RULE 43- Appeals from the CTA and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the CA

Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines. (n)
Section 3. Where to appeal. — An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (n)
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days. (n)
Section 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven
(7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse
party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of
Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals
upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion,
the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the denial. (n)
Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The
petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.
(2a)
Section 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (n)
Section 8. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the
petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (6a)
Section 9. Contents of comment. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in
seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The comment shall (a)
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the
reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the
petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. (9a)
Section 10. Due course. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as
may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing
thereof, and on the records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned
has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it
shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. (n)
Section 11. Transmittal of record. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been
given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the
original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record
to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of
Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. (8a)
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms
as it may deem just. (10a)
Section 13. Submission for decision. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may
set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen
(15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the court of Appeals. (n

Herbosa v. CJH Development Corporation, G.R. No. 210316, 28 November 2016.

Doctrine: The Court in this case ruled against the appealability of a Cease and Desist Order by the
Security and Exchange Commission because an appeal may only be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case. and that an interlocutory order is not appealable until after
the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice
and unduly burden the courts.
The Court also discussed in this case, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal.
Facts: The respondent entered into a Lease Agreement with BCDA for the development of a property
within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. The respondent came up with a development plan and
put it into effect. Part of such development plan was the construction of two (2) condominium-hotels.
The residential units in these condotels were then offered for sale to the general public by means of
two schemes: 1. Straight purchase and sale contract; or 2. Sale of the unit with an added option to
avail of a "leaseback" or a "money-back" arrangement.
Later, the BCDA and the CJHDC entered into an agreement for the restructuring of the latter's rental
payments and other financial obligations to the former. Pursuant to this agreement, the respondent
transferred ownership of a number of condo units to the petitioner via dacion en pago.
The BCDA then requested the SEC to conduct an investigation into the operations of CJHDC and
CJHSC on the belief that the "leaseback" or "money-back" arrangements they are offering is a
investment contracts which are considered as securities under the Securities Regulation Code.
The SEC En Banc then immediately issued a CEASE AND DESIST ORDER against Respondents.
Thus, CJHDC and CJHSC then filed a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA questioning the above CDO and
praying that the same be reversed and set aside.
The CA ruled in favor of CJHDC and CJHSC, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether appeal before is the proper remedy against a CDO?
Ruling: NO. The Court rules that a Motion to Lift Cease and Desist Order is the proper remedy and
not an appeal. The Court said that a CDO is not final, it is just provisional, and that the prohibition
thereunder is merely temporary, subject to the determination of the parties' respective evidence in a
subsequent hearing. Thus, it is clear that the subject CDO, being interlocutory, may not be the subject
of an appeal.
The Rules of Procedure of the SEC states that a party against whom a CDO was issued may, within
a period of 5 business days from receipt of the order, file a formal request or motion for the lifting
thereof with the OGC. Said motion or request shall be set for hearing by the OGC not later than fifteen
(15) days from its filing and the resolution thereof not later than ten (10) days from the termination of
the hearing. Hence, instead of filing an appeal with the CA, respondents should have filed a motion to
lift the assailed CDO.
Since the law and the SEC Rules require that this motion be heard by the SEC, it is during this
hearing that respondents could have presented evidence in support of their contentions. However,
they chose not to file the said motion.
As to the issue with regard to failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC, being the
agency that have primary jurisdiction over the case: The Court said that the CA resolution of the issue
as to whether respondents' scheme of selling the subject condotel units is tantamount to an
investment contract which requires the expertise and technical knowledge of the SEC being the
government agency which is tasked to enforce and implement the provisions of the Securities
Regulation Code as well as its implementing rules and regulations. The SEC Code also provides that
the Commission, after proper investigation or verification, motu proprio, or upon verified complaint by
any aggrieved party, may issue a cease and desist order. The Court thus, ruled that the CA
erroneously gave due course to it in disregard of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction.

Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188492, 28 August 2018.
Doctrine: This case focuses on the correct period for appealing the decision or award of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators. The issue arises because the decision or award of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators is appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides a period of 15 days from notice of the
decision or award within which to file the petition for review. On the other hand, Article 276 of the
Labor Code sets 10 days as the period within which the appeal is to be made.
The ten (10)-day period stated in Article 276 of the Labor Code should be understood as the period
within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators (VAs) or Panel of
Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) by filing the petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen (15) days from notice pursuant to Section 4
of Rule 43.
Facts: Under Section 5(2) of R.A. 6728, 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of
salaries and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the
petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees. Shortly thereafter, and in order to save the
depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan, its Board of Trustees approved the funding of the
retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases.
Thus, the private respondents, GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor
Union challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 6728.
The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration after failing to settle the controversy by
themselves. The voluntary arbitrator then ruled in favor of GNC, stating that retirement benefits can be
paid using the 70% net incremental proceeds. The respondents received the decision on June 16,
2008 and requested a 15-day extension from July 1, 2008, to July 16, 2008, to file their petition for
review with the CA which was granted by the CA.
The petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator was
already final and executory under Article 276 of the Labor Code but it was denied by the CA. Hence,
this petition.
The petitioner argues that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction when it denied the Motion to Dismiss
despite the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor
Code. The petitioner claims that the respondents received the decision on June 16, 2008, and had ten
days to file an appeal, but did not do so until July 16, 2008, making the decision final and executory.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss despite the finality of the decision?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the petition for review shall be filed within 15 days pursuant to
Section 4, Rules 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court also clarified that the 10-day period under Article
276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the Voluntary
Arbitrator's decision or award.
The Court also cited its ruling in Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, where it said that the
decisions of voluntary arbitrators should be given great respect and, as a general rule, should be
considered final, particularly when the arbitrator is highly qualified. However, this respect does not
prevent judicial review of their decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code states that voluntary arbitration
awards are final, unappealable, and executory, except in cases where money claims exceed certain
amounts or where there is abuse of discretion or gross incompetence. Despite this provision, the
courts may review decisions of administrative agencies, such as the NLRC or the Sandiganbayan, if
there are issues of jurisdiction, abuse of discretion, denial of due process, violation of substantial
justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law. This applies to voluntary arbitrators as well, who act in a
quasi-judicial capacity and whose decisions involving the interpretation of the law may be subject to
review by the court.
Simply put, parties who are not satisfied with the decisions or awards of Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panels of Arbitrators can appeal through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Going back to the main issue, the Court said that by allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of
Congress is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA’s decision to seek
recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative
agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a
condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.
Thus, to reiterate, the Court clarified that Article 276's 10-day period is for filing a motion for
reconsideration after a ruling by Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators. After resolution of the
motion, an appeal may be filed with the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court within 15 days from notice under Section 4 of Rule 43.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSED the petition.

Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation v. Trans-Asia Oil & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 207942,
12 January 2015.
Doctrine: Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the Office of
the President (OP) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the Court of Appeals
(CA). Section 4 of the Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Under Section 4 of Rule 43, the reckoning of the fifteen (15)-day period to perfect the appeal starts
from the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 specifically allows
only one motion for reconsideration to an appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of
notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
The consequence of the failure to perfect an appeal within the limited time allowed is to preclude the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case in order to review and revise the judgment
that meanwhile became final and immutable by operation of law.
Facts: This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Camarines Norte, a portion of
which was owned and mined by PIMI. Later, PIMI’s portion was sold in a foreclosure sale to the MBC
and to BDO and then subsequently to Yinlu by way of a deed of absolute sale.
However, Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of an MPSA over a area which was granted
on July 28, 2007, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the
mineral deposits in the covered portion of the mineral lands.
In 2007, Yinlu informed the DENR by a letter stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were
within the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would commence
exploration works in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its personnel to
access the areas for the works to be undertaken. However, Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could not
proceed with its exploration works in the areas covered by Yinlu’s mining patents.
This response of Yinlu compelled Trans-Asia to seek the assistance of the MGB Regional Office V in
resolving the issues between the parties which was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who
directed the MGB Regional Office V to verify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu. The issues
presented for resolution by the DENR Secretary were: (1) whether the mining patents held by Yinlu
were issued prior to the grant of the MPSA; and (2) whether the mining patents were still valid and
subsisting.
Subsequently, the DENR Secretary issued an order resolving the issues in Yinlu’s favor. Thus, Trans-
Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP) which only affirmed in toto the resolution of the
DENR Secretary. Trans-Asia then filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration which were
both denied.
Trans-Asia then appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the rulings of the DENR Secretary
and the OP. The petitioner then filed a MR which was denied. Hence, this petition. Yinlu contends that
the CA should have outrightly dismissed Trans-Asia’s appeal for being taken beyond the required
period for appealing; and that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for reconsideration was
improper inasmuch as the motion did not cite any exceptional circumstances or reasons.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was filed beyond the reglementary
period as provided for by Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling: YES. As to the tardiness of Trans-Asia’s Appeal, the Court ruled that the contention of Yinlu
is correct. Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the OP in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section 4 of the Rule states that the
appeal must be taken within 15 days “from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or
from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x.”
In the case at bar, Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution denying the first motion for
reconsideration on July 14, 2010. Hence, it had until July 29, 2010 to appeal to the CA by petition for
review. However, it filed the petition for review only nearly 10 months from its receipt of the denial.
Under the circumstances, its petition for review was filed way beyond the prescribed 15-day period.
The CA opined that Trans-Asia’s petition for review was timely filed, citing the fact that Trans-Asia
filed its second motion for reconsideration which the OP denied. It pointed out that Trans-Asia
received a copy of the resolution only on April 26, 2011; hence, the 15-day appeal period should be
reckoned from April 26, 2011, rendering its filing of the petition for review in the CA on May 11, 2011
timely and within the required period. It observed that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for
reconsideration was allowed under the OP Rules on Appeal because the second motion was
exceptionally meritorious.
However, the Court said that the determination of whether or not the ground raised in the second
motion for reconsideration was exceptionally meritorious lies solely belonged to the OP. The Court
stressed that the CA could not usurp the OP’s determination in order to make its own.
As earlier indicated, the OP found and declared the second motion for reconsideration of Trans-Asia
“clearly unmeritorious” when it denied the motion. Consequently, the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration did not stop the running of the appeal period that had already commenced, the day
Trans-Asia received the OP resolution denying the first motion for reconsideration. The decision of the
OP inevitably became final and immutable as a matter of law by July 29, 2010, the last day of the
reglementary period under Section 4 of Rule 43.
In taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its tardiness, therefore, the CA gravely erred.
Under Section 4 of Rule 43, the reckoning of the 15-day period to perfect the appeal starts from the
receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 specifically allows only one
motion for reconsideration to an appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of notice of
the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. With Trans-Asia having received the denial on July
14, 2010, its 15-day appeal period was until July 29, 2010. The filing of the petition for review only on
May 11, 2011 was too late.
Furthermore, the Court said that although procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice, there are no reasons to relax them in Trans-Asia’s favor.

Albor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 196598, 17 January 2018.

Doctrine: While the CA enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in granting a first motion for extension of
time pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, its authority to grant a further or second
motion for extension of time is delimited by two conditions: First, there must exist a most compelling
reason for the grant of a further extension; and second, in no case shall such extension exceed fifteen
(15) days.
Facts: Editha was the agricultural lessee of a lot. As agricultural lessee, Editha had been paying rent
to the agricultural lessors, the heirs of Rosario. Later, the heirs of Rosario sold the subject lot to the
respondents. Thus, Editha, asserting that she had the right to redeem the lot from respondents,
lodged a complaint for redemption of landholding and damages before the PARAD which ruled that
Editha's right of redemption did not prescribe for want of a valid written notice.
However, while the PARAD sustained Editha's right of redemption, it nevertheless resolved to dismiss
her complaint after finding that Editha failed to consign the full amount of the repurchase price.
Aggrieved, Editha filed an appeal before the DARAB which affirmed in toto the PARAD's ruling.
Thereafter, on 25 November 2008, Editha filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file a
Rule 43 petition for review. She prayed for an additional fifteen (15) days, or from 25 November 2008
until 10 December 2008. Shortly thereafter, Editha through counsel moved for a second extension of
thirty (30) days, or from 10 December 2008 until 9 January 2009, within which to file the petition for
review. Eventually, Editha's petition for review was filed on 5 January 2009.
The CA however, dismissed Editha's petition for review for having been filed out of time. The
appellate court ratiocinated that while it may grant Editha's first motion for extension of fifteen (15)
days within which to file the petition, it was devoid of authority to grant her second motion for
extension which asked for an additional time of thirty (30) days.
Editha filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the CA. Both resolutions
denying Editha's petition for review were anchored on Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition via Rules 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not granting Editha’s motion for extension of time and
petition for review?
Held: NO. The Court said that it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory
right and the one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must
be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays.
Moreover, the perfection of appeal is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well because
failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules renders the judgment final
as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment
The Court then quoted Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the
expiration of the reglementary period to appeal, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days.
Thus while the CA enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in granting a first motion for extension of
time, its authority to grant a further or second motion for extension of time is delimited by two
conditions: First, there must exist a most compelling reason for the grant of a further extension;
and second, in no case shall such extension exceed fifteen (15) days.
Editha maintains that the filing of the second motion for extension of time was prompted by the
sudden withdrawal of her previous counsel. The CA and ultimately the SC, however, did not
appreciate such predicament as a most compelling reason to grant her plea for further
extension of time.
The SC said that even if the Court were to believe that Atty. Talabucon's withdrawal was
"sudden", it cannot be gainsaid that the corresponding motion to withdraw as counsel was filed
with at least seven (7) days remaining from the 15-day extension granted by the CA. Ordinary
prudence should have impelled Editha to seek the assistance of a new counsel immediately
after signing her conformity to the motion to withdraw as counsel. Yet, regrettably, she hired
her new counsel only one (1) day before the expiration of the extension. Hence, Editha must be
prepared to accept whatever adverse judgment may be rendered against her.

Heirs of Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169913, 8 June 2011.
Doctrine: Non-compliance with any of the requirements under Sec. 6, Rule 43 concerning the
contents of the Petition for Review, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, is
sufficient ground for its dismissal. However, as held in the case of Jaro v. CA, subsequent and
substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
The Court also reiterated that time and again, it has held that a strict and rigid application of
technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of
a parcel of agricultural land. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio by
another woman.
When Gregorio died, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Deleste. Subsequently, Hilaria
died and Edilberto Noel was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance,
an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. Thereafter the SC held
that Deleste and the intestate estate of Gregorio, were held to be co-owners of the subject property,
each with ½ interest in it. Meanwhile, PD 27 was issued. Pursuant to this law, the subject property
was placed under the said program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the DAR
as the landowners.
Eventually, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who
were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. Thus, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners
herein, filed a petition seeking to nullify private respondents’ EPs. The PARAD then rendered a
Decision declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation
of petitioners’ constitutional right to due process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal. Notwithstanding it, the
petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution which was granted. However, this writ order granting
the writ of execution was nullified by the DARAB. Subsequently, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the
PARAD in its Decision. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was then denied by the DARAB.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, challenging the Decision and Resolution
of the DARAB which was denied by the CA for petitioners’ failure to attach the writ of execution, the
order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition
and other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA was correct in dismissing outright the petition for review of the petitioners?
Held: NO. The Court said that in filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final
orders, or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is
required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed
from, with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and
other supporting papers.
Further, Section 7, Rule 43 of the Rules provides that non-compliance with any of the above-
mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the petition, as well as the documents that should
accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal.
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition for petitioners’ failure to attach the writ of execution,
the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the
petition and other supporting papers. However, the Court said that a perusal of the issues raised
before the CA would show that the documents required by the appellate court are not necessary for
the proper disposition of the case.
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when they
appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the
challenged resolution issued by the DARAB denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration; (2) the
duplicate original copy of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration; (3) the assailed decision issued by
the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the order of
execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution
earlier issued; and (5) the Decision issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the
cancellation of the EPs. The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such
technical ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court, instead
of dismissing the petition outright, could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary
documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito, the Court held that "under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to
submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial justice." In
Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of
the rules of procedure.
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided
if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by
the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant case.

Suelo v. MST Marine Services, G.R. No. 252914, 9 November 2020.

Doctrine: This case discussed the correct period to appeal a decision or award of the Voluntary
Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators and highlights the importance of correctly computing the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review.
Facts: The petitioner was hired by respondent as an Engineer for a six (6)-month contract on board a
vessel. On May 28, 2016, he boarded the vessel and commenced his duties as Second Engineer.
However, on October 29, 2016, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital where he was
diagnosed with uncontrolled hypertension. Subsequently, he was given medications, declared unfit for
all marine duties, and signed off in Singapore on medical grounds. He arrived in the Philippines on
November 4, 2016 and immediately flew to his hometown.
On November 7, 2016, he reported to the respondent's branch office in Iloilo. He alleged that
respondent did not allow him to report to its Manila office and refused to refer him to a company-
designated physician. Instead, the respondent allegedly asked him to seek medical treatment subject
to reimbursement. However, when he submitted his request for reimbursement, the respondent
denied it. Accordingly, he filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, damages, and
attorney's fees before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) however denied petitioner's claim, rejecting his allegation that
respondent asked him to seek medical treatment subject to reimbursement. Aggrieved, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner, through counsel, received the copy of the
order of the denial of the MR on July 12, 2019. On July 22, 2019, petitioner moved for a twenty (20)-
day extension within which to file a petition for review before the CA, or until August 11, 2019. On
August 9, 2019, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules before the CA which
was however denied since it was filed two (2) days late. The CA explained that since petitioner
received the VA's Decision denying his motion for reconsideration on July 12, 2019, he only had until
August 7, 2019 (which is 10 days from the receipt of the decision), within which to file the Rule 43
Petition before the CA. However, he belatedly filed the same on August 9, 2019 in violation of Section
4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Rule 43 petition on procedural grounds?
Held: YES. In Guagua National Colleges v. CA, the Court categorically declared that the correct
period to appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators to the CA via
a Rule 43 petition for review is the fifteen (15)-day period set forth in Section 4 thereof reckoned from
the notice or receipt of the VA's resolution on the motion for reconsideration, and that the ten (10)-day
period provided in Article 276 of the Labor Code refers to the period within which an aggrieved party
may file said motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review, and no further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case shall it exceed
fifteen (15) days.
In this case, records reveal that petitioner received a copy of the VA's Decision denying his motion for
reconsideration on July 12, 2019. Thus, he had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until July 27, 2019
within which to file the petition, or to move for a 15-day extension of time to file the same. Assuming
that an extension is granted, he had until August 11, 2019, reckoned from the expiration of the
reglementary period on July 27, 2019, within which to file his petition.
Indeed, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file his Rule 43 Petition within the allowable
period or on July 22, 2019. Although the Rules allow only for a 15-day extension or until August 11,
2019, he was able to file his petition on August 9, 2019, also clearly within the allowable extended
period. Hence, in both instances, petitioner filed his pleadings on time.
In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing outright the Rule 43 Petition based solely on
procedural grounds; therefore, a remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, 5 October 2010.

Doctrine: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes
the discretion given to the Court of Appeals in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a
decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately
executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Facts: This is a resolution of the second motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of
the Ombudsman to a decision of the Supreme Court with respect to the stay of the decision of the
Ombudsman during the pendency of an appeal citing Office of the Ombudsman vs Laja.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman should be stayed during the
pendency of the appeal?
Held: NO. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that
an appeal of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being
executory.
In the case under consideration, the Court in this second partial MR that the Ombudsman’s decision
imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot
be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA.
Thus, the Court said that the respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court because in the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the
Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Here, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
The Court also said that for the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed
by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the
discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA.
Thus, to emphasize, the provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a
decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of
Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
WHEREFORE, the second motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.