Surviving Helicopter Ditching 

● Published on July 25, 2020 

KP Sanjeev Kumar 
Test Pilot, ATP (Bell 412, AW139), kaypius.com 
 
Every year, when the South West Monsoon hits India, a niggling question faces naval and
offshore helicopter crew who must fly against strong winds, leaping waves and blinding rain
to undertake missions or reach their offshore destinations.
What if I have to ditch the helicopter?
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) defines ditching as “an emergency landing on
water, deliberately executed in accordance with rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) procedures,
with the intent of abandoning the rotorcraft as soon as practicable.”
[NH90 crash at sea Jul 19, 2020. Netherlands MoD photo (via Vertical Magazine)]
Case 1: Recently, two officers from Dutch Navy died after their ​NH90 helicopter​ “came down
in the Caribbean Sea near Aruba on Sunday (19 July 2020) at the end of a coast guard
patrol”. Two other crew members escaped without major injury. A photo (above) shows the
wreckage of the helicopter floating upside down with the Emergency Flotation System (EFS)
inflated. An investigation is underway. At this point, it is not clear if it was a ‘crash’ or
‘ditching’ (both have potentially different implications for survivability).

Case 2: On 29 Apr 2017, crew of an AW139 (Regn A6-AWN) ex-Abu Dhabi Aviation ditched
at sea seven minutes after takeoff from Dhabi II oil rig for another rig BUNDUQ. “Because
the oil temperature continued to increase, the Commander decided to descend to 200 ft in
preparation for a possible ditching. While descending through 210 ft, and with an oil
temperature of 119°C, the flight crew heard a loud grinding noise emanating from the
gearbox area. The Commander followed the instruction in the QRH and decided to ditch the
Aircraft“, the ​report​ reads.

[Photo of AW 139 (Regn A6-AWN) ex-Abu Dhabi Aviation ditched at sea 29 Apr 2017]
Photos of the ditched helicopter shows it floating perfectly, but upside down. Two flight crew
members and one passenger managed to escape with their lifejackets into a life raft before
the helicopter capsized due ‘slow deflation’ of the left-aft float. The crew had activated the
emergency floats (EFS) prior touchdown on water.
The AW139 can carry 15 passengers in high-density seating configuration. A6-AWN had just
one passenger in the cabin when they ditched (aircraft took-off from Abu Dhabi with five pax;
four disembarked at Dhabi II rig). The particular model of AW 139 had two liferafts packed
into sponsons on either side that could be deployed by activating handles in the cockpit.
Only one life raft deployed; more than sufficient for three survivors. The flight deck had a
sum total of 32,000 hours flying experience. Weather or sea state was hardly a factor, with
mild winds of 7 to 8 kts and visibility in excess of 7 kms.
This paragraph from the accident report is important:
“The Investigation identified that the causes of the deflation were a tear of the bag fabric and
seam delamination. It was identified that the in-flight activation of the flotation bags was not
compliant with the certification of the Aircraft’s flotation system, which caused the deployed
float cover to fragment. The remains of the float cover probably caused a tear to the aft left
flotation bag. The Investigation also identified that many flotation bags did not pass inflation
tests during regular shop visits because of seam problems.”
High intensity naval and offshore flying goes on unabated under the belief that EFS
“guarantees” safe ditching upto “sea state 6” (or whatever the type-specific RFM specifies).
But ask ‘how to determine sea state’ and crew shrug their shoulders with a tentative answer:
“from prevailing winds?”. There are no weathermen or oceanographers in Bombay High.
Often, weather app ​Windy​ or the ship / rig’s anemometer (with unknown position errors) are
the only tools.
Wind speed is a ‘necessary but not sufficient’ condition to determine sea state. Wave height
depends both on local and remote winds (swell). Oceanographers utilise terms such as
‘​fetch​‘ (horizontal distance over which wave-generating winds blow) and ‘duration’ of
prevailing winds to determine sea state. Both ‘fetch’ and ‘duration’ of the blow are required to
develop a particular sea state. There is definite correlation between wind speed and sea
state. But this is subject to oceanographic parameters, without which a direct correlation can
be incorrect or misleading.
There is ​Beaufort Scale​ for winds and a WMO Code ​Table 3700​ for sea state (SS). There
are some grey areas of overlap. Can these scales be used interchangeably for offshore
flying? For instance, ​Beaufort Scale 6​ means “strong breeze” of 22-27 knots, “where large
waves begin to form; the white foam crests are more extensive everywhere; probably some
spray”. Sea state 6 describes the sea as “very rough” with a wave height of 4-6 metres.
These are two different scales.
As per EASA, sea state is “a classification of sea conditions established by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO)“. Interestingly, the WMO itself ​no longer recommends
the use of sea state. It has been replaced by ‘significant wave height’ (Hs). Indian offshore
crew can at best expect to receive wind speed from an offshore destination. This is
extrapolated to sea state and life goes on, sometimes straddling a difficult space between
letter and spirit. Flying continues as per ‘reported winds’ and not ‘significant wave height’;
one is ‘objective’ while other is ‘subjective’. There are no suitable alternatives available
presently.
The Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) of AW 139 (Section 1, Supplement 9) states:
“the Emergency Flotation and Life Raft System is approved for ditching, up to Sea State 6, in
accordance with JAR/FAR 29“. The next paragraph lays down a number of conditions,
including provision of approved equipments such as life rafts, number of passengers (basis
life raft capacity), life preservers, emergency locator transmitter (ELT), etc.
AW139s operating offshore keep EFS (floats) “armed” throughout the flight between
crossing coast outbound/inbound. In the ditching report of Abu Dhabi Aviation AW139, the
captain’s decision to operate the EFS prior touchdown in water was questioned. The Bell
412 RFM on the other hand carries a specific “WARNING” prohibiting operation of floats in
forward flight:
SEVERE NOSE UP PITCHING WILL OCCUR IF EMERGENCY FLOATS ARE INFLATED
IN FORWARD FLIGHT OR DESCENT. — from Bell 412 EP RFM
If EFS is destabilising in flight, who has seen its behaviour after meeting a “very rough” sea?
Aeroplanes have well-rounded, buoyant fuselage, huge wings and tail planes (remember
Sully and his “Miracle on the Hudson”?). In contrast, the helicopter is short, stubby and, at
best, bears the flotation characteristics of a boulder falling off a cliff (see this ​video​). Some
helicopters such as the Westland Sea King were specifically designed with a ‘boat hull’; with
watertight integrity and buoyancy. We have also seen US Marine Corps Chinooks “​floating​”
with engine power in placid waters as special forces drove into their cargo hold in powered
rafts.
But all this is without EFS inflation. Once inflated, EFS can be draggy and destabilising,
especially if ditching with forward speed. With EFS inflated, takeoff is “prohibited” for most
helicopters. Some helicopters like the Bell 412 are specifically designed with ‘high-skid’
configuration to accommodate EFS. Offshore helicopters in general operate with EFS,
push-out windows for the cabin, life-preservers and emergency breathing system (EBS) for
pax, thereby ensuring maximum survivability in the event of ditching.

[An Indian Navy Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter at low hover over sea (picture courtesy
INAS 322)]
Case 3: In a memorable accident from naval archives (Feb 1, 1981), young Lt Cdr Subodh
Purohit (later Cmde, RiP) and his crew from Indian Navy undertook a copybook ditching of
Sea King 503 at sea after a main rotor malfunction during an oceanic passage. The
helicopter with four occupants floated on EFS for almost seven hours while help arrived. The
helicopter later capsized after taking in water even as the crew were rescued by a lifeboat.
“The marvelous job as Captain of the aircraft carried out by ‘Subbo’ while floating – his
continuous commentary reminding us that Seakings can float for 8-10 hrs; naval ships would
have sailed to reach us in the next 7-8 hrs, and so on, to keep our morale high. Last but not
the least, the timely decision to descend from 8500 ft to 200 ft made all the difference
between life and death“, Cmde Rajendra Sharma, TACCO on that flight, recounted in a story
he wrote 38 years later. This was a Sea King, a ‘flying frigate’, with boat-shaped hull
designed for ‘single-engine water takeoff’.

[A Seaking 42B in ASW hover (Picture courtesy Indian Navy)]

Today, most helicopter EFS are designed for auto-inflation on water impact. Compact,
high-speed, multirole helicopter designs derived from ‘landlubber’ cousins have all but
abandoned the ‘boat hull’ concept. For the military, a high level of training and preparedness
for ditching can be assumed. Can this be taken for granted in civil aviation where 15
passengers (read “clients”) are often sandwiched between ‘devil and the North Sea’ in
high-density seating configuration of, say, an AW139, with no consideration for the sea state
below? Food for thought.
The purpose of EFS is to provide adequate time and stability for crew and passengers to
escape a ditched helicopter. A 2016 Notice for Proposed Amendment (NPA) from EASA
states:
“In an otherwise survivable water impact, most fatalities occurred as a result of drowning
because the occupants were unable either to rapidly escape from a capsized and flooded
cabin, or to survive in the sea for sufficient time until rescue. Furthermore, the testing
environment in which helicopters are type-certified for ditching bears little resemblance to the
sea conditions experienced in operation.”
The last line is a clincher & perhaps formed basis for the ​EASA NPA​ that aimed to fill these
gaps.
JAR 29.801 lays down the specifications for ditching and EFS. Sub-para (b) requires that
“each practicable design measure, compatible with the general characteristics of the
rotorcraft​, must be taken to minimize the probability that in an emergency landing on water,
the behavior of the rotorcraft would cause immediate injury to the occupants or would make
it impossible for them to escape“.
Understandably, actual ditching trials would be too dangerous and impractical. Hence,
sub-para (c) of JAR 29.801 that “the probable behavior of the rotorcraft in a water landing
must be investigated by model tests or by comparison with rotorcraft of similar configuration
for which the ditching characteristics are known. Scoops, flaps, projections, and any other
factors likely to affect the hydrodynamic characteristics of the rotorcraft must be considered“.
How many of us (naval, offshore crew & certification agencies) have read these lines with
the seriousness it deserves?
Certification requirements for ditching are often met through modelling, simulation and
“read-across”. When the helicopter arrives on surface of water, ​metacentric height​ will
face-off with Centre of Gravity (CG). Simulation and modelling can only go so far. Such trials
also don’t factor intangibles like human anxiety, panic, disorientation, etc.
In Indian waters, we are fortunate to have sea surface temperatures that may not induce
shock or hypothermia. For the navy, extrapolating this to inclement weather, or far reaches
of operational deployment seen in recent times, could pose new challenges.
Offshore crew may also like to consider cultural aspects specific to country. Many of us in
Indian offshore have seen highly obese passengers asserting their ‘window seat’ rights in
high-density seating configuration just to maximise their own survival in the unlikely event of
a ditching. Extrapolate this to ditching in ‘Sea State 6’ and we have some serious concerns.
Even the North Sea operators and UK CAA grappled with harsh realities of ditching
survivability that ultimately resulted in ​CAP 1145​.
Is equipping rotorcraft with EFS a “necessary & sufficient” condition for safe ditching? Is lack
of EFS an obituary to the helicopter or its occupants? Do we take certification and approvals
for ditching at face value or is there a need to balance this against contextual and cultural
reality of our operations? History informs us that behaviour of aircraft, weight & balance,
correct deployment of EFS, use of ‘air pockets’ or EBS, and, most importantly, training and
readiness of crew and passengers will ultimately determine the outcome of a ditching.
Simply ticking boxes won’t help!