Class Moot 1 - Akash 1735

4th YEAR CLASS MOOT, 2020
NAME: AKASH (1735)
JHAJHA JHJHAH
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH
CRIMINAL APPEALS No. ___OF 2020
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT APPEAL UNDER SECTION

374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF
SHER SHAH ...................................................................................................APPELLANT 1
GAJENDAR SHAH…………………………………………………………APPELLANT 2
SURI SHAH………………………………………………………………APPELLANT 3
v.
STATE OF HARYANA.............................................................................RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES III
TABLE OF CASES IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION V
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS VI
ISSUES RAISED VII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS VIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1
1. That Whether Appellant 1,2 & 3 Can Be Prosecuted U/S 302 R/W Section 34 Of The
Indian Penal Code, 1860 1
2. Whether The Nature Of Injuries And The Nature Of Weapon Was Such As To Cause
Death Of a Person 4
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF THE DECEASED AMOUNTED TO GRAVE AND
SUDDEN PROVOCATION? 6
4. WHETHER THE SESSION COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SENTENCING THE
APPELLANTS WITH LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE
ACT COMMITTED BY THEM? 9
PRAYER XV
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

I
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.R All India Reporter

Anr. Another
IPC Indian Penal Code
Art. Article
BOMLR Bombay Law Reporter
i.e. That is
SC Supreme Court
Cri. Criminal
SCR Supreme Court Report
& And
Ed. Edition
Hon’ble Honorable
ILJ Indian Law Journal
ILR Indian Law Report
U/S Under Section
R/W Read With
Ed. Edition
Admn. Administration
NCT National Capital Region
No. Number
Ors. Others
p. Page
¶ Paragraph
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec. Section
Pvt. Private
Ltd. Limited
v. Versus

II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (45 OF 1860).
 THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973.
 THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872.
BOOKS REFERRED
 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, LexisNexis, Butterworths
Wadhwa Publication Nagpur, 32nd ed., (2010).
 PSA PILLAI CRIMINAL LAW, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa Publication Nagpur,
10th ed., (2008).
 K.D.GUAR, TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, Universal Law Publication
Company, 7th ed., (2013).
 DR. HARI SINGH GAUR, PENAL CODE, Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Vol. 1&2.
JOURNALS
 ALL INDIAN REPORTER.
 SUPREME COURT CASES.
 INDIAN LAW REPORTER.
DATABASES
 Lexis Nexis Legal.
 Indian Kanoon.
 SCC Online.

III
TABLE OF CASES
S NO. CASES CITATION
1. Mahbub Shah v. Emperor (1945) 47 BOMLR 941
2. Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani & Ors. V. State AIR 1999 SC 1557

of Maharashtra
3. Suresh and Anr. V. State of U.P (2001) 3 SCC 673
4. Marinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479
5. Nagraja v. State of Karnataka (2008) 17 SCC 277

6. Girija Shankar v. State of U.P (2004) 3 SCC 793
7. Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh (1989) 2 SCC 217
8. Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 327
9. Sekar v. State 2002 (8) SCC 354
10. Perana v. Emperor 1936 A1.I.I.J 333
11. Suraj Dev v. The State (Delhi Admn) (Crl) Appeal No. 103
of 2009
12. K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605
13. R. DUFFY (1949) 1 A1. I.F.R
932
14. Boya Munigadu v. The Queen (ILR 3 MAD 33)
15. In Re C. Narayan AIR 1958 A.P 235
16. Ayyanar v. State of Tamil Nadu
17. Babu Lal v. State AIR 1960 AII 223
18. Suyambukkani v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) I.W (Crl.) 86
19. Sankaral Alias Sankarayee v. State (1989) L.W (Crl.)
468
20. Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958) SCR 1495
21. Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 616
22. Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana (Crl.) 1609 of 2009
23. Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Adm.) (1990) SCC 29
IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
WHEREAS THE PRESENT APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE CHALLENGES THE JUDGEMENT OF THE
LEARNED PRINCIPAL SESSIONS JUDGE, JHAJJAR IN C.A.NO. OF 2020.
SECTION 374(2) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE READS AS FOLLOWS:
“374. APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS…. (2) ANY PERSON CONVICTED ON TRIAL HELD BY A
SESSION JUDGE OR AN ADDITIONAL SESSION JUDGE OR ON A TRAIL HELD BY ANY OTHER
COURT IN WHICH A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR MORE THAN 7 YEARS [HAS BEEN
PASSED AGAINST HIM OR AGAINST ANY OTHER PERSON CONVICTED AT THE SAME TRAIL];
MAY APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT.”

V
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
1. The Sher Shah (appellant 1), a farmer living with his family consisting of his wife
(Sobti), a son Gajendar Shah (appellant 2), daughter Naina and brother Suri Shah.
(appellant3).
2. Karim, a boy living in the same village, was working as a system operator 12 km
away from the village in Jhajjar, was in love with Naina, daughter of Sher Shah.
Being a father in order to protect his daughter warned Karim to stay away and
severely admonished and scolded Naina to refrain from meeting Karim.
3. Suri Shah owed a debt of Rs 20,000 to Karim but because of his helplessness to pay
could not return the said money though he never denied paying off his debt as he
needed some time.
4. On 8th August 2018, Suri Shah invited Karim to collect the debt. Karim reached
around 8:30 pm at their house when the family finished their dinner.
5. Sher Shah, Suri Shah and Gajendra Shah on hearing whispers from the backyard went
to investigate, albeit unarmed. On seeing Karim and Naina together Sher Shah lost his
temper and started abusing Karim.
6. Gajendra brought Lathi from inside of the house as it easily available at every
household and gave blows on the leg of Karim. Suri Shah grabbed the Lathi and
started beating Karim and gave blows on head and chest.
7. Karim was taken to the hospitals by the villagers where he died 3 days later. Post-
mortem report confirmed that Karim suffered injuries on head and fracture of 3 ribs.
None of the injuries independently was sufficient to cause death while they
cumulatively were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
8. First Information Report was registered under section 307 r/w section 34 Indian Penal
Code 1860, and after the death of Karim charges were altered to Section 302 r/w
section 34 Indian Penal Code,1860.
9. Session Court convicted Appellant 1, 2 & 3 under section 302 r/w section 34 &
sentenced them to life imprisonment for having committed the murder of Karim.
10. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Trial Judge, the
Appellants have preferred the present appeal.

VI
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1
WHETHER APPELLANT 1,2 & 3 CAN BE PROSECUTED U/S 302 R/W SECTION 34 OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE NATURE OF INJURIES AND WEAPON WAS SUCH AS TO CAUSE DEATH OF THE
PERSON.
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE ACT OF DECEASED AMOUNTED TO GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION.
ISSUE 4
WHETHER THE SESSION COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANTS WITH LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT COMMITTED BY THEM.

VII
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
CONTENTION 1
THE SESSION COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS COMMON
INTENTION BETWEEN SHER SHAH, GAJENAR SHAH AND SURI SHAH TO COMMIT OFFENCE
UNDER SECTION 34 IPC, 1860 AND THEREBY CONVICTING THEM OF THE SAID CHARGE
BECAUSE:
a) Sher Shah, Gajendar Shah and Suri Shah did not Acquire any Common Intention to
Attract under the Scope of Section 34 IPC;
b) The Act of the Appellants was not premeditated and was in the Heat of the Moment.
CONTENTION 2
THE SESSION COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS UNDER
SECTION 302 IPC BECAUSE:
a) The Case Does not fall in any of the Clauses of Section 300 IPC, 1860 and there was
no Intention of the Appellants to Kill the Deceased.
b) Appellants did not use any Lethal Weapon and no Particular Injury was Sufficient to
Cause Death and the Act was not Premeditated.
c) The Case Falls under the Exception 1 of Section 300 IPC as the Act of the Appellants
was Grave and Sudden and the Death was Caused by Mistake or Accident.
CONTENTION 3
THE LIFE SENTENCE GIVEN BY THE SESSION COURT TO THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE:
a) The Case Falls Under Section 304 IPC, 1860 therefore Does Not Attract Harsh
Punishment of Life Imprisonment.

VIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
CONTENTION 1 THAT WHETHER APPELLANT 1,2 & 3 CAN BE PROSECUTED U/S 302 R/W
SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court-
1) That Taking into Consideration the Statement of Facts, It Can’t be Said that Appellant 1,2
& 3 had an Intention to administer the use of Lathi and give blow on the Deceased to
finally cause death of the Deceased.
2) That Such an Act in the Spur of the Moment does not Attract Heavy Punishment &
Penalty under Relevant Section of Indian Penal Code, Which are:
Section 302: Punishment for Murder
Whoever Commits Murder shall be Punished with Death, or [imprisonment for Life], and
shall also liable to fine.
Read With
Section 34: Acts Done by Several Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention:
When a Criminal Act is Done by Several Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention of All,
Each of Such Persons is Liable for that Act in the Same Manner as if it were done by him
alone.
3) That there are Umpteen Number of Reasons which could earlier not be brought to the
attention of the Session Court which the Appellant most Respectfully Submits before this
Hon’ble Court for proving the Non Culpability of Accused 1,2 & 3 as per the above
Mentioned Sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
4) That the Contention of the Respondent till Now that there Was Common Intention of
Appellants 1,2 & 3 to Kill the Deceased cannot be taken into consideration as they all

1
went to the Backyard of the House unarmed to investigate on hearing the Whispers
Coming.
5) In the Case of Mahbub Shah v. Emperor1 and Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani &
Ors. V. State of Maharashtra2 it was Observed that “…to Invoke the Aid of Section 34
Successfully, it must be Shown that the Criminal Act Complained Against was done by
one of the Accused Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention of All and Care Must be
Taken not to confuse Same or Similar intention with Common Intention…”. And this
Requirement certainly not satisfied in the Present Case as there was no dispute, malice or
Personal Grudges against the deceased by any of the appellant and requisite intention
can’t be attributed to the Appellants.
6) Moreover in the Majority view taken by Sethi, J & Aggarwal, J (as They then were) in the
Case of Suresh and Anr. V. State of U.P3 it was held that “…Intention is to be Judged by
the Act in Relation to the Surrounding Circumstances…” And Such Circumstances shows
that it all happened in the Heat of the Moment without predetermination of mind as A-2
Brought Lathi from Inside the House which is a Common Household Item instead of a
lethal weapon, Nothing Prevented them from using a Knife, Which is also a Common
Household item although far more Dangerous.
7) It was Observed in the Case of Marinal Das v. State of Tripura4 that “…Section 34
Requires a Pre-arranged Plan and Presupposes Prior concert therefore there must be
prior meeting of minds & it can be developed at the spar of the moment but there must be
Pre-arrangement & Pre-mediation Concept.” This is not in the Present Case as all of the
Appellant lost their Temper on seeing Karim and Naina Together. If it would have been
Pre-arranged or Pre-meditated to murder the Deceased they would have armed
themselves with Sharp Lethal weapon at the Time of going to the Backyard.
1
(1945) 47 BOMLR 941
2
AIR 1999 SCC 1557
3
(2001) 3 SCC 673
4
(2011) 9 SCC 479

2
8) That the Supreme Court in Nagraja v. State of Karnataka5 Held that “A Past Enmity by
Itself, in our Opinion, May not be a Ground to hold for drawing any inference of
Common Intention amongst the Parties…” and in Girija Shankar v. State of U.P6 it was
held that “Section 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive Offence”
and That “The Distinctive Features of the Section is the Element of Participation in
Action”.
9) That having regard to the background in which occurrence has taken place, the appellant
were not actuated by Common Intention as if there would have been Malice of killing the
deceased they would have not called Karim to their House.
10) That it not only the Prosecution which has gravely erred in invoking section 34 of the
IPC Against the Appellant, but also the Sessions Court which has Passed an Order of
Conviction under section 302 r/w section 34 of the IPC.
5
(2008) 17 SCC 277
6
(2004) 3 SCC 793

3
CONTENTION 2: WHETHER THE NATURE OF INJURIES AND THE NATURE OF WEAPON

WAS SUCH AS TO CAUSE DEATH OF A PERSON
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court-
11) That it is Pertinent to Mention that in case of Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh7 the
Supreme Court Said that “…If on a sudden quarrel a person in the heat of the moment
picks up a weapon which is handy & causes injuries out of which only one prove fatal, he
would be entitled to the benefit of the exception.” It was further held that “the Number of
Wounds caused during the occurrence in such a situation was not the decisive factor what
was important was that the occurrence had taken place on the account of a sudden and
Un-predetermined fight & the offender must have acted in a fit of anger”. There was
absolutely no intention to kill the deceased on the part of the Appellants. Admittedly,
None of the Appellants were carrying a weapon of such lethality which could show their
intent to commit an offence such as the present one.
12) In Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana8 the Supreme court held that “…All Fatal Injuries
Resulting in Death Cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the purpose of not availing the
Benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC”. After the injuries were inflicted and deceased had
fallen down, the appellants are not Shown to have inflicted any other injury him. With
Regard to the Facts on record it is clearly shown that in the heat of passion upon a sudden
provocation, Appellants with Lathi not being a lethal weapon caused injuries at random and
thus did not act in a cruel or usual manner.
13) That in Sekar v. State9 the Supreme Court convicted the accused under Exception IV to
Section 300 IPC instead of Section 302 where the deceased fell on the ground after the
accused had given injuries on his head and left shoulder, Accused again Inflicted another
blow on his neck.
7
(1989) 2 SCC 217
8
(2002) 3 SCC 327
9
2002 (8) SCC 354

4
14) In Perana v. Emperor10 It was observed that “The use of Lathi is certainly Dangerous but
is not so dangerous that one would suppose that anybody would be in the ordinary Course
think that death is probable cause of use of Lathi. Our Experience is that Lathis are
Frequently used and Result in nothing more than injuries which are simple hurts or at the
most grievous hurts.” Appellants in the Heat of the Moment without Knowledge of the
Graveness of the Weapon used Lathi which is present at every household in village and did
not use any lethal weapon.
15) When there was only extortion by one of the accused and a wooden Log was hit on the
head of the Deceased which is vital part of the body, the case was found to under section 304
and as under section 302 in Suraj Dev v. The State (Delhi Admn)11 Taking into consideration
the aforesaid case it is pertinent to reiterate that the Appellants also used a Lathi and not any
Lethal Weapon.
16) In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab12, the Accused had in the spur of the Moment
Inflicted a Knife Blow in the Chest of the Deceased. The Injury Proved Fatal. The Doctor had
opined that the Injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of Nature to cause death. The
Supreme Court observed that “…the quarrel was of trivial Nature, in these Circumstances, it
is Permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with the Knowledge that
he was likely to cause death and the court altered conviction from section 302 to section 304
IPC…” The Facts on record show that none of the injuries by itself was sufficient to cause
death but were only cumulatively sufficient to cause death.
10
1936 ALL LJ 333
11
(CRL.) Appeal No. 103 of 2009
12
(1983) 2 SCC 342

5
CONTENTION 3 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE DECEASED AMOUNTED TO GRAVE

AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION?
It is most respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Courts-
“Exception 1 to section 300 IPC- When Culpable Homicide is not murder: Culpable
Homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by
grave and sudden provocation, causes death of the persons who gave the provocation or
causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
(17) That in K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra13 it was laid down by the court that No
abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down of what amounts to grave and
sudden provocation. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends
upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc. Circumstances which led
to this ‘Act’ of the 3 Appellants was after seeing Karim and Naina together late at night at
backyard of their house in their small village in Haryana where customs, traditional values
cannot be compared to that of a city. There was no period of cooling down and this ‘Act’
of the Appellants was in the spur of the moment.
(18) It is pertinent to point out that Karim (deceased) used to meet Naina on the weekends
when her father was not at home on the pretext that he had come to collect the money and
on the date of incident also Karim met with Naina in her backyard. These circumstances
tantamount to provocation by the paramour himself.
(19) LORD GODDARD, C.J, in R. DUFFY 14 defined provocation as:
"Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which
would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and
temporary loss of self - control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him
or her for the moment not master of his mind” and that “…there are two things, in
considering it, to which the law attaches great importance. The first of them is, whether
13
AIR 1962 SC 605
14
(1949) 1 ALL ER 932

6
there was what is sometimes called time for cooling, that is, for passion to cool and for
reason to regain dominion over the mind. Secondly, in considering whether provocation
has or has not been made out, you must consider the retaliation in provocation- that is to
say, whether the mode of resentment bears some proper and reasonable relationship to the
sort of provocation that has been given.”
(20) That the Appellants did not have time to cool down and regain their self-control. In
this regard we may refer the pronouncement of judgement rendered by Subba Rao, J (as he
then was) in the celebrated pronouncement of K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra in
which case the court noted that the accused clearly indicated that he had not only regained
his self-control, but, on the other hand, was planning for the future. Between 1.30 p.m.
when he left his hours 4.20 p.m., when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and
therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control. Based on facts on
record it is clearly indicated that in the present case, the Appellants did not have the
requisite cool down period here as everything happened in a spur of the moment within 1-
2 minutes.
(21) In Boya Munigadu v. The Queen15,the Madras High Court held that“… the State of
the mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct of the deceased, may be
taken into consideration in considering whether the subsequent act would be sufficient
provocation to bring the case within the Exception of section 300 IPC…”
(22) Further, In In Re C. Narayan16, it was held that“…the mental state created by an

earlier act may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether a subsequent act was
sufficient to make the assailant to lose his self – control…”
(23) Under the English Law, the provocation must be grave as well as sudden. But, by way
of judicial thinking, the Indian Criminal Law has gone ahead. (Ref: K.M Nanavati v.
State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605). In our system, there is the concept of
"sustained provocation". It is concerned with the duration of the provocation. There may
be incidents/occurrences, which are such that they may not provoke the offender suddenly
to make his outburst by his overt act. However, it may be lingering in his mind for quite
some time, torment continuously and at one point of time erupt, which would lead to loss
of self-control, make his mind to go astray, the mind may not be under his
15
(ILR 3 MAD 33)
16
A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 235

7
control/command and results in the offender committing the offence. The sustained
provocation/frustration nurtured in the mind of the accused reached the end of breaking
point, under that accused causes the murder of the deceased.
(24) In Ayyanar v. State of Tamil Nadu, it was held that courts in the decisions of Babu Lal
v. State17 and Suyambukkani v. State of Tamil Nadu18 have added one more exception,
known as ‘sustained provocation’. Therefore, while considering whether there are
materials to indicate that there is a grave & sudden provocation as contemplated under
Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, sustained provocation, on account of a series of acts more
or less grave spread over a certain period of time, would undoubtedly stand added to
Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. It is evident from the bare and apparent facts on record
that the conduct of the Appellants was not predetermined and there was no time to cool
down therefore the offence of murder is not made out as it was truly grave and sudden.
(25) That in Sankaral Alias Sankarayee v. State19 it was held that “There are types of
cases, where there has been sustained provocation for a considerable length of time and
there would not have been a real sudden provocation immediately preceding the murder. In
such cases, the Courts have given the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300, I.P.C. on the
ground that the provocation which is the root cause for the commission of the offence need
not arise at the spur of the moment”.
(26) It is humbly put forward that the Session Court has gravely erred in considering the
evidence in totality and in the light of the judicial pronouncement as aforesaid, has wrongly
charged the Appellants for the offence under section 300 IPC.
17
AIR 1960 All 223
18
1989 LW (Crl.) 86
19
1989 L.W. (Crl.) 468

8
CONTENTION 4: WHETHER THE SESSION COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN

SENTENCING THE APPELLANTS WITH LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ACT COMMITTED BY THEM?
It is most respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Court-
(27) That taking into consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it
cannot be said that the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC should be upheld.
(28) That the act committed does not fall under Sec 300 IPC but it does fall under Sec 299(c)
IPC. Therefore such an act committed without any mens rea or without the intention to kill
does not attract heavy punishment & penalty under relevant section of Indian Penal Code,
which are:
Section 299: Culpable Homicide
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that
he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Section 304: Punishment for Culpable Homicide not Amounting to Murder
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with
[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
(29) That there are significant features of the case which are required to be taken into
consideration in awarding the appropriate sentence to the accused:

9
i. Admittedly, the incident happened at the spur of the moment.

ii. It is clear from the evidence on record that the appellants did not use any lethal
weapons to attack Karim.
iii. The A-3, Suri Shah gave a lathi blows on the head and chest of the deceased which
proved fatal.
iv. The other accused did not indulge in overt act therefore, except the appellant, the
other co-accused namely Sher Shah (appellant 1), Gajendar Shah (appellant 2),
should have been acquitted by the lower court. However all of three appellants were
convicted by session court.
v. The incident took place on 8th August, 2010 and the deceased remained hospitalized
and ultimately died after three days of hospitalisation.
vi. This is also true that there was no previous enmity between the parties.
(30) Therefore, it is abundantly clear that there was no mens rea or intention to kill or that
there was prearranged plan or that the incident had taken place in furtherance of the common
intention of the accused persons, when all these facts and circumstances are taken into
consideration in proper perspective, then it is improper to maintain the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 IPC.
(31) The appellant having struck blows on the head and chest of the deceased with the lathi,
can be attributed with the knowledge that it would cause an injury which was likely to cause
death and not with any intention to cause the death of the deceased. The offence committed
by the appellant, therefore amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Code.
(32) In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab20 it was held that Culpable homicide would amount
to Murder if both of the following conditions were satisfied:
 That the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing a bodily
injury; and
 That the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death.
20
(1958) SCR 1495

10
Thus, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury
which, in the ordinary course of nature, would be sufficient to cause death, viz. that the
injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
(33) In Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana21, the accused inflicted blow in the heat of the
moment in sudden fight with blunt side of Gandhala on head of the deceased which is a
vital part of the body causing his death. According to the doctors this particular injury in
the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. But the court altered the
conviction of accused from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II I.P.C as according to the
court, the intention to cause such an injury was likely to cause death was not made out.
(34) In Gurmukh Singh v State of Haryana22 Supreme Court held that “…in the absence
of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention
of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary
course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither Clause I nor Clause III of Section
300 IPC will be attracted…"
(35) That the contention of the State that the act falls under Section 302 IPC can not be
sustained as, if the act of the appellants falls within either of the Clauses 1,2 and 3 of Section
300, but is covered by any of the 5 Exceptions, it is punishable under the first part of Section
304. If however, the act falls within Clause (4) of Section 300, and at the same time covered
by any of the five Exceptions to that Section it will be punishable under the IInd part of
Section 304, Indian Penal Code,1860.
(36) In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration)23 the Supreme Court stated that“…The
question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with
the intention of causing death of the deceased…” As the totality of the established facts and
circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden
quarrel and without pre-meditation during the course of which the appellant caused a
solitary fatal injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the
deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed
21
(1981) 3 SCC 616
22
(CRL.) Appeal No. 1609 of 2009
23
(1990) Supp. SCC 29

11
with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.
Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the
deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury
which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither Clause I nor
Clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.
(37) There are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before
awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. Each case has to be seen from its special
perspective. The relevant factors are as under:
 Motive or previous enmity;
 Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;
 The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;
 Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;
 The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
 The age and general health condition of the accused;
 Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;
 The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which
the blow was inflicted;
 The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;
 Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death but the death was because of shock;
(38) These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an
appropriate sentence to the accused. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. In our respectful submission, proper and appropriate sentence
to the accused is the bounden obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court
must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence
should be according to the gravity of the offence to meet the ends of justice.

12
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is humbly pled and requested that the Honourable High Court of Punjab & Haryana
may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. Acquit Mr. Sher Shah (Appellant-1), Mr. Gajendar (Appellant-2), Mr. Suri Shah
(Appellant-3) for Murder under Section 302 Read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code,
1860.
2. Reduce the Sentence of Life Imprisonment of the Appellants.
And pass any such order, judgement or direction that the Honourable Court
deems fit and proper in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Counsel for the Appellants as in duty bound shall
forever pray.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
____________________________________________
Sd/-
COUNSELS FOR THE APPELLANTS

XV

Class Moot 1 - Akash 1735

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Class Moot 1 - Akash 1735

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4th YEAR CLASS MOOT, 2020

NAME: AKASH (1735)

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT

CRIMINAL APPEALS No. ___OF 2020

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT APPEAL UNDER SECTION

SHER SHAH ...................................................................................................APPELLANT 1

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES III

ISSUES RAISED VII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS VIII

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

A.I.R All India Reporter

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (45 OF 1860).

 THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973.

 THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872.

 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, LexisNexis, Butterworths

Wadhwa Publication Nagpur, 32nd ed., (2010).

 PSA PILLAI CRIMINAL LAW, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa Publication Nagpur,

10th ed., (2008).

 K.D.GUAR, TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, Universal Law Publication

Company, 7th ed., (2013).

 ALL INDIAN REPORTER.

 SUPREME COURT CASES.

 INDIAN LAW REPORTER.

 Lexis Nexis Legal.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

S NO. CASES CITATION

1. Mahbub Shah v. Emperor (1945) 47 BOMLR 941

2. Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani & Ors. V. State AIR 1999 SC 1557

5. Nagraja v. State of Karnataka (2008) 17 SCC 277

WHEREAS THE PRESENT APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE

SECTION 374(2) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE READS AS FOLLOWS:

MAY APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT.”

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WHETHER THE ACT OF DECEASED AMOUNTED TO GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court-

Section 302: Punishment for Murder

Section 34: Acts Done by Several Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention:

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

CONTENTION 2: WHETHER THE NATURE OF INJURIES AND THE NATURE OF WEAPON

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court-

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

CONTENTION 3 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE DECEASED AMOUNTED TO GRAVE

It is most respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Courts-

(19) LORD GODDARD, C.J, in R. DUFFY 14 defined provocation as:

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

(22) Further, In In Re C. Narayan16, it was held that“…the mental state created by an

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

CONTENTION 4: WHETHER THE SESSION COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN

It is most respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Court-

Section 299: Culpable Homicide

Section 304: Punishment for Culpable Homicide not Amounting to Murder

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

i. Admittedly, the incident happened at the spur of the moment.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS