Professional Documents
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Author(s): Patricia Malone and Norman Benson
Source: Journal of Thought, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 9-20
Published by: Caddo Gap Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42590229
Accessed: 21-11-2019 13:15 UTC
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Journal of Thought
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Journal of Thought , Summer 1 995 9
Liberal Universalism
and Multicultural Curricular Refor
in the Social Studies:
Issues to Consider
Patricia Malone
The William Paterson College of New Jers
Norman Benson
University of Massachusetts, Lowell
Introduction
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10 Liberal Universalism
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Malone & Benson 11
Debates over the role of history in the social studies have frequently
centered on the proper emphasis to be placed on the dual goals of social-
ization and counter-socialization.6 Theorists favoring an emphasis on
socialization goals are uncritical of liberal accounts of national history
that gloss over the many failures in the American past to achieve liberal,
universalistic ideals of liberty and equality. They prefer such accounts
because these were presumed to engender emotional attachments to the
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12
political ideal
phasizing coun
ested in helpin
pare national
violations of l
The philosoph
tion position
offered by t
argument con
civic education
likely to foste
liberalism has
good. Philosop
ability to see
education should not be confused with civic education. The latter has as
its goal the formation of individuals who can conduct their lives within,
and support their liberal political community. It is unlikely that truth-
seeking activities will be fully consistent with the latter. A moralizing
history depicting traditional, key figures in American history is prefer-
able to revisionist accounts derived from rigorous historical research.
Finally, Galston contends that it is important to judge the principles of
civic education by their congruence with the basic features of the society
they are expected to sustain. Galston is apparently not troubled by the
likelihood that marginalized groups will notice the absence, in practice,
of the ideals contained in the preferred moralizing histories and perhaps
proceed to question their credibility.
The rationale of political philosopher Amy Gutmann illuminates the
counter-socialization approach to civic education in social studies pro-
grams.8 She argues that the long-standing problem of civic education in
the United States springs from understanding our educational options
as a choice between liberal concern for the widest range of individual
choice of the good life and that of educating children so that they will
choose the good life. Since citizens disagree on the relative value of
freedom and virtue, there is an impasse unless educators prioritize
rationale deliberation. Rational deliberation offers the best answer to
the central problem of civic education because it allows educators to
combine the development of individual autonomy with civic virtue.
Students should be helped to develop deliberative skills so that they can
shape society in accordance with their own moral choices.
It can be seen that both rationales are concerned with programs that
undergird liberal political philosophy. Neither philosopher attempts to
justify alternative understandings of liberalism, but Gutmann's ratio-
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naie can pr
tations of l
ability to d
which they
could deve
would appa
Liberal
The Unite
moving to
hundred y
several rea
countries. I
political th
review.9
A key concept of procedural liberalism is its emphasis on state
neutrality with respect to ideas of the good life. Ronald Dworkin has
outlined the following rationale for state neutrality.10 The procedural
model first insists on the primacy of each individual's right to define the
good life. Because of this priority assigned to the autonomy of the indi-
vidual, pluralistic societies have necessarily adopted a commitment to
treat individual preferences with equal respect. The central function of
the liberal state with respect to these preferences is neutrality. If the
liberal state were to choose one idea of virtue, it would necessarily violate
other people's conception of the good. Even though an individual's idea
of virtue might be supported by a majority, the effect of the state's
violation of the neutrality principle would be to treat minorities with less
than equal respect.
The philosophical assumptions of Immanuel Kant are imbedded in
the ethic of individual rights.11 Kant's view of human dignity is rooted in
the primacy of individual autonomy. Dignity is not associated with any
particular understanding of the good life, but with the power to hold such
a view. Critics have argued that procedural liberals have prioritized the
Kantian preference for autonomy over other values without openly ac-
knowledging this preference. They have thereby avoided the need to
provide a philosophical justification for this choice.
Universalism is another key tenet of procedural liberalism. It is
based on the assumption that the state should recognize only the indi-
vidual rights that originate in the needs that all people have in common,
that is, the universal need for primary goods such as income, health care,
and education, as well as religious freedom and other basic constitutional
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14 Liberal Universalism
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Malone & Benson 15
Alternatives to Universalist
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16 Liberal Universalism
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M alone & Benson 17
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18 Liberal Universalism
Conclusion
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Malone & Benson 19
Notes
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20 Liberal Universalism
1992),pp.99-100.
19. Charles Taylor .Multiculturalism and the " Pol
20. Benjamin Barber, An Aristocracy of Everyon
the Future of America (New York: Ballantine B
21. Richard Wasserstrom, "On Racism and Sex
Issues. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Universit
Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p
22. Thomas Bender, "Public Culture: Inclusion
History," in Historical Literacy : The Case for
tion , eds. Paul Gagnon & The Bradley Commiss
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), pp. 198
23. Michael Olneck, "The Terms of Inclusion: Has
Equality in American Education?" American
(1993):234-260.
24. Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, Telling the Truth, p. 301.
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