Party Politics

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Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh

Inge Amundsen
Party Politics published online 27 November 2013
DOI: 10.1177/1354068813511378
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Article
Party Politics
1–10
Democratic dynasties? Internal party ª The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1354068813511378
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Inge Amundsen
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway

Abstract
First of all, this paper explores the rationale for internal party democracy, highlighting the ‘school for democracy’
argument. Second, it identifies three crucial processes as determinants for the level of intra-party democracy; a demo-
cratic process for the election of leaders, for the formulation of policies and for coalition making. The first is emphasized.
Third, the quality of intra-party democracy in Bangladesh is analysed in terms of party leadership selection and the pre-
valent practice of dynastic rule. The overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy of political parties in Bangla-
desh is weak, due to the electoral parties’ weak organizations, strong centralization and prevalent informal decision-
making processes controlled by a limited number of party elites (dynastic parties). This general result has important impli-
cations regarding the prospects of democratizing party politics and consolidating democracy in Bangladesh.

Keywords
Bangladesh, intra-party politics, democratization

Introduction has led to a debate on what internal party democracy entails

in real-world (and developing world) politics. It requires
Well-functioning political parties are essential for the consoli-
openness, inclusiveness and shared decision-making power
dation of democracy. As Schattsneider put it: ‘political parties
among leaders and members within the party, and some have
created democracy’ and ‘modern democracy is unthinkable
forwarded the ‘school of democracy’ argument that demo-
save in terms of parties’ (Schattsneider, 1942: 1). Teorell adds
cratic party procedures will strengthen the overall demo-
that ‘no modern democratic state has been able to do without
cratic culture by nurturing citizens’ democratic aptitude.
political parties’, and it is intuitive to demand that political Second, we will identify and outline the components of
parties be ‘democratically ruled’ just as ‘the systems of which
internal party democracy as analytical tools for examining
they form a part’ (Teorell, 1999: 363).
the level of internal party democracy in the ‘real world’.
This article analyses intra-party democracy in one partic-
Three processes are crucial for intra-party democracy: a
ular country, Bangladesh, in order to answer the question of
democratic process for the election of leaders, for the for-
whether (or to what extent) a dynastic party can still be dem-
mulation of policies and for coalition making.
ocratic. According to Chhibber (2013: 277), dynastic parties
Third, based on the (normative) notion that democracy
are political parties in which ‘the top leadership comes from
requires democratic elections of party leaders, and based
within a family’. In theory, family leadership can still be on the (largely accepted) worldwide standards for demo-
democratic so long as it is elected through sufficiently dem-
cratic election of party leaders, we will analyse the demo-
ocratic intra-party procedures, but are the party-ruling fami-
cratic quality of leadership selection within the main
lies in Bangladesh democratically elected?
political parties of Bangladesh.
First, we explore the argument that internal party
democracy is essential for a political system to be demo-
cratic. The scholarly literature is largely in agreement about Paper submitted 17 May 2013; accepted for publication 30 September
what political parties should strive to accomplish, namely 2013
interest aggregation, popular participation, policy formula-
Corresponding author:
tion, legislation and policy execution. These are, however, Inge Amundsen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, PO Box 6033 Bedriftssenteret,
descriptive and normative proposals on what political par- N-5892 Bergen, Norway.
ties should be, given a (Western) democratic ideal, and this Email: inge.amundsen@cmi.no

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2 Party Politics
The theoretic argument is developed by using existing
academic literature on the topic of leadership selection in
political parties. Our sources on Bangladesh are primarily
internal party documents on constitutions and election pro-
cedures of the parties, seconded by existing literature (aca-
demic literature, reports, news, etc.). In addition, we have
conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with
around 15 politicians and party officials, along with a hand-
ful of academics, non-governmental organization (NGO)
representatives and government officials (including a for-
mer election commissioner). The party officials were MPs
and standing committee/presidium members of the ruling
party (Awami League), of the main opposition party
(Bangladesh Nationalist Party) and of several of the
smaller parties.
The overall finding is that the degree of internal democ-
racy in Bangladesh’s political parties is very limited.
Decision-making, including leadership selection, is largely
informal and handled by a restricted number of party elites.
This is unfortunate, especially for a country undergoing
democratic consolidation, where the political parties should
have been ‘schools of democracy’ aiming at enhancing cit-
izens’ civic skills through voice and participation.
Internal party democracy
There is a long research tradition on the internal life of
political organizations, and over the past 30 years scholars
have increasingly focused on internal party democracy
(Croissant and Chambers, 2010: 196). In addition, practi-
tioners and donors have been promoting internal party
democracy as one way of addressing the problem of ‘dem-
ocratic deficits’ in emerging democracies. Support for
political parties has been given by donor agencies directly
as funding via party-based foundations and institutes
and indirectly as an element of ‘good governance’ and
‘democracy support’ programmes (Amundsen, 2007: 10–
14; Catón, 2007: 14–15).
Despite (or rather because of) the increased attention by
scholars and donors, there is some debate on the question of
what internal party democracy entails in real-world poli-
tics. Although there seems to be a broad agreement that it
requires openness and inclusiveness as well as voice and
participation, some scholars emphasize participation of the
lower party structures and party members in party decision-
making processes (Croissant and Chambers, 2010:
196–197; Lotshwao, 2009: 903–904). There is, however,
also some disagreement about how wide the circle of
decision-makers should be. Most scholars argue that partic-
ipation of party members (the rank-and-file) and the vari-
ous party-affiliated institutions (like women, youth and
local party organizations) is required, but some would also
include the party’s support base, broadly defined as party-
independent social/economic/cultural organizations, civil
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society and professional organizations, interest groups,
activists and voters (Scarrow, 2005: 6).
There is also some debate on the justification and bene-
fits of internal party democracy. A pragmatic argument is
that internally democratic parties will select more capable
and appealing leaders, formulate more responsive policies,
and thus gain a greater number of victories at elections. On
a more theoretic and normative level it is argued that dem-
ocratic internal party procedures will strengthen the overall
democratic culture. Internal party democracy has an
‘apparent potential to promote a ‘‘virtuous circle’’ linking
ordinary citizens to government, benefiting the parties that
adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability
and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties
compete for power’ (Scarrow, 2005: 3).
School of democracy
It has been argued repeatedly that internal democracy is
necessary for creating a viable democratic culture within
the party as well as in society at large. For those who
believe in the merits of participatory democracy, intra-
party democracy is an end in itself. This is the ‘school of
democracy’ argument: parties should be the incubators that
nurture citizens’ political learning, socialization and com-
petence. Opportunities for participation in decision-
making within the political parties can help citizens expand
their civic skills (Scarrow, 2005: 3; White and Ypi, 2010:
810).
The ‘school’ function of parties is to train, educate and
coach people in democratic values, principles and proce-
dures. It should encompass not only party members and
cadres, but also sympathisers, voters and the general public.
This function is regarded as additional to the four central
roles or functions of political parties in modern representa-
tive democracies: interest articulation (develop consistent
policies and government programmes), interest aggrega-
tion (pick up demands from society and bundle them into
realistic policy alternatives and programmes), recruitment
(engage, select and train people for elected positions and
office), and accountability (oversee and control govern-
ment) (Catón, 2007: 7).
Moreover, scholars holding the more outcome-oriented
‘responsible party’ position also defend the ‘school of
democracy’ argument. They maintain that the parties’
essential contribution to democracy is in offering clear and
distinct electoral choices, and argue that inclusive pro-
cesses can boost the legitimacy of the alternatives they pro-
duce. Inclusive parties can offer more acceptable policy
packages and programmes. Internally democratic parties
have a greater likelihood of being open to new ideas and
new personnel. For instance, democratic leadership selec-
tion can attract different and more capable people, and give
a broader social representation and a better representation
of ideas (Mimpen, 2007: 1; Scarrow, 2005: 4).
Amundsen
At the same time, some scholars and practitioners (and
indeed party leaders) are critical to intra-party democracy,
advocating for a more authoritarian or oligarchic style of
party leadership. They point to the risk that internal party
democracy can undermine party cohesion and decision-
making efficiency. They argue that too much internal party
democracy can ‘overly dilute the power of a party’s inner
leadership’ (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and that ‘internal demo-
cratic procedures may raise possibilities for party splits and
crises’ (Mimpen, 2007: 1).
This argument was advanced previously by Schattsnei-
der, who said democracy is ‘not to be found in the parties
but between parties’ (1942: 60). Duverger made a similar
statement when arguing that ‘an internally democratic
party is not well armed for the struggle of politics’ and that
‘a party that organizes itself along authoritarian and auto-
cratic lines is superior to others’ (1954: 134). These argu-
ments are in the same vein as Michels’s ‘iron law of
oligarchy’ (1915/1962), which holds that elite rule, or oli-
garchy, is (regrettably) inevitable in any democratic organi-
zation. The idea of rule by oligarchy is also in line with the
Leninist ideology of the ‘vanguard party’, for that matter.
In more pragmatic terms, Scarrow (2005: 3) argues that
some procedures are better suited to some circumstances
than to others, and Mimpen (2007: 1) argues that intra-
party democracy can have positive consequences as well
as adverse effects, depending on the political context.
However, as these scholars have not specified the circum-
stances, we will make one basic hypothesis: when democ-
racy is not in place, some vanguard parties are needed, but
when democracy is formally established, democratic
parties are needed.
In other words, in line with Schattsneider, Duverger and
others, we will make the hypothesis that non-democratic
parties might be needed in the context of democratization.
In a situation where an opposition fights for the establish-
ment of democratic politics and procedures (like institu-
tional checks and balances, rule of law, free and fair
elections) against the vested interests and resistance of
entrenched ruling elites, parties with an authoritarian or oli-
garchic style of party leadership might be needed.
By contrast, and in line with ‘participatory democracy’
theory and the ‘school of democracy’ argument, more
inclusive and internally democratic political parties are
needed in the context of democratic consolidation. When
democracy is formally established, when elections are free
and fair and their results generally respected, internal party
democracy is needed for the development of a broader
democratic culture.
This point is important. Authoritarian parties might well
be needed to defeat the ancien re´gime, but it is hard to be
convinced that a political party which is not internally
democratic will be working to establish a true democratic
system and a democratic political culture, and be open to
the possibility of its own electoral defeat. Internal party
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3
democracy and open and democratic leadership elections,
on the other hand, will make it less likely that the party
leadership will be preoccupied with holding on to their
recently acquired power positions (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and
the personal benefits that come with it.
The elements of internal party democracy
Political parties have over the last two decades become sub-
ject to more legal regulation and state supervision. In many
developed countries, funding regimes have become stricter
and accounting regulations more rigorous. Ceilings are
introduced on campaign donations and spending, and
sometimes requirements are made as to how parties should
be organized (Gauja, 2008: 244).
This also takes place in some countries throughout the
developing world, due to transnational learning as well as
donor assistance and pressure. More developing countries are
introducing and strengthening laws on political parties, regu-
lating party and candidate registration, party funding and
campaign spending. However, state regulation on internal
party organization, internal party democracy and leadership
selection remains very weak in most developing countries.
In the real world, internal party democracy ranges from
the most centralized political parties, where the party pres-
ident has the final say, to the most decentralized political
parties, where the national party organization only has a
coordinating role. Within this continuum, three areas of
decision-making are identified, on which it is possible to
measure the degree of internal party democracy: leadership
and candidate selection (or election), policy selection and
formulation, and coalition formation (Croissant and Cham-
bers, 2010: 195–197; see also Scarrow, 2005: 7–11). In all
three areas, the question is on inclusiveness and on the
extent of formalization and institutionalization.
Leadership selection is the process of selecting or elect-
ing candidates for party office and public office (nomina-
tion for general elections). This raises a number of
questions, as outlined by Croissant and Chambers (2010:
197): who can nominate, who can be elected, and who can
elect? Do internal rules, regulations and procedures exist,
and are these rules obeyed? At what level of territorial and
organizational structure are the nominations, candidates
and electors chosen? Are there any functional criteria,
group quotas or veto powers?
In addition, one can ask about policy selection and coali-
tion formation. The question is again about inclusiveness
and centralization. What role do party elites, party mem-
bers and/or ‘militants’ and supporters play in setting party
policies? At which levels do they participate in drafting
party programmes and setting party positions? How and
when can a party form coalitions and alliances with other
parties? Are party leaders obliged by party regulations to
seek the approval of the party members or party substruc-
tures before entering into coalitions?
4 Party Politics
Coalition selection is increasingly important in Bangla-
desh, where the parties are coalescing into two blocks.
However, we have chosen to analyse leadership selection,
as intra-party democratization is, first of all, about broaden-
ing the inclusiveness of leadership selection, in Bangladesh
and beyond.
Dynasties in South Asia
Political dynasties are common in most of South Asia, with
the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty of the Indian Congress Party the
best known. Yet Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have also
had their share of dynastic politics, with the Bhutto clan,
Bandernaike’s children and the Koirala family, respec-
tively, running political parties over several decades.
According to Tariq Ali, a leading figure of the international
left since the 1960s, even reluctant ‘heirs’ like Rahul
Gandhi are ‘dragged along and promoted’ because ‘this is
the only way they feel they can stay in power because their
policies are indistinguishable from all other parties in the
country’ (Saxena, 2012).
In India, the Congress Party and a ‘whole slew of
regional parties’ are dynastic, with the top leadership com-
ing from within a family (Chhibber, 2013: 277). Despite, or
rather due to, the growth of dynastic parties at the regional
level, the Congress Party and its Nehru-Gandhi dynasty are
in serious trouble. In the 2012 elections for the Uttar Pra-
desh legislative assembly, the state from which the party
‘rose as the beacon of freedom before independence from
Britain in 1947’, the party ‘won only a miserable fourth
place’ (Chalmers and Gopalakrishnan, 2012). The Gandhi
dynasty may never rule India again with a clear Congress
majority in the national parliament.
In Pakistan, family-based politics remain as one of the
main features of the political system (Rais, 2009). Paki-
stan’s leading political parties are dynastic, each with
national ambitions and a provincial stronghold. The Paki-
stan People’s Party is the party of the Bhutto family (the
chairman of the party is now 24-year-old Bilawal Bhutto
Zardari, son of President Asif Ali Zardari and former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto); the Pakistan Muslim League–
Nawaz is controlled by the Sharif clan; and the Awami
National Party is the party of the Wali Khan family (Lie-
ven, 2011: 57). One exception is the emerging Pakistan
Movement for Justice party, which claims to be internally
democratic and not corrupt, led by Imran Khan, a charis-
matic ex-captain of the national cricket team.
Observers and analysts generally refer to feudal culture
and family- and caste-based politics to explain political
instability, confrontation and the failure of democracy in
Pakistan (Rais, 2009). The parties are like family busi-
nesses. Coalitions are based on political convenience rather
than ideology or policy compatibility. Like in Bangladesh,
the main weaknesses are the absence of a democratic cul-
ture within the political parties, along with military
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interventions that have disrupted civilian rule and caused
the decay of institutions and the political process.
Dynasties in Bangladesh
Villagers in Bangladesh seem to value their dynasties: they
value politicians who can ensure a continuous flow of
patronage from above. They prefer leaders with personal
qualities like education, wealth and generosity, and when
asked they explain that ‘ordinary people do not make good
political leaders’ (Ruud, 2011: 67–68). Dynasty is an effi-
cient branding, mobilization and vote-winning method in a
country where party programmes are vague and actual pol-
icies are moving into the populist middle.
Political parties in Bangladesh are neither totally auto-
cratic nor fully democratic, but incorporate elements of
autocracy, oligarchy (dynasty) and democracy, like in most
of South Asia (International IDEA, 2007: 89). Like Paki-
stan, Bangladesh has seen a seesawing political history,
with democratic experiments being aborted by military
coups several times since independence. The last military
dictator handed over power to a non-party caretaker gov-
ernment (NCG) in 1990, which subsequently organized
parliamentary elections (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 6).
Formal, multiparty democracy and the parliamentary sys-
tem were thus restored in Bangladesh with the elections of
1991. These were deemed free and fair and coincided with
democratization in large number of other countries, in what
has been called the ‘third wave of democracy’. Since then,
the two main parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Ban-
gladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have dominated politics,
won every other election and ruled one after the other. And
both parties are unquestionably dynastic.
That is, Bangladesh had an interlude in 2007–2008 with
a military-backed caretaker government that made several
political reforms and attempted to ‘clean up politics’. It
strengthened the election commission and tried to reduce
election-related expenses and violence. But one core
reform element failed, namely its attempt to remove the
dynasties and introduce intra-party democracy by ousting
the two party leaders (popularly nicknamed the ‘minus-
two formula’). The leaders of the AL and BNP demon-
strated control of their respective parties and remained in
charge when elections were held again in 2008 (Jahan and
Amundsen, 2012: 13).
Dynasties and alliances
The AL is a centre-left, secular party, the ‘heritage party’
and a former socialist party, advocating nationalism,
democracy, secularism and socialism (described as social
justice and a society free from exploitation) (Awami
League, n.d.: 1).
Sheikh Hasina has led the AL since 1981. She was one of
the surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
Amundsen
‘father of the nation’ and Bangladesh’s first president, who
was assassinated in 1975. Sheikh Hasina was the prime min-
ister from 1996 to 2001 and again today. During her first pre-
miership, in particular, the family established itself as a
ruling dynasty, building up a political base in government
and administration and expanding its economic power.
Sheikh Hasina’s uncle by marriage, Zillur Rahman,
served as the AL’s general secretary for many years. He was
also the president of Bangladesh from 2009 until he died
early 2013. His son Nazmul Hasan Papon is an AL member
of parliament. A couple of other cousins also play important
roles in the party, like Abul Hasnat Abdullah, member of the
working committee, and Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim, mem-
ber of the presidium, MP and former minister.
Hasina’s younger sister, Sheikh Rehana Siddiq, is an
informal ‘advisor’, confidant and companion on state visits
and functions, but Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Ahmed Wazed (Joy),
now seems to be the one groomed to take over, although he
lives in the US. Joy joined the party in 2010 (as ‘primary
member’) (Joy joins politics, 2010), and he is a ‘special advi-
sor’ to the party president (his mother). He has recently also
taken part in international visits and political rallies and mass
meetings in Bangladesh, along with his mother (Joy to travel
around the country, 2013; Tusher, 2013b).
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is a nationalist,
centre-right political party, opposing communism and
socialism and promoting free market policies. It has grown
distinctly more religious; it is actively voicing the Islamic
consciousness of the Muslim majority of Bangladesh, and
it is allied to distinctly Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-
Islami and the Islami Oikya Jote.
Khaleda Zia has led the BNP since 1983. She is the
widow of military ruler Ziaur Rahman (‘Zia’, with no fam-
ily relation to the Rahmans of the AL), who established the
party in 1978 in an attempt to civilianize his rule. Zia was
murdered in 1981, and Khaleda, ‘much like her rival
Sheikh Hasina’, consolidated her control of the party ‘by
banning all major decisions taken in her absence and mak-
ing it impossible to remove her as its chief’ (International
Crisis Group (ICG), 2012: 9).
Khaleda’s son Tarique Rahman was made senior vice
chairperson in 2002 and effectively his mother’s successor
(‘in response to rising demand from ranks and files of the
party’, according to his web page). Tarique now figures
on placards and posters with his mother and deceased
father, and a personality cult is being nurtured in rallies,
on placards and with his web pages (www.tariquerahman.-
net and http://tariquerahmanfanclub.webs.com) and blogs,
where he is presented as ‘our next Prime Minister’.
Included in the political/business family were also
Khaleda’s sister Khurshid Jahan Haque, former MP and
minister (deceased 2006), and her brother Sayeed Eskandar,
former vice chairman of BNP and MP (deceased 2012).
Tarique’s younger brother Arafat Rahman is a businessman,
sentenced in court in 2011 in absentia for corruption
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5
and money smuggling during his mother’s 2001–2006
premiership.
Dynastic succession is thus secured within the BNP.
Likewise, the same trend seems to be developing within the
AL, if Hasina’s son takes up the challenge. At the same
time, the AL/Mujib dynasty is larger, extended with family
members occupying a greater number of government, party
and business positions.
Beyond the two major parties, there are two other rela-
tively important parties, but these are not dynastic. The
third largest party, the Jatiya Party, was established by for-
mer military dictator Hussain Mohammad Ershad in 1984
in an attempt to civilianize his rule, and it is still in busi-
ness, allied to the AL, and is still led by Ershad, now an
octogenarian MP. In the last elections it secured 27 MPs,
but the party has split several times and is in terminal
decline. Without a clear successor, the party is more per-
sonal authoritarian than dynastic.
The fourth largest party is the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-
Islami (JIB), a conservative but pragmatic Islamist party
with links back to Muslim organizations of the colonial
period. Jamaat is the BNP’s largest alliance partner, although
the BNP seeks to distance itself from it as some Jamaat lead-
ers have been convicted for ‘crimes against humanity’ in the
belated Bangladeshi war trials, and because the party har-
bours radical ideas like the application of Sharia Law and
(old) sympathies towards Pakistan. Driven by Islam, Jamaat
(along with the communist party and some other small par-
ties) is more based on ideology than dynasty.
Of the remaining parties with parliamentary representa-
tion, three are allied with the AL in the Grand Alliance and
two are allied to the BNP in the 18-Party Alliance. In addi-
tion, four independents later joined the alliances. This means
that although there are eight parties in Bangladesh with rep-
resentation in parliament – and most of these are not dynastic
– none of them operate outside the two blocks or are indepen-
dent of the influence of the two dynasties. The two leading
parties are favoured by the ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) elec-
toral system – a system that makes other parties gravitate
towards two distinct party coalitions (blocks) (Jahan and
Amundsen, 2012: 12) – and by a constitutional provision
(the famous Article 70) banning floor-crossing, thus making
all MPs follow the party leadership in every vote, including
the alliance partners that tend to vote along the same line.
So, from 1991 onwards, voters in Bangladesh have been
presented with two choices: one alliance led by the AL and
the Mujib dynasty and another by the BNP and the Zia
dynasty.
Legal provisions
Bangladesh has no provision for public funding of political
parties, maintains weak regulations for party funding and
campaign spending, and has no legal provision or state reg-
ulation of internal party organization or leadership
6 Party Politics
selection. Political parties are referred to only a few times
in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
(1972, with later amendments), in the Representation of the
People Order (1972, that establishes the election system
and the election commission) and in the Electoral Rolls
Ordinance (1982, that deals with voter registration).
However, all political parties must register with the Ban-
gladesh Election Commission (BEC), and the BEC-
promoted Code of Conduct for political parties – along with
a noticeable pressure from the BEC under the last military-
backed and reformist NCG (2006–2008) – presents the parties
with a number of requirements (Hussain, 2012: 83–84;
International IDEA, 2007: 78). The more important provi-
sions include the disclosure of candidate and campaign
spending and transparency in finances and fundraising.
Beyond these financial requirements, there are ‘recommenda-
tions’ for a 33 per cent quota for women in all party bodies and
internal decision-making through regular party elections.
The latter recommendations are not compulsory, as they
have never been promulgated into law (despite promises by
political parties that they would be). Besides, the election
commission’s sanctions on violations are toothless and neg-
ligible (a fact confirmed by various observers, including a
former election commissioner). In practice, the political par-
ties have been ignoring many of them; for a while some of
the larger parties even ignored the legal requirement that par-
ties had to be registered with the commission. There is not
much talk about the 33 per cent representation of women and
no more pressure for regular internal party elections. The
entire reform agenda seems to have come to a halt.
Leadership selection
Internal party democracy requires an open and inclusive
process of selecting candidates for party and public offices.
In Bangladesh, party leaders are to be elected at regular
party conventions or conferences, according to the proce-
dure laid down in the party by-laws. In the case of both
AL and BNP, however, leadership election, including the
selection of the party leader, is conducted beforehand and
only approved by the convention as a mere formality.
In formal terms, the AL party president and general sec-
retary are elected by the tri-annual party convention, called
the council, which is the party’s supreme body. The council
is composed of 3000–4000 district representatives, includ-
ing the president, general secretary and up to 25 party
members from the party’s 74 district bodies. Then, for the
selection of the other party bodies, the tri-annual council
elects the majority of the members whereas the party pres-
ident nominates a certain number.
However, opposition officials and independent observ-
ers, as well as two AL officials (a MP and an executive
committee member) we spoke with, made the claim that
in reality, the party leader is elected at the party convention
only through a formal approval of a single candidate.
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Although possible alternatives are discussed behind closed
doors prior to the convention, our sources indicated that
elections for the party president (and general secretary) are
always devoid of alternative candidates. The leadership
issue has always been settled informally before being for-
mally endorsed by the council (by acclamation).
Moreover, the members of the presidium, executive and
advisory committees are for all practical purposes chosen
by the party president (International IDEA, 2007: 93). The
council authorizes the party president to nominate all mem-
bers, in ‘consultation with’ other office holders. This
applies to the 15-member presidium (the daily executive
body), the 71-member executive committee (the central
committee which meets monthly) and the 34-member advi-
sory committee (an advisory body that also includes non-
party members and meets about every three months).
If there are factions in the party at the level below the
leader, which is rather common, the party president will
ensure that people from the various factions are drawn into
the executive bodies (International IDEA, 2007: 92; inter-
view sources). It is reported, however, that the latest
changes in the AL executive committee did not include the
known reformists, despite hectic lobbying (Tusher, 2013a).
Thus, there is no real democracy in party leadership
selection within the AL. Although the outgoing presidium
formally functions as a nomination committee (it presents
the candidates), the wide-ranging nomination powers given
to the party leader means that the real bargaining between
factions and brokering over positions takes place mainly
before and after the tri-annual party council.
When it comes to nominating the party’s candidates for
parliamentary elections, the AL is, like some other parties
(including the BNP), increasingly ‘selling’ nominations.
‘You can now buy yourself a MP nomination the same way
as you buy an air ticket to Singapore: pay up and off you
go!’ said a Bangladeshi MP when referring to this practice
(Amundsen, 2014).
The fact that people can ‘buy’ parliamentary positions is
also described in another study: ‘Money raised by an appli-
cation fee from aspiring candidates for party tickets could
also be substantial during an election year’ (International
IDEA, 2007: 101–102). ‘The Bangladesh Awami League
reported most of its income by this method. In the 2001
elections it could gather a substantial sum of 24 million
BDT (c. 430,000 USD)’ (International IDEA, 2007:
fn23). The applications are then scrutinized by a core group
of leaders of various party organs but the final nominations
are made by the party president, ‘in consultations with the
executive committee and the parliamentary group’, accord-
ing to our interview sources.
In the BNP, the president (here called chairperson),
senior vice chairperson and the general secretary are for-
mally elected by the party convention (council), in a pro-
cess similar to that in the AL. But in reality the BNP
system is even more centralized and informal, as confirmed
Amundsen
by both BNP officials and others in our interviews. For one
thing, the three annual council meetings have not been held
regularly (between 1993 and 2009 there was a 16-year
lapse, and the 2012 council has yet to be held), and there
are no proper records of the meetings.
Furthermore, in the BNP, the 15 members of the stand-
ing committee and the 34 members of the advisory council
are all appointed by the chairperson. The approximately
250 executive committee members are elected among the
council representatives, in formal terms by the council but
in reality by the party chairperson. Concerning the selection
of candidates for parliamentary elections, BNP candidates
are (like AL candidates) selected by the top party leaders,
according to their applications, ‘fees’ and in ‘consultations’
with the party leadership, although the chairperson has the
final say. These are facts confirmed by the independent
observers as well as the BNP officials (standing committee
members and MPs) we have interviewed.
The third largest party, the Jatiya Party (National Party)
has a distinctly ‘dictatorial’ style: the JP founder Ershad
declared himself party chairman for life in 2009, he
appoints all posts, the central committee works under his
direction and he dominates the decision-making process.
According to Article 39 of JP’s constitution, the party
chairman has the power to form, suspend or abolish com-
mittees at all levels, under the condition that he consults
with the members of the presidium (according to our inter-
view sources; see also the JP Constitution, n.d.).
In contrast to the formal and informal ‘single man’ dic-
tatorship in the JP, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami seems
to be well organized, guided by principle rather than person
and thus more internally democratic, according to our inter-
view sources. The party was quick to register with the BEC,
has held regular party meetings and congresses and
recently adapted its constitution to adhere to BEC regula-
tions and the country’s constitution (the party changed the
section on ‘establishing the rule of Allah’ to ‘establishing a
fair and just Islamic society’, and it now allows non-
Muslims to be members) (ICG, 2012: 10; Jamaat drops
‘rule of Allah’ from charter, 2012).
Jamaat is headed by a leader who is elected by the cen-
tral council (the Rokon) for three-year terms in a direct and
secret ballot with alternative candidates. However, the
party leader (Motiur Rahman Nizami) has been re-elected
continuously since 2001, which may indicate rather strong
leadership behind a democratic façade.
Programme formulation and coalition
making
All over South Asia, including Bangladesh, policies, pro-
grammes and election manifestos of parties are generally
worked out by the top party leadership. Party programmes
are discussed in the highest decision-making bodies before
they are made public or presented before the party
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7
conventions for approval (which means, usually, an unani-
mous approval without any substantial discussion or
changes made) (International IDEA, 2007: 96). The daily
policy decisions are mostly made by the party president
in consultation with an informal group of party officials and
advisors. According to our interview sources, there are few
policy issues of any significance being discussed in formal
terms in the various party organs.
Regarding coalition making, decisions are taken at an
even higher and more informal decision-making level.
According to our sources, the question of whether this or that
party should join this or that party coalition is decided by the
party leadership (party president and close advisors),
although consultations are made in an informal way with
party dignitaries and factions, and the formal decision is
made by the presidium. There is no formal endorsement
by the national convention or council, and there is no written
agreement on terms and conditions. This is due to the heavy
horse-trading involved, as party coalitions in Bangladesh
entail in practical terms that the parties of a coalition are not
presenting competing candidates in any constituency. It is
the sheer weight of the candidates and parties in terms of
popular following and vote-winning possibilities that counts.
Local party democracy
At the local level there is a certain degree of democratic
procedure in electing committee chairmen and secretaries,
as the constitutions of all four parties provide for the elec-
tion of leaders at the sub-national level. This might indicate
a certain ‘school of democracy’ at the local level. But are
the political parties educating and coaching people in dem-
ocratic values, principles and procedures?
The AL constitution provides for election of leaders at
the district, ‘upazila’ (subdistrict), municipal and metropol-
itan level in local triennial meetings (called councils),
although it does not specify the election process at the
grassroots level, i.e. the union, ward and village levels. In
practice, members of the local committees are usually not
elected in local council meetings through secret voting, but
selected from above by the national level leadership and
‘elected’ by acclamation in the meetings, according to
independent observers as well as AL officials. Besides,
council meetings are rarely held and many committees con-
tinue for years beyond the expiry of their terms.
In two district and two upazila committees that we ran-
domly selected for scrutiny, we found that one AL district
committee was formed partly through election by secret
ballot and partly through selection. That is, eight senior
positions, including the president and secretary, were
elected through secret ballot, and this eight-member com-
mittee then selected the remaining positions. In the other
district, the committee was formed in 2002 through accla-
mation in an open council endorsing the party leadership’s
choices. Moreover, the two district committees were
8 Party Politics
formed in 2003 and 2002, respectively, and were still oper-
ating. In the two upazilas, the committees, which are still
operating, were elected in 2004 and 2009, respectively,
by acclamation of the leadership’s nominees.
In contrast to the AL, the BNP constitution stipulates
election of members of all committees from the district
down to the union and ward levels through local, biennial
meetings. However, as with the AL, local party committees
are often not elected but selected by the party leadership
and ‘elected’ by acclamation locally. In the BNP, local
council meetings are even more sporadic than within the
AL. In the two districts selected for scrutiny, we found that
one committee was formed on an ad hoc basis in 2003 and
another in 2010, and that the members of both were
selected by national-level leaders. Similarly, the two upa-
zila committees were nominated from above in 2009.
The constitutions of Jatiya and Jamaat also provide for
election of committee members from the district level down
to unions and wards. Nevertheless, in the two districts and
upazilas we examined, the party president of JP had simply
selected the local party committees, after consultations with
local leaders. In Jamaat, however, the local leaders of the
two district and upazila committees had been elected
through secret ballot, in 2011, in line with the party consti-
tution. In Jamaat, all party members can vote and can be can-
didates, and the candidates are elected by simple majority.
In sum, of the four parties we looked at, only Jamaat fol-
lows the practice of leadership selection by party members
locally and through secret voting. The AL has a mixed
practice of election through secret ballot and election by
acclamation of candidates presented by the party leader-
ship. The BNP and the JP were the worst performers; in the
BNP all local committees examined were selected by the
party leadership and in the JP by the party president. Con-
sequently, the level of local, internal party democracy is
underdeveloped in Bangladesh, and local party organs can
hardly be said to fulfil the role of a ‘school of democracy’.
Instead of regularized politics, the parties in Bangladesh
(in government and opposition alike) frequently call for
‘hartals’. Hartals are a form of mass protest, which includes
public agitation, street manifestations, road blockages,
stone throwing and varying degrees of civil disobedience.
Hartals can muster millions of protesters throughout the
country and shut it down for a day or two. Hartals illustrate
the party leaders’ influence on the political agenda and
their ability to mobilize the masses. This happens, however,
in a way that is not nurturing a democratic culture but rather
confrontation and violence.
Confrontational politics
There is a distinctly confrontational political climate in
Bangladesh. Politics is perceived as a zero-sum game in a
‘winner-takes-all’ system, in which the ruling party dynasty
(no matter which) has always used the incumbency advantage
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to the full and strived to establish hegemonic control over the
political agenda and over the use of public resources. One
writer argued that the confrontational politics is a manifesta-
tion of the undemocratic (feudal) political culture in which
each party seeks to monopolize state power as if the other
party does not have the right to exist (Hossain, 2000: 509).
Politics has to some extent become a battle of family
vendettas, with the two leading ladies and their families,
friends and supporters cultivating two opposite and incom-
patible narratives about the history of the liberation war,
international relations, religion and society. Each is demo-
nizing the other for being erratic, hegemonic, corrupt and
dictatorial.
This explains the frequent ‘hartals’ and the prolonged
boycotts of the parliament. In fact, the opposition
lawmakers (no matter the party) have boycotted roughly
half the parliamentary sittings over the last 20 years (Jahan
and Amundsen, 2012: 63). The current opposition has boy-
cotted the incumbent parliament since its formation.
The confrontational climate may indicate a basic strug-
gle for the establishment of democracy, which could, per-
haps, legitimize the oligarchic leadership style within the
parties. The two party leaders repeatedly claim that this is
what is going on, and the deepest political disagreements
are about the basic rules of democratic procedure, in partic-
ular the modalities of the next elections. A core question is
whether elections are to be held under a caretaker govern-
ment or an electoral commission. The current AL govern-
ment in 2011 abolished the constitutional provision for
caretaker governments, but the BNP wants to return to the
caretaker system, fearing an election commission will not
be independent. This is an important element of the current
deadlock situation in which the BNP boycotts the parlia-
ment and threatens to boycott the next elections.
But the political parties of Bangladesh are not engaged
in a struggle for the establishment of democracy. The mil-
itary dictators of Bangladesh are gone (even when they
could return relatively easily), and since 1991, two govern-
ments have stepped down following electoral defeat, and
elections are deemed relatively free and fair. Thus, it seems
that Bangladeshi politics is more of a struggle for hege-
mony through electoral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-
all’ political system, than it is a struggle for establishing
democracy in the first place. This can also be seen from the
fact that political reform is hardly on the agenda; the parties
are not fighting for democratic reforms that can restrict
executive power and reduce dynastic influence, neither in
the polity nor within the parties.
Conclusions
Bangladesh’s two leading political parties are clearly
dynastic, led by the daughter and the widow of former pre-
sidents. The BNP has appointed a successor from within the
family, and the AL is about to do the same. The reason for
Amundsen
this strong dynastic inclination is, first of all, that the fam-
ilies themselves are holding onto power within the party,
and because the various party factions prefer an undisputed
leadership. Furthermore, dynastic politics is an efficient
branding and vote-winning method in a country where
party programmes are vague and people seem to prefer the
‘influential families’ when voting.
One of the consequences of the prevalent practice of
dynastic rule in Bangladesh is the continuation of a con-
frontational political climate, with two families in a dead-
lock battle. Another consequence of dynastic politics is the
low degree of internal party democracy. We have seen that
the party leaders have been ruling their parties for more
than 30 years, and how they have been re-elected without
contestation. Internal party democracy in terms of top lead-
ership election is not open for democratic procedure, and
vital decision-making in terms of programme formulation
and alliance building is the exclusive right of the party
leader and the inner circle. In Bangladesh, not even elec-
toral defeat challenges the position of the party leader.
From the Bangladeshi experience, then, it does not seem
that dynastic parties can be democratic. Here, the inherent
contradiction between dynasty and democracy is spelled
out to the advantage of the former; dynasty is protected
from democratic infringements.
Although the political dynasties are a hindrance to intra-
party democracy in Bangladesh, dynastic parties in other
countries can still, theoretically, be democratic. But that
possibility is reduced when adding the experience of India
and Pakistan to the present findings.
Now, are the political parties of Bangladesh engaged in
a struggle for the establishment of democracy, which can
legitimize the oligarchic party leadership styles? The two
parties and the two party leaders repeatedly claim they are,
and the deepest political disagreements are about the basic
rules for democratic procedures, in particular the modal-
ities of the next elections. But the parties in Bangladesh are
not struggling to establish democracy: recent governments
have stepped down and relatively fair elections have been
held. This, paired with the fact that parties are not fighting
for democratic reforms that can restrict executive power
and reduce dynastic influences suggests that Bangladeshi
politics is more of a struggle for hegemony through elec-
toral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-all’ political system.
In terms of intra-party democracy, it could be that party
fragmentation would become worse with greater internal
party democracy. However, the most devastating fragmen-
tation has taken place within the Jatiya party, the most
authoritarian political party in Bangladesh. It could also
be that internal party democracy might weaken the parties’
policy-making power, but it seems that dynastic efficiency
is invested more in protecting family interests and in scorn-
ing the other party than in promoting democratic values.
In sum, Bangladesh is not in the early stages of democra-
tization; it is not in a situation of political parties fighting for
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9
democracy against an entrenched undemocratic regime. Con-
sequently, the arguments for an authoritarian and oligarchic
style of party leadership in Bangladesh are weak. Rather, the
Bangladesh experience supports the rationale for internal
party democracy and the normative ‘school of democracy’
argument. Bangladesh needs political parties that can engage,
educate and coach people in democratic values, principles
and procedures (rather than in endless political squabbles and
confrontations), and Bangladesh needs inclusive politics and
party-internal democratic procedures that can produce more
legitimate and efficient policy programmes, give a broader
social representation and restrict the vested interests of the
party leaderships. Bangladesh needs political parties that can
contribute to the establishment of a democratic culture by
being themselves internally democratic.
Acknowledgements
I extend my thanks to Professor Rounaq Jahan, senior researcher at
the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, for
her assistance in data collection, and to the politicians and observ-
ers interviewed in Bangladesh. I am also grateful to the two anon-
ymous reviewers of Party Politics for their helpful comments, and
to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Embassy in Dhaka,
for funding the research cooperation between CPS and the Chr.
Michelsen Institute. Only the author, however, can be held respon-
sible for possible omissions, errors, and misrepresentations.
Funding
This work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs/Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dhaka, through its funding
of a research cooperation programme between the Centre for Pol-
icy Dialogue (CPD, Bangladesh) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute
(CMI, Norway).
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Author biography
Inge Amundsen is a political scientist and Senior Researcher at
the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway. His
research focusses on democratic institutionalisation, parliaments,
political parties, political corruption, and natural resources
(petroleum resource management and revenue management).