The Never-Never Land of IR - Neal & Hamlett (ISQ)

The Never-Never Land of International Relations
Author(s): Fred Warner Neal and Bruce D. Hamlett

Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 281-305
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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REVIEWS AND OTHER DISCUSSION
The Never-Never Land of

International Relations
FRED WARNER NEAL

CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL
AND
BRUCE D. HAMLETT
UNIVERSITY OF SANTA CLARA
Scholarship about scholarship, like theory about theory, and

teaching about teaching, is rarely very stimulating. Such com-
modities are not in short supply in the field of international rela-
tions, and this is not an attempt to add to them. The purpose of
this paper is rather to question whether the study of international
relations is proceeding in a desirable direction, and, if not, thereby
to offer a suggestion for the reorientation of international relations
scholarship. The utility of any academic discipline (including inter-
national relations) is measured ultimately by the contribution made
to the understanding of human problems and/or to the improve-
ment of the human condition. This is particularly true of the social
sciences, which focus upon human beings as they relate to each
other in the process of group interaction.
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969
281
282 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMLETT
The thesis herein set forth is that scholarship in international

relations is moving away from the problem (or human) focus and
has become too preoccupied with theory and methodology as ends
in themselves. The argument will be made that there are several
particularly meaningful questions in international relations on
which students in the discipline could more profitably focus.
Nationalism and international studies
The concept of international relations is a fairly recent and

favorable development in the academic community. It is necessary,
however, to raise the serious reservation of whether the study of
international relations can really be international. Can it portray the
world, the relations among nations, the factors causing them, and
their impact, in a way which does not give primarily a national
rather than an international view of these things. The question is
not so much the maintenance of objectivity (which in any absolute
sense is impossible) as it is the problem of escaping from the
milieu of one's own nationalism. We are all creatures of our own
culture; it could hardly be otherwise. Nationalism is the dominant
force in our age, and one can say that it has become nearly all-
pervasive, triumphing over ideology, religion, art, science, education
and virtually everything else. In some areas, this is altogether
proper, because the cultural milieu in which people live deserves
expression. In other areas, it is not so significant, either because
the subject matter has limited rather than universal impact, or
because the attrition of nationalism has itself been limited. But
with regard to international relations, neither the subject matter
nor its significance is limited, and the impact of nationalism has
been especially great. This is, of course, because nationalism is
what international relations studies are about. While the focus is
upon the whole group of nations and their respective nationalisms,
the studies have to be carried out by individuals whose views of the
world are necessarily conditioned, at least to some extent, by the
nationalism, i.e., by the cultural milieu, of a particular nation.
International relations is the single discipline which experiences
the full impact of this problem. While nationalism also affects such
fields as political science, religion, and sociology, its impact is only
tangential. These fields are either not directly concerned with a
particular culture or a particular nation (as, for example, religion
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
THE NEVER-NEVER LAND 283
or sociology), or they are consciously and of necessity confined to

the expression of a particular culture or nation in and of itself and
not in relation to other cultures or nations (as, for example, political
science). International relations, consequently, has built into it an
almost inevitable distortion of reality, both sharper and of greater
significance, than other field's of study. When the distortion is mani-
fested by obvious patriotic biases of the flag-waving variety, it may
be more extreme but is not as serious as when it consists of less
obvious biases stemming from ignorance, misunderstandings and
naivete-often idealistic in nature-inherent in national cultures.'
These biases have little or nothing to do with the intentions of the
scholar. Usually he is unaware of them. When he is aware of them,
he is able to minimize them. The basic issue, nevertheless, is whether
he can escape them sufficiently and still have anything meaningful
left. If the question is proper-and we think it is-then even to
raise it has significance for international relations as a field of
academic study.
Let us look at this matter from the point of view of international
relations scholarship in the United States. This is legitimate because
international relations is an American invention dating from the
time after World War I when the American intellectual community
discovered the world. Like most American essays in regard to the
world, it has been enthusiastic, well-financed, faddist, nationally-
oriented, and creating more problems than it solves. The American-
ization of the world has been a post-World War II process. Interna-
tional relations, however, has not yet caught on abroad like chewing
gum, coca cola, and ice in drinks. There are some outstanding ex-
ceptions, but in most foreign centers of learning the closest thing to
international relations is still diplomatic history, with international
law taught, along with Roman law, as a technical and somewhat
esoteric subject.
In the United States, of course, there was not even this before
World War I. American intellectual enthusiasm for world concepts
was deeply stirred, if it was not begot, by Woodrow Wilson and his
1 To illustrate, a great many of the studies concerning the process of

political and economic modernization have reflected a democratic, capitalistic
bais. W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1960) for example, assumes the model of American economic
development as applicable to all underdeveloped countries.
views about peace, democracy, international organization and the

evils of power politics. The ensuing American rejection of the
League of Nations, and the world along with it, did not dampen
this intellectual enthusiasm; indeed, it gave added zeal.
This enthusiasm was reflected in the early orientation of inter-
national relations studies toward the idea of international organiza-
tion. It was more idealistic and legalistic than analytical.2 As the
League failed and as the postwar world became the prewar
world, the zeal of internationally-minded members of the academy
increased. It was a peculiarly American zeal, combining high-
minded internationalism with a parochial American outlook. The
failure of the United States to enter the League and to participate
actively in the efforts at collective security was seen as the primary
factor in the collapse of international order and the debacles of
t-he late thirties. And the intellectual community, taking on its con-
science the sin of American isolationism, consciously dedicated
itself to -the proposition that, come what may, the United States
now had to right the wrongs of two decades and participate actively
in world affairs. Meanwhile, since the League had failed so
ignominiously, the emphasis on international organization in the
international relations studies no longer sufficed. It was replaced
by what might be called the New York Times approach, with em-
phasis on the current events which were so engrossing, particularly
current events relating one way or another to American foreign
policy. Of course, there were notable exceptions, but in general
American international relationists had little doubt that with the
United States now playing, or about to play, its proper role in
the world, things would be set aright in short order, with a new in-
ternational organization guaranteeing peace, order, democracy
and the four freedoms everywhere. The only thing to do was to
chronicle the events.
This orientation soon had to be altered. The Soviet Union, like-
2 See, for example: Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An

Introduction to the Western State System (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1933); John Eugene Harley, Documentary Textbook on Inter-
national Relations: A Text and Reference Study Emphasizing Official Docu-
ments and Materials Relating to World Peace and International Co-Operation
(Los Angeles: Suttonhouse, 1934); and Horace Meyer Kallen, The Structure
of Lasting Peace: An Inquiry Into the Motives of War and Peace (Boston:
Marshall Jones Co., 1918).
wise emerging from isolation, proved to have its own ideas about
how to reorder the world, and these did not fit the American con-
cepts. The focus quickly moved to what was universally regarded
as Soviet obstructionism and then the Cold War. Part of the ease
with which so many American international relations scholars em-
braced the American Cold War positions resulted, to an important
extent, from the annoyance and frustration they felt at seeing their
neat ideas of how the world would be run so rudely upset.
A clear illustration of the impact of nationalism and of recent
historical events upon international relations scholarship can be
found in our treatment of the Munich debacle. The debacle was
not seen in terms of the Anglo-French failure to collaborate with
the Soviet Union to restrain Germany-a gambit that might have
worked-but simply in terms of the Anglo-French failure to inter-
vene in defense of Czechoslovakia. Acquiescence in the demand
by a militarily powerful state that a smaller state hand over part
of its territory or suffer military invasion was clearly appeasement.
Whether the meaningful alternative to it for the Western powers
was a more adroit foreign policy or military intervention is a
legitimate question. But American thinking tended to reject the
former alternative and has concentrated upon military intervention
as the sole means of circumventing appeasement. This Munich
syndrome conditioning became important after World War II,
when the American government began to think of the Soviet refusal
to acquiese in its ideas for reordering the world as military aggres-
sion, either threatened or actual. To give in to the Soviets would
be appeasement, and the way to cope with appeasement was
military intervention. Not to do so would be isolation, and isolation
was, clearly, a cardinal sin.3
It was this kind of faulty reasoning, both by scholars and deci-
sion-makers, more than any ideological biases or conscious aims at
3 The syllogism was simplistic: Isolation was bad, as indicated by what

happened between the wars. Active United States participation in international
affairs thus was now necessary for peace. Soviet opposition to U.S. efforts
amounted to aggression, or the threat of it. Giving in to such threats was
appeasement. The way to combat appeasement was by military intervention.
Therefore, the alternative to isolation was military intervention, or the readi-
ness to intervene militarily. For a more complete discussion of this point, see
Fred Warner Neal, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union (Santa Barbara,
California: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961).
VOLUME 13, NuMsER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969
286 FRED W. NEAL AND BRuCE D. HAMLETr
global hegemony that led us into our cold war posture and the
containment doctrine. Based on the logic-or illogic-of the
original syllogism, the containment policy and most of our scholarly
analyses of this policy simply ignored the fundamental principle
of international politics-the principle of core interests; that is,
the idea that all states regard certain geographic areas-usually
proximate to them-as so vital that when these areas are threatened
the state will react as if its very existence were threatened. Such core
interests, as defined by policymakers, are essentially non-negotiable
in the 'same sense that the existence of a state is non-negotiable.
Where core interests overlap, therefore, conflict of some kind-
usually military-results, and, traditionally, the state with more
power at its disposal is able to force the less powerful state to
accept its version of core interests. But core interests must be
limited somewhere; otherwise they conflict with core interests of all
other states. The trouble with the containment doctrine-designed,
in Kennan's words, "to confront the Russians with unalterable
counterforce at every point . . ." -was that it did not seem to
allow for any "legitimate" Soviet core interests. The usual unques-
tioning acceptance of this in international relations studies meant
that our scholarship was often replete with propaganda for U. S.
cold war policies and attitudes. This is not to say that such was
the intention; merely that it was the result.4
One of the most capable international relations scholars is
Hans Morgenthau, and one of the better treatments of the postwar
imbroglio over Eastern Europe-a clear Soviet core interest-is to
be found in his famous book, In Defense of the National Interest.
The book makes an excellent exposition of the concept of core inter-
ests-without calling it that. But in his treatment of the events
after Yalta, up to and including the Truman Doctrine, Morgenthau
does not oppose the idea that the United States should have sought
influence in Eastern Europe-indeed he seems to approve of the
idea. His criticism is that we used only legalistic means and then
4 Among the examples of this syndrome see John W. Spanier, American

Foreign Policy Since World War 11 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960)
and Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962). There are many others.
cried "thief' after the horse was stolen.5 He consequently appears to

sanction in practice what he condemns in theory.
In terms of national policies, all this led to what might be called
interventionism on an isolationist base. In the United States,
isolationism is often thought of as meaning simply non-involvement
in world affairs. In our opinion, isolationism should refer neither
to intervention or non-intervention, nor to participation or non-
participation in world affairs (consider Switzerland, for example,
which does not even belong to the United Nations), but rather
an ignorance of the world, an inadequate understanding of the
main currents of world affairs. In this !sense, the containment doc-
trine can be called isolationist even though it meant frenetic
American involvement. Our international relations scholarship, in-
fected as it is with the original isolationist distortion, has more often
than not been unable to see this. Our international relations intellec-
tuals did not really escape isolationism by coopting for participation
and intervention; they only aggravated it.
International relations as a discipline
As international relations moved from an amorphous academic

subject to an amorphous academic discipline, the lack of theoretical
equipment became especially burdensome. This lack not only
affected the quality of international relations studies adversely, but
it also made difficulties with international relations' disciplinary
pretensions. Earlier it was the development of theory that had con-
tributed to the acceptance of both political science and sociology
as disciplines, and it was not unnatural that the need for academic
status (and research grants) led the international relations scholars
in the same direction. The search for a "general theory" was on.6
To the extent that theory led international relations scholars to
examine the content of their work, this development was all to the
5 Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York;

Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 105 ff and pp. 115 ff. Morgenthau's more recently
expressed ideas on Asia represent a greater harmony between theory and
policy proposals. Nevertheless, the fact that an example could be found in one
of his books only illustrates the pervasiveness of the syndrome.
6 The outstanding early explorer was Kenneth W. Thompson. See, for
example, his "The Study of International Politics," Review of Politics, 14,
(Oct. 1952), pp. 433-67 and "Toward a Theory of International Politics,"
American Political Science Review, 49, (Sept. 1955), pp. 733-46.
VOLUME 13, NUflER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969
288 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMLETr
good. There was clearly a need not only for greater precision and
for some generally accepted basis for asking the pertinent questions,
but also for more attention to methodology. We have now had some
15 years of intense concentration on theory and methodology, some-
times, it seems, almost to the exclusion of everything else. What
has been the result? There has been considerable benefit in terms
of more precise concepts and more precise data. This has diminished
the nationalist distortion in many international relations studies,
although not completely and not sufficiently. But these gains have
come at a price, which, unfortunately, is high. One important result
of the orientation to theory and methodology has been a retreat
from consideration of concrete vital problems of international rela-
tions, and this at the very moment when the concrete vital problems
have become of transcendent importance to us all. International
relations studies, now more than ever, tend either to avoid real
problems, or to deal with non-problems. This difficulty will be dis-
cussed more fully below.
A second major weakness is the tendency to be overly abstract
and thereby to obscure the human aspects of international political
relationships. Such terms as "international system," "international
actor," and "state" are used repeatedly without reference to the
fact that states are organizations rather than organisms, and that
it is human beings who make decisions and act in the name of the
organization. The basic difficulty is the tendency to reify the state
or the "system" and, consequently, to utilize simplistic images and
explanations of interstate behavior. Morton Kaplan, for example,
has spoken of the "needs" of social systems, maintaining that "a
social system is motivated as truly as an individual human being"
and that "a system can act to satisfy needs . . ."7 Similarly, Robert
North has discussed the "powerful motivating force in both the
individual and the state," and the tendency for "a state to operate
in such a way as to maximize its perceived rewards and to minimize
its perceived punishments."8 By using the terms 'state' and 'system'
in this manner, Kaplan, North, and others have glossed over a
7 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New

York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957) p. 254 and p. 255.
8 Robert North, et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications
for the Study of International Crises (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1963), p. 147.
THEu NEVER-NEvE LAND 289
truly basic point of international relations studies. Such use ignores

the fact that decision-makers formulate and implement the state's
foreign policy, and that decision-makers, as human beings, act on
the basis of perceptions, expectations, and motivations.9 Any theory
which ignores these aspects of human behavior necessarily obscures
the actual substance of politics.'0
While theory must, to some extent, be abstract, it has-or should
have-a non-abstract purpose. It is intended to be a bridge to
reality, a tool for dealing with the concrete. Unfortunately, not all
international relations theory has been oriented in this direction."-
The concept of systems theory, for example, is a useful one. But
the concept itself is quite simple: entities act and react in relation
to other entities, forming groups and sub-groups which must be
looked at as entities themselves. Having set up a theoretical basis
of this kind iil regard to international relations, one would think it
would then be applied to international problems. Often, instead,
we have had little more than theory about systems theory.'2 The
implied assumption seems to be that knowledge develops through
the repeated analysis of words and concepts. Unfortunately, this
9 For a useful discussion of the relationship between perception (and

misperception) and foreign policy actions, see Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on
Misperception," World Politics, 20 (April 1968), p. 45479. North, of course,
also has done outstanding work in studying factors affecting individual decision-
makers.
10 We would agree with Harold and Margaret Sprout in the "need for a
viewpoint and a mode of thinking that enables one to abstract and generalize
without losing touch with the human substance of political actions and rela-
tionships, with the conditions that circumscribe human achievements, and
with the human impacts on the habitat in which political problems arise and
to which the human future is related." See their An Ecological Paradigm for
the Study of International Politics (Princeton University: Center of Inter-
national Studies, March 1968), p. 7.
11 Among the exceptions are articles in Journal of International Agairs,
Vol. 21 (1967), devoted to "theory and reality in international politics." See
particularly Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and
the Balance of World Power," pp. 215-31.
12 See, for example, J. S. Goodman, "The Concept of 'Systems' in Inter-
national Relations Theory," Background, 9 (February 1965), pp. 257-68;
Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York:
MacMillan, 1966); Klaus Kiiorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International
System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961; Charles
A. McClelland, "Systems Theory and Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human
Conflict, edited by Elton M. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1965).
290 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMLErr
is not the case. Meaningful theories and models can only be the
end product of several coordinated, cumulative studies of empiri-
cal reality. Thus far systems theory has not been so employed in
international relations research.'3
Two important exceptions to the above criticism of systems
theorists are Kenneth Boulding and Karl Deutsch. Both have at-
tempted to employ systems theory as a means for understanding
reality. In Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, Boulding argues
that a "general theory of conflict" can be developed which distills
the essence of all conflict situations. One of his major themes is that
the modern nation-state is "conditionally viable," in that two states
in the international system have the capacity to destroy or absorb
all other states. This 'fact' of international politics has raised the
question "whether we can continue to have a world of independent
states or whether sovereignty . . . will have to be surrendered to a
world government . . ."14 Boulding is clearly focusing upon one of
the key problems of international politics.'5
Deutsch's work has been equally useful in that he has focused
upon the process of political and economic integration in Western
Europe."6 If one accepts the value judgment that a more integrated
world is a desirable condition, then the body of data and hypotheses
which Deutsch is accumulating will have important future utility.
From the point of view of this paper, however, the more significant
aspects of both Boulding's and Deutsch's research is that (1) they
13 Initial steps in this direction include: Leonard Binder, "The Middle

East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, 10 (April 1958),
pp. 408-29; and Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies:
The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, 15 (Jan.
1963), pp. 213-35.
14 Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 273. See also Chapter 4.
15 It is questionable, however, how useful systems theory has been in his
analysis. John Herz, for example, arrived at the same conclusion five years
earlier without utilizing the same abstract approach. (See his "The Rise and
Demise of the Territorial State, World Politics, 9 (July 1957) pp. 473-93.
16 See: Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1967); France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite
Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1967); "Integration and the Social System: Implications of
Functional Analysis," in The Integration of Political Communities, edited by
Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co.,
1964).
T in NEVER-NEVER LAND 291
have focused upon concrete problems of international politics, and

(2) they have used systems theory as merely one of several tools
in the analysis of reality. Their approach could usefully serve as
a model for other scholars in the field.
The yen for precision via theory has in fact often resulted in
imprecision. The horrible example, par excellence, is game theory,
and its worst manifestation in international relations studies is its
main one-deterrence theory and arms control. Here the national
distortion was sometimes blatant-if usually unconscious and unin-
tentional. It was as if the carpenter, impressed with using tools,
but finding himself with only a saw, proceeded with his building
work as if only sawing were required. Not much got built, and what
did had little resemblance to a house. Game theory in the study of
nuclear strategy achieved its heyday after American international
relations scholars were forced, by Soviet scientific advances, to
realize that playing international politics with nuclear weapons was
more than a one-way street.17
It is necessary to speak of the responsibility of the international
relationists using game theory more than game theorists-largely
mathematicians and physicists-dealing in international relations.
The extent of the national distortion here-and the dangerous de-
parture from reality which resulted-has been well spelled out by
a famous game theorist in international relations, Anatol Rapoport,
with such force that at least some reconsideration has been forced
on some international relations scholars.18 Rapoport, with subse-
quent support from Philip Green,19 has argued that the utilization
of techniques such as game theory has resulted in distorted con-
clusions and inaccurate policy proposals and has ignored value
judgments. In short, scholars have become preoccupied with their
17 See, for example: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling and Morton
H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
1961); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1960); and Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror,"
Foreign Affairs, 37 (January 1959), pp. 211-34.
18 Cf. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper and
Row 1964) and "Game Theory and Human Conflict," in The Nature of
Human Conflict, edited by Elton B. McNeil (Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall, 1965).
19 Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966).
VOLUME 13, NUJMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969
"scientific" approach and consequently have ignored basic political

questions.20.
Methodology, like theory, is a tool to be used in the understand-
ing of reality. To some extent, attention to methodology in inter-
national relations studies has been so directed. The difficulty has
been that there is no consensus as to what the tools are to be used
for. This is in part both the fault of inadequate theory and the
over-emphasis on methodology itself. It is important to realize that
tools exist and that they can be utilized. A screwdriver is a tool,
for instance, but it is not of much value unless you want to make
something for which you can use it. A screwdriver is of little help
to a carpenter sawing two-by-fours, just as a saw is of little help to
an electrician putting in light fixtures. Frequently, our international
relations scholarship seems preoccupied simply with the collection
of assorted saws and screwdrivers and other tools-called in this
instance, "data"-at the exclusion of concern with how the tools
might be used, or, even whether they can be used. This might be
called The Journal of Conflict Resolution approach to international
relations. In one way, it frees itself from the nationalist distortions,
but largely because it frees itself from everything else as well,
except the phrenetic collection of data.21
The data collection approach is a fascinating one, nonetheless.
Holding that the practice of international relations is in a bad way
because we do not have enough facts, the exponents of this ap-
proach seem to believe that scholarly investigation of anything that
even remotely can be related to international affairs contributes to
a body of facts that, maybe, somehow, sometime, someplace, can
be utilized. No matter if it is Babylonian monetary policies or the
sex life of Greek slaves, it is all grist for the mill. (A certain Ph.D.
dissertation mentality is apparent here, perhaps.)
This approach is closely related to emphasis on the behavioral
20 See ibid., pp. 93-156, for a thorough critique of the implications of

game theory in the formulation of strategic policy.
21 See, for example, the following articles in a recent volume of The
Journal of Conflict Resolution: L. G. Morehous, "One-play, two-play, five-play,
and ten-play runs of Prisoner's Dilemma," 10 (1966), pp. 354-62; Charles
G. McClintock and Steven P. McNeel, "Reward Level and Game Playing
among six persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," 10 (1966), pp. 488-96;
and F. Trenery Dolbear, Jr., and Lester B. Lave, "Risk Orientation as a
Predictor in the Prisoner's Dilemma," 10 (1966), pp. 506-15.
sciences and quantification.22 Again, in themselves, these are useful

orientations. A whole range of data based on psychology, anthro-
pology, and sociology-both the methods of these disciplines and
the body of knowledge which they have accumulated-is of course
pertinent to studies of international relations, especially as related
to decision-making and group behavior. And to the extent that these
and other data can be made precise through quantification, the bases
for international relations studies are enhanced. But they are not
international relations studies in -themselves. They are tools. Those
in the behavioral sciences primarily, with secondary orientation to
international relations-Jerome Frank, Urie Bronfenbrenner, e.g.,
-use them that way.23 Those in the study of international relations
using behavioral techniques often do not. For an importment seg-
ment of the latter, the tools seem to have taken over.
Content analysis is a case in point. The best example we can
think of is represented by what might be called the Stanford ap-
proach. It would not be fair to say that the Stanford approach com-
bines the worst of both worlds. In contrast to the formless activity
of The Journal of Conflict Resolution approach, the Stanford ap-
proach does limit itself-perhaps too narrowly-to areas more
related to international relations. However, the philosophy is the
same, with the emphasis on quantification. Thus, according to the
Stanford approach, it is useful to tabulate all international activity
during and immediately before a particular international situation
or crisis. The outbreak of World War I, for example, is studied by
totaling the number of international telegraph messages and diplo-
matic communications, the types of verbs and adjectives in news-
paper dispatches, the number of persons crossing pertinent inter-
22 For an example of the results of an emphasis (or over-emphasis) upon

quantification, see J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and
Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940," World Politics, 18
(January 1966), pp. 236-82. The authors attempt to measure a state's inter-
national status by counting the number of diplomatic representatives each
state had at several historical intervals. Their data are then capable of
demonstrating "facts" such as that Peru had greater status than did the USSR
in 1940.
23 See, for example, Jerome Frank, Sanity and Survival: Psychological
Aspects of War and Peace (New York: Vintage Books, 1968); and Urie
Bronfenbrenner, "The Minor-Image in Soviet-American Relations," Journal of
Social Issues, Vol. XVII (1961), pp. 45-56.
294 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMLErr
national borders, etc.24 One apparent aim is to build up some kind

of indices of crisis and, presumably on the theory that history re-
peats itself as detail rather than farce, try to utilize this to see when
current international situations are approaching a boiling point of
crisis.25 This, says J. David Singer, constitutes transforming facts
into data and data into theory.26 While this is perhaps true, the old
sun spot approach can be utilized in the same way.
Perhaps we are being too harsh. There is, in much of this, a
commendable effort to be objective, an end toward which we all
reach. But the result seems to be more one of avoiding the real
problems of international relations-theory at the expense of phi-
losophy, data collection at the expense of analysis, quantification at
the expense of meaning. While the objective is to be scientific, what
is achieved is often merely technical. This trend, it should be noted,
is not confined to international relations.27 All the social sciences
have gone in the same direction. If economics is the worst example,
its distinction is one of degree only. The effect is for t-he social
sciences steadfastly to eschew attention to policies, to goals, to
philosophy, even to logic.
Ortega y Gasset warned us about exactly this development in
The Revolt of the Masses. The technician, he wrote, may know a
great deal about a little, but he knows nothing about very much.
Yet it is technicians who are becoming the custodians of the scholar-
ship on which society depends for its direction and achievements.
In political science, at least-and perhaps, by inference, interna-
tional relations-there are evidences of a counter-trend, as witness
the widespread criticism of the American Political Science Review
24 See, for example, North, et al., op. cit., pp. 161-76, and Ole R. Holsti,
"Perceptions of Time and Alternatives as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making,"
Peace Research Society Papers, 3 (1965), pp. 79-120.
25 For a defense of the Stanford approach, see Robert C. North, "Re-
search Pluralism and the International Elephant," International Studies
Quarterly, 11 (December 1967). See also, "The Costs of the Scientific Study
of Politics: An Examination of the Stanford Content Analysis Studies," by
Robert Jervis, in the same issue, pp. 366-68.
26 J. David Singer, "Data-Making in International Relations," Behavioral
Science, 10, (January 1965), p. 78.
27 Speaking of political scientists, Alfred Cobban asserts that their "effor
to be pure scientist is mostly a device for avoiding politics without achieving
science." "Decline of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly, 68,
(September 1953), pp. 321-27.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTELY
TirE NEvER-NEvim LD 295
on exactly this basis and the demand for establishment of a Society

for the Study of Political Problems which grew out of a recent meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association.28
The indirect impact of this "technification" is also important in
regard to the propensity of international relations scholarship to
deal with specific non-problems. This is a different and more contro-
versial question than generally not dealing with any problems. A
non-problem is one which is either of no real significance in the
terms that it is presented, or is of a completely different kind of
significance, or is presented in terms of a glaring distortion of
reality. Examples in the academic field include certain studies in the
last few years on arms control and most studies on "conventional
war," by which is meant a repetition of World War II, without the
use of nuclear weapons. Studies about Asian "stability" which
ignore Chinese core interests are also of the non-problem variety.
Perhaps the most prolific studies on non-problems are those deal-
ing with NATO.29 NATO was based on the assumed danger of
Soviet physical military aggression. Whether this assumption was
(or is) correct cannot be proven. The basis of the perceived threat
of Soviet aggression stemmed to a considerable extent from the
presence of Soviet armies in Central Europe. NATO never had
enough forces to hold off a "conventional" Soviet attack. Having no
nuclear weapons of its own, NATO's strategy was always based on
the American thermonuclear umbrella. Many discussions of NATO,
however, treated it as though its significance lay in the strength-or
lack of it-of its troops. On top of this, West Germany became the
most important unit of NATO. As a result, no compromise with the
USSR on the German question was possible because of the fear it
would weaken NATO. Thus we were estopped from political moves
which might have resulted in withdrawal of Soviet troops from
central Europe, which was t-he main factor in stimulating forma-
tion of NATO in the first place.30 For this reason, it is difficult to
28 Cf. letter by Christian Bay in American Political Science Review, 61

(December 1967), p. 1096.
29 See, for example: Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965); Alvin J. Cottrell and James E.
Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964); and Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future
of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
80 For more discussion of this point, see Fred Warner Neal, "The Political
296 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMirxr
see the utility of discussions of NATO centering around its defense

function. This did not stop the studies from being produced, and
even now that France's withdrawal has deprived NATO of its main
geographic modus operandi, we are still treated to international
relations studies written as though none of this were so.3' In short,
these are discussions of non-problems.
A problem focus for international studies
What should be the focus of our international relations studies

insofar as they are able to escape from theory about theory and
methodology about methodology? Without attempting to limit inter-
national relations studies, we would propose their orientation to
certain overriding problems. After all, international relations-how-
ever you define it-has unique importance. As everyone knows,
international relations can now quite literally result in the destruc-
tion of all of us and of everything we have and desire and believe.
War and peace have always been dramatic aspects of inter-
national relations, of course, but never before such absolutes. From
this point of view, what are the most relevant topics for studies in
international relations?
We would suggest three, and possibly a fourth, as being of such
overriding relevance that they should have priority over everything
else-a crash program, so to speak-keeping in mind that the list
makes no pretensions to being exclusive. There are longer run ques-
tions of a more fundamental nature, though it is doubtful there are
any on whose answer the survival of our civilization more depends.
First is the study of what the French call immobilisme. That is,
the problem of foreign policy rigidity, not only in terms of a specific
foreign policy, or that of a particular nation, but in terms of general
principles and their impact on international relations as a whole. It
is evidently very difficult for a modem state to change an important
foreign policy.32 In many cases it is a question whether an important
Unity of Western Europe-Myth or Reality," in The Unity of Western Europe,

edited by Jack D. Dowell, (Pullman, Wash.: Washington State University
Press, 1964).
81 See, for example: Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The World Without NATO,"
Orbis, 10 (Spring 1966) pp. 79-90; and Captain Robert J. Hanks, "The High
Price of Success," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1968, pp. 26-33.
32 Recent illustrations of this difficulty include the French in Indo-China
and Algeria, the West Germans in regard to East Germany, the Soviet Union
foreign policy stance can ever be changed. The prerequisites would

seem to be powerful charismatic leadership or a revolutionary, or
near-revolutionary, change of regime. Involved in this situation are
all of the ramifications and complexities of the mass society which
Ortega described. Most of the political and sociological studies on
this point ignore Ortega's analysis, and do not concern themselves
with the international relations aspects of the problem.33 Since
change is the constant "fact" of international relations, and given
the imperative for compromise-which is the leaven of international
relations-the problem assumes the highest importance at a time
when conflict avoidance is literally necessary to survival.
Also involved in this problem are studies of national interest, of
appeasement and compromise, of the uses of international organiza-
tion-indeed just about the whole spectrum of international rela-
tions studies. Closely related is the question of whether in the
modern mass society a foreign policy can ever be rational. There
are certainly elements present which indicate a propensity for for-
eign policies (particularly those of the great powers) to be irra-
tional34-not that they always are, but the propensity is there. It
can further be suggested that the more irrational the policy, the
more vigorously it is pursued. Maybe this is an exaggeration, but
the question has significance for international relations studies
based, as they tend to be-perhaps as they must be-on the assump-
tion of rationality of decision-makers and their ability to control
and change the state's policy vis-a-vis other states.35 Of course, a
part of the problem here is the new irrationality of war, the threat
of which, as Quincy Wright says, always hangs over the conduct of
international relations. Many scholars have accepted this as regards
in regard to its support of socialist governments, and, now, the United States
in Vietnam.
83 Charles E. Lindblom, an economist, has offered some important initial
propositions concerning this problem. See, "Policy Analysis," American Eco-
nomic Review, 48 (June 1958), pp. 298-312; and "The Science of 'Muddling
Through,"' Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring 1959).
84 The term "irrational"-easily capable of misuse is used here to
describe a policy where the non-relation of means to ends is in clear violation
of logic, as, e.g., to destroy a city-or a nation-to "save" it.
85 As an illustration of this built-in assumption of rationality, see, for
example, Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1966).
thermonuclear war, and, given the threat of escalation, there is an

increasing tendency similarly to regard so-called conventional war.
An important ramification of this problem is the propensity for
great power involvement in the internal conflict of smaller states.
It is worth questioning whether under modern conditions a guerrilla
war with a modicum of popular support can be put down, no matter
how great the power of an outside intervening state. The significance
of studies on this issue involves not only the questions of nationalism
and of communism but also of the international relations within the
communist world itself. The problem is not so much great power
involvement in fomenting the revolutions, as it is subsequent great
power assistance to revolutionary movements in response to military
intervention by the other great power. We naturally tend to think
of this now as pertaining to communist revolutions, with the United
States intervening against them and the Soviet Union and/or China
intervening in behalf of them. But not all revolutions are from the
left, and the situations could be reversed. The real question, in this
context, is whether it is true that major powers are unlikely to win
foreign wars against revolutionaries, while simultaneously being
unable to keep limited wars limited and not daring to fight thermo-
nuclear wars. If this is true, or if it might be, then a number of these
questions of international relations are put in a much different light
than we have assumed them to be thus far.
This problem, or complex of problems, introduces t-he second
topic of special relevance for international studies and one espe-
cially difficult for Americans. This is t-he question of the super-
power. Not super-powers, plural, but the super-power, singular, as
of now, the United States. It would seem to be the case that in terms
of the overall physical power it is capable of disposing, t-he United
States is presently so much more powerful than even its closest
rival, the Soviet Union, that it has become altogether a new and
unique phenomenon in the world. Its wealth is so great that its
influence is, or could be, all-pervasive. It cannot be defeated in any
military test where it is willing to use its might, even if it cannot
always win.
The United States can, of course, be destroyed, but only in an
Armageddon situation. Such a situation is, alas, by no means impossi-
ble, but it is extremely unlikely unless the first nuclear stone is cast
by the United States. Short of this, there is a normal tendency of the
INEINATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
THE NEvER-NEvER LAND 299
United States-primarily as a result of its preponderant power-to

throw its weight around, as it is now doing in several places (most
obviously in Vietnam). This is not because of any inherent aggres-
siveness on our part but simply because our impact is similar to
that of an lelephant among many lesser animals. While uniquely
great power, like uniquely great authority, may produce corrup-
tion, it certainly does produce isolation of the power-holder from
the other states. The others are never able to satisfy the uniquely
great power-holder without sacrificing their own interests. And the
power-holder increasingly is likely to use his own power to compel
satisfaction of his demands, which he may well see as necessary to
his security. This situation is clearly illustrated by recent United
States policy with respect to the other NATO nations. American
demands, on France and Britain particularly, have greatly increased
in the last decade, at the same time as the American political influ-
ence over these states has decreased. This same illustration can be
expanded to include the United States position within the United
Nations, with the exception that the American demands upon the
organization have decreased, primarily as a result of the decreasing
United States influence.
These illustrations raise several important questions concerning
both American foreign policy and international politics in general.
In the case of super-power dominance, is there a tendency for
lesser powers to collaborate against the greater one? What, in such
a situation, should the greater power do if it cannot obtain satis-
faction by diplomacy or non-military pressure and is unable to
resort to military pressure? Does the greater power in this situa-
tion actually become the weaker one? Or, is the greater power
inexorably led against its judgment, ideals, and interests to set off
the chain reaction leading to its destruction? If so, what does the
world do about it?
This problem is fraught with potential danger for everybody,
and there are no guidelines for its resolution. Consider the United
States in Vietnam, for instance, where all the new factors apply.
The United States, unlike the French, can under no conceivable
circumstances be beaten. Given the perspectives of modern guerrilla
war, it is unlikely that it can win. Given the inflexibilities of major
foreign policies in today's nation-state, it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the United States to change its policy.
VOLUME 13, NUMm 3, sEP1 MER 1969
300 FRED W. NEAL AND BRucE D. HAMLETr
Other nations involved in colonial wars-and faced with un-

beatable internal opposition-have had to give up even when they
possessed a preponderance of power of sufficient magnitude to
destroy the country and its inhabitants. Being involved as a colonial
power for purposes of their own gain, such states were estopped
from destroying everything and everybody; with all property de-
stroyed, with no natives to do the work, there would be no chance
of national gain. But one aspect of the American super-power
position is that the United States is not a colonial power and we
do not need the profits of imperialism, at least in any ordinary sense.
Marxists and New Leftists to the contrary, that is not why we are
in Vietnam. However, as Jean-Paul Sartre has recently pointed out,
the reasons for restraint which limited the European powers in
their colonial wars do not apply against the United States. Given
its inability to win the war against its opponents (in the traditional
sense of "victory"), what Sartre fears is that the logic of U.S. policy
-to use a euphemism-could well be literally to destroy the popu-
lation (i.e., genocide), regardless of the abhorrence we might have
for such an action.6 Hopefully, given the restraints of idealism
and/or of common sense, the United States will not follow the
policy to its final condition of genocide. The basic problem, how-
ever, is that the United States has in fact both the capacity and the
"logical" policy motivation to carry out this action. In a meaningful
sense, this is the question of super-power behavior in contemporary
international politics.37
Probably there is not now time for any international relations
studies on this aspect of world affairs to have an impact on the
Vietnam situation. It is too late for that. But we do believe pro-
foundly that serious scholarly attention to the problem, in an objec-
tive and analytical form applicable to international relations gen-
36 Jean-Paul Sartre, "On Genocide," Ramparts, 6 (February 1968), pp.

35-42.
37 Illustrating the tendency for international relations scholars to focus
upon non-problems are the several recent studies of bipolarity and multi-
polarity, systems of historical significance but not applicable to the present
super-power, militarily dominated system. See, for example, Karl Deutsch and
J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,"
World Politics, 16 (April 1964), pp. 390-406; and R. N. Rosecrance, "Bi-
polarity, and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10, (1966), pp. 314-
27.
THEs NEVER-NEVER LAND 301
erally, could well help U.S. policyrnakers-and policymakers of

other countries-to see the situation in its true light and help avoid
future Vietnams.
This brings up the third, and most important, of the tasks
to which international relations studies should devote themselves.
It is the matter of ways and means of coexistence. Even now some
of us do not like this term because the Communists thought of it
first-their tautological form is "peaceful coexistence." Neverthe-
less, the term coexistence expresses the situation well: How do great
powers armed with thermonuclear weapons and opposing ideol-
ogies, each embracing a different Weltanschauung, keep from de-
stroying each other and at the same time not abandon the contest
to the adversary?38
There are, we think, four prerequisites. First is some under-
standing from a theoretical point of view, about what coexistence
does and does not mean. What it does not mean is giving up the
ideological conflict. It means only defusing it, militarily. Prior to
the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
1956, there was adequate reason for doubting that the Soviet Union
really thought coexistence was possible, except as a tactic. The
changes in Soviet theory, and in -the Soviet view of the world,
particularly as regards the inevitability of war, and the persistence
with which the Russians have followed out t-hose tenets since 1956,
should remove our doubts, as it removed those of Pope John 23rd.
This point itself involves more studies of Communism and the
Soviet Union than of international relations specifically, but it is an
integral part of the problem.
Secondly, coexistence involves acceptance of some kind of status
quo. As regards the territorial status quo, this is difficult mainly in
regard to the states left divided as a result of World War II. The
real problem concerns not so much the territorial status quo as the
balance of power status quo, and this involves internal conflict.
Great powers have always had a propensity to intervene in internal
conflicts of smaller powers, and sometimes of great powers as well.
The outcome of internal conflicts can often change the international
power balance. There are various kinds of intervention, to be sure,
38 Cf. Fred Warner Neal, "Co-existence: Practical Problems and Politics,"

Co-Existence, 3, (January, 1966), pp. 7-18.
302 FRED W. NEAL AND BRuCE D. HAMLETr
but our focus here should be military intervention.There are various

kinds of military intervention, too, including military aid in the
form of money and weapons; military advisers, as with the United
States, initially, in Vietnam and elsewhere; military volunteers, as
with the Chinese in Korea; and outright invasion on behalf of one
side or the other.
Not only should some categorization and definition of what
constitutes intervention be attempted, but an effort might well be
made to codify it and regulate it. For example, the Soviet Union's
position is that it will not initiate intervention, even on behalf of
local Communists, provided there is no intervention by capitalist
powers. But does this mean that the United States could not respond
to requests for military aid from a friendly government beset by
leftist revolutionaries without expecting that this might bring in
Soviet intervention on the side of the revolutionaries? And what
constitutes a government? The idea of unsuccessful revolutionaries
declaring themselves a government is not an unknown tactic. Would
such a regime have t-he same right as an established govermnent to
ask for outside assistance?
It seems apparent that intervention of some kind is likely to
occur, no matter what. What we are really concerned about is the
intervention of the great powers, but it is more than this. Of partic-
ular concern is whether one intervention begets another. The U.S.
intervention in the Dominican Republic may have been unwise and
immoral, but it was not dangerous. The U.S. intervention in Viet-
nam is significant not so much because it may be immoral and
unwise but because it is dangerous. Here an important question is
where the intervention takes place. The Soviet intervention with
tnissiles in Cuba was perfectly legitimate from a legal point of
view. It came at the request, or at least with the approval, of the
established Cuban government. But it was not legitimate from the
point of view of international politics, from the point of view of the
principle of core interests.
The Soviet position on coexistence, while opening the door to
various kinds of new arrangements in international relations, is by
no means simply all dove-like sweetness and light. The Soviet posi-
tion is that they will not initiate intervention, or possibly not even
intervene if somebody else intervenes. However, once a revolution
of the kind they like is successful, they will intervene to keep a new
THnE NEVER-NEVER LAND 303
socialist regime from being put asunder by the capitalists. This is,
of course, something of a counterpart to the U.S. policy of defend-
ing non-socialist regimes. Both sides completely disregard the prin-
ciple of core interests.
The most dangerous disregard of the principle to date was the
Soviet missiles in Cuba, a subject, incidentally, treated by our inter-
national relations analysts with gross inadequacy. But we have
repeatedly challenged Soviet core interests, too, and our interven-
tion in Vietnam surely challenges Chinese core interests, if not those
of the USSR. The question arises about the usefulness of consider-
ing an international arrangement to respect core interests, regard-
less of internal conflicts. This would not be spheres of influence, so
abhorrent to the idealists and to the smaller powers. It would simply
be an agreement about what areas the great powers would stay
out of.
We have in mind here the possibility of diplomatic understand-
ing, rather than precise agreement in the form of a treaty. Even this
might not be easily arranged. There would be fears that it would
encourage efforts to extend core interests, and obstacles such as
domestic political objections would have to be overcome. It is
precisely these problems which diplomacy and leadership should
consider.
It might well be that such an arrangement would go far to dis-
courage great power intervention even in areas of their own core
interests, since fear of challenge by other great powers often under-
lies intervention in the first place. Smaller powers also would have a
role to play. Those smaller powers particularly within the clear
core interest of a great power would be asked to forego calling on
other great powers to help them with their internal problems. Fin-
land has done it with great success, to cite only one example. The
problems for international relations research and analysis posed by
these points are obvious.
A third and concomitant area for study in connection with co-
existence would be the possibility and advisability of seeking inter-
national agreements for neutralization of areas outside the clear
core interests of the great nuclear powers. That is, the major powers
would be asked to agree not to attempt to embrace such areas within
their power system, regardless of ideological orientation. Where,
how, and whether such concepts have utility, and the nature of
304 FRED W. NEAL AND BRUCE D. HAMLETr
their relationship to the whole spectrum of international relations

constitute important questions for international relations scholars.39
The fourth prerequisite for coexistence may not be a prerequi-
site at all, but it probably is, and it deserves study in any event.
This concerns the area in which internationalization, via United
Nations peace-keeping, might be expanded. It would be possible,
it seems, only if the other three prerequisites are obtained first. But
if they could be worked out, then, presumably, there would be less
great power resistance to agreeing to some limited automatic peace-
keeping authority for the United Nations in limited areas and situa-
tions. The limited aspect must be stressed. Only if it were limited
would there be any possibility of obtaining great power agreement.
Without great power agreement the United Nations peace-keeping
effort would not work, and to attempt it would almost certainly
mean more rather than less conflict.
Intensive international relations studies should be carried on
into all of these and other aspects of coexistence. If the field of
international relations has any significance at all, if it has anything
to offer society, it had better be first of all in this area. As was said
earlier, there may be more fundamental long-run problems, but, as
Lord Keynes has argued, there may be no long run if we do not
give more concern to the short run.
There is one final topic which we would like to see covered
in international relations studies. This is the topic of so-called revi-
sion of post-World War II history. Most if not all the immediately
pressing problems of international relations relate to the Cold War
in some way or other, and, as was suggested earlier, most of our
studies about them in the United States assume without much ques-
tioning the official U.S. view of how the Cold War started (i.e., that
it was primarily caused by Soviet military aggression, actual and
potential, and by Soviet efforts at aggrandizement, either national
or ideological or both). This simplistic interpretation is a grievous
distortion of the truth. There is little doubt that our statesmen, then
39 General Said Uddin Khan, a former commander of United Nations

peacekeeping forces, is currently studying this problem of neutralization in
regard to Southeast Asia. His analysis appears in "A Southeast Asia without
war," Vietnam Matters for the Agenda (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions, 1968), pp. 36-41.
TEE NEvER-NEvER LAND 305
and now, believed the facts to be as they have stated them. The
tragedy is that they were so seldom challenged by scholars.
Now, at long last, there is beginning to be more serious investi-
gation into this recent history, and some of it throws an entirely
different light on the origins of the Cold War than we have been
led to believe.40 Unfortunately, some of it over-compensates via a
New Left or Marxist philosophy which sees only evil in U.S.
motives rather than merely setting forth the facts and explaining
them. Not only does this represent a distortion itself, but it is also
likely to have far less impact than the dispassionate work of more
acceptable scholars. The reexamination of the origins of the cold
war is important for international relations. Only if we free our-
selves of earlier misconceptions about who did what and why can
we ever finally escape the nationalist distortion that has afflicted so
many of our international relations studies.
International relations scholars presently face the responsibility
of transfomling their field from an abstract academic game and
treatment of non-problems to a discipline that justifies its need by
contributing to mankind and human survival. In summary, three of
the most urgent problems deserving attention are (1) the propen-
sity for foreign policy rigidity, (2) the implications of super-power
behavior vis-a-vis other states, and (3) the ways and means of
coexistence. If the discipline of international relations is to develop
and contribute to human survival, it soon must begin to focus upon
these issues.
40 For example, Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1965); David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of
American Diplomacy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965);
and Carl Ogelsby and Richard Shaull, Containment and Change (New York:
MacMillan, 1967). These works follow in the path of Marxist analysis of
William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., 1959). For other categories, see D. F. Fleming, The Cold War
and Its Origins (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961); Edmund Stillman
and William Pfaff, The New Politics: America and the End of the Postwar
World (New York: Coward McCann, 1961); and Fred Warner Neal, U. S.
Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union (Santa Barbara, California: Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961).

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The Never-Never Land of International Relations

Author(s): Fred Warner Neal and Bruce D. Hamlett

The Never-Never Land of

FRED WARNER NEAL

Scholarship about scholarship, like theory about theory, and

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

The thesis herein set forth is that scholarship in international

Nationalism and international studies

The concept of international relations is a fairly recent and

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

or sociology), or they are consciously and of necessity confined to

1 To illustrate, a great many of the studies concerning the process of

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

views about peace, democracy, international organization and the

2 See, for example: Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

3 The syllogism was simplistic: Isolation was bad, as indicated by what

VOLUME 13, NuMsER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

4 Among the examples of this syndrome see John W. Spanier, American

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

cried "thief' after the horse was stolen.5 He consequently appears to

International relations as a discipline

As international relations moved from an amorphous academic

5 Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York;

VOLUME 13, NUflER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

7 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

truly basic point of international relations studies. Such use ignores

9 For a useful discussion of the relationship between perception (and

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

13 Initial steps in this direction include: Leonard Binder, "The Middle

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

have focused upon concrete problems of international politics, and

17 See, for example: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cam-

VOLUME 13, NUJMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

"scientific" approach and consequently have ignored basic political

20 See ibid., pp. 93-156, for a thorough critique of the implications of

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

sciences and quantification.22 Again, in themselves, these are useful

22 For an example of the results of an emphasis (or over-emphasis) upon

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

national borders, etc.24 One apparent aim is to build up some kind

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTELY

on exactly this basis and the demand for establishment of a Society

28 Cf. letter by Christian Bay in American Political Science Review, 61

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see the utility of discussions of NATO centering around its defense

A problem focus for international studies

What should be the focus of our international relations studies

Unity of Western Europe-Myth or Reality," in The Unity of Western Europe,

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

foreign policy stance can ever be changed. The prerequisites would

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969

thermonuclear war, and, given the threat of escalation, there is an

INEINATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

United States-primarily as a result of its preponderant power-to

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Other nations involved in colonial wars-and faced with un-

36 Jean-Paul Sartre, "On Genocide," Ramparts, 6 (February 1968), pp.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

erally, could well help U.S. policyrnakers-and policymakers of

38 Cf. Fred Warner Neal, "Co-existence: Practical Problems and Politics,"

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 1969