UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

UNMASKING MASKIROVKA: SOVIET DECEPTION IN THE BELORUSSIAN

OPERATION

HI359: ERA OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

SECTION D1

DR STEVE WADDELL

BY

CADET BERARDINO ’20, CO H4

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

28 NOVEMBER 2017

______ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND

ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT.

______ I DID NOT USE ANY SOURCES OR ASSISTANCE REQUIRING

DOCUMENTATION IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT.

SIGNATURE:
____________________________________________________________

WORD COUNT: 3934

 Berardino 1

By 1944, the fourth year of World War II on the Eastern Front, Soviet operational

art had matured significantly. Forced to fight for survival in the period of 1941-1943, the

Red Army suffered tremendous losses and horrifying defeats. Yet, after victory at

Stalingrad and successful offensives throughout 1943, by the summer of 1944 the Red

Army had the upper hand in the Great Patriotic War. In possession of the initiative, the

Soviet Union would clearly take the offensive. What befuddled the Germans was where

the hammer would fall. Up until the Soviet Belorussian Operation, codenamed

“Bagration,” began on June 22, German commanders believed the main Soviet offensive

would take place farther south in Ukraine. German intelligence failed to detect the

buildup and did not understand the magnitude of Soviet plans until it was too late. Thanks

to Soviet counterintelligence efforts, the Germans had an incredibly difficult time

discerning Soviet preparatory moves while the Red Army had ample access to

information about German dispositions and movements. This asymmetry of information

demonstrated a crucial tenet of Soviet operational art. In the Belorussian Operation,

Obespechenie Boevykh Deistvii (Protective Combat Action) combined deception,

reconnaissance and counterintelligence to negate German strengths and amplify Soviet

local superiority, allowing the Soviet Union to destroy German Army Group Center.

The Belorussian Operation of June 22, 1944 represented the culmination of Soviet

operational art honed over three years of fighting. Soviet operational art emphasized

mobility, initiative and various deception measures to achieve local superiority and rapid

exploitation of enemy weaknesses. Prior to an operation, the Soviets focused on

 Berardino 2

preparing quickly and concealing troop movements.1 Soviet commanders concentrated on

this pre-battle in order to provide the maneuver and exploitation phases with the best

chance of success. Preparatory operations were critical to Soviet operational thinking;

Protective Combat Action ensured surprise and secrecy.2 While the notion of Protective

Combat Action had been doctrine since the start of the war, in the lead-up to the

Belorussian Operation the Soviets successfully applied all aspects of PCA for the first

time. Soviet security agencies worked together to ensure the holistic implementation of

PCA, allowing successes by each effort to augment the capabilities of the others. By

accomplishing PCA objectives collectively, Soviet forces amplified their advantage over

the Germans, contributing to the stunning success of the operation.

The Doctrinal Components of Protective Combat Action

Maskirovka, or deception, formed the backbone of PCA. The Soviet Union

throughout the war consistently possessed local superiority of forces, allowing the Red

Army to achieve breakthroughs in key sectors of the front. Soviet forces at the front level

and below emphasized secrecy of force deployment, demonstrated actions to deceive the

enemy, performed simulations to confuse the enemy, and practiced disinformation,

including the use of false orders and rumors.3 Maskirovka at the operational level

emphasized secrecy and propagation of false or misleading information. Such actions at a

minimum helped to confuse enemy intelligence and, in the most successful cases, blinded

1
Col Gen. F. Gayvoronskiy, “The Development of Soviet Operational Art,” in Russian, in
(Moscow Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 2, February 1978, pp. 38-47) 42.
2
David M. Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, (Novato,
CA: Presidio, 1990) 4.
3
David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, (London: Frank Cass and
Company Limited, 1989) 570.
 Berardino 3

the enemy to key maneuvers.4 Enemy intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities played

a key role in the effectiveness of operational maskirovka. In the second period of the

war,5 from1942-1943, maskirovka succeeded to varying degrees. However, the first time

that maskirovka achieved all of its objectives was in the Belorussian Operation, due to

improved STAVKA (Soviet high command) capacity, better Soviet intelligence and weak

German intelligence.6 As the STAVKA increased its capabilities, strategic deception

came to augment operational maskirovka, allowing the STAVKA to disguise the location

of main strategic operations. These developments played an integral role in the success of

maskirovka in the Belorussian Operation.

Razvedka, or intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, formed the second pillar

of PCA. The Soviet concept of razvedka included both traditional intelligence work as

well as reconnaissance, often in force, to produce hard information. Effective razvedka

operations consisted of ground reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, signals intelligence

and the forward deployment of agents into enemy rear areas.7 While providing the

commander with relevant information related to the enemy, razvedka could also serve a

deceptive role. Soviet commanders created the appearance of local emphasis in non-

essential areas of the front and influenced enemy behavior by probing the enemy and

conspicuously gathering intelligence on the ground. After preliminary razvedka,

reconnaissance in force allowed Soviet commanders to verify intelligence and seize

4
Ibid., 33.
5
There are three generally accepted periods of WW2 in the East. The first period, 1941-Summer
1942; the second period, Fall 1942-Winter 1943; and the third period, 1944-1945.
6
Ibid., 563.
7
Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, 156-157.
 Berardino 4

prisoners for interrogation.8 Razvedka contributed to PCA by informing commanders of

the enemy position and assisting in maskirovka through diversionary reconnaissance.

The third piece of PCA, rear-area security, enabled the implementation of

maskirovka and razvedka by ensuring Soviet intelligence superiority. Throughout the

war, two agencies, the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and GUKR

SMERSH (Army Directorate of Counterintelligence), handled rear-area security for the

Red Army. The Soviet Union inherited strong counterintelligence capabilities forged by

25 years of internal conspiratorial spy hunting.9 Both agencies fulfilled different roles in

the operational Red Army. The NKVD monitored rear areas for enemy activity while

SMERSH operated on the front line and beyond in an active counterintelligence role.

Each Soviet front, equivalent to an army group, generally had two divisions of NKVD

security troops used to set up checkpoints and monitor the rear. After 1943, SMERSH

officers commanded them and coordinated rear security efforts with the front

commander.10 As part of the preparatory phase of any operation, NKVD troops routinely

cordoned off the operational area to restrict enemy activity. On top of physical security,

commanders mitigated security threats by using fewer planners and producing less

written material.11 The NKVD, along with political officers, also helped to foster a

8
Ibid., 162.
9
Robert W. Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-
1945, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 46. From the foundation of the USSR,
counterintelligence and political policing were hallmarks of Soviet State power. Executing the purges and
collectivization required the formation of tremendous state capacity. This capacity was used to great effect
during the war.
10
Ibid., 65-66. Checkpoints verified soldier’s documents and cleared individuals for travel near
the front. Soldier’s carried several forms of identification to verify their identity.
11
Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 566, 568-569. “Planning security
improved as NKVD units implemented extensive anti-agent activity in 25 kilometer sectors to the rear of
the front and routinely cleared civilian population from the region”.
 Berardino 5

climate of suspicion among frontline troops and promoted political loyalty.12 Draconian

security measures ensured that all personnel behind Soviet lines belonged there and

maintained operational secrecy at all levels.

If the NKVD acted as a shield in the Soviet counterintelligence effort, SMERSH,

military counterintelligence, was the sword. When the People’s Commissariat for

Defense reorganized Soviet intelligence in mid-1943, they divided counterintelligence

between the NKGB (People’s Commissariat for State Security) for foreign intelligence

and counterintelligence within the USSR, and SMERSH focused on military

counterintelligence.13 The purpose of SMERSH was twofold: To prevent the penetration

of Red Army units by enemy agents and to capture or kill German spies near the front.

Unlike the NKVD, SMERSH units were subordinate to the front commanders they

served with.14 Embedding SMERSH units with combat commands allowed them greater

access to officers and proximity to frontline units allowed agents to conduct their

counter-infiltration mission. SMERSH units operated in small teams. To monitor the vast

numbers of troops on the front, SMERSH officers recruited an estimated 13 million

military and civilian informants during the war.15 Informant networks allowed SMERSH

to saturate the Red Army and maintain optimum security. SMERSH’s tactics, in

12
Gayvorinskiy, “The Development of Soviet Operational Art”, 43. The author discusses “party-
political work,” a Soviet euphemism for terror tactics and establishment of informant networks.
13
Vadim J. Birstein, Smersh: Stalin’s Secret Weapon.( London: Biteback Publishing, 2011,) 179-
182.
14
“Regulations on the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the Defense Commisariat
(‘Smersh’) and its organs,” approved by Stalin on April 21, 1943. Document No. 151 in Kokurin and
Petrov, Lubyanka, 623-6.
15
Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945, 61-63.
While only one SMERSH officer was assigned to a battalion, he would recruit informants and resident
agents who were required to recruit 6-8 additional informants.
 Berardino 6

combination with NKVD security, created an exceedingly hostile environment for

German agents. As a result, of the 44,000 German agents deployed on Soviet territory

during the war, Soviet counterintelligence rendered 39,500 ineffective.16 Given the high

rate of capture or death, the German spies who survived the war did so ineffectively.

Protective Combat Action at Work: The Eve of the Belorussian Operation

By the time of the summer offensive of 1944, the Soviet military machine

operated at peak efficiency. The STAVKA implemented all aspects of PCA with

unprecedented effectiveness. Prior to the beginning of the Belorussian Operation in June,

the Soviets maneuvered millions of men, thousands of tanks and planes, and vital

engineering assets into the operational area largely undetected. Efficient implementation

of maskirovka at both the strategic and operational levels enabled this feat. Broadly, the

Soviets employed strategic maskirovka to influence German perceptions of the summer

offensive’s priorities. While the Soviets greatly improved their capabilities throughout

the war, German intelligence failures accounted for significant advantages. Hitler by

1944 had compartmentalized German intelligence, preventing agencies from working

together to provide a coherent picture. German intelligence became competitive, not truth

seeking, incentivizing German agents to tell the Fuhrer what he wanted to hear.17 Soviet

maskirovka succeeded in taking advantage of German deterioration to dominate the

information battlefield.

16
Ibid., 50, 57-58.
17
David Jablonsky, “The Paradox of Duality: Adolf Hitler and the Concept of Military Surprise,”
in Leaders and Intelligence, edited by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1989) pp. 55-118, 72.
 Berardino 7

Leading up to the Belorussian Operation, the Soviets deceived the Germans at the

strategic level. Cooperating with the British in Operation Bodyguard, Soviet intelligence

convinced the Germans that a combined Anglo-Soviet invasion of Scandinavia was

imminent.18 The Germans reacted to these rumors even as Generals L. A. Govorov

(Leningrad Front) and K. A. Meretskov (Karelian Front) opened the summer 1944

offensive with a diversionary attack in the Vyborg region near Leningrad. They drove

Finland from the war and diverted German attention from Soviet preparations in

Belorussia. The combination of Soviet false information and actual, limited attacks

constituted a larger Soviet strategic deception effort designed to coax the Germans into

believing the main Soviet attacks would come from the north and south.19 Strategic

maskirovka worked. German planners saw the Leningrad attack as a prelude for the main

Soviet offensive in the south. According to the chief of German intelligence in the East,

Reinhard Gehlen, the Germans knew Zhukov’s plan for a general offensive. They also

had the plans of Generals Ivan Konev and Rodion Malinovskiy, both stationed in

Southern Ukraine.20 The Wehrmacht believed that, as in previous operations, the Soviets

would strike from the southwest.21 Even as the Germans noticed activity in Belorussia,

they insisted that the Soviet buildup was cover for the real attack from the south.22 The

Germans, acting on their intelligence, sent their reserves to Ukraine and restricted

shipments of men and materiel to Army Group Center.

18
Roberts, "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories," 200.
19
David Glantz, When Titans Clashed. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1995,) 202-203.
20
Reinhard Gehlen, The Service translated by David Irving, (Canada: Nelson, Foster and Scott
Ltd., 1972,) 95-96.
21
Col. Gen. A. Burdeynyy, “The Sword of ‘Bagration’” in Military Herald No. 6, 1974, pp 10-17,
12.
22
Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 369-370.
 Berardino 8

Strategic maskirovka averted the gaze of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

from Belorussia to Southern Ukraine. This afforded the Soviets an opportunity to exploit,

but not a guaranteed victory. The STAVKA utilized operational maskirovka to achieve a

positive correlation of forces and achieve operational surprise against the local forces of

Army Group Center. Zhukov ordered that the troops would move only at night, remain

dispersed and camouflaged, and observe radio silence along with other measures.23 These

techniques aimed to blind the Germans to troop movements. NKVD and SMERSH units

worked in conjunction with maskirovka efforts by systematically destroying German

intelligence in Belorussia. As a result, the Germans had no access to strategic or detailed

operational intelligence.24 The only reliable German sources of information in Belorussia

were observations from frontline units: Reconnaissance and fighting patrols, observation

posts, and artillery surveying posts.25 From these sources, Army Group Center had an

accurate picture of Soviet frontline positions, but thanks to Zhukov’s measures, the

Germans missed the deployment of three combined-arms armies, a tank army, and

several mobile corps. Notably, the Germans believed that two of the Soviet shock

formations, 5th Guards and 2nd Tank Armies, were opposite Army Group South Ukraine.26

Because the Germans did not know the whereabouts of key Soviet formations, their

23
“Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Concerning Concealment,” 29
May, 1944, from TsAMO SSSR, fund 48-80, inventory 1795, file 3, sheets 3-5. Original.
24
Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945, 84-85.
25
Combined British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, “German Operational Intelligence,” April, 1946, in
German Military Intelligence 1939-1945, edited by Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War Department,
(Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984,) 206.
26
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 203.
 Berardino 9

sudden appearance on the battlefield caught the Germans off-guard.27 Surprise proved to

be the decisive moment of the operation.

In contrast to the chronically under-informed Germans, Soviet planners obtained

an accurate picture of the strength and disposition of German units in Army Group

Center. Soviet razvedka efforts in the Belorussian Operation combined ground

reconnaissance, radio intercepts, air reconnaissance, and large numbers of agents

operating in the German rear. The Soviets operated 61 radio stations in German-occupied

Belorussia, enabling partisan coordination. Additionally, ground reconnaissance in force

verified information received from signals intelligence and identified new German

defenses.28 Soviet front commanders like 1st Belorussian Front commander, Konstantin

Rokossovsky took it upon themselves to conduct razvedka in their areas of operations. In

the 1st Belorussian Front’s sector around Bobruisk, intelligence work included air

reconnaissance and some 400 trench raids that captured more than 80 prisoners and many

documents.29 Captured prisoners and documents provided intelligence and intensified

counterintelligence operations and radio games. Soviet intelligence observed German

movements and monitored the extent to which Army Group Center reacted to

maskirovka.

Razvedka during the Belorussian Operation served a dual purpose. First, it

gathered critical intelligence for the Red Army. Second, the physical act of razvedka

27
Col. P. Boldyrev, “The Bobruisk Operation,” in Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 September 1944, in
Military Review, March 1945, pp. 105-108, 108. “The enemy did not know in what strength, when, and in
what direction the blow would be inflicted.”
28
Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, 156-157, 160-162.
29
Konstantin Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985,) 237.
 Berardino 10

served as a diversionary measure. Key to Soviet razvedka operations were partisans

operating in the German rear in Belorussia. By 1944, Soviet partisans numbered some

140,000 operating in 200 detachments. From June 21-22 partisan units acted as forward

observers for Soviet aerial and artillery bombardment, greatly improving the accuracy of

the strikes.30 In the maskirovka plan for Operation Bagration, Zhukov explicitly outlined

requirements for commander’s reconnaissance. He emphasized secrecy and ambiguity in

reconnaissance operations, preventing tank soldiers from appearing in special uniforms,

among other security measures.31 From June 20-23, reconnaissance efforts focused on

unimportant areas and avoided the critical sectors of the front.32 Throughout the region of

the Belorussian Operation, the Red Army conducted reconnaissance in force broadly over

500km to confuse the enemy as to the main axis of advance.33 By maintaining the

reconnaissance effort on the entire front and protecting troops from detection, the Red

Army maintained operational secrecy and augmented maskirovka efforts.

Soviet operational art proved so effective in the Belorussian Operation in large

part because of the counterintelligence campaign. Operational deception measures rely on

a pliant enemy to take the bait. The efforts of SMERSH and the NKVD in the lead up to

the Belorussian Operation enabled maskirovka to succeed to the extent that it did.34
30
Geoffrey Roberts. "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories." In Stalin's Wars: From
World War to Cold War, 1939-1953, 192-227. Yale University Press, 2006, 200.
31
“Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Concerning Concealment.” “Do
not conduct commander’s reconnaissance in large groups simultaneously. TO conceal the true sectors of
action organized the work of commander’s reconnaissance groups on a broad front, including the passive
sectors. In necessary cases, command personnel on commander’s reconnaissance are authorized to wear the
uniforms and gear of privates. Tank soldiers are categorically forbidden to appear on commander’s
reconnaissance in their special uniforms…”
32
Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 367.
33
Lt Col. A. Izomsimov, “On the 35th Anniversary of the Belorussian Operation,” in Russian, in
Moscow Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 6, 1979, pp 45-47, 47.
34
Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945, 148.
 Berardino 11

Soviet counterintelligence performed three crucial activities to neuter the Abwehr: Agent

apprehension, radio games, and rear-security measures. German agents sent across the

border in 1944 were either espionage specialists, saboteurs or versatile spies.35 To address

the threat posed by these agents, SMERSH operatives analyzed the dress, speech, and

documents of soldiers and civilians in an effort to expose agents.36 This approach proved

highly successful, and during Operation Bagration counterintelligence caught German

agents around Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogliev and Minsk. SMERSH turned many of them to be

used as part of 183 total radio games designed to convince the Germans that the attack

would fall farther south.37 While agent apprehension provided manpower for radio games,

the games themselves conversely facilitated enemy agent capture.38 Soviet

counterintelligence severely restricted German intelligence capabilities. Even Gehlen

himself admitted to Hitler “that Russian security was so good that we had never yet

managed to predict the actual date and hour of an attack.”39 For Germany in 1944, such

variability in its assessments damaged the credibility of German intelligence, making

frontline commanders more susceptible to Soviet maskirovka.

In the Belorussian Operation Protective Combat Action integrated

counterintelligence, maskirovka and razvedka to amplify Soviet combat power in

35
Combined British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, “German Operational Intelligence,” 196-197.
Agent training generally took 3-6 weeks and was divided into three types: FAK I-training to identify allied
units and conduct usual military espionage. FAK-2 trained saboteurs and physically fit candidates. FAK-3
produced all around better spies.
36
Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941-1945, 67-71.
37
Ibid., 100, 107. Radio games involved the capture of an enemy agent and using that agent to
send false reports back to their handlers.
38
Birstein, Smersh: Stalin’s Secret Weapon, 223-225. When a plane bound for the Kalmyk lands
was shot down, Captain Eberhard von Scheller was captured and volunteered to work for Smersh. He
conducted a radio game until August, 1944 resulting in the capture of 21 saboteurs.
39
Gehlen, The Service, 97.
 Berardino 12

Belorussia. On the eve of battle, the Germans were objectively unprepared to defend

Belorussia even though their strategic reserve forces were sufficient to prevent the

ensuing debacle.40 Thus, Army Group Center’s total unpreparedness testified to Soviet

maskirovka success, particularly at the strategic level. Operationally, Gehlen anticipated

the sectors of attack against Army Group Center when he stated on June 13 that

“particular attention should be paid to the areas southeast and east of Bobruisk, on both

sides of Chausy, along the highway northeast of Orsha, and on both sides of Vitebsk.”41

While accurate, these warnings came too late because poor strategic intelligence meant

that Army Group Center lacked defense-in-depth capabilities and the mobile

counterattack forces necessary to slow the predicted Soviet armored thrusts.42 On June

22, 24 of 30 German motorized divisions were south of the Pripyat River in Ukraine. The

Germans had no mobile reserve in the theater to defend Belorussia.43 Soviet strategic

PCA focused on counterintelligence. Thus, dominance in this domain meant that German

intelligence was too slow to influence the Belorussian Operation.

The Soviet Reaper: Exploitation of Protective Combat Action’s Success

All Soviet preparations aimed at one goal. Stalin himself put it bluntly in his May

1, Order of the Day: “The objective now is to liberate all our territory from the Fascist

invaders and to restore the State frontiers of the Soviet Union in their entirety, from the

Black Sea to the Barents Sea.”44 To this end, the STAVKA reorganized Soviet forces

40
Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, 213-214.
41
Gehlen, The Service, 96-97.
42
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 204.
43
Izomsimov, “On the 35th Anniversary of the Belorussian Operation,” 46.
44
Joseph Stalin quoted in Roberts, "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories," 199.
 Berardino 13

opposite Army Group Center. Reshuffling commanders and areas of operation, by the

summer offensive there were eight Soviet fronts north of the Pripyat marshes.45 Soviet

forces numbered roughly one million men in 77 divisions in four fronts and faced

850,000 Germans in 42 divisions. To destroy the significant German forces, the Soviets

would conduct a deep encirclement of Minsk. In the north, I. Kh. Bagramian (1st Baltic

Front) and I. D. Cherniakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front) planned to encircle the Germans

at Vitebsk. Simultaneously, in the south, Rokossovsky (1st Belorussian Front) would

encircle Bobruisk and eventually meet up with the northern elements to capture Minsk.46

The STAVKA set the date for Bagration, June 22. Stalin timed the offensive in

accordance with his promise to the Western Allies that the summer offensive would

support Allied landings in France.47 The pieces set and PCA completed, the new and

improved Red Army awaited the order to strike.

Soviet attacks on June 22 swiftly broke through the shocked defenders and made

rapid progress toward objectives. Following the artillery barrage over the night of June

21-22, Soviet reconnaissance troops in the north occupied the sparsely defended German

positions. The Germans, caught totally by surprise, could only offer resistance with

Panzerfausts and other handheld systems, their own tanks nowhere to be found. More

often than not, Soviet commanders simply bypassed German positions, leaving them cut

off.48 By midday on June 25, Soviet forces linked up behind Vitebsk, encircling the

German LIII Army Corps.49 Even though German intelligence had anticipated these exact

45
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 196.
46
Ibid., 198-199.
47
Roberts, "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories," 200.
48
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 204-205.
49
Ibid., 205.
 Berardino 14

sectors of attack, the German commanders could not do anything to stop it due to the

success of strategic PCA. When the German front line collapsed after a few days of the

Soviet offensive, the bulk of German armor was too far south to react to events in

Belorussia.50 Soviet preparations and operational discipline enabled them to strike with

efficiency never before seen in multiple axes of attack.

In the southern sector of the attack, on June 24, Rokossovsky’s 1st Belorussian

Front broke through towards Bobruisk. Tasked with defending Bobruisk, the German 9th

Army consisted of the 12th Infantry and 1st Panzer Divisions behind 100-110 km of

defensive lines.51 Such a high degree of defensive preparations had become a familiar

German tactic by 1944. Hitler had designated Bobruisk a festung -- “fortress town” --

meaning that German troops were expected to fight to the death and as a result could not

retreat until it was too late for them to escape. Soviet PCA enabled the total isolation of

9th Army, a unit that with adequate support, could have been formidable. However,

without warning or appropriate flank protection, Soviet forces encircled 9th Army in the

city by June 27. General Issa Pliev’s Cavalry Mechanized Group cut off retreat to the

West as Rokossovsky’s forces took up defensive positions outside the city. Scraping what

armored forces were available to 9th Army, a counterattack by the 41st Panzer Corps failed

to seal off the breach in the German defenses.52 While German forces had been defeated

an encircled prior to the Belorussian Operation, the total unpreparedness of German

troops in the southern sector was new. Soviet PCA prior to the battle ensured that the

50
Gehlen, The Service, 97.
51
Boldyrev, “The Bobruisk Operation,” 105.
52
Ibid., 105-106.
 Berardino 15

attack was unexpected and German mechanized forces were too few to respond

effectively.

Having totally seized the initiative and beaten off German counterattacks, the Red

Army began systematically destroying the Germans in the city. The Red Army took

advantage of its air superiority to strafe the exposed German units caught without air

cover. After days of artillery and air attack, on the night of June 28-29, the commandant

of Bobruisk launched a doomed breakout along the Berezina River. Waves of drunk

German officers and NCOs charged the Soviet lines where Soviet artillery decimated

them. The survivors retreated into the city and surrendered later.53 The once-proud

Wehrmacht perished ignominiously in the fields of Belarus, a testament to the total

failure of German intelligence and the stunning success of Soviet PCA. On top of the

deception coup, Soviet forces also displayed their operational prowess in the employment

of cavalry mechanized groups in concert with tank armies.54 The Belorussian Operation

proved that the initiative at all levels of war belonged to the Red Army. Without an

accurate picture of the front or Soviet capabilities, German leaders continued to fight

reactively in the long retreat to Berlin. The Belorussian Operation succeeded at all levels

of war, proving definitively that PCA and operational maneuver combined were

unstoppable.

Conclusions

53
Boldyrev, “The Bobruisk Operation,” 105-108.
54
Malinovskiy and Losik, “Soviet Military Art in the Great Patriotic War,” 19-20. The lesson of
the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations was the ability to break through enemy echeloned defenses
and pursuing fleeing units and routing approaching reserves with the armored troops. KMG (cavalry
mechanized group) designed to break through, breach was exploited by 5th Guards Tank Army.
 Berardino 16

Strategically, the defeat of Army

Group Center had disastrous

implications for the German war

effort. After two months of fighting,

Army Group Center’s active

personnel count fell from 880,000 to

445,000 men, despite continuous

reinforcement of the front.55 The

Belorussian Operation blew the

Eastern Front wide open. A rolling

barrage of operational offensives

followed Bagration and threatened

to collapse German resistance on the

Eastern front. Building on

Bagration’s success, the Lvov-

Figure 2: This map shows the major offensives of 1944 beginning
with the Belorussian Operation and culminating with the defeat of
German forces in Scandinavia. (Roberts, 194)
Sandomierz offensive drove a

wedge between Army Group Center and Army Group North Ukraine and a southern

offensive broke into Romania and threatened Hungary. Because of these successes, Army

Group North found itself encircled in Courland where it would remain under siege for the

remainder of the war. For the Soviets, victory in the Belorussian Operation proved the

effectiveness of Protective Combat Action. Successful security operations reinforced the

55
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 214-215.
 Berardino 17

emphasis Soviet operational art placed on vigilance in the face of enemy aggression.56

Soviet planners’ focus on PCA and the decisive outcome it produced had far-reaching

impacts for future Soviet operational developments, both in the war and beyond.

Often scholars of WWII portray Soviet victories in the latter part of the war as

inevitable and a product of the Russian steamroller’s inexhaustible resources. However,

closer study of the conduct of Soviet operations within the limitations of its economy,

political considerations, and human capital reveals the difficult nature of Soviet victory.

The Red Army won many battles in 1944, triggering victory salutes in Moscow, but they

came at a heavy price.57 This heavy price was justified through a combination of

politicking and genuine rage. As Gehlen put it, “Stalin had mobilized the energy of the

Russian people by appealing to their patriotic instincts and by encouraging an imitation

Soviet nationalism.”58 Stalin combined the anger of the Russian people with more

realistic operational goals and increased delegation to subordinates.59 By empowering

subordinates, the Red Army was able to realize its complex PCA schemes in Belorussia

and beyond that took individual initiative to succeed. Each individual agent who

apprehended a spy, each commander who concealed his forces, and each partisan who

observed a German position contributed to the victory. As the Red Army honed its

operational art, they neared Berlin. Closing in for the kill, Soviet policy became

preoccupied with avenging their suffering and destroying the fascists.60 Such single-
56
“The Failure of Fascist Aggression Against the USSR (On the 40th Anniversary of the
Beginning of the Great Patriotic War),” Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, in Russian No 6, Jun 81, signed to
press 22 May 81, pp. 3-15, 14.
57
Roberts, "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories," 199.
58
Gehlen, The Service, 103.
59
Roberts, "Triumph and Tragedy: Stalin’s Year of Victories," 202-203.
60
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 256.
 Berardino 18

minded determination helps to explain the increasing savagery of the war, necessitating

effective operations to secure victory.

The Belorussian Operation remains the best example of Soviet operational art in

history. The application of PCA at all levels of war and the effective exploitation of

relative advantages proved essential to the achievement of the operation’s ambitious

goals. While the Soviets applied maskirovka in traditional ways, the effectiveness of

deception increased due to absolute intelligence superiority. Throughout the preparatory

phase of Bagration, Soviet counterintelligence guaranteed operational security and

neutralized enemy agents. With the enemy blinded, Soviet intelligence acted in both a

deceptive and informative capacity. The Germans never managed to assemble a coherent

picture of the strategic and operational situation, largely due to their chronic lack of

human intelligence. Soviet troops achieved such stunning success only through a holistic

application of PCA and vigorous counterintelligence work. Soviet operations as a whole

in the Belorussian Operation helped the Red Army to win decisively and shorten the war.

While victory in 1944 was extremely likely, it was not guaranteed. Highly effective

Soviet operational art provided the decisive edge.

 Berardino 19

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