Vargas e A Guerra - HiltonHAHRarticle

Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro "Axis" during the World War II Era
Author(s): Stanley E. Hilton

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 201-231
Published by: Duke University Press
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HispatnicAmericanHistoricalReview
59(2), 1979, 201-231
Copyright( 1979 by Duke UniversityPress
BrazilianDiplomacyandthe
Washington-Rio de Janeiro
"Axis"
duringtheWorldWarII Era
STANLEY E. HILTON
TmHeraoftheSecondWorldWarhad a profoundimpact
on Brazilian foreignpolicy. Relationswith Germany,
Brazil'sleading European tradepartner,reached their
twentieth-century nadir. Britain's financial and commercial role in
Brazilianaffairsweakened stillfurther, continuingthe decline initiated
by the Depression. Among the great power rivals for influencein
Brazil,the beneficiaryof wartimecircumstanceswas the United States.
Indeed, the unprecedentedintensification of relationswith that coun-
trywas one of the most significantchaptersin modem Brazilian di-
plomacy and an historicalphenomenonpregnantwithimplicationsfor
not onlywartimebut postwarhemisphericrelations.This articleseeks
to contributeto an understandingof the Rio-Washington"axis" by re-
assessingtwo of its key aspects: the natureof Braziliandiplomacyand
the characterand objectivesof Americanpolicy toward Brazil.
The major statementon wartime Brazilian-Americanrelationsis
FrankD. McCann'sThe Brazilian-American Alliance,1937-1945.Ac-
cordingto McCann, Brazil was a somewhatpassive victimof stronger,
domineeringpowers. Berlin'sgoal in Brazil was "conquestand domina-
tion to fulfillthe Fuehrer's dream of world dictatorship,"and Roo-
sevelt's United States was surprisinglynot essentiallydifferentfrom
Hitler's Reich in this regard. The New Deal trade program,for ex-
ample, insofaras it concernedBrazil, was aimed at establishingAmer-
ican "economic and political hegemony"over that country. During
the war, moreover,Washingtonwould play "a two-facedgame" with
Rio de Janeiro,continuingto seek "domination"of Brazil at the same
time that it formulatedplans for a programof postwar militaryas-
sistance to Latin America in which the importanceof Brazil to hL-le
United States "was reduced, if not eliminated."The Getulio Vargas
* The authoris AssociateProfessorof Historyat Louisiana State University.
Researchforthisarticlewas fundedby the Social Science ResearchCouncil and
theFulbright-HaysFacultyResearchProgram.
202 HAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
government, realisticor tough-mindedin its bargaining

insufficiently
with Washington,had placed Brazil by mid-1944"in the position of
a woman who has given in to her lover and can only trustthat his in-
tentionsare honorable." Americanintentions,however,were not hon-
orable. The crowningblow in what McCann regardsas Washington's
deceitfultreatmentof Brazil came in the matterof representationon
the SecurityCouncil of the new United Nations: "Americanfailureto
obtain a securitycouncil seat for its faithfulally and Washington's
general depreciationof Brazilian prestige paralleled American eco-
nomic and militaryeffortsto keep Brazil subservient. "'
If this passivity-domination thesis is correct,the historianwould
expect to findthe recordof Brazilian-Americanrelationsto be one of
concession and sacrificeby Rio de Janeiroin returnfor little from
Washingtonthat satisfiedperceived national interests.One logically
would encounter,furthermore, ample signs that key Brazilian policy-
makers expressed grave anxieties,at least privately,about the dan-
gerous intimacyof relationswith the United States and the domineer-
ing thrustof Americanpolicy. If thatpolicyin facthad as its conscious
goal the political and economic domination of Brazil, the histo-
rian should also discover substantialevidence of explicit discussion
of that goal in Americanpolicymakingcircles. Yet neitherBrazilian
nor Americanarchives,nor those of Great Britainand Germany,yield
any such evidence. On the contrary, thesesourcesamplydocumentthe
Machiavellian opportunismof Brazilian leaders who skillfullyprobed
the vanity,anxieties,and prejudices of counterpartsin other coun-
tries and were remarkablysuccessful in barteringgeographic acci-
dent for valuable economic,military,and political concessionsfrom
Washington. The recordalso shows that the Roosevelt administration
eschewed domineering,deceitfuldiplomacytoward Brazil and never
devised any programfor establishingeconomic,political, or military
controlover that country-a fact explicitlyappreciated not only in
Brazilian circles,but by European rivals as well.
Anyevaluationof the foreignpolicybehaviorof the Vargas govern-
mentmustunderscorethe latter'scapacityfor,and skill at, the diplo-
macy of opportunismand deception. The Machiavellian characterof
Brazil's responseto one of its major prewar challenges-the intensive
trade rivalrybetween Nazi Germanyand the United States-has been
documented.2It is importantto stressin this regardthat while Brazil
1. Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945

1973), pp. 7, 81, 328-332,341, 458.
(Princeton,
2. StanleyE. Hilton,Brazil and the GreatPowers,1930-1939: The Politics
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO "AXIS" 203
traded with Germanyon a bilateral basis that contraveneda liberal
agreementsigned with the United States in 1935, the Vargas govern-
mentproclaimedits solidaritywith Americanpolicy,systematically ex-
ploiting Washington'sgood-neighborlinessand frequentlydistorting
the truthin order to disguise or justifyBrazil's commercialalliance
with Germany,a factthat variousprominentBrazilian authoritiespri-
vatelydecried.3
Vargas,heavilyinfluencedby his financeminister, the militaryhigh
command,and his own desire to diversifyexportsand markets,dis-
played a high degree of opportunisticindependencefromWashington
in the trade dispute, which is not an isolated example. Indeed, the
reactionof his governmentto othermajorinternationalproblems,such
as the Italo-Ethiopian embroglio,reflecteda similarlypragmatic,in-
dependent spirit. The Italo-Ethiopian conflictwas the first great
challenge to the Versailles systemin the 1930s. Roosevelt and the
State Department clearly sympathizedwith Ethiopia and they en-
deavored in vain, on the eve of the outbreakof hostilitiesin 1935, to
dissuade an adamantlyisolationistcongressfromdeprivingthe Presi-
dent of the power to discriminatebetween aggressorand aggresseein
applyinga mandatoryarms embargo in the case of war. The admin-
istration'ssubsequent famous appeal for a "moral embargo" was an
effortto restrictthe flow of otherimportantmaterialsto Italy.
Vargas and his counselors,on the other hand, fromthe very be-
ginningof the tensionin Italo-Ethiopian relationshad scented com-
mercial opportunity.In mid-1935,Vargas himselfcorrespondedwith
the governorof Rio Grande do Sul about special consignmentsof
mules and frozenbeef forthe Italian army,pointingwith enthusiasm
to the possibilityof supplyingvarious products to Italian troops on
their way to East Africa. Foreign MinisterJose Carlos de Macedo
Soares (1934-1937), a devout Catholic, staunchanti-Communist from
Sao Paulo-a regionof heavy Italian immigration-andunabashed ad-
mirerof Mussolini,shared Vargas' desire to maximizeprofits.Italian
of Trade Rivalry(Austin,1975); JohnD. Wirth,The Politicsof BrazilianDevel-

opment,1930-1954 (Stanford,1969).
3. AmbassadorOswaldo Aranha,for one, protestedhis govemment's"lack
of integrity"and its "policyof subterfugeand inveiglement" towardWashington
in the German-American tradestruggle.Aranha (Washington)to Rubens Rosa,
Feb. 18, 1935; Aranhato Getu'lioVargas,June4, 1937, Centrode Pesquisa e
Documentagcode HistoriaContemporanea (hereaftercitedas CPDHC), Fundagco
GetuilioVargas (Rio), Oswaldo Aranha Papers (hereaftercited as OA). Cf.
ValentimBougas to Aranha,June 18, 1936, OA; AmbassadorMalio Pimentel
Brandao(Washington)to Vargas,Sept. 14, 1938, CPDHC, Getu'lioVargasPapers
citedas GV).
(hereafter
204 HAHR MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
mobilization,he remindedthe finance ministerlate in August, pre-

sentedBrazil with an "exceptional"commercialopportunity.Early in
October,afterhostilitiesbegan, Macedo Soares argued in a memoran-
dum to Vargas that Ethiopia meant nothingto Brazil, whereas Italy
had providedimmigrantsand was a ready marketfor foodstuffs and
"raw materialsindispensablein war, such as cotton,rubber,etc." The
followingmonthItamaratirejected in somewhatabrupt termsan ap-
peal fromthe League of Nations for sanctionsagainst Italy, making
no mentionof Brazil's traditionaloppositionto wars of conquest.4
Ambassador Oswaldo Aranha in Washingtondecried his govern-
ment'sattitude,warningboth Vargas and Macedo Soares of the un-
favorableimpactthat it had on Americanopinion. The responsefrom
Rio de Janeirowas to give verbal assurances of solidaritywith U.S.
policy, but simultaneouslyto intensifythe successfulpursuit of new
supplycontractswithItalian authorities.5In March 1936,as Ethiopian
Macedo Soares publiclylauded Mussolinide-
resistancedistintegrated,
claringthat Brazil was pursuingfriendshipwith Italy "with devotion
and enthusiasm,in the certaintythat we are workingfor a common
ideal of greatness."Later that year, afterconclusionof a secret com-
mercial modus vivendi with Berlin and after assuringthe American
embassythatBrazil would not negotiateany trade understandingwith
Rome thatwould violate the liberal principlesof the Brazilian-Ameri-
can treaty,theVargas government signed a confidentialclearingagree-
mentwiththefascistregime.6
The pronouncedsympathyof the Vargas administration forfascist
Italy and Franco's Nationalistforces in Spain (Vargas in 1936 even
authorizedsecretdonationsof sugar and coffeeto Nationalisttroops7)
4. Vargasto J.A. Floresda Cunha,June24, 1935, ArquivoNacional (Rio de

Janeiro),Colegao Presidenciada Repuiblica(hereaftercited as PR), processo
1.890; June27, 1935,PR, 1.917; July17, 1935,PR, 2.074; JoseCarlosde Macedo
Soares,memo [to ArturSouza Costa], n.d. [Aug. 22, 1935], PR, 12.529; Macedo
Soares to Vargas, Oct. 9, 1935, PR, 7.129; Ministeriodas Relaq5es Exteriores
(hereaftercitedas MRE) to Aranha,Nov. 7, 1935, ArquivoHistoricodo Itamarati
(hereaftercited as AHI), vol. 408/3/13. Cf. Hilton,"Brazil and Great Power
Trade Rivalryin South America,1934-1939" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Texas,
1969), pp. 154-172.
5. Aranhato Vargas,Nov. 11, Dec. 3, 1935, OA; Aranhato MRE, Nov. 12,
1935, AHI, 408/3/8; MRE to Aranha,Nov. 14, 1935, AHI, 408/3/13;Vargasto
Aranha,Nov.25, Dec. 14,1935, OA.
6. Macedo Soares, Discursos (Rio, 1937), pp. 114, 116; Hilton,"Military
Influenceon BrazilianEconomicPolicy,1930-1945: A Different View," HAHR,
53 (Feb. 1973), 81. A Portuguesetranslation of the latter,with new evidence
on the generalsubject,appears as chapter2 of Hilton,0 Brasile a Crise Inter-
nacional,1930-1945 (Rio, 1977).
7. FranciscoFrancoto Vargas,Oct. 29, 1936, GV.
THE WASHINGTON-RIO
DE JANERO "AXIS" 205
was a disquietingsignal to observersin the United States, where ex-
portcirclesand governmentspokesmenwere understandablydisturbed
about Brazil's flauntingof the commitmentsit had assumed in the
1935 trade treaty. And when Vargas, with the backing of the army,
jettisonedcongress and proclaimed the Estado Novo in November
1937, a new ingredientwas added to Americanconcernover the drift
ofBrazilianpolicy.8
One of the immediateobjectivesof the Vargas regimein 1938 was
thereforeto reassurethe United States,a key diplomatically,thatBra-
zil had not joined the Axis-a task made even more urgentby the fact
thatRio de Janeirowas at that time in the finalstages of negotiations
withthe Germanembassyand Krupp representatives fora major arma-
mentscontract,one that would mean continuedexpansionof bilateral
tradewiththe Reich.9 Vargas' adroituse of the 1938 crisisin German-
Brazilianrelationsto allay Americananxietiesand divertattentionfrom
his commercialalliance with Berlin was furtherevidence of his de-
votionto,and successat,realpolitik.
The precipitatedeteriorationin relationswith Berlin originatedin
Brazil'snationalisticresponseto the activitiesof Nazi agentsin southem
Brazil, a region of German immigration.10Extended analysis of the
subject is impossiblehere,but one episode, German-Brazilianconver-
sationsin February-March1938, is worthyof examinationbecause it
lucidly illustratesVargas' diplomatictechniques. In his view, having
Washingtonbelieve that his governmentwas reacting vigorouslyto
Nazi political bullyingwould be an excellentway to still speculation
in the United States about his allegedlypro-Axisleanings and camou-
flage the projected strengthening of militaryand economic ties with
Berlin. A visit by Germanambassador Karl Ritteron February25 to
discuss the anti-Nazi agitationin southernBrazil, where state author-
ities were closing Nazi party officesand harassingparty spokesmen,
providedthe shrewdBrazilian leader withhis firstopportunityand he
characteristicallysoughtto turnit to double advantage. Accordingto
Ritter,Vargas was "measuredlycordial" (freundlichgemessen) through-
out theirfifty-five-minute conversationand repeatedlyassured him of
8. On the sharpreactionin the UnitedStatesto the Estado Novo,see Hilton,

GreatPowers,pp. 171-172.
9. Germanfirms,with officialsupport,were selling armamentsto Brazil
for compensation(blocked) marksthat Brazil earned fromextra-quotasales of
primaryproductsto Germany.The firstarmamentscontracthad been signed
withKrupp in February1977. Hilton,"MilitaryInfluence,"p. 83.
10. Kiite Harms-Baltzer,Die Nationalisierung der deutschenEinwanderer
undihrerNachkommen in Brasilien[ ... ] (Cologne,1971).
his friendlyintentionstoward German interests. Ritter welcomed

Vargas' statementsas a basis foran understandingand later reported:
"The President,at the end of the conversation,expressedhimself-as
he previouslyhad done repeatedlyin public-in veryfriendlyfashion
toward the German communityin Brazil.""' Having reassured the
Germans and protected the armamentsnegotiations,Vargas, well
aware of Americansensitivityto Nazi intrigue,moved quicklyto im-
prove his image in the United States. He called in his friendAranha,
who had recentlyresignedhis post in Washington,and had him trans-
mitto AmbassadorJefferson Cafferya doctoredaccount of the meet-
ing,now depicted as an angryclash, withthe tellingrequest that Caf-
feryrelaythe newsto Roosevelthimself.'2
The appointmentof Aranha to the post of foreignministerthe fol-
lowing month was another calculated move by Vargas to assuage
American concern, and Aranha immediatelyset out on the course
chartedby his chief. He sent personal messages of solidarityto State
11. Karl Ritterto GermanForeignMinistry, Feb. 25, 1938, NationalArchives

(Washington),Records of the GermanForeign Ministry,microfilm roll 3155,
serial69639, frames518439-442 (hereaftercited as RGFM, 3155:6939/518439-
442, forexample).
12. Jefferson Cafferyto State Dept., Feb. 27, 1938, Dept. of State,Foreign
Relationsof the United States,DiplomaticPapers, 1938, 5 vols. (Washington,
D.C., 1955-1956), V, 409 (hereafter citedas FRUS). The assumption underlying
McCann'sanalysis,whichis based on the adulteratedversionof the meeting(Al-
liance,p. 83, n. 16), is thatBerlinhad politico-territorial
designson SouthAmer-
ica. He consequently viewsRitteras a truculent defenderof Nazismfromthe out-
set. This generalargument overlooksthe intemaldivisionsand conflicts overgoals
and meanswithinthe Nazi foreignpolicyapparatus,as well as studiesbased on
GermanrecordsthatshowthatSouthAmericadid not figureprominently in Nazi
long-rangeplanningand that Berlin'saims in the regionwere commercial,not
political. See Paul Seabury,The Wilhelmstrasse: A Studyof GermanDiplomats
underthe Nazi Regime (Berkeley,1954); Leonidas E. Hill, "The Wilhelmstrasse
in the Nazi Era," PoliticalScience Quarterly, 82 (Dec. 1967), 546-570; Hilton,
"Brazil and Great Power Trade Rivalry;"Harms-Baltzer, Nationalisierung.Reli-
ably documentedNazi discussionsof possible acquisitionsof non-Europeanter-
ritoriesfocusedsolelyon Africa. GerhardL. Weinberg,"GermanColonial Plans
and Policies,1938-1942"in WaldemarBessonand FriedrichHillerv. Gaertringen,
eds., Geschichteund Gegenwartsbewusstein (Gbttingen,1963), pp. 462-491.
Those who suspectBerlinof territorial goals in SouthAmericarecognizethe ex-
tremelytenuousnatureof the documentary supportfor this view. See, for ex-
ample,AltonFrye,Nazi Germanyand theAmericanHemisphere, 1933-1941 (New
Haven, 1967), pp. 168-194. A soundrecentreviewof the subjectis Hans-Jurgen
Schroder,"Hauptproblemeder deutschenLateinamerikapolitik 1933-1941,"Jahr-
buch fMrGeschichtevon Staat, Wirtschaft und GesellschaftLateinamerikas, 12
(1975), 408-433. It is relevantto note thatin June1940, at the heightof Nazi
power,Karl Ritterhimself, thena special economicadviserto the Wilhelmstrasse,
in oudiningthe Reich's futurecolonialempireand "GreaterEconomicSphere,"
specificallyexcludedBrazil fromthose areas, predicteda postwarcontraction of
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANERO "AXIS" 207
Departmentofficialsand even made a special broadcastto the Amer-
ican people.13 But Aranha's unquestioned sympathyfor the United
States did not mean that he opposed cordial relationswith the Reich,
and his oppositionto bilateralismstopped shortof losing an oppor-
tunityto acquire badly needed armaments.'4 He consequentlyhad
been maintaininginformalcontactswith Ritter,and the latterhad re-
cently advised Berlin that Aranha's cooperative attitude made him
hopefulof a satisfactory settlementof the partyquestion. The firstof-
ficial encounterbetween the two men took place on March 16, when
Ritterraised the issue of partyactivitiesin the South. Separate records
of the meetingby both diplomatsindicate that it was a cordial en-
counter. Ritter,in fact, was so encouraged by Aranha's "well-inten-
tioned" remarksthat he recommendedthat Berlin preventattacks on
Brazil by the Nazi press.15 Two days after that meeting,however,
Aranha,followingVargas' lead, cast it in a differentlightfor Ameri-
can benefit,tellingCafferythat his strongstand in the face of Nazi
pressurehad led Berlin to instructRitterto do what he could to sub-
vertAranha'spoliticalposition.'6
tradewiththatcountryand even suggestedthat,in orderto providea laborforce

for the "colonial empire,"Germansettlersin South Americabe encouragedto
movefromthatregion.Ritter, memo,June1, 1940,Documentson GermanForeign
Policy,Series D (1937-1945) [hereafter cited as DGFP], 13 vols. (Washington,
D.C., 1957-1964), IX, 496-500.
13. McCann,Alliance,pp. 74-75; Aranhato Secretaryof State CordellHull,
Mar. 17, 1938,OA.
14. On Aranha'sinterestin annamentsand reluctantdefenseof compensation
tradeon the groundsthatit was at least a meansof obtainingbadly neededmili-
taryhardware,see Aranhato Vargas,June4, 1937, OA; HerbertFeis, memo,June
29, 1937,NationalArchives, RecordsoftheDept. of State (hereaftercitedas DS),
file632.6231.
15. Aranha,memo,n.d. [Mar. 22, 1938], AHI, mayo29.506; Ritterto German
ForeignMinistry, Mar.23, 1938,RGFM, 1913:3954/EO54521.
16. Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 18, 1938, DS, 832.00/1178. Cf. McCann,
Alliance,p. 87, who arguesthat the encounterbetweenAranhaand Ritterwas
marredby near physicalviolenceand accepts Aranha'sstatements to Cafferyas
accurate. McCann's authorityfor the near-fisticuffsepisode is an item in the
newspapercolumn of Drew Pearson that appeared one year afterthe alleged
incident.It is noteworthy thatPearsonin 1938-1939 was tryingto obtainfrom
Itamaratia contractforradiopublicityand thathis articledepictingAranhaas a
rough-and-ready adversaryof Germanbullyingwas publishedjust as Aranhawas
arrivingin Washingtonforspecial economicand militarynegotiations.In 1940,
Pearsonreceiveda commissionfromItamaratito conductradio publicityon be-
half of Brazil. Aranhato Pearson,June14, 1938, OA; Brandaoto Vargas,Dec.
6, 1938, GV; Pearsonto Aranha,June10, 1939, Mar. 7, Aug. 28, 1940, OA. It
shouldalso be notedthatin mid-1938,whenthe diplomaticquarrelbetweenBer-
lin and Rio de Janeirodid worsen,the Wilhelmstrasse,farfromencouragingRit-
ter to subvertAranha'sposition,actuallyrebukedhim for undiplomaticconduct
The tactic used by Rio de Janeirowas highlysuccessful. On the

one hand, the Americanpress, fed the distortedversionsof the Ger-
man-Brazilianconversations,hailed Vargas' resistanceto Nazi mach-
inations,while Cafferywrote of the "completechange of policy" that
allegedly had occurred in Rio de Janeirosince proclamationof the
Estado Novo.17 On the other hand, Berlin was sufficiently mollified
by the reassuringattitudeof Vargas and his foreignministerthat the
armamentscontract,providingin essence for the exchange of nearly
900 pieces of artilleryforraw materials,was concluded withouthitches
on March28.18
The recordof Brazil'smaneuveringduring1939-1941,the period of
hemisphericneutrality,also shows that the Vargas government,far
frompassively allowing itselfto be victimizedby the great powers,
made shrewd use of the rivalrybetween the two blocs. Indeed, its
policyduringthatperiod continuedto be studiouslyambiguous. While
systematically proclaiminghis devotionto Pan Americanideals, Var-
gas courtedAxis goodwill in a numberof ways. In November 1939,
he wired congratulations to Hitler forhaving escaped unhurtfroman
assassinationattempt,and monthslaterhe agreed to assume protection
of Italian interestsin Allied countrieswhen Mussolinijoined Hitler in
the war.'9 His famousspeech of June 10, 1940, reflectedhis commit-
ment to opportunismand even deception. Praised by the Axis
press and saluted by il Duce in a privatetelegram,Vargas, to counter
the alarm produced in the United States by his apparent declaration
of solidaritywith the Axis,privatelyassured the State Departmentof
his loyaltyto the hemisphericcause and then days later met secretly
with the new Germanambassadorto insistanew on his sympathyfor
theAxis.20
Until the Battle of Britain,Vargas negotiatedsimultaneouslywith
towardAranha. GermanForeignMinistry to Ritter,May 30, 1938, RGFM, 3092:

6966/519410-411.
17. New YorkTimes,Mar.22, 1938; Washington Post,Mar. 24, 1938; Chicago
Daily Tribune,Apr.2, 1938; Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 28, 1938, DS, 832.00/
1183.
p. 84.
Influence,"
18. Hilton,"Military
19. MRE to Brazilianambassador(Berlin), Nov. 10, 1939,AHI; MRE, 0 Bra-
sil e a SegundaGuerraMundial,2 vols. (Rio, 1943), I, 95-96.
20. Italian ambassadorto Vargas,n.d. [June13-14, 1940], GV; BerlinerBdr-
sen-Zeitung, June12, 1940; Der Angriff(Berlin), June14, 1940; unsignedmemo,
June17, 1940, OA; Cafferyto State Dept., June12, 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5 vols.
(Washington,D.C., 1959-1961), V, 618; Hull, memo,June13, 1940, Manuscript
Division,Libraryof Congress,Cordell Hull Papers, folder 192, container57;
AmbassadorKurtPriifer(Rio) to GermanForeignMinistry, June21, 1940,DGFP,
IX, 659.
bothBerlinand Washingtonforassistancein establishinga majorsteel
complexand, as Brazilian recordsdemonstrate,he and his counselors
were well aware that Germaninterestin the project was theirmajor
trumpcard and they judiciously displayed it to pressure the Ameri-
cans.21While holdingpolitico-commercial talks himselfwith t-heGer-
man embassy,Vargas pushed similar negotiationswith Washington,
making certainthat Americanauthoritieswere reminded of German
offers.22During the period of neutrality,furthermore, Rio de Janeiro
refusedto cooperate,or did so only in piecemeal fashion,in Wash-
ington'shemisphericdefenseprogram"because of Americaninability
to supplyBrazil witharms"23-inotherwords,withouta quo therewas
no quid as far as the calculatingBrazilian bargainerswere concerned.
Vargas also demonstrated his independenceby resistingAmericanpres-
sure to eliminateAxis influencefromair transportation in Brazil, tak-
ing effectivestepsto do so onlyafterthe hemispherewas at war.24He
systematically refused,moreover,to make a state visit to Washington
despiterepeatedAmericanentreaties.25
The head of the Brazilian army'ssecretservicenoted aptlyin Sep-
tember1939thatthe Germanscould have littlereasonto oppose Vargas
since Brazil's "foreignpolicy correspondsto their desires." This fact
was amplyappreciatedin Axis circles,and theirfirmconvictionduring
1940-1941 that Vargas was in theircamp should be consideredwhen
judging the characterof Brazilian diplomacy. "We have everyreason
to supporthiisregime,"the new German ambassador concluded early
in 1940,and Berlin'sItalian allies agreed. "The AxisregardsBrazil as a
futureally and [major]base of supportin all SouthAmerica... ," wrote
a Brazilianofficialin Rome laterthatyear. In October,on the tenthan-
niversaryof the Revolutionof 1930, the only heads of state who sent
congratulationsto Vargas were Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Emperor
Hirohitoof Japan,and the leaders of two Axis-controlled Eastern Eu-
ropean countries.By mid-1941,Wilhelmstrasseanalystswere labeling
the Vargas regime"the bulwarkagainst the inclusionof South Amer-
21. Vargas to AmbassadorCarlos MartinsPereirade Souza (Washington),

Dec. 1, 1940; Martinsto Vargas,Mar. 1, July2, 1940,GV.
22. Priufer to GermanForeignMinistry, June21, 1940,DGFP, IX, 659; Aranha
to Martins,Aug.5, 1940,AHI, 408/3/16.
23. McCann,Alliance,p. 208.
24. Ibid.,pp. 216-221.
25. Rooseveltto Vargas,Jan.4, 1941, FranklinD. RooseveltLibrary(Hyde
Park), FranklinD. RooseveltPapers (hereaftercited as FDR), President'sPer-
sonal File 4473 (hereaftercited as PPF); Alzira Vargas do AmaralPeixoto(for
Vargas) to (Sra.) Martins,Jan.29, 1941; (Sra.) Martinsto Vargas,Feb. 17, 1941,
GV.
210 IIAHR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
ica in Roosevelt's anti-Germanpolicy." Vargas carefullyencouraged

this belief,having confidentialemissariessuch as his brotherperiod-
ically reassurethe Germanembassyas the schismbetween Berlin and
Washingtonwidenedin thelattermonthsof 1941.26
Afterthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Vargas, despite pleas
fromsome cabinetmembers,27 declined to break immediatelywiththe
Axis and wavered until the Rio Conferencein January1942. During
the interveningcriticalweeks, he sent his privatesecretary,Luis Ver-
gara, repeatedlyto the German embassy with protestationsof good
intentionsand distortedaccounts of diplomaticpressurefromWash-
ington.28At the conference,Vargas stillresistedAmericanpleas, agree-
ing finallyto sever relationswith the Axis only aftersecuringfirm
guaranteesof greaterAmericanmilitaryassistance.29Even afterthe
break withBerlin,however,Nazi authoritiescontinuedto believe that
Vargas was sympatheticto their cause and would resist American
policyas long as possible.30
Vargas,in fact,despiteobvious constraints,continuedto maintaina
relativelyindependentattitudevis-a-visWashington. In mid-1942,for
example,he abruptlysuspended shippingto the United States at a time
whenit "needed everyvesselit could get"because he thoughtAmerican
naval protectionof Brazilian ships was inadequate.3' His government
also persistedin itsextremelycautiousapproachto hemispheredefense.
"It becomes increasinglyapparent,"Chief of Staff George Marshall
complained in May 1942, "that the Brazilians are not seriouslyco-
operatingwithus to secure thatvital [Northeastern]area, sea and air,
againstAxis aggression."Even afterBrazil's entryinto the war in Au-
gust 1942,Brazilian cooperationremainedsomewhathalfhearted.The
State Departmentin April 1943 lamentedthat Brazil's recordin meet-
ing its shippingcommitments had been "verydisappointing,"while the
Americancommanderof the South AtlanticForce, in a candid note to
26. [Major HenriqueHoll], Boletimde Informag6es, no. 11, n.d. [Sept.-Oct.

1939], PR, 33.470; Priiferto GermanForeign Ministry,Jan. 3, 1940, RGFM,
1302:2281/480376;Luis Sparanoto Vargas,Rome,Sept. 26, 1940, GV; MRE to
Brazilianembassy(Berlin), Nov. 16, 1940; GermanForeignMinistry memo,June
10, 1941, DGFP, XII, 994; Priiferto GermanForeignMinistry, Nov. 29, 1941,
DGFP, XIII, 895.
27. ActingMinisterof JusticeVasco Leitao da Cunha to Vargas,Dec. 8, 1941,
GV.
28. Hilton,Su&sticasobreo Brasil: Historiada EspionagemAlemano Brasil,
1939-1944 (Rio, 1977), p. 219.
29. McCann,Alliance,pp. 253-258.
30. Louis P. Lochner,ed. and trans.,The GoebbelsDiaries (New York,1948),
p. 145.
31. McCann,Alliance,p. 266.
Vargas, underscoredthe "apparent slackening"in Brazil's militaryef-
fort.32
A key reason forBrazil's reluctantparticipationin the defensepro-
gramdefinedby Washingtonwas a basic conflictof strategicinterests.
Even before the outbreakof the war in Europe, American-Brazilian
discussionshad revealed thatwhereasWashingtonwas concernedwith
defense of the Northeasternhump, Rio de Janeirowas preoccupied
more with the Argentinethreat than the Axis challenge.33 During
1940 and 1941,the prioritythat Brazilian leaders assigned to southeln
defenseslay at the heart of the difficultiesthat Americannegotiators
encounteredin joint defense talks.34As Cafferycautioned Washing-
ton, the Vargas governmenthad "very little interestin Hemisphere
defenseas such,"35and the problemof divergentprioritiesremaineda
seriousone even when Brazil's break withthe Axis become definitive.
One of the majortasksof General Estevao Leitao de Carvalho as head
of Brazil's delegationto the JointBrazil-United States Defense Com-
missionwas thereforeto remindhis Americancounterpartsthat Bra-
zil's strategicconcernsincludedthe South as well as the Northeastand
to persuade themto help bolsterBrazil's militarypositionon the Ar-
gentineborder.36
An importantquestion to ask in assessingthe costs and benefitsof
the wartimeBrazilian-Americanalliance is whetheror not Brazil it-
self profitedfromit. With regard to the commercialaspects of that
alliance, it should be noted that the collapse of importantEuropean
marketsduring1939-1940 created grave financialproblemsforBrazil,
as governmentplanners,industrialand business groups,and the press
repeatedlybemoaned.37 Export expansion,by opening new markets
32. GeorgeC. Marshallto UnderSecretaryof State SumnerWelles,May 10,

1942, DS, 832.20/4031/2;Cafferyto Aranha,Apr. 1, 1943, AHI, Embaixadados
EE.UU., Notas Recebidas; AdmiralJonasIngramto Vargas,Apr. 3, 1943, GV.
33. Ministerof War Eurico Dutra to Vargas,June21, 1939, Ministerioda
Guerra(Rio), Arquivodo Estado Maior do Exercito(hereaftercited as EME);
LourivalCoutinho,0 GeneralGoes Depoe (Rio, 1956), pp. 360-361.
34. GeneralPedroGoes Monteiroto Dutra,Aug. 6, 1941,EME.
35. Cafferyto State Dept., Sept. 24, 1941, DS, 810.20, Defense/1542.
36. Goes Monteiroto Gen. Estevao Leitao de Carvalho,Aug. 4, 1942; Vargas
to Carvalho,Oct. 23, 1942; Goes Monteiroto Dutra,Dec. 4, 1942; Carvalhoto
Aranha,Dec. 23, 1942, InstitutoHistoricoe GeograficoBrasileiro(Rio), Estevao
Leitao de CarvalhoPapers (hereaftercited as ELC). Carvalhorecountshis ex-
periencesin A Servi9odo Brasilna SegundaGuerraMundial (Rio, 1952).
37. RobertoSimonsenet al. to Vargas,Apr. 26, 1940, PR, 9.374; "Mercados
Interditos,"Correioda Manha (Rio), May 9, 1940; Souza Costa, statements,
Didriode Noticias(Rio), May 22, 1940; AssisChateaubriand, "Uma Calamidade
Nacional,0 Jornal(Rio), June7, 1940; ArturTorresFilho,memo,July26, 1940,
ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior,Anais (typewritten), Julho-Agosto1940,
212 HAR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
or developingnew products,became thereforean urgentnationalgoal.

In fact,shortlyafterthe outbreakof hostilitiesin Europe, the Federal
ForeignTrade Council,foreseeingthe "inevitableills" thatthe conflict
would bring,had recommended,and Vargas had approved,a program
forstimulating the productionof itemsforwhichthe war would create
a ready demand.38 Americanmobilizationwas a godsend and Bra-
zilian analystshailed forfinancialreasons the opportunityto develop
or increaseexportsof strategicmaterialsto the United States.39On the
otherhand, as Brazilian authoritiessubsequentlycompetedwith other
allies to benefitfromAmerican industrialconversion,they fully ex-
ploitedthe advantagesthatgeographicalaccidentgave them,frequent-
ly utilizing"militarynecessity"as a pretextto claim equipment and
industrialraw materialsthat were not, in fact, destined for the de-
fenseprogram-a fact that rankledharriedAmericanofficials.40
Afterobtainingsatisfactory guaranteesof nationalsovereignty,Bra-
zilian leaders regarded as a definiteboon the bases that the United
Statesbuilt in the Northeastat its expense. Americanactivitiesin that
region should prove to be of "incalculable" value to Brazil, Aranha
exulted in a message to Vargas in 1942. The airfieldsthemselves,he
predicted,would play a "decisiverole"in Brazil'sfuturedevelopment.4
The dispatchof the famousBrazilianExpeditionaryForce (FEB) was,
of course,a calculated move to enhance Brazil's prestigeand bargain-
ing positionin postwarcouncils,and Brazilian policymakersalso saw
it as a means of pryingfurthershipmentsof war materielout of Amer-
ican arsensals.42Indeed, Brazilian records reveal that the major ini-
tial impulseforthe FEB was the fearthatthe Allied invasionof North
Africahad so reduced the Axis threatto the Northeastthat Washing-
ArquivoNacional,Arquivodo ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior(hereafter

citedas CFCE), lata 152.
38. ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior,minutes,Sept. 18, 1939, CFCE,
lata 150. For the wartimeeffortto forcemarketsin neighboring countries,see
Hilton,"Vargasand BrazilianEconomicDevelopment,1930-1945: A Reappraisal
and Planning,"Journalof EconomicHis-
of His AttitudetowardIndustrialization
tory,35 (Dec. 1975), 773-776. An expandedversionof this articleappears as
chapter3 ofHilton,CriseInternacional.
39. See, for example,"A Borrachana Economia Brasileira,"Diario Carioca
(Rio), June11, 1940; "Agir sem demora,"Dia'rio de Noticias,June30, 1940;
TorresFilho,memo,Aug. 3, 1940, CFCE, processo1.060, lata 81.
40. StandingLiaison Committee,minutes,Aug. 6, 1943, National Archives,
RecordGroup353; LawrenceDuggan to Edward Stettinius, Jr.,Dec. 15, 1943,
DS, Officeof AmelicanRepublicsAffairs, Memorandaon Brazil (hereaftercited
as OARA: Brazil),vol.7, box27.
41. Aranhato Vargas,Nov. 9, 1942, ArquivoNacional,Pedro Salgado Filho
Papers. SalgadoFilhowas theAirMinister.
42. McCann,Alliance,pp. 344-345.
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEMO "AXIS" 213
ton would lose interestin armingBrazil if that lattercould not offer
the United Statesa greaterdividend on its investment.43
Approachingthe questionfromthe Americanside of the diplomatic
equation,it is importantto note firstthat the consistencyand unityof
goals implicitin the dominationthesis did not exist withinthe Amer-
ican policymakingapparatus. That thesis overlooks,in other words,
the well-knownconfusionand conflictsof interest,perceptions,goals,
and authoritythat prevailed in the United States duringthe period,
producing cleavages among and within the organizations,agencies,
and departmentsthat vied for scarce resourcesand for influenceon
foreignpolicy.44 The Treasury and State Departments,to mention
a well-knowncontest,foughta runningbattleforpolicy initiativedur-
ing the Rooseveltyears.45There were also recurrentdisagreementsbe-
tween civilian and militaryplanners-and, indeed, among the latter
themselves-overquestionsof nationalpolicy. With specificregardto
policytowardBrazil duringthe grimyears1940-1943,the conflictsbe-
tween the Armyand Navy on the one hand, and the Armyand State
Departmenton the other,have been carefullydocumented.46Within
the State Departmentitselftherewere deep schismsand crosscurrents,
such as thatbetween Secretaryof State Cordell Hull and Under Secre-
tarySumnerWelles, that stemmednot onlyfrompersonalitybut from
policy divergencesas well.47 Foreign observerswere struckby this
competitiveconfusionprevailing in American policymakingcircles.
JoaoAlbertoLins de Barros,Vargas' wartimeCoordinatorof Economic
43. Carvalhoto Vargas,Nov. 27, 1942; Carvalhoto Aranha,Dec. 23, 1942;

Vargas to Carvalho,Mar. 29, 1943; Carvalho,Relatoriodos Trabalhosda Dele-
gagaodo Brasil'a ComissaoMista,June1943; Carvalhoto Dutra,Jan.8, 1944,ELC.
44. For an insightful analysisof Americanpolicy towardArgentinaduring
thoseyearsthat takes into accountthis bureaucraticcompetition, see ErnestR.
May, "The 'BureaucraticPolitics' Approach: U.S.-ArgentineRelations,1942-
1947" in JulioCotlerand RichardR. Fagen, eds., Latin Americaand the United
States: The ChangingPoliticalRealities(Stanford,1974), pp. 129-163.
45. According to Hull, Secretaryof the TreasuryHenryMorgenthau, Jr."often
acted as if he were clothedwith authorityto projecthimselfinto the field of
foreignaffairsand inaugurateefforts to shape the courseof foreignpolicy.
Hull, Memoirs,2 vols. (London, 1948), I, 207. Morgenthau was particularlyanx-
ious about Axis influencein SouthAmericaand placed greatimportanceon im-
provingrelationswith Brazil, frequently conductingnegotiationswith Brazilian
agents. JohnM. Blum, From the MorgenthauDiaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-
1967), I, 523-526, II, 50-58; Hilton,GreatPowers,pp. 155, 164, 193-198, 201-
204,206.
46. StetsonConn and ByronFairchild,The Frameworkof HemisphereDe-
fense (Washington,D.C., 1960), pp. 285, 287-288, 291, 298-299.
47. JuliusW. Pratt,CordellHull, 1933-1944, 2 vols. (New York,1964), I,
13-31; Pratt,"The Ordeal of CordellHull," Review of Politics,28 (Jan. 1966),
76-98; Hull,Memoirs, II, 1229-1230.
214 IAM I MAY I STANLEY E. HITON
Mobilization,visitedthe United States in 1942 and reportedalmostin

despairthatthe"multiplicity of organs"involvedin foreignaffairswere
like "hermeticcompartments, each one strugglingto assertits suprem-
acy"in policyformulation.48
The specificsof AmericanbehaviortowardBrazil would also seem
to weaken the thesis that the United States was seekingto dominate
Brazil duringthe Roosevelt-Vargasera. With regardto the argument
thatthe trade policy of the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s was
aimed at drivingGermanyout of the Brazilian marketand establish-
ing "economicand political hegemony"over Brazil, certainsalient as-
pects of German-Americanrivalryshould be emphasized. The United
States ran an average annual deficitof approximately$55 millionin
tradewithBrazil duringthe 1931-1938period,yet Americanexporters
were forcedto wait indeterminateperiods forpaymentof goods they
sold to Brazil, an anomaly that Brazilian observersrecognized.49At
the same time,Brazil was expandingtrade with the Third Reich on a
basis that violated Rio de Janeiro'streatywith Washington,a fact
also privatelyadmitted by Brazilian officials. The question to ask,
then,is how was it possible for the Vargas governmentto maneuver
with such strikingsuccess vis-a-visthe United States if the latter,a
greatpower, was determinedto dominateBrazil, a veryweak power.
The answer is that Washingtondid not aspire to the economic con-
quest or politicalcontrolof South America,and Brazilianpolicymakers
were well aware ofthatfact.
Indeed, Brazilian officialsin the mid-1930swere deeply impressed
by the cordialityand spiritoffraternity thatAmericanauthorities, from
Roosevelt on down, displayed in financial and commercial discus-
sions.50In appraisingAmericancommercialdiplomacy,moreover,Bra-
48. Joao Alberto Lins de Barros to Vargas, Dec. 25, 1942, GV. "Inconsistency
and lack of coordination appeared . . . to be the chief defects of American meth-
ods," a BritishForeign Officeanalystcommentedaftera tripto Washingtonin 1944.
"Small wonder, then, that the State Department find it difficult. . . and in the
long run impossible to committhemselves to any consistentpolicy. R. A. Gal-
lop, memo, Mar. 8, 1944, Public Records Office (London), Records of the Foreign
Office,hereaftercited as FO), doc. AS 1538/901/51.
49. See, for example, Diario Carioca, Apr. 15, 1933; Diario de Nottcias, May
20, 1933. During trade discussions with Washington in 1934, Brazilian negotiators
admitted among thenmselvesthat American interests were right in regarding as
"absurd" Brazil's treatmentof American exporters. The United States could well
impose a bilateral payments agreement,confessed the foreignministerat one point,
mean "only that we are going to pay wvhatwe should pay." Conselho
since it wo-uLld
Federal de Comercio Exterior, memo, Aug. 10, 1934, CFCE, processo 979, lata
70; Macedo Soares to Aranha, Nov. 23, 1934, OA.
50. See, for example, Ambassador J. F. de Assis Brasil, memo, June 9, 1933,
zilian analystsmade special note of Washington'scurious refusal to
seek special privilegein trade with theircountry.51Roosevelt,in fact,
in 1933 instructedthe State Departmentnot to interfereon behalf of
privateinterestswithfinancialgrievancesagainstthe Brazilian govern-
ment. And in 1934, when Brazilian authoritiesthemselvesofficially
proposed a clearingagreementthat would have enabled Americanex-
portersto "offerprices and conditionsmore advantageous than their
competitors"could in the Brazilian market,52Washington, despite
heavy pressure fromirate creditorsand exporters,rejected the pro-
posal as unfairto Brazil and contraryto commercialliberalism.53In
ensuingyears a policy of moral suasion and appeals to reason, as de-
finedby the State Department,ratherthanthe aggressiveuse of Amer-
ican economicstrengthto secure commercialadvantage,became firm-
ly entrenchedas the approach of the Rooseveltadministration to trade
relationswith Brazil. This fact bewildered Britishcompetitors54 and
led policymakersin Rio de Janeiroto the correctconclusionthat Cor-
dell Hull and his associatescould be satisfiedwiththe rhetoricof good-
neighborlinessand would not employ sanctionsagainst Brazil for the
latter'sde factocommercialalignmentwithBerlin.55AmbassadorCaf-
fery,appraisingBrazilianconductand intentionsmorerealisticallythan
the State Department,argued in May 1938 thatif Washingtonwere to
adopt "retaliatorymeasures, envisaging definite economic pressure,
Brazil would change her policy overnight," but he sparkedno response
in Washington.56Secretaryof the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,Jr.,
AHI, mago 7.100; Minister Gilberto Amado (Montevideo) to Vargas, Dec. 27,
1933, AHI, mago 9.399; Boucas to Vargas, Mar. 7, 1934, Aranha to Vargas, Nov.
2, 1934, OA.
51. Consul Sebastiao Sampaio (New York) to MRE, Apr. 15, 1933; J. E. do
Nascimento e Silva, memo, Apr. 25, 1933; AHI, mago 7.100.
52. Marcos de Souza Dantas and Aranha, memo, July 1934, DS, 810.5151,
Williams Mission/44; Hilton, Great Powers, p. 51.
53. "By forcing Brazil to divert some exchange [to pay debts to Americans]
it would mean forcing that Governmentto disturb its plans for rationing its ex-
change in such a way as to best serve the interestsof the country,"Feis explained
to other officials. Feis, memo, Sept. 14, 1934, DS, 832.5151/430.
54. Hilton, Great Powers, pp. 50-51, 132-139 documents the British attitude.
55. Hull systematicallydeclined to protest Brazil's compensation trade with
Germany in 1935 and went out of his way in 1936 to reassure the Vargas govern-
ment aftererroneousreportsthat Washingtonwas contemplatingreprisals. Aranha's
declaration in mid-1937 that Brazil would be "very pleased if all countries treated
Brazil on the same friendlyterms the United States has . . . for many years, and
now more than ever" was thus not merely a public relations gesture. 0 Jornal,
July21, 1937. For a detailed discussion of Washington's "soft line" toward Bra-
zil with regard to the German trade issue, see Hilton, Great Powers, passim.
56. Cafferyto State Dept., May 6, 1938, FRUS, 1938, V, 346-347. "I do not
see the slightest chance of expecting any pressure," one of Caffery's aides wrote
thinkingprimarilyof Brazil, recommendedin June that the United

States utilize its financial resourcesto help Latin American govern-
mentsresistAxis overtures.But even this proposal was turneddown
because the White House and State Department,in Roosevelt'swords,
fearedthat"it would be greatlymisunderstooddown thereand be re-
gardedas a resumptionof dollardiplomacy."57
As authoritiesin Washingtoncontemplatedwhat seemed to be an
increasinglyaggressiveAxis challenge in South America in ensuing
months,theydebated various policy alternatives,but the use of force
was not one of them. While the United States logicallywould not re-
gard with"equanimity"any effortby European countriesto "colonize"
SouthAmerica,Secretaryof CommerceDaniel Roper privatelywrote,
the era of the marineshad passed and Washingtonhad to treat "the
South Americannationsas freeand equal and . . . associate withthem
on that basis." Following Munich, Morgenthau again pressed Roo-
seveltto allow himto devise a programof economicassistanceto Latin
America. "Our neighborsto the South are sorelyin need of capital and
commerceto enable themto develop theirresourcesfreefromforeign
intervention," he admonished the President. "Unless we assist them
theywill become a helpless field forpolitical and economic exploita-
tionby the aggressornations."58Rooseveltnow authorizedhimto open
talks with Brazilian authorities,but the only concrete aid extended
priorto August1940 was a $20 millionloan, scornedby Morgenthauas
ICmere pin money,"to permitBrazil to clear up commercialarrears.59
Resisting strong criticismand pressure from angry bondholders
and exporters,the Roosevelt administrationthus steadfastlyrefused
throughoutthe 1930s to attemptto coerce Brazil into adopting a par-
ticularline of commercialaction. The recordalso reveals no irregular
effortsby Americanauthoritiesto interfere with Brazilianpoliticsdur-
ing that period. When leftistand ultraliberalgroups in the United
States endeavoredto mobilize opinion against the Vargas government
forthe wave of repressionthat followedthe abortiveRed uprisingof
November1935, Roosevelt assured Aranha that he regarded the mat-
ter as Brazil's affairand would pay no heed to the clamorfor official
fromWashington.RobertScottento Caffery,June9, 1938, Uni-

pessimistically
versityof SouthwesternLouisiana (Lafayette),Southwestern Archiveand Manu-
scriptsCollection,
Jefferson
Caffery Papers.
57. Morgenthauto Roosevelt,June7, 1938; Rooseveltto Morgenthau, June
10, 1938, RooseveltLibrary,HenryMorgenthau, Jr.Papers,MorgenthauDiaries,
vol. 168.
58. Daniel Roperto Hull, Nov. 12, 1938, Hull Papers,folder95, container40.
59. Hilton,GreatPowers,pp. 194-206.
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS" 217
intervention.60 The launching of the Estado Novo late in 1937 was
widely attacked by the responsibleAmericanpress and certainlythe
administration was dismayedby what seemed to be a blow to demo-
cractic government;but the immediate officialresponse, articulated
by Under SecretaryWelles, was to label the episode "purelya domestic
and internalmatter." On December 6, Welles went so far as to pub-
liclycriticizethe Americanpressfornot havingreactedwith"tolerance
and with friendlysympathy"to the political crisis in Brazil, a stand
that Aranha privatelyhailed as an act "of great courage, given the
atmospherethat exists here [against Brazil]." As Aranha indicated,
Welles had spoken forthe administration, "which decided, against its
normalprocedure,to challenge [public] opinion and the press in our
case."6' Even withregardto an issue of greatsignificanceto Washing-
ton-that of Nazi activitiesin Brazil-the State Departmentdeclined
an opportunity to influenceBrazilianpolicy. Asked by Aranhain 1938
for counsel regardingways to curb such activities,Cafferydemurred
and the State Departmentapproved his caution. "This would seem to
be a question to be determinedsolely by the Brazilian authorities,"
Welles wrote.62
In the militarysphere Americanpolicy toward Brazil in the 1930s
was similarlyunaggressive.One of the major goals of Brazilian policy
was immediatemilitarypreparedness,which meant primarilythe ac-
quisitionof armamentsand ships abroad. A unique opportunitywas
thus created fora potentialsupplierto extend greatlyits influencein
Brazil. What was Washington'sresponseto thatopportunity?Through-
out the decade, the firmpolicyof the Americangovernmentwas to dis-
courage the sale of armsto foreigncountries,particularlyLatin Amer-
ican states,since theyfaced severe economic problems and typically
had difficultymeetingtheirfinancialobligations. The State Depart-
mentspecificallyarguedthatpointin 1933-1934in discouragingAmer-
ican sbipbuildersfromparticipatingin Brazil's naval program at a
time when European diplomaticagencies were "cooperatingopenly"
with firms from their countries who were seeking Brazilian con-
tracts.63The White House laterwas inclinedto give Brazil some naval
60. Aranhato Vargas,Apr.1936,OA.

61. State Dept., press conference,Nov. 11, 1937, DS 832.00/1081;Welles,
speech,New YorkTimes,Dec. 7, 1937; Aranhato Vargas,Dec. 7, 1937, GV.
62. Cafferyto State Dept., Mar. 18, 1938; Welles to Caffery,
Mar. 21, 1938,
DS, 832.00/1178.
63. State Dept. memo, Dec. 6, 1933, DS, 832.34/236; State Dept. memo,
Mar. 12, 1934,DS, 832.34/239;U.S. Embassy(Rio) to StateDept., June11, 1934,
DS, 832.34/246;StateDept. memo,Aug. 15, 1934, DS, 832.34/249.
218 HAMR IMAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
assistance,and firstthoughtof selling decommissionedcruisers,but

the Navy blocked the transactionin 1936. Rooseveltand the State De-
partmentthen promoteda plan to lease overaged destroyersto Bra-
zil, but abandoned it the followingyear in the face of strongobjections
fromArgentina.64As a result,Brazil turned to European suppliers
placing orders with Italy for submarinesand with Great Britain for
destroyers.Nazi Germanywas especially successfulin expandingits
influencein Brazil by supplying armamentsthrough compensation
trade. It was the desire to protectthese commercial-military relations
thatled Rio de Janeiroand Berlinto settleamicablytheirpoliticalclash
of 1938, and during 1939-1940 the Brazilian high command exerted
strongpressureon civilianleaders to guaranteethe supplyof armsun-
derthe Kruppcontracts.65
The State Departmentwatched with dismay the increase in the
"politicaland commercialprestigeof our European rivals"as a result
of arms sales, but argued curiouslythat providingarms to Brazil and
other Latin Americancountries"would probably in the end weaken
ratherthan strengthenour prestigethroughoutthe hemisphere."The
Armyin May 1938 drew a more logical conclusionand suggestedthat
the governmentpromoteprivate sales of arms to Latin America,but
the State Departmentsuccessfullyopposed the idea. It was not until
1939 that the administration requested Congressto authorizethe sale
of surplusmilitaryequipmentto Latin America,and Congresswould
not pass the necessaryresolutionuntilthe Wehrmachthad conquered
France.66
The generalpatternof officialrelationsbetween the two countries
duringthe war period was one in which Washington,eager to secure
Brazil'scooperationin hemisphericdefense,cultivatedthe latter'sgood-
will witha varietyof services,demonstrating all the while a scrupulous
regardforBrazilian sovereignty.In the economic sphere,Roosevelt's
cabinet agreed in mid-1940that, in order to strengthenhemisphere
defense,economic assistanceshould be extendedto South Americato
cushionthe regionagainst the financialdislocationof war and to de-
64. Welles to Aranha,May 27, 1936, GV. On the destroyers' episode, see
BryceWood, "ExternalRestraints on the Good NeighborPolicy,"Inter-American
EconomicAffairs, 16 (Fall 1962), 3-24. Rejectinga subsequentappeal forarms
by Brazil,a StateDepartmentofficialilnformed the Brazilianambassadorthat"the
of thisGovernment
officers abroadhad standinginstructions not to engagein the
promotion of the sale of military
equipment."State Dept. memo,Sept. 16, 1938,
OARA: Brazil.
65. Hilton,"MilitaiyInfluence," pp. 89-90.
66. Wellesto Missionsin Latin America,Dec. 17, 1937, DS, 810.24/11;Conn
and Fairchild,Hemisphere Defense,pp. 208-209.
velop "new industriesand production."67Brazil became a major tar-
get of this new policy. When State Departmentadviser HerbertFeis
wrotethatit was unnecessaryto "say how firmwe considerour friend-
ship with Brazil and how steadyis our desire to cooperate withit,"he
was not only using the diplomatic tone that characterizedAmerican
overturesto Brazil,but was also reflectingAmericanobjectives. It was
because of officialAmericanintervention that the Vargas government
was able to begin work on a national steel industrythat year, a fact
that led a genuinelygratefulAranha to assure Sumner Welles, after
signatureof the firstVolta Redonda loan contractin September1940,
"I will not forgethow muchwe owe you and the State Departmentfor
thathappy result."68Washingtonsubsequentlymade new loans, facil-
itated the transferof technology,and respondedfavorablyto Brazilian
requestsby givingthe steel project a top-priorityclassificationin 1941
forthe purpose of obtainingexportlicensesforequipment. Two years
later Washingtongranted Volta Redonda the same priorityas new
Americansteelplants.69
Brazilian officialsfound that Americanauthoritiesdisplayed "the
best of good will" in handlingBrazilialnrequestsforindustrialraw ma-
terialsand equipment,70 and what difficultiestheydid encounterwere
caused, theyrealized,by wartimecircumstancesbeyond Washington's
control.71Aside from the steel complex, Brazilian negotiatorsdis-
covered that otherprojectsconsideredimportantfor Brazil's military-
industlial development,such as a national engine factory,also met
witha receptiveatmospherein Washington.Exultingoverthe factthat
the factoryhad received a priorityclassificationequal to that of gov-
ernment-owned plants in the United States,a Brazilian officerlabeled
Washington'sgesture"an excellentdemonstrationof efficientfriendly
cooperation in Brazil's industrial development" and proudly re-
ported to Rio de Janeirothat as a resultBrazil found itself"in a priv-
67. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture,and Commerce to Roosevelt,

June20, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 274.
68. Feis to Souza Costa, July 13, 1940, Library of Congress, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Herbert Feis Papers, container 26; Aranha to Welles, Oct. 15, 1940, OA.
69. Aranha (MRE) to Martins, Jan. 9, 1941, AHI; Martins to Amaral Peixoto
(for Vargas), Jan. 16, 1941, Martins to Vargas, June 14, 1941, GV; Caffely to
Aranha, Feb. 8, 1943, AHI, Embaixada dos EE.UU., Notas.
70. Col. Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva to Vargas, May 26, 1941, GV. Cf.
Martinsto Vargas, Dec. 16, 1941, GV.
71. Martins to Simonsen, June 30, 1941, InstitutoHistorico e Geografico Bra-
sileiro (Rio), Jose Carlos de Macedo Soares Papers; Commercial Attache Walder
Sarmanho (Washington) to Vargas, Sept. 6, 1941, PR, 31.956; Martins to MRE,
Oct. 10, 1941, AHI; Conselho Federal de Comercio Exterior, minutes, May 11,
1942, PR, 15.723.
220 HAIR I MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
ileged position and one very prestigiousfor us" vis-a-visother coun-

tries in the competitionfor American assistance. "We have only
reasonsto believe thatthe 'Vargas programforindustrialization of the
country'will continueto be executed with increasingAmericanaid,"
Aranhanotedprivatelyin 1943.72
Authoritative Brazilian perceptionof Washington'sresponseto the
crucial coffeequestion was overwhelmingly positive. To help prevent
severefinancialdislocationin Brazil and otherLatin Americancoffee-
producingcountriesfromthe closing of European markets,American
expertsmade in 1940 what the Brazilian financial attach6 called "a
complete,exhaustiveand perfectlyimpartial"studyof the matterand
and worked out a special conventionthat guaranteed to those coun-
triesa shareof the Americanmarketat reasonableprices. The director
of Brazil'sNationalCoffeeDepartmentlaterremarkedto Finance Min-
ister Artur Souza Costa that with the conventionWashington had
erected"a rare monumentof greatpolitical wisdom." When a coffee-
exportingfirminquired earlyin 1942 about the possibilityof securing
higherpricesforshipmentsto the United States,the director'sresponse
was incredulous. "It seems to us, fromall standpoints,impossibleto
seek a greaterprice for coffee,"he informedSouza Costa, "since the
one that we obtained is a resultexclusivelyof the magnanimityof the
Governmentof the United States ...73
In the area of Americanmilitarypolicy towardBrazil after1939,it
is significantthat,althoughthe Armyand Navy agreed monthsbefore
the outbreakof war in Europe thatthe establishmentof militarybases
in NortheastBrazil was vital to Americannational security,"nearly
threeyearsof delicate and involvedpoliticaland militarynegotiations"
would be necessaryto persuade Rio de Janeiroto allow the stationing
of Americantroopsin thatregion.74The diplomaticand militaryrec-
ords of both countriesshow that those negotiationswere sensitiveand
protractedin large part because Washingtonwas anxious to avoid of-
fending Brazilian national sensibilitiesand, consequently,it moved
only as fast as the Vargas governmentpermitted."Since we are ob-
viouslynot in a positionto use force,in pursuitof our policy in the
south Americas,"General Dwight Eisenhower once aptly remarked,
"we must depend upon wheedling." Reflectingon the staffdiscus-
72. Col. AntonioG. Muniz (New York) to Aranha,Sept. 19, 1941, PR,
27.583; Aranhato Dutra,Aug.11, 1943,OA.
73. Eurico Penteadoto Aranha,Nov. 29, 1940, OA; Director,Departamento
Nacional do Cafe to Souza Costa, Sept. 8, 1942, PR, 20.792, June23, 1942, PR,
5.845.
74. Connand Fairchild,Hemisphere Defense,p. 13.
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS 221
sions of 1940-1941,ardentnationalistPedro G6es Monteiro,then chief
of staff,recalled that"happily,the Amelican officerswere veryunder-
standing and sensible, strictlyaccepting the viewpointsof the [Bra-
zilian] GeneralStaff."75
It should also be noted that the major bone of contentionin those
negotiationswas notAmericanencroachmentson Braziliansovereignty,
but Washington'sinabilityto supply the arms that Brazil wanted.
Americanpolicymakersagonized over the question, recognizingthat,
as the Chief of Naval Operations put it, Brazil's importanceto the
United States was "perfectlyenormous,"but they could do littledur-
ing 1940-1941 except expressgoodwill and franklyexplain to Rio de
Janeirothe immensedifficultiesthat Washingtonfaced.76 Following
Pearl Harbor,however,Americanmilitaryaid to Brazil would be con-
siderable and, in comparisonwithassistancegiven to otherhemisphere
countries,it would be both massive and preferential.77
The course of negotiationsabout specific items of militaryas-
sistancewas markedon the Americanside by an obvious desire to bol-
sterthe Vargas regimepoliticallyand diplomatically,a fact that,ac-
cording to Brazilian observers,elicited numerous complaints from
Spanish Americangovernments.78 Over strenuousobjectionsfromthe
Navy, Roosevelt,forexample,orderednaval unitsturnedover to Bra-
zil in 1942 because, he said, "thisis a matterof internationalrelations
which has to be gone throughwith regardlessof the purely military
desirabilities."In the criticalmilitary-economic matterof petroleum
supplies,Washingtonin mid-1942included Brazil in the same category
as Great Britain,and followingBrazil's entryinto the war in August
it agreed to meetall thepetroleumrequirementsof the Brazilianarmed
forces. This represented"absolutelyexceptionaltreatment"of Brazil,
an ebullient Brazilian general exclaimed.79 In ensuing monthsBra-
zilian authorities repeatedly commented among themselves about
75. DwightD. Eisenhowerto Gen. GeorgeStrong,May 16, 1942, The Papers

of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years (Baltimore,1970), vol. 1, p. 306;
Coutinho,GeneralGo'es,p. 378.
76. StandingLiaisonCommittee, minutes,Jan.23, 1941,RG, 353. A typically
frank,apologeticcommunication is Marshallto Aranha,Jan.6, 1941, OA.
77. The value of total Lend-Lease supplies to Brazil reached $366 million,
which was approximately three-fourths
of the total given to Spanish American
countries.Conn and Fairchild,HemisphereDefense,p. 329.
78. Col. Vasco Alves Secco (Washington)to Salgado Filho, Sept. 29, 1943,
ArquivoNacional,SalgadoFilhoPapers.
79. Rooseveltto AdmiralErnest King, Aug. 22, 1942, FDR, PPF: Brazil;
Cafferyto Aranha,May 4, Sept.29, 1942,AHI; Gen. JulioHortaBarbosa (Wash-
ington)to Vargas,Sept.4, 1942,AHI, mago36.730.
222 HAHR | MAY I STANLEY E. HILTON
Americangoodwill and receptivityregardingplans and programsfor

bolsteringBrazil's militaryand internationalposition.80
Roosevelt'sstopoverin Natal in January1943 to see Vargas follow-
ing the Casablanca meetingwith Churchillwas largely a calculated
gesture to enhance Brazilian prestige. In conferencewith Vargas,
Rooseveltsurveyedthe generalpolitico-military situation,discussedfur-
therjoint militaryand economiccollaborationbetween Brazil and the
United States, and broached postwar problems. "President Vargas
was in highgood humoron the tripback fromNatal... ," Cafferylater
wroteto Roosevelt. "He told Aranha that he was highlypleased with
the trip,delightedwithhis conversationwithyou, and had come back
with his feeling of confidencein you even strongerthan it was be-
fore."81
A strikingexample of the Americanattitudewas Washington'ssup-
port for the FEB. Not only did the United States governmentequip
and transportthe FEB, but it overrode strongBritishobjections to
Brazil's participationin the ground fightingin Europe. London had
never shared Washington'senthusiasmfor Brazil,82and relationsbe-
tween Great Britainand Brazil in the earlystages of the war had been
far fromcordial. When the Britishseized a Brazilian ship carrying
a consignmentof Krupp armamentsin 1940, a major crisis in those
relationswas averted only by energeticintervention by the State De-
partmentand Chief of StaffMarshall, who persuaded the Britishto
release the ship.83Washingtonalso pressed London in 1941 to allow
Brazil to send militaryobserversto the Middle East; a reluctantForeign
Office then asked the War Office to cooperate, emphasizingthat it
made the request only because Washingtonhad "repeatedlymade it
clear thattheyattachgreatimportanceforboth politicaland economic
reasons to Brazil and to the improvementof Anglo-Brazilian rela-
tions. ."84 Later in the war London stronglydisapprovedof the idea
80. See, forexample,thelettersto VargasfromDutra,Sept. 2, 1943; Martins,

Jan.18, 1944; Naval AttacheJoaoP. Machado (Washington),Nov. 17, 1944,GV.
81. Cafferyto State Dept., Jan.30, 1943, FRUS, 1943, 6 vols. (Washington,
D.C., 1964-1965), V, 655-656; Cafferyto Roosevelt,Feb. 9, 1943, FDR, PPF:
Brazil.
82. The Board of Trade candidlyacknowledgedearlyin the war thatBrazil
was "near the bottomof the list" of countriesof politicalsignificanceto Great
Britain.Board of Trade to ForeignOffice,Dec. 18, 1939, FO, A8930/539/6.
83. McCann, Alliance,pp. 209-211; Conn and Fairchild,HemisphereDe-
fense,p. 271. Marshallurgedat one point"thatwhateverpressurewe have be
broughtto bear on theBritish."TreasuryDept. memo,Dec. 3, 1940, Morgenthau
Diaries,vol.335.
84. ForeignOfficeto War Office,Oct. 4, 1941, FO, A7922/190/6.
of Brazil's involvementin the European theaterof war, and even after
bowing to Americanpressure,Churchillendeavored to minimizeBra-
zils futurerole.85The State Department,however,believed that "im-
portantpolitical stakes"were involved,"such as the strengthening of
the Brazilian voice in the postwarsettlements," and it also feared that
rejectionof the FEB "mightseriouslyweaken PresidentVargas' posi-
tion." Under Secretaryof State Edward Stettinius,Jr.,cautioned by
Hull that"the delay in carryingout the plan is embarrassingPresident
Vargas and threatenshis prestige,"proceeded to admonishBritishlead-
ers about "thepoliticalimportance[of the FEB] bothwithinBrazil and
fromthe standpointof her prestigeas an ally,"and only then did they
abandontheirresistanceto theundertaking.86
American planning for postwar militaryassistance to Brazil was
designed to transformthat countryinto an effectivemilitary-diplo-
maticpartnerand to assist it "in becomingself-sufficient in a military
sense, ratherthan having continuinghelp."87 joint discussionsof the
matterwith Brazilian staffofficersbegan in 1944 and were entirely
consistentwith the simultaneoussupportthat Washingtonwas giving
to the FEB. Brazilian planners,moreover,went along wholeheartedly
withthe idea of the closestpossible militarycollaborationbetween the
two countriesafterthewar.88
The capstoneof the dominationthesis,as noted earlier,is allegedly
depreciatorytreatmentof Brazil by Washingtonin the matterof a seat
forthat countryon the United Nations SecurityCouncil.89 According
to ProfessorMcCann, the United States not only refusedto support
Brazil's bid, but even deceived Brazilian leaders about Americanin-
tentions. Citing Hull's memoirs,McCann states that the Secretaly of
State "claimed" that Washingtonhad supported the idea of a per-
manentseat for Brazil duringthe DumbartonOaks talks in 1944, but
85. Stettinius to Hull, May 22, 1944,FRUS, 1944, 7 vols. (Washington,D.C.,

1965-1967), III, 13.
86. Hull to Stettinius, Apr. 15, 1944, DS, 7400.0011,Stettinius
Mission/34D;
Stettinius
to Hull,May 22, 1944,FRUS, 1944, III, 14.
87. AmbassadorAdolfBerle (Rio) to StateDept., July26, 1945, FRUS, 1945,
9 vols. (Washington,D.C., 1967-1969), IX, 607. Berle servedas ambassadorto
Brazilduring1945-1946,replacingCafferywho was transferred in 1944.
88. AdmiralA. R. de Vasconcellosto Vargas,Nov. 1, 1943; AdmiralHenrique
Guilhemto Vargas,Mar. 22, 1944; Vargasto G6es Monteiro,Apr. 12, 1944; Var-
gas to Roosevelt,Apr. 13, 1944, GV; Dutra, memo,Apr. 17, 1944, EME.
89. One additionalitem in McCann's argument-thesuggestionthat Wash-
ingtonwas monitoring Brazil'sdiplomaticcorrespondence, thusplacingthatcoun-
tryat a disadvantagein negotiations withtheAmericans-shouldbe clarified.The
evidencehe adduces is a copy of a telegramsentby Vargasto Souza Costa on
Feb. 14, 1942, while the latterwas in Washingtonconductingmilitaryand
thatthe Britishand Russians had opposed it. "If that was indeed the
case, argues McCann, "the United States owed Brazil an honest ex-
planation,but it was nevergiven." With the disappearanceof Aranha,
Welles, Hull, and Roosevelt fromthe diplomaticscene by 1945, Bra-
zil's cause in Washingtonwas fatallyweakened. To be sure,"the drive
forAmericandomination"of Brazil intensifiedwiththe adventof Tru-
man. "Washingtonallowed the Brazilian governmentto continue in
the expectationthatits efforts[to gain a seat] would be rewarded. . . ,"
McCann concludes. "Instead of greatness,however,its reward was
subservience."90
The record of the Americanresponse to Brazil's desire for repre-
sentationon the SeculityCouncil does not supportthat interpretation.
Washingtonin fact raised the question of a permanentseat for Bra-
zil withthe Russiansand Britishapparentlyeven beforeRio de Janeiro
seriouslyput forthits candidacy. At the verybeginningof the Dum-
barton Oaks meetingsin August 1944, Hull advised Stettinius,who
headed the Americannegotiatingteam, that"he supportedthe idea of
a permanentseat for Brazil."91 Roosevelt also favored the idea, but
economicnegotiations, a copy that came into the hands of SumnerWelles and

which he forwardedin translationto Roosevelt. "There is no indicationthat
it came froma Braziliansource,"McCann states(Alliance,p. 266). The Vargas
Papersshow,however,thatSouza Costahimselfgave themessageto theAmericans
in orderto bolsterBrazil'sbargaininghand. Vargas wantedmilitaryequipment
urgentlyand to prod Washington,he sent Souza Costa on Feb. 9 an ominous
reporton alleged Argentinemilitaryactivityon Brazil's southernborder,autho-
rizinghim"to use thisinformation in a strictly
secretmannerin orderto expedite
delivery[of] our materiel."He renewedthe messageon Feb. 14 and two days
laterreceiveda wirefromSouza Costa assuringhim that"mywhole effortis di-
rectedpreciselytowardobtainingactual deliveryof the materielthat we need.
I will have anothermeetingwith SumnerWelles today and will take the op-
portunity to transmitthe informationthatyou sentby telegramso as to reinforce
my argumentabout the urgencyof satisfying our requests." The message that
Welles subsequentlysent to Rooseveltwas a translation of Vargas' telegramof
Feb. 14. Vargasto Souza Costa,Feb. 9, 14, 1942,Souza Costa to Vargas,Feb. 16,
1942, GV; Welles to Roosevelt,Feb. 18, 1942, FDR, PPF: Brazil. It shouldbe
noted,moreover, thatwhereasneitherthe availableAmericannorBrazilianrecords
indicate that WashingtonmonitoredofficialBrazilian communications, Vargas'
personalfilesdisclosethatBraziliancensorsmonitored at least the telephonictraf-
fic betweenthe State Departmentand the Americanembassyin Rio. Vargasap-
parently receivedtranscriptsor resumesof such conversations as a matterof course
whentheydealtwithsubjectsof politicalsubstance.The censorseven commented
on the "tone" of the conversations.See, for example,Censura Telegraficado
BrasiltoVargas,Feb. 28, July25, 1944,GV.
90. McCann,Alliance,pp. 341,458.
91. ExtractfromStettinius Diary,Aug. 24, 1944,FRUS, 1944, I, 732. "I my-
self felt stronglyon this point,believingthat Brazil's size, population,and re-
sources,along withher prospectof a greatfutureand the outstanding assistance
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIMO AXIS 225
when Stettiniusraised the question,AmbassadorAndreiGromykoand
Sir AlexanderCadogan, speaking for the Russian and Britishgovern-
ments,expressedon at least threeoccasions theircandid oppositionto
givingpermanentseats to any but the Big Four and possiblyFrance.92
The Brazilian governmentobviouslywould have welcomed a per-
manentseat, and its diplomaticagents argued thereafterin talks with
Allied leaders thatBrazil deservedsuch recognition,but thiswas a bar-
gainingmaneuverdesigned to increasethe chances of securinga non-
permanentslot on the Council. Brazilian policymakersrealized that
it would be impossibleto overcomethe resistanceof at least the Eu-
ropean great powers to Brazil's candidacy. Itamarati'sinstructionsto
AmbassadorCarlos Martinsin Washingtonearlyin November1944 re-
flectedRio de Janeiro'srealism: endeavorto obtain a permanentseat,
said Itamarati,but if that should prove impossible,try"to ensure the
electionof our country. .. to a positionof temporarymember."93
The State Departmentquickly sought to discourage insistenceon
a permanentseat. A high-rankingofficialwas frankwith Martins,
pointingout to him that countriesreceivingpermanentseats would
logically be those possessingthe militarycapacity to assume world-
wide obligations. The followingmonthStettinius,in a telegramto the
Americanembassyin Brazil intendedfortransmission to Itamaratiand
in conversationwithMartins,gave the Brazilian governmentwhat can
only be described as an honest expositionof Washington'sposition.
"The United Statesis preparedto give strongsupportto Brazil's claim
to a non-permanentseat on the SecurityCouncil," Stettiniusstated.
"It is notpreparedto insistupon the allocationto Brazil of a permanent
seat." The "determinedopposition"fromthe othermajor powers, es-
pecially the Soviet Union, made a permanentseat for Brazil impos-
sible. Permanentmembership,he repeated,would have to be reserved
forcountriesthatcould contributeto peace-keepingon a global scale.
At a meetinglate in January1945, Martinsand otherLatin American
diplomats in Washington received from the State Department an
equallycandidrestatement
of the realitiesof international
politics.94
Stettinius,in his explanationto Brazilian authorities,stressedthe

significanceof Russian objections,and Martinsagreed that generally
she had renderedher sisterUnited Nations,warranther receivingpermanent

membership." Hull,Memoirs,II, 1678.
92. FRUS, 1944,I, 731, 737, 744.
93. MRE to Martins, Nov. 4, 1944,AHI.
94. State Dept. memo, Nov. 13, 1944, OARA: Brazil; Stettiniusto U.S.
charge(Rio), Dec. 18, 1944,FRUS, 1944, I, 952; Martinsto MRE, Dec. 19, 1944,
AHI; StateDept. memo,Jan.31, 1945,FRUS, 1945,I, 41.
deterioratingrelationsamong the great powers hinderedBrazil's can-

didacy.95 Moscow, furthermore, would hardlybe disposed to accept
as a partnera countrythat had not maintainedrelationswith it since
1918. It was preciselyin the hope of improvingBrazil's chances of ob-
tainingpostwar representationthat the State Departmentnow took
the initiativeof urgingVargas to restoreties with the Soviet Union, a
factheretofore ignored.
Hull in March 1944 had already informedMartinsthat Roosevelt
was willingto serve as an intermediary should Brazil desire. State De-
partmentanalystsat the end of the year,recognizingthat "Brazil's am-
bitionsto play an influentialrole in the postwar securityand peace
organizationsmake it highlyimportantforher to have Russian support
-or at the veryleast forher not to have Soviet oppositionto her par-
ticipation,"urged friendlyintervention.Accordingly,Stettinius,with
his eye on the approachingconferencein San Franciscoto draw up the
United Nations charter,passed throughBrazil in February 1945 and
took the occasion of a meetingwithVargas in Petropolisto admonish
him that "no time should be lost by Brazil in recognizingRussia."96
Two weekslaterhe pressedForeignMinisterPedro Ledo Velloso to act
beforethe conferenceopened, and Vargas decided to heed the advice.
On March 2, he instructedVelloso to establishcontactswith the Rus-
sians "in accordancewiththe talkwe had withStettiniusin Petropolis."
Velloso, thenin Mexico City as head of Brazil's delegationto the Cha-
pultepec Conference,subsequentlyproceeded to Washingtonwhere,
throughthe good officesof the State Department,AmbassadorsMar-
tinsand Gromykoexchangednoteson April2 reestablishingdiplomatic
relations.97
Roosevelt'sdeath thatmonthdid not adverselyaffectBrazil's status
in Washington or diminishAmerican interestin shoringup Brazil
as a diplomatically. Truman"on several occasions"priorto that time
had indicated to Martinshis convictionthat a "strengthening of the
good neighborpolicy, especially with Brazil," was needed, and after
assumingthe presidencyhe had Martins informedthat he "fullyin-
sisted" on givingBrazil "maximumassistance."98At San Francisco in
95. Martinsto MRE, Dec. 19, 1944,AHI.

96. Martinsto Vargas, Mar. 4, 1944, GV; State Dept. memo, Nov. 1944,
OARA: Brazil;ThomasM. Campbelland GeorgeC. Herring,eds., The Diariesof
Jr.,1943-1946 (New York,1975), p. 263.
Edward Stettinius,
97. Pedro Ledo Velloso (Mexico City) to Vargas, Feb. 28, 1945; Vargas
to Velloso,Mar. 2, 1945, GV; State Dept. memoranda,Mar. 10, 13, 16, 1945,
FRUS, 1945, IX, 223-226; Martinsto MRE, Apr.2, 1945, AHI.
98. Martinsto Vargas,Apr.14,June15, 1945,GV.
THE WASHINGTON-RIO DE JANEIRO 'AXIS' 227
May, Americandelegates told Velloso that Truman intended to pro-
pose Rio de Janeiroas the site of the firstpostwarinter-American con-
ferenceand, because it would be "politicallyadvantageous"forBrazil
and would avoid a cessationiof Lend-Lease supplies,they urged Rio
de Janeiroto declare war on Japan.99Trumansubsequentlyremarked
to the new Americanambassador to Brazil, Adolf Berle, that "he was
more anxious to have good relationswith Brazil than any othercoun-
tryin Latin America,"a statementthat became the subject of a State
Departmentcircularto the diplomaticmissionsin Latin America.100
Velloso at San Francisco quickly realized the futilityof tryingto
overcomeRussian and Britishobjectionsto a permanentseat for Bra-
zil-Anthony Eden told him "withall candor" that he opposed such a
move-and he also immediatelydiscoveredthat Brazil's case was seri-
ously weakened by the lack of unanimousSpaniishAmericanendorse-
ment. Stettinius,however,assuredthe Brazilianenvoyof Washington's
determinationto lobby on behalf of Brazil's election to a "non-
permanentseat fortwo years,"the maximumtemporaryposition,when-
ever such electionswere held at the as yet unscheduledfirstmeeting
of the futureworld body.101Late that year, as plans were being for-
mulatedforthe inauguralsessionof the UnitedNations,Rio de Janeiro
launched in earnesta diplomaticcampaignfora temporaryseat. Fear-
ing thatthe pretensionsof Britainand Russia fortheirfavoritesmight
prejudice Brazil's chances, Itamarati appealed to the State Depart-
ment,receivingin reply repeated assurances and proof of American
support.'02
At the turnof the year,an anxious ItamaratiinstructedMartinsto
remindthe State Departmentthat its endorsementof Brazil's claim
would be interpretedas "an expressiveproof"of Americanrecognition
of Brazil's contributionto the war effort.On January12, 1946, Brazil
was elected to a two-yearseat by the firstGeneral Assembly,receiving
the largestnumberof votes cast for a nonpermanentmember.103An
exultantVelloso in Rio de Janeiroexpressed both "officialapprecia-
tion"and "personalgratification" forAmericansupport,sayingthat he
99. Vellosoto Vargas,May 23, 1945, GV; State Dept. to U.S. charge (Rio),
June6, 1945,FRUS, 1945,IX, 627.
100. State Dept. memo,June13, 1945, DS, 711.32/6-1345; State Dept. to
Missionsin Latin America,June27, 1945, DS, 711.32/6-2745.
101. Vargas to Velloso, May 8, 1945; Velloso to Vargas,May 10, 20, 23,
1945,GV.
102. MRE to Martins,Nov. 27, 1945; Martinsto MRE, Nov. 29, Dec. 3, 1945,
AHI.
103. MRE to Martins,Jan.3, 1946, AHI; Sec. of State (London) to State
Dept.,Jan.12, 1946,FRUS, 1946, 11 vols. (Washington,
D.C., 1969-1972), I, 157.
228 HAHR MAY I STANLEY E. HITON
realized that"it was thishelp whichhad put Brazil in top place of vot-
ing,"while Martinsin Washingtontold the State Departmentthat he
was "verypleased and particularlygratefulforthe unqualifiedsupport
given by the AmericanGovernmentto Brazil's desires.'04
Did Washington,then, engage in a "general depreciationof Bra-
zilian prestige"duringthe World War II era? Did the United States
seek to "dominate"Brazil? The historicalrecord dictates a negative
answer,showingclearlythat the Roosevelt administrationat no time
devised a programfor establishingpoliticoeconomiccontrolover that
country,nor did it desire to do so. It is noteworthyin thisregardthat
attentive,informedanalystsrepresentingprewar competitorand war-
timeally GreatBritain,who were eversensitiveto Americanmaneuvers
in Latin America, saw no impulse to domination in Washington's
policies. AmbassadorWilliam Seeds in the mid-1930shad suggested
thatit was the Americanbusinesscommunityand not the government
that pursued exclusivistaims in Brazil,'05and London's endorsement
of the Good NeighborPolicythroughoutthe decade as a means of pro-
tectingthe Britishpositionin Brazil indicatesthatLondon was reason-
ably satisfiedthat Americanpolicy was equitable.'06 During the war
Britishauthoritiesin general seemed to credit the Roosevelt admin-
istrationwith an enlightenedapproach to Latin America. A Foreign
Office spokesman in February 1943, for example, argued that the
State Department was "a restraininginfluence upon American im-
perialism,"and a knowledgeable consultantagreed. Some groups in
the United States would like to exclude other powers from Latin
America,but "this is certainlynot the officialpolicy of the present
administration," he wrote. The embassyin Washingtonalso discounted
the idea that the Roosevelt governmentwanted to dominate South
America,and concluded thatAmericaneconomicpolicy in thatregion,
thatis, the promotionof industrialization, would actuallybenefitGreat
Britainitself.'07As forBrazil,a Britishanalystnoted the obvious early
in 1943: "Brazil is being 'groomed'forthe leadershipof South Amer-
ica . . . ," he said in referenceto Americantreatmentof that country.
Indeed, reportedthe Washingtonembassy monthslater, "the settled
104. U.S. charge (Rio) to State Dept., Jan. 14, 1946, DS, 501.BC/1-1446;
StateDept. memo,Jan.16, 1946, DS, 710 Consultation(4)/1-1646.
105. Sir WilliamSeeds (Rio) to ForeignOffice,May 18, 1933 FO, A4409/
112/6.
106. Hilton,GreatPowers,p. 214.
107. ForeignOfficememo,Feb. 22, 1943, FO, A2102/520/51;Robin Hum-
phreysto Gallop,Mar. 1, 1943,FO, A2213/348/51;R. I. Campbell (Washington)
to VictorPerowne(ForeignOffice),May 29, 1943, FO, A5359/348/51.
policy of the United States [has been] to increase by every possible
meansthepowerand importance"of Brazil.108
Even moreimportantis the conclusionreached by key Brazilianof-
ficialsactivelyengaged in negotiationswithWashingtonthattherewas
no imperialistthrustin Americanpolicy. Late in 1938, Ambassador
Mario PimentalBrandao in Washingtonposed the veryquestion: did
Brazil have anythingto fearfromAmericanactivityin South America?
"The maximumthat one could admit,in the most pessimisticof hy-
potheses,as being the extremepretensionsof the United States with
regard to Latin America, and especially Brazil," he declared, "is to
establishwithus relationsas perfectas those of Canada with England
and with the United States itself." His successor,Carlos Martins,ar-
gued the nextyear that a thirdtermforRooseveltwould be "the best
thingthat can happen to us," and late in 1942 he exuberantlyhailed
the benefitsthat the partnershipwith the United States had brought
to Brazil.109A recurrenttheme of Aranha's officialand private cor-
respondenceduringthe 1930s was Washington'sisolationistmood and
its insistenceon establishingcooperative relationswith all of Latin
America to the detrimentof the special relationshipwith Brazil that
he wanted to forge.1"0As foreignminister(1938-1944) Aranha was
not concernedthatrelationsbetween the two countrieswould become
too close; on the contrary,his fear was that they would not become
close enough."' Writingin 1943, Aranha insisted that Brazil's best
means of meetingthe challenges of an "openly and boldly imperial-
istic"age was to ally itself"materially, withthe
morallyand militarily"
United States,"12 which,by implicationthen,was not a countrythat
threatenedBraziliansovereignty.
ValentimBougas, one of Vargas' closestfinancialadvisersand head
of the wartimeAmazon rubberprogram,emphasized the contrastbe-
tween Washingtonand some Americanbusinesssectors,advisingVar-
108. ForeignOfficememo,Feb. 26, 1943, FO, A2230/348/51;Campbellto

Anthony Eden, Oct.22, 1943,FO, A10016/281/51.
109. PimentelBrandao to Aranha,Nov. 8, 1938, OA; Martinsto Vargas,
June28, 1939,Sept.4, 1942,GV.
110. See, for example,his dispatchto MRE, Jan. 14, 1935, AHI, 408/1/5;
lettersto Vargas,Mar. 6, 1935,May 12, 1936,Nov. 24, 1937, GV; letterto Macedo
Soares,May 14, 1935, OA; dispatchto MRE, Jan. 15, 1936, AHI, 408/1/9.
111. PonderingAranha'simminentarrivalfor economicand militarytalks
in 1939, Welles aptlyremarkedthat"the inclination of the BrazilianGovernment
is alwaysto go considerably thanwe are readyto agree to go as to the
further
formof cooperation,"StandingLiaison Committee, minutes,Jan.21, 1939, RG,
353.
112. Aranhato Dutra,Aug.11, 1943,OA.
gas in 1942 that "happily for us the governmentauthorities,notably

PresidentRoosevelt,the Departmentof Agricultureand that of State
do not adhere to that antiquated policy of dominationand subjuga-
tion." Althoughhe had been initiallyskeptical of all great powers,
GeneralGoes Monteiro'stripsto the United States in 1939 and 1940-
the Americans,he had written,demonstrated"maximumgoodwill"
toward Brazil-left him convinced by mid-1944that a wholehearted
alignmentwith Washingtonwas Brazil's wisest policy. He reasoned
that "the United States, endeavoringto erase foreverthe vestiges of
imperialistictendencies,will not take a singlestep that mightseem to
be interventionin the internal affairsof the nations of this hemi-
sphere."113Brazilian members of the JointDefense Commissionin
Washingtonalso looked forwardwith satisfactionto an even closer
partnershipwiththe United States afterthe war, and fromhis vantage
pointin Lisbon, AmbassadorJoao Neves da Fontoura,a futureforeign
minister,saw thingsin a similarlight. The United States represented
the sole hope forWesterncivilization,he wrote enthusiastically, since
only that countrypossessed the materialresources,creativespiritand
"provenaltruism"to assist othercountriesin meetingthe problemsof
thefuture."14
As forVargas, his private correspondenceyields no expressionsof
concernabout alleged Americanimperialism.Rather,like Aranha,he
had encouragedsince the mid-1930sa special relationshipwith Wash-
ingtonas a means of extractingmilitaryand economic assistancefrom
the UnitedStates and in the generalinterestsof Braziliansecurity,and
as the war drew to a close his majorworry,as myriaddocumentsdem-
onstrate,was that the United States mightlose interestin the alliance
afterthe conflicthad ended. Americanpolicy, afterall, had brought
unusual benefitsto his countryat a relativelylow cost. Indeed, as a
resultofhis government's wartimecollaborationwiththe United States,
Brazil had been assureda positionin postwarcouncilsthatwould make
it unique among Latin Americancountries,and significantstrideshad
been taken toward the realizationof a long-standingnational goal-
the establishmentof industrialand militarysupremacyin South Amer-
ica. If the wartime"axis" did not bringthe postwarbenefitsthat Bra-
zilian policymakersanticipated,it was not because the Americangov-
113. Bougasto Vargas,Feb. 22, 1942, GV; G6es Monteiroto Dutra,June10,

1939, EME; Goes Monteiroto Vargas,May 28, 1944, GV.
114. Carvalhoto Aranha,Feb. 15, 1944; Carvalhoto Gen. FirmoFreire,Apr.
4, 1944, ELC; Col. Alves Secco to Salgado Filho, Apr. 24, 1944; Joao Neves da
Fontourato Vargas,Oct. 7, 1943,GV.
ernmenthad played a "two-facedgame" with Rio de Janeiroduring
the war, but ratherbecause unexpected Cold War challenges riveted
Washington'sstrategic attentionon Europe and Asia and drained
Americanresourcestowardthoseareas.

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Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro "Axis" during the World War II Era

Author(s): Stanley E. Hilton

government, realisticor tough-mindedin its bargaining

1. Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945

of Trade Rivalry(Austin,1975); JohnD. Wirth,The Politicsof BrazilianDevel-

mobilization,he remindedthe finance ministerlate in August, pre-

4. Vargasto J.A. Floresda Cunha,June24, 1935, ArquivoNacional (Rio de

8. On the sharpreactionin the UnitedStatesto the Estado Novo,see Hilton,

his friendlyintentionstoward German interests. Ritter welcomed

11. Karl Ritterto GermanForeignMinistry, Feb. 25, 1938, NationalArchives

tradewiththatcountryand even suggestedthat,in orderto providea laborforce

The tactic used by Rio de Janeirowas highlysuccessful. On the

towardAranha. GermanForeignMinistry to Ritter,May 30, 1938, RGFM, 3092:

21. Vargas to AmbassadorCarlos MartinsPereirade Souza (Washington),

ica in Roosevelt's anti-Germanpolicy." Vargas carefullyencouraged

26. [Major HenriqueHoll], Boletimde Informag6es, no. 11, n.d. [Sept.-Oct.

32. GeorgeC. Marshallto UnderSecretaryof State SumnerWelles,May 10,

or developingnew products,became thereforean urgentnationalgoal.

ArquivoNacional,Arquivodo ConselhoFederal de ComercioExterior(hereafter

43. Carvalhoto Vargas,Nov. 27, 1942; Carvalhoto Aranha,Dec. 23, 1942;

Mobilization,visitedthe United States in 1942 and reportedalmostin

thinkingprimarilyof Brazil, recommendedin June that the United

fromWashington.RobertScottento Caffery,June9, 1938, Uni-

60. Aranhato Vargas,Apr.1936,OA.

assistance,and firstthoughtof selling decommissionedcruisers,but

67. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture,and Commerce to Roosevelt,

ileged position and one very prestigiousfor us" vis-a-visother coun-

75. DwightD. Eisenhowerto Gen. GeorgeStrong,May 16, 1942, The Papers

Americangoodwill and receptivityregardingplans and programsfor

80. See, forexample,thelettersto VargasfromDutra,Sept. 2, 1943; Martins,

85. Stettinius to Hull, May 22, 1944,FRUS, 1944, 7 vols. (Washington,D.C.,

economicnegotiations, a copy that came into the hands of SumnerWelles and

Stettinius,in his explanationto Brazilian authorities,stressedthe

she had renderedher sisterUnited Nations,warranther receivingpermanent

deterioratingrelationsamong the great powers hinderedBrazil's can-

95. Martinsto MRE, Dec. 19, 1944,AHI.

108. ForeignOfficememo,Feb. 26, 1943, FO, A2230/348/51;Campbellto

gas in 1942 that "happily for us the governmentauthorities,notably

113. Bougasto Vargas,Feb. 22, 1942, GV; G6es Monteiroto Dutra,June10,

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