Directions: 1) Do not make any marks on this article 2) Read the bracketed sections of the article, 3) Refer to the map at the back if needed. 4) Write these questions out and answer them on a separate sheet of paper. 5) Use COMPLETE SENTENCES. QUESTIONS: A) Why does the author feel that Yugo- slavia could survive without Slovenia? B) Why have Croatia and Serbia laid claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina? C) Under what conditions did Tito's solution to Yugoslavia need to operate under in order to succeed? D) What was the major change that began the unraveling? E) What is the problem with the Kossovo region? What is the historical significance of the region? F) Which were the first two republics to go the independence route? G) Which region tried to force a new Yugoslavia around it? Which of the republics goes with this idea? : H) Which republics want a compromise? I) What are the credentials of the author of this article? Pvastens pee a > ge eee | YUGOSLAVIA: BALKAN BREAKU by Dennison Rusinow the summer of 1990, Yugoslavs of assorted nationalities wryly forecast that the European map at the beginning of the twenty-first centu- ry would show only seven countries: a large one called “Europe” and six small ones on the territory of present-day Yugoslavia. By early 1991, the later half of this prophecy, with three or four if not six independent stares in ex-Yugoslavia, looked increasingly likely. As carly as autumn 1990, the CIA was reportedly predicting 2 breakup, “‘most probably in the next 18 months,” and that civil war is “highly likely.” Te may not come to that. Yugoslavs have a habit of going to the brink of some abyss, apparently poised to jump over, only to adjourn for another cup of coffee and further consider- ation. At present, however, the breakup of Yugoslavia seems more likely than at any time since this multinational state was reforged out of the crucible of simultaneous war for national liberation and civil war during World Wer II, as a federation of six republics and two autono- ‘mous provinces with Marshal Josip Broz Tito a its head. Two years ago, many Slovenes were already telling visitors that “Yugoslavia is a 70-year-old mistake that should finally be rectified.” Polls and anecdotal evidence suggest that a growing number of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, atleast in the ranks of the political elite, are coming to agree with that view. They argue that multiple incompatbilities among the cultures, interests, and even personalities of the Yugoslav nations, which have plagued their unity since the found- ing of the state and greatly contributed to its Lang < DENNISON RUSINOW is carrenaly a research profesor and adjunct profesor of bistory at the University of Pittsburgh. He bas lived for 30 years in Yugoslavia and Austria as an Associate of the American Universities! Field Staff. 143,FOREIGN POLICY 7 first disintegration in 1941, have finally provid- ed conclusive evidence that these disparate peoples would be better off, happier, and more prone t0 cooperate with one another if they lived in separate states. Most of the govern- ments produced by genuine multiparty elections in all six republics in 1990 are moving or being pushed in the same direction. Tn post-Cold War Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union no longer face the pros- pect of confrontational involvement that disin- tegration or civil swife in Yugoslavia almost certainly would have triggered when it served as a seategic buffer between their alliances. Eu- rope’s widening area of peace, however, is stil fragile, especially where populations and pas- sions do not suffer present state boundaries gladly, Such cases are notorious in the Balkans, especially in Yugoslavia In Slovenia, legal and other preparations for secession (the preferred word is now “disso- ciation”) have been underway for more than a year. In a plebiscite held on December 23, 1990—the same day run-off elections in Mon- tenegro and Serbia drove other nails into the coffin of Yugoslav unity—z reported 88 per cent of the 93 per cent of the Slovene elector- ate who went to the polls voted for “an inde- pendent and a sovereign Slovenia.” The Slo- vene government then gave the other republics six months in which to negotiate a confedera- tion pact modeled on the European Communi- ty, oF face Slovenia's unilateral, total dissocia- ton. Subsequent Slovene actions indicate that the deadline is serious. By itself, the secession of Slovenia would not constitute the end of Yugoslavia. But could Croatia be far behind? For the rest of the world, including Ameri~ cans, the prospect of serial secession raises another question: Would the disintegration of Yugoslavia matter to anyone except the Yugo- slavs themselves? The answer depends on whether or not 2 breakup could occur without widespread violence or full-scale civil war. Whether by agreement or default, a peaceful breakup should be considered 2 matter for the Yugoslavs alone. In this instance, a U.S. policy of unqualified support for “the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yugo- slavia,” a policy consistently enunciated and 144, Rusinow almost . consistently Pursued since the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslev split, would be as outdated 2 its Cold War premises. If on the other hand, appears likely that nothing short of civil wan will ultimately consummate or frustrate a breakup, a policy of support for Yugoslavia’s sorvival in some form would be justified more than humanitarian grounds Afier Tito 3 In principle, civic peace and the Yu state could survive Fisiaraire ase borders, except with Croati, are fixed with excernal states. Ninety per cent of the popula tion is Slovenian; the rest consists of call autochthonous Italian and Magyar minorities and “guest workers” from the rest of Yugosle via. The crucial question is whether Crest could follow Slovenia's example without un. leashing widespread violence ot war. Serbs and Croats in diaspora across Yugosav- ja are the primary reason for doubting 2 smooth disintegration: 24 per cent of all Serbs live outside Serbia, mostly in Bosnia: Herzegovina and Croatia; 22 per cent of all Croats live outside Croatia, mostly in Bosnia- Herzegovina and Serbia's Vojvodina, Croatia's Serb minority, 12 per cent of the republic's population, is majors in a number of dis- tricts, particularly around che republi’s horse. shoe border with Basie Herat Frightfl experiences in the World War II“Independent State of Croatia” sell haunt minority popula, tions there. In March 1991, going beyond earlier threats to secede from Croatia if and when Yugoslava’s current federal structure 1s altered, the regional Serb organization in Krajina, as the region is called, first proclaimed autonomy and then, two weeks later, Kegjn's union with Seria, : he situation is complicated by historic an. ethnic claims by both Cresta and Serbia aa Bosnia-Herzegovina, a complex patchwork of 13 million Serbs, 758,000 Croats, and 1.6 million’ Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims, whom the Croats claim as Islamicized Crow, and the Serbs as Islamicized Serbs. The three communities’ areas of serdement are thoroughly enmeshed, and all suffered the brutal civil war | ind attempted genocide of Serbs by the Usta- 145, SS <— | ?FOREIGN POLICY sha regime in Croatia during World War I Iredentiss in the governing and opposition partes in both Croatia and Serbia have staked Claims to some or all of Bosnia-Herzegoving; meanwhile, Bosnians and their new tinational coalition government discuss defending the independence and territorial integrity of their republic within or without Yugoslavia, Among the uncertainties that cloud the eves tual shape of Yugoslavia—or non-Vugoslay. ia—one thing seems clear: Yugoslavia canoe survive in its present form, The country shaped by Tito is no longer desired by most groups, except by a number of Bosnians and Macedo nians who fear a number of proposed alterna. tives more than they dislike the current consti- tagon. ‘he “Titoist solution” to Yugoslavia’s nf] tional question consisted of a state for each South Sky nation in an increasingly genuine federation, economie decentralization, and cul. tural autonomy under a centralized but multi. national and supposedly internationalist com. munist dictatorship. But Tito's prescription never laid the national question to rest. As soon 5 more genuine devolution of cenwal économ- ic and political powers in the 1950s created ‘opportunities for political and economic com. petition among the republics, the problem resurfaced. National tendencies were contain- able—although the lid nearly blew off in Cro- atia in 1971—as long as four conditions existed, The first was Tito himself—the authoritative, final arbiter among contending national elites and interests, backed by “his” party and army. The second was the almost constantly incress- ing production and publie and private con- sumption, which grew impressively until the 1980s, With living standards and prospects improving for almostall, albeit unequally, inter- ethnic competition for economic resources could be managed satisfactorily. Increasing prosperity also sustained the third condition maintaining the union: 2 relatively high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the re- gime, unlike Eastern Europe's other commu- nisteruled states. Legitimacy was rooted in a unique set of perishable etaibutes including the | ‘founding myths” of the regime's native and (heroic origins, and successfl defance of Stalin, Wy 146, eee Vee ge ae BOER 7 ce Felative liberality, “self management” as the most livable socialism in Eastern Europe, and Tito’s respected high profile on the world stage. Finally, a federal Yugoslavia persisted because none of the major national commun. ities—though each considered itself disadvan- taged or exploited—fele that its existence as 4 national community, either in its “own” repub- lic or asa large minority in others, was actually endangered, All four conditions were intact, if somewhat battered, at the beginning of the 1980s. None survived the decade. Tito died in May 1980. The economy went into a tailspin that same year, inaugurating a decade of declining production and living stan dards, high unemployment and inflation, and attendant miseries. In light of worsening condi- tions, the optimism of the 1960s and 1970s gave way to gloomy pessimism. Without Tito to knock heads together; mul- tinational collective federal presidencies created in the early 1970s and the interregional con- \ sensus required for most central decision mak- ing under the 1974 constitution frustrated every concerned effor to stabilize and restart the | sputtering economy. By 1982 there was already | general agreement, expressed in the appoint. | ment of a commission of experts and politicians} | © drafi comprehensive reform program, that an economic system based on the latest un- workable version of “selfsmanagement” and guasi-markets should be fundamentally re- | formed and partially dismantled. Bue conflicting interests and preferences emong eight regions d leaderships made both consensus and re- 3m impossible, [Erosion of the regime's legitimacy in the eyes | of the populace was 2 natural consequence of | economic misery and political paralysis. Only | the slowness of the erosion, which is hard to | meesure but probably reached the critical stage in 1988, is surprising. Whether because of residual strength of the myths of South Slav “brothethood and unity” forged in the pan- Yugoslav struggle for national liberation and of special virtues of “self management,” or because of fear or inertia, the regime and state created by Tito were not seriously challenged, except in Kosovo, until the eve of Eastern ») 147, eeFOREIGN POLICY Europe's anticommunist revolutions in 1989, By that time, intervening events had rendered inevitable what had always been probable: The challenge would be nationalist and would there. fore threaten the survival of the state Ethnic tensions in Kosovo precipitated chain reaction of aggravated nationalisms, en- gulfing first Serbs and then Albanians, Croas, Slovenes, and almost all other groups in the conviction that part or all of their national community was endangered. Once again the national question became an existential one, dominating and subsuming all others. To an increasing degree, all other aspects of individual identity and group interests are associated with and subordinated to reified “national” identity, interests, and aspirations. The nation becomes the value against which all others are measured; rational discourse and political and economic cost-benefit calculations take second place or vanish altogether. Kosovo is sacred to Serbs, who have long historical memories and know it as the cradle of their culture and statehood, and the site of the 1389 epic defeat chat led to their infamous “five hundred years under the Turkish yoke.” As a result of later migrations and staggeringly high Albanian birthrates, about 90 per cent of “Kosovo's population now consists of mostly ‘Muslim, non-Slavic Albanians, The Albanians’ “right” to Kosovo on demographic grounds confronts the Serbs’ “right” to it on historical grounds. After mass demonstrations by Kosovo's Albs- nians in 1968, a series of amendments to the federal constitution significantly enlarged the autonomy of Serbia's two autonomous provin- ces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, creating virtually, but not legally, separate republics. The benef- ciaries of these expanded powers, the govern- ment and League of Communists of Kosovo, were by then predominantly Albanisn. They promptly initiated 2 version of “affirmative action” in education, employment, and patron- age on behalf of their fellow-nationals who had all been previously subject to negative discrimi- nation and political under-representation. Kos- ovo's previously dominant Slavic minority (pri- marily Serbs) responded by emigrating in in- creasing numbers, The Albanian raajority, by ca { Rusinow far the poorest people in the country’s poorest region, remained dissatisfied, especially the ‘owing number of those with higher education 7rd no commensurate employment prospects. eginning at the University of Pristina, mas demonstrations by Kosovar Albanians erupted sain in March 1981 and were met by physical Tepression, arrests, and curfews. The demon- Seators’ central demand was the transformation ‘of Kosovo into a de jure republic, 2 demand that by then was almost entirely symbolic, but enormously important 2s such for both Alba- hiians and Serbs. Most Yugoslavs were under the impression that a republic, unlike an auton- ‘omous province, enjoyed a constiutional right to secede. This misperception was believed to explain the Albanians’ republican demand as @ legal prelude to immediate secession, presum- ably to rejoin Albania. a a A Ss Yugoslavia cannot survive in its pres- ent form. ‘Albanian casualties inflicted by the police, mass arrests, curfews, and periodic police and army reinforcements, have sometimes calmed but never quelled the simmering rebellion. Violence by both sides, arrests and detentions of Albanians without due process, intimidation of the remaining Slavic minority, which Serb nationalists view as an organized attempt to create an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo, and the exodus of Montenegrins and Serbs have continued spasmodically. The Slavic minority, 27 per cent in 1961 and 15 per cent in 1981, is now estimated at less than 10 per cent. For a time, the rest of Serbia's reaction to the events in Kosovo was muted. As late as 1986 many Serbs lamented in bitter resignation: “Kosovo is lost!” Most soon changed their minds. A new paladin of Serb national interests appeared on the scene—Slobodan Milosevié— who became president“of the League of Com- munists of Serbia in May 1986, self-anointed champion of beleaguered Serbs when Kosovar Albanian police beat Serb demonstrators in his Presence during a rally in April 1987, purger of Political opponents and dissenting voices in the Serbian mass media, and president of the col- lective presidency of the Socialist Republic ofFOREIGN POLICY Serbia in May 1989, [Ze December 1990, Mioievié was elected {& | 65 per cent of those voting and 47 per cent of | the electorate) as executive president under ¢ | Rew Serbian constitution granting extensive powers to that office. His party, called the Serbian Socialise parry since July 1990 bus really heit to both the former Serbian League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance ot Working People of Serbia, the Communiss! mass-membership “ffont organization,” can. tured 194 of the Serbian Parliament's 250 Seats in the same round of elections. Milosevié owed his triumph in largest part to his earlier embrace of the most nationalist voters and the Serbian flag. He also owed it to other considerationsJA populist, socialist plat- form (bz Sy What came to be called “the Great Serbian Bank Robbery,” an ilegal banks ing and currency manipulation scheme 10 py § delinquent or larger wages and pensions) prom. ised avoidance of unemployment and other fiseries aficting other Yugoslav regions nd East European countries making the transition : to a market economy. Skillful control and ma- hipulation of Serbia's mass media, combined with some intimidation, contributed to Milo- Sevie’s victory. So did the political style and Charisma of 2 man who has been described as zthe first Yugoslav politician to recognize that Tito is really dead.” The MiloSevie phenome. non, particularly the extension of his charisma and claim to be the defender of Serbdom for Serbs throughout the counzy, has spread the Kosovo poison to the rest of the Yugoslav body politic, voiding the hope that Kosovo would remain, at worst, a Yugoslav Norther Ire- land—festering on as an incurable problem that erupss in periodic violence but can be contained within the province, While Milosevié could not solve the Kosovo problem, he reunited Serbia by essentially wip- ing out the auronomy of Kosovo and Vojvodi- na. He accomplished this through a combina- Gon of mass meetings to mobilize increasingly frenzied support for his campaign and through engineering the resignation of “autonomist” 3 Savernment and party officials in Vojvodina in October 1988, through constitutionally and rocedurally dubious amendments to the Serbi- 150. Croats of Croatia as well as the Slavic Muslimn Plurality and Croat minority in. Bosnia-H a Rusinow an constitution, and finaly by simply closing down Kosovo's parliament, government, and Albanian-languoge media in July 1990 Serbia is once again whole, if not free, after 45 years of what most Serbs regard as a shame. ful division again seen as part of a broader, colder plot in which Tito the Croat, Stalin’. Comintern, and the Vatican conspired to keep Orthodox Christian and traditionally anticom: munist Serbia divided and weak, ‘Mass demonstrations by Milosevié supporters also led t0 2 coup in Montenegro in January 1989, perhaps the first step toward union be, tween Serbia and Montenegro, whose people have never been sure whether they are a sepa- rate nation or the best and fiercest Serbs, ‘These coups were described as an extension of the “antibureaucratic revolution” —Milogevie’s term for his earlier removal of discredited “bu. reauerats” (his party opponents) in Serbia prop. er. After Montenegro, Milofevié called for extending that revolution to other republics. True to a Serbian national ideology, which is equally content with a unitary Serb-dominated Yugoslavia as with a greater Serbis, Miloiewé has been a vigorous advocate of strengthening Yugoslavia's federal center. He campaigned aetively for abrogation of the interregional consensus rules adopted in the 1970s, and for ‘other constitutional changes that would dissolve the constitutional and political impasse that had frustrated pan-Yugoslay economic and political reforms since Tito's death. To that same end, he also called fora corresponding strengthening of the federal party center. The merits of some of Serbia's constitutional proposals were under. Cut by suspicions that the implicit aim was Serb mination and perhaps assimilation of non. bs. lovenes were the first to express widespread concern that Milofevi’s proposals could pres- 8ge threats not only to their autonomy but to their longer-term existence as 2 small nation in a Serb- and Milogevié-dominated Yugoslavia, Gills for loose confederation of “sovereign?” States or outright secession multiplied. As Milo- / ¥evic extended his claim as defender of Serb. m to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the r 151,FOREIGN POLICY zegovina displayed similar fears; so did “na. tionally. conscious” Macedonians and Mon. cenegrins. Ryiuig the Serbs By the beginning of 1990 Milosevié seemed to have overreached himself. The communist parties and governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia appeared to be edging toward the anti-MiloSevié postures of their Slovene and Croatian counterparts. A coalition of four re- publics began to take shape, all eager to contain Milogevié within the boundaries of “reunified” | Serbia and its satellite Montenegro. At home, } Milosevie’s authoritarian behavior and more extreme expressions of Serb nationalism began to cost him the support of many liberal Serb intellectuals initially attracted by his charisma and “antibureaucratic,” pro-Serb programs. The officer corps of the Yugoslav Army, which is dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins, was reportedly unhappy with the prospect of civil war in Kosovo, and perhaps elsewhere, due to Milo3evié’s policies. In addition, Serbia was conspicuously lagging behind Slovenia and Croatia, and even Mace- donia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with respect to political and economic reform, Noncommunist and anticommunist groups, some with more extreme Serb nationalist rhetoric and programs, appeared on the Serbian political scene, de- manding the free, competitive elections that the communist establishments in Slovenia and Croatia, already tilting toward their social-dem- —ngratic wings, were in the process of conceding. ‘The 14th (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists (the LCY) convened in Belgrade on January 20, 1990, was called on the initiative of the Vojvodina branch of the Serbian party. Miloevié apparently be- lieved that the time was right for his bid t0 revitalize and recentralize the party, with him- self at its head as de facto leader of four out of eight regional parties (in Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro) He miscalculated. In most of Yugoslavia and elsewhere, communists were desperately at- tempting to transform themselves into social- democrats, at least in image, and were coming to accept the multiparty elections that Milogevié | | \ 152, jwise reunification and reassertion of authority, | date to walk out if the Congress failed to ac- usinow sill denied as necessary in his already allegedly “democratized” Serbia. Ie was, all in all, an inauspicious moment for a congress of commu- ‘The Slovene delegation arrived with a man= cept their proposals for a still looser and con- federal LCY (a “League of Leagues”), endorse- ment of multiparty elections, and strong com- mitment to the rule of law and human rights throughout the country. The Congress became ‘a duel of angry words and stratagems between the Slovenes and MiloSevi¢'s gang of four par- ties. The Croatian delegation (itself split into social-democratic and communist factions) and those of Bosni-Herzegovina and Macedonia feebly sought to forge a compromise that would keep the party together. On the fourth night the Slovenes finally walked out. After a dramatic conftontation at the podium berween Miloievié and Crostian party President Ivica Ratan, Serb against Croat once again, a rump session eventually agreed with Roan’ insis- tence that the Congress could not continue without the Slovenes. ‘The Communist party of Yugoslavia, creator and sustainer of the second Yugoslav state, had self-destructed. Nothing remained to support the continuation of the state except whatever was left of “the Yugoslav idea,” and a federal government under Prime Minister Ante Mar- kovié, whose demonstration of skillful, deter- mined leadership in launching the most com- prehensive economic reforms of the post-Tito ity at home and abroad that same month. ticipating the demise of the LCY, Markovié’ (@ Croat) and Deputy Prime Minister Zivko Pregl (aSlovene) made adroit use of press conferences and the congressional corridors t0 spread the word that both Yugoslavia and its federal government could and would survive the party’s demise. Markovié’s popularity among nervous delegates, as the Congress and Ley disintegrated, was manifest. Had he then. or in the next days announced the formation of 4 pan-Yugoslav “government” party, which he did six months later (and too late), Yugoslavia’s and his own subsequent history might have been different. 153. ‘eta increased his and the government's popular =)FOREIGN POLICY By the end of 1990, multiparty elections had been held in all six republics. All six regional parliaments and the governments they subse. j quently named can now claim the mandate of democratic election. The national question and the fate of Yugoslavia, complicated by 2 new division berween communist and noncommanist republics are in the hands of these newly elecr- ed officials, In two cases, Montenegro and Ser- 7 bia, the majorities and governments are Com- munist (formally renamed “Socialist” in Serbia), In the other four republics they are not, though the former ruling party is part of the governing coalition in Macedonia, individual Communists have been co-opted in the other republics, and the Slovenes elected Milan Kuan, a popular reform-Communist and former party president, as president of the republic. In all cases the winning parties or coalitions can be fairly de- bed as nationalist. in Slovenia's April 1990 parliamentary elec- tions, Kuéan’s reform-Communists won 17 pet cent of the votes, the most of any single party. The ultimate victor, however, was 2 coalition called Demos, composed of seven recently |” | formed parties including social-democrats, |-national-libecals, Christan-Democrats, peasants, and “greens.” That coalition garnered 55 pet | cent of the vote and 126 out of 240 seats. The ‘common denominstors were anti-Commonism, varying hues and degrees of Slovene nation- | alism, and hastily recruited candidates wih ltde lor no political experience, with the exception of LY defectors. Lojze Peterle, a previously un~ |known political novice, is prime minister be- |eause his Christian-Democrats unexpectedly | won more votes than any other Demos patty. The Demos government is leading Slovenis, in deliberate steps, toward secession. Brakes of this process are now failing. These included public opinion polls in early 1990 showing that a majority of Slovenes still favored belonging *© 1 looser, preferably confederal Yugoslavia; simi lar views held by most of the parliament! |opposion and part of the governing colton land calculations of the economic costs of inde + pendence and the risk of army interventior he Demos government has been preaccl’ pied with the national question and has lacked an effective program on other fronts, including 154 Rusinow economic reform, to stanch economic deterio- fation. Its popularity has declined rapidly. Many domestic as well as foreign commentators view at least the timing of the December 1990 plebi- gcite on independence and sovereignty primarily gs 4 device to recoup popularity, ‘Serbian policies and rhetoric have consistent- Iy increased the likelihood of Slovene secession. Since mid-1990, circumstantial evidence, sup- ported by some statements, indicates that Milo- Eevié and company believe their plans for Yugo- slavia now have a better hope of realization ‘without Slovenia, and are happy to give the SlogBnys a push toward the exit. Poe in Croatia’s April-May 1990 Jections was the Croatian Democratic Union (eqpz in its local acronym). The HDZ is led by {Franjo Tudjman, 2 wartime Partisan general, lcommunist turned historian, anticommunist, lind former politcal prisoner for his alleged Mnationalist-separatise” role in the 1971 (Croatian nationalist “mass movement.” Ironi- ally, the HDZ’s victory was enhanced by a grave miscalculation on the part of Ragan's |teform-Communiss. Erroneously believing \they would lead the polls in most districts, they {wrote an electoral law providing for single- | member constituencies rather than proportional representation. The HDZ thereby captured 205, or nearly 58 per cent, of the 356 seats in the tricameral Croatian parliament, and a two- thirds majority in its most powerful chamber, with less than 40 per cent of the vote. Tudjman became president of Croatia, but DZ factionalism and incompetence in the HDZ government have led to frequent reshuffling of the cabinet. More important, Tudjman has sought to placate the most nationalistic wing of his party, including some personalities whose urterances about Serbs can only be described as | racist, with policies, rhetoric, and appointments that conspicuously deviate from the statesman- like image and policies he adopted in his early weeks in power. ‘The HDz government is being propelled by| the same complex forces pushing Slovenia toward secession, including the national ques- tion, which conveniently distraess public atven- tion from both regimes’ failure in the economic field. The difference between the Slovenes’ 155. |FOREIGN POLICY 4 ‘accelerating rush toward secession and the Croats’ nervous drift in that direction is pri- marily a consequence of the far greater poten- tial for violence that Croatia’s Serb minority and the Bosnian question would pose. —“ndeed, large-scale violence has almost bro ken out on three occasions. The first occurred in August 1990 when the Serbs of Knin (in the Dalmatian hinterland) erected barricades as the town was besieged by Croatian regular and special police. The second came in January 1991, when the Croatian government defied federal presidency and army orders to tur in the newly acquired arms of its paramilitary forces. An ominous stand-off between Croatian and federal armed units was defused by a last- minute compromise, The third, in March 1991, accompanied Miloevie’s abortive and ultimately humiliating efforts to destroy the collective federal presidency, which with its authority to act as commander-in-chief had refused to un- leash the Federal Army to deal with unrest in Croatia and elsewhere, In Macedonia’s November 1990 elections, the predominantly reform-communist leadership of, the former ruling party did well enough to win _ a place in the new coalition government. How- ever, the principal winner was @ new party with a historically ominous name—the Internal Mac- edonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). In its previous incarnation, IMRO was notorious for terrorist activities against first Ottoman and then Serbian rulers of Macedonia. The overall political picture, including factions within IMO, was sufficiently confused to delay the formation of a new government for months In Bosnia-Herzegovina the vietory of national parties closely corresponded to the-percentages of the republic's three principal nations: 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb, and 18 per cent 3 Croat. By prearrangement, the republic's pres: dency, which is sll collective in order to corre- spond to its multinational population, consists of two Muslims, two Serbs, two Croats, and one for other nationalities. The president of the presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim leader, succeeded in building a coalition government of all three national parties—as he had promised but few believed he could deliver. ‘Communist victories in Serbia and Monte- 156, Rusinow negro in December 1990—expected, but larger than anticipated—completed Yugoslavia’s new political landscape, While itis even more com- plex and ambiguous than indicated here, iss general shape, sharpened by 2 series of “Yugo- shy summits” of republican presidents and the federal state presidency in early 1991, is dis- cernble: ‘*Multiple parties and leaders competing for popular support and the dynamics of related political processes in several republics have increased the likelihood of separation, whether or not this was the intent of the participants. *The governments of two republics, Slovenia and Croatia, are set on a course of “dis- sociation” if their joint proposal for a loose confederation, modeled pardally on the post- 1992 European Community, is not accepted. ‘The Slovenian government is further along this, road and more determined than its Croatian counterpart, which must consider its Serb mi- nority and the prospect that attempted seces- sion by Krajina would lead to major violence. “The Serbian government, in conjunction with its satellite Montenegro, is adamantly opposed to anything less than the central (federal) pow- ers mandated by the present constitution, end prefers more. This position is linked to the Croatian problem with Krajina by MiloSevié’s insistence that borders must be changed to include all Serbs within an expanded Serbia if farther ‘decentralization occurs, and by his active support for Serb auronomists in Krajina *Desperate to preserve some kind of Yugoslavia and to forestall civil war, the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are at- tempting to eraft a compromise. They are tiking toward a confederal solution, though they are well aware that confederation is unlike- ly ever to be acceptable to MiloSevié and his adherents, *Tense relations between Croats and Serbs are again the focus of the national question after a Period when relations between Slovenes and Serbs appeared to be the central issue. *Brinkianship continues, with the risk of un- containable violence and the probability of Croatian as well as Slovenian secession seeming to increase with each episode. On the other hand, hesitation also continues, primarily be- 157,FOREIGN POLICY cause no one wants to stare a civil war, but alsy because popular support for separation is si ‘uncertain (except in Slovenia). In light of this fragile situation, ever more ‘observers are calling for change in US. atti. tudes and policy toward Yugoslavie's unity. In general, official American policy, and that of West European governments, has so far contin. ually asserted unconditional support for’ the unity of Yugoslavia. They are right to do so, Any other sate. ments, or even silence, would be construed as support for a breakup as well as interference in 5 the internal affairs of an independent anf friendly country. A splintering, particularly if 22 accompanied by violence, cannot be in he = American or European interest. On the other hand, the United States and European countries no longer have an overrid- 2 ing interest, or perhaps much interest at all, in preserving Yugoslavia ifits dissolution is peace- fal. The results of a peaceful breakup should be quickly recognized, but strictly after the fact However, if a complete breskup is highly un- likely without civil war, if the status quo is as unwanted and untenable as ir appears to be, and if no deal on an alternative form of federa- tion with uniform membership and obligations can be struck among the republics—all of which seem to be the case—then everyone, including the United Srates, must think agzin. In a conversation some months ago, Balkan historian Charles Jelavich of Indiana University suggested that the only happy and still feasible solution would be an agreement among all the republics that “we'll do it our way, you'll do it your way, and we'll call it Yugoslavia.” To keep the peace this formula requires two additions: Present republican boundaries must remain unalkered despite their defects as national boun aries, and a common court with enforceable jurisdiction in matters of individual and com- 3 ‘munal human rights must be established. Like’ earlier Slovene and recent Bosnian ruminations & about an “asymmetrical federation,” this formu- la closely resembles the joint Croato-Slovenian. proposal for a loose ‘confederation of sovereign. states,” which was rightly criticized as less than a confederation. That proposal was firmly r jected by MiloSevié and the Serbian govera- 158, Businow ment, which is violently opposed to anything less than a tight federation for whatever re. mains of Yugoslavia and is apparently inclined toward a Greater Serbia if that proves impossi- ble. AA solution like Jelavch’s is therefore highly unlikely, but still possible, especialy at mo ments of recoil from the prospect of civil war like those that have occurred several times in recent months. In such moments, foreign fiends should consider it in the interest of European stability, as well as in the Yugoslavs’ interest, 0 urge such a solution. If the disintegration of Yugoslavia proceeds and is accompanied by violence tantamount to civil war, as seems likely, determining the ap- propriate responses of foreign friends becomes more difficult. Mediation or intervention should not come from national governments, which may seek to advance their own interes, but rather from the institution or process known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by heads of state or govern- ments of all European states (except Albania) plus the United States and Canada, included the provision that European borders may be altered only by peaceful means. It is not un- imaginable that this provision could be inter- Preted to include the internal as well as external borders of a disbanding member state. The CSCE, 2s an institution oF process, can initiate only moral and politcal sanctions. Ifthe target countries or peoples are eager to avert or stop Widespread violence or civil war, this could be sufficient. This may be a weak reed, but it may also be the strongest one available. 159,SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AS OF JANUAR! 1991 Please note that Kosovo and Vojvodina are NOT Yugoslav republics but are regions within Serbia that have large non-Serb ethnic groups living there.. This article was published in January 1991