A Monograph

by

Major Anthony S. Lieto

Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

 SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

M a j o r Anthony S. Lieto

T i t l e o f Monograph: Tactical Flexibility: Where? Why?

Approved by:

Monograph D i r e c t o r
H a r o l d R. Winton, Ph.D.

Director, S c h o o l o f
C o l o n e l W i l l i a m H. es, MA, MMAS Advanced M i l i t a r y
Studies

Director, Graduate
P h i l i p J. B r o o k e s , Ph.D. D e g r e e Program

Accepted t h i s 26lY day of b& 1990

 RBSTRACT

TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY: WHERE? WHY? by MAJ Anthony S.

Lieto, USA, 64 pages.

This monograph examines the development of tactical

organizations and where organizational flexibility was
st.'uctured a"'ld why it was focused there. The 1986 v,e.'sicm
of FM 100-5 OPERATIONS focuses on the corps as the U.S.
Rrmy's largest tactical formation. With the current corps
filling some of the roles of the WW II field army, and the
division and brigade structures not similarly evolving, it
appea.'s there exists a void which was filled by the WW II
ce'rps. Add'i t io,..,ally, tact ical dy,..,a,"ics 0,.., the batt lefield
have significantly changed since the adoption of the fixed
division, flexible brigade concept.

The monograph begins with a theoretical examination of

tactical flexibility and organizational structure. A
historical study of how the U.S. Army achieved tactical
flexibility through the organizational structure of the
division follows. This historical study examines how the
U.S. Rrmy's divisional organization has changed from WW I
to the ROAD organization (fixed division, flexible brigade)
I"lsed today, with aY"1 emphasis Cq". the structure of tactical
flexibility.

The mc,rlograph corrtirlues with arl analysis of the irl1pact

on tactical flexibility and the changes in doctrine,
organizational structure above corps, training, technology,
and threat since the adoption of the fixed division,
flexible brigade organization. An alternative organization
of a flexible d i v i ss i o n fixed brigade is p.'oposed . . A,..,
analysis of each system is examined against an established
set of criteria. The criteria includes synchronization,
agility, b'ai,",ability, sustai,..,ability, a,..,d
interoperability. This monograph examines the whole
tactical organization of corps, division, brigade as a
system rather than the traditional approach of fixed
brigade vs. flexible brigade.

The monograph concludes that the flexible division,

fixed brigade CCI'('rcept shows promise for futut"'e I~lse. A test
is proposed to examine each system in a real world
environment where the fog and friction of war can enter
into the evaluation.

iii
Table of Contents

Page

Rpproval Page ............................. ii

Rbstr'act .................................. iii

I. Introduction ......................... 1

I 1. Theory ............................... 2

I I I . U .S . .Rrmy Tactical Organizations ..... 7

IV . Changes Since RORD Concept ........... 22

V. Rnalysis ............................. 25

VI . Ccancl us i ons ......................... 35

VII . Implications ......................... 38

Rppendixes ................................

Rppendix R ............................. 46

Rppendix B .............................
.............................
42

Rppendix C 46

Rppendix D ............................. 48

Qppendix E ............................. 50

Rppendix F ............................. 52

Endnotes .................................. 54

Bibliography .............................. 56

 The 1986 version of F M 100-5 O~erationshas focused attention

on the corps as the U.S. Rrmy's largest tactical organization.

In scme respects, the present day corps has replaced the

traditional role of the field army of World War 11. The modern

day corps is unlike the corps of the past. During World War 11,

the corps was simply a tactical headquarters and the fiela..army

provided the necessary administrative and logistical support for

the subordinate divisions. "Today's corps is now responsible

for providing administrative and logistic support for

subordinate units."' However, the division and brigade

structures have not similarly evolved. With the current corps

filling some of the roles of the World War I 1 field army, i t

appears there exists a void which was f ~ l l e dby the World War I 1

corps, in that there no longer exists a tactically flexible

headquarters at the higher tactical echelons.

Rdditionally, tactical dynamics on the battlefield have

significantly changed since the completion of the Reorganization

Objective Flrmy Division (RORD) 2 The "fixed division,

flexible brigade" concept, is still the organizational structure

used by the U.S. Rrmy today. "The current complexities of Rrmy

division design can be traced back to 1962 and the RORD

concept. Changes in training, doctrine, and materiel

developments have all influenced how the U.S. Rrmy plaris to

fight at the higher tactical levels. R key issue generated by

the changes in the corps' structure, functions, and the tactical

dynamics mentioned above is at what level should the U.S. Rrmy

structure tactical flexibility?

The methodology to answer this question begins with a

theoretical examination of tactical flexibility and

organi.zational structures. There follows a historical

examination of U.S. Rrmy's tactical organizations from World War

I to the adoption of the RORD concept. This analysis will focus

on where tactical flexibility was structured, what influenced

these organizations to change, and the implications of these

changes toward tactical flexibility. The next section examines

changes that have occurred since the adoption of the "fixed

division, flexible brigade" concept. The analysis will suggest

an alternative organization and compare in detail each

alternative within its corps, division and brigade context.

This analysis wi-11 lead to a conclusion which organization best

meets the Rrmy's needs. The final section provides implications

for future studies concerning tactical flexibility.

I I. THEORY

We should establish one battle-order, the

arrangement of troops before and during
combat,... this battle array will
introduce a certain uniformity..
will be useful and advantageous.
.
which

Carl von Clausewitz

The right tactical organization is the foundation on which

armies have always sought to build their structure, but has

remained as illusive as the Holy Grail. Jomini sets his second

of twelve conditions for making a perfect army as, "having a

good organization."" He further states that, "none of these

twelve conditions can be neglected without grave in~onvience."~

Rn organization should provide a certain amount of

flexibility and combined arms to the tactical commander. The

Roman Legion, provided excellent flexibility to the legion

commander. Recording to FM 100-5, O~erations, "The need for

flexibility is greater for the committed maneuver unit commander

than for anyone else." Rn organization which provides excellent

command and control and reta.ins tactical f lexibi 1 ity must also

have some sort of combined arms to be truly useful, especially

when it might fight independently. "Combined arms are therefore

desirable to say the least, for any unit that frequently finds

itself operating in isolation."' The Roman Legion organized

into centuries, maniples, and cohorts consist ing of archers,

slingers, light-armored foot, heavy-armored foot and cavalry was

a fine combined arms organization. The Roman Legion provided

excellent flexibility and combined arms capability to'the

committed legion commander, and still would be a good

organization if armies were fighting unorganized Visignths.

Organizing for combat historically depended on haw an army

intended to fight, where an army intended to fight and who an

army intended to fight.. Since these three requirements change

frequently, so do tactical organizations. The how, when and

where of choosing an organization depends on the right m i x of

mass and mobility (maneuver). "Maneuver theory is about

amplifying the force which a small mass is capable of

exerting.. . on the other hand this mass, however small, must be

capable of conveying enough physical fighting power to offer a

threat..."7 Historically, choosing the correct m i x of mass and

mobility ensures that an organization maintains flexibility.

Brigadier General Richard Sirnpkin makes the point that

maintaining a mix of mass and mobility in an organization

ensures flexibility; however, mass and mobility are opposites

and tend to pull organizations in different directions. Nathan

Bedford Forrest said it best when he said," The idea in war is

to get there the firstest with the mostest." The ability to

move rapidly and achieve mass is what ideal organizations should

do.

The French Grand Rrmy's ability to move rapidly and mass on

the battlefield was achieved in part by its organizational

structure. The organizational structure of regiments, brigades,

divisions and corps were key to its success.

The French Grand C3rmy's ability to move rapidly was based on

the following characteristics. First, they drganized into small

units capable of independent action.

More rapid movement of armies was

becoming practicable by the recent

invention of the divisional system..

divisional organization, standard in

.
The

France by the 178B9s, provided mixed

bodies of infantry and artillery, which

could march in separate columns and were

strong enough to fight independent

act ions. a

Secondly, small independent units could live off the land better

than large units. These organi rat ions, "disgard ing cumbersome

supply trains, were capable o f more rapid movement. "* Thirdly,

decentralization of command, due to the need for independent

movement, a1 lowed commanders t o forego the cumbersome and t ime

intensive curflmand channels. "The division commanders were to

keep in touch with each other, but were not t o "waste time

waiting for order^..."^^ Organizational structure, the lack of

a cumbersome supply system and the de=entral izat ion u f command

allowed the French to achieve mobility. Despite this emphasis

on mobility, the French Rrmy of the Napoleonic era also

developed the ability t o concentrate.

The French Rrrny's ability t o mass was based on the following

characterist ics. First, posit iuning of units prior t o battle.

The corps system allowed one corps to initiate and mairkair)

contact with enemy forcer. It' s capability of independent

action for 24-48 hours allowed the other corps, usually within a

days march, "to fall upon the enemy's rear."" Positioning uf

forces allowed the French to achieve superiority of combat power

at t iniec, of Napoleon's choosing. Secondly, the use of ccmbined

arms at the regiment, division and curps level allowed for rapid

concentration of force. Each corps had several infantry

divisions, themselves being combined arms urgani zat ions, plus

additional cavalry, art i 1 lery and engineer units. In 1809

Napoleon issued artillery to each regiment to enhance massed

fires.%= The use of combined arms at all levels improved the

ability of the French t o mass. Napoleon realized that trained

soldiers were the key in achieving mass'and mobility on the

battlefield. Good training at regimental level enhanced the

ability of divisional commanders t o concentrate their forces.

"Recruits were assigned to their regiments at once, trained b y

the veterans... and were considered properly trained after twn

months of campaigning. "'"

The four key ingredients for a guod organization which

evolved from classical military art were first, an army must

have the ability t o move rapidly and achieve mass. Organizing

into separate self-sustaining units allowed the French Rrmy t o

achieve rapid movement and mass. Second, units must have some

surt o f combined arms organization to be useful. Each

organizational level adopted b y Napoleon possessed some sort u f

combined arms capabi 1 ity. Third, sustainment must not hinder

the ability u f an army to move. Discarding the cumbersome

supply structure and living off the land improved the French

Flrrny's mobility. This is not a viable option today, but the

concept of spliting into smaller self-sustaining units is

important in deciding what organizat ion to adopt. Fmurth,

training must occur at the level which organizations are

employed. This provides the "train as you intend t o fight"

philosophy.

R balance of mass, mobility, sustainability, training and

combined arms must occur fnr an organization t o maintain its

flexibility. The Roman Legion and the French Grand Rrmy were

close. The U. S. Rrrny has besn looking fnr such an organization,

which balances all these characteristics, since its decision to

adopt the divisional organizati.on in 1916.

 R descriptinn of each divisional organization will be covered

along with an examination of each system (brigade through

corps). Examination of each system will include an evaluation

of where tactical flexibility was structured. Factors which

caused this organization to change and what led tu the adopt iun

of a new organization will follow.

Fl. WORLD WFlR I

The Flmerican infantry division of 1917 consisted of two

brigades of infantry, one brigade of field artillery, a regiment

of engineers, and the division's supply and sanitary trains. It

had an authorized strength of 27,313 personnel. (Flppendix Fl) The

basic maneuver .unit of the division was the brigade which

consisted of two infantry regiments. Each regiment was a fixed

organi zat iun consisting of three infantry battalions and a

machine gun company. The authorized regirflental strength was 112

officers and 3,720 men. l4

The World War I infantry division was referred to as the

square division because of its two brigade two regiment

configurat ion. It "was created specifically for the fighting nn

the western frunt,"l" to enable it to sustain losses and

continue its mission. It was two to three times the size uf the

French or British divisions which usually numbered 8,000 men or

fewer. ' 6 Mobility was replaced with mass, based on the need tc,
fight a war of attrition. Flnother 14,088 personnel were

required to slupport it, bringing the total for each division to

around 48,000.' 7 Other reports put this number higher once all

corps, army and theater troops were counted.

The size and structure of the square division severely

constrained its flexibility. The division cornrnander d i d not

have the organizational structure to maintain a reserve. The

division employed and provided support to the brigades, and "the

only reserve available to the division commander was the

two-battalion combat engineer regiment, which was frequently

pressed into service as infantry.

The corps commander d i d not have the flexibility to move

these extremely large divisions easily. The size of the

division made it very unwieldy to move on a moment's notice and

too large to keep in reserve. Flmerican divisions when employed

in the line would occupy an entire sector previously occupied by

a Fr-ench corps of three divisions. l9 The size and structure of

the square division reduced flexibility to the division and

carps commanders.

Flexibility was centered at the brigade level. The brigade

cummander maintained the ability to move forces rapidly and

cunt inue operat ions. The brigade, with its two infantry

regiments of about 3,800 personnel each, was small enough for

rapid movernent, but large enough for offensive operations.

Rccording to Jonathan House,

The apparent intent was that an Flmerican

brigade cornrnander, with one regiment in

combat and the second behind it, could

 l e a p f r o g h i s r e g i m e n t s t o s u s t a i n an
offensive almost indefinitely, thereby
c u t t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n c y c l e t i m e necessary
to r e 1 ieve e x h a u s t e d a s s a u l t t r - o o p s .

T h e b r i g a d e a l s o b e c a m e t h e level w h e r e c o m b a t , cambat

s u p p o r t a n d c o m b a t service s u p p o r t units w e r e irk e g r a t e d . The

b r i g a d e c o m m a n d e r r e t a i n e d t h e f r e e d o m t o gco a n y w h e r e on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d and i n f l u e n c e t h e situation. "Brigade commanders

w e r e f r e e t o command from forward l a c a t i o n s , "e' a n d t h i s a b i 1 i t y

t o l e a d from the f r o n t put t h e b r i g a d e c o m m a n d e r i n t h e best

p o s i t i o n tcn a 1 l o c a t e resources. S y n c h r o n i z a t i o n occlurred at the

b r i g a d e level d u e t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o m a i n t a i n a n d s u s t a i n

momentum, t h e a b i l i t y t o see t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d k n o w w h e r - e

a s s e t s s h o u l d be e m p l o y e d . Synchroni zing maneuver w i t h f i r e

s u p p o r t a l l o w e d the b r i g a d e s t o m a i n t a i n their t e m p o , and the

d i v i s i o n s pushed support forward to maintain this tempo. The

b r i g a d e ' s a b i l i t y t o s y n c h r o n i z e a s s e t s a n d t h e a g i l i t y inherent

i n i t s ccmmand structure m a d e it i d e a l a s t h e k e y s t m n e o f t h e

U. S . d i v i s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t ion. T h e U. S . b r i g a d e w a s equal in

s i z e t o an a l l i e d d i v i s i o n .
The fixed r e g i m e n t a l l o w e d t h e b r i g a d e s t o retain their

flexibiltiy. C o r p s d i d not have t h e l u x u r y t o m o v e d i v i s i o n s

but c o u l d e m p l o y b r i g a d e s . Flllied c o r p s used the f i x e d U.S.

r e g i m e n t s u n d e r b r i g a d e control a s t h e b a s i c u n i t o f m a n e u v e r

w h e n g i v e r , a U. S. division. T h i s a l l u w e d t h e m t o e m p l o y t w o ar-

t h r e e r e g i m e n t s u n d e r a b r i g a d e i n t h e l i n e a n d one u r t w o u n d s r

b r i g a d e control i n e i t h e r t h e s e c o n d echelon or i n c o r p s

reserve. T h i s provided the c o r p s w i t h f l e x i b i l i t y and the

a b i l i t y t o move r a p i d l y a n d m a s s . = = The f i x e d regiment provided

t h e b r i g a d e a n d c o r p s commanders w i t h f l e x i b i l i t y o n a l e t h a l

battlefield.

Changes i n d o c t r i n e , rnater i e l d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h r e a t

c a p a b i l i t i e s c a u s e d t h e s q u a r e d i v i s i o n t o change. First,

d o c t r i n a l c h a n g e s i n t h e u s e o f combined a r m s , maneuver and

combat s u p p o r t , influenced t h e divisional organization. I n 1921

t h e r e v i s e d v e r s i o n of t h e U.S. Field Service Regulation

i n s i s t e d t h a t no one a r m wins b a t t l e s , and t h a t t h e combined

e m p l d y m e n t o f a1 1 arms w a s e s s e n t i a l t o s u c c e s s . Combined

arms w a s e n v i s i o n e d a s e s s e n t i a l i n w i n n i n g f u t u r e w a r s .

M o b i l i t y i n f u t u r e w a r s w o u l d b e a s i m p o r t a n t a5 m a s s w a s i n

W o r l d War I. " T a c t i c s w e r e b a s e d on t h e p r e m i s e of e s t a b l i s h i n g

a b a s e o f fire t h e n maneuvering.. . development o f a s m a l l more

mobile divisicw, w a s suggested. "=+ R more . b a l a n c e d a p p r o a c h

t o w a r d m o b i l i t y a n d mass w a s i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e new d i v i s i o n

o r g a n i z a t ion.

S @ c o n d l y , materiel d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t a n k s , a r t i 1l e r y a n d s m a l l

a r m s influenced t h e divisional organization. The t a n k between

t h e war y e a r s s p a r k e d i n t e r e s t , a n d i n 1328 a n d a g a i n i n 1 3 2 3 a n

a d h n c E x p e r i m e n t a l R r m o r e d F o r c e (REF) w a s o r g a n i z e d a t t h e

T a n k S c h o o l i n F o r t Meade, Maryland. R s Chief uf S t a f f from

1 3 3 0 t o 1935, Dcauglas M a c R r t h u r a d v a n c e d m o t o r - i z a t i n n a n d

m e c h a n i z a t icdn t h r o u g h o u t t h e army. as Matet-iel d e v e l o p m e n t s i n

a r t i l l e r y i m p r u v e d t h e a b i l i t y t o move a n d p r o v i d e s u p p o r t t o

t h e i n f a n t r y at g r e a t e r ranges. F i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r s gave t h e

U. S. Rrmy a new a n d u n p r e c e d e n t e d d e g r e e o f i n f a n t r y - a r t i 1l e r y
integration. "6 Small arms d e v e l o p m e n t a1 l o w e d t h e i n f a n t r y t o

m a i n t a i n a h i g h rate o f f i r e w i t h t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e M-i

semi-automat ic r i f l e . Materiel d e v e l o p m e n t influenced changes

to t h e division organization.

Third, t h e change i n t h e t h r e a t ' s a b i l i t y t o maneuver and

m a s s influenced changes i n t h e d i v i s i o n a l s t r u c t ure. "The

German a r m o r e d a t t a c k o n F r a n c e i n May 1 3 4 0 g a v e f I - i r t h e r i m p e t !.is

t o m e c h a n i z e d e x p e r i m e n t s a l r e a d y c u n d u c t e d i n U.S. Rrniy

maneuvers. T h e t h r e a t ' s a b i 1i t i e s tcs u s e c o m b i n e d a r m s a n d

a c h i e v e s p e e d a n d mass, w e r e b e i n g n o t i c e d by t h e d i v i s i o n a l

designers. Changes i n dn3ctrine, materiel d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h r e a t

c a p a b i l i t i e s c a u s e d t h e U.S. Rrrny t o r e o r g a n i z e i t s d i v i s i o n a r ~ d

regimental organizat ions.

B. WORLD WRR I 1 FIND THE KORERN WRR

There w e r e t h r e e underlying p r i n c i p l e s i n designing t h e

d i v i s i o n a l c w g a n i z a t i o n p r i o r t o W o r l d War 11. First, the

d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d b e rnobi le. Second, no u n i t needed

weapons whose r a n g e exceeded t h e p a r e n t unit's area o f

operat ions. Third, d i v i s i o n s would b e t y p e - f o r c e a l u n g f ~ i n c ito n

1ines, w h i l e h i g h e r e c h e l o n s became t a s k - f o r c e d . Type-farce

w a s a n u r g a n i z a t i o n which b a s i c a l l y w a s o n e f o r c e o r i e n t e d ,

while task-force w a s a combined a r m s c w g a n i z a t ion.

O u t of t h i s g u i d a n c e , t h e U. S. Rrrny d e s i g n e d t w o d i f f e r e n t

divisional organizations, o n e f o r i n f a n t r y a n d o n e f o r armor.

The i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n J u n e 1941 w a s a t r i a n g u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n
with an authorized strength of 15,245 perscmnel. I t consisted

of three fixed infantry regiments of three infantry battalions,

one antitank company and a service ccmpany in each; one

artillery regiment nf four artillery battalions; an engineer

battalion; a service support battaliun; a medical battalicw; and

reconnaissance units at division, regiment and battalion

level. ' 9 The armored division in September 1943 had an

authorized strength of 18,937 personnel and consisted of three

tank battalions, three at-mmred infantry battalions, three

artillery battalions, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance

bat tal ion, divisional service support and three cnmbat command

h e a d q u a r t e r - ~ . " ~ ( F L p p e n d i xB) These two types nf divisions were

standardized units while the corps and field armies were tasked

organized.

The corps was a command and control headquarters while the

field army was both a command and control and adrninistratlvneand

logistical headquarters. "Leaving administrat ive matters

largely at at-my level, the corps coordinated the use of combined

arms on the battlefield. The units pooled at the corps and

field army level were pushed down to the division level which

impacted on the regimental organization. "R typical U. S.

infantry division in France during 1944 normally had attached

bat t a1 ions of tanks, tank destroyers, ant iaircraft automat ic

weapons, and corps engineers. In some cases the division also

had attached 4.2-inch mortars, transportat ion, and logistical

support from pools at corps and field army level. "="

The infantry regiment became a fixed combined arms .
o r g a n i z a t i ~ u nf o r t h e f o l l o w i n g reasons. First, t h e attachments

t o d i v i s i o n f r o m c o r p s a n d f i e l d a r m y w e r e f r e q u e n t l y m a d e on a

semi-permanent basis t o f a c i 1 i t a t e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f habitual

relations. Furtherraore, " m a n y o f these a t t a c h e d f o r c e s w e r e

s u b d i v i d e d and f u r t h e r a t t a c h e d t o i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s , as were

t h e d i v i s i o n 1 s o r g a n i c assets. '133 Second, irs 1342 t h e i n f a n t r - y ,

r e g i m e n t s w e r e authcarized their own battery o f h u w i t z e r - s .

Third, c o n i b a t s u p p o r t b y p a s s e d t h e c o r p s a n d d i v i s i o n level a n d

w e n t d i r e c t l y t o t h e r.egirnenta.1 level. " T h e regirtlent , = ~ f t e n

u p e r a t e d w i t h t a n k s , e n g i n e e r s a n d p e r h a p s a d d i t ional s u p p a r t

a t t a c h e d t u f o r m a regirflental conibat t e a m (RCT). T h u s , t h e RCT

was a combined arms force, a s m a l l d i v i s i o n i n i t s e l f . "34

T h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i n n c o m b a t c o m m a n d s w e r e a l s o c o m b i n e d a-r-ms

c w g a n i z a t ions, but l a c k e d t h e m a s s f o r e x t e n d e d o p e r a t ions.

T h e y w e r e h i g h 1y m a n e u v e r a b l e but o f t e n r e q u i r e d a d d i t iunal

i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t w i t h t h e a t t a c h m e n t o f a RCT t o p r o v i d e e n u u g h

m a s s fur- s u s t a i n e d o p e r a t i o n s . F l e x i b i l i t y in t h e infantlay

d i v i s i u n s and the armored d i v i s i o n s was l o c a t e d at d i f f e r e n t

levels. T h e RCT a l l o w e d t h e c o r p s t o m a i n t a i n t a c t i c a l

flexibility, w h i l e the cumbat commands placed f l e ~ i b i l i t ya t t h e

d i v i s i o n level.

T h e RCTs, being fixed o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h co1.1ld o p e r a t e a s

"mini divisions" a l l o w e d t h e c o r p s cumniai-lder t o e m p l o y t h e m a 5

c o r p s reserve u n i t s . T h e d i v i s i o n s c o u l d move battalions

between regiments, but it w a s t h e c a r p s w h i c h e m p l o y e d c u m p l e t e

RCTs, and gained tactical f l e x i b i l i t y . During the Leyte

u p e r a t i o n , X c o r p s a n d XXIV c o r p s b o t h r n a i n t a i n e d a RCT a s a
reserve.

Combat commands w e r e n o t f i x e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d when

e m p l o y e d o r u s e d by t h e c a r p s a s s u c h , o f t e n l a c k e d t h e combat

power a n d s u s t a i n m e n t f o r cont i n u o u s o p e r a t i o n s . Tactical

f l e x i b i l i t y w a s m a i n t a i r e d by t h e d i v i s i o n commander whca t a s k e d

o r g a n i z e d t h e c o m b a t cummands a s h e d e t e r m i n e d t h e s i t u a t i o n .

"Flt t h e l o w e r l e v e l , t h e c o m b a t command c o n c e p t p r o v i d e d g r e a t

tactical f l e x i b i l i t y through d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l , but it also

t e m p t e d c o r p s commanders t o b r e a k up t h e armored d i v i s i m n and

parcel i t o u t by c o m b a t commands, a policy that further diluted

t h e a r m o r e d punch. ""6 The ccwps commander,also had t o employ

t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n as a u n i t d u e t o its l o g i s t i c a l

requirements, " l o g i s t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s extended d i r e c t l y from

division t o battalions. "J7 T h e c o m b a t ccmmands w e r e t i e d

l o g i s t i c a l l y t o t h e i r d i v i s i o n b a s e and c o u l d n o t b e employed a s

a s e p a r a t e u n i t f o r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of time. T h e RCT, a

f i x e d o r g a n i z a t ion, p r o v i d e d f l e x i b i 1i t y t o t h e c o r p s w h i l e t h e

c o m b a t commands, a flexible organization, provided f l e x i b i l i t y

t o t h e division. Thus, when t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s i m m e d i a t e l y

subordinate t o a division w a s fixed, it l i m i t e d t h e d i v i s i o n

commanders f l e x i b i 1i t y , b u t e n h a n c e d t h a t of t h e c o r p s .

Conversely, when t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s i m m e d i a t e 1 y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e

d i v i s i u n w a s changeable, i t g a v e t h e d i v i s i o n commander g r e a t

flexibility, but l i m i t e d t h a t of t h e c o r p s .

C h a n g e s t o t h e d i v i s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n fcnllowing WW I 1 w e r e

minor. I n 1'347 t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n r e t a i n e d its r e g i m e n t a l

c o m b a t t e a m o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n of a t a n k company a n d
m o r t a r company. T h e d i v i s i m n a d d e d a tank battalion t o its

o r g a n i r a t ion. T h e c o r p s and f i e l d a r m y o r - g a n i z a t ion r e m a i n e d

unchanged. T h e a r n i o r e d d i v i s i o n a d d e d one m o r e t a n k a n d a r m o r e d

i n f a n t r y battalion. I n each d i v i s i o n t h e a r t i l l e r y w a s u p g r a d e d

but b a s i c a l l y r e t a i n e d i t s s a m e o r g a n i z a t ion. T h e R C T s F;aw

action in K u r e a a n d p r o v i d e d g r e a t f l e x i b i l i t y t o c o r p s

curnrnanders. During the battle f o r the Naktong R i v e r , RCTs w e r e

r a p i d l y s h i f t e d f r - o m one d i v i s i o n ' s sector t o a n o t h e r . T h e #use

o f t h e 9 t h a n d 23 R C T s a s i n d e p e n d e n t c w g a n i z a t i o n s t o p l u g gaps

i n t h e l i n e , i n d i f f e r e n t d i v i s i o n a l sectors, p r o v i d e d

f l e x i b i l i t y t o the c o r p s c o n i m a r ~ d e r s . ~ ~

Changes in materiel develapment, d o c t r i n e and threat

c a p a b i l i t i e s i n f l u e n c e d t h e w a y t h e U. S R r m y s u b s e q u e n t l y

reorganized. I n 1 9 5 6 t h e U. S . no l o n g e r h a d a n i o n c ~ p o l y on

nuclear w e a p o n s . T h e Soviets n o w p o s s e s s e d s t r a t e g i c as w e l l as

t h e a t e r nuclear w e a p o n s a n d , " n u c l e a r w a r on t h e g r o u n d h a d

g r o w n s t r o n g e n o u g h t o cause f u n d a m e n t a l changes in the

o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i ~ i u n s . " ~T ~h e S o v i e t ' s a b i l i t y

t o w a g e nuclear w a r i n f l u e n c e d d i v i s i o n a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .

T h e U.S. Rrmy's tactical d o c t r i n e was changing. "Nuclear war

was believed l i k e l y t o create so c h a o t i c a b a t t l e f i e l d

s i t ~ a t i n n . " ~T ~h i s s i t u a t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e d i v i s i o n s t o f i g h t

isolated, and in a l l d i r e c t i o n s . The need f o r d i v i s i o n s to

fight on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d a n d t h e t a c t i c a l i r n p l i c a t i o n s

o f not m a s s i n g b u t r e m a i n i n g d i s p e r s e d i n f l u e n c e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l

changes.

F i n a l 1y , t h e U. S . Fir-my' s m a t e r i e l d e v e l o p m e n t f c c u s e d on t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f n u c l e a r weapons. " T h e Rrmy h a d t o p a y some

a t t e n t i o n t o a1 1 t h e l a t e s t w e a p o n r y o f g r o u n d warfare,

convent i o n a l as w e 1 1 as nuclear. "'= T h e U. S. Rrmy e n c o u r a g e d

r e s e a r c h i n t o n u c l e a r weaponry which r e s u l t e d i n t h e Honest

John, L i t t l e Jcnhn, C a r p o r a l a n d S e r g e a n t t a c t i c a l missiles a l a n y

w i t h o t h e r weapons s u c h as t h e 8-inch nuclear a r t i l l e r y shell

a n d t h e Davy C r o k e t t , a very short range nuclear f i r i n g rocket.

Materiel d e v e l o p m e n t s i n f l u e n c e d c h a n g e s i n t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n

o f t h e d i v i s i o n and r e g i m e n t a l e t r u t u r e .

C. PENTOMIC DIVISION

I n t h e l a t e 1350's n u c l e a r w a r a t t h e t a c t i c a l l e v e l w a s a

reality, a n d t h e U.S. Rrmy a d o p t e d a new d i v i s i o n a l

o r g a r ~ i z aito n . " T h e new d e s i g n w a s c a l l e d p e n t a m i c , a n awkward

d e s i g n a t i o n t h a t w a s s u p p o s e d t o i n d i c a t e t h e s u p e r s e s s i o n of

t h e t r i a n g u l a r d i v i s i a n by a f i v e - s i d e d f c a r r n a t i o n f u r atomic

war. "4s

T h e p e n t o r n i c i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s t r e n g t h w a s a b o u t 14,@@@

personnel. I t w a s brmken i n t o f i v e b a t t l e g r o u p s , each

c o n s i s t i n g of a h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n y , i n i t i a l l y four infantry

companies ( a f i f t h o n e w a s a d d e d i n 1353) a n d a 4.2 inch mortar

company. The d i v i s i o n also had o n e t a n k b a t t a l i o n , consistir~g

nf f i v e campanies; a reconnaissance squadron; a n engineer

b a t t a l i o n w i t h f i v e companies; and d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y , initally

w i t h f i v e 1@5mrfl h o w i t z e r b a t t e r i e s . T h i s f i r e s u p p o r t proved

inadequate, a n d i n 1353 t h e d i v i s i o n ' s f i v e b a t t e r i e s g a v e way

t o f i v e ccmposite battalicms, e a c h c o n s i s t i n g o f a 1 E i r n m and a

155rnm huwit z e r b a t t e r y , The d i v i s i o n had one bpi gade

headquarters, cornrmnded by t h e a s s i s t a n t d i v i s i n n commander.

T h e d i v i s i o n t r a i n s c o n t a i n e d a l l t h e s ~ ~ p p o t -cto r g a n i z a t i ~ n s p l u s

t h e d i v i s i o n ' s armored p e r s o n n e l carriers grouped in the

division's transportat ion battalion. T h e r e w e r e o n 1y e n o u g h

c a r r i e r s t o rnove o n e b a t t l e g r o u p a t a time. ( f l p p e n d i x C) The

c o r p s and f i e l d army cwgani z a t ions r e m a i n e d unchanged.

T h e p e n t o r n i c d i v i s i o n w a s a n a t t e m p t t o r n a x i m i z e mnbi 1i t y a n d

m i n i m i z e mass o n t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d . T h e u r g a n i 2a.t i o n

f a i l e d i n b o t h areas. Mobility of t h e b a t t l e g r o u p t-e!.j.ed on

i t s a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n t h e c a r r i e r s g r o u p e d a.t d i v i s i o n . Tf a

b a t t l e group did-not receive t h e s e carriers, it remained f o o t

mobile infantry. S i n c e t h e d i v i s i o n o n l y h a d e n o u g h cai-r-iers t o

rnove o n e b a t t l e g r o u p f o u r - f i f t h s of t h e d i v i s i o n remained f o n t

mobile. The d i v i s i o n f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e m o b i l i t y w i t h t h e

majority of its f o r c e s .

T h e b a t t l e g r o u p l a c k e d mass a n d s u s t a i n i n g power. The

b a t t l e group w a s l a r g e r t h a n a b a t t a l i o n , b u t smaller t h a n a

b r i g a d e cdr r e g i m e n t . 4s Flt a n y o n e t i r n e t h e b a t t l e gt-onp wu1.11d

c o n t a i n f i v e i n f a n t r y companies and p o s s i b l y a n a t t a c h e d t a n k

company, e n g i n e e r c o m p a n y a n d t w o a r t i 1l e r y b a t t e r i e s o f

different caliber. " T h e b a t t l e g r o u p w a s t o o small t o h a v e a n y

s u s t a i n i n g power i n e i t h e r a n u c l e a r - o r n o n - n u c l e a r

environment. "4G

C o m b i n e d arms w e r e i n t e g r a t e d a t t h e b a t t l e gr-oup l e v e l , but

t h e a s s e t s t o a c h i e v e t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n w e r e c o n t r o l l e d by
division. The d i v i s i o n r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l o f t h e assets n o r m a l l y

a t t a c h e d t o a b a t t l e group. I t d e c i d e d w h i c h b a t t l e grcaup

r e c e i v e d a t t a c h m e n t s af armcar, e n g i n e e r s and t h e p r i z e d

p e r s o n n e l carriers. However, i t w a s up t o t h e b a t t l e g r o u p

commander t o s y n c h r o n i z e e v e n t s o n t h e i s u l a t e d a n d ncm-1 i n e a t -

nuclear battlefield. S y n c h r o n i z a t i o n of t h e d i v i s i o n a l a s s e t s

w a s a s p l i t p r o p o s i t ion. T h e d i v i s i o n cnrnniander c c w ~ t r alle d t h e

m e a n s w h i l e t h e b a t t l e g r o u p commander c o n t o l l e d t h e ways.

S i n c e n o s i n g l e commander c o u l d a c h i e v e t r u e c o m b i n e d arms

operat ions, s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n d i d n a t o c c u r we1 1 a t a n y l e v e l .

R g i l i t y w a s also s a c r i f i c e d i n t h e pentomic d i v i s i u n a l

organization. "The r e s u l t i n g s i n g l e e c h e l o n between t h e

d i v i s i o n a n d t h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s g a v e t h e d i v i s i o n commander

a span of control t h a t included s i x t e e n units. 'I4' BY

e l i m i n a t i n g o n e s i n g l e command a n d c o n t r u l e c h e l o n , t h e pentmrnic
r.

d i v i s i o n s t r u c t u r e left a 11 h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h e x c e s s i v e s p a n s o f

control. 4e T h e s e e x c e s s i v e s p a n s o f c o n t r o l i n c r e a s e d t h e time

r e q u i r e d f o r d e c i s i o n s t o b e made.

F l e x i b i l t y w a s s a c r i f i c e d a t a l l l e v e l s of cnmrnand from t h e

b a t t l e g r o u p up t o t h e c o r p s l e v e l . The b a t t l e group w a s

i m m o b i l e a n d r e l i e d o n t h e d i v i s i o n f o r rnnvernent, the division

i t s e l f b e i n g f o u r - f i f t h s irnmubi le, w a s o v e r w h e l m e d by i t s own

s p a n of c o n t r o l ; a n d t h e c o r p s c o u l d n o t s p l i t u p t h e d i v i s i o n ,

n o r c o u l d it employ t h e d i v i s i c m anywhere b u t o n a n u c l e a r

battlefield.

C h a n g e s i n d o c t r i n e a n d t h r e a t c a u s e d t h e U.S. Rrniy t o

re-evaluate its d i v i s i o n a l c w y a n i z a t ion. Limited w a r s such as

Korea b e g a n t o a p p e a r more l i k e l y t h a n a n u c l e a r w a r . Doctrine

w a s beg i n n i n g t o f o c u s o n t h e l i m i t e d n a n - n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t and

i n t h e e a r l y 68' s t h e U. S. C o n t i n e n t a1 Rrrny Cornrnand (USCONFIRC)

d i r e c t e d t h e U.S. FIrmy t o p r e p a r e a c o n c e p t f o r l i m i t e d war.'-

N e w s t a t e g i c r e q u i r e r f l e n t s w e t - e f o r c i n g t h e a r m y t o t-elceok i t s

d i v i s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t ion.

The t h r e a t w a s no longer o n l y t h e S o v i e t s but also t h e i r

surrogates. T h i s new t y p e of t h r e a t s h i f t e d t h e n e e d t o p r e p a r e

for a non-nuclear cmnvent i o n a l w a r and l e d t a a r e d e s i g n o f t h e

divisional structure.

D. 'REORGRNIZRTION OBJECTIVE RRMY D I V I S I O N (RORD)

T h e ROFID c o n c e p t w a s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e U. S. army s e a r c h i n g

f o r a n o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h p r o v i d e d more f l e x i b i l i t y t h a n t h e

p e n t m ~ i co r g a n i z a t i o n . I t b a s i c a l l y r e t u t - r e d t o t h e combat

c o r m a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e W W I I a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . The

d i v i s i o n c o n s i s t e d of t h r e e brigade headquarters, art armor-ed

c a v a l r y squadron, an engineer battalion, an aviation battalion,

a n d u p t o e l e v e n m a n e u v e r b a t t a l i o n s of v a r y i n g t y p e s (infar~.try,

m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r ) , t h e d i v i s i o n s u p p o r t command

w h i c h b r o u g h t a1 l t e c h n i c a l a n d s u p p l y e l e m e n t s i n t o a c o m p o s i t e

u n i t o r g a n i z e d a l o n ~f u n c t i o n a l lines. The a r g a n i c d i v i s i c m

arti l levy consisted of t h r e e b a t t a l ions uf 1@5mm howit zevs,

later upgraded t o 1 5 5 m m h o w i t z e r s and a b a t t a l i o n of 8-inch

howitzers. The b r i g a d e s w e r e t a s k e d o r g a n i z e d a s t h e d i v i s i o n

c o m m a n d e r deemed n e c e s s a r y a n d c o u l d c o n t r n l ft-nm 2 t o 5,
maneuver b a t t a l i o n s a l o n g w i t h t h e i r a s s o c i a t e d combat and

c o m b a t s u p p o r t assets. The l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t went d i r e c t l y

from t h e d i v i s i n n t o t h e b a t t a l i o n o r g a n i z a t i n n s . The b a t t a l i o n

became t h e b u i l d i n g b l a c k o f t h e division. The b a t t a l i a n w a s

the largest "fixed maneuver o r g a n i z a t i o n " in t h e division. The

d i v i s i o n w a s a u t h o r i z e d a r o u n d 18,888 p e r s o n n e l a n d w a s a

permanent. o r g a n i z a t ion. (Flpendix D) T h e c o r p s a n d f i e l d army

s t r u c t u r e s r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d u n t i 1 t h e e a r l y 1978's.

Task o r g a n i z a t i o n occurred at t h e b r i g a d e l e v e l where u n i t s

would b e p l a c e d u n d e r t h e u p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f , or i n d i r e c t

s u p p o r t of t h e b r i g a d e . F l s i n W W 11, "constantly shifting units

r e s u l t e d i n i n e f f i c i e n c y and poor c o o r d i n a t i o n between

subot-dinate elements t h a t w e r e unfamiliar with each other. Fls a

result, b a t t a l i o n a n d b r i g a d e c o m m a n d e r s t r i e d t o k e e p t h e same

h a b i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h e a c h o t h e r u n l e s s a r a d i c a l c h a n g e of

missian or t e r r a i n occurred.

The d i v i s i u n r e t a i n e d f l e x i b i l i t y b a s e d o n its a b i l i t y t o

t a s k o r g a n i z e bt-igades a s t h e s i t u a t i o n developed. The b r i g a d e s

also had t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t o t a s k o r g a n i z e w i t h i n t h e i r

organization. T h e b r i g a d e s w e r e a command a n d c o n t r o l

h e a d q u a r t e r s between t h e d i v i s i o n and t h e maneuver b l t t a l i o n s .

I f mass w e r e r e q u i r e d , t h e division could attach additional

b a t t a l i o n s t o t h e brigade. I f maneuverability w e r e required,

t h e divisim-I could s p l i t i n t o b r i g a d e o r g a n i z a t icons t o i n c r e a s e

its m o b i l i t y . F l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e c o r p s w a s s e v e r e l y reduced

s i n c e t h e brigades, l i k e t h e c o m b a t cumwands i n W W 11, w e r e t i e d

tc t h e i r divisions f o r support. The c o r p s e i t h e r had t o employ

t h e d i v i s i u n a s a w h o l e u n i t cw t n s p e c i f y t o t h e d i v i s i o n t h e

s i z e a f t h e b r i g a d e it wished d e t a c h e d . T h i s required t h e

a l l o c a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l a s s e t s t o s u s t a i n t h i s brigade.

S y n c h r u n i z a t i o n uccured a t t h e b a t t a l i o n l e v e l . "Thc

b a t t a l i o n s became t a s k f o r c e s r e c i e v i n g a v a r i e t y n f s u b u r d i n a t e

l u n i t s o f d i f f e r e n t arms, a l l o w i n g i n t e g r a t i a n o f t h e arms a s t h e

mission required. ""'

The battalions, b e i n g f i x e d or-ganizat i o n s

and t h e l e v e l w h e r e c o m b a t , ccmbat s u p p o r t and curnbat s e r v i c e

support u n i t s were brought t o g e t h e r , s y n c h r o n i z e d combat pnwer-.

"One t r e n d s i n c e W W I h a s b e e n t o move t h e l e v e l o f t a c t i c a l and

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i w t e g r a t i o n c o n s t a n t l y t o a l o w e r echeloi-r.. .
U n d e r t h e RORD s y s t e m , i t was t h e b a t t a l i o n .

R g i l i t y a l s o remained a t t h e b a t t a l i o n l e v e l . The b a t t a l i c ~ n

possessed t h e o r g a n i c means t o r e s p o n d t o u n e x p e c t e d e v e n t s .

S i n c e t h e b a t t a l i o n was a f i x e d o r g a n i z a t i u n w i t h o r g a n i c

c a m b a t , combat s u p p o r t and cnrnbat service s u p p c * r t a s s e t s i t

c o u l d u v e r c u m e t h e f r i c t i o n o f war. " R g i 1 i t y i s t u s ~ l al y

accnrnpl i s h e d b y r e s p o n d i n g w i t h o r g a n i c means t o iunexpected

situations. B r i g a d e s p n s s e s s i r ~ y n o o r g a n i c means t o d e a l

w i t h u n e x p e c t e d e v e n t s and b e i n g u n l y a curnmand and c o n t r - o l

h e a d q u a r t e r s g a v e up some a g i 1 i t y . The d i v i s i o n s poseessed

t h e i r o r g a n i c means b u t were t o o l a r g e t o h a v e t h e a g i l i t y

r e q u i r e d t o r e a c t q u i c k l y t o nunexpected events.

Many c h a n g e s h a v e n c c u r r e d s i n c e t h e a d u p t i a n o f t h e R O n D

structure, but t h e " f i x e d d i v i s i o n , f l e x i b l e brigade" concept is

st i 1 1 p a r t o f t h e d i v i s i o n a l s t r u c t l u r e . " T h e RORD c o n c e p t o f

m u l t i p l e d i v i s i o n d e s i g n s , each w i t h a l a r g e d i v i s i o n base o f
common e l e m e n t s , and combined a r m s . . . h a s n o t been s e r i o u s l y

challenged i n a n y f o r c e d e s i g n e f f 0 r . t s i n c e 19&2, i n c l u d i n g

D i v i s i o n / C o r p s 86 a n d ROE.

IV. CHRNGES SINCE FIXED DIVISION FLEXIBLE RRIGRDE CONCEPT

S i n c e a d o p t i o n of t h e " f i x e d d i v i s i o n , f l e x i b l e brigade"

c o n c e p t w i t h RORD ' 62, s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s h a v e occur-red i n

o r ~ ; a n i z a t i o n a ls t r l - l c t u r e a b o v e t h e d i v i s i u n l e v e l , doctrine,

materiel d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h r e a t c a p a b l i t ies.

The c o r p s and f i e l d army o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e undergone

s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s s i n c e 1'362. " I n 1'373 t h e Rrmy e l i m i n a t e d

t h e f i e l d a r m y a n d made t h e c o r p s a l o g i s t i c a l , as w e l l as

cnperational, headquarters. D i v i s i o n a l a s s e t s w e r e moved u p

t m corps, t w o of w h i c h w e r e t h e C h a p a r r a l a i r d e f e n s e missile

system and t h e 8-inch howitzers. The d i v i s i u n b a s e r e c e i v e d a

f o u r t h brigade, t h e a v i a t i o n brigade with no a d d i t i o n a l

dedicated support i n e i t h e r fire s u p p o r t o r s e r v i c e s u p p o r t , and

t h e d i v i s i o n s u p p o r t command t - e o r g a n i z e d i n t a c o m p o s i t e a s w e 1 1

a s f u n c t i o n a l u n i t s t o p r o v i d e b e t t e r s u p p o r t t u t h e maneuver

brigades. These organizat i a n a l changes have s i g n i f i c a n t l y

i m p a c t e d o n t h e c o r p s a n d d i v i s i a n sl.~ppcwt a n d s e r v i c e s u p p o r t .

D o c t r i n e h a s s e e n a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e w i t h t h e a d o p t i o n of

R i r L a n d R a t t l e w h i c h c h a n g e d t h e way t h e U . S . Rrmy i n t e n d s t u

fight. I t a d v n c a t e s a b a l a n c e d c o n c e p t of f i r e p u w e r a n d

rflaneuver a s t h e k e y t o w i n n i n g o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . The

b a t t l e f i e l d h a s expanded i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s w i t h d e p t h v i t a l in
b o t h t h e o f f e n s e and d e f e n s e .

FM 1DD-5 O p e r a t i o n s i s a s i g n i f i c a n t
change from p r e v i o u s v e r s i o n s i n t w o k e y
area&. I t d e s c r i b e s t h e need f o r
cummanders a t t h e d i v i s i o n and c a r p s t o
fight three battles (close, deep,
rear). .. I t a l s o d e s c r i b e s t h e need f o t -
offensive'minded warfare t h a t can s t o p
t h e a t t a c k s o f a n a g g r e s s o r army, s e i z e
t h e i n i t i a t i v e and d e f e a t t h e e r e m y f o r c e
w i t h a cumbinat i o n u f 1 i g h t n i n g maneuver
and a c c u r a t e , m a s s i v e cumbat power,
t h e r e b y a v o i d i n g a p u r e l y a t t r i t i u n furni
quf r e a c t i v e d e f e n s e . 37

T h e new d o c t r i n e h i g h l i g h t s t h e moral q u a l i t i e s and s k i l l o f

l e a d e r s and s u l d i e r s a s b e i n g i m p o r t a n t o n t h e nun-1 i n e a t - si'id

isolated battlefield. I t t h e r e f o r e s t r e s s e s t h e need f u r

l e a d e r s a t a1 1 l e v e l s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e h i g h e t - commander" s

intent, scs i n t h e a b s e n s e n f u r d e r s t h e y c a n c o n t i n u e t h e

mission. I m p e r a t i v e s which were based o n h i s t o t - y and,

" c o n s i d e r e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y n e c e s s a r y f u r s u c c e s s a n t h e modern

b a t t l e f i e l d U " a , were embraced.

M a t e r i e l d e v e l o p m e n t s h a v e improved t h e c a p a b i 1 i.t ies a'F

t a c t i c a l iunits. I m p r o v e m e n t s i n t e c h n o l o g y h a v e made t h o

b a t t l e f i e l d c o r k i n u o u s and v e r y l e t h a l . S y s t e m s cart now o p e r a t e

during a l l t y p e s o f l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y w i t h o u t slowing t h e tempo

of the battlefield. Weapon s y s t e m s s u c h a s t h e M l n l m a i n b a t t l e

tank (MHT) and t h e i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e ( I F V ) have

s i g n i f i c a n t l y a c c e l e r a t e d ground t a c t i c a l m o b i l i t y . The a b i l i t y

#of m e c h a n i z e d f o r c e s t o rnuve CPQSS c ~ u n t r yand m a i r k a i r , s h i g h

volurnn o f a c c u r a t e f i r e w h i l e o n t h e move i m p r u v e s t h e combat

c a p a b i 1 i t i e s a f srnal l e r ~ u n i t s . F i r e s u p p o r t weapons h a v e a l s o
improved our ability to provide massed and responsive fires.

The ranges of tube art i 1 lery have not significant ly increased,

but the addition of the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)

pt-ovides the capability for deep fires. Eng ineer, signal,

aviat ion and air defense art i 1 lery equipment have a1 1 increased

the tempu, speed and abilities of U. S. FIrrny farces at a1 1 levels

on the modern battlefield.=' The high rate of maneuver, the

ability for real-time intelligence, the ability to continue

operations on a 24-hour cycle, and the capability tu mass a high

volurnn of fire with the new systems have changed the tempo of

the bdtt lef ield.

The Soviets have continued to upgrade their military

capabilities, especially their ground military capability.

In this decade no element of Soviet

m i 1 it ary power has undergone more
profound improvement than Soviet
cnnvent innal forces. Enhancement in
Soviet ground force equipment such as
armored vehicles, air defense weapons,
and tactical missile systems have been
complemented by advances in Soviet
tactical aircraft and naval forces. 6m

The Soviet military fmrce is a formidable threat. New

equipment such as the T-80 (MBT), RMP-2 (IFV), RMD, FISU-85 and

other weapons makes it necessary for the U.S. Flrmy tcs re-examine

its organizat ion. What was a sufficiently flexible organizat iun

in the early 1'360's rnight not provide the flexibiltiy required

today.

The other threat which has grown is the third world threat.

This threat also poses a danger to the U. S. "The U. 5 . interests

w i 1 1 be a t s t a k e e v e n i f t h e S o v i e t Union i s nrk i n v o l v e d .

fhird world n a t i o n s a r e i n c r e a s i n g 1y o b t a i n i n g l e t h a l weapor~s.

I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t 28 n a t i o n s p o s s e s s t h e a b i l i t y t o p r m d ~ u c e

c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s , and a t l e a s t 15 n a t i n n s h a v e t h e t e c h n o l o g y t o

p r o d u c e n u c l e a r weapons. "Ccuntries h o s t i l e t o t h e United

S t a t e s w i l l a l m o s t c e r t a i n 1 y a c q u i r e rnore l e t h a l weapon

syeterns. 'IG2 Modern weapons a r e n a l o n g e r reserved f o r

superpowers. T h e t h i r d world t h r e a t i s becoming rnore s e r i o u s .

"Low i n t e n s i t y c o n f 1 i c t , h o w e v e r , h a s b e e n t h e must common f o r m

ctf c o n f l i c t f o r t h e U . S. i n t h e post-WW I 1 era. S u c h cartf 1 i c t

i n t h e f o r m o f i n s u r g e n c y , terrorism, and sa.;bversiun t h r o a t e n c ,

U. 5. i n t e r e s t s around t h e g l o b e . The t h r e a t ' s capabi 1 it ies

and a b i 1 i t i e s h a v e becars?e s i g n i f i c a n t l y more d i v e r s e .

W i t h c h a n g e s i n .the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c o r p s ,

a d o p t i o n o f a new d o c t r i n e , new rtlater-iel d e v e l o p m e n t s and t h e

increased c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e t h r e a t ( S o v i e t and t h i r d w o r l d !

t h e U. S. Flrrny s h o u l d r e - e x a m i n e i t s o r g a n i z a t i o r ~ a ld e s i g n , w h i c h

d a t e s back t o 1'362. The " f i x e d d i v i s i o n , f l e x i b l e b r i g a d e " was

a good o r g a n i z a t i o n i n 1 3 6 2 , b u t o n e c a n l e g i t i m a t e l y q u e s t imn

w h e t h e r it cart meet t h e c h a l l e n g e s and p r o v i d e f l e x i b i l i t y .to

t h e t a c t i o a l commanders i n t h e 13'30s and b e y o n d .

In t h e twentieth century, t h e echelm-t irnrnediately b e l o w t h e

d i v i s i o n headquarters has been t h e facal point where combat,

cnrnbat s u p p o r t , and corilbat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t a s s e t s w e r e

integrated. I n . WW I t h e b r i g a d e s i n t e g r a t e d c o m b a t , CS a n d CSS

assets t o s u s t a i n and c o n t i n u e o p e r a t i o n s . I n WW I 1 t h e RCTs

a c t i n g as "mini d i v i s i o n s " o p e r a t e d independently as a c o r p s

reserve, or a s p a r t u f a d ~ v i s i o n . The armored d i v i s i o n ' s

c o m b a t commands, a l t h o u g h s h o r t 82n mass, w e r e e r n p l a y e d t o

m a i n t a i n morflent urn d u r i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d p u r s u i t o p e t - a t i o n s ,

but r a r e l y as independent u n i t s , #under c o r p s c o n t r o l , as t h e

RCTs. B r i g a d e is t h e o n l y e c h e l o n t o f i g h t b o t h e n g a g e m e n t s a n d

"Corps and d i v i s i o n s p l a n , brigades execute. ""=

B r i g a d e s at-= an- i m p o r t a n t l i n k from t h e c o r p s and d i v i s i o n s t o

t h e maneuver b a t t a l i u n s . When t h i s l i n k . was r e m o v e d , as it w a s

d u r i n g t h e pentnmic d i v i s i c w a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e d i v i s i o n and

c a r p s lost flexibility. F l e x i b i l i t y is a c h i e v e d by h a v i n g a

b t - i g a d e n r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e command s t r u c t u r e . T h e q u e s t i o n is

what kind? Should it be f i x e d or f l e x i b l e ?

The b r i g a d e o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n n o t b e examined i n i s o l a t i o n ,

b u t must b e examined w i t h i n t h e ccwps and d i v i s i o n a l s t t - u c t u r e .

C h a n g e s made t~ o n e of t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n f l c i e n c e t h e o t h e l -

two.

Two o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s y s t e m s w i 11 b e e x a m i n e d a g a i n s t a n

e s t a b l i s h e d set of c r i t e r i a . The f i r s t s y s t e m examined w i l l b e

t h e c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h e c o r p s "as t h e

c e n t r a l pceint o n t h e R i r L a n d b a t t l e f i e l d " 6 6 , t h e fixed di'vision

and t h e f l e x i b l e b r i g a d e . The second s y s t e m examined, which is

proposed as a n a l t e r n a t i v e s t r u c t u r e , w i l l include t h e corps

b a s i c a l l y as it c u r r e n t l y e x i s t s , but with a f l e x i b l e d i v i s i o n

and f i x e d b r i g a d e o r g a n i z a t ion. .The d i v i s i n n u n d e r t h e

a l t e r n a t i v e s y s t e m w i 1 1 b e c o m e a cnnimand a n d c a n t r u l

h e a d q u a r t e r s s i n i i l a r t o t h e c t x - p s i n W W 11. The f o r w a r d suppat-t

b a t t a l i o n s w i 11 b e c o m e p e r m a n e n t l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e m a n e u v e r

brigades. T h e r e m a i n i n g d i v i s i o n a l s u p p o r t cornrnand a s s e t s w i 11

move t o c o r p s w i t h # o n l y e n o u g h a s s e t s r e m a i n i n g a t d i v i s i o n

l e v e l t o suppot-t t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s . The d i v i s i o n art i 1l e r y

assets n o t i n a d i r e c t s u p p o r t r o l e w i l l a l s o move t o c o r p s .

Each d i r e c t s u p p o r t 1 5 5 r n m h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n w i l l become

perriianently a t t a c h e d t o t h e b r i g a d e . The b r i g a d e w i l l be

s i m i lar t o t h e current separate brigade organizat ion (FIppel'ldi x

E). The d i v i s i o n w i l l t - e t a i n t h e c~mniand, c o n t r o l ,

cummuni'cat icon a n d i n t e l 1i g e n c e a s s e t s r - e q u i r e d t o c o n t r o l 2-5

maneuver b r i yades.

The f o l l o w i n g f i v e criteria h a v e been s e l e c t e d f o r a n a l y s i s :

s y n c h r o n i z a t ican, agility, sustainability, t r a i n a b i 1i t y and

i n t e r o p e r a b i 1i t y . FI r a t i n g scale w i 11 b e e s t a b l i s h e d artd e a c h

s y s t e m w i l l r e c e i v e a r a t i n g based o n its a b i l i t y to s a t i s f y

each of t h e r e f e r e n c e d c r i t e r i a a t e a c h l e v e l . ( f l p p e n d i x F) The

systern which p r o v i d e s f o r t h e o p t i m a l r a t i n g a g a i n s t a l l

criteria at a l l l e v e l s w i l l be t h e one s e l e c t e d . The

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e e n t it-e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t cuve, ft-om

brigade to curps, w i l be examined, n o t s o l e l y t h e c o m p a r i s o n of

a f i x e d b r i g a d e vs. f l e x i b l e b r i g a d e a s p a s t s t u d i e s h a v e done.

T h i s st ludy u s e s a n a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l t o c o m p a r e s y s t e r n o n e

with system two, t w o i - e s u l t s w i 11 b e c a m e a p p a t - e n t . T h e f ir5.l.

r e s ~ u l tw i l l i n d i c a t e w h i c h s y s t e n i p r o v i d e s mot-e f l e x i b i l i t y , and

t h e secnnd w i l l i d e n t i f y where t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y e x i s t s . Using

t h e a n a l y s i s m e n t i o n e d below and a scale o f 1 t o 5, w i t h 1 b e i n g

a h i g h d e g r e e o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s a n d 5 a luw d e g r e e , t h e system

w i t h t h e l o w e s t t o t a l s c o r e p r o v i d e s more e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The

m o d e l a l s o a l l o w s a c m m p a r i s o n t n b e made o f e a c h l e v e l

(brigade, divisiun, corps) against each cri.teria. The a n a l y s i s

f i r s t measures system one a g a i n s t each c r i t e r i o n t h e n system

two.

SYSTEM ONE: CORF'S, FIXED DIVISION, FLEXIBLE HRIGFIDE

S y n c h r o n i z a t i o n is t h e a r r a n g e m e n t o f c o m b a t , CS, a n d CSS

a c t i v i t i e s t o d e v e l o p maximum c o m b a t p o w e r a t t h e p l a c e d e s i r e d

by t h e m a n e u v e r commander. I n system one, t h e b r i g a d e f i g h t s as

p a r t of t h e d i v i s i o n a n d p r o v i d e s t h e ccmmand a n d c a n t r o l

n e c e s s a r y t o employ a t t a c h e d and s u p p o r t i n g u n i t s . The b r i g a d e

has no organic u n i t s assigned, and its a b i l i t y t a s y n c h r o n i z e

a c t i v i t i e s d e p e n d s o n t h e assets i t r e c e i v e s f r c m d i v i s i c , n . The

b r i g a d e c a n n o t c o n t i n u o u s l y p l a n t o s y n c h r u n i z e assets which are

n o t permanently a s s i g n e d and might b e withdrawn. The d i v i s i o n

b e i n g a f i x e d o r g a n i z a t i o n m a i n t a i n s assets u n d e r i t s ccdrstrol a t

a l l times. The d i v i s i o n s y n c h r o n i z e s t h e u s e uf its o r g a n i c

assets b y t a s k c v g a n i z i n g t h e b r i g a d e s . I t c a n weight t h e main

ePfort and s h i f t a d d i t i o n a l combat, CS a n d CSS e l e m e n t s t o t h e

brigades to influence t h e situation. The d i v i s i c ~ n ' s a b i l i t y t o

shift a s s e t s among t h e v a r i o u s b r i g a d e s s y n c h r o n i z e s c o m b a t , CS

ar,d CSS a c t i v i t i e s tca i t s a d v a n t a g e . Corps can synchronize

cGrnbat amperat i o n s t h r o u g h t h e i n t e g r a t i o n uf t h e i r s y s t e m 5 i n t o
a c u o r - d i n a t e d c o r i i b i n e d a r m s o p e r a t ion. Hcnwever-, since t h e

cot-psl p r i m a r y m a n e u v e r 1.1nit i s t h e d i v i s i o n , s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n is

slow. T h e s e assets h i s t o r i c a l l y g e t pushed dowr: t o the

brigades. T h e b v i g a d e s are t h e p o i n t w h e r e synchroni z a t i c m i s

desired, but t h e assets t o achieve s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n a r e

contr-ulled b y the d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s .

ngility, "requires o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h can a c t f a s t e r t h a n

the enemy. 'I6' T h e y m u s t be a b l e t o react t n t h e u n e x p e c t e d . In

s y s t e m one t h e b r i g a d e m a i n t a i n s a g i l i t y t h r v u g h h a b i t ~ u a l

a s s o c i a t i o n o f a t t a c h e d a n d d i r e c t s u p p o r t units. TIhis a 1l o w s

the b r i g a d e t o d e v e l o p and use s t a n d i n g u p e r a t i n g procedures t o

r e d l u c e t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t n p e r - f o r m a t a c t i c a l c * p e ? - a ti o n . The

I11 (US) C o r p s Maneuver H a n d b o o k stresses t h e n e e d f o r good and

u n d e r s t a n d a b l e S O P S t o m a i n t a i n a g i l i t y on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " n

T h e b r i g a d e s h a v e nu o r g a n i c m e a n s t n r - e s p o n d t n n u n e x p e c t e d

situations, but c a n b e g i v e n a d d i t i o n a l a s s e t s a s r e q u i r e d .

Habitual r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h e w a y b r i g a d e s a n d d i v i s i o n s achipve

a g i l i t y a n d m i t i g a t e t h e p a a r c o m m a n d a n d control a r g a n i z a t i o n .

The d i v i s i o n inhet-ently maintains a g i l i t y to respond vapidly

tu changing situations. I t p o s s e s s t h e o r g a n i c assets n e e d e d t n

r e n r g a n i z e a n d r e a c t t o u n e x p e c t e d evznts. The division

c o m m a n d e r c a n reorient h i s b r i g a d e s , c h a n g e t a s k o r g a n i z a t inn,

c o n i m i t a reserve or r e a l i g n s i . ~ p p m - t r - e l a t i o n s h i p s a s t h e

s i t u a t icon d e v e l o p s . However, its s i z e ?-educes its a g i l i t y t o

r-eact t a u n e x p e c t e d s i t u a t i o n s . T h e c o r p s also m a i n t a i n s

a g i 1 i t y t o r e s p o n d v a p i d l y t o c h a n g i n g s i t u a t ions. 'The c o r p s '

combat, C S a n d C S S a s s e t s can be r e o r i e n t e d t o p r o v i d e
a d d i t i o n a l suppczrt t o t h e committed d i v i s i c - n s . The c o r p s h a s

t h e a b i l i t y t o change t a s k arganizatim-$5, c o m m i t a r e s e r v e and

reorient d i v i s i n n s . The c o r p s s i z e a l s o r e d u c e s its a g i l i t y

b e c a u s e i t m u s t e m p l o y d i v i s i c w ~t o react t o s i t u a t i o n s . Fixed

o r g a n i z a t i o n s l i k e t h e d i v i s i c m a n d cc.inps h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o

p l a n c o n t i n u a l l y a n d react t o u n f n r e s e e n e v e n t s , but are s l u w

because o f t h e i r size. The b r i g a d e ' s a g i l i t y is d e p e n d e n t o n

t h e assets it r e c e i v e s f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n and c o r p s , but is m o r e

m o b i l e because of its s i z e .

T r a i n i n g rflanagernent is a s p l i t p r o p o s i t i c w i n s y s t e m cane.

The d i v i s i o n h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y a n d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o ensru-e

u n i t s are t e c h n i c a l l y p r u f i c i e n t . The b r i g a d e s h a v e t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o e n s u r e t h e i r slices become t a c t i c a l l y

proficient by t r a i n i n g t h e s e " s l i c e s " i n t h e mission e s s e n t i a l

t a s k s required t o support t h e b a t t l e focus. Corps t r a i n

non-divisional units, d i v i s i o n s and p r o v i d e s m i s s i o n s t o its

s u b o r d i n a t e iunits. T h e c o r p s r ~ s at l s o e n s u r e u n i t s a r e

t e c h n i c a l 1y prcaf i c i e n t . However, c o r p s u n i t s u s ~ u a lyl g e t

f u r t h e r a1 l o c a t e d t o t h e m a n e u v e r b r i g a d e s w h e r e t h e a c t u a l

tactical t r a i n i n g occurs. The c o r p s e s t a b l i s h e s t h e m i s s i o n s

w h i l e t h e b r i g a d e c o n d u c t s t h e METL t r a i n i n g r e q u i r e d t o 5LIppQrt

t h e s e missions. Brigades have a r e s p a n s i b i l i t y t o t r a i n u n i t s

but n o t t h e a u t h c w i t y ; ' d i v i s i o n s and c o r p s have t h e

r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y a n d t h e a u t h o r i t y u n d e r s y s t e m u n e .

S u s t a i n m e n t i n s y s t e m u n e is f o c u s e d a t t h e d i v i s i o n a n d

corps level. T h e d i v i s i o n is a h a n d s - o n player. I t rnoniturs

t h e s i t u a t i o n and c a n s h i f t s u p p o r t a c t i v i t i e s t o assist t h e
FSHs. T h e c o r p s is also a hands-on player and through its

COSCOM i t c a n i n f l l . i e n c e s u p p o t - t t o . t h e vat-ious d ivisicms. The

F S H s a r e i n d i r e c t s u p p o t - t tea t h e b r i g a d e , but w o r k f o r t h e

DISCOM c o m m a n d e r . Sustainment is found a t each level i n systern

one w h i c h a d d s d e p t h t o s u p p c w t c n p e r a t i o n s .

I n t e r n p e r a b i l i t y i n s y s t e m one i s f o c u s e d at t h e d i v i s i a n a n d

c o r p s levels. T h e c o r p s a n d d i v i s i o n s at-e f i x e d 0 1 - g a n i z a t ions

a n d at-e a b l e t o c u n d ~ . i c t i n d e p e n d e n t o p e r a t i o n s . T h e bt-igade

r e l i e s on t h e d i v i s i c w t t o s u s t a i n i t s e l f , and t h e r e f o r e i s not

suited f o r i n d e p e n d e n t o p e r a t ions, unless a u g m e n t e d .

I n t e r o p e r e b i l i t y i m p l i e s u n i t s have t h e a b i l i t y t o o p e r a t e

i n d e p e i - ~ d e n t l yf r o m thait- p a r e n t urganization while under t h e

c o m m a n d a n d control a f an a l l i e d or s i s t e r set-vice u n i t .

D i v i s i o n s a n d c o t - p s ai-e inhet-ent l y c a p a b l e o f d o i n g t h i s , b u t

b r i g a d e s a r e not.

S Y S T E M TWO: CORF'S, F L E X I B L E D I V I S I O N , FIXED BRIGnDE

S y s t e m t w o f i x e s t h e b r i g a d e w i t h i t s o r g a n i c cornha-t, C S a n d

C S S assets. T h i s a l l o w 5 t h e b r i y a d e t h e a b i l i t y tcr s y n c h i - n n i z e

its assets i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e d i v i s i c m and cot-ps. T h e bt-igade

b e c o m e s a permanent combined arms team. I n carder tc. ensure

d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e e n e m y a 1 l t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s fn.\nct iuns m u s t be

m a x i m i z e d a n d t h i s i s d o n e w h e n bri g a d e s s y n c h r o n i z e their-

assets. s- The division's a b i l i t y t o s y c h r o n i z e d e p e n d s on t h e

a s s e t s it receives f r o m c o r p s . Huwever, it possess the a b i 1 i . t ~

t o p l a n for t h e i n t e g v a t i a n o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d anpet-ating s y s t e m s
and s t i l l m u s t b e a b l e t o s y n c h r o n i z e c o m b a t , CS and CSS a s s e t s .

There i s no change i n t h e c o r p s a b i l i t y t o s y n c h r o n i z e i t s

assets. In system t w o synchronizaticm is feel-tsed at t h e brigade

and c m - p s l e v e l .

ngility, i n systern t w o , i s f o c u s e d a t t h e b r i g a d e and c o r p s

levels. System two a l l o w s t h e brigade t o maximize t h e i.tse of

i t s SOPS. I t a l s o h a s t h e means t o r e a c t r a p i d l y t o u n e x p e c t e d

events. The divisinon's a g i l i t y i s again dependent o n t h e a s s e t s

i t r e c e i v e s f r o m corps. I t m a i n t a i n s t h e s t a f f e l e m e n t ' :-equit-ed

t o p l a n events, b u t d o e s n o t h a v e t h e u n i t s p e r r ~ i a n e r ~ t l y

assigned. The corps' a g i l i t y i s e n h a n c e d b e c a u s e it c a n s h i f t

srflaller u n i t s ( b r i g a d e s ) t o r e a c t t o unexpected s i t u a t i o n s .

T r a i n i n g u n d e r s y s t e m t w o i s f o c u s e d t a w a r d t h e t r a i n a s you

intend t o f i g h t philosophy. T h e t e c h n i c a l and t a c t i c a l t r - a i n i n g

i s acccmplished a t t h e b r i g a d e level. The brigade h a s both t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and t h e a u t h o r i t y . The d i v i s i a n s e l e c t s t h e

t a s k s a s t h e m i s s i o n s at-e received f r o m corps and r m n i t o r s t h e

training. T h e b r i g a d e receives t h e t a s k s and t r a i n s a s i t

intends t o fight. The corps provides t h e b a t t l e - f c c n s a s i n

s y s t e m one. I n s y s t e r f l t w o , t r a i n i n g i s d e c e n t r a l i z e d down t o

t h e b r i g a d e s who receive and t r a i n u n i t s i n t h e m i s s i o n

e s s e r ~ita l t a s k s r e q u i t - e d t o s u p p o r t t h e b a t t l e f o c u s .

Sustainrflent i n systern t w o i s focused almost e x c l u s i v e l y a t

t h e b r i g a d e and c a r p s l e v e l s . T h e d i v i s i o n i s nu l o n g e r a

hands-on player, b ~ t t st i 11 r t i n r ~ i t o r s t h e s i t u a t i c - n and irtf luenceo

t h e s i t u a t i o n by d e c i d i n g 8mt-t t h e p r i o r i t y u f support. The c o r p s

s t i l l maintains its c a p a b i l i t y t o influence t h e s i t u a t i o n

t h r o u g h t h e COSCOM. T h e f o c u s o f t h e sustainr11en.t e f f o r t i s t o

push a s much s u p p o r t f o r w a r d t o t h e b r i g a d e s u p p o r t a r e a s .

S y s t e m t w o p r - o v i d e s t h e bl-igade comrnandet-s w i t h 1.11-1ityo f

cunmand.

Interoperability i n systern t w o s h i f t s t o t h e b r i g a d e l e v e l .

The brigade, b e i n g a .Fixed o r g a n i z a t i o n , w i l l bc c a p a b l e o f

independent operat i n n s during c r o s s attachment o r s h i f t i n g t o

a1 1 i e d o r s i s t e l - service s e c t o r - s . T h e d i v i s i o n vet a i n s t h e

a b i l i t y t a i - e c e i v e a d d i t i o n a l b r i g a d e s frorn a l l i e d c m u n t ~ - i e sd u e

t o i t s a b i 1 i t y t o o p e r - a t e a s a cornrflniar~dand c a n t r o l

headquarters. Most NRTO c o u n t r i e s h a v e a d o p t e d t h e f i x e d

brigade c o n c e p t , which enhances i n t e r n p e r a b i 1 i t y f a r t h e

d i v i s i o n i n system t w o . T h e c c ~ r p ss t i l l m a i n t a i n s i t s a b i l i t y

t o c o n d u c t j n i n t / c o m b i n e d t a c t i c a l o p e r a t icdns.

The f o l l o w i n g a r e t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f s e l e c t i n g s y s t e m one.

First, it d o e s not c a u s e tm-mail, s i n c e no change i s .required.

Second t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y command p r o v i d e s t h e d i v i s i o n t h e

c a p a b i i t y t o mass f i r e s . T h i r d , i t a l l o w s ecarmrny o f f o r c e

csperat i o n s t u b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h a t w o b a t t a l i o n b r i g a d e .

Fourth, i t a l l o w s t h e d i v i s i o n t o m a s s b y a t t a c h i n g mcwe

battalicwzs t o a brigade. F i f t h , d e p t h i s provided i n t h e CSS

a r e n a w i t h t h e DISCOM e l e r n e n t .

T h e f o l l o w i n g a r e t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f s e l e c t i n g s y s t e m one.

First, synchr-orrizat i o n i s r d c rnaxirnired a t t h e b r i g a d e l r v e i . .

Second, t a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g of u n i t s i s s p l i t w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,

h u t rmt a t u t h o r i t y , at t h e brigade l e v e l . T h i r d , a g i l i t y i s not

e n h a n c e d a t t h e b r i g a d e or c o r p s l e v e l . Fourth, t h e d i v i s i ~ , ni s
t o o l a r g e u f a n n r g a n i z a t i o n t o move r a p i d l y , and u s e i n a

j o i n t /curflbined o p e r a t i o n . Fifth, CSS a s s e t s a t t h e d i v i s i o n a r e

n u t f u l l y u t i l i z e d b e c a u s e a l a r g e p o r t i o n of c o r p s s u p p c , r t is

t h r o u g h p u t t o t h e b r i g a d e rear areas. Sixth, di v i s i o n s cannot

a c c e p t add it i o n a l combat f o r c e s b e c a u s e t h e y are f i x e d

ctrganizations. Seventh, f l e x i b i l i t y is c e n t e r e d a t t h e d i v i s i o n

r a t h e r t h e n t h e c o r p s which is a h o l d o v e r from t h e RORD ' 6 2

concept.

T h e f c ~ l l o w i n ga r e t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s i n s e l e c t i n g s y s t e m t w n .

First, t h e d i v i s i o n l o s e s t h e a b i l i t y t u b e a hands-on player in

t h e CSS a r e n a . Second, t h e br-igade's a b i l i t y t o tl-air!

additional l o w d e n s i t y MOSS is d o u b t f u l . Third, t h e a b i 1 i . t ~t o

mass a r t i 1l e r y f i r e s is d e c r e a s e d . Fourth, fixing t h e brigade

s t r u c t u r e does not allow t h e d i v i s i o n s t o c o n d u c t economy o f

force o p e r a t i c m s . Fifth, t h e d i v i s i o n s lase t h e a b i l i t y t o

a h i f t b a t t a1 i o n s t o react t o u n e x p e c t e d s i t u a t i o n s .

T h e f o l l o w i n g are t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f s y s t e m t w o . First, the

c o r p s w i l l p o s s e s s t h e assets t a m a i n t a i n a r e a d y r e s e r v e

c a p a b l e of independent operat ions. Second, t h e c o r p s car! s h i f t

c c ~ m b a t force.; r a p i d l y acrass b o u n d a r i e s . Third, the divisiar:~

w i l l h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t n s h i f t b o u n d a r i e s q u i c k l y and t o a c c e p t

various brigade mixes. Fourth, t h e b r i g a d e w i l l c o n t r o l support;

t o its b a t t a l i o n s . Fifth, t h r o u g h p u t o p e t - a t i o n s are e n h a n c e d

w i t h t h e a b i 1i t y t o s u p p o r t f o r w a r d . Sixth, rnoving b r i g a d e s

w i 11 p r o v i d e t h e c o m b a t p o w e r t o i n f l u e n c e a s i t u a t i o n . Irloving

a b r i g a d e c a n b e d o n e i n a t i m e l y manner s i n c e a l l c o o r d i n a t i o n
is i n t e r n a l a n d a s i n g l e b r - i g a d e SOP c a n b e u s e d . Seventh, the
c a t - p s c a n c o n d u c t e c o n o m y o f f c w c e o p e r - a t i o n s by e m p l o y i n g

b r i g a d e s i z e e l e m e n t s i n s t e a d uf complete divisiuns. Eiyh-t,

system two a l l o w s t h e corps, d i v i s i o n s and b r i g a d e s t u conduct

o p e r a t i o n s w i t h a1 1 i e d u n i t s , e s p e c i a l l y i n NRTQ.

System t w o p r o v i d e s t h e cot-ps and b r i g a d e w i t h increazed

f l e x i b i l i t y o n t h e R i r L a n d b a t t l e f i e l d . (Rnnex F) It

s y n c h r o n i z e s combat, CS, a n d CSS a s s e t s a t t h e l e v e l w h e r e i . t

h i s t o r i c a l 1y e x i s t e d , t h e bt-igade. T h e d i v i s i o n cork i n u e s t o

f u n c t i o n a s a s u b o r d i n a t e command a n d c o n ' t r o l e1emef.t n f the

corps, but i t s c a p a b i l i t y t o move v a p i d l y a n d c o n d u c t

j o i r ~ t / c u r n b i n e d o p e r a t i o r j s for- t h e c a r p s , is e n h a n c c r d . Tlicr-e a'-:?

some d i s a d v a n t a g e s e s p e c i a l l y f a r t h e d i v i s i o n , but t h e

a d v a n t a g e s g a i n e d by t h e c u r p s and b r i g a d e o u t w e i y h t them.

S y s t e m t w o s u p p o r t s t h e way t h e U . S . Rrmy n e e d s t o o r g a n i z e tcz

win t h e c e n t r a l b a t t l e .

VI. CONCLUSIQNS

T h e r i g h t t a c t i c a l - n r g a n i z a t i o n is t h e f o u n d a t i o n a n w::ich

armies b u i l d t h e i r s t r - u c t u r e . Historically, d i f . F e r e r ~ tarmies

h a v e had d i f.Ferent f a u n d a t ions. T h e Romans b u i l t i.tpczrt . t h e

legion, t h e Fr-ench b u i l t u p o n t h e c o r p s , and t h e U.S. Rrmy b u i l t

upon t h e f i e l d army. Recently t h e corps has replaced t h e f i e l d

a r m y a n d h a s b e c o m e t h e l a r g e s t t a c t i c a l u t - g a n i z a t i o n upmr w h i c h

t h e Rrrny' i r t t e n d s t o b u i l d i.ts foundaticwt. "Taday's c o r p s i.i t h e

centr-a1 point nn t h e a i r - l a n d b a t t l e f i e l d wher-e c o m b a t pc1we.r- is

s y r c h r u n i z e d t o a c h i e v e t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e . "7m The cur-ps

requires t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y t o achieve t h i s t a c t i c a l

advantage. I t currently uses divisions a s t h e largest fixed

o r g a n i z a t i o n t o infll.!ence t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i u n . With t h e s i z e

o f t o d a y s d i v i s i o n , t h e a b i l i t y t o wave t h i s force r a p i d l y i n a

t i m e l y aianner i s d i f f i c u l t . I n WW I t h e s i z e u f t h e d i v i s i c w ~

reduced t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e c o r p s t o inFluence t h e t a c t i c a l

sitl-tation. During WW I 1 and K o r e a , t h e RCT p r o v i d e d t h e corps

curnrnander f l e x i b i 1 i t y t o rsiaintain a reserve and i n f l u e n c e t h e

s i t u a t i o n by r a p i d l y s h i f t i n g t h e s e u n i t s t o d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s .

T h e l e s s o n l e a r n e d was t h a t t a c t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d b e

rnobi l e and h a v e enrxugh combat power t o i n f l u e n c e t h e s i t u a t ir:,n.

T h e d i v i s i o n was t o o l a r g e , sea t h e b r i g a d e was u s e d .

T h e b r i g a d e h a s f u n c t ianed a s t h e i n t e g r a t icw p o i n t for

a s s e t s f r o m d i v i s i c a n and c o r p s . RCTs a c t e d a s m i n i d i v i s i o n s t o

p r o v i d e t h e d i v i s i c w ! and corps a s e l f s u s t a i n e d u n i t w i t h enough

combat power t m i n f l u e n c e t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . The brigade h a s been

t h e cunibined a r m s u n i t or, t h e b a t t l e . F i e l d f o r t h r e e w a r s .

Since t h e adoption o f t h e fixed d i v i s i o n f l e x i b l e brigade

s t r - u c t u r e w i t h t h e RORD 62 concept s i g n i f i c a n t changes have

uccurred i n niateriel development, dcctr-ine, t h r e a t and

o r g a n i z a t i u n a l c h a n g e s tct t h e c o r p s . H i s t c w i c a l l y, when meto ar

mure a f t h e s e t h i n g s c h a n g e s , s o h a s t h e or-gartizational

s t r u c t u r e nf t h e U . S . Rrmy. W i t h ' t h e s e c h a n g e s and t h e new

focus o f t h e corps, a re-examination u f t h e current structur.e

n e e d s t n be accomplished. T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l systeroi ri-leeds t o b e

exarnined n o t j u s t o n e part o f it. S i n c e whatever change i s dune

t a one w i I l e f f e c t t h e o t h e r two.
 W i t h t h e c u r r e n t n e e d .For m o b i l i t y a n d mass a n d f o . r t h e c ~ w p s

t o rnaintain its f l e x i b i l i t y t h e c u r r e n t f i x e d d i v i s i o n , flexible

b r i g a d e a p p e a r s n o t t o b e t h e r i g h t o r g a n i z a t ic,n f o r t h e 193121' 5.

C u r r e n t l y t h o d i v i s i o n c o n t r o l s t h e assets a n d r e t a i n s t h e

t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y t o move u n i t s . The c o r p s losec, i t s

f l e x i b i l i t y to s h i f t units rapidly. D i v i s i o n s a r e t0c9 large tn

rnnve q t u i c k l y a n t o d a y i s b a t t l e f i e l d .

b n a l t e r n a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f f l e x i b l e d i v i s i o n a n d .Fixed

b r i g a d e h a s b e e n s u b m i t t e d a s a n o r g a r t i z a t i o n a l z t r - u c t u!-e tcd

consider. I t a p p e a r s t o prmvide t h e c o r p s t h e f l e x i b i l i t y it

n e e d s t o r a p i d l y s h i f t u n i t s and i n f l u e n c e t h e s i t u a t i o r l . Thic,

n m r g a n i z a t i a n s y n c h r o n i z e s c o m b a t p o w e r a t t h e l e v e l w h e r e i t ha-

h i s t o r i c a l l y been placed. I t a l s o s a p p c a r t s t h e t r a i n a s yo!.\

fight philosophy and p r o v i d e s t h e a b i l i t y of t.~nitst o s u s k a i r

t h e r ~ l s e l v e sw h i c h i s u s e f u l f o r i n t e r o p e r a h i 1i t y w i t h a1 1i e d

units. agility, f l e x i b i l i t y and t h e a b i l i t y t o s y n c h r - o r ~ j . ~ ~ .

cornbat power a d d t o t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o r m l

structure. The c o r p s c a n m a i n t a i n a r e s e r v e ,or s h i f t 5 e ? F

c o n t a i n e d u n j . t s r a p i d l y a b c ~ n tt h e b a t t l e f i e l d w i t h e n o u g h m a 5 5

t o i n f l l . i e n c e t h e sitl-tat i o n . However, t h e i - e a r e -,8::me trade.-#:t-Fizs

with t h e fixed brigade at t h e d i v i s i r m level. The d i v i s i ~ ~ n ' s

a b i l i t y t u mass f i r e s is n o t a s r e s p o n s i v e nor- is i t s a b i l i t y t o

s y n c h r o n i z e c o m b a t puwer.

T h i s a n a l y s i s s u g g e s t s t h a t when b a t h o r - g a r ~ i z a it o n d

s t r u c t u r e s are exartlined a g a i n s t t h e c r i t e r i a o f flexibility,

agility, trainability, sustainability, and intel-ope!-ablli.ty, the

flexible division, f i x e d b r i g a d e s t r u c t u r e Appear!; t43 b~

optimal. I t is time f o r t h e U . S . Rrmy t a r e - e x a m i n e its

organizat ional structure. The alternative o r g a n i z a t ion

(flexible divisions, fixed brigades) a p p e a r s t o have prcmise.

I t s h o u l d b e examined as a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e upon which t o

b u i l d a new f o u n d a t ion f u r t h e 1790s a n d b e y u n d . '

VII. IMPLICRTIONS

T h i s a n a l y s i s is n b v i o u s l y r ~ a tc o n c l u s i v e . However, it

s u g g e s t s str-nngly t h a t h i s t o r y , recent c h a n g e s t o t h e

battlefield, a n d known c o n t e m p n r a r y r ~ q u i r e r f l e nst i n d i c a t e t h a t

t h e flexible division, f i x e d b r i g a d e c o n c e p t h a s real

p o s s i b l i t ies. I t deserves further testing. T h e Rrmy s h o u l d

ccwtduct. t w o t e s t s , i n a real w o r l d e n v i r c m m e n t , i n which f o g and

f r i c t i o r ~c a n p l a y a p a r t i n e v a l u a t i n g t h e t w o s y s t e m s .

Test 1: T h i r d U.S. C o r p s r e o r g a n i z e t h e 1st C a v a l r - y D i v i - . i o n

i n t o fixed brigades, while maintaining t h e current

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t n r e f o r t h e 2 n d R r m o r e d Division. The 1st

C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n b a s e moves t o c o r p s . E a c h d i v i s i o n w i 1 1 r-ntate

i t s b r i g a d e s t h r o u g h t h e NTC t h r e e times. The r e s u l t s be

examined and e v a l u a t e d .

T e s t 2: Test i n t e r o p e r a b i 1i t y d u r i n g m a . j o r e x e r c i s e s . The

employment u f b r i g a d e u n i t s frurfl I a n d 111 C a r p s t o E u r o p e a n d

t h e P a c i f i c d u r i n g a n n u a l REFORGER a n d TERM S P I R I T e x e r c i s e 5 t o

a l l o w t h e c c ~ r p st o u s e t h e s e f i x e d b r i g a d e s a s t h e s i . t u s t i o n

develops. R e s e r v e Ccwpor~ent # u n i t s sholuld b e u s e d a s w e 1 1 a s

active units. T h e s e b r i g a d e s s h o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h a1 1 i e d f o r c e s
as w e l l .

T h e r e s u l t 5 of t h e s e t e s t 5 o v e v a p e r i o d of t w o t o t h y - e e

y e a r s s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e e m p e r i c a l e v i d e n c e t o d e k e v - m i n e .if t h e

flexible division, fixed b r i g a d e cortcept d c e s , i n fact, have t h e

v a l i d i t y t h a t t h i s s t u d y c o n c l u d e s it has.
 FIPPENDI X FI

WORLD WFlR I

U. S. INFFINTRY D I V I S I O N (1918)
 28.106 mwn. 77 gunn.
TYPE U.S. DIVISION, 260 nuchln* gun*
1918

Hah
@IE
,3 MTZD M Q a @Ig1

 FIPPENDIX B

WORLD WRR I 1

U. S. TRIRNGULRR INFRNTRY DIVISION (1941)

U.S. RRMORED DIVISION 11942, 1943)

KORERN WRR

U. S. INFFINTRY DIVISION (1947)

U. S. RRMORED DIVISION (1947)

 U.S. TRIANGULAR INFANTRY DIVISION, 16,246 man. 48 howitaan. 68 antitank guns

June 1941

I I I I I I I 1

HHC @ H W WPNS
HHB[*~

8 x 37mm
a' FQ
pk-] nnBFl
4 x lO6mm How
@J @
4 x 166mm 6 r 37mm
How 8 x 76mm
 14.820 men. 232 medlum tanka. 1 6 8 light tanks,
TYPE U.S. ARMORED DIVISION, MAR 1042 6 4 sdf-propelled howitz8r8

1 8 a 106mm

10.937 man. 1 8 8 madium tanka. 77 light tanka.

TYPE U.S. ARMORED DIVISION, SEP 1043 6 4 amlf-plopelled howitzers

Attachmenla

@I@
MDM @ sama aa

above. lass

tha Infanty regiment.

 TYPE U.S. INFANTRY 17.700 m m (wordnu); 141 unks:

DIVISION, 1947 7 2 howitam

I I I I I 1

....
.... HW

TYPE U.S. ARM-ORED 14.976 rmn (wadm*); 361 tanks:

DIVISION.1947 72 "If-propolled howiuan
I
I I I I I I 1
 FIFPENDIX C

U. S. FENTOMIC INFFINTRY D I V I S I O N (1939)

 U.S. PENTOMIC INFANTRY 14.00Q nun
DIVISION

H q
svc
- q qq,,$-[
John
I 8 105mm Idelated
Rocket
I 1959)
m e b b a t u q lO5mm ban.
was nplawd
by 6 composite
battalions in

1959)

 RPPENDIX D

REORGRNIZRTION OBJECTIVE RRMY DIVISION

U. S. RRMORED DIVISION (1965)

 '!I 'II

18,000-20,000 ....n, 11-70 lun./howl......

TYPE U.S. ARMORED DIVISION, ROAD 27-38 Illht link., 300+ m.dlum t.nk.

I I I I 1
HHC§ ~ HHC~ m XX bJ1 ~
I I I

HHI~ @l
1011, I.llr Rocket 2
~
1611/203mm,
Iller 203mm
Tit Acqullitlon
166mm SP
I I I I

_
I
II
--1- _.
cXJ1
NIC Def.n..
...,
~1
Mlllllry
Int.lllgenc.
a
Mlllllry Police
•
~ SPT
XX

r Alliined • I I I I

G·81~c!:JEE
M .... uver
In. ~

~
IActuM
nurn..... and type. of a••llned
ParlOnnal
Sarvlce
Dlv
Mller.al
Mit Ctr
Supply
• Tran.

_Ilona _ : type Infantry dlvllion

I_ _edl _ II link and 8 machanlled bn.1 NOlie: 1. unit added atter
Initial ROAD .tructura wa. approved.
2. unlliater d.lated from llructura.
 FIPPENDI X E

FIXED BRIGRDE DESIGN

 B r i g a d e base r e m a i n s u n c h a n g e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g

b r i g a d e variations. E a c h b r i g a d e w i 11 h a v e recur,, e n g i n e e r ,

intel, support, and a h e a d q u a r t e r s and h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n y

p l u s t h e i r a r t i l l e r y and m a n e u v e r b a t t a l i o n s . Signal will be

p a r t of t h e b r i g a d e HHC.

MECHRNIZED BRIGFIDE RRMORED B R I G R D E

o O n e 1 5 5 m m How. Bn. (sp) o O n e 1 5 5 m m How. Brt. ( s p )

o T w o Mech. Inf R n ' s o Two R r m o r e d B n ' s

o O n e R r m o r Rn. u O n e Mech. Inf. Bn.

INFRNTRY BRIGRDE ( L T / R H N / R I R RSSLT)

o O n e 11i15mm Hcaw. Bn. (Towed)

o T h r e e Inf. Rn' 5
 RPPENDIX F

RNRLYTICRL COMPRRISON

 RPPENDIX F

SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2
BDE DIV CORPS BDE DIV CORPS

SYNCHRONIZRTION 4 1 3 1 3 3

RGILITY 4 2 3 1 4 2

TRRINRDILITY 3 2 3 1 3 3

SUSTRINRBILITY 4 1 1 2 3 1

INTEROPERRBILITY 4 3 2 1 2 2

SUB-TOTRL 19 9 12

TOTRL 40 32

RRTING SCRLE

1 HIGH

3 MED

5 LOW

 ENDNOTES

F i e l d Manual 1 0 0 - 1 5 , C o r ~ O s o e r a t ion-, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 9 , p. 1 - 1 .

J u h n C. P a h n s e n a n d R o b e r t C. S t a c k , " R Mobile D i v i s i o n f a r F u t u r e

. .
W a r " , M l l l t a r v R-vi-kg, J u n e 1 9 8 9 , p. 28.
J . D. H i t t l e , " J o r n i n i ' s R r t o f W a r " , R o o t s i f S t r a t p n v , ( H a t - r i s b u t - g ,
P R . , S t a c k p c a l e B o o k s , l 9 8 7 ) , p. 450.
Ibid.
C a r l von C l a u s e w i t z , p n War, e d i t e d b y Michael H o w a r d a n d F ' e t e r P a r e t ,
( P r i n c e t o n , N J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i n e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 294.
W i l l i a m R R i c h a r d s o n , TRRDOC P r i n i e r , ( F t Monroe, V a . : T R R D O C , 11394.)
p. 3.
R i c h a r E. S i m p k i n , R a r e t o t h - S w i f t , ( L c ~ n d o n , E r t g l a n d : P t - a c , s e y T s
D e f e n s e P u b 1 i s h e r s , 1 9 8 5 ) , p. 1 2 3 .
G u n t h e r E. R c * t h e n b e r g , T h e R r t o f W a r f a r e i n t h e R u e o f Na~olectr,,
( H l o o m i n g t o n , I n d . : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , i 9 8 0 ) , p. 23.
I b i d . , . p..
36.
T h e o d o r e Rapp, W a r d , ( N e w Y c w k , NY. : C o l l iet-

M a c M i I l i a n , 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 1 Q 2 .

H e w S t r - a c h e n , E u r o ~ e a nR r m i e s a n d t h e C u r t d u r t o f W, ( L o r d o n , E n g .

G e o r g e nl l e n a n d U n w i n , i ' 3 8 3 ) , p. 44.

G u n t h e l - E. R o t h e n b e r g , T h e ~ r o ft W a r f a r e i n t h e R u e o f
N a o o l e o n ,

( P l o o m i n g t ~ = ~ nI n, d . : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1 9 8 0 ) , p. 1 3 8 .

Ibid.

R u s s e l l F. W e i g l e y , Historv o f t h e U . S . R r n i y , ( B l o o r i i i n g t o n , I n d . :

I n d i a n a U n i v e r - s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p p . 386-387.
J o h n C . P i n k l e y , " R H i s t o r y u f U . S . Fir-my F o r c e S t t - u c t u r - i n y " , M i l i t a r v
B ~ v i e y ,F e b . 1 9 7 7 , p. 68.
Jonathcm M House, - 7
C e n t u r y T a c t i c s , D c d c r i n e , a n d O r q a n i z a t ion, ( F t L e a v e n w o r t h , K S . :
U . S . R r m y C o m m a n d a n d G e n e r a l . S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 42.

W e i g l e y , J-listorv o f t h e U S F l r r n u . p. 386.

H o r t s e , C o m b i n e d R r m s W a r f a r e , p. 42.

P i n k l e y , " F I H i s t o r y o f t h e U . S . R r m y F o r - c e S t r u c t ~ u r i n g " , p. 42.

House, C o m b i n e d FIr-ms W a r f a r - e , p. 42.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 7 1 .

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., p. 75.

Ibid., p. 77.

House, C n m b i r i e d R r m s war far^, p. 75-77 a n d P i n k . l e y , "n H i s t u r y o f

U . S . n r r n y F o r c e S t r u c t u t - i n g " , p. 72.

K e n t R. G r e e n f i e l d a n d R o b e r t R. P a l m e r , T h e R r n i v G i . - o u r d Fur-c:e!z: T h e

O r q a n i z a t ion o f Grcaund C o r n b a t F o r c e s . U n i t e d S t a t e s R r m v i n W w - l d W c 7 y

11, ( W a s h i l ?- ~ t C VD. ~ C . 1 ' 3 4 7 ) .,

pp.
. . 271-274.
P a l m e r , G r e e n f i e l d , U . S . FIrrny i n WW 1 1 , p p . 276-277 a n d W e i y l e y ,

H i s t o r y o f t h e U. S . R r n i y , p. 464.

.
R o b e r t H. H e r 1 i n , U . S . n r r n y W o r l d War I 1 C o r p s C o m m a n d e r s : R C o m p o o i t e
E c i o q r a p h y , ( F t . L e a v e n w u r t h , KS. : U. S . R r m y cornmand a n d G a n e r o l S t a f f
C o l l e g e ) , p. 1 .
House, C o m b i n e d R r m s W a r f a r e , p. 1 0 7 .

Ibid.

W e i g l e y , H i s t a r v a f t h e U . S . R r r n u , F'. 464 a n d H a u s e , C o n ~ b i n e d r-lr-r~is

W a r f a r e , p. 1 0 7 .
 M. H a m l i n Canrmn, T h e War i n t h e P a c i f i c , L e y t e : T h e Retut-r! t c - t h e
P h i l i ~ o i n e s . ( W a s h i n g t o n D. C. 1 9 5 4 ) , pp. 64-73.
"G C h r - i s t o p h e r R. G a b e l , T h e L o r r - a i n Carnpai g n : R n O v ~ r v i e w . S e p t ( ~ - r j i b e r - -
D e c e m b e r 1 3 4 4 , ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , K S . : LJ. S. Rrrny Cornrnand a n d G e n e r a :
S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1?85), p. 35.
37 F i e l d M a n u a l 71-1121121, D i v i s i o n Ocet-at i o n s , 15 Novernber 1 9 8 8 , p. S .
'Q H o u s e , C o m b i r e d R r r n s Warfare, p. 1 4 8 .

39 C l a y B l a i r , T h e F a x - g o t t e n War- R r n e r i c a i n K o r e a 11358-1953, ( N e w Yoi-l:,

NY, : FInchor R o o k s , 1987), pp. 18@, 288.

4m W e i g l e y , H i s t c w v o f t h e U.S. Rrniy, p. 537.

41 I b i d .

e' I b i d . , p. 536.
I b i d . , p. 537.
44 E r n e s t F i s h e r , PENTRNR S t u d y ( O p e r a t i o n s R e s e a r c h O f f i c e , W s s h i r ~ y ' t o i . , , ,
D. C. 1 9 6 5 ) p. 45-5Q a n d Jcthrt H. Cushrnan, "G'erttcmic I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n
i n C o m b a t " , I b l i l i t a r y R e v i e w ( J a n 1358), pp. 19-3121.
'= R i n k l e y , "FI H i s t m - y of U . S . F o r c e S t r u c t u r i n g " , p. 78.
Ibid.
47 Ibid.
H o u s e , ~ m i b i n e d R r r n s Warfare, p. 157.

43 B i n k l e y , "R H i s t o r y o f t h e U . S . F o r c e S t n c t u ~ - i n g " , p. 30.

"" W e i g l e y , H i s t o r - v o f t h e U. S. Rr-my, pp. 54121-541.

=I H a l u s e , C c m b i n e d R r r n s Warfare, p. i6121.

'2 Ibid.

=" B i n k l e y , " R H i s t o r y of U. S. Rrrny F o r c e S t u c t u t - i n g " , p. 81.

=' R o b e r t W. B u r - k h a r d t , " B r i g a d e O r g a n i z a t i n n a n d t h e Rip-Land H a t t le",

( F t . Leavergwor-th, K S . : U. S. Rrrny Cormand a n d G e n e r a l Sta-Ff Ccal l . e g i - ,

SFIMS, D e c l 9 8 5 ) , p. 16.
J o h n C. B a h n s e n , " K a l e i d n s c o p i c U. S. Rrrny", Rrmed F a r c e s J c ~ ~ . ~ r - ~ ? . x l
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Novernber 1985, p. 81.
s6 R o b e r t C S t a c k a n d J o h n C. B a h n s e n , "FI M o b i l e D i v i s i c m f o r F L ~ ~ : . I War."
~-E
i. l i. t - r v R P V I W & ( J u n e 1 9 D 9 ) , p. 32.
J o h n W. Woodmansee Jr. , " H l i t z h r i e g a n d t h e R i r L a n d H a t ' c l e u , !Vli I. L t . 3 1 ~
~ ~

R e v i e w , (Rug. 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 24.

sQ F i e l d M a n u a l 18@-5, O o e r a t i o n s , (may 1386), p. 2 4 .

='-9 P e t e r Kock, " G u i d e t o Rrrny W e a p n n s " , Rrrny T i r n e s , ( 2 3 O c t 1 3 8 9 ) ,

pp. D i - D - 2 3 .
S o v i e t M i 1 i t a r y PC-wer: Rn R s s e s s r i i e r ~ t of t h e T h r e a t 1 3 8 8 , ( W a s h i n g t o n
D.C. I ~ O B ) , p. GO.
6 1 F r a n k . C. C a l u c c i , R n n u a l R e p o r t t o t h e C o n s r e s s , ( W a s h i n g t n n D. C.

199121). . .D. 12.

fiz I b i d . , p. 13.

=" I b i d .

64 F i e l d M a n u a l 1121121-15, C O ~ O D ~ ~e r a i ta n s ,
( S e p t e m b e r 1389), p. 1-1.

"= , R i c h a r d E. S i r n p k i n , "Command f r o m t h e R o t t u r n " , 1 r ~ f a r . t r . y . (Mar-

R p r 1985)i . .p. 36.

kG F i e l d M a n u a l 1@8-15, C o r p s O p e r a t i o n s , ( S e p t e r u b e r i ? 8 9 ) , p . 1-1.

G7 F i e l d Marrual 71-3, p. 1-2.

" I I I C o r p s M a n e u v e r Handbcmk", Movement l-lar~dbcok, (USf4CGSC-SRMS

R Y 89/9121), p. 78

nrmv S t u d y Prcm.ject, M o u n t e d Warfare S t u d y 281214, (U. S. Rrmy W a r

C c g l l e g e , C a r l i s l e B a t - r a c k s ; PR., May 1988), p. 57.

7m F i e l d M a n u a l ID@-15, p. 1-1.

Note: Appendix A thru D copied from House, Combined Arms Warfare , (Ft.

Leavenworth, KS.: U.S. Army Command and Staff College)

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