MOTIVATION, PLANNING, AND ACTION

A Relational Theory of Behavior Dynamics

JOSEPH NUTTIN University of Louvain

Translated by Raymond P. Lorion and Jean E. Dumas

Published jointly by LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS LAWRENCE ERLBAUM

ASSOCIATES

5. From Needs to Goals and Plans 134

Forms of Motivational Mechanisms 134
Learning Mechanisms 136
Cognitive Processing of Needs 142
Instrumental Motivation 162
Comparisons and Comments 168
Personalization of Motivation 179
Conclusion to Chapter 5 195

Chapter 5
From Needs to Goals and Plans

The fact that humans set goals and make plans for themselves is one of the most striking
and least investigated characteristics of human behavior. This discrepancy is easily
understood in view of the fact that studying the rate of repetition of a response to a
stimulus has long been a main strategy for behavioral research. Motivation in terms of
goal setting does not fit in that context. But the processes by which behavioral dynamics
or needs are transformed into goals, behavioral projects, and action is the focus of this
chapter.

In order to place this discussion in its historical context, brief mention is made of the
principal "mechanisms" used to explain motivated behavior. 1

FORMS OF MOTIVATIONAL MECHANISMS

Since the beginning of this century, two types of mechanisms have dominated
psychological explanations of behavior. The first one is associative, the other dynamic.
Both were inspired by a common prototype, namely the reflex arc. Both have their
origins, not in the work of Fechner or Wundt, but in the conceptual models of Thorndike
and Pavlov on the one hand, and of Freud on the other. In fact, in his theoretical chapter
on "The Interpretation of Dreams," Freud ( 1900) explicitly stated that he understood the
reflex arc as the prototype of behavior. Although both

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1
The term "mechanism" refers to a coordinated set of processes. It does not imply that
the behavior we wish to explain is "mechanistic" in nature.
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models agree on the role of this prototype -- the action of an afferent stimulus gives rise
to an efferent response -- they disagree on everything else. Freud thought that the
stimulus (usually internal) gave rise to an increase of energy in the organism that needed
to be discharged through a response. This "dynamic" model sees behavior as a pleasure-
producing discharge of excessive psychic energy. In Thorndike and Pavlov's view, the
stimulus is not a source of energy but rather the first building block of an associative link
or connection. This model views behavior in terms of learned or reinforced connections
between stimuli and responses. Both models have dominated the explanation of behavior
until the recent development of cognitive or informational models. It should be noted
that the cognitive approach had never completely disappeared in Europe, although it
rarely if ever focused on overt behavior.

The impact of these models on the psychology of motivated behavior is obvious. There
are in fact three explanations used to account for the role of motivation in overt action:
(a) the mechanism of energy discharge; (b) the process of reinforced connections; and (c)
information processing or (as is the case here) the cognitive processing of needs into
goals and behavioral projects.

There are many combinations and variations within these three models. For example,
Hull's concept of reinforcement and Lewin's field theory include elements of the
discharge model (drive reduction). McClelland's "affective" theory adds some cognitive
elements to the associationist and hedonistic conceptions. At the same time, the
neurophysiological discovery of the functions of vigilance and attention as they relate to
the reticular system has given new impetus to energetic activation theories. Motivation
has since been referred to as a generalized state of activation or arousal, as in the work of
Hebb, Berlyne, and others such as Elisabeth Duffy ( 1962). Similarly, such concepts as
equilibrium, balance, incongruity, and discrepancy no longer apply only to theories of
homeostatic needs, but also to cybernetic and attribution theories ( Stagner, 1977).
Relevant to this viewpoint is the work of Hunt ( 1965, 1971), Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram ( 1960), Heider ( 1958), Festinger ( 1957) and Kelley ( 1967, 1971). In the same
way, psychologists who, based on economic and decision-making theories, study
motivation in terms of valences and the probability of expected outcomes ( Atkinson &
Feather, 1966) add a cognitive element (probability) to the dynamic component
(valence).

All of these theories share a characteristic with the models proposed by Freud and Hull.
They consider only the second phase of the motivational process, namely the reduction
of the motivational state. From this perspective, motivation is defined as a state of
tension that seeks to reestablish a state of balance by means of a given behavior. The
"ascendant phase" of motivation, that is the process whereby new tension or
discrepancies are

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built up, has been virtually ignored. Psychological motivation is considered as a
homeostatic need (such as hunger) and only its reduction was perceived as relevant to
psychology. Indeed, the metabolic mechanism through which a new state of hunger is
created in the organism appeared to be of little interest to psychologists. By contrast, the
process by which man generates new goals and, thus, creates new tension, will be
considered here as an essential aspect of motivation and certainly as important as the
process that produces tension reduction.

In this chapter, attention is given primarily to this constructive phase of the motivational
process. First, however, we discuss the more elementary learning mechanisms that
account for one form of development in motivation.

LEARNING MECHANISMS

An important step in the recent history of the psychology of motivation occurred when
behaviorism in general, and Hull specifically, voiced interest in the dynamic aspects of
behavior. Although Pavlov, Thorndike, and their followers acknowledged that animals
had to be deprived in order for them to learn anything, they did not discuss motivation.
The concepts of reward and reinforcement were substituted for the motivational variable.
They defined the food that the animal received as a stimulus (i.e., unconditional
stimulus) and not as a perceived or expected goal with the capacity to motivate behavior.

A new perspective began under the influence of Lewin and Freud. Hull and his followers
at Yale described reinforcement in terms of needs and drive and it gradually became
obvious that many behaviors were not motivated simply by homeostatic needs. This
perspective broadened the meaning of several concepts relevant to motivation. By a
process of association with "primary" needs, secondary or learned needs could now be
acquired ( Mowrer, 1939: Miller, 1948a). Social or "higher-level" motivation could, at
least in principle, be studied as derived motives. Of interest here to us is the extent to
which work in this area has effectively demonstrated that new dynamisms or needs could
actually be derived from primary ones.

Consider Neal Miller's well-known experiment on conditioned fear in rats to illustrate

the problem.

Learned Needs?

Miller's ( 1948a) experiment can be summarized as follows: A rat is placed in a white

experimental enclosure with a metal grid floor. After a minute during which the animal
is not shocked, the rat receives very brief shocks every five seconds for the next minute.
A door is then opened leading to a second,

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black enclosure. During that time, a continuous electric shock is presented in the first.
(white) enclosure. Not surprisingly, the rat jumps to the second enclosure, thereby
avoiding all shocks. Over the course of ten identical experimental trials, the rat learned
to jump more and more quickly from the white to the black enclosure. At that point the
critical part of the experiment begins. In subsequent trials, the rat continues to escape to
the black enclosure, although it is no longer shocked. After a while, the door between the
two enclosures is closed but the animal manages, through trial-and-error learning, to
open it (e.g, by pressing on a lever). The rat learns to execute this response very rapidly.
It is also able to learn other escape responses (e.g., turning a wheel) if the first response
suddenly becomes inoperative. According to Miller, fear of the white enclosure acts as a
primary need, which enables new responses to be acquired. This is only possible
because, in terms of Hulls' theory, escape from the white enclosure leads to need
reduction (or reinforcement), something which obviously implies that a need exists in the
first place. In summary, Miller's rats learn to fear the white enclosure through a process
of association between the color of the enclosure and the presence of shocks. Thus they
acquire a new fear, a fear of an object that previously did not elicit an escape response.
However, with regard to Miller's interpretation, we would suggest that the animal's fear
reaction pertains only to the shocks. The need that motivates the rat to escape from the
white enclosure is the need to escape from the shock announced by the white color. The
white enclosure has acquired a new meaning, and because it signifies something else
(i.e., the shock), it stimulates the rat's fear. In other words, what was learned in the
course of the experiment is this new meaning associated with the white walls, rather than
the fear itself ( Mowrer, 1960). The best evidence of such an interpretation is reflected in
the fact that the fear of the white enclosure extinguishes, although, with each response,
anxiety reduction (i.e., reinforcement) should be assumed to continue to occur with
regard to the new need. However, the gradual learning of the fact that the shock is no
longer turned on is enough to extinguish the instrumental avoidance response. It is true
that some learned fears are very resistant to extinction. Someone who "knows" that the
current is off may still be hesitant to touch an electrical appliance that shocked him
earlier. 2

An important argument in favor of our hypothesis -- that the fear of the white enclosure
reflects the fear of shocks and not a new fear -- arises from

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2
Miller ( 1963) correctly stated that this link is not purely cognitive. Cognition alone is
insufficient to eliminate a response acquired in association with a painful stimulus;
time is also needed to extinguish it. We may be dealing here with an innate
mechanism which is certainly biologically useful. By contrast, the instrumental link
with a desirable object extinguishes more quickly.

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experiments on situational control. The animal's emotional behavior when in the white
enclosure diminishes dramatically and even disappears after it has learned how to
escape. The fact of knowing how and being able to avoid or escape from a painful
stimulus is for both man and animal an important source of anxiety reduction. This fact
shows that the rat is afraid of the electric shocks and not of the white enclosure (see
Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954).

Motives and Pleasure or Affect

The basic idea of Miller's experiment, namely that concrete motives are learned through
a process of need reduction, can be found in a more generalized form in McClelland's
motivational theory. For McClelland, as for Miller, learning new motives consists of
acquiring approach or avoidance responses toward new objects. From a motivational
perspective, McClelland's theory is hedonistic in the sense that behavior is seen as
ultimately motivated by a tendency to seek pleasure. This position should be considered
briefly.

McClelland's ( 1953, 1965) theory occupies a special place among recent hedonistic
theories by being more cognitive than others, in the sense that expectancies take the
place of automatic reinforcement following reward. In explaining the onset of behavior,
it assumes a chance encounter of objects that leads to the emotional experience of
pleasure or displeasure. The pleasurable object and the path followed to reach it become
a cue that a similar positive emotional experience will occur when the object is found
again. The association that develops between the object and the experience of pleasure is
called an "affective" association and is defined as a "motive," i.e., something that moves
the subject to act in specific ways. All active motivation is thus learned. As long as a
concrete association is not learned, a need cannot be a motive. 3

In McClelland's theory, the dynamic aspect is hidden in the term "affective." The
"motivating" association is an affectively loaded association. Affectivity is here
synonymous with experiencing pleasure. We know

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3
It would appear that, at first, McClelland talked of a concrete association with a
specific experience of pleasure or success. Through a process of association, motives
were thus thought to orient the subject toward behaviors likely again to bring about
such pleasure or success. However, McClelland ( 1965) has since been talking of the
influence of the network of learned associations, not in terms of learned acts but of
learned thoughts. In a discussion of McClelland's work, Heckhausen ( 1972) also
refers to cognitive networks, although McClelland himself refers to associative
networks. Learned thoughts would have a much wider range and application. There is
an ambiguity here in the concept of "thoughts" as learned associations, since thinking
is a mode of functioning that specifically enables a subject to establish relations that
have not been previously learned or reinforced.

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( Lewin, 1922; DeRivera, 1976) that associations are not motivating as such. The classic
Wurzburg research on "sets" (Einstellung), whose importance was emphasized by
McCellad ( 1965), was conducted specifically in order to add a motivational component
to the direction given by the association. In fact, as long as the motivation for pleasure is
not explicitly introduced, McCellad's associative network explains only the direction and
not the dynamics of behavior just as the Freudian and Hullian concepts of energy and
drive produce behavior dynamics without direction. In other words, for a learned
association to become a motive, the subject must still be motivated by the kind of
pleasure he obtained in the past and believe that his actions are likely to bring about
repetition of a similar outcome (see the Valence x Probability theory). Theoretically,
McCellad's approach is similar to the instrumental motivation model described later. As
such, instrumental behavior gets its motivation from the dynamism toward the ultimate
goal object. The latter is, according to McCellad, the affective experience of pleasure. It
is important, therefore, not to stop at the level of the association process or the learned
response, but to focus on the dynamic orientation that impels the individual to make use
of what he has learned. The person who looks at the map of a city has in his possession a
complete network of streets (associations) that could lead him anywhere in the city.
However, he will not take any of these streets as long as he is not motivated to go to a
specific place. Therefore, in order to predict someone's behavior, we need to know the
network of streets (associations) he has in mind (cognitive map) as well as the place he
wants to go (motivation or goal). In McCellad's theory, the goal implied is (should be)
pleasure.

A last comment should be made about the pleasurable experience as a goal. If, in the
past, McCellad's subjects experienced pleasure when attaining power, success, etc., this
occurred only because they were motivated to seek power, achievement, etc. The
experience of pleasure is the result of a dynamic orientation, rather than the origin or
source of motives. If following the experience of power, love, etc., the individual again
seeks similar experiences, it is because he seeks power or love and not merely a general
experience of pleasure (see chapter 4). Moreover, he will probably not be satisfied with
the same form of power then, but rather by a higher form of power that will require new
behavioral means instead of previous behavioral responses. A model of human
motivation has to account for this inner development within behavior dynamics.

Channeling Needs

Whereas a need is directed toward a relatively large category of preferred objects, a

concrete motive is directed toward a specific object. In understanding the origin of a
concrete motive in terms of a learning process, one

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Thus, a basic need can hardly be canalized in the act of tying one's shoes, while several
needs can easily find a behavioral shape in voyages at sea. The same "preference" is
found in conditioning processes: A caterpillar is much more likely than a flower to elicit
a conditioned fear response.

COGNITIVE PROCESSING OF NEEDS

Having mentioned some of the learning mechanisms in the development of motivation,

we now intend to investigate more fully the process by which needs develop into goals,
behavioral projects, or plans. Indeed, human behavior is deeply affected by the fact that
every input of both external and internal origin is processed by highly developed
cognitive functions. This is also the case with human needs that develop into cognitive-
dynamic structures such as intentions, goals, and plans. This fact is at the basis of one of
the most striking overall differences between animal and human behavior, namely the
tendency toward change and progress as observed in human culture versus behavioral
stagnation in animals. Even the motivational tendency toward tradition and conservation
in some humans is very different from animal stagnation as referred to in this context.
Conservatism is a planned reaction against tendencies toward change, while the
stagnation mentioned above reflects the absence of such planning.

An important aspect in the development of human motivation involves the fact that an
outcome that once satisfied an individual may cease to satisfy him. There is a
development within motivation itself, such that an outcome that once was perceived as a
reward or success (reinforcement) is no longer perceived as such. A reinforcement that
requires increasingly higher levels of "reward" is essentially a process of self-
reinforcement: The individual sets himself new criteria with regard to the outcomes or
goals he wishes to reach. This "mechanism" is related to what could be called the
ascending phase of human motivation.

Motivation's Ascending Phase

Before considering the concrete processes that lead man to establish new goals, we
present the general framework in which this important aspect of human motivation
occurs. At the level of biological evolution in general, and of motivational development
in particular, two opposing trends are apparent. The first strives toward discharge,
balance, and rest. The second seeks to upset this balance and gives rise to increasingly
complex structures and tensions. More important than the process of discharge is the
process of "recharge." More important than tension reduction is man's attempt to fulfill
increasing responsibilities, take greater risks, and set new goals. At

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the level of experimental research, a parallel can be made with the tendency to seek
stimulation and with the adverse effects of sensory deprivation ( Solomon et al., 1961;
Zubek & Bross, 1973).

Child psychologists such as Bühler, Stern, and Gesell have argued that, from a very early
age, infants find satisfaction in states of tension rather than rest (see Scheerer, 1952). In
his pursuit of challenge or excitement, a child may forget that he is hungry or wounded (
Asch, 1952). Similarly, Child and Whiting ( 1950) report that once humans reach a
particular goal, they often set similar but as yet unreached goals that increase rather than
relax their state of tension. This same finding has appeared in experiments on levels of
aspiration and on goal discrepancy scores.

At a more theoretical level, Freud describes alternative forms of pleasure besides

discharge. In his study on masochism ( 1924), Freud discussed the phenomenon of
tension seeking but failed to revise his fundamental theory accordingly.

It is not enough to state that an individual seeks tension because he anticipates the
pleasure of a later discharge ( Fraisse & Nuttin, 1959). At the experimental level,
Sheffield, Wulff, and Backer ( 1951) showed that even animals seek sexual tension in
situations in which an anticipation of reduction could not exist. At the human level, it is
evident that individuals find pleasure in tension itself, although a prospect of success is
usually implied and many studies have shown that there is an optimal level of excitation.

More generally speaking, the dual movement of the motivational mechanism is also
found in nature relative to thermodynamics and biological evolution. In addition to the
exclusive direction of a thermal current from hot to cold and the general tendency to seek
leveling and stagnation, there is a vital "elan" in living organisms that, according to
Darwin, directs evolution toward increasingly complex forms of life. This is also the
case for the thermodynamics of open systems. In his research on what he calls
"dissipative structures," Nobel prize-winner Prigogine ( 1965, 1977) showed how a
hierarchy of self-organization develops from spontaneous fluctuations in open systems. 5
Instead of following a downward path

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5
Prigogine ( 1978) stated: "To reach this understanding, it has been necessary to
introduce a new concept of 'dissipative structure.' This structure is different from the
equilibrium structure of classical physics and chemistry. For instance, a crystal is an
equilibrium structure. Once formed, it can maintain itself without energy or material
exchanges with its surroundings. Dissipative structures, on the contrary, require
continuous exchanges with the external world in order to maintain themselves. . . .
Take a city as an example. It cannot survive without constant exchange with the
environment. . . . Dissipative structures enable to account for living organisms as
macroscopic structures far removed from a state of thermodynamic balance and which
reinvent themselves depending upon their needs and the demands of their
surroundings. Man is in the world as one such structure."

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toward leveling and chaos, molecular structures of such open systems construct an
ascending pathway that results in an orderly disposition at a higher level of organization.
Thus something, similar to the ascending tendency toward more complex structures, is
seen here at the most elementary level of molecular interaction and activity. A certain
analogy can be found between the constructive tendency in the human dynamism and the
general ascending movement in living matter ( Bertalanffy, 1968).

A similar viewpoint is found in philosophy. According to Spinoza, for instance, vital

processes continually strive toward a state of higher "perfection," which parallels
Darwin's statement about the tendency toward more complex forms of life. In
psychology, Goldstein ( 1947) and Angyal ( 1941) describe a tendency to go beyond the
status quo, while Murray ( 1959) perceives human nature as having a certain inherent
"creativity." The same principle can even be found in Heider's ( 1958) balance theory.
Similarly, White ( 1959) sees the individual as striving toward an ever increasing
"competency" as he interacts with his environment.

The processes of planning and goal setting represent the ascending tendency in the
motivational theory presented in this book. Whereas the movement toward the intended
goal leads to a lessening of the state of tension, the movement that enables one to set
new goals reintroduces a state of tension. In other words, the ascending movement
toward the establishment of new goals is the expression of a fundamental characteristic
in human motivation, namely the tendency to go beyond the goals that have already been
reached. This general tendency is at work within man's more specific behavioral needs
and orients his actions toward progress. Thus, the ascending movement of human
motivation is closely linked to the central dynamism toward self-development presented
in chapter 4; it seems to be analogous with a general ascendant trend in life.

We now discuss the concrete forms of this motivational development as expressed in

goal setting and planning. The processes involved are not of the associative or
reinforcement learning type, although learning pervades all human activity. They are of a
more creative and constructive nature, as progress itself. It is through the interaction of
cognition and motivation, i.e., the cognitive processing of needs, that motivational states
develop into goals and behavioral projects. The same processes result in the
personalization of motives and in self-regulation, since goals are personal constructs and
standards given by the subject to himself as criteria for self-evaluation.

A Cognitive Model

Information theory in general and the cybernetic concepts of feedback and self-
regulation in particular, have made it easier for cognitive processes to

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merit a place in a psychology of behavior. The "standard" that regulates the functioning
of a thermostat is often used as a basic example of this model. In 1960, Mowrer
described this standard as an image of the state to be reached as compared to the present
state of affairs. The discrepancy between the two directs behavior. The same year,
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram ( 1960) put forward a similar model. In this model,
behavior begins with a test (T) of the discrepancy between a given standard (e.g., the
temperature at which the thermostat is set) and the actual state of affairs (e.g., the
temperature of the room). When the two temperatures are in a state of "incongruity," the
heating system is switched on (O = operation), i.e., the subject begins to behave. In a
next and continuous test (T), the subject (or the thermostat) compares the outcome of his
action and goes on until a state of congruity is reached. The process then stops (E = exit).
Thus, this model labels the major phases of the behavioral process as T-O-T-E.

It is interesting to note that the authors of the TOTE model, as well as Mowrer, were
inspired by the work of economist Kenneth Boulding ( 1956) on the role of imagery and
goal representation in behavior. Thus, it appears that economists may be less inhibited
than psychologists in the use of cognitive processes. During the same period ( 1960-70),
several cognitive models of motivation were proposed ( Klein, 1958; Leeper, 1963;
Nuttin, 1953; p. 434-439, and 1965, p. 205-255; Pribram, 1971; Taylor, 1960; Zajonc,
1968b).

The major difference between the TOTE-model and the model we intend to put forward
here relates to the fact that, in our view, the standard (the temperature we want the room
to have) is not merely an informational given introduced into the thermostat. Of
particular interest is the origin and development of this standard; it is the product of a
motivation or need. At a behavioral level, a set temperature corresponds to the subject's
goal. We try to show that this standard is a first concretization, at the cognitive level, of
the subject's need as he acts to attain the "required object." The behavioral process,
therefore, does not begin with a "test" of the discrepancy between the standard and the
actual state of affairs. Instead, it begins with a preliminary and fundamental operation,
namely the construction of the standard itself, which, as a goal, is at the origin of the
action and directs its further course.

A study of how standards are constructed implies that reference be made to the very
origin of the dynamism that directs the I-E interaction (cf. chapter 3). At the biological
level, this origin lies in a basic congruity or fit between the individual and the
environment. This biological congruity is the origin of innate standards. At the
psychological level, however, the individual's optimal functioning is much more a matter
of personal construction, because the environment has become a perceived situation and
the in-

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dividual, as a self knowing person has developed a self-concept. 6 We can thus state that
what we call optimal functioning corresponds, at the sensory level, to the feeling of
physical well-being; at the psychological level it also implies the realization of
personally set goals. In other words, optimal functioning is realized when the individual
attains both innate and constructed standards by means of his behavior. In a general
sense, the tendency toward optimal functioning corresponds fairly well to what, in
emotional language, is called the pursuit of happiness. In man, conflict often complicates
this general tendency as concrete needs can oppose one another within the human
dynamism. Whereas biological standards are largely genetically determined,
psychological standards are constructed. We will deal especially with the mechanism
able to account for the latter.

Innate Standards

The psychophysiological and sensory relations uniting the organism to its environment
are regulated by biological processes over which the individual has little control. Innate
standards regulate the processes of biological adaptation. They also control whether a
relationship will be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, thereby signaling the extent to
which it deviates from the state of basic congruity. We know that these standards and the
emotional responses they elicit may be slightly modified through learning and the
immediate adaptation level ( Helson, 1964; 1973). This emotional response will be an
efficient and immediate informational guide to the organism in its interactions with its
surroundings (e.g., as it seeks the optimal temperatures).

Several researchers have attempted to determine the emotional (i.e., hedonistic) value of
different degrees of positive and negative discrepancy ( Haber, 1958; Berlyne, 1967).
Hebb ( 1949) proposed the hypothesis that fear might represent an emotional response to
certain disruptions in perceptual contacts. Walker ( 1964; 1973) considered the
complexity of an object as a modality of incongruence, while the esthetic value of certain
stimuli has been studied in terms of their complexity and potential for cortical arousal (
Francès, 1968; Berlyne, 1971; Smets, 1973).

Motivation based on an emotional response of pleasure or displeasure related to innate

standards appears to regulate much of the elementary behavior of organisms. Hedonistic
and neo-hedonistic theories apply the concept of pleasure as an emotional response that
goes very much beyond sensory relations of congruence or discrepancy. They do so by
considering

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6
Cognitive functions create a conceptual representation of the personality, as they
create a symbolic representation of all objects in the behavioral world. Thus,
personality with its inherent dynamism exists for itself as a self-concept. This self-
concept is, at the same time, somewhat of a normative self. See also Wylie ( 1961),
Diggory ( 1966), L'Ecuyer ( 1978).

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the tendency to seek pleasure as a fundamental need underlying all motivation, as shown
in chapter 4.

Two additional points should be made with regard to innate standards. The very fact that
an innate biological norm, such as a pleasant temperature, can become a standard that the
subject uses to set a thermostat implies that this norm -- in its psychological form as a
pleasurable experience-has been cognitively processed and has resulted in the setting of
a goal. A pleasant temperature thus becomes a goal we attempt to achieve by setting a
thermostat. Furthermore, some personal goals are often superimposed on innate norms.
Thus, one's innate preference for a given temperature may be modified by considerations
such as the need to conserve energy or awareness that a person's health requires that a
different temperature be maintained. Thus, even for simple motivations such as the
organism's physical and homeostatic state, we notice that a concrete standard is often the
outcome of complicated cognitive information processing. In contrast to living beings
the thermostat is indifferent to the standard at which it is set. It executes its function
without preference or initiative. 7

Second, the concept of innate standard may also be applied to psychological needs.
Human beings prefer and "require" some forms of psychological contact as opposed to
others. For instance, they prefer social acceptance to rejection, although they may choose
to be rejected rather than accepted in a certain context, just as they can set the thermostat
on an undesired temperature, in order to comply with other motivations (e.g., energy
savings). Moreover, at the psychological level, the desired object (e.g., acceptance)
depends on the subjective meaning given by the individual to a state of affairs or to an
act. More than in the case of homeostatic needs, the standard here is a personally
constructed goal in which subjective perception and self-concept play a major role.

We now turn to the study of the personal standards that play a fundamental role in our
theory of motivation.

The Generation of Goals and Projects

Sensory motivation relies, as we have just seen, on the congruence or discrepancy

existing between sensory input and an innate standard. In the cybernetic model of self-
regulation (e.g., the thermostat), the standard is set

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7
It is interesting to note that mechanical self-regulation requires a different mechanism
for every variable that needs to be controlled. For example, a thermostat differs from a
barometer or an altimeter. Human beings, on the contrary, are equipped with the
ability to construct psychologically a variety of standards corresponding to their
diverse needs and to act accordingly. Moreover, human intelligence is able to
construct all sorts of feedback mechanisms to control the many variables of the
physical world.

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by the individual; it is the result of a goal setting process. One may, for instance, choose
to increase the room temperature. In the classic explanation of this model, it is usually
shown how a discrepancy between two data -- i.e., the actual temperature and the
standard temperature introduced into the thermostat -- closes an electrical circuit which,
in turn, turns on the furnace.

When this model is applied to psychology, writers usually focus on the discrepancy
between the two data, a discrepancy that is said to "trigger" a set of behaviors directed
toward a predetermined outcome. It is thus assumed that the discrepancy acts as the
activating agent.

We do not believe that this view is correct. Whereas the room temperature is a given
physical fact, the standard-temperature set on the thermostat is a psychological
construction, the outcome of a goal setting process, as noted earlier. This goal is the
basis for the discrepancy between the actual and the desired temperature. The second
temperature is only in the individual's mind and in the instrumental index he uses to refer
to it. As long as he does not introduce his self-made standard to the situation, there is no
discrepancy. The only physical reality is the temperature of the room. Psychologically
speaking, the index in the thermostat is a reference to something, i.e., something
symbolic or meaningful that does not yet physically exist (a goal). 8

Although it is true that a discrepancy is the basis for closing the circuit and thereby
turning on the furnace, it is important to recognize that psychologically speaking -- i.e.,
at the behavioral level -- this discrepancy itself results from another activity, i.e., the
motivational process. The discrepancy, as well as the construction of the thermostat, are
the results of a process of motivational goal setting and planning.

When behavioral phenomena are translated into cybernetic and computer language, their
motivational aspect is lost in the process. This occurs because motivation is foreign to all
machines. It plays a role in their construction but, once they have been made, they
execute what they have been programmed to execute by their motivated creator.
Computer programs are, therefore, deficient in substituting and simulating the
motivational component of behavior. The activating element in computer functioning
orginates in the extrinsically supplied electric power that operates along the complex
channels outlined in the computer program. The important difference between the
extrinsic power supply of the computer and the intrinsic dynamic of the living organism
specifically consists in the former's lack of directionality. The computer's power supply
will indifferently follow whatever paths its program prescribes, whereas the subject's
behavioral projects or plans can only concretize the motivational orientations implied

____________________
8
See Heckhausen's ( 1965) 1st-Lage and Soll-Lage.

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in his intrinsic needs. The subject's functional potentialities could be compared with
some of the computer's hardware, whereas his behavioral projects are similar to the
computer's software, e.g., its program, except that the program concretizes the needs of
its human author, instead of being a dynamic outlet for Mr. Computer himself. For that
reason, reference to the computer's electric-power supply is superfluous in discussions of
computer models, whereas taking into account the intrinsically directed need for
functioning and its concretizations in the living individual appears to be essential. The
computer may be an intellectual genius but it is a motivational cripple. 9 Generally
speaking, we are interested in the process through which the individual goes from a
motivational state (need) to the performance of a specific purposive behavior. This
occurs through the intermediary of goal setting and planning. Two questions are relevant
to this issue:
1. How do we go from need to goals and plans?
2. How do we go from goals and plans to action?

Before discussing these questions in terms of adult behavior, it will be helpful to review
some data on the development of goal setting processes in infants.

Initial stages in infancy. It would be a mistake to assume that motivation in children is

governed only by the processes of energy discharge, conditioning, or learning. Just as
learning influences all behavioral and cognitive processes, including goal formation, the
goal formation process itself plays an important role in learning behavior from very early
on in life. In other words, goal setting is not, as is often believed, a process characteristic
of the "age of reason" only.

Developmental psychology has shown that, in infants, observation and looking around
belong to their primitive forms of behavior. At first passive, this behavior soon becomes
more active through the development of imitation. In theory, perception can be
conceived as a way of "co-acting" or "acting-with" the person being observed, as is often
indicated by the fact

____________________
9
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's ( 1960) model offers a striking example of the loss of
the motivational dimension in the development of a cognitive theory of human
behavior. These authors understand behavioral projects (plans) and intentions in terms
of computer programs. Like the computer, these programs do not have motivational
elements. Similarly, Miller et al. understood the role of discrepancy without referring
 to the dynamic origin of the constructed standard. Thus, they argue against Lewin's
understanding of quasi-needs, precisely because he emphasized the motivational
aspect of projects and intentions. Hunt ( 1971) recognized that Miller et al.'s "plans"
were in fact goals, and as such, different from computer programs.

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that, in observing, the observer tends to reproduce the overt behavior exhibited by that
person. 10 Perception in young children is soon accompanied by what might be called
quasi-intentional attempts at imitation. For instance, when he sees a colorful object
disappear behind a screen, the infant appears to attend to the location where the object
was last seen. Similarly, when he sees someone doing something specific (i.e., making a
series of sounds), he will attempt to imitate these sounds. The child's attempts to imitate
or to recover an object that has disappeared may be his first "intentional" actions, and
thus imply his ability to set goals for himself. The fact that the child is interested in an
object or action he sees, and that he attempts to recover or imitate it, indicates that the
perceived object or act becomes his goal, i.e., it becomes an object that is represented as
the endstate of the tendency to behave as another behaves. In turn, the perception of that
object will trigger a motivated personal action. 11

The extent of the child's intentionality and ability to set goals for himself becomes more
obvious as the child begins to communicate his intentions. Consider the following
observation made by Hunt ( 1965) on his own 11-month-old child. The child pronounced
the pseudo-word "maia-ma" (mailman) emphasizing it with much gesture, apparently in
order to communicate the intention -- "Take me to the mailbox." This intention,
according to Hunt, became clear in the existing behavioral context and was confirmed by
the child's reactions when taken to the mailbox. Thus it appears that the child had set a
goal for himself and his behavior followed an intention that was directing him toward
that goal. In communicating this intention, he sought to ask for his father's help in
reaching his goal. Note that the child had set himself a goal that was not of a homeostatic
nature and communicated it with the help of a pseudo-vocabulary and gestures.

As the child grows older, we can study his ability to communicate his intentions before
he actually starts to act accordingly. For instance, it has been shown that, by the age of
five, 80% of children can plan what they will draw before they actually start drawing (
Bühler, 1931; Hellings, 1970). This ability to set goals for oneself is affected by certain
pathological circumstances. Head ( 1920) was the first to describe a type of aphasia or
symbol blindness in which the patient is unable to elaborate an anticipatory plan. While
the patient is unable to plan how he will go from one place to

____________________
10
Imitation of overt behavior has also been observed in infra-human organisms (
Köhler, 1921, Hayes & Hayes, 1951). Monkeys, for instance, imitate other monkeys
who were seen reaching for fruit. It is also well-known that, at the beginning of the
century, the ideo-motoric theory stimulated considerable research that examined
whether cognitive acts were always accompanied by implicit motor responses (
Berger, 1962). See also the transactional theory of perception.
11
Bruner and May's ( 1972, a,b) films provide a demonstration of the very early
 expressions of intentionality in the coordinated movements of young children.

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another, he has no difficulty actually executing the behaviors required to complete the
act. His behavior is thus limited to the execution phase (chapter 2).

Consider again the normal child. Before the age of one, the child's selective attention
initially focuses on perceived objects and acts. Subsequently, the perceived acts become
goal-objects for personal performances. In other words, they first become cognitive
goals, before the act is actually carried out. We are dealing here with a collaborative
process between perceptual and representational functions on the one hand, and
motivational tendencies on the other. We note that, at the same time, certain objects,
such as a friendly gesture, lead to approach behaviors, while others acquire a negative
value. Here we have an innate motivational factor that, for instance, prefers friendly to
rejecting gestures. Similarly, in the absence of any experience, the infant's attention and
motivation focus preferentially on some categories of objects and stimuli (e.g., color,
movement, the human face). Piaget ( 1936) reported that the first actions the child seeks
to imitate already belong, at least technically, to his behavioral repertoire. Thus, he will
attempt to imitate the adult's child-like language but will pay little attention to the adult
who speaks normally as this form of language is too far removed from his own babbling
( Hunt, 1965). This obviously does not exclude the fact that such intentional or quasi-
intentional imitation may facilitate the acquisition of new behaviors, as research on
observational learning clearly shows ( Bandura, 1977a).

Thus it appears that the child's first goals are, for the most part, borrowed from the
perceptual environment. However, we will see that they soon become less dependent
upon perception as cognitive constructions develop.

In conclusion, it can be established that from a very early age, the child's behavior is
directed by a process of goal formation that relies heavily upon perception, as reflected
in behaviors such as imitating, or seeking a hidden object. The behaviors necessary to
achieve these first goals must obviously be within the child's repertoire. In fact the child
will typically ignore objects or actions that are too far removed from his own behavioral
capabilities; they will not be taken as goals.

As he develops, the child becomes less exclusively dependent upon perception. A

motivational state soon triggers not only his perceptual and motor behaviors but also a
series of cognitive and representational activities. Indeed, individuals do not set
themselves goals only by relying on perception, memory, or the repetition of previously
learned responses. They also rely on other processes that are discussed in the following.

Needs activate cognitive functioning: goal setting. Our purpose is not to investigate the
many factors that may have an impact on the con-

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struction of goals and plans, nor to predict the goals that a given subject in a concrete
situation will try to attain. We only intend to emphasize the combined role of motivation
and cognition in the process of goal setting. Since the impact of behavior dynamics is
often not explicitly discussed, we try to show that goal setting and planning are needs in
the process of cognitively seeking a behavioral outlet. In fact, needs are "required
relationships" within a behavioral context. Just as an animal's hunting behavior is the
behavioral form of its need for food, a person's goal setting and planning is his state of
need seeking its behavioral outlet at the cognitive level of functioning, thus, the cognitive
processing of needs.

Therefore, our first step in describing the process of goal setting focuses on the fact that
a motivational need activates and directs not only an individual's perceptual and motor
systems, but also his entire cognitive potential. In other words, a need for food, affection,
or power makes a man think, imagine, remember, explore, as much as it makes him
move. A mistaken understanding of the impact of motivation on human behavior results
from the exclusion of this cognitive aspect of behavioral functioning. A state of need acts
on human adults not only via efferent motor discharge mechanisms, but mainly by
activating and directing his higher cognitive functioning which results in goal setting and
planning. The special characteristics of these major processes are referred to in a
moment.

Let it first be noted that goal setting and planning are not to be understood in terms of
associative learning; they are not to be identified with the learned path that leads the
hungry animal again and again to the same reward. Except for using learned "behavioral
techniques" such as writing or professional skills, humans rarely aim at repeatedly
achieving the same goal. A student succeeding in an exam looks for further
achievements, not for repetition. He will look for something new to be done, although
previously learned techniques will be reused. This implies that the individual's
motivational state is more or less continuously in a kind of prebehavioral stage, in the
sense that its present state of development has not yet been molded into a specific
behavioral form. The concrete goal to be achieved and the path to be followed will have
to be constructed again or, at least, readjusted.

It must be recognized, however, that some goals and behavioral projects have a higher
hierarchical status in life than others. That means that the pursuit of many subordinated
goals is implied in some major decisions already made in the past. Thus, when the basic
need for self-development has been concretized in the goal and plan of a professional
career, say, becoming a medical doctor, that major goal, once attained, commands almost
automatically a great many minor goals and plans to be pursued in daily life. The goal
setting and planning processes described here relate

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more specifically to such more or less important goals and plans. Minor goals follow a
similar process, but in a more automatic way.

The first step in the process leading from needs to goals, behavioral projects, and action
can be described as follows. Motivational states (needs) activate and regulate an
individual's cognitive functioning, as just noted. That needs can activate cognitive
functioning has been often demonstrated. Motivational states express themselves more
easily at the representational level than in overt behavior. In addition to the absence of
social inhibition and a lower degree of personal commitment in representational
behavior, the continuous availability of symbolic objects and the versatility of mental
manipulation make cognitive functioning exceptionally responsive to motivational states.
Thus, the world of cognitive representations has become for many psychologists the
prime laboratory for the study of motivation. This can be seen, for instance, in Murray's
and McCellad's work with the Thematic Apperception Test, as well as in more recent
research.

It is well known that this representational approach to motivation has its origin in
Freudian theory. Before they are satisfied in reality, needs can be satisfied provisionally
through the so-called "primary process," i.e., a "hallucinatory" representation of the
desired object. However, in opposition to Freud's view, we understand the impact of
needs on cognitive activity not as a "hallucination" taking place in a world of unreality,
but as a step that prepares the individual for overt behavior. Cognitive processes provide
a "training ground" for human action.

The point to be stressed is that the individual's cognitive functioning, as activated by a

motivational state, has an "enriched" world of symbolic objects and actions at his
disposal. Everything seen, experienced, and done is preserved in a mnemonic storehouse
of information and knowledge and, in principle, can be retrieved and used for
discovering or constructing a goalobject adapted to the individual's need. Moreover, the
versatility of cognitive "manipulations" of symbolic objects allows for a more efficient
exploratory strategy than would be possible at the level of physical trial and error with
real objects and actions (chapter 2). The individual's cognitive storehouse of information
also includes the knowledge and experience of himself, i.e, his self-concept. Because of
this self-awareness, needs exist in man as permanent conditions of his personality and
not just as periodic states. Thus, man is motivated to earning a living and to think about
concrete goals and means for satisfying that need, without actually being in a state of
need. In fact, through his self-awareness and self-concept, he knows himself as being a
person in need of several categories of objects.

For these reasons, the goal setting process appears to be a creative and efficient cognitive
strategy that is used by highly developed living beings in

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their search for a constructive and personal outlet of their needs. Before manipulating the
less docile material of the real behavioral world, a few blueprints are constructed and
tested, so that, from the very beginning of a course of action, the chosen end-state is in
view and can be pursued. Thus, goal setting is an integrated part of man's behavioral
functioning and is responsible for some of its most characteristic features.

At this point, the following characteristics of the goal setting process should be briefly
mentioned. First, the cognitive activity elicited by the individual's state of need is a
searching and constructing activity. Its role is to transform a vague motivational state
into a specific goal, i.e., something specific to be achieved. That same process leads to
the construction of the behavioral path, i.e., the means-end structure or plan to
implement that goal. Therefore, the goal-object is something different from an imaginary
product; it is something "to be done," i.e., something motivationally loaded and referring
to the real behavioral world of need satisfaction. Moreover, goal setting and planning are
manifestations of the need state itself clearing its way in the behavioral world at the
cognitive level. Therefore, goals and plans are not purely cognitive products, they are
cognitive-dynamic structures. As to the concrete content of the goal, such as a
professional career or a meal, it is defined of course by its situational and cultural
context; only the process of goal generation is considered here.

It should be emphasized that converting a vague state of need into a concrete goal-object
is a major step in the behavioral process. Although, in many cases, this process is
facilitated by social learning and situational factors, the finding of a concrete goal for
satisfying a vague need -- say for gaining affection, for fulfilling an ambition, or for
giving meaning to one's life by preparing for a professional career -- are crucial and
creative steps in self-development. As an example, let us take the medical school student
mentioned in chapter 4. In a therapeutic session she remembered that, as a child, she was
hopelessly and stubbornly trying to gain the consideration and love of her father and that,
in order to satisfy that need, she set herself the goals, first of becoming a nurse and, later,
a physician. The latter idea was a very unusual goal in the context of her concrete
situation. It arose, after long pondering, as a result of ingenious combinations of
informational data. Similarly, an unemployed young engineer who is thinking about his
future and sets himself the goal of starting with a small industrial plant follows an
analogous way of processing his need into a concrete goal and plan. Generally speaking,
one can say that, in the behavioral functioning of the overall individual, the need state
becomes a cognitive problem to be solved. That means that the need activates and directs
the subject's thinking. The need is partially converted into the problem. "What should be
done? What concrete goal should be attained?" Typically, the goal is not just an object to
be reached, but rather something to be realized and

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achieved in a new context. We do not hesitate to claim that, generally speaking, the
ability to concretize one's vague needs in realistic goal-objects is a major element in
personality maturation and mental health in the different periods of life. A state of need
that cannot be converted into "something realistic to be done or achieved, " -- i.e., in a
behavioral goal -- creates a permanent condition of discomfort and helplessness in
childhood as well as despair in old age.

Our purpose in stressing the functional importance of the process of setting concrete
goals is to show that it cannot be reduced simply to predicting what a subject is likely to
do in a specific situation when he belongs to a certain category of people. Predicting, for
instance, that a physician, when faced with a patient, will set himself the goal of curing
that patient, is something different from investigating the processes involved in goal
setting. Exploring, however, the conditions for the possibility of such prediction is
interesting research (see Schank & Abelson, 1977). It shows that some minor goals are
implied in hierarchically higher choices (becoming a physician).

Cognitive processes, as noted earlier, are not restricted by temporal and spatial
boundaries. Goal objects that can only be achieved through step-bystep actions during
long periods of time in different places, cognitively can be conceived at once and
evaluated from different perspectives, including their feasibility. While many
possibilities are available at the level of imagination, their feasibility at the level of
reality must be evaluated. This does not prevent a creative individual from setting new
goals. Besides these situations and immediate possibilities available, new combinations
can be established. These two aspects of goal setting and planning -- creativity and
reality character -- are a major problem in efficient behavioral planning. In this context,
the difference between goal setting and imaginary creations at the level of fantasy is to
be emphasized. Fantasy substitutes itself for realitylevel behavior and confines the
person to empty dreams, while dynamic goal setting is a preparatory step within an
efficient behavioral process.

Constructing behavioral projects or plans. The second stage in the cognitive processing
of needs is the construction of the behavioral path, i.e., the means-end structure or plan,
through which the motivated individual tries to achieve the goal set.

At the level of physical reality, the end state or goal of an act cannot actually be achieved
before going through each of the contingent steps leading to that goal. Thus, following
the plan precedes the goal at the level of execution. At the level of creative thinking,
however, the goal is usually set before the behavioral path is attempted, as shown in
chapter 2. Indeed, constructing the path implies knowledge of the goal to be reached. As
ancient philosophers used to say: "What comes last in the order of execution is to be

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conceived first." It thus appears that efficient planning depends on this important
characteristic of cognitive processes (see above, p. 51 ).

The process involved in the construction of behavioral plans is essentially the same as in
goal setting. It is the dynamism for relational functioning -- i.e, the need for a behavioral
object -- that by activating cognitive functioning manipulates and tests the many
behavioral possibilities at its disposal. This creative activity is directed toward the
construction of behavioral means that lead to the goal set. More or less complex
cognitive structures may be parts of such behavioral projects or plans. Thus, a student
who is asked why he goes home this week-end may answer "because I did not go home
last month." At first glance, one does not see how a negative fact, namely not having
done something, can by itself be a motive for an act, except when the "reason" given is
perceived as part of a motivational plan. Suppose the student's more general motivation
is to go home from time to time to comply with the explicit desire of his parents. This
motivation itself is integrated in a more basic need that links him with his parents. In the
framework of the student's present situation, this basic need has been concretized in a
behavioral plan to go home at least once a month. It is in the context of this motivational
plan that the fact of not having gone home last month becomes an urgent motive for
doing so the following week-end, which happens to be the last of this month. The
motivation is not in the negative fact itself, but is derived from the more general
behavioral dynamics that have taken shape in the behavioral plan mentioned.

In this way, complicated cognitive structures may function as motives -in this case often
called "reasons" -- for doing or not doing something, or for doing it one way or another.
Through this planning activity, basic human needs "ramify" into an intricate network of
cognitive-dynamic channels that may be compared to the capillaries of the
cardiovascular system, as shown in chapter 4. It is important to realize that most human
motives are thus embedded in cognitive-dynamic means-end structures that, ultimately,
borrow their dynamics from the cognitive channeling of needs into behavioral pathways.
In other words, the cognitively traced pathways are conceived as the behavioral channels
in which the dynamics for relational functioning -- i.e., "needs" -- find their outlet. It is
this cognitivedynamic channeling that is called planning or the formation of behavioral
projects. In this sense, goals and behavioral projects are the first provisional realization
of the behavioral relationships that are required by a state of need. The realization is
provisional because it is only at the cognitive level of functioning, although the passage
to action is eventually required.

At this point it should be reemphasized that behavioral planning as used here is different
from the "intellectual exercise" of an expert trying out several possible ways to solve
hypothetical behavioral problems. In our instance, planning refers to the individual who
finds himself in an actual state

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of need and tries to concretize that need in the pursuit of a specific goal by means of
concrete action. In order to avoid that confusion, I prefer to speak of behavioral projects
rather than plans, since the latter term has for many psychologists a rather purely
cognitive flavor. It is in that cognitivedynamic sense that a goal is a "focused need" and a
plan the behavioral form of a need at the cognitive level of functioning.

Let it be noted also that the planning phase of behavior should not be separated --
although distinguished -- from the phase of behavioral execution. In fact, planning and
action often go hand in hand inspiring and correcting each other. Important goals and
plans usually take shape in the course of action and are processed only gradually. Take a
plan for following a career, building a house, getting married, promoted, etc. . . . it may
take months and even years for the plan to mature. The process may be compared to the
manner in which a general theoretical problem is operationalized. Situational factors and
learned experience play a major role along with creative thinking and imagination.
Previous experience belongs to the storehouse of information that remains available to
the planning subject. Moreover, the planning process should not be considered as
characterizing only the development of important goals and projects of a few select
individuals. It can be observed in the daily activities of everyone including, for example,
a father's plan to help his son in his career, or in the adolescent's efforts to be original. In
each case, a behavioral step creates a new problem which, in order to be solved, requires
that prior experience and information be reorganized. Although learned skills are used,
the concrete goal differs depending upon the specific situation. In this way, goal setting
and planning differ from the mere repetition of previously reinforced responses. The
very fact that the behavioral paths leading to the set goals, as well as the goals
themselves, are neither mere reproductions of socially learned behaviors, nor innate
patterns of response, allows human individuals to express their basic needs into more or
less personalized behavior configurations that constitute their personality.

Discrepancy as a substitute for motivation? The next step in our description of the
process leading from needs to action is related to the discrepancy or incongruity issue. In
many behavioral models a factor of imbalance or incongruity with a standard tends to
replace the reference to behavior dynamics or motivation.

The common conception of discrepancy or incongruity as a source of motivation is

depicted in the TOTE model described earlier. In fact, the incongruity between the
present state of affairs and the standard is assumed to trigger the operation ( Miller et al.,
1960; Hunt, 1965). A similar conception can be found in Festinger's cognitive
dissonance model, as well as in Heider's balance theory. These theories share the
assumption that a

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discrepancy between two sets of information elicits a dynamic effect which makes
reference to an underlying motivation superfluous. These theorists will, at most,
acknowledge that the discrepancy results in discomfort. It is as if one proposed that the
power of a stretched spring lies in the distance between its two extremities. The image is
misleading, for as long as the discrepancy is nothing more than a lack of congruence
between two cognitive inputs, there is no spring to serve as a source of dynamism. In
other words, discrepancy or distance between two points is merely an informational
datum resulting from the comparison between two items. Its motivational component
derives from a perceived relation between an actual state of affairs and a standard or
goal. The subject is motivated to reach that standard, i.e., to reduce the discrepancy. That
is the motivational basis of perceived discrepancy in behavior. In other words, the result
of the Testing operation (T) in the TOTE model is not simply information about the
incongruity or difference between two data. On the contrary, in the behavioral context,
the incongruity means that the goal, which the subject is motivated to attain, is not yet
achieved. The subject therefore is motivated to reduce the incongruity and to continue
with the operation. The activating factor that stimulates the operation to continue is the
same motivation responsible for constructing the standard. That means that the
motivation behind the fact that a certain standard was introduced in the thermostat is also
at the origin of both the motivational meaning of the discrepancy information, and the
fact that the operation continues until congruity between the perceived state of affairs
and the standard is reached. Incongruity has a dynamic impact only to the extent that
there exists a dynamism toward congruity, i.e., toward reaching the goal set. The goal
itself is the concrete form of that same motivation.

In the context of the process of constructing goals, as outlined in the previous

paragraphs, the discrepancy is due to the fact that goals (and plans) are conceived before
they are perceived as realized. That temporal lag has its origin in the properties and
facilities of cognitive functioning as compared to the slower executive phase of behavior
(chapter 2). It results not only in the perception of a discrepancy between reality and
goals, but also creates the state of tension that is characteristic of purposive behavior.
This tension is nothing else than the dynamic aspect of the discrepancy just described; it
is rooted in the state of need, except that it is more concretely related to the goal set. This
relation to a goal-object constitutes that at least implicit directedness of tension in
purposive behavior. Some effects of that tension have been experimentally investigated
in the theory of Kurt Lewin. It is true that the state of tension may persist although the
specific goal to be reached is temporarily forgotten by the subject, but even in that case
the tension is experienced as directed toward a specific action and only actions that are
related to that goal are influenced by it (e.g., better retention, as in

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the Zeigarnik effect). The state of tension that is not yet directed to a goalobject
coincides, in our opinion, with the prebehavioral state of a need.

In summary, it is not claimed that the perceived discrepancy does not play a role in
motivation. On the contrary, it provides the individual with information that the goal set
is not yet attained. Through that information the existing motivation toward the goal is
reactivated. In fact, information (cognition) and motivation are in continuous interaction.
What is claimed is that discrepancy is neither a source of motivation nor a substitute for
it.

In concluding our description of the goal setting and planning process, it should be
remembered that the impact of goals and plans on overt behavior has long been
considered too vague a process to be scientifically accepted by many psychologists. It
was rejected together with the impact of cognitive processes in general. The introduction
of cybernetic models, however, made evident the fact that a previously introduced
standard could regulate the operations of a mechanical device. More generally speaking,
the outcome of a first phase of execution and its comparison with the previously
introduced standard or goal was seen as providing, through a feedback process, the point
of departure of subsequent action and its adjustment to the predetermined standard. By
realizing it via a mechanical device, goal-regulated or purposive activity was suddenly
demystified. For the neuropsychologist too, the neurological correlate for the functioning
of standards and plans became more easily viewed at the level of the Conceptual
Nervous System. Nevertheless, I repeat that the main process in purposive behavior
namely the construction of standards or goals through the cognitive processing of needs
is still neglected in cybernetic models and in cognitive psychology in general. This is
also the case in the TOTE model. The motivational origin of standards and goals is not
explicitly considered; the Standard symbol (S) is not even introduced in the behavioral
model; it is only an element of comparison in the Testing operation (T). In our opinion,
however, constructing a standard or goal is the dynamic starting point of behavior. In
"doing something" the goal is the "something" to be achieved; it regulates every step of
the behavioral process. No other behavioral phase can occur without this standard. As
noted earlier, it is not the incongruity as such, but the fact that the Standard is not yet
attained that triggers the Operational phase (O) of the behavioral process. The same
holds for the Exit phase (E): it is controlled by the fact that the Standard is attained. The
information given by the testing operation in terms of congruity and incongruity borrows
its meaning and its impact from the motivation concretized in the standard. In other
words, the TOTE model only becomes operational by the introduction of the
motivational phase S (Standard), just as the concrete behavioral process itself does not
exist without motivation or goal. Constructing the S (Standard) should therefore be the
first phase. This suggests a revised dynamic S.T.O.T.E. model.

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From behavioral projects to action. The last stage in our model "from needs to action"
deals with the passage from the "focused need," i.e., the goal and plan, to action. This
means the passage from the cognitive to the executive level of behavior. 12

It has been shown how the individual's cognitive functioning is activated and directed by
his state of need and how the cognitive processing of the need results in goals and plans
of action. However, the motivational impact of a need on the behavioral process does not
end with goal setting and planning. Needs are not satisfied by means of such cognitive
processing. Normally, the "required relationships" are to be established at the reality
level of the I-E functional unit before fulfillment is attained.

How people go from cognition to overt action has always been a major problem in the
explanation of behavior. In fact, Hull's and Guthrie's major objection to Tolman's
cognitive learning theory involved its inability to resolve this issue. Behaviorists failed to
understand how the knowledge or conception of an action and of its outcome were
transformed into overt action or performance. As Guthrie said, with humor, Tolman's
rats were buried in their ideas. In the area of motivation, the same problem arises with
respect to the real impact of a cognitive entity, such as a goal or a plan, on the
individual's action. That a goal -- which does not yet exist at the level of physical reality
-- can provide the organism with dynamic impact and move it to action remains difficult
to accept for psychologists who reject the influence of cognitive factors in the behavioral
process.

The problem, however, presents itself in a different manner in the context of the model
proposed here. In the final analysis, the individual is not "moved" by the "attraction" of a
cognitive entity such as a goal. As mentioned earlier, it is one and the same dynamism
that is inherent in human functioning as a whole and in each of its specific behavioral
potentials. Given the functional equipment of the human individual, it is the same
inherent dynamism that leads him to think and act, to set himself goals and to bring
about their realization through overt behavior. In other words, the basic dynamism that
underlies an individual's concrete motivation regulates his total functioning, at both the
cognitive and overt behavioral levels; it activates both the cognitive processes of goal
setting and planning, and the overt behavioral pursuit of these goals.

From a more speculative view, one could state that the integrated character of thought
and action is not the end-state to be arrived at after

____________________
12
It should be noted that for purely intellectual forms of behavior, such as solving a
theoretical problem, the executive phase -- i.e., the solution of the problem -- remains
at the cognitive level. In most cases, the problem and its solution will later be
communicated in observable verbal behavior and this lends itself to research; but this
communication is another behavioral unit.
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studying two separate modalities of functioning. Rather it is the original given that
should not get lost in the process of the numerous scientific approaches which -- each for
itself -- abstract their own "object" from that complex unitary X that is the living
individual. Indeed, the functioning individual seems to do something more than each
scientific approach is able to reconstruct on the basis of the phenomena extracted from
its object by applying the chosen methods. Thus, the functioning brain of the individual
must be assumed to be doing something more than just producing the biochemical and
physical changes that the neurophysiologist is able to register. That "something more" or
"something else" is, among other things, what we understand when that same individual
with his functioning brain tells us what he intends to do, and stops telling that story when
one or another vital link in the functional chain interrupts its activity. The fact that,
eventually, a neurological correlate may be found between each psychological operation
or content on the one hand, and physical events in the organism or the brain on the other,
does not change the fact that "understanding something" is a different kind of
phenomenon, as Sherrington ( 1951) said, than an electrical potential. The functioning
individual is assumed somehow to do both in an integrated way. Therefore, the problem
of the passage from setting goals to performing acts should be formulated in a more
integrative context, viz. the functioning individual.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the processing of needs into goals, plans, and action can be represented as
follows. A vague state of need and discomfort, combined with the dynamism of entering
into relationship with objects in the environment, is registered by the individual as a
sensory input and elaborated by cognitive processes such as awareness, representation,
exploratory searching, memory, imagination, inference, and hypothesis testing. By
activating this cognitive functioning, the state of need is gradually processed into a more
focused dynamic orientation, which cognitively defines something specific to be done,
i.e., a goal-object to be achieved and a plan to implement that goal. Thus, processing a
prebehavioral state of need into goals and plans is analogous to the elaboration of a poor
sensory input into a meaningful perception of concrete situations and objects, except that
in the dynamic frame of a need the perceived objects are replaced by goal objects to be
attained. The process can be summarized in the following four propositions:
1. Needs act on human behavior not only by eliciting motor trial and error responses,
but also by activating and directing a subject's cognitive functioning in such a way
that adequate objects for satisfying the need can

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be set as goals to be achieved. Thus, the goal represents the concretized or "focused"
need.
3. Making full use of its rich store of information and the flexibility of its operations,
the subject's cognitive functioning also succeeds in elaborating a behavioral means-
end structure -- i.e., a behavioral project or plan -through which the goal can be
attained. Thus, the plan is the concrete behavioral form taken by a need at the
 cognitive level of its realization.
4. As long as the goal is not achieved, a discrepancy (incongruity) is perceived
between the actual state of affairs and the conceived goal. This discrepancy does not
act on behavior as a motivational agent by itself, but as information that the need is
not yet satisfied and, therefore, the subject is still motivated and has to continue his
purposive action. Incongruity, as well as expected outcomes, does not substitute for
motivation.
5. The passage from cognitive-dynamic goal setting and planning to overt behavioral
action should be conceived in the context of the integrated functioning of a living
being equipped with motor and mental potentials of operation. It is a unified
inherent dynamism that underlies both modalities of functioning, although different
scientific approaches abstract different characteristics from the functioning as a
whole.
INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVATION

The process of goal formation and planning represents the major part of our study of
motivational functioning in humans. A brief discussion of instrumental motivation
follows, since, in most behavioral projects, goals are normally reached through the
intermediary of instrumental acts. Indeed, as repeatedly noted, behavioral projects and
plans are means-end structures. The principal issue from our viewpoint concerns the
relationship between instrumental motivation and the dynamism that directs the
individual toward his goal.

The importance of instrumental behaviors can be seen clearly in research on the negative
effect of situations in which a subject perceives himself as having "no means" to solve
his behavioral problem. That kind of situation introduces our discussion.

The Helpless Subject

Several recent studies have highlighted the emotional impact of situations in which
subjects perceive themselves as having no control over their instrumental acts. When
faced with an object he wants to reach or avoid, the individual must be able to "do
something" and to anticipate the outcome of his actions. Controlling outcomes belongs
to the essence of behavior that we

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have defined as "acting upon" a present state of affairs in order to attain a goal. Subjects
manifest signs of severe disturbance in stressful or threatening situations in which they
experience themselves unable to act upon their environment in a predictable manner.
This has been demonstrated by Weiss ( 1971a, 1971b) and Seligman, Maier, and
Solomon ( 1971) in rats, and the phenomenon has since been studied in humans.
Following the experience that his actions are of no use, the individual learns to do
nothing, even when he is later placed in a situation in which his behavior might
effectively impact on the environment. He has learned, in effect, not to learn to try. He
has learned to be helpless -- a phenomenon often characteristic of reactive depression --
and may need psychotherapy before he can cope again.
This phenomenon is all the more important when we consider that it contrasts
dramatically with the obvious pleasure of the child who discovers that he is able to affect
his environment through his actions. It confirms what was said earlier of the need for
active functioning, i.e., of the need to act upon one's environment, to control it in a
competent and efficient manner (causality pleasure, see chapter 4).

We must note in passing that a more fundamental type of helplessness exists. It is the
helplessness of the person who is unable to transform a prebehavioral state of need into a
concrete goal. It might be hypothesized that, in order to develop normally, a child must
from a very early age be able to find behavioral means to transform his needs into
specific and realistic goals and projects. The inability to set goals or projects for oneself
is indicative of a major motivational dysfunction. It deprives the child of the pleasure of
successful actions upon his environment and locks him into autistic sensory contacts. In
effect, the ascendant component of motivation is blocked.

The Dynamics of Instrumental Acts

Our first question relates to the origin of instrumental motivation. According to some
researchers ( Miller et al., 1960), the student who intends to study in order to learn a
trade is not motivated to study. His intention, as well as his general plan of action, have
nothing to do with motivation. In opposition to this view, I argue that the student is
indeed motivated to study. His motivation, however, is instrumental. Considering
behavior and motivation in an abstract way, it may be true, of course, that an individual
who intends to exercize a trade is not motivated to study. But the concrete case
considered here is that of a student who intends to study in order to reach a goal. To the
extent that the student intends to use the means, the instrumental act participates
somehow in the motivation toward the goal. In other cases, an intrinsic motivation to
study may exist in addition to this instrumental motivation and thereby increase the total
intensity of the overall

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motivation. Yet in the present case, motivation has its origin in the dynamism that directs
the student toward a trade or a career.

Because of the influence of reinforcement theories, it is tempting to locate the origin of

instrumental motivation in the "reinforcing" event, namely the ultimate goal or expected
outcome. A "goal gradient" model is then used to account for the subject's behavior.
Beginning with the valence of the ultimate goal, the model assumes that all instrumental
acts leading to it share in its reinforcement value. A similar mechanism has been
suggested in incentive theories of motivation which, rather than base motivation on
homeostatic needs, originate it in the goal or expected outcome. Our relational model of
motivation does not choose between these two poles of the 1-E interaction. It only asks
how instrumental motivation fits into the motivational and cognitive processes
responsible for goal formation. As noted earlier, the motivational state stimulates and
directs an individual's cognitive activity, i.e., his "mental manipulation" of the
environment, in order to clear its way through the behavioral world. By cognitively
trying out several behavioral options, a link is mentally established among several
objects. This step insures that the individual meets his goal. The final project thus
includes several links between one or many instrumental acts and the goal that represents
the person's need. The network formed by these links is the project. Any act seen as a
functional means in this network acquires a new meaning by becoming part of the
behavioral path leading to the goal.

This network is more than a cognitive link for the individual who actively seeks to reach
a goal. The project he decides to follow is the outlet of his need. Therefore, the network,
which at first (i.e., in the trying-out-phase of planning) was only a cognitive exercise for
going from the present state of affairs to the goal, is now the channel through which the
motivation toward the goal impacts upon the instrumental activity. It can be seen that, as
soon as this link disappears -- when, for instance, we are informed that in the meantime
our instrumental act has become ineffective -- the motivation disappears and the
instrumental act is not performed anymore ( Estes, 1972). In other words, the dynamism
that directs the subject's activity toward the goal does go through its link with the
instrumental act. Thus, the intention to carry out this act is the concrete pathway
followed by the motivation toward the goal.

The Complexity of Means-End Relations

Several types of relation can be identified between instrumental acts and goals. Each of
them has a different impact on the motivational link that unites the means to its end.

In the first case, the individual must go through a hierarchical sequence of instrumental
acts in order to reach his goal. For example, in order to obtain

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an engineering diploma, a candidate must complete several years of study arranged in

such a way that step C in the training can only be completed after steps A and B. Such a
sequence is "contingent" ( Raynor, 1974; Raynor … Entin, 1982) in that C cannot be
reached before A and B. Under some circumstances, there may be an alternative way of
going from A to C without B. For example, a summer program may provide a candidate
with such an alternative in a program of study.

In other cases, a goal can only be reached by completing a series of instrumental acts that
are not contingently related. To be offered a certain position may, for instance, require a
specific set of qualifications. The steps required to complete the sequence are
noncontingent in the sense that the order in which they are completed is irrelevant.

Under other circumstances, certain conditions are added to the instrumental acts
necessary to reach a goal. When such requirements are not behavioral (e.g., to be a
certain age) they are not relevant to the discussion. In some instances, only one specific
and unique condition may be necessary and sufficient to reach a goal. In other cases,
alternative means may be substituted for one another or the same step can be repeated if
initially failed.

Just as the same goal may, under certain circumstances, be reached by different means,
the same means may at times lead to different goals. These possibilities will all have an
impact upon the intensity of an instrumental motivation (see the following).

Within the two major schemas of means-end relation (contingent and noncontingent) just
described, a dual probability determines the value of an instrumental act: (1) the
probability that the subject will successfully carry out instrumental acts A,B,C, etc; (2)
the probability that these acts, once completed, will effectively lead to the expected goal
( Lawler, 1968). In the case of obtaining a diploma after several years of successful
study, the first probability -- namely, the chances of success -- is the only one that really
matters. As far as the effectiveness of the instrumental action is concerned, it is reflected
by the automatic receipt of a diploma. In the case of a professional promotion, however,
the conditions for promotion may be fulfilled by several candidates. In such instances,
the means are necessary but not sufficient, since they do not necessarily lead to the goal.
The same element is important in both final and instrumental motivation.

While the first probability is determined mainly by internal factors (e.g., the individual's
ability, stamina, degree of effort, etc.) the second usually depends upon external
conditions beyond the individual's control. The first ones are the "subjective" factors of
instrumental motivation, while the second ones are its objective factors.

Another point to consider is of major importance. An instrumental act may also be an

intermediary goal which can, by itself, satisfy certain needs (e.g., pass an admission
exam). Other acts are exclusively means to an end

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and are not desirable in and of themselves. This is also likely to affect the intensity of
instrumental motivation.

The Intensity of Instrumental Motivation

Based on what has just been said, we now examine the impact of different kinds of
instrumental acts upon the intensity of instrumental motivation. The hypotheses
pertaining to this issue are presented below as propositions followed by a brief
commentary. Our hypotheses include a larger number of factors than is found in the
Valence x Probability theory originally proposed by Atkinson and Feather ( 1966) and
subsequently adapted by Raynor ( 1969) and Vroom ( 1964).

Proposition 1: The motivation for an instrumental act derives from the individual's
motivation to reach the final goal. The intensity of the former is a function of the
intensity of the latter.

This proposition has its origin in our understanding of how concrete motivations are
derived (see above). Motivation for a goal is fully channeled into each instrumental act
that is perceived as necessary to reach that goal. However, the greater the number of
alternatives still available to reach the goal, the lesser the motivation for any specific
instrumental act.
The possible negative or positive character of an instrumental act or outcome in and of
itself increases or decreases the total motivation accordingly.

Proposition 2: The number of "contingent" instrumental acts increases the intensity of

instrumental motivation only to the extent that the instrumental acts and their outcome
are also intermediary goals (see above) and not simply means to the end.

According to this proposition, and contrary to Raynor's ( 1974) hypothesis, the

motivation to undertake a first year of study is not increased by the fact that it may lead
either to only one or to many additional necessary years of preparatory study, these
intermediary years being merely means to obtain a certain qualification. The valence of
each year of study has its origin in, and is nothing more or less than, the valence attached
to the ultimate goal. In other words, these valences are not additive (see, however,
Proposition 3). The total motivation for each intermediary step may further be
complicated by the fact that their number increases the perceived distance of the final
goal and, thus, decreases its present motivational impact.

Proposition 3: The number of instrumental acts successfully performed is likely to

increase the individual's personal commitment to the overall project and

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to decrease the probability of ultimate failure. Thus, there is an overall motivation

gradient ( Miller, 1944) which also affects the motivation to perform each instrumental
act which remains to be completed.

This proposition complements the previous one. Moreover, the perceived difficulty of
the overall project increases as a function of the number of intermediary failures that the
individual endures. If these failures are not fatal and alternate with a sufficient number of
successes, the valence of the final success may be increased by the perceived difficulty
of the overall project. Thus, intermediate successes, and even failures, may increase the
individual's total commitment and motivation.

Proposition 4. The intensity of an instrumental act diminishes as a function of: (a) the
time required to reach the ultimate goal (temporal distance); (b) the number of
alternative instrumental acts available; and (c) the level of instrumentality of the act.

The level of instrumentality is a function of the two types of probability just mentioned,
namely the probability that the individual will successfully complete the instrumental act
and the probability that this act will actually bring him closer to his goal. In other words,
the motivation for the final goal is channeled to the instrumental act only if the latter is
seen as useful in the pursuit of the goal (perceived instrumentality). That is the process
through which the cognitive factor of subjective probability plays a role in the
modulation of instrumental motivation.

Proposition 5: The motivational intensity of the project as a whole and, consequently, of

each instrumental act increases as a function of the realitycharacter of the final goal.
The objective temporal distance of that goal remaining constant, its reality-character
increases as a function of the subject's future time perspective and of any other factor
reducing the subjective distance of the goal. Intermediary goals set and worked at may
have such a subjective distancereducing influence ( Nuttin, 1984).

Proposition 6: The difficulty of the instrumental act is more attractive to the person who
seeks to be socially recognized for his instrumental performance than for the person who
is merely interested in the final outcome or reward.

This proposition enables us to account for Shapira's ( 1976) finding that individuals did
not display a preference for the degree of difficulty as predicted by Atkinson's formula
and by Vroom's theory. In fact, the individual who is interested only in the final reward
prefers the instrumental

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act he sees as the easiest and, thus, as the safest. However, the individual who is also
concerned about the recognition of those who observe his performance will choose the
instrumental act which, although still likely to lead to goal attainment, is sufficiently
difficult to insure social recognition. In this case the instrumental act has a valence in
and of itself.

Proposition 7: Unlike purely instrumental goals, final goals do not loose their valence
because of their improbability and even practical impossibility, although in the latter
case subjects may refrain from performing instrumental acts toward such goals.

A strong and lasting motivation for an unattainable goal is not without impact on a
subject's behavioral life. It may even be at the origin of disturbances ( Nuttin, 1984).

In conclusion, this review of the complex factors that may effect instrumental motivation
is intended to alert researchers against using simple formulas for predicting both the
instrumental act that will be selected in a specific case and the intensity of its motivation.

COMPARISONS AND COMMENTS

Similarities and Differences with Piaget's Theory of Schemas

Several authors ( de Montpellier, 1964; Reuchlin, 1977; Eckblad, 1981) have focused
attention on a few similarities that they observed among my general views of behavior
dynamics and those which underlie Piaget's theory. Now consider a brief comparison of
some of these basic themes in order to further clarify the theoretical position presented in
this book.

Whereas Piaget approaches behavior from the viewpoint of cognitive processes, the
theory presented here focuses specifically on the dynamic aspect of action and on the
integration of different behavioral functions. The study of cognition leads Piaget to
consider all behavior in terms of adaptation. This focus is understandable given that the
very object of cognition involves establishing structures that conform or adapt to reality
as it manifests itself in overall behavior. By contrast, the psychologist who studies the
dynamics of human behavior cannot help but be impressed by the amount of effort the
individual uses in order to change and transform reality so that it conforms, not to
preexisting cognitive structures, but rather to his progressive desires and goals. It is this
difference in focus, I believe, which has lead to two key differences in our orientations.
For Piaget the emphasis is upon adaptive schemas. In the model proposed here, the em-

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phasis is on dynamic behavioral projects. As different as each of these is, both concepts
are the result of an interaction between the cognitive and dynamic aspects of behavioral
functioning. Here I attempt to explain and highlight the dynamic aspect of these
concepts.

Schema and behavioral project. The cognitively elaborated need that we have labeled as
behavioral project corresponds to the dynamic aspect of the Piagetian concept of
schema. The reader will remember that, in our view, a project is the behavioral form of a
need as constructed at the cognitive level of behavioral functioning. As Montpellier (
1964, p. 105) states: "the concept of schema used by Piaget is very close to that of a need
as presented by Nuttin, since a schema implies a tendency -- evolving from a need -- to
function in a certain way, just as a need takes shape in a schema or pattern of behavioral
interaction."

In order to clarify the similarities and differences between the two concepts it is
important to emphasize the difference between the cognitive and motivational aspects of
a schema. In Piaget's view, a schema refers to a unit of action or perception that has
meaning for the individual. For example, the movements by which an infant grasps or
reaches for an object suspended above his head represent schemas or "motor concepts,"
that is to say meaningful units of movement. In relation to motivation, Piaget explains
that the infant repeats the action of pulling on a cord suspended from above his crib,
because this action has innate interest for the child (since it causes the objects to dance in
the air). In our view, such "interest" implies a motivation and an experience of
satisfaction: The child likes to produce an effect (the reader is reminded of the earlier
discussion of "causality pleasure"). In other words, the results of his actions would not
be "interesting" for the child if he was not motivated to produce through his actions some
observable effect. Even a certain goal setting activity may be implied: It is as if the infant
pulls on the cord as a means to obtain the interesting result which is his "goal." In
Piaget's opinion, however, it is not necessary to refer to motivation since the dynamic
aspect is implied in the idea of schema itself. Indeed, the schema implies the tendency to
behave in a particular way and a given behavior would not be assimilated to a
preexisting schema until it is able to satisfy the need which is implied in it. In our view,
however, it is necessary to refer explicitly to the motivational element implied in a
specific behavior in order to understand and identify that which the individual finds
"interesting" and therefore seeks to repeat. Obviously, the assimilation of an act as
something to be repeated or performed is not identical with the concept of purely
cognitive or motor assimilation. Imagine, for example, a behavior, involving pulling on a
cord, which results in an electric shock. This outcome and movement can, of course, be
assimilated to a cognitive schema and a motor skill. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it
will be repeated; the result was significant and interesting to

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know as something to be avoided. Thus, in addition to the informational and motor

aspects of an action, there is also a motivational aspect. Therefore, to any cognitive and
motor schema must be added a schema meaning "to do" or "not to do." This element
reflects the contribution of motivational processes. Behavior provides not only
information and skill, but it also instructs one to do or not to do something as a function
of one's motivation. This factor reflects the difference between purely cognitive and
motor learning and learning in its complete behavioral sense. For this reason,
consideration of motivational direction is essential in trying to explain behavior. It
introduces, in effect, a basic specificity within an individual's general orientation toward
functioning. Thus, there is an assimilation that is not "reproductive" in behavioral action.

The fact that in Piaget's system the dynamic aspect of behavior, specifically of the
schema, remains in the background, is explained in part by Piaget's concept of need.
With reference to this aspect of behavior, Piaget appears to have been strongly
influenced by the Freudian notion of Trieb (instinct or drive). Thus, need is
conceptualized as the "physiological motor of mental activity," that is to say as a force
which emanates from physiological functioning -- in the same way as homeostatic needs
-- and which drives psychological activity. At the psychological level, need thus
becomes nothing other than the "introspective aspect" of this physiological motor. In
other words, it involves the sensation of a physiological need. It is therefore
inconceivable, says Piaget ( 1936, chapt. 1), that this "motor" could direct behavior.

In our view, by contrast, needs or behavior dynamics are inherent in the total functioning
of a living being and in each of its specific forms in particular. Therefore, they are not
only physiological in nature (chapter 4). Even in its pre-behavioral stage, the need is
intrinsically oriented toward specific forms of behavioral relationships (chapter 3). Thus,
instead of reflecting only physiological forces, needs participate in the psychological as
well as physiological nature of behavioral functioning of which they are the dynamic
aspects.

Schema and meaning. In addition to its dynamic quality, the Piagetian concept of schema
has a structural aspect. It is the schema that gives to a movement or to an object its
structure and its unity and that, therefore, transforms the movement into behavior or
gives meaning to an object. It is the schema that causes an object to be known either as a
"triangle" or as a "chair." It is the schema that gives to a group of movements the nature
of an action that consists, for instance, of "putting aside an obstacle" or "grasping an
object." In other words, the schema transforms a meaningless muscular contraction into a
significant behavior. In our view, it is the "meaning" of a behavior which constitutes its
"schema" in the structural

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sense of the term. This meaning is established gradually, beginning with sensory-motor
elements and based upon the relationships which the individual perceives and
understands between a movement, on the one hand, and a goal on the other. In other
words, the goal is the organizing factor within the schema. It is the intentional direction
of a group of movements towards a goal-object which gives these movements their unity
and meaning, in the same way that it is the incorporation of some object into a motivated
behavior which results in giving to that object its functional meaning (see chapter 2).

Thus, it is desirable to distinguish two aspects of the complex concept of schema. From a
structural perspective, the schema represents that which has been called the meaning of
an object or of a behavioral act. From the dynamic perspective, a schema represents the
behavioral project or dynamic goal-directedness which is the essence of a behavioral act.
In both instances, a cognitive-dynamic element is involved which represents the very
kernel of all behavior and which gives to it its dynamic orientation as well as its
meaning. In an earlier publication ( Nuttin, 1953, p. 445-452) I showed that the
meaningfulness of an object represents a kind of residue ("precipitate") or
"crystalization" of either performed or perceived behavior. Thus, generally speaking,
cognition is residual behavior in the same way as behavior itself represents operational
cognition and motivation (intentionality). When an object or situation is subsequently
perceived, the behavioral patterns implied in its meaning (schemas, frames, or
paradigms) are evoked in such a way that the perception of the object often becomes an
invitation, an expectation of the onset of comparable behavior. Thus, perceiving a
restaurant may evoke eating behavior. Similar views have been expressed recently by
Hewitt ( 1974) and others. In this way it is evident how closely interwoven are the
cognitive, motivational, and operational or "executive" phases of behavior. The wide gap
between cognition and behavior as proposed by behaviorism does not really exist, as
noted above. This more integrated concept of behavior results from the model presented
in chapter 2: behavior is not "movement plus the cognitive element of meaning," but
meaning that is incorporated in motor responses.

Functioning and needs. Some investigators (e.g., Eckblad, 1981) have discussed the
problem of the primary or secondary character of the concept of need in relation to the
functioning of the organism. According to the "scheme theory" as presented by Eckblad
on the basis of certain Piagetian concepts, the functioning of a system is primary and
motivation is secondary. Eckblad ( 1981, p. 101-102) states that the reverse is true for
Nuttin. It should be noted that both in our view and in Piaget's, functioning itself is
dynamic. The living, that is to say the functioning, being is intrinsically dynamic. It
should be emphasized that, in our view, it is impossible to

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arouse, within a system, motivation or need as a secondary element. Taking the example
used by Eckblad, we claim that interfering with the assimilatory activity of a schema
cannot give rise to a motive if the very activity of assimilation is not itself dynamic. In
other words, needs will not arise as a consequence of disequilibrium among schemas, as
suggested by Eckblad, unless there is a tendency towards equilibrium which is basic to
the system. Thus, in our opinion the dynamic factor must be present in a primary
inherent way within the functional system if preventing or hindering its activity is to
have a motivational effect. Even though we do not accept this tendency toward
equilibrium as basic to human motivation (chapter 4), we recognize the dynamic
character of functioning in the living being. This point is essential to the theory presented
in this book. By contrast, Piaget recognizes the need as the "conative or affective aspect
of a schema inasfar as the schema requires objects which can be assimilated" (italics
mine). Piaget sees no basis for considering motivation as a separate factor, as noted
above, because he includes the dynamic aspect within the functions of assimilation and
accommodation. By contrast in our view, it is necessary to establish in an explicit and
scientifically acceptable fashion the motivation factor per se, given that this dynamic
element is responsible for the direction of behavior and thus its principal characteristic. It
is through this behavior that man in effect does not seek to obtain, indifferently, anything
among the objects which he assimilates. Rather, he approaches some and avoids others.
Thus, motivational direction must be distinguished from assimilative and
accommodating functioning.

There is another major reason to distinguish motivational and functional processes.

Consider, for example, cognitive functioning. It is obvious that both the motivation to
perceive and cognitive curiosity should be studied as processes different from perception
itself since they obey different laws. The same distinction is necessary between social
functioning and its motivation. In summary, on the one hand, needs should not be
considered as entities in and of themselves; they are inherent in living functioning and in
its different potentialities; on the other hand, one should avoid confusing needs with the
very act of functioning since motivation gives behavioral functioning its direction and
obeys different laws.

Dynamic functioning and adaptation. Finally, we should consider the adaptive character
of behavioral functioning. As noted at the beginning of this section, the fact that Piaget
approaches behavior from the viewpoint of cognitive activity, whereas we emphasize its
motivational aspect, has resulted in two different perspectives.

What Piaget labels as the over-all adaptive process with its assimilation and
accommodation phases relates to our originally undifferentiated concept of interactional
functioning within the I-E unit. At the psychological

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level, this functioning represents behavior in its most global sense. It includes the
integrated activity of a variety of functions, including motoric, cognitive, motivational,
and emotional processes, each of which operate according to their own rules, which are
not necessarily adaptive in nature. In our view, in agreement with Piaget, this
functioning implies a dynamic aspect; the living being is not just functioning, he is also a
functional dynamism. In Piaget's view, this dynamism represents a tendency toward
adaptation. In our view, the over-all behavior of the living being essentially represents a
tendency toward interactional functioning in the direction of personal self-development
in a variety of forms. Cognitive functioning is part of that over-all dynamic behavior and
follows its own rules.

Considered within the framework of human action, functioning toward self-development

is not necessarily adaptive. More so than animals, humans are incapable of leaving
things the way they found them. Through his actions, man tends to transform the state of
things in the direction of his behavioral projects. It is in this way that he changes the
world of nature into a world of culture that reflects his basic goals. Most important, man
is for himself a subject to be developed, changed or improved. Such goals represent the
cognitive elaborations of his needs including his tendency to surpass the present state of
affairs. Thus, one can say that, in an active fashion, man adapts his world and himself to
his own constructions, more than he adapts his constructions to a given situation. Rather
than consider this active adaptation as the assimilation of reality, it appears to be, for
man himself, the accomplishment of a goal. This goal does not consist, as is the case
with cognition, in the construction of a cognitive image which adapts to the given reality,
nor in the accommodation of existing schemas which allows one to assimilate the reality
given. Rather it involves the actual transformation of reality.

Obviously, within the process of reality transformation, adaptation plays a specific role
in the sense that the human being conforms and accommodates effectively to those
aspects of reality that resist his efforts, i.e., those which do not allow themselves to be
transformed. In this case, the individual adjusts partially in order to maximize the
realization of his initial goal. Thus, adaptation in essence becomes a strategy which is
used secondarily in the service of the individual's dynamism toward self-development.

If one insists on preserving the term adaptation for this aspect of the human dynamism,
it is possible to state that the human being, in attempting to adapt his world to the image
which he creates, seeks ultimately to adapt to himself ( Fraisse, 1967), i.e., to be himself.
In any case, it would be necessary to specify how this adaptation to oneself occurs. In the
context of a being who is characterized by a tendency to improve and to go beyond that
which he has achieved, non-adaptation would appear to consist in not being able to
accomplish the desired goal or ideal. Man's permanent defi-

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ciency is that non-attained ideal. In this instance, man would feel "unadapted" to the
extent that he cannot change a situation to meet his goals. In this sense, a profound and
new meaning can be added to those already associated with the term adaptation.

Discrepancy, Dissonance, Balance and Motivation

The proposed motivational model assumes that the dynamism of action is found, not in
the discrepancy between an actual state and the desired goal, but in the very need
involved in the construction of this goal. Given the importance of concepts such as
discrepancy or dissonance and their complements balance and congruence in
contemporary psychology, it is appropriate to examine the motivational component of
these concepts which are suggestive of homeostatic equilibrium. In theoretical systems
such as Heider's ( 1946; 1958) balance theory and Festinger's ( 1957) cognitive
dissonance theory, concordance and its disruption reflect perceptual or cognitive rather
than biological equilibrium. Moreover, the following shows that these concepts are based
on an essentially Gestaltist view of motivation in which the principle of "good form"
plays an important role.

It is obvious that within a whole of relationships certain arrangements and links are
preferred over others. In essence, some result in harmony or accord, whereas other
relationships produce discomfort or disruption. Thus, perceived deviation from "good
form" results in adjustive tendencies, for example when one spontaneously alters the
position of a framed painting that hangs askew on the wall. "Good form" thus has a
dynamic component as do all "Gestalten." Typically, one prefers such forms to other
possible organizations and one strives both to perceive and to realize them ( Köhler,
1940; Heider, 1960). As is evident in Heider's ( 1960) system, Gestalt psychology
adopted this concept as central to its dynamic theory.

In addition to its relationship to perception, the concept of "good form" can be applied to
all cognitive analyses of a set of elements. Thus, in the interpersonal realm, we typically
prefer to see and know that someone whom we like also appreciates what we value. In
fact, it is relatively uncomfortable, even embarrassing, to learn that the person dislikes it
( Heider, 1958). Similarly, in relation to emotions, an individual considers it
"unreasonable" to experience a sense of fear in a situation in which there is no apparent
danger. In terms of the concept of "good form," fear in such a situation is disharmonious
and, cognitively, dissonant.

For example, we know that an instance of an "unreasonable" fear was, for Festinger, an
early stimulus for the development of his theory of cognitive dissonance ( Festinger,
1957). After an earthquake, individuals who remain frightened do not attempt to reduce
their anxiety by questioning rumors, but instead tend to believe disquieting ones as a way
of affec-

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tively justifying their fear. From a cognitive perspective, an unreasonable fear is a

disharmonious structure, (i.e., "bad form"), and thus dissonant. By finding reasons to
justify the experience of fear, an individual is assumed to be able to satisfy his need to
reduce such cognitive disharmony and, consequently to feel at ease with is fear (
Abelson et al., 1968) 13.

In 1944, Heider stated that a "good fear" requires that one recognize danger in the
environmental milieu; similarly, "good anger" requires that one be able to associate it
with personal injury. These examples represent instances of the law of "good form" or
"good unit" which assumes that certain relationships must be observed among the
component elements of perceptual or cognitive units. According to Heider, the formation
of such unities follows the laws involved with the formation of perceptual unities (
Heider, 1944, p. 327; Sarup, 1978).

According to Festinger, a similar principle is involved in experiments related to

cognitive dissonance. Thus, an individual is made uncomfortable by the perception of
two elements of awareness that are inconsistent with each other within his own
personality. Such elements form a poor Gestalt and consequently the individual attempts
to alter his percepts, attitudes, or concepts, as demonstrated in Festinger's research.
Generally speaking, it seems plausible that the tendency to be "reasonable" in behavior
can also be conceptualized in terms of a need to arrive at "good form" at a cognitive
level.

It is important, however, to distinguish among the various degrees of discomfort and

disharmony resulting from situations that do not correspond to the preferred form. The
examples given include a spontaneous attempt to straighten a somewhat lopsided picture,
the discomfort that accompanies the sadness resulting when two friends fight ( Heider),
and the guilt experienced by an individual who, in his actions and his words, ignores his
personal convictions for unacceptable reasons ( Festinger). From a motivational
perspective, an individual who is aware that he is speaking or acting in contrast to his
convictions, sets off dynamisms much more powerful than those involved for the
individual who attempts to straighten the unbalanced picture. In fact, in the former case
the need for internal consistency is at stake. Similarly, the individual who knows his two
friends are fighting suffers not only because of the fact that the various elements of the
configuration in question (i.e., his friends, their dispute, and himself) no longer constitute
a "good unit" but also because his affection for them is directly involved. For this reason,
Heider ( 1960) strongly emphasized that his balance theory is not a general theory of
motivation. As he noted, his

____________________
13
It is interesting to note the link of these findings with the research and interpretations
of Schachter ( 1964) relative to the attribution of determinants of emotion.

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theory is intended merely to "draw attention to certain aspects of a limited number of

motivational phenomena" ( Heider, 1960, p. 171).

It must be emphasized that the concepts of balance and dissonance, as used in this
context, relate to a limited aspect of human motivation, namely the cognitive or
perceptual preference for certain harmonious forms of relationships and "good units."
Yet, it is evident that this is not the primary source of human dynamism. The
relationships that are "required" for optimal functioning refer to needs rooted in the
dynamic functioning of life itself, as shown in chapter 3. The Gestaltist view conceives
of motivation in terms of concepts borrowed from the study of perception. In my view,
this perspective is inadequate. In addition to perceptual and cognitive tendencies toward
harmonious configurations or "good forms," certain behavioral dynamics, related to
various needs, may be evoked by, or implied in, the disharmonious cognitive
relationships. In that case, the dissonance is not just cognitive (i.e., related to cognitive
tendencies), but involves various personality dynamics. The following examples may
illustrate that point.

It is obvious that some conflicts exist which are purely cognitive in nature and elicit only
cognitive behavior changes (such as changing one's views, changing one's attitudes,
etc.). For example, the individual who constructs hypotheses in order to explain a
phenomenon and recognizes contradictory elements in his explanation will change his
construction in order to eliminate such "cognitive dissonance." An entirely different
matter, however, is the subject who within a laboratory experiment, for example, lies to
another subject in order to comply with the experimenter's instructions. In this case, the
conflict which results in the first subject is not limited to dissonance between cognitive
contents. The individual is supposed to know the difference between reality and what he
said to the subject, but the critical element of the situation is not cognitive. The fact is
that the first subject hates to lie and yet is aware that he did lie to another. To the degree
that he recognizes the falsehood of his comments, it is obvious to him that his action is
inconsistent with his concept of himself and his underlying need for self-consistency.
This dynamic aspect of the conflict is more important than the cognitive dissonance.
Thus, an explanation in terms of cognitive dissonance is another example of the
tendency of some psychologists to substitute cognitive processes for behavior dynamics,
as shown earlier.

Similarly, an individual who chainsmokes experiences a conflict between his desire to

protect his health and the pleasure of smoking. The state of tension produced in the
subject by the perception (cognition) of the dissonance between his desire and his act
involves all of the dynamisms at stake (protecting one's health and smoking pleasure)
and not just the tendency toward cognitive consonance.

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It is important to emphasize that cognitive aspects play an essential role in all

psychological conflicts. They do so in the sense that the relevant elements are in conflict
only to the extent that they are perceived or understood in terms of their significance for
the individual's self-concept. Smoking and lying become conflictual in relation to certain
concepts and meanings which the individual gives to these acts relative to his self-
concept. Elements that change the meaning of acts -- an important reason which justifies
the lie, or ignorance of the negative effects of tobacco, for example -- change the
perceived conflict, i.e., the level of dissonance. The effect of either minor or important
rewards given to subjects as a compensation of their lying ( J.M. Nuttin Jr., 1975) could
be interpreted along these lines.

The above remarks are consonant with interpretations that emphasize the dynamics of
self-concept and personal involvement in this context ( Aronson, 1968). Similar
consideration of motivational involvement is found in Brehm and Cohen's ( 1962) work,
as well as in the concept of personal responsibility proposed by Wicklund and Brehm (
1976). Each of these authors refers to personality's dynamic core and its tendency toward
self consistency. 14 This perspective is emphasized because it is consistent with our
concept of the dynamism of self-development and internal consistency inherent in
personality. A similar recognition of the fundamental dynamism of personality is found
in Allport's revised conceptions of the functional autonomy of motivation, as shown
below.

In conclusion, in most cases of cognitive dissonance, the state of tension experienced by

the individual derives from a conflict which is more fundamental than the discomfort
related to the dissonant cognitive elements. In other words, it goes beyond the principle
of "good form." In fact, it involves a conflict between fundamentally different needs
(internal consistency, protection of one's physical health, etc.). Yet, because
psychological conflict -- like behavior in general -- is based upon the perceived meaning
of the conflicting elements, the conflict can be resolved cognitively by changing the
perception of these elements and by changing, consequently, the individual's attitude
toward them. In effect, there are two ways to resolve the conflict: Relative to the
smoking example, the individual might stop smoking and thereby protect his health, or
he might change his opinion about the effects of smoking and thereby no longer perceive
the conflict. In essence, that which is not perceived does not exist psychologically. These
comments are offered solely to put the important contributions of the theory of balance
and of cognitive dissonance in the framework of a general theory of motivation.

____________________
14
Interested readers are referred to the theoretical comments of Greenwald and Ronis (
1978).

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Behavioral Projects and the Rationalization of Motivations

To conceptualize motivation in terms of cognitively processed goals and behavioral

projects, as I have in this book, is not equivalent to a rational conception of the
motivational process. An individual acting under the influence of an intense hatred or
any other strong and even unconscious urge may set a goal of killing a person. He may
think about accomplishing this goal by surprising the victim at a specific place and time.
I am suggesting that the overwhelming majority of human actions, even those which are
initiated by irrational, even unconscious, tendencies, involve the activation of cognitive
functions. Thus, the urge to do something is usually processed into a goal and a plan to
implement that goal. Both criminals and insane people, acting under the influence of
irrational instincts and abnormal processes, often carry out well coordinated sets of
action, which imply the existence of cognitive-dynamic means-end structures. It is,
therefore, assumed that cognitive processes are activated by all kinds of motivational
states and that goals and means-end structures result from the cognitive processing of
these motivational states. Only actions that are manifested either as emotional explosions
or as reflexes appear not to involve an efficient degree of cognitive processing. It is
indeed rare to find human behaviors in which the most subtle and flexible processes of
human functioning, i.e., cognitions, are not involved.

The activity of cognitive functions within the overall behavioral process is not to be
identified with the post factum "rationalizations" that are constructed in order to justify
one's behavior. As to the unconscious character of some activities, it refers only to some
segments of the behavioral process. Thus, an individual who is said to have an
unconscious fear or hatred with respect to a person, is aware of his hatred or fear and
often of his plan to avoid that person. Yet some processes and factors at the origin of his
feelings may remain unconscious.

"Irrational" motivations refer to urges that are not integrated in the dynamic self-concept
and value system of the individual. Generally speaking, behavior dynamics are
"irrational" as long as they have not been cognitively processed (prebehavioral stage).
Moreover, the basically heterogeneous and polyvalent nature of human dynamics makes
a fully harmonious integration difficult or even impossible. Thus, the human tendency
toward inner consistency and dynamic integration is bound to result in conflict, which is
a basic characteristic of human motivation. Conflict is the manifestation of disharmony,
but also of the diversity and richness of human motivation. The opposition between
conflicting tendencies is in no way explained by labeling one set of these as
"autochtone" and the other as socially imposed. In effect, socially transmitted tendencies
cannot be "in-

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ternalized" -- i.e., become my tendencies -- except insofar as they reflect the dynamic
potential of being human. Both, in fact, represent authentic aspects of genuine human
dynamisms.

PERSONALIZATION OF MOTIVATION

Besides the transformation of needs into goals and plans of action, the cognitive
processing of motivation results in a second important development, namely the
personalization of motives. In transforming itself into goals and projects, a need becomes
a "personal affair." The resulting goal is my goal and the behavior used to pursue it is my
action. This personalizing process affects both the dynamic and regulatory characteristics
of goals.

It is well known that many psychologists have emphasized the impersonal and
instinctual nature of human motivation. In Freudian psychology, for instance, behavior
dynamics belong to the impersonal Id, the unconscious level of personality. By contrast,
the ego is almost completely devoid of motivational impact. Even in McDougall's theory
of instincts, the concept of sentiments is presented as a combination of instinctual
emotions, rather than as a personalized motive. With respect to drive theories, the
dynamic impact is formulated in terms of physiological stimuli and automatic
reinforcement. In modern psychology, Kurt Lewin, Gordon Allport, and Henry Murray
were among the first exceptions to recognize the personalized aspects of motivation.

First, it should be noted that "personalizing the motives" was Allport's main concern in
elaborating his theory of the functional autonomy of motives. Adult actions, Allport
says, are motivated neither by instinctive forces ( McDougall), nor by infantile impulses
( Freud), but through personal motivational structures. In order to preserve the
personalized character of motivation, Allport initially thought it was necessary to detach
concrete motives from all basic dynamic orientations or needs. Therefore, he conceived
an adult motive as originating in the repetition of the motivational act itself. Thus, an act
was thought to detach itself from impersonal dynamics such as needs, instincts, or
drives, and to become functionally autonomous. In other words, the "mechanism" of
repeatingly doing something was said to become a "drive," according to Woodworth's
principle: "mechanisms become drives." However, it soon appeared that mere repetition
is not a source of motivation. It is not because a person has lacedup his shoes a thousand
times that he becomes motivated to lace-up shoes. Moreover, the principle of repetition
itself results in an automatization of behavior, rather than in its personalization. In fact,
the "mechanism" of a repeated act is obviously not personalized. Therefore, in his later
publications, Allport ( 1961) reformulated his theory. At that point he argued that a

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motive that evolves out of the subject's basic need for personality development is a
personalized motivation. This concept is in agreement with the model herein proposed.
In that model, motivation becomes personalized through the cognitive elaboration of a
need into a personal goal and intention to do something, and to do it according to a self-
constructed or accepted plan. As a result of this process, needs assume concrete and
personalized forms which reflect the individual's concept of himself and of his world.
These cognitive-dynamic structures are not copies of an innate, instinctive dynamism
which repeats itself identically in each individual of the same species. The basic need for
self-development, for instance, does not exist concretely except in the form of
personalized goals and projects which reflect the dynamic image which the individual
constructs of himself and of his environment.

The impact of the personalization of needs on the motivation for a specific behavior can
be documented at the levels of common observation and of experimental research. In the
former case, we often learn that a relatively unimportant undertaking is pursued with
tenacious perseverance because the person has a high level of "ego-involvement" in that
activity. He has taken, for instance, the initiative or the responsibility for it. In effect, he
pursues that project, independent of its objective importance, or defends an idea, simply
because it is his project or his idea. In other words, the attainment of the goal which he
has set for himself becomes of personal importance to the individual. Prestige and self-
esteem become the dynamic elements which underly the project and which may, at
times, surpass the original attraction to the goal.

At the experimental level, it was shown ( Lewin, 1935) that a subject who feels
personally engaged and involved in a task, tends to go on with that task although the
experimenter tells him to stop it. It was found that the same tendency to accomplish the
interrupted task is not manifested when another person started it ( Ferdinand, 1959).
Thus, what is involved here is not simply the Gestalt principle of closure, but rather the
personal involvement in the task as a whole.

Generally speaking, it can be said that each personal project or enterprise is

complemented with an additional amount of motivation: Besides the behavior dynamics
that are concretized in a specific plan, the basic need for self-development, self-
enhancement, or self-esteem is involved in the activity to the extent that the individual
engages himself in it.

The Motivational Power of Ideas and Ideologies

Before examining further the personalization of motivation as it manifests itself in the

auto-regulation of behavior, we would like to consider briefly the motivational power
attached to such personalized and ego-involved constructs as convictions, ideas, theories,
and ideologies. For our purpose it

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will be helpful to distinguish between two kinds of such cognitive-dynamic structures.

In discussing the cognitive processing of needs, it has been emphasized that motivational
states or needs activate cognitive functioning (perception, memory, thinking, imagining,
reasoning, etc.). Such cognitive functioning is the primary mechanism through which the
individual constructs a behavioral outlet for his need. Thus, goals and plans of action are
behavioral realizations of the need at the cognitive level of functioning, as shown above.
Most ideologies, convictions, and ideas belong to that type of cognitive-dynamic
structure. For instance, the "idea" that "all men are equal" is not a judgment of the type
that 2 + 2 = 4, or that a part is less than the whole. Rather, it implies an "ideology" of
what human beings and society ought to be. It is the cognitive expression of a goal to be
achieved or a state of affairs that ought to be established. In other words the motivational
power of such convictions and ideas is obvious since they are cognitive concretizations
of human dynamics.

A second type of cognitive systems is related to the human need to understand and
explain events and situations that concern the individual. This cognitive need finds its
satisfaction in the ideational structures that develop within cultural settings or are
constructed by individual philosophers and scientists. They usually try to explain general
human problems, such as the existential situation of man, the meaning of life, society,
and personality. In other cases, they may be of a much more limited scope and interest
only a limited number of individuals. To the extent that people are more or less
personally involved in such ideational structures, they will be motivationally and
emotionally attached to them, try to communicate them to others, and to defend them.
This dynamic aspect of cognitive structures is found even in scientists adhering to their
scientific constructs. In fact, cognitive systems become personal convictions or personal
achievements, people tend to be consistent to themselves, and the dynamics of ego-
involvement, mentioned above, often apply to these constructs: Man adheres to his ideas
as to himself.

It must be added that very often the second type of ideational structure does not limit
itself to purely cognitive explanations. In many cases, philosophical and religious
systems about men, society, and life in general urge their adherents to behave in certain
ways and seek to transform society along certain lines. Thus, both types of cognitive
systems often overlap, since thinking and acting in humans are very closely related to
each other.

Internal Regulation of Behavior (Auto-Regulation)

The main result of the personalization of motivation involves autoregulation, i.e., a

process of internal regulation of behavior. In order to understand that process and its
importance for a model of human behavior,

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it may be helpful, first, to consider its opposite, the external regulation of behavior and,
second, to investigate the way in which the new concepts of auto-regulation and auto-
reinforcement have been introduced in presentday psychology.

First, behavioristic theory typically provides the example of an external regulation

system. The reinforcements -- rewards and punishments -- which are administered by the
experimenter are, in essence, considered the only factors involved in the regulation and
modification of behavior. In direct opposition to this external reinforcement system is the
concept of internal regulation in which the subject's personal evaluation of his results is
considered to be essential. Research on levels of aspiration ( Lewin, 1935), for instance,
demonstrates that success or failure is not defined in terms of objective results, but in
terms of the individual's personal goal. In other words, whether a consequence is
positively or negatively reinforcing depends upon whether or not the individual achieved
his personal goal. An objectively negative consequence can have a positive impact if it is
perceived as a means towards some personal goal, whereas an individual whose goal is
only to obtain the external rewards offered by the experimenter will regulate his
instrumental activities in terms of the reinforcement contingencies established by this
external agent. In this way a reinforcement schedule will be able to influence the
behavior of an intelligent man. Such an individual will even display forms of
"superstitious" behavior when he is hungry if he discovers that such random behavior is
actually followed by nourishment (the law of instrumentality). In other words, to the
extent that an intelligent individual anticipates or realizes that a desired goal can be
obtained by a specific act, he will be motivated -- through internal regulation -- to
engage in that act.

In view of the importance of conceptions of auto-reinforcement and internal regulation it

is relevant to discuss briefly their origin and introduction in contemporary psychology.

Origin of the concept of auto-reinforcement. Introduction of terms such as self-reward,

self-reinforcement, and self-approbation represented a new direction for the psychology
of motivation and learning. For a long time motivation was studied in terms of the
individual receiving reward and approval from others. Attention is now, however, being
focused on the role of self-approval. In addition to external events, behavior is
influenced by the individual who evaluates and approves his own responses -- this
phenomenon is labeled self-reinforcement. In order to appreciate completely the
innovativeness of such a view, readers should recall that the external reinforcements,
referred to in behavioristic theories, relate directly or indirectly to the satisfaction of
organic needs (primary and secondary reinforcement). By contrast, self-reinforcement
refers to processes associated

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with the personalization of needs, i.e., to the personality of the individual who not only
experiences the "impersonally determined" states of hunger and satisfaction, but is also
able to establish standards for himself and evaluate his actions in relation to these norms.

The historical origin of contemporary thinking on this issue is found in the work of Kurt
Lewin and also of Gordon Allport ( 1943) who discussed the concept of ego in
contemporary psychology and especially in his interpretation of Thorndike's law of
effect.

In 1945, criticism of the law of effect from a personality point of view was the focus of a
symposium involving Allport, Mowrer, and Rice. 15 In the report of this symposium one
observes for the first time use of such terms as "self-approbation," "self-administered
reward," and finally "selfreward." Mowrer ( 1950) referred to this same concept in a later
chapter on identification. It is possible that Mowrer, as well as Sears and Child, were
thinking about Freud's concept of self-punishment in using for the first time the term
"self-reward." 16 In my own writing on the law of effect, I introduced a distinction
between the concept of success as opposed to reward in order to emphasize the
difference between a result with which an individual is himself satisfied (success) and a
result rewarded externally by the experimenter ( Nuttin, 1953, p. 57-70). Since 1960, the
term self-reward has been widely employed in research on social learning and, more
generally, on behavior modification. Similar concepts are presented in the cognitive
theories of Mischel ( 1973) and Heckhausen ( 1973; 1975; 1981). These theorists refer to
such concepts as "self-reinforcing functions," "selfproduced consequences," and "self-
imposed standards and goals." Rotter's ( 1954) concept of a "minimal goal" referred to
the same concept. In a similar vein, one should also mention the more recent research of
Weiner ( 1974) in which it is demonstrated that the emotional concomitants of an
objective success and failure depend upon the perception of the "causes" which produce
this result. Specifically, if the locus of control is perceived as internal, the individual
responds to success and failure respectively with pleasure or displeasure. If, by contrast,
the locus of control is perceived as external, there is no emotional impact on the
individual. This body of research underlines the importance of the internal regulation of
behavior.

____________________
15
The text of the symposium was published in 1946 in Psychological Review, vol. 53.
16
The terms "self-reinforcement" and "self-punishment" which have been used since
1953 by Skinner refer to a diffeent mechanism ( Skinner, 1953, p. 237-239). With
respect to Thorndike's writings, it is not justified to interpret his concept of OK-
reaction in terms of self-reward ( Mowrer … Ullman, 1945). In his book, Thorndike (
1940) talks about self-approval without referring to his law of effect or to the OK-
reaction.

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Self-concept. The motivational and cognitive processes implied in selfapproval find their
origin in a behaving human subject who is able to know himself. In fact, his personality
i.e., his pattern of psychological functioning represents the central component of a
behavioral system in which all information arrives and is processed and by which the
over-all system is regulated and controlled ( Fraisse, 1976). This subject or processing
center is an organism that is able, as just stated, to serve as the object of his own
cognitive activity (i.e., he knows himself) and is often referred to as an "ego." 17 In the
process of knowing himself, the individual is also aware -- at least partially -- of his
behavior dynamics or needs. In fact, in that processing center, the subject's need for self-
development concretizes itself in conscious goals and plans and in an over-all concept of
his dynamic self, i.e., the dynamic self-concept or ego-level in Lewin's terminology. As
the personalized concretization of a need for self-development, the self-knowing
personality and the dynamic self-concept function as a source of new personalized
motivation in the various behavioral life-situations. Indeed, in man the processes of self-
development and growth are not limited to the functional dynamism of biological
growth. They also consist in setting and reaching goals and in becoming more or less
what one intends to be. In other words, through his higher cognitive functions, the
human individual develops a self-concept, i.e., a certain image or idea of himself.
Moreover, the inherent functional dynamism within the personality (cf. chapter 3) adds a
dynamic dimension to the self-concept. It is that dynamic self-concept that concretizes
itself in personalized goals which function as criteria for the internal regulation of
personalized action. Thus the dynamic self-concept is the internal criterion through
which self-evaluation, self-approval, selfpunishment, and personal values take shape. It
is within the same context that a certain tension, and even conflict, may develop between
the ideal and the realistic self-concept, i.e., the self as perceived and the self as
dynamically conceived. In this context, one is allowed to say with Hunt ( 1971) that
achieving one's goals and accomplishing one's projects and tasks are the most important
forms of reinforcement. The difference between such self-reinforcement and external
reward is comparable to the difference between ego-pleasure and sensory pleasure, or
between a true success and an extrinsic reward.

In the same context, a better insight may be gained into the earlier defined concept of
"optimal functioning." It is important to note that, at the level of personalized behavior,
"optimal functioning" is largely self-determined by the behaving personality. Thus
human psychological needs may, for the most part, be defined in terms of self-
constructed goals and plans. One may

____________________
17
The term ego is used in a global sense to refer to all of personality in contrast to the
Freudian concept of ego which is stripped of all its motivational functions.

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say that, on the one hand, goals are concretizations of behavioral needs, but that, on the
other hand, the goals become self-constructed criteria, standards, or norms that must be
met in order for the personality to be satisfied with himself i.e., to meet his personalized
needs. Reaching one's goals has become a psychological and personalized need. In other
words, our definition of needs refers to the concept of optimal functioning (chapter 3).
This optimal functioning, now, appears to consist largely of being able to do and to
achieve what one sets out to do and to achieve. Thus, man appears to be largely
responsible for what he finally needs on the level of personality functioning. To a certain
extent, his concrete psychological needs and criteria are self-constructed. It is necessary,
however, to add "to a certain extent," because at each stage of personality development,
the internal criteria of what one has to achieve cannot be lowered or changed indefinitely
without entering into conflict with the concept of oneself. In fact, the dynamic concept of
the self, or ego-level, are rather stable criteria which -- according to the ascending
tendency in human motivation -- may try to increase rather than decrease their
exigencies. However, values may change as a function of personality restructuring or
reorganizing one's behavioral world and its value hierarchy.

Motivational alienation. In contrast to the personalization of motivation there is also a

process of motivational alienation which should be briefly mentioned. This process
refers to the means by which an individual experiencing social or some other form of
pressure is led at times to do and perhaps even to wish for things that are inconsistent
with his own intentions and perceptions. Some interesting experiments on the impact of
social pressure and conformity have examined this problem ( deMontmollin, 1977;
Mulder, 1977). The reader should recall the early research by Asch on perceptual
conformity which resulted from the influence of peer pressure. Even more dramatic than
these forms of social influence is the impact of authoritarian pressure on the thoughts
and actions of individuals. The impact of this process is manifested, for instance, in the
behavior of citizens under certain political regimes and in research on passive obedience
to authority conducted by Milgram ( 1974). Motivational alienation thus refers to the
extent to which external pressure deprives the individual of the capacity to take a
position or to personally evaluate a situation ( Feuerlicht, 1978).

We have already noted that imitation and identification with other persons are strategies
for personal development in young individuals. With regard to social influences in
general, the main psychological problem in our present context is the degree of
personalized elaboration of these influences and interactions. In and by itself, the impact
of social factors and processes on individual behavior and development is the normal
course of human functioning. Social interaction, indeed, is not a process to be added

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to an individual's personality functioning. On the contrary, individual personality

functioning does not exist, and is not even possible, without a network of behavioral
relations and interactions with people and objects. Therefore, the social dimension is not
something to be added to the individual's functioning; it is implied in it, as has been
shown in our personality model. Each time we speak of the human individual we refer to
the socially functioning individual, i.e., to the individual within the
IndividualEnvironment unit as described in chapter 3. Other individuals do not exist.

Recently Moscovici ( 1976) proposed an interesting theoretical interpretation of

phenomena associated with social influence. His argument emphasizes processes
involved with social change and innovation resulting from the actions of an individual
upon a group. This emphasis on the individual acting upon the group, instead of the
group acting upon the individual, is similar to our thesis with regard to adaptation,
namely that instead of adapting themselves to the situation humans also are able to adapt
the situation to their own goals and plans. One should recognize, however, that for many
people conforming to others is perceived as the only possible form of self-development.

Will and "Personalized" Action

People are often surprised that the term will has not received more attention in the study
of human motivation. It is understandable, since psychology tends to conceptualize
behavior as being determined by external "loci of control." Even motivation is often
conceived in terms of stimuli, as noted above. It should be clear, of course, that we are
not questioning the influence of external factors on behavior. Yet, consideration of
selfregulation and self-reinforcement makes obvious the extent to which the individual's
self-concept and self-constructed goals influence the meaning and evaluation of these
external events and their impact on behavior. The motivation process referred to as
"will" should be considered within the same perspective. Will, in fact, belongs to that
category of personalized processes of motivational self-regulation which is also called
selfdetermination.

The first point to be emphasized is that the dynamic component of the will has its origin
in the general behavioral dynamism. This dynamism, or need, as shown in a previous
section, is cognitively processed into concrete goals to be achieved. In our conception,
the will is that concretized behavioral dynamism or tendency insofar as it is taken up,
subsumed, or accepted into the subject's concept of his dynamic self and self-
development. Consider schematically how such a process might work.

On the basis of his cognitive functioning, as already discussed, the individual is aware of
himself, his activities, opinions, and tendencies, and of

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the values of his social world. Gradually, through this awareness, the individual develops
a general image or concept of his dynamic self and the basic orientations of his
development. In other words, this image of himself represents the concretized scheme of
his needs and opinions as they develop in the course of his activities and experiences.
Unconscious tendencies, as explained above, may be part of that self-concept.

On the other hand, the impulses and urges which, at each moment, impact on the
individual as the concrete manifestations of his needs, are registered as entering
informations. Among these inputs, unconscious tendencies may be represented as
conscious signals for approach or avoidance behavior; they may also be concretized in
goals to be achieved.

It is at this moment that the self-regulating and self-evaluating process within the
individual examines the motivational congruence between the dynamic concept of the
self on the one hand, and the orientation of the tendency or the meaning of the proposed
goal-object on the other hand. Such self-evaluation can be compared with the "Test"
process of the T-O-T-E model, except that the present testing concerns the congruence
between two dynamic orientations.

The process can be illustrated by the following example. Consider a son who is tempted
to lie to his parents in order to be able to accompany his friends on a vacation despite the
anticipated opposition of his father. The son must evaluate and determine the extent to
which he is able to integrate within one structure the two conflicting components: his
image of himself and the lie to his parents as he perceives it in the present behavioral
context. Is he able to take up, subsume, or accept that concrete type of lying within his
dynamic self-concept? The strength of the tendency to accompany his friends will be one
of the factors determining the degree of distortion of the self-image that can be tolerated
by the personality. The degree of inner consistency within the subject's personality will
be another factor. In some people, there will be no difficulty at all in subsuming the lying
behavior in the self-concept; in other people, accepting such a lie within their own
personality functioning will not be possible. In the latter case, the subject is not "willing"
to lie in the present behavioral context. In between both extreme cases, several degrees
of hesitation and inhibition may characterize the subject's behavior. But, generally
speaking, it is to the extent that the subject "accepts" his lying behavior as an "act of his
own" that the act can be considered as an object of his will, i.e., as integrated in his self-
evaluating personality structure. Thus, in order for a tendency to become an act of will, it
is not sufficient that the individual is aware and recognizes that the tendency is actually
part of his personality functioning and that the act is experienced as attractive. It is also
necessary that the person decides or accepts to pursue the concrete goal of the tendency,
that is to say, that he allies himself with this way of functioning.

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In many cases, the object of a voluntary act is not pursued for itself but as a means
within the framework of a project or of an imposed or accepted task. In such a case, the
individual accepts both the goal and the means towards it.

The processes which have just been described relate the will to the dynamic conception
that the subject has developed of himself. The origin and the progressive development of
that "self-concept" result from the individual's experiences of, and responses to, all the
internal and external influences and factors acting upon its hereditary structure.

Finally, given the variety and complexity of human dynamics, one can expect that the
processes involved in the elaboration of a voluntary act will often occur within a
conflictual context. In fact, certain aspects of personality dynamics will tend to accept
the proposed action; others will oppose it. In other cases, however, a newly proposed
goal will be recognized immediately by the personality as fitting or not fitting within an
earlier chosen frame of personality development. Thus, a child who has learned and
accepted the habit of lying to his parents will experience no conflict in making lying
behavior an object of his will. On the contrary, a child who had never lied to his parents,
will have a difficult time in either maintaining or changing that image of himself. This
fact shows that the development of voluntary behavior is characterized by a few crucial
points of evaluation, choice, and decision, besides many quasi-automatically performed
acts. The latter are immediately recognized as fitting in previously adopted dynamic
schemes, in the same way as the goal to cure a patient is spontaneously generated in a
person who earlier in his life achieved the goal of becoming a physician. From what has
been said, it is easy to understand why some authors limit the activity of the will to
situations of conflict: In their view, voluntary actions are confined to the crucial points of
conflict and decision in human behavior. Most actions, however, are voluntary in their
cause or origin.

Free acts and personalized behavior. From a psychological point of view it is important
to distinguish between the motivational process of voluntary action and the philosophical
problem of a "free will" in human behavior. The first, as just shown, is a modality of
psychological functioning related to the problem of self-regulation, while the second
reflects the impact of philosophical and ethical problems dealing with human behavior.
These philosophical and ethical problems are of major importance, of course, in the
over-all evaluation of human action, responsibility and other social and individual
problems. in the scientific psychological context, however, we prefer not to discuss the
problem of freedom, since the problem is philosophical in nature and related to the
equally philosophical problem of determinism. Science can limit itself to investigating,
by means of its own methods, the relationships between

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phenomena and factors and to interpreting its findings in terms of its own theoretical
constructs. We, therefore, propose not to involve philosophical problems in our
discussion and not to speak of "free" actions, but of "personalized" behavior.

Some philosophical authors have a tendency to conceptualize free acts as spontaneous

outpourings or outflows, unaffected by tangible factors and emanating from the
personality. In contrast, it is found that action, as well as all other phenomena and events,
are influenced by multiple factors. There is no observable phenomenon whatsoever
which is not affected by this rule. It is, however, possible to speak of different kinds of
elaboration or processing of the factors which influence human acts. Since the human
being is capable of cognitive elaboration of data, he may process some inputs into
meaningful "information." This form of elaboration of certain impinging factors is
sufficiently distinct from other mechanisms -- such as biochemical processes, for
instance -- to lead to specific kinds of responses labeled behaviors. Thus, the processes
by which sodium chloride (1) is assimilated by the organism, (2) affects the chemical
composition of blood, and (3) produces the sensation of thirst are different from the
process by which the thirsty individual eventually decides to drink or not to drink.
Among these elaborative processes are some highly developed ones involving cognitive
functioning through which the behaving subject becomes aware of himself, of his
activities, aspirations, and motives, and of the world he perceives. Through his cognitive
functioning, the subject is able also to "re-present" circumstances and events which are
not actually present in the outside world and, therefore, possibly unknown to the
experimenter. Thus, in addition to the experimental factors that are manipulated by the
instructor, some other data and events may be cognitively present to the subject and
change the meaning of the experimental factors impinging on him. It is as a function of
such personally perceived data, together with his individual goals, that the subject
elaborates and evaluates each factor that impacts upon himself, as shown above. Thus,
the sensation of thirst produced by the assimilation of sodium chloride may lead not to
drinking behavior but to the decision to abstain from drinking because the subject
"thinks" that the water from the faucet tastes bad or because of some personal goals to be
achieved.

Without considering directly the philosophical question of the deterministic character of

the elaborative process, one can state that the type of cognitive elaboration just described
is "personalized" in the sense that the inputs and informational data have been processed
and evaluated as a function of the standards, goals, and self-concept the subject has
constructed and set for himself. The executive phase of his behavior is a function of this
personalized processing of data. As scientific psychologists, we do not want to go any
further than the personalized character of the act, as just described (see also the section
on self-regulation).

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As a way of making the processes involved in the concept of "personalized behavior"

more precise, a few comments will be made.

The fact that an experimenter is able to control the behavior of his subjects such that, by
manipulating the experimental factor, he can control either the occurrence or non-
occurrence of the desired act does not imply that the behaviors in question cannot
represent personalized actions. First, it must be mentioned that, at several levels of
psychological research, the self-regulating and personalized processes of a subject's
activity are not involved. Thus, for instance, the processes through which frustration
generates aggressive behavior or eating salted food produces drinking behavior must be
considered in two phases. First, there is the process by which frustration or salt
respectively produce a tendency to aggressive or drinking behavior. Second, there is the
passage from the tendency to overt aggressive or drinking behavior. Self-regulating
processes are not involved in the first process. The impact of personalized behavior
concerns only the passage from aggressive tendencies and thirst to aggressive actions
and drinking behavior respectively. In the latter process, thirst or another aroused
tendency becomes an additional "motive" for subjects in the experimental group. It will
normally lead to action by the subjects in that group as predicted in the hypothesis, even
if the tendency is elaborated by selfevaluating and self-regulating processes, except in
the rare case that an opposing self-constructed goal or reason interferes with that action.
Relative to most other forms of research, the problem of self-regulation does not arise at
all. Consider for instance, the mechanisms through which the structure of materials to be
memorized affects the degree of retention, or the processes by which specific light
stimuli are processed into color perception, etc.

With respect to the experimenter's control of a subject's action as a function of

manipulating an experimental factor, the following should also be considered. For
"reasonable" subjects who have agreed to participate in the study, the experimental
conditions will usually be perceived and processed such that they become "motives" or
"reasons" to carry out the desired action. Thus, it is through self-regulating or
personalized decision processes that the external conditions presented to them become
reasons for personalized action. It has been found that in many cases the instructions of
an experimenter, or even the very circumstances of an experimental situation, will
motivate the subject to perform an action that he would otherwise never perform. The
experimental situation as such seems to be a sufficient determinant or motive for
accepting and performing unusual behavior. It frees the subject from his personal
responsibility.

It should be noted, however, that the personalized way of processing behavioral

"determinants" is always combined with the physical, physiological, and unconscious
processes involved in behavior dynamics. Therefore, the personalized character of
behavior is necessarily relative and limited.
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In relation to the philosophical thesis proposed by some psychologists, namely that the
personalized and self-regulating behavioral process as just described is also the product
of a totally deterministic mechanism, one should consider that, in that case, the statement
itself of that thesis -- as well as of its opposite -- is an externally determined and
necessarily occurring event. It would be difficult to attribute any objective judgmental
value or veridicality to such a process.

In summary, to the extent that an action is co-determined by the selfknowing, self-

evaluating, and self-regulating processes described above, it is said to be "personalized"
and the subject is said to be the producer of his behavior. The processes of cognitive
elaboration and evaluation of factors confer to an action its distinct and relatively
personalized character, which distinguishes it from chemical or physiological reactions."
18

Personalized actions and predictability. From what has been said so far, it appears that
the fact that one must submit to the influence of various factors does not prevent the
individual from carrying out personalized actions. Relative to the predictability of such
actions, one should recognize the existence of a serious misunderstanding. It is important
to emphasize the distinction between experimental prediction and the prediction of a
specific concrete event. Experimental prediction refers to a way of formulating a
research hypothesis which can be either validated or invalidated. Thus, it may be
hypothesized, for instance, that frustration is at the origin of aggressive behavior. In
order to validate that hypothesis, it is predicted that, under controlled conditions,
frustrated children will display the phenomenon (aggression) to a significantly higher
degree than a control group. The hypothesis and its related prediction can be
experimentally tested. The scientifically investigated and validated phenomenon in such
research is that the factor of frustration exerts some influence on the behavioral event of
aggression. In other cases, only the existence of a relationship between the two
phenomena will be established. In any case, the research findings do not predict
aggressive behavior for a specific individual. It is, therefore, more accurate and less
ambiguous to state that the goal of psychology -- or of science in general -- is to study
the influence of various factors on events, rather than to formulate that goal in terms of
the

____________________
18
Relative to physical freedom, it is interesting to note that animals as well as newborns
strongly resist all attempts at physical restraint, Pavlov, who conceives of all
behaviors and behavior dynamics as "reflexes," speaks in this context of a "freedom
reflex" in the dog, just as he speaks of a food and curiosity reflex. In a series of
experiments on the origin of emotional reactions in the newborn, Fauville ( 1939;
1955) and his collaborators ( Stoffels, 1940; Lin, 1949) demonstrated a significant
increment (in a 5 to 1 proportion) of spontaneous movements of the two legs of a
newborn in reaction to artificial restriction of movements of the head. At the
psychological level, one finds analogous reactions in the phenomenon of "reactance"
studied by Brehm ( 1966; 1972; 1981).
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prediction of behavior. In fact, true prediction of a specific event depends upon

exhaustive knowledge of all relevant factors. In human psychology, such exhaustive
knowledge also involves awareness of those factors present on the cognitive or
representational level of the subject's functioning. Such specific predictability of
concrete events in uncontrolled situations is obviously very dependent upon the
complexity of the phenomenon studied. It may be relatively easy in physics, somewhat
more difficult in medicine, and almost unattainable in psychology. In fact, it is easy to
predict that a pot of water will start boiling with the application of a specifiable amount
of heat. But prediction is less accurate when linking cardiovascular disorders with a
personal history of eating animal fats.

It is important to note that, in psychology, behavior does not become less predictable in
relation to the extent to which it is "personalized." In fact, it is relatively easy to predict
the occurrence of an important and deliberate action that is performed by a familiar
person. Predictive accuracy decreases for unimportant acts that usually depend upon
thousands of circumstances wich are fortuitous and reflective only of momentary
conditions. Such actions are likely to be minimally personal and therefore much less
predictable under uncontrolled conditions. It can be stated that the more important and
personalized the act, the more predictable it will be for people who are familiar with the
involved individual. During the war, when the enemy demanded that the President of the
University provide a list of students, those who knew him could accurately predict that
he would not comply with this demand. However, his action was highly personalized in
the sense defined above, that is to say that all behavior determinants were elaborated as a
function of his self-concept, his hierarchy of values, and his personal goals.

Manipulation of behavior and "human dignity." In the context of personalized behavior,

another practical issue remains to be discussed. Specifically, attention must be given to
the problem of the so-called automatic modification of behavior using general
conditioning technology. Consider first the following cases.

Supplementary motives. It is often said that, in several fields of social life, citizens are
not really "free" to choose between two or more alternative possibilities once the State or
any other powerful agency links a "reward" to one of the alternatives offered. Thus, it is
said that in some countries parents cannot freely choose between a public and a private
school given that the cost of one is significantly higher than the cost of the other and
typically the distance that the child will have to travel is significantly longer in one case
than the other. In the same way, although farmers are not forbidden to grow certain crops
-- which would be illegal -- they are offered a

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sizeable reward if they choose not to do so. Skinner ( 1971) describes an analogous case
that was submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court. At issue was whether it is an infraction of
personal liberty to associate specific rewards and punishments for particular behaviors.
In terms consistent with cognitive motivation, such positive and negative
"reinforcements" are for the individual supplemental motives to act in an instrumental
fashion in one way rather than another.

From the perspective of psychological processes, we can state that adding supplemental
motivation does not prevent a subject from making a personalized choice. In other
words, behavior remains a personalized act in spite of the existence of these additional
motives. In effect, cognitive evaluation and self-regulation as described here operate
specifically on the motives or tendencies that are present at a given point in time. Yet,
even if the "free" or personalized nature of behavior remains, behavior itself has changed
in the examples given. The choice is no longer between a private and a public school, or
between planting or not planting a particular crop, but, in the first instance, between a
private school and supplemental expenses on the one hand, and a public school without
such expenses on the other.

Thus, individuals find themselves confronted with situations in which rather strong
means have been used to add one or more supplemental consequences to an action,
thereby eliminating for those individuals the possibility to choose simply between the
two alternatives. In more extreme cases, it is possible to present an individual with a
choice between participation in a political activity resulting in imprisonment, and
participation in a propaganda conference resulting in promotion. In each instance, the
processes of making a personalized decision remain possible, but the choice is limited to
imposed alternatives. The limitation of "freedom" is in the alternatives made available.
Thus, it is impossible to choose simply between two specific political activities. Since
the incentives are so unequal, only in very exceptional cases -- but still real -- will an
individual select that alternative to which is attached the certainty, or at least the risk, of
imprisonment. One cannot say that an individual who chooses the action resulting in
imprisonment does not carry out a personalized action. But he has been denied another
liberty -- that of remaining loyal to his political conviction without supplemental
consequences. The individual has been forced to link "political convictions and prison."
Avoiding the prison and attending the propaganda conference of the opposite party is an
equally personalized choice but easier to make for many people.

Automatic well being. At first glance, a less dramatic example appears to be that people's
behavioral acts will be followed by a "reinforcing consequence" whose positive nature is
determined by whether the action is or is

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not profitable. Someone who is concerned with your health, for example, might decide to
administer an electric shock each time that you take a cigarette and reward you each time
you select a piece of gum. It is not likely that everyone will agree with the means used
by this person who has such good intentions for you! Many will disagree with the
assumption that anyone can evaluate and decide what is good for someone without
consulting his own will, i.e., his own self-evaluating processes. People prefer to decide
for themselves what they will do and what is good for them. One might also question the
nature of the behaviors that would be followed by either positive or negative
reinforcements. The criteria which establish a reinforcement contingency are very
directly reflective of the personal evaluations -- i.e., the self regulation -- of each
individual. Therein lies the essential aspect of his personalized functioning system: A
foreign "agency" is substituted for the self-evaluating and self-regulating personality.

Skinner ( 1971), among others, has asked whether society can continue to permit to each
man the luxury to refuse behavioral techniques established to protect him against his
"unhealthy" urges. Should we make available general rewards for "healthy" behaviors?
Many answers have been offered to this question. In the final analysis, it seems
"inhumane" to improve or even protect an adult individual "without himself," i.e.,
without appealing to his own personalized evaluation, value hierarchy, and goals. One
might say that what is in fact being exploited in a generalized conditioning technique are
the mechanisms of elementary motivations, which spontaneously would direct people
toward the easy and attractive rewards such as sensory pleasures or social approval. In
fact, higher rewards are usually more individualized and, therefore, more specifically
related to the cognitive structures and goals of each individual.

In evaluating this universal happiness-creating system, one should consider, among

others, the following points. First, it is unrealistic to assume that through rewarding some
specific behavioral responses, all undesirable and socially unacceptable behaviors will be
gradually eliminated from people's behavioral repertoire. Many people feel rewarded in
performing acts that are harmful to others or socially unacceptable. There is no evidence
that these tendencies will be eliminated by rewarding other types behavior. Second,
happiness and reward seem to be highly differentiated states. Thus objects and events
that are rewarding or joyful for some people may be annoying or even painful for others.
Although it is true that most people like to earn money, some may refuse to receive
money for certain activities: They may feel greater reward without money. It seems
equally unrealistic to think of a universally acceptable type of happiness. The idea itself
of a uniform way of behaving, thinking, and feeling is repulsive to many people. Some
of us tend to be different and, in any case, would refuse to become "happy," "social," or
"good" according to externally fixed

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norms. Finally, one may attach the highest value to self-regulation and selfevaluation as
such. One may be convinced that humans gain something worthwhile by having to
evaluate for themselves the pros and cons of various alternatives presented to them by
making use of the personality processes described above. Even the personal decision to
give up one's possibility of undesirable deviations cannot contribute to the ultimate
selfdevelopment of the personality since, in that case, his development can no longer be
called "self-development." Therefore, one should not "facilitate" or "automatize" the
tasks involved with personal selfdevelopment by obliging everyone to function at the
"safe" level of semiautomatic reinforcement. That latter way is safe, indeed, since the
personalized way of behaving is not without its dangers and risks of deviation. But
excluding risks and dangers of undesirable deviations is excluding also the possibility of
positive differentation. After all, what one calls a human being in essence involves the
acceptance of risks. Groups of living beings that tend to be identical copies of a unique
model are well-known in the animal realm, but they do not belong to the human species.

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER V

A central theme of this chapter is the cognitive elaboration of needs into behavioral
forms. It has been demonstrated how, by activating the cognitive function, an individual
in a state of need seeks a behavioral outlet in personally constructed goals and plans.
These goals serve as "standards" or norms in a self-regulatory system that is aware of its
own activities (dynamic self-concept). In other words, needs become personal constructs
and the self-constructed goals become criteria by which actions are evaluated. Even
external factors -- for example, the result obtained in some form of contest -- act on an
individual's behavior insofar as they are positively or negatively evaluated in relation to
personal standards. Thus, the personalization of motives and behavioral self-regulation
are conceived as results of the individual's cognitive elaboration of his own behavior and
behavior dynamics.

An essential aspect of the model involves a demonstration that standards or goals are not
to be conceived as "givens" or informational inputs, but as cognitive-dynamic constructs
and concretizations of the individual's need. The special characteristics of cognitive
activity, together with the individual's tendency toward growth and self-development
(ascendant phase of motivation), are responsible for the constructive and creative nature
of human goal setting and planning. Discrepancy or incongruity between the self-
constructed standard and the actually perceived state of affairs is not a source of
dynamics in itself. The same dynamism that is responsible for the goal set continues to
activate behavior until goals are achieved (action).

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The dynamics of both cognitive and motor behavior participate in the unitary dynamism
underlying the various functional potentials of a living organism. Therefore, the problem
of the passage from cognitive to overt behavior has to be approached in the context of
this unitary functioning of the human individual.

The cognitive processing and personalization of needs co-exist with the processes of
conditioning and channeling which, at a more primitive level of functioning, also
concretize needs in behavioral forms. Both elaborative processes are interrelated in such
a way that, together, they regulate motivated behavior and motivational development.

Within a cognitive model of behavior, instrumental motivation plays an essential role.

Behavior normally operates within man through processes in which goals (desired
outcomes) and acts, perceived as means, constitute the essential components of behavior
(law of instrumentality). We have insisted on the dynamic source of instrumental
motivation and identified the channels through which instrumental acts participate in the
individual's motivation towards the final goal.

In a word, the relationship that unites men with the behavioral world is twofold: it is
dynamic in the sense that the individual, as one pole of the Person-World unit, has a
need to contact certain categories of objects; it is cognitive to the extent that, in addition
to physical manipulation, it involves operations that are infinitely more flexible and
apply to the symbolic representations of these objects. As a function of such cognitive
operations, the individual also cognizes himself, his behavioral activities, and dynamics.
This self-awareness results in a dynamic self-concept. On the other hand, the needs are
elaborated and concretized in terms of conceptualized objects that serve as goals and
standards in the self-regulation of behavior.

To the extent that he is able to process his needs into self-constructed goals and plans,
man is responsible for the standards that regulate his optimal functioning.

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