Memorial Petitioner

TEAM CODE:
5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
Petition invoked under Article 32 of Indiana Constitution
WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020
SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI DEFENDANT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI
PROSECUTION
V.
MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS DEFENCE
Most respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Chief Justice and companion
Judges of Supreme Court of Indiana.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER
5th AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................
TABLE OF CASES.......................................................................................................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................................
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................
STATEMENT OF ISSUES........................................................................................................XIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................XIV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.........................................................................................................
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES
NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR
DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION..................................................................................1
1.1 THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16(3):..................................................
1.2 THAT SUCH POWERS IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD BE AGAINST THE
FOUNDATION OF INDIANA.............................................................................................
CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE
POWER TO DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS
FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES.................................................................................................3
2.1 THAT THE STATE DOESN’T HAVE ANY SUCH POWERS.....................................
2.2 THAT SUCH RESERVATION IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD DIRECTLY
AND PROXIMATELY INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF TRADE.........................
CONTENTION 03: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL
CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL......................................................5
3.1 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 14............................................................................
3.2 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 16............................................................................
3.4 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 (1) (G)................................................................
3.5 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 21..........................................................................
CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S
147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
AND THE HIGH COURT OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM
..................................................................................................................................................11
4.1 THE ACCUSED ARE GULITY U/S 147,148 AND 149 OF IPC...............................
4.2 THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY U/S 120B, 326, 307,302 READ WITH S. 32...........
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXTENSION
& And
S. Section
¶ Paragraph
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Anr. Another
U/S Under Section
Cr. Criminal
v. Versus
ed. Edition
etc. Etcetera
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e. that is
Govt. Government
No. Number
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
 The Constitution of India, 1949 (Act )

 The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Act 2 of 1974).
 The Indian Evidence Act,1872 (Act 1 of 1872).
 The Indian Penal Code,1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
BOOKS AND DIGESTS

 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 25th Ed.).
 Stedman, Stedman's Medical Dictionary 967 (Wolters Kluwer, 28th ed.).
DICTIONARIES, ONLINE DATABASES & WEBSITES

 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co, 8th ed.).
 SCC Online
 LexisNexis
 P Ramanatha Aiyar and Shakil Ahmad Khan, The Law Lexicon (Lexis Nexis, 2nd ed).

TABLE OF CASES
S. Pg
CASE TITLE CITATION
No. No.
1. 12
2. 1
3. B. Venkat Swamy v. Vijaya Nehru (2008) 10 SCC 260 4
4. Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 2
5. Brij Bhushan Sharma v. State of U. P 2001 CriLJ 1384 15
6. Brij Mohan v. State 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2312 2
7. C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 9
8. Chattar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 14 SCC 667 9
9. Chhotanney v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 2013 15
10. Firoz Khan v. Union of India AIR 2007 Ori 81 5
11. Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516 14
12. Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619 4
13. Gopi Nath v. State of U. P (2001) 6 SCC 620 7
14. Govindaswamy v. State of Kerala (2016) 16 SCC 295 10
15. Gurubasappa v. Gurulingappa 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 106 11
16. Ilayaraja v. State 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14207 4

17. Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik (1986) Cr.LJ 1510 3
18. Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083 7
19. Jasmeet Kaur Talwar v. Gurjit Singh Talwar 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6576 2
20. Jatinder Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2020 SC 161 3
21. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 5
22. John Indiculla v. State 2005 Cr LJ 2925 (Ker.) 7
23. Joseph v. State of Kerala (2000) 5 SCC 197 9
24. Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat (2013) 15 SCC(Cri) 688 3
Kanna Alias Mahalakshmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami

25. AIR 1972 Mad 247 6
Achari
26. Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa AIR1987 SC 1507 12
27. Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 4
28. Krishna Mahadev Chavan v. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 191 12
29. Kundala Bala Subranayam v. State of AP 1993 Cr.LJ 1635 15
30. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P (2010) 2 SCC 748 9
31. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 6
32. Narendra v. State of Karnataka (2009) 6 SCC 61 4
33. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1657 5
34. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766 11
35. Pachipala Laxmaiah v. State of A.P 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1166 5

36. Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P (1991) SCC (Cri) 407 9
37. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 2
38. Prakash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 65 8
39. Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram AIR 1959 Mad 323 10
40. Rajammal v. State of T. N 1993 Cr.LJ 3029 (Mad.) 14
41. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 3
42. Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43 9
43. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat (2011) 11 SCC 111 14
44. Ran Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 4 SCC 70 4
45. Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharashtra 2008 Bom CR (Cr) 185) 7
46. Rawal v. State of Gujarat 2013 AIR (SCW) 5219 5
47. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199 1
48. S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1996 SCC (4) 596 2
49. Sachin Jana v. State of West Bengal (2008) 3 SCC 390 7
50. Salome v. Dr.Prince D.Immanuel 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 1651 5
51. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 5
52. Sangeetha v. Jitendra Bhandari 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 16858 6
53. Saraswathy v. Babu 2014 (3) SCC 712 8
54. Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371 1

55. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 9
56. Shiv Prasad Chuni Lal Jain v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 264 7
57. Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy 1988 SCC (Cri) 60 5
58. Smt. Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad (2007) 3 SCC 136 6
59. Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy AIR 1989 C 121 5
60. State of A.P. v. Raj Gopal Asawa AIR 2004 SC 1993 2
61. State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Narayan Dandalwar (2000) 9 SCC 257 4
62. State of Maharashtra v. Shivaji Anandrao 2002 Cr.LJ 4198 (Bom) 15
63. State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh 989 Cr. L.J, (NOC) 13 (P&H) 14
64. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (2014) 9 SCC 632 7
65. State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86 7
66 State of UP v. Randhir AIR 1959 All 727 14
67. Subedar Tewari v. State of U.P. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 91 10
68. Surender Chauhan v. State of M.P (2000) 4 SCC 110 7
69. U Suvetha v. State (2009) 6 SCC 757 4
70. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 33 5
71. Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 462 8
72. Vijeta Gajra v. State of NCT of Delhi (2010) 11 SCC 618 7
73. Wasim v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 7 SCC 435 4

74. XXXXX v. XXXXX 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2327 5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Article 32 of the Indiana
Constitution
ART. 32: REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THIS

PART (PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION)
1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. BRIEF SKETCH OF HISTORY

1. Devbhoomi located in the heart of Indiana is a ‘Developed State’. After elections in
March 2019, Kranti Party formed Government in Devbhoomi. Infrastructural and
industrial development followed in the state. It was the era when progress of
Devbhoomi was on boost. In 2019, Mr. Rajendra Singh Ambata was sworn in as the
Chief Minister of Devbhoomi.
2. The rapid rate of development started attracting people of other States as it offered
them better standards of living. The natives expressed their resentment over this
ongoing practice, as the benefits of the state’s development were going to the
outsiders and not to them. The issue of reservation for the natives was on rise and
turned into a revolution. After long protest and widespread media coverage, Kranti
Party decided to accommodate the demand of the natives and on 1st April 2020,
Devbhoomi Legislature passed the ‘Devbhoomi State Employment Local Candidates
Bill, 2020.’
II. ISSUES INVOLVED
3. After the commencement of this Act, the outsiders and the private employers opposed
the Act being violative of their Fundamental Rights. They organized protests and
marches for revocation of the Act. An NGO named ‘Satat Vikas Sangh’ approached
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana through a Writ Petition demanding that the
alleged Act be declared unconstitutional. After the enactment of the Act, hostility
among groups increased.
4. While this was a burning issue, two women were brutally raped and murdered. This
incident further disturbed the law-and-order situation in Uchihar. Keeping in mind the
disturbed aesthetics and to maintain the image of his son, the Chief Minister (CM)
was to address the people of Uchihar at Patel Maidan at 12 Noon on 24 th May. Post
this announcement, thousands of outsiders blocked the roads to prevent the CM’s
visit.
5. Subsequently, in the morning around on 24 May 2020, Mr. Teja Singh along with 25
other armed personnel started their journey to Uchihar. Near Negi Gaon, the convoy
of Mr. Teja Singh saw that around 300 protestors have blocked the road ahead and are
shouting under provocation.

6. Mr. S.P. Pandey (D.S.P., Uchihar) insisted Mr. Teja Singh upon returning, as the
situation posed an imminent danger to Mr. Teja Singh and his associates. But Mr.
Teja Singh didn’t budge and asked his associates to forcefully remove the barricades
and proceed further not stopping under any circumstances. Seeing the convoy of Mr.
Teja approaching, around 200 people started running towards the convoy and started
shouting that the convoy will not be allowed to go further. During a heated argument
one unidentified person threw a handmade petrol bomb on Kalia’s vehicle, and the
vehicle caught fire.
7. Mr. Kalia and 5 others came out from the vehicle and warned the protestors to step
back. On the perception of immediate threat, Mr. Teja asked his associates to rush
towards Patel Maidan and “not to stop whatever and whoever comes in between.”
Noticing this, the protestors started hitting the vehicle with Lathis and began pelting
stones. Thereupon, Mr. Teja directed his driver Mr. Vibhuti Singh to accelerate the
vehicle at maximum speed and not to stop even if stones were pelted on them.
8. In this clash, various protestors were severely injured. Three protestors died by
coming in front of Mr. Teja’s vehicle. After hitting these three men, Mr. Vibhuti lost
control of the vehicle and the car crashed on road divider. Mr. Teja, Mr. Vibhuti and
three others stepped out of the car with licensed arms and open fired at the protestors
who came running towards him with their lathis and iron rods. After this incident, the
protestors found Mr. Prashant Tamde, news reporter of ABC News who died due to a
gunshot. Subsequently, on 30th May 2020, the Government of Indiana ordered CBI
inquiry.
III. SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
9. CBI arrested Mr. Teja, Mr. Kalia, Mr. Vibhuti, Mr. Ranga and 7 others and charged
them u/s147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B and 34 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860.
The matter was then tried by the CBI Court and it found all the accused Guilty of the
above-mentioned charges. Aggrieved by this, the accused appealed against this
judgement before the High Court of Devbhoomi. The High Court reversed the
Judgment pronounced by the CBI Court and acquitted all the accused persons.
IV. PRESENT STATUS
10. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court of Devbhoomi, the Respondents
appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana, in January 2022, and the Hon’ble Court
has admitted the Appeal. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court being satisfied that the
Writ Petition filed by the SVS involves substantial question of law, listed it for final

hearing in the month of May 2022. Realizing that the incident of Uchihar is the
outcome of the Act passed by the Legislature of Devbhoomi, the Chief Justice of
Indiana clubbed them and placed them before the appropriate Bench for final hearing
in May 2022.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ANY SPECIFIC

POWERT TO MAKE LAW/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATIONS AND
IF YES, THEN TO WHAT EXTENT?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO DIRECT THE

EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL
CANDIDATES?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES

ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149, 302,
307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the State legislature of Devbhoomi does
not have any specific power to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservation. Article
16(3) enables only the Parliament to make laws in a special case prescribing any requirement
as to residence within a State or Union territory as a condition of employment in the State or
Union territory. Under article 35(a) this power is conferred upon Parliament but is denied to
the legislatures of the States, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution. Also, such power
if allowed would be a threat to the unity and integrity of the nation by fostering and
strengthening narrow parochial loyalties based on residence within a state.
CONTENTION 2: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DO NOT HAVE THE

POWER TO DIRECT THE EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE
JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the state government do not have the
power to direct the employers of private sector to reserve jobs for local candidates. The
constitution does not have any provision for domicile-based reservations in employment for
the private sector. Even Article 16(3) talks about domicile-based reservations but limits them
to the public sector under the exclusive discretion of the parliament. Furthermore, under
Article 19(1)(g), all citizens have a fundamental right to practice any profession, or to carry
on any occupation, trade or business as a fundamental right. Mandating private institutions to
employ a certain set of candidates would constrict their right to carry on their occupation
freely.
CONTENTION 3: THAT THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL

CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that The Devbhoomi State Employment of
Local Candidates Act, 2020 is in excess of legislative competence and its provisions offend

Constitutional restrictions. The Act is ultra vires as the state legislature is not the competent
authority to enact the said act. Further it also contravenes Article 14, 16, 19 (1)(g), 19 (1)(e)
and 21 of the Indiana Constitution. It is also contended that the provisions in the Act are
vague, unreasonable and overboard.

It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty u/s 147, 148 and 149 of the Indiana
Penal Code (herein referred to as IPC) as the accused armed with deadly weapons consisted
of an unlawful assembly that used force and violence in persecution of a common object.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the accused are guilty u/s 120B of the IPC since there
existed a pre-mediated plan of the accused to instigate violence amongst the protestors and
stifle the protests against the Act. The accused person’s act of mowing down three protestors
under their vehicle, causing death of Prashant Tamde and furthermore causing grievous hurt
to other protestors make them all liable u/s 302, 307 and 326 respectively read with section
32 of IPC.

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO. 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION
It is humbly submitted that the state legislature of Devbhoomi doesn’t have any specific
powers to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservations.
1.1 THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16(3):
1. Under article 16(3) of the Indian Constitution, the Parliament has the sole power to make
laws in a special case prescribing any requirement as to residence within a State or Union
territory prior to appointment, as a condition of employment in the State or Union
territory. Under article 35(a) this power is conferred upon Parliament but is denied to the
legislatures of the States, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution.
2. Confirming the same reasoning, Justice M Hidyatullah, in the case of AVS Narasimha
Rao & ors vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors1 said, “the legislative powers to create
residential qualification for employment is thus exclusively conferred on the Parliament
and can make laws regarding the same.” The implementation of this power of the
parliament under Article 16(3) was witnessed when the Parliament enacted the Public
Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 19572 aimed at abolishing all existing
residence requirements in the states and leaving exceptions for Andhra Pradesh, Manipur,
Tripura and Himachal Pradesh.
3. It is humbly submitted that domicile-based reservations though are allowed in educational
institutions but they carry the rationale of giving back to the state. First, since the state
finances these colleges from taxpayers, they deserve a reciprocal benefit. Second, there is
a high possibility that the majority of the talent generated will be retained within the state
leading to its development. But such considerations do not translate into matters of
private employment. No taxpayer money is involved in the private firms, business etc.
Furthermore, there is no surety of people employed under the private sector to remain in
the same place forever and thus the same rationale cannot be applied.
2
Act no

4. Furthermore, in 1995, the Supreme Court, in the case of Sunanda Reddy v state of
Andhra Pradesh3, upheld the decision in Pradeep Jain and struck down the policy that
allowed an extra 5% weightage in marks for candidates with Telugu as a medium of their
instruction. In this judgement, the Supreme Court quoted from the Pradeep Jain
judgement: “Now if India is one nation and there is only one citizenship, namely,
citizenship of India, and every citizen has a right to move freely throughout the territory
of India and to reside and settle in any part of India…. it is difficult to see how a citizen
having his permanent home in Tamil Nadu or speaking Tamil language can be regarded
as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh. To regard him as an outsider would be to deny him his
constitutional rights and to derecognize the essential unity and integrity of the country by
treating it as if it were a mere conglomeration of independent States.”
1.2 THAT SUCH POWERS IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD BE AGAINST THE

FOUNDATION OF INDIANA
5. It is humbly submitted that the Preamble of the Constitution of Indiana was framed with
great care and deliberation so that it reflects the high purpose and objective of the
Constitution makers. At a time when caste and religious centered controversies are
ubiquitous to Indiana and communal riots due to religion, caste, creed, region etc. are
common in the nation, giving such promotion to regional loyalty at the expense of
national integrity serves as a blow to the philosophy of our constitution.
6. It is humbly submitted that Article 1 of the Constitution proceeds to declare that Indiana
shall be a Union of States but emphasizes that though a Union of States, it is still one
nation with one citizenship. Part II recognizes only Indian citizenship; it does not
recognise the citizenship of any State forming a part of the Union.
7. In State of Karnataka v Union of India & Another 4, the court stated that the Central
Government has the power to give direction to the State Government, doing so not
because of geographical or territorial unit reason but because they are constitutionally
empowered to do so. Similarly, in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Union of India5,
the Supreme Court held that the Indian constitution does not promote a principle of
absolute federalism and that “the central government is the final authority for any issue.
The political power distributed between both union and state government with greater
weight given to the union government.”
3

8. In State of Rajasthan v Union of India6, 1977 former Chief Justice Beg, stated that if our
constitution creates a central government which is amphibian in the sense that it can be
either federal or unitary according to the need of the situation and the circumstance of the
case. Furthermore, it is submitted that the if such domicile-based discrimination is
allowed, then a contradicting paradigm would be created wherein the outsiders of a
particular domicile who have been vested the fundamental rights by virtue their
citizenship could be deprived of it because of the state-created domicile-based
discrimination. As mentioned earlier, doing so will result in creating a parallel citizenship
to the citizenship of Indiana which threatens the foundational structure of cooperative
federalism on which Indiana is based upon.
CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE
POWER TO DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS
FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the constitution does not have any
provision for domicile-based reservations in employment for the private sector. Article 16(3)
talks about domicile-based reservations but limits them to the public sector under the
exclusive discretion of the parliament.
2.1 THAT THE STATE DOESN’T HAVE ANY SUCH POWERS

9. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that through the 93rd Constitutional
Amendment of 20057, the State was allowed to implement reservations in private unaided
educational institutions for greater access of quality higher education to SC/ST’s.
However, it did not provide for reservations of employment in private companies. Thus,
private companies which are not aided by government or fall under the public domain
cannot be forced to select candidates on any other ground but merit.
10. Domicile-based reservations in educational institutions whether aided by the government
or not are commonplace but they carry the rationale of giving back to the state that cannot
be extended to private sector employment as has already explained earlier. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in the case, P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra8 held that paucity

of resources in government institutions cannot be a reason for forcing private institutions

to implement reservation policies.
11. It is humbly submitted that the power to create domicile-based reservation in private
sector if provided to the state would go against the constitutional ethos of article 19 (1)
(g). In Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India 9, the SC observed that if a
restriction on a trade directly and proximately interferes with the freedom of trade, it
becomes challengeable under Article 19(1)(g).
12. Under Article 19(1)(g), all citizens have a fundamental right to practice any profession, or
to carry on any occupation, trade or business as a fundamental right. Mandating private
institutions to employ a certain set of candidates constricts the right to carry on their
occupation freely. A reservation policy in the private sector imposes regulation on the
selection process and the standard yardsticks for selection takes away the freedom which
the private enterprises enjoy.
2.2 THAT SUCH RESERVATION IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD DIRECTLY AND

PROXIMATELY INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF TRADE
13. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that along with violating the
constitutional ethos, such reservations come with extreme economic implications which
are contrary to the interests of the natives of state, the outsiders as well as of the nation.
Reservations would directly and proximately interfere with the employers right to
freedom of trade in the following ways:
14. Reduced mobility of labour: Restricting the sources of employment would mean that
more time would be required to find candidates. This would make businesses inelastic if
they would want to upscale their operations which would in turn, disrupt and dismantle
the entire wheel of the economy by gravely reducing the mobility and free flow of labour.
15. Companies forced to either skill or their efficiency: In this era where scouting for global
talent is the key to gaining competitive advantage, the short-sighted and ill-informed
strategy severely robs the private companies of their freedom to recruit employees as per
their needs. Under such circumstances, the companies are either forced to sacrifice skill
or their efficiency.
16. Companies forced to either opt for capital intensive methods or to leave Devbhoomi: It
is further submitted that companies hire when they are assured of the suitability of the
candidate and then further invest in the upgradation of their skills. However, because of
9

reservations they will be forced to invest substantially in advance which would increase
the cost of labour. This has the potential to backfire as companies would now be forced to
either opt for capital-intensive methods or leave the state of Devbhoomi destroying the
already existing jobs too. Furthermore, several small businesses would entirely run out of
business since they wouldn’t have the resources to do either of these.
17. Antithetical to a booming business regime: It is humbly submitted that reserving jobs in
the private sector is also a delegation of the state government's duty to invest in and
improve the skill-based or vocational education and training of its people; the result of
which is a trade-off where an employer can either incur costs and bear risks of skill
upgradation of an unfamiliar candidate or compromise in talent. Such a law is antithetical
to a booming business regime and can over time, kill the pace of economic growth and
private investments leading into a pit hole of unemployment and poverty.
CONTENTION 03: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL

CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
18. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that to be held unconstitutional, a statute
must either be in excess of legislative competence or because the matter offends some
Constitutional restrictions.10 In the case at hand, The Devbhoomi State Employment of
Local Candidates Act, 2020 (herein after referred to as “the Act”) is ultra vires as the state
legislature is not the competent authority to enact the said Act. Further it also contravenes
fundamental rights and mandatory provisions in the Constitution. It is also contended that
the provisions in the Act are vague, unreasonable and overboard in the following ways
and hence is to be declared unconstitutional.
3.1 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 14

19. It is submitted that the Act violates the right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution. The Constitution of Indiana allows classification of people/things for the
purpose of a legislation for providing protection11 and insure equality.
20. A legislative classification must be reasonable and must rest upon some substantial
distinction with a reasonable relation for which such classification is made 12. For a
classification to be reasonable two tests must be fulfilled: - (20.1) the classification must
10
COOLEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIbONS,359, (8th edn., 2011).
11
Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1956 SC 479,
12
Mahendra Pal Singh, V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India 52 (Eastern Book Company 2017)

be founded on an intelligible differentia and (20.2-20.3) the differentia must have a

rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question 13. Further,
(20.4-20.6) the classification must not be based on an arbitrary foundation14.
20.1 The classification made is not founded on an intelligible differentia:
Intelligible differentia is a test which uses rational/reasonable grounds to distinguish
between people or things. However, in the instant case the distinction made between
the native and the non – natives for providing reservations in private jobs is
unreasonable, and thus does not have intelligible differentia. It was held in Pradeep
Jain that even valid discrimination bas ed solely on residence cannot be sustained if
it is unreasonable. The Act imposes a blanket and unreasonable restriction on
employment of outsiders in all private jobs. Such blanket restriction has been put in
place without any deliberation on the purpose for prescribing such classification
between domiciles of the state and outsider.
20.2 That the classification made has no rational nexus with the object sought to
be achieved by this Act: The basis of classification made by the state must be
according to the object of the law15. The differentia must have a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question 16. In the present case, the
objective behind enacting the Act was the upliftment of the unskilled natives by
providing them jobs in private sector, however no demarcation has been made
between the skilled and unskilled workers of Devbhoomi for the purposes of the
reservation making it unclear who will use these reservations for their benefit.
20.3 It is submitted that the only classification that is made the basis for the Act is
50,000 rupees. However, this classification is also unreasonable as this pre-condition
of remuneration operates on the presumption that only factory and blue-collar jobs
fall within it but in reality, the median salary for Indiana’s population is below forty
thousand rupees17. Thus, this classification encompasses majority of jobs. This
arbitrary restriction on the outsiders in all private jobs deprives them of their
constitutional right to employment.
20.4 That the quantum of reservation provided is arbitrary: The Supreme Court in
the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 18 held that reservation under Art’s.
13
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222
14
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (2) SCR 621
15
Prabhakar Rao H. Mawle v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1827, ¶ 6.
16
Anwar Ali, supra note 2, at ¶ 46
17
Source it
18

15(4) and 16(4) should not exceed 50%. It should be held as Constitutional
prohibition and any reservation beyond 50% would be liable to be struck down. The
Court further opined that no provision of reservation or preference can be so
vigorously pursued as to destroy the very concept of equality.
20.5 Furthermore, in M Nagaraj Vs Union of India19, a five-judge bench ruled that
the ceiling of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely,
backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency are
all Constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity
in Article 16 would collapse.
20.6 A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. Jaishri
Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister & Ors20., struck down the Maharashtra law
granting reservation to the Maratha community in admissions and government jobs in
the state in the Maratha quota case on May 5, 2021. The court held that there is no
need to revisit the Indra Sawhney case and the 50% ceiling, although an arbitrary
determination by the court in 1992, is now constitutionally recognized. It is submitted
that the 75% reservation imposed by the Act in the present case at hand is off the
reasonable limits and exceeds the cap laid down in the Indra Sawhney case. The
reservation granted to the natives under the Act is violative of the Constitutional
provisions and cannot be classified as an extraordinary situation and hence is to be
struck down by this Hon’ble bench being ultra vires to the Constitution.
21. It is submitted further that the act also confers arbitrary power upon executive. The SC in
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India21 held that a statute which confers discretion on the
executive must furnish criteria or guidelines for exercise of that discretion. Without such
criteria or guidelines if the discretion in effect confers arbitrary power, the statute will be
hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Additionally in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi22 the Court held that wherever there is arbitrariness in State action – Article
14 must immediately spring into action to strike down such state action. Article 14 is
meant to strike back at arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary involves negation
of equality.
22. In the present case, the discretion whether an employer’s claim regarding the non –
availability of desired local candidate for the job is true or false confers arbitrary power to
19
20
21
22

the designated officer, as he will the sole authority to decide whether a particular
employer can be exempted from the reservation or not. This clearly amounts to
arbitrariness and hence is violative of Article 14.
20.7 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 16
23. It is humbly submitted that in Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India23, the bench agreed to the
fact that the word ‘domicile’ in the general parlance refers to domicile “not in its
technical legal sense but in a popular sense as meaning residence and is intended to
convey the idea of intention to reside permanently or indefinitely.” The meaning of
domicile was understood in the same sense in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad24
where it was held that “residence” and “domicile” carry the same meaning, in as much as
both refer to the permanent home.
24. In the Act, the foundation already established in the above-mentioned cases is being
followed where Section 2(g) of the Act defines local candidate as someone who is
domiciled in the state of Devbhoomi. Furthermore, the factual matrix uses the words
“native”, “local resident” and “domiciled” in the state of Devbhoomi quite loosely and
interchangeably implying the same meaning to all of these terms. Thus, it is humbly
submitted that the understanding of the word “domicile” in respect to the Act, implies the
place of residence. Article 16 explicitly affirms that domicile discrimination is
impermissible through its words that no discrimination is allowed on the basis of “place
of birth” and/or “residence”.
25. Articles 14, 15 and 16 form the same thread ensuring the right to equality and supplement
each other25 and by not adhering to any of these principles, the Act introduced by the state
of Devbhoomi is in contradiction to the constitutional ethos of the nation and thus should
be held invalid.
3.4: THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 (1) (G)
26. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservation by the State
Government in a private establishment violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of
Indiana. By mandating private institutions to employ a certain set of candidates, the Act
constricts their right to carry on their occupation freely.
23
24
Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad AIR 2000 SC 525
25
State of Kerela v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490, ¶ 10.

27. The 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005 allowed the state to make provisions for
the advancement of socially and educationally backward citizens or SC/ST in matters
relating to admission in private educational institutions. However, the amendment does
not give power to the state to make such provisions for employment in private institutions
and therefore, any law in this regard lacks a Constitutional support. In 2016, the
government of Karnataka proposed 100% reservation in blue collared jobs in private
sector industries26. It was contended that the government may recommend the private
sector to give preference to Kannadigas but they cannot enforce any binding law upon
recruiting locals on them.
28. The reservation policy imposed by Act effectively interferes with the Constitutional rights
of private enterprises to carry on their trade freely, especially when they do not receive
any Standard Operating Procedures from the government and the law also fails on
Constitutional touchstone. The counsel for the petitioners most respectfully put forth
before this Court that the Act makes it imperative for the organizations to employ local
candidates. Prima facie, the Act is in utter violation of the rights of the employers.
29. This act also violates Article 19 (1)(e) as a person has a right to reside and settle in any
part of India. But this act restricts a person to exercise this right and settle in Devbhoomi
because to reside and settle at a place, employment is must. But 75% of them being
reserved doesn’t give them a reasonable opportunity to secure a job and settle in
Devbhoomi, and thus violating Article 19 (1)(e).
3.5: THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 21
30. It is humbly submitted by the counsel for the Petitioner that the Act violates the right to
live with dignity of the people enshrined under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. The
liberty of an individual is a matter of fundamental natural law, a private preserve, and
must be safeguarded from unnecessary interference 27. The scope of Art. 21 is very broad
and it covers every aspect which is required for an individual to live a healthy and secured
life 28
31. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India29, characterizing Art. 21 as the heart of
fundamental rights, Bhagwati J. observed: “It is the fundamental right of everyone in this
country… to live with human dignity free from exploitation…. it must include protection
26
Kya case hai yeh
27
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (1975) 2 SCC 148
28
See generally M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, pp. 1131, (7th Edition, Lexis Nexis - 2017)
29

of the health and strength of workers, men and women…, opportunities and facilities for
children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity,
educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.
32. In the present case, if 75% reserved employment of local candidates whose gross monthly
salary is not more than 50, 0000 is to be made effective, it would mean that the employers
(to escape the punitive fines) would have to lay off the non-native people working at
present in the said category which clearly violates their human dignity. To be noted is
also the fact that no provisions are made to restore the position of the laid off employees.
33. Article 21 also includes the right to livelihood. The Court, in Board of Trustees of the
Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni 30, came to hold that ‘the
right to life’ guaranteed by Article 21 includes ‘the right to livelihood’. In The Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation31, a five-judge bench of the Court implied that
the right to livelihood is borne out of the right to life. The Court further observed: “The
sweep of the right to life conferred by Art.21 is wide and far-reaching… An equally
important facet of the right to life is the right to livelihood because no person can live
without the means of livelihood.”
34. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that by implementing such a domicile-
based reservations, a direct implication would be that people from other states would not
be able to seek employment in Devbhoomi since there’s an active discrimination working
against them by the state violating their right to livelihood.
35. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the acquittal of the accused persons
by the Hon’ble High court is not justified as the acts of the accused persons were
unlawful and punishable u/s 147,148,149,302,307,326,120B and 34 of the Indiana Penal
Code.
4.1: THE ACCUSED ARE GULITY U/S 147,148 AND 149 OF IPC
30
31

36. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the accused can be held guilty for
rioting u/s 147 if the essentials u/s 146 are fulfilled. It is humbly submitted that there was
an unlawful assembly which used force and violence in persecution of a common object.
37. THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY : To constitute an 'unlawful assembly', it
should be established that there was an unlawful assembly of five or more persons 32, who
have a common object among33 the five specified u/s 14634. In the present case, Mr. Teja
Singh was accompanied by 25 armed personnel to Uchihar. Out of these 25-armed
personnel, Mr. Teja Singh, Mr. Kalia, Mr Vibhuti Mr Ranga and 7 others are guilty of the
offences committed. Thus, the first pre - requisite that there must be 5 or more people is
fulfilled. In Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar 35, the Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that there would be an unlawful assembly of five or more persons, even if less
than that number have been convicted by it.
38. Secondly, the common object has to be essentially inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, manner of
executing the common object and so on36. Acts and conduct of the accused also operate as
guiding factors37. It is submitted that when we apply these aforementioned tests in the
present case it can clearly be laid out that the common object of the unlawful assembly
was to instigate violence in an otherwise peaceful protest, create chaos, disharmony and
stifle the dissent.
39. It is humbly submitted that the accused knew of massive protests being held to prevent
the Chief Minister to enter Uchihar. If the primary motive was to reach the destination
safely, the accused could’ve taken any other route but they remained insistent to go into
the angry crowd despite DSP S.P Pandey warning them against doing so due to security
reasons. Furthermore, the language used by Mr. Kalia, “how to deal with this disorderly
conduct of protestors” conveys how their primary concern was to “deal” with the
protestors and not to reach their destination safely.
40. Additionally, the statement of PW 1 confirms the preparation that the accused had done to
achieve the common object as the accused seemed well prepared to create such a situation
32
Khajah Noorul Hossein v C Fabre-Tonnerre, 24 WR 26, p 27; Masalti v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC
202 [LNIND 1964 SC 173] , p 211 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 226 ; State v Banamali Maharana, 25 Cut LT 433; State of
Kerala v KJ Thomas, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 661 : (1961) Mad LJ (Cr) 45; Upendra Nath v State, (1968) Cut LT 226;
33
Amar Singh v state of Punjab -pg 397
34
Sheik yusuf
35
Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 573 , pp 578–579; see also Shaji v State of Kerala, (2005)
Cr LJ 3121 (Ker) (DB
36
37

of violence. It is further submitted that the third essential: the common object of the
unlawful assembly in the present case is falling under section 141(1), (2) and clause (3).
41. THERE WAS USE OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE : The word “force” in section 146 of the
IPC, has to be understood as defined in the Oxford Dictionary, “Strength exerted on an
object, power, impetus”. “Violence” is a word of wider import than “force” and includes
force used against inanimate objects also38. In the present case, Mr. Teja and his armed
personnel forcefully removed the barricades, ensued violence and force by threatening the
protestors with armed weapons. Furthermore, accelerating a car at maximum speed
among hundreds of protestors and open firing at them all encapsulates under force and
violence.
42. SUCH VIOLENCE WAS IN PERSECUTION OF A COMMON OBJECT : The common
object of the unlawful assembly has already been proved. The violence and force ensued
was clearly to obtain that objective. Thus, all the essentials are being met fairly and all the
accused are guilty of rioting and should be punished as per punishment laid u/s 147 of
IPC.
43. Furthermore, it is submitted that to constitute an offence under Section 148, a person
must be a member of such an unlawful assembly which along with being guilty of the
offence of rioting under Section 146 is also armed with a deadly weapon.
44. Where members of unlawful assembly carry arms with common object, it is immaterial
whether all the arms carried by all accused persons were used or not 39. In the present case,
all the accused were carrying pistols and arms and those arms were used for inflicting
violence which can clearly be corroborated with factual matrix, witness statements, FIR
and Forensic Report.
45. Sec 149 propounds a vicarious liability in two contingencies by declaring that if a
member of an unlawful assembly commits an offence in prosecution of the common
object of that assembly, then every member of such unlawful assembly is guilty of the
offence committed by the other members of the unlawful assembly40.
38
Maiku v State, AIR 1953 All 749 , p 750 : 54 Cr LJ 729, p 750; Samaruddi v Emperor, 40 ILR Cal 367, pp
373-74 : 13 Cr LJ 821; Re Marimuthu Naidu, AIR 1923 Mad 606 [LNIND 1923 MAD 345] : 25 Cr LJ 139;
Venkatambbia v Crown, AIR 1923 Mad 603 [LNIND 1922 MAD 221] : 24 Cr LJ 356
39
Saddik @ Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh v State of Gujarat, 2016 (7) Supreme 202 : AIR 2016 SC 5101
[LNIND 2016 SC 401] .
40
See Sundar Singh Vs. State, AIR 1955 All 232 (FB) 14See Sabir v. Queen Empress, (1894) ILR 22 Cal 276;
In re Choitano Ranto and Others, AIR 1916 Mad 788 15 See Shambu Nath Singh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1960
SC 725.

46. Even in cases where all the members of the unlawful assembly do not share the same
common object to commit a particular offence, if they had the knowledge of the fact that
particular offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the
unlawful assembly even if the common object may be different41. Mere knowledge of
likely commission of an act or the commission of the offence by any member of unlawful
assembly also attracts the provision of section 149, IPC42.
47. In Sheo Prasad Bhor v State of Assam 43, it was held that when charge under section 149,
IPC is made, it is not necessary that each accused should be assigned independent part
played in the beating. If it is found that one of them was a member of the unlawful
assembly which ultimately caused the death of the deceased, then all who were members
of the unlawful assembly can be held liable and convicted.
48. Similarly in the present case, the offence of murder and grievous hurt committed was in
prosecution of common object and even if individual act cannot be assigned to every
member, the fact that they all had knowledge of likely consequences of open firing at the
crowd and accelerating the car in crowd makes all the 11 accused liable under Section
149 IPC.
4.2: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY U/S 120B, 326, 307,302 READ WITH S. 32
49. It is submitted that meeting of minds to form a criminal conspiracy u/s 120B has to be
proved by adducing substantive evidence in cases where circumstantial evidence is
incomplete or vague44 The essential ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy are an agreement
between two or more persons which relates to doing or causing to be done either an
illegal act or an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means.
50. For an offence u/s 120B IPC, it need not necessarily be proved that the conspirators
expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved
by necessary implication. It is not necessary that each member of the conspiracy must
know all the details of the conspiracy. The offence can be proved largely from the
inferences drawn from the acts or illegal omission committed by the conspirators in
pursuance of a common design45.
41
Koli Jesa Arjan v State, (1988) 15 Rep 556 (Guj).
42
Rohit Yadav v State of Bihar, 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 202 (Pat).
43
44
2013 AIR SCW 5848
45
Source them kahin se.., a lot of claims

51. Further, the law does not require that the act of agreement take any particular form and
the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. 46 In the present case,
on 24th May at around 6:00 am, Teja Singh went to the place of event with his 25-armed
personnel even after knowing that there was a massive protest and his visit will make the
protestors violent and the law and order of the city can get worse. Forcefully removing
the barricades and the statement of PW1 further points towards the prior meeting of
minds of the accused to act on their intention to instil violence.
52. It is humbly submitted that despite one’s not making any overt act, if he is found to be a
party, that is to say, he had agreed to the common design and had not resiled he is guilty
of conspiracy.47 In this instant case, Mr Teja was stopped by the DSP Uchihar Mr. S.P
Pandey so that the peace can be maintained but the accused forcefully removed the
barricades, accelerated the car and mowed down protestors, killing three and grievously
hurting many others. He gave order to his associates not to stop whatever and whoever
comes in between them and all of his associates followed those instructions thus,
participating in the overt act with the shared agreement to cause harm and create chaos.
Thus, the accused should be held guilty u/s 120B of IPC.
53. It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt
by dangerous weapons or means to the protestors, thereby being an offender under
Section 326 of IPC.
54. VOLUNTARILY CAUSING HURT: The act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt has been
defined under Section 322. Intention to cause hurt, or knowledge that an act is likely to
cause hurt, is the most decisive factor to decide whether a person can be held guilty of
voluntarily causing hurt48. Furthermore, it is submitted that even if the necessary intention
is not proved, the requirement of the explanation will stand satisfied if the offender is
shown to have the knowledge that, by his act, he was likely to cause grievous hurt49
55. It is submitted that in the present case, the accused had the knowledge that if they would
accelerate the car in a heavily crowded place, it is bound to hit and maw down people.
The accused’s intention can clearly be interpreted from the words “do not stop the car no
matter what or who comes in front of the car”. Thus, it can clearly be seen that all the
accused had the knowledge and intention to cause grievous hurt.
46
Dharmarajan v State, 2014 CrLJ 3162 : 2014 (2) KLJ 314 .
47
Ashok Datta Naik v State, 1979 CrLJ (NOC) 95 (Goa); Jagat Narain v State of Punjab, 1979 CrLJ (NOC) 106
(Punj) : 1979 Raj LW 192
48
Abdul Karim v State of Maharashtra, 1978 Cr LJ 1485 , p 1487 (Bom).
49
Joseph Cheriyan v State, AIR 1953 Tr & Coch 129 : 54 Cr LJ 706.

56. THE HURT CAUSED IS GRIEVOUS: Grievous hurt is hurt of an aggravated form.
Section 320 states specify the nature of injuries that can be categorized as ‘grievous hurt’.
The eighth clause u/s 320 is a general clause which covers all injuries which endanger
life50 or which caused bodily pain or disrupted a person’s routine activity for twenty days
or more.
57. GRIEVOUS HURT BY DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS : It is humbly submitted that
dangerous weapons under section 326 IPC covers even instruments which are not
designed for use as weapons, but are capable of being used as weapons. No generalisation
can be made about what constitutes a ‘dangerous weapon’. It needs to be ascertained in
the light of the facts of each case51.
58. Further, it also includes causing hurt by dangerous means. In People v. Aguilar52 it was
observed that a car can be considered a deadly weapon insofar as it is an instrument that
can be used in a way to cause substantial, significant or great bodily injury or death, so it
can be classified as a deadly weapon. Perusal of the facts, it can clearly be seen that car
was used as a weapon to inflict grievous hurt.
59. It is further submitted before the Hon’ble bench that Teja, Kalia, Vibhuti and Ranga are
guilty of an unlawful offence under Section 307 of IPC. In State of Maharashtra v
Balram Bama Pate53 the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that the injury
caused to the victim should be sufficient to cause the death. What the Court has to see is
whether the act, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in this section.
60. For the purpose of conviction under section 307, IPC the prosecution needs to prove that
there was an intention to commit murder and the act was done by the accused.
61. THE INTENTION: It is submitted that whether the accused person intended to commit
murder of another may be traced in his acts, and attended facts and circumstances. The
type of weapons he carried and the nature and situs of injury inflicted by him may be of
great assistance to the court for ascertaining his “intention”. Intention may also be
gathered from the words uttered, if any, at the time of the incident, motive of the accused,
50
Ramla v State of Rajasthan, (1963) 1 CrLJ 387.
51
Prabhu V State of Madhya Pradesh 2008(15 )SCALE228 , 2008(13 ) JT72 14
52
People v. Aguilar (1997) 18 Cal.4th 1023
53

and severity of the blows given, etc. However, it needs to stress that it is not necessary
that injury caused is capable of causing death54
62. In the present case, following words, instances and weapons clearly point out the
intention of the accused to instigate violence amongst the protestors and create
disharmony and chaos:
 Mr. Teja deploys his official security guards at his home and instead travels to
Uchihar with 25 other armed personnel despite having the knowledge about the
thousands of people protesting to stop him from entering Uchihar. He then asks Mr.
Teja how to deal with the disorderly conduct of protestors instead of discussing the
possibilities of reaching their destination safely. When DSP S.P Pandey insists on Mr.
Teja returning due to safety concerns, Mr. Teja ignores the requests and directs his
associates to remove the barricades and to not stop under any circumstances. Mr.
Kalia and Mr. Ranga asks the protestors to step back or their one negligent act could
cause the life of hundreds and finally Mr. Teja directs his associates to accelerate the
car amongst the heavy crowd at maximum speed and not stop whatever or whoever
comes in between.
63. THE ACT: In the case of Liyakat Mian v State of Bihar55 the accused shot a person from
very close quarters causing injuries on the abdomen and the left arm. It was held that the
knowledge that the injury caused by him would result in death could be imputed to the
accused. For a charge of attempted murder u/s 307 IPC, the accused must discharge or
fire the firearm and if the shot misses or the weapon malfunctions he nevertheless has
committed an act capable of causing death under s 30756.
64. It is submitted that in the present case, after hitting three men when Mr. Teja’s vehicle
crashes into the divider. Mr. Teja, Mr. Vibhuti and three other associates stepped out of
the car with licensed arms and started to open fire at the protestors. The Act of the
accused persons firing at the crowd of protestors from close quarters point towards the
intention for an attempt to murder. If the intention would have been to safeguard their
own selves and escape the danger, shots fired from any one person would have been
sufficient.
54
Jage Ram v State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 [LNIND 2015 SC 60]; Ghulam Mustafa v State of
Uttarakhand, (2016) 15 SCC 752; Vineet Mahajan v State of Punjab, (2017) 14 SCC 803 [LNIND 2017 SC 275]
: AIR 2017 SC 2939 [LNIND 2017 SC 275]. Shyam Sharma v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 9 SCC 362
55
Liyakat Mian v State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 807 : (1973) Cr LJ 584 (SC) : (1973) 4 SCC 39
56
Awadesh Mahto v State of Bihar(1979) Cri LJ 1275, HC (Patna); R v Francis Cassidy(1867) 4 Bom HCR (Cr
Ca) 17, HC (Bom); Queen Empress v Niddha(1891) XIV 14 All 38, HC (All)

65. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mangal Singh v. Kishan Singh57 that a
firearm shot missing the victim would fall under Section 307 of the Code (IPC). For a
charge under the Penal Codes 307 to succeed the accused must discharge or fire the
firearm and if the shot misses or the weapon malfunctions he nevertheless has committed
an offence u/s 30758. Similarly in the present case, the founding 9 bullet shells clearly
implies that these shots were fired at the crowd with the intention to cause death or such
grave harm which is likely to cause death.
66. It is humbly contended that the accused is guilty for committing the offence of murder
under Sec 302 IPC keeping in consideration the essentials u/s 300 IPC. The Prosecution
humbly contends that both, the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime are established in
the instant matter, negating any claims of private defense.
67. ACTUS REA IS PROVEN: It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, the actus reus is
established by way of factual matrix and witness statements. The circumstantial evidence
in the instant matter shows that within all human probability, the act must have been done
by the accused.59
68. In the morning of 24th May, 2020, as per PW (5) and the factual matrix, Mr Teja asked
Kalia to forcefully removed the barricades after brief argument with the officer.
According to the confessional statement of PW 4, the accused, Vibhuti Singh, ran car
over the protestors leading to the deaths of three protestors. Further, post this as per PW
3, Teja Singh opened fire at the crowd, leading to the death of the reporter, Prashant
Tamde, reaffirmed by the post mortem report which clearly lays down that the death was
caused by a gunshot wound.
69. In a case where murder was caused in the prosecution of rioting, it is not required for the
accused to be assigned a specific over act, all the accused will be liable who are sharing
the membership of the unlawful assembly and have the same unlawful objective.60
70. MENS REA IS PROVEN: Mens rea is considered as guilty intention61, which is proved or
inferred from the acts of the accused62. It is submitted that the intention to kill is
established in light of clear-cut motive of the accused & preparation of the accused.
57
58
Awadesh Mahto v State of Bihar(1979) Cri LJ 1275, HC (Patna); R v Francis Cassidy(1867) 4 Bom HCR (Cr
Ca) 17, HC (Bom); Queen Empress v Niddha(1891) XIV 14 All 38, HC (All)
59
Bakshish Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016
60
Bhe Ram vs State Of Haryana on 29 March, 1979, Sardara v state of Haryana
61
Commissioner of Income Tax v Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, AIR 1982 PH 1, 4
62
State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722

80.1 The accused had intention to kill: It is presumed that every sane person
intends the result that his action will produce and if a person hits another on a
vulnerable part of the body, and death occurs as a result, the intention of the accused
can be no other than to take the life of the victim and the offence committed is
murder.63 Moreover, the intention to kill is not required in every case, mere knowledge
that natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice for a
conviction u/s 302 of IPC. 64
80.2 The intention to kill can be inferred from the murder and nature of the injuries
caused to the victim.65 Causing a serious injury on a vital part of the body of the
deceased with a dangerous weapon leads to the inference that the accused intended to
cause death or bodily injury sufficient to cause death of the victim. 66 Given that the
accused shot the victim in left part of the chest and ran car over the protestors, injuring
vital parts of the body67, it is logical to conclude that he intended to cause the death of
the victim.
80.3 The accused had motive to kill: Sec 8, Evidence Act stipulates that any fact is
relevant which shows or constitutes motive or preparation for any fact in issue or
relevant fact. Thus, previous threats or altercations between parties are admitted to
show motive.68 It is further pertinent to note that if there is motive in doing an act, then
the adequacy of that motive is not in all cases necessary. Heinous offences have been
committed for very slight motive.69 As already established in, all the accused were
participant of unlawful assembly sharing an unlawful objective to instigate violence.
80.4 Preparation of the accused: The Supreme Court of India interpreted the word
“Preparation” not only as of the action or process of preparing the components to
produce the compound, but also that which it is prepared 70 Though preparation by itself
is not punishable and is irrelevant if the offence is not committed or is not even
63
(1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635
64
Santosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 602 (SC)
65
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803
66
Md. Idrish v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 1724 (Raj); Md. Sharif And Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 380; Badri v. State of
U.P., AIR 19953 All 189; Dibia v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373, State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu Berad,
AIR 1956 Bom 609
67
Factsheet, post mortem reports of the victims
68
Son Lal v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 1142, Chhotka v State of WB, AIR 1958 Cal 482
69
State v Dinakar Bandu (1969) 72 Bom LR 905
70
Union of India & others Vs Formulators Association of India, 2002 8 SCC 410

attempted, preparation is proof of premeditation71 where the offence or its attempt is

committed.
80.5 In Appu v. State72, it was held that the fact that the 4 accused brought bar
made of iron and a pair of pincers it amounted to preparation on the part of the accused.
Which clearly showed an intention to commit the offence of burglary. Similarly in the
present case, the fact that Teja Singh was accompanied by 25 armed personals along
with the heavy ammunition clearly points towards the intention to instigate violence
and suppress the dissent. The same can be corroborated from the confessional statement
of PW (1).
71. THE ACCUSED CANOT AVAIL THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENSE : It is humbly
submitted that one of the foremost principles for private defence to be kept in mind is that
there must be an imminent danger giving the signal to act in exercise of the right of
private defence73 and thus, private defence does not include the right to launch an
offensive attack.74
72. It is further submitted that imminent danger in the present case could have been avoided.
The accused should have tried the other possible routes or they should have opted another
safe way to escape. Instead of opening fire the accused could have fired a warning shot,
or at the very least, fired at some other part of the body, given that in exercising the right
to private defence, one of the most important caveats is that no more harm than is
necessary should be caused.75
73. It is thus apparent that the accused exceeded his right of private defence and any defence
of ‘necessity’76 also cannot be claimed by him as an act of necessity must be done with a
bona fide intent and without any unnecessary force or violence 77. Furthermore, there can
be no right of private defence where the riot is premeditated on both sides78. In the present
case, the entire thing was pre planned and the accused share no bona fide intent, and thus
shouldn’t be given a defense of private defense. Before accepting the plea of right of
private defence, it is necessary to consider whether there was reasonable apprehension in
the mind of the accused that an offence is likely to commit and there was no sufficient
71
J V Ryan, The Law of Criminal Evidence in British India, Calcutta, 1912, p 15.
72
AIR 1971 Mad 194
73
Hari Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 1505
74
Shajahan v State of Kerala, (2007) 12 SCC 96
75
State of Haryana v Mewa Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1407
76
Sec 81, IPC
77
Gopal Naidu v. Emperor AIR 1923 Mad 523
78
Cite this case law

time to have recourse to the protection of public authority. 79 25. However, in the present
case, the accused had the reasonable apprehension that if he continued on the same route,
violence will occur. Despite knowing this and being warned by DSP, he continued to
move forward and thus he cannot be granted the plea of private defence.
74. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused is guilty for
the offence of murder, given that the requisite mens rea and actus reus is established from
the facts of the case, beyond a reasonable doubt.
75. Furthermore, it is humbly submitted that ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally
for a criminal act done by him. However, section 34 of IPC makes an exception to this
principle and lays down the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The
soul of section 34 IPC is the joint liability in doing a criminal act.80
76. As observed in Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab81 the existence of a common intention
amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section.
To constitute common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of them was
known to the rest of them and was shared by them.82 It was held in Bherusingh v State83
that when the accused persons tried to escape after attacking the victim which caused his
death, they act in close concert and harbour the common intention of beating the deceased
which falls u/s 34 IPC.
77. Similarly in the present case, the accused drove together in a convoy to the place of event.
That the accused had common intention in committing the crime has already been
established through the accompanying circumstances, behaviours and statement of
witnesses. After committing the act, the accused also fled from the crime scene together.
All of this point towards their joint liability towards committing the act and thus the
accused should be held guilty u/s 34 of the IPC.
79
80
Kuria v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1085 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] : (2012) 10 SCC 433 [LNIND 2012 SC
678] 2012 Cr LJ 4707 (SC).
81
Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109 : (1977) 1 SCC 746 .
82
(1979) 47 Cut LT 330 (338) : ILR (1979) 1 Cut 356 .
83
Bherusingh v State, 1956 Madh BLJ 905 : 1956 Madh BLR (Cri) 209 : AIR 1956 Madh Bha 269 (270) : 1956
Cr LJ 1408 (DB).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsels on behalf of the Prosecution humbly pray before the Hon’ble Sessions Court at
Bangalore to kindly adjudge and declare that: -
a. That the state legislature of Devbhoomi does not have any specific power to make
laws/policies for domicile-based reservations.
b. That the state government do not have the power to direct the employers of private
sector to reserve jobs for local candidates.
c. That the Devbhoomi State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020 is
unconstitutional.
d. That the accused are guilty of the offence u/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120b and
34 of the indian penal code, 1860 and the high court of Devbhoomi has erred in
acquitting them.
AND/OR
Pass any other order which the bench deems fit in the best interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness the Counsels on behalf of the Prosecution as in
duty bound shall forever pray.
All of which is respectfully submitted

__________________________
SD/-
Counsels for Prosecution

Memorial Petitioner

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TEAM CODE:

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

Petition invoked under Article 32 of Indiana Constitution

WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020

SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER

STATE OF DEVBHOOMI DEFENDANT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022

MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS DEFENCE

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................

SCC Supreme Court Cases

U/S Under Section

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

 The Constitution of India, 1949 (Act )

BOOKS AND DIGESTS

DICTIONARIES, ONLINE DATABASES & WEBSITES

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

3. B. Venkat Swamy v. Vijaya Nehru (2008) 10 SCC 260 4

4. Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 2

5. Brij Bhushan Sharma v. State of U. P 2001 CriLJ 1384 15

6. Brij Mohan v. State 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2312 2

7. C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 9

8. Chattar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 14 SCC 667 9

9. Chhotanney v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 2013 15

10. Firoz Khan v. Union of India AIR 2007 Ori 81 5

11. Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516 14

12. Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619 4

13. Gopi Nath v. State of U. P (2001) 6 SCC 620 7

14. Govindaswamy v. State of Kerala (2016) 16 SCC 295 10

15. Gurubasappa v. Gurulingappa 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 106 11

16. Ilayaraja v. State 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14207 4

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

17. Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik (1986) Cr.LJ 1510 3

18. Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083 7

20. Jatinder Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2020 SC 161 3

21. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 5

22. John Indiculla v. State 2005 Cr LJ 2925 (Ker.) 7

23. Joseph v. State of Kerala (2000) 5 SCC 197 9

24. Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat (2013) 15 SCC(Cri) 688 3

Kanna Alias Mahalakshmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami

26. Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa AIR1987 SC 1507 12

27. Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 4

29. Kundala Bala Subranayam v. State of AP 1993 Cr.LJ 1635 15

30. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P (2010) 2 SCC 748 9

31. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 6

32. Narendra v. State of Karnataka (2009) 6 SCC 61 4

33. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1657 5

34. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766 11

35. Pachipala Laxmaiah v. State of A.P 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1166 5

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

37. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 2

38. Prakash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 65 8

39. Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram AIR 1959 Mad 323 10

40. Rajammal v. State of T. N 1993 Cr.LJ 3029 (Mad.) 14

41. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 3

42. Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43 9

43. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat (2011) 11 SCC 111 14

44. Ran Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 4 SCC 70 4

46. Rawal v. State of Gujarat 2013 AIR (SCW) 5219 5

47. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199 1