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Dual-Fuzzy enhanced Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Method for Automatic Train Operation System 最终版7 PDF
Dual-Fuzzy enhanced Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Method for Automatic Train Operation System 最终版7 PDF
Wei ShangGuan
Ziqi Wang
School of Electronic and Information Engineering
School of Electronic and Information Engineering the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control
Beijing Jiaotong University Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing, PR China Beijing, PR China
20125106@bjtu.edu.cn wshg@bjtu.edu.cn
Abstract—Automatic Train Operation (ATO) is a vital part of the internal hierarchy and high maintenance cost. Without affecting
rail traffic signal system. Failure Mode Effects and Criticality the safety and efficiency of train operation, PHM is usually used
analysis (FMECA) is the first step of Prognostic and Health to know the health status of ATO system in real time and make
Management (PHM). In this paper, this method based on double optimal maintenance strategies. And FMECA is the first step of
layer fuzzy enhanced failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is health management. But in the traditional FMECA method, the
proposed. Firstly, ATO failure analyzer is applied to classify and ranking of failures is based on the Risk Priority Number (RPN),
score ATO failure causes. Secondly, expert scoring mechanism is which is calculated by product the three factors S, O and D [2]. It
used for fuzzy aggregation of multiple scoring opinions. Finally,
ignores some important hidden problems. To remedy the
Fuzzy Risk Priority Number (FRPN) is obtained by fuzzy risk
traditional FMECA insufficiency, significant efforts have been
estimator which is employed for fuzzy aggregation on Severity (S),
Occurrence (O) and Detection (D) get in the second step. The result
made by combine the FMECA with other methods [3-5]. N. G.
shows that this proposed method can find out the potential failure Mutlu and S. Alyuntas [3] proposed an approach based on the
causes which are same Risk Priority Number (RPN) value in integration of FMEA with the FTA method and Belief in Fuzzy
traditional FMECA. The reliability of ATO system can be Probability Estimations of Time (BIFPET) algorithm for
guaranteed. finishing process in the fabric dyeing department of a textile
company. C. FenChi, D.Sigmund and M.O. Astardi [4] applied
Keywords-component; Automatic train operation; Double layer the root cause analysis, the functional block diagram, and failure
fuzzy; Failure mode and effects analysis; modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for passenger vehicle recalls.
N. Chanamool and T.Naenna[5] applied the Fuzzy failure mode
I. INTRODUCTION and effect analysis (FMEA) to assess the failures in the
With the acceleration of urbanization, urban rail transit has emergency department. Because the subsystem structure and
entered a period of rapid development. Up to now, a total of 45 working mechanism of ATO are typically characterized by
cities in China have opened urban rail transit, with 244 operating complexity, multiple targets, delay and nonlinear dynamic
lines and a total length of 7,969.7 kilometers. ATO mainly system. In the context, this paper describes a fuzzy aggregation
realizes the automatic control of train traction and service opinion and a fuzzy risk priority number assessment for ATO
braking system, as well as generating the command of the failure cause based on FMEA and fuzzy logic method. The study
automatic opening/closing of train door, platform screen door [1]. is compared by the traditional method and the fuzzy ones
ATO system is composed of components with high reliability through the Pareto chart.
and strong anti-interference ability through logic combination This paper is structures as follows. In Section 2, a brief
and bus structure, and its equipment composition is shown in Fig. review of FMEA and Fuzzy logic approach are given. Section 3
1. presents the methodology of research and double layer fuzzy
The ATO system operation are increasingly becoming the enhanced FMEA frame. Section 4 is completed by a discussion
focus of the public due to its high security level, complex of the results and a comparison of the proposed double layer
Corresponding authors: Wei ShangGuan (wshg@bjtu.edu.cn)
2021 Global Reliability and Prognostics and Health Management
(PHM-Nanjing)
fuzzy enhanced FMEA with traditional FMECA. The results are TABLE II. CRITERIA DEFINED FOR OCCURRENCE SCORING IN FMEA
verified by Pareto chart. Finally, some conclusions are provided
Rating Occurrence Probability Failure probability
in Section 5.
10 Extremely high ≥ 1/2
7 High 1/20
5 Moderate 1/400
3 Low 1/15000
Figure 1. Equipment constitution of ATO system 2 Remote 1/150000
1 𝑥≤𝑎
𝑥−𝑎 2 𝑎+𝑏
1− 2( ) 𝑎≤𝑥≤
𝜇(𝑥) = 𝑏−𝑎 2 (4)
𝑥−𝑏 2 𝑎+𝑏
2( ) ≤𝑥≤𝑏
𝑏−𝑎 2
{ 0 𝑥≥𝑏
S-shared fuzzy membership has the following membership
function:
0 𝑥≤𝑎
𝑥−𝑏 2 𝑎+𝑏
2( ) 𝑎≤𝑥≤
𝑏−𝑎 2
𝜇(𝑥) = (5)
𝑥−𝑎 2 𝑎+𝑏
1− 2( ) ≤𝑥≤𝑏
𝑏−𝑎 2
{ 1 𝑥≥𝑏
Fuzzy logic can deal with accurate and inaccurate
information in a consistent way. it can combine S, O and D in
more practical way. And the risk assessment function may vary
from system to system [11-13].
Figure 2. Double layer fuzzy enhanced FMEA frame
III. METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we propose the method based on double layer TABLE IV. FMEA FOR ATO SYSTEM
fuzzy enhanced FMEA. It divides the evaluation process of ATO Failure
system into ATO failure analyzer, expert scoring mechanism Function Failure modes Failure cause cause
and ATO failure fuzzy risk estimator as shown in the Fig. 2. number
Supporting an expert team is consisted of m member {TM𝑚 (m= -Damaged in the power FM1
interface
1, 2, ..., M)} which assess failure modes {FM𝑛 (n= 1, 2, ..., N)} -Inverter overload FM2
with three risk factors (S, O&D). Power failure
-Inverter temperature too
A. ATO failure analyzer FM3
high
Although ATO system used by domestic urban rail transit
operators are different in structure, the basic components of -Battery low voltage FM4
ATO are the same, which are composed of on-board equipment -Communication with HMI FM5
and trackside equipment. ATO is a subsystem responsible for Communication
failed
automatic train operation. It controls train operation according template failure
-Loss ATP signal FM6
to the speed-distant curve and ATO curve calculated by ATO
algorithm. ATO system realizes optimal control and the best -electromagnetic
ATO FM7
interference
running state of the train by simulating the driver and it follows Input interface
the closed-loop control in principle. Its specific control process failure
-Worn input interface FM8
is as follows: the speed measuring motor and radar transmit the
information of train position to ATO through ATP, the input of -Fault of tachogenerator FM9
the reference position comes from the position information of
the transponder, and ATO provides the set value data for output -Memory burned out FM10
Central
to the traction and braking system. Under this context, FMEA processing board
-corrupted in the network FM11
was used for it to carry out quantitative analysis (TABLE Ⅳ). failure
adapted plug-in
-Traction fault FM12
B. Expert scoring mechanism Output interface
In this mechanism, the method based on fuzzy rules is fault -Display crashed FM13
adopted, and a logic relationship is established, in which
multiple expert evaluations are taken as inputs and a fuzzy
numerical value is output. The inputs and the output factors are
7 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 100<RPN<150 Moderate
6 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 3 150<RPN<250 High Moderate
5 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 3 3
250<RPN<350 Low High
4 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 2
3 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 350<RPN<500 High
FM1 1 2 1 1
Figure 5. Fuzzy risk graph:(a) S and D factors changes versus FRPN FM2 5 5 6 6
output, (b) O and D factors changes versus FRPN output, (c) S and O factors FM3 8 5 4 6
changes versus FRPN output.
FM4 1 3 2 2
IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS FM5 8 3 7 7
In this study, three members, who are TM1, TM2 and TM3, FM6 5 6 4 5
are experts with rich experience in ATO system maintenance. FM7 4 5 7 7
According to TABLE Ⅴ, three experts scored 13 failure causes
FM8 8 5 5 6
in three aspect (S, O&D) and calculated the fuzzy aggregated
values as shown in TABLE Ⅶ-Ⅸ. FM9 2 5 3 3
FM10 1 5 4 3
TABLE Ⅹ shows the risk priority number of each failure
causes and its ranking using traditional FMECA and double FM11 2 2 7 5
layer fuzzy enhanced FMEA. The failure FM8 has a rank of 1 FM12 5 1 2 2
with highest FRPN value of 271.5. The rank 13 was assigned to FM13 5 5 4 5
the lowest FRPN value equal to 29.85 for the failure cause FM4.
As shown in TABLE Ⅹ, the RPN value of FM2 and FM6 is
TABLE VII. SEVERITY VALUE OF FAILURE CAUSE the same, which both is 120. But their FRPN value is different,
which is 95.99 and 96.14 respectively. This proves that
Failure cause number TM1 TM2 TM3 Aggregated S value
traditional FMECA doesn’t take into account the importance
FM1 3 5 3 4.03 degree of each input factor and different value of S, O and D can
FM2 5 4 2 4
result the same RPN value. As a result, resources are wasted
while some high-risk potential failure reasons are not noticed.
FM3 3 6 8 7
Pareto chart is a kind if chart that arranges the failures
FM4 1 3 2 2
according to their important degree, which is a graphical
FM5 8 3 7 7 embodiment of “The 80/20 Rule”, that is, 80% of the problems
FM6 7 7 8 8 are caused by 20% of causes. In Pareto chart, different categories
of failures are arranged in descending order of RPN value, and
FM7 1 2 8 5 the cumulative percentage graph is drawn in the same graph. The
FM8 8 7 7 8 key reasons of most problems are mainly found through Pareto
FM9 4 4 6 6
chart. It can be seen from TABLE X that there are 12 categories
of RPN ranging from 20 to 336, and 13 categories of FRPN
FM10 1 2 6 3 ranging from 29.85 to 271.5. The cumulative RPN values “RPN-
FM11 8 7 2 5 c”, its percentage “RPN-p”, the FRPN values “FRPN-c”, as well
as its percentage “FRPN-p” are determinate as shown in TABLE
FM12 7 8 9 8
Ⅺ and TABLE Ⅻ.
FM13 5 6 7 7
TABLE XI. PARETO ANALYSIS FOR RPN Figure 6. RPN for Pareto chart.