario will be the careful selection of an
ASEAN state as a Member of the new-look EAS Member and ipso facto as
the EAS Chair for each specified period. The EAS Chair, with ten notional
or nominal or real votes, will have to be acceptable to all ASEAN Members
in the first place and also their partners in the East Asia Summit.
Paradoxically but prudently, the now-expanded EAS will then have an
effective strength of only nine! The EAS Chair, invariably an ASEAN
Member, will command ten real or notional or nominal votes, with each
non-ASEAN Member having only one vote. Such a compact forum will
surely facilitate serious discussions and decisions on all issues of mutual
interest, excluding disputes relating to the “core interests” of sensitive
countries. During discussions, the EAS Chair will, of course, be expected to
stand up for the collective viewpoint of all the ten ASEAN Members on
each issue. At the same time, the EAS Chair will be expected to speak and
act impartially on behalf of the entire EAS on all its decisions.
 Far from being a parlour game of political pastime, the conceptualisation
of such a proposal can lead to greater cohesiveness within the EAS and
sustain ASEAN’s role into the future. The now-bigger EAS can then
occupy the commanding heights of strategic thinking and planning on all
aspects of regional co-operation. A forum like the newly-inaugurated
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and one or two
other institutions of a similar nature for other subjects can serve as
platforms for co-operative action. These other institutions are not in place
now.
In the final analysis, the sustainability of ASEAN’s non-partisan
stewardship of the new-model EAS will also depend on the quality of
subjects chosen for discussions and all-round co-operative effort. Even a
passing reference to such possible subjects will form a separate study by
itself.
At the beginning of the 2010s, ASEAN’s EAS partners are, by and large,
divided among themselves. This has given ASEAN a historic chance to try
and play an impartial lead-role in shaping the geo-political and geo-
economic order in East Asia. Coincidentally or otherwise, new political
tensions flared up during the run-up to the EAS expansion in late October
2010 and immediately after that. In focus were old issues, but the political
tensions were surely felt more acutely than before on the East Asian
diplomatic scene.
During the run-up, Washington articulated a decisively pro-Japan policy
towards China. At stake was the old maritime-territorial issue of
sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The United
States re-emphasised that its long-standing military alliance with Japan
could be invoked to protect these islands as Tokyo’s possessions. On a
parallel track, Tokyo felt outraged over Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev’s visit to an island in dispute, just north of Japan, in early
November 2010. The island is part of a chain of four which the now-bygone
Soviet Union had “reclaimed” at the end of the Second World War. Russia,
as the Soviet Union’s successor state, later began exercising control over
these islands, which Japan never tired of claiming as its own.
These two episodes of tensions in late October and early November of
2010 served as an early wake-up call for the newly-expanded EAS. As two
key founding Members of the EAS, both China and Japan were puzzled, if
not also rattled, by the respective actions of the United States and Russia,
both new Members of the EAS. Another early wake-up call for the new-
look EAS was the combination of dissonance and diversity of views in the
Group of Twenty (G20) summit hosted by the Republic of Korea in
November 2010. Almost all of ASEAN’s partners in the expanded EAS are
G20 members as well.
Yet, it is not unthinkable that the political equations among some or all of
ASEAN’s EAS partners can change over time. This will allow some or all
of ASEAN’s EAS partners to seize the initiative and threaten the primacy of
the core sub-entity, ASEAN itself.
So, in the turn of an unusual metaphor, ASEAN did, in the first place,
show great courage in venturing into the outer space of politics by
launching and expanding the EAS. Surely, therefore, the time has come for
ASEAN, with back-stage help from the other EAS Members, to set out on a
lonely but innovative space-walk! A duly-chosen ASEAN country can
represent the entire organisation in the new-look EAS and also serve as its
solitary Chair at any given time! As always in diplomacy, the difference
between success and its opposite is statesmanship.

_____________________
1
The late American President Dwight Eisenhower used the phrase “atoms for peace” to refer to the
peaceful uses of atomic energy.
2 Jiang Yili, Comparative Study between Buddhism and Hinduism. Singapore: Candid Creation,
September 2004.
 CHAPTER 33

REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM:
THE ASEAN JOURNEY
Simon Murdoch

I recently attended a Track 1.5 conference, the first in my new capacity as a

retired diplomat and former senior official of the New Zealand government.
The underlying subject matter of the event was to explore possibilities for
pan-regionalism and supra-regionalism in Asia and the Pacific littoral.
In the lively discourse of this event, there were conflicting views
expressed about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) —
some from its own member delegations and some from others — and its
place in the “architecture” of regionalism, as it is today and as it may yet
become. I am not an expert on Asia, or on regionalism, and I would
probably characterise myself as a “bilateralist” by experience, and
preference. I left the conference a little troubled, but not — at the time —
quite sure why. Perhaps it was that, in contrast to the pragmatic approach
most working diplomats would characteristically take, emphasising utility
(“… it may not be not perfect but it’s here, and it’s the only one we’ve got
…”), several of the commentators seemed more inclined to look at ASEAN
in a more anthropological way.
Rather than it being a “fact on the ground” in the everyday conduct of
international relations within and with the countries of Southeast Asia, at
times it was almost as if ASEAN were a fossil, a diplomatic life form which
might have already passed its evolutionary moment. It is like an idea whose
time had come but had also gone.
Feeling discomforted with this, my thoughts then ran back over
ASEAN’s development and how, in my own career, I had come in and out
of contact with the ASEAN story. It was a reminder of one of those truisms
about “journeys” and “progress”, when in an attempt to evaluate the
destination one sometimes needs to pause, and ponder on how fast and how
far one has already come. If ASEAN were an unclimbed mountain, how
would we describe the degree of difficulty of its ascent, and how would we
assess the skills of the mountaineers? When and how does a new regional
construct go from being a gleam in the eye to a diplomatic reality — a
presence with influence, to be heeded and taken into account? If that kind
of acceptance is ASEAN’s peak, what does it mean when that is attained?
And is that all there is? What next?
I was conscious, too, of some of the struggles the regional organisations
of Oceania have been through, and the effort made by regional governments
— not least New Zealand — over many years to build relevance and
effectiveness. It is interesting to consider static and dynamic regions of the
world and ask whether the presence or absence of effective institutions of
political and economic regionalism has made a difference. Or even whether
it is possible to say the more troubled parts of the world often appear to be
those where governments (or non-state actors with commercial, sectarian or
other sectoral and factional agendas) pursue their own sovereign identity
and ends via policies unharmonised with those of others affected by them,
especially neighbours; and where interstate relations are very two-
dimensional, lacking, especially, a modality for plurilaterally negotiated
understandings and commitments involving multiple stakeholders within a
given geography (Central Europe and the Middle East come to mind). In an
age of diminishing distances and porous borders, where complexity spills
over, and when parts of the traditional multilateral machinery (the UN and
international financial institutions [IFIs]) seem prone to gridlock, one would
expect to see more states, particularly smaller states, gravitating towards
such a model, and to see the practitioners of their politics and diplomacy
pushing the envelope — testing how much value the plurilateral or
regionalist approach might bring to resolving particularly stubborn
problems and damaging disputes. If ASEAN is measured in this light, it has
done well.
 In any event, in considering the modern history of Southeast Asia, widely
acknowledged as a story of overall progress, I would find it hard not to
allocate some credit to the leaders, who saw a place for regionalism and
were prepared to push that envelope. A group of states, with some shared
adherence to order and stability as cardinal values, some devotion to risk
management and able to recognise conflict avoidance as the prerequisite for
sustained economic and human development, found their way, over time, to
a regionalist consciousness which was progressively nurtured among their
political and economic elites.
Today, of course, it is ASEAN, the institution, with its operational
outputs and bureaucratic footprint which both expresses and represents that
consciousness at the executive level. But the habits of regional diplomacy,
especially the need to pause national decision-making machinery long
enough to consult, do not come easily; the search for consensus can easily
be made to look ponderous and unresponsive — both of which ASEAN (or
the EU for that matter) is said to have been. Nonetheless, the effort
expended to create a regionalist posture and sustain it against the various
risks — interpersonal “chemistry” failures at the top, process hijack, agenda
corrosion and negotiation fatigue — was, and is, considerable.
ASEAN has had its low moments; its chances of succeeding were far
from assured 43 years ago. The age of empires in Asia did not just fade
softly away, let alone the Cold War (still with us in parts of Asia), and in
particular during the 1945–1965 period, when new states were
experimenting with the nature of their own nationalism, it was always
possible for ethnic or other kinds of cultural tribalism to be exploited for
their populist value and to escalate into political rivalries, ideological
confrontations and threats of conflict. Leaders had to learn how to manage
themselves against such snares and temptations. ASEAN had to learn from
the experience. Through the Secretariat, it formulated much of the learned
behaviour as doctrine. Even today, notwithstanding the accumulated legacy
of ASEAN risk-management and dispute-settlement practice, the outlook
would not be considered entirely benign. Contemporary political and
governmental systems must continue to be capable of change, to adjust to
generational shifts in popular expectations and manage new external
pressures which could destabilise the prevailing subregional order that
ASEAN’s leaders, over two generations, have so consciously fostered.
 The narrative of ASEAN’s emergence as the legitimate representative
regional body for modern Southeast Asia has been well told by others. For
post-1945 NZ governments, a dominant consideration was the expectation
of the United States that its allies and treaty partners would share the burden
of shielding “free Asia”, from which flowed memberships of collective
security arrangements in East Asia, giving rise, in turn, to diplomatic
relations and bilateral connections with the countries themselves. The UN
Charter’s support for regional political governance structures and the
British connection through Commonwealth-based plurilateralism may have
contributed something as well. By the mid-1960s, as I understand it, the
overall NZ policy stance towards regional architecture was some
appreciation for the idea of ASEAN and some empathy towards its
proponents.
Lifting development rates by breaking down regional economic barriers
between Southeast Asian states was the declared and ostensible goal at
ASEAN’s conception in 1967. However, in order to find a common voice
and then to sustain it coherently in the outside world, the real challenge for
embryonic ASEAN was seen to lie in overcoming potentially divisive
legacy issues of a politico-security kind arising from state-building frictions
between and among “the five” themselves. To become recognisable in the
world for a degree of like-mindedness, this group of states first had to “put
its own house in order”. Then they could at least expect to be listened to by
larger actors, and even exert some of the kind of influence on their common
geopolitical environment to which they aspired. Without harmony, there
will be no unity and no credibility.
At the height of the Cold War, geopolitics were very stratified; diplomacy
was predominantly based on assessments of influence and credibility by
nations of each other in the familiar currency of economic strength and
military (nuclear) power projection.1 Everyone knew their place. And the
ASEAN Member States, then, were relatively weak militarily and
industrially. But the war in Vietnam was signalling a new order — one in
which ASEAN’s weight could be multiplied by acting regionally as
champions of order, stability and developmental progress. ASEAN’s
founders had first to delegitimise external subversion, military
brinkmanship and intimidation, and ultimately the resort to armed force
itself, not least by neighbouring states against each other. This became a
defining challenge to regional statecraft in 1975 when it began to seem that,
with the United States pulling back and Vietnam, whose army could control
the whole of Indochina, harbouring wider expansionist goals, the regional
balance was tipping in the wrong strategic direction.
The first NZ Prime Minister with whom I worked closely was Robert
Muldoon, a political conservative who believed in the general Cold War
strategy of containment as it applied in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. He
had inherited a collective security commitment — the Five Power Defence
Arrangements (FPDA) — that took on a new value for its ASEAN
Members after Saigon fell on 30 April 1975. He visited ASEAN capitals in
1975 prior to his election victory. Muldoon was a champion of regional
institutions, particularly the Pacific Forum, in Oceania, and pragmatic
about, and probably comfortable, more so than any of his successors, with
the wider East Asian postcolonial state building model as it was then — a
mix of command economy; military order over civil libertarianism; strong
executive/weak parliament/guided democracy. He certainly gave that
impression during his official visits to Asia — to Indonesia and the
Philippines, as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK), and especially post-
Mao China. His professional advisers (and his own instinct) told him to take
account of the signs of Asia’s spreading economic transformation and its
coming ascendancy (already palpable in our relations with Japan), which
would allow New Zealand to break further out of its strategic economic trap
to diversify its markets for exports and its sources of capital and investment.
In 1977 it was he who attended the first post-ASEAN Summit, where he
welcomed the evidence of growing regional cohesiveness. His government
supported ASEAN, when it asserted itself in a collective diplomatic action
on the world stage for the first time over the invasion of Cambodia, and the
subsequent crisis of the boat people.
Looking back at the evolution of ASEAN in the 1980s, I found myself
far more conscious of the political changes occurring in individual states,
particularly the Philippines, than of the economic tracks along which ideas
of regional coherence and co-ordination were running. There were, of
course, major obstacles to political regionalism, especially in Indochina
where Soviet and Chinese interests had clashed. Walking the “recognition
line” ASEAN had drawn between not condoning the Cambodian genocide
and not approving the Vietnamese invasion that ousted Pol Pot was not
politically easy in New Zealand. In 1984 there had been very tense
moments regarding Vietnamese military presence inside Thailand’s borders
and it was hard then to see any signs of the eventual integration of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) into ASEAN, to form a
unified group of ten states. However, with China on the move (exactly as
Deng Xiaoping had forecast to Muldoon in 1980) and with the coming of
Gorbachev, the risks of economic failure and isolation were exposed and
Vietnam needed to execute a major shift, which it began in 1986. After a
decade or more of diplomatic, political and even military standoff, during
which ASEAN’s leaders held together and held firm in the face of a variety
of pressures, the tide turned. The political order imposed on the region in
the Cold War finally began to unravel. The turnaround in Southeast Asia
was overshadowed, perhaps by the other, better-known Ostpolitik, but it
was remarkable in the same way. Wider global factors had a bearing, of
course, but the diplomacy was regional, and on hindsight, perhaps ASEAN,
by its very existence, offered a path beyond ideological polarity towards a
centre ground characterised by greater economic freedoms, devolution,
social diversity and blended politics, as well as an agenda emphasising
progress through negotiated accommodations for states willing to
contemplate them. If the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) itself was still
some way off (1995) as an institutional presence, the new idea (of the
potential to be cohesive about regional security) behind it had begun to
arrive.
The path from “association” to “community” was never linear, nor the
pace of change fast. With intra-regional security remaining a preoccupation
during the 1980s, ASEAN-based economic regionalism could not gain
much traction, albeit the momentum and competitiveness of Asia’s Tiger
economies were already a sufficient reality to force others, New Zealand
included, to think beyond protectionism to structural reform and other
adjustments. These were years more of speculative diplomatic efforts about
“Pacific Basin” constructs, such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council (PECC), than about a pan-Asian construct, per se, although
Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, for one, was already articulating
such ideas with characteristic force.
I returned to the service of the Prime Minister in 1987, when the New
Zealand/Australia economic relationship was being renegotiated, with the
aim of driving beyond the beachhead of full free trade in goods (of the
Muldoon era) to a more comprehensive set of liberalisation-affecting
services, as well as other kinds of negotiated harmonisation to address
Trans-Tasman legal and regulatory distortions, behind the border,
obstructing a true single market. The Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was part of the policy backdrop in
Wellington, but more so, probably, was an awareness of the pace of
European Union (EU) integration and the strong advocacy of Australia for
regional institution-building in its Asian policies (culminating in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] initiative of Prime Minister Bob
Hawke).
In 1985, New Zealand had fallen into a serious dispute with the United
States over its antinuclear policies and their impact on port access for naval
vessels and potentially aircraft. After fruitless efforts to negotiate a
compromise, participation in the activities of the ANZUS (1951) Treaty
was denied, and the security guarantee was suspended. It was very clear to
the government of Prime Minister David Lange and his ministers that
Australia had little sympathy for its position. What was less clear (it was
usually conveyed sotto voce) was the impact of this rather public and bitter
standoff on New Zealand’s value proposition among ASEAN Member
States and more widely in East Asia. In Japan, it was the cause of particular
discomfort, for obvious reasons. But coinciding as it did with a period of
(post-Vietnam) doubt and uncertainty, it also worried those ASEAN
Member States which, notwithstanding some considerable degrees of
attachment to the doctrines of non-alignment and denuclearisation, had
come to recognise the continued presence of the United States in the region
as critical to the preservation of a balance of power in conventional terms
and also of strategic stability. New Zealand was a small friend, more
valuable as a security partner in East Asia because of its close ties to the
United States than in their absence; with those security connections broken
or practically inoperative, and real constraints over political and diplomatic
dialogue with Washington, New Zealand, for some if not all of ASEAN,
became a more problematic partner. (It was to take another 20 years — and
the emergence of both an expanded ASEAN and a new post-9/11 regional
security agenda — to see politico-military co-operation restored to a
significant degree.)
There was at this time considerable bipartisanship in NZ international
trade and economic policy. The agenda inherited from Mike Moore by
incoming Prime Minister Jim Bolger and his senior ministers was
reaffirmed but they consciously picked up the pace, especially as New
Zealand emerged from the 1987–1992 recession. There seemed a new spirit
of activism, too, on the ASEAN side, visible in the 1992 decision to launch
its own free trade area (FTA) negotiations. The APEC process was about to
be escalated to a leaders’ summit, which would, within a year, also set an
FTA target of its own in the 2010/2020 formula of the Bogor Declaration.
In this heady atmosphere, some officials began to ask whether the Australia
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)
and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), when the intra-regional negotiations
succeeded, might, one day, be “vehicles” that could “dock”. Two-way trade
growth had made business communities positive, although the aftermath of
our long recession had exposed tensions in New Zealand about
unemployment and the rise in Asian-source settlers as a proportion of NZ’s
annual migrant intake. To some extent this took political shape as a
byproduct of the reformed NZ electoral system, then in its teething phase.
But it sat oddly with a foreign policy aim of being more open to Asia. The
Bolger government, after some initial wobbles, responded robustly to
“immigration politics” aimed at Asian communities, by establishing a new
public-private foundation to advocate cross-sectoral progress in NZ-Asia
relations and to support positive programmes in communities, among other
measures.
A galvanising event — for politics and business across Asia, for ASEAN
itself and indeed (though this was not apparent at the time) for ideas about
“outward-lookingness”, including closer trade and economic ties with New
Zealand — was the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It was, above all, an
insight into the nature of globalisation. It confirmed that intra-Asian trade
and investment flows had already reached a level of complexity that
demanded better regional economic governance, cross-border regulation
and macroeconomic harmonisation. It revealed some of the limits of the
development capitalism model, especially the command economy rubric of
regulatory favouritism and limited transparency. It revealed, in the split
which occurred over IMF conditionality and the rescue of Indonesia, that
while ASEAN had deep interdependencies, especially with North Asia,
there were wider links in the chain and stakeholders in regional stability
beyond geographic Asia, such as Australia and New Zealand, which,
besides being export markets, had other assets to offer. Both had proven
themselves reliable bilaterally as security and development partners, and
had displayed the will and the means to be constructive actors in their
various dialogue-status engagements with ASEAN itself.
Decisions by ASEAN to accelerate the AFTA timetable; to more
vigorously pursue integration of an ASEAN of ten; and to step up outreach
to China, Japan and the ROK in order to bind them more closely into the
regionalist project and its architecture were to follow. Initially, the crisis
forced trade liberalisation to retreat somewhat. Closer to home, much of the
Bogor ambition dissipated and APEC-wide negotiation for a supra-regional
Pacific Rim economic space seized up. Some kept trying bilaterally —
Singapore and NZ, with a model Closer Economic Partnership (CEP)
building on World Trade Organization (WTO) standards — but the tide was
out on most favoured nation-based multilateralism, as the failure of the
Seattle WTO launch was soon to show. The overall trend was to turn to
limited preferential bilateral negotiations — the era of the “noodle bowl”.
By the time I returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) in late 1998,
events within Indonesia — the recession, street politics and the reformasi
movement — were bringing the curtain down on the reign of President
Soeharto, thus opening up, among many other things, the vexed question of
Timorese independence. Within a year — in fact at the 1999 APEC leaders,
meeting in Auckland — the UN-based stabilisation and self-determination
process for Timor-Leste was initiated, and supported in due course, by New
Zealand, Australia and a number of ASEAN Member States. But the wider
questions, concerned with the future shape of the Indonesian state and its
political machinery, the role of its armed forces, federal and provincial
power-sharing and economic governance, were even more of an unknown.
It must have been a great (private) concern to those leading the thinking
about deeper regional integration via ASEAN that the largest Member State
— and one which had exerted positive efforts for ASEAN’s own
development pretty consistently over the years — had come to a critical
point in its national journey. Without a committed and outward-looking
Indonesia — no matter how hardwired for consultative decision making its
systems and procedures had become, and no matter its rising diplomatic
coherence and influence — what could ASEAN hope to become?
In the three years I spent in Australia as NZ’s High Commissioner, I
found very close attention was paid to such questions in both Canberra and
Wellington. Early on in my posting, a storm, which threatened Canberra-
Jakarta relations, began to gather over illegal entry into Australia by “boat
people” who were asylum seekers and economic refugees. People
smuggling is a phenomenon which repeats itself endlessly in wider Asia
and Europe, especially where civilian populations are displaced, and of
course, it requires cross-border diplomacy to avert situational friction and
deep regional co-operation to find effective solutions. Many of those
seeking to enter Australia had made their way east and south, principally to
Indonesia, from Iraq, Pakistan and especially Afghanistan. The storm broke
in August 2001 with the Tampa crisis.2 Initially it was not clear whether
enduring solutions based on deep co-operation were imminent or even
possible, and a more pragmatic approach to the security and humanitarian
dilemma needed to be found urgently among those willing to try to help.
New Zealand, whose new Prime Minister Helen Clark could see the bigger
picture, sought to assist and allow Indonesia and Australia to work on
compartmentalising and de-escalating as best as they could, considering the
limits of their national positions, and move towards some shared policy and
operational space for issue management.
It was just as well, because a new and bigger threat was looming. The
9/11 attacks in New York and Washington were soon to be followed by the
foiled Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) plot in Singapore. After the first Bali atrocity
of October 2002, other forms of enhanced security and intelligence co-
operation, not limited to strictly neighbouring states, were clearly necessary
and urgently required. It was a moment for deeper and broader regionalism.
The role of ASEAN and the scope of its influence were illuminated by
“borderless” threats such as jihadi terrorism. Without diminishing the
criticality of national action or bilateral co-operation, ASEAN also had an
impact. It was able to develop and facilitate some regional frameworks for
counter-terrorism, with some measure of trans-border tactical effectiveness,
and it has lent its good offices to various approaches to civilisational
dialogue. It went on to act with expedition over the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis of 2003, and to set region-wide governance
parameters for emergency relief and rehabilitation after the tsunami of
Boxing Day 2004. Its responses to the recrudescence of political violence in
the new Timorese state in mid-2006 revealed some ambivalence where the
consent environment was considered complex. This ambivalence seemed to
repeat itself with the Myanmar cyclone disaster. Such events test the
contemporary applicability of ASEAN’s cornerstone, the “non-interference”
doctrine.
The Clark government in Wellington, with political constituencies that
were suspicious of free trade and not at all sympathetic to non-interference
when human rights or human security were at stake, nonetheless found its
way, by its second term (2003), to a strategic posture on ASEAN and wider
Asia. Reinvigorating Asian relationships by creating modern mutual value
propositions needed to be given its proper significance not just as a task for
the ministry for which I had just become responsible, but as a
multidimensional national goal. Allowing single issues or events to
determine content or progress in bilateral relationships, and wallowing in
nostalgia for the past — the Colombo Plan, or the days of the NZ Defence
Force in Changi or Butterworth — was not a policy. Prime Minister Clark,
once persuaded of what was required — a comprehensive approach which
incorporated a strong regional dimension — blessed a new multisectoral
domestic initiative, “Seriously Asia”, that would sustain a wider
constituency for the strategy within New Zealand, and set about the external
diplomacy personally at leaders’ level.
In its economic dimension, the strategy looked to find partners for trade
liberalisation in the “noodle bowl”. Building upon the Singapore agreement
(which was successfully trilateralised with Chile as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and a possible vehicle for rekindling the APEC ambition), our
diplomats reached out to Brunei first; then, bilaterally, to Thailand and to
Malaysia. We had wondered what China might do, once admitted to the
WTO, and our ministers were directly floating the idea that a “pathfinder”
CEP/FTA with New Zealand could make sense in Beijing. (We also sought
to engage the United States, and some hopes were held that once the US-
Australia agreement was negotiated our turn might come but those were not
well-founded.) This ambitious programme could be justified purely on
economic grounds from NZ’s point of view as a further dimension of our
existential quest, as a small and geographically remote state, for economic
security through expanding access to capital and trade markets. However,
the market-access improvements we offered in return were comparatively
minor. What was in it for our prospective Asian partners? The value
proposition therefore had to have a strategic and political dimension. Could
it perhaps be that we — large and small states — were all potentially
heading towards some wider notion of stability and order built around
political convergences, greater economic openness and wider policy
harmonisation?
ASEAN had itself been driving towards a broader goal since 1999. That
was the year of the landmark 10+3 summit that agreed on key principles for
co-operation in an expanded, East Asia frame of reference. In 2000 the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), which aimed to accelerate the
overall progress of development in the CLMV Member States via sustained
human development transfers, was launched. In 2002 the comprehensive
framework for ASEAN-China trade and economic co-operation was
announced and China signed off on the East Asia Vision Group report. The
original scope of AFTA and the plan for an ASEAN Economic Community
had to adjust to wider realities of the economic power shifts that were
propelling China — and India — towards the front rank of global influence,
alongside Japan. ASEAN, under its new Secretary-General Ong Keng
Yong, was also accelerating its outreach beyond Asia to the EU, and to the
United States. In regular contact with ASEAN via dialogue partners, such
as Brunei and others, we sensed the requirement of our posts in Asia was to
listen, to read the trend lines, not the headlines. It became progressively
more apparent that ASEAN had a momentum towards a deeper
institutionalisation of the ten and towards a wider construct involving its
three big North Asian economic partners — the “Plus 3”.
The defining moment for me, personally, was learning that the 30th
anniversary of ASEAN would go beyond the “10 Plus 1” format to a
summit of the 13 leaders of East Asia. While it was not completely clear
how much substantive business the summit might be able to transact,
ASEAN, as we saw it, was itself changing course and turning a new page in
the book of Asian regionalism. I strongly felt it was a moment not to be
missed.
By the time of the annual summit and post-summit events of 2004 in
Vientiane, after some intensive diplomatic effort and good will, it had been
agreed that the ASEAN dialogues for the year would be conducted at
leaders’ level not just for the “Plus 3” (and India) but also for New Zealand
and Australia. Not since 1977 had ASEAN invited the NZ Prime Minister
to attend its annual showcase political event, and for all the efficacy of other
forms of contact, bilaterally and on multilateral fringes, this seemed a
telling gap. At that meeting in Laos, PM Helen Clark, rather than dwelling
on the history of NZ’s post-war support for Southeast Asian stability and
for ASEAN itself, laid out the strategic direction in which New Zealand
hoped — and planned — to travel with regard to its future Asian
relationships: the wish for closer links with ASEAN (via intended accession
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) including a new trade and
economic pact — the long-awaited plurilateral “docking” of AFTA and
ANZCERTA.3 She chose not to avoid NZ’s history as an European
“outpost”, nor our location beyond geographic Asia. The leaders all knew
that such factors could be used as a constraint at any time if the political
will for inclusiveness and outward-lookingness did not stretch far enough.
By my judgement, she was well and warmly received. She went on to
articulate to the other visiting leaders4 a strong interest in the prospective
East Asia Summit (EAS), as a political event, of course, but more so as a
potential setter of the future direction and pace of regional integration
activity on all fronts.
In December the following year, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was
adopted by the 16 states present. Even at the moment of public
announcement, there were clearly a range of views, some lukewarm, and of
expectations, some minimalist, about what commonalities of values or
identity or outlook could be called upon by the 16 when tested by events,
threats or opportunities. For ASEAN, nonetheless, it was a serious
diplomatic statement of intent, an assertion that it had the vehicle and the
engine to carry the weight of a new, wider and deeper regionalism.
Subsequent meetings of the EAS, which might have done more to expose
an agenda, have been beset by external complications, and there have been
signs that China, in particular, has some bottom lines about the scope of that
agenda.
It appears to be a given that the regional integration pathway runs, as it
has in Europe, upwards through economic towards politico-security affairs.
It gets steeper as it goes further and has many potholes when national
autonomy is felt to be threatened or domestic political initiative is seen to
be suppressed. An economic area of 16 — the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) — has been declared an EAS goal, but
not strongly resourced and seen as the eventual endpoint of a more
sequenced and gradual programme. The necessary conditions for the EAS
to escape political minimalism will be found in a nexus between the depth
of ASEAN’s joint commitment and the individual attitudes of the dominant
states towards making use of it. Some scholars5 forecast a period of
uncertainty on this latter score, as the region, in particular China (and
Japan), absorbs the nature and intentions of the Obama administration
towards Asia. Clearly, too, the achievement of a durable settlement of the
Korean peninsula/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear issues
would alter the diplomatic and security landscape in ways that could change
the calculus about the utility of the EAS.
Even if the EAS is not yet a real diplomatic fact on the ground, it
illustrates how far ASEAN has come in its journey and it may provide a
goal against which ASEAN can judge the progress of its own unfinished
unification agenda. As well as its underlying drive for a level of strategic
stability and power balance in its wider neighbourhood, it is not to be
assumed in future that New Zealand will necessarily be able to rest its
relations with wider Asia on a platform which has room — and resourcing
— at best for a moderate, incremental and selective deepening of bilateral
diplomacy, important though that is. Rather, there is every reason to
continue to be a constructive plurilateralist by contributing via
ASEAN/EAS to the regionalist agenda for stability and prosperity. And
New Zealand’s domestic policies should be consciously shaped by openness
to the region and the cultures it embraces.
As a small state, seeking to consolidate a place in dynamic East Asia,
New Zealand has worked hard, for well over fifty years at relationship —
deepening by means of practical support for nation-building and for
peaceful political and economic development. Stability in the region as a
whole has had to be secured by collective initiatives as well as the efforts of
the regional states and their friends. The emergence of ASEAN as a viable
organisation dedicated to these very goals has provided New Zealand with
opportunities to participate in the collective endeavour. ASEAN’s outward-
looking posture has enabled New Zealand, a TAC signatory, and trade
treaty partner via AANZFTA, and a foundation Member of the EAS, to
expand the scope of its engagement through constructive contributions to
wider regional institution-building.

_____________________
1
In 1958 Henry Kissinger, arguing in favour of the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in
(NATO) Europe, said this was “the only means by which Europe can gain a degree of influence over
its future”. Foreign Affairs, April 1958.
2
For an account of this, see David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory: How a Government
Lied Its Way to Political Victory. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003.
3 Late in 2009 the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand negotiation was finalised, and it comes into force
in 2010. New Zealand has also actively supported the inclusion of Vietnam in the Trans-Pacific
(“P8”) negotiations that have recently commenced.
4
In her meeting with the People’s Republic of China, the agreement to negotiate a bilateral
FTA/CEP — China’s first with an OECD member — was decisively advanced. It was finalised in
2008.
5 For example, Li Mingjiang, “China and Asian Regionalism”, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (Singapore) Working Paper, May 2009.
 CHAPTER 34

ASEAN AND LATIN AMERICA: TIME

FOR A VIBRANT CONNECTIVITY
Paulo Alberto da Silveira Soares

For the last three years, while living in Singapore, I have been learning a lot
about Asia and more specifically the Southeast Asian region and its
economic scenario. The perceptions gathered in these short notes are no
more than a brief set of reflections on the potentialities, which are scarcely
explored, for the enhancement of a much greater connectivity between the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Latin America.
Nevertheless, I have been developing quite a strong personal intuition, as
I gradually feel it taking shape in my mind, that rather sooner than later, we
might witness a rapid expansion of trade, broader economic and financial
exchanges and a great deal more co-operation between the two regions.
Obviously, a much greater effort of engagement than what we’ve seen so
far in these regions will be required from governments, from policy makers,
from the public and the private sectors, from businesses and from scientific,
technological and academic quarters to make these potentialities take shape,
become a work-in-progress and eventually be fully accomplished. A
challenging task, though not an impossible one.
A few quick remarks on the world economy post-financial crisis seem
appropriate to highlight my argument. By now, I guess it is becoming quite
evident that “the irresistible shift of power from West to East” is a current
world reality, and that, ironically, this new change in the world’s economic
centre of gravity has been given impulse by the effects generated by the
crisis itself. Here are some evident signs of Asia’s remarkable leap forward:
emerging Asia is rebounding from recession much faster than the developed
world. Its banking systems have reacted in a much quicker and healthier
way. In Latin America, likewise, Brazil’s banking and credit system has not
been mired in a greedy housing mortgage wave.
Actually, since 1995, Asia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew
more than twice as fast as that of the USA or Western Europe, and will most
certainly continue to grow in 2010 (7%) and the following years. The
region grabbed a larger slice of exports, with a 31% share of world exports.
According to recent IMF sources, when measured by purchasing power
parity, Asia’s share of the world economy increased from 18% in 1980 to
27% in 1995 and 34% in 2009. It will come as no big surprise if Asia’s
economy exceeds the combined sum of the American and European
economies within the next four years.
Figures from the Economist Intelligence Unit suggest that Asia accounts
for around one-third of world retail sales. It has been consuming around
35% of the world’s energy and accounted for two-thirds of the increase in
world energy demand since 2000. In 2009, as much as 40% of global
investments occurred in Asia. While the rich countries’ growth rates will
most likely show a timid performance over the next years due to all the side
effects of the financial crisis, namely the increasing public debt, higher
taxes, huge household debts, tightening consumption and shortage of
employment, in the ASEAN and Latin American economies, the trends are
indicating quite the opposite: the GDPs of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as those of Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia, are all bound to grow in
2010 and 2011.
My perception is that ASEAN and Latin America have to be much
further exposed to each other. For that matter, Latin American observers
should have a better assessment of the potentialities of the outcome and
resolutions of the 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in 2007. It felt as
if a mood of reinvention was in the air. It appeared that ASEAN was
starting to breathe a new atmosphere of relevance, a new era, a new
horizon, after a long 40 years of ups and downs. As a matter of fact, the
ASEAN Charter and the Blueprint for an ASEAN Economic Community,
which had been adopted at the 13th Summit, became the cornerstone and
the point of inflection for a rejuvenated ASEAN.
Viewed from a cool, stoic and short-term perspective, for many in Latin
America and even in Southeast Asia, my assumptions might sound over-
optimistic or somewhat far-fetched. Could this be due to a lack of public
awareness of what ASEAN has been doing since and of what Latin
American economies have been achieving so far? Most probably, yes. The
fact is that without awareness, hardly any interest can be aroused. Without
awareness, hardly any understanding will be generated. So obviously what
must be done is to raise awareness within the public and private sectors and
across the different segments of the Southeast Asian and Latin American
civil societies.
It would not be too far from reality to say that in Latin America, there is
still a relatively limited realisation that ASEAN’s most relevant endeavour
is the building of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the year
2015. This is an endeavour which aims to achieve economic integration
targets and implement a free flow of goods, services and investments,
generate skilled labour and promote a freer flow of capital, and endeavour
to integrate the ten economies of ASEAN Member States into a single
market, a regional production base, which will benefit a population of
nearly 600 million people, with a GDP above US$1.5 trillion.
On one hand, one may feel that the Latin American economies have not
yet fully realised the economic and trade critical mass that the ASEAN
Economic Community will soon be generating. In fact, the AEC is already
doing so through free trade agreements already effective or through ongoing
negotiations with key global traders such as China, Japan, India, Australia
and New Zealand. Likewise, a free trade agreement between the European
Union, Singapore and Vietnam is already being finalised. Alongside these
actions, an increasing number of Western and Eastern countries have been,
for some time now, or are becoming ASEAN dialogue partners.
Following this trend, it must be said that some action has also been
achieved between the two regions. In November 2008, ASEAN foreign
ministers and MERCOSUR (the trade/economic integration group of South
American economies comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay)
representatives, somewhat inspired by the Singaporean and the Brazilian
foreign ministers, had their first round of preliminary talks aiming at the
creation of the basis for a “dialogue partnership”. (The full text of the Press
Statement is found in Annex 1.)
On the other hand, I guess most ASEAN public and private sector actors
may not yet be fully aware that MERCOSUR countries also have trade
agreements in place with quite a number of countries in Latin America,
Africa and the Middle East, and presently are in the process of achieving a
free trade framework arrangement with the European Union.
Latin Americans would also do well to realise the indirect benefits of a
better interconnectivity with ASEAN that can be generated through
ASEAN’s regional and inter-regional dialogues and co-operation. These
have been achieved with inter-regional forums as Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Europe Meeting (ASEM), Forum for East
Asia and Latin American Cooperation (FEALAC), the Asian-African
Summit, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), South African Development
Community (SADC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), the Transpacific Partnership (which alongside Australia, Brunei
Darussalam and New Zealand, also includes Singapore, Vietnam, Chile and
Peru) and, last but not least, with the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).
It must be said, though, that the first ASEAN-MERCOSUR get-together
held in Brasilia in 2008 has the potentiality I mentioned before to
necessarily evolve into a pragmatic and pro-action dialogue partnership,
similar to those so far implemented between ASEAN and the United States,
the European Union and a number of Asian economies. It would be
sufficient to note the continuously increasing flows of foreign trade between
ASEAN and MERCOSUR and the other Latin American economies to
realise that there is much capacity for trade, investment and services to
expand and a quite diversified scope for co-operation yet to be explored
and, consequently, implemented. Without a doubt, this leap forward can
only be accomplished through a more dynamic impulse that is yet to be
fostered by governments and businesses from both sides. Again, it will
demand a joint effort followed by the drawing up of a market strategy. And
that strategy will have to be conceived with the engagement of and
commitment from the public and private sectors.
It has become evident to anyone looking for competitive markets around
the world that there is an increasingly diversified chain of products and
services that could increase the trade and investment flows between
ASEAN and Latin American countries and make them mutual and regular
market suppliers on a much more complementary and advantageous basis.
The varied number of sectors yet to be explored range from infrastructure,
urban solutions to consulting and services, airports, ports and road transport
logistics, from agro-business chains and foodstuff, paper and cellulose,
metals and minerals, petrol, gas and biofuels to garments, furniture, steel,
electric and electronics infotech, from heavy equipment, oil offshore
platforms and manufactures to the aircraft industry, biomedicines and
biotechnology.
For that matter, in Latin America the emerging economy of Brazil, one of
the BRICs, is a reference and can lead the way to kick-start a deeper
approach to collaboration and business opportunities with ASEAN
economies. Take, for one, the production and supply chain of biofuels,
developed through a long experience of 30 years in Brazil. Considered
today one of the most sensitive of the green sustainable energy production
chains, it has huge potential to become a cluster for ASEAN-Brazil co-
operation.
I guess it is high time for decision makers and the private sector to start
giving some thought to the idea of designing jointly a totally new
framework for a clean and green co-operation aiming ambitiously to supply
the world market. It would not be so far-fetched. Actually, it would suffice
to emulate the ethanol strategy currently being implemented between the
Brazilian oil company Petrobras and its Japanese partners, an ethanol-
blending project resulting from a joint venture between Petrobras and Japan
Alcohol Trading. The aim of the project is to launch an ethanol distribution
centre for Japan and the rest of Asia, and the project also aims at using
ethanol to generate electricity in Japan and to power thermoelectric plants.
The project is ambitious, but feasible.
Incidentally, the remarks of Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brazil’s
Minister of External Relations, raised during his visit to Singapore in 2008,
summarise, in a nutshell, the potentiality for this co-operation with the
ASEAN economies:

… One of the features of today’s international scenario is the rise of

regional blocs and countries located outside the traditional axes of
power. Valuing direct relations and exchanges between these new
actors becomes particularly relevant. I think a new chapter is
 beginning in the history of relations between Brazil and Southeast Asia
… (as their) economies are opening up to new opportunities in terms
of foreign trade and investments …
… Brazil believes that Southeast Asian countries have the conditions
required to sustainably produce and use biofuels without damaging the
environment or threatening food production. The Brazilian experience
demonstrates that biofuels can be a tool to bolster agro production
technologies, generate jobs and income in rural areas, provide access
to energy to poor populations, and contribute to reducing greenhouse
gases emissions … Many other countries may become sustainable
producers. By doing so we are paving the way for the creation of an
international market for biofuels.

Accordingly, other Brazilian ethanol partnership projects, like the one

being developed in Japan, are already being introduced in Colombia and
Africa (a project will soon start producing sugar and ethanol in Angola this
year), while, in Brazil, Petrobras has been heavily investing in cellulosic
ethanol or second-generation ethanol for a wider range of green end-users.
Projects of this magnitude are obviously capital-intensive and demand
change and adaptation in energy strategic models and policies. They are
however feasible and, if implemented, would certainly generate a
tremendous and innovative impact for a new and sound co-operation
scheme between Brazil and ASEAN Member States. They would also set a
challenging example for other regions in this overwhelming, ever-
competitive global economy in which we all are bound to live for many
decades to come.
Every day, ever-growing challenges are confronting us, in Latin America
and ASEAN. Let’s once and for all start facing them as they descend upon
us. Let’s bear in mind the words of Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani as he
prophetically penned in his book Can Asians Think?:

… the world urgently needs new thinking in global governance and

not new tinkering. There is an urgent and pressing need to discard
old thinking … and prepare new perspectives.

I conclude these thought-provoking notes by imagining that as the main

and most active emerging countries have all become part of the G20 world
economies, including Southeast Asia and the ASEAN group itself, and as
G20 is bound to gain momentum in the years to come, it will gradually pave
the way for new perspectives on trade and investment, for a much wider
range of exchange potentialities, and for an expanding connectivity between
ASEAN and the Latin American economies, among others.
 CHAPTER 35

BUILDING A STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP: A REVIEW OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN ASEAN AND
THE ILO
Ng Gek-Boo

Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO) began their co-operation in the 1980s through
the implementation of regional projects and other activities. At the country
level, most ASEAN Member States started their development co-operation
with the ILO in the 1970s. Apart from the governments (mostly the
Ministries of Labour), ASEAN-ILO co-operation also extends to the ILO’s
social partners (employers’ and workers’ organisations), research
institutions and related civil society organisations. The ILO has been invited
to attend the ASEAN Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM) and the
ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (ALMM). At the request of the SLOM,
the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific also prepares “Labour and
Social Trends in ASEAN” as a background document for facilitating
discussions at the SLOM and ALMM. After Brunei joined the ILO as a
Member in January 2007, ASEAN-ILO co-operation was strengthened with
the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between ASEAN Secretariat and
the ILO (hereafter the Cooperation Agreement) in March 2007.1
Co-operation and relations between the two organisations have been
steadily improving over the last decade, especially after the signing of the
Cooperation Agreement. This improvement is built upon two major
foundations, namely the sharing of common goals and an effective co-
operation programme.

The Common Ground

Both ASEAN and the ILO are committed to an inclusive growth strategy
with an emphasis on balancing economic and social development goals,
social justice and human rights. The ASEAN Labour Ministers’ Work
Programme 2010–2015 (LMWP), adopted on 24 May 2010 in Hanoi,
declares that “The overall objective of ASEAN co-operation on labour is
built towards the vision of a better quality of life, productive employment,
and adequate social protection for ASEAN peoples through enhancing
workforce competitiveness, creating a harmonious and progressive
workplace, and promotion of decent work for all”.2 The ratification of the
ASEAN Charter on 5 December 2008 brings the two organisations closer in
pursuit of their common goals. The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community
contains a list of issues of direct concern to the ILO. In addressing the
ALMM in 2008 in Bangkok, the Director-General of the ILO, Mr Juan
Somavia, said, “The values and the vision around which your leaders have
come together are also those of the ILO Constitution and the Decent Work
Agenda”. Not surprisingly, many priorities of the LMWP are similar to
those of the ILO programme for realising decent work in the region.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that as a tripartite organisation
with full commitment to social dialogue, the ILO fully shares ASEAN’s
emphasis on a people-oriented approach and the importance of national
capacity building. One of the main objectives of the ILO Decent Work
Country Programmes is the strengthening of national capacity, especially of
its tripartite constituents, in the formulation and implementation of national
social and labour policy. In addition, as an organisation responsible for
setting international labour standards, the ILO naturally welcomes the
ratification of the ASEAN Charter as an important step in transforming
ASEAN into a more rules-based organisation with a legal personality. The
ILO has been encouraged by the explicit commitment of the LMWP to
protect labour rights, including the rights of migrant workers. Many
ASEAN Member States have ratified ILO core labour standards and
governance standards.3 Compliance of these ratifications through national
labour legislation and their enforcement are of special significance to
safeguarding human rights in ASEAN.

ASEAN-ILO Co-Operation
Broad in scope and flexible in its implementation approach, the ASEAN-
ILO co-operation programme is aimed at promoting ASEAN ownership and
closer co-operation among ASEAN Member States. Given the diversity of
ASEAN, the co-operation programme was designed to ensure that the
common priority needs of all ASEAN Member States are included for the
benefit of the working people. The areas of co-operation with ASEAN,
specified in the Cooperation Agreement, include programmes on
occupational safety and health, HIV/AIDS in the workplace, labour market
information, industrial relations, youth employment, skill training, social
security and migrant workers. Most of these areas have been included in the
LMWP.
The ASEAN-ILO co-operation programme has been implemented with
various modalities with the ILO playing different roles as desired. Take
ASEAN-OSHNET (Occupational Safety and Health Network) as an
example. The programme was launched with an ASEAN ownership, with
the aim of raising occupational safety and health standards. Member States
exchange their good practices in the specific sectors of their concern and
provide training for staff of other Member States in areas of their
comparative strengths. The role of the ILO is limited to providing technical
support for research and training activities. It is considered a success story
because many ASEAN professionals have been able to work closely
together to improve the working conditions of their workers.4
The ILO also plays an advocacy role in promoting ASEAN co-operation
on migrant workers. In 2007, 13.5 million migrant workers originated from
ASEAN, and nearly 40% of them were employed within ASEAN itself.
While Singapore and Brunei are primarily labour-receiving countries,
Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam are labour-sending
countries, with Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand as both sending and
receiving countries. Given the trends in the growth of the labour force and
wages, the present pattern of labour migration will remain. Although the
benefits of labour migration to both sending and receiving countries are
acknowledged, ASEAN has been concerned with various issues of labour
migration. Admittedly, there is scope for improving the protection of
migrant workers and for maximising the benefits to all. The ILO welcomes
the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of
the Rights of Migrant Workers in 2007 and the creation of the Committee
on the Implementation of the Declaration. The ASEAN Forum on Labour
Migration has been meeting every year since the first forum in April 2008.
The ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration provides a set of
principles and good practices in policy formulation and continues to support
the work of the Forum.
Another area of co-operation which deserves special mention is the work
on poverty reduction. In 2009, 140 million workers in ASEAN lived with
their families on less than US$2 a day. The working poor also suffer from
inadequate, or a total absence of, social and labour protection, low
productivity and vulnerable employment conditions. These problems
deteriorated during the recent period of economic recession. The ASEAN-
ILO co-operation includes projects targeted at child labour, workers
affected by HIV/AIDS, informal sector workers and unemployed youth.
ASEAN and the ILO also undertook joint research on the social
implications of free trade agreements,5 prepared the “Compendium of
Social Security Legislation of ASEAN Countries” and, through an ILO-
Japan project, produced industrial relations profiles of ASEAN Member
States. The initiative of developing labour statistics and strengthening the
national capacity for collecting and analysing labour market information is
highly significant for formulating appropriate employment and labour
policies and for promoting effective tripartite consultation and social
dialogue.
The implementation of the co-operation programme goes a long way
towards improving the relations between the two organisations. It provides
a unique opportunity for the staff of both organisations to understand each
other’s technical capability and operational procedures, and in the
meantime, to develop mutual trust and confidence. During the process both
organisations have increasingly committed their staff and financial
resources to programme implementation. The ILO Office in Jakarta was
duly strengthened by working more effectively with the ASEAN
Secretariat. The ILO will soon attach a professional staff to work at the
ASEAN Secretariat.
The review of the ASEAN-ILO co-operation shows that the overall focus
of the programme has been on the creation of more and better jobs and the
improvement of labour market governance. The programme has contributed
to facilitating labour market reform and reducing poverty. In the meantime,
national capacity is being strengthened, and many ASEAN national
professionals in various fields have been working closely together towards
a common goal. As many work items are included in the LMWP, this
process will continue to contribute to the development of an ASEAN
Community. However, the review also shows areas for improvement. First,
its effectiveness could be enhanced considerably with better design and
planning. In some cases, the requests for ILO technical support are ad hoc,
leaving very little time for technical preparation and resource mobilisation.
As the strategic framework remains unclear, inadequate coordination could
not ensure the optimum use of resources. Second, the mechanism for review
and evaluation is lacking. Many activities were completed and considered
useful, but without proper review and evaluation, the co-operation
programme could miss opportunities to identify measures to remove
obstacles and to modify project design during the process of
implementation.

Suggestions for Future Development of the ASEAN-ILO

Relationship
Future development of ASEAN-ILO relations should take into account two
factors. First, the challenges faced by ASEAN and its Member States and
the importance of knowledge management and co-operation within
ASEAN. Internally, many labour and social issues will remain serious in the
less developed ASEAN Member States. In most ASEAN Member States,
moreover, national capacity building will continue to be an arduous task.
Externally, the challenges arising from globalisation will call for ASEAN
Member States to accelerate labour market reform, upgrade workforce
skills and raise labour productivity. The growth of labour productivity in
China and India is relatively faster than in ASEAN as a whole, and by
2007, the value of output per worker in China surpassed that of the ASEAN
average6 The process of globalisation and the launching of the free trade
agreement between China and ASEAN will no doubt call for further
adjustment of the relevant sectors and the labour markets. Second, ASEAN
must take concrete steps to share good practices, acquire technical
knowledge through different networks (including the ILO) and make full
use of its labour market institutions to accelerate the development of its
human capital. Co-operation among ASEAN Member States has been
impressive and should be expanded in the implementation of the LMWP
during 2010–2015.
The 2015 target of establishing a regional community gives very little
time to the ASEAN labour administration and its social partners to
undertake labour market reform and to make the ASEAN workforce more
productive. The effective implementation of the ASEAN LMWP also calls
for mobilisation of both domestic and external resources.
Accordingly, three specific suggestions are made for enhancing the
effectiveness of the co-operation programme between ASEAN and the ILO.
First, both organisations should work more closely in setting priorities and
work programme planning, especially with respect to national capacity
building and resource mobilisation. Labour administrations, for instance,
should be fully aware of their commitments in programme implementation,
including co-operation among the Member States. For this purpose, it will
be necessary for the ILO and ASEAN and its Member States to meet and
jointly develop their co-operation programme and formulate the work plans.
Second, the potential for ASEAN-ILO co-operation in promoting human
rights should be recognised. As mentioned earlier, many ASEAN Member
States have ratified ILO core Conventions which are of direct relevance to
the commitment in the ASEAN Charter to human rights. In many cases, the
implementation of the ratified conventions would require concerted efforts
to be made by national labour administrations and the social partners.
Future ASEAN-ILO co-operation should consider ways and means to help
Member States create the conditions to facilitate implementation. Similarly,
both ASEAN and the ILO may co-operate in assisting Member States to
prepare future ratifications of conventions.
Finally, both ASEAN and the ILO may consider setting up a mechanism
to monitor, report and evaluate programme implementation. It would be
desirable for the SLOM to undertake an annual review of the progress of
work programme implementation and consider measures for overcoming
difficulties. The SLOM may consider including such a review as a standard
agenda item for its annual session. Selected components of the work
programme could be evaluated periodically with the reports submitted to
the Member States and the SLOM for discussion on the necessary follow-
up. Indeed, the impact of the ASEAN-ILO co-operation programme could
be considerably enhanced with a simple mechanism of monitoring,
reporting and evaluation.

_____________________
1
The Cooperation Agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Secretariat and the International Labour Office (ILO) was signed in Geneva on 20 March 2007, by
Mr Ong Keng Yong, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, and Mr Juan Somavia, Director-General of
the ILO.
2 Para. 2, ASEAN Labour Ministers’ Work Programme, 2010–2015, adopted by the ASEAN Labour
Ministers’ Meeting in Hanoi, April 2010.
3
The Core Labour Standards refer to Forced Labour (Convention No. 29), Freedom of Association
(Convention No. 87), Collective Bargaining (Convention No. 98), Abolition of Forced Labour
(Convention No. 105), Equal Remuneration (Convention No. 100), Employment and Occupation
Discrimination (Convention No. 111), Minimum Age (Convention No. 138) and Worst Forms of
Child Labour (Convention No. 182). The governance conventions refer to Labour Inspection
(Convention No. 81), Employment Policy (Convention No. 122), Labour Inspection (Agriculture)
(Convention No. 129) and Tripartite Consultation (Convention No. 144). Ibid., pp. 16–17; and ILO,
“Information Note on ASEAN Member States and International Labour Standards”, Jakarta, 2005.
4 For more information, please refer to this ASEAN-OSHNET publication: Tan Fang Qun and
Tsuyoshi Kawakami (eds.), “Good Occupational Safety and Health Practices 2008/2009”, Vientiane,
2009.
5
Hidayat Idarli, “ILO/ASEAN Joint Study on Social Implications of the ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement on Labour and Employment — The Case of Indonesia”, ILO, Jakarta, December 2005.
6 Figure 3.1 in ILO, “Labour and Social Trends in ASEAN 2010: Sustaining Recovery and
Development through Decent Work”, Bangkok, 2010.
 THEME SIX

THE FUTURE
 CHAPTER 36

THE FUTURE OF ASEAN:

OBSOLESCENT OR RESILIENT?
Amitav Acharya

One of the most remarkable essays on regional co-operation in world

politics was published by American scholar Ernst Haas in 1975 under the
title: “The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory”.1 The essay,
although professing to speak of regional integration generally, was in reality
focussed on the European Economic Community (EEC, later the European
Union).
In this essay, Haas, then a Professor at the University of California,
Berkeley, argued that European regional integration, despite its considerable
growth in the 1950s and 1960s, had stagnated to the point of becoming
“obsolescent” (on the way to becoming obsolete, rather than having already
been rendered obsolete). The factors causing this were both regional and
external. EEC Members had not acted with unity and purpose when faced
with a set of new external challenges, such as the oil crisis resulting from
the Arab oil embargo in 1973, and the technological leap of the United
States over Europe. Existing ideas and approaches to regional integration,
including “neo-functionalism” which argued that co-operation on economic
and technical issues would spill over to produce higher levels of political
and security co-operation, thereby creating a supranational entity for
Western Europe, had failed to materialise. International and global
interdependence, Haas argued, had overtaken the imperative of and
progress towards European regional integration.
Is ASEAN going through a similar experience today? Of course, as
numerous scholars and policy makers have pointed out, ASEAN, past or
present, is not the same as the European Community/Union. It will never
be. ASEAN never aspired to the vision of integration and unity that
underpinned the origins and evolution of the EU. However, as with the EU,
there are pessimistic as well optimistic projections about the future of
ASEAN. No one can deny that there are serious uncertainties. On the other
hand, there are encouraging developments.
ASEAN’s accomplishments to date are hard to ignore.2 ASEAN was
created when the danger of inter-state conflict in Southeast Asia and Cold
War rivalry over Asia more generally was real and immediate. ASEAN was
born out of a diplomatic settlement of the Indonesia-Malaysia Konfrontasi,
but it was immediately mired in the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over
Sabah and the political and ethnic mistrust between Singapore and its two
largest immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. These disputes
nearly led to the demise of the fledgling regional grouping. However,
ASEAN not only survived, it also helped, both directly and indirectly, to
ease the impact of Cold War conflicts on the region. It fostered significantly
improved relationships among its Members. It realised its founders’ vision
of “One Southeast Asia”. Moreover, it played a significant and largely
productive role in bringing the decade-long conflict over the Vietnamese
invasion and occupation of Cambodia to a diplomatic settlement. When the
conflict was over, ASEAN lost little time in inviting and co-opting Vietnam
into its fold. It is difficult to imagine a war between Vietnam and its former
non-communist rivals today, which is a tribute to ASEAN’s approach and
its brand of regionalism.
Moreover, ASEAN extended its principles and platform to the wider
Asia-Pacific region, searching for a new security architecture after the end
of the Cold War. ASEAN’s open and inclusive regionalism, bereft of the
suspicions that a similar initiative by an Asian or Western great power
might have provoked, led to the establishment of the Asia-Pacific region’s
first multilateral security forum: the ASEAN Regional Forum, where
former adversaries, the United States and Russia, the United States and
China, India and China, Vietnam and ASEAN, could also sit together to
reduce mutual suspicions and forge a common understanding of security
and prosperity.
These accomplishments are real and remain important to any discussion
and debate on the future of Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific regionalism.
However, there are new developments in ASEAN which threaten to make
the organisation far less relevant if not obsolescent, unless its leaders take
important and urgent steps to manage them and chart new directions.
The first is the rise of China and India. When ASEAN was formed,
neither of these two Asian giants was ascendant. China had gone through a
debilitating cultural revolution, while India had more or less withdrawn
from Asia following its defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and was
preoccupied with archrival Pakistan, which it had successfully helped to
dismember in the 1971 war. Neither country looked anything remotely like
the economic giants they appear today. Japan was the only ascendant Asian
power, but its ability to lead Asia was constrained by its post-Second World
War constitution and lingering sensitivities in Southeast Asia about it
wartime role. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the rise of ASEAN
was made possible partly because of the parallel eclipse of both India and
China from the 1960s onwards, especially after the Bandung Asia-Africa
Conference, which did not set up a permanent regional (either Asian or
Afro-Asian) organisation. India and China disagreed over the need for such
an organisation: China wanted such an organisation but lacked the clout to
make it happen, while India could have made it happen but did not want it.
The situation is completely different today. Not only are China and India
today Asia’s engines of growth, they are also emerging superpowers of the
21st century. Moreover, they are not natural allies in their global and
regional leadership ambitions. This not only calls into question whether
ASEAN can continue to “lead” Asian regional institutions, but, more
ominously, whether it can prevent itself from being drawn into a
competition between the two Asian powers and maintain its own autonomy
and cohesion.
Second, and a more obvious point, ASEAN today is bigger, both in terms
of its membership and dialogue relationships. ASEAN at birth was a small
grouping of five like-minded states (or, more accurately, governments). It
was born partly on a golf course, through informal conversations in the Thai
resort town of Bangsaen, “with a convenient golf-course, at which emphasis
was on ease and informality — sport-shirt diplomacy”, in the memorable
words of a British diplomatic telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office in London, before its founding foreign ministers moved to Bangkok
itself to sign the founding ASEAN Declaration.3
This was the origin of the ASEAN Way, a highly informal process of
consultations and consensus-building in which leaders were a phone call
away and who engaged in mutual backslapping conversations that were a
far cry from the European Community’s much more formal decision-
making process.
Since 1999, ASEAN has doubled in size, functioning as a grouping of
ten, which is a testimony to its success in bringing the region together, but
which makes consensus-making that much more difficult. A diverse group
of cultures, political systems and economic development levels to start
with, ASEAN’s internal diversity magnified with the inclusion of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. It has not been easy to socialise
all the new Members in the ASEAN Way.
ASEAN today also has a much bigger burden to carry when managing its
external relationships. These so-called dialogue relationships, which started
in the 1970s with mainly Western nations and Japan, have now expanded,
now including China, India, Russia and South Korea. To the extent that
these relations are vital, even integral, to ASEAN’s credibility and success,
they have imposed new burdens of co-ordination and leadership on
ASEAN. Because ASEAN is basically a club of relatively less powerful
states, it is not easy for it to gather the resources and clout to manage its
relationships with these more powerful or more developed states, and to
secure their agreement to confidence-building measures and trade and
financial policies that would suit ASEAN’s interests and serve the region’s
needs as perceived and defined by ASEAN itself.
Third, the issues that ASEAN must deal with today are much more
complex. When ASEAN was created, conflicts in the region were either
domestic (like communist insurgencies) or inter-state (such as the Sabah
dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines). In this situation, ASEAN
found its norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and non-
use of force to settle inter-state disputes useful and workable. However,
today, some of the most pressing challenges facing ASEAN are neither
domestic nor inter-state (external), but transnational (or what former
Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda called “intermestic”). These
problems respect neither national nor regional boundaries. Hence, ASEAN
has found it increasingly difficult to handle them through the old norms of
non-interference. While inter-state disputes and tensions in ASEAN have
not disappeared, which makes ASEAN reluctant to abandon non-
interference, what was a morally and functionally justified approach in the
past seems increasingly less so in the era of complex global and regional
interdependence ASEAN finds itself in.
Next, let me turn to what ASEAN is doing and what it must do to remain
relevant. ASEAN has taken some important steps to adapt itself to 21st
century realities. It is building not one, but three communities: the ASEAN
Economic Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community
(originally the ASEAN Security Community) and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community. These steps imply a desire for deeper and more broad-
based co-operation, and are backed by detailed roadmaps and blueprints.
But what is not certain is the extent to which some of the more intrusive
measures for economic and security co-operation will actually be
implemented. ASEAN’s record of compliance with its own decisions and
directives, as the Eminent Persons Group crafting the ASEAN Charter
noted, is rather patchy and uninspiring. The Charter itself is a bold move
and contains supervisory and monitoring provisions to see through the
implementation of ASEAN’s community-building measures, but only time
will tell how far ASEAN will go in making its community-building vision a
living, breathing reality. To this author, the international community
remains far from convinced that these communities will materialise in their
full operating form.
Moreover, some of these community-building measures do not go far
enough. There is no ASEAN peacekeeping mechanism. The
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights has been widely
criticised for lacking teeth (although once in place, it may develop a life of
its own). ASEAN’s own dispute settlement mechanisms are yet to be tested
in practice. ASEAN Member States continue to seem to have more trust in
and use for international bodies like the International Court of Justice to
settle their bilateral legal disputes. No matter how practical and sensible this
approach may seem to the ASEAN Member States themselves, they do not
convince the international observers (including many well-wishers of
ASEAN) that ASEAN means business. Hence, moving towards a regional
peace operations mechanism, granting more authority to the Human Rights
Commission, making existing agreements on environmental pollution (to
prevent and address forest fires in Indonesia) more effective and credible,
and demonstrating the effectiveness of extant and newer dispute resolution
mechanisms are some of the areas which ASEAN must work on to signal to
the international community that it means business.
The pressure on ASEAN has increased with competing proposals for
alternative regional structures. In 2009–2010, Australia put forward a
proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community and Japan mooted an East Asian
Community. Although these ideas were not able to attract significant
regional support, they are a wake-up call to ASEAN to get its house in
order and act with greater unity and purpose than ever before, or be lost in
the game of great power geopolitics. Also, internal and inter-state issues
such as Myanmar’s political management and the dispute between
Cambodia and Thailand will continue to highlight the difficulties within
ASEAN. However, ASEAN needs to manage these difficulties in a way that
will instill confidence in its principles and processes. ASEAN must also
complete its drive towards greater institutionalisation and compliance with
its norms and agreements.
Above all, ASEAN would be wise not to take sides in any form of rivalry
and competition among the Asian great powers, such as China and India.
Indeed, this may be ASEAN’s biggest challenge and the key to its future
relevance and even existence. Instead of being sucked into it, ASEAN must
maintain its unity and engage all outside powers on an equal and
transparent basis.
Regional co-operation and integration are not linear processes. Ernst
Haas’ pessimism in 1976 about the obsolescence of the EEC proved to be
wrong. The EEC revived, and from the 1980s onwards moved towards even
greater regional unity, leading to a single market and a single currency.
Similarly, ASEAN’s evolution may be meandering and yet reach its destiny
in the long run. However, it is prudent to note that there is nothing
inevitable about ASEAN’s decline and demise, but it is not unthinkable, and
the more its policy makers take cognisance of this, the better.

_____________________
1
Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley, CA: Institute of
International Studies, University of California, 1975.
2 Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN at 40: Mid-Life Rejuvenation?”,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64249/amitav-acharya/asean-at-40-mid-life-rejuvenation, 15
August 2007.
3
For these and other details of ASEAN’s founding, see the author’s Constructing a Security
Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd edition. London and
New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 87.
 CHAPTER 37

HOW CAN ASEAN STAY RELEVANT?

Joergen Oerstroem Moeller

There are seven essential points to recall when building economic

integration.
The first is that integration is not an end in itself, but an instrument to
achieve political goals. Many ideas about the European integration have
met with opposition because this fundamental observation has not been
respected. Integration can be compared with fiscal policy or housing policy
or similar domestic policies that all are designed to do something for the
people. If this vital distinction between goals and means is not observed,
confusion starts to reign and popular support for integration withers away,
making it difficult to rally votes in parliament and among the public.
Economic interdependence among countries makes it impossible to
pursue policy goals different from or contrary to what neighbours are doing.
Pursuing analogous political goals with adjacent nation-states enhances
room to manoeuvre for each nation-state. In today’s world, sovereignty is
not a safeguard against influence from the outside, but a mechanism to
avoid international rules that are obstacles to implementing one’s own
domestic objectives. The defence of domestic policies takes place abroad as
attempts to escape the trap of being caught by international institutions
proclaiming that this or that is not permissible, or you have to do this or that
to comply with commitments undertaken.
 The second point is a strict observance that — again like domestic
policies — the objective of building economic integration is to improve the
daily conditions for the population. Much discussion about the direction of
the European integration has focussed on lofty goals such as Europe’s role
in the world. This is necessary, at least to a certain extent and when the
integration has reached a certain level, but it is imperative to start with the
basics and that is living conditions such as employment, higher real wage
and lower consumer prices. It is useless to tell the population that the
advantage of joining the single currency is to “sit at the table” when
decisions are taken. For ordinary persons this is abstract and does not relate
to their daily lives. It is important to stress lower consumer prices and more
jobs. In the long term the integration will be judged by its ability to do
something for the people that could not have been done without integration
or by doing something better than if the nation-states in question had tried
to do it in isolation.
The European integration has been quite good at that, even if not always
successful. In its first stage, trade barriers were dismantled and a common
agricultural policy established; taken together it markedly improved the
living standards for a vast majority of the population. People felt in their
own daily lives that the integration did something for them and
consequently supported the integration. In its next stage, a single currency
and a single market were implemented, again with better living standards as
a result. Conditions were a bit more difficult for the second stage because
these policies were overall beneficial for all Member States, but the benefits
were distributed unevenly within and among nation-states, which gave rise
to misgivings. The integration process had to be adjusted to bridge the gaps
between those who benefited largely, those who benefited marginally, and
those who suffered a loss. Member States must be partners in all common
policies, showing solidarity across the board even in areas of no interest,
and ruling out an à la carte solution. Luxembourg, for example, is a full
participant in the Common Fisheries Policy even though it is a landlocked
country.
On paper, the benefits and losses weigh evenly, but in reality the losses
are “heavier” for people than gains. It is of no use to elucidate the virtues of
the integration by pointing out that the overall benefits are larger than
losses, because those who benefit are less vocal in their support than the
losers in their criticism. This poses an awkward dilemma for an economic
integration as it normally works to ensure there are more winners than
losers. The way ahead to solve this problem is to talk openly about the
potential losses before the policy in question is implemented, adding what
will be done to channel some of the benefits into policies designed to help
those who will lose out.
It may be too early to judge whether the Europeans have been successful
at that, but they have clearly tried hard with the Social Fund, the Regional
Fund and a whole string of supportive policies brought in to redress
imbalances created by new steps towards integration. Such policies only
work as long as the benefits clearly outweigh the losses and one of the
lessons from Europe is only to implement steps where this is the case.
When the Europeans tried to go one more step by creating a more
competitive economic structure through focussing on technology and
similar measures, the limits were all too visible. These policies, known as
the Lisbon Strategy, may have been and probably still are beneficial for
Europe as a whole, but the distribution of benefits among peoples and
nation-states was not accompanied by an outline of what to do for the losers
and that proves an almost insurmountable obstacle.
The third point is the necessity of relating to people. Any political system
rests on the shoulders of the people in the sense that they must feel it is
theirs. Looking at nation-states around the globe, it dawns on the observer
how difficult it is to achieve this. In the United States barely half of the
electorate bothers to vote in the presidential elections. In Europe votes cast
reach 70% or even more for national elections, but fall below 50% for
European elections.
Having worked with the European integration for decades, I am
convinced that Europe’s political system is fully democratic and offers the
European population the same guarantees for transparency, accountability
and legitimacy as the national political systems. The problem is that this is
not how a large majority of the Europeans feel.
There may be many explanations for this: the distance between voters
and political institutions or language barriers. The fact remains, however,
that as long as we have not reached a level where the political system has
been adopted by the populations, the integration remains fragile no matter
what arguments can be advanced to sing its virtues. In a way it is the fault
of the Europeans themselves for trying to build a strong integration while at
the same time rejecting a move towards some kind of federation or
confederation, which would have solved these problems, but the
explanation for this “half-baked” solution is that this is what the Europeans
so far want. Then the challenge becomes to achieve it inside this box.
The fourth point is about institutions. Institutions are necessary and
irrespective of all good intentions there are fairly low barriers for how much
can be achieved without an institutional framework.
There is, however, a misunderstanding to be dealt with. Institutions are
instruments to channel decisions the Member States wish to take to deepen
the integration. If such a will is present, institutions can facilitate the
process and serve as a vehicle not only for creating a process but also
ensuring compliance with commitments undertaken. If the political will is
not present, even the best institutions are powerless and impotent.
The initial step in the institutional build-up is therefore not to look at
decision-making mechanisms and institutional frameworks, etc., but to
sketch very early on what the political objectives are, what the Member
States want to achieve, why they want to do it and then add what role the
institutions are expected to play in this setting.
The Europeans have from time to time been hypnotised by institutions.
At the end of the 1970s the catchword was to create a European Union by
institutional improvements. Nothing came of that because the substance —
what the union was supposed to do — was absent. The proposed
constitution was rejected in 2005 by a majority of the voters in France and
the Netherlands because in the eyes of the population it was merely
institutional tinkering, offering little relevance to their daily lives. Except
for the European political elite, not many Europeans bother whether the
chairman of the European Council — the highest political body in the
Union — is nominated for a number of years or rotated among the Member
States. The question was asked: What can be done with these changes that
could not be done with the existing machinery? There was and is no
convincing answer to this question. Consequently the people drew the
conclusion that these changes were not worth making.
This is the heart of the matter for institutions. People seem to be willing
to accept institutional changes if they are linked to new policies of
substance and relevant to them. No one disputed a European System of
Central Banks when the single currency and the economic and monetary
union were set up. No one disputed that when a single market was to be
implemented, qualified majority voting would promote the process towards
this objective. Institutional changes were clearly necessary to implement
political goals adopted.
Right now the Europeans have implemented changes in the institutional
machinery for foreign and security policies. The question remains, however,
what new policies such changes are going to facilitate. If only institutional
changes not linked to new policies occur, no policy improvements will be
visible and the step risks backfiring. Many people will ask why it was made
and there will be widespread disappointment over institutional changes that
did not lead to better policies. That will make it more difficult to deepen the
integration the next time.
Fundamentally, institutions rest upon trust among the Member States,
which means that they and their citizens are convinced that decisions are
not influenced by other nation-states or individuals appointed by nation-
states occupying high posts. There is an European saying that “Caesar’s
wife must be above suspicion”. The same goes for institutions.
A question often asked is why Member States respect decisions taken by
the European Court of Justice even if the Court and the other European
institutions do not have real powers to enforce their decisions. The answer
is that the Europeans comply because they wish to comply. They realise that
the European Union is a kind of European judicial system operating in
principle as the domestic judicial system, which means that if a Member
State does not comply neither will other Member States. It is not because
they are forced to do so or fear “punitive” action if they do not, but do so of
their own free will. They trust in the institutions and the Court of Justice;
this trust is the ultimate “enforcer”.
No measures to give institutions teeth to enforce decisions can be more
effective than such a political will; if the political will is not present, no
powers, however strong they may seem, can do the trick.
The fifth point is to structure the integration in such a way that it is
perceived as a win-win game, with every Member State feeling that it is
better off inside than outside. To a certain extent, this is an interpretation of
the first observation (integration is not an end in itself). No Member State
can be expected to join and feel at ease unless the advantages are tangible,
visible and understood. Why should they?
In the European context there have been at least two episodes where this
was questioned by Member States: in the 1960s by France about qualified
majority voting for certain elements of the integration of specific interest to
agriculture; and by Britain around 1980 taking the stance that economically
the integration was not advantageous or at least less advantageous for
Britain than for most other Member States.
In such cases a legal approach does not lead to success. It does not matter
whether it can be argued that it is right or wrong as long as the country in
question is convinced of the opposite. The problem must be addressed to
hammer out a solution, squaring the circle between maintaining the
structure and tilting it a bit towards changes asked for by the “dissatisfied”
Member State. The problem of course is that this must not be allowed to
snowball into a situation where everybody asks for more benefits.
The sixth point is the ability to adapt and adjust. Challenges facing the
Member States change over the years and what was needed some years ago
may be out of tune today. The Europeans have been good at adjusting albeit
not without flaws and errors, but basically they have done it. Over the last
few years a whole new chapter has been set up to deal with human security,
fight against terrorism and common policies vis-à-vis immigration issues,
dominating a larger part of the European political agenda. Only 15 years
ago this was an embryonic part of the integration and 20 years ago it barely
existed in the treaties. It shows an understanding of the shift in political
priorities from economic issues to more value-based criteria for policy
making and political choices in Europe. It is an illustration of continuing
efforts to make it relevant to the citizens.
There is a seventh point of a more general nature. Integration is normally
presented as economic integration, as is indeed the case for this chapter. We
must, however, be clear about three things. First, integration formed on a
regional basis is anchored in globalisation. The idea is not to establish a
group of nations separated from globalisation or deviating from the
predominant global policies, but to deliver an input to the further
development of globalisation. It is part of globalisation, not a measure to
protect against globalisation. Second, fundamentally it is inscribed in the
policy of cementing peace by entering into close contact with adjacent
nation-states, trying to dispose of animosities and misunderstandings and
adopting instead mutual good will, confidence and trust. Economic
integration is an instrument to achieve peace and prosperity. Third, it serves
as a disciplinary banister, forcing Member States to observe rules and
follow responsible policies.
 These are some of the points that came to my mind when trying to
answer the question of how to be relevant. There may be others and some of
those chosen by me may be less important in the eyes of other observers.
The main lesson from Europe is therefore to look at what has been done and
draw your own lessons. The Europeans have gained experience and lessons
and in some cases paid heavily for mistakes. ASEAN can use this
experience by studying it and select what is found useful to guide its own
integration suited to the circumstances and challenges in Southeast Asia.
Euclid, having opened a school of mathematics in Alexandria, was asked
by King Ptolemy whether he could not explain his art to him in a more
compendious manner. “Sir”, said the geometrician, “there is no royal road
to learning”.
So it is with economic integration. Every group of nation-states chooses
their own road to integration. There is no royal road, no easy way and no
short cut.
 CHAPTER 38

ASEAN INTO THE FUTURE:

TOWARDS A BETTER MONITORING
AND EVALUATION OF REGIONAL
CO-OPERATION PROGRAMMES
Azmi Mat Akhir

Since its establishment on 8 August 1967, ASEAN has implemented many

sectoral co-operation programmes and projects. The project implementation
approach has evolved from standalone projects and activities into a
programme approach with the adoption of the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA)
in 1998, into the more concrete Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) in
terms of thrust areas and programme measures in 2003, and eventually into
a comprehensive Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 in
March 2009.
With the endorsement of the ASEAN Charter and its eventual full
ratification by all ASEAN Member States at the 13th ASEAN Summit in
November 2008 in Singapore, there have been expectations and
anticipations that regional policies and the supporting programmes and
activities would now be implemented in a more timely manner through a
rules-based approach and with better co-ordination between the various
levels as a result of the restructuring of the co-operation machinery or
mechanism. However, as issues of common concern are gradually
becoming more complex and require multisectoral approaches in resolving
them, such as climate change and food security, the various sectoral
ASEAN bodies can no longer afford to work alone in their individual silos
and should adopt a more integrated approach to regional co-operation. At
the same time, and most importantly, these ASEAN bodies would need to
ensure that regional policy implementation activities in their respective
sectors are adequately monitored and evaluated to guarantee that regional
co-operation projects are translated and incorporated into the national
development agenda. Only then will ASEAN co-operation be more
meaningful and be of real benefit to the individual Member States.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), or performance measurement, of the
implementation of ASEAN strategies and programmes have not been
satisfactorily achieved because in most cases this only takes the form of
general progress reports on the status of implementation which are
presented at the annual meetings of the ASEAN sectoral bodies concerned.
Little emphasis, if any, has been incorporated into the progress reports on
the problems and risks encountered during the implementation process
which could serve as directions for the future. Hence there is no guideline
for better and further implementation of the programmes and projects that
will help ensure their successful completion in accordance with the stated
objectives.
In many cases, co-operation projects implemented on a “cost-sharing” or
“self-reliance” basis among Member States through the co-ordination of
respective ASEAN bodies, which are mostly highly dependent on the
ASEAN Secretariat for administration and co-ordination, lack the capability
and political seriousness to ensure successful implementation and
achievement of objectives, in a real sense. However, regional co-operation
in trade and third-party-funded programmes and projects are rather
exceptional. This was and is because such projects have been and are
usually implemented under the administrative as well as monitoring and co-
ordination responsibility of a joint project steering or co-ordinating
committee between the donor agency, the responsible sectoral ASEAN
body and the ASEAN Secretariat. This is understandable as the donors are
responsible for their taxpayers’ money that is used to finance ASEAN
cooperation projects. In recent years, a number of ASEAN dialogue and
development partners have even set up their respective project offices at the
ASEAN Secretariat to provide administrative and managerial support to
ASEAN projects supported by their funding.
Therefore, sectoral ASEAN bodies involved in the implementation of
programmes and projects on a “cost-sharing” or “self-reliance” basis should
adopt the implementation and M&E mechanism practised by various past
and current joint donor-ASEAN project steering or co-ordinating
committees, or even the project offices, for externally funded ASEAN
programmes and projects. Previous experiences have proven the
effectiveness of these mechanisms.
As ASEAN moves into the fifth decade of its establishment, the
challenges it faces in ensuring effective and efficient implementation of all
regional policy initiatives become greater, particularly given the
replacement of the VAP 2004–2010 with the more comprehensive Roadmap
for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015. ASEAN must ensure that all
prerequisite resources for successful implementation of the policies are
available and targeted effectively and, most importantly, are sustainable.
The commitments by Member States must be credible with qualitatively or
quantitatively measurable outputs or results for co-operation projects and
activities that take advantage of specifically designed implementation plans
and M&E mechanisms.
Although the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 has
replaced the VAP, the M&E concept for regional policy implementation
contained in the latter’s Goals and Strategies Towards Realising the
ASEAN Community can still be referred to for performance measurement
of current and future ASEAN regional policy implementation. Performance
or success indicators at the regional (macro) level may include conformity
with the regional policy priorities and sectoral needs; achievement of
planned results, expected outputs and outcomes; overall contribution to the
policy goals and objectives; and overall sustainability in terms of
knowledge gained, political will to sustain momentum and the continuity of
flow of benefits. At the national/Member-State (micro) level, the
performance criteria depend on the stated objectives of the project. Most
importantly, a baseline situation must be established to serve as a reference,
or benchmark, to enable meaningful monitoring and evaluation exercises to
be undertaken at both the regional and national levels, especially the latter.
An effective M&E mechanism would need specific indicators and
benchmarks which can be used and shared at the national and regional
levels to report on the outcomes and effects of co-operation programmes
and projects. At the national level, a bottom-up approach is needed to
measure the performance of national line agencies involved in the
implementation of co-operation projects, as well as to allow tracking of the
progress of these projects. This should be more comprehensive than the
existing progress reports submitted to the respective sectoral ASEAN
bodies by the implementing national line agencies, which are usually
general in nature and do not include critical evaluations of the status and
directions for future implementation or of the outcomes of the projects
involved. At the regional level, too, there should be established a new,
strong system to track the overall performance of ASEAN, which should be
reflected in the commitment and performance of sectoral ASEAN bodies
involved, to ensure accountability to all stakeholders in a particular co-
operation sector. Performance measurement reports should discuss in detail
the performance or success indicators mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
At the national level, stronger commitments from the line-implementing
national agencies should be called for in the future through an effective
implementation and M&E mechanism co-ordinated by a lead agency which,
in turn, will be responsible for informing the respective ASEAN National
Secretariats. While line-implementing national agencies and the ASEAN
bodies, which usually comprise mainly administrative government officials,
may be short of expertise and time, they may be able to harness the
knowledge and expertise of their respective national academic and research
institutions to help contribute to effective regional policy implementation.
This may be achieved through engaging the participation of these
institutions in the particular sectoral ASEAN bodies involved. The
representatives of these academic and research institutions could, as a
group, be assigned as a special task force to help plan, implement, and
monitor and evaluate specific projects or activities of the ASEAN bodies
concerned. In other words, the ASEAN Track 1 (state) machinery and its
Track 2 (non-state) machinery should work more closely together.
In co-operation with higher education, for instance, ASEAN already has
the ASEAN University Network (AUN) Programme at its disposal for this
purpose. While the AUN may already be occupied with its own
programmes and projects on ASEAN co-operation in higher education, its
Board of Trustees which comprises vice-chancellors, rectors and presidents
of prime national universities in the ASEAN region, assisted by its
Secretariat, may be requested to identify and assign academic
representatives to any particular sectoral ASEAN body. In a similar manner,
the Track 2 ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
(ASEAN ISIS) could be harnessed to assist ASEAN sectoral bodies more
actively in conducting appropriate studies to help identify sectoral needs,
and better plan and implement cooperation programmes and activities in the
respective sectors.
The ASEAN Charter does not only impart a legal personality to the
Association, it calls for a stronger sense of commitment by Member States,
through their national line agencies’ roles in the respective sectoral ASEAN
bodies and their subsidiaries in the effective implementation and fruitful
completion of co-operation projects, to support the administrative efforts
and co-ordination provided by a restructured ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC).
Although it has been restructured as the nerve centre of ASEAN regional
policy implementation, ASEC must still equip itself with the necessary
capacity and capability to initiate, plan, implement, co-ordinate, and
monitor and evaluate policy and programme implementation at the regional
level as effectively and efficiently as possible. ASEAN is seen by many
development partners in this region as having the capability to issue a
regional mandate in adopting co-operation programmes and projects, but
lacking the necessary absorption capability, both in ASEC and the
individual Member States. Until such time when ASEC is adequately
strengthened — especially with the necessary manpower, expertise and
competence — the Secretariat, therefore, would need to outsource part of its
tasks through smart partnerships with academic and research institutions in
the region. The academic and functional advantages of such partnerships
could be harnessed to enhance co-ordination and M&E mechanisms of
ASEAN regional policy implementation.
The various prime universities or institutions of higher learning and
research institutions of the ASEAN Member States would be in the best
position to assist ASEAN and ASEC in the planning, implementation and
M&E of regional policies, programmes and projects. The universities,
especially, are eminently suitable because they possess both the academic
and research capabilities that could be harnessed for the above purposes.
Moreover, some ASEAN regional policy initiatives may have research and
development issues which are also of interest to these academic and
research institutions, and so encourage them to share their knowledge,
expertise and other resources through active participation in relevant
programmes and projects. This would also promote greater awareness of
ASEAN among these institutions.
The partnership or networking between ASEC and regional academic and
research institutions to augment its capacity and capability to efficiently
execute performance measurement of ASEAN regional policy
implementation may be realised either through various existing ASEAN
sectoral co-operation machineries or through approaches external to these.
The first scenario implies reinforcing particular existing sectoral
cooperation machinery with the necessary and appropriate M&E
component. It would also mean ASEC sharing the M&E responsibility with
the Member States through their relevant national academic and research
institutions while concurrently maintaining a direct and specific linkage
mechanism or networking modality with these institutions.
Thus, in modality, ASEAN and/or ASEC could use one or more of the
following interlinking options to assist in the planning, implementation and
M&E of regional policies, programmes and projects: utilise the existing
ASEAN sectoral machinery/mechanism; or establish special independent ad
hoc task forces comprising academic or research experts directly
“networking” with ASEC. The first modality would entail the respective
sectoral ASEAN bodies including in their fold experts from the universities
or research institutions to assist in designing and conducting performance
measurement for specific programmes and projects. This could be done by
including academic experts in the national delegation or team of line
agencies involved in the respective sectoral ASEAN bodies. Whenever
needed, a sectoral ASEAN body concerned can form an ad hoc task-
oriented ancillary group of these academic or research experts from all
Member States to handle the M&E aspect of project implementation. This
is particularly relevant because most of the permanent Member States’
representatives in sectoral ASEAN bodies are civil servants who are not, or
may not be, experts in performance measurement of development
programmes and projects. As a matter of fact, some sectoral ASEAN bodies
in the past had formed ad hoc ancillary entities to handle specific tasks.
There are two possibilities for putting into practice this first modality.
One would be to utilise the ASEAN University Network (AUN) process,
while the other is through other sectoral processes. In the first case, the
AUN could be requested to form special ad hoc task forces under the
purview of its Board of Trustees (BOT) to help design and conduct
effective M&E mechanisms for regional policies, programmes and projects
in collaboration with the respective sectoral ASEAN bodies. While being
directly responsible to the AUN-BOT, the task force shall have direct
networking with ASEC and participate in the meetings of the sectoral
ASEAN bodies involved and in the M&E of the relevant sectoral
programmes and projects implemented by those bodies. In the second case,
representatives from academic and research institutions may be attached to
the respective sectoral ASEAN bodies or their subsidiaries (such as a
project steering or co-ordinating group) as an ancillary group assigned with
the M&E task. This ancillary experts group shall be responsible to the
parent sectoral body through the project co-ordinating body concerned, but
shall also be free to link directly with ASEC and vice versa at all times to
network on matters pertaining to the performance of the sectoral projects
under its purview. This will facilitate and allow for continuous appraisal of
co-operation projects by ASEC, instead of having to wait for the annual
meeting of the sectoral body concerned in order for ASEC to be informed
of project implementation progress. To facilitate the process, alternatively,
the assignment of representatives from the academic institutions could also
be done through the AUN-BOT, similar to the first case above.
The other modality is that ASEAN may give ASEC the authority to form
an ad hoc (time-bound) task-oriented M&E group of academic and research
experts under its direct purview and stewardship. This would be
commensurate with ASEC’s significantly increasing role in initiating,
planning, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating policy
implementation at the regional level, in which ASEC should be supported
by a sound M&E mechanism of co-operation projects under a particular
policy initiative at the national level.
However, unless external funding is available with ASEC, Member
States should support the operations of this ad hoc M&E experts group and
regard it as their “in-kind” contribution and commitment to ASEAN. This
approach is best suited for ASEAN regional projects that are directly
implemented by ASEC. Nevertheless, ASEC may also utilise this approach
to assist it in monitoring and evaluating projects through sectoral
mechanisms by “attaching” this experts group to, or including it in, any
particular project implementation process.
 In closing, it is reiterated here that these proposed options are meant for
programmes and projects implemented among ASEAN Member States on a
“cost-sharing” or “self-reliant” basis, or for projects with minor partial
funding support from dialogue or development partners, or other third-party
donors, which do not have a special joint coordinating body or unit between
the ASEAN sectoral bodies and the donor agencies concerned.
Undoubtedly, these options have their respective strengths and weaknesses.
In order to minimise weaknesses, the choice of a particular performance
measurement methodology or M&E mechanism should be determined on a
project-by-project basis. Alternatively, existing variations of the above
suggested options of M&E mechanisms could be adapted when necessary.
 CHAPTER 39

STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATION

FOR AN ASEAN COMMUNITY
Wilfrido V. Villacorta

ASEAN has a promising future. It has its limitations, but history tells us
that relations among states are not permanent. Domestic circumstances
change, leaders change, the world changes.
During my term as Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2003 to
2006, there occurred unanticipated changes within the organisation. In that
short period, I saw the fruition of many milestones in the development of
ASEAN, which took place under the watch of then Secretary-General Ong
Keng Yong:

1. Bali Concord II which mandated the establishment of the ASEAN

Community.
2. Deliberations on the ASEAN Charter.
3. Development of ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit.
4. Signing of agreement for co-operation between the ASEAN Secretariat
and the secretariats of other regional organisations.
5. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence towards Women.
6. Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, particularly Women and
Children.
7. Accession by dialogue partners and development partners to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
8. Drafting of the ASEAN Economic Blueprint.
9. Adoption of the Vientiane Action Programme.
10. The ISO-100 certification of the ASEAN Secretariat, the first
international organisation to be given such certification.

When the Bangkok Declaration was signed by the leaders of the five
founding states on 8 August 1967, they merely established “an Association
for Regional Cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia to be
known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)”. Over 43
years, the ASEAN Member States concluded among themselves various
multilateral agreements on trade, security co-operation, health and other
transnational concerns. But there were no predictable, consistent and
expeditious mechanisms for implementing these agreements and for settling
possible disputes.
Now the leaders and peoples of ASEAN dream of an ASEAN
Community. Beyond being a loose organisation characterised by voluntary
co-operation among its Members, a community requires general
consciousness of the interdependence, common interests and the common
destiny that bind those who comprise it. A community of states is more
difficult to achieve, when a wide diversity of cultures, languages, histories,
economic developments, political systems and religions exists. What would
be the test of an ASEAN Community is the appreciation by its peoples of
the concrete benefits they directly derive from their countries’ membership
in the organisation.
In my first year in ASEAN, I participated in the 9th ASEAN Summit in
Bali, which formally adopted the goal of building an ASEAN Community
by 2020. After I completed my term in 2006 and was designated a
consultant to the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the ASEAN leaders
accelerated the date for realising that goal to 2015.
The need to establish an ASEAN Community was enunciated in the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (popularly known as Bali Concord II) on
7 October 2003, during the 9th ASEAN Summit. The declaration spelled
out the features of the envisioned community:
 1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars,
namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and
socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually
reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and
shared prosperity in the region;
2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually
beneficial integration among its Member States and among their
peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security,
development and prosperity with a view to realising an ASEAN
Community that is open, dynamic and resilient;
3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective
ASEAN Member States and shall urgently and effectively address the
challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different
economic levels into equitable development opportunity and
prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and
harmony;
4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to
discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on
matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation,
maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense
cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political
values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes
through peaceful means.1

Building Blocks Towards a Rules-Based ASEAN

In order to prepare for the building of a community, it was necessary to
review the institutions of the organisation. The ASEAN Secretariat was
tasked at the beginning of 2004 to hold a series of meetings to examine both
the strengths and weaknesses of the ASEAN institutional framework. The
meetings were led by then Secretary-General Ong and had representation
from all Member States. The consensus reached was that a Charter was
needed to build an integrated community that would go beyond mere
functional and economic cooperation.
In the Joint Communiqué issued by the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 29–30 June 2004, the foreign affairs ministers
 … agreed to work towards development of an ASEAN Charter
which would, inter alia, reaffirm ASEAN’s goals and principles in
inter-state relations, in particular the collective responsibilities of all
ASEAN Member States in ensuring non-aggression and respect for
each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the promotion and
protection of human rights; the maintenance of political stability,
regional peace and economic progress; and the establishment of
effective and efficient institutional framework for ASEAN (Sec. 6).

The ministers directed the ASEAN Secretary-General and Directors-

General “to complete their study on ASEAN’s institutional framework to
determine how the ASEAN structure could be further strengthened to
facilitate the realisation of an ASEAN Community (Sec. 67)”.2
At the ASEAN Summit held in November 2004 in Vientiane, the
Member States of ASEAN included the initiation of “the preparatory
activities to develop an ASEAN Charter” as a goal in the Vientiane Action
Programme (VAP). This goal was formalised into a mandate during the
Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 when the ASEAN leaders
signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. This
document formed an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to submit
recommendations on the elements of the ASEAN Charter that would
provide specific norms and fixed procedures for legal certainty.
During the 12th ASEAN Summit that took place in Cebu, the
Philippines, in January 2007, the leaders signed the Cebu Declaration on the
Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, endorsing the EPG’s report and directing
a High Level Task Force (HLTF) to draft the Charter. The final version was
approved by the leaders during the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore on
20 November 2007.

Salient Aspects of the ASEAN Charter

The Charter facilitates the economic and political liberalisation of ASEAN.3
It identified as one of ASEAN’s purposes the creation of

a single market and production base which is stable, prosperous,

highly competitive and economically integrated with effective
facilitation for trade and investment where there is free flow of
 goods, services and investment; facilitated movement of business
persons, professionals, talents and labour; and freer flow of capital.4

Moreover, it upheld ASEAN’s adherence to multilateral trade rules and

rules-based regimes “for effective implementation of economic
commitments and progressive reduction towards elimination of all barriers
to regional economic integration, in a market-driven economy”.5
Popular participation was likewise highlighted: “to promote a people-
oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to
participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and
community building”.6 These provisions were supported by libertarian
principles in Article 2: “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the
principles of democracy and constitutional government”;7 “respect for
fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and
the promotion of social justice”;8 and “upholding the United Nations
Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law,
subscribed to by ASEAN Member States”.9
Since the Charter came into force in 2008, ASEAN has adopted a
Roadmap laying out the goals, strategies and actions for realising an
ASEAN Community by 2015. At the 14th ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin,
Thailand, held from 28 February to 1 March 2009, the ASEAN leaders
signed the Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–
2015), which replaced the Vientiane Action Programme.
The Roadmap is composed of the ASEAN Political-Security, Economic
and Socio-Cultural Community Blueprints, together with the second
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Work Plan.

Legal Effects of the ASEAN Charter

The Charter establishes the legal personality of ASEAN. It has been
registered by the ASEAN Secretary-General with the Secretariat of the
United Nations, pursuant to Article 102, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter.
The legal character of the organisation facilitates the development of
dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN. Further, it paves the way for
mechanisms that will balance and reconcile the traditional principles of
consensus and non-interference with the liberal principles of democracy and
human rights.
By institutionalising ASEAN’s legal status, the Charter has made the
organisation a subject of international law, conferring on it rights, privileges
and immunities recognised in international law.
ASEAN now enjoys certain rights in the domestic systems of Member
States. The Charter allows the establishment of appropriate dispute
settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, for disputes which concern
the interpretation or application of the Charter and other ASEAN
instruments.10
The ASEAN Charter enhances the international standing and recognition
of ASEAN and its Members and hastens the ASEAN integration process
and the implementation of existing commitments.
It gives ASEAN Member States the right of recourse to the modes of
peaceful settlement provided in Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter
or any other international legal instruments to which the disputing Member
States are parties.11

Addressing Human Rights

ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan has reminded ASEAN citizens
that

… the task of building the Community is not only the job of our
governments: the governments alone cannot do it … There must be
a sense of ownership, participation, and the awareness that we, as a
collectivity of individuals, own the process and can shape this
Community in our own image. We must strive to create a
Community of caring and sharing societies, but without the
participation of people, we will not make it.12

A major component of people’s participation in building a community is

the active promotion of human rights.13
This aspiration enshrined in the ASEAN Charter was expressed in the
Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. It
welcomed the international consensus achieved during the World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 14–25 June 1993 and reaffirmed
ASEAN’s commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993.
The ASEAN foreign ministers stressed that

human rights are interrelated and indivisible comprising civil,

political, economic, social and cultural rights. These rights should
be addressed in a balanced and integrated manner and protected and
promoted with due regard for specific cultural, social, economic and
political circumstances.

They also emphasised that “the promotion and protection of human rights
should not be politicised”.14
They agreed that

ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on human rights and

actively participate and contribute to the application, promotion and
protection of human rights. … [and] emphasised that the protection
and promotion of human rights in the international community
should take cognisance of the principles of respect for national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal
affairs of the states.15

During the 3lst ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila on 24–25 July

1998, the foreign ministers noted the establishment of the informal
nongovernmental Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism.
ASEAN’s landmark achievements in the area of human rights are as
follows:

1. 1998 Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN

Region;
2. 2001 Declaration on the Commitments for Children in ASEAN;
3. 2004 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the
ASEAN Region;
4. 2004 Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women
and Children; and
5. 2007 Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of
Migrant Workers.

The ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly

Women and Children was approved at the 10th ASEAN Summit in
Vientiane on 29 November 2004. It directs Member States “to undertake
actions to respect and safeguard the dignity and human rights of genuine
victims of trafficking in persons”, “to undertake coercive actions/measures
against individual and/or syndicate engaged in trafficking in persons and
shall offer one another the widest possible assistance to punish such
activities” and “to take measures to strengthen regional and international
cooperation to prevent and combat trafficking in persons”.
The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights
of Migrant Workers was adopted at in the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu on
13 January 2007. Both the receiving states and sending states are tasked to
promote “the full potential and dignity of migrant workers in a climate of
freedom, equity, and stability in accordance with the laws, regulations, and
policies of respective ASEAN Member States”. They shall, for
humanitarian reasons, “closely cooperate to resolve the cases of migrant
workers who, through no fault of their own, have subsequently become
undocumented”. Moreover,

the receiving states and the sending states shall take into account the
fundamental rights and dignity of migrant workers and family
members already residing with them without undermining the
application by the receiving states of their laws, regulations and
policies.

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights

The ASEAN Charter stipulates that “in conformity with the purposes and
principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an
ASEAN Human Rights Body” and that “the ASEAN Human Rights Body
shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting”.16
 Article 2 of the Charter mandates “adherence to the rule of law, good
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government”;
“respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human
rights, and the promotion of social justice”; and “upholding the United
Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian
law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States”.
This was the first time that the promotion and protection of human rights
became enshrined as a major goal for the purpose of building an ASEAN
Community.
The parameters set by the ASEAN Charter for the protection and
promotion of human rights are derived from the bedrock principles that
evolved in the development of ASEAN over 40 years:

1. Respect for independence, sovereignty and equality of all Member

States;
2. Renunciation of aggression and of the threat of the use of force or any
action;
3. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States;
5. Respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national
existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion.

The Terms of Reference formulated by the High Level Panel emphasised

that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR) is “an inter-governmental body and an integral part of the
ASEAN organisational structure” and is a consultative body.
The Commission is mandated to “promote human rights within the
regional context, bearing in mind national and regional peculiarities and
mutual respect for different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds,
and taking into account the balance between rights and responsibilities”.
It is likewise reiterated in the Terms of Reference that the Commission
should respect the principles of ASEAN as embodied in Article 2 of the
ASEAN Charter, in particular:

(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial

integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;
 (e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States;
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national
existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion;
(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of
democracy and constitutional government;
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of
human rights, and the promotion of social justice;
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law,
including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN
Member States; and
(l) respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the
peoples of ASEAN, while emphasising their common values in the
spirit of unity in diversity.

Moreover, the Terms of Reference require recognition “that the primary

responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms rests with each Member State”, the “pursuance of a constructive
and non-confrontational approach and cooperation to enhance promotion
and protection of human rights”; and the adoption of an “evolutionary
approach that would contribute to the development of human rights norms
and standards in ASEAN”.
To balance these seemingly qualified approaches to human rights
implementation, the Terms of Reference include in their Principles “respect
for international human rights principles, including universality,
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as well as impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity,
non-discrimination, and avoidance of double standards and
politicisation”.17
Former ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong has the following to
say about the prospects of human rights in ASEAN:

… even in the UN Charter, the idea of non-interference in the

internal affairs of sovereign states coexists with the ideal of human
rights. This coexistence may not be logically neat, but reflects the
reality of international relations in the world. The ASEAN human
rights body will have to find practical ways forward and its own
 balance. It will not necessarily evolve in a smooth trajectory or
according to a strict timetable.18

Possibilities for the Future

Because of the diversity in political systems among Member States, there
are indeed inherent limitations to the extent to which human rights can be
promoted and protected in ASEAN. However, the establishment of the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights is a significant
first step that can lead to greater awareness, appreciation and eventual
realisation of the desire of the peoples of the region for greater respect for
their human dignity.
Despite the challenges facing it, ASEAN is considered a success story
that must be sustained and emulated. Neighbouring powers have always
looked at ASEAN as a driving force and a stimulus for an evolving regional
architecture. Countries from as far as Africa and Latin America continue to
express interest in becoming ASEAN’s development partners.
I repeat what I said at the start of my article: “ASEAN has a promising
future. It has its limitations, but history tells us that relations among states
are not permanent. Domestic circumstances change, leaders change, the
world changes.”
My experience in ASEAN attests to this reality. For example, who would
have guessed in 1967 that ASEAN would have a charter that would make it
a rules-based organisation? Who would have speculated that given its
diversity, ASEAN Member States would have incorporated in its charter the
promotion of democracy and human rights?
The co-operation among them within the framework of ASEAN is
constantly improving, as they look forward to the realisation of an ASEAN
Community by 2015. They have become more open and collegial after
years of intensive interaction since the expansion of the organisation in the
late nineties. They are more conscious now of maintaining a balance
between respect for each other’s domestic concerns, on the one hand, and
the collective interest of ASEAN, on the other — its principles and
aspirations, and its international image. Motivating them is the central role
ASEAN plays in the development of the Asia-Pacific region.
ASEAN is a unique case, in which a group of middle powers takes the
lead in bringing together the big powers to engage in dialogue with the rest
of the countries in the region. It sets the direction and agenda of the
ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three, and the East Asian
Summit. All of its dialogue partners have acceded to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and have either signed or
initiated trade, cultural and security agreements with ASEAN.
ASEAN has an effective voice in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEAM), World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the United Nations. The “template” of ASEAN has been useful
to its Northeast Asian neighbors as well as other regional organisations in
devising their intra- as well as inter-regional cooperative frameworks.
In the final analysis, however, it is the peoples of the region that will
determine the character of the emerging ASEAN community — the extent
of their commitment in promoting and protecting their human rights, their
openness to free trade and the other objectives of the economic pillar of the
ASEAN Community, and their support for rules-based institutions that were
created by the Charter.

_____________________
1
ASEAN Concord II, 9th ASEAN Summit, 7 October 2003.
2 Joint Communiqué, 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 29–30 June 2004.
3
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf.
4 Art. 1(5), Chapter I.
5
Art. 2(2.n), Chapter II.
6 Art. 1(13), Chapter I.
7
Art. 2(2.h), Chapter I.
8 Art. 2(2.i), Chapter I.
9
Art. 2(2.j), Chapter I.
10 Art. 25, Chapter VIII. See also Locknie Hsu, “Towards an ASEAN Charter: Some Thoughts from
the Legal Perspective”, in Framing the ASEAN Charter: An ISEAS Perspective, compiled by Rodolfo
Severino. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp. 45–52.
11
Art. 28, Chapter VIII.
12 Surin Pitsuwan, Welcome Address at the ASEAN Secretariat Symposium on Methods of
Stakeholder Involvement in Regional Organizations, Jakarta, 23–25 November 2009.
13
See Wilfrido V. Villacorta, Inter-regional Cooperation in Democracy Building: Prospects for
Enhancing ASEAN-EU Engagement. Stockholm: International IDEA, 2009. See
http://www.idea.int/eu.
14 Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23–24 July 1993.
15
Ibid.
16 Sections 1–2, Article 14, Chapter IV.
17
Paragraph 2.2, Section 2. Principles, Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights.
18 Ong Keng Yong, “Future of ASEAN Community Building in the Midst of the Current Economic
Turmoil”, Address at the ASEAN Mid-Year Fulbright Enrichment Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 12
March 2009.
 GLOSSARY

AADCP ASEAN Australia Development Assessment Cooperation

Programme
AANZSCEP ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations and Trade Agreement
ABAC ASEAN Business Advisory Council
ACCI ASEAN Chamber of Commerce & Industry
ACFTA ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AEM ASEAN Economic Ministers
AFAS ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights
AICO ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme
AIPA ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly
AKFTA ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area
ALMM ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting
AMS ASEAN Member States
APC Asia-Pacific Community
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC ASEAN Political-Security Community
APT ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea)
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN 4 The newer members of ASEAN — Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar and Vietnam
ASEAN 6 The five original founding members of ASEAN —
 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand
ASEAN- ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
ERAT
ASEANTA ASEAN Tourism Association
ASEC ASEAN Secretariat
ATIGA ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement
BIMP-EAGA Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-The Philippines
East ASEAN Growth Area
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CLMV Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam
COCI Committee on Culture and Information
CPR Council of Permanent Representatives
CSCE Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe
CSOs Civil Service Organisation
DP Dialogue Partners
EAS East Asia Summit
EEC European Economic Community
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EPG Eminent Persons Group
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Area
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEL General Exceptions List
HPA Ha Noi Plan of Action
HSL Highly Sensitive List
IAI Initiative for ASEAN Integration
IDE Institute of Developing Economics
IL Inclusion List
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMT-GT Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
LMWP Labour Ministers’ Work Programme
MERCOSUR Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) between Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay founded in 1991 by the
Treaty of Asunción, which was later amended and
updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose
is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of
goods, people, and currency.
NAFTA North America Free Trade Area
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
NZ New Zealand
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OIC Organisation of Islamic Conference
OSHNET Network of Occupational Safety and Health
ROK Republic of Korea
ROO Rules of Origin
RTA Regional Trade Agreement. A Broad term which denotes
not only FTAs but also customs unions.
SL Sensitive List
SLOM (ASEAN) Senior Labour Officials Meeting
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TCG Tripartite Core Group
TEL Temporary Exclusion List
UN United Nations
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade & Development
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment Committee
VAP Vientiane Action Programme
WTO World Trade Organization
 ANNEX I: PRESS STATEMENT

1st ASEAN-MERCOSUR Ministerial Meeting Brasilia, 24

November 2008

1. The 1st ASEAN-MERCOSUR Ministerial Meeting was held on 24

November 2008, in Brasilia. The Meeting was co-chaired by H.E.
Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the
Federative Republic of Brazil, pro tempore president of MERCOSUR
(Common Market of the South) and H.E. Sompong Amornvivat, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, the current
Chair of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The
Meeting was attended by the Ministers and high-level representatives of
ASEAN and MERCOSUR Member Countries and the ASEAN
Secretariat.
2. The Ministers recalled the informal meeting between MERCOSUR and
ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Brasilia on 22 August 2007 on the
sidelines of the III Ministerial Meeting of the Forum for East Asia
Latin-America Cooperation (FEALAC). On that occasion, ASEAN and
MERCOSUR Ministers had expressed their common aspiration to
explore ways to further strengthen inter-regional ties, including trade
and investment cooperation.
3. The Meeting held an in-depth discussion and exchange of views on
various international issues of common interest in the spirit of South-
South cooperation, including the WTO — Doha Round and the
international financial situation. It also considered developments in
MERCOSUR and ASEAN as well as ways and means to enhance
MERCOSUR-ASEAN cooperation in areas such as trade and
investment, intellectual property, energy security, food security,
 agriculture, transportation, tourism, environment, people-to-people
contacts, technical cooperation and other areas of mutual interest.
4. The Meeting stressed the constructive roles of both MERCOSUR and
ASEAN in the promotion of peace, stability, prosperity, regional
integration and sustainable development as well as community-building
in their respective regions.
5. The Meeting reaffirmed MERCOSUR’s and ASEAN’s commitment to
successfully concluding the WTO Doha Round, in a fair and balanced
manner, and welcomed recent declarations of world leaders in this
regard.
6. The Meeting recalled the importance of the elimination of all forms of
export subsidies to agricultural products and substantial reduction of
trade distorting agricultural support in major subsidizing countries, with
a view to promoting rural development in developing countries.
7. The Meeting stressed the importance of incorporating a development
dimension in international discussions concerning intellectual property,
as a meaningful contribution to economic and social progress in
developing countries, to preserve policy spaces necessary for ensuring
access to knowledge and promoting public goals in the fields of health
and culture, as well as sustainable environment.
8. The Meeting emphasized the strong commitment of ASEAN and
MERCOSUR to the Bali Roadmap and the need to preserve momentum
at the 14th COP of UNFCCC in Poznan so as to reach an agreed
outcome on climate change at the 15th COP of the UNFCCC to be held
in Copenhagen in December 2009.
9. The Meeting considered the international financial crisis and its effects
on emerging economies and noted that due to their responsible
economic policies, ASEAN and MERCOSUR countries are in a more
favorable condition to face the crisis than in the past. They stressed the
importance of preventing the crisis, originated in developed countries,
from eroding recent achievements in both regions in terms of social
inclusion and poverty reduction. Welcoming the Washington
Declaration of the G-20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy, the Meeting noted that developing countries have been the
main engine of world economic growth, a fact which gives them all the
credentials for a more relevant role in the discussions on a new
international financial architecture. In this regard, the Ministers
 underscored the need to reform the multilateral financial institutions, in
order to make them more legitimate and effective.
10. The Meeting recognized the importance of inter-regional cooperation in
order to improve energy security and expressed the view that ASEAN
and MERCOSUR should work towards the identification of areas of
cooperation in order to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, such as
energy efficiency and alternative and renewable sources of energy. The
Meeting noted the potential of alternative and renewable sources of
energy in addressing the challenge of global energy security and in
promoting economic development, including employment. Both
regional groupings emphasized the need for more predictable and stable
prices for energy commodities such as oil and gas.
11. To address the challenge of food security, the Meeting recognized the
importance of developing agricultural productivity through, among
others, greater investment, technology transfers, improvement on
infrastructure, as well as research and development in our regions.
12. The Meeting emphasized the need to foster people-to-people ties at all
levels through the promotion of cooperation in culture, tourism and
sports, the exchange of visits of students/youths, academicians,
parliamentary members and journalists as well as the dissemination of
relevant information among member countries of both regional
groupings.
13. Recognizing the importance of international trade as an engine for
economic growth and social development, and that bilateral and
biregional economic partnership arrangements significantly contribute
to the expansion of world trade, the Meeting agreed that closer region-
to-region economic cooperation between ASEAN and MERCOSUR
should follow a building-block approach. In this regard, both sides shall
continue to engage in a process of dialogue as a platform for closer
economic cooperation, with an initial focus on information exchange
and sharing of experiences on regional economic integration and trade
agreements, trade and investment promotion and facilitation, and
promotion of cooperation between the two regions’ business
communities and economic research institutions.
14. Acknowledging the importance of enhancing linkages among the two
regions, the Meeting expressed the view to explore additional areas for
future cooperation in fields of common interest and mutual benefits,
 among others, in addressing poverty alleviation, health and
communicable diseases, disaster management and security challenges.
15. The Meeting agreed that a SOM shall be held in Kuala Lumpur in
March 2009 to prepare a region-to-region Roadmap and Action Plan on
the issues of mutual interest discussed in the 1st ASEAN-MERCOSUR
Ministerial Meeting.
16. The proposed Plan of Action will be submitted to an ASEAN-
MERCOSUR Ministerial Meeting to be held at the margin of the next
U.N. General Assembly.
17. The Meeting expressed its deep appreciation to Brazil for her
hospitality and excellent arrangements for this Meeting. The Meeting
also decided to hold the second meeting in an ASEAN country no later
than June 2010.
 INDEX

10 Minus X 16

ASEAN Charter 5, 14, 15, 23, 39, 41, 47, 58, 65, 78, 83, 84, 89, 95–97, 128, 141, 143, 206, 207, 209,
210, 224, 227, 231, 268, 274, 279, 287, 295, 298, 303, 305–308, 310, 311
ASEAN Economic Community 10, 12, 29, 31, 35, 38, 77, 80, 88, 93, 98, 119, 139, 146, 147, 149,
153, 157, 160, 191, 197, 235, 263, 268, 269, 287
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 10, 12–15, 24, 26, 48, 88, 92, 98–100, 102, 105–112, 114–119,
121–123, 131, 139, 141, 143, 198, 215, 233, 259, 260, 263, 264
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 41, 209, 310–313
ASEAN Political-Security Community 34, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 287
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 10, 36, 80, 181, 208, 287
ASEAN Vision 2020 9, 12, 14, 15, 79, 80, 122, 132, 151, 153
Asia-Pacific community 218, 219, 225
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 46, 131, 146–148, 219, 221, 222, 224–226, 258–260,
263, 270, 314
Australia 5, 11, 31, 48, 55, 66, 68, 69, 87, 89, 91, 98, 119, 137, 140, 145–149, 191, 218, 219, 223–
226, 231, 232, 234, 237, 239, 244, 249, 258–261, 263, 264, 269, 270, 287

Bangkok Declaration 30, 87, 304

BIMP-EAGA 25, 26, 48, 50, 90, 159, 160, 162–164, 167
Brunei Darussalam 25, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 61, 65, 90, 154, 155, 167, 187, 192, 202, 270

Cambodia 10, 30, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 49, 53, 57, 65, 76, 80, 87–89, 107, 118, 121, 134, 155, 171, 172,
174–176, 179, 180, 183, 185, 186, 192, 194, 201, 203, 205, 257, 276, 284, 286, 288
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralism (CMIM) 135, 230
China 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 30, 31, 36, 48, 57, 65, 66, 67, 69, 87–91, 95, 98, 118, 119, 121, 125–
128, 134, 135, 137, 142, 151, 181, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 215–219, 223, 226, 227, 229–234,
237–250, 257, 260, 263, 265, 269, 278, 284–286, 288
Cold War 221, 222, 242, 255–257, 284
Cyclone Nargis 30, 50, 71, 73

Dispute Settlement 15, 96, 102, 105, 113–115, 116, 255, 287, 307, 308

East Asian Community 48, 66, 223, 225, 226, 230, 288
East Asian Summit (EAS) 66, 68, 222, 224, 227, 230, 231, 237–251, 264–266, 303, 313
East Timor (Timor Leste) 4, 38, 53–58, 228, 261
European Union (EU) 4, 5, 36, 95, 97–99, 102, 122, 155, 198, 222, 223, 255, 258, 263, 269, 270,
283, 284, 292, 293, 308
G20 (Group of 20) 6, 34, 69, 126, 134–136, 148, 231, 251, 272

IMT-GT 25, 159–162, 164, 167

India 5, 11, 14, 19, 31, 36, 66, 69, 87, 89, 91, 95, 98, 118, 119, 125, 128, 134, 137, 140, 151, 188,
191, 193, 197–199, 223, 226, 231–234, 237–249, 263, 264, 269, 278, 284–286, 288
Indonesia 10, 12, 20, 25, 29, 30, 39, 45, 48–50, 54–57, 65, 68, 69, 80, 87, 90, 115, 127, 129, 130,
133, 142, 146, 153–155, 159, 167, 171, 172, 174–176, 179–181, 185, 191–194, 196, 201–203,
229–232, 246, 257, 260, 261, 268, 276, 284, 287, 305, 306
International Labour Organization (ILO) 192, 193, 196, 203, 273–279

Japan 5, 11, 31, 48, 66, 68, 69, 89, 91, 98, 119, 126, 127, 135, 137, 140, 174, 181, 182, 221–228, 230,
232–234, 237, 239, 241, 242, 244–250, 257, 259, 260, 263, 265, 269, 271, 277, 285, 286, 288

Korea 5, 6, 11, 31, 48, 66, 68, 69, 89, 98, 119, 127, 135, 137, 140, 181, 205, 223, 230–232, 235, 244,
246, 249, 251, 257, 265, 286

Lao PDR/Laos 10, 49, 65, 76, 87, 89, 99, 107, 118, 134, 155, 171, 172, 174–176, 179, 180, 193, 195,
201, 203, 215, 216, 229, 257, 264, 276, 286

Malaysia 10, 25, 29, 30, 39, 45, 48–51, 56, 65, 80, 87, 90, 99, 115, 118, 130, 131, 153–155, 159, 167,
171, 172, 174–176, 179, 180, 182, 192–195, 197, 201–203, 223, 229, 230, 263, 268, 276, 284, 286
MERCOSUR 269, 270
Myanmar 10, 34, 40, 49, 50, 57, 65, 71–76, 81, 87, 89, 107, 118, 132, 153–155, 171, 172, 175, 176,
179, 180, 193, 201, 203, 205, 232, 246, 257, 262, 276, 286, 288

New Zealand 5, 11, 31, 48, 74, 87, 89, 91, 98, 119, 137, 140, 146, 223, 231, 237, 244, 253, 254, 257–
266, 269, 270

Russia 5, 31, 48, 66, 125, 134, 155, 224, 227, 231, 237, 238, 241–245, 247, 248, 250, 284, 286

Singapore 10, 19, 20, 29–31, 39, 45, 46, 51, 57, 63–65, 73, 74, 87, 90, 94, 112, 115, 117, 118, 153–
156, 171–180, 182, 183, 185, 192–197, 201–203, 219, 222, 225, 229, 231, 243, 246, 260, 262,
265, 267–271, 276, 284, 295, 306, 308, 309

Thailand 4, 10, 12, 25, 29, 30, 34, 39, 40, 49, 56, 65, 75, 80, 87, 115, 118, 121, 129–133, 135, 143,
153–155, 159, 167, 171–176, 178–180, 183, 186, 192–195, 197, 201–203, 205, 228–230, 233,
257, 263, 268, 276, 288, 307
The Philippines 4, 10, 25, 29, 30, 39, 48, 49, 56, 65, 74, 80, 87, 115, 132, 142, 154, 155, 159, 171,
172, 174–176, 178–180, 193–195, 197, 198, 201–203, 228, 230, 257, 268, 276, 286, 306

Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) 151, 153–157

Two Plus X 15, 16

United States of America (USA) 268

Vietnam 12, 30, 40, 49, 57, 65, 76, 87–89, 91, 107, 118, 121, 153–155, 171–176, 179, 180, 181, 183,
193–195, 201, 203, 204, 229, 233, 256, 257, 259, 268–270, 276, 284, 286
 EDITOR’S BIOGRAPHY

LEE Yoong Yoong is a Research Fellow in the Economics and Business

cluster at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS). He has more than fourteen
years of work experience in the areas of international relations, international
business and economic development. Prior to joining the IPS, Yoong Yoong
spent four years working in the ASEAN Secretariat based in Jakarta,
Indonesia, where his last appointment was as Head of the Infrastructure
Unit, responsible for the regional cooperation and integration of the
Transport/Logistics, Energy and Minerals sectors. Prior to that, he spent
seven years with the Economic Development Board (EDB) of Singapore,
responsible for driving talent outreach initiatives and programmes to
facilitate inflow of global talent into specific Singapore-based industries, as
well as for evaluating business/market opportunities for firms in the Asia-
Pacific region. Yoong Yoong holds a Master in International Relations from
the Institute of Defence of Strategic Studies (now the S Rajaratnam School
of International Studies) of the Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. Yoong Yoong coordinates a key roundtable that discusses the
state of Singapore’s economy twice a year. His international experience
includes a stint with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), based in Bangkok, Thailand.